1 Introduction of the Steering Committee: The Steering Committee

Introduction of the Steering Committee:
The Steering Committee TMF Evaluation commissioned and supervised nine studies, which
are regarded as important building blocks for the synthesis report of this evaluation. These
were seven thematic studies, and two cross-cutting studies. This study on peace building is
one of the seven thematic studies. The Steering Committee regards this study as a very useful
contribution to the final result, about a theme for which the methodological tools to evaluate
the effectiveness and sustainability are not yet well developed by the worldwide donor
community as well as by researchers and practitioners. In evaluating peace building
interventions the attribution problem is especially urgent, as organizations often try to prevent
something from happening instead of trying to make it happen. Additionally, integration with
other development interventions can be improved as a step towards a more holistic peace
building approach to addressing not only direct conflict prevention but also the root causes of
conflict. In the synthesis report the Steering Committee has given its own interpretation of the
main conclusions in section 2.1.
1
Triple L bv.
Evaluation of the Theme-based Co-financing Programme (TMF)
Expert study : Peacebuilding
Final Report
Research Team:
Prof. Sultan Barakat, PhD
Richard Jones, PhD
Prof. dr. Gerd Junne
Drs. Guus Meijer
Dr. Abdullah A. Mohamoud
Drs. Willemijn Verkoren
15-03-2006
2
Contact address:
Triple L bv (Life-long-learning)
Gerd Junne
Europaplein 115
1079 AX Amsterdam
Tel. 020 – 646 4153
gjunne@inter.nl.net
3
0. CONTENTS
Table of Contents
List of tables
List of figures
List of boxes
List of abbreviations
i
iv
iv
iv
v
1.
SUMMARY
1
1.1.
1.2.
1.2.1.
1.2.2.
1.2.3.
1.2.4.
Most important research activities
Most important research findings
Impact of the TMF programme
Learning Capacity of TMF organisations
Interaction with partner organisations
Recommendations
1
2
2
2
3
5
2.
INTRODUCTION
7
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
2.6.
Context of this report
Composition of the research team
Description of the content of the report
Description of the field
Main research questions
Limitations of the report
7
7
10
10
11
11
3.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
13
3.1.
3.2.
3.2.1.
3.2.2.
3.3.
13
15
15
17
18
3.4.
Terms of Reference
Activities of the Evaluation Team
Countries visited
Methods of data collection
Specific challenges for the evaluation of peacebuilding
activities
Main indicators used
4.
“PEACEBUILDING” IN THE TMF-PROGAMME
22
4.1.
Conceptualisation of “peacebuilding” and the role of civil
society
Positioning of theme in DGIS
The TMF Policy Frameworks
TMF-funding
The selection process
22
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
4.4.1.
i
21
23
25
26
26
4.4.2.
4.4.3
4.4.4.
4.5.
Coverage of the TMF programme
- Organisations
- Activities
Funding criteria
Funding amounts
Developments of the TMF funding system
28
28
28
28
29
5.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
31
5.1.
5.1.1.
5.1.2.
5.1.3.
5.2.
5.2.1
5.2.2.
5.3.
5.3.1.
5.3.2.
5.3.3.
32
32
35
39
45
45
47
52
55
59
61
5.4.
5.4.1.
5.4.2.
5.4.3.
5.4.4.
5.4.5.
5.4.6.
5.4.7.
Description of TMF Organisations
Mission and Strategy
Organisational structure of TMF-organisations
TMF-funded activities of the six organisations
TMF-funded activities in East and Central Africa
Conflicts in East and Central Africa
Activities of TMF-organisations in the region
Chain analysis
Relationship between Ministry and TMF-organisations
Relationship between TMF-organisations and local partners
Relationship between Ministry and local partners: the role of
embassies
Analysis of specific issues
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Relevance
Sustainability
Impact
Gender sensitivity
Learning ability
6.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
81
6.1.
6.1.1.
6.1.2.
6.1.3.
6.1.4.
6.1.5.
6.1.6.
6.1.7.
6.2.
6.3.
Answers to the general questions
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Relevance
Sustainability
Impact
Gender sensitivity
Learning capacity
Answer to the specific questions in the Terms of Reference
Recommendations
81
81
82
82
83
83
83
84
84
87
7.
ANNEXES
89
7.1.
Annex 1: Terms of Reference
89
63
63
64
66
69
69
74
74
ii
7.2.
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7.
7.8
7.9.
7.10
iii
List of Background Documents Used
List of Interviewees
Mission and strategies of the six TMF-organisations
Semi-structured Interviews with TMF-organisations: questions
Research Themes for the Field Visits
Methodologies for the Evaluation of Peacebuilding Activities
Indicators Used by TMF-organisations
Concepts of Post-War Recovery and Peacebuilding
Benchmarking the TMF: A Comparative Review
108
116
123
130
137
141
142
144
157
List of tables
Table 3.1
Table 4.1.
Table 4.2.
Table 5.1.
Table 5.2.
Table 5.3.
Table 5.4.
Table 5.5.
Table 5.6
Countries Visited
TMF-funding requested and allocated for 2003-2006
TMF-funding requested and allocated for 2004-2007
Selected TMF organisations and their TMF subsidies
Missions of the six TMF organisations
Strategies of the six TMF organisations
Size of the TMF organisations, measured by the number of
staff and the size of the annual budget
Contribution of TMF subsidy relative to total programme
or institutional budget
Causes of conflict in countries in East and Central Africa
16
29
29
32
33
34
35
39
47
List of figures
Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.2.
Traditional chain model of development cooperation
Funding relationships and (potential) communication
flows
53
54
List of boxes
Box 3.1
Box 4.1.
Box 5.1.
Box 5.2.
Difficulties for the evaluation of peacebuilding activities,
compared to other development-oriented interventions
IKV’s appeal
Different types of partnerships: the case of Pax Christi
War Child’s contribution to peace building and
reconciliation
20
27
61
68
iv
List of abbreviations
AIV
APFO
BPP
BZ
CBO
CDW
CIA
CPBC
CSO
DMV
DRC
EC
ECCP
ECOS
EU
FEWER
GPPAC
GTZ
IAG
IGAD
IKV
INCORE
M&E
MFO
MFS
MoU
NGO
NPI
PC
PRDU
SAF
SNV
TMF
UK
UN
UNICEF
UNIFEM
US
WANEP
WRR
v
Advisory Council on International Affairs
Africa Peace Forum
Better Peace Practices programme
Buitenlandse Zaken (Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Community Based Organisations
Creative Development Workers
Central Intelligence Agency
Child Problem Behavior Checklist
Civil Society Organisation
Directie Mensenrechten en Vredesopbouw
Democratic Republic of Congo
European Communities
European Centre for Conflict Prevention
European Coalition on Oil in Sudan
European Union
Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
Inter Africa Group
Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad
International Conflict Research (University of Ulster)
Monitoring & Evaluation
Medefinancierungs Organisatie
Medefinancieringsstelsel
Memorandum of Understanding
Non-Governmental Organisation
Nairobi Peace Initiative
Pax Christi
Post-War Recovery and Development Unit, University of York
Stability Assessment Framework
Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers
Thematische Medefinanciering
United Kingdom
United Nations
United Nations Children’s Fund
United Nations Development Fund for Women
United States
West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
Netherlands Scientific Council on Government Policy
vi
1.
SUMMARY
1.1.
1.2.
1.2.1.
1.2.2.
1.2.3.
1.2.4.
Most important research activities
Most important research findings
Impact of the TMF programme
Learning Capacity of TMF organisations
Interaction with partner organisations
Recommendations
1.1. Most important research activities
Focus: Research on the peacebuilding activities within the TMF framework has concentrated
on three aspects:
- the impact of TMF funding on the activity of TMF-organisations,
- the evaluation systems and procedures put in place by TMF-organisations, –
- the quality of the partnerships between TMF-organisations and local partners.
Research team:
The research has been carried out by
- Prof. Sultan Barakat (Director of the Postwar Reconstruction and Development Unit
(PRDU) of the University of York),
- Dr. Richard Jones (Researcher, PRDU),
- Prof. Gerd Junne (University of Amsterdam, project leader),
- Drs. Guus Meijer (former Co-Director of Conciliation Resources),
- Dr. Abdullah Mohamoud (SAHAN Consultancy) and
- Drs. Willemijn Verkoren (Researcher, University of Amsterdam).
Scope: The evaluation has covered activities of six of the ten TMF-organisations in the field
of peacebuilding which received funding in the rounds 2003-2006 and 2004-2007. These were
- the European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP),
- Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad (IKV)
- International Alert,
- Pax Christi Nederland,
- Saferworld, and
- War Child Nederland.
Research method: The research is mainly based on the study of documents, interviews with
staff at headquarters of the six TMF organisations under review and field visits to partner
organisations in Burundi, DR Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan.
1
1.2. Most important research findings
It is a general finding of this study that the organisations do important work in often insecure
and difficult circumstances and regions, in which many other development actors do not
venture. They do so with relatively little means compared to the large development actors.
They have a clear added value through their specific peacebuilding expertise and activities.
1.2.1. Impact of the TMF programme
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
TMF support for peacebuilding activities has contributed to a considerable growth of the
field in the Netherlands.
No organisation reported a shift of activities in the direction of classical project work, and
a decline of advocacy activity as a result of TMF funding (as some had feared).
Since most of the subsidy (for the six organisations under review) was given in the form
of institutional subsidy (rather than programme subsidy), the influence of the Ministry on
the content of the work has been limited. Most of the content related funding criteria
remain somewhat irrelevant.
The emphasis of the Ministry on sound management practices and working quality
assurance schemes did stimulate the organisations to professionalize their activities
further.
The improvement of M&E procedures has been stimulated by TMF - in two ways. First,
throughout the TMF process the Ministry has placed a lot of emphasis on the development
of more systematic M&E practices by the organisations as a requirement that came with
the funding. Second, the fact that in most cases TMF funding was institutional rather than
programme or project funding meant that organisations were able to use it for an
improvement of institutional capacities.
The funding of institutional overheads – human, physical and technical resources – is
regarded as vital to ensuring the success and sustainability of TMF organisations. They
have become less dependent upon project financing and have thus gained planning
autonomy. They can much better decide on their own strategy and make their own choices
in terms of project and region selection.
TMF has enabled the development of overarching activities such as regional cooperation
and linking partners in different regions together. It also makes it easier to work in regions
that are not so “sexy”.
The TMF procedures do not stimulate cooperation between organisations and in some
cases restrict the flexibility to react to sudden changes.
While the Ministry’s lack of desire to ‘plant their flag on projects’ is perceived as a
welcome contrast to other donors, almost all TMF organisations deplore a lack of real
policy dialogue with the Ministry.
1.2.2. Learning capacity of TMF organisations
§
All organisations recognise the importance of reflection and learning and admit that their
learning capacity needs to be improved further. Most organisations understand “learning
capacity” as referring primarily to M&E procedures and the feeding back of their results –
indeed a vital component. Less attention appears to be paid to other aspects of
organisational learning, although this is not true for all the organisations analysed.
2
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Evaluation of the effectiveness of interventions is often difficult, because a focus on
conflict prevention makes the attribution problem especially critical, since the TMF
organisations often try to prevent something from happening instead of make something
happen.
For ECCP the documentation and dissemination of experiences, lessons learned and best
practices is one of its core functions. During the Global Partnership for the Prevention of
Armed Conflict (GPPAC, ECCP’s main activity) Steering Group meeting in October 2005
a proposal has been discussed to make it one of the priorities of the network to set up a
framework for the exchange of experiences, lessons learned and best practices. M&E
procedures, on the other hand, are still in an early phase of development. A consultant has
been commissioned to help design an M&E system for GPPAC.
International Alert has initiated the Better Peace Practice programme (BPP) to explore
how to better evaluate impact and effectiveness of its work.
War Child has undertaken research projects in cooperation with universities such as
University of Amsterdam, Free University Amsterdam and Boston University. It has also
initiated pilot projects, currently underway in Uganda, Sierra Leone and Kosovo, to devise
suitable monitoring and evaluation instruments. Programme and partner evaluations have
been undertaken in the Caucasus and Israel / Occupied Palestine Territories programmes.
For Pax Christi, a committee conducted an assessment of six research and evaluation
papers dealing with Pax Christi’s work in the Greater Horn over the period between 2000
and 2004. The report was published in July 2005, together with Pax Christi’s reaction and
reflections on follow-up. Pax Christi has commissioned a series of best practice studies
and regularly organises block weeks for reflection on past experience, future strategy and
exchange between programmes.
IKV has recently paid extensive attention to the development of its knowledge function
after an internal working group concluded that much of the knowledge inside IKV was too
much tied to individual persons and therefore fragmented. A number of changes in the
organisation have been made, most notably the institution of two thematic officers who
are assigned to pay attention to overarching themes that are relevant for all regions and
stimulate institutional learning.
There are still obstacles to organisational learning, some of them intrinsic to the work of
TMF organisations in the field, which is characterized by emergency situations which
demand immediate reaction (which leaves less attention for long term reflection). Besides,
staff is highly motivated, but (partly as a result) also continuously overburdened. Another
difficulty is at the local level; some partners do not have the capacity to implement stricter
M&E standards. Limited resources are, in general, an obstacle for devoting more time to
learning processes.
1.2.3. Interaction with partner organisations
§
§
§
3
In the field of peacebuilding, many relationships do by and large correspond to the
traditional chain model, in which the involvement of a Northern partner contributes to the
development of local partner institutions. (International Alert’s long term involvement
with Dushirehamwe in Burundi can be seen as a case in point.)
But there is a broad range of different partnerships that do not fit into the traditional
image of a chain of development cooperation, linking donors in the North to Northern
NGOs and their Southern partner organisations.
For peacebuilding activities, there are often good reasons not (or not fully) to transfer
activities and responsibilities to Southern partners, because
o risks inherent in the work in conflict zones (destruction, confiscation of facilities,
difficulties of access, interruption of communication and supplies, threat to staff
security) limit the capacity of Southern partners,
o Southern partners run the risk of being prosecuted or otherwise punished for
advocacy activity,
o Southern partners would not be regarded as impartial in the local context,
o Southern partners do not yet have the same access to means of communication and
information as Northern partners,
o Southern partners are selected for their strength rather than their weakness and the
partnership is an equal one to which terms like ‘capacity building’ and ‘transfer of
responsibilities’ do not apply,
o Southern partners need the Northern partners to give resonance to their concerns,
amplifying their voice through lobby and advocacy and providing access to
Northern fora,
or
o no potential Southern partner organisations exist in many countries for the kind of
activities advocated (e.g. psycho-social support as in the case of War Child).
§
§
§
§
Where local capacity is sufficiently available, working through partners is the preferred
way for War Child. This relationship corresponds most closely to the traditional “chain
model” of development cooperation, - with War Child providing financial and/or technical
support to implement projects. Through working with local partners, efforts are made to
increase local capacity in a sustainable way. Many of the other partnerships do not easily
fit into this pattern.
In a situation in which more than one type of activity is carried out, and a plethora of
partners is involved, there may still be the desire for an external coordinator that can serve
as an impartial and credible catalyst. A comprehensive programme asks for a broad
spectrum of activities, as in the case of the Ituri programme of Pax Christi in the DR
Congo and the involvement of many different local groups. Building a platform
representing the different ethnic communities, the different religions, women, youth and
human rights groups in a setting of conflict and an extremely weakened civil society is not
an easy thing to do. As all members in civil society were one way or the other implicated
or seen as implicated in the ethnic war, there is often no credible local partner who can
act as an independent catalyst that brings all segments of society together.
The partnership is often dependent on internal developments in partner organisations on
which a Northern partner has little influence (as Saferworld’s partnership with the Inter
Africa Group (IAG), Addis Ababa, illustrates). If the local partner organisation suffers
from a high staff turnover, management problems, lack of team spirit, etc.), it is difficult
to remedy these problems, especially if project funding is dedicated to specific activities,
but not to institution building, and if the problems are not fully acknowledged by the
partner organisation itself. There are situations in which it would have been good if the
TMF organisations had not overestimated the capacity of their partners and had provided
more coaching
In the case of international networks (as the Global Partnership for the Prevention of
Armed Conflict (GPPAC), initiated by the ECCP), the regional network partners are
selected for their strong role in the region. Some of these organisations are probably
stronger and more resourceful than the TMF-organisation ECCP itself. In such cases, the
relationship is completely equal, even if there is a financial flow involved from the TMForganisation to the regional partner organisation, such as the Nairobi Peace InitiativeAfrica (NPI-Africa).
4
§
§
Advocay in peacebuilding requires the interaction with many actors which do not fit into
the general picture of partner organisations: war lords, guerrilla movements, opposition
leaders.
There is not necessarily a development towards a clear “end goal” with regard to the
development of partnership relations.
1.2.4. Recommendations
1. Future policy frameworks need to pay more attention to the specific nature and
requirements of peacebuilding work by NGOs, and its linkages with peacebuilding
activities by other actors (bilateral and multilateral efforts) and with other
development activities.
2. To provide better feedback to TMF-organisations and to harness their experience for
common learning processes, more capacity should be created in the Ministry or more
use should be made of external capacity to screen the reports from TMF-organisations
for valuable elements that would be relevant for different departments of the Ministry,
embassies, and other TMF- or MFO-organisations.
3. The embassies could play a larger role in the coordination among different Dutchfunded (and other) activities. They could also play an important role in inducing local
CSOs into partnerships with local governments in order to prevent some of the
problems that can arise when funding goes only to civil society, undermining state
capacity.
4. TMF-organisations should be more explicit in elaborating the ways in which their
objectives and activities contribute to the overall aim of building peace (and how they
relate to activities of other organisations and institutions in this respect).
5. Peacebuilding activities in the narrow sense (like dialogue, advocacy, monitoring)
have to be linked to development activities which can address root causes of conflict
by stimulating good governance, social inclusion, equitable economic development,
employment, education, a responsible use of raw materials, ecological conservation,
etc. TMF-organisations could be more active in establishing links and coordination
with other development organisations.
6. A lot has been written in this report about the nature of partnerships in peacebuilding.
Capacity building and a transfer of responsibilities are important for sustainability, but
some activities continue to require an active Northern involvement. A balance has to
be found between the influence and involvement of Northern and Southern
organisations. TMF organisations could better explicate and elaborate their chosen
balance.
7. Much of the positive impact of TMF funding was a result of the institutional subsidies
to TMF organisations. The new funding system will no longer provide for institutional
subsidies, but only for programme funding. This report recommends that a funding
form is adopted that retains the positive sides of core funding. This would be achieved
by providing funding specifically for institutional development and organisational
learning. Organisations would have to explain in their applications how and why they
5
aim to develop and carry out capacity building and learning, and would be held
accountable later on based on the concrete results they are able to show in this area.
8. Advocating the importance of tangible benefits: Impact is greater when there are
tangible immediate benefits that directly improve people’s lives at the community
level. In such a context it is much easier to discuss ‘gender,’ ‘empowerment,’ and
‘participation’ as people’s receptive capacity is greater. In addition a logical approach
such as that of Dushirehamwe’s combing a contribution towards basic needs in
parallel to a more abstract influencing of policy has a greater impact amongst target
groups.
9. Advocate greater levels of funding transparency: There should be complete
transparency between the TMF funded organisation and its Southern partner in terms
of the funding arrangement and clarification of the amount of funding available for
each specific activity. Global funding figures such as those given by Saferworld to
IAG do not give local partners sufficient information for planning purposes.
10. Advocate a practical understanding of linkages: TMF funded organisations need to
have an appreciation of the linkages of all parties involved in the project. Building
capacity of one at the detriment of another ultimately limits the positive impact.
Improvements in engaging CSOs to participate in regional and national decisionmaking should not just be limited to enabling the CSOs to link up with a regional
facilitating partner like IAG. Civil society would also benefit if there were greater
linkages between the CSOs themselves to enable them to gain the benefits of synergy.
6
2.
INTRODUCTION
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
2.6.
Context of this report
Composition of the research team
Description of the content of the report
Description of the field
Main research questions
Limitations of the report
2.1. Context of this report
Theme-Based Cofinancing (in Dutch: Thematische Medefinanciering – TMF) has been
introduced in 2002 as a new system for funding Dutch and international civil society
organisations involved in development co-operation. NGOs compete in a yearly tender
process for support in the coming four years. This scheme is presently evaluated, because it
will be replaced by a new one (MFS) from 2007 on. The present evaluation concentrates on
the experience with the first two rounds of TMF applications, submitted in 2002 and 2003 for
support in the years 2003-2006 and 2004-2007, respectively.1
The present sub-study of the TMF programme in the field of peacebuilding is one of nine
studies carried out in this framework. The nine teams focus on different sectors and two
overarching themes.2 The present sub-study was contracted in May 2005. An intermediate
report was submitted on the 1st of October, 2005.
The evaluation process has been coordinated by a Steering Committee, which carries the final
responsibility for the overall process. It selected the TMF organisations to be covered in this
review and the Great Lakes as the region to which field trips should take place.
Intermediate results have been discussed with representatives of individual TMForganisations and at a meeting with representatives of four Dutch TMF-organisations in
January 2006.
2.2. Composition of the research team
The Dutch-British research team matches well with the evaluated TMF-organisations, which
have their headquarters either in the Netherlands or in Britain. The team consists of six people
who bring together a wide range of different perspectives and international experience, from
1
An analysis of the content of all applications in the first two rounds is to be found in Lau Schulpen et al.
(2005), “TMF in perspectief. Eindverslag van een onderzoek naar organisaties in de TMF-rondes 2002 en 2003”,
Nijmegen, April 2005. The report provides a survey of the objectives and intervention strategies of NGOs
involved in development cooperation.
2
The other sub-studies are on Economic Development, Communication, Gender, HIV/AIDS, Biodiversity and
Human rights and on two overarching themes, Monitoring and Evaluation and Thematic Added Value.
7
academia as well as policy and practice. The team leader has been Professor G.C.A. Junne,
University of Amsterdam. Members of the team are:
Prof. Sultan Barakat, Ph.D., the founding director of the Post-war Reconstruction and
Development Unit, founded at the University of York in 1992. Dr. Barakat has extensive
experience in development planning and in conducting in-country strategy making and
training workshops, with a large number of publications in the field of refugee shelter,
humanitarian assistance policy and impact, NGO development and peace building strategies,
settlement planning, rehabilitation and conservation of urban areas, post-war reconstruction
and development, disaster mitigation, social and economic rebuilding of war-torn societies.
He has field experience in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Colombia, Indonesia
(Aceh), Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Palestine, Philippines (Mindano),
Somalia (Puntland), Sri Lanka, Turkey, UAE, Uganda, and Yemen. He has acted as an
advisor to governments, United Nations agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations. Dr.
Barakat has extensive experience in carrying out monitoring and evaluation activities in the
field of development and peacebuilding. His thinking about evaluating post-conflict
development activities is reflected in the article “Attributing Value: Evaluating Success and
Failure in Post-war Reconstruction”, with Margaret Chard and Richard Jones, which has been
published in Third World Quarterly (October 2005).
Dr. Richard Jones, Ph.D., Research Fellow at the Post-war Reconstruction and Development
Unit (PRDU) at the University of York. He has particular experience in participatory
research, project management and monitoring and evaluation. Dr. Jones has recently
completed a long-term assignment with the Delegation of the EU in Uganda to define an EU
programme component in support of Conflict, Prevention Management and Resolution
(CPMR), under the 9th European Development Fund for responding to the conflict in
northern Uganda. In Burundi, he was part of the PRDU team evaluating the Community
Based Bujumbura Peace Programme for CARE Nederland. As part of his ESRC funded PhD,
he worked with the Rwandan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning's National Poverty
Reduction Strategy Programme on participatory poverty assessments at individual, household
and group level. He was involved with researching characteristics of poverty and livelihoods,
the impact of projects, identifying how capacities could be strengthened, assisting with the
training of poverty assessors/community development officers and the relationship between
poverty and refugee return. The research concluded with the incorporation of communities'
ideas for development initiatives to be integrated with the national poverty reduction
programme.
Prof. Dr. Gerd Junne, Professor in International Relations at the University of Amsterdam
and the Scientific Director of the Amsterdam School of International Relations. He is also the
director of “Triple L bv”, the Ministry’s contract partner for the present evaluation. His
present research focuses on different aspects of conflict prevention and transformation,
mediation and the conditions for constructive dialogue between conflicting parties. He has
directed numerous projects for the United Nations, FAO, ILO, the European Union, the VW
Foundation, the Rathenau Institute, the German Parliament, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Dutch Ministry of Transport, and the Dutch National Research Program on Air
Pollution and Climate Research. He carried out evaluations of the International Institute for
Communication and Development and of the Hivos ICT programme in Africa. He teaches
courses on “Peacekeeping” and “Post-Conflict Development”. He is one of the founders of
The Network University (TNU) with international online courses on “Transforming Civil
Conflict”, “Gender and Conflict Transformation”, “Youth Transforming Conflict” and “Post-
8
Conflict Development” and one of the initiators of the Amsterdam Centre for Conflict Studies
which has recently been set up at the University of Amsterdam.
Drs. Guus Meijer, free-lance consultant and trainer in international peacebuilding and
conflict transformation, with a focus on Southern and West Africa and a particular interest in
the Lusophone countries. He has extensive experience in project management, training,
evaluation and research, particularly in Africa. In 1981-1984, Mr. Meijer was Researcher with
the National Institute for Educational Development in Maputo, Mozambique. In 1985-1989 he
was General Coordinator of the Eduardo Mondlane Foundation in Amsterdam. During the
1990s he worked as Training Officer with International Alert, as Training Director with
INCORE, and as Co-Director with Conciliation Resources. In addition he carried out
numerous consultancies and training programmes. Since 2002 Mr. Meijer is based in the
Netherlands as a free-lance trainer and consultant, carrying out evaluations of projects for
Cordaid and NiZa, among others.
Dr. Abdullah Awil Mohamoud is founding director of Sahan Consultancy, which conducts
policy oriented research and fact finding missions abroad, mainly in Africa, undertakes
evaluation and monitoring activities, provides training and offers advisory services on
integration and multi-cultural issues. He holds an MA degree of Jawaharlal Nehru University,
New Delhi, and earned his PhD with a thesis on “State Collapse and Postconflict
Development in Africa: The Case of Somalia”. He served regularly as an election observer in
UN, EU, Council of Europe and OSCE missions to conflict and war-torn societies (to EastTimor, Kosovo, Nigeria, Serbia and Zimbabwe). He has been a consultant to the Dutch
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on institutional capacity building in Africa, the lead project
advisor for ICCO in a project on “Diaspora and the peace process in the Sudan” and the lead
researcher of a feasibility study on the critical role of the diasporas in conflicts in the Great
Lakes and the Horn of Africa regions. He has also organised a series of events for NCDO
under the title “Shaping a New Africa”.
Drs. Willemijn Verkoren is a researcher, lecturer and programme developer at the
University of Amsterdam. She studied Contemporary History and International Relations and
has done research on issues related to democratisation and post-conflict development,
particularly in Cambodia and the Balkans. Her M.A. thesis on “Making Democracy Work”
won two academic awards, the national prize of the Netherlands Society for International
Affairs (NGIZ) and the University of Amsterdam prize for the best thesis dealing with an
urgent societal problem. She works with the University of Amsterdam’s International School
for Humanities and Social Sciences (ISHSS) where she teaches courses in the realm of peace
and conflict studies and is involved in setting up new programmes and activities in the same
field. Together with Gerd Junne, she published an edited volume entitled “Postconflict
Development: Meeting New Challenges” in 2004. At present, she is engaged in a PhD project
about learning and knowledge sharing in the field of peacebuilding.
The members of the team are well acquainted with the activities of NGOs in conflict zones
and global advocacy, but in no way dependent on the organisations under review.
9
2.3. Description of the content of the report
The organisation of the present report is straightforward. Chapter 3 presents the research
methodology. It explains why it is so difficult to make an impact assessment of individual
peacebuilding measures and how the field in general and the research team for this evaluation
in particular has dealt with this problem. It also provides the rationale for the focus of the field
studies on the Great Lakes area.
Chapter 4 describes the place of “peacebuilding” in the Ministry and in the two first rounds of
TMF funding. It provides some historical background of the interaction between the Ministry
and NGOs in the field, the specific policy objectives of TMF with regard to this theme and the
reasons for the selection of the six TMF organisations that have been studied in this review.
Chapter 5 is the core of the present study. It presents the research findings. It summarizes the
mission and strategies of the six TMF-organisations under review and explains why the
relationships between these organisations and their partner organisations in conflict zones
often do not correspond to the chain model that underlies much of development cooperation.
It describes the impact that the TMF funding system has had on the organisations.
Furthermore, the chapter discusses the efficiency, effectiveness, relevance and sustainability
of activities by the six organisations, as far as the available data allow. The data do not allow
the researchers to say much about the overall impact that these activities have.
Chapter 6, finally, contains the conclusions of the study and a number of recommendations,
addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the TMF organisations.
The study has a double objective. On the one hand, it makes a contribution to the evaluation
of the TMF system of funding and of a number of aspects of the activity of the TMForganisations. On the other hand, it should make a contribution to the learning process of all
institutions involved, - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the TMF-organisations and
their partners.
2.4. Description of the field
Peacebuilding includes not only post-conflict activities, but equally those efforts during or
even before the outbreak of violence that directly and explicitly aim to strengthen the
mechanisms for preventing or reducing violence and foster constructive cooperation between
groups and individuals. In different contexts one may think of actions or interventions (be
they social, political, economic or cultural) that contribute to the non-violent management and
resolution of disputes such as such as democratic and inclusive political institutions, a fair
distribution of wealth and power, the rule of law and respect for human and civil rights.
Peacebuilding is a separate field, but it shows considerable overlap with other fields of
development cooperation. It is a separate field, because the aim is in the first place the
prevention of violent and destructive conflicts, rather than the creation of some tangible assets
as roads, hospitals, or schools. But it is closely related to many other fields, since poverty
reduction, economic development, respect for human rights, gender issues and media play an
important role in conflict prevention. The difficulties in allocating the responsibility for some
10
applications for TMF funding to a specific Directorate at the Ministry is a good indicator for
that.
Unlike much “regular” development work, peacebuilding activities are often highly political
in nature. For some of the organisations evaluated (particularly IKV and Pax Christi),
activism and opposition against oppressive governments is an important component of their
work. This has implications for the relationship between civil society and government
(discussed in Chapter 5 and under Recommendations) and for the role of civil society in
peacebuilding (discussed at the beginning of Chapter 4).
As with most policy fields, every actor active in (post)conflict settings has his own political
agenda, which may differ significantly from that of other intervening actors. The war and
reconstruction in Iraq make the political nature of peacebuilding work, and the differences
between the various postconflict actors (different types of NGOs, different governments, the
UN, the World Bank, the private sector), very clear: their roles range from active opposition
against the strategies adopted in Iraq, via cooperation with the US forces there in order to
carry out one’s work, to support for the US intervention.
2.5. Main research questions
The main research questions are:
-
-
What is the range of activities which have been supported under the TMF programme?
What has been the impact of the TMF programme on the TMF organisations? Are
there comparable programmes from other donors?
How clearly did the TMF organisations translate their aims and objectives into
concrete activities and how do they see the contribution of these activities to the wider
aims?
How do the TMF organisations monitor and evaluate the outcome (and where
possible: the impact) of their activities, and how have these monitoring and evaluation
activities evolved in the past years? In how far have the organisations become
“learning organisations”?
How have their partnerships with local organisations evolved?
The focus of the study is on the impact of the TMF funding system, the learning capacity of
the TMF organisations and the quality of the partner relations.
2.6. Limitations of the report
This evaluation is neither an evaluation of the six TMF organisations as such nor an
evaluation of the impact of their work on peacebuilding.
It is not an evaluation of the TMF organisations, but only of a few specific aspects of it. This
report concentrates on the impact of TMF funding, on the development of evaluation routines
and on the quality of partnerships. It is not a review of their overall work.
When we studied the impact of TMF finances, we mainly concentrated on TMF-organisations
that received an institutional subsidy. This is the most distinctive feature of TMF. Four of the
11
six organisations covered in this study received an institutional subsidy. This is not
representative, however, for all TMF organisations in the sector. Of the TMF organisations in
the field of peacebuilding, about half received project financing and the other half an
institutional subsidy. We concentrated on the impact of institutional subsidies, not project
financing, because project financing is more normal and in line with the practices of other
donors as well.
