International Community Peace Plans in Croatia and Bosnia

Transcription

International Community Peace Plans in Croatia and BosniaHerzegovina 1991-1995
By
Igor Vranic
Submitted to
Central European University
History Department
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
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Master of Arts
Supervisor: Professor Florian Bieber
Second Reader: Professor Roumen Daskalov
Budapest, Hungary
2014
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Copyright in the text of this thesis rests with the Author. Copies by any
process, either in full or part, may be made only in accordance with the
instructions given by the Author and lodged in the Central European Library.
Details may be obtained from the librarian. This page must form a part of
any such copies made. Further copies made in accordance with such
instructions may not be made without the written permission of the Author.
2
Abstract
The thesis offers a review of the Yugoslav war of
dissolution with special reference to the international
community’s peace plans. The thesis’ main aim is to
examine the purpose and efficiency of international
diplomacy and the role of the Republics of Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina in new geopolitical relations
caused by the fall of Communism. Answers are
provided as to what caused the war, what the war aims
of the belligerent sides were and problems of
international mediation. Moreover, special emphasis is
put on the declassified intelligence records of the
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Clinton administration.
3
Abbreviations used in the text
ABiH
Armija Bosne i Hercegovine (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
BiH
Bosna i Hercegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
HDZ
Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union)
HVO
Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (Croatian Defence Council)
HR BH
Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna (Croatian Community of
Herceg-Bosnia, 1993-1996)
HZ HB
Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna (Croatian Community of
Herceg-Bosnia, 1991-1993)
JNA
Jugoslavenska narodna armija (Yugoslav peopleʼs army)
RS
Republika Srpska (The Serb Republic in BiH, 1992- )
RSK
Republika Srpska Krajina (Republic of Serbian Krajina, 1990-
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1995)
SDA
Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action)
SDS
Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serbian Democratic Party in BiH)
SR BiH
Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina (Socialist
Republic of BiH, 1943-1992)
UNPA
United Nations Protected Areas
4
Contents
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 7
1. THE VANCE PLAN AND THE INTERNATIONAL
RECOGNITION OF CROATIA ....................................................................13
1.1
Role of Yugoslavia in global context ................................................................. 13
1.2 An overhead of the nature of the war ...................................................................... 15
1.3 From armed conflict to international recognition ................................................... 17
1.4 From declaring independence to the acceptance of the Vance Plan as a precondition
for international acknowledgement ............................................................................... 21
1. 5 Split-ups in Serbian authorities over the acceptance of the Vance Plan ................ 32
1.6 The matter of „pink zones“ ...................................................................................... 33
2. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
AND CUTILLERO'S MISSION .....................................................................35
2.1 The main political parties and their goals ............................................................... 35
2.2 The referendum on independence and international recognition of BosniaHerzegovina ................................................................................................................... 37
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3. THE VANCE-OWEN PLAN.......................................................................43
3.1 Progressive implementation and the Joint action plan............................................ 48
4. THE OWEN-STOLTENBERG PLAN .....................................................52
4.1 The Action Plan of the European Union .................................................................. 58
5. THE WASHINGTON AGREEMENT ......................................................61
6. PLANS OF THE CONTACT GROUP .....................................................64
5
6.1 Z-4 Plan .................................................................................................................... 64
6.2 The Plan of the Contact Group for BIH .................................................................. 67
7. THE DAYTON AGREEMENT ..................................................................70
7.1 A security guarantee or a cause of instability? ........................................................ 77
8. THE ERDUT AGREEMENT .....................................................................80
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CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................83
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Introduction
The last war in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina produced a
multitude of scientific, semi-scientific, memoir and publicist work. The
1990's topics are a common subject of daily-political discussions and form a
part of the national master-narratives of former Yugoslav nations.1 Only a
small number of related scientific contributions suit the requirements of
modern historical science, being drastically outnumbered by personal and
political interest-based attempts created under false scientific pretense.
Furthermore, relevant participants are attempting to present themselves in a
better way through their own literary actions. The authors of these works
usually accuse others of not accepting their propositions. Consequently,
current problems are results of wrong paths taken by others because of their
conscious refusal of the authors’ help.
A separate group of scholars consists of non-Yugoslav authors,
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usually poorly familiar with the topics as well as with the languages of the
studied area. They usually produce some kind of colonial discourse
regarding peoples of former Yugoslavia, i.e. how they have ancient hatreds
or of their prewar unity, how they were not wise enough to choose the right
choice in first democratic elections etc. These are mostly people who have
1
I use term master-narrative as defined by James Wertsch as a socially usable knowledge of
the past which describes whole national history in continuity in a shortened diachronic
sequence and is precondition of the integration of the modern nation. James V. Wertsch,
Voices of Collective Remembering (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 67.
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spent some time in the former republic capitals of Yugoslavia where they
gained acquaintances. In this way, they unintentionally portrayed a distorted
picture in their scholarly works by neglecting the Yugoslav periphery.
Another problem regarding Western scholars, but also a part of
scholars from former Yugoslavia, is the wrong use of terms such as
Bosnia/Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnian Croats or Serbs/Croats or Serbs from
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnian/Bosniak, multiethnic/multinational. Firstly,
Bosnia means part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, although authors usually use it
when referring to the whole territory of the state. In my thesis, when I refer
to Bosnia/Bosnian it is only in geographical terms, mostly Central Bosnia
region (Središnja Bosna). Secondly, the authors refer to Bosnian Croats or
Serbs, although they are considering the whole Croatian/Serbian population
of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Consequently, the appropriate term should be Croats
or Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina or Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats or
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Serbs (or BiH Croats/Serbs in shortened version which I will use further on).
Moreover, Bosnians are all people from Bosnia region and Bosniaks are
Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina who identify themselves as such
in a national sense. Although Bosniak became the official name of the people
only in 1993, I should use it from the beginning in order to avoid confusion.
Finally, another blunder is in the use of the term multiethnic. The three
constituent people of BiH are not multiethnic but multinational because in
8
BiH (and elsewhere in the Balkans) nationhood, not citizenship, provides
membership in the nation.2 Also, when I am using terms such as Serbian
side/Croatian side/Bosniak side, I am reffering to the elites in power and do
not consider that their actions were supported and justified by the
populations.
The biggest problem regarding the historiography of the former
Yugoslavia is an absence of scholars who are familiar with most of the
Western and domestic scholarly works. To be more precise, Western works
are usually based on Western literature with some works from domestic
literature that support their claims. The same goes for domestic literature
from the states of former Yugoslavia. Therefore, all historiographical
communities are separated by an unbridgeable gap and should get more
familiar with each other.
In this contribution I will attempt to present the key events of the war
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that was led on Croatian and Bosnian-Herzegovian territory, with special
attention to the peace plans under the aegis of the international community.
More precisely, it is a comparative approach to American and European
diplomacy during the above mentioned war. Considering these plans, I
present the changes they brought to the outfields, the offers they made to all
sides, but also the reasons for their general failure. However, it is important
2
Victor Roudometof, Collective Memory, National Identity and Ethnic Conflict – Greece,
Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question, (Westport, CT:Praeger, 2002.)
9
to bear in mind that the given image is primarily made by the current level of
knowledge, which could experience a drastic change in the future when
official archives of all the involved sides open. In my thesis, I am going to
examine recently published intelligence documents by Bill Clinton’s former
administration and try to place them in the broader picture of the existing
literature. My main attention will be on the quality of the intelligence reports
which were later used by higher officials, their main concerns, predicaments,
solutions and perceptions of the war.
In the first chapter, I will briefly situate Yugoslavia in the context of
global politics and changes caused by the collapse of communism.
Furthermore, I will deal with the outbreak of the war in Croatia giving
special emphasis to the general characteristics such as the armament of the
local Serbian population by the Yugoslav People’s Army, warfare tactics and
the key domestic events, the debates on sovereignty, international relations
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with a special emphasis on the German-French debate and the acceptance of
the Vance plan as a condition of the international recognition of Croatia. In
addition, the question whether republics or peoples have the right to succeed
will be discussed. Furthermore, it will be argued why both sides decided to
accept plans only after a few months of mediation and what their particular
reasons were. Finally, in the end it will be pointed out the disagreements
regarding the acceptance of the Vance plan by the Serbian leadership and the
10
problem of “pink zones”- territories under Serbian rule that needed to be
given to Republic of Croatia by the Vance plan.
The second chapter will discuss the referendum on independence and
international recognition of BiH. Special emphasis will be put on the
disagreement of the three national parties regarding the future organization
of the state. In addition, Cutillero’s plan will be discussed and the reason for
the Bosniak signature withdrawal from the plan.
In the third chapter, the Vance-Owen plan will be discussed with a special
emphasis on the outbreak of the Croatian-Bosniak war and the reasons for
the failure of this plan. Moreover, progressive implementation of the VanceOwen plan and Joint action plan will be discussed.
The fourth chapter will deal with the Owen-Stoltenberg plan and the
reasons for the establishment of the Croatian Community Herceg-Bosnia. It
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will also discuss the short lived Action plan of the European Union.
In the fifth chapter, discussion will be put on the Washington agreement
and the new approach of the American policy towards the end of the war by
forcing Croatian and Bosniak sides to form a military alliance in order to
force Serbs towards peace settlement.
11
In the sixth chapter, the plans of the Contact group for BiH and Croatia
will be discussed. Special emphasis will be on the proposal of the territorial
autonomy to Serbian population in Croatia and the reasons for its refusal.
In the seventh chapter, Dayton agreement will be discussed with the
special emphasis on its functioning and how it marked state-building in BiH.
Also, it would be debated whether it resolved the pre-war problems or it even
deepened national divisions.
In the last chapter, it would be discussed what lead to the Erdut agreement
or more precisely what the causes were for the peaceful reintegration of the
territories under Serbian rule into Republic of Croatia.
In conclusion, it would be argued what the main problems of the war were
and international mediation, how the war created the newly formed states
and was the war solution to the previous problems or it just deepened the old
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ones.
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1. The Vance Plan and the international recognition of
Croatia
1.1 Role of Yugoslavia in global context
The late 1980s of the twentieth century brought about notable global
changes and subsequently the collapse of Communist systems in Europe.
Significant changes also affected the European Community, today’s
European Union. Leading countries started establishing tighter co-operation,
and the possibility of expanding the Union was growing stronger as an idea.
Although it was the main potential entrant, Yugoslavia did not join the EC,
having, as it did, preconditions to complete such reforms as political and
cultural democratization and introducing the market economy system. 3
Besides, democratic elections were also a precondition for receiving the
loans Yugoslavia had been given since the start of the 1980s.4
The first democratic elections held in Yugoslavia in 1990 resulted in
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winning campaigns by democratic national parties, except in Serbia where
the Communists led by Slobodan Milošević maintained their lead. This
period was significantly affected by the turnaround in American politics,
since the USA wanted to reduce its military obligations in Europe after the
3
Ivica Miškulin, “Sladoled i sunce“ – Promatračka misija Europske Zajednice i Hrvatska,
1991.-1995.,“ .,“ [“Ice cream and the Sun“ – Observing mission of European Community
and Croatia, 1991.-1995.] Časopis za suvremenu povijest 2 (2010): 299-301.
4
Andrea Bekić, “London i Bonn – dva pola politike Europske Zajednice prema priznanju
Republike Hrvatske 1991. godine,“ [London and Bonn – two poles of European Community
towards the recognition of Croatia 1991.] Časopis za suvremenu povijest 2 (2010): 340.
