EaM 2-2013 - Univerzita obrany

Transcription

UNIVERSITY OF DEFENCE / CZECH REPUBLIC
Economics and Management
2013
UNIVERSITY OF DEFENCE / CZECH REPUBLIC
ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT
2013
Economics and Management - p. 2 - 2013 Brno 31 August 2013
Published by University of Defence in Brno
2
ISSN 1802-3975
EDITORIAL BOARD
EDITOR IN CHIEF
Pavel FOLTIN
Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Defence, Brno
Czech Republic
EDITORIAL BOARD
Ladislav ANDRASIK
Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology, Slovak University
of Technology in Bratislava, Slovak Republic
Ghita BARSAN
“Nicolae Balcescu“ Land Forces Academy, Sibiu, Romania
Vasile CARUTASU
“Nicolae Balcescu“ Land Forces Academy, Sibiu, Romania
Miroslav CEMPIREK
Czech Republic
Marijana CINGULU
Faculty of Economics & Business, University of Zagreb, Chorvatsko
Petr CECH
Institute of Hospitality Management, Prague, Czech Republic
Monika GRASSEOVA
Czech Republic
Frantisek HANZLIK
Czech Republic
Hubert HRDLICKA
Language Training Centre, University of Defence, Brno
Czech Republic
Josef KALAS
Czech Republic
Ales KOMAR
Czech Republic
Miroslav KRC
Czech Republic
Oto KUBIK
Academy STING – Private College, Brno, Czech Republic
Marek KULCZYCKI
The Tadeusz Kosciuszko Land Forces Military Academy, Poland
Stefan KURINIA
National Defence University, Warszaw, Poland
Ivan MALY
Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
Ivan MRAZ
General Staff, Prague, Czech Republic
Arpad POHL
Faculty of Military Science and Officer´s Training, National University of Public
Service, Budapest, Hungary
Ladislav POTUZAK
Czech Republic
Milan SOPOCI
Armed Forces Academy of General Milan Rastislav Štefánik, Liptovský Mikuláš,
Slovak Republic
Oleg STANEK
The University of Quebec at Rimouski, Canada
Jiri URBANEK
Czech Republic
Cezar VASILESCU
Regional Department of Defense Resources Management Studies (DRESMARA),
Brasov, Romania
Jaroslav ZELENY
Czech Republic
Iva ZIVELOVA
Faculty of Business and Economics, Mendel University of Agriculture and Forestry in
Brno, Czech Republic
EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Vitezslav JAROS
Czech Republic
Copyright © 2013
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior
permission of University of Defence in Brno University Press.
CONTENTS
Jiří ČERNÝ
POSSIBLE FACTORS INFLUENCING TACTICS DEVELOPMENT IN THE
ARMY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC ……..........................................…..…........ p. 7
Jan DROZD
IMPLEMENTATION POSSIBILITIES OF THE MILITARY OBSERVER
TRAINING TO THE TRAINING SYSTEM FOR PEACETIME MILITARY
ENGAGEMENT AND PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS ……………..……. p. 14
Monika GRASSEOVÁ and Eva ŠTĚPÁNKOVÁ
DECISION PROBLEMS SOLVING IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE OF THE
CZECH REPUBLIC .…………………………………………………………….. p. 21
József GYARMATI and Peter ZENTAY
COMPARING MILITARY TECHNOLOGY DEVICES WITH MULTICRITERIA DECISION MAKING AND SOLVING GROUP DECISION
PROBLEMS ………………..……………………………………………….…….. p. 30
Petr HAJNA, Vladimír HALENKA and Vladislav VINCENEC
ENSURING OF COMPETETIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE MARKETPLACE
THROUGH LOGISTICS ....................................................................................... p. 37
Aleš KOMÁR, Miroslav CEMPÍREK and Vladislav VINCENEC
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE MILITARY OPERATIONS
…………………………………………………………………………………….... p. 46
Petr KŘÍŽEK, Karel FILIP, Zbyšek KORECKI, Jaromír MAREŠ and Radka
LOPOUROVÁ
COST EVALUATION OF THE OPERATION OF MILITARY GROUND
EQUIPMENT ……………………………………………………………………... p. 51
Milota KUSTROVÁ
MILITARY TRAINING AREAS - PLACES WITH HIGH NATURE
CONSERVATION VALUE ……...............................................……………...….. p. 59
Miroslav MAREŠ
SECURITY CULTURE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC ...................................... p. 67
Jan MAZAL, Miroslav MAŠLEJ, Petr STODOLA and Ivana MOKRÁ
MODELING APPROACH TO THE SPECIFIC TACTICAL ACTIVITIES
………………………….……………………………………………..….…............ p. 76
Jan NOHEL
COLLECTION, PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION ON
THE ENEMY´S SITUATION AS PART OF THE COMMON OPERATIONAL
PICTURE …............................................................................................................. p. 87
5
Pavel OTŘÍSAL
SOME BASIC APPROACHES TO THE NEW CONCEPT OF CBRN DEFENCE
IN THE CZECH ARMED FORCES …................................................................. p. 98
Miroslav PECINA and Roman DUFEK
LOGISTICS INFORMATION SUPPORT IN NATO-LED OPERATIONS
…………………………………………………………………………………….. p. 105
Árpád POHL
SOME SPECIFIC FEATURES IN THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM OF ISAF
REGIONAL COMMAND NORTH …................................................................. p. 112
Ján SPIŠÁK
MILITARY CONCEPTS – A BACKGROUND FOR FUTURE CAPABILITIES
DEVELOPMENT ….............................................................................................. p. 119
Martin ŠKVAŘIL
APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE HOST NATION SUPPORT
PLANNING AND PROVIDING PRINCIPLES …............................................. p. 126
Martin VLKOVSKÝ, Tomáš BINAR, Martin REJZEK and Radim UŠEL
THE
OPTIMISATION
OF
LONG-TERM
STORAGE
OF
SELECTED
MILITARY
TRANSPORT
VEHICLE
TYPES
IN THE CZECH ARMED FORCES CONDITIONS ……..………………….. p. 134
Radim ZAHRADNÍČEK and Zdeněk SKALIČAN
SOME ASPECTS OF CREATION OF TASK FORCES FROM A PERSPECTIVE
OF THE CZECH ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS ……………………....…….... p. 142
The Authors´ Bibliographies: .................................................................................. p. 151
The Reviewers´ Bibliographies: .............................................................................. p. 155
The language revision has not been made. The authors are responsible for the papers content.
6
POSSIBLE FACTORS INFLUENCING TACTICS DEVELOPMENT
IN THE ARMY OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Jiří Černý
Abstract: Contemporary period of time in the Army of the Czech Republic (ACR) can be (apart
from omnipresent uncertainty concerning future development connected with financial
restrictions) characterised by discussions on future design of organizational structures of the
ACR; i.e. expected reorganization which should have an impact on all levels of the ACR.
Questions concerning sustaining (increasing or decreasing) current and declared operational
abilities of units and brigades are connected with the process of possible changes in the
organization of the army. Searching for new approaches and ways in the process of creating a
“new” ACR should also be closely connected with further development and elaboration of the
theory of military art. In this article the author tries to point out some factors that are related to
the development of tactics and influence the process of creating the ACR organizational
structures.
Keywords: command and control, operating environment factors, tactic
1 The importance of analyses and experience
When searching for further development of ground forces tactics that would enable
accomplishing combat (operational) tasks in future warfare and operations, the best way
appears to be making use of analyses, experience and characteristics of current warfare
(operations) and predicting future warfare (operations). Based on existing knowledge of
tactics and the art of operation based on the knowledge of effects of present-day and
perspective technologies and military equipment, the character of future battlefield, and
possible ways of conducting combat activities, it is necessary (when working with
analyses) to determine future character of warfare and operations as accurately as
possible in order to adjust training of commanders, staffs and troops in specific fields.
Let me add my personal statement – in the ACR there is no self-contained effective
system or practical use of experience and analyses results. The Department of
Doctrines, Military Academy, Vyskov deals with the problem of knowledge acquisition
and Lessons Learned. In my opinion I am convinced that the job they do is brilliant and
contributing. They issue documents, materials and information which can help the
military staff to be well informed in the issue of contemporary military science
development.
Unfortunately I have a feeling that not all units of the ACR (mainly I mean these
“norms creators”) are efficiently involved in this process. I also mean that acquired
knowledge results are used to develop the theory of tactics and the ACR as a whole.
Even from this point of view it is apparent that it seems impossible to develop the
tactics itself. Based on analyses, experience, and new pieces of knowledge the doctrinal
system should be developed. Many military doctrines and publications describe only
generalities concerning individual types of operations, tactical activities, experience and
translations of allied doctrines and publications (they look like generalities in NATO
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Doctrines ATP, AJP...). Thanks to deployment of our units in allied operations I believe
there is enough information, experience and new pieces of knowledge. In my opinion
the problem is in the fact that (apart from processors, some commanders and some
members of the academic community) nobody reads nor evaluates these documents (I
am talking especially about those people who are responsible for creating directives and
doctrines). At the same time I believe that the basic goal in this process i.e. “lessons
learned based on previous experience aim of which is to improve future activities” is not
met. It naturally gives the impression that a lot of problems occur again and again.
Practice proves that it is mainly commanders (commanding authorities) at tactical levels
who use and implement “lessons learned” in the training in the form of various drill
exercises within their units. The reason of that is clear – their point is to accomplish
their tasks in future operations, their point is to protect their lives as well as lives of their
soldiers. Unfortunately, these commanders do not have time to analyse the lessons
learned, incorporate them into directives (publications) and, consequently, issue this
material for the military public. I dare to say that this all was and still is happening
without respecting mutual connections. I believe that conclusions based on documents
(analyses) elaborated by commanders of individual task forces after having finished
their operational tasks and current view of military professionals on theory of tactics
development could be used in the form of “service periodicals” (see “Military
Professional” magazine which was popular in the past) issued by the General Staff (GS)
of the ACR. Such periodical could be used by units and formations at tactical levels. In
this respect I highly appreciate the effort of the Doctrines magazine editorial board
which keeps trying to inform military public on new experience at tactical levels in the
form of non-reviewed articles.
2 Creation of doctrines and directives
Based on the facts in Chapter 1 I am convinced that if there is a reorganization in the
ACR it will be the right time to officially abolish the Field Code (Všeob-Ř-1) and
Combat Directives (Vševojsk-1-1, 2, 3,…) in order to create new codes, directives,
doctrines, or manuals which will be mandatory for given time and will not be a subject
of debates questioning validity of these materials. These materials will be used within
the teaching-learning process at the University of Defence. These materials will also be
studied by commanders, staffs and troops within their units and formations. Current
time is, unfortunately, characteristic of the fact that in the field of tactics (it also applies
to the area of command and control) the commanders must follow mandatory directives
and codes. Each commander demands this in order to be legally protected. Although
doctrines (Ground Forces in Operations Pub-31-10-01 and Tactics of Ground Forces
Pub-31-10-02) were published in 2011, when simply comparing the contents it is
obvious that the Field Code and Combat Directives differ from the doctrines in the
content and the terminology and at some points they are contradictory.
3 Influence of equipment and technologies on tactics development
Contemporary state of tactics is a result of a long-term process, development of which
was significantly influenced by the number and quality of equipment (weaponry and
technologies). Tactics is significantly influenced by equipment. Based on previous
experience, when introducing new equipment in the armed forces, it appears to be
necessary to delimit and define its influence on cooperation of already used and
introduced systems (see influence of introducing a new wheeled armoured personnel
carrier PANDUR on tactics and command of small units). Things should not go the way
that in the process of introducing new equipment the unit commanders, in a long time
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horizon, create various tactical combinations right on the spot in the terrain. Now I am
driving at non-existence of regulations concerning tactics of units equipped with
wheeled armoured personnel carriers.
In previous war conflicts, commanders and tacticians were grounded on their own
combat experience. In current and future operations they have to be flexible because the
equipment is being continually developed. Future wars will be of dynamic character
because modernized equipment as well as various integrated communication,
reconnaissance and weapon systems will be used. The military will make use of air and
space reconnaissance, unmanned aircraft, means of electronic warfare – this all will
change the play of forces as well as units’ configuration at the battlefield. The fact is,
however, that choosing the best tactics, even when the equipment is being developed so
fast, is the best way to achieve success in operations (combat). Experience gained in
both previous and current operations has shown that even units equipped with not very
modern equipment can, on certain conditions, successfully fight modern trained and
equipped enemy forces.
4 Influence of command and control system factor on theory of tactics
development
The system of command and control is an important factor influencing the theory of
tactics and the character of future conflicts. In order to get some concrete conclusions
necessary to improve the command and control system, we shall have a look at
predicated activities of future armies. Manoeuvre is the ground of tactics. Its purpose is
“to move” the units either towards the enemy (offensive activities) or from the enemy
(defensive activities). The units’ movement on the battlefield is carried out as a reaction
to the enemy’s activities. The manoeuvres will be carried out not only by combat
tactical units but also by combat support and logistic units. To support the combat units’
manoeuvres, the enemy will be put under fire both from the air and land. These
activities must be coordinated all the time not only by the ACR commanders at tactical
levels but also by commanders within allied coalition forces. Tactical units carrying out
the manoeuvre as well as support units should be actively protected from the enemy’s
airstrikes. Enemy forces can paralyse combat activities of the whole tactical task forces
by incapacitating not only their fire support systems but also their logistic units. No
combat is possible without logistic support. Having said all that it is apparent that there
can be no delay in the command and control system development.
Nowadays the ACR has at its disposal only limited forces equipped with conventional
weaponry. That is why I believe it is important to highlight the role of a man (a military
professional) in our army, especially his erudition. Although commanders and staffs at
tactical levels are creative and flexible, I am convinced they have to deal with many
difficulties. These difficulties concern the knowledge of general tactics theory as well as
the command and control process especially within the process of combat planning and
control. It is surprising that although during the past ten years tremendous amount of
financial sources was spent on implementation and possible use of operational-tactical
command and control system of ground forces, staffs at tactical levels do not use it and,
what more, do not know its potential. For task forces staffs it is not an easy task to deal
with several sorts of activities and pick up the one that appears to be the best and will be
accepted as a commander’s decision. Combat documentation processing, calculations,
and analyses are very time consuming, too.
There can be more difficulties, causes of which do not have to be necessarily grounded
in units’ or staffs’ organizational structures. When dealing with the problem of
command and, above all, the command and control system itself, it is necessary to take
9
into account the fact that the deployment within coalition forces will affect the tactics
development, operational art and, inevitably, individual elements of the command and
control system. Dealing with the issue of efficient functioning of the command and
control system is closely related to dealing with communication systems. These play an
unsubstitutable role and can be dealt with via introducing modern and, above all, NATO
compatible communication and information systems and devices. The requirement for
the future is that tactical units have to be equipped with such a communication system
that will provide connection at all times - even when some of its elements are eliminated
as a result of electronic warfare conducted by the enemy. Another aspect that is related
to the issue of the command and control system is the perspective of organizational
structures of the ACR. The command and control system is grounded in organizational
structures. I am convinced that current brigade structures of the ground forces are not
very ideal for the future development of the ACR and should be changed. Some
proposals and considerations concerning battalion and brigade organizational structure
modifications are spreading around units at tactical levels. I do not know yet what the
result will be in force. However, I am an optimist. I believe that all measures and
changes that are to be taken will meet the targets i.e. they will save costs in the horizon
of a few oncoming years and, above all, create effective units at tactical levels that will
be interoperable and compatible with similar units of our allies. In order to create such
units it is necessary to integrate current and future operations (combat) characteristics
analyses into the whole organizational structure of the ACR, i.e. not only into
deployable and partially deployable elements but also into stationary elements. I assume
that if we are able to implement the idea of creating combined brigades, good conditions
for establishment of small task units will be created. These small task units would meet
current and future ambitions of the ACR. At the same time it would be possible to make
use of growing significance of flexibility in decision making processes and modulability
(assemblability, connectivity) of organizational structures of army branches and force
branches. This significance is caused by unpredictability of current and future operating
environment, operational tasks and character of both activities and targets of potential
enemy. My opinion is that if army branches are isolated during the peace time it will be
extremely difficult to make them work efficiently within “close cooperation” in
operations. I am also convinced that it is necessary to establish operational headquarters
for ground forces (at division level). This headquarters would be designed not only to
train task forces for operations but it could also be fully deployable within NATO (EU)
allied forces operations. Now the tactics development and the art of operation could be
more efficiently developed as fields of study, which would also be a significant feature
in the view of future ACR commanders’ and strategists’ personalities development.
5 Military-political factors
When creating and developing the theory of tactics it is not possible to ignore militarypolitical factors. The need of having continuously verified and drafted tactics
development should be grounded in risks evaluation as well as in evaluation of threats
to our state. Analyses concerning these problems should be reflected in the declaration
of military-political ambitions and in establishing of long-term bases to plan abilities.
Another factor influencing the theory of tactics development should be evaluation
considering the way the roles and functions of earmarked forces and sources are
accomplished, or in other words, if conditions enabling this accomplishment have been
created. The stated point of view offers a question if the project of brigade and battalion
task forces is still “alive” and if earmarked units (see document called Inspection of
Forces – an outline of individual possible task forces to meet military-political
10
ambitions of the Czech Republic) have, in current situation, all necessary theoretical
bases. Along the stated question there is a doubt that tactics is not being developed
within individual task forces and their elements. I assume that Field Order as well as
Combat Directives together with Military Doctrine called Tactics of Land Forces in
Operations do not play this role and do not determine generally valid tactical principles
and ways of use of task forces in operations (armed conflicts). Should this project be
“alive” I ask a question why operational concept for the brigade and battalion task
forces has not been worked out yet. This would be a concept showing the way the
future armed conflicts will look like and specifying supposed operating environment of
the conflict. This would also be a concept that would specify the use of resources
(intelligence, reconnaissance, sapper devices, logistics, integration of land and air
forces, cooperation with Special Forces…). The concept should explain the reason of
participation in allied operations. Consequently, concepts for formations and units
should be issued. In this context I would like to mention current and future role of light
mounted infantry battalions at armoured brigades. The thing I miss is a directives
(doctrine) specifying deployment of these battalions in operations. When I talk to the
members of the brigades (as well as the members of the stated battalions) and discuss
their possible deployment in operations I come to the conclusion that existing directives
included in standard operating procedures (SOP) have not been made by professionals.
When compared with similar NATO units, the names of the battalions themselves are
vague to me. That is why I tend to support the idea of creating infantry battalions that
would accomplish standard tasks. The problems of terminology in the ACR are related
to this issue, too. The reason why the terminology is so significant is that it works as a
communication tool in tactical professional communication (as well as in
communications of all army branches). I do not want to name individually various
national military terminology dictionaries, NATO Glossary of Military Terms and
Definitions accepting STANAG (3680) to AAP-6, Czech military encyclopaedias (The
Department of Doctrines, Military Academy) published in the last few years but
considering my experience concerning the use of terminology by military staff in the
field of tactics I am convinced that there has been success in gradual unification of
terminology support. However, I have to say that I miss directives – regulations
because NATO Glossary of Military Terms and Definitions (AAP-6) cannot react to
national particularities in the use of terminology in the ACR. What more, after every
operation every year there appear a lot of new and tactical expressions that should
deserve our attention. That is why I would like the Czech military encyclopaedia to be
issued as an official terminology dictionary of the ACR every year; to update it every
year and have it distributed to units and formations.
6 Operating environment factors
The theory of tactics development is related to geopolitical factors; i.e. the environment
of future deployment of the ACR forces and equipment. So called “ability to be
deployed in the whole spectrum of operations” is based on understanding that in order
to accomplish operational (combat) tasks in future operations the commanders will have
to combine collateral offensive, defensive, stabilization, and support (other) tactical
activities. These activities will be carried out by individual elements of task forces that
will change one type of activity for another one; possibly carry out some activities
simultaneously. This will always depend on operational topic; i.e. which activities will
prevail and be dependant on the phase of operation.
As experience and analyses of last operations show, there is a growing significance of
elaboration of the theory of tactics, rules and tactics concerning fighting in built-up
11
areas and city agglomerations. In operations conducted by the USA and NATO in Iraq
and Afghanistan and by Israeli units in Palestine and Lebanon a lot of experience as
well as questions appeared. The operations showed that it is necessary to use heavily
armoured vehicles (tanks, ACPs) because there is simply no other way to fight a well
trained and equipped enemy in built-up areas. An armoured bulldozer, task of which is
to pull/knock down walls and buildings, clear and make passageways in ruins and
barricades made by the enemy, turned out to be the most efficient of all armoured
vehicles in fighting in built-up areas. Current valid directives and doctrines in the ACR
recommend to by-pass built-up areas when fighting a regular enemy. However, due to
the fact that big cities are built mainly in valleys (surrounded by mountains), there is
usually either no place to manoeuvre (by-pass) or the manoeuvre is very limited.
Operations conducted against irregular adversary will be referred to as combat
operations. The adversary will try to eliminate our technological advantages and get us
involved in a combat activity in a built-up area, where technology loses its efficiency.
Military units will have to carry out their activities at ground level as well as above and
bellow this level (roofs, upper floors of buildings, subways, sewerages, cellars). The
combat activities will also require new equipment. Built-up areas include dense network
if infrastructure represented by streets, buried services (gas pipes, electric wires, water
pipes….). Latest experience says that in towns it is difficult to distinguish the adversary
from civilian population. Attitude of civilian population towards our forces is also
important. The above mentioned factors, when compared to current situation within the
theory of tactics development (in relation to organizational structures and equipment the
units and formations have disposal of), underline the fact that the ACR is neither
prepared nor being properly trained for combat in built-up areas. Tactics in future
conflicts and individual operations will change. It will have to be able to react to
changes in operating environment. That is why I put emphasis on collecting and
analysing information and knowledge coming from particular types of conflicts and
operations and applying the information and knowledge in the training system of
commanders, staffs and units.
An evaluation published in Military Strategy in 2011 states that probability that the
Czech Republic would be attacked by a massive military assault is very low. However I
am convinced that the theory of tactics development should deal with individual tactical
activities conducted on the Czech Republic territory. Hypothetically speculating about
possible combat activity on the Czech Republic territory including movements, then,
above all, character of border areas should be respected. Border mountains, living
density, woods and forests, objects, built-up areas, valleys, number of communications
should be other important factors taken into account in the process of tactics
development. It should also be a reason to elaborate tactical principles for the use of the
ACR task forces. From this point of view I assume that delaying operations and defence
will be the most preferred activities in future. Delaying operations should be conducted
in order to delay the enemy, wear him down, cause casualties and thus to get time for
political negotiations and gradual transmission to active offensive activities. Defensive
activities conducted by task forces can be carried out in order to fiercely defend
important areas and objects.
7 Conclusion
The truth is that in the ACR the tactics development was focused on elaborating the
issue of conducting stabilization tactical activities in stabilization operations. The
military units approached the University of Defence with request to develop the process
of teaching tactics in the field of tactical activities and drills of small units rather than in
12
the field of deep understanding of tactics as a whole. Training of individuals and units
was directed towards their use in non-combat operations. For various reasons
(especially due to the impact of lack of finances in the Army of the Czech Republic) the
number of brigade and battalion exercises focused on the issues of planning,
controlling, training offensive, defensive and other tactical activities in terrain using
vehicles including support and combat support units rapidly decreased in the last ten or
fifteen years. I assume this is the reason why there is less theoretical knowledge in the
field of tactics and why development of tactics (as a part of military art) stagnates.
Now it is the right time to find an answer to a question: “What is going to be next in the
field of tactics development when the coalition forces have left Iraq and are going to
leave Afghanistan?”
Another question to be answered is “What is the role of the University of Defence
(UoD) in the issue of theory of tactics development (as a field of study)?” I assume that
nowadays, under current conditions, the ability of the UoD to develop (scientifically)
the theory of tactics is limited. There are several reasons. Some of them result from the
fact that practice in the ACR is ahead of theory. Another reason is that the theory of
using the units in operations is approached tendentiously, ad hoc. Some of the other
reasons are related to the functioning of the inner system at the UoD but I see the main
reason in the missing career structure which has not been introduced yet.
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
ALLARD, K. Command, Control, and the Common Defence. Library of Congress
Cataloguing-in-Publication data. Yale University Press.1999. 359 p.
ISBN 0-16-053377-1.
Bílá kniha o obraně. Praha: Ministerstvo obrany ČR. Praha: 2011.
ISBN 978-80-7278-564-3. 167 s. [In Czech].
CORDESMAN, A.H. Strategy, Tactics and Military Lessons. Centre for Strategic
and International Studies. The CSIS Pres. Washington, D.C.2003. 572 p.
ISSN 0736-7136. ISBN 0-89206-432-3.
Obranná strategie ČR. Praha: Ministerstvo obrany ČR. Praha: 2012. 12 s.
ISBN 978-80-7278-606-0. [In Czech].
Pozemní síly v operacích [Vojenská publikace]. Vyškov: Institut doktrín
VeV-VA, 2011. 295 s. [In Czech].
Taktika pozemních sil [Vojenská publikace]. Vyškov: Institut doktrín VeV – VA,
2011. 338 s. [In Czech].
13
IMPLEMENTATION POSSIBILITIES OF THE MILITARY
OBSERVER TRAINING TO THE TRAINING SYSTEM FOR
PEACETIME MILITARY ENGAGEMENT AND PEACE SUPPORT
OPERATIONS
Jan Drozd
Abstract: The article deals with the possibilities of the military observer training system
implementation to our preparation system for Peacetime Military Engagement (PME) and
Peace Support Operations (PSO). The purpose of the article is to open discussion and consider
the possibilities of applying training objectives and topics taken from the efficient United
Nation (UN) military observer training system. It also stresses out main objectives useful for
implementation to combat operation and counter-insurgency operation as well. The article
indicates basic classification of the military operations as well as description of the UN above
mentioned system.
Keywords: Training, Military observer, Peace support operations, Peacetime military
engagement
1 Introduction
We have a year 2013 and participation of our forces in operation ISAF is gradually
reaching end. In accordance with government proposal for 2013-2014 prospectively
2015 participation of the Czech soldier in foreign operation will change its character.
Forces will mainly focus on training of the local army and police. Czech government
approved participation of 539 members of the Czech army in mission ISAF in 2013 and
340 soldiers in 2014. In 2015 we can speak about 150 soldiers who are going to trading
Afghan armed forces. Step by step all the responsibilities for safe environment in
Afghanistan is handing over to Afghan armed forces and in 2015 the Afghan forces is
going to be fully responsible for overall safety in Afghanistan. Based on the Chief of
staff Czech armed forces are ready to participate more within the European Union peace
mission. As a first step towards this course of action we can name our participation in
EU mission EUTM in Mali.
In a mean time European Union is going to prepare „EUROPIAN UNION SECURITY
AND DEFENCE WHITE PAPER“. Based on the already published proposal of this
document the EU is going to reinforce EU participation on peacekeeping mission. This
type of mission is mainly belonging to United Nation lead. Peacekeeping operation is a
basic and the most important pillar of the international effort to keep and build peace all
over the world, which was proved when the UN received Nobel Prize for peace in 1988.
We can assume that this type of mission is going to be as a main stream in a future and
we are supposed to be ready to participate. Even now, Czech army participates within
this mission mainly by providing United Nation military observers. Just a few people
know, that the Czech participation in based on a history and we already build up a big
14
credit of our soldier as a military observers. Our first mission was in 1953 where our
military observers altogether with diplomats participated in UN mission in Korea. Based
on above mention we cannot disregard these facts, and we are supposed to be still a
good member of the international community and be ready to fulfil given tasks not only
by NATO but also by European Union and UN.
This topic in our army is not developed yet I any documents. The preparation of our
military observer is based on the UN guidance. The article should show the way and
possibilities how we can deal with training and preparation for mainly Peacetime
military engagement and Peace support operation. There are going to be described and
suggest possible topics and way of its implication to the training and preparation of our
forces not only for above mentioned operation but also for combat and counterinsurgency operation as well. Many of the training objectives could be implied to the
officer’s training and education system in a military university.
2 Classification of the military operations
In order to understand the complex topic as military operation is we can divide military
operation based on many factors. However it is not the purpose of this article and for
better understanding we will just focused on the essential classification. As it is
generally accepted we can divide all military operations according to main effort to four
groups as it is depicted in the scheme.
Scheme 1: Classification of the military operations
Source: in author’s possession
a. Combat operations
This type of operation basically includes operations where two fighting sides are trying
to reach their goal using force against either regular armed forces or irregular armed
forces (illegal armed groups). The basic tactics in these operations are mainly all
spectrums of the offensive and defensive operations.
15
b. Counter-Insurgency operations
COIN mostly includes operations within the states with races, cultural, religious and
ideological disagreements which lead to armed rebellions against government. The main
premises for this type of conflicts are weak government and its inability to face
insurgent using its own armed forces.
c. Peace support operations
PSO includes operations where the diplomatic, civilian and military means are used
altogether in order to rebuild or keep peace in the crisis area.
d. Peacetime military engagement
The main purpose of this operation is to create secure sector in peace time. The typical
example of these operations is observations missions.
Even though we can distinguish among this type of operations it is necessary to mention
that to include any operation to specific operation type is not easy as seems to be. Even
within one operation we can find countless elements of almost all type of operations.
The border between these operations is very weak and from the Peacetime military
engagement we can easily move to Country- Insurgency operation in a short time and
vice versa.
This article is focused on preparation process of the military observer. As it was already
mentioned observation missions are include to the fourth type of operation, which is
Peacetime military engagement (PSO). The importance of PSO we already discussed in
the introduction. However it is vital to stress that readiness for PSO is crucial in order to
fulfil possible task. Despite the fact that we will mainly speak about the military
observer we can imply this training scheme to possible preparation for other type of
mission particularly Peace support operations.
3 Type of the training
We can basically classify the training to the four groups:
Scheme 2: United nation military observer training classification
Since the Mission specific training and in-mission training are mainly in a units and
mission headquarters hands we will focus on the Generic training. Refresher training in
our case is organized by the unit commander during the regular training. We will stress
out objectives, topics and skills included in those training groups which could be used
and applied in our general training as well as officer education system.
3.1 Generic training
This type of training includes obvious subjects, applicable to any soldier. It is
determined to train and prepare all soldiers for not only Military observe duty, but also
to be a skilful part of the PMO and PSO member. To simplify, we can state that this
type of training is developed to transfer all military skills to be applicable for PMO and
PSO. Generic training is mainly at nation level and it help build up the nations readiness
to send prepared personnel for operation in a short time. Within this training is very
desirable to put stress not only on skills, but also on the multinational aspects of the
operations. Generic training is applicable to all spectrum of the mission and we can
16
implement some modules to the training for Combat and Counter-insurgency training as
well. Moreover in modules of the Generic training we can find applicable information
for officers training. Focusing on the Military observer it could be imply in any time
before the deployment. The time dedicated to this training could vary according to
national level of the training in general. As it was already indicated Generic training
incudes four basic modules as it is depicted in the scheme.
Scheme 3: United nation military observer generic training
3.1.1 Module 1: The United Nations, international organizations and legal
considerations
This module is focused on the essential information concerning UN itself. All PME and
PSO participants should understand background, history and organization of this
organization. They will be informed about the historical development of the United
Nation, its organs and role. All learners will get familiar with history of the
peacekeeping operations, their concept, structure, role of the military observer as well as
role of the military component of these operations. Very useful part of this module,
which is applicable even for the preparation or other type of operations, is a part where
the learners will get familiar with role of the UN Agencies, International Organizations
(IO) and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO). Those organizations are involved in
any type of operations all over the world and officer should definitely know about their
participations. Another important topic, which can be used in the education system and
training for all spectrum of the military operations is a legal aspects of the operations
including code of conduct, gender awareness, international humanitarian law and laws
17
of armed conflict. Specifically those topics are very desirable for officer training and
education. The scheme below summarized the topics, which are part of the module 1.
Scheme 4: United nation military observer generic training module 1
3.1.2 Module 2: The military observer’s duties and responsibilities
This module is focusing on military observer’s duties and responsibilities within the
PME and PSO. It is necessary to stress that the role of the military observer in this type
of operation are vital, since military observers are simply eyes and ears of the
commander. Based on the information from the military observer commander of the
mission has vital information as we call it commander’s critical information requirement
(CCIR) based on which the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is made. In this
module participant will be familiar with essential skills necessary for gaining
information and reporting procedure. Module content in a below scheme depicted skills.
18
And repeatedly event in this specific modules we can identified skills which could be
imply to the training and preparation for other kind of military operations. Particularly
reporting, which plays crucial role in all operations is very important as well as
patrolling and monitoring. Despite the fact that reporting and reporting system vary
from operation to operation the core of these skills are similar. There are also
possibilities to implement team leading and staff skills to the officer training and
education system in all level.
3.1.3 Module 3: Military observer and PME/PSO member skills and techniques
Military observer in many cases will act not only as a soldier but also as a diplomat and
mediator. In a daily bases he will need negotiation skills as well as inevitable part of
PME a PSO operations, which is knowledge in basic cultural, traditional and religious
awareness. Since almost all operation is on the multinational level this aspect should not
be disregard. Our soldiers will definitely encounter many situations where they are
expected to react adequately despite the cultural or religious differences. Parts of this
module are also objectives which are already implemented to our training system. This
module is basically focused on the practical training and modelling of the real situations.
However we are already practice most of the module objectives, there are still objectives
which could be more developed.
As it is seen in the scheme, particularly in this module we are speaking about the
practical skills. Some of the subjects included in the negotiation and mediation bubble
are media relations, use of interpreters and social interaction with local population.
Based on the observations in real operations, those are definitely the skills which are
sometimes crucial and more than important. It is easy to state that social interaction is
not vital aspect of the soldiers training, but if we consider the fact, that local populations
in very reliable source of information we can see this topic from other angle. The similar
situation is use of interpreter and media relations. Another subject in a scheme depicted
as a DDR, which means Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration is also topic
which is not trained and taught apart of military observer. And of course we could find
other objectives which could be implemented to our system based on the particular task
and operation.
19
3.1.4 Module 4: Final exercise
The final exercise is the highlight of the training, including most of the topics taught.
Exercise can be structured as a PME or PSO with its own basic documents. The exercise
supposed to be as real as possible a supposed to cover all vital topics for trainee.
Especially the final module is flexible and commander of the trained unit has
opportunity to train and check readiness of his unit. It is opportunity to go through all
objectives and repeatedly teach all topics. As a very important is feedback, where
trainees are going to receive information what was good and what was wrong.
If we focused on the military observer officers are divided into teams that carry out
given tasks in a simulated situation. Instructors are supervising the planned incidents
and give feedback immediately after each incident. After carrying out the given task, the
team gives a briefing. When the feedback is given, team leader will be changed and the
team will have a new task. Even from this military officers training we can apply some
of the procedure. Particularly change of the team leader or in other case could be change
of the platoon commander would be very useful in order to make other team member
ready to take over the responsibilities for given task in case of need. All spectrum of the
incident could be trained especially topics which were during the training recognize as a
crucial.
4 Conclusion
For over 50 years, the United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs) have been
participating in PME and PSO all over the world. They represent entire international
community, successfully observed, monitored and contributed to solution finding of the
contemporary rammed conflicts. Relying upon their military skills, UNMOs must
rapidly adjust to the unique tasks of their mission areas. [1] Within the mentioned 50
years there have been developed a reliable and efficient system of preparation and
training. Many countries contributed to this system drawing from the real situations and
experience. The system was in countless cases proved as functional and maximally
efficient. Moreover this system is very flexible and new knowledge is implemented.
Efficiency and proved effectiveness are the reason to consider this system as a reliable
source for implementation to our training system especially in case of preparation and
training for military operations. As it was indicated in the article there are many
possibilities how to use this system and how to implement many objectives and topics.
The purpose of this article was not to solve and suggest new training system but to show
possible way and open the discussion leading to development of our own training
system. Based on the latest information concerning future participation of our army in
the EU operation, the significance of this way of thinking obtains a new dimension.
Let’s this about it and do our best in this field.
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
20
Selection standards and training guidelines for United Nations military observers.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Training and Evaluation Service, New
York 2002.
Guidelines for the selection, deployment, rotation, extension, transfer and
repatriation of the military observers in United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, New York 2001.
Military observer’s handbook. United Nations Department of Peace-keeping
Operations, New York 1995.
DECISION PROBLEMS SOLVING IN THE MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Monika Grasseová and Eva Štěpánková
Abstract: The aim of the paper is to present selected findings of the survey “Decision problems
solving in the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic”. Quantitative research is focused
cross-sectionally in the individual levels of management of the CR MoD (the Ministry of
Defence of the Czech Republic). The data collection was realized in the period from June to
October 2012, the data of the total number of 137 respondents were analyzed. The survey is
focused especially on the types of solved problems, obstacles to the rational decision making,
methods that are used during decision making and the phases of the process of decision
problems solving.
Keywords: decision problems solving, Ministry of Defence.
1 Introduction
In terms of dealing with an intention of organization’s development we focused on
advancement of methods, methodologies and heuristics (MMH) for solving
unstructured decision making problems. The aim of MMH advancement is to set up
clearly the purpose of their use within identified phases of the process of unstructured
decision making problems, and define the principles and procedure of their use within
the Ministry of Defence for individual defined types of such problems. The reason for
dealing with this issue is to increase a quality of decision making and quality of training
military professionals in solving unstructured decision- making problems.
In order to acquire primary data we chose questionnaire survey. In terms of
questionnaire survey we focused on a current state of solving decision-making problems
in the CR MoD. The questions are aimed at revealing what types of unstructured
problems are dealt with, what obstacles the problem solvers encounter, what methods
they use while solving problems, what factors they find significant for successful and
efficient decision making, and further what phases they carry out in the process of
solving decision-making problems. The research was carried out in the period of June –
October 2012.
2 Problem formulation
One of the project goals was to identify and evaluate obstacles to rational solving of
unstructured decision-making problems by the management, senior officers and
members of staffs of the CR MoD (Questionnaire questions 2-5). Concerning the
obstacles we formulated the following hypothesis: Among the major obstacles to
efficient solving of unstructured problems there is a lack of time for solving, incomplete
or no information at all and insufficient competence (experience) of the management
subjects.
Additionally, we examined what factors are considered significant for successful and
efficient decision making by the CR MoD members. For these factors we formulated
the following research hypothesis: The members of the Ministry of Defence consider
21
time sufficiency for problem solving, informational sufficiency and clear assignment of
the problem (task, mission) to be significant for successful and efficient decision
making.
2.1
Theoretical background
The standard classification in use for decision making problems is dichotomic, however,
the terminology for classification of problems used by experts is not uniform. The
classification of decision making problems into well-structured and unstructured (illstructured) in terms of their complexity, clear definition and possibility of algorithm
development represents one of the fundamental classifications (Simon, quoted in [1]).
With the unstructured decision-making problems the following is typical:
occurrence of several decision makers and involved parties with different views
on the problem situation being solved [2],[6];
occurrence of a rather big number of factors affecting the solving of a given
problem (both internal and external), the factors are not exactly known, having
complicated and variable interrelations [6];
randomness of changes within some items of the organization’s surrounding
(political, economic, technological environment, etc.);
uniform and explicit defining of the problem is difficult [8];
occurrence of a rather large number of assessment criteria of solution variants,
while some of them being of qualitative nature [4];
difficult availability and interpretation of information necessary for decision
taking, and of variables describing the surrounding [2].
Therefore, unstructured problems can be understood as problems whose assignments,
ways of solving and required results (goals) are difficult to be identified, described and
represented, for example in terms of a mathematical model. [4].
Based on the executed contents analysis of management regulators and strategic
(conceptual) documents we work on the presumption that for the past 5 years mainly the
following types of unstructured problems have been dealt with in the Ministry of
Defence (Questionnaire Question 1): organizational structure change; implementation
of the accepted decisions, international obligations, legal requirements, operations and
assignments at a lack of resources for allocation; plan processing; source processing
into a plan; document processing (conceptual or strategic) dealing with enhancement of
the organization or area; processing methodology, standing operational procedure, order
or different internal regulation; preparation and realization of training (a training
processor, a training participant); preparation and realization of a foreign mission.
According to written sources the obstacles to decision making, which hinder the
achievement of required quality of solving decision-making problems, can be both on
the part of a subject of decision making together with the other participants of a problem
solving process [3], and on the part of organizational unit that controls the process of
decision making [3].
Fotr [3] who draws on Simon’s [7] theory of Bounded rationality includes among the
barriers to rational decision making on the part of a subject of decision making
(decision-maker) the following: a limited ability of an individual to process information,
cognitive extend limitations of every real-time decision-makers, limited ability of an
individual to formulate and solve complex decision-making problems, limited ability of
an individual to identify themselves with a value system of a group or organization, and
reoccurrence of those decisions that have already proved to be ineffective.
