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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
COMPETITION LAW
NOUVEAUTÉS EN MATIÈRE DE
DROIT DE LA CONCURRENCE
SEMINAR
Stikeman Elliott llp
|
Montréal
Toronto
Ottawa
Calgary
Vancouver
October 24, 2012
New York
London
Sydney www.stikeman.com
COMPETITION LAW
Programme
7:30 Registration and Breakfast / Inscription et petit-déjeuner
October 24, 2012
8:00 Recent Developments in Canadian Competition Law
Paul Collins, Partner and Head of the Competition and Foreign
Investment Group / Associé et chef du groupe du droit de la
concurrence et des investissements étrangers
8:20 Recours collectifs en droit de la concurrence :
développements récents
Yves Martineau, Partner / Associé
8:40 Les risques accrus en droit de la concurrence –
le temps de mettre à jour ses politiques de conformité
Stephen Hamilton, Partner / Associé
9:00 Question Period / Période de questions
9:20 Closing Remarks / Mot de la fin
COMPETITION LAW
Summary / Sommaire
Speakers / Conférenciers
October 24, 2012
Paul Collins, Head of Competition & Foreign Investment Group / Chef du
groupe du droit de la concurrence et des investissements étrangers
Stikeman Elliott, Toronto
Stikeman Elliott, Montréal
Presentations / Présentations
Recent Developments in Canadian Competition Law
Recours collectifs en droit de la concurrence : développements récents
Les risques accrus en droit de la concurrence – le temps de mettre à jour
ses politiques de conformité
resources / Ressources
Selected articles from The Competitor, Stikeman Elliott’s Online Ressource
for Competition Law Developments and Analysis / Articles extraits du
blogue The Competitor, la ressource en ligne de Stikeman Elliott en
matière de droit de la concurrence : www.TheCompetitor.ca
Investment Canada Act FAQ / Foire aux questions sur la Loi sur
Investissement Canada
Top 10 Rules of Competition Law / Les 10 grandes règles du droit de la
concurrence
COMPETITION LAW
Speakers / Conférenciers
October 24, 2012
Paul Collins, Partner
Head of Competition & Foreign Investment Group
Stikeman Elliott, Toronto
Paul Collins
5300 Commerce Court West, 199 Bay Street, Toronto, Canada M5L 1B9
Direct: (416) 869-5577 Fax: (416) 947-0866 pcollins@stikeman.com
Law Practice
Paul Collins is head of the Competition and Foreign Investment Group. He practises corporate
and commercial law and specializes in the area of competition law, providing both
transactional and general compliance advice as well as advice in the area of marketing and
advertising law. Mr. Collins is also a leading advisor for foreign investors in connection with the
Investment Canada Act. His practice puts him in constant contact with the federal Competition
Bureau and the Investment Review Division of Industry Canada. He is a past Chair of the
Executive Committee of the Canadian Bar Association Competition Law Section.
From May 2010 to May 2012, Mr. Collins served as Senior Deputy Commissioner – Mergers
Branch - with the Competition Bureau where, as the head of the Mergers Branch, he was
instrumental in the Bureau’s review of high-profile corporate transactions, as well as the
development of key Bureau policies arising from the significant amendments to the
Competition Act introduced in 2009. Such Bureau policies/guidelines include the revised
Merger Enforcement Guidelines published in October 2011, as well as the Merger Review
Process Guidelines, the Fee and Service Standards Handbook for Mergers and MergerRelated Matters, and a number of Interpretation Guidelines. During Mr. Collins’ tenure with
the Bureau, he was a member of its Senior Management Committee. Mr. Collins is already
well-established as a Canadian leader in competition law and his direct experience with the
day-to-day workings of the Bureau over the last two years will only enhance his practice.
Professional Activities
Mr. Collins is an active member of the Canadian Bar Association (Competition Law Section)
and the Antitrust Law Sections of both the International Bar Association and the American
Bar Association. He has been an adjunct professor at the University of Toronto Faculty of
Law. He is the former chair of the Legislative Reform and Competition Policy Subcommittee
of the Canadian Bar Association (Competition Law Section). He has spoken at numerous
conferences organized by the Canadian Bar Association, the International Bar Association,
American Bar Association and The Canadian Institute.
Speaking Engagements and Publications
Mr. Collins’ recent speaking engagements include:
> “Stock Exchange Mergers in Canada, the US and EU,” 2012 Annual Competition Law
Fall Conference, Canadian Bar Association, September 2012, Gatineau, Quebec.
> “A Brave New World: Mergers Practice in 2012,” 2012 Annual Competition Law Spring
Forum, Canadian Bar Association, May 2012, Toronto, ON.
> “The New Merger Guidelines: Getting the Deal Through,” 2011 Annual Competition Law
Fall Conference, Canadian Bar Association, October 2011, Gatineau, Quebec.
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP PROFILE
> “Global Enforcers Roundtable,” 5 Annual Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium,
Georgetown Law, September 2011, Washington, DC.
th
> “Current Developments in Merger Law and Enforcement,” 15 Annual IBA Competition
Conference, September 2011, Florence, Italy.
th
> “Antitrust Enforcement Priorities,” Second Annual Chicago Forum on International
Antitrust Issues, June 2011, Chicago, Illinois.
> “Trends and Development in Merger Policy and Analysis,” 10 Annual Conference of
the International Competition Network, May 2011, Den Haag, Netherlands.
th
> “Cooperation in Merger and Unilateral Conduct Matters,” ICN Cooperation Roundtable,
March 2011, Washington, DC.
> “Merger Enforcement Guidelines & Second Stage Merger Review Process,” 10 Annual
Competition Law & Policy Forum, Northwind Professional Institute, Langdon Hall,
February 2011, Cambridge, ON.
th
> “Creeping Acquisitions,” Meeting of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation &
Development (OECD), February 2011, Paris, France.
> “Recent Developments in Canadian Competition Law,” Stikeman Elliott Competition
Group Seminar, February 2011, Toronto, ON.
> “Merger Review Under the New Regime,” Competition Law Essentials for Business
Lawyers and Executives, Osgoode Professional Development CLE, January 2011,
Toronto, ON.
> “M&A Issues Confronting the Competition Bureau,” 8 annual Advanced Mergers &
Acquisition Conference, December 2010, Vancouver, BC.
th
> International Competition Network Merger Workshop, November 2010, Rome, Italy.
> Mergers & Acquisition Conference, October 2010, Toronto, ON.
> “Antitrust regulation for natural resources,” Joint session with the Antitrust Committee,
International Bar Association Conference, October 2010, Vancouver, BC.
> “’Right this Way, SIR’: Evaluating the Direction of the New Canadian Merger Review
Process,” 2010 Canadian Bar Association Annual Fall Competition Law Conference,
September October 2010, Gatineau, QC.
> “International Competition/Antitrust Update,” 2010 Corporate Counsel World Summit,
September 2010, Toronto, ON.
A sampling of Mr. Collins’ publications includes:
> Contributor, Commentaries, Competition Act and Commentary (Butterworths, 2010).
> Antitrust Law Journal – (Vol. 73, No. 1, 2005) – “The Aspen Skiing Case from a
Canadian Competition Law Perspective” – co-authored with D. Jeffrey Brown and Kevin
Rushton.
> World Competition – September 2003 – “An Analysis of the Proposal to Decriminalize
the Anti-Competitive Pricing Practices under the Competition Act”.
> The Law and Economics of Canadian Competition Policy – University of Toronto Press
– May 2002 with Professors Trebilcock, Winter, and Iacobucci. This book has been
awarded the prestigious 2002 Douglas Purvis Memorial Prize for a work of excellence
relating to Canadian economic policy.
2
Mr. Collins is listed and recognized in the following publications:
> Legal Media Group’s 2012 Guide to the World’s Leading Competition and Antitrust
Lawyers/Economists.
> The 2010 Lexpert/American Lawyer Guide to the Leading 500 Lawyers in Canada for
Competition.
> The 2010 Chambers Global's The Guide to the World's Leading Lawyers for Business
as a recommended lawyer for Competition/Antitrust and Competition/Antitrust:
Investment Canada, and the 2010 edition cites Mr. Collins as having a reputation for
"working hard to put the deal together."
> PLC’s Cross-border Competition Handbook 2010.
> The Best Lawyers in Canada 2010 in Competition/Antitrust Law.
> Global Competition Review's The International Who’s Who of Competition Lawyers &
Economists 2010 and The International Who’s Who of Business Lawyers 2010.
> The 2010 Lexpert Guide to the Leading U.S./Canada Cross-border Corporate Lawyers
in Canada in the area of Competition Law.
> The 2010 Lexpert Guide to the Leading U.S./Canada Cross-border Litigation Lawyers in
Canada in the area of Competition Law
> PLC's Global Counsel 3000 as a “recommended lawyer” in Canada in the Competition/
Antitrust practice area, and the 2010 PLC Which Lawyer?, as highly recommended in
Competition/Antitrust.
> The Canadian Legal Lexpert Directory 2009 as a practitioner “most frequently
recommended” in the Competition Law sector.
> Ranked by Lexpert as one of Canada’s Top 40 Lawyers Under Age 40.
Representative Work
Mr. Collins has acted for:
> Ticketmaster in connection with its merger with Live Nation.
> Yahoo! in connection with its search agreement with Microsoft.
> Ciena in connection with its acquisition of certain businesses from Nortel.
> EDS Corporation in connection with its acquisition by Hewlett-Packard.
> Yahoo! in connection with its proposed services agreement with Google.
> Huntsman Corporation in connection with its proposed acquisition by Hexion.
> Groupe Pernod Ricard in connection with its acquisition of the Absolut vodka brand.
> Wrigley in connection with its merger with Mars.
Education
University of Toronto (LL.B. 1992, Honours BA economics 1989).
Background
Mr. Collins is fluent in Greek.
Bar Admission
Ontario, 1994.
3
Yves Martineau
1155 René-Lévesque Blvd. West, 40th Floor, Montréal, Quebec, Canada H3B 3V2
Tel: (514) 397-3380 Fax: (514) 397-3580 ymartineau@stikeman.com
Law Practice
Yves Martineau is a partner in the litigation practice group of the Montréal office of
Stikeman Elliott. He deals with every aspect of litigation, such as commercial law, banking law,
bankruptcy, product liability, professional liability, leasing and real estate law. Mr. Martineau
has pleaded before all civil courts of Quebec and before the Supreme Court of Canada.
Over the years, he has developed a specific expertise in class actions, primarily defending
manufacturers and banking institutions.
Mr. Martineau is included in the following publications:
> 2013 edition of The Best Lawyers in Canada in class action litigation and securities
litigation;
> Benchmark Litigation Definitive Guide to Canada's Leading Litigation Firms & Attorneys,
2012 edition;
> Featured in the article "Canadian Big Suits" in The American Lawyer magazine, April
2011;
> 2012 Chambers Global’s The World’s Leading Lawyers for Business in the areas of
class action and dispute resolution with the following quotation: "Yves Martineau is fast
becoming a big name in class action defence work in addition to insurance litigation”;
> The Canadian Legal Lexpert Directory 2012, as a practitioner “consistently
recommended” in the class actions litigation sector and “repeatedly recommended” in
the securities litigation and product liability litigation sectors;
> Lexpert 2011 Guide to the Leading US/Canada Cross-border Litigation Lawyers in
Canada, as a leading practitioner in the litigation – class action sector.
Mr. Martineau is a member of the Quebec Bar and a member of the Canadian Bar
Association. In 2006, he was appointed member of the Class Actions Advisory Committee of
the Quebec Bar. He is a frequent speaker for the Service de la formation permanente of the
Quebec Bar Association and taught civil representation at the École du Barreau du Québec.
Publications
> Co-author of Commentaire sur la décision Picard c. Air Canada – L'autorisation de
recours collectifs nationaux au Québec, Repères, Éditions Yvon Blais, February 2012.
> Co-author of “Canada” chapter appearing in Getting the Deal Through: Product Liability
2010, Law Business Research: London, 2010.
> Multi-Defendant Class Actions in Canada, Class Action Defence Quarterly, 2007,
(Buttersworth), Vol. 1, No. 3.
> Le recours collectif et la garantie contre les vices cachés, Barreau du Québec, Service
de la formation permanente, Développements récents sur les recours collectifs (2005),
Volume 232, Cowansville, Y. Blais, 2005, p. 1-34.
> La compétence des tribunaux en matière de faillite, (2004) Vol. 83 Revue du Barreau
Canadien 411.
> Les moyens préliminaires au stade de l’autorisation du recours collectif : la fin justifie
les moyens, Barreau du Québec, Service de la formation permanente, Développements
récents sur les recours collectifs (2004), Volume 213, Cowansville, Y. Blais, 2004, p.
33-55.
> L’article 1002 du Code de procédure civile et la preuve appropriée : entre le devoir et la
discrétion, Barreau du Québec, Service de la formation permanente, Développements
récents sur les recours collectifs (2004), Volume 213, Cowansville, Y. Blais, p. 57-73.
> Commentaire sur la décision Worthington Corporation c. Atlas Turner inc. – La Cour
d’appel reconnaît la constitutionnalité des articles 3129 et 3151 du Code civil du
Québec, Droit civil en ligne, Cowansville, Y. Blais, 2004.
Representative Work
Mr. Martineau has been involved in more than 90 reported cases, such as:
> Kuwait Airways Corporation v. Iraqi Airways Company and the Republic of Iraq, [2010]
2 S.C.R. 571
> Perreault v. Wyeth Soins de Santé Canada, EYB 2010-179274; EYB 2012-205403
(C.A.)
> Option Consommateurs v. Infineon Technologies AG, [2008] R.J.Q. 1694 (C.S.); J.E.
2011-2021 (C.A.)
> Maritonex Inc. v. Nicholson Manufacturing Company, J.E. 2009-356 (C.S.)
> Ekinciler Demir Ve Celik San, a.s. v. Bank of New York, EYB 2007-118029 (C.S.)
> Union des consommateurs v. Banque Toronto-Dominion et al., J.E. 2007-938 (C.S.)