Furthermore, we did not review the internal organisation, management, division of labour,
productivity or creativity of the TMF-organisations. This was outside the terms of reference
and would probably have demanded a different composition of the evaluation team. Since the
team had to deal with six different organisations, there was no time, either, to take up such a
task for individual organisations. In addition, the field studies were limited to the area of the
Great Lakes region, which would make it difficult to come up with general statements on the
work of the organisations. One of the organisations chosen by the TMF Steering Committee
(in cooperation with the Ministry) was not even active in this region at all (IKV, which left
this region to Pax Christi on the basis of their geographical division of labour, and for this
reason does not subscribe some of the consclusions and recommendations of the report
especially when it comes to the need for tighter communication and coordination with the
Embassies and the call for more attention to political analysis and strategy).
But even for the Great Lakes region on which this review concentrates, no definite answers
can be given with regard to the impact of the work of the six organisations. First of all, the
work financed within the TMF framework is not yet finished. The two rounds analysed cover
the periods 2003-2006 and 2004-2007. The review can therefore only give a provisional
impression of achievements or weaknesses. This applies to all the sector studies on the
different aspects of the TMF evaluation.
In the field of peacebuilding, however, a principal obstacle weighs much heavier, as will be
spelled out in detail in the following chapter on research methodology. Peace depends on so
many different aspects and is such a complex phenomenon that a more cautious approach is
necessary. Any review can look at the outcome of interventions, but it remains extremely
difficult in most cases, if not impossible, to make a definitive judgement on the impact. As the
Utstein Report suggested, an evaluation of the impact on peacebuilding is impossible for
individual activities and may only make sense for comprehensive peacebuilding strategies,
which are outside the scope of any single TMF-organisation.
12
3.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1.
3.2.
3.2.1.
3.2.2.
3.3.
Terms of Reference
Activities of the Evaluation Team
Countries visited
Methods of data collection
Specific challenges for the evaluation of peacebuilding
activities
Main indicators used
3.4.
3.1. Terms of Reference
The general aim of the evaluation3 is to provide insight in:
- the degree and the way in which TMF-organisations contribute to structural poverty
reduction by direct measures to reduce poverty, by institution building and by influencing
policy;
- how far they operate effectively and efficiently and
- how far their activities are relevant and sustainable.
The evaluations have furthermore to provide insight in the effects of the interventions of (and
with) Southern NGOs which have been (co-)financed by TMF-organisations, where possible
at the level of target groups. In addition a judgement is asked of the ability of TMForganisations to learn. Furthermore, the evaluation has to provide information on the different
orientations which TMF has and how these work out in practice.
As far as the sub-study on peacebuilding is concerned, the general aim of the evaluation has
been the strengthening, reform and creation of institutional capacity and of the needed
instruments in order to achieve sustainable peace. The study has to answer the basic research
questions about effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability and learning capacity with
regard to activities in Africa.
In addition, the sub-study has to show in how far the TMF organisations work conform the
TMF policy framework for the round 2003-2006 and for the round 2004-2007 respectively.
The evaluation is expected to be based on extensive research, including desk research, but
also substantial field research.
The terms of reference, included as Annex 1 of this report, furthermore list 13 specific
questions which this sub-study has to answer:
3
See “Beschrijving van de opdracht”, in: Offerteaanvraag Evaluatie Thematisch Medefinancieringsprogramma
(TMF). Betreft deelstudies (A) Vredesopbouw, (B) Mensenrechten en (C) Economische Ontwikkeling.
13
1. To map the field of activities of TMF-organisations in the area of peacebuilding.
2. What has been the influence of the TMF policy framework on the way in which TMF
organisations have given shape to activities in the field of peacebuilding and what
have been the specific advantages and disadvantages of the theme specific approach of
TMF in the field of peacebuilding?
3. In how far do TMF-partners, working in the field of peacebuilding, contribute to a
strengthening of civil society in the South?
4. The objective of TMF funding was to give organisations more money under less
stringent conditions with a longer-term perspective of 3-4 years. In how far did this
lead to the (expected) higher efficiency, (expected) higher effectiveness and the
(expected) increase in professionalism of the TMF-organisations active in
peacebuilding?
5. What are the most important aspects with regard to peacebuilding in the selected
region and which changes/developments have taken place in the region in this respect
during the last 5-10 years?
6. In which way did the TMF-funded activities relate to these aspects and in which way
did the TMF-organisations react with their activities to the signaled developments in
the peacebuilding problems in the selected region?
7. How do activities and partner organisations of the TMF-organisations in this field and
in the selected region differ from activities/partner organisations via the bilateral
channel and from the activities/partner organisations of MFOs in the same field in the
selected region?
8. Has there been any coordination of activities with MFOs and embassies, and if so, in
what way did this lead to changes of activities/ partner organisations by TMForganisations, MFO’s or the embassies?
9. With regard to the activities under 8: In how far has there been any synergy, or have
the activities been parallel to each other? Has there been a duplication of activities?
10. In how far is gender structurally and systematically integrated into policy, policy
implementation and monitoring of the TMF-organisations active in the field of
peacebuilding?
11. In which concrete way is the partnership between North and South based on a more
equal relationship and mutual ‘accountability’ and in which way can equality and
mutual accountability in the relationship be strengthened in the future?
12. Is there an increasing transfer of administrative, project-related and institutional
responsibilities within the funded TMF-organisations, which demonstrates real efforts
to build capacity and independence of Southern organisations?
13. Which lessons can be drawn from the experiences up to now which can help to speed
up the transfer of administrative, project-related and institutional responsibilities?
The full text of the Terms of References (in Dutch) is included as Annex 1 to this report. In
order to answer the more general and the more specific questions in the Terms of Reference,
the activities as described in section 3.2. have been undertaken.
14
3.2. Activities of the Evaluation Team
Firstly, the members of the research team familiarised themselves with the applications which
the TMF-organisations had submitted, which described their planned activities in the four
years to come. The team also went through the policy documents on the different TMF rounds
and collected information on the results of the two rounds under review.
Subsequently, extensive talks were held with representatives of the six TMF-organisations
that had been chosen by the Steering Committee. These talks basically covered the questions
that are listed in Annex 5. In addition, documentation made available by the different TMForganisation was studied, and open questions were clarified where necessary.
In parallel, additional literature research did take place on the specific difficulties and
different approaches to the evaluation of activities directed at peacebuilding and on the
discussions that have been going on in this field during the last 3-4 years.
Since the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC), the main
activity of ECCP, held its global conference in July 2005 at the UN Headquarters in New
York, in which the regional consultation processes from 15 world regions were brought
together and culminated, it was decided that one researcher would participate in the
conference, in spite of the fact that this had not been foreseen in the original plan of the
evaluation. The reason for the participation was threefold:
- the conference forms a substantial part of the activities of ECCP funded under the TMF
programme,
- the conference provided the opportunity to talk to a large number of delegates from all parts
of the world,
- one of the workshops at the conference dealt with the problems of evaluation of
peacebuilding activities. It formed an important part of ECCP’s efforts to find a meaningful
way for itself and its partners to monitor and evaluate their own activities, and it could
provide additional insight for the present evaluation (which it did).
On the basis of the interviews with TMF-organisations, the intermediate report was drawn up
and submitted by the 1st of October, 2005 and discussed with the Steering Committee on 6
October 2005.4
To be able to situate the TMF-funded activities in the wider spectrum of peacebuilding
activities in East and Central Africa, a comparative review of other donor organisations with
peacebuilding activities in the region was carried out. (see Annex 10)
At the same time, the first country visits took place. The list of questions used during the
country visits and adapted to the specific TMF-organisations, their partners and the specific
country in question, is provided in Annex 6.
3.2.1. Countries visited
Field trips of in most cases about a week were undertaken to six countries, which had been
chosen in consultation with the TMF-organisations:
4
See Verslag begeleidingscommissie bespreking voortgangsrapportage TMF Vredesopbouw, 6 oktober 2005.
15
Table 3.1.: Countries visited
Organisation
Country
Researcher
ECCP
Kenya
Int. Alert
Burundi
W. Verkoren
R. Jones
Pax Christi
DR Congo
Kenya,
Uganda
G. Meijer
Saferworld
Ethiopia
War Child
Sudan
R. Jones
A.Mohamoud
Since the IKV is not active in the Great Lakes region (because of a geographical division of
labour with Pax Christi), we did not visit a project of IKV.
A field visit was paid to the regional partner of ECCP, the Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa
(NPI-Africa) in Kenya, the Regional Initiator of GPPAC for East and Central Africa, which
has convened and coordinated the process in the region. The visit allowed the researcher to
also meet representatives of other local NGOs and grassroots organisations that have
participated in the GPPAC process in Central and Eastern Africa, including the “national
focal points” for Rwanda and Southern Sudan. This visit was not originally foreseen in the
plan for the evaluation, but proved to be very useful to get a better understanding of the
working of the GPPAC network, the core of ECCP activities.
The Great Lakes region is one of the main areas of activity for International Alert. Out of
these activities, the Greater Lakes Women’s Peace Programme was chosen in order to give
extra attention to the gender dimension of peacebuilding in the region. Alert’s local partner
Dushirehamwe in Burundi provides a good example of how the TMF core funding has
enabled Alert to respond with local partners to give assistance, advocacy training and capacity
building to address the specific needs of women living in the insecure environment in
Burundi.
The objective of the field visit to Pax Christi projects was to get a more in-depth picture of
(part of) the work of Pax Christi in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, in
particular Sudan, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The visit was
supposed to include attendance of a cross-border small arms monitoring meeting in Yei
(South Sudan) involving Sudanese and Congolese participants. The meeting in this form had
to be cancelled, as the Congolese participants were unable to travel safely to Yei due to
increased military activity by the Ugandan army and rebels of the Lords Resistance Army in
the border areas of DRC, Sudan and Uganda. The trip was therefore rescheduled to spend two
days in Nairobi for discussion of the work Pax Christi is involved in both in Nairobi and from
its Nairobi base. The visit to Eastern Congo had to be rescheduled as well, and now involved
only the capital of Ituri district, Bunia, as some of the most important Congolese partner
organisations are based there. Other areas and organisations which might have been visited on
the way from South Sudan to Bunia, had to be left aside as the only feasible way to get to
Bunia now for a short period of time was flying in and out from Entebbe (Uganda). This
provided an opportunity to attend a meeting between Pax Christi staff and the First Secretary
of the Dutch Embassy in Kampala, scheduled to exchange information about developments in
the region, in particular the volatile border area between Eastern Congo, Northern Uganda and
Southern Sudan.
16
Saferworld receives TMF project funding for its conflict prevention programme “Enhancing
the Capacity of the EU to Foster Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa”. Core partners for
the programme are the Inter Africa Group (IAG (Addis Ababa), the Africa Peace Forum –
APFO (Nairobi) and the regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).
IAG was selected for evaluation purposes following initial feedback from Saferworld in
London and Nairobi clarifying that IAG would be more reflective of a “difficult partnership”.
In order to avoid the impression of “victory claiming” by TMF organisations, IAG was
chosen as an example of a “challenging” partnership. The project clearly shows the limits of
local capacity under quickly deteriorating political conditions in a country like Ethiopia.
To get an impression of the field activities of War Child, Sudan was chosen because this is
the country in the region in which War Child has the most longstanding experience and has
been engaged in a wide variety of projects. The alternative would have been Uganda, where
activities only started recently.
All together, the field visits provided a wide geographical spread of research over different
countries in the Greater Lakes and Horn of Africa region, covered very different kinds of
peacebuilding activity, and made it possible to study different types of relationships with
different types of partners. The visits were too short, however, to get a clear picture of what
other organisations than the TMF organisations were doing in the region.
The visits were made by researchers of the evaluation team and not by local consultants as
suggested by the Steering Group. There were a number of reasons for that choice:
- There were no initial contacts to potential local consultants in four of the five countries, and
recruitment via the TMF-organisations might have led to a biased relationship.
- The identification and selection of possible consultants, their briefing about the TMF
context, and follow-up correspondence would have consumed almost all the time which was
available for the evaluation of the activity of partner organisations.
- Cooperation with local consultants would have created an extra risk to miss the strict time
limits of the evaluation schedule.
3.2.2. Methods of data collection
Most of the information was collected by semi-structured interviews (see Annexes 5 and 6 for
the questions asked) and by the study of documents from the TMF-organisations and their
partner organisations. About 100 interviews were held. Interview-partners were from the
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (4), from the TMF organisations (33), from partner
organisations (44), from the embassies (3), and from a range of other stakeholders like UN
agencies (UNIFEM, UNICEF), other donor organisations (GTZ), similar NGOs (Justice et
Paix, FEWER, Enfants du Monde), academics of local universities (Ahfad University for
Women, Khartoum), politicians (a member of parliament in Burundi) and civil servants (Head
Administrator, Rutana Provice, Burundi). Interviews with these other organisations than
partner organisations helped to verify the information gained from TMF-organisations and
their partners and to increase the reliability of the information obtained.
The results from the interviews were discussed with TMF organisations and to some extent
also with staff of DMV at the Ministry. Their comments were taken into account in the
formulation of the present report.
17
The originally planned survey among partner organisations of all 10 TMF organisations
which had received funding for peacebuilding activities and in all regions of the world has
been dropped. The reason was that the range of activities that TMF organisations have
engaged in is very broad, and that partner relationship with different kinds of partners differ
widely. As a result, most questions in every possible questionnaire would not apply to any
single organisation. Also an alternative plan for a smaller survey, concentrating only on
partners of IKV and Pax Christi, finally has not been pursued, because the broad variety of
partner relations and activities makes a survey a less suitable instrument.
The main purpose of the survey was to check the representativity of the findings, also for
other conflict zones outside the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. Given the fact that
few general statements could be made about the partner relations and about the impact of
different peacebuilding activities, the issue of representativity became somewhat less
important.
3.3. Specific challenges for the evaluation of peacebuilding activities
The team has carried out a literature review on the specific challenges that evaluation projects
of peacebuilding activities have to face. The general conclusion from this literature survey has
been that
“There are still no quick and easy answers to the question of how to best assess, monitor and
evaluate peace practices. On the contrary, experience shows that assessing and measuring the
impact and outcomes of peacebuilding activities is actually a very complicated task.”5
“[T]here is no known way of reliably assessing the impact of peacebuilding projects”.6
Annex 7 provides an overview of different initiatives to develop a suitable methodology for
monitoring and evaluation activities in this field.7 There are a number of differences or
perceived differences which make the evaluation of interventions in the field of peacebuilding
more difficult than the evaluation of other aspects of development cooperation (see box on the
following page).
The famous Joint Utstein Study of Pacebuilding finishes with the conclusion that it is not only
difficult, but impossible to say anything about the impact of individual peacebuilding projects:
“Whether their impact is positive depends not on the project itself and cannot be identified by
looking at the project”.8
The author pleads, instead, for an analysis of the impact of strategically linked interventions
across the peacebuilding palette, carried out by governmental or non-governmental actors
over a significant period of time.
5
Beatrix Schmelzle, 2005, New Trends in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA), Introduction, Berghof
Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Handbook, p. 2.
6
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding:
Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, 11.
7
“The variety of concepts and methodologies of assessing and measuring impacts makes it unlikely that a
single [conceptual framework] will emerge soon. Martina Fischer and Oliver Wils, 2003, Ploughing Through the
Field: An Introduction to the PCIA Handbook Debate, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict
Management, Handbook, p. 7 and Beatrix Schmelzle, 2005, p. 7.
8
Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, 59.
18
An important criterion for the evaluation of individual projects is then whether they fit into a
broader peacebuilding strategy for a specific country or region which is pursued by a broad
range of actors. The precondition for using such a yardstick is, of course, that such a strategy
does exist.
19
Box 3.1:
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Difficulties for the evaluation of peacebuilding activities,
compared to other development-oriented interventions
Peacebuilding includes activities like organising dialogues, lobbying governments
and advocacy work to draw attention to problems and possible solutions. The
outcomes of this type of work are more difficult to measure than, say, the building
of roads or vaccination campaigns.
Its results often take the form of something not occurring (such as conflict
escalation or outbreaks of violence). The results of conflict prevention measures are
therefore difficult to evaluate.
The attribution problem is particularly salient: there are so many factors and actors
at play, at different levels, that it is almost impossible to attribute an outcome to
one particular action or intervention.
It is especially difficult to link “project outputs and outcomes on the micro level to
changes and thus impact on the macro level of politics and society (an often-cited
influence gap as well as an attribution gap)”. (Beatrix Schmelzle, 2005, Berghof
Handbook, p. 5)
Peacebuilding is a long-term change process. It takes place in a highly volatile
environment in which preliminary successes can be easily overshadowed by
subsequent set-backs, - which does not imply that an intervention has not made a
positive contribution to the development.
Peacebuilding is a highly dialectical process. The very success of a dialogue
process, for example “might lead extremists to take violent action before their
political standing is seriously eroded” (Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study
of Peacebuilding, p. 59).
Conflicts are over-determined, i.e. even if some of the root causes are taken away,
others may still be at work and perpetuate a conflict. Interventions can have been
successful in addressing some of the root causes. But their effect will only be
visible once other causes are subsequently (or in parallel) addressed as well.
The causes of conflict can change. Some original causes can fade away, while new
causes come up (new grievances, interests of refugees, interest of profiteers). In
many cases, the violence itself takes the place of other ‘root causes’ as the main
issue that needs to be addressed.
“[T]he field of peacebuilding is a relatively young one as many organisations only
emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. It is therefore not surprising that many strategies,
methods and instruments still remain in a test phase and therefore need further
elaboration and investigation.” (Beatrix Schmelzle, 2005, Berghof Handbook, p. 2)
The differences between peacebuilding processes and other fields of development cooperation
should not be exaggerated, however, or lead to a defeatist attitude.9
9
“We often hear the argument that peace processes are highly complex social phenomena, which cannot be
understood, tackled or assessed along the same lines as other phenomena. I argue, on the contrary, that the field
of peacebuilding can benefit very much from ideas, models and insights gathered in related fields (policy
analysis, development practice, etc.) – and that it is about time we start doing so.” “It is obvious, and strange,
that little thinking on evaluation and impact assessment in peacebuilding makes use of the knowledge that is
20
3.4. Main indicators used
The general difficulties to evaluate peacebuilding interventions do not apply for all activities
under this umbrella term in the same way. The general complexity of peace processes should
not stand in the way of analysing the concrete outcome of specific measures where this is
possible. The TMF organisations have all mentioned a number of indicators in their own
application for funding, which can be used to measure to some extent their degree of success
(see Annex 8).
This evaluation study has mainly concentrated on three issues: the monitoring and evaluation
practices of TMF organisations, their learning capacity, and the quality of partner
relationships. Below, a number of examples are listed of indicators which have been used to
evaluate progress regarding these three dimensions.
Monitoring and Evaluation Practices
- formulation of clear evaluation criteria
- existence of internal monitoring and evaluation procedures
- use of external evaluations
- monitoring and evaluation routines built-in in project design
- participation of stakeholders in the development of evaluation criteria
- internal circulation and discussion of evaluation results
Learning Capacity
- space for individual and common reflection
- interaction with people facing similar challenges
- ability to conduct investigation about such challenges
- regular analysis of changes in the environment
- openness to criticism (e.g. publication of reports critical to own organisation)
- organisational and operational adjustments to lessons learned
Quality of Partnership relations
- frequency of contacts
- direction of reporting
- share of (TMF-) funding in overall budget of partners
- applications for funding submitted to other donors
- mechanisms in place to assure mutual accountability
- expressions of feeling of mutual understanding
- contribution to capacity building
already there.” Thania Paffenholz, 2005, Third-generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace Approach,
Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, Handbook, p. 18.
21
4.
“PEACEBUILDING” IN THE TMF-PROGAMME
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
4.4.1.
4.4.2.
Conceptualisation of “peacebuilding” and the role of civil society
Positioning of theme in DGIS
The TMF Policy Frameworks
TMF-funding
The selection process
Coverage of the TMF programme
- Organisations
- Activities
Funding criteria
Funding amounts
Developments of the TMF funding system
4.4.3
4.4.4.
4.5.
4.1. Conceptualisation of “peacebuilding” and the role of civil society
The last decade saw concepts of post-war recovery and peacebuilding becoming increasingly
the focus of international organisations, governments and NGOs, as well as an emerging
important area for research and academic studies. The concept of “peacebuilding” is
bedevilled by divisions because it has been overstretched in depth and scope, both as a
concept and as a policy instrument. The term was unclear from the start with its initial formal
introduction by the United Nations (UN) in 1992. Based on this, differing theoretical
interpretations in addition to two main operational strategies ensued, which have led to
diverse policy implementations today (see Annex 9 for details). Also due to its highly political
nature, there is still no clear common understanding of what exactly “peacebuilding” is and
what it should be.
In the understanding of the TMF programme, “peacebuilding” includes not only post-conflict
activities, but equally those efforts during or even before the outbreak of violence that directly
and explicitly aim to strengthen the mechanisms for preventing or reducing violence and
foster constructive cooperation between groups and individuals. The term “peacebuilding”,
therefore, is used within the TMF programme (and in this study) more as a label for a cluster
of activities, rather than as a precise goal. The term is used as a kind of shorthand for a broad
array of activities aimed at preventing and reducing violence, which stands in the way of
sustainable development.
Debates are taking place about the place and role of civil society in peacebuilding.10 It is
widely recognised that the strengthening of local civil society organisations (CSOs) through
mechanisms such as TMF is an important component of peacebuilding strategies. However, it
is not the only component, and the role of governments should not be left out. Neoliberal
strategies that minimise the role and undermine the capacity of government in society are
10
See for example the 2004 Clingendael report by Nynke Douma and Bart Klem, “Civil War and Civil Peace: A
Literature Review of the Dynamics and Dilemmas of Peacebuilding through Civil Society”, and the subsequent
responses to it by Ben Schennink, Cartherine Barnes, Kevin Clements, Mari Fitzduff, Anton Stellamans, and
Rigobert Minani Bihuzo sj.
22
often counterproductive in conflict situations in which state weakness and failure are part of
the problem. Governments need support to strengthen their capacity to regulate society, as
well as their representativeness, accountability and inclusiveness – all factors that contribute
to removing grievances and injustice, and building peace.
Civil society can play an important role in achieving government accountability. It also works
towards reconciliation and development through many different activities. But it cannot do
this alone. Moreover, it is not necessarily a positive force by nature. CSOs often have low
capacity. In addition, they are in some cases partial in the conflict. They are also not
necessarily representative of the population they claim to represent, and accountability of
CSOs is often an issue.
All this implies not that funding should not go via civil society; in fact, chapter five of this
report will show that highly important work has been financed in this way by TMF. What it
does imply is that more thought could be given about the ways in which civil society funding
relate to government funding, and about what could be done to ensure better synergy between
the two.
4.2. Positioning of theme in DGIS
Peacebuilding emerged as a policy theme for DGIS over the course of the 1990s. Attention
was paid to it for the first time in 1993 when a policy document entitled A World in Dispute
elaborated on the connection between development and peace and analysed conflict patterns
on a global scale. The conclusion was that the post-Cold War international constellation
required more coordination between development policy and other areas of foreign policy,
including security. In 1998, when the new Dutch government decided to concentrate bilateral
assistance on a smaller number of selected countries, there was also a possibility created to
assist other countries specifically on good governance, human rights and peacebuilding. In
addition, it became an option to fund peacebuilding in countries where inter-governmental
cooperation did not occur, working via NGOs. 11 Peacebuilding was defined in this period as
the entire spectrum of development cooperation activities aimed at helping to prevent or
resolve armed conflicts. In 2002, a White Paper on postconflict reconstruction added another
dimension to the spectrum of peacebuilding activities.12
Since 1996, peacebuilding activities have received increasing percentages of total
development expenditure. Presently they receive about 20 per cent. To help in the
development and management of strategies for implementing its peacebuilding policy, a
Stability Assessment Framework has been developed and tested in Mozambique, Rwanda and
Kenya.13
The Peacebuilding and Good Governance Division is one of the three divisions of DMV, the
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department of the Ministry (the other two are the
Humanitarian Aid Division and the Human Rights Division). The Department was created
relatively recently (in 2000) as a combination of fields which fell under three different
directorates before.
11
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding:
Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, 31-32.
12
Notitie wederopbouw na conflicten, 24 April 2002.
13
Ibidem, 32-33.
23
Support to peacebuilding through NGOs is thus a relatively young field of activity for the
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially when compared to policy fields like Economic
Development, Human Rights, or Environmental Policy. It was included into the TMF
programme partly as a result of lobby activity of Pax Christi and, to a lesser degree, IKV. The
very fact that peacebuilding organisations could get support from this source meant an
important recognition of the field. It also led to a growth of the field. MFOs and other
organisations began to develop peacebuilding as a core theme and to be more conflictsensitive in their development efforts.
In the two funding rounds of TMF funding under discussion in this evaluation, together about
€ 10,5 million of the total TMF funding of almost € 82 million was spent on “peacebuilding”
activities, which amounts to about 13 % of the total. However, since the borderline is not
clear, this percentage will vary, depending on which organisations are regarded as being
primarily “peacebuilding” oriented organisations. A good example of a borderline case would
be the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, which was probably counted as a Human
Rights organisation, but obviously could also be regarded as an organisation contributing to
“peacebuilding”.
The different policy areas are not always easy to delineate, since peacebuilding is not possible
without economic development and respect for human rights, for example. The shift in policy
objectives of peacebuilding organisations in the direction of the complex notion of “human
security” does not make such a differentiation easier and leads to an increasing overlap
between the agendas and work plans of different types of organisation. There is some kind of
“mission creep” in both directions.
Since it is so difficult to delineate activities in the field of peacebuilding from other
“development” activities, the question for the Ministry and other donors will be how financial
flows should be organised in the future to take this into account. The TMF programme has
been intended to support smaller organisations that made a special contribution and had
special knowledge. The more they engage in more general development activities, the less
relevant the programme would be from that perspective.
Peacebuilding activities as they have been financed in the TMF programme include activities
like lobbying and advocacy, the organisation of dialogues between warring parties, the
support and facilitation of peace processes, the strengthening of civil society capacities to be
involved in peacebuilding activities at community, national and regional levels, the promotion
of community security through the control of small arms flows, etc. These activities call for
strong involvement on the part of the TMF organisations and different types of partnership
than those characterising “regular” development activities (see chapter 5). As such,
peacebuilding does not fully correspond to the standard vision of the usual chain between
donor organisation and target groups in the South (Ministry > TMF organisation > Southern
partner organisation > beneficiaries). Some TMF organisations feared that their special tasks
might come under pressure, if they received funds from the TMF programme. They were
afraid that it would push them into the direction of more project oriented work, away from
advocacy and raising awareness of global structures. In retrospect this fear appears not to have
been justified and it seems no longer to exist at the TMF organisations today.
Most peacebuilding organisations are active in the field of conflict prevention (including the
prevention of escalation in violent conflicts and the prevention of the re-occurrence of conflict
24
in post-war situations). In this field, it is especially difficult to prove a causal relationship
between the intervention and the final outcome. Although the TMF policy framework
explicitly acknowledges that efficiency and effectiveness are difficult to measure and to prove
in long-term institution building and policy formation, the TMF organisations had the
impression that they encountered little attention for the special situation of the field in the
preparation of the TMF evaluation.
The relationship between the Ministry and NGOs has changed over time in the sense that they
grew towards each other. Years ago, the task of many NGOs was first and foremost to
monitor and critically follow government activity to assure that it serves the general public
interest. Now, to some extent, the roles are almost switched, at least as seen from the
perspective of the Ministry. The Ministry has to take interests of many stakeholders into
account and claims to show sometimes more nuance than some NGOs who tend to be
advocates of special interests.
Prior to the period under examination, some TMF-organisations feel that their relationship
with the Ministry was better than it is now (see chapter 5 for a description of the current
situation). Interaction took place with different Ministry departments - often the regional
departments depending on the TMF organisation’s projects – and this interaction provided
room for substantive exchanges over content and policy.
Some of the TMF organisations are critical about the Ministry’s policy consistency in the
field of peacebuilding. They point out that the Dutch government was one of the partners that
carried out the study that lead to the famous Utstein report, but that its policy in the
framework of TMF is not everywhere consistent with that report. The Utstein report draws
attention to the strategic and political dimensions of peacebuilding work, but these dimensions
are not reflected in TMF policy. More generally it seems that the Dutch Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has not come up with a peacebuilding policy that is as elaborated, comprehensive and
consistent as the policies of some other governments, notably the German and British.
4.3. The TMF policy frameworks: objectives – points of attention – intended results
The TMF policy framework for the subsidy period 2003-2006 cites as the general objectives
for the field of peacebuilding: the strengthening, reforming and creation of institutional
capacity and of the instruments required for achieving sustainable peace. Activities financed
from the Ministry’s central budget comprise the development of policy with regard to
peacebuilding and conflict prevention such as developed by (inter)national forums and
bilateral donors. Activities in that framework should first of all make a contribution to the
development of conflict analysis and – prevention. Besides, activities can be aimed at the role
of development cooperation as an instrument of conflict prevention and at deepening the
theme of business and conflict. Socially responsible business and an analysis of financing of
conflicts are relevant issues in this context.
Within the above-mentioned general objectives, also efforts are supported which aim at the
creation and consolidation of peace, which have a temporary character. In the 2003-2006
round, the main criteria for the acceptance of applications, as stated in the policy framework,
were
· the contribution to structural poverty reduction (via direct poverty reduction, capacity
building or advocacy);
25
· efficiency and effectiveness of this contribution;
· a broad societal support in North and South.
No theme-specific criteria were formulated.
In the 2004-2007 round, the main objectives for peacebuilding as stated in the policy
framework were
· North-South cooperation based on equal relations and accountability;
· Striving for capacity building through increasing transfer of management and
institutional responsibilities;
· Activities taking place in developing countries and aiming at:
involvement of crucial civil organisations in the peace process;
strengthening of representativeness and particularly inclusiveness of
government (centrally and locally);
involvement of women in peacebuilding;
supporting media;
democratic control of security sector.
These priorities come to the fore in the relative large share of TMF subsidies to organisations
that try to strengthen the role of media in conflict torn societies.
To four out of the six organisations analysed, institutional subsidies were provided. In
addition, a fifth organisation (ECCP) received a programme subsidy for a programme actually
covering most or all of its work, and the organisation has been trying to convert the grant into
an institutional subsidy as well. Out of the six organisations evaluated, only Saferworld
received a clearly delineated programme subsidy. This is not representative for the whole
range of peacebuilding subsidies allocated in the TMF programme14 – but it is the sample this
study has worked with.
This means that the relationship between the Ministry’s policy priorities and the actual
activities carried out is less clear, because in the case of institutional subsidies given to
organisations with broader programmes, the emphasis in the TMF policy on specific themes
gets more or less lost. The Ministry’s peacebuilding department (DMV/VG) emphasises that
institutional subsidies are really a gesture of good faith in the organisational development and
overall programme on the part of the recipients, and that aligning with policy themes is not so
much an issue in these cases.
4.4. TMF-Funding
4.4.1. The selection process
In both rounds, Dutch and international organisations were invited to submit a funding
application according to pre-set guidelines. The applications had to explain why the planned
activities (1) could be categorised as peacebuilding and (2) contributed directly or indirectly
to poverty reduction. They also had to specify the aims and objectives for the four years to
come, the planned activities, and ways of measuring outcomes.
14
About half of all TMF peacebuilding organisations funded get an institutional subsidy; the other half receives
programme funding.
26
DMV staff evaluated the applications based on a rating system and allocated funds to the
applicants. The budget was relatively limited in both rounds and few organisations got the
amount they had requested. In fact, most got much less (see 4.4.4.). Letters were sent in which
the allocated amounts were stated and a brief motivation of the amounts was given. The
letters in most cases also contained conditions, mostly asking for the development of better
M&E and accounting practices.
DMV staff considers it to be overwhelming how much paperwork is involved in the
application process. They would prefer a kind of certification, which assures that the internal
organisation is OK so that BZ would not have to pay any attention to these aspects.
Out of the six grantees investigated, one organisation, IKV, appealed to the Ministry’s
decision, and was granted additional funds as a result. The text box below gives the details of
the appeal.
Box 4.1. IKV’s appeal
IKV applied for an institutional subsidy in the 2003-2006 round. Of the € 13,333,791 applied for, the
Ministry rejected € 10,333,791 and granted € 3,000,000. The main reasons given were that
1. not enough spread over themes and regions
2. according to the application IKV will experience an explosive growth. It is insufficiently clear that
it has the capacity to deal with this.
3. IKV should work on an improved quality assurance system.
IKV subsequently appealed the decision, saying among other things that
1. The spread of themes and regions is for the overall TMF programme, not individual applications.
The theme-specific nature is precisely why IKV applied for TMF rather than MFP. Other themeor region- specific organisations did get funding.
2. The biggest growth was in 2001-2002. This was handled well. IKV has now chosen to limit its
growth. Anyway, the growth over 2001-2 was a result of stagnation before that.
