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The International Institute for Strategic Studies
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The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
“Over its history, IISS has hosted invaluable conversations like the Shangri-La Dialogue and produced important scholarship,
and through all of that you have made our world more secure.”
Dr Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, United States
“This annual Dialogue has emerged as a premier forum for exchange of views from strategic thinkers, policymakers and
practitioners interested in the Asia-Pacific defence and security issues.”
Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State for Defence, India
“This very important conference, [a] conference at which the security of half of the global population is discussed.”
Dr Ursula von der Leyen, Federal Minister of Defence, Germany
THE IISS SHANGRI-LA DIALOGUE
Since the inception of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, this unique experiment in multilateral defence diplomacy
has involved, at one point or other, defence ministers, deputy ministers, chiefs of defence staff, national security advisers,
permanent undersecretaries, intelligence chiefs and other national security and defence officials from: Australia, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the
Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, TimorLeste, Tonga, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States and Vietnam.
The result has been the growth of the Shangri-La Dialogue into the richest collection of defence professionals in the
Asia-Pacific. The goal of the IISS is to ensure that the Shangri-La Dialogue will continue to serve as the best available
vehicle in the Asia-Pacific for developing and channelling astute and effective public policy on defence and security.
The IISS, a registered charity with offices in London, Washington, Manama and Singapore, is the world’s leading
authority on political–military conflict. It is the primary independent source of accurate, objective information
on international strategic issues. Publications include The Military Balance, an annual reference work on each
nation’s defence capabilities; Strategic Survey, an annual review of world affairs; Survival: Global Politics and Strategy,
a bi‑monthly journal on international affairs; Strategic Comments, offering online analysis of topical issues in
international affairs; and the Adelphi book series, the Institute’s principal contribution to policy-relevant, original
academic research.
The range of IISS publications, its convening power, and the Institute’s strong international policy perspective make
the IISS a key actor in the global strategic and economic debate.
THE 14TH IISS ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
THE 14TH IISS ASIA SECURITY SUMMIT
“The Shangri-La Dialogue is one of the region’s premier security fora, and importantly, in this context its focus is not limited to
the Asia-Pacific.”
Kevin Andrews, Minister for Defence, Australia
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This publication is also available
as an e-book at www.iiss.org.
The International Institute
for Strategic Studies
14th Asia Security Summit
SINGAPORE, 29–31 MAY 2015
The IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue
The IISS wishes to
thank these sponsors
of the IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue 2015
Foreword
China Sea. These debates were frank, yet notably
(IISS) is pleased to present this summary of the 14th
moderate in tone. There was much consensus on the
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, which we convened in
need for measures to prevent further escalation of
Singapore during 29–31 May 2015. This Dialogue was
maritime disputes.
marked by the strength of delegations from key par-
We thank the government of Singapore for its
ticipating states’ defence establishments, the fact that
continuing generous support for the IISS Shangri-La
many of the delegation leaders were participating for
Dialogue,
the first time, and the constructive nature of its discus-
Shangri-La Dialogue process under the terms of the
sions. As in previous years, the 2015 IISS Shangri-La
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreed in
Dialogue provided participating states’ defence minis-
May 2012. That MOU provided for the extension of
ters, permanent heads of ministries and military chiefs
the Singapore government’s support for the Dialogue
with unrivalled opportunities for candid exchanges of
to 2019, the establishment of two IISS Shangri-La
views on the current and emerging security challenges
Dialogue Senior Fellows for Asia-Pacific Security,
of the broad Asia-Pacific region. As well as the plenary
and for a IISS Shangri-La Dialogue publications pro-
sessions and special sessions, government delegations
gramme (including an annual Asia-Pacific Regional
participated in more than a hundred private bilateral
Security Assessment, the second issue of which was
and trilateral meetings with their counterparts from
distributed to all delegates at the 2015 Dialogue), and
other participating countries. Delegation leaders were
for a series of annual specialist workshops on regional
guests at a ministerial reception, and two ministerial
defence and security issues. As part of the expanded
luncheons hosted by Singapore’s Minister for Defence.
Shangri-La Dialogue process, the third IISS Fullerton
This report summarises the discussions that were open
Forum: the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting
to all delegates in the plenary and special sessions.
was convened successfully in January 2015, bringing
The full transcripts of all sessions, including ques-
together more than 60 delegates from 22 states that
tions and answers, are available on the IISS website.
regularly participate in the summit.
and
for
supporting
an
expanded
There was a particularly large cohort of approxi-
In addition, we express our gratitude to the fol-
mately 480 delegates, half of them from governments
lowing commercial, institutional and governmental
and armed forces. In 2015, 26 governments and
benefactors for their additional, vital financial sup-
the European Union sent delegations to the IISS
port: Airbus Group, The Asahi Shimbun, BAE Systems,
Shangri-La Dialogue, led in most cases by ministers
The Boeing Company, Lockheed Martin, Mitsubishi
or their equivalents. In addition, seven countries that
Corporation, Raytheon, and Singapore Technologies
were not regular Dialogue participants were repre-
Engineering. The IISS looks forward to developing
sented, three of them by full ministers.
these partnerships in the interests of further advancing
Aspects of the Dialogue that stood out this year
regional security dialogue and cooperation.
included a wide-ranging keynote address at the
opening dinner by Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee
Hsien Loong, and important discussions in plenary
sessions, particularly regarding the roles of the major
powers in regional security and tensions in the South
Dr John Chipman cmg,
IISS Director-General and Chief Executive
Dr Tim Huxley,
Executive Director, IISS–Asia
Foreword
5
Introduction
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue (originally known as
each annual Dialogue, the emphasis each year has
the ‘Asia Security Summit’) was initiated in 2002 in
been on the most important contemporary and emerg-
response to the evident need for a forum where Asia-
ing regional security challenges. At the 2015 IISS
Pacific defence ministers could engage in dialogue
Shangri-La Dialogue, there was – as in 2014 – a strong
aimed at building confidence and fostering practi-
emphasis in ministers’ addresses and discussions on
cal cooperation. Today, the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
inter-state security concerns. There was a particular
remains the only annual meeting for defence minis-
focus on the implications of China’s assertiveness in
ters from across the broad Asia-Pacific region. It also
relation to its maritime claims for other states’ inter-
convenes chiefs of defence staff, permanent heads of
ests. Plenary sessions heard much from ministers, and
defence ministries and (in a parallel meeting) intelli-
in subsequent question-and-answer sessions, about
gence chiefs from the region. It has established itself as
the need to enhance regional security cooperation, and
a key element of the emerging regional security archi-
there was near-unanimity on the desirability of China
tecture, and maintains its status as the most important
and ASEAN agreeing and implementing their long-
and inclusive gathering of top-level defence profes-
anticipated Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.
sionals in the Asia-Pacific. By providing an agenda that
However, there was also renewed emphasis on non-
responds specifically to their concerns and interests,
state challenges to security in the Asia-Pacific. Many
and by facilitating easy communication and fruitful
who spoke in plenary paid special attention to the
contact among them, the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue has
threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
helped to cultivate a sense of community among key
in the Middle East, which had found support among
policymakers in the defence and security establish-
a small minority of Muslims in other regions, includ-
ments of regional states and of those major powers
ing Southeast Asia. As in previous years, there was
with significant stakes in Asia-Pacific security. Since
widespread recognition of the huge dangers that nat-
the first IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, growing openness
ural disasters posed to human security in the region.
has characterised the summits discussions, and this
Whereas cooperation in relation to inter-state security
was evident at the fourteenth Dialogue in June 2015.
concerns was axiomatically a massive challenge, finding ways to collaborate in the face of shared security
challenges, notably in the realms of counter-terrorism
MANAGING REGIONAL TENSIONS,
CONFRONTING NEW CHALLENGES
and humanitarian assistance and disaster response,
Because of the Asia-Pacific region’s great geographical
implicitly as one which might offer a way of building
scope, the breadth of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue’s
confidence among states which might distrust each
membership across the region, and the sheer diversity
other over conventional security issues.
was widely recognised as an easier proposition and
of the region’s security challenges, the IISS has always
Since 2002 it has been tradition that the summit
ensured that the agenda for the Dialogue’s plenary
commences with a keynote address by a leading
and special sessions is wide-ranging. While there is
regional political figure at the opening dinner on
no confected overarching ‘theme’ for the agenda of
the Friday evening. In that year, Singapore’s Senior
Introduction
7
Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore; Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for
Defence, Singapore; and Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman of the
Council, IISS; and Dr John Chipman, Director-General and Chief Executive, IISS
Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, Minister of Defence, Malaysia; and
Dr Ursula von der Leyen, Federal Minister of Defence, Germany
Minister (later Minister Mentor) Lee Kuan Yew made
plenary, Japanese Defence Minister Gen Nakatani,
the keynote address, and in subsequent years Prime
Indonesian Minister of Defence General (retired)
Minister Lee Hsien Loong and Senior Minister (later
Ryamizard Ryacudu, and India’s Minister of State for
Emeritus Senior Minister) Goh Chok Tong deliv-
Defence Rao Inderjit Singh, presented their countries’
ered speeches. In 2009 Prime Minister Kevin Rudd
views on new forms of security collaboration in Asia.
of Australia was the first leader of a country other
In the third plenary session, the UK’s Secretary of
than Singapore to address the opening dinner. He
State for Defence, Michael Fallon, Malaysian Minister
was followed in 2010 by President Lee Myung-bak
of Defence Hishamuddin Hussein, and General
of the Republic of Korea, in 2011 by Prime Minister
Tea Banh, Cambodia’s Deputy Prime Minister and
Dato’ Sri Mohd Najib Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia,
Minister of National Defense, shared their views on
in 2012 by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
the prevention of conflict escalation.
from Indonesia, in 2013 by Prime Minister Nguyen
In the fourth plenary session, on the Sunday morn-
Tan Dung of Vietnam, and in 2014 by Prime Minister
ing of the Dialogue, Chinese Deputy Chief of the
Shinzo Abe of Japan. Abe emphasised that continued
General Staff Admiral Sun Jianguo, New Zealand’s
prosperity in Asia depended on ‘rock solid’ peace and
Minister of Defence Gerry Brownlee, and Germany’s
stability, which in turn required that ‘all countries
Federal Minister of Defence, Ursula von der Leyen,
must observe international law’. Appropriately, given
explained their perspectives on how regional secu-
that 2015 marks the fiftieth anniversary of Singapore’s
rity cooperation could be strengthened, and on the
independent statehood, Singapore Prime Minister Lee
options for more active conflict resolution and cooper-
Hsien Loong delivered the keynote address in 2015.
ation. In the fifth and final plenary session, Australian
Lee’s speech focused on three core themes which reso-
Minister of Defence Kevin Andrews, the European
nated throughout the summit: the regional balance of
Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
power, regional security cooperation, and terrorism.
Security Policy (and Vice President of the European
In the opening plenary session on Saturday morn-
Commission), Federica Mogherini, and Singapore’s
ing, US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter called for
Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen paid special
an inclusive approach for all in Asia to ‘rise, prosper
attention to the links between global security chal-
and win’, while reinforcing the message that the US
lenges and the Asia-Pacific region and the potential for
was determined to ‘rebalance’ to Asia. In the second
inter-regional cooperation in facing these challenges.
8
On the Dialogue’s Saturday afternoon, five special
sessions chaired by IISS senior staff and members of
the Institute’s governance bodies, convened to discuss
a range of more specialised topics: ‘Armed forces and
new terrorist threats’; ‘Energy security challenges in
the Indo-Pacific region’; ‘Challenges for maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance’; ‘Emerging
challenges to small state security in the Asia Pacific’;
and ‘Avoiding military competition and arms-racing in
Asia’. A total of twenty-three panellists, including ministers of defence and foreign affairs, deputy ministers,
high-ranking officials, senior military commanders
(including chiefs of defence), academic experts, and
– for the first time – representatives of industry presented opening comments, which were followed in
each session by lively discussions.
John Harris, Chief Executive Officer, Raytheon International; Patrick
Dewar, Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin International; and Kevin
Andrews, Minister of Defence, Australia
represented at a high level. Even at the first IISS
STRONG AND DIVERSE PARTICIPATION
BY GOVERNMENTS
Shangri-La Dialogue in 2002, 14 countries were rep-
Despite the increasing calls on the time and attention
or close equivalents. In 2015, 17 countries were repre-
of defence ministers, military chiefs, and top-ranking
sented at full ministerial level: Australia, Cambodia,
defence officials as a result of more recently estab-
Germany, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea,
lished series of meetings such as the ASEAN Defence
Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New
Ministers’ Meeting (and its offshoot, the ADMM-
Guinea, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand,
Plus), as well as a growing number of defence and
Timor-Leste, the United Kingdom and the United
security meetings in the Asia-Pacific region that
States. The European Union’s High Representative for
serve essentially national objectives (such as the
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (who is addition-
Xiangshan Forum, which China’s People’s Liberation
ally a Vice-President of the European Commission)
Army (PLA) convened for the fifth time in November
also participated. Deputy ministers, high-ranking
2014), governments have maintained – and in many
officials, or chiefs of defence led the delegations from
cases strengthened – their participation in the IISS
Bangladesh, Canada, China, India, Laos, Myanmar,
Shangri-La Dialogue, which has become institution-
Norway, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri
alised as a recurrent fixture in the diaries of defence
Lanka, Tonga, the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam.
ministers, permanent secretaries and military chiefs.
A notable feature of the 2015 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
resented by their defence ministers, deputy ministers,
Total delegate numbers increased from approxi-
was that many of the ministers who participated and
mately 160 in 2002, to 250 in 2006, 330 in 2010, 364
spoke were relatively new in their appointments
in 2013, and 451 in 2014. In 2015, delegate numbers
and were at the Dialogue for the first time as princi-
increased to more than 490 as a result of the IISS making
pals. These included US Secretary of Defense Ashton
determined efforts to increase participation by senior
Carter, who had previously attended the Dialogue as
officials concerned with security matters from foreign
an academic delegate.
ministries and national security secretariats, and also
As has become the case each year, there was much
to increase the numbers of female and media delegates.
interest among governments, the expert community
From the Dialogue’s beginning, many key national
and in the media over China’s level of participation.
players in the Asia-Pacific ensured that they were
Commensurate with China’s international status,
Introduction
9
General Liang Guanglie, then Minister of National
Defence, led a strong PLA delegation to the 2011
summit, at which he spoke in a solo plenary session. General Liang’s participation indicated China’s
acknowledgement of both the permanence and the
utility of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue as a platform
for what might be called ‘strategic communication’
in the Asia-Pacific region. Regrettably, China was not
represented at a senior level at the IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue in 2012, due to domestic concerns associated with the generational handover of leadership of
the Chinese Communist Party that year. But Chinese
assurances that Beijing would again be represented at
a higher level were subsequently borne out at the 2013
Dialogue. In that year, Lieutenant-General Qi Jianguo,
who had been appointed as a Deputy Chief, General
Michael Fallon, Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom; and Lui
Tuck Yew, Second Minister for Defence, Singapore
Staff Department in 2012, led a particularly strong
delegation including two two-star and three one-star
China’s official position and other Chinese view-
officers, thus restoring the level of Chinese participa-
points on regional security matters to be heard clearly.
tion to that which prevailed from 2007 to 2010. At the
Reflecting the importance that China now assigns to
2014 IISS Shangri-la Dialogue, the PLA sent an equally
the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, Beijing chose to publish
strong delegation, led by another Deputy Chief,
its latest defence White Paper, China’s Military Strategy,
Lieutenant-General Wang Guanzhong, with approxi-
just three days before the 2015 Dialogue commenced,
mately the same composition as in the previous year.
and the Chinese delegation presented the first copies to
During preparations for 2015 IISS Shangri-La
be given to foreigners to IISS Directing Staff on 27 May.
Dialogue, the IISS engaged particularly closely with
Other key participant countries, such as Australia,
the Ministry of National Defence in Beijing, including
Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia,
through the medium of the third IISS Fullerton Forum:
New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States
the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue Sherpa Meeting in
– and, of course, Singapore, the host nation – have for
Singapore in January 2015, with the intent of securing
many years sent strong delegations led by ministers to
the best-possible PLA representation. China’s confi-
the Dialogue. Other governments, have strengthened
dence that a strong participation in the IISS Shangri-La
their contingents over time. In 2015, it was notable
Dialogue served its interests was evident, as Beijing
that Cambodia, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam,
sent its largest delegation to date, led by first Admiral
as well as China, sent particularly full delegations.
Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief, General Staff Department,
European interest in the Dialogue has grown stead-
who as a four-star officer was a rank senior to previ-
ily, and in 2015 Switzerland’s foreign-affairs minister
ous General Staff Department officers who had led
and Spain’s defence minister each participated for the
Chinese delegations. The PLA contingent comprised
first time, as did strong ministerial-level delegations
no fewer than 18 delegates, including five two-star
from the European Union, Germany and the United
officers. The civilian Chinese presence at the Dialogue
Kingdom. However, the IISS is conscious that some
was also impressive, and included leading academics
countries with important regional security roles (most
in the field of international relations and representa-
notably, India) were not represented at full ministerial
tives of top defence and security think-tanks, as well
level in 2015, and will continue to encourage the gov-
as influential media delegates. Overall, this strong
ernments in question to play a stronger role in future
military and non-governmental representation allowed
IISS Shangri-La Dialogues.
10
The extent to which the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
and in the air; enhanced intelligence, surveillance and
has become an important fixture in the calendars
reconnaissance capabilities to protect international
of the defence and security establishments of Asia-
sea lanes; and the improvement of disaster-response
Pacific states and outside powers has been evident in
capabilities.
the participation of national delegations in spite of
Government delegations to the IISS Shangri-La
domestic political upheavals and occasional crises.
Dialogue have increasingly used it as a venue for pri-
In 2014, despite the military coup in Thailand only
vate bilateral and trilateral meetings. The Institute is
eight days before the Dialogue commenced, that
aware of 67 bilateral meetings in the Shangri-La Hotel
country was represented by a strong delegation led
during the Dialogue weekend and more than 100
by the Permanent Secretary and Acting Minister of
such meetings in total. The detailed content of these
Foreign Affairs, Sihasak Phuangketkeow, who was
meetings, which have become more numerous each
accompanied by the defence ministry’s permanent
year, has naturally remained confidential. Over time,
secretary, the deputy chief of defence forces, and
though, they have become more transparent, with
senior officials from his own ministry. In 2015, the
governments often divulging at least elements of their
United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defence,
substance in public statements. Among the bilateral
Michael Fallon, spoke at the Dialogue despite the fact
meetings held on the sidelines of the 2015 Dialogue,
that the new British government had been formed
US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter met with min-
less than three weeks earlier.
isters from each of the United States’ regional allies
Over the years, the unique IISS Shangri-La
and security partners. US discussions with the Chinese
Dialogue culture of frank, open debate has helped
delegation were convened at a lower level, with
to foster and facilitate substantive cooperation on
David Shear, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian
important security issues, and ministers have used
and Pacific Affairs, meeting Admiral Sun Jianguo to
the Dialogue as a platform from which to propose
discuss preparations for the US–China defence dia-
and advance initiatives in areas as diverse as maritime
logue scheduled to take place in Washington DC in
security cooperation in the Malacca Strait, the analysis
June 2015. China’s delegation also had discussions
of the implications of regional states’ expanding sub-
with Japanese defence officials, focusing on potential
marine capabilities, the regional proliferation of small
improvements to communications between the PLA
arms and light weapons, the structure of the regional
and the Japan Self-Defense Forces. In addition, the
security architecture, and the idea of a ‘no first use
Japanese and Korean defence ministers met bilaterally
of force’ agreement in the South China Sea. In 2014,
for the first time since 2011, as well as trilaterally with
the Chinese delegation leader, Lieutenant-General
the US defense secretary. In the fifth trilateral meet-
Wang Guanzhong, called for deepened dialogue and
ing between the US defense secretary and the defence
exchanges between regional states’ defence establish-
ministers of Australia and Japan, the three principals
ments, including through the ASEAN-China Defence
exchanged views on North Korea, expressed serious
Ministers’ Meeting, scheduled for 2015, including
concern over Chinese land-reclamation activities in
closer cooperation on counter-terrorism, disaster
the South China Sea, and discussed enhanced ‘practi-
relief and maritime security, and the more effective
cal trilateral defence cooperation’.
management of ‘differences’ through strengthened
The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue has remained
communication among regional countries. In 2015,
above all a ‘Track One’ inter-governmental meeting.
US Secretary of Defense Carter launched a Southeast
However, participation by non-official delegates has
Asia Maritime Security Initiative aimed at build-
from the beginning served to animate and enrich the
ing regional states’ capabilities. Japan’s Minister of
summit’s proceedings, particularly through the ques-
Defense, Gen Nakatani, proposed what he called the
tions such delegates regularly pose to ministerial and
‘Shangri-la Dialogue Initiative’, comprising three ele-
other speakers in the plenary and special sessions.
ments: the promotion of common rules and laws at sea
Many of the non-official delegates at the Dialogue in
Introduction
11
the 2015 Dialogue, ASEAN, INTERPOL, NATO and
the OSCE were all represented. The NATO delegation
was particularly strong and included the Chairman
of the NATO Military Committee and the Supreme
Allied Commander Transformation.
From the time of the first Dialogue in 2002, to which
then-Senator Chuck Hagel led a strong, bipartisan US
Congressional Delegation (CODEL), the IISS has been
particularly keen to involve legislators with strong
defence, security and foreign-affairs interests. In 2015,
Senator John McCain, Chairman of the US Senate
Armed Services Committee, led a strong CODEL
including four other Senators and three senior staffers. Senator McCain, flanked by his fellow members
Dr Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, United States; and Dr Ng Eng Hen,
Minister for Defence, Singapore
of the Armed Services Committee, spoke at a CODEL
press conference on the US role in the Asia-Pacific.
Others legislators among the delegates were Reinhard
2015 were leading academics and think-tank analysts at
Bütikofer (Member, European Parliament), Ichita
the forefront of debate on Asia-Pacific security, includ-
Yamamoto (Member, Japan’s House of Councillors),
ing a number of younger delegates participating for
and Lord Powell of Bayswater (Member, House of
the first time. The IISS was pleased that Global Voices
Lords, United Kingdom).
was again able to sponsor the participation of new delegates from Australia. There was also a strong cohort
of media delegates including columnists and bloggers
Looking ahead
on regional security affairs, as well as business repre-
Bringing the 2015 IISS Shangri-La Dialogue to a
sentatives. For the first time, speakers from the private
close, IISS Director-General and Chief Executive Dr
sector were invited to join the panels of two of the
John Chipman said the IISS was ‘delighted as co-host
Dialogue’s special sessions. By refreshing each year the
that many of the ministers used the platform of the
ranks of non-governmental delegates, and by making
Shangri-La Dialogue to test ideas or to make specific
constant efforts to increase their diversity from across
policy proposals’. He said that some of the results of
the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, awareness of the
the summit ‘will emerge over the months to come’. In
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue has continuously expanded
all, 38 countries and international organisations were
in the wider policy community. In addition, the IISS
represented. He noted that the dates for the next IISS
has made efforts to involve senior representatives of
Shangri-La Dialogue had already been decided on:
relevant international and inter-state institutions. At
3–5 June 2016.
12
The IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue
chapter 1
Keynote address and
opening dinner
Friday 29 May 2015, 20:00
SPEAKER
Lee Hsien Loong
Prime Minister of Singapore
Keynote address and opening dinner
Introducing Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, IISS
In his address, Prime Minister Lee noted that 2015
Director-General and Chief Executive Dr John Chipman
is the fiftieth anniversary of his country’s separation
highlighted ‘strategic unease’ as a defining characteristic
from Malaysia. This was a good time, he said, to ‘step
of the contemporary Asia-Pacific region. A condition of
back and … look at what has changed over the past 50
flux defined relations among states, and tentative secu-
years’, focusing on three issues that had been on the
rity alignments and strategic hedging were prevalent.
agenda of the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue since it was
Dr Chipman noted that the first half of 2015 had seen
first convened in 2002: ‘the balance of power, regional
renewed tensions in the South China Sea, with various
cooperation, and terrorism’.
claimant states engaging in large-scale land reclama-
Lee said that, while the Obama administration had
tion and construction. The last week, he remarked, had
reaffirmed the United States’ role as a Pacific power
seen the release of a Chinese defence White Paper that
through its ‘strategic rebalance’, the balance of power
was ‘sure to be viewed as a foundational text for a more
in Asia was shifting, particularly as a result of China’s
extrovert Chinese defence policy’. The most important
growing economic power and influence, as well as its
overarching question facing security policymakers in
military build-up. He said that the US–China relation-
the Asia-Pacific concerned the type of regional order
ship was ‘the key’ to China’s peaceful rise, arguing
that would best assure ‘long-term peace and stability’.
that this relationship was ‘not a zero-sum game’: it
More than ever, he said, Asia-Pacific states and their
includes ‘many interdependencies and opportuni-
extra-regional partners needed to think strategically
ties’. The prime minister emphasised that no Asian
about their long-term interests.
country wanted to choose sides between the US and
Lee Hsien Loong, Prime
Minister of Singapore
14
Lee Hsien Loong, Prime
Minister of Singapore
China, and that ‘we are glad that successive US admin-
maritime disputes were handled, said the prime min-
istrations and … Chinese leaderships have engaged’
ister. While these disputes were likely to ‘outlive the
with each other. While peaceful competition between
Shangri-La Dialogue’, they needed to be contained in
these two major powers across the region was to be
order to avoid ‘bad outcomes’. Lee argued that China
expected, it was important that they should not divide
and ASEAN should conclude their Code of Conduct
the region into two spheres of influence, which would
on the South China Sea ‘as soon as possible’ and that
circumscribe other countries’ options and increase the
adherence to international law, including the UN
risk of rivalry and conflict. A more desirable form of
Convention on the Law of the Sea, would be ‘the best
competition would involve China ‘deepening its coop-
outcome’. In contrast, an outcome determined by
eration and making friends all over Asia’. The prime
‘might is right’ would set ‘a bad precedent’, even if a
minister noted that the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
physical clash was avoided. In the long term, a stable
would give substance to the US rebalance to Asia.
regional order would require ‘consent and legiti-
While there is ‘clearly a competitive dynamic’ between
macy’ as well as a balance of power.
the TPP and China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment
Regarding Japan, Lee said that even 70 years after
Bank (AIIB) initiative, Lee noted that Singapore hoped
its end, the Second World War continued to ‘cast a
that ‘eventually China will join the TPP, and the US
shadow’ over Japan’s relations with its neighbours
and Japan will join the AIIB’.
