Career Women and the Durability of Marriage

Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Andrew F. Newman
Boston University and CEPR
Claudia Olivetti
Boston College and NBER
September 2015
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Motivation
Link between work, women and divorce rates is complex and
controversial.
Some believe that families with a working wife are more prone to
divorce than those without.
Indeed, as women entered the labor force in great numbers during the
1960s and 1970s, divorce rates increased, helping cement this notion.
However ...
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
7
LFP rates of married women and divorce rates by state - 2005-2009
6
Divorce Rate (per 1000 population)
NV
Correlation= -.524
AR
OK
5
WV
WY
ID
AL
NM
KY
FL
TN
MS
COAK
4
WA
AZ
OR
NC
VA
UT
TX
3
GA
MT
MI
OH
SC
NY
ME
HI
MO
DE
NH
VT
KS
CT
MD
NJ
NE
MN
RI
SD
ND
WI
PA
IA
IL
DC
2
MA
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
LFP Married Women
LFP is from the American Community Survey 5-year sample- 2005-2009.
Divorce rate is from the U.S. National Center for Health Statistics- National Vital Statistics Reports. We use the average over 2005-2009.
Missing observations on divorce rate for CA, IN and LA. For GA, HI and MN, divorce rate used is from 2000.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Divorce and labor force participation of married women
across U.S. states: 2005-2009
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Motivation
To summarize:
By early 2000s: negative correlation between divorce rate and the rate
of married female labor force participation.
Robust to various controls, including age at first marriage and
education both of which have been shown to be negatively correlated
with divorce (Lehrer and Chen, 2011; Rotz, 2011; Isen and Stevenson,
2010).
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Motivation
To summarize:
By early 2000s: negative correlation between divorce rate and the rate
of married female labor force participation.
Robust to various controls, including age at first marriage and
education both of which have been shown to be negatively correlated
with divorce (Lehrer and Chen, 2011; Rotz, 2011; Isen and Stevenson,
2010).
Could it be that “career” women are good for marriage?
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Main Idea
Higher marriage durability of “career” women can be explained at
least partly by increased bargaining flexibility in families in which the
wife has a higher labor force attachment.
A marriage with two earners (particularly when their incomes are
relatively equal) is more stable than a marriage with one earner,
simply because it is easier for the two earners to compensate each
other (with money) and reach a new agreement in response to
preference shocks or outside opportunities.
Money as the best instrument for utility transfer
Retrospective and longitudinal data broadly support our hypothesis
and help us rule out alternative explanations.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Literature
Women’s LFP and divorce could be positively correlated because:
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Literature
Women’s LFP and divorce could be positively correlated because:
MLFP ⇒ Divorce
Lower returns to/higher stress in marriage (Becker, Landes and
Michael, 1977; Mincer, 1985; Spitz and South, 1985)
Working women less tolerant of low quality marriages because there is
no ’leisure’ benefit
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Literature
Women’s LFP and divorce could be positively correlated because:
MLFP ⇒ Divorce
Lower returns to/higher stress in marriage (Becker, Landes and
Michael, 1977; Mincer, 1985; Spitz and South, 1985)
Working women less tolerant of low quality marriages because there is
no ’leisure’ benefit
Spurious correlation
MFLP and Divorce both driven by technology (Ogburn and Nimkoff,
1955; Greenwood and Guner, 2004; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007)
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Literature
Women’s LFP and divorce could be positively correlated because:
MLFP ⇒ Divorce
Lower returns to/higher stress in marriage (Becker, Landes and
Michael, 1977; Mincer, 1985; Spitz and South, 1985)
Working women less tolerant of low quality marriages because there is
no ’leisure’ benefit
Spurious correlation
MFLP and Divorce both driven by technology (Ogburn and Nimkoff,
1955; Greenwood and Guner, 2004; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007)
Divorce ⇒ MLFP
Lower incentives to invest in marriage capital (Stevenson, 2008).