13
Cold War, but also retain its influence. This meant that the USA would not
interfere in European security issues unless it was part of some direct
interest, which was visible later during the obstruction of the Vance-Owen
peace plan. By the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia had lost its significant
strategic position of a ‘buffer-zone’ between the East and the West, and was
transformed into a guinea-pig, in other words, a training ground for
American diplomatic experiments.5
Since the 1960’s, Serbs have experienced a demographic drop, primarily
in Kosovo which became a precondition for conflict. The economic crisis in
the 1980’s led to a hard struggle for already insufficient resources. The
control of these resources was possible only under the condition of federal
control, which led to control of the republics and that of local government.
Federal control enabled arbitrary redistributions and the installation of
politically suitable people in important positions. Due to insufficient
resources, at least one group was expected to face losses. This is why
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Serbian elites were against decentralization which was favored by Slovenes
and Croats. Nationalist parties won the elections in these republics because
they asserted that the ‘national wealth’ belonged to the people, in other
words, the redistribution which they advocated was more important than
political power. An ideal denouement for Serbs was a strong centralized
5
James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War
(London: Hurst company, 1997): 29-30.
14
federation, which they would control and also redistribute all of its
resources. A back-up plan was the creation of a Greater Serbia, with a loyal
leadership in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 6 US intelligence
estimate from the October of 1990 was that Yugoslav federation was kept
only because of institutional inertia and with a help from the Communist
party and military. Also, the estimate did not give much chance for success
to Prime Minister Ante Marković and his anti-nationalist allies in
comparison with national parties. Another predicament made, was that
Serbia will refuse most of Croatian and Slovene claims for a reforms.7
1.2 An overhead of the nature of the war
The start of the war in Croatia and BIH had similar features. Firstly,
local Serbian population would put an area under their control, which would
lead to JNA (Jugoslavenska narodna armija - Yugoslav peoples army)
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separating the conflicted sides, which in praxis meant a confirmation of
Serbian conquering, creating the so-called „tampon zones“. When local
Serbian population would fail in seizing a territory, generally larger cities,
the JNA would surround the cities and strike them with the cause of
6
Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy; Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 363-67.
7
“Yugoslavia tranfsormed, 18 October 1990,“ 1-3
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1817859/1990-10-01.pdf
(accessed on May 23, 2014)
15
intimidating and banishing the population. This demonstrative type of
violence was meant to force the population to leave without a struggle, due
to the fact that the JNA did not have enough men for street combat, a vital
factor for seizing cities, but merely artillery. Another advantage of
population banishing was the inability of a potential guerilla war from
within.8 The JNA's dread of guerrilla warfare was visible at the end of 1991
when they stopped strides and engaged forces forward cleaning the rest of
spaces under control in Croatia. Cities under siege were easier to defend if
they were demolished, and capturing these cities came at a price of a large
number of dead and wounded, therefore these street combats were left for the
Serbian voluntary militia.9
Public displaying of executions, rapes, demolitions of cultural
institutions such as churches, served as a meaning of intimidation of peoples
in other cities which were under siege or were awaiting it. The purpose of
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leading such a limited war was forcing the other side to retreat, not to expand
the conflict.10 The unreadiness of the conflicted sides for an affair of great
mortality lead to the creation of coercing strategies. This meant avoiding
direct combat whenever possible. The cause of coercion was to influence the
8
Gow, Triumph, 41.
James Gow, The Serbian Project and it's Adversaries – A Strategy of War Crimes
(London: Hurst company, 2003), 161.
10
Ibid., 300.; Davor Marijan, “Sudionici i osnovne značajke rata u Hrvatskoj 1990.-1991.,“
[Participants and key features of the war in Croatia 1990.-1991.] Časopis za suvremenu
povijest 1 (2008)
9
16
other sides' conduct expressing threats to change the previous conduct. In the
case of disregarding the threats, the conflicted side will be exposed to a
punishment which is probably better to avoid. However, the punishment is to
be appropriate, so that the enforcers were satisfied, and not discontented.11
1.3 From armed conflict to international recognition
Although information about the event itself, the first trace of the
conduction of the Serbian project can be seen in the proclamation plan of
federal units of Srpska Krajina in Knin in 1989 during the celebration of the
Kosovo battle, planned by the Initial Serb Committee from northern
Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, Slavonija and Baranja, which was stopped
by quenching the sound system.12
Events which marked the beginning of tensions in May 1990 were:
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disarming the Territorial Defence, enactment of new amendments in the
Croatian Constitution, a staged assassination of Miroslav Mlinar, the
stepping out of the Knin municipality from the Municipality Community of
Dalmatia and the clash at a football match between Dinamo from Zagreb and
the Belgradian Red Star.
11
Gow, Triumph, 39.
Nikica Barić, Srpska pobuna u Hrvatskoj : 1990.-1995. [Serbian rebellion in
Croatia: 1990. – 1995.] (Zagreb: Tehnička knjiga – Golden marketing, 2005), 50.
12
17
Members of the Public Safety Station Knin sent in July 3, 1990 a
letter to the secretary of the federal SUP Petar Gračanin, in which they stand
that the Croatian government is relieving Serbian police officers and that
they do not want new uniforms or changing the name of the 'milicija' to
'redarstvo' (police) due to its similarity to the NDH (Independet State of
Croatia) nomenclature. Two days later minister of internal affairs Boljkovac
met with the signatories of the letter in Knin, who requested founding of a
municipal station, which in praxis meant an independent militia which the
central government would have no control of. 13 In early 1991, SUP SAO
Krajina was founded. Consequently, Croatian government has requested the
signing of a loyalty statement to the Republic of Croatia. Rejection meant a
surcease of employment, which was interpreted by the Serbian leadership as
a provocation.
By the end of June Borisav Jović and Slobodan Milošević were
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planning to use the JNA to force Croats and Slovenes to separate, with the
condition that the Serbs in Croatia carry out a referendum to determine the
borders.14 A similar idea came out from the royal court in The Kingdom of
Yugoslavia in 1928, after the crisis developed due to the assassination of
Croatian spokesmen in Belgrade. Serbs carried out a Serbian convocation in
Srb (Croatia) on July 25th, where the „Declaration of independence and
13
Ibid., 68.
Same idea in Croatia was proposed by Žarko Puhovski in his Socijalistička konstrukcija
zbilje [Socialist construction of reality] (Zagreb: Školska knjiga, 1990)
14
18
authonomy of the Serbian people“ was created. Main argument stressed in
declaration was the privilege of independence should be given to peoples,
and not republics.15
Shortly after this, on August 17th, 1990, the police in Zadar took
away 70 rifles from the station in Benkovac, and at the same day in Obrovac
and Knin arms of the back-up structure was given to local Serbian
population. The Croatian police in Zagreb was instructed to deal with the
situation with helicopters and transporters. The JNA stopped the helicopters,
and the Serbian population in Titova Korenica stopped the transporters. That
the rebellion was planned earlier and that JNA's interference was also
planned is clearly visible in the fact that two months earlier the 221.
Motorized brigade of the Knin corps had its classification brought to level
„B“ (15-60% capacity), and was reinforced with two batallions of „A“
classification (60-100% capacity).16
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Serbian declaration on autonomy was carried out from August 19th to
September 2nd, and on September 30th autonomy was pronounced with
99.96% of the population approving. Considering that the voting was not
completely regular and considering the media war lead against the Croatian
government. The question remains whether the local Serbian population
would remain to live in Croatia if Croatian government did not conduct
15
16
Barić, Srpska pobuna, 72.
Ibid,, 78-80.
19
ethnic cleansing by the end of the war during “Flash” and “Storm”
operations by forcing between 100 000 and 200 000 people to leave their
homes.
In early March 1991, an armed revolt broke out in Pakrac with the
intervention of the JNA, separating local Serbian population and the Croatian
police, that is, enabling the local Serbian population to retreat. Pakrac was
the first notice of the JNA's role as a „tampon-zone“. Preventing the Croatian
police from entering the territory under armed siege with closed roads, the
JNA secured better organizing of the rebels and basically gave them
protection. 17 Intelligence estimate from March was that the outbreak of
violence is unavoidable mainly because of central government’s wish for a
greater authority of federal institutions.18 A week after this, demonstrations
broke out in Belgrade against Milošević and the leading structures. The
opposition resented Milošević's poor care for Serbs outside of socialist
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Serbia and claims were made for a more democracy. 19 On Catholic Easter,
March 31, local Serbian population had taken power over the National Park
Plitvička Jezera Bureau. Croatian police came to intervene, and again the
JNA appeared as a „tampon-zone“. In May, the Croatian village of Kijevo
17
Marijan, “Sudionici,“ 57-58.
“Yugoslavia: Military Dynamics of Potential Civil War,“ 1.
(accessed May 23, 2014)
19
Ivica Lučić, “Bosna i Hercegovina od prvih izbora do međunarodnog priznanja,“ [Bosnia
and Herzegovina from first elections to the international recognition] Časopis za suvremenu
povijest 1 (2008): 120.
18
20
was attacked and 12 police officers were killed and massacred in Borovo
Selo.
1.4 From declaring independence to the acceptance of the Vance
Plan as a precondition for international acknowledgement
On June 25th, the Croatian Parliament proclaimed sovereignty and
the independence of the Republic of Croatia. By mediation of the
international community, specifically the Troika20, on July 8th in the Brijuni
Islands a three-month moratorium was proclaimed to the decision, that is a
delay to further actions and acts. In praxis, this enabled the JNA and the local
Serbian population to continue the planned overruns, the last attempt of
salvaging
Yugoslavia.
Croatian
authorities
wanted
an
immediate
transmission of international observers which was opposed by the federal
authorities. The mission arrived to Croatia in the beginning of July, but they
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pointed specifically that their assignment was merely Slovenia. This
standpoint will change only by the end of July, when Croatia became part of
the mission. Federal authorities created problems with the observing,
lingering as much as possible. After a few failed attempts, an ultimatum was
given to all sides to agree to given conditions by September 1st. The mission
20
Troika consisted of ministers of foregin affairs from past, present and future chair of
European Community. In the beggining Troika was lead by Italy, Netherlands and
Luxembourg. Italy was later succeded by Portugal.
21
started working on a civil nature although Croatian authorities also argued
military character. 21 Besides the official work, the observers carried out
intelligence for their home countries as well.
The last attempt of stopping Croatian independence was the bombing
of official residence of Croatian government Banski Dvori in October 7th,
1991, after the expiry of the three-month moratorium, by the JNA. President
of Croatia Franjo Tuđman, President of Yugoslav Presidency Stjepan Mesić
and federal Prime Minister Ante Marković left the scene a few minutes
earlier and avoided assassination. To this day it is not clear how did the JNA
got precise information about the meeting held immediately before the
bombings. The next day independence was proclaimed by the Croatian
Parliament. The Croatian government wanted to establish international
recognition as soon as possible to secure the arrival of the UN Peace keepers.
In Paris, October 11, representatives of the European Community offered
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Krajina’s president Milan Babić Serbian autonomy in Croatia and pointed
that Croatia will soon be internationally recognized, which Babić refused
immediately. 22 Serbian government and the JNA wanted to conquer the
planned areas and only after that secure the arrival of the UN Peace keepers.
