ACTAUNIVERSITATISLODZ IENSIS FOLIA PHIl OSOPHICA 6, 1480

A C T A
U N I V E R S I T A T I S
L O D Z I E N S I S
FOLIA P H I l OSOPHICA 6,
1480
Ba rb a ra Tuchariska
THE PROBLEM OF COGNITION AS AN ONTOLOGICAL QUESTION
The b e l i e f t h a t c o g n it io n
s till
t io n s e r v e s as a s t a r t i n g p o in t
t a l is m
f o r my s tu d y .
arid the p h ilo s o p h ie s of F i c h t e ,
H u s s e r l,
it,
demands p h i l o s o p h i c a l
and H eidegger,
g n itio n
i 5 asked in a new way,
g is tic .
Due to the n o t i o n a l
in to an o n t o l o g i c a l
in
Marx,
N ie t z s c h e ,
i n d i r e c t l y o r i g i n a t e in
which the q u e s tio n
of co ­
no lo nge r n a t u r a l i s t i c or psycholoc o n ten t of
of p h ilo s o p h is in g e la b o r a t e d in i t ,
ges
K a n t ' s tra n sce n d e n ­
H e g el,
which d i r e c t l y or
determin e the t h e o r e t i c a l f i e l d
re fle c ­
is s u e ,
th is f ie ld
and
the s t y l e
the problem of c o g n it io n chan­
i.e .,
it
becomes
p o s s ib le
ask
about the o n t i c s t r u c t u r e of c o n g n it io n .
I ._ On t o b j g i с a 1 Сa tego r i e s of P ost-Kant.ian P h i l o soptvy
K a n tia n tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m
d i t i o n a l e pistem ology and
iz in g c o g n it io n ( e . g .
its
q u estion ed the n o t i o n a l b a s is of tra­
c h a ra c te ris tic
m e c h a n is t ic mode),
and in tro d u ce d in t h e i r
p la c e i t s
ca n c e le d
r e a l i z e d by a s e n s u a l
p re c is e ly
and not in p r a c t i c a l ,
Kant was m od ifie d
It
that i t
in te r n a lly
o p p o s itio n a l
o b j e c t i v i t y does
etc.
not
became
The problem
r a i s e d by
tra n sc e n d e n ta lis tic
from i t s
c o n s c io u s r .c s s ,
s u b je c itve - o b je c tiv e
p o s s ib le
fu n ctio n ,
th e o rie s.
v e r y n a tu r e i n t e n ­
o n ly
w ith in
to ta lity .
the
Hence,
have to be w a rra n te d c o g n it io n through trans-
c e n d e n ta lis tc in v e s t ig a tio n .
the " o n t o l o g i z a t i o n "
as
-
how c o g n i t i o n ,
e p is t e m o lo g ic a l
ones.
co n s cio u sn e ss i s
o perates,
q u e s tio n s ,
Kant h im s e lf saw i t
in d iv id u a l,
in i t s p u r e ly
s o c ia l,
its
to demonstrate
in the subsequent
was accepted t h a t
tio n a l,
i.e .,
and t h in k in g
as c o g n i t i o n ,
c o n c e p t u a l­
own ta s k s and problems.
The task of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c r i t i q u e - as
was to c l e a r human c o g n i t i o n ,
mode of
B e s id e s ,
in
p o s t - K a n t ia n p h ilo s o p h y
o f c o g n it io n was r e a l i z e d .
F i c h t e ' s going beyond K a n t 's
ia lly
duce,
-
p o s i t i o n r e s o lv e s
as I t h in k - i n t o t h e - s t a t i n g t h a t i t
as Kant did i t ,
ness to p u r e ly
i s not enough to r e ­
the f o rm a t iv e a c t i v i t y
co g n itive c r e a t i v i t y ,
o b j e c t as
a phenomenon r e l a t i v i z e d
n al mind.
I n such a s i t u a t i o n ,
i t s e l f essent­
of human
which i s a
c o n s c io u s ­
c o n s titu tin g
to human s e n s u a l i t y
n o n - re la tiviz e d
<?
an
and r a t i o ­
.and a u t h e n t i c a l l y
..
g
r e a l e x is t e n c e should have to b e . a t t r i b u t e d to the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f .
Whereas a c c o rd in g to F i c h t e ,
not be r e c o n c il e d
the idea of
a ll. o n t o l o g i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s .
sumes t h a t the pure
I c r e a t e s tlie
of being and s e l f - t h o u g h t .
of a c t i v i t y
o b j e c t not only
of humanity.
its
It
e th ic a l
e p is t e m o lo g ic a l
o n to lo g iz e d
a c tiv ity ,
through o b j e c t i v i t y
i.e .,
the idea of
a c tiv ity
of t o t a l ,
h i s t o r i c a l being which c r e a t e s
a
su b je c tiv e - o b je c tiv e
to ta lity
What I have
ity!.
a re
in
mind
share.
r i c i t y ;
though
here
t h in k t h a t one cou ld f in d in these t h e o r i e s
these q u a l i f i c a t i o n s
have v a r i e d
system s;
fundamental c o n te n t of these
In p h ilo s o p h y o f
f i c a t i o n of
H e g e l
the s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e
M a r x
c o n s id e r s
s u b je ctive - o b je ctive t o t a l i t y ;
a x i o l o g i . c a l
is
are
Marx, N ie t z s c h e , H u s s e r l, and Heidegger.
formed i n t o d i f f e r e n t h i e r a r c h i c a l
see a c e r t a i n
a ll
H ugei,
common to a l l of them fundamental q u a l i f i c a t i o n s
Of c o u rs e ,
was
s e lf- cre ­
c o n c e p t u a liz e d in d i f f e r e n t ways.
I
It
the s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e
p h ilo so p h ica l th e o rie s ,
What i s more,
the
yet is s t il l
ground.
c o n s id e rd i n . c e r t a i n p o s t- K a n tia n
of
and
In t h i s way,
and s u b j e c t i v i t y .