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Literature
Women’s LFP and divorce could be positively correlated because:
MLFP ⇒ Divorce
Lower returns to/higher stress in marriage (Becker, Landes and
Michael, 1977; Mincer, 1985; Spitz and South, 1985)
Working women less tolerant of low quality marriages because there is
no ’leisure’ benefit
Spurious correlation
MFLP and Divorce both driven by technology (Ogburn and Nimkoff,
1955; Greenwood and Guner, 2004; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007)
Divorce ⇒ MLFP
Lower incentives to invest in marriage capital (Stevenson, 2008).
Self insurance motives (cf. Greene and Quester, 1982; Johnson and
Skinner, 1986, Johnson, 2004).
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Literature
Women’s LFP and divorce could be positively correlated because:
MLFP ⇒ Divorce
Lower returns to/higher stress in marriage (Becker, Landes and
Michael, 1977; Mincer, 1985; Spitz and South, 1985)
Working women less tolerant of low quality marriages because there is
no ’leisure’ benefit
Spurious correlation
MFLP and Divorce both driven by technology (Ogburn and Nimkoff,
1955; Greenwood and Guner, 2004; Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007)
Divorce ⇒ MLFP
Lower incentives to invest in marriage capital (Stevenson, 2008).
Self insurance motives (cf. Greene and Quester, 1982; Johnson and
Skinner, 1986, Johnson, 2004).
More recent empirical literature has found mixed results linking
divorce and labor supply of married women (see Stevenson and
Wolfers, 2007)
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conceptual Framework
Standard set-up: marriage produces “local public good” enjoyed by
each adult; in addition each enjoys private consumption
Outside income or household produced goods can be used for
transfers within household.
Intra-household allocations subject to renegotiation (bargaining).
Monetary income from working facilitates transfers
Allows purchase of all goods, not just household produced ones (solves
“double-coincidence of wants” problem)
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conceptual Framework
Standard set-up: marriage produces “local public good” enjoyed by
each adult; in addition each enjoys private consumption
Outside income or household produced goods can be used for
transfers within household.
Intra-household allocations subject to renegotiation (bargaining).
Monetary income from working facilitates transfers
Allows purchase of all goods, not just household produced ones (solves
“double-coincidence of wants” problem)
Money allows immediate settlement, less risky and subject to moral
hazard than future goods transfers
Direct purchase of goods may avoid bargaining inefficiencies
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conceptual Framework, cont.
Two household members, each with utility u(c) + φ, where
c = private goods that can be purchased on the market
φ is marriage quality
Household monetary income is I , typically earned by producing a
good that is not consumed by the household
One member is endowed (or generates at zero marginal cost up to a
ceiling) monetary income v , 0 ≤ v ≤ I
The other generates I − v
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conceptual Framework, cont.
Two household members, each with utility u(c) + φ, where
c = private goods that can be purchased on the market
φ is marriage quality
Household monetary income is I , typically earned by producing a
good that is not consumed by the household
One member is endowed (or generates at zero marginal cost up to a
ceiling) monetary income v , 0 ≤ v ≤ I
The other generates I − v
Money can be used for private consumption or transfer to the other
partner; once it’s exhausted additional transfers are generated through
more costly means
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conceptual Framework, cont.
Generates a symmetric (about 45◦ line) utility possibility frontier
W (x) for the household, where x is the first member’s utility
(pictures coming soon)
Autarky payoff is (v , I − v )
W (x) is transferable (W 0 (x) = −1) when x ∈ [φ, I + φ].