China and Korea. In Lee’s view, Japan ‘needs to
In a different model of competition, however,
acknowledge past wrongs’, particularly regarding spe-
‘unhappy outcomes’ might be ‘tougher to avoid’. The
cific issues such as ‘comfort women’ and the Nanjing
disputes in the East China Sea and South China Sea
Massacre. But, for their part, Japan’s neighbours ‘need
have ‘heated up significantly’. In the South China
to accept Japan’s acknowledgements and not demand
Sea, ‘claimant states are taking unilateral actions in
that Japan apologises over and over again’. Given the
the disputed areas, drilling for oil and gas, reclaim-
way that historical controversy has impeded Prime
ing land, setting up outposts and reinforcing their
Minister Abe’s desire for Japan to play a more active
military presence’. The US had responded with
role in Asia, such reconciliation would help Japan to
‘increased overflights and sailings’ near the dis-
‘become a normal country’. Mr Lee also expressed
puted territories. Non-claimant Asian countries,
hope that India could ‘make a big contribution’
including Singapore, had a stake in how the region’s
through a deepening partnership with the rest of Asia.
15
Turning to the question of regional cooperation
ment centre’ for ISIS, and ISIS has said it intends to
and integration, Lee remarked that, compared with
establish a wilayat (province) of its intended global
50 years earlier when there were relatively few links
caliphate there. While this was a ‘pie-in-the-sky’
between Asian countries, the region is now ‘coming
idea, it was ‘not so far-fetched’ that it could estab-
closer together’. However, Southeast Asia’s latest
lish a physical base somewhere in the region. For its
humanitarian crisis, involving ‘the human trafficking
part, Singapore ‘takes terrorism, and in particular
of Rohingyas and Bangladeshis’, had put ‘huge stress’
ISIS, very, very seriously’ and is participating in the
on Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. A ‘response at
international coalition against the organisation. The
the source’, as well as at sea, was necessary in order to
prime minister announced that the Singapore air
find a solution.
force’s deployment of an in-flight refuelling aircraft
ASEAN was building ‘a framework of coopera-
to the coalition ‘starts today’.
tion in the broader region’, using mechanisms such
Concluding his address, Lee asserted his hope that
as the ASEAN Regional Forum, the ASEAN Defence
in 50 years’ time ‘a stable regional balance’ will con-
Ministers’ Meeting, and the East Asia Summit (EAS).
tinue, that ASEAN would be ‘an effective and relevant
With its broad membership, said Lee, the EAS ‘ties
actor’, that ‘there will be free trade in the Asia-Pacific
together the two sides of the Pacific’, reducing the risk
instead of the current alphabet soup of trading
of ‘an East Asian bloc … which might split the Pacific
arrangements’, and that it should not be the case that
down the middle’. But strong nationalist sentiments
‘might is right’.
and some governments’ domestic preoccupations
implied that ‘we have our work cut out’ to ensure that
regional cooperation continues to develop.
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
On terrorism, Lee noted that the Islamic State
To a question from Republic of Korea’s Ambassador
of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) was ‘the latest virulent
for National Security Affairs, Dr Chung Min Lee,
incarnation of the jihadi threat’, and that it had
about how China’s rise as a military power should
attracted ‘malcontents and misfits, misguided souls
be managed, the prime minister replied that China
and naïve youths from all over the world’. Jihadis
was preoccupied with domestic problems and that all
returning to their home countries posed serious
Southeast Asian countries wanted to have ‘good rela-
security risks, as did the prospect of ‘lone-wolf’
tions’ with China despite the ‘problem’ of the South
attackers. Southeast Asia, he said, is ‘a key recruit-
China Sea. Answering Chinese People’s Liberation
Dr Chung Min Lee, Ambassador for National Security
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea;
Professor of International Relations, Graduate
School of International Studies, Yonsei University
16
Colonel Lu Yin, Associate Research Fellow, Strategic
Teaching and Research Department, National
Defense University, People’s Liberation Army
Haruhisa Takeuchi, Ambassador of Japan to
Singapore
Army Colonel Lu Yin’s question about how Singapore
levels’. Asked by Japan’s Ambassador to Singapore,
might help promote China–US relations, Lee said that
Haruhisa Takeuchi, for his reflections on Singapore’s
as ‘a very small country’, Singapore could play only
achievements and future, Lee emphasised Singapore’s
a ‘modest’ role, while noting that the IISS Shangri-La
advantages as a small state that could implement
Dialogue was useful as a place where China and the
policy changes relatively quickly, and also the bene-
US could talk to each other. But China and the US
fits from its ‘credible’ and ‘professional’ armed forces,
also needed to communicate directly ‘at the highest
which provided security.
17
18
The IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue
chapter 2
first plenary session
The United States
and challenges to
Asia-Pacific security
Saturday 30 May 2015, 09:00
SPEAKER
Dr Ashton Carter
Secretary of Defense, United States
First plenary session
The United States and challenges
to Asia-Pacific security
Dr Ashton Carter,
Secretary of Defense,
United States
In the first plenary session, on the Dialogue’s
agreements and are working on a measure to prevent
Saturday morning, on ‘The United States and chal-
dangerous air-to-air encounters.
lenges to Asia-Pacific security’, US Secretary of
Carter raised an issue of contention with China
Defense Dr Ashton Carter promoted the vision of
concerning its activities in the South China Sea. He
a shared regional architecture in the Asia-Pacific
noted that several nations that claim parts of that sea
region in which ‘all nations have the opportu-
have developed outposts over the years. Yet China has
nity to rise and prosper’. The US rebalance toward
gone ‘much further and faster than any other’; in just
Asia-Pacific is aimed at helping the region fulfil its
the past 18 months, China has reclaimed over 2,000
promise, Carter said. The next phase of the rebalance
acres, more than all other claimants combined. This
includes new military platforms as well as economic
was a source of tension.
and diplomatic engagement. He extolled the Trans-
Expressing deep concern about the pace and
Pacific Partnership trade agreement, which recently
scope of the land reclamation, the prospect for
passed an important milestone in winning congres-
further militarisation and the potential for these
sional approval.
activities to lead to miscalculation or conflict, Carter
Carter announced that the US Department of
called for an immediate and lasting end to land rec-
Defense is launching a new Southeast Asia Maritime
lamation by all claimants. Washington also opposes
Security Initiative to help build capacity. In enumer-
the construction of military structures on reclaimed
ating enhanced cooperation with several US partners
land. He encouraged ASEAN and China to con-
in the region, he said that in late 2014 America and
clude their Code of Conduct on the South China Sea
China had reached two ‘historic’ confidence-building
this year.
20
The US will continue to protect freedom of naviga-
he said, was that many nations in the region conse-
tion and overflight, Carter said, and to ‘fly, sail, and
quently want to strengthen their relationships with the
operate wherever international law allows’. Making it
US and other partners. Carter said, ‘this kind of behav-
clear that America ‘would not be deterred from exer-
iour, if it does not stop, one of the consequences will be
cising these rights’, he said ‘turning an underwater
the continued coalescing of concerned nations around
rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights
the region and the world’. Josh Rogin, columnist for
of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international
Bloomberg View, asked about North Korea’s growing
air or maritime transit’. China’s actions in the South
nuclear arsenal and whether Carter, as the perceived
China Sea put it out of step with the international rules
‘new leader of the Asia portfolio’ in the Obama
and norms that underscore the Asia-Pacific security
Administration planned to reinvigorate what many
architecture, he added.
feel is a ‘failed policy of strategic patience’. Correcting
Rogin, Carter said Obama is the leader of the policy,
and noted that it is a policy of seven decades of suc-
cessive administrations to build a principled security
Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman of the IISS
system in Asia based on norms, and not coercion.
Council, asked Carter about his understanding of
While the effort to achieve a nuclear-weapons-free
China’s purpose in its activities in the South China Sea
environment on the Korean Peninsula had not yet suc-
and what China’s continued pursuits there said about
ceeded, the policy has united the five key countries in
the effectiveness of the US response. Carter said China
their opposition to nuclear proliferation.
could speak for itself as to its purpose, and he repeated
Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, Deputy Director-
that America’s call for a halt to reclamation activities
General, China–US Defense Relations Research Center,
and to further militarisation was not directed only at
Academy of Military Science, PLA, called Carter’s
China. Yoichi Kato, National Security Correspondent
criticism of China’s island and reef construction
for Japan’s Asahi Shimbun, noted that China has not
activities ‘groundless and not constructive’. Freedom
responded to previous rhetorical appeals to stop rec-
of navigation in the South China Sea has never been
lamation activity and asked if it was not time for the
affected, he said, and China has never taken any ‘pro-
US to take its response to a new phase in order to deter
active measures’ through construction activities that
low intensity provocations. Rephrasing the question,
affect peace and stability. To the contrary, ‘over the
Carter suggested that one consider the effect of failing
past decades, the region has been peaceful and stable
to resolve the disputes in a peaceful way. The answer,
because of China’s great restraint’. He called China’s
Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman of the
Council, IISS; Special Adviser, Fondation pour la
Recherche Stratégique
Yoichi Kato, National Security Correspondent,
The Asahi Shimbun
Josh Rogin, Columnist,
Bloomberg View
First plenary session
21
Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, Deputy DirectorGeneral, China–US Defense Relations Research
Center, Academy of Military Science, China
Professor Kishore Mahbubani, Dean and Professor in
the Practice of Public Policy, Lee Kuan Yew School of
Public Policy, National University of Singapore
Senator Dan Sullivan, Member, Armed Services
Committee, US Senate
activities in the region ‘legitimate, reasonable and jus-
the US does not see the situation in terms of having
tified’. He asked if America’s harsh criticism, military
‘allowed China to rise’. Rather, the US was part of a
reconnaissance activities and military threats help to
regional system of peace and stability wherein China
resolve disputes in the South China Sea and maintain
could peacefully develop its economy. He repeated
peace and stability in the region. In response, Carter
his theme of ‘creating an environment in which every-
repeated that land reclamation in the South China Sea
body can rise and win’. He was personally committed
was not limited to China, but that China’s recent large-
to working with China’s government and military on
scale activities are unprecedented. He said America’s
confidence-building measures. Senator Dan Sullivan,
air and sea operations in this maritime region have
Member of the US Senate Armed Services Committee,
taken place for decades and would continue. Nor was
reinforced a point Carter had mentioned about the
it new, he said, when the ‘free press of the West covers
strong bipartisan support in the US for the rebalance
large-scale reclamation activities’. Professor Kishore
toward Asia-Pacific. Sullivan asked Carter to expand
Mahbubani, Dean and Professor in the Practice of
on the potential with regard to energy security and
Public Policy, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy,
broader security in the region of the US energy
National University of Singapore, commented that
revolution. Carter noted that the domestic energy rev-
the US had done a ‘remarkable job of managing’ the
olution was rapidly turning the US from a net energy
rise of China through its benevolent actions. As China
consumer to a net energy producer, but this did not
keeps rising, however, strategic adjustments will have
change the fact that for China, Japan and other coun-
to be made. He asked what these adjustments are
tries, oil-tanker transit through the Malacca Strait was
likely to be and what additional confidence-building
a vital lifeline. It was thus important to ensure free-
measures would be needed. Carter responded that
dom of navigation.
22
The IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue
chapter 3
second plenary session
New forms of
security collaboration
in Asia
SPEAKERS
Gen Nakatani
Minister of Defense, Japan
General (Retd) Ryamizard Ryacudu
Minister of Defense, Indonesia
Rao Inderjit Singh
Minister of State for Defence, India
Second plenary session
New forms of security
collaboration in Asia
Gen Nakatani, Minister
of Defense, Japan
In the second plenary session, on ‘New forms of
in the East China Sea. He called for agreement on a
security collaboration in Asia’, ministers from Japan,
Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.
Indonesia and India offered their thoughts on threats
Minister Nakatani set out Japan’s ideas for future
to regional security and proposed new mechanisms
security collaboration based around three pillars. The
for collaboration on dealing with them. Gen Nakatani,
first of these was the Japan–US Alliance, which had
Japan’s Minister of Defense, said that although mul-
recently been updated with revised Guidelines for
tilateral security cooperation in Asia was often seen
Japan–US Defense Cooperation. These would enable
as lagging behind Europe’s, the region had enjoyed
seamless cooperation with the US to ensure regional
peace since the end of the Cold War in spite of serious
stability, and in domains such as cyber security and
security challenges. This success story was the result
space, and would foster cooperation with other
of a combination of factors, including the solidarity
partners. The second pillar was Japan’s own efforts
of ASEAN and the various multilateral forums con-
to pursue regional peace and prosperity, deriving
structed around it, as well as the bilateral alliances and
from its ‘deep remorse’ over the Second World War.
military presence of the United States. ASEAN should
Legislation before parliament would allow Japan to
remain at the centre of regional security.
contribute more actively.
However, Nakatani described as deeply regretta-
The third pillar was closer cooperation with
ble that ‘at this very moment, vast land reclamation
regional countries. In this context, Nakatani pro-
and construction of sea ports and airstrips are being
posed a Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative (SLDI), under
conducted at a rapid pace in the South China Sea.’ In
which nations would promote common rules both
addition, there were attempts to change the status quo
at sea and in the air. This would firstly ensure safety
24
General (Retd)
Ryamizard Ryacudu,
Minister of Defense,
Indonesia
and freedom of navigation and overflight. Nakatani
was using moderate Islamic organisations to spread
gave the example of joint exercises using the Code for
peaceful religious teaching, while keeping alert to
Unplanned Encounters at Sea, such as those recently
threats and interrupting logistical support to terror-
completed by Japan and the Philippines. Measures to
ist groups. There was also a need for ASEAN leaders
prevent accidents involving submarines must also be
to address the humanitarian issue of the Rohingya
considered. Secondly, the SLDI would enhance safety
boat people. Meanwhile, the Nepal earthquake
in sea lanes and air-traffic routes. Nakatani noted
had once again shown the need for quick regional
that the Malaysian airliner that disappeared in 2014
responses to disasters.
had still not been found, demonstrating the need for
It was necessary to think one step ahead in order
a system to monitor and control regional aerospace
to ward off each threat to regional security. ASEAN
around the clock.
has developed various mechanisms to deal with secu-
Thirdly, the SLDI would improve disaster response
rity issues, including its ADMM and ADMM-Plus
capability, specifically by streamlining procedures for
meetings, which had been acknowledged as models.
rapid deployment of aircraft carrying emergency relief
But according to the minister, ‘a vast new form of
and establishing rules for their admission to stricken
security collaboration in Asia is inevitable … because
areas. Japan, Nakatani said, was determined to put the
a security incident that hits a nation will at the same
SLDI into practice.
time affect other neighbouring countries as well as the
General (retired) Ryamizard Ryacudu, Indonesia’s
international community.’ For example, an incident
Minister of Defense, said ASEAN had evolved into
in the Malacca Strait would affect not only Indonesia,
a ‘family organisation that exerts the spirit of broth-
Malaysia and Singapore, but also East Asia, Europe, the
erhood among member states’. Members were able
Middle East and North America. Another example was
to solve their differences with each other, but faced
the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), which had
common challenges such as terrorism, radicalisation,
affected both regional and international communities.
natural disasters, pandemic disease, piracy, insur-
New forms of collaboration would improve on
gency, cyber attacks and drug smuggling. Structures
existing structures, without adding more organisa-
and mechanisms of cooperation were needed to tackle
tions. What was needed was ‘a new concept, new
these threats.
culture and understanding.’ Talks were needed to find
A regional strategy was needed to address terrorist threats and radicalism. For its part, Indonesia
a solution to South China Sea disputes, and Ryacudu
suggested joint patrols among stakeholders.
25
Rao Inderjit Singh,
Minister of State for
Defence, India
Rao Inderjit Singh, Minister of State for Defence,
was one example, as was the SIMBEX naval exercises
India, said regional security threats were taking on
with Singapore. In 2008, India established the Indian
new forms, and they demanded a stronger and more
Ocean Naval Symposium, which by 2015 brought
innovative security architecture.
together 35 navies to enhance understanding of mari-
The growth of terrorism and religious extremism
posed the greatest threat. The rise of ISIS had shown
time challenges and develop collective capacities to
address them.
the need for intelligence-sharing and collaboration
Other areas for improved cooperation included dis-
between different countries’ police and immigration
aster relief, evacuation of nationals trapped in conflict,
authorities. However, new forms of collaboration had
and challenges in the cyber domain. Public transport,
also arisen because security was being defined in a
electricity distribution and banking systems could all
more comprehensive manner than before to include
be threatened ‘if there are chinks in our cyber secu-
food, energy, water, information and navigation.
rity’. Extremists’ use of the internet and social media
Newer forms of cooperation were based on regular, structured dialogue between nations rather than
to radicalise recruits also required law-enforcement
agencies to work together.
on formal alliances: examples included ASEAN and
the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. ‘ASEAN is
without doubt the best example of a forum that pro-
motes an environment of shared security in its region
In the question-and-answer session, delegates noted a
through a transparent, open and inclusive dialogue,’
proliferation of new cooperation initiatives. Not only
Singh said. India had expanded its engagement with
was there the Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative proposed
ASEAN to a full strategic partnership under which it
by Nakatani, there was also a South East Asia Maritime
would play a more active role in helping to address
Security Initiative from US Defence Secretary Ashton
threats in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.
Carter and, more recently, a South China Sea Peace
Amidst growing threats to freedom of navigation,
Initiative proposed by Taiwan’s president. Aiko Doden
India was creating a robust system of coastal surveil-
of NHK Japan Broadcasting Corporation noted that in
lance and monitoring, and was collaborating with
spite of Ryacudu’s description of ASEAN’s coopera-
partner countries to share experiences, conduct exer-
tion, there had been differences between members, and
cises and exchange information. A joint coastguard
it was now facing issues such the South China Sea dis-
exercise between India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives
putes and Rohingya refugees. She asked how ASEAN
26
Aiko Doden, Senior Commentator, NHK Japan
Broadcasting Corporation
PS Suryanarayana, Editor, Current Affairs,
Institute of South Asian Studies, National
University of Singapore
Dr Chikako Ueki, Professor, International
Relations, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies,
Waseda University
could evolve into an organisation of true strength.
tion organisations. Dr Chikako Uedi from Waseda
PS Suryanarayana, Institute of South Asian Studies,
University asked Minister Nakatani to elaborate on the
National University of Singapore, asked whether
Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative that he had mentioned,
India–US–Japan security cooperation would extend to
and asked if Japan and the US would share maritime
the South China Sea, and whether India and the US
domain awareness information with other countries
planned joint patrols in the South China Sea as part
in the region. Nakatani replied that the Shangri-La
of their recent moves to enhance security cooperation.
Dialogue Initiative involved three main elements:
On the latter point, Singh responded that specifics of
more common rules in the air and at sea, including the
the new strategic partnership had not been worked
regional implementation of the Code for Unplanned
out, but that the US and India ‘would take all steps
Encounters at Sea; the preservation of air and sea
to ensure peace in the region’. On ASEAN, Ryacudu
safety, including greater sharing of air - and maritime-
reiterated that member countries were able to settle
traffic data; and common rules for facilitating disaster
every difference among themselves, and he hoped
response. He said that air and maritime information
it would be a role model for other regional-coopera-
should be shared ‘as much as possible’.
27
28
The IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue
chapter 4
third plenary session
Preventing conflict
escalation
SPEAKERS
Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein
Minister of Defence, Malaysia
General Tea Banh
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National
Defense, Cambodia
Michael Fallon
Secretary of State for Defence, United Kingdom
third plenary session
Preventing conflict escalation
Dato’ Seri
Hishammuddin Tun
Hussein, Minister of
Defence, Malaysia
Opening the third plenary session, on ‘Preventing
today’s complex and uncertain world, one set of tools
conflict escalation’, Malaysian Minister of Defence
and one strategic mindset were not enough.
Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein said that
Southeast Asia faced three flashpoints. The first
the topic of discussion gave rise to both optimism
was the Rohingya refugee crisis. Malaysia had taken a
and pessimism: optimism, because it suggested that
leadership role in providing the Rohingyas with tem-
it lay within our power to prevent conflict; pessi-
porary shelter and protection, but this issue required
mism, because it suggested conflicts were inevitable.
a just and comprehensive settlement at the source and
Existing conflicts in the Middle East, Europe and
had to be resolved in ‘the ASEAN way’.
Africa appeared not only to be unresolved but looked
So far the focus had been on the second flashpoint,
set to get worse. Peace and stability remained crucial
defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)
for Southeast Asia and the world. Conflicts elsewhere
in Syria and Iraq, but ISIS had established a foothold
could spread to the region, so Southeast Asia had a
in other regions, including Southeast Asia, where
strong stake in conflict prevention.
some 30 groups had pledged allegiance to it. Two hun-
Shifts in technology had created an unpredict-
dred Malaysians had joined ISIS in Syria and a further
able threat environment. It had become conventional
100 had been arrested for supporting ISIS. There was
wisdom to emphasise non-state threats. This broadly
a need for vigilance and cooperation to prevent the
conveyed the current reality, but the risk of state
establishment of an ISIS caliphate and to combat ISIS
threats could not be ignored. Policymakers risked
ideology by addressing the social and political con-
falling into habits of mind shaped by existing trends
cerns of vulnerable young people and enhancing their
and failing to give attention to longer-term issues. In
sense of dignity.
30
General Tea Banh,
Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of
National Defense,
Cambodia
The third, most serious, issue was tension in the
South China Sea, which could escalate into the deadli-
had been able to establish communities and with them
norms of conduct.
est conflict of the modern age. Malaysia supported the
As to the absence of rules governing interaction
implementation of a code of conduct and the avoid-
between states, here too there were some positive
ance of actions that might raise tensions. There were
examples, including the non-use of chemical weapons
encouraging precedents for the bilateral resolution
during the Second World War, and nuclear restraint
of claims through the International Court of Justice.
during the Cold War.
States had the right to act as they saw fit in their sover-
Dialogue should always be the first resort in dealing
eign areas but also had the responsibility to be aware
with tensions. Existing mechanisms within Southeast
of the wider implications of their actions.
Asia had already proved their worth, including the
In conclusion, there was a need for states to: keep
ADMM, chaired by Dato’ Seri Hishammuddin, which
sight of the bigger picture; develop early-warning
at its Langkawi meeting in March 2015 had focused
systems for security issues; develop detailed strate-
on the threat from ISIS and had agreed to enhance
gies for dealing with social media; and promote more
cooperation in addressing it. Other achievements
military diplomacy, intelligence exchanges, openness
of the ADMM included an agreement on the avoid-
and transparency.
ance of incidents at sea. Maritime security remained
General Tea Banh, Cambodia’s Deputy Prime
a pressing regional concern. Disputes had to be
Minister and Minister of National Defense, said that
resolved peacefully and Cambodia supported the
most wars began gradually and this meant there was
code-of-conduct proposal. Without existing regional
scope for diplomacy to have an effect. There were
mechanisms, the situation in the South China Sea
three main causes of escalation: strategic uncertainty, a
would have already escalated. In conclusion, General
lack of attention by the international community, and
Tea Banh said that managing strategic tension was a
a lack of rules of interaction. Miscalculation of the kind
vital issue and required states to change their percep-
engendered by security dilemmas and a lack of confi-
tions of each other.
dence in each other’s intentions could lead to conflict.
Michael Fallon, the UK’s Secretary of State for
Another cause of conflict was the lack of a sense of
Defence, said that the UK had strong links with the
community, which might lead to the conviction that
Asia-Pacific region in trade and security, and shared
only force would generate security. This was not inevi-
the values of most Asia-Pacific states, namely toler-
table and, over the course of history, groups of states
ance, justice and the rule of law.
Third plenary session
31
Michael Fallon,
Secretary of State
for Defence, United
Kingdom
The world was becoming a more dangerous place.
act, and the UK had shown a willingness to engage
In Europe, old threats were re-emerging with Russia’s
in the Baltic states and against ISIS. The UK was the
activities in Ukraine. In the Middle East and Africa,
fifth-largest funder of UN peacekeeping missions and
ISIS and Boko Haram were seeking to establish states.
was involved in operations around the world, includ-
In Asia, North Korea continued behaviour justifying
ing in the search for MH370, the Philippines typhoon,
its ‘rogue state’ label. And land-reclamation projects in
Vanuatu and Nepal.
the South China Sea risked giving rise to miscalcula-
The third lesson was the need to strengthen inter-
tion. Regional tensions in the Asia-Pacific region had
national relationships. Existing post-Second World
global consequences.
War institutions remained valid and NATO was more
The UK had drawn lessons from its security engage-
relevant than ever. As part of the European defence
ments in the Balkans and Afghanistan. Firstly, it was
architecture, the UK wished to see the evolution of a
essential to speak out about the causes of aggression
regional defence architecture in the Asia-Pacific region
and to defend one’s values. The UK government had
but also supported a central US role. The UK also wel-
no position on sovereignty claims in the South China
comed China’s contribution to international public
Sea but provocative behaviour there risked escalation.
goods, and was developing defence relations with
The UK was concerned by the scale and speed of cur-
Japan and Korea. Its commitment to the Five Power
rent land reclamation and the implications for freedom
Defence Arrangements was undiminished.
of navigation, and called on all parties to refrain from
provocative actions. The focus should be on restraint
and responsibility, dialogue and diplomacy, and the
establishment of a binding code of conduct.