I t h in k t h a t e x a c t l y such
the p h ilo s o p h ie s of
a u n ity
as a c o n s t i t u e n t
o b je cts.
by in t r o d u c in g the m eta p h y s ic a l idea
its e lf
-
a c q u ir e s e t h i c a l c o n t e n t ,
on the p u r e ly
a tive
the o b j e c t
be e m p i r i c a l l y compre­
is p r a c t ic a l,
on ly S c h e l l i n g and Hegel who
to ta lity
as
F ich te as­
i s in i t s e l f
and c o g n it io n
s u b j e c t s and i t s
s u b je c tiv e - o b je c tive t o t a l i t y
t r e a t e d by F i c h t e
the pure I
This pure I can
g e n e ra l human I ,
g iv e s sense both to
demands suspending
As a consequence of t h i s ,
of c o g n it io n but as being because
hended as the
the t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f can­
w it h tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m which
which
is it s
s o c i a l
and
can s t i l l
such a fundamental
they
q u a li­
h i s t o ­
n a t u r e
N i e t z s c h e
n a t u r e ;
con ten ts,
but one
c a te g o rie s
to ta lity
a set
of the t o t a l ­
H u s s e r l
a n a ly s e s
of the
i,ts
concentrates
upon t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c io u s n e s s , which i s the base f o r c r e a t i n g a
„ s u b j e c t i v e - o h j e c i t v e e m p i r i c a l whole,t e r s u b j .
e c t i v i t y ;
and
e s s e n tia lly
its
and in H e id e g g e r 's p h ilo s o p h y ,
i nDa-
sein ,
i.e .,
s p e c i f i c a l l y understood human
b j e c t
of
e x i s t e n c e ,
a s e n s i b l e u n i t y of man and
being which i s a
h is w o rld .
I cannot show
more d e t a i l e d way t h a t the p h ilo s o p h ie s which
a r e - lo c a t e d in one n o t io n a l f i e l d ,
in d i f f e r e n t ways,
t io n s are the
but I am p o s i t i v e
th e
i d e 9
r a c t e r
o f
of
t o t a l i t y .
of which a re
i.e .,
gness;
in
is treated
we
and f a c t u a l i t y .
s e lf- c re a tio n .
It
such a way
In s id e
f a
G
th is
as
con­
H eid e­
human
of h i ­
in te r - s u b je c ­
sphe re , cognit­
an
event
world
C o g n it io n ,
that
co g n itio n is
o n tic t o t a l i t y ,
may
or a
which
is
understood
in
s e lf- cre a ­
an element
of
- though not n e c e s s ­
c o g n it io n as
the p ro ce ss
of
does not have to le a d to t h i s s in c e the assumpt­
samé q u a l i t i e s
a n e c e s s a ry p r e r e q u i s i t e .
seems,
and of
c o n s t i t u t i v e element of the
u nd e rstan d in g of
ion t h a t p a r t s have the
belong i s not
in
C o g n itio n as an Ont i c Phenomenon
the s e l f - c r e a t i o n o f the
- leo'l to an
N o th in ­
a c tiv ity .
The r e c o g n i t i o n of the f a c t
a rily
the
t h e o r e t i c a l sphere,
o n t i c phenomenon,
appears to be a
II.
Existen ce
a x io lo g ic a l,
c o n t r i b u t i n g to the
s u b je c tiv e - o b je c tive
and
t ra n s c e n d e n ta l
the
t r e a t e d here as an o n t i c p r i m o r d i a l i t y .
tiv e
Such i s
in p h ilo s o p h y of Marx;
arid
o b t a in
and " e x i s t e n t i a l s u b j e c t i v i t y " . '
ion can be understood as an
t h i s way,
s u b s ta n tia lly
a re the above-mentioned c a t e g o r i e s
of what i s s o c i e t a l ,
p ro ce ss e s s e n t i a l l y
c h a ­
the o b j e c t i v i z a l i o n s
N ie t z s c h e 's c o n c e p tio n ;
Thanks to these t h e o r i e s
tiv ity
th e re not
becoming as the u n i t y of Being
the dim ensions of which
c l o s e r ana­
d i f f e r e n t l y expressed
as the s a l f - c r e a t i o n ,
s cio u s n e s s
in H u s s e r l ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ;
g g e r 's p h ilo s o p h y .
s to ric ity ,
A
s e l f - c r e a t i v e
such i s the n a tu re of s o c i a l p r a x is
human c r e a t i v i t y
in vestig a te d
of them, fundamental c a t e g o r ie s
su b sta n tial s u b je c tiv ity
c h a r a c t e r of H e g elia n
a
s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e
The t o t a l i t y
but d y n a m ic a lly ,
of
in
th?i- the above-mentioned no­
the same, y e t
th e
t h e
I have
these t h e o r i e s .
t h a t in a l l
accompanied by b a s i c a l l y
here
which they p e n e t r a t e and express
main c a t e g o r i e s of
l y s i s should show a ls o
were
su ­
i s co n s id e re d as a source
however,
as the whole to which *. iey
T r e a tin g
in d is p e n s a b le i f
c o g n it io n
in
the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n
of c o g n it io n as an o n t l c
phenomenon i s to be p o s s i b l e .
t io n s f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y
The c o n d i­
of c o g n it io n can be found in
the
o n t ic
s t r u c t u r e of c o g n it io n i t s e l f .
In
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s t i c
which uses the term of
pur.é
th e
i d e a
of
.