The Croatian government, however, started a series of successful operations
21
For more information on observing mission see Miškulin, “Sladoled i sunce.“
Nikica Barić, “Djelovanje Vlade Srpske autonomne oblasti Krajine tijekom 1991.“
[Activity of the government of Serbian autonomus oblast of Krajina during the 1991.]
Časopis za suvremenu povijest 1 (2008): 68.
22
22
(„Swathe 10“, „Hurrican 91“ and „Arrow“) which resulted in recuperation of
parts of Bilogora region (central Croatia) and western Slavonija. In Geneve,
November 23, a cease-fire and the deblockage of barracks was signed by the
Presidency of Yugoslavia, Croatia and the JNA, which was meant to enable
the departure of the JNA as one of the preconditions for the arrival of the
Peace keepers.
Since the beginnings of the conflicts in ex-Yugoslavia territory, the
main disagreement was the question of the right of separation – was it a
people’s or a nation’s right? The inability of conducting sovereignty over its
entire territory was the main problem for Croatia and later for BiH.
Sovereignty has to be achieved through armed force, but also sustained in the
case of individual rebel activity.23 Accordingly, the Croatian government did
not have full, but limited sovereignty because it was not able to control its
full territory or to bound rebellion by negotiation or by force.
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Due to the disagreement of the main participants, The Minister
Council of the European Community decided to form an Arbitrage
Commission which would investigate in the problem, popularly named the
Badinter Commission to its president Robert Badinter who was the president
of the Constitutional Court of France. Even though the commission was
23
James Gow, “Serbian Nationalism and the Hissssing Ssssnake in the international order:
Whose soveregnity? Which nation?,“ The Slavonic and East European Review 72-3 (1994):
476.
23
made out of five high court judges (Italy, Germany, France, Spain and
Belgium), main negotiations were lead between Germany and France, that is
between the chancellor Helmut Kohl, the minister of Foreign Affairs Hans
Dietrich Genscher, and the French president Francois Mitterand and the
Foreign Affair minister Roland Dumas. Germany favored recognition of
newly-founded republics of Croatia and Slovenia to prevent further warfare,
while France and Great Britain claimed that premature recognition would
only enhance the clash. United States were keener not to recognize new
states, in order to keep close contact with Serbian leadership and main
persons in military.24
At the same time under the influence of Great Britain the Peace
Conference on Yugoslavia was convoked under the presidency of Lord Peter
Carrington, a highly recognized diplomat who had high positions such as the
British Minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs, Head Secretary of the
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NATO and the president in solving problems in southern Africa, especially
Rhodesia and its transformation to Zimbabwe. The Peace Conference's tactic
was, as Peter Carrington stressed, shaping the conduct of conflicted sides by
blackmailing them with international recognition by the “punishmentreward“ system. Besides, they founded several ineffective work-groups.
Germany made a major role with its lobbying for Croatia and therefore
24
“Implications of US Posture on Recognition of Former Yugoslav Republics,“ 1.
24
“jumbled“ the Peace Conference's plans. After Croatian recognition, the
Conference blamed Germany for the extension of the war due to premature
recognition. The German instance of unilateral recognition of Croatia is an
exception in international relations. In praxis, only countries with full govern
over its territory are acknowledged, and after been given approval by a
majority of the international community. One of the causes for this behavior
of Germany is surely its desire to present international status, the intrepidity
in making unilateral decisions, without fearing potential sanctions or
isolation. 25 An important role also was the German dread of refugee
immigration which was a potential threat for the country.
It is important to point out that in peace mediations the main goal is
to fulfill the interests of the ones who are mediating, and only after that the
interests of the conflicted sides.26 The international community had different
interests, on one side the German and Austrian, and on the other French and
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British. Also, United States had separate interests, mainly to prove
themselves as key international force, which they gradually established.
However, good relations were more important to them than their stance
towards Yugoslavia. The truncated Yugoslav Presidency was therefore
surprised after France changed its stance. In lieu of strengthening relations
25
Beverly Crawford, “Explaining Defection from International Cooperation:
Germany's unilateral Recognition of Croatia,“ World Politics 48-4 (1996)
26
Vladimir Filipović, “Kontroverze Vanceova plana,“ [Controversies around
Vance plan] Polemos 11 (2008): 92.
25
with the united German state, France decided to sacrifice its support for
sustaining Yugoslavia.
German diplomacy lead by H. D. Genscher advised Croatian
diplomats to be completely cooperative towards the international community
in case that the Peace Conference would collapse because of internal
problems, and the recognition of Croatia was soon to come. 27 Besides,
Croatia was told to accept the UN Peace keepers, that is, the Vance Plan as a
condition for international recognition, but also for possible membership in
the UN.
The Vance Plan was presented to all sides on December 11th, and the
Security Council implemented it with the Resolution 724 on December 14th,
1991. Sending of Peace keepers was arranged, including the military
component, but not before it was determined that all sides are respecting the
fire-cease and the weapon-import embargo. After Vance's stay in Belgrade
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where he obtained Serbian government's acceptance of the peace plan and
fire-cease on December 31th, 1991., on New Year's Day 1992., he met with
Croatian president Tuđman who accepted the plan. The next day the
Sarajevo Agreement was signed which stopped the war in Croatia.
27
Mario Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks: diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata: 1990. - 1997.
[Croatian phoenix: diplomatic processes behind closed doors: 1990.-1997.] (Zagreb:
Nakladni zavod Globus,2000): 160.
26
In Croatia, an idea appeared from parts of the ex-Yugoslav officers
who switched to Croatian military structures (Anton Tus, Petar Stipetić,
Martin Špegelj…) that it was possible to release the entire territory of
western Slavonija, and maybe more. Having in sight the situation at the time,
such an operation was impossible. The Croatian Army, with great casualties,
had performed operations on the Bilogora region and in western Slavonija,
and a great number of soldiers were not available for further combat. The
inability of defending an overly large piece of territory is clear in the
example of the Fifth Corps of the ABIH (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina)
from 1994.-1995. Besides, it was revealed that the Croatian Army captured
areas which were less defended, that is, defended by the local Serbian
population, while better defended lines held by the JNA were difficult to
surpass.28
According to the Vance Plan, the mission was to consist out of ten
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combat battalions, a hundred military observers and 500 civil police officers
and assistant military and civil personnel, counting totally up to 10 000
people.29 By then it was the most expensive UN project ever, and its cost is
visible by the fact that they could not finance it themselves, but part of the
expense was covered by the conflicted sides. UN's nature of separating
conflicted sides was determined primarily by failure they experienced in
28
29
Marijan, “Sudionici,“ 61.
27
Congo in the 1960's, after which they stopped producing offensive
operations. 30 The area under the UN mandate was split into three UNPA
(United Nations Protected Areas)31 zones, or four sectors which are were in
the zones.32 International forces and observers were to be distributed in the
given areas that were to be demilitarized, with armed forces recessed or
retreated. The JNA retreated, and the local Serbs reformed to a type of local
militia. Arming of the local Serbian population was put under strict,
“double“ surveillance, one conducted by the international representatives and
the other by the local. This “double“ system proved ineffective by the end of
the war, when the local Serbs managed to recapture arms. According to the
plan, the return of the refugees was also to be enabled (which did not occur
before the conflicts ended) and the found condition was to be kept until a
political solution between the conflicted sides was found.33
A part of the public was opposing the arrival of the Peace keepers
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because they considered that military actions should be continued, while
others pointed the soon ending of the war and that the UNPA zones will soon
be returned to the legal framework of Croatia thanks to international forces.34
With time it was shown that the UN was not able to fulfill its task and that
30
Mihajlo Ničota, “Trkači olovnih nogu,“ [Lead leg runners] Danas 10-517 (1992): 7-9.
Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina.
32
East (territory of Eastern Slavonia), West (territory of Western Slavonia), South and North
(territory of Krajina).
33
Filipović, “Kontroverze Vanceova plana,“ 99.
34
Ante Barišić, “Male ofenzive velikog dosega,“ [Small offensives of high reach] Danas 11516 (1992): 15-17; Mihajlo Ničota, “Pri kraju puta – intrevju s Mariom Nobilom,“ [By the
end of the road – interview with Mario Nobilo] Danas 11-516 (1992): 25-27.
31
28
Serbian side was not prepared to make compromises, which resulted in
military acquisition of the disputed territories (except eastern Slavonija,
Baranja and part of Srijem which were returned through peaceful
reintegration).
The military mission of the UN arrived in January 14th, 1992., in
crucial areas and estimated that conditions for a mission exist. The next day
Croatia received international recognition by twelve members of the
European Community, which encouraged other countries who mostly
acknowledged Croatia by the end of January. The president of the RSK
Milan Babić was firstly against the UN mission because he considered it as a
prejudicial decision in favor of Croatia, and demanded international
recognition of the Republic of Krajina.35 Babić also pointed that the Peace
keepers should step on the clash-line and protect the Serbs. He opposed
JNA's retreat and wanted to personally negotiate with Cyrus Vance and UN's
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general secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali. 36 International factors ignored
Babić, letting him know that they are not considering him as an international
subject. When meeting the UN's Head Secretary assistant Marrack Goulding,
Croatian president Tuđman refused to accept to an undetermined mandate of
the Peace keepers, which resulted in Goulding's fiery departure from the
35
36
29
meeting. 37 The Security Council on February 21st declared the Resolution
743 with which it confirmed that conditions were created to send the Peace
keepers after the approval of the Serbian and Croatian authorities.
UNPROFOR (United Nation Protection Forces) was founded at a mandate of
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12 months, which was possible to extend.38
37
38
Ibid., 106.
30
31
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1. 5 Split-ups in Serbian authorities over the acceptance of the
Vance Plan
From January 31st to February 2nd, a meeting of the Presidency of SFRJ
was held with Serbian participants from Croatia and BiH. The main purpose
of the meeting was the convincing of the Krajina president Babić to accept
the peace plan and the sending of the Peace keepers. Babić was the only one
opposing the plan during the voting and soon left the meeting. According to
the Krajina Constitution, the president in absence could be replaced by the
president of the „Skupština“ („Assembly“). As president of the Skupština,
Mile Paspalj accepted the plan, but pointed that it is to be accepted also by
the Krajina's Skupština.39 In Glina, February 9th, 1992, an immediate meeting
of the Krajina Skupština was held under the presidency of Paspalj, with the
presence of Branko Kostić, Blagoje Adžić and other members of military and
civil authorities from Serbia, and the only topic was the acceptance of the
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Vance Plan. Immediately after the session, Babić notified Boutros Boutros
Ghali that the meeting was illegal, but faced further disregard by the
international community. The next day Babić held an immediate meeting in
Knin, where it was pointed that the people have a legitimate right to decide
for themselves, asking for a referendum. The Knin meeting was pronounced
null on February 16th in Glina, Babić was recalled from presidential duty and
the referendum was revoked as well. Babić's resistance was not an important
39
32
factor because Belgrade controlled the JNA and the local Martić's police.