A number of questions focused on the South China
The second lesson was to maintain strong armed
Sea. Dr Sophie Boisseau du Rocher from the French
forces. States needed the means to enforce peace. The
Institute for International Relations (IFRI) asked
UK was investing in new military capabilities to the
if ASEAN’s High Council or Treaty of Amity and
tune of £160 billion over the next decade, including
Cooperation might be used to help prevent con-
new aircraft carriers and the Joint Strike Fighter. The
flict escalation. Bonnie Glaser from the Centre for
UK was also expanding its defence presence in the
Strategic and International Studies, asked for some
Asia-Pacific region and leveraging defence training.
‘concrete suggestions’ from the panel about how
However, capacity was of no use without the will to
to achieve consensus on international law and a
32
Dr Sophie Boisseau du Rocher, Senior Research
Fellow, Asia Centre, French Institute for
International Relations (IFRI)
Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman
Chair in China Studies, Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Dr Chikako Ueki, Professor, International
Relations, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies,
Waseda University
rules-based order. Dr Chikako Ueki from Waseda
was moving ‘at a glacial pace’, but asked what the
University, asked how ASEAN countries viewed the
alternative was for ASEAN and its members. Fallon
potential use of ‘negative sanctions, force if necessary’
said that the Code of Conduct was not ‘necessarily
to build and maintain the rule of law and order in
the answer’: other measures, including resolution of
the South China Sea. Senior Captain Zhang Junshe,
conflicting claims through legal mechanisms, would
Military Academic Research Institute, PLA, asked
also be necessary. Regarding the terrorist threat,
Minister Hishammuddin for his opinion of the ‘dual-
Lieutenant General Dato’ Pahlawan Dr William
track approach’ to the South China Sea that China had
Rangit Stevenson, Malaysian Institute of Defence and
proposed. Peter Jennings, Australian Strategic Policy
Security, Malaysia, asked how the ‘growing threat’
Institute, asked the British and Malaysian ministers if
from ISIS should be addressed. Hishammuddin said
any thought had been given to using the Five Power
that the threat in Southeast Asia was ‘real’ and that
Defence Arrangements to assert ‘the right of naviga-
Malaysia was ‘working very closely’ with Brunei,
tion and airspace access in the South China Sea’. In
Indonesia and the Philippines ‘to ensure that the ...
response, Hishammuddin admitted that the devel-
area they [ISIS] have identified in declaring a cali-
opment of mechanisms for preventing escalation
phate does not materialise’. Dzirhan Mahadzir,
Senior Captain Zhang Junshe, Research Fellow,
Military Academic Research Institute, People’s
Liberation Army, China
Peter Jennings, Executive Director, Australian
Strategic Policy Institute
Lieutenant General Dato’ Pahlawan Dr William
Rangit Stevenson, Chief Executive, Malaysian
Institute of Defence and Security
Third plenary session
33
Dzirhan Mahadzir, Malaysia Correspondent,
IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly
Professor Sven Biscop, Egmont Royal Institute for
International Relations, Belgium
Malaysian Correspondent, IHS Janes’ Defence Weekly,
on a humanitarian bases. There were already 120,000
asked Hishammuddin about why the ASEAN Defence
Rohingyas in Malaysia, he said, with the prospect
Ministers’ Meeting was ‘missing in action’ in rela-
of many more arriving soon. Professor Sven Biscop
tion to the Rohingya crisis earlier in the month. The
from the Egmont Royal Institute for International
Malaysian minister replied that he was ‘relieved that
Relations, asked Fallon for his view on ‘the collective
the Rohingya issue had become internationalised’
European role’ in Asia. The British minister replied
and pointed to the role of Indonesia, Malaysia and
that there ‘clearly is a European interest here’ because
Thailand in providing temporary shelter for Rohingyas
of Europe’s economic stake in the region.
34
The IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue
chapter 5
Simultaneous special sessions
Saturday 30 May 2015
Session 1
Armed forces and new terrorist threats
Session 2
Energy security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region
Session 3
Challenges for maritime intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance
Session 4
Emerging challenges to small state security in the
Asia-Pacific
Session 5
Avoiding military competition and
arms-racing in Asia
Special session 1
Armed forces and new
terrorist threats
CHAIR
General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux
The session heard that states faced three different mili-
Senior Adviser for the Middle East and
tary threats: from states, from state-like actors, and
Asia-Pacific, IISS; former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK
from non-state actors. Conflicts that mixed two or
three of these threats were increasingly characterised
OPENING REMARKS
as ‘hybrid’. There were insurgents and separatists in
Senator John McCain
the Asia-Pacific, but the Islamic State of Iraq and al-
Chairman, Armed Services Committee, US Senate
General Knud Bartels
Chairman, NATO Military Committee
General Thomas Lawson
Chief of the Defence Staff, Canada
Sham (ISIS) posed the most immediate concern. The
‘propaganda of the deed’ arising from the very existence of the ‘caliphate’, amplified by its modern and
effective information operation, created two dangers:
that of experienced foreign fighters returning home,
and that of self-radicalised ‘lone wolves’. These dan-
Nigel Inkster
Director for Transnational Threats and Political
gers were likely to increase. In the short-term in Iraq,
Risk, IISS
coalition air operations would only ever be a holding
action, pending the ejection of ISIS by Iraqi forces.
Colonel Lu Yin
Associate Research Fellow, Strategic Teaching and
It was not yet clear that the threat was sufficiently
Research Department, National Defense University,
contained, in Iraq and Syria, or globally. The inter-
People’s Liberation Army, China
national community was not displaying sufficient
urgency on this matter. There was a vital requirement
for more effective strategic communications to contest
36
General Knud Bartels, Chairman, NATO Military
Committee
Nigel Inkster, Director for Transnational Threats
and Political Risk, IISS
General Thomas Lawson, Chief of the Defence
Staff, Canada
General The Lord Richards of Herstmonceux,
Senior Adviser for the Middle East and AsiaPacific, IISS; former Chief of the Defence Staff, UK
Colonel Lu Yin, Associate Research Fellow,
Strategic Teaching and Research Department,
National Defense University, PLA, China
Senator John McCain, Chairman, Armed Services
Committee, US Senate
the ISIS narrative. The long-term solution would be to
ership and robust military command and control.
address the root causes of insurgency and terrorism.
Intelligence agencies, police and military forces needed
This required the ability to integrate diverse types of
to be deployable, adaptable and to have full-spectrum
power in a comprehensive inter-agency approach, and
capabilities to contain non-state actors, whilst protect-
would inevitably take time. Multinational intelligence
ing the population was essential. The use of lethal
sharing and collaboration would be essential.
force would need to be carefully calibrated. This put
NATO states’ experience suggested that intel-
a premium on precision weapons, and the necessary
ligence, and a broad and deep understanding of the
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabili-
conflict, were essential, as were strong political lead-
ties to provide precision-targeting.
Special session 1
37
Special session 2
Energy security challenges in
the Indo-Pacific region
CHAIR
The session addressed the opportunities for, and chal-
Lord Powell of Bayswater
lenges to, energy security in the Asia-Pacific. Overall,
Trustee, IISS; Member, House of Lords; former
panellists agreed that regional energy markets have
Private Secretary and Adviser on Foreign Affairs and
functioned reasonably well, through orthodox price
Defence to Prime Ministers Thatcher and Major
mechanisms. Threats to energy security included terrorist threats and political instability in the Middle
OPENING REMARKS
East, and the effects of supplier countries being sub-
Peter Varghese
jected to sanctions. Speakers identified the biggest
Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and
threat to energy security as being at the intersection
Trade, Australia
between energy markets and geopolitics.
Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano
Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Japan Self-Defense Forces
There was, however, broad agreement that there
were reasons to be sanguine about potential disruptions to energy markets. The US continued to play an
Dr Pierre Noël
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Senior Fellow for Economic
active role in the security of the Strait of Hormuz. In
and Energy Security, IISS-Asia
the Malacca Strait, security is provided by littoral states
with some financial and technical assistance from the
Energy Industry Comments
Republic of Korea and Japan. Despite territorial dis-
Melody Meyer
putes in the South China Sea, seaborne energy trade
38
President, Chevron Asia-Pacific Exploration and
has not been threatened. Such a relatively optimistic
Production Company
assessment, panellists said, did not preclude the need
Dr Pierre Noël, Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah Senior
Fellow for Economic and Energy Security, IISS-Asia
Admiral Katsutoshi Kawano, Chief of Staff, Joint
Staff, Japan Self-Defense Forces
Peter Varghese, Secretary, Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Australia
Melody Meyer, President, Chevron Asia-Pacific
Exploration and Production Company
Lord Powell of Bayswater, Trustee, IISS; Member,
House of Lords; former Private Secretary and
Adviser on Foreign Affairs and Defence to Prime
Ministers Thatcher and Major
for new measures to sustain energy security. It is pos-
into the provision of the public good of sea-lane secu-
sible that Asian powers and littoral states could take on
rity. Rather, the challenge stems from the geopolitical
more of the burden of securing the Strait of Hormuz.
problem of managing the regional balance of power as
The session heard that the challenge to energy security in Asia was more intractable than bringing China
Asia transitions from a US-led regional order to one
where China plays a substantively bigger role.
Special session 2
39
Special session 3
Challenges for maritime intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance
CHAIR
The fundamental importance and the considerable
Dr Tim Huxley
demands of maritime intelligence, surveillance and
Executive Director, IISS–Asia
reconnaissance (ISR) in the Asia-Pacific were laid out
starkly by all the panellists, who also stressed the
OPENING REMARKS
importance of the maritime domain. Each speaker
General Tan Sri Zulkifeli Mohd Zin
acknowledged that guaranteed access to sea lines of
Chief of Defence Forces, Malaysia
communication was essential to the economic well-
Admiral Harry B Harris
Commander, US Pacific Command
Vice Admiral Alexander Lopez
Commander, Western Command, Armed Forces of
being of the region. Territorial disputes, particularly in
the South China Sea, only served to further the need
for ISR to ‘bridge the gaps in trust’.
The issue of trust was a theme woven throughout
the session. It was emphasised that partners must be
the Philippines
able to share information with the assurance of its
Defence Industry Comments
security, particularly in the maritime domain given the
Christopher Chadwick
inherent multinational nature of the environment. It
President and Chief Executive Officer, Boeing
was noted that the security of the sea lines of commu-
Defense, Space and Security, The Boeing Company
nication could not be tackled by just a single country.
However, it was acknowledged that maritime security
Patrick Dewar
40
Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin
cooperation was still only in its developmental stage
International
in the Asia-Pacific, and previous efforts of countering
General Tan Sri Zulkifeli Mohd Zin, Chief of
Defence Forces, Malaysia
Admiral Harry B Harris, Commander, United States
Pacific Command
Vice Admiral Alexander Lopez, Commander,
Western Command, Armed Forces of the
Philippines
Dr Tim Huxley, Executive Director, IISS-Asia
Christopher Chadwick, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Boeing Defense, Space and
Security, The Boeing Company
Patrick Dewar, Executive Vice President, Lockheed
Martin International
threats and challenges from a joint and multinational
that ‘In maritime ISR, as in most things in life, one can
level have not always been very encouraging.
sometimes have too much of a good thing. Our com-
Industry perspectives suggested that technology
mander has access to more data than ever before; that
could continue to help with the maritime ISR chal-
same data can easily become overwhelming. What is
lenges the region faces. However, it was remarked
needed is actionable information.’
Special session 3
41
Special session 4
Emerging challenges to small state
security in the Asia-Pacific
CHAIR
All panellists in the session underlined the pivotal dip-
Virginia Comolli
lomatic role that small - and medium-sized countries
Research Fellow for Security and Development, IISS
play, both in relation to larger powers and in terms of
their contribution to regional governance. The defence
OPENING REMARKS
ministers of Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea
Dr Cirilo José Cristóvão
(PNG)
Minister of Defence, Timor-Leste
highlighted access and control of maritime
resources as strategic priorities for small sea-dependent countries. Timor-Leste disputes its maritime
Dr Fabian Pok
Minister for Defence, Papua New Guinea
Air Vice-Marshal Mike Yardley
Chief of Air Force, New Zealand
Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo
boundary with the far larger Australia, with uncertain
implications for hydrocarbon extraction and resource
sharing. PNG oversees one of the largest Exclusive
Economic Zones (EEZ) in the region, but with insuf-
Deputy Director-General, China–US Defense
ficient resources to police it properly. Both ministers
Relations Research Center, Academy of Military
also stressed climate-change challenges as urgent
Science, China
emerging security concerns representing threats to
political and social stability.
New Zealand’s Chief of Air Force, Air ViceMarshal Mike Yardley, and China’s Senior Colonel
Zhao Xiaozhuo both returned to a more conventional
defence focus in framing challenges to small-state
42
Dr Cirilo José Cristóvão, Minister of Defence,
Timor-Leste
Dr Fabian Pok, Minister for Defence, Papua
New Guinea
Air Vice-Marshal Mike Yardley, Chief of Air Force,
New Zealand
Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo, Deputy DirectorGeneral, China–US Defense Relations Research
Center, Academy of Military Science, China
Virginia Comolli, Research Fellow for Security and
Development, IISS
security. As a small trading country – geographi-
spoke of Beijing’s view of a ‘community of shared
cally far removed from its most important markets
destiny’, regardless of country size. Trust should be
– New Zealand is highly dependent on the region’s
built on the basis that ‘big countries should not bully
strategic
military-to-military
small countries, and small countries should not pro-
relationships, disaster relief and assistance with
voke big countries’. China’s commitment to founding
exclusive-economic-zone surveillance are invaluable
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank with many
ways of mitigating security tensions and building
of its smaller neighbours was cited as a case in point.
regional trust.
However, some delegates voiced concern with the
context.
Dialogue,
Yardley maintained that security challenges for
way in which the inherent power asymmetry between
small countries are essentially the same as those for
small countries and larger powers could be exploited,
large countries, in terms of their potential region-
particularly with regard to China’s insistence that dis-
wide consequences. Similarly, Senior Colonel Zhao
putes between countries be resolved bilaterally.
Special session 4
43
Special session 5
Avoiding military competition and
arms-racing in Asia
CHAIR
With military budgets across Asia continuing to rise
Peter Ho
and armed forces still modernising amid continuing
Member of Council, IISS; Senior Adviser, Centre for
tensions between states, common themes emerged
Strategic Futures; former Head, Civil Service, Singapore
from the panel’s five presentations, which principally
discussed trust and transparency.
OPENING REMARKS
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland; Chairman,
the region to be open about their defence policies and
OSCE Asian Contact Group
transparent in their long-term strategic intentions.’
Another panelist remarked that the US and China had
Anatoly Antonov
Deputy Minister of Defence, Russia
Air Marshal Mark Binskin
Chief of the Defence Force, Australian Defence Force
Nobukatsu Kanehara
been engaged in military competition for 20 years.
The question was ‘whether we can avoid something
that truly deserves to be referred to as an arms race.’
However, the session also heard that this competition
Deputy Secretary General, National Security
might ‘lead to to a dynamic stability in which poten-
Secretariat, Japan
tial opponents are both deterred from using force or
Dr Aaron Friedberg
Professor of Politics and International Affairs,
44
As one speaker said, because of accelerating military modernisation ‘it is important for all countries in
Didier Burkhalter
threats of force against one another’.
The importance of military-to-military cooperation
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
was evident, as was as the benefit of joint exercises and
Affairs, Princeton University
the publication of White Papers, regular dialogue and
Didier Burkhalter, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Switzerland; Chairman, OSCE Asian Contact Group
Anatoly Antonov, Deputy Minister of Defence,
Russia
Air Marshal Mark Binskin, Chief of the Defence
Force, Australian Defence Force
Peter Ho, Member of Council, IISS; Senior Adviser,
Centre for Strategic Futures; former Head, Civil
Service, Singapore
Nobukatsu Kanehara, Deputy Secretary General,
National Security Secretariat, Japan
Dr Aaron Friedberg, Professor of Politics and
International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
cooperation within multilateral forums. Cooperative
seems desirable, said one panellist, ‘from the perspec-
security developments need not impede bilateral secu-
tive of a stronger status quo power … and much less
rity arrangements, but could provide ‘an extra layer
appealing to a state that perceives itself as weaker and
of security.’ Speakers discussed cooperative security
perhaps has intentions to alter the status quo.’ But even
measures in Europe and, while some questioned the
if a state decided to be more transparent, that could
utility of these in the Asian context, others agreed they
still raise questions of intent. For instance, Washington
were ‘a vehicle to create trust’.
had taken the position that Beijing should become
One speaker pointed to the need for transparency
more transparent. China had recently issued its latest
with respect to strategic intentions as well as capability
White Paper, and while Beijing is ‘perhaps being more
development. Others questioned whether transpar-
forthcoming and more open … that doesn’t necessar-
ency was necessarily good for stability. Transparency
ily mean it’s reassuring to everyone’.
Special session 5
45
46
The IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue
chapter 6
Reception
48
The Shangri-La Dialogue

49
50
The Shangri-La Dialogue
The IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue
chapter 7
fourth plenary session
Strengthening
regional order in the
Asia-Pacific: towards
more active conflict
resolution and
cooperation
Sunday 31 May 2015, 09:00
SPEAKERS
Admiral Sun Jianguo
Deputy Chief, General Staff Department,
People’s Liberation Army, China
Gerry Brownlee
Minister of Defence, New Zealand
Dr Ursula von der Leyen
Federal Minister of Defence, Germany
fourth plenary session
Strengthening regional order in the
Asia-Pacific: towards more active
conflict resolution and cooperation
Admiral Sun Jianguo,
Deputy Chief, General
Staff Department,
People’s Liberation
Army, China
The Sunday morning of the Dialogue opened with a
was increasing, with the PLA involved in military
speech on ‘Strengthening regional order in the Asia-
training activities with over 50 countries. Security dia-
Pacific: towards more active conflict resolution and
logue and exchanges with the United States, Russia
cooperation’, from Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy
and ASEAN nations were expanding.
Chief of General Staff of China’s People’s Liberation
Referring to territorial disputes in the South China
Army, who began by emphasising China’s commit-
Sea, Admiral Sun insisted that China had always ‘exer-
ment to peaceful development and international
cised enormous restraint’ and contributed to a situation
stability. He suggested, following China’s President
that was, overall, stable and peaceful: freedom of navi-
Xi Jingping, ‘a community of shared destiny for all
gation had never been at risk. He argued that China’s
mankind’, which would promote peace and economic
construction activities in the South China Sea were
prosperity. To achieve this, zero-sum thinking in inter-
essentially functional, primarily aimed at delivering
national relations had to be replaced by new models for
public goods including maritime search and rescue,
win–win cooperation, he said. He stressed that China
disaster prevention and relief, safety of navigation, envi-
was ready to fulfil its obligations in regional and inter-
ronmental protection, and meteorological observation.
national security. Examples included China’s growing
A third strand in the admiral’s speech centred on
contribution to UN peacekeeping missions and its
ideas for enhanced defence and security cooperation.
provision of naval escorts for ships taking chemical
Enduring peace with an international order based on
weapons from Syria for destruction. Furthermore,
the principles of the UN Charter would go hand-in-
China was actively engaged in disaster-response oper-
hand with relations among countries based on trust
ations. Bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation
and inclusiveness. The resolution of differences and
52
Gerry Brownlee,
Minister of Defence,
New Zealand
disputes was possible through step-by-step consul-
eration could bring practical benefits because many
tation and dialogue. Shared responsibilities, said
security challenges were shared, he said. These included
Admiral Sun, required that large countries did not
counter-piracy activities and counter-terrorism, but also
bully smaller ones, but small countries would also
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Defence
have to refrain from using regional security issues for
establishments should undertake efforts to ensure that
individual gain. In closing, Admiral Sun returned to
future leaders from both military and civilian organi-
the principle of ‘win–win cooperation’, which would
sations had opportunities to work together for regional
build peace and guarantee security.
security. Brownlee cited the ADMM-Plus Future
New Zealand’s Minister of Defence, Gerry Brownlee,
Leaders’ Programme as an example.
emphasised his country’s dependence on seaborne
Throughout the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, speakers
trade and freedom of navigation to underscore the link
from Europe stressed their economic interdependence
between stability and economic integration in Asia. New
with Asia, which gave them a direct stake in stability
Zealand, he stressed, had benefitted greatly from Asian
and security in the region. Dr Ursula von der Leyen,
economic growth. Brownlee warned, however, that ‘eco-
Germany’s Federal Minister of Defence, pointed out
nomic interdependence on its own will not prevent a
that while the regional contexts quite clearly differed
drift towards strategic competition.’ An open and inclu-
in Asia and in Europe, many security challenges were
sive regional security order was a necessary addition to
similar: transnational terrorism, failing states, military
prevent miscalculation, escalation and conflict.
power projection and latent territorial conflicts were
Brownlee highlighted four pillars of activity for con-
pressing concerns in both regions.
flict prevention and resolution: multilateral integration,
Dr von der Leyen offered lessons learnt from a
confidence-building measures, military cooperation,
German perspective, arguing that cooperation among
and people-to-people links. New Zealand was pursu-
European countries – which had been enemies in the
ing the first pillar through its current non-permanent
Second World War – over the course of the last seven
UN Security Council seat and its partnership with
decades, was ‘living proof’ that collaboration can pro-
ASEAN. Transparency was at the root of confidence-
duce prosperity for all nations involved. Germany had
building, otherwise rapid military modernisation in the
been able to rise as an economic power because its
region would be difficult to manage; indeed, it might
companies could trade all over the world, benefitting
ultimately endanger the very economic growth that
from the freedom of the sea. The lesson was that ‘sta-
enables defence-spending increases. Military coop-
bility, security and prosperity are indivisible’.
Fourth plenary session
53
Dr Ursula von der
Leyen, Federal Minister
of Defence, Germany
To maintain the conditions for stability and prosperity, it was necessary to invest in an overarching security
ing of experiences across regions and continents would
lead to a world that was ‘united, more stable and safer.’
architecture consisting of alliances and partnerships,
she said. Even though partnerships were hard work,
they were clearly valuable, and evolved around five ele-
ments. Firstly, they provided structures and procedures
Philippe
for dialogue in times of crisis. Secondly, their rules-based
Relations and Strategy, Ministry of Defence, France,
nature engendered respect for the rule of law. Thirdly,
asked about China’s plans for developing a cyber
the transparency that came with constant interaction
force. Christopher Nelson of Samuels International
furthered mutual trust. Fourthly, a sustainable security
Associates, wondered whether China was ready to
architecture was never directed against any country, but
consider a moratorium on island-building in the South
rather focused on cooperation for mutual benefit. Fifthly,
China Sea and would commit to not stationing offen-
by working together, small and large countries gained
sive military equipment there. Professor Chiyuki Aoi,
strategic relevance in a global context. Dr von der Leyen
Aoyama Gakuin University, enquired about China’s
closed by expressing her hope that dialogue and the shar-
view of the Responsibility to Protect principle in the
Philppe Errera, Director-General, International
Relations and Strategy, Ministry of Defence, France
54
Errera,
Christopher Nelson, Editor, The Nelson Report; Senior
Vice President, Samuels International Associates
Director-General,
International
Dr Chiyuki Aoi, Professor of International Politics,
Aoyama Gakuin University
Dr Harry Harding Jr, Professor of Public Policy,
Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public
Policy, University of Virginia
Professor François Heisbourg, Chairman, IISS and
Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia, Freeman
Chair in China Studies, Centre for Strategic and
International Studies
UN context. Professor Harry Harding, University of
about China’s view of US–Indian regional security
Virginia, asked Admiral Sun if he felt that China had
coordination. Hervé Lemahieu, Research Associate for
overcome the century of humiliation or whether there
Political Economy and Security, IISS, asked Admiral
still was a legacy and issues to be considered. Professor
Sun to expand on China’s ‘periphery diplomacy’ in
François Heisbourg, Chairman of the Council, IISS, sug-
Southeast Asia, in particular with a view to Myanmar.
gested there was a marked difference between China’s
Hideshi Tokuchi, Ministry of Defence, Japan, expressed
inclusive and prudent policy as a global power and its
concern about the possibility of China declaring an Air
actions in the South China Sea, which by many partners
Defence Identification Zone over the South China Sea.
in the region are perceived as exclusive and weakening
Josh Rogin, Bloomberg View, asked whether Admiral
mutual trust. Bonnie Glaser, Centre for Strategic and
Sun felt China’s policies in the South China Sea were an
International Studies, asked whether the admiral could
example of the win–win cooperation the Admiral had
clarify China’s 9-dash line claim in the South China
mentioned. Reinhard Bütikofer, European Parliament,
Sea and suggested his insistence China was not chal-
wondered why Admiral Sun had omitted language on
lenging freedom of navigation would require further
the rule of law from his speech.
explanation. PS Suryanarayana, National University of
Addressing Dr von der Leyen, Dr Chung Min Lee,
Singapore, asked whether China was trying to create an
Ambassador for National Security Affairs, Ministry
alternative route to the Strait of Malacca and enquired
of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea, suggested
PS Suryanarayana, Editor, Current Affairs, Institute of
South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore
Hervé Lemahieu, Research Associate for Political
Economy and Security, IISS
Hideshi Tokuchi, Director-General, Ministry of
Defence, Japan
Fourth plenary session
55
Josh Rogin, Columnist,
Bloomberg View
Reinhard Bütikofer, Member,
European Parliament
Dr Chung Min Lee, Ambassador for National Security
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea;
Professor of International Relations, Yonsei University
that a strong NATO would be good for Asia as well.