*
3 e 1 f" - c r e a t i . v e
t i o n
t h e
m a n i f e s t s
z e d
by
p o w e r s
p rocess
(its
of
h is to ric ity
and autodynamics)
which - as the
and p la y the r o l e
L e t us,
to ric ity
of
we
epistem ology
as i t s
c o n c e p t u a liz i n g
h i s t o r i c i t y means,
we prejudge
It
means
p rece d in g e v e n t s ,
The f a c t
an aim,
p rin c ip le s
If
it
we
i s an autodyna­
s ta g e s of
of
these
is i t s
d e v e lo p ­
but
a ls o
t r a n s f o r m a t io n s .
nor a t t r i b u t e d to
or a programme to be made
l o g i c of an autodynamic process
that
and are caused by
the process i s not e x t e r n a l to i t ,
as a sense,
o n ly i t s
t h a t c o g n it io n i s autodynamic
or c o n c r e te t ra n s f o r m a t io n s a re produced in i t ,
the
the h i s ­
whose p a r t i c u l a r e ve n ts and s t a ­
however, something more.
the v e ry r e g u l a r i t i e s ,
on
in
is .
then not o n ly h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t s ,
The l o g i c of
the
l e a v i n g f o r a moment
h i s t o r i c i t y .
t r a n s f o r m a t io n s .
c o g n it io n
and c o n c e n t r a t e
formal a s p e c t ,
as a h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s ,
ges of, development f o l l o w the
it
In such an o n t o lo g y ,
a re t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y p u r i f i e d ,
as s e l f - c o g n i t i o n ,
c o g n it io n
mic p r o c e s s ,
e p i ­
in those in which
or i s t r e a t e d as r e d u c ta b le
t r e a t c o g n it io n as s e l f - c r e a t i v e ,
h is to ric a l
ment,
i.e . ,
i s e-
of fundamental o n t o l o g i c a l c a t e g o r i e s .
a u t o d y n a m i c
treat i t
i d e n t i f i e d w ith i t s
being becomes i d e n t i f i e d w ith c o ­
the problem of what c o g n it io n , r e a l l y
If
the
r e s u l t of the sameness of being and thought
however, de p a rt from
H e g e lia n manner,
of
H e g e lia n - express
o n t o l o g y ,
- has to be understood as s e l f - c o g n i t i o n .
n o t io n s of t r a d i t i o n a l
is
form
Such an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
p h ilo s o p h ie s which - as
and the s e l f - c r e a t i o n of
r e a l i ­
c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
being becomes i d e n t i f i e d w ith thought,
to i t ,
n i-
t r e a t i n g
in which - in b r i e f - the
s t e m o l o g i c a l
g n itio n ,
i n
a n d
c o g
s e l f - c o g n i t i o n
c o n ten t understood as s e l f - c o g n i t i o n .
v id e n t in the
of
i t s e l f
as
t h e
pure c o g n it io n ,
a u t o d y n a m i c
l a t t e r
i s an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
and
c h a r a c t e r
t h e
It
p h i l o s o p h y ,
con sciou sn ess
h is to ric a lly
in c a rn a te .
The
created s t r u ­
cture .
When i t
i s agreed upon
t h a t the h i s t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r of cognit­
ion i s autodynamic,
it
e s s e n c e
of
t h e
t i o n
t h e
a
i s
a ls o
i.e .,
to i t s e l f
shapes,
the c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y
its
its e lf.
d ire c ts
t i o n c o g n it io n c o n s t i t u t e s
its
own
co g n itio n .
The
to
is
its
sense
it
in i t s
as an o n t i c f a c t ,
sense
the o n t i c form a tion of the
of
and
as an o n t i c f a c t ,
and
sense of c o g n i t i o n ,
s in c e i t
l a t i n g e p is t e m o lo g ic a l
statem e nts i t
re co g n iz e t h i s sense a d e q u a t e ly .
however,
co n s titu te s
i s c r e a t e d by
g n itio n .
f u n c t io n
the
a given
is a part
by formu­
sense
as an
Ep istem o­
i s to
h is to ric a l
tu rn
th is
co­
r e a l sense
fact.
L e t us tu rn towards the problem of the o n t i c
n itio n ,
that
each case on ly h is to ry - b o u n d a r t i c u ­
l a t i o n s of the sense which
th e ir
not a
a ls o c o n t r i b u t e s to
o n tic fa c t,
T h e re fo re ,
a
the d e f i n i t i o n of c o g n i­
re fle c tio n
does not mean,
a s c e r ta in m e n t s are in
not
f a c t only when th e re appear
It
in to a c o g n itiv e
own p a r ­
o b je c tiv iz a -
of c o g n i t i v e a c t i v i t y .
lo g ic a l
from the
C o g n itio n a t t r i b u t e s
In the course
e p is t e m o lo g ic a l
nor t h a t i t
trea­
In the course of o b je c t iv iz a -
becomes a c o g n i t i v e
Undoubtedly,
as
t a k in g on r e a l i t y
e p is t e m o lo g ic a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which g iv e
tio n .
that i t
not a t t r i b u t e d
its e lf.
t i o n c o g n it io n c o n s t i t u t e s
It
the sense
in d ep e n d en tly - one could add - of where
d ire c ts
co g n itiv e a c t i v i t y
c o g n i t i v e one.
b e i n g
to i t s e l f
p re c is e ly
non-human a u t h o r i t y .
the sense of c o g n i t i o n
c o g n i ­
i t s
s in c e the f a c t
being c o g n it io n i s
th e
a n ece s sa ry consequence of
creates i t s e l f
o u t s id e by any human or
that
of
of
the a t t r i b u t i n g
t in g c ô g n it io n as autodynamic,
product means t h a t i t
tic u la r h is to ric a l
accepted
p r o c e s s
This assumption i s
sense of i t s
be
c r e a t i o n
c o g n i t i o n ,
of c o g n i t i o n .
must
t a k in g once
again
s t r u c t u r e of cog­
tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m as our
p o i n t of de­
parture .
Tra n s ce n d e n ta lis m broke
the t r a d i t i o n a l ,
p s y c h o l o g i s t i c , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of c o g n i t i o n .
tween c o g n it io n
as the
the p s y c h ic a c t s s tu d ie d
of pure,
of a
by p s yc h o lo g y .
e m p irica l s u b je c t,
n e i t h e r the
nor the
immanent
a ls o
in tro d u ce d
i.e .,
such
con s cio u sn e ss
through
This t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s cio u sn e ss
c o n d it io n f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y
q u e s tio n and
o f e x is t e n c e
of
o b je c tiv e
was
treated
of e m p i r i c a l
the
a con­
co n s cio u sn e ss which tra n sce n d s
given to the e m p i r i c a l s u b j e c t s o l e l y
fe s ta tio n s .