3. The successful Macedonia project, about which the embassy in Skopje was so enthusiastic, will
now have to be scaled down
4. False expectations were created about the funding of the Macedonia project.
Finally, it was decided to grant an additional €1,150,000 for the Macedonia project.
The TMF organisations coped with the fact that most of them were granted much less money
than they had requested in different ways. Pax Christi scrapped a number of activities,
including a planned media theme and a scheduled start-up of programmes in Asia. Its
innovation- and organisational learning track also became less intensive than originally
planned (although significant reforms were still implemented; see chapter 5). IKV and ECCP
partly solved the issue by finding additional donors; for the remainder they attempted to carry
out activities as planned, which led to very high work pressures for both these organisations.
War Child chose to focus particularly on the development of M&E mechanisms and made
some sacrifices in the area of programme development, undertaking less expansion and
growth of programmes than it had envisioned.
27
4.4.2. Coverage of the TMF-programme
- Organisations
In the Netherlands, the major organisations that focus exclusively on peacebuilding-related
activities all applied for, and were granted, TMF funding. Internationally, the programme
appears to have been little known – or little responded to. Three of the four non-Dutch
organisations that were funded, International Alert, Institute for War and Peace Reporting,
and Saferworld, are based in London. International Crisis Group is based in Brussels. This
shows that applications did not come from around the world. Nonetheless, the four
international TMF-organisations are important players in the field of peacebuilding, at least as
far as Europe is concerned. These organisations found out about TMF because they were sent
a notification by the Ministry.
- Activities
The activities carried out by the six organisations under review cover a broad range of
different interventions. They range from research (e.g. on trade in small arms, mainly by
Saferworld and Pax Christi), advocacy (IKV, Pax Christi), informal dialogue (Pax Christi),
early warning (International Alert), network development (ECCP, Pax Christi), to
psychosocial assistance (War Child). The six organisations all have a clear institutional profile
and their activities do not, or only marginally, overlap. (Where there is a similarity in
activities, as in the case of Pax Christi and IKV, a clear geographical division of labour has
been agreed upon. In fact, IKV and Pax Christi are presently exploring a possible merger.15)
For a detailed description of the activities of the six organisations, see below under Research
findings.
4.4.3. Funding criteria
Funding criteria did not differ from the general criteria for TMF organisations (with the
exception of a few special points of attention as mentioned above). In the discussion between
the Ministry and the TMF organisations, it was sometimes unclear in how far specific criteria
(such as geographical spread) would apply to individual applications or to the TMF
programme as a whole.
There was a clear development in the funding criteria from the first TMF round (2003-06) to
the second (2004-07), with an increasing emphasis on the South and on partnerships,
manifested by: (i) a concern for a shift of responsibilities to Southern partners, (ii) a
preference for activities carried out in the South, and (iii) special attention for equality and
mutual accountability in the relations with Southern partners. In how far this really played a
role in the allocation of funds is not clear.
From the arguments which the Ministry put forward to justify cuts in the amounts originally
requested by TMF-organisations, it becomes clear that the capacity to handle growth and the
existence of working quality assurance schemes did play a major role in the selection of
organisations funded.
15
Both organisations have signed a declaration of intention to merge their operational organisations, while
keeping their individual identity.
28
4.4.4. Funding amounts
In the two subsidy rounds together, 10 peacebuilding organisations were selected for TMF
funding. The amounts requested and allocated to these organisations are given in the tables
below, also in relation to the total volume of the TMF funds for both rounds.
2003-06
Institute for War and Peace Reporting
IKV
Pax Christi
Press Now
Saferworld
War Child
TOTAL Peacebuilding
TOTAL TMF Programme
Percentage of Peacebuilding
Requested
2003-06
350.000
13.334.000
9.344.000
2.870.000
590.924
6.400.000
32.888.924
231.612.148
14,2 %
Allocated
2003-06
350.000
4.150.000
5.000.000
1.500.000
590.924
3.700.000
14.140.924
141.409.240
10,0 %
Table 4.1: TMF-funding requested and allocated for 2003-2006
Between 2003 and 2004, the total amount available for the TMF programme has been € 124
million.16
The percentage related to Peacebuilding increased considerably and climbed from 10 percent
to 16 % in the second round. While in 2003, a less than average share of the requested funds
had been allocated, the opposite was true in 2004.
2004-07
ECCP
International Alert
International Crisis Group
European Centre for Common Ground
TOTAL Peacebuilding
TOTAL TMF Programme
Percentage of Peacebuilding
Requested
2004-07
3.627.665
3.944.000
1.600.000
12.000.000
21.171.665
158.047.680
13,4 0%
Table 4.2: TMF-funding requested and allocated for 2004-2007
16
Evaluatie TMF. Resultaat van de voorstudie, Berenschot 2005, p. 6
29
Allocated
2004-07
1.600.000
1.600.000
800.000
2.500.000
6.500.000
40.718.498
16,0 %
For most of the TMF organisations, the difference between funds applied for and funds
granted was considerable. In part it may be because organisations simply tried to ask for
inflated amounts, anticipating that only part would be granted. But this is not the whole story:
some organisations were forced to cut activities after receiving only part of the funds applied
for, while others were able to secure additional funds from other donors.
4.5. Developments of the TMF funding system
As was underlined in the first TMF policy framework, the TMF policy was a “system under
construction”. It developed further as a result of the experience with the first funding round in
2002 for the years 2003-06. As indicated above, one of the elements that received more
attention was the quality of the cooperation with Southern partners.
According to the TMF policy framework for the subsidy period 2004–2007, TMF
organisations had to make explicit in which way they give shape to North-South cooperation
based on an equal relationship and mutual accountability. The aim of capacity building and
growing independence of the Southern partners had to be demonstrated by an increasing
transfer of responsibilities for project design and execution, and institutional development. To
become eligible for subsidy, activities had to take place in developing countries as far as
possible.
According to the TMF organisations, partner capacity in the South is often overestimated by
donors. There are only 5 or 6 peacebuilding organisations in the South with a staff or more
than 20. This can be interpreted both ways, however: It can underline the necessity to invest
more in the capacity of partner organisations. But it is also a reason why a shift in activities
and responsibilities to Southern partners only proceeds slowly.
30
5.
RESEARCH FINDINGS
5.1.
5.1.1.
5.1.2.
5.1.3.
5.2.
5.2.1
5.2.2.
5.3.
5.3.1.
5.3.2.
5.3.3.
Description of TMF Organisations
Mission and Strategy
Organisational structure of TMF-organisations
TMF-funded activities of the six organisations
TMF-funded activities in East and Central Africa
Conflicts in East and Central Africa
Activities of TMF-organisations in the region
Chain analysis
Relationship between Ministry and TMF-organisations
Relationship between TMF-organisations and local partners
Relationship between Ministry and local partners: the role of
embassies
Analysis of specific issues
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Relevance
Sustainability
Impact
Gender sensitivity
Learning ability
5.4.
5.4.1.
5.4.2.
5.4.3.
5.4.4.
5.4.5.
5.4.6.
5.4.7.
31
5.1. Description of TMF-Organisations
This section aims to give a description of the process of TMF funding itself and the way it has
been experienced by the various stakeholders; an analysis of the relationships between the
various parties involved; an indication of trends and processes in the activities of the TMF
organisations, and the extent to which TMF has affected these activities. In so far as this is
possible it is attempted to relate this information to the objectives of the TMF programme and
the organisation-specific objectives outlined in the various TMF applications. In addition,
findings are analysed with the above discussion about methodology in mind.
The six TMF organisations selected by the TMF evaluation steering committee for evaluation
in this study are listed below. Two of these organisations are based in London (International
Alert and Saferworld), the other four are based in the Netherlands (but are also strongly linked
to international networks).
ECCP
International Alert
Pax Christi
War Child
IKV
Saferworld
TMF funding (in €)
2004-07
2004-07
2003-06
2003-06
2003-06
2003-06
1.600.000
1.600.000
5.000.000
3.700.000
4.150.000
590.924
Table 5.1 Selected TMF organisations and their TMF subsidies
5.1.1. Mission and Strategy
The following tables give a summary of the mission and strategies of the six evaluated
organisations. In Annex 4 an elaboration of the organisations’ missions and strategies is
provided.
32
Mission
ECCP
International
Alert
Pax Christi
War Child
IKV
Saferworld
· Strengthening regional networking in order to achieve effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies
· Influencing policymakers
Building sustainable peace in areas affected or threatened by violent conflict by:
· Shaping international policy
· Assisting those most affected by violent conflict
· Raising awareness
· To give voice to the hopes for peace
· To work with partners towards reconciliation, peace and justice
· To contribute to the establishment of an international order based on peace and the rule of law
War Child’s goal is the empowerment of children in and from war-affected areas, through:
· Psychosocial programmes applying the power of creative arts and sports to strengthen the children’s psychological and
social development and well-being.
· Creative arts and sports programmes to reconcile groups of children divided by war, to build a peaceful society.
· Creating public awareness and support on/for the plight of children in war zones.
On behalf of the Dutch churches IKV engages in promoting political solutions for crisis- and war situation. Civil society building
and international presence are the leading principles. Areas of focus are:
· Conflict prevention
· International presence and protection
· Democratisation and community building
· Harmonisation of inter-ethnic relations
· Improvement of the position of women in conflict
· Reconciliation through religion
· Globalisation of the education on peace issues
Identify, develop and publish more effective approaches to tackling and preventing armed conflicts
Table 5.2 Missions of the six TMF organisations
33
Strategies / Instruments
Networking Lobby
ECCP
Int Alert
Pax Christi
War Child
IKV
Saferworld
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Advocacy
and public
awareness
raising
X
X
X
X
X
X
Research
and analysis
X
X
X
X
X
Supporting
Organising
local peace dialogues
initiatives
Capacity
building
Psychosocial Horizontal
assistance
linking17
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 5.3 Strategies of the six TMF organisations
17
This means linking Dutch groups and individuals to groups and individuals in conflict areas as well as linking groups in conflict areas to each other.
34
Table 5.2 shows that the mission of three of the organisations (Pax Christi, IKV, and
International Alert) is quite broad, and may be roughly summarised as being building
sustainable peace in areas affected or threatened by violent conflict. These three
organisations are also comparable in that they employ a broad range of strategies, including
lobby and advocacy, supporting local initiatives, and capacity building (see table 5.3). Two of
these organisations, Pax Christi and IKV, are in fact so comparable that they are presently
exploring a possible merger. In contrast, the mission and strategies of the three others (ECCP,
War Child, and Saferworld) are more narrowly focused, and differ distinctly from one
another. ECCP focuses primarily on networking, War Child on psychosocial assistance to
children in war affected areas, including more specific peacebuilding activities like bringing
children of by conflict divided groups together (see Box 5.2. on page 68), or peace
education/conflict resolution skills training for adolescents, and Saferworld on research and
advocacy, especially with regard to small arms.
5.1.2. Organisational structure of TMF organisations
Size
The TMF organisations differ substantially in terms of size (see table 5.4). Four of the six
organisations (Pax Christi, War Child, IKV and Saferworld) are of comparable size in that
they have a staff of about 30 persons. ECCP is by far the smallest organisation with a staff of
about 10 in 2004 and 2005 and less at the time of writing. International Alert, by contrast, is a
much larger organisation in comparison with a staff of 80.
The size of the organisations’ budgets correspond roughly to their staff numbers in that
International Alert has by far the largest annual budget, ECCP has the smallest budget, and
the budgets of the other four organisations are in the same range.
Size
# staff
Annual
budget in €
ECCP
10
1.464.80318
International Alert
80
10,874,66119
Pax Christi
30
4.000.00020
War Child
33
5.630.93421
IKV
26
3.121.99022
Saferworld
35
3.660.00023
Table 5.4 Size of the TMF organisations, measured by the number of staff and the size of the
annual budget
18
Income in 2003
Based on total expenditure for 2005
20
Roughly the annual turnover
21
Realisatie 2004, War Child, sheet “Staat van Baten en Lasten” (totaal beschikbare middelen)
22
Income in 2004
23
Roughly the annual turnover (GBP 2.5 million)
19
35
History, background and organisational structure
The following gives a short characterisation of each of the TMF-organisations in order to give
a picture of the range of organisations funded under the TMF peacebuilding theme.
ECCP was established in 1997 as the secretariat for the European Platform for Conflict
Prevention and Transformation. It encourages cooperation and facilitates the exchange of
information as well as advocacy and lobbying activities among organisations involved in
conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The small staff is motivated and hard-working,
particularly in recent times when the development of the Global Partnership for the
Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) and the organisation of the conference in New York
demanded a lot of sacrifices in terms of time and energy.
The initiator of the GPPAC in 2003, ECCP has since acted as the secretariat for that group. In
that role, ECCP covers the regional and international level in coordinating GPPAC's
programme by facilitating contact between the regions, managing the entire process and
safeguarding its coherence - together with GPPAC's International Steering Group. In recent
years GPPAC has become ECCP’s major programme that overarches and integrates all other
activities. GPPAC is organised into 15 regions, each with a Regional Initiator or lead
organisation, which steers the regional process of network-building and coordinates the
development of a Regional Action Agenda on conflict prevention. The global process is led
by the International Steering Group (ISG), composed of Regional Initiators and a select group
of other parties. The regional processes culminated in July 2005 in a Global Conference at the
UN Headquarters.
ECCP is an organisation that is very much in development at the moment. In recent years, all
its activities have become part of the overarching Global Partnership (GPPAC) programme.
After the high point of the New York conference this Partnership is now at a crossroads. It
needs to be made sustainable and find clear goals for the future. The role of ECCP in this
process will have to be redefined. It also needs to find funding for the continuation of the
process. The lack of funding most recently has been very severe, and ECCP has had to let go
some of its staff. More broadly, ECCP is in a transition period in which consultations are held
and decisions made about the future direction and governance of GPPAC. All this gives rise
to a sense of insecurity and of transition.
International Alert was established in 1985 by a group of human rights advocates led by the
former Secretary-General of Amnesty International, in response to growing concerns that
human rights violations often lead to internal armed conflicts, and vice-versa. It has over 80
staff, both in the London offices and in the regions where Alert works (the organisation is
actually working in over 20 countries and territories around the world). The staff is recruited
from all over the world, too (currently 30 nationalities). The organisation is headed by its
Secretary-General and is governed by an international Board of Trustees of 12 members, each
with a specific interest and expertise in conflict-related issues. Day-to-day management is in
the hands of a Senior Management Team and Programme Managers, assisted by Senior
Advisors.
Pax Christi Netherlands is part of an international movement, called Pax Christi
International, with headquarters in Brussels. Pax Christi International consists of about 60
autonomous national sections, local groups and affiliated organisations spread over 30
countries and 5 continents, with over 60.000 members world-wide. Pax Christi Netherlands
36
was founded in 1948, and since the 1960s has been working with partners in various conflict
areas such as the Middle East, Central and Eastern Europe, Africa and later Latin America,
Caucasus and the Balkans. At first the interventions focused on public awareness raising,
education and lobby in the Netherlands, but since 1995 – as the role of civil society in
peacebuilding gained more recognition and more funds became available – it has become
increasingly active in the conflict areas themselves, working for the de-escalation of violent
conflicts, supporting local civil society initiatives in favour of a democratic and pluralist
society.
In 1998, Pax Christi Netherlands divided itself into an Association and a project organisation
(Foundation), in order to better deal with the expansion and professionalisation of its project
work while at the same time maintaining its strong roots in Dutch society. This societal
anchoring in Dutch civil society, especially but not exclusively its Catholic segment,
manifests itself not only in a one-way provision of information, but also in the active
involvement of its constituency in policy formulation and campaigning, as well as in
programmatic collaboration with other relevant and like-minded social actors in the
Netherlands.
The members of the Association elect a Council which looks after the organisation’s identity
and approves the main policy directions. The Council appoints a Board of Trustees, which is
responsible for the annual budget and accounts as well as for the quality of management. The
Board appoints the Executive Directors of the Foundation.24 PC has around 30 members of
staff (fte), some of whom are based abroad (in Belgrade, Amman and Nairobi).
At the end of 2005, Pax Christi Netherlands and IKV have decided to take their longstanding
and intensive collaboration a step further and explore an organisational merger – a decision to
be finalised and legalised in March 2006.
War Child was founded in 1995. It is quite a young organisation which has experienced a
very fast growth. Within the past five years, the organisation grew from 9 to 33 paid staff
members at the Amsterdam headquarters, with in addition about 10 permanent volunteers.
There are about 450 local staff in conflict areas. The management team consists of 5
members, the Managing Director (and founder), the Head of Operations, the Head of
Marketing and Fundraising, the Head of Communications, the Head of Finance and Facilities
and the Manager International Projects. The management team is accountable to a Board of
Directors, consisting of 6 members, most of whom have a function in Dutch companies or
Dutch charities.
War Child has been, right from the start, very good at raising funds from individual donors
(Friends of War Child), schools, sports associations and the like. It also has a strong network
of sympathetic companies that provide sponsoring and in kind donations. The orientation
towards fund raising and public events has an influence on the organisational culture. War
Child has done considerable efforts to reach high professional standards in all fields of
organisational development, - from human resource management and risk management to
monitoring and evaluation.
24
With the separation of the different functions (Accountability: Council; Supervision: Board of Trustees,
Management: Executive Directors), Pax Christi tries to meet the requirements of the Code of Good Governance
of the Commission Wijfels.
37
IKV is a coalition of Dutch churches. These churches are represented in the IKV Council that
meets approximately ten times a year and decides on policy content. The Executive Board
takes care of the development, implementation and evaluation of IKV policy and takes
decisions about major executive matters. The Executive Board also meets approximately ten
times a year (and for convenience these meetings have been staged simultaneously with the
Council’s). The IKV Secretariat executes tasks decided by the Executive Board and assists the
Board in the development, execution and evaluation of IKV policy. The Secretariat includes
project leaders and regional team leaders and support staff in the field of finance,
administration/ logistics, communication/publicity and thematic knowledge. It has 26 staff
members. IKV also appoints international advisers who support partner organisations in the
field. The Stichting Beheer IKV (IKV Management Foundation) monitors financial matters
and approves financial reports which are then forwarded to the Executive Board.
On organisational culture, it can be said that there is a culture of great commitment and
passion for the job. In addition, there is a tendency towards informality. This may be related
to the action-orientation of IKV: making political analysis on conflict and security situations,
together with other political activists and designing action strategies and influencing political
processes is most important and should not be limited too much by procedures or structures.
To an extent the informality is a quality that is highly valued by staff and considered an
integral part of the IKV work method, as it results in good partner relations, in-depth and upto-date political analysis of the conflicts that IKV and its partners are engaged in, and good
links with the Dutch public media and political activists. But it also makes it difficult to
introduce elaborate procedures. The management is aware of this tension and addresses it
quite explicitly, balancing the need for external accountability with the internal drive and
motivation and quick response time, and involving staff in deliberations and decisions. (See
also the section on learning capacity below.)
Since the early 1990s IKV has engaged increasingly in project work, next to its ongoing
campaigning and mobilisation. This raised policy questions about such things as the selection
of regions and exit strategies. IKV maintains longstanding partnership relations with political
activists and civil movements. As these evolve over time, IKV and its partners increasingly
finds themselves working in post- and frozen conflict situations, while new partnerships need
to be opened in “hot” conflict regions, leading to policy discussion about the comparative
advantages of IKV is these new areas and its focus.
Saferworld is an independent foreign affairs think tank, founded in 1989, whose mission is to
identify, develop and publish more effective approaches to tackling and preventing armed
conflicts. Saferworld works with those involved at every level: international bodies,
governments and NGOs – including local organisations whose knowledge is vital to
complement Saferworld’s own research and experience.
Saferworld has programmes in Africa, Europe and South Asia. Through a combination of
research, advocacy and training Saferworld works to:
·
·
·
Develop and implement innovative local, national and regional strategies to tackle the
spread of small arms and armed violence
Help governments and regional organisations to address arms problems and prevent
violent conflict
Provide training and support for local civil society groups so they can take action on
armed violence and human security in their communities
38
·
·
Reform law enforcement agencies and increase trust between police, other security
agencies and local communities
Ensure that development programmes enhance prospects for peace
Saferworld has 35 full- and part-time staff. It also works with a large number of volunteers. It
has a London and a Nairobi office and in addition staff based in Poland, Ethiopia and India. It
receives funds from governments, charitable trusts, foundations and individual supporters. It
has a Board of Trustees whose expertise covers areas of policy, finance, organisational change
and human resources.
5.1.3. TMF funded activities of the six organisations
Table 5.5 shows the relative contribution of the TMF subsidies to the work of the
organisations. In the case of a programme subsidy, the TMF subsidy is given as a percentage
of the total programme budget. In the case of an institutional subsidy, it is given as a
percentage of the organisation’s overall budget. In the case of ECCP, the two calculations
would probably not differ much.
TMF contribution
Type of subsidy
ECCP
Int Alert
Pax Christi
War Child
IKV
Saferworld
Programme
Institutional
Institutional
Institutional
Institutional
Programme
Subsidy relative to total
budget for programme
or institution
27 %
4%
31 %
11 %25
24 %
50 %
Table 5.5 Contribution of TMF subsidy relative to total programme or institutional budget
The text below describes the activities undertaken by each of the organisations in the
framework of TMF. It should be noted that for four of the organisations (International Alert,
Pax Christi, IKV, and War Child), this description corresponds with what would be a general
description of the organisations’ activities. This is because these organisations have received
institutional subsidies that could be used for the support and improvement of all their work.
This also goes to some extent for ECCP, for which the programme subsidised covered almost
all of its activities. Saferworld received a programme subsidy and for this organisation only
the relevant programme is described and assessed.
For each organisation, the objectives as stated in the TMF application are given, followed by
an overview of programmes and projects.
IKV’s TMF application includes detailed logframes of planned activities and objectives. Its
overall aims are:
· conflict prevention
25
Realisatie 2004, aandeel van subsidies overheden en anderen aan de totale beschikbare middelen, War Child,
Staat van Baten en Lasten.
39
·
·
·
·
·
·
international presence and protection
democratisation and community building
harmonisation of ethnic relations
improvement of the position of women in conflict
reconciliation through religion
globalisation of education about peace issues
Three important elements of IKV’s work are political lobby and advocacy, social
mobilisation, campaigning and horizontal linking, supporting longlasting partnership and
running actual programmes on the ground. The latter activity, asides from its direct value, also
complements the political work, because it enables IKV to stay in touch with what happens on
the ground and it lends legitimacy to political campaigning.
Advocacy and lobby are not undertaken according to a fixed strategy but are designed to fit
the particular situation. Often, IKV functions as a facilitator that creates a voice and platform
for local partners. In some cases its staff participates in debates themselves, mostly to
contribute to discussions taking place in the Netherlands at that moment. Since the departure
of the previous Secretary-General, who had always acted as the face of IKV, more faces now
represent IKV. Lobbying focuses mostly on the public debate, although political lobbying
also takes place.
A good example of a successful programme, which has all the elements of IKV’s work, is the
Srebrenica programme, which has combined publicity with the carrying out of projects to
achieve normalisation and democratisation in Srebrenica itself. In addition, there have been
various horizontal exchange activities, including linking the Dutch Westerbork memorial
centre with groups that established a Srebrenica memorial centre. Naturally it has been also
the subject of intensive political lobby and advocacy in the Netherlands. The Srebrenica
example illustrates the fact that IKV thinks less in terms of project, but focuses on the broader
process, which includes various elements. One piece of evidence of the programme’s impact
is that the Dutch foreign minister asked IKV for advice about the recent 10-year anniversary
of Srebrenica.
Another interesting programme has been around Iraq, where IKV has supported an
independent newspaper and various civil society movements for democratisation, human and
women’s rights and interethnic dialogue, after the rather high-profiled role in the public
debate in the Netherlands before, during and after the war. Before the war IKV was
compounded by internal discussions within IKV, while the media only focussed their
attention on one side of the IKV’s message about Iraq (the concern for the human rights
situation and the human security under the Saddam Housein regime) and blurred IKV’s
further message then (on the need for UN recognition and backing). After and during the war,
though, IKV managed to maintain the public attention to the realities on the ground in Iraq
and the unstable security situation.
An example of a negative experience has been with the Inter-Religious Community Centre in
Bosnia, which was set up partly because of pressures from the Dutch constituency to do more
about religion, rather than at the demand of local partners. Another negative aspect of that
project was that immediately an institution was created where another form of cooperation
might have been better. Fortunately, these kinds of mistakes are not made often and the
project is an exception to the rule. In the Balcans, now, other more genuinely conceived and
40
relative successful interreligious dialogue activities and political lobby for freedom of religion
have been staged..
ECCP applied for TMF programme funding to finance its Networking for Peace programme,
which aimed to systematise the different ECCP activities. The below text describes the
programme as it was intended at the time of the TMF application.
“The implementation of this programme will enable the ECCP to ensure a continuous and
sustainable service in information sharing, networking and advocacy for civil society actors
working for peace worldwide. Importantly this will be the basis for running projects like
Searching for Peace and the Civil Society Programme26 and will provide the space to give the
necessary follow-up to these projects, like:
- establishing new, and maintaining current, relationships and cooperation with keyorganisations and key-resource persons in the different regions in order to implement
programmes of mutual interest
- collecting and documenting reflections on lessons learned and best practices
- regularly updating the conflict surveys and directories.
Next to following up on running projects, the implementation of this programme enables the
ECCP to undertake activities specifically targeted at civil society in conflict areas, such as:
- organising and facilitating network meetings
- facilitating the establishment of regional conflict prevention networks composed of
key-NGOs, sub-regional networks, practitioners and academics
- developing lobby and advocacy activities for systematised action to influence specific
target groups to implement conclusions and recommendations for the field
- highlighting the role of local, regional and international civil society in conflict
prevention and peacebuilding through publications and policy documents.
Moreover the ECCP sees the allocation of the thematic co-finance grant as an opportunity to
further strengthen the organisational capacity of the ECCP in order to manage growth, change
and structure, and to develop a more systematic monitoring and evaluation system.”
Expected results from the programme were, according to the application:
1. Comprehensive information on conflicts and various approaches for conflict
prevention and peacebuilding of civil society documented and disseminated
worldwide.
2. Cooperation and networking increased among different actors (civil society, IGOs,
governments, policy makers, academics, media) working for conflict prevention and
peacebuilding worldwide.
Inclusive and multi-track approaches for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, including
support for local capacities for peace, acknowledged and supported by governments, donor
community, civil society, and a broad public.
Networking for Peace was meant to support the Civil Society programme that later became
The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC). The Global
Partnership is a worldwide network of peacebuilding organisations. GPPAC aims for
networking, knowledge exchange, and the formation of a common voice in order to lobby and
26
Later called The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflicts (GPPAC).
41
advocate for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It also makes the documentation of
lessons learned and best practices easier and more comprehensive.
Pax Christi works in all areas of promoting peace and reconciliation, but has a specific focus
on community based disarmament, security and arms trade, and human rights. Pax Christi
International is co-founder of the International Action Network Against Small Arms (IANSA)
and participates in international coalitions concerning nuclear disarmament, child soldiers and
landmines. The international movement also supports many local peace initiatives: "local
capacities for peace".
Current priorities of Pax Christi are:
- Regionally:
· Supporting peace initiatives in the ‘Greater Horn’ of Africa, focusing on the
contribution of civil society to national peace accords in the Sudan, Uganda and the
DRC, and the community-based peacebuilding project in Eastern DRC;
· Supporting peacebuilding and regional cooperation in the Balkans, in the context of
the strategic framework of preparing for EU membership;
· Supporting the DDR programme and civil peace initiatives (democratisation and
human rights) in Colombia, and lobby and advocacy with the European Union and in
the Netherlands on their behalf;
· Supporting peaceful democratic opposition movements in Cuba;
· Supporting democratisation and human rights in the Middle East, in particular Syria,
Lebanon, Jordan, Israel and the Occupied Territories, and taking up lobby and
advocacy activities in the Netherlands and the EU supporting peace negotiations based
on the principles of international law.
Thematically:
· Advocating for the control of small arms and initiating experimental projects in
community-based arms control (“no community security without the resolution of
conflict”).
Economic dimensions of conflict, in particular the role of multinational companies in areas of
conflict (e.g. oil).
The activities of War Child are undertaken from a holistic approach to child development.
Although the main aim of War Child is a peaceful future of children affected by war and the
final impact measurement takes place at child level, this can only be achieved if the
environment is conducive, and protective structures are put in place. This implies building up
societal infrastructures that ensure that child focused activities are embedded in the overall
social development. Many societies in which War Child is currently active do not consider the
psychological needs of children to be a priority. As a result, there are hardly institutions in
these societies that are specifically tasked to promote a healthy psycho-social development of
children affected by domestic conflict and civil war. War Child is promoting the interest of
children by raising the consciousness of local communities at different levels in the countries
in which the organisation operates.
War Child does this, amongst other activities, by organising community meetings, creative
workshops and awareness raising activities. War Child targets important institutions and
social actors in society in order to increase their attention to the psycho-social needs of
children. Moreover, War Child promotes the rights and interests of the children by providing
training (such as physical education) to teachers in primary and elementary schools. In some
of these schools War Child is also involved in the development of the curriculum so as to
42
ensure that the psycho-social needs of the children are taken care of. Furthermore, War Child
promotes children’s interest by transferring know-how in the field of psycho-social treatment
of children affected by enduring wars or other armed conflicts. War Child does this by
organising training sessions and lecture weeks for the staff working for local partner
organisations.
A good example of the above is the set of activities currently implemented by local partner
organisations in Afghanistan. War Child and its local partners are striving to construct a
positive environment that supports the psycho-social needs of children. They are undertaking
this task at different levels, including lobbying and raising awareness at the government level
and particularly at the Ministry of Education for the special needs of children who are
psychosocially severely affected by the war. In Afghanistan War Child and its local partner
organisations work down from the Ministry of Education to other levels of the hierarchy such
as schools and teachers, civil society institutions and the community at large. The objective is
to bring all those different policy structures and actors together in a process in which children
are at the centre and to build up a joint ownership of the initiatives. War Child strives to create
local ownership of the child-focused policy programmes it introduced in Afghanistan.
Similar activities are underway in Sudan where War Child has been active since 1996. War
Child projects in Sudan are also systematically mainstreamed in the government institutions,
knowledge centres such as universities and civil society organisations. Similar to Afghanistan,
the purpose of War Child is to build a conductive environment for the initiatives geared to the
psycho-social needs of children affected by the enduring war. War Child does not want to
focus only on the needs of children affected by war without considering the environmental
structures. War Child believes that the success of its child-centred activities will depend very
much on the extent that supportive structural structures are mobilised and actively used in this
purpose.
Saferworld´s conflict prevention programme aims to maximise the potential of the EU and
wider international community to prevent conflict by undertaking the following activities:
·
·
·
·
·
Raising awareness of the need for effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding;
Researching how the donor community can put conflict prevention and peacebuilding
initiatives at the heart of its external policies and poverty reduction strategies;
Assessing the impact of donor policies on the risks of violence in conflict prone regions
and making practical proposals as to how these policies could be better targeted;
Mainstreaming peace and conflict sensitive development practice in the planning, design,
monitoring and evaluation of development and humanitarian assistance;
Enhancing the capacity of civil society in the EU and Africa to influence the development
of policies and programmes.
Saferworld’s conflict prevention programme involves civil society in the prevention of
conflict and is undertaken in the Horn of Africa, predominately in Ethiopia and Kenya, but
also in Eritrea and Uganda.
The TMF-funded programme is called Enhancing the Capacity of the EU to Foster Peace
and Stability in the Horn of Africa. According to the TMF Application Proposal (2003:1)
the programme is based on the premise that ‘...evidence suggests that there is a need for the
EU to do more to translate the policy commitment into effective and coherent practical action.
Furthermore, the capacity of organisations and networks to engage with the EU and Horn
43
governments on issues related to conflict prevention and peace building remain weak’. Within
this overall goal and context, the general objectives/results of this programme are as follows:
·
·
·
·
·
To create opportunities for dialogue between civil society organisations and the EU, Horn
governments and regional organisations (at a national, regional and European level) on
issues related to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the region (within the
framework of the Cotonou Agreement);
To contribute to the development of and linkages between, sustainable mechanisms of
civil society participation with the framework of Cotonou in the Horn of Africa;
To raise awareness amongst a range of stakeholders in the Horn of Africa and in the EU
(including the European Commission, EU member states, Horn governments, regional
organisations and civil society organisation) of how conflict prevention, management and
peacebuilding can more effectively be addressed within EU policies, strategies and
programmes (and national development strategies);
To build the capacity of civil society actors to undertake research and advocacy as a basis
for dialogue/engagement with the EU and Horn governments and regional organisations;
To increase understanding by civil society organisations in the Horn of Africa region of
the EU and its external polices. In particular, the Cotonou Agreement and its provisions
for civil society participation, its commitment to conflict prevention and the relationship
between EU support and broader development frameworks in the region.
