Active Shooter

Terrorist & Violent Intruder Preparedness/Response Simplifying Your Response Based on A6acker Objec<ve Commonali<es www.intruderresponse.com
Vaughn Baker – Co-Founder Strategos International
20+ years L.E. experience (SWAT, Investigations, etc.)
1999-2002 – Deputy Dir. of Trng. – Surefire Institute
Co-Founded Strategos International in June of 2002
Active Shooter & Intruder Response Solutions
Strategos founded in 2002 as primarily L.E./MIL Tactical
Training Company
2007 Recognized need to train civilians as they are “true
first responders” & success vs. failure is most likely
dependent on their proper response
Trained over 60,000 school, healthcare, faith-based,
workplace, L.E., military and government professionals in 15
countries
Countries include U.S., Canada, Mexico, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Honduras, Colombia, Singapore, Japan, United
Kingdom, France, Portugal, Germany, Italy, and
Spain.
Solution Phases
Training & consulting solutions Strategos provides fall
into 3 categories that organizations should address:
PREVENTION
RESPONSE
AFTER ACTION
COMMUNITY RESPONSE Philosophy
Based on experience we determined in late 2009 that
solutions presented should be a
“community response” approach
Defining “Community” - a group of
people, and a feeling of fellowship
with others, as a result of sharing
common attitudes, interests, and
goals.
COMMUNITY RESPONSE Philosophy
These tragic events are community based events
•  Attacker is from the community
•  Victims are from the community
•  Responders are from community
•  SOLUTIONS must be
“community based!”
COMMUNITY RESPONSE Philosophy (continued)
“Community Response” should include:
•  “Professional First Responder” as well as the “TRUE
FIRST RESPONDER”
Defining Traditional “FIRST RESPONDER” - A person, such as
a police officer, firefighter, or EMT, trained in emergency response
procedures and prepared to
move quickly to the scene of
an emergency in progress
COMMUNITY RESPONSE Philosophy (continued)
“Community Response” should include:
•  “Professional First Responder” as well as the “TRUE
FIRST RESPONDER”
Defining the “TRUE FIRST RESPONDER” – Those persons
already ON SCENE when the incident begins that have proper
training, mindset and
DESIRE to do WHAT
is needed WHEN it is
needed to de-escalate
the event to those that
they are responsible
for
COMMUNITY RESPONSE Philosophy (continued)
“Community Response” should include:
•  Organization “TRUE FIRST RESPONDER” Personnel
•  “Professional First Responder” Personnel (L.E., Fire,
EMS, etc.)
•  Community Groups (parents, employees, members)
•  What is a threat
•  When to report
•  How to report
•  Awareness/Indicators
•  Roles & Obligations in Reporting & Response
What is the Value of TIME?
SUCCESS vs. FAILURE
is most likely going to be
up to the people on
scene; NOT professional
first responders
Active Shooter Statistics (2013 FBI Study)
160 Active Shooter Incidents from 2000-2013(14-15 per
year avg.)
11.4 per year avg. – 6.4 first 7 years increasing to 16.4
avg. last 7 years
69% ending in 5 min. or less / 14% ending in 2 min. or less
56% ended on shooters initiative – stopped or committed
suicide
15.6% fled the scene prior to police arrival
21 incidents “unarmed” citizens restrained shooter
5 incidents armed, non-LE personnel exchanged gunfire
with attacker
Active Shooter Statistics (2013 FBI Study)
2 incidents armed, off-duty LE engaged the shooters
resulting in attackers death
10.6% (17) Attacker committed suicide after arrival of L.E.
28% (45) police and attacker exchange gunfire
Attack Locations
•  45.6% - Commerce/Workplace – Open to public
•  24.4% - Education/Academic
•  10% - Government Facilities
•  9.4% - Open Space
•  4.4% - Residencdes
•  3.8% - Faith Based
•  2.5% - Healthcare
Active Shooter Statistics (2013 FBI Study)
160 Active Shooter Incidents from 2000-2013(14-15 per
year avg.)