Elsewhere, W (x) is non-transferable:
x < φ ⇒ 0 ≥ W 0 (x) > −1
x > I + φ ⇒ W 0 (x) < −1
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Bargaining
When marriage begins, a bargain regarding private consumption is
struck
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Bargaining
When marriage begins, a bargain regarding private consumption is
struck
Subsequently there are shocks (, η) to the value of the local public
good, which is then worth φ − to one, φ − η to the other
, η ∼ F (·) with log-concave density f (·)
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Bargaining
When marriage begins, a bargain regarding private consumption is
struck
Subsequently there are shocks (, η) to the value of the local public
good, which is then worth φ − to one, φ − η to the other
, η ∼ F (·) with log-concave density f (·)
This generates a new frontier for bargaining
If autarky point lies inside new bargaining set, marriage continues; if
not there is divorce
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Bargaining
When marriage begins, a bargain regarding private consumption is
struck
Subsequently there are shocks (, η) to the value of the local public
good, which is then worth φ − to one, φ − η to the other
, η ∼ F (·) with log-concave density f (·)
This generates a new frontier for bargaining
If autarky point lies inside new bargaining set, marriage continues; if
not there is divorce
Main theoretical result: Marriage durability (i.e. the probability
that it stays together) is maximized at v = I /2.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Utility possibilities and response to shock
I
I
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Utility possibilities and response to shock
Φ Φ Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Utility possibilities and response to shock
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Utility possibilities and response to shock
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Utility possibilities and response to shock
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Utility possibilities and response to shock
-­‐ε -­‐η η ε Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Utility possibilities and response to shock
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Utility possibilities and response to shock
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Utility possibilities and response to shock
........
I/2 ........
I/2
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Utility possibilities and response to shock
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Utility possibilities and response to shock
Δ Φ+I/2-Δ Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Utility possibilities and response to shock
Δ Φ+I/2-Δ Δ Φ+I/2 Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Main theoretical result
Given , the probability that η is small enough to preserve the
marriage is
Pr {I − v + η < W (v + )} = F (W (v + ) − (I − v ))
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Main theoretical result
Given , the probability that η is small enough to preserve the
marriage is
Pr {I − v + η < W (v + )} = F (W (v + ) − (I − v ))
Integrating over gives durability, the probability the marriage
survives:
Z ∞
D(v ) ≡
F (W ( + v ) − I + v )f ()d
−∞
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Main theoretical result
Given , the probability that η is small enough to preserve the
marriage is
Pr {I − v + η < W (v + )} = F (W (v + ) − (I − v ))
Integrating over gives durability, the probability the marriage
survives:
Z ∞
D(v ) ≡
F (W ( + v ) − I + v )f ()d
−∞
Proposition Let W (·) be any symmetric frontier transferable on
[φ, I + φ] and non-transferable elsewhere, and assume the shock
density is log-concave. Then D(v ) is maximized at v = I /2.
Proof
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Remarks
Asymmetry: if one partner values the marriage more, durability
maximization may require that partner to have higher monetary
earnings.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Remarks
Asymmetry: if one partner values the marriage more, durability
maximization may require that partner to have higher monetary
earnings.
Log concavity is not indispensable; if W is concave, it’s enough that
f is non-increasing on [φ, ∞)
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Remarks
Asymmetry: if one partner values the marriage more, durability
maximization may require that partner to have higher monetary
earnings.
Log concavity is not indispensable; if W is concave, it’s enough that
f is non-increasing on [φ, ∞)
It’s not just about inequality; transferability is essential:
Newman & Olivetti
Example
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Remarks
Asymmetry: if one partner values the marriage more, durability
maximization may require that partner to have higher monetary
earnings.
Log concavity is not indispensable; if W is concave, it’s enough that
f is non-increasing on [φ, ∞)
It’s not just about inequality; transferability is essential: Example
earnings equality is good for marriage not because equality per se is
durability maximizing, but because equality maximizes transferability
within the household.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Remarks
Asymmetry: if one partner values the marriage more, durability
maximization may require that partner to have higher monetary
earnings.
Log concavity is not indispensable; if W is concave, it’s enough that
f is non-increasing on [φ, ∞)
It’s not just about inequality; transferability is essential: Example
earnings equality is good for marriage not because equality per se is
durability maximizing, but because equality maximizes transferability
within the household.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Challenges
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Challenges
Causality may be running from the state of the marriage to the labor
supply decision (i.e., some high share wives may be “remedial
earners”).
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Challenges
Causality may be running from the state of the marriage to the labor
supply decision (i.e., some high share wives may be “remedial
earners”).
Focus on “career women” defined as those who are in the labor force a
substantial fraction of the time during marriage.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Challenges
Causality may be running from the state of the marriage to the labor
supply decision (i.e., some high share wives may be “remedial
earners”).