Programme activities include:
o Consultation workshops and training: including seven national and one regional civil
society consultation and training workshops in each country of the Horn of Africa;
o Support to research: including two reports which document lessons learned and a number
of policy orientated research papers by core and secondary partners on peace and conflict
dynamics in the region and donor, in particular EU, engagement;
o Support to policy dialogue and awareness raising: including seven national and one
regional policy dialogue seminars, two roundtables in Brussels, the production of
newsletters and work with the media.
Activities take place in both Europe and the Horn of Africa.
Activities of International Alert fall into five broad and overlapping categories that can be
drawn on singly or in a combination according to the needs of the situation (Overview of
Plans report, 2005:8).
·
Accompaniment in peace processes – offering, according to need, a variety of modes of
assistance for groups involved in peace processes, including those participating in
negotiations;
· Dialogue – creating safe spaces in which to bring together in dialogue groups of people
who are divided by conflict and who would not otherwise be in dialogue with each other
· Capacity building – building partner organisations’ awareness of peacebuilding issues and
the pedagogical, technical and organisational capacities, and encouraging them to think
creatively in order to strengthen the prospects for peace
· Research and analysis – this is the first step in every regional engagement and a
continuing part of the process. It is a mutual process with local partners that is often itself
conducted through dialogue. It is also the basis of Alerts role in policy development
Targeted outreach – raising awareness among key groups in conflict countries and in the UK
of peacebuilding, how it works, and its importance, both as general issues and with reference
44
to specific processes that could benefit from public support. This is the first step towards
harnessing energy to support peacebuilding activities and the work of the sector.
Before we describe the activities of TMF-organisations in East and Central Africa, it is
appropriate to say something about the conflicts in the region. Statements about the relevance
and effectiveness of interventions can only be made with regard to the context in which the
interventions are undertaken. Peacebuilding activities have to address the specific conflicts in
the region in question. They are highly context specific and can only be evaluated with the
causes of the specific conflicts in mind, which they want to address.
5.2. TMF-funded activities in East and Central Africa
5.2.1. Conflicts in East and Central Africa
Conflicts in East and Central Africa have many dimensions. They differ not only from
country to country, but also from province to province within the same country. Practically all
conflicts in the region have more than one cause, - which means that even if one of the root
causes is addressed, conflicts drag on. The different conflicts in the region interact. Peace in
one part of the region can lead to an intensification of conflict in another part, because
weapons may find their way to other places, fighters may move on, groups get more resolved
in their demands. The table below provides a survey of root causes in the six countries visited.
It shows at the same time the similarities of conflicts, but also the differences from country to
country. It does not show the variety of conflicts and their causes within every country, nor
does it show how the conflicts are connected with each other across national borders.
The table gives a rough indication of the accumulation of conflict causes and of the
similarities and dissimilarities. Whether any of the causes mentioned is at work in a specific
country or not and how prominent one cause is in comparison to another can be debated and
is, indeed, a topic of debate. This is not the place to continue this debate or to offer an indepth analysis of individual conflicts. What we want to underline is the multitude of causes,
many of which cannot be successfully addressed by NGOs (alone)
NGOs often do not address the root causes but make efforts to prevent their translation into
violent conflicts (by mediation, dialogue, advocacy, awareness raising, institution building),
reduce the circulation of arms or deal with the psychosocial problems of trauma healing and
reconciliation. The fact that the root causes often remain unaddressed implies that the danger
of conflicts breaking out again always remains very high, - and can frustrate years of
dedicated work by NGOs and CBOs.
The picture of a wide variety of causes makes it obvious that we cannot compare the activities
of TMF-organisations and their partners with the root causes in order to evaluate whether the
activities are adequate or not. There is a dramatic need to address all the different causes. It is
impossible to judge that specific activities would be irrelevant in this context. But it is also
clear that any feasible set of interventions by TMF-organisations as such is insufficient to
bring peace. It may just help to decrease the chance of a violent escalation a little bit, but that
is difficult to prove.
The enormous challenge to address all these causes make it also easier to understand that
different organisations can do very different things, without feeling the need to coordinate
45
their activities with others, as there may not be many others involved in a similar activity in
the same area, in spite of the overall large number of peacebuilding initiatives.
46
Country
Burundi
DRC
Ethiopia
Kenya
Sudan
Uganda
Causes
Colonial
heritage
Ideological
cleavages
Foreign
Interference
Secession
conflicts
Autocratic
government
Failing
States
Regional
imbalances
Ecological
scarcity
Youth
unemployment
Resource
curse
Religious
conflicts
Sedentary vs.
nomadic
Ethnic
strife
Tribal
clashes
Roaming
bandits
Table 5.6: Causes of conflict in countries in East and Central Africa (See the reports on Central Africa and the
Horn of Africa by the International Crisis Group (http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1144&l=1),
the sources in the Ethnic Conflict Research Digest of INCORE, a common project of the United Nations
University and the University of Ulster (http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/ecrd/) and the causes mentioned in
the “Notitie Grote Meren” of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs of February 2004)
5.2.2. Activities of TMF-organisations in the region
Below is a description of the activities undertaken by the TMF organisations in East and
Central Africa, which has been the regional focus of this evaluation. As Saferworld’s TMF
funding is specifically for a Horn of Africa programme, this information is already recounted
above. IKV does not have any activities in the region.
47
The activities of the TMF organisations in Eastern and Central Africa correspond with the
intervention strategies in table 5.3. They include
· Networking: organising exchanges, developing joint action agendas, and joint lobby
and advocacy.
· Lobby and advocacy: most of the organisations pay a lot of attention to this in Eastern
and Central Africa, working to influence local and national policy makers (in the
region as well as in the North) and regional and international organisations to get them
to pay more attention to conflict prevention and peacebuilding, or to take concrete
action in a specific conflict. This includes writing policy papers, making presentations
to conferences where state representatives are present, media strategies, informal
discussions with policymakers, and the organisation of parliamentary delegations.
Lobbying and advocacy also takes place around specific issues such as the
proliferation of small arms and the role of women.
· Dialogue: TMF organisations organise small-scale dialogues, for example between
returning former combatants and their communities and between members of
conflicting groups.
· Research: is done to learn about more and less successful working methods and
experiences as well as to establish the local context for activities. This is done to
inform the work of the own organisation as well as for other constituencies, including
local groups and governmental and non-governmental donor agencies. Research is
also carried out to collect information for advocacy purposes.
· Capacity building: this most often takes the form of organising training workshops for
local partners and other groups, including teachers and local governance institutions.
In some cases new institutions, platforms or forums are created to facilitate dialogue
and support and sustain peace processes. Training is provided on various issues
including gender mainstreaming, election participation and monitoring, professional
training, conflict analysis and prevention, and peace education. In addition, manuals
are developed and materials provided.
· Psychosocial assistance
· Horizontal linking
ECCP: In the context of this evaluation, the regional GPPAC network for East and Central
Africa was studied during a field visit to Kenya, as well as by attending the global conference
in New York. There, ECCP’s partner Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa (NPI-Africa) took the
lead in bringing organisations together and facilitating the regional process that led to the
formulation of a Regional Action Agenda. The regional process started in March 2003 with a
meeting to which a number of strategic actors from the various countries were invited. As a
Regional Initiator, NPI-Africa has convened, coordinated and developed the GPPAC
programme at the regional level, in cooperation with the National Focal Points in the various
countries.
The process took different forms in the different countries. Some organised national
consultation conferences, other would visit organisations, and still others lacked a significant
national consultation process. The National Focal points would consult regularly with NPIAfrica and be responsible for the process at the national level. This also goes for the flow of
information: NPI-Africa sends emails to the National Focal Points (as well as a number of
other stakeholders), who are supposed to forward them to the members in their country. NPIAfrica does not have a clear picture of the extent to which this has taken place.
48
The national processes culminated in a Regional Consultation, organised by NPI-Africa and
co-funded with TMF money, in October 2004. It resulted in a Regional Action Agenda, a
press release and a report. Recommendations were distributed at the UN-African Union
conference on the Great Lakes region that took place several weeks later. A Great Lakes issue
paper was also developed.
The Regional Action Agenda constituted one of the inputs for the Global Action Agenda that
was presented at the global civil society conference organised in the framework of GPPAC at
the UN Headquarters in New York in July 2005. NPI-Africa co-organised an Africa Panel at
that conference. Various representatives of member organisations in the region went to the
global conference.
Pax Christi’s Great Lakes programme concentrates on Northern Uganda, Southern Sudan,
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and regional networking, which equally
includes partner organisations in Burundi and Rwanda. The field visit focused on Pax
Christi’s work in the DRC and regional networking, as well as on activities undertaken out of
the Nairobi office.
As far as these DRC and regional networking activities are concerned, the distribution of
money, time and effort is roughly as follows:
· Community Peacebuilding in Ituri district (North Eastern Congo) – 1/2
· Regional Reconciliation Platform (DRC, Rwanda, Burundi) –1/3
· Other areas around Iuti (Haute Uele, etc. – North Eastern Congo) –1/6
The work in Ituri district is based on a “Two-Year Programme for Justice and Reconciliation
in Ituri” formulated in March 2004. The plan was the result of a long process that started with
a cross-border conference on small arms trafficking in Arua (Uganda) in February 2003,
which drew around 150 participants from DRC, Sudan and Uganda. This was followed by
meetings with the two Congolese Dioceses, the Protestant Churches and women’s groups,
other peacebuilding groups, as well as the (secular) human rights organisation “Justice Plus”
from the district’s capital Bunia, which took the lead on behalf of the Congolese partners.
The plan provided for the establishment of and support to Local Peace Committees
(“Initiatives Locales de Paix”), different kinds of reconciliation activities, re-integration of
former militia members into their communities, education on human rights and women rights
issues, general peace education especially with teachers, training on arms control and
community based security, activities in view of strengthening the position of youngsters, civic
and voter education in preparation for the 2006 elections, and trauma healing (which in
practice is only partially implemented). On the basis of the field visit and interviews with the
staff of Pax Christi, it should be noted that building a platform of indigenous groups
representing the different ethnic communities, the different religions, women, youth and
human rights groups in a setting of conflict and an extremely weakened civil society is not an
easy thing to do. As all members in civil society, as far as they survived the war, were one
way or the other implicated or seen as implicated in the ethnic war, there was no sole reliable
partner anymore present. In order to safeguard a credible peace message and access to all
communities it was necessary to establish cooperation with all segments of Ituri society. This
succeeded and helped communities across conflict lines to cooperate with each other.
The regional networking, supported by Pax Christi and its sister organisations from Flandres,
Wallonia, Germany and Italy, includes, in addition to groups from DRC, peace oriented
groups and organisations from Rwanda and Burundi (now totalling around 30). In this case,
49
there are hardly any donor relationship with Pax Christi, which rather fulfils the role of
facilitator and international conduit for joint lobby and advocacy activities.
The network has so far convened three annual meetings, in Bukavu, Kinshasa, and
Bujumbura, respectively, and two preparatory meetings with the antennas (one in Goma and
one in Kampala). These are cross border reconciliation meetings with human rights and peace
NGOs from the three countries involved (from all different government and rebel held
territories), often concluded with a political statement and/or a public rally. Next to these
meetings every year all members in all three countries organise a peace week at the same
moment. A meeting in Kigali was planned for November 2004, but at that period the
Rwandese parliament attacked all human rights NGOs and many people were forced to flee.
The meeting was subsequently moved to Bujumbura. In 2006 a large gathering will be
organised in Kigali. The phase ahead will be a further structuring of the network according to
the wishes of participants and the definition of a legal framework. Challenges still faced are
the lack of a central coordination point and a joint plan of action. On the positive side, the
network does provide an effective lobby tool for the Pax Christi movement as a whole, in
particular towards the EU and its individual Member States, the UN (e.g. Great Lakes
Conference of October 2004), and the various (national and regional) Bishops Conferences.
As for the organisation as a whole, lobby and advocacy constitute an important and integral
part of Pax Christi’s work with respect to the Great Lakes Region, as illustrated by the
example of the regional network. Pax Christi is currently the chair of the European Coalition
on Oil in Sudan (ECOS), comprising over 80 NGOs. As the chair of ECOS, Pax succeeded,
for example, in negotiating benchmarks for resuming oil production in Sudan with the top of
the oil company TOTAL. Pax also chairs two Dutch NGO platforms, one focusing on the
Great Lakes and the other on the Congo, and plays a leading role in their lobby efforts.
Among other points, the lobby focuses on a more regional approach to the Great Lakes by the
Dutch Government. On the European level emphasis is put on a more coherent and joint
approach to the Great Lakes by the different governments, notably Belgium, France and Great
Britain. In 2004, Pax Christi co-organized two Dutch parliamentary delegations, one to the
Great Lakes region and another one to Sudan, and facilitated meetings between Archbishop
Monsengwo and the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation, with the SecretaryGeneral of the European Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, Javier Solana, and with the EU’s Special Representative for the Great Lakes
Region, Aldo Ajello. These initiatives aimed to keep pressure on the European powers to
continue their support for MONUC, the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC.
War Child’s Africa programme recently underwent significant changes both initiated by
Headquarters (start of activities in Uganda) and due to contextual and political changes.
Following a security incident in Bukava, the DR Congo expatriate team has been evacuated
and all programme activities were suspended for three months in 2004. Activities were
resumed later on in a “bridge programme”, carried out by national staff. The programme in
the DR Congo now consists in capacity building of five local NGOs in Bukavu.
In Eritrea, War Child’s programme closed smoothly in 2004 due to the government’s shift of
its policy from relief to development.
Two orientation missions to establish possibilities for intervention in the Northern part of
Uganda led to the start of activities there in the autumn of 2004 in spite of security problems,
50
because few conflict situations in the world involve so many children so directly and
extremely as this one.
By far the largest (and oldest) programme of War Child in East and Central Africa is the
programme in Sudan. War Child Holland started in Sudan in 1998. Initially, it mainly focused
on trust building and gaining confidence among various communities and groups in the
society of Sudan that are seen as beneficiaries and target groups of its project activities.
During the initial period War Child financed some projects implemented by local communitybased organisations (CBOs) and associations. In addition War Child undertook capacity
building activities geared to building up and upgrading the capacity of its own national staff
such as training a team of Creative Development Workers (CDWs). It is through these CDWs
that War Child subsequently began implementing directly the psychosocial interventions for
children traumatized by war, loss and displacement. War Child also provided training to
teachers, para-professionals, caregivers and volunteers in certain local NGO’s and CBOs that
are active at grassroots level. The objective of the training was to transfer the creative
psychosocial methodological skills of War Child to Sudan. Similarly, War Child provided
training to certain international organisations that had been developing psychosocial creative
projects in Sudan such as Save the Children (UK), Enfants du Monde, Terre de Hommes, etc.
In 2000 War Child Holland actually started implementing projects in Sudan on its own. Since
then the project activities of War Child in Sudan have expanded both in size and space. The
creative psychosocial project activities of War Child Holland in Sudan are now implemented
in four locations: Khartoum- Khartoum State, Malakal- Upper Nile State, Juba-Eastern
Equatoria State and El Geneina – West Darfur. The El Geneina project in West Darfur has
been closed on 31 December 2005 mainly due to security concerns.
In each location, the project activities of War Child have increased as it implements several
activities at the same time such as training, awareness raising and advocacy campaigns aimed
to achieve a wider public attention in Sudan to aspects related to child rights and other related
social issues. Also, in each location, War Child supports local CBOs and organisations
implementing activities geared to improve the social position of the most marginalised
children and youth in the Sudan society.
War Child provides training services with the objective of transferring its psychosocial
creative methodological skills to the country. In this endeavour, War Child has succeeded
very well. War Child has trained hundreds of para professionals, teachers, caregivers,
Creative Development Workers, youth volunteers in all the four locations in Sudan. War
Child has also trained a large number of staff working for several international organisations
active in the same field.
The field visit for International Alert focused on the activities of Alert’s partner in Burundi,
the Dushirehamwe network. The goal of Dushirehamwe’s programme in the framework of
TMF is to enable women’s engagement in building sustainable peace in the Great Lakes. The
five key objectives and the respective activities of Dushirehamwe are:
·
To reinforce the capacities of Burundian women and their associations so that they
can analyse the conflict and develop a community vision for a lasting peace in
Burundi. Women leaders, teachers and community members are trained in conflict
analysis/prevention, community/social transformation, paralegal training, and peace
51
·
·
·
·
education. This training takes place in 13 provinces. There are already 173 trainers,
210 leaders, 632 committee staff and over 5000 association members. Dushirehamwe
also gave support to females in the recent election process, through sensitising
community groups to the potential role of women MPs/community advocates and
through supporting women MPs once they are in office. In addition, Dushirehamwe
lobbies Parliament to ensure that women are viewed as central to the national decision
making process. The promotion of women MPs is followed up with media and
community promotions on ‘gender’ for both men and women. Dushirehamwe are also
promoting the mainstreaming of gender into national legal texts as well as having
leaflet promotions.
To set up rapprochement amongst women in order to promote future solidarity,
mutual confidence and national reconciliation. There is a specific focus on enabling
women to be the primary vehicles for rapprochement between the established
community and the newly returning displaced, and also to facilitate the integration of
former combatants. Dushirehamwe organise meetings between established women
from the community and women of those who are returning, enabling friendships to be
formed and discussions on problem resolution to take place. Cultural activities are also
organised to consolidate friendships. The rapprochement activities are always
followed up with social reintegration initiatives; this often involves material support –
clothing, money and food for the returnees or ex-combatants.
To provide women with an understanding of the protection of human rights.
Dushirehamwe provides paralegal training focussing on women and families and
sensitisation to national and international conventions and resolutions on the
protection of women.
To support women’s initiatives for socio-economic self promotion. Dushirehamwe
provide advice and training on bee keeping, animal husbandry, cultivation, arts and
crafts and micro enterprise. Other organisations such as international NGOs provide
the assets whilst Dushirehamwe provide the connection between the community and
the international NGOs.
To reinforce the capacities of institutions and organisations of Dushirehamwe.
Dushirehamwe have to continually adapt to the changing environment, so it follows
that they must ensure that they possess the capacity to deal with change. This is
closely related to the first objective above, whereby committees are trained in
budgeting, reporting, human resource management and community organisation. This
training is usually provided by an external consultant. To increase their own capacity
Dushirehamwe often collaborate with other local and international organisations.
Section 5.4. below will build on these descriptions of activities, and focus on outcomes and
impact, in so far as these can be determined.
52
5.3. Chain analysis
In the original tender document for this evaluation, the team evaluating the TMF
organisations in the field of peacebuilding, not yet knowing which organisations had been
selected for the evaluation, assumed that the normal chain of relationship would be as
depicted in Figure 5.1, with many intervening variables influencing the final outcome.
BZ
TMForganisations
Local
partners
Final
target
groups
Figure 5.1.: Traditional chain model of development cooperation
However, the range of activities carried out by the TMF organisations does not really fit into
this scheme. Many activities are network activities, advocacy and lobbying activities in the
North, or lobbying activities in the South by the TMF organisations themselves, and not their
local partners (or only in collaboration with their Northern partners). There are good reasons
for that. Local partner organisations might be prosecuted, harassed or discriminated against by
local authorities, and the impact of direct interaction between them and Northern TMF
organisations can be much larger than any lobby activity by local organisations alone.
In other cases, the success of an intervention in conflict situations depends very much on
being recognized as impartial. Working through local partners in such a case would not be
very productive.
In general, democracy (and peace) building needs to occur from the bottom-up, but it can be
facilitated by top-down pressure from international organisations and Western states. The
work of local partners often could not be successful without the simultaneous support from
outside institutions. Besides, political interventions focus too often on the national context
rather than the broader region.
The TMF organisations evaluated do work a lot with local partners, but there is no clear-cut
chain of decision-making or policy input in either direction. There is in most cases money
flowing down the chain, but, as described above, field activities are also carried out directly
by TMF organisations – and networking activities have a unique form of their own. In
addition, even where TMF funding has flowed via TMF organisations to local partners for the
implementation of activities, it has usually been only one of multiple sources used to realise
projects.
For these reasons, this section will not so much provide a traditional chain analysis, but
instead focus on the relationships between the various actors in the chain. It will address the
relationship between the Ministry and the TMF organisations; the relationships between the
53
TMF organisations and their partners; and the relationship or interactions between the
Ministry and the local partners, via Embassies, in so far as the evaluation has been able to
establish these. The question of impact on target groups, insofar as it can be answered at this
stage, is addressed in the Results chapter under Organisation-specific objectives – and is
therefore not addressed here.
Dutch government
TMF
Bilateral
funding
Dutch /
international
NGO
Little
communication
about TMF and
other Dutch
Southern
governments
Dutch
Embassies
Southern partners
More interaction
desirable
Little monitoring of
Dutch-funded activities,
little coordination of
information flows
Figure 5.2: Funding relationships and (potential) communication flows
We do not only analyse existing relationships, we also want to point out relationships which
are not yet strong, but should become stronger in the future. In Figure 5.2, the red arrows
represent existing funding and/or communication flows. The blue dashed arrows represent
communication channels that do not work well at present. In Chapter 4, when discussing the
role of civil society in peacebuilding, and in Chapter 5, when discussing the relevance of
objectives to the theme of peacebuilding, we noted that peacebuilding requires a role for both
civil society and governments in order to be effective. We also noted that coordination
between them is needed. This is something that does not happen sufficiently at present. The
Dutch government, as a donor, could play a role in this by stimulating Southern governments
and civil society actors to work together.
It is important to recognise however that there are important cases in which cooperation with
governments is not possible. When a government is completely authoritarian, civil society is
54
forced to play a role of opposition. In addition, conflict regions are often characterized by
failing states. In those cases, civil society actors try to work with a variety of different actors
to get their work done (the so-called multi-actor approach). Bilateral assistance for institution
building is an important prerequisite to deal with failing states. Cooperation between civil
society and donors providing such assistance can matter there.
In any case, the embassies could play an important role in making cooperation happen, by
facilitating information exchange and communication between the various players in the
picture, and linking these to other Dutch-funded activities in a country, and to activities of
others (UN, World Bank, other donors). The embassies could help provide a picture about
what happens as a result of the various Dutch funding flows towards a country: TMF, MFO,
bilateral, and Embassy funding.
Aside from playing a more active role in bringing governments and NGOs together,
embassies should gather information about these various Dutch aid flows more generally,
identifying overlaps, possibilities for synergy, and gaps, and making this known to the various
parties involved. Thus, in figure 5.2., the Embassies have a much more central role than is
presently the case.
5.3.1. Relationship between Ministry and TMF-organisations
There is a regular policy dialogue between Ministry and individual TMF-organisations
(mostly) in October, after the organisations have submitted their yearly report, and before they
put together their annual plan. In addition, meetings are sometimes organised around specific
topics. Views about the usefulness of these meetings vary.
Two new staff members have recently taken over the TMF dossier at DMV. Both did not get
a profound introduction when joining DMV a few months ago, due to a heavy workload of the
department. Each has the responsibility for a number of dossiers (such as “Reconstruction
after Tsunami”), - the administrative work like the contacts with the TMF organisations
comes on top of that. These dossiers demand a lot of time and are often urgent and therefore
get priority. The follow-up with the TMF organisations thereby ends up being of somewhat
secondary importance to their overall task package.
There is a gap between TMF-organisations’ expectations in terms of communication and
policy dialogue on the one hand, and the capacity of DMV and the way policy is made on the
other (see the discussion about expectations under “Efficiency” at the beginning of the
“Results” section). More generally, some of the TMF organisations feel they are not taken
seriously as policy partners who have important experience to share.
One of the TMF organisations is highly critical about the way in which contact persons in the
Ministry dealt with it; the others are more moderate. The perception of some DMV staff
members of this critical organisation is equally negative. Personal issues play a role, but
DMV staff is also critical of the lack of progress with one organisation’s administrative and
M&E procedures. The organisation on the other hand feels underappreciated for the good
work it has been doing.
Something that appears to have put a strain on relations between the Ministry and several
TMF organisations was the release of the Clingendael report on the role of civil society and
55
peacebuilding in November 2004, and the interactions that followed. In discussing the role of
civil society in peacebuilding the report bears directly on mechanisms funding civil society
work such as TMF.
What matters for the development of the relationship between the Ministry and some of the
TMF organisations is the interaction that followed the release of this report. TMForganisations were highly critical of its content, and asked a number of academics to
formulate a response to it. The academics’ responses indeed were critical, focusing among
other things on the methodology of the report and the sources used, but also criticising its
content. The academics’ feedback was made available to the Ministry – but the latter never
responded.
Representatives of TMF organisations were also disappointed by their lack of involvement in
the way the research had been carried out. Given their own research and experience regarding
civil society and peacebuilding, they would have been willing and able to contribute to the
report – but were never asked to do so. They also proposed to organise a follow-up
discussion, but did not receive a reaction to that. They were anxious that the report would
form the basis for policy, and to some extent see their fear confirmed.
The episode has contributed to a deterioration of relations between DMV and some
organisations. The content of the report has led to a more negative expectation of the
achievements of peacebuilding organisations on the part of the Ministry, as became evident
during conversations with DMV staff members. The response to the report by the TMF
organisations was seen by at least one DMV staff member as a sign of TMF organisations’
unwillingness to be self-critical. TMF organisations maintain that they have a strong interest
in an objective analysis of their contribution to conflict prevention, but did not see that this
literature study without feedback from stakeholders could be regarded as that. The Ministry’s
lack of response to the feedback they had commissioned led to a more negative perception of
the staff at DMV.
At DMV, staff rotate every three years. When a staff member is succeeded by someone new
to the field, as often happens, there is little transfer of experience (as mentioned above).
There is however a certain transfer of perceptions about the field of NGOs and about
particular TMF organisations. This can be frustrating for organisations in their interactions
with new staff when they feel that a judgment has already been made before the interaction
starts.
Procedures
For some of the organisations not all conditions of the TMF programme were clear when
TMF funding was applied for. Staff at DMV point out that the available documentation
should have been better read. There are also complaints that choices made by the Ministry -in terms of allocation and rejection of funds applied for -- were not sufficiently motivated and
appeared arbitrary. Even though there was feedback this did not explain the choice for a
particular amount over another one. DMV staff explains that the amounts allocated were
highly dependent on the funds available for a given round. Another complaint is that there
was little room for discussion about the process and the amounts of funding given. On the
other hand, DMV points out that any organisation could have appealed its decision. The one
organisation that did, IKV, was successful (see Chapter 4 above).27
27
IKV made an appeal to the Ministry’s decision on the ground that it was in conflict with promises made earlier
about the funding of a programme in Macedonia.
56
An example of little clarity of procedures and difficulty of communication is the development
around the transforming of the ECCP subsidy from a programme subsidy into an institutional
one. At some point the contact person at the Ministry recommended that ECCP should do so.
It took ECCP a long time to try and find out exactly what this transformation of the subsidy
would mean. In the meantime the Ministry contact person moved to another post. His
replacement mentioned a condition for institutional subsidies that was new to ECCP: that an
organisation can only qualify for an institutional subsidy if it contributes directly to poverty
reduction. Furthermore, the whole application procedure in that case would have to start
anew, and the stricter criteria for institutional funding would have to be met. To ECCP, the
requirement of a direct contribution to poverty reduction was not only a surprise but also a
questionable statement, as they had considered the thematic approach as implying that
different organisations contribute indirectly to poverty reduction via their own theme-specific
work.
It is also unclear to some TMF organisations exactly how their performance is appraised by
the Ministry. The Ministry has invited TMF organisations to a meeting to discuss M&E and
the dilemma of being a learning organisation on the one hand, while being accountable on the
other. Unfortunately there was never any follow-up.
The TMF organisations also would have liked more clarity with regard to the future subsidy
system that replaces TMF. There have been a lot of questions and concerns about this and it
has been difficult to get answers from the Ministry. Once a new subsidy framework was
presented, this still did not answer all questions; moreover, it is met with some criticism. For
the organisations funded in the 2004-07 TMF round, the new system unexpectedly starts a
year before the end of the financing period (the next round starts in 2007 and there will not be
another round in 2008) and it is difficult for them to get their affairs in order in time for the
application that is due in April 2006. Another criticism is that the new subsidy framework
applies the same procedures to organisations with 10 and with 300 staff. It is also said that the
framework does not take into account the ongoing discussion about the special nature of
peacebuilding and networking and the need for different types of indicators and M&E
procedures for that kind of work. Partnerships are defined quite traditionally as donorrecipient relations, something that does not always apply to the peacebuilding field. In
addition, the framework demands that organisations demonstrate that their work is
complementary to the Ministry’s non-TMF funding policies, which is difficult to do without
staging a research into these other funding policies.
Some organisations (notably, ECCP, International Alert, and Saferworld) would have liked to
see more flexibility on the part of the Ministry. The TMF funding is considered rigid; an
organisation applies and if successful receives a set amount of funding over a defined number
of years. This provides stability which is essential for planning purposes. However,
circumstances change over a four-year period, particularly in conflict situations, and changes
in activities to better reach objectives should be understood in this light. In certain
circumstances a scaling up of funding to cover additional relevant activities would help the
funded organisation respond to changing needs.
However, opinions about the flexibility of the TMF programme vary considerably. The
opinion of the Ministry and at least one of the TMF organisations is that the programme is
very flexible indeed. The untied nature of the institutional funding has enabled a lot of
flexibility in the way the money is spent. A Ministry staff member considers TMF to have
57
been highly flexible in that it is a mechanism which can be adapted in many ways. For a
newcomer to a dossier, this has implied a lot of “detective work” to find out what was initially
applied for, what has changed etc.
In part this difference of opinion can be explained by different interpretations of the concept
“flexibility”. If organisations wanted more money during the course of a TMF period, or if
they wanted to spread the TMF differently over the four years than originally agreed, this was
not allowed by the Ministry – for understandable reasons of administration and consistency.
These organisations now complain about inflexibility. But as far as the allocation of the
subsidy within the TMF organisation was concerned, this was quite flexible indeed – at least,
for those who received institutional funding. Programme funding was obviously more tied,
and two of the organisations noting inflexibility have received programme funding.
Limited policy dialogue
After the subsidies had been granted, communication between the Ministry and the
organisations was limited, which is regretted by most of the TMF organisations. Not all
organisations receive feedback on reports submitted in the framework of TMF. More
generally, there is no dialogue on content, strategy and policy. In so far as “policy dialogues”
are organised these focus only on management and financial issues. This is regretted by the
organisations.
International Alert, Saferworld, IKV, Pax Christi and ECCP all explicitly stated the desire for
more of a partnership between them and the Ministry. Interaction on content - through
meetings, feedback on reports, and the like - is low compared to other donors. The
organisations felt that ultimately the Ministry was loosing out because dialogue can be
essential to maintaining the efficiency and effectiveness of the Ministry’s work – as a donor
and as a political agent in its own right. With better communication both funder and recipient
benefit, and the impact in target areas is more significant.
For example, it is International Alert’s policy to meet with core donors twice a year to update
them on activities and listen to donors concerns – but to date there has been no such meeting
with the Dutch Ministry. Alert is concerned about this because such meetings provide a
valuable forum for discussion and analysis which ultimately improves the donors’
understanding of the operating environment and strategic issues affecting Alerts planning and
implementation activities. This reinforces Alert’s perception that TMF funding is allocated
with the Ministry not caring too much for any lessons learned that Alert may have to offer.
Such lessons could be of strategic relevance to the Ministry’s operating procedures and policy
frameworks. Similar complaints are voiced by ECCP and IKV.
There have been efforts by TMF organisations to start a policy dialogue with the Ministry,
and indeed several meetings were organised around specific issues. However, TMF
organisations complain that these meetings were never followed up on. DMV retorts that the
organisations could themselves also be more active and that if meetings are requested they
usually take place. At the same time, Ministry staff also caution against too high expectations
about TMF organisations’ ability to provide inputs for policy – policy mostly is formulated
as a result of decisions by the Minister or developments in Parliament rather than in response
to voices from ‘the field’.
58
Interaction between the Ministry and TMF-organisations takes place at three levels. There are
very few linkages between these three levels:
(a) the interaction with the contact persons at DMV to which TMF-organisations
report. This interaction is largely limited to administrative matters. There is
little real dialogue at this level, mainly because of the heavy workload at
DMV;
(b) the interaction with the regional desks staff, which takes place at conferences,
theme meetings and other platforms around issues or regions. This interaction
is quite intensive and content related. People tend to be part of the same
“epistemic communities”, have a strong interest in the topics at hand, and
speak the same language. Access to these forums may, however, well be
unequal with the long established lobby organisations such as Pax Christi and
IKV being better able to find the right avenues than the newer organisations
like War Child and ECCP; the non-Dutch organisations generally do not
participate at all;
(c) Some of the six TMF-organisations under review are in direct contacts with
top policy makers (the Minister, Members of Parliament) and high-level civil
servants. For this level the above qualification about unequal access is even
more true.
