Libya Experts Group (LEG)

Libya Experts Group (LEG)
An AR3 Publication
AR3
LIBYA
EXPERTS GROUP
EXPERTS GROUP
LIBYA
About the Libya Experts Group (LEG)
A division of Perim Associates, LLC, The Libya Experts Group (LEG) is
comprised of nine Libya-focused professionals with a mixture of academic,
corporate and policy backgrounds. We are dedicated to understanding
political, economic and security-related developments in Libya and North
Africa, and promoting the application of development technologies in postconflict environments. LEG produces occasional briefs, papers and tailored
reports. The LEG “Short View” appears in AR3 Magazine, www.africar3.com.
The Short View: Libya in 2016
August 2016
By the Libya Experts Group, a division of Perim Associates, LLC
The West may rue not having engaged
with General Heftar earlier, when
he and the LNA might, conceivably,
have been integrated into the GNA
structure as a counter-balance to
the Islamist elements. A new U.S.
administration offers the most
proximate hope for a significant
change in international policy
There is no evidence that the GNA
forces, which are comprised of
fractious militias are able, or even
inclined to remove ISIS in its coastal
hub at Sirte. It is also highly unlikely
that any lasting progress will be made
against ISIS in Libya in the coming
months, unless the West decides to
intervene on a large scale – which is
equally unlikely. The tide will swing
against ISIS only when there is a
sustainable resolution to the national
political crisis, a cessation of external
interference and a concerted effort
by national and local government to
engage with, and provide alternative
employment for Libyan youth, who
make up a large percentage of the
active fighters on all sides.
against these groups in the Western
part of the country. To many, some of
whom might not otherwise agree with
his methods, Heftar represents the last
bulwark against what they believed to
be an externally-sanctioned transition
to Islamist rule.
The most likely outcome is a
worsening of political infighting within
the GNA and the Presidential Council,
and an ever-deeper economic and
humanitarian crisis as most of Libya’s
resources remain off-line – all of
which will further incapacitate the
GNA, while increasing the overall level
of instability and encouraging Eastern
(and other regions’) efforts
to lay the foundations for political
and economic decentralization,
if not autonomy. The worst-case
scenario for the rest of the region
is ‘no solution’, for the longer
Libya’s instability continues, the
more decisively it will exacerbate
instabilities in neighboring countries.
Unfortunately, with the U.S. election
still months away, and the UK
paralyzed in the wake of Brexit, the
chances of clear signals coming
from the West before February
2017 are poor. In providing semicovert assistance to the LNA, the
French appear to be thinking more
pragmatically and long-term about
Libya than the rest of Europe.
towards Libya; one that is clear
about the fundamental nature
of the conflict, predicates official
sanctions on legitimacy, and rewards
tangible progress towards security,
the establishment of rule of law and
respect for human rights.
The creation of a Government of National Accord in Libya has created a new and positive dynamic in the country’s politics
– or at least that is what its local and international supporters argue. In the wake of its formation, Perim Associates asked
its Libya experts to look a few months into the future, to make sense of ongoing political and security events, to discern
what is likely to take place in a country that has experienced continuous chaos since its revolution of 2011, to analyze
international efforts in regard to the IS presence in Libya, to gauge the impact on Libya’s neighbors of the ongoing turmoil,
and to question ultimately whether (and on what terms) the GNA can propel itself forward as a truly national government.
Ethan Chorin
The most obvious feature of the
West’s current policy towards Libya
is support for the Government of
National Accord (GNA), which it
believes will facilitate the conquest
of the Libyan franchise of the Islamic
State, or ISIS, in Libya. This
is despite the Libyans’ high level of
unease about the agreement, rooted
in a flawed implementation of the
Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) and
its institutionalization of Islamist
spoilers. The international architects
and custodians of the Agreement
paint General Heftar as the principle
remaining obstacle to peace, yet
cannot ignore the fact that under
his control the Libyan National Army
(LNA) has made far more significant
gains in liberating Benghazi and
much of Libya’s East from a radical
insurgency, than the GNA has made
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Dirk Vandewalle
The creation of a Government of
National Accord and of the State
Council under the sponsorship of
UNSMIL in 2015 effectively scuttled
the consultative process that was the
hallmark of Libya’s attempt to rebuild
the state by the country’s transitional
authorities after the 2011 civil war.