Focus on “career women” defined as those who are in the labor force a
substantial fraction of the time during marriage.
Lower cost of working
Lower uncertainty of monetary income
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Challenges
Causality may be running from the state of the marriage to the labor
supply decision (i.e., some high share wives may be “remedial
earners”).
Focus on “career women” defined as those who are in the labor force a
substantial fraction of the time during marriage.
Lower cost of working
Lower uncertainty of monetary income
Use panel data which allows us to follow couples over time and
separate career from remedial earners.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Challenges
Causality may be running from the state of the marriage to the labor
supply decision (i.e., some high share wives may be “remedial
earners”).
Focus on “career women” defined as those who are in the labor force a
substantial fraction of the time during marriage.
Lower cost of working
Lower uncertainty of monetary income
Use panel data which allows us to follow couples over time and
separate career from remedial earners.
Selection effects: career women may have attributes that lead them
to have higher quality marriages.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Challenges
Causality may be running from the state of the marriage to the labor
supply decision (i.e., some high share wives may be “remedial
earners”).
Focus on “career women” defined as those who are in the labor force a
substantial fraction of the time during marriage.
Lower cost of working
Lower uncertainty of monetary income
Use panel data which allows us to follow couples over time and
separate career from remedial earners.
Selection effects: career women may have attributes that lead them
to have higher quality marriages.
Exploit battery of quality-of-marriage questions.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical analysis
Key labor concept: Labor force attachment during marriage.
Two data sets:
Survey of Income and Program Participants (SIPP)
Retrospective information on marriage and work histories.
But, information about husband and marriage characteristics
completely lost for women who divorced before the survey year.
Marital Instability over the Life Course (MILC)
Relatively long panel of marriages with information on marriage and
husband characteristics (for example, fraction of household income
earned by wife).
It also contains a rich battery of qualitative questions on marital
happiness or marital problems that can be used to rule out alternative
explanations.
SkipSIPP
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Analysis: SIPP
Use retrospective questions about marriage and work to obtain a
measure of labor force attachment.
Main measure:
“Worked during marriage” = 1 if worked for at least some time of 1st
marriage, 0 otherwise.
Calculated using both work and marriage start/end dates.
80% of women in our sample.
Women who “Worked during marriage” are more likely to:
Have a college or post-graduate degree
Marry and have children later
Work full-time
Earn more
Experiment with alternative (more refined) definitions but noisier.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Analysis: SIPP
Sample:
All women age 25-54
Married once or twice
1st Marriage 1990 or later
Both work and marriage information available
Divorce statistics:
Fraction of marriages ending in divorce by year 5 = 0.18
Average duration of 1st marriage ending in divorce = 5 years
Probability 1st marriage ever ended in divorce = 0.29
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Wife’s work during marriage and divorce: SIPP
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Wife’s work during marriage and divorce: SIPP
Summarizing
Wife worked during marriage associated with 5-6 percentage points
lower probability of marriage ending by year 5
Similar results hold if year = 7, 10 or hazard model.
Strongest effect for women with relatively high educational
attainment (>High School degree).
Other mechanisms such as age at first marriage, education, children
and divorce laws (unilateral, community property) do not seem to
drive the results.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Analysis: MILC
MILC follows married couples over 20-year span.
National probability sample:
2,034 married men and women under 55 years old.
Interviewed by telephone for first time in fall 1980.
Re-interviewed five times: 1983, 1988, 1992-1994, 1997 and 2000.
1980 sample nationally representative relative to: age, race, household
size, presence of children, region, and female participation to the labor
market.
Designed to examine causes of marital instability throughout life course
of a group of married individuals.
Indicators of marital trouble or happiness.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Analysis: MILC
Our Sample:
Couples in 1st marriages as of 1980
Excludes marriages ending in widowhood.
Age of both spouses >18.
827 marriages: 24% of couples divorced by 2000.
High Labor Force Attachment:
High Attachment = 1 if wife worked >75% of the time during
marriage.
Based on work after marriage and between/during surveys.