> Bouchard v. Agropur Coopérative et al., [2006] R.J.Q. 2349 (C.A.)
> Trudel v. National Bank of Canada et al., [2006] R.J.Q. 843 (C.S.); J.E. 2007-701 (C.A.)
> Biogentis inc. v. Pharma Biotech inc. et al., [2005] R.J.Q. 3016 (C.S.)
> Azco Mining Inc. v. Sam Lévy & Associés Inc., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 978
Education
Université Laval, (LL.B. with distinction, 1990) and Université Laval, (B.A., School of
Psychology, 1987).
3Bar Admission
Quebec, 1992.
2
Yves Martineau
1155, boul. René-Lévesque Ouest, 40e étage, Montréal (Québec) Canada H3B 3V2
Téléphone : (514) 397-3380 Télécopieur : (514) 397-3580 ymartineau@stikeman.com
Champs de pratique
Yves Martineau est associé au bureau de Montréal de Stikeman Elliott au sein du groupe de
litige. Sa pratique touche tous les aspects du litige, dont le droit commercial, le droit bancaire
et la faillite, la responsabilité de produits, la responsabilité professionnelle, le louage et le
e
droit immobilier. M Martineau a été appelé à plaider devant tous les tribunaux civils
québécois et devant la Cour suprême du Canada.
e
Au fil des années, M Martineau a développé une expertise particulière en matière de recours
collectifs oeuvrant principalement en défense pour des manufacturiers et des institutions bancaires.
e
M Martineau figure dans les répertoires suivants :
> L’édition 2013 du répertoire The Best Lawyers in Canada dans les domaines des
recours collectifs et des litiges en valeurs mobilières;
> L’édition 2012 du répertoire Definitive Guide to Canada's Leading Litigation Firms &
Attorneys publié par Benchmark Litigation;
> Mentionné dans l’article intitulé « Canadian Big Suits », publié dans le numéro d’avril
2011 de la revue The American Lawyer;
> L’édition de 2012 de la publication The World’s Leading Lawyers for Business de
Chambers Global dans les domaines des recours collectifs et des règlements
extrajudiciaires de différends, où on le mentionne dans la citation suivante :
[Traduction] « Yves Martineau est en train de se bâtir une solide réputation en matière
de défense de recours collectifs et dans le domaine des litiges en assurance. »;
> L’édition 2012 de The Canadian Legal Lexpert Directory, comme un avocat « très
souvent recommandé » dans le secteur du litige – recours collectifs et « régulièrement
recommandé » dans les secteurs du litige en matière de valeurs mobilières et de
responsabilité du fait des produits;
> L’édition 2011 du Guide to the Leading US/Canada Cross-Border Litigation Lawyers in
Canada de Lexpert dans le secteur du litige – recours collectifs.
Activités professionnelles
e
M Martineau est membre du Barreau du Québec et de l’Association du Barreau canadien. En
2006, il a été nommé membre du nouveau Comité aviseur du Barreau sur les recours
collectifs. Il donne fréquemment des allocutions pour le Service de la formation permanente du
Barreau du Québec et il a enseigné la représentation civile à l’École du Barreau du Québec.
Publications
> Coauteur du Commentaire sur la décision Picard c. Air Canada – L'autorisation de
recours collectifs nationaux au Québec, Repères, Éditions Yvon Blais, Février 2012.
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT S.E.N.C.R.L., s.r.l. PROFIL
> Coauteur du chapitre « Canada » figurant dans Getting the Deal Through: Product
Liability 2010, Law Business Research : Londres, 2010.
> Multi-Defendant Class Actions in Canada, Class Action Defence Quarterly, 2007,
(Buttersworth), volume 1, numéro 3.
> Le recours collectif et la garantie contre les vices cachés, Barreau du Québec, Service
de la formation permanente, Développements récents sur les recours collectifs (2005),
Volume 232, Cowansville, Y. Blais, 2005, p. 1-34.
> La compétence des tribunaux en matière de faillite, (2004) Vol. 83 Revue du Barreau
Canadien 411.
> Les moyens préliminaires au stade de l’autorisation du recours collectif : la fin justifie les
moyens, Barreau du Québec, Service de la formation permanente, Développements
récents sur les recours collectifs (2004), Volume 213, Cowansville, Y. Blais, 2004, p. 33-55.
> L’article 1002 du Code de procédure civile et la preuve appropriée : entre le devoir et la
discrétion, Barreau du Québec, Service de la formation permanente, Développements
récents sur les recours collectifs (2004), Volume 213, Cowansville, Y. Blais, p. 57-73.
> Commentaire sur la décision Worthington Corporation c. Atlas Turner inc. – La Cour
d’appel reconnaît la constitutionnalité des articles 3129 et 3151 du Code civil du
Québec, Droit civil en ligne, Cowansville, Y. Blais, 2004.
Mandats
e
M Martineau a agi dans plus de 90 causes publiées, notamment :
> Kuwait Airways Corporation c. Iraqi Airways Company and the Republic of Iraq, [2010]
2 R.C.S. 571
> Perreault c. Wyeth Soins de santé Canada, EYB 2010-179274 (C.S.); EYB 2012205403 (C.A.)
> Option Consommateurs c. Infineon Technologies AG, [2008] R.J.Q. 1694 (C.S.); J.E.
2011-2021 (C.A.)
> Maritonex Inc. c. Nicholson Manufacturing Company, J.E. 2009-356 (C.S.)
> Ekinciler Demir Ve Celik San, a.s. c. Bank of New York, EYB 2007-118029 (C.S.)
> Union des consommateurs c. Banque Toronto-Dominion et al., J.E. 2007-938 (C.S.)
> Bouchard c. Agropur Coopérative et al., [2006] R.J.Q. 2349 (C.A.)
> Trudel c. Banque Nationale du Canada et al., [2006] R.J.Q. 843 (C.S.); J.E. 2007-701
(C.A.)
> Biogentis inc. c. Pharma Biotech inc. et al., [2005] R.J.Q. 3016 (C.S.)
> Azco Mining Inc. c. Sam Lévy & Associés Inc., [2001] 3 R.C.S. 978
Études et diplômes
Université Laval, (LL.B., avec distinction, 1990) et Université Laval, (B.A., École de
psychologie, 1987).
Admission au barreau
Québec, 1992.
2
Stephen W. Hamilton
1155 René-Lévesque Blvd. West, 40th Floor, Montréal, Quebec, Canada H3B 3V2
Tel: (514) 397-3055 Fax: (514) 397-3585 shamilton@stikeman.com
Law Practice
Stephen Hamilton is a partner in the Montréal office of Stikeman Elliott in the Commercial
Litigation and Insolvency Group and is a member of the Competition and Foreign Investment
Group. He is also co-chair of the firm's Professional and Ethics Committee and a member of
the office’s Continuing Legal Education Committee. His practice covers all aspects of
litigation, from advising clients on issues of a litigious or potentially litigious nature to
representing clients before the courts or in arbitration proceedings, in all areas of commercial
law, including contract law, corporate law, insolvency and anti-trust. He is acting in several
class actions. His anti-trust practice includes merger analysis, prenotification filings under
the Competition Act, and representations to the Competition Bureau to obtain clearance on
transactions in a wide range of fields.
Mr. Hamilton was a Sessional lecturer in Judicial Institutions and Civil Procedure in the
Faculty of Law of McGill University from 1992 to 2007.
He is included in The Best Lawyers in Canada 2013, he is recognized by The Canadian
Legal Lexpert Directory 2012 as a leading practitioner in the litigation class actions sector
and he is recognized as having the highest rating ("AV") under the Martindale-Hubbell Peer
Review Ratings.
Mr. Hamilton is a member of the Quebec Bar and a member of the Ontario Bar. In addition,
he is a member of the Canadian Bar Association.
Publications
> The future of the National Class Action in Canada, in Annual Review of Civil Litigation (2007)
> L’entrée en vigueur en Ontario du projet de loi 198 ouvrira-t-il la porte à plus de recours
collectifs dans le domaine des valeurs mobilières? Class Actions Conference (2006)
> Recours personnels de l’actionnaire et recours collectifs, Insight Conferences, Montréal
(1996)
> The Corporate Veil Reconsidered: Alternatives to Lifting the Veil, Meredith Memorial
Lectures, Montréal (1995)
> Search and Seizure in Canada (Canada Law Book, 1984) (co-authored with Pearl
Eliadis)
Recent Conference
> “Canada’s “New” Competition Act: Understanding the Legal risks and Opportunities”,
Training session, Stikeman Elliott, October 15, 2009.
Education
Oxford University (Master of Laws, 1985) and McGill University (Bachelor of Civil Law and
Bachelor of Common Law, (Gold Medallist), 1984).
Background
From 1986 to 1987 Mr. Hamilton was a law clerk for the Honourable Mr. Justice Antonio
Lamer of the Supreme Court of Canada.
Bar Admission
Quebec, 1986. Ontario, 1988.
2
Stephen W. Hamilton
1155, boul. René-Lévesque Ouest, 40e étage, Montréal (Québec) Canada H3B 3V2
Téléphone : (514) 397-3055 Télécopieur : (514) 397-3585 shamilton@stikeman.com
Champs de pratique
Stephen Hamilton est associé au bureau de Montréal de Stikeman Elliott où il pratique le
droit dans les domaines du litige commercial et de l’insolvabilité. Il est aussi membre du
groupe de droit de la concurrence et investissements étrangers et du comité de la formation
juridique permanente du bureau et co-président du comité d’éthique professionnelle du
cabinet. Sa pratique englobe tous les aspects du litige, allant des recherches et de la
prestation de conseils aux clients sur les questions de nature litigieuse ou potentiellement
litigieuse à la représentation de clients devant les tribunaux ou dans le cadre de procédures
d’arbitrage dans tous les domaines du droit commercial, y compris les contrats, les sociétés,
l’insolvabilité et la concurrence. Il agit en défense dans plusieurs recours collectifs. Dans le
cadre de sa pratique en droit de la concurrence, il s’occupe de l’analyse de fusions, du dépôt
des préavis prévus par la Loi sur la concurrence et d’audiences devant le Bureau de la
e
concurrence visant à faire autoriser des opérations dans plusieurs domaines. M Hamilton a
été chargé de cours à temps partiel à la faculté de droit de l’Université McGill de 1992 à 2007,
où il a enseigné le cours sur les institutions judiciaires et la procédure civile.
Il figure dans la publication The Best Lawyers in Canada, édition 2013, est reconnu dans
l’édition 2012 de The Canadian Legal Lexpert Directory comme un avocat de premier rang
dans le secteur du litige en matière de recours collectifs et a obtenu la cote la plus élevée («
AV ») dans le Martindale Hubbell Peer Review Ratings.
Activités professionnelles
e
M Hamilton est membre du Barreau du Québec et membre du Barreau de l’Ontario. De
plus, il est membre de l’Association du Barreau canadien.
Publications
> The Future of the National Class Action in Canada, publié dans l’Annual Review of Civil
Litigation (2007)
> L’entrée en vigueur en Ontario du projet de loi 198 ouvrira-t-il la porte à plus de recours
collectifs dans le domaine des valeurs mobilières? Présentation donnée dans le cadre
e
de la 3 conférence avancée sur les recours collectifs (2006)
> The Corporate Veil Reconsidered: Alternatives to Lifting the Veil, Meredith Memorial
Lectures Montréal (1995)
> Recours personnels de l’actionnaire et recours collectifs, Insight Conferences Montréal
(1996)
> Search and Seizure in Canada (Canada Law Book 1984) (rédigé en collaboration avec
Pearl Eliadis)
Conférence récente
> « La « nouvelle » Loi sur la concurrence canadienne – En saisir les risques juridiques et
opportunités », Activité de formation, Stikeman Elliott, 15 octobre 2009.
Études et diplômes
Université d’Oxford (Maîtrise en droit, 1985) et Université McGill (Bachelier en droit civil et
bachelier en common law, gagnant de la médaille d’or, 1984).
Antécédents
e
De 1986 à 1987, M Hamilton a occupé le poste d’auxiliaire juridique auprès de l’Honorable
Antonio Lamer, juge à la Cour suprême du Canada.
Admission au barreau
Québec, 1986. Ontario, 1988.
2
COMPETITION LAW
Presentations / Présentations
Recent Developments in Canadian Competition Law
October 24, 2012
Recours collectifs en droit de la concurrence : développements récents
Les risques accrus en droit de la concurrence – le temps de mettre à jour
ses politiques de conformité
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COMPETITION LAW
resources / Ressources
Selected Articles from The Competitor (www.thecompetitor.ca)
Stikeman Elliott’s competition blog:
October 24, 2012
“Industry Canada issues long-awaited revised draft Investment
Canada Regulations”, Ashley Weber and Bessie Qu,
The Competitor (www.thecompetitor.ca), June 29, 2012
“Canada’s Commissioner wins prevent case - Tribunal orders
divestiture of hazardous waste landfill”, Ashley Weber, The
Competitor (www.thecompetitor.ca), May 31, 2012
“Canada announces further changes to foreign investment review
regime”, Susan M. Hutton and Robert Mysicka, The Competitor
(www.thecompetitor.ca), May 28, 2012
“Competition Bureau conducts performance review of its mergers
branch”, Susan M. Hutton and Robert Mysicka, The Competitor
(www.thecompetitor.ca), May 28, 2012
“Federal government announces targeted changes to the
Investment Canada Act”, D. Jeffrey Brown & Robert Mysicka, The
Competitor (www.thecompetitor.ca), May 1, 2012
“Competition Bureau releases new draft guidelines on abuse of
dominance”, D. Jeffrey Brown & Robert Mysicka, The Competitor
(www.thecompetitor.ca), March 23, 2012
“Rogers Communications claims misleading advertising case,
AMPs violate Canadian Constitution”, Susan M. Hutton and Marisa
Berswick, The Competitor (www.thecompetitor.ca), March 2, 2012
“Supreme Court of Canada grants leave to appeal regarding
indirect purchaser issues”, Sultana L. Bennett, The Competitor (www.
thecompetitor.ca), December 1, 2011
“Québec Court of Appeal authorizes price-fixing class action
involving indirect purchasers”, Sultana L. Bennett, The Competitor
(www.thecompetitor.ca), November 24, 2011
“Court of Appeal for British Columbia bars indirect purchaser
suits”, Katherine L. Kay and Mark Walli, The Competitor (www.
thecompetitor.ca), April 19, 2011
“Investment Canada Act FAQ / Foire aux questions sur la Loi sur
Investissement Canada”
“Top 10 Rules of Competition Law / Les 10 grandes règles du droit de
la concurrence”
Industry Canada issues long-awaited revised draft
Investment Canada Regulations
Posted on June 29, 2012
Ashley Weber and Bessie Qu
On June 1, 2012, Industry Canada published long-awaited draft amendments to the Investment Canada
Regulations. This is the Canadian government's second attempt to implement amendments to the Investment
Canada Act passed in March 2009, which raised the review threshold for WTO investors and introduced a new
metric threshold for valuing Canadian businesses based on "enterprise value". The amendments also introduce
additional notification disclosure requirements that, if implemented, will significantly increase the burden on
foreign investors for what has historically been an otherwise straight-forward, administrative post-closing
filing.