The underlying assumption of the new
approach has been that the spillover
from a somewhat limited and artificial
political settlement would encompass
other areas of the country’s political,
economic, and security arrangements
– and eventually unify the country.
The crucial question for Libya in
the coming months is whether that
assumption can hold; whether the new
set of governing institutions that have
Peter Cole
been created and are now present in
Tripoli under the aegis of the GNA will
prove more robust than its predecessor,
and whether they can emerge and
solidify themselves as a set of truly
national institutions – a formidable
task in light of both of the country’s
past and the existing fragmentation
that cuts across multiple social, political
and economic strata.
successful only because of the
persistence of fragmentation among
the different groups in Tripoli. Until
now this combination of economic
patronage and political and ideological
fragmentation has somehow worked to
provide a semblance of governance in
the capital. The real question is whether
this localized set of arrangements and
economic and political deals can be
extended across the country.
with some key Salafist commanders
in Tripoli has allowed the unity
government to secure these assets.
Likewise the Muslim Brotherhood, who
control some militias and strategic
administrative posts, has backed the
government.
And here, for numerous reasons, there
is little hope for long-term optimism
– perhaps symbolized best by the
persistence of Khalifa Hafter who
uncannily embodies the enduring lack
of centralized power. While it is likely
that, with international help, IS can be
contained, the process of physically
integrating Libya as a state will remain
elusive, with the GNA effectively
cordoned off and muddling through in
Tripoli. But, unless it finds the means
to break this isolation – which would
require a great deal of money and
superb political leadership, despite both
being in short supply in the country
– the process of regionalism and of
competing and transitory alliances for
the sake of patronage will continue
in the months ahead. The removal of
IS will be a temporary breath of relief,
but will not solve the country’s more
structural problems.
Mohamed Mufti
While this tentative agreement may
hold, it is very likely that rejectionist
elements within those militias will
consolidate themselves in southern
and central Tripoli, making it unlikely
that the unity government will be able
to hold the large urban conurbations
ringing the capital. Furthermore,
the biggest problem for the unity
government will be to subject the
institutions it nominally controls to
proper oversight, adequate restaffing,
and to effectively control their payroll
and budget. This is a generational
and systemic problem that shows no
indication of change over the next year.
of the public sector over the country’s
economic life means that new
business opportunities will be limited
as the government looks first and
foremost to its own survival and
substantial current account deficit.
The current chaos in Libya can best be
viewed as a power struggle between
two rival camps: the Government of
National Accord (GNA) and the socalled Heftar Camp. Alliances in each
camp are unstable, and overlap with
The government will likely remain
beholden to certain Tripoli militias and
their interests. An enduring problem
From that perspective the GNA and
the political approach it represents is
highly problematic, perhaps even more
so than its predecessor that emerged
in the wake of national elections
in 2012. The Presidency Council
in particular has been moderately
Regarding government stability, Libya’s
political and militia factions are set
to remain highly fragmented. Yet this
very fragmentation is what has allowed
the Presidency Council to reestablish
supervision over parts of Tripoli’s
government apparatus. A brokered deal
At the surface there are some
encouraging signs of traction by
the GNA, particularly the fact that
competing claims to the country’s
central major economic or revenuegenerating institutions – the National
Oil Company, the Libyan Investment
Authority and the country’s Central
Bank – are now the subject of
negotiation and may get resolved.
But, as it has always been in Libya’s
checkered history, control of the
country is all about being able to
provide patronage to a whole array
of groups that must be coaxed and
balanced to make the system work.
Libya’s new unity government is
likely to survive the coming 12
months. It has established, with
Libyan Army support, control over the
Abu Sitta Naval Base, and – albeit by
compromises and arrangements with
militias in Tripoli – some essential
infrastructure such as the Prime
Minister’s Office and Central Bank.