Therefore, the entire leadership in Knin was forced to accept the plan if they
wanted to continue receiving help from Belgrade.40
1.6 The matter of „pink zones“
„Pink zones“ were areas which were, according to the Vance Plan,
under Croatian government, but were temporarily held by the local Serbs and
were to be returned under Croatian rule. However, soon it was clear that the
local Serbs supported with JNA were not prepared to hand over these areas,
on which Croatia responded by warning the international representatives to
this matter. The „pink zones“ represented a massive communication and
economic problem for Croatia, and were also used to target nearby Croatian
localities. After failed negotiations, it was decided to military occupy these
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areas. The first operation of this sort happened from June 21st – 22nd in
1992, when the 40km² area of Miljevci plateau was occupied. 41 In the
January 1993, the operation „Gusar“ („Pirate“) was held, known to the
public as „Operation Maslenica“, which secured the strategically important
Maslenica Bridge, the Peruča hydropower and the Zemunik airport. This
40
41
Barić, Srpska pobuna, 158-162.
33
connected the Croatian North with the South, also solving the energetic
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problem.
34
2. International recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Cutillero's mission
2.1 The main political parties and their goals
In the summer of 1990, three national parties were founded, gaining
significant support at the first free elections, and which were to play crucial
roles during the war, and still do to this day. Alija Izetbegović became the
president of the SDA (Stranka demokratske akcije/ Party of Democratic
Action), which defined itself as the party for Yugoslav citizens who belong
to the Muslim historical and cultural circle. Radovan Karadžić was chosen to
lead the SDS (Srpska demokratska stranka/ Serbian Democratic Party), and
this party was declared as an ‘all-Serbian national movement’. Davor
Perinović was elected to be the president of the BiH branch of the HDZ
(Hrvatska demokratska zajednica/ Croatian Democratic Community), but
was removed in September and his place was taken, as the officer in charge,
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by a former sports journalist, Stjepan Kljuić. Kljujić was replaced after short
period of time by hard-liner Mate Boban from Herzegovina who was fully
enacting state policy from Zagreb, while Kljuić was more moderate and for
the dialogue with Bosniaks. The HDZ declared itself as ‘the movement of all
Croatians in the world’. 42 Therefore, none of these parties were based
exclusively on Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is important to point out that, out of
these three national parties, HDZ had the least educated members, which led
42
Ivica Lučić, “Bosna i Hercegovina,“ 109-110.
35
to incompetence in strategic thinking, both medium and long term. 43 HDZ
and SDS were dependent on the ruling parties in Croatia and Serbia so they
could not act independently. As a result, HDZ changed two leaders in short
period of time before they found person who fulfilled their goals.
The first democratic elections were held on November 18, 1990, and
won by a coalition of national parties which secured 84% of the mandates in
the Parliament of the SR BiH. The elections reflected the national structure
which has remained the practice until the present day. The key question was
that of BiH remaining in or leaving Yugoslavia, which happened after the
acceptance of the Declaration of Sovereignty. Accordingly, the relationship
with Yugoslavia determined mutual relations between the three nations.44 All
three sides had a different vision of the internal arrangement of BosniaHerzegovina, which would remain visible during the entire war. Bosniaks
wanted classical democratic civil state by principle ‘one man-one vote’. The
Serbian plan was to secure the territory as a federal unit in Yugoslavia. When
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this turned out to be impossible, due to international factors, they aimed to
secure the unification of all Serbian territories or to have a loose and
basically independent status within BIH. BiH Croats desired unification with
Croatia, but it proved impossible after Tuđman and Milošević met in
Karađorđevo on 25th March, 1991 to partition BiH. The partitioning failed
43
Ivica Lučić, “Evolution and Condition of the Elites in Bosnia-Herzegovina – A Personal
View,“ National Security and Future 6 (2005): 161.
44
Lučić, Uzroci rata, 179.
36
because they could not divide it to keep both sides satisfied. After this
failure, BiH Croats wanted ethnic federal unit in BiH which would be closely
connected with Croatia.
2.2 The referendum on independence and international recognition
of Bosnia-Herzegovina
The decision on holding the referendum to confirm status of BiH was
brought on January 24 and 25 in 1992 in the Skupština in the absence of
Serbian representatives. In October 1991, Serbian representatives founded
the Skupština of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
On BiH Croatian side, Stjepan Kljuić was replaced at the beginning of
February in Široki Brijeg with hard-liner Mate Boban because Kljuić was for
negotiations and cooperation with Bosniaks, while Croatian HDZ under
presidency of Tuđman was radicalizing their stance. The central committee
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of the HDZ was not satisfied with the formulation of the referendum and
wanted to put forward a demand for national cantons. As the meeting was
held in Livno, the matter of national cantons is now known as the Livanjsko
pitanje (The Livno Question). The Parliament of SR BiH rejected the
Livanjsko pitanje, but invited Croats to vote for independence. The
international community accepted the Croatian demands, which were
included in the Cutillero Plan, according to which Bosnia-Herzegovina was
37
to be a state composed of three units based on national, geographic,
economic and other criteria. The first round of talks was held on February 13
and 14, on the first day with the three leading parties, and including the
opposition on the second day. An agreement was not reached, while an
extension for talks was announced for February 21 and 22 in Lisbon.45
The referendum was held on February 29 and March 1, resulting in
62.68% of the population voting for independence, primarily Bosniaks and
Croats. The negotiations continued and on March 9 in Bruxelles the
‘Statement of principles for new constitutional arrangement for Bosnia and
Herzegovina’46 was proclaimed, reflecting the negotiations held hitherto on
the arrangement of BiH as a state divided into three units with a national
appellation. Local governments would have broad authority, while the state
would be decentralized with the central government being a guardian of
sustainability and key strategic interests. After the negotiations were nearly
finished, Izetbegović stated that he did not want nationally divided regions
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which were the basis of the new constitutional proposal. On March 11, the
BiH Serbian Skupština rejected the Bruxelles constitutional arrangement
emphasizing that the minimum Serbs could accept was to either remain in
45
Kasim I. Begić, Bosna i Hercegovina od Vanceove misije do Daytonskog sporazuma
(Sarajevo: Bosanska knjiga, 1997), 84-85.
46
“Statement of principles for new constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Herzegovina,“ in
B.G. Ramcharan (ed.), The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia – Official
Papers, Vol. 1 (The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 24-27.
38
Yugoslavia or a confederate state consisting of three national states.47
On April 6, a group of citizens from large anti-war rally crashed into
the building of the Skupština and proclaimed the ‘All-National Parliament of
the Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina’. The Council of Ministers of the
European Community recognized BiH on the same day, while the United
States, Austria and Croatia followed on April 7.48
CIA’s intelligence records from the March 1992 suggest that the main
intention of the Serbian side was to gain more time during the negotiations to
finish the conquest of the desired territories. 49 After Izetbegović retreated,
there was a lack of international pressure on the sides to accept the plan,
which resulted in further negotiations throughout April and May in Sarajevo
and Lisbon with poor chances of being accepted. The impossibility of a real
threat from the international community in case of non-acceptance of the
plan highlighted its weakness i.e. its inability to force an implementation
through the deployment of land troops, which is one of the main tasks in
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international mediation. One of the causes of the reluctance of the
international community to send combat forces was, as Boutros BoutrosGhali pointed out, the unfavorable natural geographic conditions, which
47
48
Begić, Bosna i Hercegovina, 88-91.
Lučić “Bosna i Hercegovina,“ 139.
49
“A Broadening Balkan Crisis: Can it be managed?,“ iii.
39
caused dread considering the American experience in Vietnam.50
According to the Cutillero Plan, the Parliament was to be bicameral.
One House would be directly elected, while the other would have an even
number of representatives from all three communities to prevent over-voting.
The central government would be in charge of defense and foreign affairs,
the economy and finances, infrastructure and the basic needs of the
population. Every community would have broad regional authority and the
possibility of veto in the Parliament on everything that could damage their
interests. Besides, all communities were allowed to decide for themselves as
long as this did not endanger the independence and territorial integrity of the
whole of the country.51
The rejection of the Cutillero Plan by the Muslim side was
accompanied by three documents published by the Presidency and the
Government – ‘The Platform for Actions of the BiH Presidency in Warfare’,
‘Standpoints on the Administrative and Territorial Arrangement of BiH’ and
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‘Constitutional Principles for the Internal Arrangement of the Republic of
BiH’. The documents shared a negative attitude towards cantonization, i.e.
the organization of the state upon the ethnic principle. According to these
documents, an arrangement similar to the plan was proposed, but differed
from it by renouncing sovereignty for the regions. The Cutillero Plan saw the
50
51
James Gow, Triumph, 97.
Gow. Triumph, 85-86.
40
regions as the source of sovereignty i.e. as units with constitutionality, in
which national majorities could form their own administration. As a result,
Bosniak elites resisted the ethnic criteria so strongly because all citizens
could not participate in political power. According to Bosniak plans, the
regions were to be established by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
most of them would not have been able to make independent political
decisions, but only economic and cultural. 52
On July 21, Tuđman and Izetbegović signed the ‘Agreement of
Friendship and Cooperation’, but Izetbegović refused to sign a military
agreement, stating that the Serbian people would “… surely see it as a
threat” and that “… it would be better to leave more room for the operations
of international factors.”53 Simultaneously, as intelligence officers noticed,
existence of ABiH was dependent on tactical alliance and military supplies
from the Republic of Croatia. Also, all international aid to BiH was
dependent on cooperation with Republic of Croatia because of its transit
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character.54 Nevertheless, Izetbegović naively tried to negotiate and establish
peace with BiH Serbs. In the summer and early fall of 1992, BiH Serbs
occupied and ethnically cleansed many predominantly Bosniak places in
52
Saša Mrduljaš, “Prvi međunarodni pokušaj unitarizacije Bosne i Hercegovine: Vance-Owenov
plan (2.siječnja 1993.),“ National Security and the Future 10 (2009): 126-28.
53
Davor Marijan, “Vještački nalaz: o ratnim vezama Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine,“ Časopis
za suvremenu povijest 36 (2004): 229.
54
“Responses to Transition Team Questions on the Balkans,“ 13.
41
Drina region (Bijeljina, Zvornik, Višegrad, Foča), Posavina region
55
(Bosanski Šamac, Modriča, Odžak, Brčko, Derventa) and parts of Sarajevo.
It was the bloodiest period of the war in BiH in which most of approximately
65 000 Bosniaks were killed and many others became refugees.
The Cutillero mission officially failed on August 26, 1992 at the
London conference when Cutillero and Lord Carrington resigned, and were
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replaced by Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen.56
55
Region around river Sava.
56
Begić, Bosna i Hercegovina, 101.