Responding, Admiral Sun argued that while the
He expressed his concern about stagnating levels of
South China Sea issue pose much debate in expert
defence spending in NATO, and asked how the German
circles, it did not pose a risk to stability. Regarding
Minister of Defence foresaw NATO defence spending
a possible Air Defence Identification Zone in the
in an age of austerity. Gong Xianfu, China Institute
South China Sea, he suggested that China would
for Strategic Studies, asked von der Leyen whether she
base its decisions on the risk to safety and security
had any particular advice for countries in Asia regard-
it perceived from activities there. Von der Leyen
ing how to proceed on the path towards a stronger
acknowledged the defence-spending challenge for
regional security order. Michael Maclay, Montrose
NATO, but stressed that Germany had recently
Associates, wondered how active a role Europe could
managed a turnaround, making an additional €8 bil-
play in Asia and asked von der Leyen to expand on
lion available for defence during 2016–19. Brownlee
her thoughts about closer EU–ASEAN cooperation. Dr
expressed scepticism regarding capacity-building
Nicholas Redman Director of Editorial; Senior Fellow
in the region, arguing many Pacific nations were too
for Geopolitical Risk and Economic Security, IISS,
small to expand their armed forces significantly. He
referring to the special role New Zealand had within
felt that alliances and dialogue between small and
the South Pacific, suggested Minister Brownlee com-
large nations on the basis of common interest were a
ment on the scope for capacity-building in the region.
more viable route to increased capacity.
Major General (Retd) Gong Xianfu, Vice Chairman,
China Institute for International Strategic Studies
56
Michael Maclay, Executive Chairman,
Montrose Associates
Dr Nicholas Redman, Director of Editorial; Senior
Fellow for Geopolitical Risk and Economic Security, IISS
The IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue
chapter 8
fifth plenary session
Global security
challenges and the
Asia-Pacific:
building cooperation
between regions
Sunday 1 June 2015, 11:30
SPEAKERS
Federica Mogherini
High Representative of the European Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy; Vice-President,
European Commission
Kevin Andrews
Minister for Defence, Australia
Dr Ng Eng Hen
Minister for Defence, Singapore
fifth plenary session
Global security challenges and the AsiaPacific: building cooperation between regions
Federica Mogherini,
High Representative of
the European Union
for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy; VicePresident, European
Commission
Opening the final plenary session, Federica Mogherini,
strategic purpose, involving concrete commitments
High Representative of the European Union for
and priorities. These include the extension to ASEAN
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President
of the EU’s unmatched experience in breaking down
of the European Commission, told delegates that the
barriers among member states and building unity.
EU is not an Asian or a Pacific power, but it has sig-
The European Commission is doubling its aid budget
nificant economic stakes and political partnerships in
for ASEAN and total EU aid to the ten-member bloc
the region. Europe and Asia face common challenges
is approaching €3 billion. There is also a High-Level
to which only joint responses could be effective. She
Dialogue on disaster relief.
noted that more goods and services traded between
Beyond the Asia-Pacific, Mogherini said there was
Europe and Asia than across the Atlantic. Europe is
scope for Europe and Asia to be partners in contribut-
also the largest foreign-aid donor to the Asia-Pacific,
ing to the stabilisation of fragile states. Military force
and EU engagement with regional states is extensive.
alone will not defeat the Islamic state of Iraq and al-
Asia is both dynamic and fragile: its economic
Sham (ISIS), she suggested, and it was necessary for
weight is enormous but the region’s latent conflict
Europe to make the most of its huge potential and to
potential cannot be ignored, Mogherini noted. Europe
use all its tools and strengths in a coordinated and
has a direct interest in ensuring freedom of naviga-
coherent way.
tion because of global supply chains, and hence it
The High Representative concluded by recalling
hopes to see an ASEAN–China Code of Conduct on
that the EU, while thought of primarily as an economic
the South China Sea concluded as soon as possible.
power, has deployed personnel to crisis zones for
Europe’s vision, she added, was partnership with a
more than ten years. Currently it is running five mili-
58
Kevin Andrews,
Minister for Defence,
Australia
tary and 11 civilian missions on three continents, with
coercive behaviour. In fact, it may facilitate coercive
7,000 personnel deployed. Some of these missions
behaviour. Australia is worried about any development
benefit Asian states directly, in particular the Atalanta
that raises tension in the East or South China seas. That
anti-piracy naval mission off the Horn of Africa, which
includes large-scale land reclamation by claimants and
reduced attacks from 163 in 2009 to two in 2014.
in particular the prospect of artificial structures being
Kevin Andrews, Minister for Defence, Australia,
militarised. Thus Australia considers essential the swift
began by noting that Canberra had come to realise that
conclusion of a Code of Conduct between China and
it must consider the mutual dependencies between
ASEAN. It also calls on all parties to exercise restraint,
its home region of the Asia-Pacific and the rest of the
halt reclamation activities, refrain from provocative
world. The Asia-Pacific’s rise would depend on its
actions, and take steps to ease tensions.
continued economic progress, he said, and that in turn
rests on continuing freedom of navigation and trade.
In common with other ministers at the Dialogue,
Andrews directly addressed the threat to the region
Half of Australia’s trade is routed through the
posed by fighters returning from Iraq and Syria – a
South China Sea and so tension and competing claims
phenomenon that underscores the connection between
in that area greatly concern Canberra. The shared
global security challenges and the region. Many in
dependence of the Indo-Pacific powers on such cor-
the region are connected with or inspired by ISIS, he
ridors should create a powerful incentive to manage
noted, and so regional states must cooperate to defeat
conflicts peacefully and ensure freedom of naviga-
a threat that is likely to be present for several decades.
tion for all, he said. There are grounds for optimism
Dr Ng Eng Hen, Minister for Defence, Singapore,
because the regional states’ shared interests have
began by crediting the international milieu as well
already led to enhanced cooperation on common chal-
as the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew for Singapore’s
lenges such as natural disasters, piracy and terrorism.
extraordinary development over the previous 50
The anti-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa is a
years. The rules-based system constructed by the US
conspicuous success and the day-to-day cooperation
and leading Western powers, he said, was generally
there builds a level of confidence that it would be more
inclusive and allowed many states to progress. The US
difficult for Asian navies to achieve closer to home.
presence in Asia provided vital strategic reassurance
Greater interdependence might lessen, but does not
and its dominance of the global commons enabled
eliminate, the chance of conflict, and it does not pre-
all East Asian export-based economies to develop. In
vent the risk of miscalculation or of states engaging in
time, ASEAN, India and China were beneficiaries too.
Fifth plenary session
59
Dr Ng Eng Hen,
Minister for Defence,
Singapore
This system is now in flux, Dr Ng noted. China and
grow. Thus the regional states must work together to
India are no longer poor countries marginalised by the
provide clarity, if not on principles and law, then on
Cold War or sequestered behind ‘the Bamboo Curtain’.
procedures and practices to secure stability and restore
New institutions have emerged, reflecting the rise
confidence. Dr Ng said he hoped the Code of Conduct
of Asia: the BRICS Development Bank, the Asian
in the South China Sea would soon be finalised.
Infrastructure Investment Bank, China’s ‘One Belt One
Change in the international and regional system
Road’ initiative, and the US$40-billion Silk Road Fund.
is inevitable as new powers emerge, the minister
Japan too is active, collaborating with ASEAN to offer
observed, but it was important at the same time to
US$110bn for building Asian infrastructure in the next
ensure that the security architecture remained inclu-
five years, and the US is pushing forward its Trans-
sive and operated on widely accepted global norms.
Pacific Partnership, which Singapore hopes will be a
The rules-based framework that underwrote our pros-
driving force for the region.
perity and security for decades must remain relevant
As powers rise in the Asia-Pacific, Dr Ng said, there
and strong, he concluded.
will be pressures for the rules that have governed
the international order to accommodate ‘nationalistic
aspirations’. Events in the East and South China seas
are manifestations of this change in power dynamics.
Dr Bastian Giegerich, Director, Defence and Military
Air Defence Identification Zones, or similar regimes
Analysis Programme, IISS, asked Federica Mogherini
for the seas, whilst ostensibly protecting freedom of
about the level of EU ambition with regard to a global
navigation and overflight by others, have resulted in
role. She replied that she favoured a full-spectrum
incidents at sea and in the air.
approach rather than simply relying on soft power,
Preservation of a rules-based system is necessary
with an initial focus on neighbouring regions – the
but not sufficient to maintain peace and stability in
Mediterranean, Middle East and Russia. Having a pos-
the Asia-Pacific: states must also be infused with the
itive influence in those regions would have a positive
correct spirit, the minister observed. Singapore is con-
influence globally, she said.
cerned that there are uncertainties within international
Dr Wenguang Shao, Consulting Senior Fellow
agreements and that these frameworks have not built
for China and International Affairs, IISS, and Senior
mutual confidence and trust. Instead, they have cre-
Europe Adviser, Phoenix Satellite Television Holdings,
ated instability. A deficit of trust now exists and can
pointed to the rapid pace of arms acquisition in the
60
Dr Bastian Giegerich, Director, Defence and
Military Analysis Programme, IISS
Dr Wenguang Shao, Consulting Senior Fellow for
China and International Affairs, IISS; Senior Europe
Advisor, Phoenix Satellite Television Holdings
Sir John Jenkins, Executive Director,
IISS–Middle East
Peter Jennings, Executive Director, Australian
Strategic Policy Institute
Asia-Pacific and asked whether arms control was nec-
and Western powers. Propaganda now goes directly
essary. Kevin Andrews disagreed: arms procurement
into living rooms and bedrooms of young people, in
is mainly a function of economic growth, he said,
a way that it did not previously, creating a new chal-
adding that peace is best secured from a position of
lenge. He suggested that ISIS was not amenable to a
strength. Thus the modernisation of defence capacity
negotiated solution and so it had to be defeated on the
is not at odds with the peaceful resolution of disputes.
battlefield, while the Syrian conflict had to be settled
Sir
John
Jenkins,
Executive
Director,
IISS-
politically. Dr Ng noted the widespread recognition at
Middle East, and Peter Jennings, Executive Director,
the Dialogue that religious-based terrorism is a global
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, both asked ques-
phenomenon. Singapore has been successful thus far
tions about the threat that ISIS and its supporters posed
in combating Islamist extremism, and intelligence-
to the region. Is enough being done on the ideological
sharing helped to unearth a Jemaah Islamiah cell. It is
front, is there sufficient cooperation among states, and
important to keep Muslim communities on the side of
what military steps must be taken to eradicate the ISIS
the government, he added, to provide intelligence and
threat? Kevin Andrews responded that there is con-
maintain social cohesion in the face of a threat that is
siderable intelligence-sharing between the Asia-Pacific
likely to persist for many decades.
Fifth plenary session
61
62
The IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue
appendices
I. Selected press coverage of
the 2015 IISS Shangri-La
Dialogue
II. Selected IISS publications
appendix I
Selected press coverage of the 2015
IISS Shangri-La Dialogue
BBC
29 May 2015
US-China tensions rise over
Beijing’s ‘Great Wall of Sand’
By Jonathan Marcus
You often hear politicians and strategic thinkers talk about
establishing “facts on the ground” - the need to take account
of what actually exists when framing policy.
Well in the South China Sea, the Chinese government is
going one step further.
As defence ministers and strategic thinkers from across
the Asia-Pacific region gather for the annual Shangri-La
Dialogue in Singapore, China is not just creating facts on
the ground, it is creating the very ground itself.
In a number of locations in the Spratly Islands, Chinese
dredgers are spewing up torrents of sand from the sea bed,
turning reefs into new islands.
The transformation of Mischief Reef for example,
(known to the Chinese as Meiji Reef) in territory also
claimed by the Philippines, is a case in point.
This is only one of several small outposts the Chinese
have been constructing in an effort to press their expansive
claims hundreds of miles from China’s own shores.The US
says China has been building on reclaimed land in the disputed Spratly Islands.
Every year the Shangri-La Dialogue, organised by the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) brings
together everyone who is anyone in Asia-Pacific defence circles “to take the temperature” - as IISS director general John
Chipman puts it - of security developments in the region.
This year, once again, US-China tensions are centre stage.
Beijing’s efforts to create new facts on the ground have
been termed by some as an attempt to construct a “Great
Wall of Sand” to delineate the boundary of China’s interests - a reference to the ancient Great Wall that guarded
China’s frontier.
Mr Chipman says: “In both the State Department and
64
the Pentagon, we are seeing real concern about Chinese
activities in the South China Sea but also about some of
the activities of other claimant states who have sometimes
sought to make the areas they feel able to control more habitable or to build facilities on them.”
‘Preposterous’ claims
So does he expect some strong exchanges over the coming
few days on this subject?
After all, the newly promoted head of US Pacific
Command Admiral Harry B Harris only a day
ago described China›s claims to a vast swathe of islands in
the South China Sea as “preposterous”.
Admiral Harris was speaking on his way to Singapore
where he is accompanying his boss, the US Defence
Secretary Ash Carter, who is also known for his habit of
plain speaking.
“The US Secretary of Defence is going to err on the side
of strategic clarity rather than strategic ambiguity,” Mr
Chipman told me, “and really call for a stop to this activity
by all sides.
“After all in 2002, all of the Asean states in a declaration
of principle agreed not to seek to change the status quo.”
That’s a polite way of saying expect tough words from
the Americans.
But what about actions? US maritime patrol aircraft and
warships have already ventured close to some of the newly
constructed facilities, ignoring urgent messages from the
Chinese authorities to go away.
There is a real danger of serious friction. “The US is
going to argue that it needs to continually demonstrate the
freedom of the seas,” says Mr Chipman.
One of the things he hopes will happen at this Singapore
meeting is that “there will be a continuation of the US-China
military-to-military talks to try to ensure that there are no
accidents or incidents at sea or in the air”.
Just ahead of the meeting, Beijing has published what
many have dubbed a “Defence White Paper” setting out the
country’s strategic horizons and goals.
Mr Chipman believes that this document “will be seen
in time as a foundational text for a new more extrovert
Chinese defence policy.
“It actually says that China should abandon its obsession with land security and that security overall has to be
achieved through predominance at sea. They are almost
casting the Navy as the senior service.”
‘Responsible stakeholder’
Of course, he notes, there are two aspects to this document.
In its concluding paragraph it says that China wants to contribute to the public good of international security.
It’s a signal that Beijing is interested in playing a wider
role - something senior US officials have long demanded of
China, that it become “a responsible stakeholder” in international society.
Human security will also figure in the talks over
the coming days, the plight of the Rohingya boat
people highlighting the complex issues thrown up by
refugees and migration.
In the Asia-Pacific though, just as in Europe, there are
no easy answers here given the powerful mix of diplomatic
and domestic factors.
The Shangri-La Dialogue derives much of its importance
from the fact that there is no formal security architecture in
the region - there’s no Asian Nato for example.
While there have been meetings of Asean defence ministers, and wider gatherings, Mr Chipman told me that
it is “very difficult to imagine” a formal defence body in
the region.
Some countries, he says, “will tilt a bit towards China,
some will tilt towards the United States, most would prefer
not to have to have a choice and I think it is this that will
still colour defence and diplomatic relations in the region
for some time to come”
©2015, BBC
Reprinted with permission
Reuters
29 May 2015
Break the vicious cycle, Singapore
tells South China Sea rivals
By Rujun Shen and David Alexander
Singapore’s prime minister called on countries on Friday
to break the “vicious cycle” of the South China Sea row, as
the United States and China exchanged increasingly angry
barbs over reclaimed islands in the disputed waterway.
Inaugurating Asia’s biggest security forum, the
Shangri-La Dialogue, Lee Hsien Loong also warned of the
threat of Islamic State militancy in Southeast Asia and said
it was not inconceivable that the ultra-radicals could establish a base in the region physically under their control, like
in Syria or Iraq.
Just hours before Lee spoke, the Pentagon said China
had placed mobile artillery weapons systems on a reclaimed
island in the South China Sea.
U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter, who is to address the
three-day Shangri-La Dialogue on Saturday, has called for
a halt to the reclamation work, saying it was out of step
with the regional consensus.
Admiral Sun Jianguo, a deputy chief of China’s People’s
Liberation Army, will speak the following day.
Singapore’s Lee said that if the rise of China in the
international order was to remain peaceful, U.S.-Chinese
relations had to remain strong.
“No country wants to choose sides between U.S. or
China,” he said.
But after weeks of angry rhetoric, the two sides were at
loggerheads again on Friday.
The U.S. says China’s actions undermine international
law and interfere with the freedom of navigation in international waters. China says the islands are sovereign
Chinese territory.
Pentagon spokesman Brent Colburn, who is traveling
with Carter, said China’s reclamation created “an air of
uncertainty in a system that has been based on certainty
and agreed-upon norms”.
China’s Xinhua news agency said some of the participants in the Shangri-La Dialogue “attempt to monopolize
the right to speak in the field of international security.”
“They echo each other, distort the truth, magnify differences, add fuel to fire, so that dialogue diverges from the path
of strengthening exchanges and enhancing mutual trust.”
Singapore’s Lee said: “These maritime disputes...can and
should be managed and contained. If the present dynamic
continues, it must lead to more tensions and bad outcomes.”
Islamic State Base
Lee’s comments on Islamic State were the strongest made
by a regional leader on the threat posed by the radicals.
“The idea that ISIS can turn Southeast Asia into a wilayat
- a province of a worldwide Islamic caliphate - is a grandiose, pie-in-the-sky idea,” he said. “But it is not so far-fetched
that ISIS could establish a base somewhere in the region,
somewhere where the governments’ writs do not run.”
Hundreds of people from Southeast Asia have joined
Islamic State forces in Iraq and Syria and regional security experts have warned of the dangers they may pose if
they return.
Terrorism, maritime security and energy security are
among the topics to be discussed at the three-day security dialogue, where defense ministers, military officers
and international security experts from the United States,
Europe and Asia are participating.
Aside from debate in open forums, most of the countries
hold closed-door bilateral meetings, with over 200 such
sessions scheduled according to the organizers.
Before events formally started on Friday, China’s
Admiral Sun held a series of bilaterals, including ones
Selected press coverage
65
with Japan’s Director-General of the Ministry of Defense,
Hideshi Tokuchi and Vietnam’s deputy defense minister
General Nguyen Chi Vinh.
“We believe that through mutual cooperation the two
parties will be able to solve the South China Sea dispute,”
Sun said on his meeting with Vietnam, which also has territorial claims in the region.
Malaysia, Taiwan, Brunei and the Philippines also claim
parts of the sea.
John Chipman, director general of the International
Institute for Strategic Studies that organizes the forum, said
despite the sharp rhetoric from politicians, there has been
improved dialogue between the militaries of the countries
involved in the maritime disputes, which this weekend’s
meeting could build on.
“It will be interesting if the defense ministers point in
their remarks to the importance of keeping that military
dialogue going, whatever the political postures of the countries’ leadership might be,” he said.
©2015, Reuters
The Straits Times
29 May 2015
14 years of giving it a go
for regional security
By William Choong
NOT many observers of regional affairs will know that it was
the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew who gave the much-needed push
for the establishment of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual
defence summit that will kick off its 14th edition tonight.
In 2001, Dr John Chipman, the director-general of the
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), had
a brainwave - compared to Europe, Asia did not have a
defence forum which involved meetings of more than two
defence ministers. So he sought the advice of Mr Lee. Mr
Lee’s curt answer: “Give it a go.”
Fourteen years on, the Dialogue has come a long way.
It also bears Mr Lee›s imprimatur, given that the themes he
espoused still resonate today.
Speaking at the first Dialogue in 2002, it was Mr Lee
who noted that the immediate threats to South-east Asia
were Muslims who had returned home after fighting with
Al-Qaeda and Taleban forces in Afghanistan. Addressing the
Dialogue in 2003, Mr Lee expressed his worry about the contending objectives of regional powers vis-a-vis North Korea.
But Mr Lee’s biggest contribution to the Dialogue and
regional security was his obsession with the regional power
balance. Speaking at the 2008 inauguration of the Lee Kuan
Yew Conference Room at Arundel House, the London
headquarters of the IISS, he stressed that a stable global
66
order would need support from all powers - America, the
European Union, as well as China, India and Brazil as they
grew and Russia as it turned more muscular.
So as Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
addresses the Dialogue tonight, it is likely that he would reiterate these broad themes. In fact, having attended a decade’s
worth of Dialogues, I’d eat my hat if Mr Lee doesn’t reiterate
the importance of “open and inclusive” regionalism.
Speaking at the 2005 Dialogue, the younger Mr Lee
stressed that Singapore believed that an “open regional
architecture” would give all major powers a stake in Asia
and produce a “stable, predictable regional order”.
Today, regional order is supported by economic
dynamism and institutions such as the Asean Defence
Ministers’ Meeting Plus, the East Asia Summit and the
Shangri-La Dialogue.
Among them, the Dialogue is the forum of choice. In
2002, Mr Lee Kuan Yew spoke to 160 delegates. This year’s
Dialogue will see a tripling of that figure to approximately
480 delegates.
The tenor of the Dialogue has also changed since 2002.
Europe is now well-represented, with the defence ministers
of Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom participating,
as well as the European Union’s High Representative for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
More importantly, China is now playing a bigger role
in the Dialogue - a forum it once feared as a Western-led,
anti-China grouping.
Like last year, in 2015 China is sending one of the largest
national delegations to the Dialogue. Its 18-strong delegation of senior military officers, officials and researchers will
be led by Admiral Sun Jianguo, the first deputy chief of
general staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
While this is a step lower compared to 2011, when China
sent its defence minister, it may be significant that Admiral
Sun is a “four-star” officer, more senior in rank than
Lieutenant-General Wang Guanzhong, the three-star officer
who led China’s delegation last year. It is rumoured that
Adm Sun is slated for promotion to China’s Central Military
Commission, the PLA’s highest policymaking body.
Expect the three “Ts” of Asia-Pacific affairs - terrorism,
trade policy, and territorial disputes - to be discussed this year.
Speaking in January at the Fullerton Forum - a senior
officials’ meeting for countries represented at the Dialogue
- Singapore Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen echoed Mr Lee
Kuan Yew’s 2002 point when he spoke about the threat
posed by “returning waves” of South-east Asian fighters
from the wars in Iraq and Syria.
It is also likely that trade and broader geo-economic
issues will be highlighted this year.
US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter will probably offer
Washington’s mantra about America being a “resident
Asia-Pacific power” and stress the durability of its “rebalance” to the region. He will harp on the attractiveness of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation free trade deal
which he says is as important as an aircraft carrier.
Adm Sun may expound on the peacefulness of China’s
rise (and again provoke a flurry of interventions from
the floor). He would likely talk about China’s desire to
share the fruits of its economy, in the form of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank and China’s “one belt, one
road” vision to link up the Middle East to China.
By far, the most explosive issue could be concern over
territorial disputes in the South China Sea. At the Dialogue
last year, the United States and China clashed openly over
the latter’s actions in the South China Sea.
Since then, China has been busy carrying out reclamation works in the Spratlys - sparking concerns that Beijing is
presenting the region with a fait accompli. Only last week,
a US Navy P-8 Poseidon patrol aircraft flying over the features was warned by the PLA to “leave immediately”.
No matter what happens this weekend, one needs to see
the Dialogue from a wider perspective - fireworks in the
Island Ballroom do not stand in the way of tangible cooperation between great powers; at times, it can beat the path
to greater cooperation.
Only months after the China-US spat at the 2014
Dialogue, US President Barack Obama and Chinese
President Xi Jinping met in November and agreed on a
technology deal, an accord to prevent accidental military
clashes, as well as a joint plan to curb carbon emissions.
That said, the Shangri-La Dialogue cannot afford to rest
on its laurels.
Late last year, China held the Xiangshan Forum, a security forum that some see as the Chinese analogue to the
Shangri-La Dialogue.
While the emergence of more multilateral institutions
such as the Xiangshan Forum could lead to unwieldy or
“messy” regionalism, it is still better that more countries
are “giving it a go”, as the late Mr Lee Kuan Yew said, in
building regional stability.
©2015, The Straits Times
El Pais
29 May 2015
EE UU acusa a China de llevar armas
a una isla en disputa del Pacífico
By Macarena Vidal Liy
Las reclamaciones territoriales de Pekín en el mar del Sur
de China, cada vez más contundentes, protagonizarán este
fin de semana elDiálogo Shangri-La, el foro anual sobre
Seguridad más importante en Asia Pacífico. Estados Unidos
ha acusado a China de haber colocado equipos móviles de
artillería en una isla en disputa en el Pacífico. “Se trata de
un hecho molesto y supone una escalada”, ha dicho el senador John McCain. Un portavoz del Pentágono que viaja con
el secretario de Defensa al foro, ha confirmado a Reuters
que EE UU conoce la existencia de este armamento.
La portavoz del Ministerio de Exteriores chino, Hua
Chunying, ha asegurado carecer de información sobre esos
supuestos equipos.
Analistas militares citados por Reuters consideraron
que el armamento parece representar más una declaración
de principios que un intento de desequilibrar la situación.
“Hay que recordar que potencialmente tienen bastante más
artillería en los buques de guerra que desplazan de manera
habitual por aguas del mar del Sur de China”, declaró un
agregado militar a esa agencia.
China reclama la mayor parte del mar de Sur de China.
Filipinas, Vietnam, Malasia, Brunéi y Taiwán también reclaman partes de esta importante ruta comercial.
Los ministros de Defensa o altos cargos militares de
26 países, incluido el ministro español, Pedro Morenés,
se reúnen desde este viernes y hasta el domingo en
Singapur en medio de una escalada retórica entre Pekín
y Washington por la construcción china de islas artificiales en zonas en disputa.
EE UU calcula que los dragados chinos han creado una
superficie de 809 hectáreas en total en cinco emplazamientos
de las islas Spratly, de las que 607 se han añadido este año.
El secretario de Defensa de EE UU, Ashton Carter, que
intervendrá en el foro que organiza el Instituto Internacional
de Estudios Estratégicos (IISS) el sábado, ya ha comenzado
a adelantar sus argumentos. “Lo nuevo es [la fabricación de
islas artificiales y] la escala a la que se construye”, declaró a
bordo del avión que le transportaba a Singapur. Y acerca de
las quejas chinas por los sobrevuelos estadounidenses de
las zonas en disputa, instó a que “nadie se equivoque: EE
UU volará, navegará y operará donde le permita el derecho
internacional, como hacemos por todo el mundo”.
En una parada previa en una base militar en Hawái,
Carter había instado a China a poner fin de inmediato a
las obras. Según afirmó entonces, las actividades de Pekín
“hacen que se incrementen los llamamientos para que EE
UU se implique en Asia Pacífico. Vamos a atender esos llamamientos”. EE UU, aseguró, “seguirá siendo la principal
potencia en Asia Pacífico durante décadas”.