Within DMV, a discussion has started on how best to handle contacts with TMF-organisations
in a different way and to do more efforts – if capacity allows – to use the experience of TMF(and MFO-) organisations and to be more proactive in bringing staff from the Ministry, from
the Embassies and from TMF- and MFO-organisations together who share the same interests
in specific regions, sectors or issues.
5.3.2. Relationship between TMF-organisations and local partners
In most cases partners indicate that the relationship is an equal one, they have a say in
decision-making, and there is mutual accountability.
The field visits largely confirmed what the TMF organisations had already indicated about the
different nature of partnerships in peacebuilding. In many cases, organisations’ local partners
are not the weaker party that need to be supported and developed, with the eventual objective
of a gradual transfer of responsibilities. In the case of networking activities, the partners are
more partners in the regular sense of the word: equal partners in a relationship in which both
sides have something to offer. Partners are selected based on their unique position, experience
or strength, and their ability to facilitate a process at the regional level. In the case of lobby
and advocacy work, partners are often local activists who need the TMF organisation to help
them gain a voice. Conversely, the TMF organisations need their local voice and experiences
in order to have a stronger message for advocacy and lobbying. The organisation of dialogues
requires an outside third party and often cannot be done by local partners themselves. Thus, in
many cases the TMF organisations act not so much as donors (though money does flow from
them to their partners), but as facilitators and international conduits for joint lobby and
advocacy activities.
59
That is not the whole picture, however. The picture is in fact very diverse with strong partners
like NPI-Africa (partner of ECCP in Kenya) and Dushirehamwe (partner of International
Alert in Burundi) at one end of the spectrum, and weak partners like Inter Africa Group (IAG,
partner of Saferworld) and Pax Christi’s incipient network of Ituri civil society groups, at the
other. Where partners have been weak this has sometimes led to problems. For example,
Saferworld found working with IAG difficult because of the lack of management in the latter.
Saferworld feel that a significant part of the problem was that their programme, devised in
London, did not adequately consider the realities of the capacity of IAG.
Most of the TMF organisations engage in capacity building initiatives. In some cases these are
aimed at building the capacity of weaker partners. In other cases they work in cooperation
with partners to build the capacity of other groups.
Inside War Child, a long discussion has taken place on activities in Africa around the
question: can you get enrooted in a region where there are hardly any partners with the
specific psychosocial knowledge and creative methodology that War Child has been
developing over the past ten years? It was concluded to be relevant and feasible, since many
potential links with existing local and international intervention methods and strategies were
available. The main challenge for War Child is to find suitable ways to link new
methodological developments to this existing knowledge in sometimes rapidly changing
violent circumstances. In Sudan, War Child implements a so-called self-implementing
programme, through international staff. In partner programmes, on the other hand, there is no
international field staff from War Child directly involved on the ground.
The text box below illustrates the different types of partnerships with the example of Pax
Christi and its activities in the Great Lakes region.
60
Box 5.1. Different types of partnership: the case of Pax Christi
In the case of Pax Christi, and their work in East and Central Africa, examples can be found of various
types and levels of partnership. On the one hand, Pax Christi participates e.g. in the Working Group on
Small Arms, which works out of Nairobi and covers the 12 countries that signed the Nairobi Declaration,
campaigning, researching and monitoring compliance with the Nairobi Protocols on behalf of regional civil
society and in partnerhip with the (intergovernmental) Regional Centre on Small Arms. As referred to
above, Pax Christi also chairs the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS), which focuses on lobbying
in the North. Both cases exemplify fully equal partnerships within a horizontal network structure. The
partners are clearly mutually accountable and decisions on policy and implementation are taken jointly.
The case of the Regional Reconciliation Platform in the Great Lakes region (in this case, in particular DRC,
Rwanda and Burundi) is an example of a slightly different type of partnership. As an external agency, Pax
Christi plays a specific role, not or hardly as a source of funding, but as a facilitator and an international
conduit for joint lobby and advocacy activities (see Box 5.8). Again, there is a high degree of mutual
accountability and joint decision-making among partners.
In the case of the Ituri network in Eastern Congo, Pax Christi’s role has been much more that of an active
catalyst, providing close support to the various local groups and the network itself, in the form of funding
for joint activities, the organisation of meetings and workshops, and generally by closely monitoring the
developments through frequent visits and consultations, especially in the early phases. Through this slow
and careful process, trust was built between the network members, between them and their local
communities, sharply divided along ethnic, religious and other lines, and between the network and Pax
Christi. It is a clear example of a partnership whose main feature is the building and strengthening of local
capacities in a situation in which hardly any existed. Despite the very different character of the relationship
from the examples referred to above, there is again a high degree of mutual accountability and the partners
are clearly involved in decisions on policy and implementation. This is e.g. illustrated by the fact that the
two-year project document, on which activities are based, was itself the outcome of an extensive process of
consultations and mutual planning, rather than a ready-made imposition from the outside.
5.3.3. Relationship between Ministry and local partners: the role of embassies
The partners visited of ECCP, Saferworld, and International Alert have never had any
contacts with the Dutch embassy in their area of work. Embassies indicated that they do
engage in some monitoring and coordination of Dutch-funded activities, but that this is mostly
ad-hoc and oriented more at MFO activities.
Pax Christi’s relationship with the Netherlands’ Embassies in East and Central Africa vary in
function of the work in the country in question. Relatively intensive contacts exist with the
Embassies in Kampala and Khartoem, since there is a functional motive for the mutual
exchange of information on developments in Eastern Congo, Northern Uganda and Southern
Sudan and the work of various governmental and non-governmental initiatives with regard to
peace and conflict issues. Contacts with the Embassies in Nairobi and Kinshasa are more
sporadic (as Pax Christi is not active in Kenya, while the embassy in Kinshasa is understaffed
(according to Pax Christi) and geographically very far away from Ituri). As the Embassies are
not involved in the contractual (funding, reporting, accounting) relationship between the
Ministry and TMF organisations, the relationship is felt as more open and constructive than it
otherwise might have been.
The contact between War Child and the Netherlands Embassy in Khartoum is limited and
rather informal. No member of the Embassy staff has ever visited the War Child office in
Khartoum. There is no coordination between War Child and the Embassy.
61
Since the Darfur crisis emerged the numbers of Dutch government sponsored NGO’s,
foundations and associations active in different parts of the country has explosively increased.
The monitoring and the evaluation capacity of the Embassy has not expanded and remains as
it was before the civil wars. Only recently two extra diplomats have been stationed there. The
way the Embassy monitors the War Child activities is based only on commenting on reports
that it receives from time to time (from the Ministry in The Hague, not from War Child in
Sudan). The Embassy undertakes field visits to different projects implemented by different
Dutch NGO’s, but the projects are so many that the Embassy has neither the time nor the
manpower to monitor and evaluate all of them.
It appears that the role of the Embassy, and the extent to which it is involved in monitoring or
coordination of TMF-financed activities, depends largely on personal relationships between
Embassy and NGO staff and personal ideas and motivation on the part of Embassy staff.
This information about interaction with Embassies may be specific to East and Central Africa.
IKV notes that its communication with the Embassies in the Balkans, for example, is very
good.
62
5.4. Analysis of specific issues
5.4.1. Efficiency
- Programme level
This evaluation interprets “efficiency” as referring to the relationship between input and
output. Input in this context is the money granted by the Ministry to the organisations in the
peacebuilding field under the TMF programme. Outputs are “deliverables” such as workshops
organised. Asking about efficiency means asking: could the same output have been achieved
with less input?
As will be elaborated below, the TMF funding (input) has contributed to enabling
organisations to live up to their objectives and carry out activities that can be classified as
outputs (developing networks, organising meetings, training activities, lobbying and advocacy
work). In addition TMF has made it possible for those who received institutional funding to
develop their organisational capacity and learning mechanisms. These instruments in
development have been a notable output of TMF. In that sense, the programme has been
efficient.
However, even more or better outputs may have been achieved if communication with and
among the TMF organisations had been better. For example, the speed of the development of
M&E mechanisms varied considerably among organisations and for at least one organisation,
these mechanisms are still not in place. The Ministry is critical of this, but it also carries part
of the blame, because it could have been more supportive in assisting in the development of
procedures.
- Organisation level
At the organisational level it has been difficult to reach any conclusions about the relationship
between TMF input and output, because in most of the cases analysed, TMF provided core,
institutional funding, that did not get allocated to specific activities. However, it can be said
that most of the TMF organisations did use part of the funding to improve their organisational
performance, rather than using it only to fill any holes in the budget.
The organisations that received programme funding provide a diverse picture. In the case of
ECCP, efficiency was high in the sense that a very large programme was built up partly with
TMF subsidies, and that developments were even more rapid than expected. At the same time,
ECCP did not reach the intended outputs in all fields, and M&E procedures kept lagging. In
the case of Saferworld, it is difficult to reach overall conclusions about the efficiency of the
programme because the partner visited may not provide a representative example. That said,
the field visit raised doubts about the efficiency of Saferworld’s partner, which has not
sufficient capacity to deliver the outputs that the inputs would warrant.
One general remark that can be made is that all organisations have roughly the same ratio of
annual expenditure vs. number of staff (see table 5.4 earlier in this chapter), signalling that
general spending efficiency is similar among the organisations. Comparing this ratio of staff
vs. expenditure to “regular” development organisations (which we have not done) may yield a
different result: peacebuilding organisations generally have higher staff costs than more
technical development agencies, because of the people- and knowledge-intensiveness of their
63
work. The capital of peacebuilding organisations is not concentrated in logistics or material,
but in people. This sometimes leads to discussions with controllers who qualify staff costs as
“overhead” which should be brought down. Peacebuilding organisations plea for a better
understanding of their need to employ relatively more staff.
5.4.2. Effectiveness
- Programme level
Effectiveness is understood by the evaluators as referring to the relationship between
programme objectives and outputs. Asking about effectiveness means asking, do the outputs
found contribute to meeting the objectives of the programme? Do activities work, are they in
the right place, at the right time, for the right people, in order to meet the objectives?
The objectives of the TMF rounds under examination were as follows. In the 2003-06 round,
in which Saferworld, IKV, Pax Christi, and War Child were subsidised, the main criteria for
the acceptance of applications, as stated in the policy framework, were
· the contribution to structural poverty reduction (via direct poverty reduction, capacity
building or advocacy);
· efficiency and effectiveness of this contribution;
· a broad societal support in North and South.
No theme-specific criteria were formulated.
All organisations in their TMF applications tried to show the ways in which their
peacebuilding activities contributed to poverty reduction, since this was an objective of the
programme. Indeed it can be said broadly that no development is possible without peace and
that conflict contributes to poverty – in that sense working for peace is working for poverty
reduction as well. However, because the contribution to poverty reduction is indirect, it is
difficult to establish in how far the organisations’ outputs correspond with the objective of
poverty reduction. It follows that the efficiency and effectiveness of the organisations’
contribution to poverty reduction is difficult to establish as well. All the same, this chapter
provides some conclusions about the efficiency and effectiveness of the peacebuilding
activities of the organisations, and this can be interpreted as bearing indirectly on their
contributions to poverty reduction as well.
IKV, Pax Christi, and War Child (and ECCP, which was funded in the next round) are active
in the Netherlands as well as in conflict areas in order to build political and societal support
for peacebuilding work. Particularly IKV and Pax Christi (and ECCP) pay a lot of attention to
lobby and advocacy in both North and South to increase their support base. War Child has
been very successful in the Netherlands to raise attention and money for the cause of waraffected children. In that sense, most of the organisations financed in the 2003-06 round were
effective when it comes to the third objective of building societal support in North and South.
In the 2004-07 round, in which ECCP and International Alert were subsidised, the main
objectives for peacebuilding as stated in the policy framework were
· North-South cooperation based on equal relations and accountability;
· Striving for capacity building through increasing transfer of management and
institutional responsibilities;
· Activities take place in developing countries and aim at:
64
-
involvement of crucial civil organisations in the peace process;
strengthening of representativeness and particularly inclusiveness of
government (centrally and locally);
involvement of women in peacebuilding;
supporting media;
democratic control of security sector.
These objectives can also be seen as an elaboration of the policy framework of 2003-06,
which did not specify objectives for the peacebuilding theme. In that sense they may also be
brought to bear on the organisations financed in that earlier round – but with the important
understanding that these organisations did not know these objectives at the time of their
application.
The objective of North-South cooperation based on equal relations and accountability has
been met by most organisations in their cooperation with their partners, which has mostly
been characterised by mutual accountability. However, the field visit to Saferworld’s partner
Inter Africa Group (IAG) showed that there have been exceptions: in this case the partner was
too weak organisationally to have a genuinely equal partnership. It should be noted however
that this partner may not be representative of Saferworld’s partners: it was identified by the
organisation before the field visit as one of its least successful partnerships.
The objective of capacity building through transfer of responsibilities is being strived for only
in part of the activities, due to the different nature of partnerships in some peacebuilding
activities (see above under “relationships”). Still in some cases capacity building has been an
important activity and partners (such as Dushirehamwe in Burundi and the civil society
network in Ituri) have been enabled to grow and improve effectiveness.
For ECCP, Saferworld, International Alert, IKV, and Pax Christi, the involvement of civil
society actors in peace processes is a central part of their work. War Child pursues similar
objectives, involving communities, teachers, parents and caregivers in their activities.
Strengthening of representativeness and particularly inclusiveness of government is part of the
lobby and advocacy activities of ECCP, Saferworld, International Alert, IKV and Pax Christi.
ECCP has involved government representatives in its networking activities in order to further
this goal. Of course this goal cannot be achieved through civil society funding only and
bilateral assistance to governments should be a complementary activity.
The involvement of women has been the central part of the activities of International Alert’s
partner Dushirehamwe in Burundi. It has also been an explicit part of ECCP’s GPPAC
network (both in terms of participation and content) and of Pax Christi’s Ituri civil society
network. IKV is beginning to pay more attention to the issue of gender. Saferworld’s
Ethiopian partner IAG, which as we wrote above is relatively weak, has not paid attention to
this issue.
Supporting media was not explicitly part of the objectives of any of the organisations and
partners visited. However, the TMF-peacebuilding rounds funded other organisations which
have this as their central aim. These organisations have not been part of this evaluation.
Democratic control of the security sector has been part of the lobbying and advocacy
activities of Pax Christi, IKV, ECCP, International Alert, and Saferworld. For War Child it
65
falls outside the scope of its work. However, as with the accountability of government, this is
not an aim that can be achieved through lobby and advocacy alone and bilateral engagement
with governments can probably help the effort.
- Organisation level
The organisations have all elaborated lists of objectives and intervention strategies as part of
their TMF applications. The TMF organisations appear to have largely acted in accordance
with the plans laid out in their applications. ECCP is the partial exception: its GPPAC
programme developed into the organisation’s central activity in a way that was not foreseen in
the application. However, ECCP states that GPPAC serves the objectives it had written in its
application, and that its success deserves recognition: the network has developed at an
unexpected and impressive pace.
The organisations have largely worked in accordance with their objectives, which is
impressive, particularly when it is taken into account that the working circumstances in
conflict regions were sometimes difficult. Saferworld’s Ethiopian partner IAG, for example,
has had to deal with a rapidly deteriorating political environment in Ethiopia. At the time of
writing, some of its staff are actually in jail.
5.4.3. Relevance
- Programme level
Relevance is understood in this evaluation as referring to the relationship between the overall
aim, peacebuilding, and the objectives of the TMF programme for the peacebuilding theme.
The objectives of the TMF rounds under examination have been listed in the previous section
under “effectiveness”.
Here we will not discuss the relevance of poverty reduction, the main 2003-2006 objective,
for peacebuilding. It is more useful to relate the objectives stated in the 2004-2007 TMF
round to the overall aim of peacebuilding, because these objectives were formulated
specifically for the peacebuilding theme, as opposed to the 2003-2006 objectives.
North-South cooperation based on equal relations and accountability, interpreted here as
referring to the partnerships of the TMF organisations, is relevant to peacebuilding because it
may enable partners to better carry out activities. It also may ensure better policy on the part
of the TMF organisations because this policy will be based in part on inputs by Southern
partners, who are better in touch with local realities and priorities.
Striving for capacity building through increasing transfer of management and institutional
responsibilities is only partly relevant to the field of peacebuilding, for the reasons outlined
above under “relationships”. Nonetheless, although there has been debate about this, most
observers agree that a strong civil society in conflict areas can play a role in achieving and
sustaining peace and democracy, and in that sense the building of their capacity certainly is
relevant. Thus, the relevance of this objective depends on the type of activity undertaken and
the type of partner it is undertaken with.
66
Activities take place in developing countries: this objective is relevant to the extent that most
conflicts take place in developing countries and that poverty and inequality are factors that
can contribute to conflict. Nonetheless the objective is clearly not formulated specifically for
the peacebuilding field and it would be more relevant if it was elaborated further to include
“conflict-prone” countries or something along those lines.
Of course, including such a provision would mean that attention would also have to be paid to
ways of identifying which countries are at risk of (a return to) violent conflict. This would
lead the policy framework to include early warning and conflict prevention as objectives,
things that are (or should be) an important part of the range of peacebuilding strategies
because they can prevent the cost of violence and much more expensive intervention and
reconstruction strategies at later stages of a conflict Thus, the policy framework could have
been more relevant if early warning and conflict prevention had been included.
The objective of the involvement of crucial civil organisations in the peace process is based
on the assumption that civil society is always conducive to peace. This matter is subject to a
discussion (see chapter 4). Although it may be true that no sustainable peace and democracy
are possible without a strong civil society, the nature of this civil society is also important:
organisations may have low capacity or be partial in the conflict, for example. In addition, the
accountability and representativeness of civil society actors can also be an issue. For those
reasons, affecting the capacity, accountability and mindset of civil society organisations could
have been added to this objective in order to make it more relevant.
The strengthening of representativeness and particularly inclusiveness of government,
centrally and locally, is highly relevant to peacebuilding because a representative and
inclusive government can be an important conflict regulation and violence prevention tool. It
is important that not only representativeness, which can be understood to mean majority rule,
is included, but also inclusiveness, which may be understood to mean minority participation
and protection. This is particularly important in (post)conflict settings. Another important
ingredient, not mentioned in the policy framework, is the strengthening of security and the
rule of law, without which accountable government cannot function.
It is important that governments are mentioned in the policy framework because of the
discussion around the role of civil society in peacebuilding. It is clear that governments also
have a role to play and that there are risks to funding civil society only: not only are CSOs not
necessarily capable, accountable and impartial, but they may also build up parallel structures
through which funds are spent, sidestepping the government which is already struggling to
gain control of the volatile conflict situation. Strengthening governments is an important aim
because most conflicts are caused at least in part by weak and failing states. This cannot be
done through civil society along. The policy framework could be much clearer about the role
of civil society, the role of governments, and the ways in which the two interact.
The involvement of women in peacebuilding is relevant to peacebuilding in order to ensure
that strategies and solutions adopted are to the benefit of all of the population, thus preventing
renewed conflict. In addition, because women have usually been less actively involved in the
conflict than men, they may also come up with different and possibly more constructive
solutions. The involvement of other vulnerable groups like minorities, returning refugees, and
former fighters, could have been included as well.
67
Supporting media is important as part of the process to build democratic accountability.
However, as with civil society, the type of media that is supported, and/or the way in which it
is supported, makes an important difference. Uncritically supporting media that spread hate
speech obviously does not contribute to peacebuilding. Helping media to incorporate
standards of neutrality and conciliatory attitudes should be an important part of strategies to
support media.
Democratic control of the security sector is an important objective for the prevention of
renewed violence, and thereby for peacebuilding.
As described in chapter 4, economic and social development strategies also play an
indispensable role in peacebuilding, as without alternative survival strategies people will
easily resort to violent conflict. The policy framework does not make this explicit. This does
not mean to suggest that such objectives should be imposed on peacebuilding organisations,
which after all work in their own particular “niche”. But the policy framework might have
elaborated on how these development strategies, pursued by organisations funded under
different themes and programmes, relate to peacebuilding work and in what way coordination
or cooperation is required.
- Organisation level
Not all organisations are equally explicit in elaborating the ways in which their objectives and
activities contribute to the overall aim of building peace. Most organisations have to be more
explicit about this in their strategy formulation.
Box 5.2. War Child’s contribution to peacebuilding and reconciliation
War Child’s contribution to the psychosocial development and well-being of children is widely
acknowledged. The relevance of the activity for peacebuilding and reconciliation has not always been
obvious. War Child has recently started a “Peace Building Campaign” to make its contribution more visible.
In many (post-)conflict areas (Kosovo, Bosnia, Israel/Occupied Palestinian territories, Russia, and to a
lesser extent in the Great Lakes region), War Child stimulates the interaction between divided groups of
children. The organisation strives for actual integration and prevention of dropout or segregation of groups
of children divided by war or conflict. To stimulate the co-existence between these groups, War Child
organizes specific creative workshops for mixed groups. These workshops aim at enhancing understanding
and cooperation between the groups.
War Child also contributes to the rehabilitation and promotion of cultural rites and events, because such
events have a collaboration and peace building function and create a sense of belonging. The low threshold
to join these events creates the opportunity for people to exchange and reconcile. Sport activities, too, are
organised to strengthen community bonds and reconcile divided groups.
In the five countries in which War Child started such activities, more than 3000 children have been reached
by these activities.
68
5.4.4. Sustainability
- Programme level
By “sustainability”, this report refers to the extent to which efficiency, effectiveness and
relevance are expected to be maintained over time.
TMF has made an important contribution to the sustainability of activities. This is due to the
four-year duration of the subsidy and the fact that it could be used for the capacity building of
organisations and partners (see above). Improving the managerial capacity of organisations
implies better quality assurance over the longer term.
There is some concern that TMF has heightened competition between Dutch NGOs, because
it discouraged cooperation. It was not possible to apply for consortium funding, and money
from other organisations financed by the Dutch government could only be used up to a certain
threshold in combination with TMF funding.
According to the Minister, the TMF organisations should work closely together to achieve
sustainable results. At the same time, they are expected to come up with something innovative
(that was one of the purposes of the TMF programme), - which would become much less
“special” if it was shared by other organisations. The demanded “innovativeness” therefore to
some extent stays in the way of a closer cooperation and information exchange among the
TMF organisations.
- Organisation level
Most of the funded organisations work for capacity building, with the aim to make activities
sustainable even if they were to withdraw. This is not the case for every activity because, as
has been repeatedly stated, some peacebuilding activities require the continued participation
of Northern organisations. For most of the activities examined it is at this stage difficult to
make any conclusions about their sustainability, since the funding period has not yet ended.
5.4.5. Impact
- Programme level
The Dutch Ministry is one of the few funders to recognise the importance of core funding for
non-project or –programme specific purposes. The majority of donors only want to fund
actual project activities and are increasingly reluctant to fund organisational overheads and
the necessary programme infrastructure -- even though without adequate overhead funding the
effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of activities are obviously put at risk.
The fact the TMF funding has mainly been provided in the form of institutional funding and
not earmarked for any specific activity is considered a great advantage. It has enabled
organisations to professionalise their management structures and thereby become more
efficient and effective in their operations. This professionalisation is not only the result of the
form of the subsidy but also of pressure from the Ministry to formulate project cycles and
work on M&E systems.
69
Even in cases were a programme subsidy was allocated, organisations have had the freedom
to allocate it within the programme as they saw fit. The organisations appreciate this type of
funding as it makes a welcome change from some donors only wanting to fund ‘glamorous
quick impact projects’. The fact that TMF recognises the importance of capacity building as a
key strategy to improve response to the critical issues of conflict, poverty and peace is greatly
appreciated.
At the same time critiques at the Ministry raise doubts about such core funding, because it is
difficult to monitor and link back to policy -- it may disappear into the larger budget of an
organisation and be used to fill gaps.
Nonetheless it is clear that TMF funding has been significant for the effectiveness of TMF
organisations’ operations, and the Ministry’s lack of desire to ‘plant their flag on projects’ is
in welcome contrast to other donors funding stipulations. TMF funding gives organisations
the institutional and administrative capacity that they would not otherwise have. It is therefore
primarily an enabling fund. When TMF funds were allocated the Ministry emphasised the
need to improve managerial and M&E capacities as a precondition. It is a clear finding of this
study that the TMF organisations have taken that condition seriously and have all done a lot
of work in this area (see also under “learning capacity” below). The text below gives an
overview of the ways in which TMF funds have contributed to the effectiveness of each
organisation.
At IKV, the TMF process forced staff and management to think about the organisation’s aims
and priorities and make assumptions and objectives explicit. A professionalisation in terms of
management aspects had already begun to take place, but the TMF process speeded up this
process as it forced IKV to pay attention to managerial aspects. Importantly, TMF financing
provides financial security, which brings security to partners and staff and enables IKV to
innovate and be flexible in its response to developments. Activities that are not directly
project-related, such as enabling partners to work together across different parts of the world,
have been made possible. Because the subsidy is not tied to particular projects, it has enabled
the development of overarching activities such as regional cooperation and linking partners in
different regions together. It also makes it easier to work in regions that are not so “sexy”.
TMF also enabled IKV to grow significantly. The fact that IKV has become much less
dependent upon project financing as a result of TMF also means that it has gained significant
planning autonomy. It can much better decide its own strategy and make its own choices in
terms of project and region selection. This is considered to be a great advantage.
For ECCP, TMF funding has made possible the establishment of regional desks within the
organisation, which has been of great value to the development of the GPPAC programme. In
addition, it has enabled the creation of the position of Head of Programmes. Neither of this
would have been possible with only project subsidies. Through its willingness to fund staff
costs, then, TMF has made an important contribution to ECCP’s work. ECCP’s internal
management has improved significantly, in part as a result of pressure from the Ministry (and
also because the development of GPPAC made it necessary). ECCP now deals with much
more money from many different donors but it still manages to get a good overview.
For War Child, getting some core funding from the Ministry has ensured the continuity of
some of its core activities. Though only a small part of the total budget, TMF is important for
the long term because it guarantees funding for a four-year period. War Child is able to use
70
the TMF funding to improve the capacity and quality of its institutional and organisational
capabilities, which is considered a great advantage.
Both Saferworld and International Alert highlight that ‘TMF’s lack of desire to plant their
flag on a project, makes a welcome change’. Both organisations, with their focus on
partnership and capacity building, know from experience how some donors are reluctant to
fund activities associated with less visible aspects of development. TMF enables organisations
to build partnerships and articulate the needs of those who would otherwise continue to be
marginalised. This may not have the same visible impact as an infrastructure development
project or health intervention project but its impact is nonetheless significant in terms of the
increased ability of civil society to respond to change and consolidate peace.
Professionalisation of management activities at Pax Christi had already started well before
TMF funding became available, but the extra money, the fact that it was granted for a four
year period and its institutional character no doubt strongly contributed to the further
strengthening of this aspect. In addition to the necessity to elaborate a four-year plan and the
obligation to plan and report annually to the Ministry, the contribution most visibly manifests
itself in Pax Christi’s investment in institutional development and organisational learning,
including the internal consultations, reflection and study in the quarterly so-called ‘block
weeks’ and the commissioning of external evaluations, such as the Horn of Africa study and
the Best Practice studies.
- Organisation level
Keeping in the back of our minds all the cautionary notes given in this report about the
difficulty of measuring impact in general in peacebuilding work, and in particular given the
stage of the TMF rounds, this section will nonetheless make some remarks about impact.
These remarks are based on scattered, one-off observations and conversations with
stakeholders during the different field trips. In addition, the results of M&E by the TMF
organisations and their partners are taken into account. Although it is too early to assess long
term impact, these observations, conversations, and evaluation results still give some idea of
the effectiveness of activities so far.
In general, the picture that arises is quite positive. It seems as if the TMF organisations and
their partners are indeed moving towards their stated objectives, even if their work is
sometimes hampered by unstable circumstances.
Saferworld’s Horn of Africa Project has certainly had the effect of influencing policy. As one
respondent stated: ‘in 2001 we had little knowledge about the EC and the EC did not include
CSOs in their thinking. Now however due to our programme there is a Cotonou taskforce
made up of CSOs with whom the EC actively engage. The government of Ethiopia no longer
routinely sends annual reports to Brussels without first consulting CSOs. There are now far
better linkages between CSOs, regional organisations like IAG, national and international
organisations. There are still challenges ahead but the basic foundation has been laid for
greater levels of active participation in the future.’
Increasing the practical influence of CSOs on national and regional development policy is a
long term process which requires a relative view to be taken. For example, the European
Commission and the Ethiopian Ministry of Finance and Economic Development submitted a
joint report, which did not include any intrinsic input from CSOs. However, the report was
71
given to the CSOs after it was written to enable CSOs to comment. In the current operating
environment this was seen as a welcome initial first step.
With the above in mind there are direct links between Saferworld’s Horn of Africa Project
and TMFs objectives for civil society building, influencing policy, and raising the level of
policy dialogue. However, as identified in the Horn of Africa Project Evaluation (2002:18)28
whilst ‘most of the planned quantitative outputs of the project (seminars, reports, training)
have been achieved despite the existing mismatch between the ambitions of the project and
availability of the human resources, the project’s wide coverage has only allowed a fairly
superficial engagement in some activity areas.’
The activities of International Alert’s partner in Burundi, the Dushirehamwe network,
correspond with the priorities of the target groups (women in associations throughout
Burundi) and with the TMF objectives. Dushirehamwe’s activities influence policy at the
national level as the association has contributed towards national strategies and frameworks
for national legislature and at both community and national level is a force for national
reconciliation. At all times the priorities of the impoverished women are at the forefront of
Dushirehamwe’s institutional concern.
Monitoring and evaluation as to whether priorities are being met involve members of the
target group as they are questioned by association committees and team leaders. In addition,
Alert has also sent monitoring teams to question the target groups. The Coordinator maintains
that the impact of Dushirehamwe is easy to see: Women can analyse the situation and
formulate solutions based on the new context; women can express themselves as they have
been provided with the techniques to do so; women are more informed about the law,
constitution, human rights and ‘development’; women have been elected to Parliament and
now form 30 percent of the MPs; 50 Dushirehamwe Association members have been elected
as Colline Heads,29 and 25 percent of all Commune Administrators are now women.
It is difficult to say how much of this is solely attributable to the work of Dushirehamwe and
not in some cases due to positive discrimination as part of the fledgling political process.
However, the facilitation and support of these women to become elected and work in their
new function, appears in large part due to the support and facilitation that Dushirehamwe has
given. Dushirehamwe acknowledge that there are aspects of the programme that have limited
the overall achievements. Impact could have been greater, but insecurity and acute and
widespread poverty continue to be the main barriers to greater success.
Nonetheless, from discussions with the women associations it is immediately apparent that
Dushirehamwe have provided women with ‘tools’ to meet the future needs and improve their
current situation. This is demonstrated by a degree of self confidence which is not present
amongst women outside the Dushirehamwe Association and contrasts with other community
assessment exercises that the PRDU has undertaken in Burundi.30 The discussions showed
that women feel empowered when it comes to conflict analysis and management skills, and
have a better understanding of their own rights and potential roles. They feel also empowered
28
Evaluation of the Horn of Africa Project, Terhi Lehtinen and Betty Wamalwa Muragori, December 2002
Burundi, like Rwanda is the land of the ‘mille collines’. A hill/colline is one of the lowest forms of local
administration.
30
The PRDU undertook an evaluation of the Community Based Bujumbura Peace Programme (2004) for CARE
Netherlands. As part of the evaluation, community visits took place around Bujumbura – Cibitoki, Mwanza,
Kinama, Kemenga and Kanyosha.
29
72
because of better women representation, and they have confidence in the future, for which
they feel a shared responsibility. They feel as if their priorities are now on the national
developmental and political agenda. The women’s associations have begun engaging in
concrete activities towards reconciliation, better health care and education, and agriculture.
Pax Christi’s work with community-based organisations in Ituri district in the DRC, while
still very much in its early stages, has generated new energies and perspectives for civil
society organisations to play a constructive role in the rebuilding of their society. Ituri district
is an area that has seen one of the most violent inter-ethnic conflicts in recent years. The TMF
funding has provided part of the (financial) space to take a careful and slow approach towards
rebuilding trust, contacts and dialogue between hostile communities, including the Churches,
which had in some cases become highly compromised themselves. The building of a
community-based infrastructure for peace in the form of a district-wide platform of religious
and secular civil society organisations, gradually reaching out to remote and hostile villages,
while strengthening its own functioning through training and mutual exchange, may prove to
be an important ingredient of the social, political and economic (re)construction of the area.