Fotr [3] quotes the following rationality obstacles on the part of organization:
insufficient quality of information basis, inflexibility of organizational structure that
22
hinder temporary team creation for solving critical decision making problems, presence
of a large number of levels of management hierarchy, and inaccuracy and ambiguity in
determining decision-making authority of certain organization members.
Therefore, it can be inferred that the effort to increase quality of decision-making
processes in organizations is closely related to minimization of these obstacles to
rationality.
2.2 Methodology
The aim of this paper is to reveal, in terms of research carried out by the members of the
Ministry of Defence, factors that positively or negatively affect their decision making.
We focused both on the factors whose presence is significant for efficient decision
making and also on those obstacles (barriers) that can hinder successful decision
making.
The survey sample was chosen by means of a method of purpose (deliberate) selection.
Out of the total 137 acquired questionnaires two had to be excluded from the further
evaluation due to missing data. Thus, the total of questionnaires for the further analysis,
or data evaluation, is 135. Out of this number 28 respondents are the personnel of the
CR MoD, 10 respondents work at the operational command or at a military institution
of the same level, 44 respondents are members of brigades or a similar military
institution, 50 work at a battalion or an institution of similar level and 3 respondents are
personnel of University of Defence.
Potential positive and negative factors were identified by means of the method of
brainstorming where a part of the executive team for intention participated, then
information acquired at scientific conferences were used and also the data from
implementation of the case studies at career courses. The acquired suggestions were
consequently modified and evaluated in terms of content similarity and level of
similarity. This way a list of factors and obstacles was acquired, factors that are
potentially significant in the decision-making process of a commander, and obstacles
that the MoD personnel, who participate in problem solving, are supposed to encounter.
The factors that are vital for efficient decision making were examined first. The
respondents should answer the following question: Rate ALL the factors mentioned in
the table according to the level of their significance to you (how important they are in
your opinion) for successful and efficient problem solving.
These are the factors that were to be evaluated: sufficiency of time / information for
problem solving, clear problem assignment (task, mission), sufficiency of experience in
solving the given problem, sufficiency of competent personnel participating in problem
solving (e.g. in acquiring information, preparing documentation), reliability and
responsibility of personnel cooperating in problem solving, sufficiency of theoretical
knowledge for solving the assigned problem, quality of cooperation with other
departments participating in the problem solving, presence of SW support as well as
manual or procedural methodology for problem solving.
The respondents rated significance of the individual factors by means of a five-point
scale (1 = insignificant factor; 2 = little significant factor; 3 = average significant factor;
4 = very significant factor; 5 = critically significant factor).
When identifying decision-making obstacles within MoD the focus was on those
obstacles on the part of an organization. The question included in the questionnaire
which examined the intensity of the occurrence of individual obstacles perceived by
commanders themselves reads as follows: What were the most frequent obstacles which
hindered your efficient solving of the problem(s) marked by you in Question 1?
The respondents could mark a free number of the offered obstacles which relate to the
abovementioned factors of efficient decision making (a lack of time / information,
23
unclear assignment of a problem, a lack of experience, a lack of competent personnel
and personnel’s unreliability and irresponsibility, a lack of theoretical knowledge etc.)
Options were offered from which respondents could choose all the obstacles which they
perceive as significant. The answer included also an option of adding more obstacles in
case that these were not included in the offered variants, but still respondents may
consider them to be relevant.
3 Problem solution
The summary of the results relating to the respondents rating the significance of the
decision-making factors is illustrated in the Graph 1. To help orientation within the
graph the offered rating of the individual factors was reduced into three groups - little
significant factor (scale point 1 and 2), average significant factor (point 3) and very
significant factor (point 4 and 5).
Graph 1: Rating factor significance of the efficient decision making
Let us turn our attention to some of the statistical characteristics of the explored data.
To be able to obtain insight of the data distribution it is appropriate to present an
average, median and modus of variables – see Table 1. The presented values relate to
the original five points rating the significance of the individual aspects by the
respondents.
24
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
Average 3,92 4,60 4,50 3,40 3,61 3,94 3,33 3,34 2,70 2,97 3,20
4
5
5
3
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
Median
4
5
5
3
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
Modus
Table 1: Rating factor significance of the efficient decision making – average, median
and modus
Legend: A – sufficiency of time for problem solving; B – sufficiency of information for problem solving; C – clear problem
assignment; D – sufficiency of experience in problem solving; E - sufficiency of competent personnel participating in problem
solving; F - reliability and responsibility of personnel cooperating in problem solving; G - sufficiency of theoretical knowledge for
solving the given problem; H - quality of cooperation with other departments participating in the problem solving; I - presence of
SW support for problem solving; J presence of manual, methodology and procedures for problem solving; K – knowledge of
appropriate methods for problem solving and the way of their applications.
Based on the graph 1 and table 1, it is evident that the respondents assign at least
average significance to all of the offered factors of the efficient decision making, and
they consider the most of them to a great extend to be even very significant factors of
successful decision making. The overwhelming majority of the respondents (more than
90%) percieves as significant mainly these factors of efficient decision making:
sufficiency of information for problem solving and necessity of clear problem
assignment. The aforementioned is supported also by fairly high values of averages,
medians and modes with these variables.
The next three aspects that are according to the majority of the respondents significant
in decision making are characteristics of their colleagues – especially their reliability
and responsibility (76%), sufficiency of time for problem solving (74%) and sufficiency
of competent personnel (60%). The average rating of these aspects in the sample is
close to point 4 (very significant factor), the same is the value of median and mode for
these quantities.
The remaining factors are percieved approximately by a half of the respondents as
significant and by the other half as average significant. All the statistical characteristis
under consideration are situated around point 3 (average significant factor).
Next, let us focus on evaluation of those obstacles that the respondents view as
hindering the efficient decision making significantly. The total results indicating a
number of marking the individual obstacles to rational decision making, as it was
offered in the questionnaire, is summarized in the Graph 2.
25
Graph 2 – Obstacles to rational decision making in MoD
The personnel of MoD mention as the most frequent obstacle to efficient decision
making a lack of time and information provided for problem solving. These two
obstacles are presented by about two thirds of the respondents. Then a significant
obstacle that is confirmed by about a half of the respondents is unclear assignment of
tasks and problems to solve. There is a less frequent mention of the obstacles regarding
problematic cooperation with the other sections of the Ministry which are involved in
problem solving, absence of a clearly defined procedure of problem solving and a lack
of competent personnel participating in problem solving.
The other obstacles to efficient decision making are declared in fewer numbers. About a
quarter of the respondents admits a lack of experience with solving assigned problems.
Less than a fifth of the respondents mentions obstacles such as unreliability or
irresponsibility of the personnel participating in problem solving, absence of SW
support for problem solving, a lack of theoretical knowledge or absence of knowledge
of appropriate methods for problem solving.
In total, thirteen respondents then state different obstacles, among them for example
parallel occurrence of more tasks at the same time, absence of knowledge on the part of
superiors about competences of inferiors, inappropriate organizational structure, sudden
changes in assigned tasks, indecisiveness of senior officers, etc. Only five from all the
respondents state that they do not encounter any obstacles to efficient decision making
at work.
Subsequently, we examined differences and similarities in intensity of declared
obstacles at individual levels of management. In addition to the total overview of the
key obstacles to decision making in the Ministry of Defence we further examined what
obstacles the members of MoD encounter at different levels of management.
26
It can be stated that there were no significant differences in perception of the most
significant factors and obstacles to rational decision making identified among individual
levels. The personnel of all levels identify the most important requirement for efficient
decision making in the necessity of a sufficient number of information available for
problem solving, and then necessity of a clear assignment of a problem or task. In other
areas the situation is similar, since the respondents do not differ significantly. In other
words, the significance of the individual aspects is perceived quite similarly. No
significant differences were identified in perception of the factors of the efficient
decision making of the members of different management levels in Armed Forces of the
Czech Republic.
As the most significant obstacles to rational decision making these aspects are again
indicated with the highest score: a lack of time, and similarly with the key factors there
comes also a lack of provided information for solving the given problem. Further trends
of evaluating the significant obstacles to efficient decision making, specific for
individual levels, follow below.
Additional significant obstacles to decision making in MoD personnel’s view are
unclear problem assignments, problematic cooperation with other department sections
and absence of a standardized procedure for solving the assigned task.
Personnel of operational command or unit feel not only a lack of time and information
to be significant obstacles but also unclear problem assignment and problematic
cooperation with other department sections. Unlike MoD, they further refer to another
obstacle in terms of unreliability and irresponsibility of participating personnel,
however, they mention less a lack of experience with the assigned problem, and do not
mention missing manual or procedural methodology for problem solving.
Members of brigades again find a problematic aspect in unclear problem or task
assignment, then also in a lack of competent staff and in cooperation with other
department sections. And again, as it is with MoD, another obstacle to efficient decision
making is the absence of manual or procedural methodology for problem solving.
Members of a battalion, unit or other military institution of the same level mention
again, in addition to the most pressing obstacles of time and information, unclear
assignment of tasks or problems, while the other obstacles to efficient decision making
are similar as it is the case with brigades.
Personnel of University of Defence (UO) demonstrate similar views of obstacles as the
above mentioned levels of the Ministry of Defence. However, it is necessary to point
out that some of the frequent obstacles mentioned at the other levels are less frequent in
UO’s view (e.g. a lack of time and information, unclear problem assignment, and
problematic cooperation with other department sections). On the other hand, UO
personnel mark different obstacles as relevant more often in comparison with the other
levels (e.g. a lack of theoretical knowledge or experience for the assigned problem
solving, absence of SW support as well as manual or procedural methodology for
problem solving).
Generally speaking, there are no sharp differences in perception of the most significant
obstacles to efficient decision making at the individual levels of the Ministry of
Defence. Frequency of mentioning the individual obstacles does not significantly differ
through the individual levels.
4 Conclusion
In the article presented here the validity of the following hypothesis has been verified:
Among the major obstacles to efficient solving of unstructured problems there is a lack
of time for solving, incomplete or no information at all and insufficient competence
27
(experience) of the management subjects.
The aforementioned hypothesis has been only partly supported. In the executed survey
four major obstacles to efficient decision making have occurred. According to this
finding the established hypothesis is to be modified as follows: Among the major
obstacles to efficient solving of unstructured decision-making problems there is a lack
of time for solving, incomplete or no information at all and unclear assignment of a
problem or task. Further significant obstacles include problematic cooperation with
other department sections which are involved in the same task, and absence of a
standardized procedure for solving the assigned task. The remaining obstacles, among
them also a lack of experience with solving the assigned task, seem to be less important,
or at least less frequently mentioned by the members of the CR Ministry of Defence.
Furthermore, we verified the hypothesis for factors that the CR Ministry of Defence
members consider significant for successful and efficient decision making: the MoD
members consider the major factors for successful and efficient decision making to be
time sufficiency for problem solving, informational sufficiency and clear problem (task,
mission) assignment.
Based on the questionnaire survey it has been shown that the most of the respondents
(more than 90%) percieve factors of efficient decision making as important when it
comes to informational sufficiency for solving of the given problem and necessity of
clear problem assignment. The abovementioned is supported further by fairly high
average values, medians and modes at these variables.
Three additional aspects, which are, according to the majority of the respondents,
significant in decision making are characteristics of their colleagues – mainly their
reliability and responsibility (76%), time sufficiency for problem solving (74%) and a
sufficient number of competent personnel (60%).
The aforementioned hypothesis has been only partly supported. In the executed survey
five major factors of successful and efficient decision making have occurred.
According to this finding the established hypothesis is to be modified as follows:
members of the Ministry of Defence rank among the major factors that are significant
for successful and efficient decision making the informational sufficiency for the given
problem solving, necessity of its clear assignment, reliability and responsibility of
cooperating personnel, time sufficiency for problem solving, and sufficient information
and competent personnel.
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MINGERS, J. and ROSENHEAD, J. Problem structuring methods in action.
European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 152, 2004, pp. 530-554.
SIMON, H. A. The New Science of Management Decision. Prentice Hall, 1960.
VESELÝ, A. Problem delimination and problem structuring in public policy,
Karolinum, 2009.
29
COMPARING MILITARY TECHNOLOGY DEVICES WITH
MULTI-CRITERIA DECISION MAKING AND SOLVING GROUP
DECISION PROBLEMS
József Gyarmati and Peter Zentay
Abstract: The paper presents a military application of a multi-criteria decision problem. In the
first part the used MDCM model is introduced. The utilisation of this model is presented in the
second part of the paper. The third part presents a solution for group decision making with
multiple criteria.
Keywords: decision theory, military technology devices, group decision making.
1 Introduction
In the paper decision problems are examined where the decision maker is faced with a
choice constrained of many course of actions and these variants are examined by the
decision maker according to many different properties. The decision maker has to
choose the optimal course of action according to his aims based on his score of values.
The task can be solved by MCDM (Multi-Criteria Decision Making) which is a widely
used method of operational research. The general model of the solution is shown in
equation (1).
A1 A2  An
C1 w1 a11 a12  a1n
C2 w2 a21 a22  a2 n
(1)



 aij

Cm wm am1 am 2  amn
x1
x2  xn
th
th
where: Aj = j alternative; Ci = i criterion; wi = ith criterion’s weight number; aij =
performance of jth alternative based on ith criterion; xj = measurement of overall
effectiveness of jth alternative.
According to equation (1) the course of action are characterized by m criteria by the
decision maker according to his aims. The importance of each criterion are different
from the point of view of the decision maker, this can be taken into consideration by wj
weights. Each alternative are valuated according to the criterion, this is shown by the aij
value. To each alternative a value is rendered according to the following equation:
xj = f(Ci;wi;aij)
(2)
According to the function used in equation (2) xi can be a value defined an ordinal scale,
in this case the rank of the course of action is the solution. Using an appropriate
function, xi can be defined on a ratio scale in this case the difference and ratio between
the courses of action can be determined.
The determinant property of MCDM is the multiple examination points of view. The
decision maker is not satisfied by examining only one property, because his aims are
30
complex that is why he wants to accomplish many aims that differ from each other, at
one time.
2 AHP (Analytic Hierarchy Process) the applied MCDM method
The method was first published in 1980 according to [1] and from ever since it is widely
used. Let A1, A2,…An be alternatives and the values of these be shown by p1, p2,… pn,
and pi  R+ i=1…n. The C [xij] n×n matrix can be defined by the xij = pi/pj and the pT
[p1, p2,… pn] vector where j = 1…n. According to the definitions the following equation
(3) is valid:
Cp = λp
(3)
where: λ is the eigenvalue and p is the eigenvector of the C matrix. The alternatives are
known by the decision maker from which the fraction pi/pj can be estimated and the
estimated Ĉ can be made using this p can be solved.
According to equation (3) the point values of alternatives are contained by the p
eigenvector belonging to the maximal eigenvalue (λmax).
The comparison is done hierarchically. The decision maker determines the criteria
according to his aims. The criterion has to be weighed according to equation (3). The
weight numbers is contained by the eigenvector of the quadratic matrix of which size is
determined by the number of point of views. Following this all alternatives have to be
compared in pairs according to criteria. For the comparison the AHP method uses the
pi/pj  {1,2…9} scale if pi>pj. The pi/pj =1 means indifference between two examined
alternatives, while in the case of pi/pj =9 Ai is extremely more important than Aj.
Altogether the number of paired quadratic comparison matrices is equal to the number
of criteria, where the size of the matrix (the number of rows and columns) are set by the
number of alternatives. The eigenvectors of all of the paired comparison matrices show
the values of the analysed alternatives according to the given criterion. The weight
numbers and the normalized values by each criterion have to be summarised according
equation (5).
m
x j   wi aij
(4)
i 1
where aij is the normalized value of the xij.
3 Military application of MCDM
3.1 General description
For the characterisation of the ability of a military device the analysis of only one
feature is not sufficient. In the interest that these devices can be measured from the
user’s point of view it is necessary to observe many characteristics collectively. The
MCDM is suitable for solving this task. The assumption is proven by briefly presenting
a practical application. Beforehand it is necessary to examine that in which case the
application of this method is useful. The most general and frequent case is acquisition.
During the acquisition process the MoD makes a tender and the manufacturers or the
dealer-distributors companies apply to the tender. The applications differ according to
economic or users point of views. The task of the authorised personnel of the Ministry
of Defence, is to select the best possible alternatives, that contain the economical
considerations (purchase price, paying conditions, maintenance costs, investments, etc.)
and also the technical parameters.
The process of comparing and selecting the optimal device:
1. Identifying the aims of the decision maker. In order that these aims be identifiable,
firstly the application circumstances of the military devices have to be determined.
The answers to the questions have to be given “For what do we want to use the
device for? In what circumstances and in what condition?” Only after clarifying
31
these questions those aims can be formulated, that we want to achieve with the given
military device.
2. Determining the alternatives. It is important to have sufficient information about the
up to date military devices and weapon system. The information on the military
devices helps in the determination of the decision criteria. The data acquisition
should be based on a simple market research, and also necessary to collect all the
peace- and wartime operation experiences.
3. Determining decision criteria. It indicates the decision making aims in the model,
but during their determination the property of the device have to be taken into
consideration. This is the most complex part of the process that has the largest effect
on the result. In every case it has two projections; the economical and user. The
economical point of view is financial. The most common used points of views for the
military devices are the firepower, mobility and armour protection.
4. Weighing decision criteria. The scale of value of the decision makers are displayed
in the decision model as the criteria together with their preferences. The weighing is
supported by mathematical models such as AHP. The applications of models help
this step. It is a difficulty that the personnel taking part in the process have generally
different scale of values. The weight numbers have to be based on consensus among
the experts taking part in the decision process.
5. Selecting a comparison method. There are great many MCDM methods found in
international literature. These methods also have many properties; this means that the
selection of a method is again a multi-criteria decision problem. It is important to
know what kind of results is expected by the decision maker, for example a ratioscale level is needed or a preference order of alternatives is satisfying enough. In
Hungary the statutes for public procurement gives the model for comparison that in
some cases are also valid for military procurement.
6. The application of the method and validating the results. In this case the property of
the used MCDM method has to be taken into consideration. Sensitivity analysis can
be used.
3.2 Comparing Artillery pieces
The comparison analysis is published in details in [3].
1. The decision aim is the selection of optimised ordnance of an artillery battery of a
mechanized infantry battalion.
2. Infantry battalions most generally are equipped with 120mm mortar battery, but there
are also different cases for example with a smaller than 150mms howitzer. The
combat procedures are continuously developing that implies the change of weapons
this is why the 120mm and the 81mm mortar are being compared. During the
selection of weapons the ordnance manufactured by ally and the possible hostile
countries were taken into consideration, because the determination of a proportion or
a preference can be important that show the relationship of weapons between our
own and the enemy’s. The weapons in the paper are not mentioned in detail to avoid
any promotions.
3. Starting from the aims of the decision maker and taking into consideration the
ordnance the following criterion were determined: rate of fire, range, fragment effect,
displacement time and battlefield mobility. During the research economical point of
views were not taken into considerations, because these monetary sums are only
available in details during the acquisition process. The authors do not wish to spoil
the accuracy of the comparison with the use of estimated values only.
4. The weighing of point of views was made by the AHP method. For the weighing a
form was applied that are used for the AHP a method and AHP questionnaire was
32
filled out by thirty competent people (expert). From the results, it can be stated that,
the opinion of the importance of the criteria of the experts are significantly different,
that requires further research. This result is explained in chapter 4 of this paper.
5. The comparison were made by the AHP analysis, the results are shown in Figure 1.
6. In Figure 1 the comparison of two 81mm and two 120mm mortar is shown. The
figure shows two values for the 120mm mortar referring to the classical high
explosive shell and the extended range shell (rocket assisted). From the Figure 1 it is
clear that taking into consideration only the high explosive shell, there is no
significant difference between the 81mm and 120mm mortar but the firepower of the
120mm mortar is evidently much larger. The advantage of the larger calibre weapon
is only evident in the case of the extended range shell. The approximate identity of
the measurement of overall effectiveness of 120mm and 81mm mortals is a result of
the criteria and its weights. Those points of view were taken into consideration where
the smaller calibre weapons have an advantage. The example shows well that how
the selection of the points of views meaning the determination of the precise aims of
the decision maker effects the outcome of the valuation. These results are further
examined in chapter 4 of this paper.
81 mm
1,2
120 mm
ER
ER
1
0,8
HE
HE
0,6
HE
HE
0,4
0,2
0
M1
M2
M3
M4
Figure 1: Result of mortar’s AHP analysis [3]
4 Solution for a Group Decision Problem
4.1 Group Decision Problem of artillery pieces
For the formulation of the problem firstly the decision making person have to be
clarified. In the case of a military device the decision making person is the one who
makes the selection considering the given method from the incoming proposals for the
given ordnance. The advantages and disadvantages realised by the decision effects
many people and also many people take part in the preparation of the decision. The
documentation of the tender is prepared according to the aims of the decision maker that
identifies what functions and utility has to be satisfied by the purchased ordnance. In
addition the documentation has many projections: financial, user, technical, logistical.
Several experts take part in the preparation, most often: economical, technical and user.
The experts establish their preferences according to their own point of views. An
economical expert has a different scale of value than a user. A significant opinion
difference can also be between the users, due to the fast development of military
technology and the continuous changing of combat procedures.
In many cases the decision making process can be considered as a future estimation,
where the decision maker tries to estimate the usage in the future of the ordnance to be
purchased and based on this estimation rank them.
33
In the case when the decision maker is searching for the correct solution by depending
upon the knowledge of more experts, can experience the dispersion of the opinion of the
experts. The correct solution should be searched through the expert opinions. The
difference of opinions can contain important information especially if it appears on the
user’s side. The expert’s opinions of the preference of the considerations of experts
were measured during the comparison of ordnance and are shown in Figure 2 by boxplot analysis.
From Figure 2 it is clear that by taking the importance of expert opinions,
a considerable difference can be seen, not regarding the shooting distance. The opinion
difference can be caused by hidden information that the decision maker has to know. A
solution of the consensus search of group decision problems is offered by stochastic
APH, where the experts’ pi/pj preference distribution is analysed, a solution is given in
[5].
The consensus among opinions has many disadvantages. The average, no matter how it
is determined, would not represent the scale of value of all the participant and it would
lead to the loss of information. The difference in opinion in general has a well defined
reason. These are usually kind of non general opinions that are supported by one part of
the experts and rejected by others. It can serve as important information for the decision
maker. A good example of this is presented in the research of [3], of which a relevant
part of it is shown in Figure 3. The research in [3] where the experts were ranked into
groups by the help of multidimensional scaling and hierarchical cluster analysis
according to their relevant opinion of the weight numbers of their criteria. Experts with
nearly the same opinions are collected in these groups forming the so called opinion
centre these opinion centres are identifiable with indicating reasons.
Figure 3 shows the averaged weight numbers opinion of two opinion centres. The most
significant is the different judgement of the points of view of the firepower (rate of fire,
range, and fragment effect) and the point of views considering the size and weight of
order
1
2
3
4
5
Rate of
fire
Range
Fragment
effect
Displacement time
Battlefield
mobility
Figure 2: Box plot analysis of criteria’s preferences of mortar [3]
the device (displacement time, mobility). In Figure 3, group “A” prefers the large
firepower less mobile while group “B” the smaller firepower but more mobile device.
The following problem occurs during averaging, that before designating the experts the
opinion centres are not known and there is no sampling procedure lacking the previous
knowledge that with its accessible help every opinion centres is represented by the
34
sufficient number of experts. In the example group “A” had the larger number of
participants, but this does not mean that this opinion is the determinant.
A
C
0,5
0,5
0,4
0,4
0,3
0,3
0,2
0,2
0,1
0,1
0
0
Rate of fire
Range
Fragment
effect
Displacement
time
Mobility
Rate of fire
Range
Fragment
effect
Displacement
time
Mobility
Figure3: Weight of the groups [3]
The experts in group “B” without any exception had foreign mission experiences. The
results can also be explained by, that there are opinions that the smaller calibre, lighter
and more battlefield movable devices are desirable, but these are only indicated by the
expert’s own foreign mission experiences. In all cases this supplementary information
from the group decision process has to be dealt with on its proper level by the decision
maker.
4.2 Proposed solution of Group Decision Process
The development of military equipment is fast. The application of troops and the battle
procedure are also changing fast based on the experience of the wars in the last decades.
It follows many different opinions about the future application of the examined military
device.
The army operates military devices from the acquisition to the recycling decades
depending on the type. The cost of devices and its operation and maintenance is very
high and the purchased device has to be usable after the acquisition for a long time. The
mentioned problem is complex and all the available information is needed to solve it.
On one hand the information goes from the market and the military practice on the other
hand it goes from the experience of military person. The task of decision maker is to
choose the most applicable device for the troops. There are many experts who help the
work of the decision maker and they usually prepare the decision which means
comparing the military devices and giving the result of comparison to the decision
maker.
This paper and the [3] and the [4] show that these experts opinions are different. If the
decision maker counts average among these opinions it causes the following problems:
the average do not represent all experts;
and it causes loss of information.
The process of MCDM methods is well defined and the decision maker need objective
result but all method based on criteria and its weight number. The criteria have to be
based on the aims of the decision maker and these criteria importance is different. The
result of calculating weight number based on the experts opinion and it is subjective and
depend especially the experience and the scale of values of the expert. The decision that
means the selection of the optimal device has a long time and great effect therefore all
information and opinion should be important. In this case a suitable mathematical model
that helps to insert all opinion to the decision process has to be searched.
The multivariate statistic suits to solve the group decision problem. The [3] and the [4]
show an example where cluster analysis and multidimensional scaling was used. Both
35
models should be used because in this case the results can be compared. The process
creating subgroups:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Fulfilling AHP questionaries’ by each expert.
Calculating eigenvector of each expert’s paired comparison matrix.
Grouping the expert with multivariate statistic.
Identifying the reason caused by opinion centers.
Solving this problem AHP method is proposed because its outcome is ratio scale weight
numbers. If the AHP process not applicable for instance the number of criteria creating
the preference order of criteria is proposed. The subgroups should be created using rank
correlation methods in this case. Proposed solution of group decision making:
1.
Creating a represent sample of experts.
2.
Identifying subgroups of experts with nearly the same opinion.
3.
Identifying the reason that forms the subgroups.
4.
Using the information identified by subgroups.
5 Conclusion
The paper presented the use of MCDM for comparing military devices. According to
the results it can be stated that the order of priority can be decided in every case. The
comparison may be hindered by the available certified data and information. The lack of
data is most evident in the case of the financial point of view, in that case, when the
comparison is not made during the purchase, but during a decision preparation or an
R&D planning phase.
The comparison of military devices in all cases is a group decision problem, because of
the large number of the affected parties. Stochastic methods provide help in solving
these problems. Important information can be gained by the identification of opinion
centres and by determining the indicating reasons of opinion differences between
individual groups. The opinion centres can be identified by multivariate statistic.
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
36
SAATY, T. L. The Analytic Hierarchy Process: Planning, Priority Settings,
Resource Allocation. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980.
BRANS, J. P., and VINCKE, P. H. A preference ranking organization method
(The PROMETHEE method for multiple critera decision making). Management
Science, 1985, 11(6), 647-656.
GYARMATI, J., FELHÁZI, S., KENDE, G. Choosing the Optimal Mortal for an
Infantry Battalion’s Mortar Battery with Analytic Hierarchy Process using
Multivariate Statistics. NATO RTO, Decision Support Methodologies for
Acquisition of Military Equipment, Symposium Brussels, ISBN:978-92-837-01019, 2009, 1-12.
Available
from:
ftp://ftp.rta.nato.int//PubFullText/RTO/MP/RTO-MP-SAS080/MP-SAS-080-08.doc.
GYARMATI, J. Application of statistical analysis in the selection of the optimum
variant of a 12.7 mm calibre rifle. Academic and Applied Research in Military
Science (ISSN 1588-8789), 2008 7(3), 473-489.
Available from: http://www.zmne.hu/aarms/docs/olume7/Issue3/pdf/09gyar.pdf .
HAHN, E. D. Decision Making with Uncertain Judgment: A Stochastic
Formulation of the Analytic Hierarchy Process. Decision Sciences, 2003 34(3),
443-464.
ENSURING OF COMPETETIVE ADVANTAGE IN THE
MARKETPLACE THROUGH LOGISTICS
Petr Hajna, Vladimír Halenka and Vladislav Vincenec
Abstract: The article deals with the procedures leading to competitive advantage by reducing
costs and increasing the value of the product. Innovation of final products are always
necessary and in the forefront of corporate governance. At the same time on the same level gets
the ability to innovate processes throughout the supply chain and their integration in order to
make them a tool to gain competitive advantage. Long – term use of methods to achieve profit
and maintain its position in the market, cost reduction with time, after which the product is on
the market or with the growing market share, are no longer sufficient in the current conditions.
The key performance indicators of the supply chain, are the cost of goods sold and inventory
turnover.
Keywords: logistics, marketing, logistics management, supply chain, competitive advantage,
business environment, globalization of industry, strategy planning.
1 Introduction
Organizations that are moving on the market, increasingly understand that for better use
of their products or services on the market. And success of their business is necessary
besides a reducing of costs also better serve to customers. It is also clear that these two
goals can not be longer realized only by a standard practice within their own
organizations. Such as increased of labor productivity, reduced of material consumption,
reduce of administrative costs, etc., but it is necessary to make consistent changes in
management of the organization in today's complex market environment. The leading
organization started besides managing of procedures within their own organization to
focus on practices throughout the supply chain (Supply Chain) and moving from
managing their organization's logistics management logistics.
2 Logistics and supply chain management
A key element in logistics and warehouse management are accurate and current
information. Only provided, that you have a current and truthful data, you can begin to
optimize logistics processes inside and outside the organization. We can help you
effectively manage the entire logistics - purchasing, storage, sale, suppliers or transport.
Logistics is essentially focused on plans (plans) for the movement of products and
information in the environment. Supply chain management using the created framework
and seek to integrate and coordinate processes (supplier and customer in the
environment). The objective of supply chain management can be, for example limiting
the amount of assets in the stocks that exist within the organizations of the supply chain
through the sharing of information on demand and current inventory levels. These
approaches require a change of thinking in relations between organizations in the supply
37
Services
chain. Supply chain management is focused on cooperation, trust and understanding that
if the chain is properly managed, is achieved the necessary synergies. One possible
definition of supply chain management is: Management of relationships between
suppliers and customers in order to provide maximum customer value while reducing
costs in the whole supply chain [1]. Supply chain management focuses on monitoring
and control of relationships to profitably for all elements of the chain. Of course, this
can cause conflicts, especially in situations where a very narrow interest of one of the
chain has subordinate the interests of the whole chain of the advantage. The logic of the
foregoing that while we normally use the term supply chain management, more
correctly, we should use the term demand chain management (because the aim of our
the best service
market for goods
highest value added
lowest cost
cost reduction
Figure: 1 Market and competitive advantage
Source: [1]
efforts should be to satisfy the customer, not the supplier), and network, because
relationships are not simply in the process in line but will rather resemble the individual
elements interconnected networks of relationships. Efficient logistics and supply chain
management is the source for competitive advantage. Success in the market is made up
of the basic elements of supply chains, but you can simply say that the most important
are the relationships between our company, customers and competitors. Source of
competitive advantage is the ability of the organization in the eyes of the customer to
differentiate from competitors and to work with lower cost and higher profit. In
a competitive environment, success can bring either an advantage in reducing its own
cost or benefit of increased value added to the consumer - the best concurrence of both.
The traditional way to reduce costs is by increasing the volume of production, the price
per unit decreases with the number of products sold. Logistics and supply chain
management provides many opportunities to increase efficiency and productivity of
each process and thus reduce costs. In many fields of logistics costs represent such
a high proportion of total costs that reach their reduction is possible only general
reorganization of supplier processes. Customers in mature markets don’t seek specific
product (product, service), but look for the best value for their investment money.
38
In other words, the product does not buy them to be customer owned, but because it
expects to receive ownership of the product something "will". For some product prevails
for some of its specific working parameters, others prefer a product having some, for
them attractive performance characteristics. If the product or service is its value does not
differ from others on the market, the customer usually buys cheaply available.
Therefore, it is necessary that the product is somehow differentiate from those similar to
the market. This can be achieved, for example, by adding a specific product added value
to certain market segments. This method experts call "segmentation" of the market [1].
Adding a value becomes a very powerful tool to attract and retain the benefits of the
market. Similarly, it is a powerful tool to add value through additional services. The
market is becoming more and more sensitive to providing respectively. failure to
provide other related services. That is why more and more companies focus on
providing additional services as a means to suppress competition and achieve
competitive advantage. In this context, the suppliers try providing enhanced service
offerings to establish closer relationships with their customers. Expanding services can
be imagine in a wide range of delivery method, providing customer service, financial
services, other technical support, etc. Ways to success in the market can be represented
by a simple graph.
Companies whose market position corresponds to the position at the bottom left of the
graph, are indistinguishable from their competitors, produces high costs do not provide
services beyond the scope provided by competing suppliers. It is only a matter of time
when their market share will drop so much that it disappears. A market will not even
notice it as a loss. The only way to salvation leads in the direction of the arrows by
moving either up or right. Path reducing internal costs such as reducing the proportion
of fixed costs increase sales of products or the close involvement of the customer in the
development of the product, etc. [2] The opportunity may present itself by introducing
new technology, it does not sooner or later be available for competitors. As already
described, the strategy of reducing costs and by increasing production is the traditional
way to reach a competitive advantage. The described strategy is most effective in the
early stages of the sale, allowing you to reach a strategic position in the market and an
advantage over the competition and sometimes even forcing higher-cost producers to
leave the market. The main instrument for achieving benefits through cost reduction,
however, increasingly appears to be a reassessment of the logistics system and supply
chain management. Whereas that in many industries is the cost of a considerable part of
the total logistics cost, the revision can be achieved by substantially greater cost savings
than what can be achieved by increasing production. The second option to leave the area
in the bottom left corner of the graph is the path and provide better service. Customers
in all fields expect more reliability from suppliers and willingness to respond to their
needs, or require shorter lead times, delivery "just-in-time" and related services with
high added value. As already mentioned, the ideal position of the company or its
product on the market is in the upper right corner of the graph in Figure 2 Management
of companies looking for ways to reach these positions. Companies that reach this
position, they are distinguishable from other market players. Products, which they are
offering, providing customers more value than the competition and at the same time
their production is associated with low cost. It can be proved that the logistics
management has the ability to contribute their own company to achieve both benefits:
reducing costs and adding value.
39
3 Logistics management tasks
From the above it is clear that the task of management is to provide logistics planning
and organization of all activities necessary so that the result is the delivery of the best
possible product at the lowest cost. Therefore, the logistics must look as close
interconnection market the feedstock base. Logistics management is a means to satisfy
customer needs by coordinating the flow of material and information between the
market and suppliers (through his own company and its internal and external processes).
In the past, production and marketing was seen as two separately operating processes.
At best, they were held together, not excluding cases where between them flared open
fight. Production priorities were focused on effectiveness and efficiency, which was
achieved by high-serializability, minimal changes and standardization of products.
Marketing on the other hand tried to achieve competitive advantage through supply
variant diversity, raising the necessary services to the customer and very frequent
product innovations. In today's dynamic environment are conflicts between marketing
and production counterproductive and unnecessary. Representatives of both areas must
seek ways to achieve a common goal. It is no coincidence that the last time the
marketing and production of re-entering the center of attention. Marketing is therefore
understanding, the focus on the customer and meet their needs is increasingly seen as
one of the basic strategies of survival in the market. At the same time there is great
pressure to reduce costs, resulting in major changes in the management and organization
of production. The described situation is a logistics integrator of all other processes and
provides a system view on what is happening in the company.
4 Supply chain and competition
Businesses have traditionally seen themselves as the elements that exist on the market
independently and together with other companies competing with each other and fight to
survive. Survives the one who adapts quickly. That attitude prevents many companies
understand the fact that the market is better cooperate to achieve benefits than another
(to destruction) to fight. Although it sounds like a contradiction, it is a simple
expression of the idea of integration of supply chains. The supply chain is a network of
participating organizations, which are interconnected supplier-customer links in many
processes and activities that creates value in the form of product or service provided by
the final consumer. For example, a clothing manufacturer in the supply chain has a link
to the supplier of the substance, which is dependent on producing fiber weaving. On the
other hand, the clothing manufacturer have to work with a distribution network and
stores that his product as quickly as possible, in the required quantity and appropriate
quality is given to the consumer. All companies participating in the supply chain and
design, must work together. So far, this is often not the individual participants and they
don’t work together. Here we must understand that as what we call supply chain, are no
cross-ownership. In the past, a form of management seemed to be optimal, but now
more and more organizations are focusing on those activities that they do best, in which
they have a competitive advantage. The rest of abandoning another form of outsourcing,
more or less part of the work is done outside the organization. A typical example is the
automotive industry, where most of the parts originally came from his own company. At
present, the vast majority of brands focused on developing, marketing and trade, and
production of parts and groups of leaves suppliers. This way of organizing work is of
course not only owns the automobile industry, examples can be found in a wide range of
companies, from sports equipment to computers to home electronics. The trend of
increased use of outsourcing has obviously impacts on supply chain management, at
40
least in coordinating the flow of materials from numerous suppliers (often from abroad)
and distribution of finished products through a large number of intermediaries. The
reason for this is that all the costs in the supply chain ultimately reflected in the price of
the finished product on the market. Companies that aspire to the role of market leader,
understood this fact and are now trying to establish procedures that will make the whole
supply chain more competitive by reducing costs and increasing the value of products.
The above companies understand that competition is not company against company, but
among supply chains.
5 Changes of business environment
Changes that affect current business have also an impact on logistics. It is no
exaggeration to say that the biggest impact of the ongoing changes in the business
environment is just the logistics. What involved changes mainly? This includes the
following changes:
New competitive environment;
Downward pressure on prices;
More significant role of the customer.
New competitive environment
Earlier, it was stated that in the current business is a change in the understanding of the
competition. Now do not compete companies with each other, but there is a competition
between supply chains. It is mainly because the customer requires reliable delivery of
timely delivery of goods, which can only be guaranteed by smoothly functioning
systems able to react quickly to changings of demands of the market. In the past, worked
simple marketing strategies, take a strong brand, run a massive advertising campaign,
along with aggressive selling methods guarantee the success of your product. The
current state of business shows that the former model will no longer be able to satisfy
more customers. Instead, companies must demonstrate that they have the competence
and ability to compete in the market. This can be achieved mainly by the ability to
deliver a product with high customer value. The ability to provide a high added value to
the customer is that the organization will focus on the main processes which are
managed and implement better than the competition. The main processes include the
development, relationships with suppliers and customers, and order fulfillment.
Numerous companies consider now as one of the critical processes the logistics of
supply and distribution logistics. It shortens the life cycle of the product, customers are
embracing practices just-in-time and the market is changing from a seller's market to
41
Number
of days
120
supplier-primary
production
logistics
supply
vehicle
logistics distribution
manufacturers distribution and sale of
100
Resource
s
80
0
60
40
maximum
average
customer
stores
shipment on the way
loading and shipping
work in process – vehicles
shipment on the way
completion components
unfinished installation
work in progress
parts of own production
purchased parts
raw materials
0
production
20
minimum
Figure 2: Course of the stocks in the automotive industry
Source [1]
customer market. In such a situation determines the availability of demand, it is shown
that the decision to purchase a specific product is produced in the time and place of
purchase. These cases, where the ability to influence the success of logistics, concerns
not only the consumer market. The business market is also reflected in the fact that the
parameters of a specific product are less important than the timeliness of delivery and
flexible response to customer needs. This does not mean that the technical parameters
become less important. In parallel with this, as the ability to influence the market shifts
from the supplier to the customer, is the fact that customers want to reduce the number
of their suppliers. Business success in the future will lie in ability how much are they
able to establish mutually beneficial relationships with major customers. Given the
focus on critical customer activity, in case creating of closer relations between him and
the supplier be the case that the supplier will produced directly in the customer's
business and deliver the entire subsystems directly to the production line (method of
just-in-time II). Examples of this procedure are known in the automotive, aerospace and
electronics industries. It has already been mentioned process of shortening of product
life cycle. In extreme cases, it happens that at the request of the market is developed,
manufactured and distributed product that is at the time of placing on the market
obsolete.
42
A good example is the area of personal computing and information technology in
general. Shortening of the life cycle raises of course the fundamental problems for
logistics management. Shortening of life cycle requires shorter supply. It is traditionally
perceived as the time elapsed from the time the order is placed to delivery of goods.
With the change in environment will be necessary to apply a broader view of the time of
delivery and include it in all activities from product design, purchasing, production to
distribution to the market. Already now there are cases where the life cycle is shorter
than the time of delivery.
Downward pressure on prices
Although this is not true in general, in most markets today is significantly larger price
battle than it was twenty years ago. Falling prices in the shops, followed by prices of
components, raw materials and industrial products. This happens especially in sectors
such as consumer electronics, home furnishings, clothing and air transportation. While
part of the decrease in prices can be explained by the normal reduction in prices due to
gain of experiences with the production, a large proportion of cases have other reasons.