The switch to "enterprise value" was ostensibly designed to better capture the value of a business as a going
concern. However, as discussed in our previous post on May 28, devising a workable definition of "enterprise
value" proved more difficult than anticipated when the legislation was amended in 2009. In response, the new
draft Regulations establish a more rigorous methodology for calculating enterprise value, addressing some of
the concerns raised by the Canadian Bar Association in response to the 2009 amendments. The
recommendations that were adopted include:
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valuing unlisted securities based on a good faith determination of their market value as opposed to the
value of listed securities because the economic rights attached to unlisted securities may not be the same
as those attached to listed securities;
using “total acquisition value” instead of book value of assets for acquisitions of private companies and
asset acquisitions so investments are given equal treatment regardless of the way they are structured;
defining "trading period" with reference to the implementation of the investment to provide investors
more certainty in assessing whether or not their investments are reviewable; and
specifying a source for currency conversions.
The new proposed Regulations further emphasize the different thresholds applicable to WTO and non-WTO
investors. While the review threshold for acquisitions by WTO investors will gradually be increased to $1
billion CAD, the threshold for acquisitions by non-WTO investors and acquisitions of cultural businesses will
continue to be based on the book value of assets, the threshold for which will be indexed annually, to account
for inflation.
Moreover, as compared to book value, which is a known and objective quantity, “enterprise value” based on a
good faith determination of value is inherently subjective and introduces considerable uncertainty into the
review threshold analysis.
The government has also proposed changes to the notification disclosure requirements, which are significantly
more burdensome than the existing framework, and as a result, seem inconsistent with the mandate of
narrowing the scope of the ICA. They include the disclosure of:

the identity of the investor's directors, five highest-paid officers or any security holders with a 10% or
greater stake in the investor's company;
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP │ MONTRÉAL TORONTO OTTAWA CALGARY VANCOUVER NEW YORK LONDON SYDNEY
www.stikeman.com
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date of birth of the individuals mentioned above;
the nature and extent of ownership of a foreign state;
the purchase agreement or a description of the terms and conditions of the transaction;
source of funding for the investment; and
the business activities carried on by the Canadian business, including the North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) codes of the products or services offered.
It is clear that the Canadian government, in drafting the notification disclosure requirements, borrowed from
the disclosure obligations found in the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) review
process. While the proposed Canadian notification requirements are by no means as comprehensive as those
required under CFIUS, CFIUS applies only to investments that have potential implications for national security,
and the United States does not otherwise have any notification requirements for foreign investments in
general. The Canadian government has introduced more rigorous notification requirements, but has not put
any limitation on the types of transactions that will be subject to this more onerous obligation.
Therefore, while these amendments seek to clarify “enterprise value”, in the same breath, they also increase
the potential administrative and compliance costs for the majority of transactions that are below the review
thresholds, and do not raise any concerns for Canada. If implemented, these disclosure requirements could in
fact have the perverse effect of being bad for business in Canada.
There is no clear timeline as to when the regulations will come into force.
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP
2
Canada's Commissioner wins prevent case - Tribunal
orders divestiture of hazardous waste landfill
Posted on May 31, 2012
Ashley Weber
On May 29, 2012, the Competition Tribunal ruled in favour of the Commissioner of Competition, and ordered
CCS Corporation to divest a hazardous waste landfill site, the acquisition of which the Commissioner had
alleged would result in a substantial prevention of competition in the market for hazardous waste disposal in
northeastern British Columbia. This was the first contested challenge to a merger by the Commissioner since
2005.
Complete Environmental had received regulatory approval to open the Babkirk landfill in February 2010, and
had not yet started construction when CCS Corporation acquired the site. CCS already operates the only two
operational secure landfills for hazardous waste in British Columbia. The Commissioner alleged that, through
the acquisition of the Babkirk landfill, CCS had prevented the entry of a potential competitor, thereby
substantially preventing competition.
While the transaction was not subject to pre-merger notification under the Competition Act, in Canada the
Commissioner has jurisdiction to challenge even non-notifiable transactions. Such challenges can be launched
for up to one year after closing. Despite not being notified, the Commissioner learned of the transaction prior
to closing, and informed the parties of her objection to the transaction.
Of note, in her application, the Commissioner had sought dissolution as a possible remedy, which the
respondents moved to challenge in November 2011 on the basis that dissolution was an overly broad and
punitive measure. In the hearing on that motion Justice Simpson refused to grant summary disposition, and
confirmed the possibility of dissolution as an effective remedy, concluding that it would be for the Tribunal to
weigh the evidence for and against divestiture versus dissolution as potential remedies.
The release of the Tribunal’s decision in this case is still pending.
3
Canada announces further changes to foreign
investment review regime
Susan M. Hutton and Robert Mysicka
In the wake of the Canadian government’s announcement that it plans to make targeted changes to the
Investment Canada Act (ICA), the Honourable Christian Paradis, Minister of Industry, announced on May 25
that additional amendments will be made to the ICA and the foreign investment review process. Other
proposed amendments, including the publication of reasons for interim decision, and enabling the Minister to
accept the posting of security for the performance of undertakings, had already been announced on April 27,
2012.
The latest proposed changes include:
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Implementing the increase in the review threshold from C$330 million (based on book value of assets of
the Canadian business) to C$1 billion (based on enterprise value) for WTO member countries(part of the
2009 amendments, the implementation of which had been stalled – see below);
A new guideline for mediation procedures under the ICA for resolving disputes in relation to compliance
with undertakings.
Enterprise Value
Asset value—or book value—is the traditional metric used for valuing Canadian businesses under the ICA to
determine whether an acquisition of control by a non-Canadian investor will meet the applicable threshold and
require Ministerial review and approval under the Act. Currently, the review threshold for investments by
WTO investors is set at C$330 million and is indexed to the growth in nominal GDP at market prices, pursuant
to section 14.1(2) of the Act. The government’s proposed switch to “enterprise value” was originally included
in draft regulations under the ICA in March, 2009 which, to date, have not been promulgated.
As discussed in our previous post, the concept of “enterprise value” for publicly-traded companies was
proposed in 2009 to be defined as market capitalization, plus total liabilities, minus cash and cash equivalents.
As for privately-held entities, such organizations would continue to be valued on the basis of the book value of
the assets in question. Exactly how and when these values were to be determined, however, proved more
difficult to implement than anticipated.
A letter from the Canadian Bar Association (CBA) in August, 2009, raised concerns about the market
capitalization component of “enterprise value” due to the volatility of this metric and the requirement
contained in the draft regulations to update it on a quarterly basis. In particular, the CBA noted that “a
transaction might close very shortly after the end of a fiscal quarter such that the value of the equity securities
cannot be determined until very close to closing, or may not even be known at closing. In situations where the
market capitalization hovers around the review threshold, this would cause substantial unpredictability for
the investor.”
The government has not indicated whether it will be making changes to the definition of “enterprise value” in
view of the comments made by the CBA, however it has stated that the changes to the ICA will be made in
accordance with the core recommendations of the Compete to Win report of the Competition Policy Review
Panel published in June, 2008.
New draft regulations on “enterprise value” were to have been issued this weekend, but had not materialized,
as of the time of posting.
4
Guidelines for Mediation Procedures
The second major change announced by Minister Paradis on May 25 is the issuance of a Mediation Guideline
(Guideline) to ensure the availability of formal mediation procedures under the ICA. The Guideline, issued
pursuant to section 38 of the ICA, will apply where the Minister believes that a non-Canadian investor has
failed to comply with a written undertaking made in relation to an approved investment. This mediation
process is designed to avoid costly and protracted litigation in the courts, which, as seen in the U.S. Steel case,
can be expensive and burdensome for all the parties involved.
The ability to mediate disputes over breaches of undertakings will likely make it easier for the Minister to
enforce undertakings, since mediation is generally simpler and cheaper than litigation, particularly in the
context of the complex ICA regime.
5
Competition Bureau conducts performance review of its
mergers branch
Susan M. Hutton and Robert Mysicka
The Competition Bureau has released an updated Merger Review Performance Report (Report) tracking the
activities of its Mergers Branch since the last report published in May, 2010 and discussed in our previous
post.
Since 2010, the Bureau has published a series of revised guidelines as part of its ongoing efforts to realign its
merger review procedures following the 2009 amendments to the Competition Act and the Notifiable
Transactions Regulations. The updated guidelines include:
New Service Standards for Merger Review
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Competition Bureau Fees and Services Standards Policy for Mergers and Merger-Related Matters published
in October, 2010
Procedures Guide for Notifiable Transactions and Advance Ruling Certificates under the Competition Act
published in November, 2010
Competition Bureau Fees and Service Standards Handbook for Mergers and Merger-Related Matters
published in April, 2012
Interpretation Guidelines
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Hostile Transactions Interpretation Guideline Number 1: Bureau Policy on Disclosure of Information
released in July, 2011
Hostile Transactions Interpretation Guideline Number 2: Bureau Policy on Running of Subsection 123(1)
Waiting Periods released in July, 2011
Pre-Merger Notification Interpretation Guideline Number 13: Satisfying the Information Requirements set
out in Section 16 of the Notifiable Transactions Regulations and Completeness of Notification released in
June, 2011
Revised standard language for “no action” letters issued by the Bureau, announced in August, 2011
In addition to these customized service standards and interpretation instruments, the Bureau has released
more general guidelines outlining its merger review process including the Merger Enforcement Guidelines, a
Mergers Remedy Study, and Merger Review Process Guidelines.
Finally, as part of its effort to enhance communication and transparency in the process of merger review, the
Bureau has committed, where possible, to publicly communicate the results of certain merger reviews through
the issuance of Position Statements that briefly describe the Bureau’s analysis of a particular transaction. The
following position statements have been published by the Bureau since the release of the 2010 Report:
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BCE Inc. and Rogers Communications Inc./ Maple Leaf Sports & Entertainment Ltd. (2012)
Cardinal Health Canada Inc. / Futuremed Healthcare Products Corporation (2012)
Chartwell Seniors Housing REIT / Health Care REIT Inc.(2012)
Transcontinental Inc./ Quad Graphics Canada Inc. (2012)
Canadian Tire Corp, Ltd. / The Forzani Group Ltd. (2011)
6
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XM Canada / Sirius Canada (2011)
BCE Inc. / CTVglobemedia Inc. (2011)
The Bureau’s transparency initiative also includes the publication of a Merger Register used to disclose
completed mergers on a monthly basis—including those that have not been made public. The Bureau’s Merger
Register is the most controversial of its transparency initiatives, as some critics have argued that it will lead to
the disclosure of confidential commercial information which has traditionally been afforded protection under
section 29 of the Competition Act.
Bureau Workload and Resources
The Bureau’s caseload in the FY 2010-11 increased slightly since FY 2009-10 from 216 matters to 236.
Complete statistics for FY 2011-12 were not available at the time of the Report’s publication.
As noted in its 2010 Report, the Bureau’s workload and resources have continued to be strained by an influx of
highly complex transactions that have raised competition concerns. Examples of highly complex reviews since
the 2010 Report include:
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BHP’s hostile bid to acquire Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan which was ultimately blocked by the Minister
of Industry under the Investment Canada Act
London Stock Exchange’s proposed merger with the Toronto Stock Exchange (“TMX”) which was
unsuccessful due to a competing bid to acquire the TMX by Maple Group
Google’s acquisition of Motorola which involved the competitive effects of patents in the wireless industry
BCE and Rogers’ proposed acquisition of Maple Leaf Sports Entertainment which the Bureau is currently
reviewing
Since the 2010 Report, the Bureau has issued 13 SIRs and four consent agreements have been registered with
the Competition Tribunal.
In litigation before the Competition Tribunal, the Bureau has been very active on the front of unresolved
merger matters. In January, 2011 it challenged CCS Corp’s acquisition of Complete Environmental Inc. which
was the owner of a proposed hazardous waste landfill in British Columbia. This application represented the
Bureau’s first challenge of a merger since 2005. In June, 2011 the Bureau filed an application with the Tribunal
seeking to prohibit a proposed joint venture between Air Canada and United Continental Holdings Inc.
Non-Notifiable Transactions
The 2009 amendments to the Competition Act raised the threshold for notifiable transactions from $ 50 million
to $ 70 million. Pursuant to an annual indexing formula set out in the Act, the threshold has now increased to $
77 million. The practical effect of these revisions is that fewer transactions are now subject to mandatory
notification, which in the Bureau’s view potentially increases the likelihood of non-notifiable mergers raising
substantive competition issues.
Accordingly, the Bureau has embarked on a new initiative to actively monitor transactions in the Canadian
marketplace. This monitoring involves scanning various media sources and mergers acquisition databases, as
well as reviewing complaints from relevant stakeholders in the marketplace.
While year-to-year fluctuations exist within each notification subset (e.g. pre-merger notifications, ARCs, premerger notifications and ARCs, and other) the Bureau found that the proportional distribution of merger
reviews by matter type has remained relatively consistent for an extended period of time.