The ECCP-facilitated networking activities in the GPPAC regional network for Eastern and
Central Africa are experienced largely as positive by network members. They particularly
value the extent to which the network has given them a voice beyond their own locality and
has achieved an important advocacy success with the organisation of a large civil society
conference at the UN. Another positive outcome is considered to be the exchanges of
knowledge and experience that have taken place inside the network. In terms of impact, the
regional consultation drafted a recommendations document for the international conference
on the Great Lakes Region that was held at the same time with heads of state, and presented
the document there. Some recommendations were indeed adopted. Another indication of
impact at the regional level is the “conversion” of the Kenyan Assistant Minister who
attended the New York conference and is now actively in favour of peacebuilding, even
taking the initiative to reconcile the opposing cabinet members during the recent political
crisis in Kenya. In addition, in various countries of the region people have used the Action
Agendas to advocate, and have rallied around them. At the global level, it is hoped that
GPPAC has positively influenced the UN.
No field visit was made to IKV projects, because IKV is not active in the Great Lakes region.
However, the results of IKV’s own M&E activities indicate that at the concrete activity level,
a lot has been achieved and things are going by and large as it had been envisioned in the
TMF application. With little means IKV has managed a significant amount of activism and
media attention; horizontal linking has been successful; and IKV has been able to make sharp
conflict analyses. More generally at the project level IKV has been efficient and effective. At
a higher level of overall objectives, however, it is more difficult to establish what contribution
IKV’s activities have made. This has to do with attribution problems as well as with the longterm nature of society building processes. IKV has been less successful in its objectives of
women’s empowerment and inter-religious dialogue, which have received less attention. In
response, staff members have been assigned to work on these issues.
The impact of IKV’s lobbying and advocacy work can be illustrated by the fact that IKV is
rated by the CIA as the fourth most important lobby organisation in the Netherlands, in terms
of its capacity to influence public opinion and set off discussions on peace and security – as it
did in the debate on the necessity for regime change and democratisation in Iraq; the truth
finding about the humanitarian mission in Srebreniça; the calls for safe havens and
73
international human security intervention on the Balkans; the harmonisation of strategies and
analytical frameworks between Israeli and Palestine peace movements; and a possible
contribution to the prevention of a violent outburst on 25 April 2005 in the Moluccas.
5.4.6. Gender sensitivity
With the exception of Saferworld’s partner Inter Africa Group (IAG), all of the TMF
organisations and their partners pay attention to the issue of gender. IKV has recently begun a
gender mainstreaming exercise. The ECCP-facilitated GPPAC process in Eastern and Central
Africa is considered by all involved to have been highly gender sensitive in terms of both
participation and content. Pax Christi’s civil society network in Ituri has identified gender as
one of its focal points. International Alert’s partner in Burundi, Dushirehamwe, focuses
entirely on the role of women.
5.4.7. Learning ability (Ministry, TMF organisations, partners)
Learning organisation
All organisations recognise the importance of reflection and learning, but at the same time
they all admit that their learning capacity needs to improve further. Some organisations
understand “learning capacity” as referring mostly to M&E procedures and the feeding back
of their results (whether in the form of Lessons Learned, Best Practices, or something else)
into programme development - indeed a major facet. Less attention appears to be paid to other
aspects of organisational learning such as reflection and discussion about organisational goals;
mobilising the individual knowledge of staff, partners and stakeholders; and continuing to
develop knowledge through exchanges with people outside the organisation – such as
academics, people in other organisations, and local people in project countries.
Nonetheless, significant experimenting is taking place inside the TMF organisations to
improve their learning capacity. IKV works on its “knowledge function” in broad terms and
has implemented significant organisational changes, including the creation of theme
functionaries, as a result. This process however is still in a very early stage. ECCP, as a
network organisation, is looking to focus more on knowledge exchange between the
organisations it connects. This process, too, is in an early phase.
War Child is busy setting up a knowledge and learning system (internally called “LEGO:
Let’s Exchange and Guide our Operations”) which in the future would also allow a better
exchange of knowledge with partner organisations. The LEGO system will be a resource
system, consisting of fact sheets, concept papers, guidelines and project activities. All these
elements will be integrated in a web-based system, including a search engine. Partners and
Programme staff will be able to easily build their interventions with the aid of this system. It
is not yet highly elaborated, but there are many ideas about it, and here and there a start is
made with experimenting with aspects of it. War Child also increasingly participates in
networks (like the Inter-Agency Standing Committee which developed the guidelines for the
Common UN Ground Rules Based on Agreed Principles, for UN activities in countries in
crisis or emerging from conflict). In the programme countries, it tries to develop strong
relations with working groups, coalition partners, lobby networks, etc. to influence policy.
According to War Child’s strategic plan, it aims to become the leading organisation in its
field, which would imply (as indicators of achievement) participation in local networks, being
74
consulted for expert opinion, and having publications cited in the work of others. War Child is
also active with curriculum development in sports and education.
Due to the financial space created by longer-term institutional funding, in part coming from
TMF, Pax Christi has been able to develop a number of creative initiatives for organisational
reflection and learning and improvement of practice. The organisation convenes so-called
‘block weeks’ every quarter, with the compulsory participation of all staff and aimed at
maintaining a common identity, exchange of information, sharing of experiences and lessons
learned, reflection on new developments, and the harmonisation of intervention strategies.
Despite strong pressure on all staff stemming from the day-to-day management of projects
and programmes, it has been possible to maintain the rhythm of these internal study weeks –
most recently blended in with the “best practice” exercises referred to below. The ‘block
weeks’ are enriched through external input from other bodies or agencies, such as the WRR
(Netherlands Scientific Council on Government Policy) and the AIV (Advisory Council on
International Affairs), and individual consultants.
M&E
The improvement of M&E procedures is a high priority with all the organisations visited, and
changes are taking place. In part this priority-setting and development has been the result of
TMF - in two ways. First, throughout the TMF process the Ministry has placed a lot of
emphasis on the development of more systematic M&E practices by the organisations as a
requirement that came with the funding. Second, the fact that in most cases TMF funding was
institutional rather than programme or project funding meant that organisations were able to
use it for the development of organisational capacities, including M&E – previously this was
in several cases not possible due to a dependency on project and programme funding.
It is a positive finding that the TMF organisations have taken the Ministry’s condition to work
on M&E seriously. They generally recognise the importance of M&E not only as a
requirement for accountability towards donors but also to improve their own work. TMF
organisations take responsibility for the development of mechanisms to deal with the
difficulty of measuring peacebuilding work.
The text below gives a brief overview of the developments at the TMF organisations in this
field. It should be emphasised that the evaluated organisations’ M&E procedures are in
various stages of development, and few are in full operation as of yet. Nonetheless it emerges
that TMF has had a significant impact on the development of monitoring and evaluation
procedures by the TMF organisations. This appears to be more the case for the Dutch
organisations than the British ones – International Alert’s thinking in this field is only partly
connected to TMF, which provides only a small part of its budget, and Saferworld was
granted a programme subsidy rather than an institutional one, meaning that less emphasis was
placed on the development of its learning capacity as an organisation.
IKV has recently paid extensive attention to the development of its knowledge function after
an internal working group concluded that much of the knowledge inside IKV was too much
tied to individual persons and therefore fragmented. A number of changes in the organisation
have been made, most notably the institution of two thematic officers who are assigned to pay
attention to overarching themes that are relevant for all regions and stimulate institutional
learning. In addition, regional teams have been instituted. Other changes include the regular
organisation of work lunches; the promotion of increased attendance of conferences by staff;
and the creation of personal development plans. All of these changes have only become
75
operational on Sept. 1st, so as of yet little can be said about their results. What is clear
however is that there is a culture of reflection at IKV and despite time pressures fundamental
questions about direction and strategy are being discussed.
TMF has made it possible for IKV to organise partner conferences every two years, important
for the cross-regional exchange between partners as well as between them and IKV. TMF has
also provided the opportunity to develop and systematise the organisation’s managerial tasks.
More specifically, TMF has had a significant impact on M&E procedures. The results of daily
monitoring of projects by project leaders are now more structurally brought together and
integrated into quarterly and annual reports, which include detailed logframes. The annual
reports assess developments at a higher level, relating political and other developments to the
objectives and intervention strategies included in the TMF application. In addition, in
cooperation with the Ministry a project cycle has been written up. IKV has also introduced
guidelines for project and programme evaluation and established a working group for the
development of qualitative indicators more suitable to IKV’s work. Overall, M&E has
become more structural and forces more explicit thinking about priorities and results.
ECCP’s monitoring and evaluation system is a work in progress. A lot of thinking has
actually been done about its improvement but there has been no time to put this on paper. The
rapid development of the GPPAC programme has put high time pressures on staff. Thinking
is taking place about how to measure activities such as networking and lobby and advocacy,
and about useful indicators. In effect ECCP uses many innovative methods and indicators but
there is no drawn-out system yet, due to time constraints. The Ministry has placed a lot of
emphasis on the improvement of the internal ECCP management system. This has indeed
improved significantly. However, it does not deal with measuring content. Part of the reason
why ECCP’s M&E system is in development is that it depends also on the focus that will be
adopted by GPPAC’s International Steering Group for the years to come: you have to know
what you are going to do if you are to know what you are going to measure.
The documentation and dissemination of experiences, lessons learned and best practices is
one of ECCP’s core functions. ECCP has published a book about best practices. It also
organized a workshop on the Outcome Mapping method (see chapter 3 of this evaluation
report) during the GPPAC conference in New York. At the GPPAC Steering Group meeting
in October 2005 a proposal was discussed to make it one of the priorities of the network to set
up a framework for the exchange of experiences, lessons learned and best practices. Beyond
GPPAC, a People Building Peace website is being built for the exchange of experiences
worldwide. More broadly, at the time of writing a consultant is being commissioned to assess
the networking activities of the ECCP and GPPAC, including the M&E procedures. At the
next International Steering Group meeting in Nairobi, the assessment and the M&E system
will be discussed in depth - both the system itself and the incorporation of it into the Work
Plan 2006–2010 - and decisions will be taken on the way forward. This process will be guided
by the consultant.
In one of its 2005 study weeks (see above), Pax Christi discussed the conclusions of the
Utstein peacebuilding study. The 2004 Utstein synthesis report identifies the ‘strategic deficit’
of conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions as the lack of strategic connections
(i.e. that projects and programmes are not, or insufficiently, connected to, derived from or
integrated with wider peacebuilding policies). With respect to evaluation, the report contains
the proposal to assess peacebuilding impact at the strategic (country) level, and not at the
project level – individual projects should continue to be evaluated in terms of their outputs,
76
fulfilment of their contractual and financial obligations, ‘best practice’ and strategic
consistency, but their impact on the prospects for peace can only be assessed within a larger,
countrywide context. On the basis of these discussions, Pax Christi decided to introduce an
assessment model developed by the Clingendael Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, called the Stability Assessment Framework (SAF). This framework is a
process-management tool that aims to ground the evaluation of peacebuilding interventions
firmly into their strategic design, which in turn should be based on solid studies of the realities
on the ground, tracking trends in 12 ‘indicators of stability’ concerning Governance, Security,
and Socioeconomic Development.
In 2004, Pax Christi commissioned the Disaster Studies Department of Wageningen
University (Prof. Georg Frerks and Dr. Dorothea Hilhorst) to conduct a series of “best
practice’ studies and exercises with Pax Christi staff in Utrecht, in order to draw lessons from
the various programmes and share them within the organisation. The plan is to conduct 8 such
studies, with a frequency of 2 per year. The first exercise was held in June 2005 and
concerned the lobby and advocacy campaign with regard to violent threats against local
democracy in war-torn Colombia carried out in 2002 and 2003. The campaign included,
among other components, delegations of Dutch MPs and NGOs and of European Mayors to
Colombia, and a visit of a Colombian delegation of indigenous leaders, Mayors and NGOs to
several European countries.
The Colombia study highlighted some of Pax Christi’s unique strengths in lobby and
advocacy work, such as in-depth and specialised country knowledge and expertise in ‘political
handwork’ and a ‘political nose’. Among the results of the campaign, the report lists
strengthening of links between institutions and municipalities in Colombia and Europe and
the launch of specific projects, increased Dutch pressure in drawing more support for the
democratically elected government, and increased awareness and appreciation of Pax Christi’s
work and expertise.
The Great Lakes programme is planned to be the subject of the next exercise, expected to take
place in early 2006.
At the request of PC, a committee chaired by Prof. Ton Dietz conducted an assessment of six
research and evaluation papers dealing with PC’s work in North East Africa over the period
between 2000 and 2004. The six papers dealt respectively with (i) PC’s work in the Horn of
Africa, with special focus on Peace from Below and Community Security without Arms; (ii)
Local peace initiatives in Southern Sudan, among which Sudan Women Voice of Hope; (iii)
Radio Voice of Hope (Sudan); (iv) the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan; (v) the Gambella
Peace Process (Ethiopia); and (vi) the Peacebuilding Programme in Equatoria (Sudan).
The committee’s report with recommendations was published in July 2005, together with
PC’s reaction and reflections on follow-up. The report’s main conclusion was that PC as a
relatively small organisation had a great impact.31 The principal recommendations were for
PC to limit itself to its core tasks, considered to be the facilitation of dialogue between
31
The general conclusion of the evaluation commission was: ‘Er is bij de evaluatiecommissie veel waardering
voor de activiteiten van Pax Christi in de Hoorn van Afrika en over de wijze van rapporteren van die
activiteiten. De commissie is onder de indruk van de omvang en de ambitie van Pax Christi’s activiteiten in de
regio en constateert dat er veel gebeurt waarbij een aantal activiteiten ook een duidelijke impact blijkt te
hebben.’
77
conflicting sides and the promotion of peace processes, and to base its strategic analyses more
on field analyses, thus reinforcing PC’s adoption of the SAF (see above). Other issues that in
the eyes of the evaluators could be strengthened, included follow-up activities, gender
mainstreaming, and coordination with the development agencies Cordaid, ICCO and SNV. In
its reaction, PC manifests a clear capacity for self-reflection and openness for learning.
War Child is working actively on monitoring and evaluation instruments. In order to address
the deficiency of adequate monitoring and evaluation instruments in the field of the
psychosocial improvement or healing of children affected by war, War Child has done a
research project in cooperation with Boston University. The project has developed
questionnaires and worked on the operationalisation of the concept (what does psycho-social
wellbeing mean in the local context). The questionnaire has been applied to a population of
children and young people. Half of them have then participated in a programme of World
Vision32, half of them in a programme of War Child. There will be a second questionnaire
(measurement) after the programme. The result will be
a) an evaluation instrument, and
b) interesting results comparing the effectiveness of two different ways to empower
children in conflict situations.
War Child has also initiated pilot projects, currently underway in Uganda, Sierra Leone and
several countries in the Balkans, to devise suitable monitoring and evaluation instruments.
Both the studies and pilot projects are still ongoing and no definite materials are produced. In
the meantime, War Child has developed a country report format which it uses for monitoring
purposes.
A large scale survey has been carried out in Sierra Leone (in six communities in three regions
with 1200 respondents in total: 600 adults and 600 children, - 100 adults and 100 children in
each of the six communities involved, chosen at random) in January 2005. A second
questionnaire was filled in in December of that year. It deals with the effectiveness of
community based intervention. Did children experience more support? Were more facilities
created for them?
Another evaluation has taken place in the first half of 2005 in Kosovo in order to evaluate the
impact of a workshop programme. It is based on the CPBC (Child Problem Behavior
Checklist), developed by Achenbach, complemented by questions formulated by War Child.
Children, teachers and parents have filled in a questionnaire before and after a workshop
programme of 16 sessions (200 respondents in total, including the control group).
Saferworld’s TMF funded programme is subjected to ongoing project monitoring through input from the project coordinator and regional coordinator.
According to the MoU (2003) the evaluation was organised according to the requirements of
the Phase 4 project proposal and conducted in accordance to the priorities of the participating
organisations and with full participation of the secondary partners (the Cotonou Steering
Groups), wider stakeholders, EU agencies and regional networks. Due to the nature of the
32
The difference between the programmes is that World Vision’s intervention have a more therapeutic character
(with one-to-one interaction) and is more directed at young people, whereas the group addressed by War Child in
general is younger and is more involved in collective creative activity rather than in a “curative” trajectory; - see
the distinction between “curative” and “developmental” interventions in the “State of the Art” in psychosocial
interventions with children in war/affected areas”, War Child, Amsterdam, May 2005, p. 19.
78
programme and as it is still a relatively new undertaking, more focus is placed on process
indicators than outcome indicators. Thus, Saferworld concentrated more on the efficiency
indicators.
As many such organisations Saferworld feels that there is inadequate time for meaningful
reflection. Although there are regular six monthly meetings and writing up of lessons learned,
the actual time to turn feedback into lessons learned and then turn lessons learned into tailored
project/programme inputs for the future is lacking. Saferworld has made it a priority to seek to
understand the key components of successful partnerships and then cross cut the findings into
all their programmes. However, although the institutional knowledge is seen as sound, the
capacity to implement the necessary changes is lacking for want of funding.
International Alert like all the organisations recognises the importance of having a process of
reflection to enable greater efficiency and effectiveness of future activities. The TMF Funding
Proposal (2003:4.4.1) explains: ‘the evaluation of impact and effectiveness of our work is
critical to decisions about what we choose to do and how we apply our resources’. Therefore
the Better Peace Practice programme (BPP) was initiated to begin exploring these issues in
relations to Alert’s work. The assumptions guiding the initiative are:
·
·
A desire to ensure that our interventions do not generate harm for people
More optimally, a concern that our work makes some small contribution toward the
ending of wars and the building of just and sustainable societies within which individuals
and groups can resolve differences/conflicts non violently.
Alert confirms (TMF funding proposal 2003:4.4.1) that the normal project cycle goes through
three specific phases: 1) analysis/design of projects 2) implementation and 3) evaluation,
feedback and changes to the original design. It is in each of these areas as discovered through
BBP that Alert can and must become much more reflective about their actions and
consequences.
Alert’s normal evaluations are donor led, and there is flexibility within all Alerts programmes
for adjustments to be made. However Alert, like similar organisations, experiences difficulties
with monitoring and evaluation outcomes. Firstly, Alert finds that donors do not understand
the evaluations, because they have insufficient appreciation of the context. Secondly, the
evaluation process itself limits its overall effectiveness. Ideally Alert would allow one of the
programme managers in the Great Lakes to write, not necessarily about evaluation in the
strictest sense, but about lessons learned from the frontline. Although this was advocated by
the BPP in its initial findings, long term funding revenue for the BPP has became problematic,
- so many of the related aims and initiatives remain on hold.
Alert often find that discussing the process of evaluation and ideas for the future with local
partners such as Pole through three day workshops yield significant results for both current
and future capacity building, management and programming initiatives. Such workshops also
focus on the partnership and in particular the transfer of lessons learned. Therefore there is
institutional learning from the evaluations, but this is in ‘bits and pieces.’ Much of Alert’s
activities are cross cutting - so Alert, through the evaluations, can learn from one programme
to another, and they seek to develop these lessons in terms of future thematic policy and
research work. These cross cutting lessons learned are shared by key regional fieldworkers
who are able to apply lessons in relatively diverse contexts.
79
However, there is no systematic reflection to identify best practice, structurally there are
mechanisms in place, but there is not the capacity due to lack of funding to enact effective
monitoring and evaluation.
Some TMF organisations have partners who themselves do a lot of work in this area and
provide valuable inputs into the thinking of the TMF organisations. For example, ECCP has
identified learning, M&E and networking as major priorities within the GPPAC network in
the time to come. Network members such as the Nairobi Peace Initiative Africa (NPI-Africa)
and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP) have already a lot of thinking and
experiences to contribute.
- Obstacles to learning
The most oft-mentioned obstacle to learning is high work load and time pressure, which
makes it difficult for staff to focus on these issues. There is a lack of time to reflect. Learning
points are formulated but not always taken up. Funding is also mentioned as an issue. ECCP
notes that reviews are costly and often not funded by donors. Saferworld states that although
its institutional knowledge is sound, the capacity to implement the necessary changes is
lacking for want of funding. Other obstacles to learning include the short-term focus that is
often inherent to working in conflicts; the sense of urgency about daily tasks; the fact that
staff members are motivated by passion for their job rather than money and are often less
businesslike; and the informal character of some of the organisations (notably IKV).
One way to deal with these issues, which are rather severe at peacebuilding organisations
where staff is highly motivated but (partly as a result) also continuously overburdened, is to
set clearer priorities and focus on fewer projects.
Another difficulty is at the local level; some partners did not have the capacity to implement
newly developed M&E standards. Although difficult at first, for many partners appling new
M&E standards turned out to be a positive thing, building their capacity and enabling them to
professionalize. Some partners, however, were not ready to implement the procedures; for
them it presented mainly problems.
80
6.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1.
6.1.1.
6.1.2.
6.1.3.
6.1.4.
6.1.5.
6.1.6.
6.1.7.
6.2.
6.3.
Answers to the general questions
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Relevance
Sustainability
Impact
Gender sensitivity
Learning capacity
Answer to the specific questions in the Terms of Reference
Recommendations
It is a general finding of this study that the TMF-organisations do important work in often
insecure and difficult circumstances and regions, in which many other development actors do
not venture. They do so with relatively little means compared to the large development actors.
They have a clear added value through their specific peacebuilding expertise and activities.
This chapter will first present the conclusions with regard to the general questions about
efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, sustainability, impact, gender sensitivity, and learning
capacity. It will then give an answer to the 13 specific questions, which were asked in the
terms of reference (see section 3.1.).
6.1. Answers to the general questions
The general issues will always be approached from a double perspective. They will be looked
at (a) at the programme level (with regard to the TMF programme in the field of
peacebuilding), and (b) at the level of the TMF-organisations. The conclusions with regard to
TMF-organisations will be limited to general observations and will not discuss every
individual organisation in detail.
6.1.1. Efficiency
(a) TMF-programme: Inputs did lead to significant outputs. However, the evaluation has
surfaced issues with regard to low communication and feedback between the Ministry and the
TMF organisations, and a lack of policy dialogue with DMV. This is explained to a large
extent by high time pressure at the Ministry, combined with the limited capacity of the DMV
directorate in terms of its number of staff, their expertise in the field of peacebuilding,
frequent staff turnover, and the priority allocated to the contacts with TMF organisations.
There are also some examples of mutual bad feelings between DMV staff and some
organisations. This is unfortunate because, with peacebuilding being a relatively new and
little circumscribed area, learning and feedback are of particular importance for the field to
develop and efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, sustainability and impact to increase.
In addition, there is little or no coordination between
81
- the TMF peacebuilding theme and other, related, themes
- TMF-funded activities and other Dutch-funded activities
Such coordination could improve efficiency, but also effectiveness and relevance of
peacebuilding activities.
(b) TMF-organisations: Institutional TMF-funding has been used for organisational
development and strengthened monitoring and evaluation processes. With more non-project
related funding, TMF-organisations have spent more thought on the most efficient use of the
means available. In the case of programme funding, it is more difficult to say anything about
the efficiency by lack of comparison with similar projects carried out by other organisations.
.
6.1.2. Effectiveness
(a) TMF-programme: The programme has been effective in the sense that the TMForganisations’ activities contribute rather well to the objectives stated in the policy
framework.
(b) TMF-organisations: Activities of the TMF-organisations have been effective in the sense
that the organisations work largely in accordance with their objectives, despite difficult
working circumstances in conflict areas.
6.1.3. Relevance
(a) TMF-programme: TMF could be more sensitive to the specific realities of peacebuilding
and the working environment of organisations in this field.
The relationship between ‘classical’ peacebuilding work and development should be
elaborated for higher relevance of the policy framework.
The role of civil society vs. governments in peacebuilding, and the consequences of that for
the financing of CSOs and governments by donors like the Dutch government, are not
sufficiently elaborated in the framework. The same goes for the importance of conflict
prevention and the necessity of lobby and advocacy as strategies that complement other
peacebuilding activities by influencing the context and structures that shape conflict and
peace.
(b) TMF-organisations: Organisations could be more explicit in elaborating the ways in
which their objectives and activities contribute to the overall aim of building peace. They
usually have elaborated an overall aim of contributing to sustainable peace, and a number of
strategies for achieving this. What they have not always done is to explicate how these
strategies will further the aim, how they complement strategies by other actors (such as
states), and why these and not other strategies were chosen. This is not to say that the
activities of the TMF organisations are irrelevant to the overall aim of peacebuilding (they are
not), but merely that more explicitation of relevance could contribute to coherence of
activities and to the development of thinking in the field of peacebuilding.
The organisations evaluated focus mostly on peacebuilding activities in the narrow sense (like
dialogue, advocacy, monitoring). These activities are vital, even more so because no other
82
organisations focus on them. They deal with the consequences of conflict for social relations
and contribute to better relations and more stability, which are prerequisites for development.
They also help to build civil society and create a constituency for peace agreements.
However, it is important that these peacebuilding activities are linked to development
activities which address the root causes of conflict by stimulating economic development,
employment, education, a responsible use of raw materials, ecological conservation, good
governance, etc. Not all TMF-organisations make efforts in this direction. This report does
not argue that they should necessarily engage in development activities themselves – but more
explicitation of how their work relates to development activities, and more cooperation with
development actors, would be a positive development. The Ministry may also have a role to
play in stimulating this.
6.1.4. Sustainability
(a) TMF-programme: TMF has contributed to the sustainability of activities because of its
contribution to the organisational capacity of TMF organisations.
(b) TMF-organisations: This is uncertain. It depends very much on the political developments
in the region (this goes not only for peacebuilding organisations but for all groups working in
the Great Lakes). The capacity building of Southern partners, which is an aim in many
activities, contributes to sustainability. Variations between TMF-organisations are partly
related to the special nature of partnerships for some peacebuilding activities, for which an
eventual transfer of responsibilities to Southern partners cannot be the aim.
6.1.5. Impact
(a) TMF-programme: TMF-organisations certainly improved their monitoring and evaluation
capacities considerably as a result of the TMF programme.
This is mainly true in cases in which core funding was provided. This core, untied
institutional funding has had a particular impact and added value, also compared to other
sources of funding.
At the same time it is difficult to say anything about the impact of institutional subsidies and
their contribution to attain specific policy goals, because the funds “disappear” in the overall
budget of the organisation in question and it is impossible to attribute specific activities of the
organisation to a specific source of funds.
(b) TMF-organisations: The picture varies and in many ways it is too soon to tell. However,
anecdotal information gathered during the field visits gives some indication that most of the
activities are indeed making a positive impact.
6.1.6. Gender sensitivity
(a) TMF-programme: The involvement of women is an explicit objective of the TMF
programme.
(b) TMF-organisations: All the organisations and partners, except Saferworld’s partner IAG,
pay explicit attention to gender in their activities.
83
6.1.7. Learning capacity
(a) TMF-programme: The present evaluation is in itself a reflection of learning capacity. But
“lessons formulated” turn only into “lessons learned”, if behavior changes as a result. The
learning curve was steep between the first and the second round of TMF funding, and
somewhat less between the second and the third round.
(b) TMF-organisations: Learning capacity has grown as a result of TMF, although the extent
to which mechanisms have been developed varies. All organisations are in the midst of a
process to develop M&E mechanisms and indicators that are applicable to the peacebuilding
field. The organisations examined provide some good cases of steps to improve organisational
learning, of which others might learn. Some notable examples:
· Pax Christi has instituted quarterly block weeks in which staff withdraw to share
experiences and reflect on practice.
· War Child is developing a resource system, consisting of fact sheets, concept papers,
guidelines and project activities. All these elements will be integrated in a web-based
system, including a search engine.
· Pax Christi decided to introduce an assessment model developed by the Clingendael
Institute for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called the Stability Assessment
Framework (SAF). This framework is a process-management tool that aims to ground the
evaluation of peacebuilding interventions firmly into their strategic design, which in turn
should be based on solid studies of the realities on the ground, tracking trends in 12
‘indicators of stability’ concerning Governance, Security, and Socioeconomic
Development
6.2. Answer to the specific questions in the Terms of Reference:
1. Map the field of activities of TMF-organisations in the area of peacebuilding.
A survey of peacebuilding activities of TMF-organisations has been provided in Table 5.3.
TMF-organisations are engaged in a wide range of activities. They do practically all of these
also in the Great Lakes region
2. What has been the influence of the TMF policy framework on the way in which TMF
organisations have given shape to activities in the field of peacebuilding and what
have been the specific advantages and disadvantages of the theme specific approach
of TMF in the field of peacebuilding?
TMF funding has considerably increased the size of peacebuilding operations. But the TMF
policy framework as such had little influence on the content of the field activities of TMForganisations. Most of the funding for the TMF-organisations analysed was institutional
funding. In these cases, the specific content related priorities of the TMF policy framework
did not play a central role in the selection process. However, there has certainly been an
indirect impact on field activities. All TMF-organisations have been instigated to invest more
in monitoring and evaluation activities, and as a result, we assume, field activities have further
improved.
84
3. In how far do TMF-partners, working in the field of peacebuilding, contribute to a
strengthening of civil society in the South?
The activities have certainly strengthened Civil Society in the Great Lakes region (examples:
women group in Burundi, Civil Society platform in East Congo, organisations for psychosocial support for children in Sudan, regional network of peacebuilding organisations in East
and Central Africa). Capacity building, however, is not the central objective of peacebuilding
TMF-organisations. Many of their contributions to peacebuilding do not go via local partners,
and this will and should stay like that in the future.
4. The objective of TMF funding was to give organisations more money under less
stringent conditions with a longer term perspective of 3-4 years. In how far did this
lead to the (expected) higher efficiency, (expected) higher effectiveness and the
(expected) increase in professionalism of the TMF-organisations active in
peacebuilding?
This was the case for those organisations which received institutional funding. Project funding
had these effects to a much lesser degree.
5. What are the most important aspects with regard to peacebuilding in the selected
region and which changes/developments have taken place in the region in this respect
during the last 5-10 years?
Peace is a highly fragile phenomenon, because there are many mutually enforcing root causes
of conflict in the region (colonial heritage; artificial, failed and fragmented states; ecological
degradation; corruption; lack of economic development and large-scale youth unemployment;
religious cleavages; ethnical tensions; resource curse; etc.), most of them out of reach for
NGOs. What has become obvious in the last years is that sustainable peace can only be
reached at a regional scale. Fragmented efforts of peacebuilding in one place can lead to
intensified conflict elsewhere (as demonstrated in Sudan).
6. In which way did the TMF-funded activities relate to these aspects and in which way
did the TMF-organisations react with their activities to the signaled developments in
the peacebuilding problems in the selected region?
The organisations evaluated focus mostly on peacebuilding activities in the narrow sense (like
dialogue, advocacy, monitoring). These activities are vital, even more so because no other
organisations focus on them. They deal with the consequences of conflict for social relations
and contribute to better relations and more stability, which are prerequisites for development.
They also help to build civil society and create a constituency for peace agreements.
However, it is important that these peacebuilding activities are linked to development
activities which address the root causes of conflict by stimulating economic development,
employment, education, a responsible use of raw materials, ecological conservation, good
governance, etc. Not all TMF-organisations make efforts in this direction. This report does
not argue that they should necessarily engage in development activities themselves – but more
explicitation of how their work relates to development activities, and more cooperation with
development actors, would be a positive development. The Ministry may also have a role to
play in stimulating this.
85
7. How do activities and partner organisations of the TMF-organisations in this field
and in the selected region differ from activities/partner organisations via the bilateral
channel and from the activities/partner organisations of MFOs in the same field in the
selected region?
There was not enough time to analyse activities financed via the bilateral channel or MFO
organisations. The more specific organisations (like ECCP, War Child) occupy an obvious
niche; their activity (networking, psycho-social support) clearly differs from the activities
financed through different channels.
8. Has there been any coordination of activities with MFOs and embassies, and if so, in
which way did this lead to changes of activities/ partner organisations by TMForganisations, MFO’s or the embassies?
There has been relatively little contact with embassies, let alone much coordination of
activities with MFOs and embassies in the field (and, consequently, hardly any change of
activities as a result of that). However, there are some notable exceptions to this. The extent of
contact appears to depend largely on the personal initiatives of embassy staff and NGO
representatives and is not part of a structural policy. Contacts with MFOs are more frequent in
the Netherlands, where TMF and MFO staff meet in country and theme platforms and the
like.
9. With regard to the activities under 8: In how far has there been any synergy, or have
the activities been parallel to each other? Has there been a duplication of activities?