However, significant utilities and
security infrastructure are still beyond
its control. Although the business
climate may somewhat ameliorate,
the effects of a continued dominance
is that some of the most resilient
and trained professional army and
security groups that might provide
a counterweight to those militias
are in Benghazi, where they recently
recaptured much of the city from
Islamist militias.
Relocating these entities to Tripoli will
be impossible, given how much they
reflect local tribal and social concerns.
The Western army units to the south
and west of Tripoli have been mired in
a tribal and ethnic conflict for the last
year and will not be able to supplant
the capital’s militias.
This will leave the unity government
functionally unable to extend its
writ outside the Tripoli coastal strip.
Equally, it will prove unable to force
next, a move advocated by Sheikh
Gharyani.
the retirement of General Heftar,
whose command of some Eastern
units will remain a significant
obstacle to a more structured political
settlement. Heftar, however, will prove
weaker than commonly realized, partly
because of the constraints put upon
him by Libya’s army and by tribal
interests. Were he to mount a bid for
power, it would be unlikely to succeed.
More likely is that the bedrock of the
army and security services will stay in
the East, while the unity government in
the West relies on an Interior Ministry
that is now a confusing hybrid of Salafist
militias and former police officers.
tribal, ideological, regional and even
criminal allegiances.
Future conflicts will bring other
armed groups into the battle – many
of which have so far remained
uncommitted and mostly on Heftar’s
side. However, moderate Islamists,
ferocious in their feud against Heftar,
are politically more flexible. They may
even be better qualified to fight IS.
But an Islamist-dominated Libya
ultimately remains unsustainable. In
all of this, one reality stands out clearly.
The present UN-sponsored approach,
based on political negotiation and the
apportioning of government seats,
is doomed. It has simply reinforced
Libya’s historical tendency towards
segmentation of authority.
The GNA, enthusiastically supported
by the international community, lacks
democratic legitimacy and has so far
largely remained dysfunctional. It is
allied with and protected by Islamic
militias who will reject it on an
ideological basis in the longer run.
On the opposite side of the divide
stands Heftar with the Libyan
National Army that has fought
devastating street wars in Benghazi
against IS and Islamic militias.
Misratan-cum-Islamic militias are now
fighting on behalf of the GNA to evict
IS from Sirte. If they prevail, their guns
will be turned against Heftar’s army
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Wolfgang Pusztai
Libya is heading towards a turning
point in the second half of 2016. Two
major determinants will be the future
development of the Government of
National Accord (GNA) and the fate
of the Islamic State (IS). The GNA
will likely consolidate its position
in Tripoli, but will not be able to
act independently from the major
militias in the city. This will mirror
Azza K. Maghur
Much of Libya’s immediate
political future will hinge on the
implementation of the Libyan Political
Agreement (LPA), a pact among the
warring Libyan parties that was signed
in December 2015. The LPA has
introduced into Libya’s political life
a significant path toward a political
transition in which elections are no
the political situation during the
Ali Zeidan government. Only an
international stabilization force,
invited to Libya in order to secure key
parts of the capital, could prevent such
a recurrence – but such a targeted
intervention is increasingly unlikely.
IS will be able to maintain its control
over the city of Sirte, dragging
Misratan militias into a war of
attrition that will allow the former
to regain the initiative in a few
months. It is unlikely that forces from
Cyrenaica will substantially contribute
to the fighting around Sirte.
Eastern leaders will not accept a
GNA dominated by Tripolitanian
militias, thus further exacerbating
federalist tendencies. General Heftar´s
LNA will try to gain control over all
of historical Cyrenaica, and could
succeed if IS remains bogged down in
Sirte – potentially bringing all of the
longer the driving force – in contrast
to political attempts at reconciliation
until now. The LPA is neither an
international nor a Libyan agreement:
it has been drafted, coordinated
and orchestrated by United Nations
Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)
with the support of foreign states.
Currently, the LPA is an agreement
that is binding only upon its parties.
It is not applicable to Libyan territory
or the people living within it. Neither
can it be invoked before Libyan courts
nor used as a binding document
since it is not yet Libyan legislation.