Complexity Designations
The data compiled in the Report supports the Bureau’s view that its mergers workload is becoming
increasingly complex. The table below, reproduced from the Bureau’s Report, indicates that over the three
7
quarters of FY 2011-2012 the percentage of matters designated as ‘complex’ increased by approximately 7%
over the previous fiscal year:
Since the 2010 Report, the Bureau has found that the average time required to review a non-complex matter
increased by approximately 1.3 days, though the average time required to a review complex matter decreased
by approximately 7 days which follows from the implementation of a considerably shorter service standard for
complex reviews, introduced through the Merger Fee Policy and revised Merger Handbook in November, 2010.
The Report concludes that the Bureau has been able to meet the service standard in more than 90% of its
reviews, regardless of complexity.
8
Federal government announces targeted changes to
the Investment Canada Act
D. Jeffrey Brown & Robert Mysicka
On April 26, 2012 the Minister of Finance, Jim Flaherty, introduced the budget implementation legislation, Bill
C-38—the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act—which provides for significant amendments to federal
legislation in line with the objectives set out in the government’s 2012 Budget Plan.
In addition to the government’s budget implementation measures, Bill C-38 includes proposed changes to the
Investment Canada Act designed to increase transparency in the foreign investment review process while
preserving commercial confidentiality for investors supplying information under the Act. The proposed
amendments will also authorize the Minister of Industry to accept security for payment of any penalties
ordered by a court as a result of any contravention of the Act, including breach of undertakings given by a
foreign investor to secure approval of investments under the Act.
The following includes a summary of the key amendments as they relate to specific sections of the Act:


Section 19 will be amended to allow the government to accept security in respect of any future failure by a
foreign investor to abide by undertakings made pursuant to the Act. Such a contravention currently
carries a maximum penalty of $ 10,000 per day of contravention.
Subsection 36(4) will be amended to allow for the disclosure of:
− Information relating to the Minister’s acceptance of a security provided under the proposed
amendment to section 19 of the Act.
− Information in any notice sent to an investor approving an investment as being of net benefit to
Canada;

− Information in a notice and in reasons provided to an investor under section 23(1) of the Act
indicating that the Minister is not satisfied that an investment will be of net benefit to Canada (such
satisfaction on the Minister’s part being necessary for implementation of a reviewable transaction
under the Act), and giving an investor 30 days to make representations and submit undertakings in
that regard.
Proposed Subsection 36(4.1) will include a provision requiring the Minister to inform investors before
communicating any information permitted to be disclosed under subsection 36(4), and preventing such
disclosure if they satisfy the Minister, without delay, that the communication or disclosure would
prejudice them.
The practical effect of the transparency amendments is that the Minister will have the ability to publicly
disclose the information contained in any notice sent to investors indicating: (i) that the Minister is (or is not)
satisfied that an investment will be of net benefit to Canada; (ii) the reasons provided to an investor explaining
why the Minister is not satisfied that an investment will be of net benefit to Canada; and (iii) information
relating to the Minister’s acceptance of a security provided under the proposed amendment to section 19 of
the Act.
9
Competition Bureau releases new draft guidelines on
abuse of dominance
Posted on March 23, 2012
D. Jeffrey Brown & Robert Mysicka
The Competition Bureau announced yesterday that it has released its long-awaited revised draft Abuse of
Dominance Guidelines outlining the Bureau’s approach to reviewable matters under sections 78 and 79 of the
Competition Act. The newly released Guidelines are intended to replace the draft guidelines released in January,
2009, which was the first time the Bureau had updated its enforcement approach to abuse of dominance since
2001.
Abuse of dominance occurs when a dominant firm (or group of firms) in a market engage in a practice of anticompetitive acts that result, or are likely to result, in a substantial prevention or lessening of competition.
Sections 78 and 79 of the Competition Act allow the Competition Tribunal, on application by the Commissioner
of Competition, to prohibit dominant firms from engaging in anti-competitive practices, or to order such
further remedial action as is reasonable and necessary to restore competition in the market.
To prove abuse of dominance, three principal elements must be established:
1) one or more persons substantially or completely controls, throughout Canada, a class or species of
business;
2) the person or persons have engaged in a practice of anti-competitive acts; and
3) the practice has had, is having, or is likely to have the effect of preventing or lessening competition
substantially in a market.
As regards the Bureau’s approach to these basic elements, the 2009 Guidelines did not represent a fundamental
shift. Rather, they merely updated some of the Bureau’s practice in light of recent jurisprudence, most notably,
the Canada Pipe case, which provided the first opportunity for the Federal Court to consider the application of
the abuse of dominance provisions in sections 78 and 79 of the Act.
The new Guidelines, which replace the previous publications on abuse of dominance, are considerably shorter
and more concise. Highlights include the following:
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The new Guidelines state explicitly that, unlike certain other jurisdictions that prohibit supra-competitive
pricing by dominant firms, “charging higher prices to customers, or offering lower levels of service than
would otherwise be expected in a more competitive market, will not alone constitute abuse of a dominant
position.”
The new Guidelines reiterate the view that market share is one of the most important determinants of
potential market power. They also expand in several ways upon the Bureau’s approach to market shares
in assessing whether market power exists.
While reiterating that a market share of less than 35 percent will generally not prompt further
examination, the Bureau’s approach where a market share above 35 percent exists is now more nuanced.
In the 2009 Guidelines, the Bureau said that where market share is above 35 percent it “will normally
continue its investigation.” The new Guidelines state that a market share between 35 and 50 percent will
not give rise to a “presumption” of dominance “but may be examined by the Bureau depending on the
circumstances,” while a market share of 50 percent or more will generally prompt further examination.
Such an approach appears to suggest an acceptance that dominance at shares less than 50 percent will be
a relatively uncommon occurrence.
10
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The new Guidelines state that, in addition to an individual firm’s market share, distribution of the
remaining market among competitors is relevant: while greater market share is likely to increase a single
firm’s ability to sustain a price increase, such an exercise of market power also increases with the
disparity between its market share and those of its competitors. The Bureau will also look at the
durability of a firm’s market share. If shares have fluctuated significantly among competitors over time
(e.g., as a result of the intermittent exploitation of new technology that allows firms to “leapfrog” their
rivals), a higher current market share may be less relevant to establishing market power.
The new Guidelines state that, although “anti–competitive act,” as described in section 78 of the Act, is
defined in relation to its purpose—an intended negative effect on a competitor – the Federal Court of
Appeal and the Competition Tribunal have acknowledged that paragraph 78(1)(f) (which deals with
buying up of products to prevent the erosion of existing price levels) is “one” exception to the
requirement that an anti-competitive act be directed at a competitor. Whether use of the word “one” is
intended to indicate that the Bureau believes there may be other exceptions is unclear.
In assessing whether a particular act is likely to be anti-competitive, the new Guidelines reiterate that the
Bureau generally views conduct described in section 78 of the Act as falling into two broad categories: (i)
exclusionary conduct; and (ii) predatory conduct. Unlike the 2009 Guidelines, however, details regarding
the Bureau’s approach with respect to specific anti-competitive acts have been removed, including raising
rivals’ costs, exclusive dealing, tying, bundling, bundled rebates and denial of access to a facility or service.
What this means about the Bureau’s current thinking on these acts is unclear, the effect of which is to
diminish rather than enhance understanding of the Bureau’s approach to the enforcement of section 79.
As with the 2009 Guidelines, the Bureau notes the inherent difficulty of distinguishing between predatory
and competitive pricing. In the new Guidelines it states that one of the methods it will use to overcome
some of these difficulties is an examination of whether the alleged predatory price can be matched by
competitors without incurring loss, and whether the alleged predatory price is merely “meeting
competition” in the sense that it is a reaction to match a competitor’s pricing strategy. How the Bureau’s
consideration of whether a price can be matched by competitors without incurring a loss relates to the
other requirements of predatory pricing, such as sale by the alleged predator below some level of cost and
recoupment, is unclear.
The Bureau has reaffirmed that, in considering whether an impugned act prevents or lessens competition
substantially, the question is not whether the absolute level of competition in a market is substantial or
sufficient. Rather, the Bureau considers the relative level of competitiveness in the presence and absence
of the impugned practice such that it can satisfactorily determine ‘but for’ the practice at issue, would
there likely be greater competition in the market?
As noted in a previous post, section 79 of the Act was amended in 2009 to include administrative monetary
penalties (AMPs). In cases where it finds that an abuse of dominance has occurred, the Competition Tribunal
may impose a maximum AMP of C$10 million for a first infraction and C$15 million for subsequent infractions.
While AMPs were introduced after the publication of the 2009 draft guidelines, it is unfortunate that the new
guidelines are silent on how the Bureau will incorporate AMPs into its section 79 enforcement approach.
Indeed, the new Guidelines provide no guidance on remedies at all.
The new Guidelines are open for comment by interested parties until May 22, 2012.
11
Rogers Communications claims misleading advertising
case, AMPs violate Canadian Constitution
Posted on March 2, 2012
Susan M. Hutton and Marisa Berswick
Rogers Communications Inc. will appear before the Ontario Superior Court in June, claiming that two aspects of
the Competition Act dealing with civilly reviewable misleading advertising are unconstitutional: AMPs
(administrative monetary penalties) in the millions of dollars, and the “adequate and proper” testing
requirements. If they are ruled unconstitutional, the case stands to gut the Competition Bureau’s ability to seek
multi-million dollar penalties under the civil misleading advertising provisions of the Competition Act, and may
have implications for its ability to do so in abuse of dominance provisions as well.
The Competition Bureau’s legal proceedings against Rogers began in September, 2010 when Wind Mobile filed
a formal complaint with the Competition Bureau regarding Roger’s new discount cell phone service, Chatr
Wireless. In November 2010, the Commissioner started legal proceedings against Rogers to stop the allegedly
misleading advertising of Chatr, based on claims that it had fewer dropped calls than competitors.
Section 74.01(1)(b) of the Competition Act makes it civilly reviewable conduct, among other things, to make a
representation to the public in the form of a statement regarding the performance a product or service that is
not based on an “adequate and proper test thereof”, the proof of which lies on the person making the
representation. Under section 74.1(1)(c) of the Act, the Competition Tribunal or the courts may make orders
prohibiting the conduct in question, requiring the issuance of corrective notices, requiring the payment of
restitution to affected customers, and/or requiring the payment of up to $10 million in an “administrative
monetary penalty” or “AMP” (for a first such “offence”, and up to $15 million thereafter). The Commissioner
sought orders against Rogers seeking all four remedies, including an order to pay the maximum AMP of $10
million.
Rogers argues that a $10 million AMP is unconstitutional because penalties of that magnitude are essentially
criminal fines, but under section 74.1 of the Competition Act they are awarded after a civil trial. The various
aspects of criminal procedure that protect defendants, such as requiring the Crown to prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt, are lacking under section 74.1 proceedings.
In addition, Rogers is also asking the court to strike down section 74.01(1)(b) of the Competition Act which
requires companies to make “adequate and proper” tests of a product’s performance before making
advertising claims, arguing that the provision violates its right to freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
Interestingly, these same questions were previously addressed by the Competition Tribunal in its 2006
decision in the case of Commissioner of Competition v. Gestion Lebski Inc. et al (CT-2005/007). The Tribunal
held that the “adequate and proper test” provision infringed the respondents’ rights to freedom of expression
under section 2(b) of the Charterin that it penalized representations that could be true, on the ground that they
were not based on a prior adequate and proper test. Turning to the question of whether the infringement was
justified in a free and democratic society under section 1 of the Charter, the Tribunal held that no evidence had
been led on the basis of which it could find that paragraph 74.01(l)(b) constituted minimal impairment of the
right to freedom of expression. The provision therefore failed the Oakes test for justification of Charter
infringements in that case and was found to be of no force or effect.
The AMP (which at the time was limited to a maximum of $200,000), on the other hand, was found by the
Tribunal to be of a magnitude that was not penal in nature, and which was consistent with the stated aims of
civil penalties to encourage compliance and to deter prohibited conduct. The Tribunal also found that since the
proceedings were civil in nature, and the AMP is not a “true penal consequence” (if unpaid, AMPs are collected
12
by civil means as a debt due to the Crown; failure to pay the AMPs is not a criminal offence). The AMPs in
question in that case were found to violate neither section 11 nor section 7 of the Charter.
The Tribunal’s constitutional rulings expressly applied to that case alone, however, since under Supreme Court
of Canada precedent (Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin), only the courts can rule
definitively on constitutional questions while administrative tribunal rulings on such issues have effect only in
the case at hand.
Moreover, the maximum AMP in question in the Rogers case increased in 2009 from $200,000 to $10 million.
In addition, the views of the courts on constitutional questions can have precedential value. The courts’ views
of Rogers’ constitutional claims stands, accordingly, to have important ramifications for the ability of the
Commissioner to seek multi-million dollar AMPs in respect of non-criminal conduct, as well as for the
Competition Act requirement that advertisers conduct “adequate and proper” tests prior to making
performance claims. Although not at issue in this case, depending on its outcome, the ability of the
Commissioner to seek AMPs of up to $10 million for “abuse of dominance” (also a civilly reviewable practice
under the Competition Act) may also come into question.
13
Supreme Court of Canada grants leave to appeal
regarding indirect purchaser issues
Posted on December 1, 2011
Sultana L. Bennett
On December 1, 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in the British Columbia Court of
Appeal decisions Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft) (2011 BCCA 186) and Sun-Rype
Products Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Company (Sun-Rype) (2011 BCCA 187). Microsoft and Sun-Rype were
two to one majority decisions concluding for the first time in Canada that indirect purchasers of allegedly
price-fixed products have no cause of action recognized in law. (see our ealrier post titled: Court of Appeal for
British Columbia bars indirect purchaser suits.)