There has been little synergy, but also no duplication of efforts. In comparison with the tasks
ahead, the combined efforts of all Dutch (or Dutch-financed) institutions are quite limited,
compared to the vast challenges, the large area, and the many problems in Africa. Synergy
should be looked for among all international actors, not just the Dutch-financed institutions.
10. In how far is gender structurally and systematically integrated into policy, policy
implementation and monitoring of the TMF-organisations active in the field of
peacebuilding?
All TMF-organisations have gender structurally and systematically integrated into policy,
policy implementation and monitoring, although monitoring routines in general are still in
development, also in this respect.
11. In which concrete way is the partnership between North and South based on a more
equal relationship and mutual ‘accountability’ and in which way can equality and
mutual accountability in the relationship be strengthened in the future?
In those cases in which capacity building is an important element of the relationship, a more
equal relationship has been achieved (examples: Ituri, Burundi) In countries in which the
leeway of NGOs is limited (like actually in Ethiopia), a development in this direction is
hardly possible. For network partnerships, the relationship has been more or less equal right
from the start.
86
In the field of peacebuilding and good governance, too much stress on the rhetoric of equality
can be counterproductive where it hides existing power imbalances instead of bringing them
to the fore.
12. Is there an increasing transfer of administrative, project-related and institutional
responsibilities within the funded TMF-organisations, which demonstrates real efforts
to build capacity and independence of Southern organisations?
There is in those cases in which capacity building is a prominent component of the
partnership. But the field of peacebuilding knows many other forms of important partnerships
where this is not the case.
13. Which lessons can be drawn from the experiences up to now which can help to speed
up the transfer of administrative, project-related and institutional responsibilities?
This question is very much based on a traditional chain model of development cooperation,
which does not correspond to most relationships in this sector. A more important role of local
institutions could be stimulated by a combination of education, consultancy roles in other
conflicts (outside the region), and improved networking.
6.2. Recommendations
1. Future policy frameworks need to pay more attention to the specific nature and
requirements of peacebuilding work by NGOs, and its linkages with peacebuilding
activities by other actors (bilateral and multilateral efforts) and with other development
activities.
2. To provide better feedback to TMF-organisations and to harness their experience for
common learning processes, more capacity should be created in the Ministry or more use
should be made of external capacity to screen the reports from TMF-organisations for
valuable elements that would be relevant for different departments of the Ministry,
embassies, and other TMF- or MFO-organisations.
3. The embassies could play a much larger role in the coordination among different Dutchfunded (and other) activities. They could also play an important role in inducing local
CSOs into partnerships with local governments in order to prevent some of the problems
that can arise when funding goes only to civil society, undermining state capacity.
However, these partnerships should only be encouraged where this is possible and
desirable; there are also cases in which civil society should play a role of opposition rather
than cooperation with governments.
4. TMF-organisations should be more explicit in elaborating the ways in which their
objectives and activities contribute to the overall aim of building peace (and how they
relate to activities of other organisations and institutions in this respect).
5. Peacebuilding activities in the narrow sense (like dialogue, advocacy, monitoring) have to
be linked to development activities which can address root causes of conflict by
stimulating good governance, social inclusion, equitable economic development,
employment, education, a responsible use of raw materials, ecological conservation, etc.
87
TMF-organisations could be more active in establishing links and coordination with other
development organisations. (We have been informed that some of the TMF organisations
have indeed done so and should note that this evaluation has not been able to examine
these initiatives.) There is some discussion and unclarity about the extent to which the
newly developed policy framework for the coming years will make such cooperation more
or less difficult.
6. A lot has been written in this report about the nature of partnerships in peacebuilding.
Capacity building and a transfer of responsibilities are important for sustainability, but
some activities continue to require an active Northern involvement. A balance has to be
found between the influence and involvement of Northern and Southern organisations. In
many cases this has been done, but TMF organisations could better explicate and
elaborate their chosen balance.
7. Much of the positive impact of TMF funding was a result of the institutional subsidies to
TMF organisations. The new funding system will no longer provide for institutional
subsidies, but only for programme funding. This report recommends that a funding form is
adopted that retains the positive sides of core funding. This would be achieved by
providing funding specifically for institutional development and organisational learning.
Organisations would have to explain in their applications how and why they aim to
develop and carry out capacity building and learning, and would be held accountable later
on based on the concrete results they are able to show in this area.
8. Impact is greater when there are tangible immediate benefits that directly improve
people’s lives at the community level. In such a context it is much easier to discuss
‘gender,’ ‘empowerment,’ and ‘participation’ as people’s receptive capacity is greater. In
addition a logical approach such as that of Dushirehamwe’s combining a contribution
towards basic needs with a more abstract influencing of policy has a greater impact
amongst target groups.
9. There should be complete transparency between the TMF funded organisations and their
Southern partners in terms of the funding arrangement and clarification of the amount of
funding available for each specific activity. This recommendation does not apply to all
TMF organisations and all partnerships in the same way, as the character of the
partnerships varies considerably.
88
Annex 1:
Terms of Reference
89
1. Introductie
1.1 B ELEIDSKADER THEMATISCHE MEDEFINANCIERING (TMF)
1.1.1 Context
In de beleidsnotitie ‘Civil Society en Structurele Armoede Bestrijding’ die op 27 juni 2001
aan de Tweede Kamer werd aangeboden, is de beleidsvisie op maatschappelijke organisaties
uiteengezet. Een nieuw subsidiesysteem is ontwikkeld, met onder andere een
medefinancieringsprogramma voor thematisch of anderszins gespecialiseerde civil society
organisaties (CSO’s). De belangrijkste inzichten en ontwikkelingen worden hier samengevat.
·
Structurele/duurzame armoedebestrijding en ontwikkeling van civil
(maatschappelijk middenveld) zijn onlosmakelijk met elkaar verbonden.
society
Het opkomen voor rechten, het creëren van ontplooiingsmogelijkheden en het verkrijgen van
toegang tot hulpbronnen, geschiedt door organisatie, krachtenbundeling tot sociale beweging
en het organiseren van countervailing power. De structuren en systemen die streven naar
empowerment vormen tezamen belangrijke delen van civil society, waarbij het samenspel
tussen mondige burgers en een sterke overheid een belangrijke rol speelt.
·
Civil society ontwikkeling is een endogeen en autonoom proces.
Sterke civil societies hebben hun eigen systemen en structuren en eigen diepgewortelde
waarden en normen ontwikkeld over lange periodes. Buitenstaanders staan voor de opgave de
interne dynamiek van een in essentie autonoom proces te versterken en te voeden. Bij gebrek
aan kennis kunnen ook goedbedoelde interventies verstorend werken.
·
Noordelijke CSO’s kunnen Zuidelijke CSO’s in hun capaciteitsopbouw het beste
ondersteunen, als beiden onafhankelijk en autonoom zijn.
De veelheid aan verschijningsvormen en fasen in ontwikkeling van civil society in
verschillende landen in het Zuiden vraagt om maatwerk bij externe interventies. Dat
maatwerk kan veelal het best geleverd worden door actoren uit andere civil societies. In
laatste instantie delen CSO’s waarden en normen en kennen een vergelijkbare geschiedenis en
pluriformiteit.
·
CSO’s als deel van international civil society spelen een belangrijke rol bij de
bevordering van beleidscoherentie.
In het kader van ontwikkelingssamenwerking werden tot voor kort alleen die Noordelijke
CSO’s gefinancierd die zich richten op directe armoedebestrijding en maatschappijopbouw in
ontwikkelingslanden. Beleidsbeslissingen op andere terreinen dan ontwikkelingssamenwerking en de dynamiek van de economische mondialisering zijn vaak van grotere
betekenis voor de binnen- of buitensluiting van armen dan alle ontwikkelingshulp bij elkaar.
De vorming van internationale netwerken voor lobby en advocacy, het helpen bouwen van
transparante instituties voor eerlijke Noord-Zuid-onderhandelingen en het creëren van ruimte
voor zuidelijke CSO’s om de belangen van het Zuiden in het Noorden te behartigen - kortom
de mondialisering van civil society - verdient ondersteuning.
90
1.1.2 Overwegingen
Het Beleidskader Thematische Medefinanciering is opgesteld om drie redenen:
a.
Bevorderen van goed ontwikkelde, onafhankelijke en professionele civil society bij de
uitvoering van activiteiten ten behoeve van structurele armoedebestrijding.
b.
Bevorderen van de betrokkenheid van het maatschappelijk middenveld bij de
beleidsontwikkeling van de Minister voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking.
c.
Stroomlijnen van de behandeling door het Ministerie van en bevorderen van
transparante en uniforme besluitvorming over thema- en/of doelgroepspecifieke
subsidie aanvragen.
Het Beleidskader Thematische Medefinanciering biedt ruimte om die maatschappelijke
organisaties financieel te ondersteunen die kwaliteit bieden vanuit een gespecialiseerde
invalshoek of ten behoeve van een specifieke doelgroep. Om voor subsidie in aanmerking te
komen dienen zij een bijdrage te leveren aan structurele armoedebestrijding in landen in het
Zuiden of de armste landen in Midden- en Oost-Europa (voorkomend op de DAC1-lijst). Zij
doen dit door steun te geven aan organisaties in die landen volgens een of meer van de
volgende interventiestrategieën: (1) strategie rechtstreeks gericht op armoedebestrijding, (2)
maatschappijopbouw en (3) beleidsbeïnvloeding. Gelijkwaardigheid tussen organisaties in het
Noorden en het Zuiden speelt daarbij een belangrijke rol. In de aanvraag dient dan ook
aangegeven worden dat er sprake is van een samenwerkingsverband gestoeld op
gelijkwaardige relaties en wederzijdse accountability. Tevens zal uit de aanvraag het streven
naar capaciteitsopbouw en verzelfstandiging van Zuidelijke organisaties duidelijk naar voren
dienen komen.
Naast Nederlandse organisaties komen ook buitenlandse organisaties in aanmerking voor
TMF-subsidie. Mogelijk verandert deze situatie in de toekomst aangezien de minister voor
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking heeft aangegeven TMF-subsidiemogelijkheden te willen
beperken voor Nederlandse organisaties.
1.1.3 Ondersteuning van het maatschappelijk middenveld in ontwikkeling
Het Beleidskader van de Thematische Medefinanciering heeft zich gedurende de
verschillende rondes ontwikkeld. Structurele armoedebestrijding als centrale doelstelling van
het beleid vraagt niet alleen tijd maar ook een cultuuromslag bij donoren - zowel overheden,
particuliere actoren als multilaterale instellingen - en ontvangers van hulp. Partnership,
gebaseerd op ownership en vraaggerichtheid, en werken vanuit armoedeanalyses in OSlanden, verlangen een andere rol voor donoren dan de rol die zij in het verleden speelden. De
nadruk komt veel meer te liggen op het doelmatig en doeltreffend faciliteren van endogene
armoedebestrijdingsprocessen dan op het bepalen van de inhoud. Doelmatigheid en
doeltreffendheid zijn bij complexe processen als maatschappijopbouw en beleidsbeïnvloeding
moeilijk toetsbaar en meetbaar te maken, waarmee het vinden van goede indicatoren van des
te groter belang is.
1.1.4 Doelstellingen van het subsidiesysteem
Het doel van de Thematische Medefinanciering is om uit centrale middelen initiatieven te
steunen van thematisch gespecialiseerde organisaties die zich in samenwerking met en ter
versterking van lokale organisaties inzetten voor een versterking van het maatschappelijk
middenveld en een structurele vermindering van armoede in meerdere ontwikkelingslanden.
Armoede is niet alleen een gebrek aan voedsel of andere materiële zaken. Armoede is ook
machteloosheid en kwetsbaarheid. Armoede kent meerdere dimensies: economische,
politieke, sociale en sociaal-culturele dimensies. Gendergelijkheid en milieu zijn voorts
transversale thema’s die voor alle dimensies gelden.
91
Armoede is het resultaat van een proces, niet een statisch gegeven. Armoedebeleid zal zich
daarom niet (alleen) richten op de bestrijding van symptomen en gevolgen, maar tevens en
vooral op de mondiale, nationale en regionale processen die armoede veroorzaken en
instandhouden.
Structurele armoedebestrijding kent drie interventiestrategieën: (1) strategie rechtstreeks
gericht op armoedebestrijding, (2) maatschappijopbouw en (3) beleidsbeïnvloeding. Bij de
eerste strategie is armoedebestrijding gericht op het verbeteren van de levensomstandigheden
van armen door strategische en duurzame interventies. Maatschappijopbouw is het versterken
van democratische maatschappelijke structuren en organisaties om evenwichtiger
machtsverhoudingen in de samenleving te doen ontstaan. Beleidsbeïnvloeding beoogt
verandering van processen en structuren die nationale en internationale ongelijkheid
instandhouden.
Cruciaal bij de invulling van die strategieën is ownership, samenwerking met andere spelers
in het veld, netwerken en het creëren van een trampoline in plaats van een vangnet.
Transparantie en accountability over doelen, werkwijze, afstemming met PRSP’s, en het
leveren van maatwerk. Goed donorschap in brede zin.
1.1.5 Thematische invalshoek
Het Beleidskader Thematische Medefinanciering is bedoeld voor organisaties die thematisch
gespecialiseerd zijn of zich op specifieke doelgroepen richten. Subsidie kan worden verleend
voor initiatieven die vallen binnen een (of meer) van de volgende thema’s:
1.
Economische ontwikkeling: duurzame economische ontwikkeling, maatschappelijk
verantwoord ondernemen, internationale handel.
2. Menselijke ontwikkeling: human development, basisgezondheid, drinkwater en sanitatie,
reproductieve en seksuele gezondheid, HIV/AIDS, voeding, kinderen en jongeren,
sport.
3. Sociaal-culturele ontwikkeling: basic education, cultuur, communicatie.
4. Politieke ontwikkeling: mensenrechten, goed bestuur.
5. Vrede en veiligheid: conflictpreventie, vredesopbouw, ontmijnen en rehabilitatie/
wederopbouw na conflict.
6. Milieu: ecologische ontwikkeling, biodiversiteit.
7. Gendergelijkheid.
Om innovatie, lerend vermogen, inspelen op nieuwe vragen uit het Zuiden, en daaraan
gekoppelde steun voor nieuwe thema’s te bevorderen, is er een beperkte ‘open thematische
categorie’ voor aanvragen die niet onmiddellijk in een van de genoemde thematische
invalshoeken onder te brengen zijn.
1.2 D OELSTELLING EVALUATIE TMF
De evaluatie heeft tot doel inzicht te geven in:
·
De mate waarin en de manier waarop de organisaties bijdragen aan structurele
armoedevermindering door middel van directe armoedebestrijding, maatschappijopbouw en beleidsbeïnvloeding.
·
De mate waarin zij doelmatig en doeltreffende opereren.
·
De mate waarin de activiteiten relevant en duurzaam zijn.
De evaluatie richt zich op de rondes 2003 - 2006 en 2004 - 2007. Er vindt een TMF-ronde
2005 - 2008 plaats en de TMF-organisaties zijn inmiddels geselecteerd en hebben uitsluitsel
gekregen over het al dan niet toekennen van de gevraagde subsidie. In de toekomst zal de
92
financiering van TMF en van de medefinancieringsorganisaties opgaan in één geïntegreerd
beleidskader.
De evaluaties moeten tevens inzicht geven in de effecten van de interventies van en bij
zuidelijke NGO’s die mede door de TMF-organisaties gefinancierd zijn; en bij voorkeur ook
op doelgroepniveau. In dit kader is het tevens interessant het lerend vermogen van de
organisaties te beoordelen. Voorts dient de evaluatie inzicht te geven in de verschillende
oriëntaties die TMF heeft en hoe die uitwerken. Derhalve is gekozen voor de deelstudies die
alle zeven thema’s dekken, alsmede een TMF-brede evaluatie.
1.3 L EESWIJZER
In deze Terms of References worden de reikwijdte en diepte van de evaluatie afgebakend. Dit
gebeurt door het formuleren van basisonderzoeksvragen en per deelstudie specifieke
onderzoeksvragen (zie volgende hoofdstukken) te formuleren. Het beleidskader TMF per
thema is richtinggevend geweest voor het opstellen van de vragen. Aanvullend zijn
beleidsnotities geraadpleegd.
Dit document bestaat uit verschillende delen. In het eerste deel komen de
basisonderzoeksvragen aan de orde die gelden voor alle deelstudies. Dit deel bevat tevens een
hoofdstuk waarin wensen ten aanzien van de methodologische aanpak worden beschreven. In
het tweede deel worden per deelstudie specifieke onderzoeksvragen geformuleerd die
voorafgegaan worden door een korte schets van het beleid.
De onderzoekers wordt gevraagd op basis van de specificaties in deze Terms of References
hun plan van aanpak op te stellen. Het kan zijn dat er nog wijzigingen en/of aanvullingen
worden aangebracht in de onderzoeksvragen. Na gunning wordt het definitieve plan van
aanpak dan ook in overleg met de begeleidingscommissie vastgesteld.
93
DEEL 1: BASISONDERZOEKSVRAGEN
94
2. INLEIDING
2.1 C ENTRALE ONDERZOEKSVRAGEN
De deelstudies die zullen worden uitgevoerd in het kader van de Evaluatie van het Thematisch
Medefinancieringsprogramma (TMF), hebben tot doel inzicht te geven in de mate waarin en
de manier waarop de organisaties bijdragen aan structurele armoedevermindering door middel
van directe armoedebestrijding, maatschappijopbouw en beleidsbeïnvloeding.
Daarvoor is het van belang de volgende centrale onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden:
1. In welke mate opereren zij doelmatig en doeltreffend?
2. In welke mate zijn de activiteiten (interventies) relevant en duurzaam?
3. Wat zijn de effecten van de interventies van en bij zuidelijke NGO’s die mede door de
TMF-organisaties gefinancierd zijn?
4. In hoeverre hebben de TMF-organisaties lerend vermogen (ontwikkeld)?
2.2 U ITWERKING VAN DE BEGRIPPEN
De belangrijkste begrippen in bovenstaande onderzoeksvragen vormen de evaluatiecriteria.
Deze criteria - doeltreffendheid, doelmatigheid, relevantie, duurzaamheid en lerend
vermogen - worden hierna kort inhoudelijk toegelicht.
De onderzoekers dienen per deelstudie aan te geven in hoeverre welke evaluatiecriteria
relevant zijn, welke indicatoren voor de beantwoording worden gebruikt en hoe dit
vervolgens wordt onderzocht (plan van aanpak).
2.2.1 Doeltreffendheid (effectiviteit)
De mate waarin de vooraf gestelde doelen worden bereikt (doelbereiking of doelconformiteit)
en de mate waarin het beleid en de subsidieregeling hieraan hebben bijgedragen. In TMFcontext gaat het dan om de realisatie van structurele armoedebestrijding via
armoedebestrijding, maatschappijopbouw en beleidsbeïnvloeding langs de zeven thema’s.
2.2.2 Doelmatigheid (efficiency)
Betreft de manier waarop het TMF-beleid is uitgevoerd en/of de inzet van TMF-middelen
tot de meeste effecten leidt (of kunnen de middelen beter of anders worden ingezet om de
beleidsdoelen te bereiken)?
2.2.3 Relevantie
De mate waarin de inspanningen van de TMF-organisaties en hun partnerorganisaties
van betekenis zijn voor de realisatie van de beleidsdoelstellingen. In die zin is dit
criterium een aanscherping van doeltreffendheid: in hoeverre zijn de TMF-activiteiten
van belang voor de structurele armoedebestrijding? Het begrip relevantie kan ook
uitgebreid worden naar de context in het Zuiden: heeft de TMF-financiering relevantie,
extra meerwaarde ten opzichte van financieringen door MFO’s, bilaterale en
multilaterale instellingen en de EU?
2.2.4 Duurzaamheid
De mate waarin de TMF-activiteiten op hechte grondslagen berusten. Het gaat hier, met
andere woorden, om de ‘houdbaarheid’ van de activiteiten. Belangrijke afweging in dit
kader betreft de situatie wanneer de TMF-financiering beëindigd zou worden: in
hoeverre zijn de gefinancierde programma’s en instellingen in staat zonder TMF-
95
financiering hun werkzaamheden voort te zetten en in welke mate zijn de inmiddels
gestarte activiteiten bij de doelgroep beklijfd en kunnen deze zonder TMF-financiering
doorgang vinden?
2.2.5 Lerend vermogen
De mate waarin de TMF-organisaties in staat zijn te leren van eerdere ervaringen en de wijze
waarop zij deze kennis en ervaring toegankelijk maken en inzetten voor toekomstige
activiteiten.
96
3. DOELTREFFENDHEID EN DOELMATIGHEID
3.1 D OELTREFFENDHEID
·
In welke mate hebben de TMF-organisaties/programma’s en hun partners
bijgedragen aan realisatie van de TMF-doelstellingen, met name de structurele
vermindering van de armoede in het Zuiden?
·
In welke mate draagt de TMF-financiering hieraan bij (ten opzichte van andere
geldstromen en/of middelen)?
·
In welke mate leveren TMF-organisaties/programma’s een bijdrage aan de
ondersteuning van het maatschappelijk middenveld (‘bevorderen goed ontwikkelde,
onafhankelijke en professionele civil society’) in betreffende OS-landen?
·
In welke mate hebben de TMF-organisaties hun programma activiteiten adequaat
aangepast aan veranderende doelstellingen?
·
In welke mate zijn de projectdoelstellingen van TMF-organisaties voldoende
SMART33 geformuleerd?
·
Welke strategische keuzes zijn er gemaakt ten aanzien van partnerorganisaties,
soorten interventies (eventueel andere strategische keuzes)?
·
Waarom zijn juist deze keuzes gemaakt en wat zijn daarvan de consequenties
(geweest)?
·
Hoe wordt de doeltreffendheid van de TMF-organisaties beoordeeld?
3.2 D OELMATIGHEID
·
Op welke wijze heeft TMF de selectie van en de samenwerking met de particuliere
organisaties vormgegeven en hoe kan deze worden beoordeeld?
·
Op welke wijze monitoren, evalueren en verantwoorden (tussentijdse inhoudelijke
en financiële voortgangsrapportages) subsidieontvangende organisaties hun
activiteiten en die van hun partners?
·
Hoe is TMF te duiden in Nederlandse context (immers alleen organisaties met
draagvlak) en context van ontvangende land in samenhang met andere
bestedingen, bijvoorbeeld van MFO, bilateraal, multilaterale donoren?
·
Wat is de rol van ‘beleidsdialogen’ tussen het ministerie en maatschappelijke
organisaties die subsidie ontvangen: wat zijn doelstellingen, hoe verloopt de
uitvoering, wat zijn resultaten en wat is hun doorwerking (bijvoorbeeld in beleid, of
aanpassingen daarvan)?
·
De inzet van het TMF-beleidsinstrument (subsidiëring) in relatie tot de resultaten
en effecten: de mate waarin dezelfde resultaten/effecten tegen geringere kosten
bereikt hadden kunnen worden (of: het behalen van grotere resultaten/effecten
tegen dezelfde kosten).
·
De mate waarin geplande programma’s/projecten al dan niet gerealiseerd zijn
(inclusief verklarende omstandigheden).
33
SMART staat voor: Specifiek, Meetbaar, Acceptabel, Realistisch en Tijdsgebonden.
97
·
Hoe is de verdeling tussen uitvoeringskosten en kosten gerelateerd aan concrete
activiteiten ten behoeve van de doelgroep?
·
Hoe wordt de doelmatigheid van de TMF-organisaties beoordeeld?
98
4. RELEVANTIE EN DUURZAAMHEID
4.1 R ELEVANTIE
·
Wat is de meerwaarde van de TMF-financiering voor de te evalueren organisaties/
programma’s en voor hun partnerorganisaties?
·
In welke mate worden door TMF-organisaties stakeholders betrokken bij
formulering van beleid, allocatie van middelen en het bepalen van activiteiten?
·
In welke mate hebben de activiteiten van TMF-organisaties bijgedragen aan
structurele armoedebestrijding (doorwerking in de OS-landen)?
·
In welke mate spelen de TMF-organisaties met de doelstellingen van hun
programma-activiteiten in op de problematiek van de diverse thema’s in de
geselecteerde regio’s?
·
Welke veranderingen hebben plaatsgevonden in deze problematiek in de afgelopen
vijf jaar en in welke mate hebben de TMF-organisaties de doelstellingen van hun
programma-activiteiten daartoe aangepast?
·
Wat is de maatschappelijke impact in Nederland van de activiteiten van TMForganisaties? (Dit in relatie tot hun vereiste draagvlak in Nederland.)
·
Hoe wordt de relevantie van de activiteiten van de TMF-organisaties beoordeeld?
4.2 D UURZAAMHEID
·
Op welke wijze is de relatie met de partnerorganisaties vormgegeven (inclusief
totstandkoming)?
·
In welke mate is er sprake van gelijkwaardigheid en autonomie?
·
Is er sprake van - en zo ja, op welke wijze - allianties met de private sector?
·
Op welke wijze werkt de TMF-organisatie en/of haar partnerorganisaties aan
beleidsbeïnvloeding en maatschappijopbouw?
·
Op welke wijze werkt de TMF-organisatie aan haar draagvlak in Nederland? En hoe
wordt deze beoordeeld?
·
Hoe wordt de relatie met de Nederlandse overheid gekarakteriseerd? Is er sprake
van goed donorschap?
·
Hoe wordt de duurzaamheid van de activiteiten van de TMF-organisaties
beoordeeld?
99
5. EFFECTEN
·
Op welke wijze zijn de partnerorganisaties geselecteerd (criteria, procedure)?
·
Hoe is de samenwerking met de partnerorganisaties vormgegeven?
·
Welke niveaus zijn te onderscheiden bij het beoordelen van de effecten (naast het
doelgroepenniveau)?
·
Welke omgevingsfactoren spelen een rol bij het bepalen van de resultaten van het
programma?
·
Welke effecten hebben de interventies (gehad)?
·
Hoe zijn de effecten of resultaten van de interventies te beoordelen?
100
6. LEREND VERMOGEN
·
In hoeverre is er sprake van een strategische visie van TMF-organisaties en hoe
wordt deze beoordeeld?
·
In hoeverre zijn activiteiten, interventies, bedrijfsvoering, partnerkeuzes, beleid
(inclusief eventuele wijzigingen) en werkwijze afgestemd op deze visie?
·
In welke mate hebben de TMF-organisaties algemeen erkende veranderingen in de
problematiek van de diverse thema’s zoals dit in de geselecteerde regio’s heeft
plaatsgevonden gesignaleerd en in hoeverre heeft dit geleid tot veranderingen in de
programma activiteiten en de relatie met partnerorganisaties?
·
Worden lessons learned in kaart gebracht en zo ja, wat wordt er mee gedaan?
·
Hoe wordt kennismanagement vormgegeven?
·
Worden interventies regelmatig geëvalueerd dan wel gemonitord? Zo ja, wat is de
frequentie hiervan? Wat gebeurt er met de uitkomsten?
·
Op welke wijze werkt de organisatie aan resultaatgerichtheid (professionalisering)?
·
Op welke wijze wordt innovatie (met name op het gebied van organisatie,
management en programma) door TMF-organisaties vormgegeven?
·
In hoeverre zijn TMF-organisaties in staat veranderingen door te voeren?
·
Beoordeling van het lerend vermogen van de TMF-organisatie: in welke mate is zij
in staat te reflecteren op eigen activiteiten en daaruit concrete lessen te formuleren
op basis waarvan (indien van toepassing) aanpassingen in beleid en uitvoering
worden gedaan?
101
7. METHODOLOGISCHE AANPAK
7.1 M ETHODOLOGISCHE KNELPUNTEN
·
De mate waarin TMF-organisaties evalueerbaar zijn, dat wil zeggen voldoen aan de
voorwaarden die bepalen hoe goed een programma te evalueren is:
-
Het programma is adequaat gedefinieerd, dat wil zeggen doelstellingen, daaraan
gekoppelde activiteiten/interventies, te verwachten resultaten zijn SMART
geformuleerd).
-
Relevante informatie is beschikbaar (beleid, interventies en resultaten).
Bereidheid bij de betrokkenen om te leren van de evaluatie, dat wil zeggen de
uitkomsten van de evaluatie te gebruiken voor verbetering van het programma.
De onderzoekers dienen aan te geven hoe zij omgaan met deze knelpunten in hun plan
van aanpak.
· Doelstelling evaluatie is nogal abstract, daarom is het van belang:
-
In kaart te brengen welke actoren betrokken zijn en hun onderlinge relaties, aan de
hand van een ketenanalyse.
-
Inzicht te geven in de toegevoegde waarde van de TMF-benadering door te
onderzoeken hoe TMF-organisaties het TMF-beleidskader hebben vormgegeven (zie
ook de basisonderzoeksvragen).
-
Effecten niet alleen bij doelgroepen te onderzoeken, maar daarbij ook een
contextanalyse te betrekken, zodat duidelijk wordt welke omgevingsfactoren
(politiek, economisch, sociaal-cultureel, milieu) een rol hebben gespeeld.
·
Attribution gap: in hoeverre zijn de effecten van de interventies daadwerkelijk (dat
wil zeggen objectief) meetbaar? Met andere woorden, hoe wordt de doeltreffendheid
van de interventies bepaald? Belangrijk in dit kader:
-
Formuleren van realistische (pragmatische) evaluatiecriteria.
-
Deze criteria moeten vertaalbaar zijn in operationele indicatoren.
-
Lessons learned in het kader van eerdere evaluaties en monitoring betrekken in de
evaluatie.
-
Vermijden van victory claiming door te evalueren organisaties.
·
Acceptatie van de evaluatiebevindingen (draagvlak, maar ook ten behoeve van het
lerend vermogen) is belangrijk, daarom moeten mogelijke discussiepunten
geadresseerd worden in de onderzoeksopzet:
-
de evaluatiecriteria (samenstelling)
-
de representativiteit van de uitkomsten/betrouwbaarheid van de informatie
-
de mate waarin kritische bevindingen al worden verbeterd
-
op welke wijze wordt ‘het veld’ betrokken bij opzet en voortgang van het onderzoek?
·
Bruikbaarheid van de evaluatie:
-
Evalueren = leren, maar in hoeverre kunnen de onderzoeksbevindingen bijdragen
aan het lerend vermogen van TMF-organisaties en aan beleidsontwikkeling in het
algemeen?
102
7.2 T E HANTEREN ONDERZOEKSMETHODEN EN - TECHNIEKEN
Omdat causaliteit tussen interventies en effecten moeilijk vast te stellen is, is het uitgangspunt
eerder de plausibiliteit aan te tonen door verschillende onderzoeksmethoden te combineren:
multi-method approach en een combinatie van breedte- en dieptebenaderingen:
·
Belangrijkste methode: casestudy.
·
Daarnaast:
-
Literatuurstudie/deskstudie:
analyse
materiaal (secundaire bronnen).
-
Interviews met
focusgroepen, etc.
·
(voortgangs)rapportages,
sleutelfiguren/cliënten/extern
deskundigen,
beschikbaar
discussies
met
Voor de themaoverstijgende studie geldt dat de uitkomsten bij voorkeur
representatief voor alle TMF-organisaties moeten zijn. Voor de hand liggende
onderzoeksmethode is de survey (grootschalig onderzoek met behulp van
vragenlijsten).
103
DEEL 2: DEELSTUDIESPECIFIEKE ONDERZOEKSVRAGEN
104
8. DEELSTUDIE VREDESOPBOUW
8.1 B ELEIDSCONTEXT V REDESOPBOUW
8.1.1 Beleidskader 2003 - 2006
Het beleidskader Thematische Medefinanciering voor de subsidieperiode 2003 - 2006 stelt bij
het thema vredesopbouw dat de algemene doelstelling van vredesopbouw is het versterken,
hervormen en opzetten van institutionele capaciteit en het benodigde instrumentarium om
duurzame vrede te bewerkstelligen.
Activiteiten die uit dien hoofde uit centrale middelen worden ondersteund, betreffen de
verdere ontwikkeling van beleid terzake vredesopbouw en conflictpreventie zoals
geëntameerd door (inter)nationale fora en bilaterale donoren.
Activiteiten dienen daarbij vooral een bijdrage te leveren aan de ontwikkeling van
mogelijkheden voor de toepassing van conflictanalyse en -preventie. Daarnaast kunnen
activiteiten gericht zijn op de rol van ontwikkelingssamenwerking als instrument van
conflictpreventie en op de verdieping van het thema business and conflict, waarbij zowel
maatschappelijk verantwoord ondernemen als de financiering van conflicten belangrijke
issues zijn.