China ha respondido en un tono similar. Sus medios oficiales aseguran que ningún país extranjero tiene derecho
a dictarle lo que puede hacer en áreas que considera bajo
su soberanía. Y en una entrevista concedida al diario China
Daily, Ouyang Yujing, director general del Ministerio de
Exteriores, puso sobre la mesa la posibilidad de declarar
una zona de identificación aérea, o ADIZ, en el mar del
Sur de China, como ya hizo Pekín de manera unilateral en
un área del mar del Este de China que incluye el archipiélago que se disputa con Japón, conocido como Senkaku
en japonés y Diaoyu en mandarín.
67
China ha dejado claro en los últimos días que no está
dispuesta a ceder en sus reclamaciones territoriales y que
se toma muy en serio el defenderlas. Esta semana ha publicado un nuevo libro blanco sobre estrategia militar en el
que subraya el protagonismo cada vez mayor de su Marina.
En lugar de limitarse a la defensa de las aguas costeras,
ha indicado, sus barcos tendrán también como misión la
defensa en aguas internacionales.
En una muestra de la importancia que da a lo que pueda
ocurrir en el foro, Pekín ha enviado una numerosa delegación, de 29 personas, encabezada por el almirante Sun
Jianguo, el militar de rango más alto del Ejército Popular de
Liberación (EPL) que ha participado en estos encuentros.
Pero un portavoz del Ministerio de Defensa chino ha indicado que el discurso de Sun, previsto para el domingo, se
centrará en la colaboración, el diálogo y la defensa conjunta.
El libro blanco también asegura que, aunque China no rehuirá una confrontación si es atacada, no atacará ella primero.
Según afirma Niklas Swanström, director del Instituto
para la Política de Seguridad y Desarrollo, el riesgo de
que se produzca una escalada en la situación en el mar del
Sur de China “existe, pero no es serio”. En su opinión, “ni
China ni EE UU tienen interés en un conflicto”.
Más allá de las fricciones entre EE UU y China, el foro
tomará la temperatura a la situación de la seguridad de la
región, donde la creciente reafirmación militar china ha llevado también a aumentar el gasto militar de países como
Japón o India, sus principales rivales en la zona.
©2015, El Pais
Le Monde
30 May 2015
Pékin fixe à sa marine de guerre
des horizons planétaires
La Chine, soucieuse de protéger ses intérêts à l’étranger et
ses ressortissants répartis sur tous les continents, -confirme
sa transformation en puissance navale. Dans un nouveau
Livre blanc, publié mardi 26 mai, le premier consacré à
la stratégie militaire, le Conseil d’Etat (gouvernement)
a exposé la vision de ses stratèges afin de donner un rôle
plus global à ses forces armées. Cet exposé, présenté par
Pékin comme un acte de transparence, intervient sur fond
de querelle sino-américaine dans les mers de Chine du Sud,
où les chantiers de poldérisation de récifs et d’atolls menés
par Pékin sont la cible depuis plusieurs mois d’une virulente campagne de dénonciation de la part de Washington.
Ce Livre blanc chinois de la défense entérine la
mue attendue d’une puissance commerciale désormais
planétaire. Le document souligne que “ la sécurité des intérêtsoutre-mer - de la Chine - dans l’énergie et les ressources,
les voies maritimes stratégiques, ainsi que des institutions,
68
du personnel et des actifs présents à l’étranger, est devenue
une préoccupation majeure “. Le texte juge également qu’”
avec l’expansion des intérêts nationaux chinois, la sécurité
nationale est devenue plus vulnérable aux tumultes régionaux et internationaux, le terrorisme, la piraterie, enfin, les
désastres naturels et les épidémies majeures “.
Ce n’est pas la première fois qu’il est fait mention des “
intérêts outre-mer “ dans un document officiel. Mais, relève
le spécialiste Mathieu Duchâtel,
qui dirige le bureau pékinois du Stockholm-International Peace Research Institute, ils “ ont pris une
place si importante dans ce nouveau document, celle d’une
préoccupation majeure “.
Confrontation sino-américaine
“ L’idée a fait son chemin. Elle est maintenant presque liée à
l’identité de la Chine comme grande puissance, celle qu’elle
projette à l’intérieur du pays et à l’extérieur “, poursuit le
coauteur, avec le diplomate danois Jonas Parello-Plesner,
d’un livre à paraître tout prochainement en anglais, China’s
Strong Arm : Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad.
Pour le chercheur, les deux tropismes qui ressortent
de l’exposé, “ les affaires maritimes dans la région et la
protection des intérêts extrarégionaux d’une Chine globalisée, se combinent dans la construction de la puissance
navale chinoise “. “ Le changement de ton est évident par
rapport au dernier Livre blanc, qui mettait l’accent sur la
coopération internationale de l’APL - Armée populaire de
libération - au sein de missions multilatérales, souligne-t-il.
L’environnement, cette année, est bien différent en raison de
la -confrontation Chine-Etats-Unis en mer de Chine du Sud
et du dangereux cycle surveillance/contre-surveillance. “
Selon M. Duchâtel, “ la surveillance maritime constante à
-laquelle la marine chinoise est soumise en mer de Chine du
Sud explique beaucoup des comportements chinois (y compris les constructions d’îles artificielles), au moins autant
que les intérêts de souveraineté “. L’échange radio survenu,
le 20 mai, devant les caméras de CCN entre l’équipage d’un
avion de surveillance américain Poseidon survolant plusieurs de ces atolls au large des Philippines et le contrôle
aérien de la marine chinoise a fait monter un peu plus le ton
entre Pékin et Washington, à quelques jours du Dialogue du
Shangri-La, à Singapour du 29 au 31 mai, le grand rendezvous des ministres de la défense de la zone Asie-Pacifique.
Liberté de navigation
Lors de ces échanges radio, les Américains se sont évertués
à faire valoir la liberté de navigation dans les eaux territoriales, tandis que les Chinois leur intimaient, sur un ton
d’abord poli, puis de plus en plus sec, de quitter le “ territoire souverain “ chinois.
Le Pentagone avait préalablement fait savoir qu’il étudiait l’envoi de navires et d’avions dans la zone des 12 milles
autour de ces îlots artificiels chinois, provoquant une levée
de boucliers en Chine, le quotidien à gros tirage Global
Times, porte-parole belliqueux du régime, appelant même
la Chine à “ se préparer minutieusement “ à la possibilité
d’un -conflit avec les Etats-Unis.
S’exprimant depuis Pearl Harbour lors d’une cérémonie
de passation des pouvoirs à la tête de la flotte du Pacifique,
le mercredi 27 mai, le secrétaire américain de la défense,
Ashton Carter, a rappelé que les Etats-Unis entendaient “
voler, naviguer et agir partout où les lois internationales
l’autorisent “. Ceux-ci souhaitent “ un arrêt immédiat et
durable des projets de poldérisation de la Chine et des
autres pays concernés “, a-t-il ajouté, accusant Pékin “
d’être en déphasage, à travers ses actions en mer de Chine
du Sud, avec les normes internationales qui sous-tendent
l’architecture de sécurité de l’Asie-Pacifique “.
Pour Mathieu Duchâtel, la notion de “ liberté de navigation “ défendue par les Etats-Unis se voit opposer une
riposte rhétorique par les Chinois dans le nouveau Livre
blanc, celle de “ protection en haute mer “ (open seas protection) : “ Elle suggère un passage sécurisé pour la marine
chinoise dans les eaux internationales, ce qui peut être
important lors d’évacuations de ressortissants, par exemple
; elle peut aussi faire référence à des opérations d’escorte de
flotte commerciale comme dans le golfe d’Aden. “ Reste à
savoir comment les Chinois entendent la mettre en pratique.
©2015, Le Monde
BBC
30 May 2015
Business interests propel
change in China’s global role
By Jonathan Marcus
One of the chief tasks of any government is to ensure the
safety of its citizens abroad.
Sometimes this might even require military action to
evacuate or maybe even extricate people from some crisis
in a far-flung country.
In this sense, China is fast becoming no different from
any other major player in the world.
And in the process, its foreign policy and its global footprint are significantly changing.
A new book released here by the International Institute
for Strategic Studies at its Shangri-La Dialogue - Asia’s premier security forum - investigates for the first time these
subtle changes in China’s global role.
Entitled China’s Strong Arm: Protecting Citizens and
Assets Abroad, it consciously borrows a phrase attributed to
the great British statesman Palmerston during the zenith of
Britain’s imperial power, when he spoke of its “strong arm”
in protecting its passport holders wherever they ventured.
According to one of the book’s co-authors, Jonas ParelloPlesner, a Danish diplomat: “For some years now, Chinese
companies have been going out to unstable parts of the
world - to Sudan for oil exploration, to Libya, Afghanistan
and Pakistan for mining and construction - and have
brought along with them a corps of Chinese workers which
has created... a profoundly changed global risk map for
China’s leaders, both in terms of its human presence and
for its assets abroad.”
The seminal event, he says, was in 2011 in Libya “when
China managed in 12 days in late February through to the
beginning of March to rescue more than 35,000 workers
who came out by ship, aeroplane, or by bus”.
He points to a similar evacuation in Yemen in March,
“where Chinese naval vessels went in, docked and
brought out more than 600 Chinese citizens as well as
other foreign nationals”.
In this sense, China was behaving exactly like other
major countries when faced by such a crisis.
But surely the despatch of warships to a conflict zone
raises questions about that traditional cornerstone of
China’s foreign policy, namely non-interference in other
countries’ affairs?
Constant tension
Mathieu Duchatel, a specialist at the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, who is based in
Beijing (and the book’s other co-author) told me that this
shift in China’s foreign policy was “clearly being driven by
practical concerns rather than ideology”.
“There was a major turning point in 2004, which was
completely unexpected,” he says.
“Within a few months, there were three attacks on
Chinese nationals - one in Sudan, one in Pakistan and one
in Afghanistan.
“And this prompted a strong reaction in China - it
attracted the attention of the top leadership. China realised that it had so many nationals overseas and that some
of them were based in unstable countries - war zones in
some cases - and so they realised that protecting them was
a national interest.”
This realisation established what has become a constant tension in China’s foreign policy that has not yet
been resolved.
As Mr Parello-Plesner told me: “China has companies
willing to accept risk who are out there to secure business
or markets in virgin territories where there isn’t necessarily
a high-level of Western competition.
“That’s why in the search for oil they have gone into
Sudan.”
Then, on the other hand, you have the Chinese
government, which is traditionally inclined towards noninterference and more risk averse and would rather stay
out of troublespots.
These two trends converge, he says, and “we see the
Beijing government having to do much more, often in innovative ways”.
69
He gave the example of South Sudan where the Chinese
are now fielding a combat battalion in the UN mission
that’s there to stabilise the country.
“But it’s also part of the UN mandate that they can help
to secure oil workers who are predominantly Chinese, so
there you see a combination of China pursuing its national
interest which works for the broader public good.”
Fortuitous
This of course raises a fundamental question - does China
have the military resources needed for such interventions
to protect its nationals abroad?
In some cases the answer is clearly yes.
This is now explicitly part of Beijing’s new defence strategy that was published last week.
But, as Mr Duchatel told me, the Chinese navy’s involvement in evacuations in Libya and Yemen was slightly
fortuitous in that it had warships nearby, as part of antipiracy operations in the Gulf.
What about a crisis further from China’s own resources
- suppose an evacuation were needed in a West African
country where over 30,000 Chinese passport holders might
be involved?
China, he says, “simply couldn’t carry that out with the
same level of military involvement”.
There are those in the West who see this growing
Chinese global role as a potential threat, offering Beijing a
potential excuse to justify the deployment of military forces
in all kinds of places that might traditionally have been
well away from its routine concerns.
Of course, China does not yet have the means to do this.
Common ground
But Mr Duchatel suggests that on the contrary, this could
perhaps be a positive development.
“It is hard to think of scenarios of any evacuation from
a country where the West and China would be opposed,”
he says.
In contrast to what is happening in the South China Sea,
this is an area where there is a lot of common ground and, he
argues, “there is potential for China and the West - meaning
the US and Europe - to work together to enhance stability”.
There are technical things the militaries could do
together in cases of evacuation.
Says Mr Duchatel: “It is pretty clear that when there
is an evacuation, China is not the only country to evacuate - Pakistan, the Europeans and the US all carry out such
operations and there has to be some degree of co-ordination just to avoid competition for limited resources like
landing areas.”
©2015, BBC
70
Agence France Press
30 May 2015
US hits China over sea
reclamation, vows more patrols
Singapore // The United States on Saturday called for an
immediate halt to China’s land reclamation in the disputed
South China Sea and vowed to continue sending military
aircraft and ships to the tense region.
Beijing’s behaviour is “out of step” with international
norms, the US defence secretary Ashton Carter said at a
high-level security conference in Singapore.
“First, we want a peaceful resolution of all disputes. To
that end, there should be an immediate and lasting halt
to land reclamation by all claimants,” Mr Carter told the
annual Shangri-La Dialogue on security, with a Chinese
military delegation in the audience.
“We also oppose any further militarisation of disputed
features,” he said.
He acknowledged that other claimants had developed
outposts of differing scope and degree, including Vietnam
with 48, the Philippines with eight, Malaysia with five and
Taiwan with one.
“Yet, one country has gone much farther and much
faster than any other.
“China has reclaimed over 2,000 acres, more than all
other claimants combined and more than in the entire history of the region. And China did so in only the last 18
months,” Mr Carter said.
“It is unclear how much farther China will go. That is
why this stretch of water has become the source of tension
in the region and front-page news around the world.”
China insists it has sovereignty over nearly all of the
South China Sea, a major global shipping route believed to
be home to oil and gas reserves.
During a question and answer session after Mr Carter’s
speech, a Chinese military official said the criticism was
“groundless and not constructive”.
“Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea is not at
all an issue because the freedom has never been affected,”
said Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo from China’s Academy
of Military Science.
The head of the Chinese delegation, Admiral Sun
Jianguo, deputy chief of the general staff department at
the People’s Liberation Army, is scheduled to address the
forum on Sunday.
Last week the Chinese military ordered a US Navy
P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft to leave an area above
the heavily disputed Spratly Islands. The American plane
ignored the demand.
“There should be no mistake: the United States will fly,
sail, and operate wherever international law allows, as US
forces do all around the world,” Mr Carter said.
“After all, turning an underwater rock into an airfield
simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit
restrictions on international air or maritime transit.”
Washington on Friday accused China of deploying two
artillery pieces on one of its artificial islands in the South
China Sea.
The heavy weapons, since removed, posed no security threat but their positioning – within range of territory
claimed by Vietnam – underscored Washington’s concerns
that China is pursuing a massive island-building project for
military purposes, US officials said.
In his speech, Mr Carter urged China and the 10-member
Association of Southeast Asian Nations to adopt a “code of
conduct” in the disputed waters.
Along with Vietnam, fellow Asean members the
Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei all claim parts of the sea,
as does Taiwan.
©2015, Agence France Press
Associated Press
30 May 2015
Pentagon chief criticizes Beijing’s
South China Sea moves
By Lolita C Baldor and Matthew Pennington
SINGAPORE (AP) — China’s land reclamation in the
South China Sea is out of step with international rules, and
turning underwater land into airfields won’t expand its
sovereignty, Defense Secretary Ash Carter told an international security conference Saturday, stepping up America’s
condemnation of the communist giant as Beijing officials
sat in the audience.
Carter told the room full of Asia-Pacific leaders and
experts that the U.S. opposes “any further militarization”
of the disputed lands.
His remarks were immediately slammed as “groundless and not constructive” by a Chinese military officer in
the audience.
Carter’s comments came as defense officials revealed
that China had put two large artillery vehicles on one of
the artificial islands it is creating in the South China Sea.
The discovery, made at least several weeks ago, fuels fears
in the U.S and across the Asia-Pacific that China will try
to use the land reclamation projects for military purposes.
The weaponry was discovered at least several weeks
ago, and two U.S. officials who are familiar with intelligence about the vehicles say they have been removed. The
officials weren’t authorized to discuss the intelligence and
spoke only on condition of anonymity.
The Pentagon would not release any photos to support
its contention that the vehicles were there.
China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea has
become an increasingly sore point in relations with the
United States, even as President Barack Obama and China’s
President Xi Jinping have sought to deepen cooperation in
other areas, such as climate change.
Pentagon spokesman Brent Colburn said the U.S. was
aware of the artillery, but he declined to provide other
details. Defense officials described the weapons as self-propelled artillery vehicles and said they posed no threat to the
U.S. or American territories.
While Carter did not refer directly to the weapons in his
speech, he told the audience that now is the time for a diplomatic solution to the territorial disputes because “we all
know there is no military solution.”
“Turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does
not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on
international air or maritime transit,” Carter told the audience
at the International Institute for Strategic Studies summit.
China’s actions have been “reasonable and justified,”
said Senior Col. Zhao Xiaozhuo, deputy director of the
Center on China-America Defense Relations at the People’s
Liberation Army’s Academy of Military Science.
Zhao challenged Carter, asking whether America’s criticism of China and its military reconnaissance activities in
the South China Sea “help to resolve the disputes” and
maintain peace and stability in the region.
Carter responded that China’s expanding land reclamation projects are unprecedented in scale. He said the U.S.
has been flying and operating ships in the region for decades and has no intention of stopping.
While Carter’s criticism was aimed largely at China, he
made it clear that other nations who are doing smaller land
reclamation projects also must stop.
One of those countries is Vietnam, which Carter is scheduled to visit during this 11-day trip across Asia. Others are
Malaysia, the Philippines and Taiwan.
Asked about images of weapons on the islands, China’s
Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said she
was “not aware of the situation you mention.”
She also scolded Carter, saying the U.S. should be
“rational and calm and stop making any provocative
remarks, because such remarks not only do not help ease
the controversies in the South China Sea, but they also will
aggravate the regional peace and stability.”
Carter appeared to strike back in his speech, saying
that the U.S. is concerned about “the prospect of further
militarization, as well as the potential for these activities to
increase the risk of miscalculation or conflict.” And he said
the U.S. “has every right to be involved and be concerned.”
But while Carter stood in China’s backyard and added
to the persistent drumbeat of U.S. opposition to Beijing’s
activities, he did little to give Asia-Pacific nations a glimpse
71
into what America is willing to do to achieve a solution.
He said the U.S. will continue to sail, fly and operate in
the region, and warned that the Pentagon will be sending
its “best platforms and people” to the Asia-Pacific. Those
would include, he said, new high-tech submarines, surveillance aircraft, the stealth destroyer and new aircraft
carrier-based early-warning aircraft.
U.S. Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., who also is attending
the Singapore conference, told reporters that the U.S. needs
to recognize that China will continue its activities in the
South China Sea until it perceives that the costs of doing so
outweigh the benefits.
He said he agreed with Carter’s assertion that America
will continue flights and operations near the building projects, but “now we want to see it translated into action.”
One senior defense official has said the U.S. is considering more military flights and patrols closer to the projects in
the South China Sea, to emphasize reclaimed lands are not
China’s territorial waters. Officials also are looking at ways
to adjust the military exercises in the region to increase U.S.
presence if needed. That official was not authorized to discuss
the options publicly and spoke on condition of anonymity.
One possibility would be for U.S. ships to travel within
12 miles of the artificial islands, to further make the point
that they are not sovereign Chinese land. McCain said it
would be a critical mistake to recognize any 12-mile zone
around the reclamation projects.
The U.S. has been flying surveillance aircraft in the
region, prompting China to file a formal protest.
U.S. and other regional officials have expressed concerns about the island building, including worries that it
may be a prelude to navigation restrictions or the enforcement of a possible air defense identification zone over the
South China Sea. China declared such a zone over disputed
Japanese-held islands in the East China Sea in 2013.
China has said the islands are its territory and that the
buildings and other infrastructure are for public service use
and to support fishermen.
©2015, Associated Press
Today (Singapore)
30 May 2015
End vicious cycle in
South China Sea: PM
By Xue Jianyue
SINGAPORE — Amid renewed tensions between the
United States and China over reclaimed islands in the South
China Sea, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong yesterday
warned regional leaders that every Asian country stands to
lose if regional security and stability are threatened.
72
Delivering the keynote address at the Shangri-La
Dialogue, Mr Lee set out what needs to be done to ensure
a stable regional order, which requires consent and legitimacy in the international community and “cannot be
maintained by just by superior force” in the long run. He
also called on China and the Association of South-east
Asian Nations (ASEAN) to conclude a Code of Conduct on
the South China Sea “as soon as possible, so as to break
the vicious cycle and not let the disputes sour the broader
relationship”.
“If all parties adhere to international law... that is the
best outcome,” he said. “On the other hand, if a physical
clash occurs, which escalates into wider tension or conflict,
either by design or more likely by accident, that would be
very bad.”
He added: “But even if we avoid a physical clash, if
the outcome is determined on the basis of might is right,
it will set a bad precedent. It may not lead immediately to
a hot conflict, but it will be an unhappier and less sustainable position.”
In recent weeks, US and China exchanged increasingly
angry barbs over the reclaimed islands. On Thursday,
Beijing defended its building of the artificial islands and
accused Washington of stirring up trouble in the economically vital region.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying
said no outside actors had the right to dictate to China in an
area it claims as its sovereign territory. Ms Hua’s remarks
came less than a day after US Defence Secretary Ashton
Carter delivered the strongest US warning yet against
Beijing’s moves in the South China Sea, demanding a halt
to land reclamation in disputed waters and vowing that
Washington would remain Asia’s leading power “for decades to come”.
Mr Lee is the second Singapore leader in recent weeks to
urge China and ASEAN to swiftly agree on the code. Earlier
this month, Defence Minister Ng Eng Hen had called on the
two parties to “expeditiously” do so as maritime territorial disputes, if left unchecked, could be disruptive to the
global economy.
Away from the territorial disputes, Mr Lee said that
World War II continues to cast a shadow over relations
between Japan and its neighbours China and South Korea,
even though it had ended 70 years ago. “It is past the time
to put this history behind us properly, like the Europeans
have done. This requires statesmanship and largeness of
spirit on both sides,” he said.
Japan needs to acknowledge past wrongs, and Japanese
public opinion needs to be more forthright in rejecting the
more outrageous interpretations of history by right-wing
academics and politicians, Mr Lee said. While Japan has
made apologies in general terms, its positions on specific
issues such as comfort women and the Nanjing massacre
has been “less than equivocal”, he noted.
At the same time, Japan’s neighbours need to accept the
country’s acknowledgements and “not demand that Japan
apologises over and over again”.
Mr Lee said: “The history of the war should not be used
to put Japan on the defensive, or to perpetuate enmities
into future generations. Only with largeness of heart can
all sides move forward to reduce distrust and build up
cooperation.”
Mr Lee stressed the importance of positive relations
between the US and China, and the need for the former
to be part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). “The
US-China relationship is fundamentally different from the
US-Soviet relationship of old. It is not a zero-sum game.
There are elements of competition, but many interdependencies and opportunities for mutual benefit,” he said.
A step towards establishing the TPP involves the
passing of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) by the
US Congress. The TPA provides the US President with
the authority to negotiate international agreements that
Congress can approve or disapprove, but cannot amend
or filibuster.
“Failing to get the TPP done will hurt the credibility and
standing of the US not just in Asia, but worldwide,” Mr
Lee said.
Mr Lee said he expects that the US, China and Japan
will remain major powers, while India will play an increasing role in the region. He hopes the world will continue
to have an open global system of trade, investment and
economic cooperation, and “certainly free trade in the
Asia-Pacific instead of the current alphabet soup of trading
arrangements”.
“It should not be a world where might is right, the
strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they
must,” he said. “It should be a world where legitimacy and
constructive engagement are the international norm, and
every country, big and small, can compete peacefully for a
chance to prosper.”
©2015, Today (Singapore)
Times of India
31 May 2015
Island row: China and Japan
may sign pact to end crisis
By Saibal Dasgupta
BEIJING: China and Japan may sign an agreement to diffuse maritime crisis between the two nations.
The two countries have come close to a military confrontation over a sea dispute on a few occasions in recent years.
Two military leaders, Vice Chief of Staff of China’s
People’s Liberation Army Sun Jianguo and Director
General of the Japanese Defense Ministry’s Defense Policy
Bureau Hideshi Tokuchi, have expressed hope that the two
countries will soon sign a Memorandum of Understanding
on the maritime and aerial crisis liaison mechanism.
The two were brought together in the same platform
by the Shangri-La Dialogue. The Shangri-La Dialogue is
organized by the Britain-based International Institute for
Strategic Studies which brings together defense ministers,
senior officials and security experts to exchange views on
key issues that shape the defense and security landscape of
the region.
They also expect to launch the mechanism and implement the agreement at an early date, the officials said
after a meeting on the sidelines of the ongoing Shangri-La
Dialogue involving defense ministers of 26 nations in
Singapore.
Sources said that the move is significant because Japan
has decided to get out its pacifists constitution and develop
military capability of its own instead of depending entirely
on the United States. China also wants Tokyo to get out of
the US influence and deal directly with it, observers said.
The two countries are quarrelling over ownership of
the Diayou Islands (called Senkaku in Japanese) in the East
China Sea which is currently in Japan’s control. China also
has a serious grouse against Japan for allowing its soldiers
to torture thousands of Chinese men and women during
World War II.
Sun told Japanese officials that China is willing to work
with Japan to promote the good- neighborly relations and
cooperation, according to the official Xinhua news agency.
It wants to protect the hard-won progress in the improvement of bilateral ties, Sun said, indicating that China would
do nothing to aggravate the differences.
China is keen to push Washington out of the picture
although the US maintains significant naval presence in
the region to reassure its allies like Japan of its protection,
sources said.
Sun expressed hope that the two sides would continue
defense exchanges and cooperation, strengthen mutual
understanding along with enhanced management and control over contradictions and crisis.
Tokuchi said Japan is willing to make efforts to improve
the bilateral ties there were sharp difficulties and differences in the Sino-Japan relations.