Earlier this month the Québec Court of Appeal in Option Consommateurs v. Infineon Technologies AG (2011
QCCA 2116), unanimously overturning a Superior Court decision that had denied a motion to authorize class
action proceedings, allowed indirect plaintiffs to proceed with their price-fixing suit, expressly disagreeing
with the British Columbia Court of Appeal’s rulings in Microsoft and Sun-Rype that such plaintiffs have no claim
in law. (see our earlier post titled: Québec Court of Appeal authorizes price-fixing class action involving
indirect purchasers.)
These appeals will mark the first time the highest court in Canada will consider this issue in the context of
competition class actions.
14
Québec Court of Appeal authorizes price-fixing class
action involving indirect purchasers
Posted on November 24, 2011
Sultana L. Bennett
On November 16, 2011, the Québec Court of Appeal issued a judgment unanimously reversing the 2008
Québec Superior Court decision in Option Consommateurs v. Infineon Technologies AG dismissing the motion for
authorization to institute class action proceedings. Significantly, the class includes both direct and indirect
purchasers, and the Quebec decision thus follows the dissent in the 2011 British Columbia Court of Appeal
decision in Sun-Rype Products Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Company, holding that the defendants would not
face an unfair risk of double recovery because the plaintiffs alleged a single, aggregate loss notwithstanding the
mix of direct and indirect purchasers in the class.
Background and Decision in the Superior Court
The defendants were manufacturers of dynamic random access memory or “DRAM,” a semiconductor memory
product used in electronic devices, each of whom had admitted participation in a price-fixing conspiracy
between 1999 and 2002 and all but one of whom had pleaded guilty to Sherman Antitrust Act violations
arising from that conduct in the United States.
In its motion to institute the proceedings in Québec Superior Court, Option Consommateurs, a consumer
advocacy organization, alleged that the defendants failed to respect statutory obligations under the
Competition Act, and breached the general extracontractual duties imposed upon them by the Civil Code of
Québec. Claudette Cloutier, a Montreal resident, sought status as the designated representative in the
proceedings on behalf of direct and indirect purchasers of DRAM in Québec. In October 2001, Cloutier had
purchased a computer containing DRAM online from Dell Computer Corporation’s website, and claimed to
have paid an artificially inflated price for the computer as the result of the defendants’ price-fixing activity.
Justice Mongeau of the Superior Court denied the motion to authorize proceedings on two grounds: first, that
Québec did not have proper territorial jurisdiction to hear the class action, but that even if it had, the
allegations did not meet the test for authorization under Québec class proceedings law. Option
Consommateurs and Cloutier appealed the ruling to the Court of Appeal.
The Québec Court of Appeal’s Ruling
In rendering its judgment reversing the decision of the Superior Court, the Court addressed three major issues:
(i) the source in law of the claims made by the putative class members; (ii) jurisdiction over the alleged losses
of the class members; and (iii) and the authorization of the class action under Québec class proceeding law.
As a threshold matter, the Court held that the direct and indirect purchasers of DRAM within the class both
essentially alleged a single extracontractual fault as the basis for their causes of action: the conspiracy to
inflate artificially the price of DRAM, a conspiracy that would have if not for the passing of the statute of
limitations given rise to a civil remedy pursuant to section 36 of the Competition Act. Accordingly, the Court
found that there would be no impediment to the authorization of the class action based on a different source of
liability between direct and indirect purchasers.
The Court’s ruling on Québec’s territorial jurisdiction over the proceedings suggests an expansive view of the
extraterritorial application of Canadian antitrust laws upon foreign defendants. While Justice Mongeau had
held that Cloutier’s financial loss was connected to Québec only by reason of her domicile being there — a fact
which could not by itself establish financial loss suffered in Québec and provide a basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction — the Court of Appeal, while agreeing that the question of jurisdiction was one appropriate for
decision on an authorization motion, came to the opposite conclusion. Despite the fact that the defendants
15
were not domiciled in Québec and had no place of business there, and the alleged conspiracy was not alleged to
have taken place in Québec, the Court concluded that the damage Cloutier claimed to have suffered in Québec
arising from her online computer purchase justified the exercise of jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeal went on to find that the class action was authorized pursuant to articles 1002 and 1003
C.C.P. Rejecting the defendants’ position that the motion did not clearly set out an undue restraint of
competition resulting from their anti-competitive activities outside of Canada, the Court held that while the
plaintiff was “far from having established its case on the merits,” the extent of the conspiracies as set out in the
plea agreements were sufficient to support the allegations of undue restraint of trade. Furthermore, while
acknowledging the “unhelpful lack of detail” in the allegations relating to the class members’ loss, the Court of
Appeal found that there had been alleged sufficient facts to establish the loss and to constitute a prima facie
demonstration of loss under article 1003(b) C.C.P.
The Court then addressed the defendants’ argument that the alleged losses suffered by indirect purchasers
were not compensable because of the indirect purchasers’ lack of standing. Referring to the British Columbia
Court of Appeal’s decisions in Sun-Rype Products Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Company (Sun-Rype) and ProSys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft Corporation (Microsoft), which concluded that indirect purchasers of allegedly
price-fixed products have no cause of action recognized in law, the Court was not persuaded that double
recovery could result from the recognition of indirect purchasers’ claims. Instead, concurring with the reasons
of the dissenting justice, Donald J.A., in Sun-Rype, the Court held that the defendants would not face an unfair
risk of double recovery because the motion alleged a single, aggregate loss notwithstanding the mix of direct
and indirect purchasers in the class. Significantly, the complexity of proving the passing-on of losses to the
indirect purchasers was acknowledged by the Court, but deemed merely an evidentiary concern that should be
properly addressed as part of the burden of proof resting upon the plaintiffs once the case proceeded to trial.
Conclusion
The rulings in this decision are reminders of the relatively low threshold for authorization of class actions in
Québec. The Court of Appeal, even while noting the lack of specificity in the motion pertaining to loss and
causation (including the fact that Cloutier had not alleged that the DRAM in her computer was sold to her
directly or indirectly by the defendants or any them) and acknowledging the evidentiary challenges awaiting
the plaintiff upon trial, ultimately held the allegations sufficient to meet the test for authorization under
Québec law.
The timing of the decision is also notable. The Supreme Court of Canada is expected to rule on the leave
applications in Sun-Rype and Microsoft in the near future.
16
Court of Appeal for British Columbia bars indirect
purchaser suits
Posted on April 19, 2011
Katherine L. Kay and Mark Walli
On April 15, 2011, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia released judgments in two competition class
actions which concluded for the first time in Canada that indirect purchasers of allegedly price-fixed products
“have no cause of action recognized in law.” Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft (Microsoft) and Sun-Rype
Products Ltd. v. Archer Daniels Midland Company (Sun-Rype) were appeals heard one after the other by the
same panel of three judges. Both cases were decided by a two to one majority and overturned chambers
judgments certifying class actions (see Microsoft and Sun-Rype respectively) .
The majority judgments found that the issue of whether indirect purchasers could sue to recover a price-fixing
overcharge passed on to them by the defendants’ customers (or other intermediaries in the product
distribution chain) was a “pure question of law” capable of being resolved at the pleadings or class certification
stage of the case, and that it was “plain and obvious” that indirect purchasers had no such claims.
The judgments in Microsoft and Sun-Rype depart from a clear recent trend in favour of certifying competition
class actions in Canada, exemplified by the B.C. appeal court’s late-2009 decision in Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v.
Infineon Technologies AG , in which large and diverse classes of direct and indirect purchasers have been
certified and courts have generally held that questions of the legal sufficiency of claims should be left for the
“laboratory of the trial court” and decided on a full factual record rather than on the certification motion.
The judgments significantly alter the competition class action landscape in British Columbia, and potentially
throughout Canada.
The Microsoft and Sun-Rype Cases
Microsoft was brought on behalf of a proposed class of all B.C. residents who on or after January 1, 1994
purchased, indirectly, certain Microsoft applications software or operating systems software as part of their
computers. The plaintiffs alleged that Microsoft conspired with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)
(among others) to raise the price of the Microsoft operating systems and applications software installed by the
OEMs, and that such overcharges were passed on to the plaintiffs as purchasers of the computers. The
plaintiffs sought to recover damages for breach of the Competition Act and common law tort, or in the
alternative sought disgorgement/restitution of Microsoft’s unlawful gains on behalf of the proposed class. The
chambers judge granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in March 2010.
Sun-Rype was brought on behalf of a proposed class of all B.C. residents who purchased high fructose corn
syrup (HFCS) or products which contained HFCS from January 1, 1988 to June 30, 1995. The proposed class
consisted of direct purchasers such as Sun-Rype, which purchased HFCS from defendants for use in soft drinks
it manufactured, and of indirect purchasers who bought various food and beverage products containing HFCS
as a sweetener. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant manufacturers had conspired to fix the prices of HFCS
during the proposed class period and that direct and indirect purchasers had paid an unlawful overcharge as a
result of the alleged conspiracy. The chambers judge granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification in
June 2010.
The defendants’ appeals from the certification orders in Microsoft and Sun-Rype were heard consecutively by
the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in the fall of 2010.
17
The Majority Judgments
Writing the majority judgments in Microsoft and Sun-Rype, Lowry J.A. found that there was no basis for the
certification orders insofar as they related to indirect purchasers of the allegedly price-fixed products, because
the indirect purchasers had no cause of action as a matter of law.
The majority began its analysis with the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Kingstreet Investment Ltd.
v. New Brunswick (Finance). In Kingstreet, a nightclub sought the return of user taxes on alcohol purchases it
had paid to the province of New Brunswick, on the grounds that the taxes were constitutionally invalid. The
government defended the claim in part on the basis that the nightclub had suffered no loss from the tax,
because it had passed on the charges to its own customers. The Supreme Court in Kingstreet rejected “the
passing on defence in its entirety”, finding that it was inconsistent with the premise of restitution law,
economically misconceived, and that it created serious difficulties of proof of damages.
Turning to the allegations of unlawful price-fixing in Microsoft and Sun-Rype, Lowry J.A. found that Kingstreet
made it “clear beyond question” that “[i]n responding to a claim brought by a [direct purchaser] alone, it would
be no answer for the defendants to say the [direct purchasers] suffered less than they were overcharged
because they passed some of the overcharge on to the [indirect purchasers]. Rather, the direct purchasers’
“loss was complete at the time the overcharge” was paid, and the direct purchasers “are in law entitled to
recover the whole of the amount of the overcharge for which they may establish the defendants are liable to
them, regardless of how much of it had been passed on”.
With respect to the potential claims of indirect purchasers, the majority reasoned that if there is no recognized
defence of passing on, it must “follow that even though an overcharge may in fact have been passed on … the
law does not recognize it: as a matter of law the overcharge or the loss for which the wrongdoer is liable is
sustained when the overcharge is paid at first instance”. Accordingly, indirect purchasers “who would seek to
recover an overcharge that has been passed on are effectively claiming a loss that in law is not recognized”, and
“[f]or that, there can be no cause of action.”
Lowry J.A. noted that if defendants were precluded from raising the passing on defence against direct
purchasers, but indirect purchasers were permitted to sue to recover the amount of an overcharge paid by
them, the defendants would face the prospect of paying the same loss twice to different plaintiffs. The majority
found that “our law will not sanction” such double recovery. It stated that its position was consistent with
“American federal law” after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, which held that
“passing on cannot be used offensively to recover overcharges in an anti-trust action where it cannot also be
relied on as a defence.”
In Microsoft the Court of Appeal set aside the certification order and dismissed the action altogether because
the case had been brought only on behalf of indirect purchasers.
In Sun-Rype, the class consisted of both direct and indirect purchasers of HFCS. The Court of Appeal set aside
the certification order and remitted the certification application back to the chambers judge for further
consideration.
The Dissent
Donald J.A. dissented in Microsoft and Sun-Rype, disagreeing with the majority’s conclusion that it was “plain
and obvious” indirect purchasers had no cause of action. The dissent agreed with the majority’s view that “the
pass-through defence is dead”. However, Donald J.A. found that the “corollary proposition barring a passthrough claim is by no means a logical or legal necessity.”
While recognizing the validity of the “bedrock principle” against double recovery, the dissenting judge wrote
that “the double recovery rule should not in the abstract bar a claim in real life cases where double recovery
can be avoided.” Donald J.A. noted that in Sun-Rype “the remedies sought are either aggregate damages or a
constructive trust in restitution – one amount for the entire class” of direct and indirect purchasers, and that
there was “no realistic possibility of double recovery with a single all-encompassing assessment.” The dissent
also noted that “class proceedings are flexible enough to create ways and means of avoiding overrecovery.”
18
Donald J.A. found that denying indirect purchasers a cause of action could undermine the goals of class
proceedings legislation, which include increasing access to justice and behaviour modification. He reasoned
that without the participation of indirect purchasers, the “case may not be economically viable and the alleged
wrongdoers will retain most of their ill-gotten gains with the result that the class action goals of deterrence
and behaviour modification will be lost”. The dissent further noted that in Microsoft, the direct purchasers
were alleged co-conspirators with the defendants who would be unlikely to sue in their own right.
The dissent found that the U.S. federal rule barring indirect purchaser antitrust suits has been the subject of
considerable public policy debate in the U.S. and that many states have enacted “Illinois Brick repealer” statutes which
give indirect purchasers the right to bring claims in state courts. Donald J.A. found that courts in the U.S. “repealer”
states have expressed the view that the “complexity” of proving damages in indirect purchaser cases, relied upon by
the U.S. Supreme Court to bar such suits, was in fact manageable and the damages issues capable of resolution.
Donald J.A. identified the prior “judicial reluctance in Canada to strike [indirect purchaser] claims prior to a full trial on the
issue” as a reason favouring the rejection of “the defendants’ attack on the pleading” at the certification stage of the case.
Implications of the Judgments
The judgments can be expected to have a significant impact on the competition class action landscape in
Canada. For example, it would appear open to defendants in certified class actions involving claims by indirect
purchaser plaintiffs to seek summary dismissal of the indirect purchaser claims and modification of the
certification order on the basis of the Microsoft and Sun-Rype judgments. (The judgments would not be
expected to have much impact on certified cases involving only direct purchaser classes, such as Steele v.