It
and
d i f f e r e n t i a t e d be­
p h ilo s o p h ic a l
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c io u s n e s s ,
s c io u s n e s s which i s
is
sub ject
n a tu ra lis tic
It
the
it
^nd
mani­
as
a
c o g n it io n
w it h i t s
s u b j e c t i v e and o b j e c t i v e c o r r e l a t i v e s .
however,
p ro b le m atiz ed ,
nor the t r a n s c e n d e n ta l co n scio u sn e ss
s u b je ctivism ,
f o r the
of
m u lBut
s u b j e c t in
adequate
a way
to
the
t h a t would
s itu a tio n
in
The i n t r o d u ­
tr a n s c e n d e n ta l con sciou sn e ss
as something
u n i v e r s a l does not mean
c r e a t i n g a /iew
concept
t r a d i t i o n a l one.
comings w i t h i n tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m
p h y s ic s ;
t h e
s u b j e c t s .
of e m p i r ic a l s u b j e c t s a p pears.
of
but only m odifying the
c o n d it io n s
t r y to r e f o r m u la t e the t r a d i t i o n a l i n d i ­
le a d to the concept of c o g n it io n
c t i o n of the n o tio n
the
a s s u m i n g
of the c o g n i t i v e
which the m u l t i p l i c i t y
fill
to ask about the dangers of i n ­
c o g n i t i v e
tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m did not
v i d u a l i s t i c n o tio n
dangers of indi­
one has to ask about
p o s s i b i l i t y of c o g n it io n ,
t i p l i ' c i t y
c o g n it io n
T ra n sce n d e n ta listic
to •a void the
one has
d i v i d u a l i s t i c su b je c tiv ism ,
n e ith e r
its e lf.
p h ilo s o p h y d is c o v e r e d t h a t in order
v id u a lis tic
Tra n sce n d e n ta lism ,
as H&ldegger n o t ic e d ,
t h e r e i s no on tolog y
of
s u b je c tiv ity ,
The e f f e c t s of the s h o r t ­
can be seen in p o s t- K a n tia n meta­
of
c o g n it io n in i t ,
no attempt to
the pure e p is t e m o lo g ic a l c a t e g o r i e s w ith o n t o l o g i c a l c o n t e n t.
Heidegger attempted o n t o l o g l z a t i o n
beyond
of c o g n i t i o n ,
tra n s c e n d e n ta lis m and
m eta p h y s ics ,
attem pts to b u i l d o n t o l o g i c a l
epistem ology
what hs h im s e lf c a l l e d
b e in g ,
cannot be
of t r u t h appears in h is
as f u l l y
the openness of b e in g ,
c rite rio n
herm eneutics c o g n it io n
has no n orm ative
and language a re
a
by
of
c o n d it io n s
f o r Gadamer language
re a lly
b e l i e f does not e n t a i l
H eid eg g e r,
any raodifi<-atlons
b le m a t iz a t io n i s
- o b je c t r e l a t i o n .
ta lis tic
It
the
It
It
ve ry
in
of
s u b j e c t w ith
seems,
b e lie f
however,
In h is
the p o s s i b i l i t y
And t. jugh
co n versatio n ,
'the
n o tio n
as
it
o b ject,
that
what
t h a t c o g n it io n
has to be p rob le m atiz ed
if
assumption of the m u l t i - s u b j e c t i v i t y
of
An
H is to ric ity
as w e l l .
remains f o r him,
a re la tio n jo in in g
one between s u b j e c t s .
o n ly
b e in g .
Gadamer.
for
stru ctu ra l q u a lific a tio n s
as
n e ith e r a
of
be in g .
of c o g n it io n and i t s
n it io n w ith in h is theory.
i?
patency
was made a ls o
e x is ts
fin ite
understood
ch aracter,
the
c o n s titu e n t
both fundamental
the
When the n o tio n
o n to lo g ic a lly
for e va lu a tin g
is
of
h is
l i m i t s of
the weaknesses of H e id e g g e r 's
T ru th ,
attempt to o n t o lo g iz e c o g n it io n
w ith
the
s a tis fa c to ry .
co n c e p tio n ,
attempt become con sp icuo us.
v a lu e nor a
to g e th e r
w ith in
the fundamental ontology
treated
y e t h i s going
is
the
of cog­
did
and
th is
for
not the
demands proa
s u b je c t-
tra n s c e n d e n ­
c o g n itiv e s it u a ­
tio n
is
to be t r e a t e d as the fundamental premise of the on tolog y of
co g n itio n .
Such a p r o b le m a t iz a t io n becomes p o s s ib le only w ith
the
h elp of the n o tio n of the s o c i a l n a tu re of the s u b j e c t i v e - o b j e c t i v e
to ta lity .