42
3. The Vance-Owen plan
As regards the aforementioned Bosniak objections, the newly elected Vance
and Owen started working on a new plan which would partly satisfy the
demands of all sides. According to this new plan Bosnia-Herzegovina would
be organized as a decentralized federal state divided into ten regions– three
for every nation and a neutral Sarajevo. Again the plan was made by a
principle of ethnic division of the country so the SDA leadership was not
particularly satisfied. Vance and Owen’s opinion was that Bosniaks are
delaying with negotiations because they are counting on the international
help. On the principals committee meeting held on February 5, 1993, Vice
President Al Gore conveyed opinion of Vance and Owen, although he
considered Bosniak’s claims justified: “Vance/Owen claim that the Bosnians
(Bosniaks, author’s remark) only hold out because they hope we would come
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in.”57
The Vance-Owen Plan was supported by the European Community and
Russia, but the main role in its rejection was played by the new Clinton’s
administration of the United States. The Bush administration had kept away
from Bosnia-Herzegovina since the beginning of the crisis. Also, the territory
of Yugoslavia lost its geostrategic importance so that the United States left
57
“Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia, February 5, 1993,“ without page number
43
the resolution of the crisis to the European Community.58 The Plan consisted
of three parts: military, political and a map of delineation. The military part
included the separation of the warring sides, demilitarization of Sarajevo and
placing heavy armament under control. According to the political part, every
unit had to have an administrative and economic center, but without political
autonomy. A bicameral parliament was to be organized with a directly
elected House of Representatives and House of Peoples which would consist
of members of the regional governments. The House of Representatives
would be elected by the principle of proportional representation. It was
proposed that in the case of disagreement between the Houses, the last word
would be the one of the House of Representatives.59
The situation changed drastically when presidential candidate Bill
Clinton started to mention possible military intervention against the Serbs in
Bosnia and Herzegovina in his campaign. Since then, the Bosniak side
started to linger in negotiations, although they were seen by American
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diplomacy as “the clear losers” who should be helped with the map.60 In the
case of military intervention against the Serbs, state could have been
organized on equal principles and Serb military expansion would not be
adopted.
58
Gow. Triumph, 205.
59
“Deklaracija o BiH,“ Večernji list (13.05.1992): 6-7.
“Deputies Committe Video Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 26 February 1993,“ 2.
60
44
BiH Serbs rejected the plan and seized mostly Bosniak territories in
eastern Bosnia, except the enclaves of Srebrenica, Goražde and Žepa. 61 A
potential reason for the Serbian rejection may be linked to the third unit in
the Vance-Owen plan, which would have split the unification of all
territories under Serbian control, causing problems of supply in western
Bosnia and the parts under Serbian control in the Republic of Croatia.62
The Vance-Owen plan led to an open Bosniak-Croat war in territories
under joint control. Bosnian Croats cleansed Busovača, Novi Travnik, Vareš,
Kiseljak, Vitez, Kreševo and Žepče while Bosniaks cleansed Jablanica,
Konjic, Fojnica, Kakanj, Zenica, Travnik and Bugojno. This lead to the long
lasting loss of multiethnicity and multiculturalism of these territories.
After the Serbian rejection of the Vance-Owen plan, the International
Conference on the former Yugoslavia decided to move from Geneva to New
York so that the Security Council could adopt the resolution on its
implementation. Its implementation was overruled by the votes of the five
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permanent members after the objection of the United States. After
unsuccessful negotiations with his former deputy from the State Department,
Warren Christopher, Cyrus Vance resigned from duty. He was replaced by
the former Norwegian minister of defense and actual minister of
international affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg on May 1. In order to retain good
61
62
Mrduljaš, “Prvi međunarodni pokušaj“, 139-40.
Gow. Triumph, 240.
45
relations with their European allies, on February 10, 1993, the United States
announced its six statements on American policy towards Bosnia and
Herzegovina: all agreements must be the result of negotiations, not imposed,
sanctions against Serbia should be stricter; the use of military force in case of
Serbian involvement in Kosovo; the cessation of murders and destruction;
and all agreements needed to be conducted on the field after consultation
with the allies of the US.63 The United States rejected the Vance-Owen plan
because of its unwillingness to send combat troops.
The Security Council adopted Resolution 820 on April 17, 1993 in
order to force the Serbian side to sign the Vance-Owen plan within a period
of nine days under the threat of the enlargement of sanctions. Lord Owen
was in Belgrade from April 21 to 26 trying to convince Milošević and
Dobrica Ćosić to force the Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina to sign the plan.
On April 25 and 26, the ruling BiH Serbs from Bosnia-Herzegovina decided
to conduct a referendum on whether to accept the plan. The purpose of
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conducting the referendum was probably to gain more time and not to suffer
more sanctions. Such a plan proved to be wrong because of the Security
Council's Resolution 821, which expelled Yugoslavia from ECOSOC (UN
economic and social committee). The last attempt to save the Vance-Owen
Plan occurred at the beginning of May in Athens when Milošević, Ćosić and
Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis tried to convince Karadžić to sign the plan.
63
46
Karadžić signed the plan, but stated that his signature had to be ratified by
the Parliament.
Milošević, Ćosić, Mitsotakis and the Montenegrin president Momir
Bulatović were present during the assembly in order to force a positive
outcome. A great majority of Parliament members (96%) supported the
referendum.64 Although Milošević was disappointed, it was only due to the
sanctions against Yugoslavia. That moment was a turning point because
local Serbian leaders were not ready for a compromise and wanted the
promised unification with, or federal status within, Yugoslavia. Serbs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina had a ‘plan B’ which was stated in the ‘Declaration of
the continuation of the peace process’65 on May 19. After rejection of the
Vance-Owen plan, the main idea of this new plan was a Serbian republic in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Intelligence assessments from May 1993, point out to a
few significant American concerns. Firstly, international intervention against
Serbs was avoided because it could induce others to provoke conflicts to
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trigger international response. Moreover, additional troops from Eastern
Europe, Ukraine and Russia were considered to be military and political
burden.66
64
“Narodna Skupština Republike Srpske: Deklaracija o nastavku mirovnog procesa,“ in
Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske 2/6 (1993)
66
“Prospects for Bosnia,“ iv, 2, 6, 8.
65
47
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3.1 Progressive implementation and the Joint action plan
The international community and Russia held a meeting on May 16 in
Moscow on a Russian initiative. The main topic was the progressive
implementation of the Vance-Owen plan. An agreement was generally
accepted, but the biggest problem was the sending of military troops and
observers. The United States promised to send air-force without ground
troops. Lord Owen held a meeting with the Croatian and Bosniak side on
48
May 18 in Međugorje at which a progressive implementation of the plan was
accepted. The Vance-Owen Plan was to be put into action in territories under
Croatian and Bosniak control. During the next two days, Lord Owen
travelled to NATO headquarters in Naples, as well as to Minsk and Kiev to
find military troops and observers for the mission. Although Belarus and
Ukraine accepted the deployment of troops, the plan of progressive
implementation was not carried out because the strongest forces rejected
sending ground troops, probably because a potential failure would be hard to
explain to their domestic public.67
The major forces published the ‘Joint statement of BosniaHerzegovina’68 on May 22, also known as the ‘Joint Action Plan’. The plan
was adopted by states which were to provide the majority of troops: United
States, Russia, Spain, France and United Kingdom. This plan meant the final
ending of the Vance-Owen plan. The main points of the new plan were:
sending humanitarian help, enlargement of sanctions against Serbia and
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Montenegro until their withdrawal from the occupied territories, closure of
the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina (especially with Serbia), founding of
protected areas, continuing the prohibition of flights over BosniaHerzegovina, founding of a court for war crimes, establishing permanent
peace in order to prevent the conflict from spilling over into neighboring
67
Bertrand de Rossanet, War and peace in the former Yugoslavia (The Hauge, London,
Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997): 26-32.
68
Ivan Bandić, “Washingtonski sporazum,“ Međunarodne studije 1 (2001): 155.
49
countries.
The shortcoming of the Joint Action Plan was that there was no specific
mention as to what would happen, apart from sanctions, if Serbs continued
their offensive or how much time was anticipated for a Serbian retreat from
the occupied territories. A meeting was supposed to be held on June 3 and 4,
but did not take place because Mate Boban’s helicopter was fired upon. In
the agreement with representatives of the international community
concerning the meeting, Izetbegović requested that Serbian positions in the
presidency belonging to the SDS should be replaced with Serbs from other
parties. As the meeting failed to take place, negotiations were led with each
side individually. Karadžić wanted observers to be sent and emphasized the
Bosniak attacks on all fronts, while Bosniaks were pointing out to the siege
of Goražde.69
After the attacks on buses in Novi Travnik, it was decided that
negotiations would be continued in Geneva on June 13 and 14.70 According
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to the agreement, the establishment of provinces and local jurisdictions was
to be enabled, as well as the creation of a court for human rights which
would support international humanitarian law, and cooperation with the
international humanitarian mission. The result of the voting was three in
favor, three opposing and three sustained, after which the agreement was
69
70
de Rossanet, War and peace, 39-40.
de Rossanet, War and peace, 42.
50
then forwarded to the Presidency for voting. 71 Izetbegović categorically
rejected the agreement primarily because it was based on ethnic principle
and awarded Croatian and Serbian conquests.
Military estimate from June 1993, was that ABiH will not be able to
preserve territories they possess nor recapture the lost territories. Also, ABiH
was predicted to deteriorate without significant international help. BiH Serbs
were envisioned to slowly capture Bosniak enclaves in Eastern Bosnia.
Croatian position in BiH was stated to be firm – they could keep the
territories under control against Bosniaks and Serbs and were predicted that
further conquest of territories under Bosniak rule is only possible with the
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Serbian help.72
71
Ibid., 43.
72
“Combatant Forces in the Former Yugoslavia,“ iii, 3, 5.
(accessed June 1, 2014)
51
4. The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan
After the Serbian rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan, and the short failed
episode with progressive implementation and the Joint Action Plan, the
international community attempted to find a solution with the new OwenStoltenberg peace plan which was very much like the Cutillero plan, a plan
generally accepted by the Serbs. Owen and Stoltenberg organized
negotiations on June 15 and 16 in Genthod, Switzerland, which was attended
by presidents Milošević, Bulatović, Tuđman and Izetbegović, as well as
Radovan Karadžić and Mate Boban. Presidents Tuđman and Milošević
suggested the idea of a Federative Republic of BiH, consisting of three
constitutive republics without international subjectivity, the securing of
Bosniak territory with a gateway to the sea, the right of return for refugees
and respect for human rights. After it seemed that all was arranged, on June
23 Izetbegović promised to discuss the model with the Presidency, but
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immediately after leaving the meeting told the journalists outside that he had
given up on that plan.73 In a statement for the BiH radio-television on July 8,
Izetbegović claimed the following with regard to the peace initiative: “It is a
very ugly option. That is all I can say to you at the moment.”74 The following
day, the Office of the BiH Presidency issued a denial on agreeing to
73
de Rossanet, War and peace, 45-46.
“Predsjednik Predsjedništva BiH Alija Izetbegović: Interview za RT BiH,“ Hina, Baza
EVA 7080209 (1993)
74
52
confederate BiH, in which it was stated that confederation, that is, ethnic
division can:
“ (…) be imposed as a solution only under the condition
that there is no other choice, in other words, if the
following choice is presented – either that [ethnic
division] or starting a never ending war, which would lead
us back to living in caves.”75
On July 17, 1993, the Presidency of BiH issued a ‘Starting Point of the
BiH Presidency for Negotiations in Geneva’.76. The ‘Starting Point’ stressed
that the Parliament should be bicameral, with the Lower House being
represented proportionally to the population. At the end of the document, it
was noted that, in the case of the rejection of the proposal, the Presidency
was prepared to propose to the Security Council the establishment of an
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international protectorate over BiH.
In Geneva, on July 30, the ‘Constitutional agreement of the Union of
Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ was concluded and was supposed to
be implemented once agreement over maps and humanitarian rights was
reached. Each republic would have a right to veto, while the Parliament
would consist of 120 positions according to the principle of parity – equal
75
“Ured predsjednika BiH: Demanti izjave Alije Izetbegovića da „pristaje na
konfederalizaciju BiH,“ Vjesnik (10.7. 1993): 11.