Large share of the price reduction can be attributed to new competitors that have entered
the global market. They usually produce quality consumer goods and lower prices by
using its low-cost production base. Another part of downward pressure on prices is due
to the removal of trade barriers, making it easier for new entrants to the market, quickly
establishing itself. It also means that in many industries can be developed an excess of
production capacity, which leads to a surplus of supply over demand, thus creating
further downward pressure on prices. A role in reducing prices also played wide use of
Internet, which enabled previously unthinkable wide price comparison. At the same time
via the Internet realized internet sales, auctions and auction, which in turn puts pressure
on prices. Customers and consumers are during the recent period also focused more on
prices. Situations from the past where manufacturers of branded goods were able to
dictate to customers the price are currently not more possible. On the market are today
comparable products at a significantly lower price, and the customer has a much wider
choice. To maintain profitability must companies find better ways to reduce their own
costs in proportion to decreasing prices. And this at the time when most companies have
already gone through several rounds of 'slimming' diets. All of this shows that the
potential savings for most companies can not find in their own processes, but in the
wider supply chain. It should also be borne in mind that, as we have previously described,
the cost of the entire supply chain Figure 2 shows the status of inventory in the supply
chain in the production of the car from the original supplier to retailer. We see that in
this particular case there was a paradox that most stock is kept in the most expensive
form - finished products. Although the costs of maintaining inventory from one sector
and varies from company to company, the actual average cost of stockholding is rarely
less than 25% of their volume. In a situation in which the automotive industry is, these
costs themselves may decide the creation of profit or loss. The example above clearly
illustrates the need of consider the entire supply chain. Many companies are still
inclined to the assessment and evaluation of their costs within their own society. As
already mentioned, in an environment where individual firms do not compete, but
supply chains, it is necessary to apply a broader perspective on ways to reduce costs and
prices for the final consumer. The need to apply a broader perspective in assessing costs
is further underlined by the expansion of outsourcing to hedge certain activities.
43
More significant role of the customer
The current customer is more demanding, requires top-quality product while providing
comprehensive services at a high level. Goods on the market are becoming more and
more difficult to distinguish its technical parameters. Therefore, the only way to reach
an advantage is through an increase in the total value of the product. This can be
achieved mainly by improving the quality of services provided through customer
service. Customer service can be described as providing comprehensive services in time
and place. In other words, a product for the customer receives value only after he gets
into his hands, and in the time and place requested by the customer. Customer service
can take many forms, from early delivery to ensure customer service. The fundamental
role of customer service is to increase product value and therefore in the eyes of the
customer to increase the price of the base product. Ability to respond to customer's
request in the shortest possible time in terms of meeting the needs of just-in-time crucial
for maintaining existing and gain more customers. These customers require not only a
short time to meet their needs, but also require suppliers of high flexibility and
increasingly customize the product to your requirements. In other words, the supplier
must be able to meet specific customer requirements in less time than ever before.
A key feature in this area is the ability to respond quickly to satisfy customer demand. In
a rapidly changing market environment, rapid response capability even more important
than it used to be taken long-term strategy in the traditional concept of business.
Reliability is one of the basic requirements that customers place on suppliers. For
example, the main reason why companies have safety stock is the uncertainty of future
orders and the ability to deliver the desired product at a customer desired quantity and
time. Significant improvement in reliability can be achieved by a comprehensive
revision of the processes that affect the result of the activity. Leaders in manufacturing
have long understood that the quality of products cant be increase by thorough control of
finished products, but rather it is necessary to focus on the processes and ongoing
management. And, this is true in the area of supply processes. The key to increase the
reliability of logistics is to improve the view of the movement of materials and products
throughout the supply chain. Often, can come to creation of the lack of an overview of
the demand for a particular material or product. The situation becomes worse with the
increasing distance of the location from supplier in demand in the supply chain. As an
example, manufacturers of thin sheets have only a very limited view of the need for this
material in the automotive industry. If the supply chain achieve improved overview of
the state of the processes, the level of inventories and needs, reliability of the whole
chain is significantly increased. Resistance to external influences in today's turbulent
market environment plays an essential role. Political, economic and business
environment is increasingly subject to unexpected shocks and fluctuations. Resilient
supply chains around the chain will not be the lowest cost, but they are capable of
dealing with most of the disruption of the business environment. A characteristic feature
of resilient supply chain means recognizing and describing knowledge of the most
vulnerable places. Key is the administration, organization (controlling) and management
bottlenecks and supply chain relationships. The critical path in the supply chain is
usually found where the passage of a chain depends on a single supplier or suppliers
with long lead times. Well adjusted and maintained customer-supplier relationships in
supply chains play a key role. It has already been shown that customers tend to reduce
the number of suppliers. In many industries, is the use of a single source of a certain
commodity or product standard practice. Businesses that use this practice, highlight
44
increasing of quality control, sharing, innovation, and reduce costs and simplify
production planning and supply.
6 Conclusion
The article deals with strategies leading to competitive advantage by reducing costs and
increasing the value of the product. From the above it is clear that the long-used method
to achieve gain and maintain market position, cost reduction with time, after which the
product is on the market, respectively, with a growing share of the market, not under
current conditions is sufficient. Management companies must look for other ways to
achieve competitive advantage, especially in the area of logistics and supply chains. It is
necessary to use yet neglected opportunities of the service sector of the service for
customers. Productivity can increase simultaneously reducing unnecessary production
and storage capacity, reducing the volume of assets and inventories. Another way is
closer and more effective cooperation with suppliers. And that is dominated by wellthought-out strategy planning and logistics management and supply chain in its entirety,
from providing raw materials to ensure quality services for customers and consumers.
The key performance indicators of the supply chain are the cost of goods sold and
inventory turnover. Structure of businesses leaving the original line management
structure based on ownership interests in companies and subordinates will be more use
of closely related business processes and financial links between different entities
supply chains. The current competitive pressures force companies to forget the former
rivalry and distrust. The requirement for speed and flexibility to meet market demands
greater openness and mutual trust. Innovation of final products are still necessary in the
forefront of business management at the same time on the same level gets the ability to
innovate processes throughout the supply chain and their integration in order to create
one tool to gain competitive advantage.
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
CHRISTOPHER, M. Logistics and Supply Chain Management, Third Edition,
Pearson Education Limited, London, 2005. ISBN: 978-13-0-273-68176-2.
GROS, I., GROSOVÁ, S. Delivery Systems, Jutta GROUP s.r.o., Přerov. 2012.
ISBN 978-80-87179-20-8.
PORTER, M. E. Competitive Strategy, The Free Press, 1980.
PORTER, M. E. Competitive Advantage, The Free Press, 1985.
PERNICA, P. Logistics Management - theory and business practice, Radix, spol.
Ltd., Prague, 1998. ISBN: 80-86031-13-6.
45
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN THE MILITARY
OPERATIONS
Aleš Komár, Miroslav Cempírek and Vladislav Vincenec
Abstract: Modern Army must protect the environment both during implementation of the
operation and after operations, if it does not jeopardize its success. The inclusion of
environmental considerations into planning and decision-making process is the responsibility
of the commander. The article covers ways of dealing with the environmental safety in the
Czech military regulation and, documents in the Alliance, with an emphasis on commander’s
responsibility procedures in accordance with doctrines NATO.
Keywords: Environmental protection, military operations, NATO EP standards,
environmental responsibility.
1 Introduction
Environmental issues in the conduct of military operations can have a significant impact
on the targets fulfilment of the operation and the overall success of the civilian
reconstruction. Commanders in the conduct of the military operations should take all
practicable steps to protect the health of soldiers, civilians and the environment. In terms
of command of the Army of the Czech Republic is the main scope of the environmental
issues in military operations transferred to the authorities of logistics. The principle
should be that the condition of environmental protection of military bases and
operational area, after the termination of operations and closing bases should not be
worse than the original condition. In order to achieve this objective, the commanders
and the other members of the armed forces know how military operations affect the
environment and know the laws, doctrines and regulations governing this area. It is the
responsibility of commanders that include environmental protection in their planning
processes and respect in the performance of operational tasks. Commanders must
enforce environmental policies and operating practices that are environmentally
friendly.
The focus must be directed at
a)
prevention, by concentrating efforts to prevent pollution and reduce or eliminate
pollution at the source,
b)
protection of natural resources and cultural heritage,
c)
compliance with laws on environmental protection and
d)
clearance of contaminated areas and restoration of contaminated sites.
Underestimation of environmental issues may increase the risk of contamination and
thus the cost of subsequent regeneration of the original condition.
46
2 Current State
The internal regulations of the army help to fulfil the provisions generally applicable
law. Environmental protection in the defence sector is pursued by number of internal
rules. The most important are the rules governing the obligations of commanders and of
army officials. Legislation on the environment is based on EU law that is respected in
other states and armies of the Alliance. Environmental law becomes the basis of
policies, doctrines, procedures and other documents of NATO. Internal regulations of
the Army of the Czech Republic are focused on generally valid environmental safety
conditions of military activities. Commander directs and leads not only to a combat
soldier readiness, but also to observe standards of safety, fire precautions, health and the
environment [1].
Unit commander shall, especially in particular implementation of combat preparations
proceed in accordance with the basic order, which generally contains the basic
requirements for compliance with environmental safety. They realize analysis and
evaluation, always after performing the tasks in the operation, in order to evaluate and
use the acquired knowledge and experience to correct identified deficiencies and use of
best practices in the field of environmental protection (lesson indentified). they control
the preparation of processing services plan in the period of military operations and
specify the tasks directly subordinate functionaries according to environmental
conditions, the environment in which the operation is complete (use of learned
lesson) [2]. Elements of logistic in the field, such as technology parks field dispensaries
fuels and lubricants, with a gathering of damaged equipment repair shops are usually the
biggest risk of environmental pollution in field conditions during operations.
3 Responsibility of commanders and procedures to protect of the environment
Damage of the environment is one of the possible negative consequences of military
operations. Responsibility of each commander in the operation is set to meet the primary
military task, but is hampered by many conditions. In the area of environmental
protection, commanders and units involved in military operations, for example, restrict
the legal provisions of the country in which operate written and unwritten conventions,
local doctrines, etc. It is important that commanders in their decision-making process
were able to choose correctly between the levels of performance of the principal goals
and objectives of secondary operations, such as a minimum the impact of military
operations on the environment.
3.1 Responsibility of commanders
Commanders bear responsibility for the overall integration of environmental protection
during the planning military missions and during his management activities within their
jurisdiction. They must prove their ability to lead subordinates and to present the
importance of environmental safety in their management activities.
It must also ensure the operational planning phases, exploration and actual operation,
involvement of experts in environmental safety. Responsibility of commanders for
environmental protection during NATO-led military operations highlights a number of
regulations. The main responsibility of NATO commanders is achieving their military
tasks.
Commanders at all levels should:
"Increase environmental awareness and promote the protection of environment by
their subordinates;
47
-
identify and assign clear responsibility and funding resources, for example staff
and equipment to reach the targets of environmental objectives;
consider environmental impacts in decision making;
ensure compliance, if possible in the success of the mission in accordance with
applicable laws and agreements on the environment;
ensure the prudent use of natural resources;
strengthen relations with neighbouring units in solving environmental problems;
incorporate the concept of pollution prevention into all military activity by
promoting reuse, recycling,, best available techniques and processes substitution,
improved operational efficiency and training "[3].
3.2 Procedures for commanders
Environmental protection in military operations must be organized and conducted in
accordance with the valid legislation of the Czech Republic, which is consistent with
EU legislation, internal regulations of the Army of the Czech Republic [1, 2, 4],
STANAG agreements [3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9], and standard operating procedures have devised
for different types of operations. Commanders must consider the consequences of their
decisions on the environment in time and consistently. First of all, needs to focus on:
protection of health and safety of soldiers and minimize the risks to the
environment;
improve community relations, for example in solving waste problems;
improve environmental safety training prior to deployment;
investment in skilled workers and innovative environmental technologies;
the inclusion of issues of environmental safety into everyday activities;
search for new prevention solutions protect the environment;
shortening the logistics chain, which creates less need for convoys, reducing the
threat to soldiers load and environment;
building environmentally safer and more efficient bases;
selection of stable areas suitable for new environmental troop deployment.
4 Planning for environmental protection
Planning is the foundation of each operation. Protecting the environment but sometimes
in some of the plans of operations, but also in normal peacekeeping troops is
underestimated. Units do not realize that their negligent behaviour can endanger both at
first the environment in which they operate, as well as their own health and jeopardizing
the successful performance of their duties at the place of deployment. Military
operations are generally characterized by phases of varying duration depending on their
nature, intensity and complexity.
48
Level of environmental protection in %
100
80
60
40
20
0
Training
Mobilization
Phase
of
deployment
Operational Post
operative
phase
phase
Redeployment
of troops
from operation
Training
Figure 1: The degree of environmental protection in the phases of the operation [11]
To perform the operation, it is necessary the planning, preparation, training units,
reconnaissance in the area of deployment, the deployment of forces and resources, the
operating performance of the task, comprehensive support deployed troops and their
rotation or redeployment [10]. Environmental issues must be integrated into operational
planning. The rate of inclusion of environmental considerations into operational
planning will depend on the maturity of the commanders, planners and logisticians. It
will, however, vary depending on the tasks performed at each stage of the operation. In
some armies, such as the U.S. Army, this fact is enshrined in military regulations, as we
can see in the following figure 1.
As the chart shows, the greatest emphasis on environmental protection and planning is
given in the initial phases of the operation including training, where they have obtained
the necessary habits for the implementation of activities. Environmental security
objectives must be carefully planned before operation is started. The unit must
immediately upon arrival in the operating space forces begin to fulfil specified tasks.
Environmental measures in the operational phase decreasing to zero but it can always be
changed according to unforeseen events and the need to change the planning.
Nevertheless, environmental protection is not core strategy of military tasks and stress is
laid on military success.
Environmental security is gaining importance towards the end of the operation, when is
a necessity to carry the evaluation of the effects of operation on the environment. After
that is necessary to remove the damages and return the area to its state before starting
the operation.
5 Conclusion
Research has shown that before and after the operation, the environmental law is fully
exercised by the commanders. Success is a commander operation priority and so during
the operation comes to the forefront meets the objectives of the operation. The inclusion
of environmental issues in the regular training of security forces is a prerequisite for the
successful fulfilment of the requirements for environmental protection in the operation.
Prerequisite for rigorous safety planning environmental protection is immediately on
receipt commander's intent. Commanders carry the responsibility for implementation of
49
environmental regulations and the implementation of appropriate procedures for the
operation. Each NATO country develops knowledge in the field of environmental
security in fundamental issues of environmental protection in their armed forces.
A similar approach is used in the Army of the Czech Republic. Commanders carry
responsibility for preparing their subordinates in the field and every soldier should be
able to consult the relevant documents and norms that solve this area.
Proper preparation of training helps to prevent or minimize the negative impacts of
military activities on the environment. Proper training tasks and goals of the operation
and the risk of damage to health and the environment will decrease. After termination of
operations and closure of bases, it is necessary to conduct a survey of the environment,
which revealed shortcomings and prevent further damage to the environment. The
ecologization of military activities also reduces the cost of operation and compensation
for damage after its completion. Higher levels of environmental security will be
achieved the Army of the Czech Republic via implementations above NATO
standardization agreements.
References
MoD. Zákl-1. Basic Regulation of Armed Forces. Prague. 1992.
MoD. Vševojsk-1-1 Responsibilities of unit’s commanders of the Czechoslovak
Army. Prague. 1993.
[3] NATO Standardization Agency (NSA). STANAG 7141 EP. Joint NATO Doctrine
for Environmental Protection During NATO Led Activities. (AJEPP 4). 5th Ed.
Brussels: NSA, 2008.
[4] MoD. Všeob-P-5 Parks Military Techniques in the Ministry of Defence and their
operation. (Military regulation). Prague. 2003.
[5] NATO. Standardization Agency (NSA). STANAG 7141st Joint NATO Doctrine
for Environmental Protection During NATO Led Activities. (AJEPP 4). 5th Ed.
Brussels: NSA, 2008.
[6] NATO. Joint NATO Waste Management Requirements During NATO Military
Activities. STANAG 2510th (AJEPP 5). 2nd Ed. Brussels: NATO Standardization
Agency. 2009.
[7] NATO. Environmental Protection Best Practices for Sustainability of Military
Training Areas. AJEPP 7th (STANAG 2594). NATO Standardization Agency
(NSA). Ingolstadt, 2012.
[8] NATO. Best Practices for Environmental Protection Military Compound in
NATO Operations. AJEPP-2. (STANAG 2581). Brussels: NATO Standardization
Agency (NSA). 2010.
[9] NATO. Environmental Management System in NATO Operations. AJEPP-3.
(STANAG 2583). Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency (NSA). 2011.
[10] DoA. Environmental guidebook for military operations. USA: Department of the
Army HQ, 2008. 118 p.
[11] DoD. Field Manual 3-100.4. USA: Department of the Army HQ. 2000.
[1]
[2]
50
COST EVALUATION OF THE OPERATION OF MILITARY
GROUND EQUIPMENT
Petr Křížek, Karel Filip, Zbyšek Korecki, Jaromír Mareš and Radka Lopourová
Abstract: Efficiency of expenses during lifetime of the product is gradually getting more and
more important point of view in an assessment of military ground equipment (MGE). This paper
deals with analyze of many point of view related to the operation of MGE. Analysis is divided
into analysis of operational costs, analysis of expected/estimated costs for general repairs and
analysis of the expenses for maintenance and acquisition of the parts and consumable
materials. Article deals with questions of utilization, existence or absence of relevant standards
as well.
Keywords: cost evaluation, operation of military equipment
1 Introduction
Department of Defense (DoD) make an effort to launch – launch of activity planning
accordance to costs of individual activity, not pursuant to expected costs like was before
2011. However to the evaluation of mentioned activities there are missed financial
standards yet. On the other hand to the evaluation of expected costs of MGE the
financial standards already exist. One of the financial standard group of MGT is related
to operation indicators, second of the group is engaged to expected price of general
repair and third of the group is counted as a multiple of 1000 crowns to ensuring
common repairs. In a third case of the group is hard to talk about that as a standard. Up
to now is common to separate planning of operation costs from activities. Operation
costs are intended as a complex for each cost center. [1, 2, 3].
The goal of this article is outline of a possible way how interconnect estimated costs
with activities of DoD – cost center [5].
2 Financial standards to secure of the operation of military ground equipment
To provision of the operation of MGE financial standards are divided into two
independent groups.
One of the groups is created by price of general repairs. This price was determined by
calculation list of civic repair companies during period time - from 2006 to 2009. For
each planned period is possible to refresh financial standards - in dependence of
inflation or in context of price evaluation on the market [4].
Second group is created by estimated costs related to securing of operation and
operability of military equipment. It consists of two parts [6]:
Fixed part – used for an accomplishment of the prescribed tasks regardless to
consumption of operational indicators – accomplishment of prescribed tasks –
closely tied up to INA or prescribed by producer (supplier);
51
Variable part – related to the unit of operational indicators. Including costs
linked to own use of operational military equipment, cost linked to assigned tasks
prescribed by producer, supplier or imposed by law regulation.
For determination of financial standards of secure operation MGE were used following
criterions:
Direct operating costs – come out of consumption and purchase certain material or
service essential to secure operation of specific type military equipment in a
period of 3 years by using data from logistics information system of (LIS)
(subsystem “Maintenance of the military equipment”), operational standards of a
fuel consumption, including standards for lifetime of the consumable materials,
operational documentation for maintenance and change of the flue and oil and
etc., paper documentation registered at the military units
For determination direct costs of operation MGE there are not included –
acquisition costs, mandatory expenses related to ground equipment operations and
service expenses (if it is not stated different way e.g. technical checks (TCh),
emissions (EM), toll sticker, legal insurance, general repairs).
Parts of financial standards contained following items:
o Fuel – costs linked to the amount of fuel consumption during operation
(km or rather Mh), price of a flue, operational standards of consumption,
amount of the consumption of operational unit.
o Motor oil and grease – means all operational substances except for fuel.
Including e.g. motor oils, lube and many kinds of protective matters.
o Tires – cost related to tire’s changes of a particular type of equipment –
linked to average lifetime of a tire,
o AKB – cost related to the accumulator’s changes linked to average
lifetime.
o Material acquisition to secure of maintenance – means all material used
during maintenance except fuel. E.g. filters, paint, lamps and other
material according to technological procedure)
o Service acquisition to secure of a maintenance – concern to particular
types of MGE, like motorcar, bus etc. where is supposed cooperation
with civic service company)
o Regular repairs – spare-part’s acquisition – include purchasing costs
of spare-parts. Spare parts required for regular repairs of MTG.
o Regular repairs – service acquisition – linked to the purchasing cost of
a service. Regular repairs assured by civic companies).
In present time from financial standards was removed items linked to tires, because
there was created new standard related to tires’ acquisition.
Financial standards of regular repairs were determined in the past - on the basis of
analysis of spare part’s consumption and service consumption linked to the regular
repairs in last 3 years. In consequence of analysis of this problem it was set up as casual
item with different costs of repair by the same type of equipment. For planning purpose
and utilization of the mentioned operation costs/expenses were set up by calculation 30% as a part of total cost on operation of a particular type of equipment.
Data actualization is realized in regular period time by logistic specialists. Including
maintenance of all data in “Information system of logistics” (LIS). Particular data are
associated to certain group of item and stock number of item. Date actualization can be
accomplished for a whole group of item as well as for each item [3].
-
52
3 GME operation cost evaluation
Evaluation of operational costs of GME forms the important element of expenses
monitoring process related to the MOD activities. Cost evaluation is really demanding
process depended on the precise implementation of data connected to real expenses
related to equipment services, equipment operation, activities of military repairs
personnel and spare parts and other materiel being consumed.
Workshop specialist performance and working hours have to be correctly recorded. It is
not about newly acquired information but it is necessary to change the way of its
recording. In the past, information was recorded only into paper documents and
evaluated generally. Nowadays, data is recorded into LIS, subsystem UVT (equipment
maintenance) and is summed with the total equipment cost during its whole life-cycle.
GME cost operation monitoring also proceeds from the conditions of new equipment
PANDUR or TATRA T-810 acquisition when resort is obliged to provide the suppliers
with information related to life-cycle cost monitoring.
Based on the cooperation among department of operation GME of Section of logistics
MOD and Military Technical Institute of Ground Forces in Vyškov (formally one of
divisions of VOP 026 Šternberk s. f.) operation indicators and other data from LIS were
set in order to be able to determine life-cycle cost of PANDUR and T-810. Their
definition comes from AAP 48 and its Czech version ČOS 051655 „Stages and
processes of systems life-cycle in NATO“, see Table 1.
Table 1 Summary list of focused weapon system data
O. n. Data
1.
2.
4.
5.
6.
7.
annual kilometers run over per vehicle ride
annual kilometers run over per vehicle ride with cargo
annual kilometers run over per vehicle ride without
cargo
Annual consumption of fuel per vehicle
Annual consumption of fuel per vehicle with cargo
Annual consumption of fuel per vehicle without cargo
Price of fuel
8.
Accumulator lifetime
9.
10.
11.
No data (data involved into point 5.1.6)
Accumulator price
12.
vehicle tire lifetime
13.
Tire price
Price of other materiel per year of vehicle operation
(shooting exercise included)
Annual number of break through projectiles being shot
from armored vehicle gun
Annual number of fragmentation and explosive
projectiles shot from armored vehicle gun
Annual number of training projectiles being shot from
vehicle gun
Gun break through projectile price
Gun fragmentation and explosive projectile price
Gun training projectile price
3.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Unit
Note
[km/year]
[Mh/ year]
[Mh/ year]
[l/ year]
[l/ year]
[l/year]]
[CZK/l]
[year]
To be determined by producer
within data export into Omega
Data about change (consumed
spare parts)
[CZK/pc]
[km]
Data about change (consumed
spare parts)
[CZK/pc]
[CZK/pc]
[pc/year]
[pc/year]
[pc/year]
[CZK/pc]
[CZK/pc]
[CZK/pc]
53
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
54
Annual number of projectiles being shot from vehicle
machine gun
Machine gun projectile average price
Number of smoke grenades being shot by smoke device
per vehicle
Smoke grenade price
Annual ATGM (anti-tank a guided missile) number
being shot by vehicles
ATGM price
Distance between each vehicles preventive maintenance
within particular year
Period between each vehicles preventive maintenance
within particular year
Number of spare parts „x“ being changed per one
activity within preventive maintenance per each vehicle
Spare parts prices being changed per one activity within
preventive maintenance per each vehicle
Preventive maintenance labor-intensity of each vehicle
reduced by labor-intensity of spare parts change defined
in vehicle logistical decomposition
Average cost per 1 Nh of preventive maintenance
Prices of other materiel being consumed within one
activity of each vehicle preventive maintenance (% from
spare parts price)
Motor oil quantity within preventive maintenance
Motor oil price within preventive maintenance
Gear oil 1 quantity within preventive maintenance
Gear oil 1 price within preventive maintenance
Gear oil 2 quantity within preventive maintenance
Gear oil 2 price within preventive maintenance
Oil quantity power steering within preventive
maintenance
Oil price power steering within preventive maintenance
Brake fluid quantity within preventive maintenance
Brake fluid price within preventive maintenance
Quantity cooling liquid within preventive maintenance
Price of cooling liquid within preventive maintenance
Additive quantity into cooling liquid for preventive
maintenance
Additive price into cooling liquid within preventive
maintenance
Windshield washer liquid quantity within preventive
maintenance
Windshield washer liquid price within preventive
maintenance
Quantity of coolant into air-condition within preventive
maintenance
Price of coolant into air-condition within preventive
maintenance
Multipurpose lubricant quantity within preventive
maintenance
Multipurpose lubricant price within preventive
maintenance
[pc/year]
[CZK/pc]
[pc/year]
[CZK/pc]
[pc/year]
[CZK/pc]
[km]
[time]
[pc]
[CZK]
[Nh]
Labor-intensity per tenders,
reduction out of ISL (in ISS)
[CZK]
[CZK]
[l]
[CZK/l]
[l]
[CZK/l]
[l]
[CZK/l]
[l]
[CZK/l]
[l]
[CZK/l]
[l]
[CZK/l]
[l]
[CZK/l]
[l]
[CZK/l]
[l]
[CZK/l]
[kg]
[CZK/kg]
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
Hydraulic liquid quantity within preventive maintenance
Hydraulic liquid price within preventive maintenance
Lubricant 1 quantity for cannon within preventive
maintenance
Lubricant 1 price for cannon within preventive
maintenance
Lubricant 2 quantity for cannon within preventive
maintenance
Lubricant 2 price for cannon within preventive
maintenance
Distances between failures of particular parts of each
vehicle
Labor-intensity of parts change per each vehicle
Number of shots between failures of arm systems
Prices of changed spare parts
Annual number of each vehicle repairs
Labor-intensity of each vehicle repair reduced by laborintensity of spare parts change defined in vehicle
logistical decomposition
Average cost per 1 Nh of repairs
Prices of other materiel being consumed within one
activity of each vehicle repair (% from spare parts price)
Distances between failures of particular part of the 4th
level of repairs of each vehicle
Number of shots between arm systems failures
Particular part repair price within the 4th level of repairs
of each vehicle
Labor-intensity of particular part change within the 4th
level of repairs of each vehicle
prices of other materiel being consumed within one part
change per vehicle
Period until revision RE 10 of each vehicle
Period until legal revision of each vehicle
revision RE 10 price
Legal revision price
Distance until GR (general repair) per each vehicle
GR price
Average number of short-term deposition of one vehicle
per year
Price of one short-term deposition
Average number of long-term depositions per year
Price of one long-term deposition
[l]
[CZK/l]
[kg]
[CZK/kg]
[kg]
[CZK/kg]
[km]
[Nh]
[pc]
[CZK]
[pc]
[Nh]
[CZK]
[CZK]
[km]
[pc]
[CZK]
[Nh]
[CZK]
[year]
[year]
[CZK]
[CZK]
[km]
[CZK]
[pc]
[CZK]
[pc]
[CZK]
Life-cycle cost monitoring has been centralized into one project – OMEGA and LIS has
been adjusted in an appropriate way. Changes were managed by Armaments division of
MoD at first and then indicated by MGE operation department. Application has not
been finished yet because of missing definition of export format which would enable to
use data in other software applications for evaluation and benchmarking purposes as
was guaranteed by the product supplier.
In January 2010 routine operation of tenders PANDUR, DINGO, IVECO, T-810, Land
Rover, modernized tank and armored vehicles (BMP) management was launched in ISL
by means of internal directive of the Armaments division director. Military units
55
manage the above mentioned tenders in conformity with the directive (based on ISL
data analysis) but with several problems.
Within the period of new information systems implementation people usually do not
trust the new things and collect data in an old paper format. It means for the system that
spare parts which have been consumed for maintenance reasons are not involved into
accounting documents. Numbers of tenders involved into old paper books of repairs are
different from tender identifications within LIS. This situation results in inaccuracy and
distortion of data involved in ISL.
Data related to cost of KBV vehicle operation per 18 months period can be seen from
table 2.
Table 2 Report of maintenance and repairs being executed via own power and their price
without materiel
2011
o. n.
Maintenance
labor-intensity
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
42
42
42
42
24
42
42
56
42
24
24
24
24
24
30
24
24
24
24
price
21 840,21 840,21 840,21 840,12 480,21 840,21 840,-
1.
Repairs
laborintensity
30
48
price
Maintenance
laborintensity
15 600,-
Term 2012
Repairs
price
laborintensity
4
42
21 840,-
42
21 840,-
42
54
42
42
42
21 840,28 080,21 840,21 840,21 840,-
24
24
12 480,12 480,-
31
48
48
48
48
24
71
72
72
72
64
60
16 120,24 960,24 960,24 960,24 960,12 480,36 920,37 440,37 440,37 440,33 280,31 200,-
price
2 080,-
3
1 560,-
3
54
1 560,28 080,-
6
3 120,-
8
4 160,-
24 960,-
21 840,-
12 480,12 480,12 480,12 480,12 480,15 600,-
24
12 480,-
6
3 120,-
36
18 720,-
12 480,12 480,12 480,12 480,-
36.
37.
Total
564 293 280,-
144
72
72
1156
74 880,-
37 440,37 440,601 120,-
78
40 560,-
Note: equipment under o. n. 24 – 37 was delivered by the end of 2011 [6].
Table 3 List of particular operation rates of weapon system
2011
2012
P
O. n.
km
price
Shots from
gun
Shots price
1.
7
1 218,-
2.
1121
195 054,-
126
677 376,-
Shots from
machine
guns
Shots price
2120
63 600,-
610
106 140,-
270
8 100,-
964
167 736,-
km
price
Shots from
gun
Shots price
Shots from
machine
guns
Shots price
165
4 950,-
21
112 896,-
701
21 030,-
3.
377
65 598,-
261
1 403 136,-
42
1 260,-
420
73 080,-
4.
1964
341 736,-
533
2 865 408,-
1730
51 900,-
1178
204 972,-
26
139 776,-
1060
31 800,-
5.
5
870,-
240
1 290 240,-
1205
36 150,-
324
56 376,-
15
80 640,-
550
16 500,-
6.
3308
575 592,-
148
693 480,-
670
20 100,-
6
1 044,-
7.
890
154 860,-
954
165 996,-
8.
533
92 742,-
30
161 280,-
250
7 500,-
431
74 994,-
11
59 136,-
9.
2185
380 190,-
73
254 640,-
200
6 000,-
650
113 100,-
10.
17
2 958,-
2
348,-
11.
1601
278 574,-
40
1 200,-
404
70 296,-
12.
848
147 552,-
52
279 552,-
422
12 660,-
3
522,-
13.
1378
239 772,-
30
161 280,-
348
10 440,-
801
139 374,-
14.
3093
538 182,-
43
129 000,-
100
3 000,-
1056
183 744,-
15.
1321
229 854,-
43
231 168,-
1968
342 432,-
16.
619
107 706,-
45
241 920,-
523
91 002,-
17.
2930
509 820,-
149
801 024,-
352
10 560,-
2127
370 098,-
18.
1091
189 834,-
135
725 760,-
516
15 480,-
914
159 036,-
19.
2025
352 350,-
207
1 112 832,-
935
28 050,-
612
106 488,-
20.
2302
400 548,-
80
430 080,-
300
9 000,-
618
107 532,-
21.
2265
394 110,-
42
225 792,-
20
600,-
986
171 564,-
12
22.
1015
176 610,-
76
408 576,-
340
10 200,-
1075
187 050,-
23.
2237
389 238,-
777
135 198,-
24.
1350
234 900,-
1023
178 002,-
25.
1154
200 796,-
1364
26.
1341
233 334,-
415
27.
3038
528 612,-
28.
691
120 234,-
29.
1148
30.
10
120
11
53 760,-
645 120,-
59 136,-
30
900,-
250
7 500,-
70
2 100,-
375
11 250,-
700
21 000,-
340
10 200,-
500
15 000,-
445
13 350,-
260
7 800,-
64 512,-
540
16 200,-
7
37 632,-
110
3 300,-
10
53 760,-
50
1 500,-
237 336,-
15
80 640,-
1150
34 500,-
72 210,-
15
80 640,-
490
14 700,-
1974
343 476,-
294
1 580 544,-
2000
60 000,-
11
1 914,-
71
381 696,-
35
1 050,-
199 752,-
4
696,-
67
360 192,-
45
1 350,-
2168
377 232,-
5
870,-
559
3 005 184,-
852
25 560,-
31.
2045
355 830,-
31
5 394,-
458
2 462 208,-
382
11 460,-
32.
1713
298 062,-
171
29 754,-
278
1 494 528,-
470
14 100,-
33.
396
68 904,-
1771
308 154,-
34.
1684
293 016,-
8
1 392,-
46
247 296,-
129
3 870,-
35.
1652
287 448,-
677
117 798,-
361
1 940 736,-
965
28 950,-
36.
1384
240 816,-
618
107 532,-
287
1 542 912,-
713
21 390,-
37.
2257
392 718,-
311
54 114,-
66
354 816,-
1816
54 480,-
Total
56524
9 835 176,-
25791
4 487 634,-
2796
15 031 296,-
15228
456 840,-
10
2323
53 760,-
12 146 304,-
10
9870
300,-
296 100,-
4 Conclusion
To sum up the most important information it is necessary to emphasize that the more
precisely data will be entered into ISL, the more precise and reliable will be the final
57
information. Quantity of collected data has not been increased; only approach to their
collection and controlling has changed.
By means of LIS quantity of partial reports related to repair activities is minimized. On
the other hand development of LIS and its subsystems has to continue together with the
task to connect it to other information systems for planning and accounting (FIS,
APV,VP etc.)
Based on the acquired data it is necessary to deal with verification of data being entered
by the users. This type of data cannot be found anywhere else.
LIS will be adjusted from the point of view of maintenance and repair materiel
shipment in such a way that there will be only one tender number generated by LIS on
each document. This is the only way how to reach complete and reliable overview of
MGE operational costs.
Similar way of costs monitoring is possible to be used for activity based costing.
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
58
Č.j.: 6272-2/2006/DP-3042. Směrnice pro používání pozemní vojenské techniky
AČR v míru. Praha. GŠ AČR, 2006.
RMO č. 24/2010 Plánování činnosti a rozvoje v resortu Ministerstva obrany
z 5. května 2010. V současné době nahrazeno RMO 66/2012.
OCHRANA, F. Nákladově užitkové metody ve veřejném sektoru. Praha, Ekopress,
s. r. o., 2005. ISBN 80-86119-96-3.
KUNC, S. Manažerská ekonomika v podmínkách AČR. Brno. 2007.
ISBN 80-7231-168-9.
KUNC, S. Řízení nákladů v AČR. Vojenské rozhledy. 2003. 1. ISSN 1210-3292.
KŘÍŽEK, P. Současný stav hodnocení nákladovosti provozu pozemní vojenské
techniky [Written thesis for the state doctoral examination]. Brno, 2013, 42 s.
MILITARY TRAINING AREAS - PLACES WITH HIGH NATURE
CONSERVATION VALUE
Milota Kustrová
Abstract: The term military areas covers a wide and heterogeneous range of terrains and
infrastructures owned and/or used by the armed forces. Most of the military areas, and
especially those used for training and testing, contain significant, even spectacular, amounts of
natural and semi natural habitats and landscapes, with corresponding abundances of wildlife.
Sometimes they are among the richest and most important sites for biodiversity in the country.
The article deals with the description of military training areas from the nature conservation
perspective, talks about the importance and nature conservation projects in military areas in
some European countries.
Keywords: military training area, nature conservation
1 Introduction
At first view, military practice and nature conservation have little in common. But:
Since military areas are less fragmented and benefit from a rather low impact of
agriculture and forestry they are of utter importance to conservation. The military areas
used for training and firing exercises stand out as large areas, uninterrupted by roads or
built-up areas. Size is an important ecological condition for the population dynamics of
many species. The French Ministry of Defence is one of the country’s biggest
landowners, controlling 265,000 ha, 0.5% of the total national territory. 13 military
camps alone account for 40%, or 108,600 ha. The UK’s Ministry of Defence owns
240,000 ha in total, 1% of total British land territory. The natural value of this estate is
illustrated by the fact that it includes 190 SSSI (Sites of Special Scientific Interest, the
most stringent protection level under national legislation in the UK). The Italian armed
forces control a territory whose total surface is 170,100 ha, four times the surface of the
nation’s flagship Abruzzo National Park. This includes 331 training areas, half of which
are used as firing or shooting range, and about 200 sites occupied by lighthouses and
radar devices.[1] In all these areas public access is strictly forbidden, as well as any kind
of exploitation, including building, agriculture and tourism development.
Many rural areas have lost ecological gradients as a result of rural land consolidation
programs and intensification of agriculture. These processes bypassed military areas.
Many military areas have a high biodiversity because they were never used
agriculturally, and so were never fertilized. A basic ecological principle is that the
number of different plant species on a site increases as that site’s soil and water
becomes poorer in nutrients. An oligotrophic environment means that microhabitats,
each with their peculiar plants and animals, stand out more clearly, whereas when soil
and water become enriched with nitrogen and phosphorus (i.e. eutrophic) the ecosystem
becomes more uniform and biodiversity declines. Some areas have been used only as
59
military areas for very long periods, during which other users were not allowed in, or
much constrained in their activities. This meant no intensive agriculture, no residential
building, no quarrying or mining, no hydrological changes, etc. Hence, natural processes
(like river erosion and sedimentation processes, mobile dunes, accumulation of dead
wood in forests) could take place untrammelled over large areas and – often – on intact
soils. The armed forces may not originally have had the intention to preserve large tracts
of natural heritage, but the fact that de facto they have done so, deserves to be
acknowledged.
2 The impact of military activities on nature
The general public usually considers military training areas as a devastated moonscape.
This opinion is widespread especially among those who have never been to a military
area, or who lack the necessary information. People are often convinced that operations
in the military areas cause large-scale contamination by chemical or radioactive combat
substances, fuels, destruction of vegetation and soil, killing animals or disturbance by
excessive noise. These negative factors, if they do occur, usually affect only small sites
within the military areas which are intensively used for training. Much larger areas of
military districts, however, serve only as a buffer zone for the intensively used parts and
military operations are almost never carried out here, or only irregularly and very rarely.
Such extensive buffer zones are needed primarily for safety reasons. They often serve as
important refuge for endangered species and communities. Human activities with
negative impact on the natural environment, such as over-intensive agriculture and
forestry, construction, industry and recreation, are excluded in the long term from the
areas of active military operations. Moreover, the regular disruption of land cover during
military operations supports the maintenance of several habitats of community interest
(it often replaces the natural function of wind on drift sands). Military areas are isolated
from the surrounding landscape for decades. Its biological value is several times greater
than of the surrounding countryside.[2]
This may sound strange, given the kind of activities commonly associated with military
use. Disturbance does occur in military areas, but mostly at regular intervals, often in the
same sections of the area, while the size of many military areas allows migration
possibilities. Although military exercises may seem violent and spectacular, in many
bases and training areas only a part of the site is used. Firing ranges for instance
typically consist of long straight ‘shooting galleries’ separated by broad areas of wood
or heath in between. The ranges are used, but for obvious reasons there is not much
traffic on them, and the swathes of nature between the firing lines are seldom if ever
used for anything. Tanks and other heavy vehicles tend to be used on well-defined
tracks or routes which do not change that often. Infantry exercises do range over a wider
area, but their impact is often low. Paradoxically, some of the disturbance that occurs
during military activities can be beneficial for conservation. Pioneer communities of
fauna and flora depend upon disturbance; in nature this can be soil erosion, wildfire,
flooding etc., to which certain species are adapted. In the absence of disturbance, such
communities evolve into other habitats through the process of natural succession.