Toyota Canada Inc.)
While not binding in Ontario, the judgments may lead to judicial reconsideration of the view that indirect
purchasers may plead a cause of action predicated on price-fixing. More than a decade ago, the certification
judge in Chadha v. Bayer found that it was not “plain and obvious” that indirect purchasers had no cause of
action, and rejected the Illinois Brick rule as inapplicable in Ontario. Although the order granting certification
in Chadha was reversed on appeal, the Ontario appellate courts reversed the decision on the basis that the
indirect purchaser plaintiffs had not presented a sufficient evidentiary record to support certification. The
Court of Appeal for Ontario expressly left open the possibility that a sufficient showing could be made by
indirect purchaser plaintiffs in future cases. However, Chadha predates the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kingstreet, and the judgments in Microsoft and Sun-Rype provide a basis on which defendants may renew
arguments that indirect purchaser claims are barred as a matter of law.
The exclusion of indirect purchaser plaintiffs could cause fundamental changes to the nature of competition
class actions in Canada. The proposed classes in most competition class actions consist largely (if not
overwhelmingly) of indirect purchasers. In many price-fixing class actions, the direct sales of defendants into
Canada are miniscule in comparison to their sales in foreign jurisdictions, and the vast majority of direct
purchasers of the allegedly price-fixed product are located outside of Canada (and thus are not members of the
proposed class). The exclusion of indirect purchasers from the proposed class would thereby result in
significantly smaller classes and claims in these actions.
On the other hand, one of the principal arguments against class certification raised by defendants in many
competition class actions in Canada is that proving proposed class members have paid an overcharge raises
individual rather than common issues for class members, and that the need to resolve those “proof of loss”
issues to establish the defendants’ liability to the class renders the proposed class proceeding unmanageable.
The difficulties proving loss are particularly acute where the proposed class is large and consists primarily of
indirect purchasers who may be multiple steps down multiple product distribution chains from the
defendants. Removing the “pass-on defence” and indirect purchaser plaintiffs from these cases as a matter of
law would eliminate the need to consider the layers of distribution below the direct purchasers, and make
proof of loss for the proposed class a less complex inquiry. In a direct-purchaser only regime, class certification
might well become easier to achieve.
The plaintiffs have stated that they will seek leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
For further information, please contact your Stikeman Elliott representative, any author that may be listed above or any of our lawyers listed
at www.stikeman.com. This article provides general commentary only and is not intended as legal advice. © Stikeman Elliott LLP
FAQ
INVESTMENT
CANADA ACT
Q:Is Canada still open to foreign direct
investment?
A: Absolutely. Although a recent high profile
transaction received a heightened level of public
and political attention, and there is also some
uncertainty whether there may be a general policy
and/or legislative change on the horizon, there is
no doubt that the Canadian government is generally
supportive of foreign direct investment. Since the
Investment Canada Act (the “ICA”) came into force
a quarter of a century ago, over 99% of reviewable
transactions have been approved. As discussed in
more detail below, only two transactions were rejected
and they each had unique circumstances.
Q: How does the ICA work?
A:
The ICA has three distinct processes applicable to
foreign direct investment in Canada: notifications,
economic reviews under the “net benefit” to Canada
test, and national security reviews. A notification is
a very simple filing that is often made after closing,
when a non-Canadian investor acquires control of a
Canadian business or commences a new business. No
governmental approval is required for notifications.
An economic review under the “net benefit to Canada”
test is required in certain cases when a non-Canadian
investor acquires control of a Canadian business,
and certain thresholds are exceeded. Reviewable
investments in Canadian businesses generally require
ministerial approval before closing.
A national security review may be required where
the government believes that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that an investment may be injurious
to national security. If the process is initiated by the
government, governmental approval must be obtained.
National security reviews are expected to be rare.
Q: What is the trigger for an ICA notification?
A:A notification is required where there is an acquisition
of control of a Canadian business by a non-Canadian,
and where the thresholds for an economic review
|
MONTRÉAL
TORONTO
OTTAWA
CALGARY
VANCOUVER
are not met. A Canadian business exists where the
target business has: (i) a place of business in Canada,
(ii) individual(s) in Canada who are employed or selfemployed in connection with the business and (iii)
assets in Canada used in carrying on the business.
Generally, the Canadian business test is easily met.
Notifications are also required when new Canadian
businesses are established by a non-Canadian.
Q:What is the trigger for an ICA economic
review?
A: There must be an acquisition of control of a
Canadian business by a non-Canadian in one of
the ways specified in the statute and an asset value
threshold must be exceeded. In the case of buyers
who qualify as “WTO Investors” under the ICA the
threshold for 2011 is exceeded where the Canadian
business has assets with a book value greater than
CDN$312 million (unless a cultural business is
involved). There are technical issues associated
with measuring asset values that are beyond the
scope of this FAQ.
Q:Wasn’t the ICA amended to increase the
threshold and bring in a new “enterprise
value” test?
A:Yes, but implementing regulations have not been
enacted and the process currently appears to have
stalled.
Q:Are there exemptions from review
requirements?
A:There are a number of exemptions. The most important
exemption is for an indirect acquisition of a Canadian
business by a WTO investor (i.e., acquisition of control
of the offshore parent corporation of a Canadian
corporation). Although the test is complex, a WTO
investor is most commonly found to exist where an
entity is controlled by persons who are residents of one
or more states that are members of the World Trade
Organization.
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Q:What if there is only a head office and
perhaps a stock exchange listing in Canada
and the operating assets are located outside
of the country?
A: Generally speaking, this fact is insufficient to exempt
a transaction from a review, if otherwise required.
Even if all operations are offshore, the existence of
the Canadian head office will usually be sufficient to
constitute a “Canadian business” under the ICA.
Q: Are there sensitive sectors?
A:The recent amendments to the ICA regarding sensitive
sectors have come into force. There is now just one
sensitive sector: cultural businesses. Substantially lower
thresholds for review apply to acquisitions of control of
a Canadian cultural business.
Q: What is a cultural business?
A:The ICA treats a Canadian business as a cultural business
if it engages in any of the following activities:
(a)the publication, distribution or sale of books,
magazines, periodicals or newspapers in print
or machine readable form, other than the sole
activity of printing or typesetting of books,
magazines, periodicals or newspapers,
(b)the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of
film or video recordings,
(c)the production, distribution, sale or exhibition of
audio or video music recordings,
(d)the publication, distribution or sale of music in
print or machine readable form, or
(e)radio communication in which the transmissions
are intended for direct reception by the general
public, any radio, television and cable television
broadcasting undertakings and any satellite
programming and broadcast network services.
Q: What if the business is only involved in
cultural products to a de minimis extent?
A:There is no de minimis exemption, in the view
of Heritage Canada, the department responsible for
administering the ICA provisions in respect of cultural
businesses.
Q:Are there special issues for cultural
products?
A:Yes, there are a number of unique cultural
considerations. The review threshold drops in most
cases to CDN$5 million (book value of assets). In
some cases reviews can be ordered where the asset
value is below CDN$5 million. Also, Heritage Canada
conducts the review of acquisitions of cultural
businesses. Policy considerations of Heritage Canada
may play a role in the review. Transactions involving
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP: INVESTMENT CANADA ACT FAQ
certain cultural sectors are subject to policies that
acquisitions will not be approved except in certain
cases. The policies are not always applied.
Q:What must be done to get approval if an
economic or cultural review is required?
A:An application for review must be filed with the
applicable governmental agency. The application
must explain the purchaser’s plans for the business in
detail. In many cases it will be necessary to give the
Canadian government legally binding undertakings
regarding the future operation of the business.
Q: What kinds of undertakings must be given?
A:This varies with the circumstances of each transaction.
Generally speaking, undertakings cover employment
levels (number of persons), capital expenditure and
research and development expenditure levels, the
preservation of a Canadian head office, the role of
Canadians in senior management and the board
of directors, and a wide range of other factors.
Undertakings usually run for three to five years
after closing.
Q: What is the test for approval?
A:The Minister must determine that the transaction
will likely be of net benefit to Canada.
Q: Is the approval process onerous?
A:The process may initially be concerning to foreign
investors who are unfamiliar with it. However,
the government agency conducting the review has
extensive experience and will endeavour to reach
an outcome that is acceptable to the investor while
still providing a sufficient basis for the Minister to
properly approve transactions. As discussed in this
FAQ, high profile transactions are likely to experience
a much higher degree of scrutiny.
Q: Is the review process public?
A:No. At present the investment review process is
conducted in strict confidence as required by the
ICA. It is important to note that it is common on
more significant transactions for the investor (at the
request of the government), or the government in
some cases, to issue a press release at the end of the
process that discloses information regarding the main
elements of the undertakings given by the investor. It
is also of note that a private member’s bill to remove
confidentiality protections for undertakings and parts of
the enforcement process was introduced in Parliament
in March 2010. However, this bill has not passed first
reading and it is unclear whether it will ever become law.
More recently, following the decision on the PotashCorp
matter discussed below, the House of Commons
unanimously passed a non-binding motion that the ICA
review process be more open, collaborative and finally
accountable to communities affected by these decisions.
Q: How long does a review take?
A: A typical review usually takes 60 – 75 days, but this
varies depending on the circumstances.
Q:
Are there special rules applicable to stateowned enterprises (”SOEs”)?
A:SOE investments are reviewed according to the same
factors that apply to private investors. That said, the
government has issued guidance as to particular issues
it will consider when reviewing SOE transactions.
In short, the Minister will need to be satisfied as to
the commercial orientation of the investor and that
its governance structure meets commonly accepted
business norms. Undertakings may be required to
address these issues.
Q:Has the government approved SOE
investments in the past?
A:Yes. A number of such investments have been approved
including by Chinese, Korean, European and Middle
Eastern SOEs.
Q:Which transactions have been rejected under
the ICA?
A:There have been two rejections to date. The first, in
2008, was in respect of the proposed acquisition by a
United States defence company, Alliant Techsystems
Inc., of the space business of MacDonald, Dettwiler
& Associates Ltd. That business developed and
operated the Radarsat satellite program, as well as
the robotic arm attached to NASA’s space shuttle.
The second rejection, in November 2010, was in respect
of the proposed acquisition of Potash Corporation of
Saskatchewan Inc. (“PotashCorp”) by BHP Billiton Plc.
There was strenuous objection to the acquisition by the
province of Saskatchewan where most of PotashCorp’s
mines are located, echoed by other provincial
governments, as well as from other stakeholders.
The Minister of Industry issued a press release on
November 3, 2010 that referred to a notice that he had
sent to BHP to the effect that he was not, at that time,
satisfied that the proposed transaction was likely to
be of net benefit to Canada and informed BHP that it
had 30 days to make any additional representations
and undertakings it deemed appropriate. Ten days
later, the Minister issued a press release stating that he
had been informed that BHP Billiton had withdrawn
its application for review and that this terminated
the ICA review process. The Minister stated that
Canada welcomed foreign investment as being in the
best interests of Canada for all the benefits it brings,
including new ideas, sources of capital, and job creation.
However, in the case of this particular acquisition the
Minister determined that three of the criteria specified
in the ICA were not satisfied, in particular, the criteria
relating to Canada’s ability to compete in world markets,
productivity, efficiency and innovation in Canada,
and the country’s overall level of economic activity.
Q: Do politics play a role under the ICA?
A:In some cases politics may be very important. Although
the factors to be considered by the Minister are specified
in the ICA, they are often very broad. For example, one of
the specified factors is the compatibility of the investment
with national industrial, economic and cultural policies.
The Minister therefore has considerable discretion
when making decisions about particular investments.
Also of note is that there is consultation with other
federal governmental departments and affected
provincial governments. Individuals and organizations
may make submissions to the government. In recent
years, the ICA process has received a higher degree of
political prominence, which places the Minister under a
higher degree of scrutiny. Some transactions have been
the subject of political debate in Parliament. However,
the Minister and his staff can be expected to take care to
exercise their responsibilities within the requirements
of the ICA.
Q:What is the role of governmental relations
and public relations advisors?
A:In many cases, significant governmental relations and
public relations efforts will not be required. However,
for transactions that may raise politically sensitive
issues, GR and PR strategies and implementation are
essential. An early assessment (well before public
announcement) of political risk should be made. It is
often appropriate to make courtesy calls and meet with
key municipal, provincial and federal officials, in order
to introduce the investor and explain the rationale.
Engaging with such officials at the earliest possible date
often allows any concerns to be raised and addressed on
a constructive basis. In these cases ongoing monitoring
of the political and public reaction to a transaction is
very important.
Q:How does the national security review
process work?
A:
There are a number of steps, but in essence the ICA allows
the government to initiate a review where there are
reasonable grounds to believe that an investment may be
injurious to national security. Unlike the economic review
provisions, there does not have to be an acquisition
of control of a Canadian business. Once commenced,
a transaction may not be completed until approval is
obtained. Closed transactions are subject to remedies
including divestiture orders.
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP: INVESTMENT CANADA ACT FAQ
Q:Is there a voluntary filing process to deal with national security
issues?
A:No. However, in some cases it is possible to provide the government with notice
of the transaction before closing and obtain the benefit of a statutory prohibition
on a review, once applicable time periods have expired.
Q:Have any national security review processes been commenced?
A:
We are aware of only one such case. A national security notice of a potential
review was issued in respect of the proposed acquisition by George Forrest
International Afrique S.P.R.L. (“GFI”) of Forsys Metals Corp (“Forsys”). Forsys
owned uranium exploration and development properties in Namibia, which
were not in production. The transaction did not complete. It does not appear
that a full national review was ever commenced.
Q: Is there a process to enforce undertakings?
A:Yes. The ICA has an enforcement provision. Remedies include fines and
divestment of the acquired business. The Attorney General of Canada (“AGC”)
has commenced proceedings against US Steel in relation to undertakings it
gave when it acquired Stelco. The AGC alleged that US Steel has breached
undertakings related to production and employment levels. US Steel is
vigorously defending the proceeding and is, among other things, arguing that
the global downturn is a critical factor that must be considered when assessing
compliance. US Steel has also brought a constitutional challenge regarding the ICA
enforcement provision. Although its challenge was dismissed at the trial level,
US Steel is pursuing an appeal.