76
“Polazište Predsjedništva BiH za pregovore u Ženevi,“ Hina, Baza Eva 0085 (1993)
53
representation from each member of the Union. The Presidency was to
consist of presidents of the three republics who would change every four
months, and would decide by consensus. The competencies of the Union
were to be foreign affairs, foreign trade and the functioning of common
institutions, while all other power would be handed to the republics. None of
the constitutive republics would be allowed to leave the Union without the
consent of all republics.77
The next day Alija Izetbegović withdrew his signature on the advice of
his legal advisor, Francis Boyle, because the membership of BiH in the UN
seemed to be in question. Even though Izetbegović was promised that the
status of the Union in the UN would not be changed, Bosniak side sought an
immediate guarantee from the Security Council and the General Assembly.78
On August 4, Alija Izetbegović sent a letter to Tuđman in which he
suggested a union between the territories of the Bosniak and Croatian
Republics and the continuation of the fighting against the Serbs. Resignation
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of people who had brought about the current state of affairs was sought and
offered by Izetbegović.79 The answer from Tuđman arrived on August 10, in
which it was stressed that Croatia was ready for cooperation between the two
77
“Constitutional Agreement of the Union of Republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina,“ in
B.G. Ramcharan (ed.), The International Conference, 291-300.
78
“Predsjednik predsjedništva BiH Alija Izetbegović povlači svoje „da,“ Hina, Baza EVA
7310060 (1993)
79
“Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee on the activities of the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,“ in B.G. Ramcharan (ed.), The
International Conference, 824; “Pismo predsjednika predsjedništva BiH Alije Izetbegovića
predsjedniku RH dr. Franji Tuđmanu,“ Vjesnik (8.8. 1993): 11.
54
constitutive units, but that this agreement had to be reached by the local
representatives of those republics and that Bosniak offensive operations
against Croatian areas had to be stopped.80 The military chiefs of all three
sides signed a truce on August 11 at Sarajevo Airport. It was agreed upon to
postpone discussion on the disputed areas of Brčko, Posavina, eastern
Bosnia, Bihać pocket, eastern Herzegovina, central Bosnia and Sarajevo for
a later date.
In line with the idea of a union between the three republics, on August
28, 1993 the Croatian side proclaimed the HR HB (Hrvatska Republika
Herceg-Bosna/ Croatian Republic Herceg-Bosnia) in Grude. HR HB was
proclaimed with the goal of establishing Greater Croatia by the hardline
lobby from Herzegovina. In the resolution of its establishment it was stressed
that the Croats, as a constitutive nation, were establishing a state community
with other nations as the bearers of sovereignty. However, there was no
mention of the right to secession or the desire for annexation to Croatia.81
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The HR HB House of Representatives issued the ‘Declaration for an
independent BIH as a union of equal republics’ in which it was stressed that:
“ … we are in favor of Bosnia and Herzegovina's independence in
internationally recognized borders, as a state of three equal constitutional
nations” and:
80
“Pismo predsjednika RH dr. Franje Tuđmana predsjedniku predsjedništva BiH Aliji
Izetbegoviću,“ Hina, Baza EVA 8110167 (1993)
81
“Temeljna odluka o uspostavi i proglašenju Hrvatske Republike Herceg-Bosne,“ Večernji
list (29.8. 1993): 4-8.
55
“ … the founding of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
as an independent and internationally recognized state, is
only possible with the consent of all three equal and
constitutional nations and all together, through the Union
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”82
Nevertheless, acts made by both HR HB and Republic of Croatia
proved that they were secretly working on the unification.
On September 20, negotiations were held on the British HMS Invincible
war ship between the representatives of the international community and
Tuđman, Izetbegović, Milošević, Bulatović and Radovan Karadžić and Mate
Boban. It seemed that all parties agreed to the proposed arrangements and
territorial solutions, but Bosniak side rejected the agreement. The treaty
offered 30% of the territory to the Bosniak Republic with access to the Brčko
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and Neretva ports, which would be connected with the Adriatic at the Port of
Ploče, through a concession of 99 years provided by Croatia. Sarajevo would
be under UN administration and Mostar under EU administration. 83 It is
interesting to note that in one of the later intelligence records there is a
mention it was agreed on the HMS Invincible that Serbian Republic would
82
“Deklaracija za neovisnu BiH kao uniju jednakopravnih republika,“ Vjesnik (9.2. 1994):
9-11
83
Gow, Triumph, 255-56.
56
have a possibility for a referendum on secession after two or three years.84
What were the circumstances and under which conditions this decision was
made, remains unclear.
After yet another rejection of the amended version of the OwenStoltenberg Plan known as the ‘The Peace Packet on Bosnia and
Herzegovina’ from late September 1993, on October 20 Alija Izetbegović
issued a resolution on the recall of the Croatian members of the Presidency,
Franjo Boras and Miro Lasić, and replaced them with Ivo Komšić and
Stjepan Kljuić.85 In the meantime, regional boss of Western Bosnia region
Fikret Abdić proclaimed Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia on 29th
September because of his disagreement with majority of the ruling SDA
party. Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia lived from black market
with Serbs and Croats, but was soon militarily defeated by the BiH
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Government forces.
84
“Bosnia Strategy,“ 4.
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1817859/1995-07-20A.pdf
85
Nevenko Herceg and Neven Tomić, Izbori u Bosni i Hercegovini (Mostar: Centar za
studije novinarstva, 1998): 258.
57
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4.1 The Action Plan of the European Union
After the Bosniaks refused the plan from HMS Invincible, Lord Owen
started the initiative for the wider pacification of the region, including
Kosovo, RSK and BiH. If a solution could be found for RSK, then sanctions
against Yugoslavia would be removed. This plan failed when Tuđman
announced after talks in Norway in early November that he was prepared, at
most, to acknowledge the local and cultural autonomy of the Serbs in
58
Croatia.86
In his peace initiative from Novemeber 2, Tuđman requested that the
international community impel all conflicting sides to sign in favor of the
Union within 14 days, under the threat of sanctions. 87 Following this, the
international community started a peace initiative known as the Action Plan
of the EU, the primary goal of which was to convince Bosniak side to accept
the Union, and was set in motion by Germany and France. Bosniak side was
offered a small expansion of its territory, according to which they would be
given 33.56%, and the Croats 17.5%. The starting point for the negotiations
was the packet from the HMS Invincible, while Bosniak side was advised to
agree with the other sides under the threat of reducing international support.
Izetbegović demanded the opening of the airport in Tuzla, which was not
agreeable to the Serbs because they were afraid that it would be used for
military purposes, and he also requested sending of peace troops to the only
Bosniak parts of the territory for a period of five years, in order to protect the
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Bosniak side until it developed an armed capacity for self-defense. Milošević
requested the removal of sanctions because he had fulfilled all conditions,
while the acceptance of the plan depended on the Bosniaks. 88
At the meeting in Bruxelles between the three BiH sides and the
86
Steven L. Burg & Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina – Ethnic Conflict and
International Intervention (Armonk, New York, London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998) 282.
87
“Peace Initiative of 1 November 1993. of Dr. Franjo Tudjman, President of the Republic
of Croatia,“ B.G. Ramcharan (ed.), The International Conference, 1358.
88
Burg & Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 282-283.
59
ministers of foreign affairs of the European Twelve, on December 22 and 23,
Izetbegović rejected the solution offered, and after that Karadžić no longer
agreed to the UN administration in Sarajevo.89 On the initiative of Tuđman,
Milošević and Bulatović, a meeting was held on January 18 and 19 in
Geneva with Izetbegović, Karadžić and Mile Akmadžić. The Bosniak side
remained inflexible and demanded 40% of the territory, access to Neum, the
merging of the eastern enclaves and access to the Sava River. 90 Also,
Izetbegović stated that some changes should be made in the Western and
Central Bosnia so the Muslim Republic should get the territories which
Muslim majority had before the war. The Co-Chairmen proposed a solution
whereby the disputed territory could be referred to an arbitration commission
and its recommendations come to the Security Council after a peace
agreement has been implemented. Croatian and Serbian side accepted these
provisions, while Izetbegović stated that large number of important areas
would be left unresolved and Bosniak side is not ready to have Serb or Croat
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forces remaining in the disputed territories.91
89
Gow, Triumph, 257.
Burg – Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 284.
91
“Peace talks, 18 and 19 January 1994,“ in B.G. Ramcharan (ed.), The International
Conference, 911.
90
60
5. The Washington Agreement
At a meeting on January 18, 1994, Presidents Tuđman and Izetbegović,
together with Haris Silajdžić and Krešimir Zubak, signed a proposal drafted
by the BiH Federation Constitution and a preliminary agreement on the
future economic and military cooperation between the Federation of BiH and
Croatia. According to the treaty, there had to be ethnic parity in
parliamentary representation, while cantonization was a subject for future
discussion. Silajdžić was in favor of the deal, but Izetbegović was against it.
The new initiative brought the active involvement of the USA toward
solving the crisis in which it had previously stood to the side. Meanwhile,
hardliner Mate Boban was removed from office, and replaced by more
moderate Krešimir Zubak. Prime ministers Silajdžić and Granić were invited
to a new round of negotiations in the State Department from February 27 to
March 2. Both prime ministers were left surprised by the radical turn in the
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negotiations.92
Specifically, it was no longer possible to hold long negotiations, as was
the practice before, or to change key points of the agreement. All that was
left to them was to agree over trifles. It was the principle of ‘take it or leave
it’, which would now be promoted by the USA, and the ‘leave it’ option
meant severe sanctions and air raids. This was best seen during the Dayton
92
Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, 606-607.
61
Peace Talks during which the negotiators were in kept semi-incarcerated
conditions found in the Wright Patterson military base. Besides the inability
to stall, these conditions did not allow the sides to use statements made for
the domestic media as a means of creating pressure on the international
public.
According to the agreement, the central government would control
foreign affairs, citizenship, national currency, monetary and fiscal policies,
finances, telecommunications, energy and infrastructure. Jurisdiction was to
be divided between the central and local authorities in the areas of human
rights, health care, environment, social policies, immigration and asylum,
tourism, infrastructure and the use of natural resources. Canton jurisdiction
would cover the police, education, culture, public services, radio and so on.
Besides this, the Federation of BiH should form a confederation with Croatia
and enter into a customs and monetary union with it. The Washington
Agreement was signed on March 18.93 Even though the treaty was signed,
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the Croatian areas remained under the rule of HR HB, and the Bosniak areas
under the government in Sarajevo. 94 The Washington agreement was in
practice a military-political alliance designed by the Clinton’s military
advisors in order to force the BiH Serbs to the negotiating table. It served its
93
Ibid., 609-10.
Gordana Ilić, “Hrvati u BIH 1991.-1995. godine: Nacionalni sukobi i uloga Međunarodne
Zajednice u mirovnim procesima,“ [Croats in BiH 1991.-1995: National conflict and the role
of International community in peace process] National Security and the Future 3-9 (2008):
110.
94
62
main purpose, but proved to be completely outdated by the end of the war.