97.3% Male – 6 of the incidents were female attackers
All but 2 incidents involved a single attacker
Highest Casualty Counts
•  Aurora, CO Movie Theater – 70 casualties - 12 killed, 58
wounded
•  Virginia Tech – 49 Casualties – 32 killed, 17 wounded
•  Ft. Hood 2009 – 45 Casualties – 13 killed, 32 wounded
•  Sandy Hook – 29 Casualties – 27 killed, 2 wounded
Terrorism - Domestic/International – FBI Definition
•  (1) Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law; (2) Appear to be intended to in<midate or coerce a civilian popula<on Active Shooter – DHS Definition
•  "an individual ac+vely engaged in killing or a2emp+ng to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, ac6ve shooters use firearm[s] and there is no pa2ern or method to their selec+on of vic+ms.” •  Recent trend towards shooter becoming mobile and not in one specific confined area – Navy Yard Shooter, Univ. of California-­‐Santa Barbara Shooter, Overview of Terrorism Incidents
2008 MUMBAI ATTACKS
•  12 coordinated shooting & bombing
attacks lasting 4 days
•  164 killed, 308 wounded
•  10 well trained terrorists conducted attack
•  Attacks were committed by 2 or 3
attackers
Overview of Terrorism Incidents
2013 Kenya Westgate Mall Attacks
•  67 killed, 175 wounded
•  4 trained terrorists conducted attack
w/ AK 47’s and explosives
•  Siege last 48 hours
Overview of Terrorism Incidents
2015 Charlie Hebdo Attack
•  12 killed, 11 wounded in initial attack – 5 others killed and
11 more wounded in related attacks in following 72 hours
•  2 trained terrorists conducted attack w/ rifles, explosives &
RPG forced coerced access/entry
Attacker Objective Commonalities
Target Selection
•  Victim Specific Motivation – However do engage
targets of opportunity as well
•  Target Accessibility
•  Victim Types at Location Shock the Conscious (kids,
foreigners, etc.)
•  Location naturally confines victims & delays LE
response (Oslo Norway)
Attacker Objective Commonalities
“God” Complex
•  Active Shooter - VA Tech, UC Santa Barbara, Columbine
•  Terrorist – “Hand of God” Actions
Pre-Planning
•  Terrorists – Dry Run Probing
•  Active Shooters – Kill lists, IED testing,
•  Mass casualties in compressed time frames
Attacker Objective Commonalities
Social Media Communication
• 
Prior to the Act – Veiled communication
Death Acceptance
• 
• 
Active Shooter - DOES NOT plan escape strategy
Terrorist – Considers death “martyrdom”
Attacker Objective Commonalities
Set the New Record
•  Body County
•  Type of Death
•  Who is targeted shocks the conscious
Media Hungry
• 
• 
Active Shooter - Wants to be remembered –
Columbine “Basement Tapes”, VA Tech NBC Video
Manifesto, UC Santa Barbara You Tube Posting
Terrorist – Utilizes social media and and video sent
to media outlets to claim responsibility & justify
actions as well as recruiting tool
Attacker Objective Commonalities
Access Denial Strategies Cause Attacker to
Move On
•  Why?
Generally DO NOT Take Hostages
No empathy for victims
Generally kill up close – Want to share personal
space of victim at time of death
Other Commonalities ACTIVE SHOOTER & Terrorist
•  Not motivated by revenge alone
because many times the act is
random in nature and not “damage
to persons for damage done to them”
or as simply acting out on their
perceived ideology
•  Does not seek retribution on specific
wrong or people who have done him wrong
•  Instead SEEKS:
1.  Destruction of ANY and ALL
2.  Notoriety
3.  Infamy through slaughter
4.  A moment in time vs. lifetime of moments
The PSYCHOLOGY of the ACTIVE SHOOTER
•  A lot of research attempting to IDENTIFY the patterns of the
ACTIVE Shooter
•  Not a lot of research on the ‘WHY” they do what they do
1.  Such a planned “scale of violence”
2.  Apparent “randomness of violence”
3.  The “active killer’s” propensity of commit
suicide as the “escape strategy”
•  A lot of research attempting to
identify the patterns of the
ACTIVE SHOOTER
The PSYCHOLOGY of the ACTIVE SHOOTER
•  Active Shooter’s WORLDVIEW
1.  VICTIM
2.  VICTIMIZER
•  Seeks to transition from VICTIM to the
VICTIMIZER category
•  Cultural forces lead the Active Killer to
believe that mass murder is a path to
celebrity wanting to be remembered as a
VICTIMIZER not a VICTIM
•  Those acting like VICTIMS will be
perceived and treated as such by
the VICTIMIZER
RESPONSE Implications for FIRST RESPONDER
•  Active Shooter DOES NOT negotiate….he VICTIMIZES
•  Active Shooter DOES NOT lie in wait to battle law
enforcement- Only one LEO has been killed responding to
Active Shooter incidents and very few have been injured
•  Even when UNARMED citizens resist and FIGHT BACK the
Active Shooter frequently retreats and crumbles
•  Active Shooter incidents have primarily been aborted by a
single courageous actor
1.  50% UNARMED citizens
2.  25% armed citizens
3.  Remainder have been Law Enforcement
RESPONSE Implications for TRUE FIRST RESPONDER
•  So WHY FIGHT BACK?!!