68% of wives in our sample
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Analysis: MILC
“High Attachment” women more likely to:
Have a college degree
Earn more
Have less variability in their share of household earnings
Graph
However, their husbands are not statistically different, except for being
slightly more likely to have had a working mother while growing up.
Some additional stats:
Average age at (first) marriage: 20 (women), 22 (men)
89% white
Education: 46% (women) and 55% (men) have > high school diploma.
10% women and 8% men change education status post 1980.
Wife respondent: 51%
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Wife’s Labor Attachment and Divorce
Inequality
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Empirical Analysis: MILC
Alternative definitions based on worked before/during marriage.
Alternative Definition: Career Woman (Career)
“Career” = 1 if respondent said that pretty important or very
important reasons for wife working were:
Having a career
For a sense of accomplishment
For contact with other people
For financial independence
64% of wives in our sample are “Career”
Correlation (High Attachment, Career) = 0.6***
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Wife’s Work and Divorce: Alternative Definitions
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Wife’s work, household inequality and divorce
Dependent variable is Divorce by End of Survey
High Attachment
(1)
(2)
-0.0867***
[0.0287]
-0.0683**
[0.0302]
0.224*
[0.119]
-0.242**
[0.123]
742
0.238
732
0.246
I(40): Wife Contribution >=40%
(High Attachment) * I(40)
Observations
R-squared
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in brackets. Weighted with weights
provided by MILC. Omitted categories: Low Attachment; White; <HS; Protestant.
Includes controls for: Years married, husband's and wife's race, husband's and wife's age at
marriage, whether wife worked before marriages, average household income during marriage,
children, %time husband worked full time.
Divorce probability:
High Attachment, Low Share = -7%
High Attachment, High Share = -9%
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Alternative mechanisms
To summarize, high female labor force attachment reduces the
probability of divorce by about half, particularly when she earns close
to 50% of the family income.
Could some form of selection be driving the results?
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Alternative mechanisms
To summarize, high female labor force attachment reduces the
probability of divorce by about half, particularly when she earns close
to 50% of the family income.
Could some form of selection be driving the results?
Search: “High Attachment” women choosier, marry later and have
higher quality matches.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Alternative mechanisms
To summarize, high female labor force attachment reduces the
probability of divorce by about half, particularly when she earns close
to 50% of the family income.
Could some form of selection be driving the results?
Search: “High Attachment” women choosier, marry later and have
higher quality matches.
Selection: “High Attachment” women are more ‘stable’ (better at
compromising, care more about kids etc.) both in their jobs and in
their marriages.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Alternative mechanisms
To summarize, high female labor force attachment reduces the
probability of divorce by about half, particularly when she earns close
to 50% of the family income.
Could some form of selection be driving the results?
Search: “High Attachment” women choosier, marry later and have
higher quality matches.
Selection: “High Attachment” women are more ‘stable’ (better at
compromising, care more about kids etc.) both in their jobs and in
their marriages.
Sorting: Egalitarian households might somehow reflect better matching
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Alternative mechanisms
To summarize, high female labor force attachment reduces the
probability of divorce by about half, particularly when she earns close
to 50% of the family income.
Could some form of selection be driving the results?
Search: “High Attachment” women choosier, marry later and have
higher quality matches.
Selection: “High Attachment” women are more ‘stable’ (better at
compromising, care more about kids etc.) both in their jobs and in
their marriages.
Sorting: Egalitarian households might somehow reflect better matching
All these stories imply that we should observe higher marriage quality
in households with high attachment wife.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Alternative mechanisms
To summarize, high female labor force attachment reduces the
probability of divorce by about half, particularly when she earns close
to 50% of the family income.
Could some form of selection be driving the results?
Search: “High Attachment” women choosier, marry later and have
higher quality matches.
Selection: “High Attachment” women are more ‘stable’ (better at
compromising, care more about kids etc.) both in their jobs and in
their marriages.
Sorting: Egalitarian households might somehow reflect better matching
All these stories imply that we should observe higher marriage quality
in households with high attachment wife.