Furthermore, the LPA didn’t specify
the steps by which it can be integrated
into Libya’s legal framework.
The LPA created two institutions that
did not exist during Libya’s transitional
period after 2011: the Government
of National Accord (GNA), and the
hydrocarbon facilities in eastern Libya
under Heftar´s control.
The LNA will try to isolate Derna, in
order to prevent Egyptian terrorist
groups from utilizing the city. In
southern Libya, in Fezzan and Kufra,
low-level violence will continue,
with occasional outbreaks of more
intense fighting between the Toubou,
the Tuareg and local Arab tribes in a
struggle for domination of resources,
smuggling routes and control of
larger cities. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb and other terrorist groups
will continue to use this widely
ungoverned space as a safe haven.
If IS and other radical Islamists can
be brought under control, we could
expect a possibility of some kind of
stabilization throughout the country
– even if the central government’s
influence remains limited to northern
Tripolitania.
State Council (SC). In accordance
with the LPA, the elected House of
Representatives (HoR) continues to
perform its mandate as the legislative
authority of Libya.
However, as long as the HoR is unable
to oblige to the LPA by adopting
it as a constitutional amendment,
the GNA performs its obligations
in complete detachment from the
HoR. This includes with cabinets that
were denied a vote of confidence by
the HoR. An issue of greater concern
is the LPA’s failure to become part
of the legislation, and not being
implemented as a policy instrument
that promotes consensus or mutual
faith among the different parties. The
fate of the LPA hints at the larger
political vacuums that continue to
exist in Libya’s public life five years
after the fall of the previous regime.
Francis Ghiles
The impact of Libya’s political and
economic situation will continue
to preoccupy both its immediate
neighbors – particularly Tunisia – and
the European Union in the months
ahead. One of the latest twists in the
never ending Libyan saga hints at the
increasingly fractious nature of an
already very fraught political situation,
and of its repercussions regionally and
between Libya and Europe.
In a somewhat bizarre development,
the country’s two competing Central
Banks – one installed in Benghazi, the
other in Tripoli – have taken delivery
of different bank notes. Tripoli ordered
its currency from the country’s
established purveyor in London while
Benghazi had its notes printed in
Moscow. The insatiable demand in
Libya for bank notes is explained by
three factors: Libyans do not trust
their banks enough to deposit money,
the informal market is cash fueled and
inflation is pushing prices up.
Meanwhile Libya has seen its hard
currency reserves dwindle from
$111bn in 2011 to $40bn by midJuly 2016. Cash withdrawals from
banks have been limited to 500
dinars per day (roughly 320 euros).
The country’s general political
problems have now become reflected
in a particularly acute monetary
expression.
The impact of this monetary
confusion and distrust has not been
lost on Libya’s immediate neighbor
Tunisia. Tunisia is eager to see Libya
rebuild itself, adding a projected 2%
to the country’s GDP growth, and
creating many desperately needed
jobs. Libya’s western neighbor has
many factories in Libya – all of which
are operating far below capacity.
For southern Tunisia in particular, a
more stable Libya could be a new
lease on life in an otherwise dire
economic situation.
The EU has proposed to intervene
in order to stop boats in Libya’s
territorial waters carrying illegal
immigrants across the Mediterranean.
That however will likely encourage
smugglers to use smaller and more
dangerous boats. As Turkey has
stemmed the flow of refugees crossing
into Greece, the pressure from Libya
increases exponentially as most of the
illegal immigrants originating in Libya
are destined for the Italian shores.
In a larger sense, no one in Europe
seems to know how to tackle the
complex issues that led Libya to
become a failed state. Talk of a type
of Marshall Plan to halt the inflow of
illegal migrants and refugees is now
all the rage in Brussels. A fine idea,
of course, but it continues to mask
Europe’s inability to tackle an issue
that finds much of its origin in the
Libya chaos – a chaos Europe still
prefers to deal with offhandedly.