G e n e ra lly,
s o c i a l world
is
on the b a s is
is
of the concept
the fundamental
re a lity
then a human w o rld , but not in the
of i n r l i v i d u a l
co n s c io u s n e s s ,
The substance of which
and r e l a t i o n s .
as e . g . ,
human world i s
made
They c o n d it io n each o th e r
s p e c t i v e of the a c t i v i t i e s
as he i s
ed i n t o
network of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s ,
s t i t u t i o n s c r c a t e d on them.
is
the
p a rtic ip a tio n
of
Man,
"th ru st"
And t h i s
As a whole,
man
which in c lu d e s
i.e .,
in
o n tic
understood in t h i s way,
acting in i t .
is
is
and
in
s o c ia lly
re la tio n s
and i n ­
the a c t i v i t y
which i s
a c tiv ity ,
is
shows hims’e l f
doomed,
of s suprathe c o n d it io n
a p a rtic u la r
s o c i a l subject­
as having been
in o n t i c
of
the
se n s e ,
e n tire
for
man.
s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - c o g n i t i o n ,
From now on,
I w ill
between s u b j c c t i v i t y - i n - a c t i n g
and sub­
Man's s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - a c t i n g
c o d i t i o n f o r and a product o f
s o c ia l a c t i v i t i e s .
to g e th e r w it h h i s usage,
c a l l y p a r t i c u l a r way.
is
c i a l r e l a t i o n s and a cco rd in g
a re alw ays
are
done w i t h i n
to s o c i a l p a t t e r n s
re la tio n s
which bind
even when he i s d i r e c t e d at t h i n g s .
always - e s s e n t i a l l y - s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n s ,
ch aracter:
i s both the
I t means th a t sub­
s o c i a l i z e d in a
The s o c i a l c h a r a c t e r of
means not o n ly t h a t a c t i v i t i e s
in te rs u b je c tiv e
ex­
in c o r p o r a t ­
the s o c i a l world so f a r
to be the a c t i v i t y
d i f f e r e n t i a t e in t h i s paper
p e o p le ,
acts
He
the
s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - a c t i n g
j e c t ! v ity - in - c o g n itio n .
that a c t i v i t i e s
the p e r ­
aspects,
formed,
and
h i s sensual and i n t e l l e c t u a l equipment.
je c tiv ity ,
both
of a s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l ,
i n t o the s o c i a l w o r ld ,
h is to ric a l
i s a t the same time
these
and h i s s u b j e c t i v i t y ,
f o r h i s being the perform er
iv ity .
of
Man e x i s t s in
and i n d i v i d u a l a c t u a l i z a t i o n
a
seen in
In
s o c ia lly
e s t a b l i s h e d manner w i t h i n the l i m i t s
- in d iv id u a l su b je ct,
form
b e in g - in - s o c ia l- w o r l d .
world inasmuch
as h i s a c t i v i t y
and
o b je c tiv ity .
is ts in t h i s
the
It
the C a r t e s ia n sense.
This t o t a l i t y ,
i n d i v i d u a l man, whose e x is t e n c e i s
man e x i s t s .
are s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s
which c o n s t i t u t e i t ,
c o l l e c t i v e s u b j e c t and s o c i a l
what i s s o c i e t a l ,
sense of being a c o r r e l a t i v e
such
as w e l l as autodynamic t o t a l i t y .
of
in which
human
h is to ri­
a c tiv itie s
the l i m i t s of so­
but
man
-
in f a c t w it h
Human a c t i v i t i e s
o th e r
remain
and t h i s g iv e s them an
they e s t a b l i s h c o n t a c t between i n d i v i ­
dual s u b j e c t i v i t i e s - i n - c o g n i t i o n .
the same time
The c o n d it io n and the product at
of these i n t e r a c t i o n s ,
th e ir in te r s u b je c tiv it y ,
seen from the p e r s p e c t iv e of
is s u p ra - in d ivid u a l,
in t e r p e r s o n a l
con­
s c io u s n e s s .
Having accepted the n o tio n
of what i s s o c i a l
t u t i v e c a te g o ry of the on tolog y
c o g n it io n i s - in i t s
that i t
of c o g n i t i o n ,
o n tic s tru c tu re
has i n t e r a c t i o n a l ,
- a
d ia lo g ic a l
not in such a m e ta p h o ric a l
.so c ia l
form.
und erstan din g
as
the
It
is
a d ia lo g u e in a l i t e r a l ,
phenomenon,- and
s t r u c t u r e
a c t i o n s
a
t i о n.
s y s t e m
w h i c h
i n d i v i d u a l
t a k e
S tric tly
i n
of
C o g n itio n
speaking
i t s
s o c i a l
p l a c e
one
o n t i c
i n t e r ­
a m o n g
t h e
s u b j e c t i v i t i e s - i n - c o g n i *
The system i s
o n t i c s t r u c t u r e of the
The c o g n i t i v e a c t ,
thus d e s c r ib e d ,
i s
and
a cco rd in g to which w h ile
human, sense.
c o g n i t i o n
th a t
i s a d ia lo g u e ,
e x p lo r in g n atu re we ask q u e s tio n s and n atu re answers us.
can say t h a t
c o n s ti­
we must agree
a u t o d y n a m ic a lly h i s t o r i c a l
forms the
s e lf- c r e a tin g co g n itio n .
understood as s o c i a l
to use H e g e lia n
r e c t e d a g a in s t s u b j e c t i v i t y " .
d i r e c t them selves
and
in te ra c tio n ,
can
e x p r e s s io n , as " s u b j e c t i v i t y
S u b je c tiv itie s - in - c o g n itio n
be
d i­
which
to each o th e r or a g a in s t each o t h e r are not their
own c r e a t i o n s in the sense
of being g ive n to them selves in the a c t
of the in n e r- c o n s c io u s n e s s
as pure
c ia lly
se lf- k n o w le d g e .
They
are so­
created.
The idea of
the i n t e r a c t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of c o g n i t i o n a llo w s us
to p ro b le m a tiz e the seem ingly obvious
i s a r e l a t i o n between s u b j e c t
the o ld t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s t i c
c t i v i t y
of
c o n d it io n s which
of
It
enable human con s cio u sn e ss
F i r s t of a l l ,
that
c o g n it io n
and shows in a new l i g h t
p r o b l e m
c o g n i t i o n .
towards the t r a n s c e n d e n t.
can be n o t ic e d :
c o n v ictio n
and o b j e c t ,
is
to
t h e
the
go
o b j e ­
problem of the
beyond i t s e l f
two n o n - id e n t ic a l
is su e s
the problem of an i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t iv i t y - in - c u g n i -
t i o n going towards anoth er
s u b je c tiv ity - in - c o g n itio n
s u b je c tiv ity ,
and the problem
tra n s c e n d in g towards
of
a
what i s o b j e c t i v e -
- in - c o g n itic n .