Bombing, shelling, prescribed burning for training purposes and armoured vehicle
manoeuvres can mimic these natural disturbances and create pioneer communities, or
maintain them against natural succession. Thus bare sand and soil, uncommon habitats
which rapidly evolve through succession but host a range of rare plants and
invertebrates, are constantly created in military areas used for such exercises. Holes left
60
by tracked vehicles can fill with water and become pools which are ideal breeding
habitat for amphibians. [1]
Defence estate covers a number of sites of high ecological value, with a variety of wellpreserved habitat types ranging from long tracts of coastline and alluvial plains to high
mountain peaks, heaths and scrub, wetlands and steppe grasslands in between.
3 NATURA 2000 and the military
NATURA 2000 is a coherent European ecological network of protected areas that is
being established within the EU Member States. The network aims to conserve the most
valuable natural habitats and the most endangered species of wild fauna and flora - i.e.
habitats and species of Community interest. The European Commission selects the sites
from submitted proposals (National Lists) of the individual Member States and decides
about their incorporation into the NATURA 2000 network. Natura 2000 is not a system
of strict nature reserves where all human activities are excluded.
Given that they host such important natural heritage, it is not surprising that
considerable portions of the military estates in the EU scientifically qualify for inclusion
in the Natura 2000 network, and have indeed been proposed (for examples: in the
Netherlands 50% of the total
military estate have been included into Natura 2000, in Belgium 70% was included,
45% of Danish military areas has been included into Natura 2000). The armed forces are
already important stakeholders in Natura 2000 by the very fact that military areas have
been proposed for the network, but they are also potential partners. Natura 2000 has
much to gain from a partnership with the military owners and managers of pSCI (Sites
of Community Importance) and SPAs (Special Protection Areas). Natura 2000 is by no
means intended to be a system of totally closed reserves, and multifunctional use
(including military activities) of the sites is one of the essential characteristics of the
network.
LIFE is the EU’s financial instrument supporting environmental and nature conservation
projects throughout the EU, as well as in some candidate, acceding and neighboring
countries. Many LIFE projects cover more than one site. Multi-site projects often target
a particular habitat type or species at national or regional level, implementing actions in
a series of Natura 2000 areas where the habitat or species occurs. In several such
projects, the Natura 2000 sites included military areas. Two different routes were taken:
Active military participation: the military authorities became partners in the project,
responsible for carrying out conservation actions on their own land.
Passive military participation: the military authorities left the conservation work to the
specialists, but gave permission for the NGO or agency running the LIFE-Nature project
to enter the military area and do what was needed. These are multi-site LIFE projects
where some sub sites are military estate and the military authorities allow the project
beneficiary to do restoration work on their land, collaborating with it in planning and
supervising the work.
A number of LIFE-Nature projects have received technical assistance from the Armed
Forces, even though not one of the sites was a military area. In these cases, the military
provides manpower, machinery or specialist knowledge towards solving a challenge
facing the project on the ground. Partnership projects between the military and
environment authorities, co financed by LIFE, are excellent laboratories to learn to work
together and gain mutual trust and a professional working relationship.
Besides active military sites, there are former military sites which kept or acquired great
61
natural value thanks to their military status, but began losing this value after their
decommitment from military use. Where the ecological value came from regular
disturbance by military activities which kept creating and re-creating pioneer habitats,
decommitment meant that these habitats and the species which depend on them began
disappearing. Where the ecological value stemmed from a lack of disturbance because
the site was closed to the public, decommitment meant an influx of visitors, or possibly
even plans to commercially exploit the site. The events of 1989 and following years
brought a completely new strategic environment and this has been reflected through
major changes to military infrastructure in Europe. Many military bases and training
areas were closed, especially in central and eastern Europe. The process is not yet ended
– armed forces are still restructuring themselves to become lighter and more mobile, in
response to current security issues. In turn, this means that where such military use ends,
there is a risk that the nature values decline.
Since 2000 ‛nature conservation & the military’ is a major topic at Nature Foundation
David (has started 2001 in Germany with a literature research and a data collection of
military areas, active and decommissioned). With different projects, military training
areas in Germany as well as Central and Eastern Europe (17 countries included), which
own a high value for nature conservation, were identified. All relevant information was
compiled in databases. The aim of Nature Foundation David efforts are to ensure the
long-term protection of conservation values in those areas already taken out of military
use or those to be decommissioned soon. In cooperation with CEE web (Central and
East European Working Group for the Enhancement of Biodiversity, who has started
international military project with CEE network in 2006, Since 2007 they both work
together), NF David try to identify military training areas – in current military use or
decommissioned – which have a value for nature conservation. The focus was on
military training areas larger than 1,000 ha. For these areas detailed information on their
conservation value, occurring species, protection status etc. were collected for a
database. Results of the database: 6 countries are cooperating in the project and entering
data; to date 97 military areas are recorded; where of 73 sites in military use and 24
decommissioned; 40 sites are more than 1 000 ha large; ranges from 300 – 37 000 ha;
24 sites with protection status (NPR, Natura 2000) in all countries; 35 LIFE+ projects
on MTAs in Europe, 8 in new Member States (Table 1).
Table 1 LIFE+ projects on MTAs in EU new member states [3, 4]
Country
Hungary
Full name of LIFE + project
Restoration and conservation of priority habitats
and species in the Eastern Bakony area
Establishing the background of saving the
Hungarian meadow viper from extinction
Conservation of Otis tarda in Hungary
Conservation of Aquila heliaca in the Carpathian
basin
Slovakia
Restoration and management of Sand Dunes
Habitats in Záhorie Military Training Area
Restoration of wetlands at Záhorie lowland
62
Total budget
2.218.000 €
EU
co financing
75 %
649.000 €
50 %
4.350.000 €
44 %
585.000 €
75 %
1.538.000 €
70 %
624.000 €
50 %
Latvia
Marine Protected Areas in the Eastern Baltic Sea
Restoration of biological diversity in military
training area and Natura2000 site Adazi
3.111.000 €
50 %
905.000 €
50 %
4 LIFE Programs in the MTAs of the Slovak Republic
Zahorie Military District is the oldest and largest military district in Slovakia and it
presently covers the area of 27 650 ha. Zahorie Military District was established in its
recent area in 1950, hence before the large-scale intensification of landscape. Since that
time, the entire area has been used predominantly for military purposes. Other human
activities have been restricted to the services for the military area only. This very
specific land use has resulted in conservation of a unique area of great natural values.
Running and still waters and wetlands alternate with dry sand dunes. Chemistry of
eolian dunes is extremely acidic, which is reflected in specific soil conditions and
vegetation cover. Thanks to extraordinary habitat diversity, there is a high number of
species and communities with different ecological requirements present here on a
relatively small area. High biological diversity is given also by the location of the area
being situated on the edge of the Alpine, Pannonic and Continental bio geographic
regions. Forest habitats of various types ranging from fen alder woods to dry pine-oak
woods cover more than 72% of the area. 18 habitats of Community Importance and 6
habitats of national importance have been recorded in the area. [5] Thanks to the unique
natural richness of Zahorie Military District, parts of this area have been included in the
NATURA 2000 network. At present, ten Sites of Community Importance with a total
area of almost 5 000 ha are located in Zahorie Military District, while proposals of other
sites have been elaborated. In all Sites of Community Importance within Zahorie
Military District their military use is considered as a priority. However, usually this is
not in conflict with the interests of nature conservation. Zahorie has been the scene of
two nature restoration and management projects, co-financed by EU-LIFE.
4.1 Project ‛Restoration of the wetlands of Zahorie lowland’
The first one, lasting from 2005 to 2009, the project ‛Restoration of the Wetlands of
Zahorie Lowland’ (WETREST, LIFE05 NAT/SK/000112) submitted by the State
Nature Conservancy of the Slovak Republic was supported under the LIFE NATURE
Program of the European Commission. The main project objective was to contribute to
the development of NATURA 2000 network in Zahorie Lowland through the
conservation, restoration and overall enhancement of important wetland habitats and
species. The following activities were carried out as a part of the project
implementation:
Elaboration and implementation of Management Plans and Restoration Projects
for 8 most significant wetlands - proposed Sites of Community Importance (4 of
them are situated within Zahorie Military District);
Elaboration of amendments to the forest management plans so that they are in
compliance with the requirements of nature conservation;
Implementation of specific restoration and management measures - restoration of
the water regime of wetlands (blocking and backfilling the drainage ditches,
restoration of small streams) and improvement of habitat conditions required by
the most threatened plant and animal species;
63
-
Construction of the fish by-pass on Rudava River near Veľké Leváre community
in order to enable fish migration that has been obstructed by the existing weir,
Restoration of species-rich lowland hay meadows along Rudava River (tree and
bush cutting, mowing);
Education and training of project personnel, including excursions, seminars and
work - shops for staff of partner organizations participating in the project;
Raising public awareness on wetland conservation and restoration through the
project presentation in media, publishing information and education materials,
organizing lectures and excursions for general public and installing information
panels at the project sites. [5]
All these actions dealt with sites that were not directly used for military training, but lay
within the buffer zone around the exercise areas.
4.2 Project ‛Restoration and management of sand dunes habitats in Zahorie MTA’
At present, the rare habitats on the shooting ranges of the Zahorie Military Training
Area are threatened by overgrowing with trees, especially Scots Pine and Black Locust.
Such overgrowing results in serious changes in the structure of these habitats and
furthermore decreases the diversity of their unique flora and fauna. The second project
does however deal directly with land used for military training and exercises. Therefore,
since 2006 to 2011 the Military Technical and Testing Institute Zahorie, in cooperation
with the State Nature Conservation of the Slovak Republic and the Regional
Association for Nature Conservation and Sustainable Development (BROZ),
implemented the project ‛Restoration and Management of Sand Dunes Habitats in
Zahorie Military Training Area’ (ZAHORIE SANDS, LIFE06NAT/SK/000115) [6].
The main objective of the project is to contribute to the development of the European
network of protected areas NATURA 2000 in the Zahorie Military Training Area,
especially through the enhanced conservation of the sand dunes and dry heaths habitats,
their restoration and improvement of the living conditions for their characteristic
species. [2] Project area is formed by three Sites of Community Importance (SCI
Bežnisko, SCI Kotlina and SCI Šranecké piesky). All three SCIs are actively used as
shooting ranges and located in Zahorie MTA.
The following activities have been performed as a part of project implementation:
Elaboration and testing of new methods and approaches to the habitat
management in military areas to reconcile Natura 2000 conservation requirements
with their military use;
Elaboration and implementation of comprehensive Management Plans for 3 Sites
of Community Importance (SCI Bežnisko, SCI Kotlina and SCI Šranecké piesky)
Implementation of specific restoration and management measures and
improvement of habitat conditions for the most threatened plant and animal
species at the total area almost 500 ha;
Favourable conservation status of the habitats and species of Community interest
was reached at all 3 project sites;
Education and training of project personnel, including excursions, seminars and
workshops for staff of partner organizations participating in the project;
Raising awareness of military personnel on nature conservation topics and
improvement of cooperation between military and nature conservation institutions
on nature conservation management in Zahorie MTA and other military areas in
Slovakia;
64
-
Raising public awareness on nature conservation in military areas and other
project issues through project presentation in the media, publishing information
and education materials, organizing lecture and excursions and installing
information panels at project sites. [7, 8]
5 Conclusion
There are some deep differences between the Central and Eastern Europe countries, as
well as some remarkable parallelisms. Between those countries which are now members
of the EU and those which are not. In the former, there is an obligation to designate
Natura 2000 sites, which can include military areas, and to ensure that species and
habitats from the Habitats and Birds Directives are kept in a favourable state of
conservation. In the other countries, there is no such legal and enforceable obligation to
designate ecologically valuable military lands as conservation areas. Only the more or
less voluntary international conventions such as Bern, Bonn, Ramsar or CBD are
applying here. Countries like Croatia which are candidates for EU accession are
however already aligning their environmental and nature policies to the EU models, and
the Council of Europe-sponsored Emerald network is in many ways parallel to Natura
2000 in its scientific concept and strategy.
The transformation programs affecting all the Armed Forces of the countries mean that
some training areas and other facilities have been, or will be, decommissioned, while
other training areas will be modernized and the training program itself will be changed.
The shift away from a conscript army means less basic training, but the target of
building up a professional army implies more training, especially more advanced
training. Wherever training programs are being transformed, there is an opportunity to
introduce principles of ecological care into the new training schemes.
Slovakia is interesting because it appears that here the obligation to designate Natura
2000 areas as a result of Slovakia’s accession to the EU in May 2004, has been a
powerful catalyst in bringing together environment agencies, NGOs and military
authorities to starting nature conservation work on military land. In the 1990s, after the
foundation of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, cooperation began between
military and environment authorities, mainly at a local level. An example of this was a
project to restore the original hydrological regime in a section, six kilometres long, of
the Rudava River, which flows through the Zahorie military training area. With Latvia
and Hungary, Slovakia appears to be the CEE/SEE country where practical nature
restoration and management work within military areas, and the collaboration between
defence and environment authorities and NGOs, is most advanced. Thus, these three
countries can act as role models and examples.
References
[1]
[2]
GAZENBEEK, A. LIFE, Natura 2000 and the military. Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities : Luxemburg, 2005. ISBN 92-8949213-9, ISSN 1725-5619.
KLIMOVÁ, K. a ŠÍBL, J. Tajomný svet pieskových dún vo vojenskom obvode
Záhorie. Štátna ochrana prírody SR : Banská Bystrica, 2009. 28 str. ISBN 978-8089310-50-0.
65
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
66
HÖNTSCH, K. and JOHST, A. Military training areas of high nature
conservation value in Central and Eastern Europe – first analysis of database and
networking
process.
Available
on
the
Internet
[online]
http://www.adazinatura.lv/~/media/Fotogalerija/Adazi/Sarolta_Tripolsky.ashx.
NATURE FOUNDATION DAVID: Nature conservation and the military in
Central and South-Eastern Europe. Available on the Internet [online] <
http://www.naturstiftung.de/uploadfiles/documents/Militaer/2806_095349_Overvi
ew_total_engl_15_2012_06_28.pdf>.
VALACHOVIČ, D. Mokrade európskeho významu vo vojenskom obvode Záhorie.
Štátna ochrana prírody SR : Banská Bystrica, 2006. 30 str. ISBN 80-89035-70-1.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG ENVIRONMENT – LIFE UNITS. LIFE
country factsheet – Slovakia 2012. Available on the Internet [online]
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/countries/documents/slovakia_en_jun12.pdf.
ŠÍBL, J. a KLIMOVÁ, K.: Obnova a manažment biotopov pieskových dún vo
vojenskom výcvikovom priestore Záhorie. VTSÚ, ŠOP SR a BROZ : Senica Bratislava, 2011. 28 str. ISBN 978-80-89310-64-7.
DIRECTORATE GENERAL ENVIRONMENT, UNIT E.4. LIFE: Ex-Post
Evaluation of Projects and Activities Financed under the LIFE Programme
Country-by-country analysis - Slovakia. July 2009. Available on the Internet
[online]
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/life/publications/lifepublications/evaluation/doc
uments/eval_slovakia.pdf>.
SECURITY CULTURE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC
Miroslav Mareš
Abstract: The aim of this paper is a basic analysis of security culture in the Czech Republic
within the general conceptual framework elaborated by James Sperling (worldview of the
external environment, national identity; instrumental preferences; interaction preferences).
The author focuses on important actors and ideological streams within the security debate in
the Czech Republic and their perception of security culture. Four short case studies are
included in this analysis.
Keywords: Security culture, Czech Republic, Kosovo crisis, NATO-summit, radar
base.
1 Introduction
Security culture is a concept used in contemporary security studies for the analysis of
security governance and security development. It refers to the a broader environment of
security debates and decisions. Research on security culture in various countries was
carried out [5], however, up to now not in a comprehensive form in the Czech Republic.
On the other hand, many publications deal with partial issues in this research field
[3,7,9]. This paper aims to a description of the basic concept and categories of security
culture (elaborated by James Sperling because the concept of this author seems to be
influential and suggestive within this scientific discipline) and its use for a basic
analysis of the Czech situation.
2 Concept of the National Security Culture
National security cultures – according to Sperling – „provide the lens through which
national authorities refract structural position of the state in the international system; it
explains the subjective understanding of objective threats to national security, the
instruments relied upon to meet those threats, and the preference for unilateral or
multilateral action” [5]. Sperling´s key elements of national security cultures are
described in the following table.
67
Table 1: Key elements of security culture according Sperling [5].
Worldview
of
the Elite consensus on the underling dynamics of the
external environment
international system, the importance and viability of state
sovereignty and the definitions of security threats
National identity
Extent to which national elites have retained „egoist“
definition of national interests or broader, collective “we”
defined against some ”others”
Instrumental
Hard (military, economic power) or soft instruments
Preferences
(international law, economic aid, normative frameworks) of
statecraft and power
Interaction Preferences
Level of cooperation favoured by state when seeking to
ameliorate a security threat (from unilateral action to
multilateralism within highly formalized institutional
structures).
Security culture can be understood as a part of general political culture. This can be
defined as follows: “Political culture is the underlying set of values and beliefs about
politics and the system of meaning for interpreting politics among the given population”
[1]. Security culture is also interconnected with general political debates in each
country. Strategic culture can be identified within security culture, according to
circumstances of strategic development and strategic decisions.
Figure 1: Dimensions of strategic, security and political culture. Source: Author
3 Security Culture and Major Czech Security Debates
Czech security culture was and is determined by many external as well as internal
factors. As a small country in East Central Europe the Czech Republic occupies a
strategic position in the centre of the continent, where strategic interests of great powers
were and are in conflict. It led to tensions between Western and Eastern orientation of
the Czech external security policy as well as to clashes about allies during various
historical periods (Austroslavism vs. Panslavism in the 19th century, French vs. German
68
orientation in the 1930s and Western or Soviet orientation after the World War II) [6, 9]
After the fall of communism the Western orientation dominated in the Czech political
debates. However, also representatives of Eastern orientation or supporters of
isolationism were and are relevant participants of these debates. Within the Western
oriented elites and political streams tension between orientation to the USA and to
European integration can be identified.
According to experts from the Institute of International Relations in Prague, four main
categories of foreign-political streams can be defined. The universalists support
symmetric orientation to the European integration and to trans-Atlantic relations with
the USA orientation, while the Europeanists and Atlanticists prefer only one of these
orientations. both rejected Isolations [3]
Table 2: Foreign-political streams in the CR and Euro-Atlantic development according to
Drulák, Kořan and Růžička [3].
Deepening of
European
Integration
Yes
No
More intensive transatlantic relations
Yes
No
Universalists
Europeanists
Atlanticists
Sovereignists
As representatives of the universalists we can mention former Czech and Czechoslovak
President Václav Havel, contemporary Minister of foreign affairs Karel Schwarzenberg
or President Miloš Zeman (he has also the “Russian vector”). The atlanticists are - for
example – Hynek Fajmon (member of the European Parliament from the Civic
Democratic Party) or Petr Mach (chairman of the small The Free Citizens Party and
leading personality of the think-tank Centre for Economy and Politics) and
contemporary Prime Minister Petr Nečas (at least more than ten years ago as defence
expert of the Civic Democratic Party). The Europeanists are – among others – social
democratic politicians Lubomír Zaorálek and Vladimír Špidla or reform communist
member of the European Parliament Miloslav Ransdorf. The isolationists are right-wing
politicians Miroslav Sládek, Tomáš Vandas or populist Tomio Okamura.
However, some politicians and thinkers cannot be clearly subsumed under one of the
above mentioned four categories (former president Václav Klaus seems to be
somewhere between the atlanticists and the isolationists, for example). An Eastern
orientation to Russia is not included in the previous categorisation (see above mentioned
differences between Zeman and Schwarzenberg). A partially different point of view is
included in the next schema, elaborated by the author of this paper (where Russian
orientation plays an important role). The orientation to the European core (mostly
German politics), to the USA, to Russia and to isolationism and ideological families are
important elements of this scheme.
69
Figure 2: Strategic vectors of the Czech foreign security policy. Source: Author.
With the affiliation with atlanticism and very often also with universalism preferences
for military actions under US-leadership against “rogue states” and terrorists are
interconnected (Václav Havel profiled himself as “hawk” during the NATO mission in
Yugoslavia in 1999 or invasion in Iraq in 2003).
It is important to mention that representatives of the above mentioned categories are
activists of political and/or ideological streams. They can be representatives of various
governmental institutions (president, government, diplomacy) or they can influence
politics from non-governmental positions (opposition parties, media, NGOs, think tanks
etc.) significantly [4]. In the Czech Republic it is not possible to designate specific
institutions as holders of stabile ideological positions. Standpoints of presidents or
governments depend on concrete representatives in these positions. The army, police or
intelligence services conduct sometimes as interest groups in their own matters,
however, they are not stabile actors of ideological debates. They are loyal parts of the
democratic political process in the Czech Republic and they are able to fulfil various
demands of political representation. This fact can be demonstrated with the help of the
following case studies.
4 First Case Study: NATO Attacks against Yugoslavia in 1999
In March 1999 the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) attacked Yugoslavia
because of repressive measures of Yugoslavian government against Albanian
population. The Czech Republic had been at that time only two weeks a member of the
alliance. The Serbians are by Czech nationalists (including leftist nationalists) percepted
as traditional Slavic allies of the Czech geopolitical struggle. The opposition against the
NATO action was strong. On the other hand, a support of a large part of Czech elites
for the attack and strategic responsibility of the Czech government caused the final loyal
position of the official Czech policy [9,14].
Domestic political discussion about the NATO-accession was very complicated in the
middle of the 1990s, mostly due to internal political discussion inside the Czech Social
Democratic Party (ČSSD). This party officially supported the entrance of the Czech
Republic in the NATO, however, many members opposed this step. In 1999, the social
democratic government was ruling. The governmental position towards the action
against Yugoslavia was generally loyal to the NATO, however, Czech diplomacy tried
to develop its own plans for the de-escalation of the crisis [13].
70
Domestic political debate was characterized by tensions between the government and
the leftist opposition (including the KSCM and left-radical faction within the ČSSD) on
the one hand and by strong demands to a more active role in support of the NATO from
middle-rightist parties and interest groups (they were represented in the initiative We are
in the NATO) on the other hand. Street protests were organized mostly by right-wing
and left-wing radicals, however, only with several hundreds of participants.
The NATO did not demand active participation of the Czech armed forces or security
corps in the operations in Yugoslavian territory. However, it required transport and
flight of NATO forces over the Czech territory. Czech security forces were able to
secure these tasks. In Macedonia a Czech military hospital for Albanian refugees was
stationed [13].The sceptical position of some soldiers and policemen to NATO attacks
was not publicly manifested.
5 Second Case Study: NATO summit in Prague 2002
In 2002 the Czech Republic hosted in Prague the summit of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation. It was the first NATO summit after the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the
USA. A wave of solidarity with the victims of these attacks was strong at that time and
Czech politicians – with the exception of extremists – supported the American war on
terror (the situation partially changed after the invasion in Iraq in 2003). The
organisation of the NATO summit was understood as a prestigious matter for Czech
policy.
After the elections in 2002 a coalition government of the Czech Social Democratic
Party (Prime Minister Vladimír Špidla), Christian and Democratic Union –
Czechoslovak People´s Party (KDU-ČSL) and liberal Union of Freedom – Democratic
Union (US-DEU) was ruling. The main opposition party – Civic Democratic Party –
was a strong supporter of the NATO. In such political environment the securing summit
was a political priority shared by main elites of the country [8].
From parliamentary parties it was only the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
that rejected the organisation of this summit. In fact, the main reason was opposition
against the NATO and anti-American orientation. However, in summer 2002 floods
damaged the Czech territory. The communist argued that financial sources should be
used for the reconstruction of the damaged territories, not for the organisation of this
summit [15]. During the summit communists protested against the NATO, several
moderate demonstrations were organized also by the anarchists. They were not able to
influence the security of the participants of the summit due to massive security measures
[8].
The security of the summit was an “honour task” also for Czech security forces. A
unique common body of intelligence and law enforcement agencies was established, for
example. The Czech security system was able to cooperate with the allies. A common
air defence was carried out not only by the Czech air force. The US Air Force operated
over the Czech territory (a special act of the Czech law was adopted for this
purpose)[16].
6 Third Case Study: US Radar Base in the Czech Republic (2002-2010)
The United States of America requested between 2002-2010 installation of a radar
constituting a part of the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) in the Czech Republic.
It was a part of hardline Bush´s doctrine. A negative attitude towards this step was
declared mostly by Russia, however, also several European and Middle East countries
71
and non-state groups were unsatisfied with the engagement of East Central European
countries in the NMD. In 2010 Obama´s administration stopped this part of the NMD.
[10].
Public debate was very intensive after the spring 2006 in the Czech Republic (during
first years of negotiations it was a secret matter). The right-centre government (created
from the ODS, the KDU-ČSL and the Greens) supported the radar. However, a strong
opposition against the U.S. radar base existed within the CR, as well as at transnational
level. A basic overview of public debate is included in the following table.
Table3. Public debate about US radar in the Czech Republic. Source:[10]
Groupings
Arguments
Modes of
action
Opponents
Social democrats (majority),
Initiative Ne základnám! (No
Bases!), coalition of leftist
(including communist), human
rights, environmentalist and
Islamic organizations;
further anarchists, far right
spectrum;
The base is a part of dangerous
expansionism of the current U.S.
administration
The base increases the risk of a
missile and/or terrorist attack on
the Czech territory.
The base harms national
sovereignty (parallels with Nazi
occupation 1939-1945 and with
the Soviet occupation 19681991).
Protection of the USA without
the protection of the CR itself is
unacceptable
BMDS is inefficient.
Opposition in Parliament,
demonstrations, internet
agitation, newspaper agitation,
limited time on TV
Small part - discussions about
violent resistance (including
guerilla). Demand: a
referendum
Supporters
Conservatives, liberals, christian
democrats (contemporary
governmental parties);
Unclear was attitude of the greens.
Government (Premier Minister
Mirek Topolánek) had generally a
problematic support in the
Parliament
The base is a part of defense of
western democratic values.
The base must be protected by the
US military forces and this is a
strategic advantage for Czech
security.
Potential risks should be taken as a
result of US help to the Czechs in
WW I, WW II, Cold War and
during the entrance-process to the
NATO.
Economical Benefits.
The base has indirect influence on
the possibility of the U. S. visa-free
regime for Czech citizens
Executive power, TV agitation,
newspaper agitation, rejection of a
referendum
Czech armed forces cooperated loyally with the US allies. The radar should have been
stationed in the military site in Jince. The Czech army and Military police were able to
secure this area. Czech intelligence services monitored espionage activities in relation to
the radar installation as well as the Russian support to the anti-radar movement. Security
72
Information Service (BIS) wrote: “Russian services attempted to establish contacts with
public opinion-makers, political circles and the media and infiltrate organizations
influencing public opinion to win them over for supporting Russian interests in debates
on the issue of locating an American radar in the Czech Republic“[2]. American
withdrawal from the project was respected.
7 Fourth Case Study: EU Operation in Mali 2013
In 2013 the French Army carried out a successful operation against Islamist non-state
militant groups in Mali. The EU decided on the creation of the European Union
Training Mission to Mali. The Czech right-centrist government of the ODS (with Prime
Minister Petr Nečas from this party), Christian-democratic party TOP 09 and liberal
party LIDEM joined this mission. After domestic political negotiations also the major
part of social democratic opposition sustained this mission “[11].
For the Czech government the mission is also an instrument how to keep impact on
Common security and defense policy of the EU [12]. It was the reason why some
Eurosceptic politicians supported the mission. Countering Islamism and US engagement
in Mali were important arguments, too. A large part of social democrats were loyal to
the EU. On the other hand, some social democrats, regional populists and communists
rejected this mission as a part of „militarization of the EU” and because of financial
costs of this mission“[11].
The Czech army was able to create a small contingent of 34 soldiers without problems.
Despite the fact that Africa is not the most important region of Czech interest, several
military observers and small groups in various missions served in this continent in
previous years. Czech intelligence community started sharing information with friendly
services. In preparation of this mission an important role was played by the Ministry of
foreign affairs [11] and this fact confirmed understanding for this mission as a
diplomatic instrument.
8 Conclusion
As demonstrated in this paper, majority of Czech elites support the pro-western
orientation and the NATO and EU operations. Communists declare hostility against this
orientation, however, they do not have coalition potential currently. Close relations of
major Czech elites with the USA were demonstrated during negations about the US
radar in the CR during the past decade, on the other hand, there existed a strong
opposition against this radar. Threats to state sovereignty are perceived in a broader
context, together with interests of the allies (mostly the USA and several western
European countries). Individual preferences are sometimes not enforced (on behalf of
common NATO-interests), as the Czech policy during Kosovo crisis showed. Czech
elites interconnected with American “hawk” are able to support the use of hard military
power, however, also economic aid and supporting human rights are important elements
of Czech statecraft. Preference for international cooperation in military matters is
significant, including operations in domestic territory (as was demonstrated with the
engagement of the USAF during the NATO-summit in 2002). Different perception of
the NATO and the EU is typical of the debate among Czech elites, however, the
operations of the NATO as well as the EU are supported if it is necessary (as the
operation in Mali in 2013). Opponents of the „out of area” operations frequently use the
argument about high financial costs of such missions. Transatlantic accent, cooperation
with the NATO and the EU and support of military operations against enemies of the
73
Western world are the most significant elements of recent major Czech strategic culture.
The army and security corps are loyal parts of the security system, not individual actors
of major political debates with ideological or geopolitical statements.
Acknowledgements:
This contribution was prepared as part of the research project “Methods of Predicting
Long-term Geopolitical Development in Central Europe - VF20102015005“, funded by
the Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic
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[12] Parlament České republiky. Poslanecká sněmovna. Sněmovní tisk 920/0, část č.
1/10 Vl.n.působ.sil MO ve výcvik.misi EU v Malij.rep. (EUTM Mali) [online]..
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[vid.
15.
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<http://www.psp.cz/sqw/text/tiskt.sqw?O=6&CT=920&CT1=0>
[13] RHODES, Matthew.Czech Malaise and Europe. Problems of Post-Communism,
(47), 2, 57-66. ISSN 1075-8216.
[14] WEICHSEL, Volker. Tschechien. Nationalpolitische Traditionen und
integrationspolitische Konzepte. LIT Verlag, Berlin. 273 pp. ISBN 978-3-82580061-1.
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[16] Zákon č. 482/2002 Sb., o posílení ochrany vzdušného prostoru České republiky
v době konání summitu Organizace Severoatlantické smlouvy v Praze a o změně
trestního zákona.
75
MODELING APPROACH TO THE SPECIFIC TACTICAL
ACTIVITIES
Jan Mazal, Miroslav Mašlej, Petr Stodola and Ivana Mokrá
Abstract: The contribution deals with current or potential approaches to the modeling
and optimization of tactical activities. This issue takes on importance in recent times,
particularly with the increasing trend of digitized battlefield, the development of C4ISR
systems and intention to streamline the command and control process at the lowest
levels of command. From fundamental and philosophically point of view, this new
approaches seek to significantly upgrade and enhance the decision-making process of
the tactical commanders.
Keywords: Computer decision support, C4ISTAR, ISR, DSS, OTT.
1 Introduction
One of the most important capabilities of the Armed forces is the ability to decision.
Decision-making has to be supported by the processes and technologies. The military is
important area of social theory and practice, were modeling and simulation have been
used for centuries.
Computer support of military applications and processes is not exceptional by these
days, however its domain still falls within the areas outside of the direct decision
support of the commanders in combat operations. The first attempts to mathematically
modelate the complex battle situations to support the decision-making processes of the
commanders started in the 1960s. The original math models was based on a very general
assumptions and tried to build the rationality of the behavior of the selected tactical
element in the very approximate terms. These models were appropriate as doctrinal
approaches, but for the implementation of individual tactical solution or as direct
support to the tactical decision-making activities were not applicable.
Modeling and simulation performed important cognitive and practical function in
military history. Its emergence and development form an integral part of military history
and continuous development of all its important components. For a long time, the
military modeling and simulation had a applied character, mainly in the commanders
decision, prediction and planning in combat operations, it plays decisive role in
immediate decision search in asymmetric warfare and war against terrorism.
Decision making is one of the most important activities, which a Manager or person
generally do in their everyday life. Decision-making is always a choice between two or
more options. Decision process in military environment is similar to its civil equivalent,
but with different inputs, outcomes and consequences. Same as in civil management,
military commanders are forced to choose optimal solution based on proper weighting
of multi-criteria requirements.
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In a military decision-making practice it stands out in the foreground more than in the
civil sector, mainly such factors as the time (speed of decision making), the issue of
available material resources, unfamiliar environment (terrain, enemy, population), and
particularly the factor of possible loss of life and technology.
The commander is often forced to make decisions quickly based on their experience
with the mentioned conditions. We are talking about empirical-intuitive decisionmaking process. Under these assumptions, it seems logical to facilitate decision-making
by a modeling support
2 The system approach
The system concept of computer support of tactical decision, from fundamental point of
view, is possible to split into two approaches, namely:
Subjective - empirical and intuitive;
Objective - mathematical and algorithmic.
For effective tactical decision making, it is necessary to keep the coexistence of these
approaches in the balanced synergy conjunction and complementarity in such
a proportion that fulfils the type of the decision-making problem. From the perspective
of computer support and automation of decision-making activities, it is currently
possible to provide a part of the decision-making process with the aid of machines and
even though the trend of automation constantly growing, so far there is no indication
that the human element should be fully excluded from the advanced decision-making
processes in the near future. In any case, the impact of the automation to the
effectiveness and to the time required for the key decision development is absolutely
vital, as indicate the last experiences from the war in Afghanistan.
Until now, the decision-making process of the commander was usually conducted in
terms of empirical experience and intuition and most likely it will remain identical in
the near future. Already in the 60s in the last century, there appeared a tendency to
model specific operational and tactical processes [1]. The initial math models have
suffered from serious deficiencies relating to a complex data base of the battlefield. The
models were unable to deal with a wide range of information cover, what is the key of
the operational and tactical decision-making processes. Furthermore, in many cases,
models were based on very approximate assumptions suffering from an information
deficit and the solution could not lead to a rational result applicable in practice in any
case.
Computer support within algorithmic approach is still a relatively new element which,
though some initial attempts of its "start-up" done in the past, is still on the beginning
and probably it takes some time to accommodate this approach in the decision-making
process of the commanders on the tactical level. Major upgrade of a new approach
comparing a previous solutions consist in:
comprehensive concept of the operational environment;
detailed real-time virtualization;
advanced extrapolation of its operational attributes (status) in a wide range of
conditions;
subsequent series of operational and tactical analyses, integrated into solutions
that respect the multi-criteria priorities.
Leading position on that field still keeps the US military. US introduced the
revolutionary operational and tactical approach called the Deep Green concept in 2008
[2]. Deep Green concept is inspired by a Deep Blue supercomputer (1997) and is
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focused on advanced operational and tactical tasks dedicated to the ground forces of
21st century. This concept is solved through the DARPA Agency (Defence Advanced
Research Project Agency) and its philosophical and componentary scheme is shown on
the following figure (1).
Computer support of this approach is splited in two ways:
Algorithmic - having an impact on the development of theoretical algorithmic solutions
and also affecting the software for particular computing platforms. This approach
includes the fundamental math solution and its adaptation and optimization for machine
processing
Figure 1: The DEEP GREEN concept referred by DARPA
Source: http://www.darpa.mil/ipto/solicitations
3 Operational and tactical tasks
On many fields, particularly in technical and technological base is already usual the
state, that the large spectrum of processes can be not only virtually modeled but also
solved in inverse manner with specified requirements. In many cases it is possible to
achieve such precision that correspond with the real tests for more than 90 percent
(statics, aerodynamics, hydrodynamics, and so on). This is caused by a small degree of
uncertainty of the model, which unfortunately appears in a high degree in the socioeconomic area particularly in the operational and tactical environment. Therefore it is
extremely difficult to model the combat activities progress with an accuracy of
technological processes; however, it is possible to model the conditions of certain
tactical scenario and through the optimization of these conditions to use the results as an
issue for the selection of particular option or activities.
There are two approaches of the operational tactical tasks solution, in particular those,
which fulfill the criteria of the so-called inverse task:
Analytical- it allows formulating the solution of inverse task by mathematical
expression (for example by polynomial). In the area of operational and tactical
tasks it is usually very difficult to find such a solution, and the way-out is the
evolutionary solution;
Evolutionary - it is approach (using brute force), where the solution is based on
the search through a broad spectrum of possible iteration assessment or all
possible input sets. As a model example on that field can serve for example the
square root calculation, where the accurate solution is based on iterative
algorithm.
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As already indicated above, usually in the area of complex operational tactical tasks
dominate the evolutionary approaches, since finding a direct analytical solution is either
very difficult or does not exist. Furthermore, it should be noted that, in the case of
operational and tactical solutions, it is usually a multi-criteria problem, where just the
settings of the entry criteria can be quite a complex task by itself. There plays the key
role the individual approach (opinion) linked with the pragmatic (tactical) aspect of the
solutions. Like the classic examples of operational-tactical tasks, may serve the search
for the optimal location of shooting position.
Figure 2: 2D Strike model (reciprocal hyperbolic), constructed with the probability target hit
function (hyperbolic) and probability function of the friendly element endanger (logarithmic).
Source: authors
In the construction of the model, it is possible to implement deductive approach and is it
possible to issue from the assumption of the likelihood compromise of intervention of
the target and acceptable risk of friendly element in the context of the implementation of
the attack. It is demonstrated in the figure 2, where the function of 2tactical pragmatism
of the fire depends just on the distance to the target.
However, the model in real conditions is linked to additional criteria and inputs, such as
the enemy and friendly element altitude difference, distance from the nearest vegetation,
position of the Sun, type of the weapons, level of the training and so on. In the case that
we assume the second parameter as the angle between the source and the target element,
then the construction of the model can look like follows formula (1):
(1)
x – the distance to target (0,1500)
y – the horizontal angle between the friendly and enemy element (-80,80)
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Figure 3: Model of the shooter location pragmatic function
Source: authors
In general, it is relatively complex task, where each additional input increase the
dimension of the model, so another approximate model represents the formula (2) and
Figure 3, there are considered 3 inputs (n1, n2, n3) in this case, where this calculation
must be applied to any combination of the deployment configuration of individual
elements (the shooter and target) on a digital model of the battlefield to find the optimal
solution.
(2)
n1 – the distance from the nearest vegetation
n2 –the difference of the excess of friendly and enemy element
n3 – the distance to target
Figure 4: 3D cut of the model of the shooter location pragmatic aspect function
Source: authors
4 Integration of the geographical and operational analyses
The field of computational area analyses has been only the domain of geographical
resort in the past, within the fact that the isolated analysis (visibility, throughput,
mobility, and so on) were not comprehensively integrated. This limited spectrum of
pragmatic results was not sufficient enough to fulfill the contemporary military
requirements and latest advances in the information technology. Modern approach to the
tactical decision support usually combines various analyses with geo-tactical
background. In real operation the tactical activities are very closely linked to
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geographical factors, this synergy is apparent and could be utilized in favor of the
pragmatic aspects of the tactical solution. One of the most critical phases is appropriate
input factors selection. If the incorrect settings of these factors will be applied, however,
the result exists, the final solution may not be applicable to the practice. The final
solution is completed through the system integration of partial solutions that define the
theory and algorithmic principles, system approach define the construction and partial
solution or analyses processing. The mentioned system integration would be treated as
an integration process in the context of multi-criteria decision concept of partial
solutions that can be divided into three basic modules:
Math module, carrying out the exact operations over data structures;
Multi-objective module containing the entry set of commander/operator
requirements;
Module of input quantifying factors and criteria interpretation.
4.1 Approach to the maneuver optimization
The fundamental approach is based on a sequence of procedures and the weighted
integration of discrete layers, where all phases converge to a maneuver optimization
issued from a modified versions of Floyd-Warshall algorithm. Initial C++ application
was designed for a basic experiments, providing relatively fast solution (derived from
path-finding algorithms used in autonomous systems), whose task was to verify
theoretical approach and the time profile of solution. Designed application would deal
with that job under all conditions. The application allows users to build the customized
tactical model to calculate the optimal route for specific geo-tactical conditions,
including stability analyses. If it is necessary, application could find alternative routes
with more-favorable movement factor. Following chart presents an idea of theoretical
approach fig.5:
Figure 5: Theoretical approach to the model construction and processing
Source: authors
Fundamental theoretical approach in that case was inspired by Floyd-Warshall
algorithm. Original algorithm was pushed throughout several modifications that make it
computationally applicable even for a large data structures comprising more than 106
nodes. Basic adjustment lay in elimination of so-called reverse cycles by stopping the
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calculation on all nodes in its root. Generally it is not trivial task and it can be accessed
in several ways, where, as one of the possible solution is the introduction of the socalled genetic structure processing, where each element of a sequence of progressive
calculation shall be borne by the information about the elements of its predecessors, for
example, in the shape of the bit-field, where the individual bits encode the occurrence of
the given attribute. Within the fact, that modification of the next element (node) copies
the genetic information of a predecessor, including its contribution to the new element.