Even intelligence estimates did not give much chance to the Federation with
the strong international support.95
One of the primary tasks of the American ambassador in Croatia, Peter
Galbraith, according to his own testimony, was to convince Croatian
president Tuđman to stop supporting the BiH Croats under the threat of
sanctions if he decided to continue his support. The abandonment of the HR
HB was dependent on the incorporation of the Serb-held territories of the
Republic of Croatia and the promised aid of the USA concerning the
establishment of stronger connections with the West. It seems that the crucial
role in convincing Tuđman was played by foreign minister Mate Granić.96
The agreement itself was in fact a modification of the Action Plan of the EU,
because the Federation was basically meant to be comprised of the Croatian
and Bosniak territories which were anticipated by the previous plan. Neither
side was particularly satisfied with the agreement, but there was no more
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choice to make, except over details.
95
“Muslim-Croat Federation: More than a Cease-Fire?,“ 1.
96
Peter Galbraith, “Turning points: Key decisions in Making Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia,“ in Maya Shatzmiller, ed., Islam and Bosnia – Conflict Resoultion and Foreign
Policy in Multi-Ethnic States (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2002): 138-41.
63
6. Plans of the Contact Group
6.1 Z-4 Plan
After the signing of the Zagreb Agreement on the cessation of fire
between the RSK and Croatian authorities on March 30, a new round of
negotiations began which included the USA, Russia, UN and EU, so that
they became known as the Z-4 (Zagreb Four Talks). According to the
agreement, the delineation line was to be 2km long, while the treaty itself
was understood by the Krajina Serbs as a chance to stabilize the RSK. After
the signing, the UN mandate was prolonged which gave Serbs an extra
feeling of security. Serbs were demanding, pension payments, which was
partially agreed to by Croatia. Economic relations were also discussed, but
Prime Minister of RSK Mikelić said that he needed the confirmation of the
RSK Skupština which in practice meant that it was a failure. The economic
part of the deal was only signed before the end of December through the
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direct telephone intervention of Slobodan Milošević.97
The Contact Group was formed in April 1994, and consisted of Russia,
the USA, and – as the representatives of the EU, UN and the International
Conference on Former Yugoslavia – Germany, France and Great Britain.
According to the plan for Croatia, named Z-4, Serbs were to be given broad
autonomy with their own symbols, separate legislative bodies, a president
97
64
and ministry cabinet (government), a separate currency and a police force. At
the request of the American ambassador Galbraith a meeting took place with
Tuđman on September 12 1994, at which the ambassador proposed that two
majority Serbian districts, Glina and Knin, linked via Slunj, should have
some elements of statehood, while the rest of the Serb-held territories in
Slavonia should be reintegrated into Croatia. The next meeting was held on
October 10, at which Galbraith introduced an expanded version of the plan.
According to this version, besides the above, it was suggested that the area of
Serbian autonomy be called Krajina, and that it should have a president, a
parliament and courts. There would be no border between Krajina and
Croatia, and Krajina would have autonomy in the areas of education, culture,
energy, tourism, trades, taxes and police. It would be allowed to sign state
treaties in agreement with Zagreb, and in the area of autonomy it could also
sign treaties with other Serbian states. The currency would be controlled by
the Croatian National Bank, but Krajina could have its own banknotes. A
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separate constitutional court was to be established, consisting of two judges
from Krajina, two from Croatia and three representatives of the international
community. Krajina would enjoy the rights to its own flag and coat of arms.
A precondition for acquiring Krajina citizenship was possession of Croatian
citizenship. State borders with BiH would be controlled by the central
government, while Krajina would be demilitarized within 5 years.
Tuđman opposed such a proposal, stating that he could agree to the
65
cultural autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia, and territorial autonomy in the
districts of Glina and Knin, but without the elements of statehood. In a
meeting on January 30, 1995, Tuđman stated that he would consider the
plan, which could be a starting point, but could not depart from the
constitutional decrees of Croatia. The Krajina Serbs rejected the plan
claiming that it was made in agreement with the Croats at the expense of the
Serbs, and on the same day they refused to receive an international
delegation. Croatia was opposed mainly due to the possibility that Krajina
could sign international agreements, thus providing it with subjectivity and a
basis for potential separation from Croatia in the future.
The uncompromising politics of the Krajina Serbs led to a situation
where it was no longer possible to discuss arrangements of any kind or
coexistence with Croatia, even though there definitely were people in the
leadership who understood that the plan was the best they could get. Prime
Minister Mikelić also rejected the Plan, which, considering his loyalty to
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Milošević, also meant that it was not agreeable to Belgrade. This proved to
be true after the international representatives, who were not received by
Krajina authorities, were also not welcomed in Belgrade the next day. This
type of behavior can primarily be interpreted by Milošević's abandonment of
the maximum Serbian demands for a Greater Serbia with the western borders
of Virovitica–Karlovac-Karlobag and his desire to strengthen Serbian
authority in east Bosnia. Besides, it was becoming clear that, due to
66
international factors, Krajina would not be internationally recognized.
Milošević could not publicly declare his rejection of the plan because he
would have probably been accused of betraying national interests. Rather he
ordered Knin to reject the plan and distanced himself from further political
moves by the Krajina leadership.98 To Milošević, Krajina served as a means
to blackmail Croatia in the negotiations over BiH.99
6.2 The Plan of the Contact Group for BIH
According to the plan of the Contact Group, BiH would be organized into
two entities, the Federation of BIH and the Republika Srpska (Serbian
Republic) as well as Sarajevo under the jurisdiction of the UN. Since 1994,
Croatian-Bosniak cooperation had led to the conquest of territories under
Serbian rule. In the case of a Serbian rejection of the plan, threats were made
to lift the arms embargo and impose stricter sanctions as well as to withdraw
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UNPROFOR. For the first time Milošević distanced himself from the politics
of the BIH Serbs. The Contact Group did not officially withdraw after its
failure and nor did it undertake some sort of action which would bring
significant changes on the field. 100 In July, the Group presented a map
according to which the ratio between the Federation of BiH and the RS
98
Ibid., 474-80.
Albert Bing, “Put do Erduta – Položaj Hrvatske u međunarodnoj zajednici 1994. - 1995. i
reintegracija hrvatskog Podunavlja,“ Scrinia Slavonica 7 (2007) 391.
100
99
67
would be 51% : 49%. The Bosniak side felt that the Federation should have
58%, but it agreed in principle, stating publicly its conviction that the Serbs
would not agree, which soon turned out to be true. According to the
suggested constitutional principles, the presidency was to consist of one
member of all constitutive nations, and would change every four months.
The parliament would make decisions upon the basis of a two-thirds
majority, which would have to include a simple majority of every nation.
The American demands on lifting the arms embargo was heavily criticized
by the other members of the Group, who feared for their combat troops and
threatened to withdraw them. As a counter-proposal they put forward the
idea of stricter sanctions.101
The different interests of the Group's members proved to be too big of
a problem when decisions had to be made on how to act after the Serbian
rejection of the plan, that is, should the embargo be lifted (USA), await
Serbian approval (Russia) or tighten sanctions (Germany, France and Great
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Britain).
101
Burg & Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 303-04.
68
69
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7. The Dayton Agreement
In the autumn of 1994, the Bosniak side started a series of operations in
the Bihać area, most probably encouraged by the Americans. The autumn
attack operations revealed the weakness of the ABiH which was winning
territories, but was not capable of keeping them, resulting in Serbian reconquests. 102 The Croatian side undertook successful actions in the late
autumn of 1994 in the Livno and Kupres areas. The Croatian actions were,
among other causes, boosted because a part of the military intelligence
structures from the Pentagon was in favor of halting the conflict based on the
situation on the field in Croatia and BiH. 103 Contrary to the expected,
international attacks did not discourage Serbs who stopped UN movements
and captured their observers. According to some opinions, Serbs had
intentionally provoked the intervention to gain legitimacy and to speed up
the continuation of their operations. The USA demanded NATO to continue
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their offensive, which was against the opinion of all the NATO members
which had troops in BiH. The former American President Jimmy Carter
arranged a four-month truce with the BiH Serbs, which was activated on
January 1, 1995. Tuđman threatened that they would not prolong the
UNPROFOR mandate, which was to expire on March 31, 1995, if the
102
Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: the making of America's Bosnia policy (Washington:
Brookings Institution Press, 2000): 31-33.
103
Bing, “Put do Erduta,“ 390.
70
situation did not change. The UN mission was renamed the UN Peace Force
on March 31, and divided into UNCRO for Croatia, UNPROFOR for BIH
and UNPREDEP for Macedonia. Whilst stressing the truce, all sides were
preparing for the continuation of combat which was to continue in April.
On May 22, BiH Serbs captured ammunition storehouse near Sarajevo,
despite the ban on heavy weaponry. After the unfulfilled 48-hour ultimatum
to return the captured munitions, NATO air raids followed. In retaliation, the
Serbs struck Tuzla and killed 67 civilians as well as taking observers as
hostages. General Rupert Smith sought the continuation of the air raids, but
the command was refused. In June, Rapid Reaction Force was founded on a
French suggestion to secure UNPROFOR. 104 The RRF was meant to be a
mobile military formation prepared to perform offensive operations. To this
day its role is not completely clear, but there are signs that the RRF
formations were to serve as wedges for the stopping of further Croatian and
Bosniak offensives against the Serbs, that is, to secure the interests of
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France, Great Britain and The Netherlands, which were the sole contributors
to the RRF.
Joint Croatian-Bosniak forces managed to capture, from June to
October, a significant amount of territory, including Bosansko Grahovo,
Glamoč, Drvar, Jajce, Mrkonjić Grad and were stopped around Banja Luka
to keep the power balance intact, that is, to prevent a total Serbian defeat.
104
Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 37-44.
71
With BiH Serbs defeated, a completely new situation would emerge, and the
international intention was the end of the conflict as soon as possible. The
biggest problem would have been the complete change of the demographic
structure of BiH in the case of a complete Serbian defeat. The loss of
territory forced the previously unyielding Karadžić to seek help from
Milošević and to accept that Milošević was internationally representing BiH
Serbs. The most important event which shocked public all around the world
and hastened peace settlement surely was genocide of more than 7 000
Bosniak people in the safe zone of Srebrenica from 13 to 19 July, 1995.105
In February 1994, Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested that NATO create
a possible plan for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from BiH. The
withdrawal plan was named the Oplan 40104, and its seriousness was visible
in the fact that it consisted of 1,300 pages of text and 24 appendices.
According to the plan, 82,000 NATO troops were to be involved in the
extraction of UNPROFOR, 25,000 of these to be contributed by the USA.
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Bearing in mind the American share, it is clear why they decided to solve the
BiH conflict rapidly. The duration of the operation was to be 22 weeks,
while the expense just for the United States would be over 700 million
dollars. A significant problem in the operation was the mountainous terrain
in BiH with poor and mined roads. The UNPROFOR withdrawal also raised
humanitarian issues. The civil population would be left unprotected, and a
105
Gow, Triumph, 279.
72
massive immigration wave to Europe was at risk. 106 Also, the Federation
would probably collapse and cause once again war between all sides.
Considering all of the risk-full situations, the USA forced the conflicting
sides to accept a treaty, so as not to risk the engagement of a large number of
combat troops and financial expense which would have to be justified to the
American public. Also, the USA made clear to the German ambassador
Ischinger that the American military force was to be part of the BiH
implementation mission only if the peace agreement was negotiated on the
American territory under the American supervision.107
The negotiations on the establishment of a permanent peace began on
November 1st at the American military base Wright Patterson, Dayton, Ohio,
after which the treaty was named. Negotiations lasted for three weeks, and
one of the preconditions was the international recognition of BiH by Serbia.