In r e l a t i o n
to the f i r s t
problem,
cy to tra n sc e n d e n t towards o th er
f o r the p o s s i b i l i t y of the
tera ctio n s,
and t h a t t h i s
one can say t h a t the tenden­
s u b je c tiv itie s
c o g n itiv e
is
a c t s which a re
tendency i s an
the c o n d it io n
s o c ia l
in ­
in d is p e n s a b le o n t i c qua-
lity
of human s u b j e c t i v i t y - i n - c o g n i t i o n .
s c io u sn e ss i s o n ly a p a r t i c u l a r
i n t e r p r e s o n a l co n s c io u s n e s s ,
o p le 's s u b j e c t iv i t y ,
s u b je c tiv ity ,
then the going
w ith in
sub ject
the
an
con­
element
of
towards the o th er pe­
g iv e n ,
h is to ric a lly
of s o c i a l l i f e .
tendency to a s s i m i l a t e the
c tiv itie s - in - c o g n itio n .
tie s
in d iv id u a l
i s a movement which tak e p la c e w i t h i n a s o c i a l
i.e .,
s u p r a - in d iv id u a l
S in c e
a c t u a l i z a t i o n and
c o n c r e te
The same a p p l i e s
o b j e c t i v i z e d c o n t e n ts
of
to the
o th e r subje-
The t ra n s c e n d in g towards o th er s u b j e c t i v i ­
and the a s s i m i l a t i n g the c o n te n t
c o n s t i t u e n t p ro ce ss e s of
of s o c i a l con sciou sn e ss
co g n itio n .
They occure
f o r such
are
i s the
very n a tu re of c o g n it io n as a s o c i a l p r o c e s s .
The tendency
to tra n sce n d e n t towards o th e r
- c o g n itio n cannot be t r e a t e d as a
s é lf
to t h in g s .
T h e
v a l i d i t y
of
Tne is s u e of the f a c t u a l
c o g n it io n аз
p ro o f t h a t c o g n it io n
- p r o b l e m '
of
c o g n i t i o n
q u e s tio n of prim ary
v a lid ity
importance
s u b je c tiv itie s - in -
for
su b je c tiv e - o b je c tiv e
t h e
of
c o g n it io n
these
becomes the
th e o rie s
which
I n the l i g h t
ch aracter
of
It
s titu e s
as c o g n it io n and
its e lf
e p is t e m o lo g ic a l
i s j u s t one of
th e o rie s.
c h a r a c t e r of the idea
(th in g n e s s ),
it
treat
of what
co g n itio n ,
a treatm ent i s n e i t h e r the o n ly p o s s ib le nor the o n ly
in p h ilo s o p h y .
u. a 1
demands s e p a r a te i n q u i r y .
re la tio n .
was s a id here about the autodynamic
refers itf a c t
such
e x i s t i n g one
the forms in which c o g n it io n conreco g n iz e s
Its
In order to see the
t h a t c o g n it io n i s
i s enough to remind
own
a c tiv ity
h is to ric a lly
in
lim ite d
le a r n i n g about f a c t u a l i t y
us of those
p re - K a n tia n epistem ology in which c o g n it io n
th e o rie s
of the
was understood
аз
a
r e l a t i o n between human s u b j e c t i v i t y ,
human mind and ( d i v i n e ) obje-
c i t v e knowledge.
in te rn a liz in g
In these t h e o r i e s ,
tra n s c e n d in g was p r o b le m a tiz e d .
c o n d it io n s
in which human
Q u estion s
in which human
knowledge would r e f e r to o b j e c t i v i t y ,
however,
l i m i t a t i o n s of the
en a b le s us to
n itio n
n o t,
s u b je c tiv e - o b je c tiv e
c a n c e l the problem
in a v e r s io n proper
t o ta k e
the
knowledge
con sciou sn ess
of
problem
A ll
the
c o n ce p tio n
o b je c tiv e
f o r t h i s c o n c e p t io n ?
because t h i s v e r s io n of the
in q u i r e s ought
of
than
about
or
fa c tu a lity ..
t h a t the r e c o g n i t i o n
the modern r e f l e c t i o n on c o g n i t i o n .
cal
rath er
asked
s u b j e c t can a c q u i r e o b j e c t i v e
r a t h e r than about the c o d i t i o n s
Can we s a y ,
were
the
t h i s c o n c e p tio n
is
h is to ric a l
of
co g n itio n
v a lid ity
of cog­
I
we c a n ­
t h in k
c h a ra c te ris tic
of
c u r r e n t e p is t e m o lo g i­
as t h e i r
o b lig a to ry
p o in t of r e f e r e n c e ,
s e t t le m e n t s ,
if
they have to take in t o account i t s problems end
only to overcome them.
O th e rw ise ,
recognized
only and
from t h e i r own p o in t of view .
e x c lu siv e ly
L e t us then a n a ly s e the
as i n q u i r i e s
th e re i s a dan­
ger t h a t they may be
problem how
o b j e c t i v i t y of c o g n it io n and i t s
co n ce rn in g c o g n it io n
the
q u e s tio n
f a c t u a l v a l i d i t y , can
about
the
be asked у on
the ground of the suggested u nderstanding of c o g n i t i o n .
When we ask
about the o b j e c t i v i t y
we want to understand how i t
l a t i o n between c o g n it io n
tie s - in - a c tin g .
tio n
we want to
le a r n how i t
is
p o s s ib le
e x p lic a tio n is
are
of
in
to what i s s o c i a l l y o b j e c t i v e ,
assumptions,
is i t s e l f
the ground
of the
what i s
in te re s t,
i here
w ith a
o n to lo g ica l
in
that i t
view of s o c i a l being.