•  Active Killer perceives his life as a VICTIM in a world
of VICTIMIZERS and desires metamorphosis.
•  Swift, aggressive action y first responders exploit this
lifetime of conditioned “VICTIM-like” response
•  In his brief role as VICTIMIZER he
will attack mercilessly those acting
like VICTIMS but those who adopt a
posture and action of an aggressor
they become the act of who is has
always perceived as the
VICTIMIZER
Attacker Background, Goals & Objectives
Long List of Personal Failures (Who do they blame?)
NOT Highly Trained (Amateur) BUT Heavily Armed!
Generally does not take
hostages
Close Range & Multiple Shots
to each Victim
PRE-OCCUPIED with setting
the record
Lockdown Principles for Public Places
Overview & Functions of a Lockdown
Purpose - To PREVENT attacker from obtaining ACCESS either to
interior of building or room/office/area where you may reside
Functions of a Lockdown
• 
Removing persons from the threat;
• 
Isolating the dangerous situation from much of the building/area;
• 
Allowing for an accurate accounting of persons within rooms; &
• 
Depending on the situation, facilitating an organized evacuation
away from the dangerous area.
Lockdown Principles for Public Places
2 Types of Lockdowns
• 
Threat OUTSIDE the building - Examples would be fugitive in
geographic area on run from law enforcement, violent crime with
criminal at large in geographic area of building, etc.
• 
Threat INSIDE the building - Examples would be unauthorized
access by intruder with unknown intentions, active shooter with
known intentions
• 
Notification of one of the above types of “lockdowns” should be
clear and quickly understood by students, employees,
congregations members, visitors & staff
Lockdown Principles for Public Places
Threat OUTSIDE – Lockdown Procedures
1.  Leaders, supervisors or ANYONE that has been trained make
announcement such as “threat outside lockdown” or “perimeter
lockdown”, etc.
2. Designated personnel or those closest LOCK exterior doors
3. Clear hallways, restrooms, & other areas that can’t be secured
4. Secure & cover room or office windows
a. Move all persons away from windows
5. Account for all persons within room/office
a. Leaders should prepare a list of missing and extra persons
in the room
6.  Control all movement, but continue activities.
7.  Once threat has subsided, the building leadership announces
“ALL CLEAR CODE” over the PA system.
Lockdown Principles for Public Places
Threat OUTSIDE – Lockdown Procedures (continued)
Considerations
• 
Special attention should be paid to activities that are outside of
the building, such as playgrounds, ball fields, outside activities
• 
Persons must be able to hear the lockdown announcement.
Make sure your exterior PA systems are installed & working
properly.
• 
An alternate lockdown location must be identified. This location
can be indoors or outdoors. (IF person(s) can be safely hidden)
Lockdown Principles for Public Places
Threat INSIDE – “Intruder” Lockdown Procedures
1.  Building leadership orders and announces “Threat Inside Lockdown” or
“Emergency Lockdown” over PA system.
2.  Immediately direct students, staff, visitors, congregation members, etc. to the
nearest room or secured space.
3.  Activities or person(s) that are outside of the building SHOULD NOT
enter the building.
4. Move outside person(s) to the primary evacuation site
5.  Lock room/office doors
6.  Layer & Reinforce Lockdown in Rooms
6. DO NOT lock exterior doors
7.  Move people away from the windows and doors. Keep all
persons sitting or kneeling on the floor (good posture), & turn off the lights/
cover windows/ viewable openings.
8.  Take attendance of persons in each room.
1.  Supervisor or Leadership prepares a list of missing or extra persons
Lockdown Principles for Public Places
Threat INSIDE – “Intruder” Lockdown Procedures (continued)
9.  DO NOT respond to anyone at the door until “all clear” CODE is announced.
10. Keep out of sight
11. Be prepared to ignore any fire alarm activation, as the building
SHOULD NOT not be evacuated using this method.
12. When or if students are moved out of the classroom, assist them in moving
as quietly & quickly as possible.