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Dr. Ethan Chorin,
Founding Partner
& CEO
chorin@perimassociates.com
Dr. Dirk Vandewalle,
Director & Partner
vandewalle@perimassociates.com
Ethan Chorin is CEO of Perim Associates. He is the author of two books, Exit the
Colonel: the Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution (PublicAffairs, 2012), and
Translating Libya (Darf, 2015). He was posted to Libya with the Foreign Service from
2004-2006, as the Economic/Commercial Officer, and in that context authored
over 100 cables on economic and political issues, as well as the 2005 and 2006
U.S. Commercial Guide to Libya. He returned to Libya in 2011 to support medical
capacity building in Benghazi, as co-director of the 501c3 Avicenna Group. Chorin
holds a PhD from U.C. Berkeley in Agricultural and Resource Economics (2000), an
MIPS from Stanford and a BA from Yale, cum laude, with distinction in Near Eastern
Languages. A two-time Fulbright fellow (Jordan, Yemen), Chorin received a Meritorious
Honor Award from the U.S. Department of State for his support to U.S. business in
Libya, and a Sinclaire Award for language achievement. Chorin’s work has featured in
various publications, including The Financial Times, The New York Times, Forbes, Foreign
Policy, Prospect, Words Without Borders and Jane’s Islamic Analyst. He has appeared
on CNN, BBC, NPR, CBS, Canal+, and others. Chorin has been Nonresident Fellow at
the Dubai School of Government, Social Enterprise Fellow at Yale University School of
Management, a Director at the Berkeley Research Group and a member of the Obama
Campaign Foreign Policy Group. He speaks Arabic, French, and Farsi.
Dirk Vandewalle is a professor of Government at Dartmouth College, and teaches a
course on business practice in the Arab Gulf states at the Amos Tuck School of Business.
Dr. Vandewalle holds a Masters in International Affairs and a PhD from Columbia
University (1988). He is the author of two internationally acclaimed books on Libya:
Oil and State-building (Cornell University Press, 1998) and A History of Modern Libya
(Cambridge University Press, 2006; second edition 2012; third edition forthcoming)
and of several edited volumes and dozens of academic articles on North Africa. In
addition to his academic work on the politics of economic development in the Middle
East and the developing world, Dr. Vandewalle has written extensively for policy
journals and magazines of general interest, including Newsweek, The New York Times,
Foreign Policy, and Foreign Affairs. He has appeared on several occasions on Al Jazeera,
CNN, the Charlie Rose Show, PBS Newshour, ABC, CBS and BBC as well as Australian
and European television and radio outlets. He has repeatedly been interviewed by
virtually all major global newspapers, and has testified before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on Libya, and before numerous State Department committees,
international agencies and regional banks involved in the reconstruction of Libya and
in development in North Africa, and in front of several parliamentary commissions in
Europe. He served as Political Advisor to Ian Martin, the United National Special Envoy
in Libya, in Summer 2011, and then became the Senior Political Advisor to the Carter
Center’s electoral mission to Libya. He was appointed Senior Advisor on Democratic
Transitions for the Carter Center’s mission in Libya in 2013-14 until the mission closed
due to security issues. A two-time regional Fulbright fellow (Morocco, Arab Gulf,
Yemen), Vandewalle specializes in institutional solutions and designs for weak financial,
regulatory, educational, and business environments in North Africa, the Arab Gulf, and
in sub-Saharan fragile states. He is Chairman of the Board of the Institute of Current
World Affairs in Washington D.C. Vandewalle speaks Dutch, French and German.
Dr. Mohamed Mufti,
Senior Associate
mufti@perimassociates.com
Mr. Francis Ghilès
Senior Associate
ghiles@perimassociates.com
Col. Wolfgang Pusztai
Senior Associate
pusztai@perimassociates.com
Dr. Mohamed Mufti (Arabic, English), is a Libyan public intellectual, physician and
author. He has been a practicing physician in Benghazi since 1984, and has written nine
notable books on Libya’s politics and social history. His most recent book is Thakirat
al Nar: Diaries of the Libyan Revolution (2015). Dr. Mufti graduated in 1968 from Leeds
Medical School in the UK.