Cooperation in the defense and security field would go
a long way to improve bilateral ties, he said. There are indications the two countries might take a step forward and
consider holding a joint military exercise at a limited scale
as a confidence building measure, sources said.
©2015, Times of India
73
New York Times
May 31 2015
Building of Islands Is Debated, but
China and U.S. Skirt Conflict at Talks
By Matthew Rosenberg
SINGAPORE — It was an unexpectedly direct exchange:
With nearly every significant Asian defense official gathered in a single room, a senior Chinese military officer on
Saturday defended his country’s island-building spree in
the South China Sea and rebuked Defense Secretary Ashton
B. Carter for saying it threatened the region’s stability.
If anything, “the region has been peaceful and stable
just because of China’s great restraint,” said Senior Col.
Zhou Bo, the Chinese officer.
Yet a few moments later, away from the crowd and
cameras, Colonel Zhou’s defiant tone gave way to a seemingly more subtle appreciation of the complex relationship
that binds the United States and China together and, at the
same time, pushes them apart. The speech by Mr. Carter
that prompted his comments had “balance,” Colonel Zhou
said in a brief interview.
“We do not disagree on all things,” he added, before
rushing off to huddle with fellow Chinese officers at the
conference.
After a week of public rancor over China’s rush to
build artificial islands on reefs, rocks and atolls in the
disputed waters of the South China Sea, the first full day
of the Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual security meeting
in Singapore that attracts almost every major and minor
player in Asia, gave both sides the chance to lower the
temperature.
Though Mr. Carter did not hold any formal meetings
with Chinese officials, lower-ranking American officials
did, and it was apparent that they in effect agreed to disagree on what constitutes sovereign Chinese territory for
the time being. But American officials made it clear that
the dispute would not hinder nascent military cooperation
with China or threaten the deep economic ties that are the
bedrock of Asia’s stability and prosperity.
Adm. Harry Harris, the new chief of American forces
in the Pacific, summed it up succinctly in a briefing
with reporters at the end of the day: “Conflict is bad for
business.”
The dispute over the South China Sea has festered for
decades with China, Vietnam, the Philippines and a handful of other countries all making overlapping claims to a
stretch of ocean rich with natural gas and other resources.
While this issue simmered in the background for a long
time, disputes have escalated in recent years, most notably when China placed an oil rig near Vietnam last year,
74
but also with skirmishes between naval forces and fishing
boats from the various claimants.
Those tensions have heightened as the scope of the
Chinese building spree became apparent — American
officials say 2,000 acres of land were added in the past 18
months — and a pair of mechanized artillery pieces were
briefly spotted on two of the islands, raising fears that
China was moving to back up its claims to the new islands
with military force.
Chinese forces also this month ordered an American
surveillance plane to leave the skies over Fiery Cross Reef,
where China has built an island with a landing strip. The
American aircraft did not comply.
Then last week China released a document outlining
a strategic vision for its navy to project force beyond its
coastal waters into the open oceans. Western officials said
the release appeared timed to challenge participants at the
conference.
Other countries have also built outposts in the South
China Sea. But the construction was done before 2002, when
China and nine Southeast Asian nations signed a nonbinding agreement to “exercise self-restraint” and refrain from
trying to inhabit any land features that were uninhabited
at that time. And the pre-2002 construction was never done
at the pace and on the scale of China’s recent land reclamation efforts.
Mr. Carter, whose speech opened the day, reiterated a
call he made earlier in the week for China to halt the construction, saying that American warships and military
aircraft would continue to operate in the area, which the
United States still considers to be international waters, not
Chinese territory. He also listed numerous weaponry that
the United States could bring to bear in Asia — though he
did not directly link any of it to China — and unveiled a
new American effort to help China’s neighbors build up
their naval capabilities.
But he balanced his tough talk with entreaties to China
to work with its neighbors and the United States to ensure
stability in the region, saying that through cooperation
“everybody wins.”
He also sought to assuage Chinese fears that the United
States was using the dispute over the sea simply to keep
China in check. The United States expected countries like
China to broaden the scope of their interests as they grew
more powerful, and it was ready to work with them to keep
the peace, he said.
The United States “has never aimed to hold any nation
back or push any country down,” he said.
Mr. Carter also cited areas where the American and
Chinese militaries were already cooperating, and new initiatives, such as a measure the two sides are working on
that would help prevent dangerous air-to-air encounters
between military aircraft.
The official Chinese response was to come Sunday when
Adm. Sun Jianguo, the deputy chief of the general staff of
the People’s Liberation Army, addresses the conference.
American, European and Asian officials here said they
expected blustery language, and that had little expectation
that the Chinese would suddenly halt their effort to construct new territory in the South China Sea.
Colonel Zhou may have provided a preview on Saturday
during the question-and-answer period that followed Mr.
Carter’s speech.
After calling Mr. Carter’s criticism groundless, he said
that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was not
a problem because it was never really free, and then concluded with a loaded question. “The U.S. has taken some
measures, such as harsh criticism toward China, and military reconnaissance activities, your military threat,” he
said. “Do these measures help to resolve the dispute in the
South China Sea and maintain peace and stability?”
The American answer was that its military has always
flown and sailed in international airspace and water, and
that it is China that is trying to alter the facts on the ground,
not the United States.
But neither side for now appears willing to do much
more than demand that the other stop.
In the meantime, American officials said they would
continue to build the military capacity of allies in the
region, and forge closer ties with former adversaries
like Vietnam, so they too could benefit from American
military assistance. Over time, the hope is that stronger
neighbors backed by the United States would serve as a
deterrent to China.
Senator John McCain, who led a Congressional delegation to the conference, told reporters that he planned to
introduce legislation next week to lift parts of an embargo
on sending weapons to Vietnam.
American allies, though, did not appear entirely convinced that the United States had a long-term plan, or that
it would back up its talk about freedom of navigation and
the need to respect international laws with action.
“If we leave any unlawful situation unattended, order
will soon turn to disorder, and peace and stability will collapse,” Gen Nakatani, the defense minister of Japan, told
the forum. “I hope and expect all the countries, including
China, to behave as a responsible power.”
But few, if anyone, seemed willing to see order enforced
at the risk of war. “This has the potential to escalate into one
of the deadliest conflicts of our time, if not history,” said
Hishammuddin Hussein, the defense minister of Malaysia.
“Inflamed rhetoric does not do any nation any good.”
©2015, New York Times
Bloomberg
31 May 2015
Nice Words From China and U.S. Fail
to Dim South China Sea Tensions
By David Tweed, Sharon Chen and Chris Brummitt
Inside a plush Singapore hotel, top American and Chinese
defense officials spent the weekend treading carefully on
China’s pushiness in the South China Sea. Outside that
bubble, tensions between the world’s two biggest economies over the key shipping lane are undiminished.
The Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore is an annual
venue for the U.S. and China to set out their role in the
region, for the U.S. to tell China to stop being so assertive
against other claimant states in the South China Sea, and
China to say it has every right to defend its territory.
In contrast to last year when then-Defense Secretary
Chuck Hagel traded barbs with Chinese Lieutenant
General Wang Guanzhong, this year’s speeches by U.S.
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and Chinese Admiral
Sun Jianguo were couched in more moderate tones. Yet the
external backdrop is more tense: China has dramatically
escalated its reclamation of disputed reefs and is warning
planes from other countries away.
The lack of fireworks at Shangri-La potentially reflects
unease among some Southeast Asian nations about the
pickup in tensions, as the U.S. boosts its patrols of the South
China Sea. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
warned on Friday that smaller countries in the region don’t
want to be squeezed by the two major powers and have to
pick a side.
Regardless of what was said inside the forum, “it is more
dangerous now than last time because of the construction
and the U.S. response has been very robust, shown resolve,”
said Susan Shirk, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary
of state for East Asia, referring to China’s reclamation. “The
U.S. may be prepared to take some risks to demonstrate the
credibility of that resolve.”
Surveillance Flights
Shirk, who is chair of the 21st Century China Program at
the University of California in San Diego, also attended last
year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore since 2002.
When Hagel spoke last year there was little risk the U.S.
military would be dragged into a quarrel that had blown
up over a Chinese oil rig parked in waters also claimed by
Vietnam. Now, the tensions are more directly felt between
China and the U.S. A U.S. surveillance plane was recently
warned by the Chinese Navy to stop patrolling near reefs
China claims in the Spratly Island area.
Still, Carter, while maintaining his warning that the U.S.
would fly or sail wherever international law allowed, also
75
noted strengthening ties between the nations’ militaries.
Admiral Sun focused his speech on presenting China as a
“reliable friend and sincere partner” to developing countries and a nation seeking to cooperate.
Next Step
Throughout the three-day forum, Chinese officials talked
about their country as being beset by unreasonable neighbors intent on foiling its rights to the islands. China claims
about 80 percent of the South China Sea based on a ninedash line drawn on a 1940s map.
“Both sides seem to be wanting to find a way to pipe
down,” said Ong Keng Yong, executive deputy chairman
of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and
Singapore’s non-resident ambassador to Iran and Pakistan.
“Since America is not regarded as aggressive, China also
took one step back, but where is all this leading to? Both are
trying to measure each other’s position and see what’s the
next possible step.”
Some of the remarks from Sun and Carter show why
tensions in the South China Sea will remain. Carter on
Saturday called for an “immediate and lasting halt to land
reclamation by any claimant” and said the U.S. would continue its patrols. A day later, Sun said China would resist
any effort to subjugate it.
Shipping Lanes
Protecting freedom of navigation resonates in the region
region because the South China Sea hosts more than $5
trillion of shipping each year and is home to about a 10th
of the world’s annual fishing catch. Parts of the waters are
also claimed by Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia
and Taiwan.
While China says its artificial islands will be for civilian
use - from search-and-rescue operations to marine meteorological forecasting - it also says they’d have military
purposes, and it reserves the right to declare an air defense
identification zone over the area.
Satellite images show the construction of an airstrip big
enough to handle the largest of China’s military aircraft, while
two mobile artillery pieces have been detected on a reef.
China’s turning rocky outcrops or reefs into a “full airport,” while putting weapons on them is a militarization
that hasn’t occurred before, Australia’s Defense Minister
Kevin Andrews said in an interview.
“There has to be a halt to this kind of destabilizing
activity,” said Bonnie Glaser, a senior adviser for Asia
at the Washington, DC-based Center for Strategic and
International Studies. “There is insufficient agreement
among all the nations about how to move forward.”
Air Zone
Whether China establishes an air defense identification
zone over the South China Sea depends “on whether our
security in the air and maritime area will be threatened and
to what extent,” said Sun, who is deputy chief of the general staff in the People’s Liberation Army.
76
Sun declined to directly address a flurry of questions about China’s policy after his speech, citing time
constraints. He was mobbed by reporters as he left the
ballroom.
Chinese officials attempted to take the moral high
ground during the forum, presenting themselves as victims in the South China Sea, pushed and provoked despite
attempts to promote stability. A senior Chinese colonel
on Saturday accused the Philippines of “bullying” at the
Scarborough Shoal in 2012.
“Part of the Chinese message was that whether or not
you agree with our policy on our territorial claims, the
greater good is for you to engage with us economically
to mutual benefit, and let’s not have a difficult conversation,” said Ben Barry, a defense analyst at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies in London.
“Behind the polite and restrained message was there
any hint of concession?” he said. “No.”
©2015, Bloomberg
Wall Street Journal
31 May 2015
China’s Island-Building
Poses Dilemma for U.S.
By Andrew Browne, Gordon Lubold and Trefor Moss
SINGAPORE—China’s refusal to curtail island-building in
the South China Sea has sparked a debate in Washington
between those who believe such muscle-flexing shouldn’t
go unchecked, and others who fear the wrong response
could trigger a military confrontation or a new Cold War.
The delicacy of the Obama administration’s position
was on display throughout the weekend at the Shangri-La
Dialogue, a major security conference where Defense
Secretary Ash Carter tried to convince Beijing to stop its
building of islets in the disputed Spratly Islands.
U.S. officials say China’s program, which has expanded
dramatically in recent months, includes transforming semisubmerged reefs into forward bases with airfields fit for
military use—sparking anxiety among China’s neighbors
and threatening America’s decadeslong military primacy
in East Asia.
Obama administration officials are struggling to find
“that right balance” to exert pressure without inflaming the
situation “more than it needs to be as we try to pursue our
goals and objectives,” a U.S. official said.
“There aren’t any silver bullets to resolving this,” said
David Shear, a former U.S. ambassador to Vietnam who is
now the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific
security affairs.
In Singapore, Mr. Carter insisted the U.S. “will fly, sail,
and operate wherever international law allows,” despite
Beijing’s claims that coming too close to the islands would
be provocative. He also listed new weapons systems the
U.S. plans to move to Asia as part of its longer-term rebalance of military assets to the region, including the newest
stealth destroyer, the Zumwalt.
Yet Mr. Carter couched his remarks in language that
stressed a common vision of Asian prosperity in which
“everyone rises.” By portraying China as disrupting this
status quo and defying international norms, he appeared
to be carefully laying the groundwork for any future show
of force.
China appeared unfazed by Mr. Carter’s remarks and
showed little indication of backing down. Zhao Xiaozhou,
a Chinese colonel, said Mr. Carter “wasn’t as tough as I
expected.”
On Sunday, Adm. Sun Jianguo repeated Beijing’s line
that the islands are China’s sovereign territory and would
benefit Asia, providing maritime search and rescue, disaster relief, and scientific research bases. “There is no reason
for people to play up the issue in the South China Sea,”
said Adm. Sun, the deputy chief of staff of the People’s
Liberation Army’s General Staff. The new islands “do not
target any other countries, or affect freedom of navigation.”
That leaves President Barack Obama facing a dilemma.
His signature pivot to Asia early in his first term was meant
to reassure allies worried about China’s rise. But an overly
aggressive approach now risks antagonizing China and
could polarize the world’s most vibrant economic region—
a recurring dread of Asian countries that don’t want to
have to choose sides.
On the other side, Chinese President Xi Jinping is a
strong nationalist who views the expanding islands as
symbols of China’s rise and its determination to recover
territory lost during a “century of humiliation” at the
hands of imperialist powers.
Even within the U.S. military, there isn’t a consensus
on how to approach the situation, the U.S. official said.
Some officials inside U.S. Pacific Command see a need to
respond to China’s aggression, for example, while others
in the Pentagon wonder if responding too muscularly is
an overreaction.
“There’s not a monolithic view in the Defense
Department,” the official said. “Everyone agrees that what
they’re doing is wrong, but it’s a question of what actions
do you take to influence that behavior.”
Some analysts have argued for a grand bargain in which
the U.S. would concede greater influence to China in its
own backyard, possibly involving U.S. troop withdrawals
to create neutral buffer zones.
That would effectively mean the end of the post-World
War II status quo in which America has served as the predominant power in Asia, ensuring the right of unfettered
access to shipping lanes.
Others, including some in Congress, believe the U.S.
ultimately will have to demonstrate military resolve,
despite the danger of miscalculation on both sides.
Sen. John McCain, (R., Ariz.), who was at the Shangri-La
Dialogue with a bipartisan delegation of senators, also
urged tougher action. “We need to recognize this reality
that China will likely continue with its destabilizing activities unless and until it perceives that the costs of doing so
outweigh the benefits,” he said after Mr. Carter’s speech.
“Clearly, it has not yet concluded that.”
In weighing how forcefully to press its case, though, the
U.S. is constrained by the fact that China’s island-building
doesn’t violate maritime law, and other claimants to the
Spratlys, including Taiwan, Vietnam and the Philippines,
have all expanded the geographical features they control,
albeit not nearly as dramatically.
Nor has China threatened shipping in the South China
Sea, which carries more than half the world’s trade. And
although the U.S. accuses China of militarizing the islands,
so far it has identified only two light motorized artillery
pieces on one of them.
Even after their expansion—in the past 18 months China
has added 2,000 or so acres of land—the islands remain
mere specks in the ocean and have limited military value.
Situated some 660 miles from the Chinese mainland, they
are virtually indefensible.
“It’s not a Cuban missile crisis,” said Euan Graham, the
program director for International Security at the Lowy
Institute, an Australian think tank.
Still, the islands could be tokens in a much wider struggle likely to play out over decades, as China seeks to break
free from a chain of U.S. alliances stretching from Korea to
Australia that it believes is throttling its rise.
Washington fears that China plans to set up an airdefense zone over the South China Sea as it has done over
the East China Sea, including islands disputed with Japan.
The expanded islets in the Spratly Islands could help
enforce that regime.
Mr. Graham says China’s long-term goal is to make
the South China Sea safe for its navy, including submarines carrying nuclear ballistic missiles now bottled up
in the shallower East China Sea. Ahead of the Shangri-La
Dialogue China produced a defense White Paper that outlined its plans to project naval power farther afield.
Pressure for a short-term fix could rise as more Asian
nations, alarmed by China’s expansionism, line up behind
the U.S.
Zhu Feng, a professor at Nanjing University, said he
heard “growing flexibility” in China’s language at the
Shangri-La Dialogue this year. “They want to de-escalate,” said Mr. Zhu, the director of the China Center for
Collaborative Studies of the South China Sea.
There was also an indication the U.S. might show flexibility in at least one area. Ahead of the meeting, there was
77
speculation that the U.S. might withdraw an invitation for
China to attend the biannual Rim of the Pacific naval exercises off Hawaii next year.
But Adm. Harry Harris, the new commander of U.S.
Pacific Command, who created a stir several weeks ago by
labeling China’s new islands a “Great Wall of sand,” said
the Chinese were still welcome.
“We’ll see how it goes, but a lot can happen between
now and then,” he said.
©2015, Wall Street Journal
Financial Times
31 May 2015
Cooler heads are needed
in the South China Sea
In the past 18 months, China has been enthusiastically
dredging sand from the bottom of the South China Sea
and building artificial islands in disputed waters. During
that period, according to Ashton Carter, US secretary of
defence, Beijing has reclaimed more land than all the other
claimants put together over the history of the dispute. True,
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan have all
built islands to bolster their territorial claims. Yet Beijing’s
actions dwarf those efforts in both speed and scale.
The exercise is being carried out in a state of secrecy.
No one knows quite what China is up to nor what it hopes
to achieve. The lack of transparency is unnerving given
China’s territorial ambitions. With little or no basis in international law, it lays claim to virtually all of the South China
Sea, asserting ownership of everything within a nine-dash
line hugging the coast of the Philippines, Malaysia and
Vietnam. One theory is that Beijing wants to build a runway
in order to enforce an air defence identification zone over
the entire sea. Beijing should desist from such an unnecessary provocation.
In the run-up to this weekend’s Shangri-La Dialogue, a
regional security summit held in Singapore, Washington
has begun to push back. This month, it flew a P-8 Poseidon
aircraft — with a CNN television crew on board — over one
of China’s new islands, eliciting a sharp warning from the
Chinese navy. The US says it has detected artillery pieces
and has reserved the right to sail warships within 12 miles
of the newly created islands. This weekend, Mr Carter
made it clear the US would “fly, sail and operate wherever
international law allows” and said China’s act of “turning
an underwater rock into an airfield” in no way conferred
sovereign rights. Chinese Admiral Sun Jianguo responded
that Beijing’s actions were “justified, legitimate and reasonable” and were intended to provide “international public
services”. His words will bring little comfort to the Asian
nations that feel threatened by China’s behaviour.
78
In the short term, both China and the US need to ratchet
down tensions. All nations, including China, should give
thought to Mr Carter’s call for a moratorium on new island
construction. The atmosphere would then be more conducive to conclude a code of conduct that could prevent
accidents and unnecessary provocations in future. China
should also spell out exactly what its nine-dash claim
means and explain what it hopes to achieve through island
construction. It should reiterate its commitment to freedom
of navigation. For its part, the US should stop grandstanding via the television cameras and should think hard before
it sails warships past Chinese-built islands. The danger is
that Beijing will feel obliged to respond in kind.
In the longer run, there is a more fundamental issue at
stake. China’s actions are nothing less than the beginning
of a challenge to US dominance in the Pacific. Given its
economic might, that is hardly surprising, nor need it be
threatening. Most countries in the region want to strike a
balance between the ambitions of a rising China and the
comfort of US presence. At the moment, the two countries
are on a slow, but unmistakable collision course. The trick
will be to bind both China and the US into a wider, regional
security framework that establishes rules of the road —
and of the sea and the air. Such rules will have to have
widespread support, including from the two most powerful Pacific powers themselves. The status quo is probably
unsustainable. Yet it will not be in the region’s interests
simply to replace the Pax Americana with a Pax Sinica.
©2015, Financial Times
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
31 May 2015
Auf dem Shangri-la-Dialog
zum Konflikt um das
Südchinesische Meer steht
China isolierter da als je zuvor
By Till Fähnders
SINGAPUR, 31. Mai.Asiens wichtigste Sicherheitskonferenz,
der Shangri-la-Dialog in Singapur, läuft seit einigen Jahren
nach dem gleichen Schema ab: Am Tag nach der Eröffnung
hält der amerikanische Verteidigungsminister die erste
Rede, in der er Chinas aggressives Verhalten in der
Nachbarschaft kritisiert und ein verstärktes Engagement
Amerikas in der Region verspricht. In der anschließenden
Fragerunde meldet sich dann ein uniformiertes Mitglied
der chinesischen Delegation, um die Anschuldigungen
zurückzuweisen. Am zweiten Konferenztag ist dann ein
Chinese dran, der die Vorwürfe in aller Breite zurückweist
und die friedlichen Absichten Chinas betont. Daraufhin
wird er selbst mit bohrenden Fragen der Delegierten überhäuft, die er ausweichend beantwortet.
Die Presse kann dann über diesen “Schlagabtausch” berichten. Andere Teilnehmer, darunter Verteidigungsminister
und weitere Repräsentanten aus Südostasien, Ostasien
und Ozeanien sowie Europas, tun auf der Veranstaltung
ansonsten vor allem ihre Sorgen kund. Am stärksten tat
dies nun Malaysias Verteidigungsminister Hishammuddin
Hussein. Er warnte, dass das “alte” Problem sich überlappender Gebietsansprüche im Südchinesischen Meer “zu
einem der tödlichsten Konflikte unserer Zeit, vielleicht
sogar der Geschichte” eskalieren könnte. Der deutsche
Europaabgeordnete der Grünen Reinhard Bütikofer nannte
den Konflikt “nicht weniger brisant als die Ukraine-Krise”.
In diesem Jahr waren die Erwartungen, dass es zu
einer verbalen Konfrontation zwischen den Mächten
China und Amerika kommen würde, noch größer als
sonst. Daran hatten beide Länder ihren Anteil. China
versetzt mit seiner Landgewinnung im Südchinesischen
Meer die Nachbarländer seit Monaten in Aufregung. Die
Aufschüttung von Inseln dort, wo sich Gebietsansprüche
Chinas mit denen Vietnams, der Philippinen, Malaysias,
Bruneis und Taiwans überlappen, dienen teilweise
eindeutig militärischen Zwecken. Auch auf der Shangri-LaKonferenz wurden keine echten Lösungen gefunden. “Die
Ratlosigkeit ist mit Händen zu greifen”, sagte ein ranghoher Teilnehmer.
Selbst die Vereinigten Staaten scheinen in der Sache
keinen stringenten Plan zu verfolgen. Um China zu
zeigen, dass es nicht einfach Fakten schaffen kann, hatte
Washington vor wenigen Tagen ein Aufklärungsflugzeug
über die Atolle geschickt und auch ein Fernsehteam
des Senders CNN an Bord genommen. Die Journalisten
erlebten, wie die Amerikaner von der chinesischen Marine
aufgefordert wurden, das umstrittene Gebiet zu verlassen. Das ändert zwar nichts am neuen Status quo, aber
mit dem CNN-Bericht war die Bühne bereitet, auf der
Verteidigungsminister Ashton Carter am Samstag die
Einstellung der Bautätigkeiten fordern konnte, über die
Amerika “sehr besorgt” sei.
Der Amerikaner gab damit nicht nur der Sorge seiner
Regierung Ausdruck, sondern auch die der meisten anderen
auf der Konferenz vertretenden Länder, mit Ausnahme
natürlich Chinas. Carter sagte, dass auch andere Länder
militärische Außenposten in dem Gebiet errichtet hätten.
Jedoch seien die chinesischen Aktivitäten “beispiellos” in
ihrem Ausmaß. Er ließ keinen Zweifel daran, dass Amerika
sich nicht abschrecken lassen werde. Aus Sicht Amerikas
handelt es sich bei dem Gebiet um die Korallenriffe und
Atolle herum klar um internationale Gewässer.
Aus der chinesischen Delegation war es dem bekannten
Schema nach an Zhao Xiaozhuo, einem Obersten der
Volksbefreiungsarmee, die “harsche Kritik” Carters
zurückzuweisen. Chinas Aktivitäten seien “legitim,
angemessen und berechtigt”, sagte Zhao. Am Sonntag
wiederholte der chinesische Delegationsleiter und stellvertretende Generalstabschef Sun Jianguo diese Formulierung.
Der Admiral stellte es zudem so dar, als handele es sich
bei den Landgewinnungsmaßnahmen um eine harmlose
Bautätigkeit, von der alle profitieren würden.
Insgesamt verlief der Schlagabtausch zwischen China
und Amerika diesmal weniger heftig als im Jahr davor, als
der damalige Verteidigungsminister Chuck Hagel China
eine Destabilisierung der Region vorgeworfen hatte. Die
Stimmung war konstruktiver, allerdings stand China noch
isolierter da als in den vergangenen Jahren. Die von der
britischen Denkfabrik IISS in einem Fünfsternehotel des
reichen Stadtstaats Singapur veranstaltete Konferenz, an
der jedes Jahr Hunderte Verteidigungspolitiker, Fachleute
und Vertreter der Rüstungsindustrie teilnehmen, bemüht
sich zwar darum, viele asiatische Stimmen zu Wort
kommen zu lassen. Aber der Diskurs wird häufig von der
westlichen Sicht dominiert.