This process is carried out through the main field elements chosen for next phase
solution. The status and verification cycle matches the bit position in the bit field with
the position of the active element in the default structure. If the element belongs to a
root what was modified (attribute is present), the element is excluded from the
processing in the following iterative phase because it will be modified in the next steps.
This process is theoretically simple, however, the realization of this step is relatively
difficult in practice, because the memory performance Pn achieves:
(3)
N is the number of nodes (elements) of the graph.
It means that models which contain more than 106 nodes must allocate over 125 GB
memory only for genetic structure of each element. In the case of information transfer
into other elements the amount of operations raise to a level that is incompatible neither
with the real time application, nor on the fastest nowadays computers. It is therefore
necessary to address the sub-problem in a different way and optimize the whole process
by other approach. Previously mentioned idea works well but for a wide set of nodes
(more than 106) is ineffective. There is a several optimization approach that could bring
some benefits. For example the first, optimization principle is focused on a separate
iterative sub-loop, which looks for a so called back-cycles and processes on limited set
of nodes. It eliminates non-perspective iterations (this is the key point) and shorten the
solution time significantly. It searches the smallest sum of weights in a graph, but only
on a subset of already modified elements and, in the meantime, until any of all possible
elements is unable to modify.
Using this optimization trick, it is possible to reduce timing of solution from 70 hours to
90 milliseconds (this case is linked to a 106 nodes and 8*106 edges of a graph) what
seems to be a really significant improvement.
Another important aspect of mentioned solution is particular ability of parallel execution
of the sub-phase processes and potential of implementation on GPGPU (General
Purpose Graphics Processing Unit). In that case, there is the general problem of no
possibility of total avoidance of particular phase’s serialization. Because of dependency
of particular iteration steps on previous result, nevertheless process solution of each
phase is possible to parallelize. Contemporary concept of GPGPU parallel programming
suffer by a small complication of global memory access (because of wide array of
element it is not possible to store them in a fast shared memory) of particular threads
what is resulting in reduced performance as it would actually be.
4.2 Tactical and geographical factors
The initial approach to the factors integration is treated in approximate scenario, where
the input factors were derived from the following effects:
The influence of altitude;
The effect of vegetation (forest);
The influence of water;
The impact of communications;
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The impact of general terrain;
The effect of visibility of threatening element.
Filling the input data structure is crucially important and more comprehensive research
and experiments are needed. To generate pragmatic results in military operation, it is
necessary to sensitively design the input structure of graph weights. It must properly
correspond with provable statistical analyses of wide spectra of experiments. Just for
demonstration purposes and integration process evaluation was intuitively estimated the
values linked to a set of important factors, derived from the previous research, partially
dedicated to that problematic [2] and [3]. The result of a core calculations, model
integration, data modeling, visibility analyses and shortest path algorithm
implementation is shown on the following figure 6:
Figure 6: Optimal maneuver modeling under tactical conditions
Source: authors
Where the obvious desire of motion is situated close to a communications and avoids
visible area as is illustrated, were threatening visibility laid out had a decisive impact on
final weighted criteria displacement of the model. At the next illustration is shown the
shadow map, what demonstrate the total sum of weights of the minimum path to the
each point of the map under the mentioned conditions. There is apparent a manifest of
the complications in the areas of visibility of the threatening element and the minimum
values of threatening the overall paths along the roads. Result is presented on following
picture:
Figure 7: Structure of final “Pragmatic” graph (minimum of weighted sum dedicated to the
shortest path) Source: authors
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5 Modelling and digitizing of the battlefield
The relevant results achievement in the framework of the battlefield modeling lay in the
deployment of high level complexity and relations, which previous models did not
implement. This condition could be achieved by implementation of the same or higher
information view (scope) of the commander addressing the tactical problem. This
circumstance is currently simply achievable by C4ISR utilization.
To resolve this issue it is necessary to realize the goal of the entire tactical modeling
process and the context of the command and control. If we come from the fundamental
nature of the army and its dedication to the martial activity, then the decision of
commanders usually follow the search for an optimal tactical activity, or the sequence of
activities leading to assigned tasks competition in the shortest (possibly fixed) time and
with a minimum released effort or resources. So in other words, the main aim is such a
sequence of tactical elements (maneuver, fire and strike) subordinated units/troops
which will lead to the most effective task fulfillment.
To resolve this issue, it is possible to partially take inspiration from the game of chess as
well as the military leaders did in the past. Mainly from the basic model of the playing
field and the rules for the individual elements, it can serve as an approximate raster
scenario for the tactical battleground modeling, where the model adapted to the current
conditions will be incomparably greater complexity and must take into account all
relevant factors affecting the combat activities. Despite the fact that the current
modeling of the combat is from the philosophical perspective relatively highly
theoretical matter, it is intuitively clear that the chances of a successful application of
these models can be in case of fulfilling the appropriate complexity, very high.
Solutions to the particular problems are based on a set of individual approaches and
could not be unified. The overall concept should be understood as a comprehensive
issue, rather than an isolated problem. Currently, there is no universal solution capable
of addressing more various tactical tasks, and it is necessary to find adequate (separate)
solutions to each problem. The way of individual problem solution usually comes from
the weighted integration of tactical analysis linked to the quantification and multi
criteria decision making. A general approach to the battlefield modeling can be
compared with the large 3D matrix (set) of particular math and tactical models. As an
example solution may serve the ambush area optimization, illustrated on Figure 6,
where the red circles represent the extrapolated positions of the opponent and the pink
circles indicates the position of friendly elements.
Increasing diameter of the pink circles indicates the position relating to the particular
position of the opponent indexed in this case, from top to bottom. So, the center of the
red circle on the top position is related to the center of the pink circle with the smallest
diameter and the center of the red circle on the lowest position correspond with the
center of the pink circle with the largest diameter. The optimal maneuver of each
element is depicted from the default position for optimal action.
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Figure 8: Ambush area optimization (SW University of defence)
Source: authors
6 Conclusions
The latest military trends are setting the demanding requirements to the contemporary
operations. The focus is laid on the quality and proper integration of underlay analyses,
necessary for the effective decision process execution. These trends are apparent since
the year 2002 and escalating in the context of building the new approach to the decision
making activities of the commanders.
In context of information technology development and increasing demands on combat
information systems as for instance C4ISTAR, what slowly reach its technological edge,
the next way of tactical and technological future of 21-st century battlefield are turning
to model based tactical decision support. This problematic consist of wide set of
operational and tactical problems, generally reaching side of multi-criteria decision tasks
and in most cases converge to tactical battle and non-battle process optimization. The
construction of models of decision-making processes and their solution is motivated by
intentions to limit the intuitive decision-making and eliminate the negative
consequences of subjective problem-solving procedure.
Optimization of operational and tactical activities, though this is not apparent at the first
glance, is linked to the pragmatic aspects and algorithmic scheme, enabling their
advanced automation. The solutions are not usually the trivial and the results are
necessary to analyze in terms of its stability and assess its pragmatic level. However,
this innovative approach has pushed a previous static concept of information
distribution to a new dimension and provides a powerful tool in the planning and
combat operation management process. This concept also creates the key conditions for
the effective integration of automated and robotized systems into the combat operations.
References
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BUEHLER, M., IAGNEMMA, K., SINGH, S. (Eds.). The DARPA Urban
Challenge: Autonomous Vehicles in City Traffic. Springer Tracts in Advanced
Robotics, vol. 56. USA: Springer, 2009. p. 626. ISBN 978-3-642-03990-4.
RYBANSKÝ, M., VALA, M. Geographic Conditions of Military Transport Using
Roads and Terrain. International conference on military technologies
(ICMT 2009). Brno, 2009. ISBN p. 9. 978-80-7231-649-6.
RYBANSKÝ, M., VALA, M. Analysis of relief impact on transport during crisis
situations. Moravian Geographical Reports, vol. 17, no. 3, 2009. pp. 19-26. ISSN
1210-8812.
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RYBÁR, M. a kolektiv. 2000, Modelovanie a simulácia vo vojenstve. Bratislava:
MO SR. ISBN 80-88842-34-4
STODOLA, P., MAZAL, J., RYBANSKÝ, M. Dead Reckoning Navigation for
Autonomous Unmanned Ground Vehicles in a Real Terrain. In: Proceedings of
the Joint 9th Asia-Pacific ISTVS Conference. Sapporo, Japan, 2010. p. 10.
STODOLA, P., MAZAL, J. Optimal Path-finding Algorithm for Autonomous
Unmanned Ground Vehicles. International Unmanned Vehicles Workshop
(UVW2010). Istanbul: Turkish Air Force Academy, 2010. p. 6.
SURDU, John R., COL, 2007. Deep Green Broad Agency Announcement No. 0756. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Information
Processing
Technology
Office
(IPTO),
Website:
http://www.darpa.mil/ipto/solicitations.
COLLECTION, PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTION OF
INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY´S SITUATION AS PART OF
THE COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE
Jan Nohel
Abstract: The aim of the article is to describe information support of the command and control
process in the form of the intelligence process regarding the enemy’s operation on the
battlefield and the methods of its use for creating the Common Operational Picture. The
methods of information support of the decision-making process have been described with
regard to the conditions of current asymmetric operations. In conclusion the article deals with
the possibilities of providing information support which will lead to more efficient creation of
the commander´s situational awareness on the battlefield depending on the volume,
character and necessity of the processed data topicality with clearly comprehensible output.
Keywords: command and control information support, information collection,
common operational picture.
1 Introduction
The tasks fulfilled by the ACR units in foreign operations range from special forces´
offensive actions up to supporting humanitarian projects with civilian participation. The
identification of the enemy in these operations is difficult as he takes advantage of
hiding among the local population to camouflage his activities. He tries to take full
advantage of his strengths and coalition forces´ weaknesses using the asymmetric
method to conduct combat operations. The asymmetric method of the conduct of
combat operations means the threat to armed forces and government authorities
operating in a distressed area, usually connected with feasible and frequent use of
unusual means and methods of combat operations. These enable the elimination of high
technological predominance and superiority in numbers of the coalition forces and the
utilization of their weaknesses for the achievement of often considerable and surprising
success by paramilitary forces [8]. The asymmetric threat may be based namely on the
enemy´s specific methods of operation, often criminal ones, which are aimed at terrorist
attacks conducted not only against military targets. It may resemble unconventional
methods of combat which the enemy uses to confront qualitative and quantitative
superiority of the coalition forces, e.g. suicide bombing attacks and the use of
improvised explosive devices (IED). A weaker enemy applies conventional methods of
combat to prevent the coalition forces from using their forces and technological
potential and to inflict maximum losses on them. These are e.g. the use of snipers,
sudden attacks performed by small armed groups, shelling, etc.
The effective performance of tasks in such an environment requires the commander´s
(staff´s) complex situational awareness of the battlefield to be able to adopt qualified
decisions leading to the attainment of operation objectives. For this it is necessary to
87
provide the collection and processing of large quantity of updated data and information
from the whole spectrum of action. The summarization of acquired facts into one output
will facilitate fast orientation in the situation on the battlefield and the estimate of
mutual influences of environmental factors. Through the performed orientation the
commander is able to determine where he occurs, what the final condition he wants to
achieve is and to realize the method for the achievement of the required final condition.
The commander (staff) is able to compare the development of the enemy´s situation and
the civil environment in the past and to estimate their future goals using the continuous
upgrading of information inputs. This will help him react to an unexpected attack of the
enemy or to the change in the civil population behaviour and thus to make the entire
command and control process more effective.
2 Command and control information support
Information support is a process (a set of information activities) supporting informationcontrol, decision-making and cognitive processes [9]. It contains information search,
processing, transfer and distribution or archiving processes. Command and control
information support represents the process which supports commanders for whom it
creates the picture on the current state of performed operations. On its basis they may
issue instructions required for the accomplishment of the operation objective. The
information support of commanders at the command and control tactical level is focused
namely on the so-called task variables, which are the aspects of the situation in the area
of operation directly affecting the success of task accomplishment.
2.1 Characteristic of information on task variables
The task variables [6] at the command and control tactical level are determined by a
specific task and relate to a specified area, time, friendly forces and equipment, the
composition and operation of the enemy and civil influences. The task variables are
divided into six information areas as follows:
The first area includes the information on the unit task in the superior´s formation and
its roles in the operation. It also contains limitation for the independent task
performance (among others e.g. rules of weapon use, arriving at checkpoints).
The second area contains the information on the enemy which describes dangerous
areas of action and the presence of the enemy. The information which every commander
needs to know relates to: deployment, unit strength and composition of the enemy in the
area of manoeuvre, his armament, range of fire and optical visibility from the enemy´s
area of deployment, combat operation of the enemy of in the past (date, time, place,
strength and type of attacks), periodical attacks of improvised explosive systems (date,
time, place, type, the situation in the vicinity) and location of minefields.
The third area is formed by the information on the effect of the terrain and natural
phenomena on the manoeuvre of subordinated forces and equipment. This acquired
information will specify under which conditions the terrain will be passable. The stress
in this area of geographic and hydrometeorological characteristics is laid on the
following: relief of the terrain and obstacles (vegetation, trafficability, water passability,
weather effect on the trafficability of the terrain and communications, traffic capacity of
the area (network of communications and structures on communications over land with
the following parameters: surface, length, width, bearing capacity), observation
possibilities, key areas, potential approaches.
The fourth area contains the information on friendly forces and equipment. It
represents the capabilities of friendly forces and equipment. It includes the following:
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parameters of friendly vehicles, deployment/operation of friendly/allied units in the area
of operation, deployment of friendly or allied bases and police stations, optical and radio
visibility from a certain point in the area of operations depending on the terrain,
effective range of friendly unit weapons, the representation of the effective range of
supporting weapons in manoeuvre.
The fifth area includes the available time calculation required for unit commander´s
planning, unit preparation, subordinates´ planning and preparation and control of
readiness.
The sixth area contains the information on the civil environment influences. It means
namely the relationship of the local population to the presence of coalition forces, their
composition, organizations and associations, personality features of the local population,
significant events and holidays, significant structures and their ability to affect our
forces and equipment.
The entire planning and decision-making process of commanders and staffs in the ACR
foreign operations takes 1 to 2 days depending on the type of operations and external
factors. In the case of a crisis situation, such as e.g. the attack on a unit and the
communication with the superior is lost and the unit commander has to decide himself
at the place within the shortest possible time, the decision-making process shouldn´t
take more than 10 minutes.
Out of the task variables the situation of the enemy is the most critical area owing to the
complicated estimate of the future operation variant. In all the other areas there is either
complete information coverage (task and condition of friendly forces and equipment),
relatively constant conditions (character of the terrain) or predictable conditions on a
long-term basis (weather forecast and assumptions of the civil environment). For this
reason mainly information management and consequent understanding of the enemy´s
situation will be dealt with in the next part of the text.
2.2 Characteristic of Information
Current and accurate information on the enemy´s operation and composition is the basis
for the complex information support of the command and control process for the reason
of necessary situational awareness of the battlefield on a real-time basis. In the course of
the planning process as well as the task performance the commander has to know and
understand the current state and development of the enemy´s situation on the battlefield.
On the basis of the current situational awareness and the long-term development of the
enemy´s situation in the area of operations the commander is capable of anticipating
most of the risks and threats in the future and responding to them in advance effectively.
The information processed on the basis of a large amount of input data from all
available sources is a characteristic element of command and control information
support in the environment with the asymmetric manner of conducting combat
operations by the enemy. The summarization of this information represents the situation
display of the battlefield, on the basis of which all the planning and decision-making
activities regarding the manoeuvre of units fulfilling the tasks in the area of operations
take place.
3 Intelligence process – situation of enemy
The command and control information support regarding the operation and composition
of the enemy is provided by the combat intelligence. Its entire information activities are
arranged in the intelligence process which consists of five steps[2]: planning,
preparation, collection, processing and creation of information. This cyclic process
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further includes the function of analysis, evaluation and distribution of intelligence
information which occurs in its whole course constantly.
3.1 Planning
In planning as an initial step of the intelligence process, the evaluation of the enemy´s
situation, the definition of the required final condition in the operation and the
identification of requirements for information are carried out. Then the information
collection plan is created, synchronized and coordinated from the viewpoint of security
and effectiveness. After that, intelligence staffs will allocate human and material
resources and further necessary technical support for particular tasks. The commander´s
intent, his instructions for operation planning and Commander´s Critical Information
Requirements (CCIR) are a basic solution for intelligence planning and control.
3.2 Preparation
The preparation for performing intelligence is initiated after the receipt of the
Operational Order or Plan, Preliminary Combat Instruction or the commander´s intent to
perform the operation. It contains the preparation of personnel, material and equipment,
coordination of exercises, acquaintance with the current situation in the operation area,
acquaintance with the rules of employment, formation of intelligence teams and
architecture, coordination of analytical cooperation, etc.
3.3 Collection of information on the enemy´s deployment and operation
The collection of information on the enemy includes all activities aimed at data and
information gathering which will enable commander´s situation understanding in the
area of operations. The capability of complex situation understanding of the enemy in
the area of employment can be achieved through the maximization of data and
information collection from all available sources. This network of sources will meet all
the requirements for information from different directions and its verification as well.
The collection of data and information on the enemy is supported by four characteristic
methods as follows [5]:
a)
Reconnaissance;
b)
Surveillance;
c)
Security operations; and
d)
Intelligence operations.
Reconnaissance is a systematic, active and dynamic activity focused on information
gathering through visual observation or other detection methods in different zones of the
operation area. It is carried out by soldiers engaged in the operation who reconnoitre as
dismounted, mounted or transported by air. Their capabilities of collecting data and
information may be extended using various sensors or passive equipment for
monitoring. Reconnaissance is performed before, during as well as after the operation in
the area of responsibility. It provides and updates the information on the enemy´s
deployment and operation, by which it gives freedom of manoeuvre to commanders of
units engaged in the operation area. Generally, the commander focuses his
reconnaissance efforts on CCIR, targeting and dead spots without sufficient information
coverage. When planning road and area reconnaissance he aims at predetermined
structures with a view to confirm or disconfirm the presence of the enemy.
Surveillance is the systematic observation of the airspace, ground or underground areas,
points, persons or things using visual, intercept, electronic or photographic equipment
[1]. It may be used independently for continuous monitoring of areas of interest or as
part of reconnaissance. Equipment of surveillance searches and tracks the signs of the
enemy´s operation in the area of interest which the reconnaissance activities may then
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focus on. Similarly, it is also used to control various technical areas of the enemy´s
action using which it reduces potential risks for friendly forces and equipment. For
efficient continuous surveillance commanders take advantage of simultaneous coverage
of a particular region by several surveillance devices, the main tasks of which are the
following: early warning regarding the enemy´s operation, identification and monitoring
of the enemy´s forces and equipment including his communication capabilities and
evaluation of key targets. Commanders evaluate the results of surveillance continuously
and take measures for more effective information gathering from the area of interest.
Efforts of surveillance are focused on restricted zones, geographically specified areas,
points of interest or organizational, social, infrastructure and communication networks.
Security operations are aimed at the protection of friendly forces and equipment against
the enemy´s surprise operation and reduce the entire situational unawareness on the
battlefield. In contrast with the data and information collection methods they are
oriented to friendly structures, forces and equipment protected by them in the operation.
The aim of security operations is to search actively the information on the enemy´s
deployment and movement, on the possibilities to take advantage of the terrain by the
enemy and on the possibilities to take countermeasures by friendly forces.
Intelligence operations match the information collection devices to the commander´s
requirements for information. The units supporting intelligence operations acquire
information either from friendly sources or take advantage of information sources of
tactical, operational and strategic intelligence. Each type of intelligence operations
provides the commander with specific capabilities and sensors which require specific
information control and processing.
Types of intelligence operations
The intelligence operations regarding the enemy´s operation can be divided into seven
following types[12]:
a)
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT).
SIGINT is intelligence including either independent outputs or the combination of
outputs from Communications Intelligence (COMINT), Electronic Signals Intelligence
(ELINT) and Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT). It uses
communication, electronic and other instrumentation signals as information sources.
Characteristic of Signal Intelligence types:
COMINT analyses radio communication in addition to broadcast and television
transmission;
ELINT includes technical intelligence which analyse all uncommunicative
electromagnetic radiation in addition to nuclear detonations and radioactive
sources;
FISINT analyses technical information obtained through the recording of
electromagnetic radiation connected with testing and operational use of air,
ground and underground systems. It includes the use of signals of signal,
electronic and distance-measuring interrogators.
b)
Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT).
OSINT is intelligence from open sources which collects, processes and distributes
information from publicly available sources for the purpose of meeting specific
requirements for intelligence information [3].
c)
Imagery Intelligence (IMINT).
IMINT is intelligence taking advantage of optical, electronic or digital outputs from
infrared, laser, multi-sensor or radar recording and from visual photographing.
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d)
Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).
MASINT is technical intelligence detecting, locating, monitoring and identifying or
describing specific characteristics of position or dynamic objects and sources. It uses
outputs from radar, spectroradiometric, infrared, laser, hyper-spectral image, acoustic,
radio-frequency and seismic sensors and sensors for detecting the use of mass
destruction weapons.
e)
Human-Source Intelligence (HUMINT).
HUMINT is a collection of information from people and various media through the
soldiers trained for this purpose with the aim to identify enemy units and their
deployment, strength, composition, intent, equipment, occupancy and capabilities.
f)
Technical Intelligence (TECHINT).
TECHINT is intelligence which collects information and analyses the threats of enemy
military equipment and vehicles.
g)
Counterintelligence (CI).
CI prevents and neutralizes the efforts of the enemy to collect information through the
information collection done by friendly forces; it analyses obtained information,
investigates and takes countermeasures including the technical ones. It includes all
detection and identification activities and the use and neutralization of the enemy´s
intelligence operations.
3.4 Processing
In case of large amount of information acquired from various sources, the information is
arranged and divided depending on the commander´s requirements for information and
its efficiency in the creation of situational awareness. In the step of processing the
acquired information is converted into formats suitable for subsequent analysis,
information creation or for immediate use by the commander. It may be translating
documents, developing films or converting electronic data into standardized reports. On
the contrary, data and information from air reconnaissance and from observers can be
distributed immediately. Most of these outputs, however, must be evaluated by analysts
from the viewpoint of relevance and accuracy.
3.5 Information creation
In the step of information creation, intelligence staffs analyze, integrate and interpret
data and information from one or more sources to the form of final intelligence products
with the use of information support from the superior as well as subordinates. Early,
accurate and clearly summarized intelligence products will help the commander
recognize the enemy´s operation variant and improve the plan of information collection
in the operation area. The quality and method of information processing may affect the
preparation and planning of friendly forces operation fundamentally.
3.6 Intelligence process functions
The intelligence process functions [2] are in progress continuously during the entire
time of its cycle. They include analysis, distribution and evaluation of acquired data and
information.
Commanders and staffs perform the analysis of acquired information with regard to the
problems or situations which they tackle through its collection with the purpose of
maximum coverage of Priority Information Requirements (PIR). The performed analysis
helps commanders at all levels adopt decisions on the best strategy of information
collection and the priority with regard to available information sources. Intelligence
staffs analyze every requirement for information to define its reliability, the ability to
support the commander´s intent and the best method to meet the requirement. The
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outputs of this intelligence process function facilitate to define priorities and to perform
the synchronization of information collection from more sources. Intelligence staffs try
to determine expected variants of the enemy´s operation, CCIR and their indicators
through the information analysis. The intelligence analysis is a key to creating the
commander´s situational awareness. It is performed by analysts, specialists for a given
area trained to assess information reliability, relevance and importance. Intelligence
staffs arrange acquired data and develop another phase of the intelligence operation
which includes the evaluation of events and the estimate of their consequences. On this
basis they are also able to anticipate the development of the situation subject to newly
acquired information. In their analyses they produce more variants of the enemy´s future
operation and their recognizable signs. They identify possible threats as well as
opportunities for the efficient use of friendly forces and equipment in each estimated
variant. After analysis and synthesis of all available information, new requirements for
information collection may occur to confirm expected variants of the enemy´s operation
which will enable more effective use and reaction of friendly forces to the enemy´s
operation. The outputs of intelligence analysis are included in the situation display of
the battlefield.
Another function of the intelligence process is timely distribution. Sharing accurate and
current information from all available sources is a key to successful synchronization and
coordination of forces and equipment, their defence and situation comprehension in the
operation. Current information must be distributed in a proper comprehensible format
which will support the decision-making process of the commander. It is also necessary
to create intelligence architecture including the Information Distribution Plan so that
each recipient can receive required information in time. Various methods and products
supported by technical facilities are used for information dissemination. These are
written (reports), verbal (briefing) and graphic products (map and electronic), the
purpose of which is to provide the recipient with relevant information.
The last function of the intelligence process is information evaluation, which is a
continuous process, monitoring of the current situation and its development in all phases
of the operation. The continuous evaluation of intelligence operations, equipment,
available information and aspects of the battlefield environment are necessary for
supporting CCIR, meeting requirements for information, redirecting information
collection equipment based on the commander´s requirements, proper use of
information and intelligence, identification of the enemy´s efforts and his prevention or
disclosure of deception.
3.7 Unmanned aerial vehicles as flexible source of information on the enemy
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) controlled through the radio network are capable of
operating without a human crew. They may also be pre-programmed for flight and for
use of carried sensors, weapons or load [11]. Their great advantage is flexibility in task
performance by reason of their technical equipment manoeuvrability and variability.
Based on the task, they may be equipped with various devices which enable the task
accomplishment. These are e.g. electro-optical and infrared sensors, the synthetic
aperture radar, ground moving target indicator, SIGINT and electronic means,
photographic and video equipment [10]. They are not limited by terrain obstacles,
fatigue or the possible loss of the human crew when collecting information.
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Unmanned aerial vehicles as dynamic means taking advantage of carried technical
devices for data and information collection may perform different intelligence tasks,
e.g.:
a)
Area reconnaissance.
They may monitor systematically a pre-defined area of intelligence interest and identify
the signs of the occurrence of the enemy´s forces and equipment. The goal of UAV
operation is to identify the deployment and composition of enemy units accurately; to
identify particular targets and their activities and to enable the priority selection of their
destruction; to identify possible enemy reinforcement assets and their routes; and
further, to identify possible supply routes of enemy engaged units. The detection of the
use of mass destruction weapons and the levels of possible area contamination may also
be part of area reconnaissance.
b) Road reconnaissance.
It is reconnaissance of determined roads important for manoeuvre of friendly forces and
equipment. It includes identifying the deployment and composition of enemy units on
these roads as well as in their vicinity from where they are capable of disrupting
coalition forces´ manoeuvres efficiently; further, identifying barriers which prevent
friendly forces from using roads.
c)
Monitoring points of interest.
Unmanned aerial vehicles may monitor temporarily or constantly specific points,
persons, vehicles or other structures important for the performance of operational tasks
or for the purpose of responding to CCIR.
d) Network monitoring.
Network monitoring includes observing organizational, social, communication or
infrastructural interconnections and relations of individuals, groups and organizations. It
also includes the identification of physical and virtual infrastructure aspects (bridges,
markets and roads) in the life of inhabitants [5].
e)
Performance of security operations.
In the course of task performance as well as in the location of troops out of combat,
unmanned aerial vehicles may carry out continuous monitoring of the area of action and
its vicinity with a view to early warning against an unexpected enemy´s operation. This
maintains commander´s situational awareness and enables effective reaction of friendly
forces and equipment to the enemy´s manoeuvre.
f)
Data collection for intelligence operations.
Using on-board sensors and devices unmanned aerial vehicles operate as a means of
data and information collection to carry out intelligence operations, such as e.g.
SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT, TECHINT and Counterintelligence.
Unmanned aerial vehicles enable the commander the search and identification of the
enemy beyond the limit of their visibility and the transfer of acquired information on a
real-time basis. Automated activities of information management, processing and
dissemination obtained through UAVs facilitate information evaluation, analysis and
distribution nearly on a real-time basis. Based on the task and the UAV type, the
commander is able to obtain important and updated data and information on the
enemy´s situation in the area of operation.
4 Common operational picture
The Common Operational Picture (COP) represents all the important information from
the area of intelligence interest in one integral output resulting from the commander´s
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requirements and is based on the general data and information shared by more than one
commander [4]. It allows all commanders and staff workers to gain complex insight into
the development of the operation and to coordinate the operations leading to the
successful task accomplishment. The process of the COP creation and use can be
divided into four interconnected elements – data and information collection, analysis,
decision and action.
Data and information collection element is created by all sources of information on
the enemy which the commander is able to use in performing the task. These are all
available types of reconnaissance, reports from the superior and the units engaged in the
operation and the sensors scanning the signs of enemy operations. The speed of
information gathering, processing and distribution from these sources for further
processing is critical for creating the COP.
Data and information analysis element is created by intelligence staff members who
analyze possible effects of the enemy´s operation on the manoeuvre of friendly forces
and equipment depending on the time and area and judge its future development. It
creates an important part of the Common Operational Picture through the integration,
refinement, complex analysis and sharing of the important intelligence information of
the enemy. Distinctly displayed situation of the enemy will enable the orientation in the
area and the operations important for the effective command and control process.
Decision-making element is done by commanders who plan and control the operations
of subordinated units. On the basis of complex situational awareness they are capable of
adopting qualified decisions on task performance by available forces and equipment [4].
The situational awareness on the battlefield enables more efficient manoeuvre of
subordinated units and the use of combat power accurately and in time. Using the COP
the reconnaissance authorities may also be tasked subsequently to cover identified gaps
in the area of action.
Action element is formed by forces and equipment which fulfil tasks in the operation
area. In addition, they may also be used as information sources. They participate in
creating the COP on the battlefield through providing current information from the area
of employment. Immediate availability of the updated COP provides commanders of
even the smallest manoeuvring units with the complex orientation in the area of task
performance which enables them coordination of task performance in larger military
groupings.
The Common Operational Picture may be a plot of the tactical situation on the terrain
layout of a computer programme which can work in the network with other computers
of coalition units´ commanders. The station interface must support immediate and
secure data and information transfer in the network and their accurate display. The
character of information provided through the COP is derived from variable tasks in the
area of intelligence interest.
5 Conclusion
The military operations conducted against the enemy in asymmetric combat are
unpredictable with regard to their future development and dynamics. The frequent
moment of surprise on the enemy´s part puts pressure on commanders to adopt effective
decisions on the operation and reaction of their subordinates rapidly. Such risks make
bigger and bigger demands on the speed, accuracy and comprehensibility of the entire
process of command and control information support. The complicated estimate of the
enemy´s situation development on the battlefield, his intents and incalculable conduct
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puts pressure on the coalition forces to collect and update information from the
operation area constantly. For intelligence estimates of the enemy´s future variant the
analysts´ intuition built-up on the basis of complex situational awareness plays an
unsubstitutable role. However, every activity or manoeuvre of friendly forces causes the
reaction of the enemy. In the same way, every reaction of friendly forces to the enemy´s
operation causes his backlash [7]. For this reason, the situation development on the
battlefield nearly never proceeds according our assumptions. Therefore, every
commander needs to know all available current information on the enemy´s employment
and operation so that he can use friendly forces effectively.
Large amount of information from the full spectrum of action in the operation area can
be obtained using different types of automated information sources. They may include
the search of the enemy´s elements in a given area, their identification, specification or,
if need be, continuous monitoring and processing of acquired data. The subsequent
distribution of this clear information to all users in a common information network
supports the creation of the rough COP of the battlefield. The distributed information is
displayed on the terrain layout using its position characteristics without the hidden
information of tactical-technical character. It is, however, only a tactical symbol
positioned on the map according to relevant position data. The visualization of the
enemy´s capabilities and a possible fire action can be obtained through the fusion of
tactical algorithms and technical capabilities of weapons and equipment depending on
terrain geographic parameters. In this way, every commander would promptly know the
areas dangerous for friendly units with regard to the current weapon range and possible
arrival of the enemy´s forces and equipment.
The network-interconnected digitized environment provides all commanders with
important knowledge for effective command and control process in the form of the
COP. Using the COP, the manoeuvre and combat force effectiveness of subordinated
forces and equipment increases. Through the visual display and summarization of even
hidden information of the enemy´s elements in the COP of the battlefield, the analytical
activities of all commanders will be easier for creating situational awareness on the
battlefield. Linking definite and hidden information on the enemy and the possibilities
and capabilities of friendly forces and equipment in a digitized form will also enable the
acceleration and improvement of planning and reaction capabilities to sudden situation
change on the battlefield. The ability to adopt a qualified decision faster than the enemy
will provide the commander with major advantage for gaining the superiority over the
enemy. It minimizes doubts in decision-making and improves the trust in the entire
command and control process.
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
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JP 3-0 Joint Operations, Suffolk: Point Doctrine Group, 2011, GL-17 p.
FM 2-0 Intelligence, Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2004,
PIN: 081441-000, 4-1 – 4-14p.,
FM 2-22,9 Open source intelligence, Washington: Headquarters Department of
the Army, 2006, PIN: 083698-000, 2-1 p.
FM 3-0 Operations,Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2011,
PIN:079091-000, C1 6-12p., C1 4-3p.
FM 3-55 Information Collection, Washington: Headquarters Department of the
Army, 2012, PIN: 102534-000, 1-12p., 1-5 p.
[6]
FM 5-0 The operations process, Washington: Headquarters Department of the
Army, 2010, PIN: 082115-000, C-5-7 p.
[7] FM 6-0 Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, Washington:
Headquarters Department of the Army, 2003, PIN: 080933-000, B-3 p.
[8] Doktrína armády české republiky, 2. vydání, Vyškov: Správa doktrín ŘeVD,
2010, 11 s.
[9] LUKÁŠ, L., HRŮZA, P., KNÝ, M. Informační management v bezpečnostních
složkách. 1. vydání. Praha : MO – AVIS, 2008, ISBN 978-80-7278-460-8, 214 s.
[10] „Eyes of the army“ U.S. Army roadmap for unmanned aircraft systéme 20102035, Alabama, Fort Rucker: UAS center of excellence, 2010, 8 p.
[11] UAV or UAS?, internetové stránky: Unmanned aerial vehicle systems, c2013, online, 5.1.2013, dostupné z: http://www.uavs.org/index.php?page=what_is
[12] FM 2-0 Intelligence, Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 2004,
PIN: 081441-000, 6-1, 7-1, 8-1, 9-3, 10-1, 11-1p.
97
SOME BASIC APPROACHES TO THE NEW CONCEPT OF CBRN
DEFENCE IN THE CZECH ARMED FORCES
Pavel Otřísal
Abstract: Relatively quite long time the new military regulation of Oper-1-3 (2011) is valid
within the whole Czech Armed Forces. This regulation is based on Standardization agreement
(STANAG) marked as 2528. This STANAG introduces Allied Joint Publication AJP-3-14
“Allied Joint Doctrine for Force Protection which is a NATO/PfP publication. The paper
introduces current valid Czech definitions of Armed Force Chemical Corps, CBRN Defence
and chemical support and it suggests a possible content of “CBRN Defence” regarding
demands fulfilment set in AJP-3-14.
Keywords: Chemical corps, chemical support, CBRN Defence, Czech Armed
Forces.
1 Introduction
Both conceptions “Chemical Support” (CS) as a part of the support of troops operations
and “Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence” included in a
category of force protection are currently used in the Czech Armed Forces (CAF). Alone
division of measurements included into both categories is quite difficult mainly from the
point of view of particular tasks recognition which have to be fulfilled by troops in
operations. From this reason some activities have been developed in order to determine
a new framework of integrated measurements which will be understood in a totally
unique way and moreover, accordingly with North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). As an ideal connected link the NATO Allied Joint Publication AJP-3-14 has
become.
2 Determination of Chemical Corps and its Relationship to CS and CBRN Defence
Although, fulfillment tasks of CS and CBRN Defence is a combined arms meter so
within their realization the Czech Armed Forces (CAF) Chemical Corps (CCs) play
absolutely important role. From this reason it is necessary to explain and stress some
starting points in a framework of both CS and CBRN Defence thereby to determine
initial solutions for their combination. Binding and valid military regulations and
publications which representatives are “Field order of Army Ground Forces [1], a
proposal of Všeob-Ř-1 [2], military regulations Vševojsk-2-1 [3], Vševojsk-2-6 [4] and
terminological norm of CCs [5] and military publication Land Forces in Operations [6]
is CCs, CC and CBRN Defence defined in different ways. This fact causes problems
with unique specification of CCs contents and clear definition of fulfilled tasks. Some
definitions are introduced in chapters 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3.
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2.1 CAF CCs definitions
Terminological norm NN 30 0101 is a binding military regulation which sets definition
determination of terms within CCs competence. In that norm there is introduced that
CCs is a branch of CAF. It fulfills the most complicated and specific tasks
measurements of CS within CBRN monitoring, CBRN hazard management, radiation
and chemical accidents, troops´ protection in areas contaminated CBRN compounds and
Toxic Industrial Materials (TIM). It is created by units of CBRN survey,
decontamination and others. Its parts are groups and centers of warning and reporting.
The military regulation Všeob-Ř-1 defines the CCs which is designated for CS of
troops. It fulfills the most complicated and specific measurements of CS in CBRN
monitoring, within CBRN hazard management, radiation and chemical accidents, troops
protection in areas contaminated by CBRN compounds and TIM. Selected forces take
part in operations in the peace on the Czech Republic territory. It is formed by a brigade
level formation, formations and units of CBRN survey, CBRN protection,
decontamination and others. Its parts are collected and management groups of CBRN
monitoring (CBRN cell workplaces, workplaces and centers of CBRN warning and
reporting and so forth).
In a proposal of Field rules of CAF ground forces there is introduced that CCs is
designated for CS of brigade level formation, formations and equipments. It fulfills the
most complicated and specific tasks of CS within CBRN monitoring, CBRN
management, radiation and chemical accidents, brigade level formation, formations and
equipment CBRN protection in areas contaminated radioactive and toxically compounds
and within masking. In the area of protection against biological weapons it performs
general biological survey.
Military publication Pub-31-10-01 sets that CCs: Is designated for CS of brigade level
formation, formations and equipment. In the area of protection against biological
weapons it performs general biological survey.
From above mentioned definitions result from that CCs fulfils tasks of CS and takes part
on CBRN Defence. From it follows, that in both cases it fulfils professional tasks based
on employment of the same technical devices, procedures and methods. Tasks
fulfillment come into the category of CS are significantly preferred. It follows from
views of CCs task specification before joint to the NATO. Furthermore, in current time
CCs fulfills significant tasks within Czech Republic Integrated Rescue System (IRS).
These tasks are neither exactly nor generally mentioned and it is only possible to hope
that tasks within IRS are going to be completed in a mentioned scope. These tasks are
specified in so called type activities of IRS parts, which are not elaborated in forms of
military regulations, but activities performed in the responsibility of Fire Brigades. CCs
play the role of cooperation provider within their realization.
2.2 Definition of CS
Terminological norm of NN 30 0101 sets that CS is a kind of a support of troops
operations whose aim is created needed conditions for tasks fulfillment within
contamination CBRN compound to troops and to participate on their protection. CS
includes:
- CBRN monitoring;
- physical protection of people and material of brigade level formations, formations
and equipment (objects) against effects of CBRN compounds and TIM;
- decontamination of personnel, equipment, vehicles and material of brigade level
formations, formations, units, equipment, terrain, roads and objects.
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Military regulation Vševojsk-2-6 introduces that: “CS is a part (kind) of the support of
troops operations.” And advert to the article 154 of Všeob-Ř-1. In this article there is
only named the framework of the support of troops operations whereas particular
measurement of CS are elaborated in the head 4, part 4 “Chemical Support”. In the first
article of introduced part (article 174) in named that CS includes:
- CBRN monitoring;
- physical protection of brigade level formations, formations and units (objects) against
effects of CBRN compounds and TIM;
- decontamination brigade level formations, formations and units (equipment), terrain,
roads and objects.
In the military regulation Vševojsk-2-6 measurements of CS are not listed. The text of
the head 1, part 2 “Ways of CS tasks fulfillment” enables to summarize single
measurements of CS in the way that CS includes:
- CBRN monitoring;
- physical protection of people and military material of brigade level formations and
units (military objects) against effects of CBRN compounds and TIM;
- decontamination; this part adverts on military regulation Všeob-Ř-1, article 183. In
that article is noted: “Decontamination of formations (units), terrain, roads and
objects.
The military publication Pub-31-10-01 notes that: “CS (CBRN Support) creates a
complex of measurements whose aim is creates needed conditions for tasks fulfillment
within contamination CBRN compound to troops and to participate on their protection.