Q:Are changes expected to the ICA and related policy?
A:Yes, although it is difficult to predict the details. The Minister is expected to provide
further guidance about the government’s current views on foreign investment
in the near future. It is likely that Parliament and the Industry Committee will
consider amendments to the ICA, including amendments to make more of the
process open to the public. It is also worth noting that some amendments
made in 2009 to move from an asset value test to an enterprise value test and to
increase the review threshold from the current CDN$312 million (the threshold
for 2011) to CDN$600 million have not yet come into force due to the lack of
implementing regulations. It is unclear at this time whether these amendments
will ever come into force.
Q:Is the current climate favourable for foreign investment in
Canada?
A:While there has been more public scrutiny and political debate of a few high-
profile transactions in recent years, the Canadian government has repeatedly
and clearly stated that in general it is strongly supportive of foreign direct
investment in Canada. In the wake of the PotashCorp decision it can be expected
that there will be further formal and informal guidance from the government as
to the review process. There may also be amendments to the ICA with particular
emphasis on transparency and enforcement. Early assessment of ICA issues is
essential for the development of a successful strategy to obtain approval.
For more information, please
contact the author, Shawn Neylan
(sneylan@stikeman.com),
a member of the Competition and
Foreign Investment Group, or any
Stikeman Elliott lawyer listed below.
MONTRÉAL
John W. Leopold
jleopold@stikeman.com
Peter Castiel pcastiel@stikeman.com
Michel Gélinas
mgelinas@stikeman.com
OTTAWA
Jeffrey Brown
jbrown@stikeman.com
Lawson A. W. Hunter
lhunter@stikeman.com
Susan M. Hutton
shutton@stikeman.com
TORONTO
Paul Collins
pcollins@stikeman.com
Shawn C.D. Neylan
sneylan@stikeman.com
VANCOUVER
John F. Anderson janderson@stikeman.com
CALGARY
Craig A. Story
cstory@stikeman.com
NEW YORK
Kenneth G. Ottenbreit kottenbreit@stikeman.com
Gordon N. Cameron gncameron@stikeman.com
SYDNEY
Brian G. Hansen
bhansen@stikeman.com
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LONDON*
Derek Linfield
dlinfield@stikeman.com
* Authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority,
SRA No. 77786
© STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LLP | www.stikeman.com
This publication provides general commentary only and is not intended as legal advice.
0912
FOIRE AUX QUESTIONS SUR LA
LOI SUR INVESTISSEMENT CANADA
Q. :L’investissement étranger direct est-il
toujours possible au Canada?
R. :Certainement. Il ne fait aucun doute que le gouvernement
canadien appuie l’investissement étranger direct,
même si une OPA récente, hautement médiatisée, a
provoqué de nombreux débats dans le public et la classe
politique et qu’une modification éventuelle de la loi ou
de la politique du gouvernement a été évoquée. Depuis
l’entrée en vigueur de la Loi sur Investissement Canada
(la « LIC »), il y a un quart de siècle, plus de 99 % des
opérations susceptibles de révision ont été approuvées.
Comme nous l’expliquons plus en détails ci-après,
seules deux opérations ont été refusées. Il s’agissait
dans chaque cas de situations exceptionnelles.
Q. :Comment fonctionne la LIC?
R. :La LIC prévoit l’application de trois mécanismes
distincts à l’investissement étranger direct au Canada :
l’avis d’investissement, l’examen économique quant
à l’« avantage net » du Canada et l’examen relatif
à la sécurité nationale. L’avis d’investissement est
un document très simple, souvent présenté après
la conclusion de l’opération par l’investisseur non
canadien qui acquiert le contrôle d’une entreprise
canadienne ou qui constitue une nouvelle entreprise
au Canada. Aucune approbation gouvernementale n’est
nécessaire.
L’examen économique vise à vérifier si l’opération est
à l’avantage net du Canada. Il est exigé dans certains
cas où un investisseur non canadien acquiert le
contrôle d’une entreprise canadienne et que certains
seuils sont dépassés. Un investissement susceptible
d’examen doit généralement être approuvé par le
Ministre avant la conclusion de l’opération.
Un examen relatif à la sécurité nationale peut avoir
lieu si le gouvernement estime qu’il existe des
motifs raisonnables de croire qu’un investissement
pourrait porter atteinte à la sécurité nationale. Si
le gouvernement décide de mener un tel examen,
l’approbation gouvernementale est nécessaire.
L’examen relatif à la sécurité nationale est censé être
une mesure exceptionnelle.
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT S.E.N.C.R.L., s.r.l.
|
MONTRÉAL
TORONTO
OTTAWA
CALGARY
Q. :Dans quel cas doit-on donner un avis
d’investissement selon la LIC?
R. :L’avis doit être donné lorsqu’un non-Canadien
acquiert le contrôle d’une entreprise canadienne
et que l’opération ne nécessite pas d’examen
économique. L’entreprise cible est une entreprise
canadienne si elle remplit les conditions suivantes :
(i) elle possède un établissement au Canada; (ii) elle
emploie au Canada au moins un individu travaillant à
son compte ou contre rémunération dans le cadre de
son exploitation; (iii) elle dispose d’actifs au Canada
pour son exploitation. En général, il est facilement
satisfait au critère de l’entreprise canadienne. L’avis
doit également être donné par les non-Canadiens qui
constituent une nouvelle entreprise au Canada.
Q. :Dans quel cas l’examen économique est-il
exigé par la LIC?
R. :Un examen économique sera requis lorsqu’un non-
Canadien acquiert le contrôle d’une entreprise
canadienne de l’une des manières indiquées dans la
loi et que la valeur de l’entreprise dépasse certaines
limites. Dans le cas des acheteurs qui sont investisseurs
OMC au sens de la LIC, le seuil applicable en 2010
est une valeur comptable des actifs de l’entreprise
canadienne supérieure à 299 millions de dollars
canadiens (à moins qu’il s’agisse d’une entreprise
culturelle). Le calcul de la valeur des actifs comporte
certains aspects techniques que nous n’aborderons
pas ici.
Q. :Une modification de la LIC n’a-t-elle pas
augmenté le seuil monétaire et prévu un
nouveau critère de « valeur d’entreprise »?
R. :Oui, mais aucun règlement d’application n’a encore été
édicté et le processus semble actuellement piétiner.
Q. :Existe-t-il des dérogations aux exigences
d’examen?
R. :Il existe un certain nombre de dérogations. La plus
importante est celle qui s’applique à l’acquisition
indirecte d’une entreprise canadienne par un
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investisseur OMC (lorsque la société mère extraterritoriale
acquiert le contrôle d’une société canadienne). Bien que
le critère soit complexe, un investisseur sera considéré
comme un « investisseur OMC » lorsqu’il s’agit d’une
entité contrôlée par des personnes qui résident dans un
ou plusieurs pays membres de l’Organisation mondiale
du commerce.
Q. :Qu’arrive-t-il si la société a seulement
son siège social et éventuellement une
inscription en bourse au Canada, mais que
les actifs de son entreprise sont situés à
l’étranger?
R. :En général, ce n’est pas suffisant pour dispenser
l’opération d’un examen par ailleurs exigé. Même si
toutes les activités sont extraterritoriales, l’existence
d’un siège social au Canada suffit normalement à faire
d’une entreprise une « entreprise canadienne » au sens
de la LIC.
Q. :Y a-t-il des secteurs critiques?
R. :Les modifications récentes à la LIC relatives aux secteurs
critiques sont entrées en vigueur. À l’heure actuelle,
l’entreprise culturelle est le seul secteur critique. Des
seuils beaucoup moins élevés s’appliquent à l’acquisition
du contrôle d’une entreprise culturelle canadienne.
Q. :Qu’est-ce qu’une entreprise culturelle?
R. :La LIC considère qu’une entreprise canadienne est une
entreprise culturelle si elle se livre à l’une ou l’autre des
activités suivantes :
a)la publication, la distribution ou la vente de livres,
de revues, de périodiques ou de journaux, sous
forme imprimée ou assimilable par une machine,
à l’exclusion toutefois de la seule impression ou
composition de ces publications ;
b)la production, la distribution, la vente ou la
présentation de films ou d’enregistrements vidéo;
c)
la production, la distribution, la vente ou la
présentation d’enregistrements de musique audio
ou vidéo;
d)l’édition, la distribution ou la vente de compositions
musicales sous forme imprimée ou assimilable par
une machine;
e)les radiocommunications dont les transmissions
sont destinées à être captées directement
par le grand public, notamment les activités
de radiodiffusion, de télédiffusion et de
câblodistribution et les services de programmation
et de diffusion par satellite.
Q. :Qu’arrive-t-il si l’entreprise touche à des
activités culturelles, mais de manière très
accessoire?
R. :Selon le ministère du Patrimoine canadien, l’autorité
responsable de l’application des dispositions de la
LIC relatives aux entreprises culturelles, dès qu’une
entreprise touche à des activités culturelles, elle est
visée par la loi. Il n’y a pas d’exception.
Q. :Les entreprises culturelles font-elles l’objet
de mesures particulières?
R. :Oui, les entreprises culturelles font l’objet d’un traitement
particulier. Dans la plupart des cas, le seuil d’examen
baisse à cinq millions de dollars canadiens (valeur
comptable des actifs). Dans certains cas, un examen
peut être ordonné si la valeur des actifs est inférieure
à cinq millions de dollars canadiens. Il faut aussi savoir
que c’est le ministère du Patrimoine canadien qui
examine les acquisitions d’entreprises culturelles et
que certaines de ses orientations pourraient influer sur
l’examen. Dans certains secteurs culturels, le ministère
a pour politique de ne pas approuver une acquisition,
sauf cas particulier. Ces politiques ne sont pas toujours
appliquées.
Q. :Comment fait-on approuver une opération
nécessitant un examen économique ou
culturel?
R. :On doit soumettre une demande d’examen à l’autorité
publique compétente. La demande doit expliquer en
détails les projets de l’acheteur pour l’entreprise. Il
faudra très souvent fournir au gouvernement canadien
des engagements concernant l’exploitation future de
l’entreprise.
Q. :Quel type d’engagement doit être pris?
R. :Les engagements varient selon la nature de l’opération.
En général, ils portent sur le niveau des emplois
(nombre de personnes), le niveau des dépenses en
immobilisations et en recherche-développement, le
maintien du siège social au Canada, le rôle des Canadiens
dans la haute direction et le conseil d’administration et
de nombreux autres facteurs. La durée des engagements
varie normalement de trois à cinq ans après la conclusion
de l’opération.
Q. :Quel est le critère d’approbation?
R. : Le Ministre doit décider si l’opération sera vraisemblablement
à l’avantage net du Canada.
Q. :Le processus d’examen est-il exigeant?
R. :À première vue, le processus peut sembler inquiétant
à l’investisseur étranger qui n’en a pas l’habitude.
Toutefois, l’autorité publique qui réalise l’examen a une
vaste expérience et s’efforcera d’en venir à un résultat
qui est acceptable pour l’investisseur et qui procure un
fondement satisfaisant à l’approbation du Ministre. Il est
bien entendu que les opérations très médiatisées sont
susceptibles de faire l’objet d’un examen beaucoup plus
approfondi.
Q. :Le processus d’examen est-il public?
R. :Non. À l’heure actuelle, le processus d’examen des
investissements est rigoureusement confidentiel,
conformément à la LIC. Soulignons qu’il n’est pas rare,
dans le cas d’opérations de grande envergure, que
l’investisseur (à la demande du gouvernement) ou
parfois le gouvernement publie à la fin du processus un
communiqué de presse portant sur les points principaux
des engagements pris par l’investisseur. Soulignons
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT S.E.N.C.R.L., s.r.l. : FOIRE AUX QUESTIONS SUR LA LOI SUR INVESTISSEMENT CANADA
également qu’un projet de loi émanant d’un député et
visant le retrait de la confidentialité des engagements et de
certaines parties du processus de mise en application de
la loi a été présenté au Parlement en mars 2010. Toutefois,
ce projet de loi n’a pas encore franchi l’étape de la première
lecture et il n’est pas évident qu’il finira par devenir loi.
Plus récemment, à la suite de la décision PotashCorp
dont il est question ci-après, la Chambre des communes a
adopté à l’unanimité une motion non contraignante visant
à rendre le processus d’examen de la LIC plus transparent,
plus coopératif et plus responsable envers les collectivités
qui sont touchées par ces décisions.
Q. :Combien de temps l’examen prend-il?
R. :En général, l’examen dure de 60 à 75 jours, selon les
circonstances.
Q. :Des règles spéciales s’appliquent-elles aux
sociétés d’État?
R. :Les investissements des sociétés d’État sont examinés
en fonction des facteurs applicables aux investisseurs
privés. Cela dit, le gouvernement a publié des lignes
directrices sur les points particuliers dont il tiendra
compte dans l’examen des opérations envisagées par
des sociétés d’État. En bref, le Ministre devra être
convaincu que l’investisseur a une vocation commerciale
et que sa structure de gouvernance respecte les normes
commerciales généralement acceptées. Il se peut que des
engagements soient exigés sur ces points particuliers.
Q. :Le gouvernement a-t-il approuvé des
investissements de sociétés d’État par le
passé?
R. :Oui. Un certain nombre d’investissements de ce type ont
été approuvés, notamment ceux de sociétés d’État de la
Chine, de la Corée, de l’Europe et du Moyen‑Orient.
Q. :Quelles opérations ont été refusées en
vertu de la LIC?
R. :Il y a eu deux refus à ce jour. Le premier, en 2008, portait
sur un projet d’acquisition présenté par une société
américaine d’armement, Alliant Techsystems Inc., qui
visait l’entreprise spatiale de MacDonald, Dettwiler &
Associates Ltd. Cette entreprise a mis au point et exploité
le programme de satellite Radarsat, ainsi que le bras
robotique fixé à la navette spatiale de la NASA.