13.  When the threat is over/the intruder has left the building, building
leadership. announces “ALL CLEAR CODE” over PA system.
***NOTE - Please note that some threats, such as a confirmed fire,
intruder within a room, may override lockdown procedures.
Also, lockdowns may be initiated in non-threatening
circumstances to keep people away from areas where there may
be a medical emergency or other disturbance.***
Lockdown Principles for Public Places
“If & When” Lockdown Procedures Fail
•  Any effective plan or strategy should include “contingency
planning” for failure
•  CORRECTLY & IMMEDIATELY implementing a “lockdown”
should be the first response
•  Recognize that implementing a “lockdown” is meant to
PREVENT the intruder from having access to rooms & victims
•  Everything discussed up to this point includes:
- Threat Recognition, Threat Assessment, Access Control,
Lockdown Implementation, Law Enforcement Response
•  The above DOES NOT include what to do IF the shooter or
intruder makes it into the room or area that YOU ARE IN!
•  Hiding under desks/tables or behind objects once the shooter is
in the area you are in has proven unsuccessful repeatedly
Lockdown Principles for Public Places
“If & When” Lockdown Procedures Fail (continued)
Consideration, Discussion, Education & applicable implementation
should also include a “3 OUT” Approach
• 
- LOCK OUT - Lock the shooter (or potential shooter) out
of the building or out of the classroom. “Lockdown”
- GET OUT - If the shooter is in your area – attempt ESCAPE.
If rooms, offices or areas are on 1st or 2nd floor escape
through exterior window could be an option.
- TAKE OUT - If the shooter is in your area and you cannot
run – FIGHT! Simply taking a position under a desk in
the “fetal position” will do NOTHING to prevent you from
being a victim.
What "3 OUT" Decision
Making IS NOT!
REMEMBER!
IMMEDIATE or an INDIRECT THREAT + LOCATION
= PROPER RESPONSE!
If threat is an indirect threat and not seen
LOCK OUT; or GET OUT to LOCK OUT
is usually best option
CORRECT "3 OUT" Decision
Making Model
•  Direct Contact in area that cannot be "locked out" immediately
•  Immediate threat in area where GET OUT success
•  In area that cannot be secured
is not possible or probable
•  Moving
can beAND
"locked out" quickly OR
•  towards
Indirect immediate
Contact or area
otherthat
Stimulus
•  LOCK OUT has failed or is failing!
out and
immediate
exit is possible
•  away
In an from
area building
that canwhere
be locked
out quickly
•  Improvised objects utilized as weapons, directing others
•  LOCK, LAYER and REINFORCE “lock out”
(teenagers or older) in directed group response
Why Fight Back?
Good Guys Finish Last? NO! . . . . UNPREPARED Good Guys Finish LAST! Survival vs. Prevailing Figh6ng Back – If you are going to get BEAT . . . Get BEAT doing SOMETHING not BEAT doing NOTHING! Lockdown Principles for Public Places
“If & When” Lockdown Procedures Fail (continued)
• 
The Take OUT approach should be considered a “last resort”
option and it is unrealistic to assume that people will not be
seriously hurt or killed as a result. It is FAR MORE unrealistic to
think that hiding under desks or behind objects will save any lives
at all however.
• 
YES!, fighting is an option; but it should be your LAST option
– SO prepare mentally for this option and obtain training for
teachers, administrators & staff appropriately. It IS NOT
recommended that training be implemented for students
on this option as it could lead to inappropriate or VERY untimely
implementation of that “LAST RESORT” option.
Lockdown Principles for Public Places
“If & When” Lockdown Procedures Fail (continued)
•  “3-OUT” Questions to Ask Yourself for the following areas:
•  Your assigned room, area or office
•  Common Areas such as cafeterias, auditoriums,
lobbies, gymnasiums, meeting areas, etc.
•  “How could I “LOCK OUT” from this area?”
•  “How could I “GET OUT” from this area?”
•  “How can I “TAKE OUT” from this area?”
LOCKING OUT – Using Magnets LOCKING OUT -­‐ Bridging LOCKING OUT – Using Chair Legs LOCKING OUT – Tying Off Doors LOCKING OUT – Tying Off Closers LOCKING OUT – Tying Off to Tables LOCKING OUT – Anchoring Questions About Training or Consulting?
www.intruderresponse.com
training@strategosintl.com
888-569-5444
Terrorist & Violent Intruder Preparedness/Response Simplifying Your Response Based on A6acker Objec<ve Commonali<es www.intruderresponse.com