Francis Ghilès is a trilingual (English, French and Spanish) journalist and political
analyst who through eighteen years with The Financial Times reporting on international
capital markets and North Africa has built up extensive experience and high level
contacts throughout the Western Mediterranean, the UK, the USA and Japan. He has
been Research Assistant to Pierre Mendès France (MP and the Mayor of Grenoble),
Co-founder of the annual Mediterranean Gas Conference, founder of the North Africa
Business Development Forum, and Senior Fellow at IEMed in Barcelona.
Mr. Ghiles is now based at the Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB), where he
analyses emerging security, political, economic and energy trends in the region and connects
them to European, US and North African policy priorities. Mr. Ghiles has been a freelance
writer for the IHT, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, Les Echos, Libération, El Pais,
La Vanguardia, The Financial Times, Institutional Investor, Euromoney, Nature, The Times
Literary Supplement, Pouvoirs, Le Monde Diplomatique, Politique Etrangère, and has been
interviewed widely on international media. He has lectured at most of the major U.S. and
European universities. Mr. Ghilès earned advanced degrees from St Antony’s College Oxford
and the University of Keele. He graduated from Sciences Po Grenoble with distinction.
Col. Wolfgang Pusztai is a Libya-focused military and intelligence analyst, with both
an operational and academic background. Pusztai served in the Austrian Ministry
of Defense as an advisor to missions undertaken by the Austrian Government, the
European Union and NATO. From 2007 to 2012 he was Austria’s Defense Attaché to
Italy, Greece, Tunisia and Libya, and spent considerable time on the ground in Libya
during the Arab Spring. Pusztai holds an MS in National Security Strategy from the
National Defense University / National War College in Washington D.C., and has
lectured and extensively about strategy as well as about the developments in North
Africa, in particular Libya and Tunisia. Wolfgang speaks German.
09
Ms. Azza Maghur
Senior Associate
maghur@perimassociates.com
Peter Cole
Senior Associate
cole@perimassociates.com
One of Libya’s most prominent international and human rights lawyers, Azza Maghur
has more than three decades of legal experience, much of it gained on high-profile
disputes, such as Libya’s territorial dispute with Chad (1996) and the Pan-Am-Lockerbie
case in the Netherlands (2000). She acted as member of the inaugural committee
within the Tripoli Bar Association that issued the first Libyan human rights report
(1998) and was consultant to BNP Paribas on the first privatization process in the
Libyan banking sector (2007). With assistance from the International Red Cross, she
represented Libyan detainee at Guantanamo, and has campaigned for the rights of
HIV-positive Libyans. After the 2011 Libyan Revolution, Maghur was appointed by the
then National Transitional Council as a member of the Libyan National Council for Civil
Liberties and Human Rights. She was offered cabinet positions by two Libyan Prime
Ministers (Minister of Culture, 2012 and Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, 2014),
which she declined in order to continue her human rights work in civil society and in
private practice. In addition to drafting important legislation (Election Law #4) and
chairing the committee for the new NGO law (2012), she was the only female member
of the February Commission that amended the Constitutional Declaration (2014).
Maghur is recognized for her campaigns in support of incorporating international rights
treaties into Libyan legislation; striking unlimited preventive custody from Libyan law;
raising awareness about the abuses surrounding “social homes” for young women;
allowing Libyan women married to non-Libyans to pass on their nationality to their
children; and promulgating laws against sexual harassment in her country. She is
President of Watan Youbdaa, an association of Libyan artists and politicians working to
make Tripoli a capital of culture in the Arab world. Maghur speaks Arabic and French.
Peter Cole is a strategy, research and analytics consultant specializing in the Middle
East and North Africa, with expertise in conflict and post-conflict dynamics, strategic
communications, political risk, and state-society relations in weak or transitional
environments. He has provided research consultancy and analysis to a variety of
international organizations. He has also published with leading think tanks including
International Crisis Group, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Small Arms
Survey, and USIP. He is lead editor of an edited volume on Libya titled The Libyan
Revolution and its Aftermath.
Address
Berkeley, CA 94708
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