Single CS measurements are in above mentioned military regulations (norm and
publication) defined very similarly. It is necessary to note that to very important
correction of single measurements came by the approval of the first supplement to
Všeob-Ř-1 dated on the 11st of April by the ministry of Defence Vlasta Parkanová. This
supplement in the only one supplement of regulation Všeob-Ř-1 and it touches only
corrections within CAF CCs responsibility. In the same year military regulation
Vševojsk-2-6 was approved. This one comes out from Všob-Ř-1. To complete the
author adds that terminology norm NN 30 0101 was authorized in 2009. Nonetheless, a
process of preparation and final release of Vševojsk-2-6 was relatively long in
comparison with NN 30 0101 thus it is possible that just from this reason came out to
above mentioned deferent terms explanation.
2.3 CBRN Defence definition
The terminology norm NN 30 0101 defines CBRN Defence as a complex of
organizational and technical measurements and activities which have the aim to weak an
influence and remove effects of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and TIM release
and thus to contribute for keeping a combat capability of troops. Parts of CBRN
Defence are:
- detection, identification and monitoring;
- warning and reporting;
- physical protection;
- hazard management.
The military regulation Vševojsk-2-1 includes measurements of CBRN Defence and
TIM release into the Force Protection. It notes that CBRN Defence is a complex of
organizational and technical measurements and activities which have the aim to weak an
influence and remove effects of Weapons of Mass Destruction and TIM release and thus
to contribute for keeping keeping a combat capability of troops. This aim is achieved by
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the consequential realization of general measurements of protection and at the same
time of special measurements of CBRN Defence. Within specification of special tasks
of CBRN Defence it links on the article 53 of military regulation Všeob-Ř-1. This
article has been replaced by a snip 2 from the first supplementary to this regulation. In
this snip is noted that measurements of CBRN defence contents:
- detection, identification and finding of consequences WMD usage and TIM release;
- warning and reporting of troops;
- physical protection against effects of WMD and TIM;
- hazard management WMD employment and TIM release;
- medical countermeasures.
In subsequent text of military regulation Vševojsk-2-1 there are set special
measurements of CBRN Defence in this way:
- detection, identification and finding of consequences WMD usage and TIM release
(radiation and chemical accidents);
- warning and reporting of troops about nuclear attacks, chemical attacks biological
weapon employment, TIM release, CBRN situation amd warning against their
effects;
- physical protection against effects of WMD and TIM;
- prevention and hazard management WMD employment and TIM release;
- medical countermeasures of CBRN Defence.
The Pub-31-10-01 notes that CBRN Defence introduces the complex of organizational
and technical measurements and activities which have the aim to weak the influence and
remove effects of Weapons of Mass Destruction and TIM release and thus to contribute
to keeping a combat capability of brigade formations (formations and units). This aim is
achieved by the consequential realization of general measurements of protection and at
the same time of special measurements of CBRN Defence.
From mentioned definitions follows that CCs fulfils tasks of both CS and CBRN
Defence. These ones blend together and they repeat themselves. A mutual relationship
of CS and CBRN Defence measurements is illustrated in figure 1. Moreover, it is
evident that valid definitions of CS and CBRN Defence do not suit and for purposes of
implementation of AJP-3-14 they will have to be re-elaborated.
3 Mutual Relationship of Force Protection, Combat Service Support, CBRN
Defence and CS and current Understanding of their Content
Mutual relationship of force protection, combat service support, respectively CS and
CBNR Defence is illustrated in figure 1.
101
Figure 1: Mutual relationship of force protection, combat service support, respectively CS and
CBNR Defence (current state)
From definition determination of terms CS and CBRN Defence comes out that single
measurements are mutually combined thus that a border of the content between single
measurements is not unique. As an example it is possible to note CBRN monitoring (CS
measurement) and detection, identification and finding of consequences of WMD
employment, radiating and chemical accidents. Within comparison of aims, methods
and even usage of single both CS and CBRN Defence measurements can be mutually
found differences in fulfillment of specific and the most complicated tasks.
Furthermore, in definition of CBRN Defence the term of “monitoring” is revealed. This
term repeat itself in definition of CS. This multivalent determination of this term brings
into the content of fulfilled measurements a confusion and misunderstanding.
Specific and the most complicated tasks of CS and a share on force protection (mainly
CBRN Defence) fulfills CCs units. Measurements of CS completely deal with questions
concerning radioactive and chemical contamination [7]. It also takes part on solution of
question of biological contamination mainly by the non-specific (general) survey,
samplings, biological contamination areas forecast, decontamination, people and
military material disinfection.
4 A Proposal of a chase of current conception of CS and CBRN Defence
A proposal of a new conception of CCs supposes taking over of the responsibility for
CBRN Defence and CS tasks fulfillment. This, however, assumes exact determination
of responsibility for particular activities and measurements realization. From the point
of long-term named and content obscurities between specific measurements of CBRN
Defence and some measurements of CS thus seems to be good to think of a current state
introduced above and to attempt to make this situation changed. A new system of
CBRN Defence should be created. This system will include all necessary measurements
even to support of troops operations in condition of contamination caused by WMD and
TIM in combat and non-combat operations.
The author hopes that the new system would be named CBRN Defence. And it would be
defined in the system of force protection with it, that tasks would be fulfilled not only in
the system of force protection but also in system of support of troops operations. The
proposal of mentioned measurements is illustrated in the table 1.
102
Table 1 The proposal of CBRN Defence measurements and their content
The proposal of new measurements
CBRN monitoring
Includes detection, WMD and TIM, exact
identification of these compounds and
observation of CBRN situation development
in the force running and operations.
Warning and Reporting troops about
CBRN situation
Includes warning, reporting and handover of
information about CBRN situation.
Force protection against WMD and TIM
effects
CBRN Hazard management
Content of measurements
- collection of information about WMD employment and
industrial accidents;
- finding of nuclear bursts;
- finding of centers (areas) of either employment or
contamination of WMD and radiating and chemical
accidents;
- CBRN survey;
- control of exposure to nuclear and chemical hazard;
- sampling and identification of biological, chemical and
radiological agents;
- forecast, assessment and observation CBRN situation
development.
- warning of troops;
- reporting of troops and transfer CBRN reports.
Note: Realization of measurements of CBRN situation
and warning of troops are timely combined and they
repeat themselves.
- individual personnel protection;
- collective units´ protection;
- protection of armaments, material and vehicles.
- determination of risk for units´ activity in areas
disposition;
- recovery of personnel (vehicles);
- emergency medical aid;
- decontamination of troops (military vehicles and
materials, personnel, objects and terrain).
Considering what in current time in NATO documents is introduced the term of CBRN
Defence, which can be translated into the Czech language in the same way. This access
enables unique understanding of concerning problems.
In accordance with current inner CAF documents it is valid that part of forces is
detached in favour of IRS. From that reason definition of CCs would be completed in a
consequent way: “CCs is the kind of troops of CAF. It fulfills specific and the most
complicated tasks of CBRN Defence and it participates on fulfillment of tasks within
IRS in a case of the Czech Republic exposure. It is formed by a brigade level formation,
formations of CBRN Defence, units of CBRN Defence, units of survey,
decontamination units and others. In operations in the framework of IRS on the Czech
Republic territory it fulfills tasks following from concluded agreements between
Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Interior.
Potential tasks fulfilled by CCs in favor of IRS on the Czech Republic territory and in
the framework of non-combat operations in foreign countries would be specified like
this:
- detection, identification and CBRN situation monitoring;
- recovery (extraction) of personnel;
- emergency medical aid;
- decontamination of personnel, wounded personnel and vehicles and so on;
- maintenance of IRS parts (water supply, changing of personnel and so on).
The other possible tasks which would be fulfilled in the new conception of CBRN
Defence is possible to specify measurements connected with treatment of water in
favour of a decontamination site support even in cooperation with other parts of CAF
and IRS.
The mutual relationship of CBRN Defence with force protection and support of troops
103
operations would respect form illustrated in figure 2.
Figure 2: The relationship of CBRN Defence to force protection and support of troops
operations (proposed state)
5 Conclusion
Considering what most NATO states tasks of CS do not realize (they do not know
definition of CS) so they are included in problems of CBRN Defence. On the Czech site
arrives problems within international negotiation and solutions of related questions
among CAF members in the NATO framework in the area of CBRN Defence. The
whole terminology, documents are meanwhile in intentions of Allied doctrines and
standards of NATO ant are not implemented into CAF regulations and publications.
From that reason it is simpler to conform to NATO standards. As an example it is
possible to note the Slovak Armed Forces which fully accepted NATO doctrines in the
area of CBRN Defence practically without changes. A similar step would ask of
performance of necessary changes into principle CAF documents.
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
104
Všeob-Ř-1. Field manual of the Czech Armed Forces Land Forces. 2. rel. Prague :
Ministry of Defence, 1997. 192 p.
Všeob-Ř-1. Field manual of the Czech Armed Forces Land Forces. [Proposal of
the rule]. 1. rel. Prague : General Staff of the CAF, 2002. 329 p.
Vševojsk-2-1. CBRN Force Protection. Prague : Ministry of Defence, 2009. 197 p.
Vševojsk-2-6. Chemical Support in the Czech Armed Forces. 1. rel. Prague :
Ministry of Defence, 2008. 109 p.
NN 30 0101. CHEMICAL CORPS: Terminology norm. 3. rel. Prague : Ministry of
Defence, 2009. 222 p.
Pub-31-10-01. Land Forces in Operations. 1. rel. Vyškov : Section of Doctrine of
the Traning Command – Military Academy, 2011. 337 p.
DRAČKA, Emil; ZABADAL, Miroslav; KUČÍK, Jozef. Chemical support of the
battalion and brigade. Brno: NBC Defence Institute, 2005, textbook S – 3648,
207 p.
LOGISTICS INFORMATION SUPPORT IN NATO-LED
OPERATIONS
Miroslav PECINA and Roman DUFEK
Abstract: In the NATO principal document „NATO Logistics Vision and Objectives 2013-2022“
is clearly stated, that logistics support capabilities are critical for many of the types of
operations that NATO may undertake. It is important to improve visibility of logistics
requirements and capabilities and indeed improve the overall coordination in multinational
logistics. In order to support more effective and efficient management and coordination of
available capabilities and resources in multinational operations, the new logistics information
environment, exceeding current LOGFAS capabilities, and enabling collective planning and
execution of logistics support, is needed.
Keywords: Logfas, logistic, operation, NATO.
1 Introduction
Developments in the security environment during the last 10 to 15 years and the need to
deal with conventional and especially asymmetric threats and risks, wherever they
occur, sets the clear requirements for development of capabilities, especially the ability
to make and support multinational joint expeditionary operations at long distances,
under conditions with little or no local support and to sustain forces in operations for the
long period. This requires fully deployable armed forces, sustainable in operations and
capable of interoperability, which can be achieved only by a fully coordinated
multinational support for deployed forces.
In the area of NATO logistics planning there are however still persistent shortfalls that
precludes the development of multinational logistics to be fully implemented in practice.
Although nations and NATO have agreed the principal of collective responsibility for
logistics for more than a decade, the practical implementation is very slow in coming.
Previous and current NATO operations have been supported by effective, but mostly
independent, often uncoordinated, and potentially unnecessarily duplicative national
support capabilities. Lessons identified in current operations and for the NRF clearly
demonstrates that the planning and delivery of logistics continues to be primarily carried
out on a national basis. Therefore further effort is needed to exploit benefits of
collective logistics.
Better visibility, wider theatre level logistics authorities, and more agile and adaptive
capabilities to exploit emerging technologies, amongst others, could help to achieve a
more optimised logistics footprint, and thereby lead to improved effectiveness and
efficiency. There is also a need for improvement of cooperation during all phases of
operation (planning, preparation and execution) and among all actors (NATO, nations,
International organisations, contractors, etc.).
105
2 The experience of the NATO operations
The experience of the past and present NATO operations confirmed the need for
modern and highly capable forces - forces that are fully deployable, sustainable and
interoperable, able to operate across the full spectrum of possible conflicts and crises,
over a longer period of time, beyond Alliance territory, without geographical
restrictions.
To be able to respond to the logistics requirements of such forces, it is necessary to
improve the efficiency of logistics support and maximize the benefit of all stakeholders.
Logistics capability for NATO operations must be designed to reduce the level of
duplication of national resources, simplify and streamline logistics chains and NATO
Commander should have sufficient visibility, authority and flexibility to fulfill
operational requirements. This includes the need for timely, relevant and accurate
logistics information that will enable him a greater influence on the implementation of
logistics support.
Basic prerequisite for managing continuous logistical support to operating forces is a
visibility of available resources, requirements and processes. Information and visibility
of the logistics resources is also a prerequisite for NATO Commander to adequately
exercise his authority to coordinate and prioritize logistical support.
To summarise, the NATO Commander requires timely, accurate and relevant
information for effective decision making, as well as sufficient authority to make
decisions on the national and multinational logistics capabilities. The key is a visibility
of the logistics requirements, resources and processes. The visibility should include
different levels of command and control of NATO, nations and other participants, and
requested information must be provided at every level.
3 Current information environment
The need to increase visibility, transparency and efficiency resulted in requirement to
develop an automated tool, which would, based on multinational common logistics
databases, enable an easy identification of national units and their material and also
minimize errors in reports contents and the level of effort of systems users.
Main aim of such tool is to provide NATO commanders with dynamic update of
changes in key information database, including reserves and shortages of equipment and
material in the possession of their subordinate units.
Based on the above requirements, NATO has developed a comprehensive suite of
program systems called LOGFAS (Logistics Functional Area Services), containing the
following basic systems:
 ACROSS - Allied Command Operations Resource Optimizations Software
System
 ADAMS - Allied Deployment and Movement System
 EVE - Visible Effective Execution
 CORSOM - Coalition Reception Staging & Onward Movement
 LOGREP - Logistics Reporting System
These systems are based on a common internal database (LOGBASE) and use common
data files and sharing tools. For an easy identifications of all items included in the
database a codification scheme was established. All these systems are fielded prototypes
- although they are continuously under development, they are already used by the armies
of NATO member countries in operations as well as during exercises.
106
Using of LOGFAS systems confirmed the successful transmission of data, improvement
of the quality of output information, increase the availability and usefulness of data and
increased transparency and visibility of logistics capabilities. However, emerging
requirements for conducting of joint expeditionary operations are exceeding the current
capabilities of LOGFAS.
The current systems do not have a sufficient capacity for the required support to the
logistics decision making process and the NATO Commander does not have a sufficient
visibility of the available logistics resources. That is leading to missing opportunities
and wasting of resources by providing additional unnecessary supplies. Another
problem is the diversity of national systems and their mutual non interoperability.
Existing solutions simply do not meet the requirements for managements of future joint
operations; therefore development of the new information environment, based on new
technologies is the only way to satisfy operational requirements.
In more details, experience from operations identified the following problems:
 Inadequate collective planning
 Inadequate coordination, synchronization and management
 Independent and uncoordinated and often unnecessarily duplicated national
support systems
 Existing tools (LOGFAS) are not efficiently used
 Lack of interoperability between multiple and diverse systems and technical
solutions
 Incomplete overview of available logistics capabilities and facilities
 Inadequate overview of available resources and logistics requirements,
resulting in missing opportunities and unnecessary waste of resources
 Insufficient support to decision-making processes
This deficiencies lead to the fact, that NATO commander has limited ability to influence
the logistics operations and therefore he is not able to efficiently utilize the potential of
multinational support solution.
Current operations have also shown that the majority of NATO forces have limited
capabilities to work in a networked environment. Therefore it is necessary to create such
a support system that would be able to provide support for operational planning, joint
deployment of forces and their sustainability, which would lead to increase of combat
power and efficiency of operations.
4. Requirements for the development of new information environment
Appropriate network information environment and adequate tools are essential
prerequisites for improvement of the efficiency of logistics in current operational
environment, which is characterized by frequent changes and the need for
comprehensive and complex support of multinational forces in a hostile environment,
with scarce local resources.
NATO logistics operations can be optimized if the logistics is managed and coordinated
within the integrated command and control network.
The solution is to create a new logistics information environment, LOG FS (Logistics
Functional Services), which would replace the existing LOGFAS. Since the NATO
Commander must have an adequate command and control capability to coordinate
national and multinational logistics to be able to execute his operational tasks, the new
logistics information environment should be designed to facilitate the work of logistics
staffs at all levels. It is essential that the LOG FS provides the functionality needed for
107
command and control of all components of logistics, including the provision of logistics
information into the Common Operational Picture.
From the LOG FS project it is expected to maximally use the existing tools and
capabilities (such as LOGFAS) and to provide additional functions that would reflect
operational requirements and that are not supported at this time. It is supposed to
improve the overall integration, provide interoperable solutions using new technologies
and to enhance the whole life cycle efficiency, in particular by removing duplications
and centralizing common functions.
This new LOG FS environment will be based on LOGBIDS (Logistics Intelligence and
Support Services) as part of an approved Capability Package (CP 9C0103 "Functional
Services for Logistics C2"), approved by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 29 June
2007. Approval of projects included projects 42 and 43 (consolidation and development
phases). Projects 44 and 46 (evolution phase) will be approved as addendum.
NATO summit in Lisbon endorsed the overview of critical capabilities, including
development of Logistics Functional Service as part of Bi-SC AIS. The parts of the
LOG FS programmed scope were stratified as Capability Level 1 – Essential (Minimum
Core Capability Requirement). This means, that without this capability NATO will not
be able to effectively support the multinational logistics operations. Other parts, with
lower priority, will be developed later. Existing systems that are not in the highest
priority will continue to be supported.
During the LOG FS development it is important to follow several essential principles,
such as:
1)
Collective responsibility - NATO and the individual participating nations jointly
organize and provide logistical support to NATO operations, taking into account
each other's requirements and constraints.
2)
Mutual benefits - Visibility and authority for commanders, savings for nations.
The intention is to increase the level of efficiency of logistic support for NATO
forces while minimizing costs for nations and to reduce duplications and logistics
footprint.
3)
Visibility and accessibility of information for users - In order to optimize the
management of logistic support, exchange of information and a visibility over the
logistics requirements, resources, and processes is necessary in all phases of the
operation.
4)
Standardization - All existing systems and systems that will be developed (e.g. in
accordance with the force goals) should be developed with consideration of their
possible inclusion (or an interface) into a common information environment. Their
development should be in accordance with existing international standards (ISO,
STANAGs).
For the LOG FS development is important that the NATO Commander, nations as well
as other participants have the opportunity to view the declared capabilities. The NATO
Commander should be able to set priorities and evaluate deficiencies that could limit
national contributions. There should be also developed a capability to identify potential
solutions to overcome shortfalls and enable the opportunity to offer mutual support. The
new environment should be able to cover the full spectrum of logistics.
5 Proposal for a new information support
To meet requirements and to achieve the full operational capability of LOG FS, four
projects need to be realized. Projects 42 and 43 are part of the approved Capability
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Package 9C0103 and their implementation is expected to be completed in 2016. Projects
44 and 46 will be addressed through an addendum to CP 9C0103 and should be
completed by the end of 2018. Timelines of the development of individual projects,
however, are affected by many factors, such as the availability of funds, the length of the
approval process in the various committees, and in the future also by assessment of the
proposed solutions. So these timelines are only estimates.
As already mentioned above, the LOG FS objectives will be achieved through the
implementation of the program, which consists of three phases:
1)
Consolidation phase (integration of existing systems - Project 42).
2)
Development phase (implementation of new functionalities, resulting from
research and development and experimental programs - Project 43).
3)
Evolution phase (additional functionalities, improved performance, integration
and use of new technologies - projects 44 and 46).
Desired scope and functionality of LOG FS exceeds the ability of NATO to create such
an environment alone. Therefore NATO released the invitation for bids for projects 42
and 43. One of the most important prerequisites is that existing functionality, provided
by existing systems must be maintained. However, existing systems can be replaced by
equivalent systems or modification of COTS systems that meet functional requirements.
During the implementation of the new information environment it is desired to avoid the
"big bang" delivery, which assumes that the implementation will be conducted in the
form of multiple iterations. This means that the particular projects will be gradually
developed, tested and consequently implemented.
The development of the system must take into account also the fact that system users
will operate not only in static locations, but will be deployed to operations, principally
the NRF. These users can be deployed anywhere according to the situation
requirements, to the locations without available information infrastructure.
Another significant challenge is a change of developers. This could be a very expensive
process in terms of financial costs, time and human resources, which may affect the
availability of resources for the future functional systems enhancements. The cost of
LOG FS will depend on the solutions proposed by the contractor. Nations would
normally pay license fees for all standard COTS components. NCIA is taking measures
to ensure that LOG FS capabilities will be provided to nations under the same
conditions as when they are used for defensive purposes at the request of NATO.
Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that the final solution will be provided to nations
without additional financial costs. Developers, who will minimize the license fees of
developed system, will have therefore a higher chance of winning the competition.
There are several options how to reduce the costs. For example by creation of several
data centers with servers and data storage, to which nations could access as a remote
users through the NATO infrastructure, instead of installing local servers. This would
reduce the cost of support, local administration and maintenance and therefore
significantly reduce the cost for nations for using LOG FS. Since nations have different
approach to the proposed solutions (centralized NATO servers vs. national), it is likely
that both options will be offered to nations for consideration as part of the contract to be
signed with the winning bidder.
One of the fundamental problems is most likely related to the possible licensing of the
final product. This might have a significant negative impact on broad use of systems and
would discourage nations from willingness to cooperate.
109
Moreover, due to the fact that NATO does not conduct operations alone, but is
supported by the partner nations (NATO provides its systems to these nations), it would
be necessary to find possible solutions how to continue and support them, either through
the common funding, or by willingness of volunteer nation to bear the cost of others. In
addition, the project has an ambition to include also civilian actors (e.g. contractors),
therefore the Alliance should find a suitable solution.
6 Conclusions
Development of a new information environment is not an easy task. Besides financial
implications it brings a number of additional risks and challenges, which may affect the
functioning of the information environment.
However, if the implementation of those particular individual projects succeeds, the
LOG FS would become a tool that will significantly increase the efficiency of provided
logistical support.
The expected benefits from the use of the new information environment include:
reduction of stocks;
reduction of the number of logistics units and elements;
reduction of the number of logistics resources and assets, especially in the area of
transportation and storage;
reduction of the volume of transported material;
reduction of the need for storage capacity in seaports and airports;
reduction of number of contracted companies;
effective use of scarce local resources, including reducing the subsequent increase
of the prices;
increase the possibility of the use of modern logistics assets and tools;
simplification of the decision-making processes in the area of command and
control due to the implementation of common procedures.
Usage the LOG FS will result in a reduction of the total cost of the logistic support and
will also increase the efficiency of the execution of logistic support.
Acronyms
AIS
C2
COTS
CP
ISO
LOG FS
LOGBASE
LOGBIDS
LOGFAS
NCIA
NRF
110
Automated Information System
Command and Control
Commercial-off-the-Shelf
Capability Package
International Standardization Organization
Logistics Functional Services
Logistics Database
Logistics Intelligence and Support Services
Logistics Functional Area Services
NATO Communications and Information Agency
NATO Response Force
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
NATO.
NATO
Operations
Logistics
Chain
Management.
2008.
URL:<https://lognet.nato.int/OLCM/OLCM/Background/Documents/20080211_
OLCM_Concept_-_Final.pdf>.
NATO. AC/305(LCEG)(EAPC)D(2012)0009. NATO Logistics Vision and
Objectives (V&O) 2013-2022. 2012.
NATO. C-M(2003)101/MC 319/2, NATO Principles and Policies For Logistics.
2012.
URL:<https://lognet.nato.int/OLCM/OLCM/Reference/Documents/MC%203192%20NATO%20Policies%20and%20Procedures%20for%20Logistics.pdf>.
NATO. Consolidate existing LOG systems to provide LOG FS Initial Operational
Capability. Bi-SC AIS PROJECT OIS03042. 2007.
NATO. Develop Logistics Functional Services – Spiral 1. Bi-SC AIS PROJECT
OIS03043. 2007.
NATO. NATO Standard Priority System (SPS) Study. NCIA. Technical Report
TR/2012/SPW008384. 2013.
111
SOME SPECIFIC FEATURES IN THE LOGISTIC SYSTEM OF
ISAF REGIONAL COMMAND NORTH
Árpád Pohl
Abstract: In the past two decades the multinational character of military operations has
significantly increased. Combat, crisis response, or peace support operations have been
conducted primarily by allied nations or mission-oriented coalition partners. On the basis of the
multinational operations conducted so far it can be stated that there are hardly any countries
that are able to completely fulfil all logistic requirements of their national contingents in a
certain area of operations. Since I had the chance to serve as a logistic commander at a
multinational headquarters in theatre I had an opportunity to have an insight in the logistic
system of the lead nation of the region and to apply multinational procedures on a daily basis.
In the present paper I wish to publish and share some of the lessons learned there.
Keywords: logistics, ISAF, Forward Support Base, logistic support
1 Introduction
The operation of ISAF is based on the Bonn Conference in December 2001 at which the
parties agreed to provide assistance to the reconstruction of Afghanistan and the
establishment of a new government structure through the augmentation of the
multinational forces and that of the security in and around Kabul. The command of
ISAF was taken over by NATO on 11th August 2003. Upon the request of the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan the mandate of multinational forces was extended to
the entire country by UNSC Resolution 1510 on 13th October 2003.
The mission of ISAF is the following:
to provide support to establishing security for the flawless operation of the Central
Government of Afghanistan and that of international organisations;
to provide support to the reform of Afghan security forces;
to assist with the disarmament and reintegration of armed groupings.
The extension of the ISAF Area of Responsibility began first in the north of
Afghanistan when the command over the German Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT), deployed in Kunduz, was taken over. By 1st October 2004 the PRTs deployed in
Meymaneh, Feyzabad, Mazar-e Sharif and Pol-e Khumri had provided support to the
successful execution of the ISAF mission in the entire 162,000 km2 Area of
Responsibility of Regional Command North.
This organisational structure had practically not changed until the troops withdrawal.
The structure of PRTs was not equally solid because in dependence on the tasks and
threat levels their strengths could range between 200 and over 1,000.
112
Forward Support Base (FSB) Masar-e Sharif (MES)
PRT MES
PRT Feyzabad
FEY
JOWZJ
AN
PRT Meymaneh
KONDOZ
MES
KDZ
BALKH
MEY
QEY
FARYA
B
PEK
SAR-E
POL
SAMANGA
N
TAKHA
R
BADAKSHA
N
BAGHLAN
PRT Kunduz
PRT Pol-e Khumri
Figure 1: PRT structure of the RC (N) (2010)
Source: RC (N) Combined Joined 4 (CJ4)Branch 2010
2 Logistic support organisations at RC (N)
The notion, requirements, and procedures of national and multinational logistic support are
clearly defined by various NATO documents. Due to the complexity of the situation, the
strengths of forces, and the timeframe of the operation nearly all type of multinational logistic
support is present in theatre in Afghanistan. According to Zbysek Korecki, “the allied forces
can have two fundamental options:
one is to realise logistic support within the structure of military logistics;
the other is to buy services of entrepreneurs and service providers.”[1]
The RC (N) HQ deployed in Mazar-e Sharif. Germany, as Lead Nation, ran Camp Marmal as
a Forward Support Base (FSB). At the same base National Support Elements (NSEs) were
deployed by various nations, but considering their tasks and personnel those NSEs operated
only as national logistic elements (the Hungarian NSE, for example, till 2010 comprised only
seven personnel tasked with receiving and organising the onward movement of Hungarian
contingents and supplies arriving in Afghanistan.)
The PRTs in subordination to RC (N) had most of the capacities necessary for daily operation.
Together with the NSE, co-located with the FSB, the PRTs’ own national logistic
organisations ensured the operation of national supply system. Naturally, Germany as a Lead
Nation had additional robust logistic capabilities which fulfilled the requirements from other
contingents too.
The FSB has the following logistic tasks:
ground transport for passengers and cargo;
coordination of Reception Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) of units (this
became particularly important when in early 2010 the USA troops deployment to the
area of operations began);
temporary warehousing for cargo in transit to and from theatre;
113
-
administration for all support facilities and contracts;
domestic support for all units and personnel, incl. NSEs and force protection, based at
the FSB;
supporting the deployment of reserve forces.
Engineer
Role 2+(3)
NSEs
NSE
AMMO
MedBn
CJ4
MEDEVAC
LogSptBn
Recovery
Repair
Maintenance
BFI
Air Wing
EOD/Mine
clearance
Transport
Figure 2: FSB Concept
Source: RC (N) CJ4Branch 2010
The above concept clearly illustrates that an area-of-operations-based FSB has extremely
complex tasks apart from the “traditional” logistic functions. Naturally, not all of these
functions comprise the responsibility of CJ4 Branch but this is the easiest way to understand
the complex designation of the base itself. For CJ4 Branch the ensuring and coordinating of
fundamental logistic functions comprised more than enough tasks …
The German Logistic Support Battalion plays a key role in the logistic support to the FSB and
the entire region. The unit has primarily national tasks but apart from those it also fulfils the
requirements of allied nations.
Its fundamental tasks are the following:
establishing and storing fuel supplies; running the Bulk Fuel Installation (BFI),
receiving and conducting laboratory testing of stores, resupply;
establishing and storing ammunition supplies both for own and allied units;
storing and issuing spare parts and repair materials;
transportation of personnel with the use of armoured vehicles;
repair of damaged military technology;
providing combat/engineer recovery in the area of operations of RC (N).
114
From this list above the last task deserves a second scrutiny as this is the one whose execution
differs most from that under domestic circumstances. For conducting combat recovery a
Recovery Task Force is at round-the-clock readiness. This recovery team includes the
necessary protective forces with the necessary firepower, an armoured ambulance car with
medical staff, a truck tractor and a crane-lorry, and a repair subunit. A combat recovery task is
always extremely dangerous therefore it is always thoroughly prepared and organised. The
operations of the Recovery Task Force are of vital importance not only because of recovery
itself but also because of the further investigation of battle damage to the technology.
Damaged, exploded armoured vehicles are carefully examined by the manufacturers in order
to identify options of the necessary further developments. There is a permanent race between
the developers and the means of destruction used by insurgent groups and the result is the
minimising of losses. Naturally, there may be situations when the transportation of damaged
vehicles would involve disproportionate risks. In such situations the unit destroys the vehicle
on the spot.
Air Wing MeS is the other key unit for the operation of the FSB. The air wing carries out
tasks for the entire RC (N) and it is also involved in supporting ISAF through its participation
in air transportation missions, which are the following:
the operation of the military part of MeS airport, ground services, loading and
unloading;
personnel air transportation in the framework of Intra Theatre Airlift System (ITAS);
transportation of German contingents arriving via Termez, Uzbekistan;
receiving IL-76 transport aircraft arriving from Germany daily, loading and unloading
materiel.
Without the German logistic organisations working in the FSB the other nations would not be
able to fulfil their tasks or it would require disproportionate efforts from them. This proves the
fact that the capabilities of a Lead Nation – including those in the field of logistics – are
indispensable in a multinational operation.
Unsurprisingly, a number of NSEs were operating in national subordination within the FSB
but only the Norwegian NSE had real capacities out of them. Although some smaller states
also made efforts to establish their classical NSE structures they only had limited resources.
For the logistic support of the Hungarian ISAF contingent the fundamental change was when
the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) NSE as a military subunit was established in MeS in
2010. This subunit significantly eased the workload of the Hungarian PRT in Pol-e Khumri as
the in-theatre logistic support had been provided completely through the PRT before.
3 The system and command of logistic support at RC (N)
In the system of logistic support at RC (N) there are both national and multinational solutions.
The figure below gives a clear depiction of the structure and operation of the system.
115
HQ IJC
CJ4
G4 PRT FEY
HQ IJC
G4 PRT KDZ
CJ4
NSE
S4 PRT MES
E
FSB
CJ4
NSE
S4 PRT MEY
E
Coordinating
Element
S4 PRT PEK
NSE
Figure 3: Logistical system RC (N)
The FSB plays a crucial role for all contingents as it comprises a central base and practically
it functions as a hub. Both personnel and materiel pass through it, and it combines the
functions of reception, storage, and forwarding functions. Of course, such capacities are
provided for all nations thus parallel and redundant capacities can be eliminated.
Simultaneously, the FSB also functions as the NSE of the German contingent as it provides
supplies for and forwards domestic re-supplies to the German subunits directly, particularly to
the two German PRTs (in Kunduz and Feyzabad). The other nations forward materiel and
military equipment to their subunits through their own NSEs located within the FSB. All of
them closely cooperate with the relevant subunits of the air wing, the Logistic Support
Battalion, and with each other. During my six-month-long tour of duty in theatre I
experienced many times how selflessly and smoothly nations provided assistance to each
other.
The CJ4 Chief of RC (N) maintained contact with the German contingents directly while in
the case of other nations this was the task of deputy Chief, Log Ops. The reporting order
allowed us to have up-to-date information on the logistic situation, particularly on the quantity
of fuel, with special regard to aircraft fuel. In spite of the continuously worsening security
situation the supplier system of ISAF operated in a reliable way. We maintained a daily
communication with the contractors so there was only one problem with fuel supply when
limitations had to be introduced in Kunduz. Besides the reports the superior personally
inquired about the fuel situation at the VTCs and at another time he discussed the overall
logistic situation with CJ4 Chiefs. These discussions generated a live and direct cooperation.
In the case of the NSEs the situation was different. Because they were not in RC(N)
subordination the CJ4 Branch could only have a coordination role. Their success was mostly
person-dependent, however, with no direct effect on the activities of the NSEs, on the entire
system. Since daily work was based on the cooperation between executive levels, the
116
involved subunits organised the execution of their tasks directly. The situation with leadership
was further complicated by the fact that the CJ4 Chief was in a doubleheaded position: he was
responsible for the logistic support to both the RC (N) and the entire German contingent. As
roughly 100-point tasking orders came from the Bundeswehr Support Command daily,
national issues took most of the time of the Chief and multinational coordination was left to
his deputy …
CJ4 CHIEF
DEP CJ4
LOGOPS
& PLANS
LOGOPS
MOVE &
TRSPT
NBC DEF
INFRASTRUCTURE
CAMP
CDR
LOG PLANS
SUPPLY/
MAINT
Figure 4: CJ4 Branch (2010)
The above organisational chart clearly indicates that the structure of logistic command also
mirrors the functional areas of logistic support. According to the theatre-specific features,
however, they are complemented with NBC defence and environment protection, moreover it
also includes camp commander’s function which is basically a quartermaster assignment with
tasks to utilise available billeting opportunities.
Because of operational tasks the operational and planning blocks are particularly strong as
both had senior officers’ positions. LOGOPS (Deputy CJ4 Chief) assignment was manned
through Swedish, Norwegian, and Hungarian rotations. Except for them the CJ4 Branch
comprised only German personnel in the given period. Consequently, the focus of their
attention was on national issues.
Naturally, CJ4 Branch had both national and multinational tasks to conduct:
a) CJ4 multinational tasks:
plan and coordinate logistical support within the FSB and between Troop Contribution
Nation (TCN) s/NSEs in
Area of Operation (AOO) RC(N),
plan and ensure logistical support for operations,
assess logistical situation in AOO RC(N),
logistical Reports & Returns,
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-
conduct partnering with counterparts 209. Afghan National Army (ANA) Corps in
conjunction with Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT),
give logistical advice to Commander (COM) RC(N).
b) CJ4 national task (DEU NSE):
coordinate and ensure Real Life Support (RLS) and follow-on-support for DEU ISAF
contingent.
The “busiest” part of in-theatre logistic support is perhaps fuel supply therefore I wish to put
special stress on it. 30-day fuel supplies were stored at the FSB. The fuel storage site,
comprising elastic tanks and pipeline systems was capable of storing 30-day supplies of both
F34 and F54 fuels. However, this storage space did not prove to be sufficient after the arrival
of USA forces which made significant enlargement necessary. The resupply of 100,000 liters
of F34/day did not present any serious problems thanks to the reliable work of the civil
suppliers, however, the reception of quantities over that amount posed a difficulty. In theatre
the bottleneck was not the unloading capacity but the workload of UXO (Unexploded
Ordnance) dogs, which is an unknown issue in the homeland. To check civil tankers is a
continuous job requiring high-level vigilance. The suppliers reliably ensured the availability
of large quantities of fuels. Naturally, the situation in the north was simpler as the main
supply routes did not run through Pakistan therefore the problems typical in the south –
political instability, low lever security, permanent threat – were not present there.
During the withdrawal of ISAF the northern direction, where significant transportation has
been conducted – will become of crucial importance. Another factor which is further
increasing the importance of this direction is the railway line that had been built – although
currently out of use yet – between Heyraton and MeS. When it becomes operational the
withdrawal through Uzbekistan will be safe and secure.
4 Conclusions
Logistic support is one of the most difficult military tasks even under peaceful domestic
conditions since in accordance with the basic principles of logistics support must be provided
for the object of logistic support that is it has to reach the troops and military technology.
There is no “practicing” support among the daily support tasks, or supply.
In an area of operations this is even more complex because due to the character of activities
subunits are much more in need of continuous resupply. Multinational and national
procedures work complementing each other thus presenting extremely high challenges for the
coordinating and leading bodies. In Afghanistan theatre I was forced to realize that in spite of
the most careful planning and preparation there often happen events that fundamentally
change the way of execution. The logistic system of ISAF worked excellently because each
and every element in the structure, every “cog” (that is military service member) did their job
in an utterly professional way, which is not limited to professional preparedness only. Of
course, the fact that target-oriented and creative execution was a clear commander’s
requirement significantly contributed to this success as this is a genuine environment for any
real logistician.
References
[1]
118
KORECKI, Zbysek. A logisztikai támogatás az ISAF-ben, [Logistic Suppport in ISAF]
http://mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2008/3_4/12_15.pdf, p. 7, ISSN 1215-4121, 15th April
2013.
MILITARY CONCEPTS – A BACKGROUND FOR FUTURE
CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT
Ján Spišák
Abstract: This is the second continuing part of the article which informed the readers with basic
ideas on subject of military concepts. The previous part offered the basic context of the subject,
terminology, purpose, hierarchy and characteristics of concepts as a solid background for
understanding of the subject. This second part will highlight the fundamental content of the
concept´s content and possible approaches, implications and recommendations to the concept
development process.
Keywords: concept, military problem, capability development.
A new idea is first condemned as ridiculous and then dismissed as trivial, until finally, it
becomes what everybody knows.
William James, 1879
1 Background for the concept development
There are several fundamental aspects that influence the new concept development.
Firstly, it may be emerging or anticipated military problems that need to be addressed,
but “cannot be adequately coped” with available capabilities of existing Armed Forces
(AF). The second aspect is recognition that existing military problems can be effectively
addressed only by using more advanced technologies, new methods, progressive
organizational approaches or other forms of change. The reason for the concept
development might also arise if problem solution cannot be put into practice without
implementation of the necessary changes in particular sub-areas DOTMLPFI (Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and
Infrastructure). Alteration of nation´s foreign policy, as well as alteration of its vital or
strategic interests (ambitions) is also one of the reasons to be concerned with this
subject.
Whether there exist real arguments for the new concept development generally indicate:
New strategy documents or directives (Security strategy, Defense strategy,
Military strategy etc.;
Anticipated changes in security (operational) environment;
Ongoing or completed military operations. The lessons learned from these
operations can indicate to what extent is necessary to integrate existing
capabilities or which other capabilities will be needed to build up;
Real or emerging capabilities of potential adversary;
Anticipation of the new advanced technologies arrival and their innovative
utilization in operations;
Others.
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2 Content of operational concept
There exist a wide range of concepts for employment military forces in future
operations. What they often have similar or common, is their content with a description
of how to employ the AF. Such description generally originates from the character of
the anticipated future operational environment (uncertainty, rapid change, complexity
and constant conflict). Among other issues concept describes a unique context of the
military problem, characteristics and the methods of its solution, the impact on
development of necessary capabilities and other aspects. These particular features form
the basic frame of the most operational concepts. Because of these parts of operational
concepts are not generally known, it is appropriate to explain at least some of them.
2.1 Military Problem
Description of the military problem depends on the type and nature of operational
concepts; its content can vary. A different concept means a different problem. From the
most general point of view the military problem is represented by an adaptive adversary
whose capabilities allow him to deny opponent´s AF access to the areas and spaces that
are important to him in terms of providing vital and strategic interests. His AF is
capable of conducting large-scale (e.g. conventional, information etc.) operations, he
owns advanced conventional weapons and even weapons of mass destruction. He may
act asymmetrically in a wide spectrum of activities, his warfare capabilities and
technological advances enable him to conduct operations creatively and employ new
ways of warfare against his opponents. Such adversary may therefore pose an
unacceptable threat not only regionally but also in a global scale. Therefore, this threat
must be addressed.
2.2 The Central Idea
The basis of the problem´s solution is expressed in the central idea. It generally
describes how the AF will conduct operations in the future operational environment to
eliminate the military problem.