It
h is
of
c o n s t i t u t i n g human
man
p a rtic ip a te s
s u b je c tiv ity - in - a c tin g .
o p e r a t io n s ,
i.e .,
e tc.,
can be valu ed
what i s
the
i s being f o r ­
its e lf
from the
the v e r y s oGial
factu al
Things i n t e r f e r e
is
a c tiv ity
to man
i s a lr e a d y s o c i a l i z e d and e x io lo g i-
th a t i t
Hence,
Thanks to them,
which
has o n t i c r e le v a n c e f o r man and c o n c re te
human w orld g iv e s c o g n it io n i t s
because c o g n it io n
of
which
o b j e c t i v e to man,
lo n g in g s ,
s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l wholes,
to t h in g s .
c re a tiv e
the th in g n e s s which o b j e c t i v i z e s
i s always human f a c t u a l i t y .
a c tiv ity ,
to s t a r t
Man's c o n t a c t w ith what is
The p ro ce ss
an o n t iq p r o c e s s ,
The r e a l i t y ,
o b je cts.
accepted
factu al.
and i s engaged w ith a l l
c a l in the sense
refer
one has
be reduced to the
I n t h i s p rocess t h a t which i s
o b j e c t of h is
and t h a t t h in g s take
c o g n it io n cannot be co n s id e re d as the a c t i v i t y
h is s u b je c tiv ity - in - c o g n it io n .
med.
th a t
the i n t e r a c t i o n s d i r e c t them selves i n t e n t i o n a l l y .
c o n s t i t u t e s by i t s e l f
as a whole,
among
the m se lve s,
o b j e c t s to which s u b j e c t i v i t i e s
to answer these q u e s t io n s ,
e x t e r n a l to him cannot
r e a lity
In o th er
suggested here
the f a c t t h a t i n t e r a c t i o n s
d ia lo g u e and become
statem ent t h a t on
of c o g n i­
th in g s i n t e r f e r e
view
not clo s e d
they are open
in
a re­
the s u b j e c t i v i -
v a lid ity
that
p a r t in human
In ord er
e x is ts
s u b je c tiv itie s - in - c o g n itio n .
s u b je c tiv itie s - in - c o g n itio n
p a rtic ip a tin g
to
factu al
what seems s tra n g e from the p o in t
and what r e q u ir e s
in te ra c tio n ,
th a t th e re
and what i s e x t e r n a l
When asking about the
in the i n t e r a c t i o n s between
words,
of a c o g n i t i v e
i s p o s s ib le
v a lid ity
and
in c o g n i t i o n ,
they
c o g n it io n
an element
c re a tio n
of
is
p o i n t of
of
the
makes
it
become i t s
the co g n itio n - o f- s o m e th in g
human
and cannot be e x t r a c t e d from i t .
su b je c tiv e - o b je c tiv e
In o th er words, c o g n i t ­
io n i s r e l a t e d to what
a lly
v a l i d so f a r as
which i t
s ib le ,
b e longs.
i s o b j e c t i v e and becomes p o s s ib le as f a c t u ­
it
If
i s determined by the e n t i r e s o c i a l l i f e
total
i t would be pure,
i.e .,
d ire c t
such an i n t e r a c t i o n
s u b j e c t i v i t i e s would in
n e c e s s i t y of r e f e r r i n g
makes i t
in te ra ctio n
in which
a c tiv ity
a v a lu e .
tio n ,
i t makes c o g n i t i o n
To the degree t h a t t h i s
as f a r as i t
ledge
about t h in g s ,
or
tie s ,
or r u l e s over them,
re la tiv iz e s
affects
s o c ia l
t h in g s ,
and whether i t
lim ite d
a c tiv ity
and
by the
c o g n i­
t h in g s ,
its e lf
to know­
tran sform s or c r e a t e s
r e a li­
it
refers
re la tiv iz e s
the c o n d it io n s
of
S o c ia l a c t i v i t y
such
the
s itu a tio n
One could
of
factu al
a
factu al
has a f a c t u a l
the i d e n t i t y of o b j e c t i v i t y
adding v a lu e to the l a t t e r .
s i d e r a t i o n s express j u s t
factu ­
to
to
of c o g n it io n i s j u s t an a r t i c u l a t i o n
e sta b lish e s
its e lf
depends on i t s knowing them.
fu n c t io n in g of s o c i a l a c t i v i t y .
t h in g n e s s ,
m ediate,
which g iv e s c o g n it io n i t s
It
say t h a t e p is t e m o lo g ic a l r e f l e c t i o n on
ture when i t
s u b je c tiv itie s ,
would
the c o n d it io n f o r i t s own c r e a t i v e c h a r a ­
i.e .,
ty,
of
no t h in g s
no way be determined
cter.
v a lid ity
to
c o g n it io n were pos­
to t h in g s .
The d e velo p in g human
al v a l i d i t y ,
a u to n o m ira tio n of
and f a c t u a l i ­
E p is t e m o l o g ic a l
ir, which
na­
con­
t h in g s become the
p o in t of r e f e r e n c e f o r e v a l u a t i n g both the c o n c r e te o p e r a t io n , which
i s e v a lu a t e d
act,
a cco rd in g to how i t
affects
t h in g s ,
which i s e v a lu a t e d in re s p e c t of how i t
To . r e c a p i t u l a t e ,
and has the
c o g n it io n i s an
the
la tte r
are i t s
s t o r i c a l whole,
tic ip a tin g
in
- c o g n i t io n ,
is ,
in i t s
in te ra c tio n s .