Le deuxième refus, en novembre 2010, portait sur
l’OPA lancée sur Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan
Inc. (« PotashCorp ») par BHP Billiton Plc. La province
de la Saskatchewan, où sont situées la plupart des
mines de PotashCorp, s’est fortement opposée à cette
acquisition, opposition à laquelle d’autres gouvernements
provinciaux et d’autres parties concernées ont fait écho. Le
3 novembre 2010, le ministre de l’Industrie a indiqué dans
un communiqué de presse qu’il avait informé BHP qu’à son
avis l’opération envisagée n’était pas vraisemblablement à
l’avantage net du Canada et que BHP disposait de 30 jours
pour faire les déclarations et prendre les engagements
supplémentaires qu’elle jugeait appropriés. Dix jours plus
tard, le Ministre a indiqué par communiqué de presse qu’il
avait été informé que BHP Billiton avait retiré sa demande
d’examen et que cela mettait fin au processus d’examen
régi par la LIC. Il a précisé que le Canada considérait les
investissements étrangers comme étant dans l’intérêt du
Canada étant donné tous les avantages qu’ils apportent,
notamment les nouvelles idées, les nouvelles sources de
capitaux et la création d’emplois. Toutefois, dans le cas
de cette acquisition précise, le Ministre a établi que trois
des critères spécifiés dans la LIC n’étaient pas remplis,
soit ceux concernant la capacité du Canada à faire face à
la concurrence sur les marchés mondiaux, la productivité,
le rendement et l’innovation au Canada ainsi que le niveau
général de l’activité économique du pays.
Q. :La politique joue-t-elle un rôle dans la LIC ?
R. :Dans certains cas, la politique peut jouer un rôle très
important. Même si les facteurs que le Ministre doit
examiner sont spécifiés dans la LIC, ils sont souvent
très larges. Par exemple, l’un des facteurs spécifiés est
la compatibilité de l’investissement avec les politiques
industrielles, économiques et culturelles du Canada. Le
Ministre a donc une grande latitude dans ses décisions
sur des investissements particuliers. Il faut aussi noter
que d’autres ministères fédéraux et des gouvernements
provinciaux touchés sont consultés. Les particuliers et
les organisations peuvent présenter des observations au
gouvernement. Depuis quelques années, le processus de
la LIC est devenu plus politisé, si bien que les mesures
prises par le Ministre sont davantage discutées sur la
place publique. Certaines opérations ont été débattues
au Parlement. On peut toutefois s’attendre à ce que le
Ministre et son personnel exercent leurs responsabilités
conformément aux exigences de la LIC.
Q. :Quel est le rôle des conseillers en
relations gouvernementales et en relations
publiques?
R. :Dans bien des cas, il n’est pas nécessaire de recourir à
des relationnistes. Mais lorsqu’une opération soulève
des questions politiquement sensibles, une stratégie de
relations gouvernementales et de relations publiques est
essentielle. Il faut évaluer le risque politique le plus tôt
possible (bien avant l’annonce publique). Il est souvent
judicieux de rencontrer par courtoisie les principaux
fonctionnaires municipaux, provinciaux et fédéraux pour
présenter l’investisseur et expliquer la raison d’être de
l’opération envisagée. Dialoguer le plus tôt possible avec
ces fonctionnaires permet souvent de faire apparaître
les questions problématiques et de les régler de manière
constructive. Dans ces cas-là, il est important de suivre
en permanence le sentiment de la classe politique et du
public envers l’opération.
Q. :Comment fonctionne le processus
d’examen de la sécurité nationale?
R. :C’est un processus en plusieurs étapes, mais en gros la
LIC permet au gouvernement d’ouvrir un examen s’il y a
des motifs raisonnables de croire qu’un investissement
peut nuire à la sécurité nationale. À la différence des
dispositions sur les examens économiques, il n’est pas
nécessaire qu’il y ait prise de contrôle d’une entreprise
canadienne. Une fois le processus lancé, l’opération ne
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT S.E.N.C.R.L., s.r.l. : FOIRE AUX QUESTIONS SUR LA LOI SUR INVESTISSEMENT CANADA
peut être réalisée tant que l’approbation n’est pas obtenue. Une opération déjà
réalisée peut faire l’objet de certaines mesures prévues par la loi, par exemple une
ordonnance de désinvestissement.
Q. :Peut-on présenter une demande visant à faire trancher à
l’avance les questions de sécurité nationale?
R. :Non. Cependant, il est possible dans certains cas d’aviser le gouvernement de
l’opération avant sa conclusion, ce qui commence à faire courir certains délais
réglementaires après lesquels la LIC n’autorise plus le Ministre à mener un examen.
Q. :Un projet d’investissement a-t-il déjà été examiné parce qu’il
aurait pu porter atteinte à la sécurité nationale?
R. :Nous avons connaissance d’un seul cas. Un avis concernant la possibilité que soit
examiné un investissement au titre de la sécurité nationale a été délivré lorsque
George Forrest International Afrique S.P.R.L. (« GFI ») a voulu faire l’acquisition de
Forsys Metals Corp. (« Forsys »). Forsys était propriétaire de terrains uranifères
inexploités en Namibie. L’opération n’a finalement pas abouti. Il ne semble pas
qu’un examen national complet ait jamais été ouvert.
Q. :Existe-t-il un mécanisme de sanction des engagements?
R. :Oui. La LIC contient des dispositions qui permettent la sanction des engagements.
Parmi les mesures coercitives prévues, il y a les amendes et les ordonnances de
se départir de l’entreprise acquise. Le Procureur général du Canada a intenté une
poursuite contre US Steel en raison des engagements qu’elle avait pris lorsqu’elle
a acquis Stelco. Le Procureur général allègue que US Steel a contrevenu à des
engagements concernant les niveaux de production et d’emploi. US Steel se défend
vigoureusement en soutenant, entre autres, que le ralentissement économique
mondial est un facteur critique qui doit être pris en compte dans l’évaluation du
respect de ses engagements. US Steel a aussi contesté la validité constitutionnelle
des dispositions de la LIC sur les mesures de redressement. Rejetée en première
instance, la contestation a été portée en appel.
Q. :Des changements dans la LIC et la politique s’y rapportant
sont-ils prévus?
R. :Oui, mais il est difficile d’en prédire les détails. Le Ministre est censé donner dans
un avenir proche d’autres indications sur les positions actuelles de gouvernement
concernant les investissements étrangers. Il est probable que le Parlement et le
Comité de l’industrie envisageront de modifier la LIC, notamment en rendant
le processus d’examen plus accessible au public. Il faut aussi noter que des
modifications apportées en 2009 qui visaient à remplacer le critère de valeur des
actifs par le critère de valeur d’entreprise et à porter à 600 millions de dollars
canadiens le seuil d’examen actuel de 299 millions de dollars canadiens (en
2010) ne sont pas encore entrées en vigueur en raison de l’absence de règlement
d’application. Pour le moment, nous ne savons pas si ces modifications entreront
en vigueur un jour.
Q. :Le climat actuel est-il favorable aux investissements
étrangers au Canada?
R. :Ces dernières années, quelques opérations très médiatisées ont été suivies
de près par le public et ont fait l’objet de nombreux débats politiques, mais le
gouvernement du Canada a déclaré clairement et à plusieurs reprises que, en
général, il soutient fortement les investissements étrangers directs au Canada.
À la suite de l’affaire PotashCorp, on peut s’attendre à ce que le gouvernement
donne d’autres lignes directrices, officielles ou non, sur le processus d’examen. Des
modifications éventuelles de la LIC pourraient aussi accorder plus d’importance à
la transparence du processus d’examen et aux mécanismes de mise à exécution de
la loi. Il est essentiel, pour faire approuver une opération, de bien évaluer dès le
départ tous les enjeux qui peuvent être soulevés par la LIC.
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT S.E.N.C.R.L., s.r.l. |
www.stikeman.com
Auteur : Shawn Neylan
(sneylan@stikeman.com),
membre du groupe du droit
de la concurrence et des
investissements étrangers de
Stikeman Elliott.
MONTRÉAL
John W. Leopold
jleopold@stikeman.com
Peter Castiel pcastiel@stikeman.com
Michel Gélinas
mgelinas@stikeman.com
OTTAWA
Jeffrey Brown
jbrown@stikeman.com
Lawson A. W. Hunter
lhunter@stikeman.com
Susan M. Hutton
shutton@stikeman.com
TORONTO
Paul Collins
pcollins@stikeman.com
Shawn C.D. Neylan
sneylan@stikeman.com
VANCOUVER
John F. Anderson janderson@stikeman.com
CALGARY
Craig A. Story
cstory@stikeman.com
NEW YORK
Kenneth G. Ottenbreit kottenbreit@stikeman.com
Gordon N. Cameron gncameron@stikeman.com
SYDNEY
Brian G. Hansen
bhansen@stikeman.com
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LONDON*
Derek Linfield
dlinfield@stikeman.com
* Autorisé et réglementé par la Solicitors Regulation
Authority, SRA No. 77786.
0912
10RULES
TOP
OF COMPETITION LAW
1
discuss prices, profit margins, terms of sale,
costs or other competitive information with competitors.
2
divide up customers, markets, or territories with
competitors.
3
discuss any aspect of a proposed bid with a third
party including whether you intend or not to submit a bid, or
whether you intend to withdraw a bid. pursue a joint
bid with a third party without first consulting your
manager/supervisor or counsel.
4
consult your manager/supervisor or counsel before
dictating or attempting to influence a customer’s resale prices.
discriminating against or refusing to sell to another person
due to that person’s low pricing policy.
5
selling at an unreasonably low price if this could lessen
competition or eliminate a competitor.
6
condition the sale of any product on the customer’s
purchase of another product without first consulting with your
7
offering a customer prices or terms more favourable than
those offered to competing customers.
8
restrict a customer from handling the products
of a competitor without first consulting with your
9
terminate or refuse to sell to an existing customer or
to a new customer without first consulting with your
10
consult with your manager/supervisor or counsel
whenever there is any question in your mind as to the
propriety of a particular practice or course of action.
VISIT OUR COMPETITION LAW BLOG AT
TheCompetitor.
TORONTO
(416) 869-5500
OTTAWA
(613) 234-4555
MONTRÉAL
(514) 397-3000
10
GRANDES RÈGLES
DU DROIT
LES
DE LA CONCURRENCE
1
NE PAS discuter de prix, de marges bénéficiaires, de
conditions de vente, de coûts ou d’autres renseignements
d’ordre concurrentiel avec ses concurrents.
2
NE PAS partager les clients, les marchés ou les territoires
avec ses concurrents.
3
NE PAS discuter de quelque détail que ce soit d’une
soumission avec une tierce partie, ni même du fait que l’on a
ou non l’intention de faire une soumission ou de retirer une
soumission. NE PAS aller de l’avant avec une soumission
commune avec une tierce partie sans d’abord consulter son
directeur ou superviseur ou son conseiller juridique.
4
CONSULTER son directeur ou superviseur ou son conseiller
juridique avant de dicter ou de tenter d’influencer les prix de
revente d’un client. CONSULTER son directeur ou superviseur
ou son conseiller juridique avant de faire preuve de
discrimination envers une personne, ou de refuser de
transiger avec elle en raison de sa politique de bas prix.
5
juridique avant de vendre des produits à des prix
déraisonnablement bas, si cela risque d’avoir pour effet de
réduire la concurrence ou d’éliminer un concurrent.
6
NE PAS exiger d’un client, comme condition de vente d’un
produit, que ce client acquière un autre produit, sans
d’abord consulter son directeur ou superviseur ou son
conseiller juridique.
7
juridique avant d’offrir à un client des prix ou des conditions
plus favorables que ceux qui sont offerts à d’autres clients
qui lui font concurrence.
8
NE PAS empêcher un client de distribuer les produits d’un
concurrent, sans d’abord consulter son directeur ou
superviseur ou son conseiller juridique.
9
NE PAS cesser de vendre à un client actuel ou refuser de
vendre à un client éventuel sans d’abord consulter son
directeur ou superviseur ou son conseiller juridique.
10
juridique lorsque le bien-fondé d’une pratique ou d’une ligne
de conduite particulière semble douteux.
VISITEZ NOTRE BLOGUE SUR LE DROIT DE LA CONCURRENCE
www.TheCompetitor.ca
TORONTO
416 869-5500
OTTAWA
613 234-4555
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT S.E.N.C.R.L., s.r.l.
MONTRÉAL
514 397-3000
www.stikeman.com
MONTRÉAL
1155 René-Lévesque Blvd. West, 40th Floor, Montréal, QC, Canada H3B 3V2
Tel: (514) 397-3000 Fax: (514) 397-3222
TORONTO
5300 Commerce Court West, 199 Bay Street, Toronto, ON, Canada M5L 1B9
Tel: (416) 869-5500 Fax: (416) 947-0866
OTTAWA
Suite 1600, 50 O’Connor Street, Ottawa, ON, Canada K1P 6L2
Tel: (613) 234-4555 Fax: (613) 230-8877
CALGARY
4300 Bankers Hall West, 888 - 3rd Street S.W., Calgary, AB, Canada T2P 5C5
Tel: (403) 266-9000 Fax: (403) 266-9034
VANCOUVER
Suite 1700, Park Place, 666 Burrard Street, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6C 2X8
Tel: (604) 631-1300 Fax: (604) 681-1825
NEW YORK
445 Park Avenue, 7th Floor, New York, NY 10022
Tel: (212) 371-8855 Fax: (212) 371-7087
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT LONDON
Dauntsey House, 4B Frederick’s Place, London EC2R 8AB England
Tel: 44 20 7367 0150 Fax: 44 20 7367 0160
Authorized and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, SRA No. 77786
SYDNEY
Level 12, 50 Margaret Street, Sydney, N.S.W. 2000, Australia
Tel: (61-2) 9232 7199 Fax: (61-2) 9232 6908
© StIKEMAN ELLIOtt LLP
|
www.stikeman.com
This publication provides general commentary only and is not intended as legal advice.

booklet here - Stikeman Elliott LLP

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