Example: “Joint Forces, supported by other instruments of national power, allies and
partners, will conduct synchronize high-tempo operations in multiple domains to thwart
enemy plans. They disrupt his cohesion and break his will; thereby he becomes
incapable to conduct hostile activities and prevent achievement of our strategic
objectives”.
Ideas generalized in the concept create an elementary way of the future AF employment
through which they fulfill strategic assignment. It also indicates the necessary steps to
integrate their activities with those of other partners in operations. The central idea can
then be further conveyed into specific actions of military forces, as follows (possible
pattern):
Use outposts to extend/expand our access, exploit the sea for maneuver and
create the uncertainty in the mind of the enemy;
Open entry points for expeditionary forces;
Utilize capability of forces (global strike, intelligence, reconnaissance and
surveillance, information operations ...) with the support of the superior
commander, components of forces and other supporting forces and resources;
Use operational maneuver and integrate joint functions (e.g. fire, maneuver,
protection...) to defeat the enemy and gain the initiative;
Destruct and isolate key adversary capabilities and targets of significant value;
Others.
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Awareness of threat (the military problem) gives the operational concept enough space
to contemplate the necessity of dealing with in acceptable ways. It is necessary that the
activities of military forces will not cause unintended and undesirable escalation of
conflict with regard to difficultness and complexity of stabilization and post-war
reconstruction of operational environment.
2.3 Military solution of the problem
The central idea in operational concept precedes the determination of military solution
to the problem. It can be expressed in different ways, depending on the environment, the
nature of the activities, etc. To fulfill its objectives, the AF must perform a wide range
of joint activities in cooperation with allies and partners within the given time, space
and purpose. Solving the problem will require comprehensive activities of the all AF.
Various aspects of problem solving can be in the concept expressed as follows:
Acting simultaneously from different operational directions and in multiple
dimensions which will include the physical environment (land, air, sea, and
space), virtual environment (cyberspace and information space) and the human
dimension (social, moral and cognitive domains);
Implementation of integrated and interdependent activities with other elements,
especially with alliance and coalition military partners, non-military homeland
and foreign partners and other elements of national power;
Demonstration and sustaining the power. The ability to demonstrate and sustain
will enable forces to maneuver into advantageous strategic and operational
areas. They will use available military and commercial strategic means of
transportation. They will be able to avoid the vulnerable and pre-estimable areas
to cause troubles in opponent´s decision-making. Logistical support will enable
maintaining freedom of action and constant supply of troops;
Acting on key elements, systems and processes of enemy in order to create rather
more systematic (e.g. strategic and operational) than local results. It can be
achieved by creating and using effects via direct and indirect approaches. This
means acting on such key elements and processes which elimination will cause
direct consequences and will approach desired results;
Coping with tempo (of operations) allows joint forces to achieve the initiative and
time advantage over the opponent who cannot reach such tempo;
Quick and smooth transition to other activities. Most systems (here the future
opponent, exploiting various operational methods; traditional, irregular,
catastrophic, etc.) may be resistant to individual actions. Therefore, it is
necessary to keep a mix of sequential, parallel and complementary activities to
create conditions that allow achievement of desired results. Joint forces must have
comprehensive abilities for evaluation of changing circumstances in order to
anticipate the opportunity for transition to other activities and also possess the
capacity for their fast and smooth progress;
To make difference in activities. The purpose is to avoid or minimize undesirable
effects and unwanted, possibly catastrophic consequences (joint forces should
identify which activities can cause these effects. Military operations include
human, social system. This includes cultural, religious, local and other aspects,
their perception is critical and depends on the circumstances);
Creating a constant pressure on the enemy, conducting simultaneous operations
in all domains of the operational area and creating dominant lethal and nonlethal effects;
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Conducting information operations to deceive and isolate the enemy, shaping
space for subsequent stabilization, continuous evaluation of the effects, the
analysis and prediction of enemy´s activity;
Others.
Description of military problem solution can be expressed in different ways. It may be
either description in terms of structuring operations into separate phases, or description
in terms of the character of operational activities. It is also description focused on
creating effects based on so-called “defeat mechanism”. What is the purpose of these
effects? It is crucial to understand that the direct physical destruction of the enemy as
such, may no longer be the most efficient way to achieve the objectives with regard to
the human and social response of conducting military operations. To make a desirable
change of opponent´s systems is possible utilizing other ways of its elimination, which
may ultimately be both less costly and of lower risk.
Therefore, in the operational art is still more often preferred term “disintegration“ as
combination of dislocation and destruction defeat mechanisms. Experts also see this
way as the most preferred method of elimination. On the other hand, the elimination of
the enemy may concurrently include so-called “stabilization mechanism”, as a feature
of “the soft power”, frequently used during the stabilization phase of the operation. The
use of both types of mechanisms should be seen complementary; the fact which the
creators of operational concepts must not forget.
2.4 Possible approaches to the military concept development
To get an idea about the military concepts development, it can be draw on existing,
mostly foreign experience and the fact that this process has been successful for many
years. However it is more complicated issue. We are not able to respond this question
yet whether a similar process could work effectively in environment of the CZ AF and
if desired outcomes will be in accordance with time frame of national defense planning
process. Despite this fact one can offer possible solution.
The process of military concepts development, as illustrated in Figure 1, is based on a
fictitious reality, when already developed and accepted hierarchy of military concepts
exists, here so-called version 1. In the hierarchy, as evident, there are included
institutional concept (on the top of hierarchy) and a set of operational, functional and
enabling (integrating) concepts. Although the individual time limits of particular
activities (January and July) are also fictitious (different months may be set, depending
on decision of the official authorities), they suggest the logical flow in the
implementation process of all necessary activities.
The military concepts development process should be well thought-out, cyclical and
gradual. Its objective is to optimize effort of revision, evaluation and writing of
individual concepts; these particular activities are overlapping. The process should
prevent the emergence of collisions in the processing effort, to enable implementation
of the evaluation results (of the individual concepts) and concurrently allow
involvement of different actors in the concept development. The concept development
“rhythm” is obviously influenced by various factors and/or significant events including
an ongoing process of defense planning, scenarios development, changes of strategic
directives or others.
As indicated in the Figure 1, issuing of the top-hierarchy concept falls within June 2013.
The actual release of the document was preceded by the revision process, during which
were assessed changes in the security and operational environment, the strategic
documents were evaluated, lessons learned from operations were taken into account as
well as the results from the experimentation. Finally the new concept has been
developed on the basis of the revision report.
122
As indicated, the capstone (institutional) concept is reviewed every 3 years with any
resultant revision published in June. The review is informed by changes in the
postulated security and/or operational environment, strategic guidance, and insights
and/or results from experimentation.
Fig 1 Concept Development Process (Rhythm Matrix)
Source: [13]
Following the capstone concept release, operational concepts are reviewed for
compliance with guiding strategic documents and enter a 1 year revision/writing period
as required. They are informed by changes in the capstone (institutional) concept, the
postulated operational environment, strategic guidance, lessons learned from operations,
and insights and/or results from experimentation. The operational concept publication
precedes the revision of functional concepts.
Following the concepts on the higher level of the hierarchy, functional concepts are
reviewed for compliance with guiding documents and similarly as in the previous case,
enter a 1-year revision/writing period as required. They are informed by changes in the
superior concepts, the strategic guidance and the postulated operational environment,
lessons learned from operations and insights and/or results from experimentation.
Functional concepts may initiate development of new enabling (integrating) concepts.
These may be developed at any time. They are informed by insights gained in
development of all above situated concepts.
In accordance with the Secretary of Defense directive there are published
Transformations Roadmaps (plans) for a set of joint forces and also for single services
that will be employed in future operations. Among other data, plans show both types of
forces and other organizations involved in the implementation of operational concepts
and how they intend to develop certain military capabilities specified in the operational
concepts.
A very fundamental aspect of the concepts development is the Long-Term Capability
Requirements (LTCR) development process. It is a long-term process carried out
123
usually every four years, which focuses on the Czech Republic strategy, the AF
structure, and resource management to determine a defense programs for the next 20
years. The results of this activity serve for the concepts processing.
Development of Planning Scenarios is an important aspect in this process for need of
defense planning. The scenarios are based on classified threats and serve as a source of
information to guide development of military capabilities listed in operational and
functional concepts. Scenarios also influence development of standing and contingency
operational plans as a part of the National Defense Plan.
To provide a fluent concept development processing there are organized joint meetings
of representative decision maker; in this case a person being responsible for the
concepts development process, with the “concept community” to develop the Concept
Development & Experimentation Plan. This document provides a framework for the
implementation of experimentation towards the developed concepts and capabilities.
A unique role in this process is played by the Concepts Development Steering Group.
Their meetings take place to review concepts status, avoid possible conflicts, and
synchronize concept development efforts, review assessment and recommendations for
the new concept proposed by the concept community. Number of meetings in a given
year will depend on quantity of concurrently assessed and developed concepts or need
to deal with this area.
Closing this particular chapter it is necessary to declare that aforementioned approach to
the concepts development is not dogma but it can serve as a useful tool in thinking
about the context of the future AF and their capability development.
2.5 Implications for capability development
The idea of military problem solutions - how the AF will conduct operations in the
future operational environment, also suggests its possible consequences; what the AF
need and what capabilities must be achieved in order to ensure the anticipated
operational tasks. A team of experts, which develops operational concepts, must
therefore “see behind the horizon”. Not only to answer the question, what are the
consequences of the capabilities development in particular areas, but also what other
concepts in the horizontal and vertical level will have to be subsequently and afterwards
created.
It is also necessary to answer the next question; what are the operational concepts
implications for the other partners, allies, civil organizations, etc. The operational
concepts consequences must be also understood as a challenge for technology
development, the defense industry, science and other areas in order to secure the role of
the joint functions. They are mutually integrated in operations, and directly relate to the
capability development.
3 Conclusion
Absence of concepts, the military concepts in particular, is a factual obstacle that may
adversely affect the capability of the AF for preparation and conduct of future
operations. Because concepts are closely linked to needs of financial and material
resources allocation, the whole defense planning process must establish the way where
the capability development will be long-termed, planned and will include all areas of
DOTLMPFI.
At this time, yet only emerge ideas and gradually formulate thoughts about development
of the AF capstone concept and other concepts relatively. Conclusions from the 5th
International scientific and experts’ conference “Building-up and development of
operational concepts - the key to the development of future capability of the AF of the
124
Czech Republic” organized in Brno, Czech Republic in 2012 unambiguously confirmed
the necessity of the system approach to the military concepts development process. The
truth is: the whole conceptual approach to this subject is unsystematic yet; neither
unified nor coordinated and during development process are not used appropriate
methods or experimental verification.
In terms of the concept development process initiation a number of personnel and
organizational precautions will have to be adopted and implemented. It is necessary to
be deeply involved in this problem at the top level of the Ministry of Defense and
support these ideas systematically. Otherwise, the concept development process within
the Czech Armed Forces will become only unfulfilled dream.
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. Version 3.0. DoD USA. 2009.
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations Activity Concepts. Version 1.0. DoD
USA. 2010. 228 p.
Joint Operations Concepts Development Process. Washington D.C. Joint Chiefs
of Staff, 2007. 76 p.
GALATÍK, Vlastimil; PIKNER, Ivo; SPIŠÁK, Ján. Zásady tvorby operačních
koncepcí. Univerzita obrany, BRNO, 2010, ISBN: 978-80-7231-755-4.
Joint Operations Concepts Development Process. Washington. 2007. 76 p.
Available from: http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare
Major Combat Operations Joint Operating Concept. Version 2.0. DoD USA.
2006. 114 s.
MATTIS, James N. Joint Concept Development Vision. DoD USJFCOM,
Norfolk, 2009.
Available from: http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2009/jc_vision.pdf
OCHRANA, František. Vize, prognózy, koncepce, realizační plány a prováděcí
metodiky jako nástroje řízení rezortu. In Vojenské rozhledy, 4/2008, p. 3-13.
SCHMITT, John F. A Practical Guide for Developing and Writing Military
Concepts. Defense Adaptive Red Team: Working Paper #02-4 [online]. December
2002, Available from: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/dart_guide.pdf
The Future Land Operational Concept. The Development, Concepts and Doctrine
Centre, Ministry of Defence, Shrivenham SWINDON, Wiltshire, 2008.
TRADOC Pamphlet 71-20-3. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Concept Development Guide. Department of the Army TRADOC Headquarters,
US Army Training and Doctrine Command Virginia, 2011. 48 p. Available from:
http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/.
Zásady tvorby koncepcí v resortu Ministerstva obrany (pomůcka). Finální
pracovní verze k 5.6.2009. MO SOPS, Praha. 2009. 56 p.
ZŮNA, Pavel; PIKNER, Ivo; SPIŠÁK, Ján; GALATÍK, Vlastimil; KUBEŠA,
Milan; FRANK, Libor; DUBEC, Radek; KRČMÁŘ, Miroslav; ČEP, David.
Operační koncepce: přístupy a postupy. Powerprint s. r. o., Brandejsovo nám.
1219/1, 16500 Praha 6 - - Suchdol. Vydání první. Praha 2012. ISBN: 978-8087415-68-9.
125
APPLICATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE HOST NATION
SUPPORT PLANNING AND PROVIDING PRINCIPLES
Martin Škvařil
Abstract: The article deals with providing of the Host Nation Support (HNS) in the conditions
of recent international military operations and exercises. The work analyses the rules and
principles for planning and providing HNS using examples of the exercises organized in the
year 2012 (Ramstein Rover 2012). HNS planning procedures for relevant activities carried out
in 2013, where the Czech Armed Forces participation is presumed (Capable Logistician 2013,
Ramstein Rover 2013), are considered as well.The author emphasizes the importance of The
Czech Republic HNS Capability Planning Catalogue and the potential structural changes
impacts on these abilities. The article is focused on the processes and procedures particularly
identified in the Czech Air Forces.
Keywords: Host Nation Support (HNS), international exercise, Ramstein Rover,
logistics, HNS Capability Planning Catalogue.
1 Introduction
Host Nation Support (HNS) is an important element of a potential or real operations and
exercises planning. HNS concept leads to an effective logistic support of deployed
forces while keeping the lowest possible cost. Coordinated planning and providing is
a key factor of the HNS defined as a civilian and military assistance in peace, in the time
of crisis or war that is provided by Host Nation (HN) to other operation participating
allied forces.
The actual security environment is not characteristic of the threat of unexpected and
massive armed forces deployment in the symmetric opened conflict among several
autonomous states or alliance anymore. The current situation analyses and defence
predictions indicate as most probable military intervention deployment of highly mobile
elements capable of wide spectrum operations and long distances deployment. This
modern warfare creates basis and requirements for training and deployment procedures,
where the role of logistic support is undeniable. Creating of applicable conditions for
international exercises seems to be the right way how to rationalise operation
preparatory where members of different armed forces proceed the activities to meet
united goals according to NATO procedures.
Allied units operational activities support is defined as the one of the main tasks of The
Czech Armed Forces (ACR) and is one of the priorities defined in the White Book on
Defence. On this tendency the Czech Republic (CR) reflects by the participation,
in some cases even by creating the organization background of the international
exercises. Ramstein Rover, realized at Czech air bases and military training areas for the
first time in 2012, may be considered as a specific example of such activity. Both
planning and realization of this exercise are optimal opportunity for providing analysis
126
focuses on logistics support. Due to the fact that the CR takes the role of HN,
an extensive planning process such as coordination meetings, establishment of mutual
agreements (Memorandum of Understanding - MOU, Status of Forces Agreement –
SOFA, Technical Agreement – TA, Joint Implementation Arrangement – JIA), and
creation of documentation based on the alliance model was necessary.
Organization and planning of a wide scale international exercise requires to put
an emphasis on the documentation of the individual countries logistic capabilities. This
provision allows to select the host country which dispose of the capacities and
capabilities that are necessary to ensure the exercise requirements. This procedure is
analogous to the operations planning process. It is always necessary to analyze
the operational area with the focus on logistics capabilities documents (HNS Capability
Planning Catalogue) and relevant indicators.
2 Host Nation Support Principles Application Analysis
2.1 The Importance and Reasons for Using HNS Concept
The importance of HNS may be identified and described by using general HNS
principles specified for conditions of current operations, exercises and humanitarian
crises (disasters). It is reasonable to find concrete connections between normative
background and practical applications. Following this approach, the real contribution of
the analyses may be considered. HNS concept of logistics allows the application of joint
operation strategies, and leads to higher efficiency level of using limited resources.
Economical aspects of logistic support are essential in the time of military expenditures
reduction [10]. These tendencies are reflected not only in Economy principle, the
financial consequences of military activities are involved in Reimbursement, Cooperation and Co-ordination Principles as well.
The crucial area of units deployment is the provision of access to the transport roads,
traffic junctions, multimodal terminals across all transiting countries and the destination
country (Operation Area). By optimizing the process of logistical support during
reception and integration into the operational formation transport expenditure reduction
can be reached. HNS is not only about allocation of resources to create appropriate
conditions for unit sustainability, but also about preparation of basis for a quick
diplomatic procedures process to permit transition and access to Ports of Embarkation
(POE) and Port of Disembarkation (POD) of transit countries [7]. This approach was
applied in the case of the Croatian sea- and airports during operation IFOR (The
Implementation Force - Operation Joint Endeavour: 20 Dec. 1995 - 20 Dec. 1996)
[8, 16]. The opening of airspace to deploy air units is essential as well. For example
during KFOR (operation Kosovo Force), NATO units ware allowed to cross Italian,
Albanian, Greek and Turkish air space during the air campaign.
HNS enables deployed forces to operate longer continuously away from national supply
sources. During KFOR and AFOR operation (NATO Operation Allied Harbour: Apr. Sep. 1999), for example, Greece and Italy have provided to the coalition forces large
scale of services, supplies and materiel that otherwise would required a significant
quantity of additional air, sea or land transport capacity to deploy [1].
HNS, when properly implemented, can reach the reduction of requirements for
expensive transport capacities and other support capabilities that would otherwise stay
in every Sending Nation’s (SN) responsibility. Not every nation can afford all the
mobile, deployable port capabilities, transportation assets, and refuelling/supplying
capabilities that are needed to support forces and sustain operations in distant areas.
127
HNS enables forces to deploy faster and in a more economical way.
To ensure higher efficiency in the strategic (sea and air) transport capacities distribution,
the Movement Coordination Centre Europe (MCCE) was established. This agency
provides application of cooperative and shared transport usage concept. The concept
deals with transport capacities provided by some nations to the others (the financial
compensation, if required, is fully in their responsibility) or with transport capacities
that are determined for NATO usage [13].
Application of HNS concept promotes cooperation among participating nations and
strengthens the connection between the SN and the HN. The interaction among
individual nations and NATO commanders in charge of the operation is also key factor
of a successful execution of allied operation. The HNS plays an important role in this
context because it does not include only the provision of logistic assistance. The
responsible and flexible approach establishes great basis for receiving possible future
services in return. For example The Czech and Slovak Republic change their roles of
HN and SN during Ramstein Rover 2013 and Capable Logistician 2013 exercises.
2.2 The Role of the ACR In Chosen International Exercises
Participation in international exercise is an essential part of a successful deployment
on a real battlefield. The new security situation emphasizes the importance of using Air
Forces. The focus has shifted from regional stationary forces to highly mobile units with
short response time. An emphasis is placed on practicing and implementing Standard
Operating Procedures (SOP) which are usually practiced according to the model applied
in some of the current mission.
Analyses of Exercise Ramstein Rover 2012 (RARO 12, 4 – 21 Sept. 2012)
For priority section of training the process of Forward Air Controller units (FAC)
preparation and reconciling of ground and air units in Close Air Support (CAS) were
chosen a wide-spectrum scenarios reflecting real environment in endangered areas [18].
All participants, including logistic units, have the opportunity to increase the level of
professionalism, standardization and expertise in the international environment even
without the necessity of deployment in military operation.
The importance of logistics support is identified in all phases of the deployed units
activities. The actual deployment precedes transport of materials and personnel into
specific operating conditions. This phase is usually, in the case of international exercise,
in the sphere of responsibility of the participating units of SN(s). HNS assistance is
practically activated after passing the frontier of HN. To coordinate the movement and
control of loading, unloading and storage in optimal the creation of Movement
Coordination Centre (MCC) organised by HN representatives [17]. This HNS element is
able to fulfil all requirements for the transport and handling operations mentioned in
SOR (Statement of Requirements).
An integral part of the management of foreign operations is the management of all
processes connected with stay of foreign troops at the base, this area is managed by the
team of Real Life Support (RLS) [17]. It includes support of all participated units during
training activities and beyond. The exercise was in the logistics perspective quite
a specific because of the dangerous goods (ammunition, explosives) transports and
handling procedures. The special safety storage areas have been identified and regulated
under a specific security mode.
Exercise RARO 2012 is specific in the way of logistics control and execution authorities
structure. Except of the national structure the Multinational Logistic Centre (MNLC)
has been established. MNLC communicates with the NATO Exercise Control (EXCON)
128
and also summarizes the logistical requirements through the regular reports from each
SN and HN [17]. The aim of all cooperation and reporting system is the possibly most
effective distribution of all human and material sources in specific time and space
conditions. In Figure 1 there is function and principle of MNLC coordination principle.
HN can summarize the requirements of the SN with the objective to ensure all
requirements of the negotiated contracts in accordance with its own needs. MNLC
concept abstracts from this conventional approach and operates with a mandate of
NATO command. All the tools and powers that are attributed to MNLC can be used.
The reporting system will allow to distribute information and the aim is to aligned the
objectives in the particular segments. The result is a more effective and efficient use of
resources that can not be done without HN representatives. Knowledge of the local
environment is necessary although the preparatory stages include regular site survey.
Figure 1: Coordination of exercise participating subjects
Source: [17]
An integral part of exercise executive is a system of logistic report. In the first stage the
battle rhythm must be set to organise all essential processes of daily activities. To keep
EXCON properly informed and reach the level of real operation conditions, logistics
related information are distributed and analysed by Logistics Assessment Report
(LOGASSESSREP), Logistic Update Report (LOGUPDATE) Movement Situation
Report (MOVSITREP) [11]. Using these tools provides evaluation (assessment) of
logistic units situation. The purpose is to standardize the method for reporting about the
situation to superior logistics level and provide an assessment of the overall logistics
situation with recommended steps for potential optimization. Reports include especially
following areas: sustainability of logistics, inventory situation, occupancy of transport
capacities. Other reports deal with the health care, infrastructure condition and other
relevant areas.
Financial coverage of exercise expenditures is governed by the standard NATO
mutually shared costs procedures. Each participant coincides his own expenditures to
the exercise involvement, including additional-costs which are connected with such
activities. The NATO headquarters then not only covers the cost of directly participating
129
elements, but also pre-approved expenses leading to a complex exercise support (target
situation, the communication, etc.) that covers all exercising countries activities [18].
HN advantage is the fact that additional-cost are minimized, the benefit resulting from
the organization of exercise is increased (practical experiences with HNS procedures
etc.). Quantification of additional-costs of 22nd Air Base connected directly with the
exercise execution consisted primarily of the jet fuel transportation expenditures
(support of the field airport - FARP), motor fuel consumption, provision of food and
ecology expenditures (waste disposal and cleaning). The total cost estimation of
RARO 12 counts about 1 million CZK (personnel costs and flight activities carried by
the CR are not included) [18].
It is evident that in the case of non-realization of the exercise RARO 12 at 22nd Air Base
took place another exercise comparable with BORES or DOMESTIC CAS, which
would be characteristic by similar additional-cost, excluding transportation of jet fuel.
Generally the additional-cost in comparison with benefits obtained in exercise of that
scale and significance can be considered as adequate.
Conclusions and results of the training process were evaluated very positively and the
CR was also suggested to be an organising nation (HN) for exercise RARO 2013 [9].
This decision allows continuation of the tradition established in 2010 when the first
exercise of this kind took place (USA, 21 Aug. – 3 Sept. 2010) [12].
Capable Logistician 2013 (CL 13, 8 - 26 June 2013)
Another way how to train logistic capabilities is presented by Exercise Capable
Logistician 2013. Czech units are in position of SN and will detach logistics assets,
equipment and logistics personnel in large scale of expertises. The Czech party must
plan all requirements necessary for deployment, using assets located in CR during the
exercise may be acceptable no more. All problems are determined to be solved within
the area of exercises. Logistic standardization and interoperability are the main goals,
identified deficiencies may support optimisation and improvements in future
deployment. Participating on helicopter operations may bring The Czech Air Forces
valuable feedback for analyses of its own HNS approach (especially in the area of
Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration – RSOM, ammunition, jet fuel,
maintenance and logistic services).
The training will be conducted at the Military Training Area (MTA) Lest and the airbase
in Sliac, Slovakia. Exercise will be planned and coordinated by the Multinational
Logistics Coordination Centre (MLCC) and supported by Slovakia as the Host
Nation [15].
3 The Czech Republic Host Nation Support Capability Planning Catalogue (HNS
CAPCAT)
HNS CAPCAT in accordance to the HNS doctrine defines possible civil and military
capacity and assistance provided by the Czech party to allied and partner forces located
on or transiting through the area of the Czech Republic. Catalogue is used as the
primary planning tool for HNS planners of SN(s) and NATO authorities. It includes
a summary of capabilities for RSOM support. HNS CAPCAT provides initial
quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the possible support that can be provided by
the CR [2].
Availability of capabilities within the HNS will always be subject of arrangements with
HN. All capabilities figures are total capabilities. Total capacity available for NATO use
will be negotiated prior to a specific operation or exercise [14]. To provide high
130
efficiency and safety of operations it is necessary to ensure a coherent planning and
providing HNS among NATO, HNS, SN(s) and the CR authorities.
On the basis of analyzes carried out in this area is possible to see the essential
deficiencies which are caused mainly by the fact that the creation of HNS CAPCAT are
not involved all potentially interested parties. In preparing this publication and
execution of HNS the most of activities are realized by the Ministry of Defence of the
Czech Republic (MoD) and the Armed forces of the Czech Republic (ACR), but to
accomplish the real procedure of HNS it is necessary to involve other ministries
(government authorities) [4].
In the praxis there were identified government authorities that have the area of HNS
prepared in detail, and carried out specific activities within HNS provision in practice
(The Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Health and the
State Material Reserves Administration). HNS process within the other government
authorities absolutely absent or is not enough prepared [4]. For this reason, it would be
optimal to create a document with specific tasks for potentially interested parties. This
situation may be solved by establishment of now structure of HNS coordination
elements with the now organisation and responsibility. In case of individual
governmental authorities involvement, the detailed requirements for each governmental
authorities (represented by the Interdepartmental Commission for HNS) would be
specified by superior department which is responsible for fulfilment of the NATO
commander and SN requirements.
In the conditions of peace, when the HNS CAPCAT is used primarily for international
exercises planning is the general form of planning documentation without a detailed
involvement of the competent authorities sufficient. All information that must be
completed for the proper and flawless run of exercises are processed and distributed at
the moment of the real need identification. However, if the Catalogue should be
effective in a higher level of crisis when the CR is mobilized with activated defence and
fully functioning national economy, it is necessary to consider the solution of this
problem. Especially in the time of structural changes in the ACR is also important to
emphasis the continuous updating of HNS CAPCAT. The HNS organization,
responsibilities, and the essential information and capabilities that are declared in the
HNS CAPCAT may be changed. The concept of HNS CAPCAT should have been
cancelled in the NATO member countries from 1 January 2007 [4]. This regulation has
not been implemented and the document is further updated and available for download
from Staff Information System (SIS) and LOGFAS database.
4 Conclusions
The Czech Republic is according to the analysis results considered as an active member
of NATO. In the area of international exercises the CR creates conditions for further
cooperation development. The participation on exercises carried out in 2012 brought
some important experiences that should be implemented to the planning and executive
parts of similar future activities (exercises RARO 13, CL 13 or real operations) in the
form of Lessons Learned, methodical sheets or internal regulations. All the RARO 12
participant experienced the atmosphere as well as control and reporting procedures of
the international engagement.
The economical conditions of allied armed forces indicates military expenditure
reduction tendency and reaching of higher efficiency of using limited resources by costand capacity sharing principle. The HNS CAPCAT supports allied authorities in the
131
potential (total) logistics capacities analyses and allows to design the logistic support
model for concrete operation or exercise. The author emphasizes the importance of the
periodical update because the current situation in the Czech Air Forces is characterised
by structural changes that may impact declared logistics capabilities. The author suggest
a new approach of authorities involved in HNS planning process to improve future
crises managing.
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133
THE OPTIMISATION OF LONG-TERM STORAGE
OF SELECTED MILITARY TRANSPORT VEHICLE TYPES
IN THE CZECH ARMED FORCES CONDITIONS
Martin Vlkovský, Tomáš Binar, Martin Rejzek and Radim Ušel
Abstract: The paper deals with new long-term storage possibilities of military vehicles with an
emphasis on corrosion protection, which can cause significant damage to military vehicles.
Based on the experiment, which was carried out by the University of Defence in cooperation
with TART (CORTEC) Company, the new technological process of preparation (preservation)
of selected types of military transport vehicles for long-term storing was proposed.
A subsequent comparison of existing technological process of preparation (preservation) with
the proposed, the advantages of new procedure is verified. The calculation is focused on the
economic and environmental aspects.
Keywords: military transport vehicle, long-term storage, corrosion, inhibitors
1 Introduction
The deficiency of financial means for the military transport vehicle1 (MTV) operation
and maintenance leads, in certain cases, to long-term inoperability of MTVs adversely
affecting their reliability. Military transport vehicles often have to operate in
diametrically different climatic conditions with high relative humidity, temperature and
dustiness. This lays increased demands on their reliability, which can be defined as
a general system property resting in the equipment ability to perform required functions
while maintaining determined operating indicator values within the limits and time as
per technical conditions [1].
The reliability requirements follow from a number of factors, including trouble-free
operation, sustainability, reparability, readiness and safety. The elementary unit of
reliability is a failure. There is a range of failure causes.
The financial value of military transport vehicles, including those stored or inoperable
on a long-term basis, is substantial. For this reason, it is required to identify
environment-friendly storage methods maintaining the existing reliability with
minimum costs.
1
A military transport vehicle refers to a vehicle produced and designed for training and transport
in performing combat tasks in armed forces [6].
134
2 Corrosion and its Economical Effects
In global scale, corrosion poses a technical and technological problem with considerable
economic impacts. It is estimated that corrosion attacks and destroys 10 to 12 % of
annual production of metal materials. The total of direct (relating to the restoration of
corrosion-attacked parts) and indirect (relating to equipment unavailability for e.g.
production process) losses is estimated to as much as 3 % of annual gross domestic
product of developed industrial countries [3].
Corrosion can be classified as atmospheric and electrochemical. Due to its goal and
scope, this paper is only concerned with the atmospheric corrosion.
In statistical terms, the atmospheric corrosion is the cause of up to 80 % of all losses
incurred as a result of corrosion. The atmospheric corrosion is conditioned by the
existence of corrosion system components (electrolyte on a metal surface), and the
division of a heterogeneous surface to anodic and cathodic places. Water precipitation
or water vapour absorption represent the electrolyte, in which air pollutants, dust and
sulphur dioxide are dissolved. Sulphur dioxide belongs to the most important corrosion
agents affecting, together with the time of dehumidification, the rate of corrosion [2].
In the Czech Republic, there are areas with varying intensity of air pollution depending
on the density of population and industrial activities. In the dislocation areas of military
units and military facilities of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic (ACR), the
atmospheric corrosion on MTVs causes economic losses. For example, chassis
components and certain spare parts (engine cylinder liners) are often strongly affected.
Places with higher concentrated tension occur, and the probability of failure grows
exponentially.
In aggressive environment, materials corrode in consequence of chemical or physicalchemical processes that erode the material surface. These processes spread both on the
material surface and inside the material via diffusion channels along grain boundaries or
other defective areas, and the corrosion agent penetrates the material. Corrosion, as
a material degradation effect, results in weight loss and structure cross-section
attenuation. It considerably affects default basic material properties, such as mechanical
characteristics (material toughness and yield point reduction). These changes may
worsen system operating conditions (e.g. revolutions, efficiency etc.) Thus, a material
limit state may be induced, which can be defined as a limit situation of balance between
the effects of outer influences and the material (structure) response.
Corrosion is the boundary between a normal and failure state. As a rule, corrosion
occurs at weakened and most loaded spots in material. It has a cumulative effect that
grows exponentially in time. For this reason, the failure occurrence probability cannot
be determined, and the frequency of possible failures cannot be affected. This also leads
to unexpected expenditures in the MTV maintenance system in the ACR. MTV repairs
cannot be effectively scheduled, and financial means cannot be optimally utilised in the
system of state property management [2].
3 Long-Term Storage of Military Transport Vehicles
The Armed Forces of the Czech Republic make use of short-term and long-term
storage.
Short-term storage preserves MTVs against ageing and corrosion effects in the period
of up to one year, and should be applied to vehicles out of operation for longer than 30
days.
This type of storage involves basic maintenance and reduced scope of preservative work
[2].
135
Long-term storage is a set of technical-organisational measures resulting in a longterm MTV preservation for the period of 1-5 years. In the ACR, dynamic and static
storage methods are applied [2]. As far as the dynamic method is concerned, special
drying equipment is employed for dehumidification and to maintain optimum
microclimate. This method involves consumption of electrical energy leading
to additional operating costs. In addition, MTVs also have to be kept in a roofed space
(storehouse), which may generate further additional costs. As for static storage,
“removing” water molecules by means of preservative oils, greases, or special coatings
and sprays is normally applied in the ACR. To a limited extent, older types of driers,
e.g. on silica gel basis, absorbing excessive humidity, are utilised. The above-listed
preservative (depreservative) agents are mostly environmentally-unfriendly, and their
disposal gives rise to further additional costs.
A specific variant of the static storage method is the application of up-to-date drying
technologies, corrosion inhibitors, which have not been introduced in the ACR yet.
Corrosion inhibitors produce protective gas atmosphere in closed spaces, which
“condenses” on all metal surfaces, including cavities, grooves, holes, corners etc.
Corrosion inhibitors hinder corrosion even without direct contact, are easily applicable
and save costs. No preservation-, depreservation- and environmentally-friendly
disposal-related additional costs are incurred.
4 Discussion and a Design Solution
4.1 Technological Procedure Formulation
Below, a preservation and wrapping technological procedure is proposed for
comprehensive treatment of a selected military transport vehicle – TATRA 815 for the
purpose of long-term storage and putting out of operation.
For complete MTV washing and preservation, water with 10-20 % of CORTEC
VpCI 415 agent shall be applied. The agent concentration depends on the level of
uncleanness. A pressure car wash shall be used. CORTEC VpCI 415 agent shall be left
unwashed on the surface for at least 10 minutes. After the surface dries properly,
excessive moisture shall be wiped up. The consumption of VpCI 415 per a TATRA 815
8x8 is 19 litres.
For the transmission preservation and treatment, CORTEC VpCI 323 inhibitors
shall be mixed into gear oil in the gear box and other gear equipment. The gear oil shall
be mixed with VpCI 323 in 10% concentration. The preservation period is 5 years.
For the cooling system preservation, CORTEC M-640L shall be mixed in 5%
concentration (5-year preservation) in a cooling system with a water-cooled aggregate.
For the fuel system preservation, the fuel tank shall be refilled to ¾ of its volume, and
then CORTEC VpCI 705 inhibitor shall be mixed into the fuel in the amount of 0.2 %.
Upon mixing, the vehicle shall be started and heated to operating temperature. As
a result, all the pipe system is preserved.
For the electrical wiring preservation and protection from corrosion, all electrical
wiring shall be treated with CORTEC VpCI 239 Elektricor agent. The agent, in the
form of spray, shall be applied to all electrical wiring, including closed boxes, terminal
boxes etc.
For the preservation of enclosed interior spaces against corrosion, CORTEC VpCI
132 shall be applied. These are foam pads sized 250 × 250 mm, impregnated by VpCI
inhibitors that protect enclosed spaces of up to 14 dm3.
For the tyre surface protection from UV radiation, ageing and drying, Rep-Grip
MIL Rubber preservation agent shall be applied. The agent shall be applied to clean tyre
surface. The agent is available in the form of spray with the volume of 147 ml.
136
Uncovered clean metal surface shall be preserved by wax agent CORTEC VpCI 368.
It is applied to clean metal using a brush. Upon drying, the wax film is resistant to UV
radiation. Then, the entire vehicle shall be closed – wrapped into MilCorr. The anticorrosion protection period in this foil is 5 years. MilCorr is heat-shrinkable,
inflammable foil with a UV filter. A military transport vehicle wrapped in this material
can be stored in an open area.
For the long-term preservation (5 years), the following amount of the wrapping foil is
required:
TATRA 815 4x4 – 115m2;
TATRA 815 8x8 – 153m2;
UAZ 469 – 46m2;
Land Rover 110 TDI – 49m2.
CORTEC VpCI 126 MIL foil can be applied as an alternative. This foil is also designed
for wrapping and preservation of MTVs, but only in enclosed, roofed areas, as the foil
does not contain a UV filter. It is partially shrinkable.
Selected procedures and individual measures specified in this technological procedure
can be applied as required.
4.2 Model Assumptions
A model example was created for the purpose of mutual comparison of applied MTV
storage methods and their comparison with the corrosion inhibition method proposed.
The model presented is created with adequate rate of abstraction with regard to the
following assumptions:
long-term storage methods for the period of 5 years are compared;
the input data combine expert estimation with the data obtained from respective
entities of ACR and TART (CORTEC) Company;
possible re-preservation is not considered;
labour costs, implicitly included in the preservation and depreservation time, are
not considered.
4.3 Evaluative Criteria Identification
Multicriteria analysis considers the following criteria:
time required for the preservation (Criterion 1, k1) – the criterion refers to the
average time required to prepare an MTV for long-time storage; the goal is the
shortest possible time, i.e. the criterion is minimising (MIN);
time required for depreservation (Criterion 2, k2) – the criterion refers to the
average time required to remove MTV from long-term storage (MIN);
economic intensity of preservation (Criterion 3, k3) – the criterion considers the
costs of preservative and wrapping means; it does not consider the tools and
equipment required for the preservation proper (MIN);
economic intensity of waste disposal (Criterion 4, k4) – the criterion considers the
costs of environmentally-friendly disposal of preservative and wrapping means
(MIN);
consumption of energy for drying (Criterion 5, k5) – the criterion considers
energy intensity of humidity reduction during storage (i.e. 5 years); for better
understanding, it is then converted to expenditures for electrical energy (MIN);
outdoor applicability (Criterion 6, k6) – the criterion refers to the possibility of
MTV long-term storage in unroofed areas exposed to weather effects and solar
radiation; the goal is the outdoor applicability, i.e. if the Yes/No scale is converted
to 1/0, the criterion is maximising (MAX).
137
4.4 Multicriteria Analysis
The multicriteria analysis is based on the data stated in Table 1. In particular, the
economic aspect is considered both explicitly (refer to economic intensity and energy
consumption), and implicitly in the time required for respective activities (preservation
and depreservation).
Table 1 – Primary data for multicriteria analysis
STORAGE METHODS
STATIC
Evaluative Criteria
(Classic)
Time required for the preservation
42-45 h
Time required for depreservation
6-7 h
Economic intensity of preservation
35,000 CZK
Economic intensity of waste disposal
3,000 CZK
Consumption of energy for drying
0 MWh
Outdoor applicability
No***
*
**
***
STATIC
(Inhibitors)
15-18 h
0h
22,200 CZK
0 CZK
0 MWh
Yes
DYNAMIC
(Vesuv)
42-45 h
6-7 h
89,256 CZK*
3,000 CZK
28.8 MWh**
No***
the price comprises the preservation and wrapping price (analogically, as in the case of STATIC –
Classical method) plus the price of VESUV 130 drier, bought in 1993 for CZK54,256 [5].
the value refers to the operation of a drier with 1.6 kW input power for the period of 5 months
a year.
the applicability of currently used preservative and wrapping means is limited by the temperature
range approx. –30 °C to +30 °C, while exposure to direct solar radiation is not assumed.
Source: modified [4]
The calculation must be based on mean values; for better understanding of the
electricity consumption, the price 1,550 CZK/MWh will be used. Resulting data for the
multicriteria analysis are stated in Table 2. Individual methods are formally referred
to as z1-z3.