Use MILC’s subjective indicators of marital happiness/stability to
assess these hypotheses.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
High Attachment and Match Quality
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
High Attachment and Match Quality
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
High Attachment and Match Quality
Dependent variable is:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Index of Marital
Instability
Index of Marital
Happiness
Either Spouse
ever suggested
divorce
Either spouse ever
talked counselor,
clergy etc.
0.0405*
-0.135
0.0468
0.0694
[0.0244]
[0.323]
[0.0359]
[0.0466]
0.0656
-1.768*
I(40): Wife Contribution >=40%
0.172
0.248*
[0.0643]
[1.032]
[0.127]
[0.144]
-0.0518
1.609
(High Attachment) * I(40)
-0.140
-0.224
[0.0716]
[1.125]
[0.135]
[0.151]
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust standard errors in brackets. Weighted with weights provided by MILC.
All regressions control for years married, husband and wife age at marriage, whether wife worked before marriage,
percent of time during marriage that husband worked fulltime, number of children under 18 in the household,log
average family income during the marriage, and husband and wife's race.
High Attachment
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
High Attachment, Match Quality, Divorce
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
High Attachment, Match Quality, Divorce
Summarizing: High attachment women do not seem to have better
marriages!
Putting it all together:
Marriages that run into trouble are more likely to end in divorce but:
Controlling for marital trouble, high attachment still negatively
correlated with divorce.
Interaction term between marital trouble and high attachment tends to
be negative
Interpretation: attached women do not have better marriages, but are
better able, via transferability, to keep them together.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion
Theory suggests, and the evidence shows, that career women differ
from non-career women in ways that are good for their marriages.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion
Theory suggests, and the evidence shows, that career women differ
from non-career women in ways that are good for their marriages.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion
Theory suggests, and the evidence shows, that career women differ
from non-career women in ways that are good for their marriages.
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Summary
Monetary earnings, particularly permanent ones, facilitate bargaining:
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Summary
Monetary earnings, particularly permanent ones, facilitate bargaining:
transferability effect
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Summary
Monetary earnings, particularly permanent ones, facilitate bargaining:
transferability effect
We use panel data to discern this effect by distinguishing between
career and remedial earners:
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Summary
Monetary earnings, particularly permanent ones, facilitate bargaining:
transferability effect
We use panel data to discern this effect by distinguishing between
career and remedial earners:
Greatest durability in egalitarian two-career households
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Summary
Monetary earnings, particularly permanent ones, facilitate bargaining:
transferability effect
We use panel data to discern this effect by distinguishing between
career and remedial earners:
Greatest durability in egalitarian two-career households
Quality of marriage questions suggest this result is not due to selection
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Further Implications
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Further Implications
Decline in US divorce rate since the mid-1980’s, despite continuing
increase in MFLP is easily understood as a consequence of the
transferability effect, particularly in the face of
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Further Implications
Decline in US divorce rate since the mid-1980’s, despite continuing
increase in MFLP is easily understood as a consequence of the
transferability effect, particularly in the face of
narrowing gender wage gap
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Further Implications
Decline in US divorce rate since the mid-1980’s, despite continuing
increase in MFLP is easily understood as a consequence of the
transferability effect, particularly in the face of
narrowing gender wage gap
increased “marketization” of many formerly household-produced goods
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Further Implications
Decline in US divorce rate since the mid-1980’s, despite continuing
increase in MFLP is easily understood as a consequence of the
transferability effect, particularly in the face of
narrowing gender wage gap
increased “marketization” of many formerly household-produced goods
Policy implication: a woman’s decision to work has very different
ramifications depending on whether she is a career woman or a
remedial worker
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Further Implications
Decline in US divorce rate since the mid-1980’s, despite continuing
increase in MFLP is easily understood as a consequence of the
transferability effect, particularly in the face of
narrowing gender wage gap
increased “marketization” of many formerly household-produced goods
Policy implication: a woman’s decision to work has very different
ramifications depending on whether she is a career woman or a
remedial worker
If a married non-career woman asks whether working will threaten her
marriage –
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Further Implications
Decline in US divorce rate since the mid-1980’s, despite continuing
increase in MFLP is easily understood as a consequence of the
transferability effect, particularly in the face of
narrowing gender wage gap
increased “marketization” of many formerly household-produced goods
Policy implication: a woman’s decision to work has very different
ramifications depending on whether she is a career woman or a
remedial worker
If a married non-career woman asks whether working will threaten her
marriage –
It’s likely too late...