The delegations were separated during the meeting, and met only during
bilateral meetings. There were no press or radio conferences so as to prevent
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the development of various interpretations and public pressure, although
there was some leakage of information. For Croatia, it was agreed that the
reintegration would last one year, with the possibility of extending it for one
more year, if everything was not done in time. The Bosniak side managed to
secure Sarajevo and the corridor to Goražde, which was the subject of
106
Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 48-49.
Gret Haller, Granice solidarnosti – Evropa i SAD u ophođenju sa državom, nacijom i
religijom [Borders of solidarity – Europe and USA in Treatment with State, Nation and
Religion ] (Sarajevo: Buybook, 2006), 282.
107
73
numerous discussions. Milošević wanted a narrower corridor, but gave up
after he was shown on a computer that it was as narrow as possible. After the
agreements were made, a problem occurred concerning the fact that BiH
Serbs got 45% of the territory, and not 49% as was predicted. This was
solved by giving the Serbs Mrkonjić Grad, while the Bosniak side was given
arbitration for Brčko.108
The Dayton peace agreement was signed on December 14 in Paris and
consisted of 10 articles, 11 appendices and 102 maps. According to appendix
1a109, a time and program was calculated for the separation of the conflicting
sides and the redeployment of IFOR (Implementation Force) which had the
task of implementing the peace. Its basic task was to protect the delineation
line, and it numbered about 60,000 personnel. Besides the above, they were
meant to be a „reminder“ to the warring sides to exclude the possibility of
further conflicts. The delineation line held by IFOR was 4 km wide.110 The
number of personnel would have surely been higher if the progressive
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implementation had been agreed upon earlier, which would have raised the
problem of finances.
The official name of the country was no longer The Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, but Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the BiH
108
109
“Dayton agreement: Annex 1a - Military Aspects of the Peace and Settlement &
Appendices to Annex 1a,“ http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=368 (accessed 20th
May, 2014)
110
Gow, Triumph, 287.
74
Constitution (appendix 4) 111 in article III, point 1, the central institutions
governed foreign affairs, foreign trade, customs, monetary policies (which
was limited considering the fact that the governor of the central bank was
chosen by the International Monetary Fund), the financing of institutions,
international obligations of BiH, policies concerning immigration, refugees
and asylum, international implementation of criminal law, implementation of
entity rights, control over common resources, regulation of traffic between
entities and air traffic control. The jurisdiction of the entities covered the
functioning of human rights, making agreements with countries and
international organizations, with the acceptance of the Parliament. According
to article VI, the Parliament consisted of two houses: Dom naroda (House of
the Peoples) and Zastupnički dom (House of the Representatives). Dom
naroda had 15 delegates, five from each nation. Nine members were needed
to reach a quorum, at least three from each nation. The Zastupnički dom
consisted of 42 representatives, with two thirds from the Federation and one
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third from RS. To reach a quorum a majority was needed. To proclaim any
law the consent of both houses was required. Each nation had the right to
veto in case its vital interests were endangered. In that case, the president of
the Dom naroda had to immediately call a commission consisting of three
representatives whose task would be to solve the issue within five days. In
111
“Dayton Agreement: Annex 4 – Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,“
http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=372 (accessed 20th May, 2014)
75
case of failure, the issue was forwarded to the Constitutional Court.
Ministers and their deputies had to be of different nationalities in order
to secure control. The coordination of civil implementation was given to the
High Representative who was named by the Security Council. Foreign
bodies included in governing were the human rights attorney named by the
OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), the central
bank governor who was named by the International Monetary Fund with a
six year mandate and three of nine members of the Constitutional Court were
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to be named by the President of the European Human Rights Court.
76
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7.1 A security guarantee or a cause of instability?
The Dayton Agreement established the paradoxical formulation of „two
entities and three nations“. The Serbian nation has its own entity through
which it achieves its sovereign rights, and has the future possibility of
exercising its right of self-determination, which is a common topic to this
day. The ethnic division which was mostly opposed by the Bosniak
leadership continued to be visible and has even deepened further. Creating
77
this order was used by the USA as a guarantee of avoiding the deployment of
a large number of combat troops and avoiding financial expense in the case
of a further armed conflict. This kind of BiH was (and remains) sustainable
only because of the international protectorate and financing. BiH is unable to
function independently which is visible in the role of the High
Representative as an independent sovereign who can stop any decision,
which means that BiH is a country of limited sovereignty or a quasi-state.112
The BiH elites wish to retain their economic and social power, which they
try to achieve by preserving the current state of the country's division and
isolation.113
In general, the Vance-Owen plan and Dayton agreement had similar
features – federal arrangement and division of governmental powers between
the central and local/cantonal/ethnic institutions. The reason why the VanceOwen plan failed and Dayton agreement succeeded was the American will to
make peace under their own terms (and not European) and affirm themselves
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as the leading power in international politics.
All BiH elites remain unsatisfied with current position – Bosniaks and
Croats because they are not able to conduct their own policy without the
other side’s support due to complex constitutional mechanisms; Serbs
because of the impossibility to secede; “Others” because they cannot gain
112
David Chandler, Empire in Denial – The Politics of State-building (London – Ann Arbor:
Pluto Press, 2006): 34. See also the other author's book for the post-war BiH Bosnia – Faking
democracy after Dayton (London – Sterling, Virgina: Pluto Press, 2000)
113
Lučić, “Evolution,“ 171.
78
any significant position due to national key principle. The question remains
whether BiH will be able to transform itself into a functioning state and how
long the international community will be prepared to finance the current
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state.
79
8. The Erdut Agreement
After the return of the territories of Krajina and west Slavonia to the statelegal framework of Croatia, American President Bill Clinton stated that the
problem of Serb-held territories in eastern Slavonia had to be solved within
the framework of a solution to the conflict in BiH. The task of renewing
contacts with the local Serbs in the Danube basin was given to the American
ambassador Galbraith and to the UN's ambassador Stoltenberg. The meetings
between the representatives of the international community and the local
Serbian leadership were held during September and October in 1995 in
Erdut. As a starting point for a solution the Z-4 Plan was suggested, but the
situation changed significantly when the political autonomy of Serbs who
formed the majority in those areas before the war was called into question.
The Croatian delegation responded to the international mediators by noting
that the local Serbs had not formed a majority in any municipality in any
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prewar census and that a military action was not excluded. In early October,
the Croatian and Serbian delegations in Erdut managed to agree to the
acceptance of eleven agreement articles on solving the conflict. The question
of Croatian Podunavlje was meant to be solved before the start of the Dayton
negotiations, but this was rejected by Milošević probably so that he could
negotiate in case the talks somehow turned in an unexpected direction. One
of the reasons for finding a quick solution was the artillery bombardment of
80
Croatian areas from the territory of the BiH Serbs. 114 In considering the
implementation of a military operation a large number of military victims
was predicted, as well as the possible interference of the Army of Yugoslavia
and the bombings of Croatian cities, which resulted in the plan being
rejected.
Nevertheless,
the
USA
estimate
was
that
VJ
(Vojska
Jugoslavije/Army of Yugoslavia) will not intervene due to poor morale and
insufficient mobilization.115
At the request of the Croatian delegation in Dayton, on November 2,
the question of the reintegration of the Croatian Podunavlje was raised, and
both sides agreed to it on November 11. Opinions differed on the question of
the duration of the UN mandate in the transitional period. Finally it was
agreed that the UN mandate would last one year with the possibility of it
being extended for one more year in case one of the parties sought an
extension. Also, Croatian side searched for the guarantee that the Serbs from
other parts cannot move to the sector East because they were afraid that
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Milošević would send majority of Krajina refugees to settle down in the
sector East. 116 After reaching the agreement, Galbraith and Stoltenberg
travelled to the signing of the treaty in Erdut which occurred the next day.
Hrvoje Šarinić signed the treaty on behalf of the Croatian government, and
114
Bing, “Put do Erduta,“ 397-401.
“Resolving Sector East: By Pen or Sword,“ 6.
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1817859/1995-10-12B.pdf
116
Ibid., 4
115
81
Milan Milanović on behalf of the Serbian. According to the agreement, the
territory was to be under UN administration for a period of between one to
two years. The basic task of the UN was to organize a multinational police
force, organize local elections and conduct demilitarization. The agreement
was fulfilled in early 1998, which resulted in the establishment of the total
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territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia.117
117
Bing, “Put do Erduta,“ 401-403.
82
Conclusion
The calling of the first democratic elections in Yugoslavia with the
encouragement of the international community, especially of its European
part, for the purpose of democratization and transformation to a market
economy, led, in the eyes of the international community, to the unexpected
collapse of Yugoslavia.
International mediation during the war in the area of the former
Yugoslavia, observed in detail through the proposed peace plans, highlighted
a lack of consensus between the main members in key issues regarding the
prevention and conclusion of the war. Besides, it also highlighted the
weakness of the European part of the international community in imposing
its own solutions due to the lack of military capacity. The USA as a global
superpower had the potential to control the development of the war, refusing
to send combat troops which were requested by Europe and the UN to
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implement a peace process. By establishing the Vance Plan in Croatia, the
infirmity of international peace mediations via the UNPA zones was
revealed, since they were unable to complete their primary mission –
demilitarization, establishment of civil life and the return of refugees.
The war ended relatively shortly after the active involvement of the
USA in early 1994. American diplomacy was led by the simple principle of
forcing peace under physical threats of military force, in which the
83
conflicting sides were left merely with the details during negotiations. Also,
genocide in Srebrenica put international public pressure on the key actors to
end the war as soon as possible to stop the mass murder of civilian
population.
From the declassified intelligence documents it can be seen that they
were carefully selected and that they hide more than reveal. Nevertheless,
some general conclusions can be made. Firstly, the United States were
mostly concerned about restructuring themselves as the leader in
international politics after the end of Cold War. Secondly, they were willing
not to impose decisions if they would infringe relations with the other key
powers. Finally, their main concern was to establish peace under their own
conditions and to reaffirm themselves as the leading world power, although
they were not willing to risk and engage if more intense war broke out.
In conclusion, it can be said that the most important local perpetrators
of the war escaped justice. Croatian president Tuđman, Minister of defense
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Šušak and Mate Boban died soon after the war; Croatian generals Čermak,
Markač and Gotovina accused for the crimes in the operation “Storm” were
released by the ICTY; Krajina’s leader Babić was found hanged while on
trial; Serbian president Milošević died while on trial; head of the Serbian
State Security Service Jovica Stanišić and the head of the Special Forces of
State Security of Serbia Franko Simatović were released by the ICTY; Goran
Hadžić, Ratko Mladić, Radovan Karadžić and six BiH Croats are still on
84
trial; a former president of Republika Srpska Biljana Plavšić was sentenced
to eleven years, but released after six; only Krajina’s president Milan Martić
was sentenced to 35 years of prison from highest officials. States that
emerged after the collapse of Yugoslavia are mostly young democracies with
a lot of difficulties, with the exception of BiH which is under international
govern and cannot function independently. Finally, the war caused great
changes in demography of Croatia and BiH. Most Serbian population left or
was expelled from Croatia, while Croatian and Bosniak population was
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expelled from Eastern Bosnia.
85
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International Community Peace Plans in Croatia and Bosnia

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