Table 2 – Modified data for multicriteria analysis
STORAGE
METHODS
Evaluative Criteria
STATIC
(Classic)
(z1)
STATIC
(Inhibitors)
(z2)
DYNAMIC
Vesuv
(z3)
43.5 h
6.5 h
35,000 CZK
3,000 CZK
0 CZK
0
16.5 h
0h
22,200 CZK
0 CZK
0 CZK
1
43.5 h
6.5 h
89,256 CZK
3,000 CZK
44,640 CZK
0
Source: own
The criteria are then assigned weighting using Saaty’s method allowing pair comparison
of considered criteria. Individual values are stated in Table 3, including the numerically
expressed rate of preference:
1 – equal (in inverted form 1/1);
3 – slightly preferred (in inverted form 1/3);
5 – strongly preferred (in inverted form 1/5);
7 – very strongly preferred (in inverted form 1/7);
9 – absolutely preferred (in inverted form 1/9);
The Пki column states the values of geometric averages of individual criteria
preferences, and it is a necessary intermediate calculation for the weighting vector
138
determination. In the heads of two last columns, there is a variable i ∈<1; 6>; the
interval includes natural numbers, and corresponds with the number of criteria. The vi
column contains the resulting weighting vector: = (0.09; 0.09; 0.30; 0.25; 0.25; 0.03).
Apparently, the greatest emphasis is put on the economic intensity (criteria k3, k4, k5).
Table 3: Saaty’s method application
Evaluative Criteria
k6
Πki
vi
1/5 1/3 1/3
5
0.69
0.09
1/5 1/3 1/3
5
0.69
0.09
5
1
5
1
1
7
2.37
0.30
3
3
1
1
1
7
1.99
0.25
3
3
1
1
1
7
1.99
0.25
1
0.22
0.03
7.96
1.00
k1
k2
k3
1
1
1
1/5
k4
k5
1
1/5 1/7 1/7 1/7
Source: own
In the following step, the weighting vector is included in the comparison of individual
values (stated in Table 2) of the MTV long-term storage methods under consideration.
The criteria values are, however, in various units, and the goal for criteria k1 – k5 is their
minimisation, while for the last criterion (k6), it is the maximisation. The problem may
be eliminated by the application of Metfessel’s allocation of 100 points allowing
unification of the criteria to the same basis and conversion of the last criterion (k6) to
a minimising criterion by inverted allocation of points. The procedure will be presented
for the first criterion, showing the unification of the criterion values to the same basis,
and for the last criterion, which is to be converted to a minimising criterion.
It applies for criterion k1 that the proportion of values stated in Table 2,
i.e. 43.5:16.5:43.5, must be maintained. At the same time, the sum of individual values
of the three MTV long-term storage methods must equal 100. Thus, unified basis for the
comparison with other criteria, to which analogical procedures will be applied, is
provided. The percentual share of individual criterion values in the total value (sum of
values) is expressed in a simplified way as follows: 43.5 + 16.5 + 43.5 = 103.5; the
shares are then 43.5/103.5 = 0.420, which equals 42 % (points), 16.5/103.5 = 0.159
(16 %) and 42 %. Values for other criteria are stated in Table 4. The conversion of the
maximising criterion k6 to a minimising criterion may be calculated using inverse
allocation of values. In case of trivial values 0, 1, 0, the values 50, 0, 50 can be assigned
easily.
139
Table 4: Application of Metfessel’s allocation of 100 points
Evaluative Criteria
vi
z1i
z2i
z3i vi.(z1i) vi.(z2i) vi.(z3i)
0.09
0.09
0.30
0.25
0.25
0.03
42
50
24
50
0
50
16
0
15
0
0
0
42
50
61
50
100
50
4
4
7
13
0
1
1
0
5
0
0
0
4
4
18
13
25
1
TOTAL
1.00
216
31
353
29
6
65
Source: own
The outputs are the utility functions (values 29, 6 and 65 in the bottom line of Table 4),
which serve as a decision-making tool. As all the criteria are minimising for the purpose
of calculation, including transformed criterion 6, the most convenient MTV long-term
storage method is the method with the smallest number of points. This applies to
method z2, which is almost 5× better than z1 and more than 10× better than z3 in the
model presented.
Partial inaccuracies, which can be detected in individual tables, are caused by the
rounded representation of values in Microsoft Excel application. As the inaccuracies
may only be ascribed to the representation, but the calculation works with unrounded
values, the results are not distorted at all. Final rounding of values for the utility
function calculation has a minimum impact on the result.
5 Conclusion
For the conditions of the ACR, a solution suggesting the application of inhibitors was
presented allowing quick long-term anti-corrosion protection with minimum costs,
which maintains original utility properties of MTVs. The solution also considers the
environmental aspect of the long-term storage. The products specified are
environmentally-friendly, and their disposal does not require allocation of any further
financial means (they are 100% recyclable).
Other advantages include the possibility of quick and simple application of protective
agents, perfect anti-corrosion protection of wrapped MTVs and the long-term effect
(5 years). If needed, the MTVs may immediately be put into operation without
depreservation. The proposed solution is applicable to the storage of any military land
or air equipment, including groups or subgroups of the equipment.
The application of corrosion inhibitors assumes wrapping of MTVs and the generation
of own microclimate resistant to climatic effects and solar radiation. This makes longterm storage outside roofed buildings (storehouses) possible.
The corrosion inhibition technology is also applicable in the framework of strategic sea
transports of armed forces. During sea transportation, MTVs and other military land
vehicles, or possibly spare parts in containers, are exposed to extreme relative humidity,
often intensified by the effects of salty water. These factors significantly increase the
probability of corrosion occurrence.
Presumably, further research will cover long-term storage of other property groups (e.g.
electrical appliances and equipment, chemical materials, rubber parts and tyres).
140
References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
BRAUN, Pavel, VALA, Miroslav. Vojenská kolová vozidla I: Základy konstrukce
(Military Wheeled Vehicles I: Construction Basics). [Textbook]. Brno: Vojenská
akademie, 1996. 379 s.
ČORŇÁK, Štefan a kol. Provoz a údržba bojových a speciálních vozidel II
(Operation and Maintenance of Combat and Special Vehicles II). [Textbook].
Brno: Univerzita obrany. 2007, 147 s. ISBN 978-80-7231-487-4.
DVOŘÁK, Ivan. Degradační procesy a mezní stavy (Degradation Processes and
Limit States). [Skripta]. 2. vydání. Brno: Vojenská akademie, 2003. 217 s.
MILCORR. Asset Preservation System for the Military. Documents/Guides –
Restricted
Area
[online].
© 2013
[cit.
2013-04-08].
Available
at http://www.milcorr.com/?id=docs
Vesuv 130 – výdaje na pořízení (Vesuv 130 – acquisition costs). Informační
systém logistiky ACR a MO [online]. © 2008-2011 [cit. 2013-04-02].
Regulation of the Ministry of Defence no. 274/1999 Coll., Determining the Types
and Categories of Military Vehicles, the Approval of their Technical Competence,
Performance of Technical Checkups of Military Vehicles, and Tests of the
Technical Equipment in Military Vehicles, as of 15 November 1999.
141
SOME ASPECTS OF CREATION OF TASK FORCES FROM A
PERSPECTIVE OF THE CZECH ARMY CHEMICAL CORPS
Radim Zahradníček and Zdeněk Skaličan
Abstract: Article deals with problems of creation of task forces with contribution of chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear defence units. It derives from a general approach to
generating task forces. It describes fundamentals of modularity and connection of modules into
the form of a modular system. Emphasis of the article lies in a compendium of expectant tasks
of CBRN defence units which represent a basis for defining required capabilities of specific
modules of the Czech Army Chemical Corps. Furthermore it describes relation amongst terms
threat, scenario, task and capability.
Keywords: CBRN Defence, Task Force, Module, Capability
1 Introduction
The Chemical Corps belong to those combat arms which have, based on its
achievements in foreign operations, signed up positively amongst other highly respected
branches of the Army of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as „ACR“). In the
past, it contributed to drawing attention to and the overall prestige of our armed forces
within the frame of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as
„NATO”). It still keeps on maintaining the lead.
However, global advancements generate new threats and those which already exist are
being gradually modified. Analysts successfully manage to follow current trends and
associated developments so that the security environment changes are being
continuously analyzed. On the other hand, it demands constant updating of specialised
military tasks and expected capabilities of all kinds of arms. Therefore, it is highly
desirable to have the Chemical Corps prepared to react to these modifications, especially
by means of training focused on new scenarios and variants of possible engagements.
These requirements are known and documented within both NATO and ACR.
Nowadays, the question is whether conditions necessary for further development of the
Chemical Corps are being created. As a result of such positive changes, a high
deployability, especially in a new operational environmnet, would be ensured. If we
don´t manage to catch certain trends in time, the Chemical Corps might gradually lose
its professional standard and prestige, thereby also its leading position amongst
equivalent elements of coalition armies.
This article deals with problems of the Chemical Corps development and its ability to
fulfil specific and expert tasks. Through finding weak points with regard to future
expected tasks we can contribute to develop new binding documents which will help to
steer the Chemical Corps towards required modernization.
142
The chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (hereinafter referred to as “CBRN”)
specialists and subject matter experts ask these essential questions:
1)
Are the CBRN defence units being prepared to expected tasks?
2)
Do there exist capabilities and capacities of the Chemical Corps that are desired to
be modified, perhaps even created because of their absence?
3)
What are the rules to create such functional elements of forces and means?
2 Basic terms and their relation to problems
2.1 Chemical support and CBRN Defence
Military regulation „Chemické zabezpečení v AČR“ [1] defines the term Chemical
Support as „a specific kind of combat support. It is realised in order to create favourable
conditions to troops and military establishments to be able to fulfil their missions in
areas contaminated with radiological, chemical and biological agents and support them
with protection measures“. In addition, all activities of this support are primarily
performed by forces and means of arms and services of all kinds. Only the most expert
tasks requiring specially trained personnel and special equipment are carried out by the
CBRN units with their means and capabilities.
On the other hand, NATO newly defines this term, officialy titled „CBRN Defence“, as
„plans and activities intended to mitigate or neutralise adverse effects on operations and
personnel resulting from the use or threatened use of CBRN weapons and devices, the
emergence of secondary hazards arising from counter-force targeting or the release, or
risk of release, of toxic industrial materials into the environment. It will also be prepared
to prevent, protect against and recovr from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and
CBRN threats/use in order to mitigate or neutralise adverse impacts on Alliance
populations and territory” [2]. By implementing this new comprehensive approach,
NATO extends tasks of the CBRN defence units towards not only military troops but
also towards protection of civilians, territory and critical infrastructure at the same time.
Therefore, it focuses even on the weakest spots after a potential CBRN attack. The new
concept of CBRN Defence sets high demands on mobility, compatibility and high-level
expert qualifications to solve specific tasks.
2.2 Module and modularity
A possibility to operate in various types of military operations is a basic philosophy of
potential deployment of the ACR to a conflict. Extent, content and urgency of
operations of a near future will certainly be much different than the previous ones.
Based on such wide spectra of operations, various organizational structures of deployed
assets must be taken into account. Therefore, different task forces, with ability of
independent operational activity, will be established from appropriate modules of small
units [7].
A module is a basic element (entity), by which an organizational structure of joint
national or multinational task force is established. Done for the purpose of a required
type of operation, modules are designated to fulfil a specific task (tasks) or to cover
demanded capability (capabilities), either independently or in mutual integration
with other modules [8]. A modular system is composed of plenty of modules, whereas
each of them usually represent a squad / crew level [9].
Modularity is understood as one of the factors that offers flexibility during deployment
and engagement of military forces. Based on a specific situation and current mission,
modularity enables deployment of particular elements of a modular system (so called
Tailoring-to-Mission). Step by step, it is possible to enlarge the system via addition of
143
individual modules [7]. Modularity of military structures contributes to well thought-out
and purposeful utilization of operational capabilities with regard to character of an
environment which are units deployed to [5].
2.3 Task force
Task force, understood as a temporarily created groupment of units under a command of
a designated commander, does not have a permanent organization. It is designed for a
purpose of conducting a certain type of an operation or to fulfil specific tasks [3]. Its
creation represents organization of accessible sources, creation of a structure and a
system of command and control with all necessary support. In most cases, level of
command responsible for creating a task force is also responsible for providing its
required combat service support [4].
Task force creation encompasses combining of modules with regard to significant
aspects: endstate of an operation, tasks of an operation, required units´ capabilities,
battlefield conditions, a time space, etc. The goal is to create an organizational structure
which is built-up from individual modules able to meet requirements on operational
capabilities and with ability of their mutual combining, if necessary [5]. In accordance
with publication [6], task forces are divided by their size to company, battalion, brigade
or division sized elements.
Since the Chemical Corps has been regularly tasked to fulfil plenty of situations both on
the Czech territory and during foreign deployments, it has certain experience with
creation of some of the task forces. Deployed elements incorporated some highly
specialized assets and in total it counted up to a battalion strength. With respect to
present-day trends it will still be required to deploy forces up to a battalion level but
most often it will concern task forces based on a company (up to 100 soldiers). The
Czech contribution to NATO Response Force (NRF) has been a vital example. In
addition, latest Operation Serval in Mali, where company sized airborne task forces
were deployed, is also one of the contemporary military conflicts to draw from.
3. General approach to creation of task forces with contribution of CBRN defence
units
3.1 Security and operational environment
Historically, NATO dealt with a predictable adversary and knew conditions for expected
military operations. Nowadays, situation has changed dramatically. Since current threats
are hardly predictable, we are not able to define the exact nature of future conflicts and
the role of both state and non-state actors in it. More importantly, it influences expected
operational use of arms [10].
With referrence to [11], security threats can be generally divided into three types:
1)
Intentionally caused by a man (war aggression, criminality, political violence,
sabotage).
2)
Unintentionally caused by a man (technological and industrial accidents,
malfunction of critical infrastructure).
3)
Natural disasters (calamities, catastrophes).
Additionaly, these groups of threats can be divided into scenarios and sub-scenarios
which will represent a basis for description of expected tasks of the CBRN defence units
in operations.
In light of changes of an operational environment the most probable activities will be
smuggling of a CBRN material, terrorism an also smaller regional conflicts affected and
supported with either governmentlal or non-governmental organizations.
144
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (hereinafter referred to as „WMD”), their
means of delivery and the option that they will be misused by terrorists, those will be the
future key threats for the Alliance.
These facts must be necessarily taken into account in the process of force generation and
in devopment of operational plans, including plans for deployment of the Chemical
Corps. Preparedness to an effective defence of own troops and civilians is the main
objective.
3.2 Scenarios
Scenarios for employment of armed forces represent a detailed description of
circumstances of future operational situations, in which the armed forcess will be
conducting assigned tasks. Scenarios enable to assess what basic capabilities (key
capabilities) will most probably be necessary to achieve. Moreover, they enable to
analyze their estimated impact and to predict what technologies will be necessary to
affiliate [5].
Scenarios must be taken into account when defining a task to be conducted by modules
of the CBRN defence units.
3.3 Tasks
Tensions, currently more frequent and rising amongst various countries in different
regions, create demands on expected tasks and capacities of the Chemical Corps.
Essential document [2], detailing the so called „comprehensive approach“, is one of a
few documents defining the basic expected tasks of the CBRN defence units. These
three pillars represent fundamentals of the approach:
1)
Prevent the proliferation of WMD and CBRN materials.
2)
Protect against a CBRN attack (event).
3)
Recover from a CBRN attack (event).
Each pillar involves specific key tasks which determine a future orientation of the
Chemical Corps.
Principles of the prevention of proliferation pillar contribute to global efforts to nonproliferation of WMD and CBRN materials. It focuses on a capability to avoid, prevent
or deter a threat of usage or an actual usage of WMD or CBRN devices by either state or
non-state actors. Amongst specific measures we can mention providing a support to
non-proliferation initiatives, organizing seminars, explaining the consequences of actual
usage of WMD and CBRN devices, offering assistance, demonstration of capabilities,
visible military exercising, preparation of state authorities and civilian population to
such events, following international treaties or preventing from contraband of WMD or
CBRN materials and their means of delivery. Concerning the prevention of
proliferation, Special Operations Forces (SOF), supported by chosen CBRN modules,
might contribute significantly. Deterrence from activities of some „rogue states“,
described in [17], also cannot be missed out.
Protection pillar includes plenty of organizational and technical measures undertaken
before, during and after the events. Most frequently it is a complex of physical measures
conducted in order to prevent from affection by WMD or CBRN material. It includes a
so called passive defence, understood as a well-known complex of protection measures:
detection, warning and reporting and hazard prediction, individual and collective
protection, and decontamination. Amongst others, protection of critical infrastructure
and its hardening, generally termed as vulnerability reduction, will probably become
more demanded. Recently, activities of a new task “WMD Disablement”, which aim to
systematically locate, secure, characterize, eliminate or dispose WMD, CBRN weapons,
145
CBRN devices and CBRN materials, are to be developed. Last but not least,
Consequence Management measures and joint cooperation of CBRN EOD / IEDD, as a
unique CBRN Defence capability, cannot be missed out. All of these measures will be
conducted in order to provide protection to other arms and a timely and effective
response to crisis.
Recovery pillar creates conditions for removing and reducing consequences after an
executed CBRN event. As a complex of measures, Consequence Management becomes
more and more significant in connection with possible terrorist attacks on places and
events (so-called High Visibility Events, HVE) which cumulate presence of civilians
and by its nature it attracts the media. These tasks may be
short-term and include e.g. detection, monitoring, extraction of personnel from a “Hot
Zone”, triage, decontamination of both ambulatory and non-ambulatory personnel and
medical services, or may be long-term tasks which include above mentioned with
addition of forensic sampling (SIBCRA), identification in certified laboratories,
decontamination of infrastructure, and possibly others.
3.4 Capabilities
The term „capability“ generally means competence of armed forces to effectively
operate in crisis situations and war conflicts, while a possessor of an appropriate
capability is a unit (formation) or their group [12]. In this conception it is evident that
a modular system (i.e. connection of individual modules as possessors of specific
capabilities) can fulfil a complex of tasks necessary to reach the endstate of operation.
A different definition set in [2] describes capability as an ability to produce an effect
which is needed to be achieved, whilst effect represents a result of transfer of specific
activity.
A possible interpretation of requirements on capabilities can be following: the CBRN
defence units must be transformed into more appropriately sized, multifunctional,
flexible, mobile, highly specialized and rapidly deployable forces tailored-to-mission.
They must be capable of conducting joint and combined operations, cooperating with
civilian authorities and employing new technologies leading to an increase in
capabilities.
Approaches to building necessary capabilities are described in [5]. It refers to basic and
specific capabilities needed to deal with scenarios and sub-scenarios of crises. Basic
capabilities, sometimes referred to as key capabilities, serve to fulfil tasks in order to
reach endstate of an operation. Considering sub-scenarios, some specific capabilities of
a respective type of combat arms must be built and developed. This naturally calls for
a certain degree of modularity of units.
Key operational capabilities are in general defined as:
timely availability;
effective intelligence;
deployability and mobility;
effective employment;
effective command, control and communication;
sustainability;
resistance and protection of forces;
civil-military cooperation [13].
146
The White Paper on Defence formulates some specific capabilities which pertain to the
Chemical Corps and recently becoming increasingly more important:
multifunctional capacity of small CBRN defence units;
effective protection of population, critical elements of infrastructure, social events
of a high significance and activities during humanitarian and natural disasters;
CBRN Reach Back and Fusion (consultancy for commanders in foreign
operations);
simulations and modelling;
use of civilian experts, etc.
Essential spectrum of capabilities for CBRN defence units is defined in “Catalogue of
required operational capabilities of the ACR 2018” [14] which reflects the allied
directive “Capability Codes and Capability Statements” [15]. Moreover, it is necessary
to consider the operational capabilities of modules, i.e. entities of squad / crew level, in
the context of “NATO Tasks List” [16]. This document offers fundamentals for creation
of the Joint Mission Essential Task List – (J)METL.
3.5 Concept of creation of modular organizational structures
There are two parallel processes that describe the creation (generation) of any task force:
process of operational planning;
process of force generation.
Hand-in-hand, these processes enable creation of force structures. These will dispose of
necessary capabilities and capacities in order to reach required endstate of operations.
Aim of the force generation is to identify and approve national contribution to an
operation with focus on development of sufficient and meaningful compendium of
capacities, while conforming to requirements on execution of an operation.
Depicted figure represents a general model of creation of any task force. Respecting
wide spectra of operational circumstances, it concerns a logical sequence of steps
aiming at composition of a task force from particular modules.
147
Threats and their manifestation
Scenario A
Scenario B
Scenario C
Scenario D
Type of an operation which will be conducted
Task 1
Task 2
Specific task
1.1
Specific task
1.2
Task 3
Specific task
1.3
Required capabilities
Modules as possessors of
specific capabilities (skills)
Choice from a database of modules
Task force
Figure 1: General concept of a creation of task forces
Source: own processing
Primary step on a way to implementation of modular organizational structures into
binding documents is to define particular modules and describe categorization of
modularity, including methods. Having prepared a database of modules, we can
precalculate typical combinations of units for a whole spectrum of operations [8].
In accordance with [13], task forces will be created primarily on a basis of organic units.
These will be purposefully added with specific modules, especially of combat service
support and combat support. However, all types of arms and services must be, based on
its designation, able to create core of a company-sized task force. In addition, some
chosen types of arms, including the Chemical Corps, must be able to create core of a
battalion-sized task force. The intent is to gradually achieve modularity on a company
level and even on a lower level by some chosen arms (the Chemical Corps).
148
4 Current status and way ahead
Some of today´s capabilities, capacities and standardly used equipment of the CBRN
defence units were designed in accordance with former perception of threats and their
implied tasks. Up to now, accented have been tasks of detection of high concentrations
of chemical agents, warning of manoeuver units, mass decontamination and all
measures related primarily to general war. Training was focused on employment of units
with fixed structure, dealing with repetitive and doctrinally expectable tasks. It was a
logical reaction to need of ability to manage impacts of massive strikes of WMD (socalled „Cold War Scenario“).
However, in future operations there can´t be expected fulfilments of the wide range of
CBRN tasks at once. Planners would always take attention to specificity concerning
each individual situation and so that the execution phase would be done only with
chosen CBRN modules. In addition, NATO principle of cooperative defence along with
principle of Smart Defence / Sharing and Pooling has to be complied. It is desirable to
explicitly set a compendium of capabilities that the ACR will have to hand and of those
capabilities that will be provided by our NATO partners.
During the process of creation of task forces, an organic structure of the Chemical Corps
will be the source of modules to draw from. These units will be variantly combined
together and mutually connected on the principle of modularity. It is therefore useful to
maintain a high specialization of executive modules, i.e. to orient on quality and
reasonable quantity. Obviously, it will be necessary to determine all modules of the
Chemical Corps as well as to update definitions of their expected tasks, operational
capabilities and requirements in accordance with allied publications. On this basis it will
be possible to create a variety of structures of task forces for a whole spectrum of
operations.
5 Conclusion
Future approach of the Chemical Corps to solving crises should include ability to create
modular and capacity-flexible units. Therefore, units will be conformed to specific tasks
and hence more readily deployable. The Chemical Corps has a need of further
organizational and technical development in order to be able to fulfil new and expected
tasks. Some of the capabilites of the Chemical Corps have to be adjusted to current
needs or even created. Such task forces must reach certain interoperability and
compatibility. Based on existing NATO expectations, the Czech Republic will still
make an effort to act as a lead-nation in the problems of CBRN Defence. Therefore, it is
appropriate to deal with problems of creation of task forces, particularly to work out a
modular system of the Czech CBRN defence units.
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Chemické zabezpečení v Armádě České republiky. [Vševojsk-2-6]. Praha:
Ministerstvo obrany, 2008.
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Defence Concept. [MC 0603]. Brusel: IMS, 2012.
Vojenský výkladový slovník vybraných operačních pojmů. Pomůcka. Vyškov:
Správa doktrín Ředitelství výcviku a doktrín, 2005.
149
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[7]
[8]
[9]
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150
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výcviku a doktrín, 2006.
DUBEC, R. a kol. Tvorba modulárních struktur úkolových uskupení. Praha:
Powerprint s.r.o., 2012. ISBN 978-80-87415-54-2.
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velení a řízení [Pub-53-01-2]. 1. vyd. Vyškov: Správa doktrín Ředitelství výcviku
a doktrín, 2007.
OTŘÍSAL, P. Stanovení operačních schopností modulárních struktur CHV AČR.
Vyškov: Ústav ochrany proti zbraním hromadného ničení, 2010.
DUBEC, R. Analýza způsobů tvorby modulu a tvorby modulárních struktur
úkolových uskupení. Studie projektu obranného výzkumu STRUKTURA. Brno:
Univerzita obrany, 2011. Ev.č. 81/9/27/2011-2994.
Doktrína Armády České republiky. 2. vyd. Vyškov : Institut doktrín, 2010.
KŘÍŽ, Z. Adaptace Severoatlantické aliance na nové mezinárodní bezpečnostní
prostředí. Brno: Mezinárodní politologický ústav Masarykovy univerzity, 2006.
ISBN 80-210-4218-4.
Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive. Brussels: Allied Command
Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 2010.
Bílá kniha o obraně. 1. vyd. Praha: Ministerstvo obrany-OKP MO, 2011. ISBN
978-80-7278-564-3.
Dlouhodobá vize rozortu MO. Praha: Ministerstvo obrany, 2008.
Katalog požadovaných operačních schopností AČR 2018. Praha: Sekce plánování
sil MO, 2009.
Capability Codes and Capability Statements. Brussels: Allied Command
Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 2011.
NATO Tasks List (NTL). Brussels: Allied Command Operations, Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 2004.
MAREŠ, M. Aktéři proliferace zbraní hromadného ničení. In Obrana a strategie,
2005, č. 2, s. 7. Dostupné z: <http://www.defenceandstrategy.eu/cs/archiv/rocnik2005/2-2005>
NATO’s Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation
of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending Against Chemical,
Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats, [online]. © 2009, [cit.
2012-03-12]. Dostupné z:
<http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_57218.htm>
The Authors´ Bibliographies
Tomáš BINAR, Eng., Ph.D., Department of Logistics , Faculty of Economics and
Management, University of Defence, Brno. He deals with the Transport and Handling
Technology.
Email: tomas.binar@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 443 678.
Miroslav CEMPÍREK, Assoc. Prof., Eng., PhD., University of Defence, Brno. He
works at the Department of Logistics in the field logistic support and environmental
security.
Email: miroslav.cempirek@unob.cz Phone +420 973 443 858.
Jiří ČERNÝ, Eng., Ph.D., Senior Lecturer, Department of Military Management and
Tactics, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Defence Brno. He is
interested in command and control problems on brigade and battalion level.
Email: jiri.cerny@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 443 022.
Jan DROZD, Eng., Senior Lecturer, Department of Military Management and Tactics,
Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Defence Brno. He deals with
issues of the Tactics on battalion level.
Email: jan.drozd@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 443 152.
Roman DUFEK, Eng., NATO International Staff, Defence Policy and Planning
Division, Logistics Section. He is dealing with logistics cooperation initiatives and
programmes with non-NATO nations.
Email: dufek.roman@hq.nato.int, Phone: +32-(0)27071910.
Karel FILIP, Eng., Doctoral study program student, Faculty of Economics and
Management, field of study: Logistics.
Monika GRASSEOVÁ, Assoc. Prof., Eng., PhD., Department of Military Management
and Tactics, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Defence, Brno. She
deals with the issues of management.
Email: monika.grasseova@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 442 975.
József GYARMATI, Assoc. Prof., National University of Public Service, Faculty of
Military Sciences and Officer Training.
Email: gyarmati.jozsef@uni-nke.hu.
Petr HAJNA, Prof., Eng., CSc., Department of logistics, University of Defence, Brno.
He deals with issues of logistics supply chains.
Email: petr.hajna@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 443 995.
Vladimír HALENKA, BG., Eng., He deals with the development of logistics
principles of environmental and working environment.
Email: vladimir.halenka@army.cz, Phone.: +420 973 214 302.
151
Aleš KOMÁR, COL(R), Prof., Eng., PhD., Department of logistics, University of
Defence, Brno.. He works at the Department of Logistics in the field food and
environmental security.
Email: ales.komar@unob.cz, Phone +420 973 442 802.
Zbyšek KORECKI, Eng., Ph.D., Department of Territorial Studies, Mendel University
in Brno. He deals with issues of logistics support accomplishment and life cycle cost.
Email: korecki@mendelu.cz, phone: +420 545 136 311.
Petr KŘÍŽEK, Eng., Doctoral study program student, Faculty of Economics and
Milota KUSTROVÁ, Eng., Ph.D., Armed Forces Academy of gen. M. R. Stefanik
Liptovsky Mikulas, Department of Management. She deals with environmental issues
in the armed forces in military logistics.
Email: milota.kustrova@aos.sk, Phone: +421 960 423081.
Radka LOPOUROVÁ, Eng., Ph.D., Department of logistics, University of Defence,
Brno. She deals with issues of acquisition management and electronic tools operation
within the CAF environment.
Email: radka.lopourova@unob.cz, Phone: + 420 973 443 088.
Jaromír MAREŠ, Eng., Ph.D., Department of Logistics, Faculty of Economics
and Management, University of Defense, Brno. He deals with the operation
and maintenance of vehicles.
Email: jaromir.mares@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 443 101.
Miroslav MAREŠ, Assoc. Prof., JUDr., PhDr., Ph.D., Department of Political Science,
Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University in Brno. He specialises in the study of
political violence and extremism, both within the Czech Republic and in European
trans-national context.
Email: mailto:mmares@fss.muni.cz, +420 549 495 143.
Miroslav MAŠLEJ, Eng., Ph.D., Department of Military Management and Tactics,
Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Defence, Brno. He deals with the
issues of management and leadeship.
Email: miroslav.maslej@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 442 454.
Jan MAZAL, Eng., Ph.D., Department of Military Management and Tactics, Faculty of
Economics and Management, University of Defence, Brno. He deals with the issues of
systems for support of military decision process.
Email: jan.mazal@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 442 311.
Ivana MOKRÁ, Eng., Doctoral study program student, Faculty of Economics and
Management, field of study: Military Management. She deals with the issues of systems
for support of military decision process.
152
Jan NOHEL, Eng., 73rd tank battalion, Přáslavice. Doctoral study program student,
Faculty of Economics and Management, field of study: Military Management. He deals
with the problems related to the information support of the planning and decisionmaking process of commanders at the tactical command and control level.
Email: jan.nohel@centrum.cz, Phone: +420 973 407 575.
Pavel OTŘÍSAL, Eng, Ph.D., MBA, NBC Defence Institute of the University of
Defence Brno. He deals with problem concerning combat and operational deployment
of the Chemical Corps and problems related to Individual and Collective protective
equipment.
Email: pavel.otrisal@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 452 335.
Miroslav PECINA, Assoc. Prof., Eng., Ph.D., Department of logistics, University of
Defence, Brno. He deals with issues of military logistics. He works as a senior trainer of
LOGFAS information system.
Email: miroslav.pecina@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 443 312.
Árpád POHL, Assoc. Prof., PhD., Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training,
National University of Public Service, Budapest. He deals with issues of logistic
support of military operations.
Email: pohl.arpad@uni-nke.hu, Phone: 0036/1 432 9000.
Martin REJZEK, Eng., Ph.D., Department of Logistics , Faculty of Economics and
Management, University of Defence, Brno. He deals with the transport supply system in
terms of the armed forces.
Email: martin.rejzek@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 443 130.
Zdeněk SKALIČAN, Assoc. prof., Eng., Ph.D., University of Defence Brno. He works
as a director of the NBC Defence Institute. His educational and research specializations
are detection of chemical warfare agents, decontamination and CBRN Defence.
Email: zdenek.skalican@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 452 301.
Ján SPIŠÁK, Eng., Department of Lifelong Learning, Faculty of Economics
and Management, University of Defence, Brno. He deals with issues of specialization
in capabilities development, operational concept development, military strategy and
operational art.
Email: jan.spisak@unob.cz , Phone: +420 973 442 300.
Petr STODOLA, Assoc. Prof., Eng., PhD., Department of Military Management and
Tactics, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Defence, Brno. He deals
with the issues of systems for support of military decision process.
Email: petr.stodola@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 442 474.
Martin ŠKVAŘIL, Eng., 22nd Air Base, Czech Air Forces. He deals with issues of
Host nation Support planning and provision in the conditions Czech Air Forces.
Email: skvarilmartin@seznam.cz, Phone: +420 775 961 537.
153
Eva ŠTĚPÁNKOVÁ, Eng., PhD., Department of Military Management and Tactics,
Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Defence, Brno. She deals with
the issues of management.
Email: eva.stepankova@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 442 138.
Radim UŠEL, Eng., Doctoral study program student, Faculty of Economics and
Vladislav VINCENEC, Eng., Ph.D., addresses the issue of fuel security, logistical
support and the principles of environmental protection.
Email: vladislav.vincenec@unob.cz, Phone: +420 443 891.
Martin VLKOVSKÝ, Eng., Ph.D., Department of Logistics, Faculty of Economics and
Management, University of Defence, Brno. He deals with the areas of material handling
systems and their applications in the armed forces.
Email: martin.vlkovsky@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 443 980.
Radim ZAHRADNÍČEK, Eng., 312th CBRN Defence Battalion Liberec. He is a
student of the University of Defence, doctoral study programme Economics and
Management. He deals with problems of use of CBRN defence units in operations.
Email: zahradnicek.radim@seznam.cz, Phone: +420 973 261 691.
Peter ZENTAY, Assoc. prof., Obuda University, Bánki Donát Mechanical and Safety
Engineering Faculty.
Email: zentay@actel.hu.
154
The Reviewers´ Bibliographies
Emil DRAČKA, Eng., Ph.D. He deals with problem concerning combat and
operational deployment of the Chemical Corps.
Email: edracka@nbox.cz, Phone: +420 776 714 356.
Zdeněk FLASAR, Assoc. Prof., Eng., Ph.D., Head of Group, Department of Military
Management and Tactics, Faculty of Economics and Management, University
of Defence, Brno. He deals with Tactics of Units and Formations.
Email: zdenek.flasar@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 442 938.
Libor FRANK, Ph.D., Head of the Group of Security Studies of the Department of
Lifelong Learning of the FEM UD. His research is focused on threat assessment and
security and defence policy of the Czech Republic.
Email: libor.frank@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 44 29 93.
Attila HORVATH, Assoc. Prof., Dr., Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training,
National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary. He deals with issues of
logistic support of military operations.
Email: horvathpresent@gmail.com.
Jan HUSÁK, Eng., Logistic Branch, Support Division of MOD. He deals with issues of
Multinational Logistics, NATO and EU Logistics and Information Systems used for the
military Logistics.
Email: husakj@army.cz, Phone: +420 973 214 283.
Vítězslav JAROŠ, Eng., Ph.D., Senior Lecturer, Department of Military Management
and Tactics, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Defence Brno. He
deals with issues of the Tactics and System of Command and Control of units,, Military
history and Theory of Military Management.
Email: vitezslav.jaros@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 442 660.
Zbyšek KORECKI, Eng., Ph.D., Department of Logistics, Faculty of Economics and
Management, University of Defence, Brno. He deals with issues logistics support.
Email: zbysek.korecki@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 443 955.
Jaroslav KOZUBEK, Eng., PhD., Vice Dean, Department of Military Management
and Tactics, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Defence, Brno. He
deals with Tactics of Units and Formations.
Email: jaroslav.kozubek@unob.cz , Phone: +420 973 443 592.
Lubomír KROUPA, Eng., Ph.D., Department of Combat Support Management,
Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Defence, Brno. He deals with
support of armed forces activities and fulfilling engineers.
Email: lubomir.kroupa@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 443 872.
155
Zdeněk KŘÍŽ, Assoc. Prof., PhDr., Ph.D., Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk
University in Brno. He specializes in history of international relations, international
security organization, security policy in Germany and the Czech Republic, civilian
affairs and democratic control of the army, and history of military conflict.
Email: zkriz@fss.muni.cz, Phone: +420 549 494 996.
Milota KUSTROVÁ, Eng., Ph.D., Armed Forces Academy of gen. M. R. Stefanik
Liptovsky Mikulas, Department of Management. She deals with environmental issues
in the armed forces in military logistics.
Email: milota.kustrova@aos.sk, Phone: +421 960 423081.
Jaroslav LINHART, Eng., Ph.D., Deputy of Chef of Logistic Division, Ministry of
Defence, Czech Republic. Area of logistics support in the Czech Army is a part of his
responsibilities.
Email: jarda.linhart@atlas.cz, Phone: +420 973 214 301.
Pavel NEČAS, Prof., Eng., Ph.D., Department of management, Armed Forces
Academy of gen. M. R. Stefanik Liptovsky Mikulas, Department of Management. He
deals with the issues of national and international security defence, and of simulation
and trainer techniques (STT) in the field of constructive, virtual and live simulation and
STT warfare application.
Pavel OTŘÍSAL, Eng, Ph.D., MBA, NBC Defence Institute of the University of
Defence Brno. He deals with problem concerning combat and operational deployment
of the Chemical Corps and problems related to Individual and Collective protective
equipment.
Email: pavel.otrisal@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 452 335.
Milan PODHOREC, Eng., Ph.D., head of group, Department of Military Management
and Tactics, Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Defence Brno. He
publishes about problems of intelligence activities and reconnaissance offensive and
inoffensive operation, security situation and her influence on army, actual interrogation
development of tactics and military management.
Email: milan.podhorec@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 442384.
Árpád POHL, Assoc. Prof., PhD, Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training,
National University of Public Service, Budapest. He deals with issues of logistic
support of military operations.
Email: pohl.arpad@uni-nke.hu, Phone: 0036/1 432-9000.
David ŘEHÁK, Assoc. Prof., Eng., Ph.D., VŠB-Technical University of Ostrava,
Faculty of Safety Engineering. He deals with the issues of civil protection, risk
management, environmental safety and international terrorism.
Email: david.rehak@vsb.cz, Phone: +420 597 322 816.
Josef ŘÍHA, Eng., Ph.D., Department of Military Management and Tactics, Faculty of
Economics and Management, University of Defence Brno. He publishes about problems
of intelligence activities and reconnaissance offensive and inoffensive operation.
Email: josef.riha@unob.cz, Phone: +420 973 442 252.
156
Oldřich SOCHA, Eng., Doctrine Section, Training Command – Military Academy in
Vyskov.
Email: sochao@army.cz, Phone: +420 973 450 906.
Martin ŠKVAŘIL, Eng., 22nd Air Base, Czech Air Forces. He deals with issues of
Host nation Support planning and provision in the conditions Czech Air Forces.
Email: skvarilmartin@seznam.cz, Phone: +420 775 961 537.
Břetislav ŠTĚPÁNEK, Eng., Ph.D., Joint CBRN Defence COE. He deals with Joint
CBRN Defence COE financial support and development of CBRN Defence problems
within NATO.
Email: bretin@seznam.cz, Phone: +420 973 452 807.
Přemysl ŠTĚPÁNEK, Eng., 71rd mechanized battalion, Hranice. He deals with the
problems of the planning and decision-making process of commanders at the tactical
command and control level.
Email: premysl.stepanek@army.cz, Phone: +420 973 425 202.
Oldřich TĚŠÍK, Eng., Ph.D., SVOS, spol s. r. o., Přelouč. He deals with the
development of armored vehicles.
Email: tesik@armsvov.cz, Phone: +420 725 582 981.
Věra VACKOVÁ, Eng., Regional government office of Central Bohemia region,
Department of Environment and Agriculture, Section of integrated prevention and
prevention of serious accidents. She is interested in protection of the environment, in
practical usage and realisation of integrated prevention and in limitation of pollutions
caused by factory processes.
Email: vera.vackova@gmail.com, Phone: +420 776 318 660.
Vladimír VRÁB, Assoc Prof, PhD, Centre of Simulation and Training Technologies,
Brno. He is response for development and application of M& for training and
educations.
Email: vladimir.vrab@unob.cz , Phone: +420 973 442 862.
Radim ZAHRADNÍČEK, Eng., 312th CBRN Defence Battalion Liberec. He is a
student of the University of Defence, doctoral study programme Economics and
Management. He deals with problems of use of CBRN defence units in operations.
Email: zahradnicek.radim@seznam.cz, Phone: +420 973 261 691.
Karel ZAPLETAL, Eng., Military Section of The Permanent Delegation of The Czech
Republic to NATO, Brussels. Military advisor for the logistics, standardization and
manpower.
Email: kzapletal@seznam.cz, Phone +913 255 1130.
157
Economics and Management
Ekonomika a Management
Published by/Vydává:
University of Defence
Univerzita obrany
Address/Adresa:
Kounicova 65, 662 10 Brno
Czech Republic
+ 420 973 442 660
http://www.unob.cz
Number/Číslo:
2/2013
Date of publication:
31th August 2013
Datum vydání:
31. 8. 2013
Executive Editor/
Výkonný redaktor:
Eng. Vítězslav JAROŠ, Ph.D.
Printed by/Tisk:
University Press of University of Defence
Vydavatelství Univerzity obrany
Registration number/
Evidenční číslo:
MK ČR E 17538
ISSN 1802-3975
© University of Defence
Univerzita obrany

EaM 2-2013 - Univerzita obrany

Transcription

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