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Further Implications
Decline in US divorce rate since the mid-1980’s, despite continuing
increase in MFLP is easily understood as a consequence of the
transferability effect, particularly in the face of
narrowing gender wage gap
increased “marketization” of many formerly household-produced goods
Policy implication: a woman’s decision to work has very different
ramifications depending on whether she is a career woman or a
remedial worker
If a married non-career woman asks whether working will threaten her
marriage –
It’s likely too late...
But if a young woman asks whether investing in a career could later
threaten her marriage –
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Conclusion - Further Implications
Decline in US divorce rate since the mid-1980’s, despite continuing
increase in MFLP is easily understood as a consequence of the
transferability effect, particularly in the face of
narrowing gender wage gap
increased “marketization” of many formerly household-produced goods
Policy implication: a woman’s decision to work has very different
ramifications depending on whether she is a career woman or a
remedial worker
If a married non-career woman asks whether working will threaten her
marriage –
It’s likely too late...
But if a young woman asks whether investing in a career could later
threaten her marriage –
If the alternative is to look for a rich husband, then by all means,
go for the career!
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
THE END
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
0
Z
∞
D (v ) =
f ()f (W ( + v ) − u)(W 0 ( + v ) + 1)d,
−∞
where u=I-v. Use W 0 (x) + 1 = 0 for x ∈ (φ, φ + I ), make a change of
variable and exploit symmetry of W (·) to rewrite this as
0
Z
φ
D (v ) =
[f (x − v )f (W (x) − u) − f (x − u)f (W (x) − v )][W 0 (x) + 1]dx.
−∞
Over the domain of integration, W 0 (x) + 1 > 0 a.e., while log-concavity of
f ensures that f (x − v )f (W (x) − u) − f (x − u)f (W (x) − v ) ≥ 0 iff v < u
(with strict inequality on a non-null set).
Thus, D 0 > 0 when v < u and D 0 < 0 when v > u, implying that D is
decreasing in inequality of earnings. Back
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
It’s not just equality...
Φ Φ Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
It’s not just equality...
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
It’s not just equality...
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
It’s not just equality...
Back
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
Distrib of Coef of Variation of Wife Contrib to HH Inc During Marriage as of 2000
0
kdensity coefvar_w_incp
.5
1
1.5
Regression Sample as of 2000
0
1
2
3
x
Low Attachment
High Attachment
High Attachment = worked 75% of marriage or more
®
Back
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
From: [Name withheld] @brown.edu Subject: Career
women and the durability of marriage
Date: February 16, 2015 at 6:56 PM
To: afnewman@bu.edu
Dear Professor Newman,
My name is [Name] and I am a senior at Brown University studying Economics and Development Studies. I've just received note from a
friend studying economics in Paris that you are leading a seminar on "Career women and the durability of marriage."
Although I cannot attend this seminar I would love to hear - as a young woman with career ambitions and Indian grandparents - what you
would have to say on the subject. Is there a paper or book of yours that I could read?
I hope you enjoy Paris.
Best regards,
-[Name withheld]
Brown University '15
B.A. Development Studies and Economics
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage
From: [Name withheld] @brown.edu Subject: Career
women and the durability of marriage
Date: February 16, 2015 at 6:56 PM
To: afnewman@bu.edu
Dear Professor Newman,
My name is [Name] and I am a senior at Brown University studying Economics and Development Studies. I've just received note from a
friend studying economics in Paris that you are leading a seminar on "Career women and the durability of marriage."
Although I cannot attend this seminar I would love to hear - as a young woman with career ambitions and Indian grandparents - what you
would have to say on the subject. Is there a paper or book of yours that I could read?
I hope you enjoy Paris.
Best regards,
-[Name withheld]
Brown University '15
B.A. Development Studies and Economics
Back
Newman & Olivetti
Career Women and the Durability of Marriage