- c o g n it io n
and
ted
to i n t e r n a l i z e
of these i n t e r a c t i o n s .
tie s ,
In d iv id u a l
i.e .,
what i s
and i s
h i­
s u b je c tiv ity - in -
and
is
ch a ra cte riz e d
s u b j e c t i v i t i e 3 -in-
trie c o n te n ts of
in the
a
the a utod y­
s u b je c t iv it y par­
a
towards o t h e r
Such a s u p r a - i n d i v i d u a l
in te ra ctio n s ,
r e a lity
tak es p la c e
C o g n itio n i s
an
in te rp e rso n a l
con s cio u sn e ss
(.preserved, m o d ifie d in some fragm en ts, e t c . )
g n itiv e
it
o n tic s tr u c tu r e ,
created nature,
by the tendency to tra n sce n d e n t
c o n s c io u s n e s s .
to t h in g s .
s o c ia l
C on se q ue n tly,
c o g n i t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n s becomes
has a s o c i a l l y
of
and not w i t h i n human mindSj although
n e ce s sa ry c o r r e l a t i v e s .
s in c e i t
namic system o f s o c i a l
refers
element
s t r u c t u r e of a d ia lo g u e .
in the specc among i n d i v i d u a l s ,
and the c o g n i t i v e
is
co-crea-
by c o n c r e t e co­
same time a c o n d it io n of ^ach
What i s o b j e c t i v e to i n d i v i d u a l s u b j e c t i v i ­
the o b j e c t
of c o g n i t i o n
p a te s in c o g n it io n because c o g n it io n
is
and a c t i n g p a r t i c i ­
an element
of
the e n t i r e
a c tiv ity
in
of human b e in g s .
c o g n it io n
i s proper
manner of s o c i a l
The way in which o b j e c t i v i t y
for
the
s e lf- c re a tio n .
g iv e n ,
h is to ric a lly
P a rtic u la ry ,
C o g n itio n gains
aspect,
p a rtic ip a tin g
through
determined
o b je c tiv ity
p a te s in c o g n it io n as th in g n e s ę .
becomes a v a lu e
p a rtic ip a te s
its
in
p a rtic i­
a x io lo g ic a l
s o c ia l c re a tiv e
a c tiv ity .
The above c o n s id e r a t io n s may r a i s e the f e e l i n g of
One might
g n itio n
ric ity ,
say th a t
re a lly
they
is .
answer
o n tic
structure
may appear u n s a t i s f a c t o r y
- e p is t e m o lo g ic a l.
However,
means changing the
it.
i s the system
the
sense
ends up w ith
a c o r r e l a t i v e of some
b u ild in g
in ­
nonan
suggested here
d e fin in g
or
or to the m eth od olo gica l c o n ce p tio n s
t io n tu rn s out to be
-
about c o g n it io n and qua­
c o g n it io n by
t h i s procedure must lead e i t h e r to n a t u r a l i s t i c
or i t
co ­
of s o c i a l
and - e s s e n t i a l l y
whole s t y l e of askin g
One cannot q u a l i f y
c o n c e p tio n s ;
what
autodynamic h i s t o ­
one has to remember t h a t c r e a t i n g
o n t o l o g i c a l con cep tion of c o g n it io n in
lify in g
the q u e s tio n
To q u a l i f y c o g n it io n as the
which in i t s
te ra ctio n s ,
do not
in s u ffic e n s y .
p s yc h o lo g is tic
m eth o d o lo g ica l
which
p rob le m atiz ed a t a l l .
t h e re remains o n ly one s o l u t i o n - to look f o r the
q u es tio n of
what c o g n it io n
c o n s titu te s i t s e l f
s t o r i c a l co g n itio n s.
Th is realm i s the
s u b je c tiv e - o b je c tiv e
a c tiv ity ..
is ,
by
to
ru le s ;
these p o s i t i o n s ,
realm in which i t
wants
in
c o g n it io n i s not
answer to the
one
s in c e
in which c o g n i­
e p is t e m o lo g ic a l m etaphysics
If
it,
a void
p e n e t r a t in g the
in the forms of c o n c r e t e h i ­
h i s t o r i c a l world of s o c i a l
C h a ir of Ph ilo s o p h y
U n i v e r s i t y of Łódź
B a rb a ra Tuchańska
PROBLEM POZNANIA JAKO PYTANIE ONTOLOGICZNE .
Punktem w y j ś c i a moich rozważań j e s t p rze ko n a n ie,
że poznanie
nadal wymaga
f i l o z o f i c z n e g o namysłu.
Kantow'ski t r a n s c e n d e n ta liz m
i w y r a s t a j ą c e z niego bezpośrednio
lub p ośred n io - f i l i z o f i e
F ich tego, Hegla, Marksa,
N ie tz s ch e g o , H u s s e r la
i Heideggera wyznacza­
j ą obszar t e o r e t y c z n y ,
w którym p y t a n ie
o poznanie s ta w ia n e
jest
w nowy sposób,
juź n ie w s z a c ie n a t u r a l i s t y c z n e j czy p o s y ch o lo g istyczne^.
Ze względu na zaw arto ść p ojęciow ą tego obszaru i wypraco-
wany w nim sposób f i l o z o f o w a n i a ,
problem poznania
s t a j e s i ę w nim
zagadnieniem ontologicznym ,
tzn. możliwe s t a j e
s i ę p y t a n ie o to,
j a k a j e s t ontyczna s t r u k t u r a poznania.
Odpowiedzi
na to p y ta n ie
mogą być o c z y w iś c ie różnorodne.
W a r t y k u l e przedstawipna j e s t j e d ­
na z n ic h .
Fundamentalną k a t e g o r ią .p o ję c io w ą proponowanej koncept u a l i z a é j i , poznania
jako
fenomenu ontycznego j e s t p o j ę c i e u s p o łe ­
c z n ie n ia.
W p e rs p e k tyw ie t e j k a t e g o r i i poznanie ja w i s i ę jako autodynamiczna h i s t o r y c z n o ś ć , k tó r a ma s t r u k t u r ę
in te ra k c ji
s p o łe c z ­
nych włączonych w c a ł o ś ć l u d z k i e j d z i a ł a l n o ś c i . D z ię k i
u w z ględ nie­
niu szerszego ko ntekstu ontycznego,
w którym r e a l i z u j e
s i ę pozna­
n ie ,
możliwe j e s t w y j a ś n i e n ie sposobu u c z e s t n i c z e n i a
w poznaniu
przedmiotów.