Neben den Appellen, endlich einen bindenden Kodex
zwischen China und den zehn Asean-Staaten (COC) zu
vereinbaren, der das Verhalten im Fall von Zwischenfällen
in dem Meeresgebiet regelt, gab es weitere Vorschläge, wie
mit der Krise im Südchinesischen Meer umzugehen sei: So
kündigte Ashton Carter eine neue “Seesicherheits-Initiative
für Südostasien” im Umfang von 425 Millionen Dollar an.
Was genau dahintersteckt, blieb indes ebenso undeutlich
wie der Vorschlag des japanischen Verteidigungsministers
Gen Nakatani einer “Shangri-La-Dialog-Initiative”. Alle
diese Ansätze kranken daran, dass China entweder von
vorneherein nicht einbezogen wird oder die Teilnahme jederzeit aufkündigen kann.
Einen Lichtblick bildeten die Europäer: Sie waren in
Singapur so zahlreich vertreten wie lange nicht mehr. Neben
Verteidigungsministerin Ursula von der Leyen sprachen
auch die EU-Außenbeauftragte Federica Mogherini und
der Verteidigungsminister Großbritanniens. Mit von der
Leyen besuchte erstmals seit 2007 wieder ein deutscher
Verteidigungsminister die Konferenz. In ihrer von vielen
Teilnehmern gelobten Rede stellte von der Leyen die
Erfahrungen Europas mit Konfliktlösungen vor. “Zwar
sind die sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen in
Europa und Asien nicht die gleichen, aber die Muster sind
sehr ähnlich”, sagte sie.
Europa habe immer wieder in seine Partnerschaften
und Allianzen investiert und die EU-Mitgliedstaaten
auch Teile ihrer Souveränität abgegeben, sagte die
Ministerin. Sie erinnerte an die deutsche Geschichte
seit den Weltkriegen. Von der Leyen machte deutlich,
dass auch Deutschland als Handelsnation Interessen im
asiatisch-pazifischen Raum verfolgt. Schließlich ginge
die Hälfte des gesamten Güterverkehrs, der über See
transportiert werde, durch diesen Raum. Wie Ashton
Carter sprach auch von der Leyen deshalb von einer
79
Sicherheitsarchitektur, die Asien benötige. Sie verwies
auf den Staatenbund Asean, mit dem die EU sicherheitspolitisch noch intensiver kooperieren wolle.
Die EU-Außenbeauftragte Federica Mogherini stellte
den Plan der EU für eine weitergehende “Partnerschaft
mit einer strategischen Absicht” vor. Das europäische
Engagement gehe weit über Handel, Investitionen und
Entwicklungshilfe hinaus. “Es muss sich auch auf dem Feld
der Sicherheitspolitik weiterentwickeln”, sagte Mogherini.
Ihr Plan beinhaltet unter anderem die Erhöhung der finanziellen Unterstützung der EU für Asean. Auch die Europäer
brachten zwar kein Rezept zur Lösung des Konflikts
mit, sind aber immerhin gewillt, etwas für Frieden und
Sicherheit in Asien zu tun.
©2015, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Washington Post
1 June 2015
China is not the only country
reclaiming land in South China Sea
By Walter Pincus
It’s time to get the facts straight on the military activities of
all countries in the Spratly Islands before Washington intensifies its confrontation with China over Beijing’s intentions.
The headlines have been about China’s reclamation of
some 2,000 acres from the South China Sea over the past 18
months and building military facilities on them.
Less attention has been paid — except by the Chinese
— to smaller but similar reclamation and military construction efforts over the years and currently by Taiwan,
Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, related to islands
they claim in the Spratlys.
Taiwan, for example, has claimed Itu Aba Island since
1955, one of the largest in the Spratlys. It served as a
Japanese submarine base during World War II and today
tankers carrying most of China’s imported oil pass nearby.
In 2008, Taiwan announced a new 3,900-foot airstrip had
been completed on the island that would support search
and rescue operations. It also could support military aircraft, as Taiwan’s president proved that year when he
landed in a C-130 transport plane.
The island now has a radar station, meteorological center and permanent troop support facilities for a
Taiwanese marine unit.
More recently, Taiwan has begun a modest reclamation
effort near the airstrip, which may be part of a proposed
$100 million port designed to handle frigates and coast
guard cutters.
Vietnam also has been expanding its holdings in the
Spratlys, which lie just seven miles east of Taiwan’s Itu Aba
80
Island and were first occupied in 1975. On Sand Cay and
West London Reef, Vietnam has been reclaiming land from
the sea to build military facilities but at about one-tenth the
size of China’s project.
West London Reef’s eastern sandbank has been
expanded by two square miles and work on a harbor facility is underway, according to a study by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). On the southern
portion a fourth structure is joining three multi-story military facilities. Another is going up in the northern portion.
A surveillance facility sits at the eastern side of Sand
Cay with a heliport next to it. The Vietnamese are also
constructing a pier and a complex of defense structures,
including what may be artillery emplacements bunkers,
according to the CSIS .
On the Spratly Island of Zhongye Dao, the Philippine
government has had a military airstrip since 1975 known
as Ranudo Air Field. The Philippine air force announced in
June 2014 that $11 million had been allocated to upgrade
the 4,200-foot runway and navy port facilities. Aside from
the air field, which has been able to accommodate C-130s
since 2002, the island has a military detachment and small
civilian population.
Malaysia is also in the Spratly picture. In early 2013, the
Chinese held naval exercises near James Shoals, a reef some
50 miles off Malaysia’s Borneo state of Sarawak, which
Malaysia claims and is considered part of the Spratlys. In
October 2013, Malaysian Defense Minister Hishamuddin
Hussein announced his country’s plan to establish a marine
corps that would be stationed at a new naval base to be
constructed at Bintulu in Sarawak.
On Saturday, at the International Institute for Strategic
Studies Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Defense
Secretary Ashton B. Carter acknowledged, “It’s true that
almost all the nations that claim parts of the South China
Sea have developed outposts over the years . . . of differing
scope and degree.”
Although Carter described China as “one country [that]
has gone much further and much faster than any other,” he
added, “We also oppose any further militarization of disputed features.”
Carter meant China and everyone else, but that may
prove difficult for the United States to accomplish.
As the defense secretary pointed out, as Asian-Pacific
“nations develop, as military spending increases, and as
economies thrive — we expect to see changes in how countries define and pursue their interests and ambitions.”
The United States, for example, is increasing its military
presence in the area, though its mainland is 7,000 miles
away and its closest states, Alaska and Hawaii, are 4,500
and 6,000 miles away respectively.
On Wednesday, Carter pointed out the “tremendous” U.S.
forces already in the region: more than 350,000 military and
civilian personnel, nearly 2,000 aircraft and 180 naval vessels.
On Saturday, he said, “As the United States develops new
systems, [the Defense Department] will continue to bring
the best platforms and people forward to the Asia-Pacific.”
Meanwhile, the Chinese in their military white paper
released Tuesday took a different view of the U.S. presence
and its activities. In the paper, Beijing took aim at “some
external countries” — no names mentioned — that “are
also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs,” along with
“a tiny few [who] maintain constant close-in air and sea
surveillance and reconnaissance against China.”
Should Americans be surprised that China says it is
reorienting “from theater defense to trans-theater mobility,” from solely “offshore waters defense” to “open seas
protection” and moving from “territorial air defense to
both [air force] defense and offense?”
The Defense Department’s report on China’s military,
released May 8, calmly says, “China seeks to ensure basic
stability along its periphery and avoid direct confrontation
with the United States in order to focus on domestic development and smooth China’s rise.”
If true, it appears that Carter will prove correct when he
said Wednesday in Hawaii: “We will remain the principal
security power in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come.”
©2015, Washington Post
Xinhua
1 June 2015
Experts believe Shangri-La
Dialogue major platform for
cooperation in Asia-Pacific
SINGAPORE, May 31 (Xinhua) -- Although one of the main
topics has been the South China Sea issue at the Shangri-La
Dialogue, experts and officials have agreed that the security
forum is still an important platform to promote collaboration and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.
China’s Defense Ministry spokesperson Yang Yujun
said the Shangri-La Dialogue, which concluded on Sunday,
offered multilateral channels for governments and scholars
to exchange views, while military officials and delegates
could also use this platform to conduct communications to
enhance mutual trust.
“It is good for better collaboration and regional security,” he said.
During the three-day event, Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy
chief of the General Staff of China’s People’s Liberation
Army (PLA), met separately with military officials and delegates from 13 countries, and exchanged views on issues
such as regional security and bilateral military ties.
Organized by London-base International Institute for
Strategic Studies, the Shangri-La Dialogue brought together
defense ministers, senior officials and security experts to
exchange views on key issues that shape the defense and
security landscape of the region.
The annual security summit has been widely recognized
as Asia- Pacific’s foremost defense and security platform.
Just days before the forum, U.S. Secretary of Defense
Ashton Carter set a strong tone by claiming that China was
“out of step” with both international rules and norms that
underscore the Asia- Pacific’s security architecture.
However, in his speech on Saturday, the U.S. defense
chief spent most of the time talking about the importance of
regional cooperation and also vowed to build better habits
of U.S.-China military-to-military cooperation, which “not
only benefits both countries but the whole region as well.”
Sun, who delivered his speech on Sunday, also emphasized that China was committed to promoting win-win
cooperation and a new model of international relations that
meets the security and development needs of all countries.
“Confrontation must be replaced with cooperation and
zero-sum game with mutual benefits if the purposes and
principles of the UN Charter are to be carried forward.
And this is also the way to achieve peaceful development,”
he said.
Tseng Hui-Yi, a research associate in East Asian Institute
at the National University of Singapore, told Xinhua that
communication played an utmost role in maintaining
regional security. Despite the existence of differences, it
was necessary to keep the doors open, and the Shangri-La
Dialogue was the platform to relieve pressure.
“No matter how fierce the conversation is, it is at least a
form of communication,” she said.
Oh Ei Sun, a senior fellow with S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies of Singapore Nanyang Technological
University, believed China’s participation in the dialogue
helped other countries better understand its position.
“China’s continuous participation in the dialogue for
many years would indeed, for example, clarify some misunderstanding in the international community against
China, as well as deepen China ‘s understanding of what
the wider international community is thinking in terms of
defense, collective security and so on.”
He said China should continue to join the Shangri-La
Dialogue as it will make a very constructive voice about
how China views the regional security architecture.
Oh also pointed out that the overdue spotlight shed on
the South China Sea disputes has led to the neglect of other
issues that deserve equal attention, including anti-terrorism
and humanitarian aid. Although these topics were brought
up at this meeting, they were not fully discussed.
“The Shangri-La Dialogue shouldn’t just focus on a
single regional issue that is currently still under control,”
he said.
Echoing Oh, Jin Yinan, a military strategist at the
National Defense University of the PLA, also expressed his
81
concern. “There’ s a trend that delegates and the media are
opt to intensify contradiction,” he said, adding that the dialogue should not be a breeding bed for stirring up conflicts,
but a place to solve problems.
©2015, Xinhua
TIME
1 June 2015
The Next Step Toward Possible
Conflict in the South China Sea
By Mark Thompson
U.S. warships likely to challenge expanded Chinese
sovereignty
When discussing the growing conflict over China’s dredging new islands to extend its sovereignty 1,000 miles into
the resource-rich South China Sea, one phrase frequently
pops up from U.S. military officers past and present.
“China,” they say, “doesn’t do off-ramps well.” What they
mean is that once Beijing has decided on a course of action,
it is rarely deterred from pursuing it. Given that—and the
U.S. declaration that it will not allow China’s sand grab to
stand—what’s next?
The chance of shots being fired now stand at better
than 50-50, says Bernard Cole, a retired Navy captain and
China expert. But he believes any initial volley would more
likely come from the Philippines or Vietnam, who also dispute China’s expanding territorial claims, than Beijing or
Washington.
“I see no flexibility in China’s position at all,” says Cole,
now a professor at the Pentagon’s National War College in
Washington, D.C. “I think China’s plan is just to have a fait
accompli, gambling on where the U.S. threshold for reaction is.”
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter has made clear in
recent days that the U.S. won’t back down, either. “There
should be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail and
operate wherever international law allows, as U.S. forces do
all over the world,” Carter said Saturday at the Shangri-La
defense conference in Singapore. “After all, turning an
underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the
rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international
air or maritime transit.”
If the Chinese don’t halt their island-building efforts in
the Spratly Islands, new U.S. military hardware will soon
be showing up in the region to help them reconsider, Carter
warned. He rattled off an incoming roster of weapons,
including “the latest Virginia-class submarines, the Navy’s
P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft, the newest stealth
destroyer, the Zumwalt, and brand-new carrier-based E-2D
Hawkeye early-warning-and-control aircraft.”
82
China didn’t seem to get the hint. “China and the
Chinese military have never feared the devil or an evil
force,” Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of staff of
the People’s Liberation Army, said at the same gathering Sunday, a day after Carter spoke. “Don’t ever expect
us to surrender to devious heresies or a mighty power.”
Basically, the two sides spoke past one another at the weekend confab. “China is unlikely to stop its reclamation in the
Spratlys,” William Choong, an Asian expert at the session,
wrote afterwards. “In fact, the reclamation will continue.”
President Obama on Monday repeated his call for
China to halt its island building. “We think that land
reclamation, aggressive actions by any party in that area
are counterproductive,” he said. “It may be that some of
[China’s] claims are legitimate, but they shouldn’t just try
to establish that based on throwing elbows and pushing
people out of the way.”
U.S. officials say the UN Convention on the Law of the
Sea bars what China is doing. “Artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands,”
the treaty says. “They have no territorial sea of their own,
and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the
territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.”
U.S. naval experts say that if the U.S. is going to back it
words with actions, the U.S. Navy soon will have to send
warships near the growing Chinese-claimed islands to
show its territorial claims are worthless. U.S. Navy officials
have said planning for such deployments is in the works.
But the South China Sea has a reputation as a ships’
graveyard. It’s shallow enough to sink them, as well as
to enable dredging gear to expand existing islands. That
limits the U.S. Navy to dispatching one of its new lightlyarmed Littoral Combat Ships, or a flat-bottomed Marine
amphibious ship, to poke around China’s islands, says
retired Navy captain Jerry Hendrix, who spent much of
his career in the Pacific.
The USS Fort Worth, a 4,000-ton, 387-foot LCS, recently
sailed near the Spratlys, where Chinese vessels kept a close
eye on her. “Routine operations like the one Fort Worth just
completed in the South China Sea will be the new normal
as we welcome four LCSs to the region in the coming
years,” Captain Fred Kacher, commodore, Destroyer
Squadron 7, said May 12 after the Fort Worth returned to
the Philippines.
A bigger San Antonio or Whidbey Island-class amphibious warship would show the U.S. is serious, says Hendrix,
now at the Center for a New American Security. “They’re
large vessels with a very shallow draft,” he says, “and they
also come with Marines.”
Hendrix believes the Chinese are trying to take advantage of a sense of U.S. wariness of overseas action. Chinese
President “Xi Jinping has perceived the U.S. administration to have rolled over on Cuba, on the Iran nuclear deal,
on Russia in the Crimea and Ukraine,” he says. The U.S.
refusal to budge in the South China Sea may also offend
some Chinese sensibilities. “There may be a perception, at
least among their military, that there may be a cultural bias
here: ‘Wait a minute, you’ll deal with the Persians, with the
Latins, and with the Slavs, but you won’t deal with us?’
That could be another source of friction.”
Cole says he’d bet on an LCS deployment. “But if I were
still a Navy planner, I wouldn’t send an LCS in there by
itself,” he adds. “The LCS almost can’t defend itself. I’d
have a couple of DDGs [destroyers] or some airplanes
just over the horizon.” Cole doubts either China or the
U.S. would fire a first shot. “But suppose the Philippines
manages to get one of those two old Coast Guard cutters
underway that we gave them and it ends up getting sunk
by the Chinese?” he frets. “We have a mutual defense
treaty with the Republic of the Philippines that very clearly
includes Philippine warships.”
©2015, Time
Sydney Morning Herald
1 June 2015
South China Sea dispute: Strong
indication Australia will join push
back on China’s island-building
By David Wroe and Philip Wen
Defence Minister Kevin Andrews has issued the Abbott
government’s strongest signal yet that Australia is prepared
to join the United States and other countries in pushing
back against China’s island-building and militarisation in
the South China Sea.
Further hardening Australia’s stance, Mr Andrews has
used a speech at a key Asian security conference to state
unequivocal opposition to large-scale land reclamation – a
clear dig at China’s island-building and positioning of military hardware on the disputed Spratly Islands chain.
His remarks to the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore,
which was attended by top Asia-Pacific defence officials
including from China, closely echo those of US counterpart
Ashton Carter, as worried countries across the region present
an increasingly united front against Beijing’s assertiveness.
Mr Andrews issued a thinly veiled warning that other
countries in the region will respond if Beijing persists,
saying that actions in international security tend to produce “a corresponding counter-reaction”.
“As with Newton’s principles, aspects of international
security are often characterised by an action and a corresponding counter-reaction,” he said. “In making decisions,
countries and leaders should always be wary of the conse-
quences, intended or otherwise, of a particular course of
action and the potential for these actions to lead to escalation and miscalculation.”
Mr Andrews added that Australia had a “legitimate interest in the maintenance of peace and stability ... unimpeded
trade and freedom of navigation” – a possible signal that
the Abbott government could, as Fairfax Media reported
last week, take part in joint military exercises close to the
Spratly Islands as a show of defiance against China’s claims.
Separately, Mr Andrews told the Wall Street Journal that
Australia asserted its right to continue flying military
patrols over the contested area – a rejection of any attempt
by China to declare an air defence identification zone – but
said there had been no formal talks with the US about naval
freedom-of-navigation exercises.
High among the region’s concerns are that China will
follow its precedent in its dispute with Japan in the East
China Sea and declare an air defence identification zone
over the waters further south.
Such a move “depends on whether our security in air
and maritime will be threatened and extensive factors
will be taken into consideration”, Admiral Sun Jianguo, a
deputy chief of staff of China’s People’s Liberation Army,
said, in an address which rejected criticisms, including
from the US, that China’s actions were “out of step” with
international norms.
He said the construction was “justified, legitimate and
reasonable”, and that the projects are for the purpose of providing “international public services” including maritime
search and rescue, research and environmental protection.
Fairfax Media has reported that China has been shifting
weapons onto artificial islands that it has built up from previously submerged atolls among the Spratly Islands.
Pentagon officials confirmed it had been aware of two
motorised artillery guns, which it believed have since been
removed.
Dr Carter, the US Defence Secretary, called for an
“immediate and lasting halt” to the Chinese expansion and
vowed that the US would defy any attempt by Beijing to
impede freedom of navigation in the area.
“Turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply
does not afford the rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit,” he said.
China is locked in territorial disputes in the South China
Sea with several neighbours including the Philippines,
Vietnam and Malaysia.
There are particular fears that as well as using the military build-up to enforce its territorial claims, China could
also threaten freedom of navigation through some of the
world’s busiest shipping lanes, which Australia relies upon
heavily for its international trade.
In the past, Australian ministers have stressed Australia
does not take sides in these competing claims, but Mr
Andrews pointedly struck a tougher pose on Sunday.
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“Australia has made clear its opposition to any coercive
or unilateral actions to change the status quo in the South
and East China Sea,” Mr Andrews said.
“This includes any large-scale land reclamation activity
by claimants in the South China Sea.
“We are particularly concerned at the prospect of militarisation of artificial structures.”
Mr Andrews cloaked his language by avoiding mentioning China directly, rather calling on “all parties” to
stop large-scale reclamation and “refrain from provocative
actions”.
But while other countries have for decades carried out
some building on islands in the South China Sea, China has
done more in the past 18 months than all other countries
combined throughout history.
©2015, Sydney Morning Herald
Asahi Shimbun
2 June 2015
China must immediately stop land
reclamation in South China Sea
A senior Chinese military officer has offered some insight
into what China is trying to achieve in land reclamation
work on reefs in the contested Spratly Islands in the South
China Sea.
At a security summit held in Singapore, Chinese Adm.
Sun Jianguo stated on May 31 that Beijing has military
objectives in mind.
The admiral, who is deputy chief of staff of the People’s
Liberation Army, told the annual meeting known as the
Shangri-La Dialogue that the undertaking is partly aimed
at meeting the country’s “necessary defense needs.” He
also indicated that an airstrip being built on one of the reefs
will be used for both military and civilian purposes.
His remarks are totally unacceptable. The reefs in this
area are claimed by several neighboring countries in territorial disputes. China’s attempt to unilaterally create a fait
accompli by force clearly violates international rules. China
should stop the reclamation work immediately.
On Fiery Cross Reef, a runway is emerging on land
reclaimed by China. It is becoming the largest patch of
ground in the Spratly Islands, a group of hundreds of reefs,
islets and atolls in waters close to vital shipping lanes.
China may establish an air defense identification zone
over the land it is reclaiming.
A defense white paper released by the Chinese government on May 26 declared a shift in the focus of its defense
strategy toward naval operations, promising to put higher
priority on the navy than on the army. Sun’s remarks reflect
this strategic shift.
In expanding its presence in the South China Sea, China
84
is apparently trying to acquire military capabilities to control important shipping lanes as well as seeking to secure
fisheries and seabed resources.
Sun also cited “maritime scientific research” and “environmental protection” as objectives for reclamation work.
But reclamation amounts to nothing less than destruction
of the environment.
Beijing seems to be confident that its behavior will not
lead to sanctions by other countries, despite the international criticism. But this is the arrogance of a major power.
China has defended its actions in the South China Sea
by saying they are within its sovereignty. This argument
is based on China’s claim that history warrants its sovereignty over the vast expanses of the resource-rich and
strategically important South China Sea within the “ninedashed line,” or a U-shaped demarcation line used by the
Chinese government for its territorial claims of most of the
South China Sea.
In maps used in China, the line is drawn as if it constituted part of the country’s national borders. But the line is
not based on any solid legal grounds in terms of international law.
The Chinese administration of President Xi Jinping has
pledged to pursue diplomatic relations with neighboring countries based on the principles of “sincerity” and
“mutual benefits.”
Beijing has reached a series of agreements with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations on peaceful
solutions to territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
China should realize that its strong-arm actions with
regard to these issues are undermining the trust of its
neighbors.
It is also worrisome that a number of Southeast Asian
countries are expanding and enhancing their naval power
in response to China’s actions.
The Philippines is reinforcing its military bases on
islands under its effective control, while Vietnam is reportedly reclaiming land on reefs.
U.S. military operations aimed at keeping China land
reclamation work in check could also further exacerbate
tensions in the area.
Taiwan, which maintains effective control over one island,
recently proposed that all the claimants agree to shelve the
territorial disputes and work together to develop resources.
Taiwan’s proposal is worth serious consideration, even
though Taipei cannot take part in international talks over
such issues because of its relationship with China.
Serious international efforts to restore peace and calm in
the South China Sea are needed immediately. Otherwise,
the situation will continue to deteriorate rapidly.
©2015, Asahi Shimbun
South China Morning Post
The Straits Times
2 June 2015
3 June 2015
Cool heads can calm sea dispute
The mother of all security
dialogues still going strong
The heated rhetoric Beijing and Washington exchanged
on the South China Sea in the lead-up to the region’s premier security summit, the Shangri-La Dialogue, gave the
impression that matters would come to a head at the annual
forum. But the tone was markedly milder when People’s
Liberation Army deputy chief of General Staff Admiral
Sun Jianguo and US Defence Secretary Ash Carter spoke
at the three-day event in Singapore that ended on Sunday.
Although both called for calm and a desire for peace, the
delegates went home with tensions remaining high and
the possibility of a mishap in the contested waters as real.
Cooler heads are needed to lower the risks and that is best
done through dialogue and negotiations.
Positions were reiterated, with Carter painting China
as a troublemaker for its land reclamation, while Sun
emphasised sovereignty and the risks posed by American
actions, which include strengthening military alliances
with Chinese neighbours and a threatened deployment
of military vessels. The commander of the US Pacific
Command, Admiral Harry Harris, set the scene in Australia
days earlier by referring to the turning of reefs into artificial islands as creating a “great wall of sand”. But China, as
Carter acknowledged, is not alone, with Vietnam and the
Philippines long ago starting such work. With an American
spy plane overflying the area on May 20, it is unsurprising that Beijing’s latest defence white paper criticised
Washington for “meddling”.
The South China Sea has become a friction point in the
relationship, but both sides know of the dangers of escalating tensions. Toned-down words in Singapore reflected
that; with important meetings coming up, ties have to be
kept in check. The annual US-China strategic and economic dialogue will be held in Washington this month and
President Xi Jinping makes an official visit in September.
Both sides also have much to cooperate on, North Korea
among them. China has to work with neighbours on a code
of conduct. The US, with trade and investment interests,
has to act constructively and responsibly.
©2015, South China Morning Post
By William Choong
WITH China’s controversial reclamation in the South China
Sea, many participants had expected this year’s Shangri-La
Dialogue to be a boxing ring, a reprise of last year, when
China and the United States duelled sharply in the open.
In the end, both sides seemed to be part of a diplomatic
gavotte. While they raised stern questions, the delivery
was more deliberate and moderate. US Defence Secretary
Ashton Carter called on China to stop its reclamation in
the Spratlys. Even when a Chinese colonel sought to taunt
him by saying China’s reclamation was “legitimate, reasonable and justified”, Dr Carter remained unflappable. The
US position, he stressed, was that all claimants - including
China - should halt reclamation, not militarise features in
the South China Sea further, and pursue peaceful resolution.
His call for all Asian countries “to rise, prosper and
determine their own destiny” sounded bizarrely familiar
to the entreaties by Admiral Sun Jianguo, the head of the
Chinese delegation, who called for “win-win” situations
and cooperative security.
Staying true to the traditions of the Dialogue, whereby
countries proposed new initiatives, Dr Carter said the
Pentagon will spend US$425 million (S$576 million) to help
regional countries boost their maritime security capacity.
Similarly, Japanese Defence Minister Gen Nakatani
proposed the Shangri-La Dialogue Initiative, which seeks
to promote common rules and laws at sea and in the air,
increase the use of surveillance in the two domains, and
build on the region’s disaster response mechanisms. While
the details are sketchy, they would if realised tamp down
dynamics that lead to tensions or even conflict.
At the very least, this year’s Dialogue has highlighted
the very limits of what can be done about China’s reclamation in the South China Sea. With innovations such as the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the “One Belt,
One Road” Initiative, China has become adept at offering economic carrots to dampen perceptions of assertive
Chinese power.
The most worrying aspect of China’s participation at
the Dialogue this year was Admiral Sun’s dogged refusal
to directly address the barrage of questions put to him,
most of them about the South China Sea. Looking visibly
irritated, the admiral said he could only address them
“briefly”, that the answers were already in his speech, and
added - quite bizarrely - that there are more “serious security issues than the South China Sea”.
To its credit, China did send a strong delegation this year,
85
and Admiral Sun is more senior in rank than Lt-General
Wang Guanzhong, who attended the Dialogue last year.
Members of the Chinese delegation told Ms Bonnie Glaser,
a China expert at the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies, that Admiral Sun was uncomfortable with answering questions directly, and held out hope that he would be
more relaxed at doing so next year.
That said, there could be a longer-term strategy behind
China’s participation at the Dialogue. It is an open secret
that China has always felt that the Dialogue was a forum
set up to criticise China’s defence policies.
That is simply untrue. Rather, the central idea of the
Dialogue is that it facilitates a candid exchange of views
that leads to recognition of, if not the resolution of, the
region’s pressing problems. By virtue of its sheer weight,
Beijing just happens to be a magnet for probing questions.
What is true is that China’s Xiangshan Forum and other
defence forums such as the Jakarta International Defence
Dialogue (JIDD) and Seoul Defence Dialogue could pose
challenges to the Shangri-La Dialogue in the longer term.
The Shangri-La Dialogue is, and will remain for a
long time, the mother of all dialogues. As former US
defence secretary Robert Gates has said, the Dialogue is
a “forum without peer”. The JIDD is a relative newcomer
in the game. The Seoul Defence Dialogue invites vice
defence ministers, and is largely focused on the Korean
Peninsula (one policy wonk calls it the “little brother” to
the Shangri-La Dialogue).
The Xiangshan Forum has potential. Last year, China
upgraded it from a Track 2 (unofficial and largely academic) status to a Track 1.5 mode (participation of officials
and experts).
China does have gravitational pull. Still, only six ministers of defence attended the Xiangshan Forum last year,
including those from Singapore, Malaysia, the Maldives
and Tajikistan. Compare this to 18 full ministers who were
at the Dialogue this year.
That said, a defence forum with Chinese characteristics - where China insists on talking on matters it prefers
to talk about, and not address the hard, controversial
issues - might be less than desirable for regional security.
One Indian analyst tweeted cynically during the Dialogue
that China’s “win-win” describes “circumstances in which
China wins, and everybody else lets it win”.
To take an opposite tack to the overused Churchillian
quote, too much jaw-jaw without recourse to action might
actually lead to war-war. So yes, the Xiangshan Forum is a
welcome complement to the Shangri-La Dialogue. But for
it to attain the level of robust exchanges and action that has
been a signature of the Dialogue since its inception will be
a long time coming.
©2015, The Straits Times
86
China Daily
3 June 2015
US should fight IS, not stir
up maritime disputes
By Wang Hui
This year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, held in Singapore over
the weekend, was overshadowed by disputes in and differences over the South China Sea. Such a deviation from
major security issues cannot possibly make the region’s
countries work together to tackle security threats and risks.
US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter used much of his
keynote speech on Saturday to lash out at China over the
South China Sea issue. Carter said the United States was
deeply concerned about the scale and speed of China’s reclamation work on some islands and islets, and insisted that
US forces would continue to “fly, sail and operate” in the
region to ensure the freedom of navigation and overflights
permitted by law.
Carter’s remarks are the latest US attempt to put more
pressure on China over the reclamation work on Nansha
Islands. Differences over reclamations started before the
security forum was held. The US and the Philippines have
been leading a chorus of criticisms against China’s legitimate activities, raising time and again the temperature of
the waters in the South China Sea.
In response, Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of
the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army who
addressed the forum a day after Carter, explained China’s
stance on island rebuilding. He said China’s construction
in the South China Sea is mainly to improve the functions
of the relevant islands and reefs and the working and living
conditions of the personnel stationed there.
Sun emphasized that the projects are designed in ways
to help China better perform its international responsibilities and obligations in maritime search and rescue
operations, disaster prevention and relief, marine research,
meteorological studies, environmental protection, navigation safety and fishery production.
China, Sun said, has built an ocean survey station for the United Nations on Yongshu Jiao reef, and
started building two multi-functional lighthouses on the
Huayang Jiao and Chigua Jiao reefs to provide international public services.
His explanation should help dispel unnecessary concerns of the international community. As a big country
which relies on the South China Sea as an important
transport channel, China concerns about the safety and
navigability of its waters more than any other country.
China’s reclamation work does not affect the freedom
of navigation and overflight in anyway. And the US just
wants to use freedom of navigation as a pretext to interfere
in the South China Sea issue.
In recent years, the US has hyped China’s maritime disputes with some Southeast Asian countries at regional forums
such as the Shangri-La Dialogue and East Asia Summit.
The US meddling has only further complicated the issue
and sowed seeds of discord in the region.
Washington’s assertion that it will continue to send
military ships and planes to patrol the waters near the
areas where Beijing is carrying out building activities
could lead to strategic misjudgements and thus make the
waters less secure.
As a country which claims to have a stake in world
peace and stability, the US could do better to contribute
to regional and world peace and security, instead of carping over the South China Sea issue. For instance, it should
make more efforts to protect the world from its biggest
threat today the Islamic State, which has been wreaking
havoc in the Middle East.
At the Shangri-La forum, the region’s countries vowed
to strengthen collaboration insecurity, especially in fight
against terrorism. In his keynote speech at the forum on
Friday, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said
the IS could pose a serious threat to whole of Southeast
Asia, because more than 500 Indonesians and dozens of
Malaysians had joined the terror group.
Since the IS group has already conquered large swathes
of land in Iraq and Syria, isn’t it time the world’s sole superpower shouldered its due international responsibilities?
©2015, China Daily
The Economist
6 June 2015
Whose splendid isolation?
THE Shangri-La Dialogue, an annual powwow in
Singapore for Asia-Pacific defence chiefs, has begun to
follow a pattern: America and its friends in Asia line up
to criticise China for its alleged transgressions in the seas
around its coast; China issues fierce, mendacious and
unconvincing rebuttals; everybody goes home. Last year,
China’s crimes were its declaration of an Air-Defence
Identification Zone (ADIZ) over an area including islands
it disputes with Japan; and its dispatch of an oil-rig to drill
in waters claimed by Vietnam. The row was vitriolic. This
year, it has been building frantically in contested waters in
the South China Sea. At Shangri-La, both the criticism and
its response were more measured. But the disagreements
seem even more profound and irreconcilable than a year
ago, and China even more isolated.
Five of the six countries with claims to all or some of the
reefs and islets in the South China Sea have built structures
on them, often after reclaiming land. China, however, has
taken this to unprecedented lengths. In his speech at the
Dialogue, America’s defence secretary, Ash Carter, said
China had filled in over 2,000 acres (810 hectares), “more
than all other claimants combined…and more than in the
entire history of the region”; and all in the past 18 months.
He called this a “source of tension”.
China argues that the sea is peaceful and stable—far
from the kind of security threat the Dialogue should have
been discussing. It insists its sovereignty is “indisputable”,
and that its building work is for the international common
good: search and rescue; disaster; meteorology; conservation; and so on. But American officials believe otherwise.
They say satellite pictures show that China brought two
mobile-artillery vehicles to one of its man-made islands
(though the weapons since seem to have been removed).
It has also added harbours and, on one or two islands,
airstrips. This has enhanced their military potential and,
China presumably hopes, created evidence of its control
and sovereignty. Mr Carter warned against “further militarisation” of the sea.
America takes no position on the sovereignty disputes,
of which those with Vietnam and the Philippines are the
most active. But like many other countries it is worried
about “freedom of navigation”: a huge chunk of global
trade traverses the sea. To show the threat that this freedom
is under, an American surveillance plane in late May flew
close to the expanding islands, with a television-news crew
on board. The Chinese navy told it repeatedly to go away.
China’s neighbours worry that eventually it will declare an
ADIZ over these waters too.
Around the world, American forces sail and fly through
areas of tension to prove that they have the freedom to
do so. But such behaviour in the South China Sea infuriates China, which claims that freedom of navigation
is not under threat. It has always objected to America’s
insistence that one such freedom is the right to send
surveillance planes and ships up to the edge of China’s
territorial waters. This disagreement has led to incidents
such as one in 2001 when a Chinese jet collided with an
American spy-plane; and another in 2009 when America
complained about Chinese “harassment” of one of its surveillance ships.
Another potentially alarming confrontation looms. Mr
Carter demanded an “immediate and lasting halt” to the
land reclamation by China and other claimants. China
shows no sign of stopping, and it seems inconceivable that
America would resort to force. But it is under pressure to
go further in asserting its right to use the contested waters
and airspace. Also at the Dialogue was a delegation of senators led by John McCain, who is chairman of the Senate’s
Armed Services Committee. Mr McCain said he hoped
America would disregard any “territorial waters” China
may claim around the man-made islands.
87
This is a complicated issue. China’s claims are unclear.
Its maps show a “nine-dash line” encompassing most of
the sea. But under the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), sovereignty depends on the
land. Countries can claim 12 nautical miles (22km) of territorial sea and 200 nautical miles of “exclusive economic
zone” (EEZ) off the coast of their mainlands and habitable
islands. Uninhabitable “rocks” get the territorial waters
but no EEZ; rocks that are submerged at high tide have
no waters at all. The status of the places where China is
building is uncertain. It is clear that, pre-construction, they
were not “islands”; but some may be rocks with territorial
waters; some “low-tide elevations” with none. Only “natural” features count, however, and America does not want
to give the impression a low-tide elevation can become a
rock, or a rock an island, thanks to construction. Despite
never having ratified it, America does adhere to UNCLOS.
And though it is not clear who does own these rocks and
reefs (America, as one naval officer jokes, is “pretty sure
they’re not ours”), the United States takes a keen interest in
whether territorial lines have a basis in international law.
Don’t be troublesome, please
The impression the Dialogue gave was of a world united
in outrage at China’s bullying in the South China Sea. But
if America goads it with intensive surveillance around its
maritime claims, China may succeed in portraying the
United States as the troublemaker. Moreover, China knows
America itself does not want to ruin what both countries
regard as a crucial relationship just to make a point about
island-building. The two countries have their annual highlevel get-together, the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, in
Washington, DC, at the end of June; and China’s president,
Xi Jinping, is due for a state visit in September. Preparations
for both events are on track, despite the bickering.
As for the complaints it endures at the Shangri-La
Dialogue, China may simply respond by stepping up
efforts to develop its own, friendlier, alternative: an annual
meeting in Beijing called the Xiangshan Forum, “Asia’s
own platform for security dialogue”. Interfering American
officials are not invited.
IISS Voices
09 June 2015
It’s Time to ‘Get the Gloves Back On’
By Colonel Lu Yin, Associate Researcher, Institute of
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, China
The 14-year-old Shangri-La Dialogue again proved itself to
be a high-end multilateral security dialogue platform, as
shown by the impressive attendance of 493 delegates from
38 countries, as well as the presence of international organisations and the involvement of nearly 5,000 people.
88
The Shangri-La Dialogue began in the year 2002, coinciding with the rise of multilateral engagement in the
Asia-Pacific region. After the Second World War, the continued existence of hostility and the lack of mutual trust
made it difficult for the region to establish multilateral dialogue mechanisms. But after the Cold War – and with the
progress of economic globalisation and regional integration – diversified, complicated and transnational security
threats appeared. The existing bilateral military alliances
in the region, which were exclusive in nature, were not
able to cope with those emerging threats. Multinational
coordination and cooperation became a necessity and multilateral security dialogue and cooperation mechanisms
were called for.
The establishment in this period of the Shangri-La
Dialogue served as a timely means of catering to such needs.
Singapore was chosen to be the venue of the Dialogue – a
‘bridge’ between the East and West, as many people saw
it, and a politically and geographically convenient location
for the gathering.
Certainly, Dr John Chipman had reason to declare
proudly in his opening remarks at the fourteenth Dialogue:
‘The annual IISS Shangri-La Dialogue provides a unique
opportunity to take the temperature of Asia-Pacific security.’ Senior defence and military officials/officers, as well
as academics, view the Dialogue as an important venue for
security dialogue and interactions, both multilateral and
bilateral. Different viewpoints converge and even clash
here, and contentious issues often become the focal point of
attention. The candid exchange of ideas that reflect current
major security concepts and concerns in the Asia-Pacific
region, as expressed by high-ranking officials and officers
at the Dialogue, has become one of the distinctive features
of the conference.
Since 2007, China has been sending high-level delegations to the Dialogue, and this year it sent its largest ever.
The Chinese delegation, as always, attended the Dialogue
to listen, speak and interact, with the intent of enhancing
mutual understanding and promoting security cooperation. However, a handful of countries or people who are
suspicious of China’s strategic intentions tend to take
advantage of the Dialogue to present a negative image of
the country.
The tension that was manifest during the thirteenth
Dialogue last year was a case in point. Nigel Inkster figuratively and correctly used the phrase ‘the gloves come off’
to describe that situation. But people were relieved to see
that the fourteenth Dialogue this year did not again become
a ‘war of words’ (to use William Choong’s expression).
Though there were still some heated debates, on issues
such as the South China Sea, one could notice the efforts
of many sides to reduce tension and avoid confrontation.
Mr. Lee Hsien Loong, prime minister of Singapore, said
in his thought-provoking keynote speechthat all Asian
countries hope that US–China relations will be positive and
no country wants to choose sides between the United States
and China. He also emphasised that in the broader region,
ASEAN has taken the lead in progressively building a
framework of cooperation, engaging South and East Asia,
Australia and New Zealand, and the wider Asia-Pacific.
US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter said in
his speech that ‘we must be better connected’ – cautious
phrasing compared to the harsh pronouncements he has
made at some previous public occasions. ‘We can accomplish this by working together, communicating better, and
developing habits of cooperation,’ he continued.
Admiral Sun Jianguo, Deputy Chief of General Staff
of China’s People’s Liberation Army, talkedabout China’s
adherence to the path of peaceful development and the
efforts of the Chinese military to strengthen Asia-Pacific
security cooperation and shoulder more international obligations and responsibilities. He emphasised that China’s
position of seeking a peaceful resolution of disputes
through dialogue and negotiation, as well as its objective
of maintaining peace and stability, remained unchanged.
He also stated at the end of his speech that ‘We hope that
all countries in the world will, in the spirit of win-win and
all-win cooperation, strengthen communication and consultation, and make concerted efforts to safeguard peace
and stability.’
It is now commonly accepted in the Asia-Pacific region
that security dialogue platforms should not be merely
talking shops but should also make substantive contributions to peace and stability. The Shangri-La Dialogue,
which is also referred to as the ‘Asian Security Summit’,
reflects this desire in its own way. The Dialogue needs
to fit into the larger picture of peace and development,
which constitutes the main theme of the current world,
and that of prosperity and stability, which is the common
aspiration of all countries. During the Dialogue, one
should always strike a balance between allowing different voices to be heard and preventing this from escalating
into confrontation. And – in the face of the variety of
security threats present in the Asia-Pacific – the emphasis should be on finding solutions through cooperation,
rather than focusing on differences and disputes that ultimately serve nobody’s interests. The Dialogue needs to
be fair, objective and constructive, in terms of identifying
security challenges and seeking solutions.
While the Shangri-La Dialogue is able to ‘take the
temperature of Asia-Pacific security’, it is also expected
to provide some effective ‘prescriptions’ for the resolution of security problems. It really is time to always ‘keep
the gloves on’ during the Dialogue as well as in the real
world, for the better future our global community of
shared destiny.
89
appendix II
Selected IISS publications
The Adelphi series is the Institute’s principal
contribution to policy-relevant, original academic
research. Books published since 2008 include:
Parello-Plesner, Jonas and Duchâtel, Mathieu, China’s: Strong
Arm: Protecting Citizens and Assets Abroad. Adelphi 451:
Routledge for the IISS, 2015.
Lewis, Jeffrey, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture. Adelphi
446: Routledge for the IISS, 2014.
Friedberg, Aaron L., Beyond Air-Sea Battle: The debate over US
Military Strategy in Asia. Adelphi 444. Routledge for the
IISS, 2014.
Barthwal-Datta, Monika, Food Security in Asia: Challenges,
Policies and Implications. Adelphi 441–442. Routledge for the
IISS, 2014.
Hokayem, Emile, Syria’s Uprising and the Fracturing of the
Levant. Adelphi 438. Routledge for the IISS, 2013.
Le Mière, Christian and Raine, Sarah, Regional Disorder: The
South China Sea Disputes. Adelphi 436–437. Routledge for
the IISS, 2013.
Dodge, Toby, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism. Adelphi
434–435. Routledge for the IISS, 2012.
90
Till, Geoffrey, Asia’s naval expansion: An arms race in the making?.
Adelphi 432–433. Routledge for the IISS, 2012.
D. Pollack, Jonathan, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and
International Security. Adelphi 418–419. Routledge for the
IISS, 2011.
Holslag, Jonathan, Trapped Giant: China’s Military Rise. Adelphi
416. Routledge for the IISS, 2011.
Taylor, Brendan, Sanctions as Grand Strategy. Adelphi 411.
Cortright, David and Väyrynen, Raimo, Towards Nuclear Zero.
Adelphi 410. Routledge for the IISS, 2010. Bisley, Nick, Building Asia’s Security. Adelphi 408. Routledge
for the IISS, 2009.
Raine, Sarah, China’s African Challenges. Adelphi 404–5.
Hughes, Christopher W., Japan’s Remilitarisation. Adelphi 403.
Perkovich, George and Acton, James M., Abolishing Nuclear
Weapons. Adelphi 396. Routledge for the IISS, 2008.
The IISS Strategic Dossier series harnesses the
Institute’s technical expertise to present detailed
information on key strategic issues. Recent
publications include:
Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2015: Key developments
and trends. IISS, 2015.
Regional Security Assessment 2014: Key developments and trends
in Asia-Pacific security. IISS, 2014.
North Korean Security Challenges: A net assessment. IISS, 2011.
The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of ‘Raúl
Reyes’. IISS, 2011.
Iran’s Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Capabilities: A net
assessment. IISS, 2011.
Iran’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities: A net assessment. IISS, 2010.
Preventing Nuclear Dangers in Southeast Asia and Australasia.
IISS, 2009.
Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East: In the shadow of Iran. IISS,
2008.
European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern
Operations. IISS, 2008.
Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the rise of
proliferation networks: A net assessment. IISS, 2007.
Strategic Comments is the Institute’s online source
of analysis of international security and politicomilitary issues. Articles focused on South, Southeast
and Northeast Asia published between March 2014
and June 2015 include:
‘India–US relations acquire new momentum’. Strategic
Comments, vol. 21, no. 12, May 2015.
‘Vietnam: maritime spat stirs domestic dissent’.
Comments, vol. 20, no. 24, August 2014.
Strategic
‘North Korean lessons for an Iranian nuclear accord’. Strategic
‘Philippines–China dispute: a sign of regional shifts’. Strategic
‘Challenges for India’s new naval chief’. Strategic Comments,
vol. 20, no. 16, May 2014.
‘Pacific Alliance trade bloc eyes global role’. Strategic Comments,
vol. 20, no. 10, April 2014.
‘China’s national-security overhaul’. Strategic Comments, vol.
20, no. 8, March 2014.
The Military Balance is the Institute’s annual
assessment of military capabilities and defence
economics worldwide. Region-by-region analyses
cover the major military and economic trends and
developments affecting security policy and the
trade in weapons and other military equipment.
Comprehensive tables portray key data on weapons
and defence economics. Defence expenditure trends
over a 10-year period are also shown.
The Military Balance 2015. Routledge for the IISS, 2015.
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, the Institute’s
bi-monthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis
and debate of international and strategic affairs.
Recent articles of interest include:
Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘The Debate Over US China Strategy’,
Survival, vol. 57, no. 3, June–July 2015, pp. 89–110.
‘Asian bank: funding infrastructure, building China’s
influence’. Strategic Comments, vol. 21, no. 11, April 2015.
David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, ‘ Waging Cyber War the
American Way’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 4, August–September
2015, pp. 7–28.
‘Japan’s defence budget bolsters altered military roles’.
Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 2, February 2015.
William Choong, ‘Defence and Japan’s Constitutional Debate’,
Survival, vol. 57, no. 1, April–May 2015, pp. 173–192.
‘Chinese vision drives East Asian détente’. Strategic Comments,
vol. 20, no. 44, December 2014.
Charlotte Kennedy, ‘Politics and Gender in Modern Australia’,
Survival, vol. 57, no. 1, February–March 2015, pp. 189–196.
‘Landmark peace deal close in southern Philippines’. Strategic
Comments, vol. 20, no. 43, December 2014.
Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball, ‘Can a Sino-Japanese War
Be Controlled?’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 6, December 2014–
January 2015, pp. 135–166.
‘North Korea: growing threat despite charm offensive’.
Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 41, November 2014.
‘Uighur militancy threatens China’s ‘new Silk Road’. Strategic
Comments, vol. 20, no. 39, November 2014.
‘Hong Kong’s protests hint at deeper problems for China’.
Strategic Comments, vol. 20, no. 34, October 2014.
‘Challenges for India’s new government’. Strategic Comments,
vol. 20, no. 26, August 2014.
David C. Gompert and Martin Libicki, ‘Cyber Warfare and
Sino-American Crisis Instability’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 4,
August–September 2014, pp. 7–22.
Yogesh Joshi and Frank O’Donnell, ‘India’s Submarine
Deterrent and Asian Nuclear Proliferation’, Survival, vol.
56, no. 4, August–September 2014, pp. 157–174.
Roderic Broadhurst and Peng Wang, ‘After the Bo Xilai Trial:
Does Corruption Threaten China’s Future?’, Survival,
vol. 56, no. 3, June–July 2014, pp. 157–178.
91
Michal Meidan, ‘The Implications of China’s EnergyImport Boom’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, June–July 2014,
pp. 179–200.
Denny
Roy,
‘The
Problem
with
Premature
Appeasement’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 3, June–July 2013, pp.
183–202.
Pierre Noël, ‘Asia’s Energy Supply and Maritime
Security’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, June–July 2014,
pp. 201–216.
Christian Le Mière, ‘Rebalancing the Burden in East
Asia’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 2, April–May 2013, pp. 31–41.
Oriana Skylar Mastro, ‘The Problems of the Liberal Peace in
Asia’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 2, April–May 2014, pp. 129–158.
Christian Le Mière, ‘The Spectre of an Asian Arms
Race’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 1, February–March 2014,
pp. 139–156.
Will Shield, ‘The Middle Way: China and Global Economic
Governance’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 6, December 2013–
January 2014, pp. 147–168.
Nigel Inkster, ‘Conflict Foretold: America and China’, Survival,
vol. 55, no. 5, October–November 2013, pp. 7–28.
Wu Riqiang, ‘China’s Anxiety About US Missile Defence: A
Solution’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 5, October–November 2013,
pp. 29–52.
Brendan Taylor, ‘Does China Still Back North Korea?’, Survival,
vol. 55, no. 5, October–November 2013, pp. 85–91.
Nick Bisley and Andrew Phillips, ‘A Rebalance To Where?:
US Strategic Geography in Asia’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 5,
October–November 2013, pp. 95–114.
Jasper Pandza, ‘China’s Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Proliferation
Risks’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 4, August–September 2013,
pp. 177–190.
Amitai Etzioni, ‘Accommodating China’, Survival, vol. 55, no.
2, April–May 2013, pp. 45–60.
Thomas Plant and Ben Rhode, ‘China, North Korea and the
Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 2, April–
May 2013, pp. 61–80.
Nigel Inkster, ‘Chinese Intelligence in the Cyber Age’, Survival,
vol. 55, no. 1, February–March 2013, pp. 45–66.
William B. Milam and Matthew J. Nelson, ‘Pakistan’s Populist
Foreign Policy’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 1, February–March
2013, pp. 121–34.
Strategic Survey is the Institute’s annual review
of strategic developments throughout the world.
Recent sections of interest include:
‘India: Stalled Reforms’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 301–9.
‘Pakistan: New Counter-terrorism Efforts’, Strategic Survey
2015, pp. 309–14.
‘Sri Lanka: End of Rajapaksa’s Presidency’, Strategic Survey
2015, pp. 314–18.
‘Afghanistan: Critical Transitions’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp.
318–30.
Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘North Korea: Is Regime Change the
Answer?’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 3, June–July 2013, pp. 7–20.
‘China: Assertive Leadership’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp.
336–55.
David C. Gompert, ‘North Korea: Preparing for the
End’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 3, June–July 2013, pp. 21–46.
‘Japan: Defence Reforms and Faltering Recovery’, Strategic
Survey 2015, pp. 356–66.
William Choong, ‘Japan’s New Politics’, Survival, vol. 55, no.
3, June–July 2013, pp. 47–54.
‘Korean Peninsula: Diplomatic Stasis’, Strategic Survey 2015,
pp. 366–79.
Sheryn Lee & Benjamin Schreer, ‘The Taiwan Strait: Still
Dangerous’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 3, June–July 2013,
pp. 55–62.
‘Australia: Political Rows and Regional Hedging’, Strategic
Survey 2015, pp. 380–7.
Kai Liao, ‘The Pentagon and the Pivot’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 3,
June–July 2013, pp. 95–114.
Liu
Chong,
‘After
Fukushima:
China’s
Nuclear
Safety’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 3, June–July 2013, pp. 115–128.
92
‘Southeast Asia: Major Security Challenges, Political
Uncertainties’, Strategic Survey 2015, pp. 387–411.