Uit de algemene doelstelling vloeit ook voort het ondersteunen van inspanningen die gericht
zijn op het creëren en consolideren van vrede en een tijdelijk karakter dragen. Deze
activiteiten binnen het kader van TMF-financiering zijn:
·
Versterking van democratische structuren en processen en instituties die kunnen
bijdragen aan verzoening.
·
Democratische controle van de veiligheidssector.
·
Ontwapening, demobilisatie en reïntegratie.
·
Versterking van de rol van de media.
8.1.2 Beleidskader 2004 - 2007
In het beleidskader Thematische Medefinanciering voor de subsidieperiode 2004 - 2007
betreffende het thema vredesopbouw dienen TMF-organisaties te expliciteren op welke
concrete wijze vorm wordt gegeven aan een samenwerkingsverband tussen Noord en Zuid
gebaseerd op meer gelijkwaardige relaties en wederzijdse ‘accountability’. Tevens zal door
een toenemende overdracht van beheers-, projectmatige en institutionele
verantwoordelijkheden het streven naar capaciteitsopbouw en verzelfstandiging van zuidelijke
organisaties moeten blijken. Om voor subsidiering in aanmerking te komen, dienen
activiteiten zich bovendien zo veel mogelijk in ontwikkelingslanden af te spelen en zich te
richten op:
Betrokkenheid van cruciale maatschappelijke organisaties bij het
vredesproces
Maatschappelijke organisaties kunnen een belangrijke rol spelen bij de ondersteuning van
formele vredesprocessen door het entameren van informele vredesdialogen, opbouw van de
benodigde capaciteit en beïnvloeding van de deelnemers aan het officiële vredesproces.
105
Versterking van representativiteit en met name de inclusiviteit van bestuur
Een belangrijke oorzaak van interne gewelddadige conflicten is het bestaan van grieven over
verschillende vormen van uitsluiting van bepaalde bevolkingsgroepen. NGO’s kunnen zowel
op centraal als decentraal niveau een belangrijke positieve bijdrage leveren.
Betrokkenheid van vrouwen bij vredesopbouw
Interventies in het kader van vredesopbouw die geen rekening houden met ‘gender’verschillen, lopen het risico minder of niet effectief te zijn. Vrouwenorganisaties dienen te
worden versterkt om als volwaardige partners te kunnen participeren in het
vredesopbouwproces.
Ondersteuning media
De media kunnen een wezenlijke bijdrage leveren aan positieve ontwikkelingen in het
vredesproces door onafhankelijke en objectieve berichtgeving. Het betreft hier niet alleen
traditionele, maar ook elektronische media.
Democratische controle veiligheidssector
In een aantal gevallen kunnen maatschappelijke organisaties en bijdrage leveren aan
noodzakelijke discussies ter bevordering van het democratisch toezicht op de
veiligheidssector en de formulering van de hiervoor benodigde hervormingen.
8.2 S PECIFIEKE VRAGEN VOOR DEELSTUDIE
DE DEELSTUDIE VREDE EN VEILIGHEID RICHT ZICH OP VIER TMFORGANISATIES EN HEEFT ALS REGIONALE FOCUS AFRIKA, MET EXTRA
AANDACHT VOOR HET GROTE MERENGEBIED.
De specifieke deelvragen voor deze studie zijn:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Breng het werkveld van de TMF-organisaties werkzaam op het gebied van Vredesopbouw in kaart.
Op welke wijze beïnvloedt het TMF-beleidskader de invulling en uitwerking van
activiteiten op het gebied van vredesopbouw en wat zijn de specifieke voor- en nadelen
van de themaspecifieke benadering van TMF op het gebied van vredesopbouw?
In hoeverre dragen TMF-partners, werkzaam op het gebied van vredesopbouw, bij aan
versterking van het maatschappelijk middenveld in het Zuiden?
Door middel van TMF-financieringen werd beoogd om aan organisaties meer geld toe te
kennen onder minder voorwaarden en met een langeretermijnrelatie van 3 - 4 jaar. In
hoeverre heeft dit geleid tot een (verwachte) hogere efficiency, (verwachte) hogere
effectiviteit en (verwachte) grotere mate van professionalisering van de TMForganisaties werkzaam op het gebied van vredesopbouw?
Wat zijn de belangrijkste aspecten met betrekking tot vredesopbouw in de geselecteerde
regio en welke veranderingen/ontwikkelingen hebben hierin plaatsgevonden in de
afgelopen 5 - 10 jaar?
In welke mate sluiten de door TMF-gefinancierde activiteiten aan bij de aspecten van
deze problematiek en in welke mate hebben de TMF-organisaties met hun activiteiten
gereageerd op de gesignaleerde ontwikkelingen in de vredesopbouwproblematiek in de
geselecteerde regio?
106
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
Hoe onderscheiden de activiteiten/partnerorganisaties van de TMF-organisaties op het
gebied van vredesopbouw en in de geselecteerde regio zich van activiteiten/
partnerorganisaties ondernomen via het bilaterale kanaal en van de activiteiten/
partnerorganisaties van de MFO’s op ditzelfde thema en in de geselecteerde regio?
In welke mate heeft er afstemming plaatsgevonden met MFO’s, ambassades en zo ja,
heeft dit geleid tot veranderingen van activiteiten/partnerorganisaties bij de TMForganisaties, de MFO’s of de ambassade?
In vervolg op vraag 8: in welke mate is er sprake van synergie dan wel van parallelle
activiteiten of duplicatie van activiteiten?
In hoeverre is gender structureel en systematisch geïntegreerd in beleid, beleidsuitvoering
en monitoring van de TMF-organisaties die zich richten op vredesopbouw?
Op welke concrete wijze wordt vormgegeven aan een samenwerkingsverband tussen
Noord en Zuid gebaseerd op meer gelijkwaardige relaties en wederzijdse
‘accountability’ en op welke wijze kan deze gelijkwaardigheid en wederzijdse
‘accountability’ in de toekomst versterkt worden?
Is er sprake van een toenemende overdracht van beheers-, projectmatige en institutionele
verantwoordelijkheden binnen de gefinancierde TMF-organisaties waaruit het streven
naar capaciteitsopbouw en verzelfstandiging van zuidelijke organisaties blijkt?
Welke lessen kunnen getrokken worden uit de opgedane ervaringen om toenemende
overdracht van beheers-, projectmatige en institutionele verantwoordelijkheden te
versnellen?
107
ANNEX 2. LIST OF BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS USED
General
Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi, Ed Garcia, and Rupesinghe Kumar (2001) ‘Nonviolent
Diplomacy: Experiences of NGOs and People’s Participation in Selected Peace
Processes,’ Journey through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons, R. Hayward Alker, TE
Gurr, and Rupesinghe Kumar, eds., (Lanaham, MD, Rowman and Littlfield), pp. 196-239.
Atack, Iain (2003/04) ‘Peacebuilding as conflict management or political engineering?’,
Trócaire Development Review, pp. 17-32.
Anderson, Mary (2001) ‘Enhancing Local Capacity for Peace: Do No Harm’,
Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder,
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 259-264.
Barakat, Sultan (2005) “Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq: an introduction”, Third World
Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 4-5, pp. 565 – 570.
Barakat, Sultan, Margaret Chard and Richard Jones, forthcoming, “Attributing Value:
Evaluating Success and Failure in Post-war Reconstruction”, Third World Quarterly, Vol.
26, No. 4-5, pp. 831-852.
Baud, Isa, 2002, “North-South Partnerships in Development Research: an Institutional
Approach." International Journal of Technology Management and Sustainable
Development 1 (3), December.
Boutros Boutros Ghali (1995) ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the
Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations’,
Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, 3 January, A/50/60 s/1995/1.
Boutros Boutros Ghali (1992) ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking
and peace-keeping’, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by
the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, 17 June, A/47/277 S/24111.
Boyce, James K. (2002) ‘Aid Conditionality as a tool of Peacebuilding: Opportunities and
Constraints’, Development and Change, 33(5), pp. 1025-1048.
Britton, Bruce, 2005, “Organisational Learning in NGOs: Creating the Motive, Means and
Opportunity”, INTRAC Praxis Paper No. 3.
Bush, Kenneth, 2003, Hands-on PCIA: A Handbook for Peace and Conflict Impact
Assessment. Federation of Canadian Municipalities.
Cousens, Elizabeth, M. (2001) ‘Introduction’, Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating
Peace in Fragile Societies, Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar, eds., pp. 1-20.
108
Cutter, Ana (2005) ‘Peacebuilding: A Literature review’ Development in Practice, Vol.
15, No. 6, pp. 779-784.
Darby, John and Roger MacGinty, eds., (2003) Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict,
Violence and Peace Processes (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave
Macmillan).
Debiel, Tobias and Monika Sticht (2005) ‘Towards a New Profile? Development,
Humanitarian and Conflict-Resolution NGO’s in the Age of Globalization’, Institute for
Development and Peace, Essen, INEF Report 79/2005.
Douma, Nynke and Bart Klem, 2004, “Civil War and Civil Peace: A Literature Review of
the Dynamics and Dilemmas of Peacebuilding through Civil Society”, Clingendael
Institute.
Ø Also used: Responses to Clingendael report by Ben Schennink, Cartherine Barnes,
Kevin Clements, Mari Fitzduff, Anton Stellamans, and Rigobert Minani Bihuzo sj.
Duffield, M., (2002) ‘Social Reconstruction and the Radicalisation of Development Aid:
Aid as a Relation of Global Liberal Governance’, Development and Change, 33(5), pp.
1049-1071.
Eade, Deborah (1997) Capacity Building; An Approach to People-Centred Development
(Oxford: Oxfam).
Earl, Sarah, Fred Carden and Terry Smutylo, 2001, Outcome Mapping: Building Learning
and Reflection into Development Programs, IDRC, http://web.idrc.ca/evaluation.
Fischer, Martina and Oliver Wils, 2003, “Ploughing Through the Field: An Introduction to
the PCIA Handbook Debate” in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment: Critical Views on
Theory and Practice. Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.
German government, 2004, Action Plan - “Civilian Crisis Prevention, Conflict Resolution
and Post-Conflict Peace Building”, policy paper.
Guijt, Irene and Woodhill, Jim, with Julio A. Berdegué and Irene Visser, 2002, "Learning
through E-networks and Related M&E Issues", paper jointly commissioned by Grupo
Chorlavi and FIDAMERICA.
Harmer, Adele, and Cotterrell, Lin (2005) ‘Diversity in donorship: The changing
landscape of official humanitarian aid’, HPG Research Report, September, pp. 1-46.
Harvey, (1998) ‘Rehabilitation in Complex Political Emergencies: Is Rebuilding Civil
Society the Answer?’, Disasters, 22(3).
Haugerudbraaten, Henning (1998) ‘Peacebuilding: Six dimensions and two concepts’
African Security Review, 7(6).
ICCO and ECDPM, 2004, “Networking for learning: What can participants do?” Zeist:
ICCO.
109
Jennings, Kathleen M. and Christian H Ruge (undated) ‘Killing many birds with few
stones: Integrating ERW and SALW actions with peace-building efforts’, Peace-Building,
Conflict Prevention and Development, United Nations Institute for Disarmament
Research, pp. 21-34.
Jeong, Ho-Won., (2005) Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process
(Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers).
Junne, Gerd and Verkoren, eds., (2005) Postconflict Development: Meeting New
Challenges (Boulder and London, Lynne Rienner Publishers).
Kapungu, Leonard (2001) ‘Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, and the Lessons-Learned
Process’, Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds.,
(Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 435-440.
Kühne, Winrich (2001) ‘From Peacekeeping to Postconflict Peacebuilding’,
Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder,
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 376-388.
Lautze, Sue and John Hammock (1996) Coping with Crisis, Coping with Aid: Capacity
Building, Coping Mechanisms, and Dependency, Linking Relief and Development (New
York, UNDHA).
Lederach, John Paul (2002) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided
Societies (Washington D.C., United States Institute of Peace).
Leonhardt, Manuela (2001) ‘The Challenge of Linking Aid and Peacebuilding’,
Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder,
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 238-245.
Llamazares, Monica (2005) ‘Post-War Peacebuilding Reviewed: A Critical Exploration
Of Generic Approaches To Post-War Reconstruction’, Centre for Conflict Resolution
Working Paper 14, February (Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, University of
Bradford), pp. 1-37.
Lumsden, Malevern (1999) ‘Breaking the Cycle of Violence’, Conflict Resolution:
Dynamics, Process, and Structure, Ho-Won Jeong, ed., (Ashgate, UK: Aldershot), pp.
131-152.
Lund, Michael (2001) ‘A Toolbox for Responding to Conflicts and Building Peace’,
Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder,
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 16-20.
Macrae, Joanna, Sarah Collinson, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Nicola Reindorp, Anna
Schmidt, Tasneem Mowjee and Adele Harmer (2002), Uncertain Power: The Chnaging
Role of Official Donors in Humanitarian Action, HPG Report, No. 12, December.
Maise, Michelle (undated) ‘Peacebuilding’ Beyond Intractability, Conflict Research
Consortium, Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess, eds., (University of Colorado, Boulder)
http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/peacebuilding.jsp.
110
Morgan, Peter (1994) ‘Capacity Development – An Introduction’, Emerging Issues in
Capacity Development, Ottawa: Institute on Governance.
Nairobi Peace Initiative–Africa and the National Council of Churches of Kenya
Community Peace Building and Development Project, 2001, Strategic and Responsive
Evaluation of Peacebuilding: Towards a Learning Model. Report of the Second ActionReflection Seminar Convened by NPI-Africa and the NCCK-CPBD Project.
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Framework for Strategic Alliances with
International NGOs (SALIN) for 2006-2010, http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?/CMS.
Paffenholz, Thania (2001) ‘Peacebuilding: A Comprehensive Learning Process’,
Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder,
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 535-543.
Pfaffenholz, Thania (2005) ‘Third-generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace
Approach’, Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Berghof Research Center for
Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin.
Pankhurst, D. and Pearce, J. (1997) ‘Engendering the analysis of conflict: perspectives
from the south’, Women and Empowerment, Afshar, H., ed., (London, Routledge).
Ropers, Norbert (2001) ‘Enhancing the Quality of NGO Work in Peacebuilding’,
Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder,
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 520-531.
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, Towards a Strategic Framework for
Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of
Peacebuilding.
Schmelzle, Beatrix (2005) ‘New Trends in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
(PCIA)’, Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Berghof Research Center for
Constructive Conflict Management, Berlin.
Schulpen, Lau (et. al) (2005) ‘TMF in perspectief. Eindverslag van een onderzoek naar
organisaties in de TMF-rondes 2002 en 2003’, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Den
Haag.
Smillie, Ian, ed., (2001) Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in
Humanitarian Crises, (Bloomfield. CT, Kumarin Press).
Spencer, Tanya (1998) ‘A Synthesis of Evaluations of Peacebuilding
Activities Undertaken by Humanitarian Agencies and Conflict Resolution Organisations’
Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action, 13
November, Final Version, pp.1-53.
Stiefel, Matthias (2001) ‘Participatory Research as a Tool for Peacebuilding: The WSP
Experience’, Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds.,
(Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 265-276.
111
Woroniuk, Beth (2001) ‘Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective’, Peacebuilding: A Field
Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner
Publishers), pp. 61-71.
IKV
-
IKV, Strategisch plan 2003-2006 – TMF subsidy application
IKV, Report IKV 2003 for TMF
IKV, Report IKV 2004 for TMF
IKV, Volhardend in Vrede, beleidsnota als basis voor een brede en voortgaande
discussie over identiteit, missie en werkwijze van het IKV
IKV, Annual Report 2000
IKV, Annual Report 2001
IKV, Annual Report 2002
IKV, Activiteitenoverzicht 2005 van het IKV
ECCP
-
ECCP, TMF application of ECCP
ECCP, GPPAC Mid-term review
ECCP, Discussion paper: the Future of the Global Partnership
ECCP, MD+5 Summit: Input from the Group of Friends on Conflict Prevention
ECCP, Dublin Action agenda on the prevention of armed conflict
ECCP, March 2005 GPPAC newsletter
Statement of commitment to GPPAC, to be signed by organisations
ECCP, GPPAC Reader: UN, Regional Organisations and Civil Society Organisations
ECCP, GPPAC Regional Action Agenda Reader
ECCP, People Building Peace: A Global Action Agenda for the Prevention of Armed
Conflict (version for approval by ISG, 6 June 2005)
ECCP, People Building Peace: A Global Action Agenda for the Prevention of Armed
Conflict (final version pre-conference)
ECCP, Flyer “People Building Peace”, based on Global Action Agenda
Van Tongeren, Paul et al., 2005, People Building Peace II: Successful Stories of Civil
Society. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Galama, Anneke, et al., 2002, Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice: On Lessons
Learned, Evaluation Practices and Aid & Conflict. Utrecht: ECCP.
ECCP, 2003, The Power of the Media: A Handbook for Peacebuilders. Utrecht:
ECCP.
ECCP, New York Global Conference Programme
Guus Meijer, Report of Attendance of the Global Conference in New York
Kofi Annan, GPPAC endorsement letter, 8 August 2005
E-mail in which President of the General Assembly invites an ECCP representative to
his civil society task force
ECCP, ECCP Annual Report 2002
ECCP, ECCP Annual Report 2003
ECCP, Preventing Armed Conflict: Responses to the Secretary-General’s Report, In
Larger Freedom, and recommendations for the High-Level Plenary Meeting, 29 April
2005
112
-
ECCP, Information sheet on International Network for Conflict Prevention and Peace
Education
ECCP, Information about Second Annual Conference on Conflict Resolution
Education to be held in Ohio in Sept-Oct 2005
ECCP, GPPAC International Steering Group meeting 2-5 October 2005 – report
ECCP, Annual Plan 2005 Networking for Peace Programme
ECCP, Adjusted Budget Networking for Peace Programme 2005
ECCP, Networking for Peace programme – report January – June 2005
ECCP, Annual Plan 2006 Networking for Peace Programme
ECCP, Explanatory Notes to the Annual Plan 2006
ECCP, Budget Networking for Peace Programme 2006
NPI-Africa, Central and Eastern Africa regional conference October 2004: conference
information
NPI-Africa, Central and Eastern Africa regional conference October 2004:
background of the conference
NPI-Africa, Central and Eastern Africa regional conference October 2004: List of
Participants
ECCP, 10 Recommendations to the International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region
J. Odera, “Civil Society Organisations in Conflict Management and Peace Building in
the Greater Horn of Africa: Roles, Experience and Lessons” –final chapter of larger
report
NPI-Africa, GPPAC Eastern and Central Africa region, Priority Challenges and
Action Recommendations
Contract between ECCP and the Nairobi Peace Initiative
Pax Christi
-
Pax Christi, Strategische Meerjarenplan 2003-2006. Subsidieaanvraag Thematisch
Medefinancieringsprogramma. Juni 2003 [Dutch]
Idem. Bijlagen. [Dutch + English]
Pax Christi, Annual Plan 2003. December 2002 [English]
Pax Christi, Annual Plan 2004. November 2003 [English]
Pax Christi, Annual Plan 2005. November 2004 [English]
Pax Christi, Jaarverslag 2003. [Dutch]
Pax Christi, Jaarrapportage 2003. [Dutch]
Idem. Bijlage. [Dutch]
Pax Christi, Annual Report 2004. [English]
Pax Christi, Jaarverslag 2004. [Dutch]
Pax Christi, Best Practice Studies Pax Christi. Wageningen Rampenstudies. 3 juli
2004. [Dutch]
Georg Frerks and Hilde van Dijkhorst, Informing the Public, Transforming Policy.
Pax Christi’s Advocacy and Lobby Activities on Colombia. Pax Christi Best Practice
Study No.1. December 2005. [English]
Pax Christi, Project Cyclus Management. Versie 1.1. 5 juli 2005. [Dutch]
Pax Christi, Syntheserapport van de evaluatie Noordoost-Afrikaprogramma Pax
Christi Nederland. Van 2000 tot en met voorjaar 2004. Juli 2005. [Dutch]
Pax Christi, La Paix et la Reconciliation dans les Grands Lacs: Historique, Causes et
Pistes de Solution. Pax Christi International, 31 October 2003. [French]
113
-
-
Pax Christi, Programme Biennal Justice et Réconciliation pour la Paix en Ituri.
[French]
Four civic education booklets published in French by the Pax Christi Great Lakes
Network (Réseau Pax Christi Grands Lacs):
- La promotion des droits humains
- De la bonne puissance pour la justice et la réconciliation
- La rôle de la femme dans la consolidation de la paix
- De la maturité politique à la consolidation de la société
Agendas, minutes and other documents emanating from the Congo Working Group
(July 2004 – November 2005) [Dutch]
War Child
-
War Child, Uganda Quarterly Report Format, June 2005
War Child, Project Monitoring Sheet, April- June 2005
War Child, State of the Art Paper, May 2005
War Child, War Netherlands Annual Plan, 2005
War Child, Uganda Country Policy Paper, March 2005
War Child, War Child Sudan Annual report 2004, dated March 2005
War Child, Document on Khartoum psychosocial program, mid 2005- end 2006
War Child, Project proposal Sudan, 2004-2006
War Child, Document on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Guidelines, dated
2005
War Child, Jaarplan 2004
War Child Methodology Working Paper, 2004
War Child Nederland Subsidie Aanvraag: Thematisch Medefinanciering , dated 2002
War Child, Baseline Study War Child Holland in Sudan: Psychosocial creative
program, Aug-Sept 2005
War Child, Draft Sudan Annual Plan 2006, September 2005
War Child Sudan: Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Guidelines 2004-2006
War Child, Document on Steps Towards Partner Selection
War Child, Foundation document of Hope-Sudan Organisation (undated)
War Child Kid’s Kingdom Newsletter, Issue No.3 September 2005
War Child, Foundation document of Boy’s Hope Centre, 1994
Saferworld
-
Saferworld 2002, Application from Saferworld to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The
Netherlands for a theme-based co-financing grant, January 2003 – June 2005
Saferworld 2003, Memorandum of Understanding between Saferworld, Africa Peace
Forum and Inter Africa Group (2003)
GTZ 2005, Partnership between Municipalities and Civil Society Organisations in
Ethiopia, Mid term Programme Monitoring Report 2005
Lehtinen, T and Muragori, B (2002) Evaluation of the Horn of Africa Project Africa
Peace Forum/Inter Africa Group/Saferworld
114
International Alert
-
International Alert 2003, Funding Proposal to Netherlands MoFA 2004-2007 (May
2003)
International Alert 2004, How do we ensure that when a war ends, peace takes root?
Publicity Material
International Alert, Overview of Plans 2005.
Association Dushirehamwe: Sa vision, Sa mission, ses principaux objectifs, ses
activites
115
ANNEX 3: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DMV Directorate
Ministry, The Hague, 27 May 2005, Willemijn Verkoren
· Rein Koelstra (DMV good governance division; contact person for TMF)
· Said Fazili (DMV peacebuilding division; involved in the TMF process as contact
person towards TMF organisations)
Ministry, The Hague, 16 December 2005, Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren
· Rein Koelstra (DMV good governance division; contact person for TMF)
Ministry, The Hague, 13 January 2006, Gerd Junne
· Yaron Oppenheimer (DMV peacebuilding division; involved in the TMF process as
contact person towards TMF organisations)
· Marijn Noordam (DMV peacebuilding division; involved in the TMF process as
contact person towards TMF organisations)
IKV
IKV headquarters, The Hague, 9, 12 and 13 September, 2005, Willemijn Verkoren
· Jan van Montfort (director)
· Dion van den Berg (senior theme-expert)
· Jannie Kuik (project leader Middle East)
· Erika ten Broeke (head of finances)
· Jan-Jaap van Oosterzee (regional team leader Middle East / Asia
· Juul Muller (head of communications)
· Miriam Struyk (project leader Caucasus)
· Paul van Oosten (treasurer IKV Board)
· Marijke van Grafhorst (chairperson IKV Board)
ECCP
ECCP Headquarters, Utrecht, 9 June 2005, Gerd Junne
· Paul van Tongeren (director)
· Annelies Heijmans (Head of Programmes)
UN Headquarters, New York, 19-21 July 2005, GPPAC conference, Guus Meijer
116
People met; informal conversations [ISG = member of GPPAC International Steering
Group]:
117
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
Kusuma Adinugroho, Senior Programme Officer, UNDP, Jakarta, Indonesia
Borjigdkhan Adyasuren, President, Environmental Education and Research Institute,
Ulaanbatar, Mongolia
Yabaki Akuila, Director, Citizens Constitutional Forum (CCF), Suva, Fiji
Hizkias Assefa, Professor of Conflict Studies, Summer Peacebuilding Institute,
Eastern Mennonite University (EMU-SPI), Harrisonburg VA, USA
Yuri Ataman, Chairperson, Joint Committee for Democratisation and Conciliation
(JCDC), Chisinau, Republic of Moldova
David Atwood, Director, Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO), Geneva,
Switzerland
Catherine Barnes, Independent Consultant, London, UK
Ton Bervoets, Independent Consultant, Amsterdam, Netherlands
David Bloomfield, Director, Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict
Management, Berlin, Germany
Emanuel Bombande, Executive Director, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
(WANEP), Accra, Ghana [ISG]
Andy Carl, Director, Conciliation Resources, London, UK
Miljenko Dereta, Executive Director, Civic Initiatives, Belgrade, Serbia &
Montenegro
Gottlieb Duwan, Senior Program Associate, InterAction, Washington DC, USA [ISG]
Micha Hollestelle, Policy Advisor Peace & Conflict, Pax Christi Netherlands, Utrecht,
Netherlands
Eunice Inácio, Coordinator, Programa de Construção de Paz (PCP), Luanda, Angola
Maria Kooijman, Executive Secretary, United Network of Young Peacebuilders
(UNOY), The Hague, Netherlands
Katarina Kruhonja, Director, Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights,
Osijek, Croatia
Peter Langille, World Federalist Movement, Canada
David Lord, Coordinator, Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating Committee (CPCC),
Ottawa, Canada [ISG]
Michael Lund, Senior Associate, Conflict and Peacebuilding, Management Systems
International (MSI), Washington DC, USA
Anna Matveeva, Independent Consultant, London, UK
Florence Mpaayei, Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPI-Africa), Nairobi, Kenya [ISG]
Kinhide Mushakoji, Director, Centre for Asia Pacific Partnership, Tokyo, Japan
Ozonnia Ojielo, Peace and Governance Advisor, UNDP, Accra, Ghana
Jagoda Paukovic, Justitia et Pax, The Hague, Netherlands
Cordula Reimann, Center for Peacebuilding (KOFF), Bern, Switzerland
Luc Reychler, Secretary General, International Peace Research Association (IPRA),
Leuven, Belgium
Mathias Ries, Head of Unit, Civil Peace Service, Civil Conflict Transformation and
Peace Building, Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst, Bonn, Germany
Gillian Robinson, Director, International Conflict Research (INCORE), Derry, NIreland
Norbert Ropers, Director, Berghof Foundation for Peace Support, Colombo, Sri Lanka
Kumar Rupesinghe, Foundation for Coexistence, Colombo, Sri Lanka
Jan Ruijssenaars, Senior Policy Advisor, NOVIB, The Hague, Netherlands
118
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
Matthew Scott, Senior Policy Advisor, World Vision International, New York, USA
[ISG]
John Stewart, Coordinator, Nonviolent Action and Strategies for Social Change
(NOVASC), Harare, Zimbabwe
Bea Stolte van Empelen, Member of the Board, ECCP, Utrecht, Netherlands
Hans van de Veen, Independent Consultant and Journalist, Bureau M&O, Amsterdam,
Netherlands
Sue Williams, Independent Consultant, Derry, Northern Ireland
Peter Woodrow, Co-Director, Collaborative Learning Projects, Collaborative for
Development Action (CDA), Cambridge Mass., USA
Henk Zandvliet, Director, Nederlands Expertisecentrum Alternatieven voor Geweld
(NEAG), Amsterdam, Netherlands
ECCP Headquarters, Utrecht, 31 August 2005, Willemijn Verkoren
· Annelies Heijmans (Head of Programmes)
· Guido de Graaf Bierbrouwer (Lobby and Communication; Europe)
· Adriana Franco (GPPAC regional desks for Latin America & Caribbean, Africa, Asia)
· Juliette Verhoeven (Publications; Lessons Learned)
· Paul van Tongeren (founding director)
Nairobi, Kenya, 28 November –2 December 2005, Willemijn Verkoren
· Florence Mpaayei and George Wachira (director), Nairobi Peace Initiative (NPIAfrica; GPPAC Regional Initiator and partner of ECCP)
· Michael Ouko (peace programme manager), New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC;
GPPAC national focal point for Southern Sudan)
· Rev. Felicien Nemeyimana (Executive Director), Peacebuilding, Healing and
Reconciliation Programme (PHARP; GPPAC national focal point for Rwanda)
· Ms. Jebiwott Sumbeiyo (programme officer), Africa Peace Forum (APFO)
· Fred Nyabera (director) and Abebe Berhe, Fellowship of Christian Councils in the
Great Lakes region and Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA)
· Susannah Jambo (coordinator), John Ahere (lobby and advocacy officer) and Justa
(nutrition and gender mainstreaming officer), New Sudan Indigenous Network (NESI)
· Frederic Kama Kama, Peace Tree Network (PTN)
Eldoret, Kenya, 1 December 2005, Willemijn Verkoren
· Selline Korir, SNV Kenya North Rift Portfolio and Rural Women Peace Link
· 2 representatives of Rural Women Peace Link
Telephone interview, 29 November 2005, Willemijn Verkoren
· Singo Mwachofi, Security Research Information Centre (SRIC)
ECCP Headquarters, Utrecht, 6 January 2006, Willemijn Verkoren
· Guido de Graaf Bierbrouwer (see above; had by then become TMF contact person)
Email correspondence, Willemijn Verkoren
· Gerard Duijfjes, Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi
· Annelies Heijmans and Guido de Graaf Bierbrouwer (see above), ECCP
119
Pax Christi
Pax Christi Headquarters, Utrecht, Wednesday 8 June 2005, Guus Meijer and Gerd Junne
· Freek Landmeter, Vice-Director of Pax Christi Netherlands, responsible for
management and organisation, and within the organisation the contact person for the
TMF evaluation
Pax Christi Headquarters, Utrecht, 11 July 2005, Guus Meijer
· Freek Landmeter (see above)
Pax Christi Headquarters, Utrecht, 22 and 24 August 2005, Guus Meijer
· Joost van Puijenbroek, Programme Manager for the Great Lakes Region
· Sanne van Driel, intern
Justitia et Pax, 22 September 2005, Guus Meijer
· Jagoda Paukovics, Justitia et Pax
Nairobi, 29 September – 2 October 2005, Guus Meijer
· Amb. Ochieng Adala, Senior Programme Officer, Africa Peace Forum
· John Katunga Murhala, Programmes Manager, Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa
· Dr. Simon Simonse, Senior Advisor, Pax Christi
Bunia, 4-6 October 2005, Guus Meijer
· Archange Angui, General Secretary, Centre d’Initiative et de Créativité pour la
Promotion Rural (CIC), Aru
· Bushoki Batabiha, Programme Director, Africa Initiative Programme (AIP)
· Jacqueline Budza, Coordinator, Forum des Mamans de l’Ituri (FOMI)
· Abbé Alfred Buju, Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace, Diocese of Bunia
· Pasteur Katembo, L’Église du Christ du Congo (ECC), Bunia
· Jennifer MacNaughton, Programme Manager, FEWER Africa
· Aimé Magbo, Director, Justice Plus, Bunia / Coordinator, Ituri Network for Human
Rights and Reconciliation
· Eric Mongo, President, Collective des ONG de l’Ituri / Coordinator, Appui à la
Communication Interculturelle et l’Autopromotion Rurale (ACIAR)
· Brigitte Mutambala Mapendo, Director, Africa Initiative Programme (AIP), Bunia
Regional Office
· Marie Pacuriema, General Secretary, FOMI, Bunia
· Joost van Puijenbroek, Programme Manager, Great Lakes Region, Pax Christi
Netherlands
· Sanne van Riel, intern, Pax Christi Netherlands
· Desiré Nkoy Elela, Coordinator of Technical Assistance, National Episcopal
Commission for Justice and Peace
· Peter Sampson, Director Central Africa, Forum on Early Warning and Early Response
(FEWER)
· Abbé Michel Uzele, Episcopal Commission for Justice and Peace, Diocese of Mahagi
120
Kampala, 7 October 2005, Guus Meijer
· Irma van Dueren, First Secretary, Political Affairs, Royal Netherlands Embassy
Pax Christi Headquarters, Utrecht, 30 November 2005, Guus Meijer
· Freek Landmeter (see above)
· Johan te Velde (Head Peace Programmes)
Pax Christi Headquarters, Utrecht, 21 December 2005, Guus Meijer
· Jan Gruiters (Director)
· Johan te Velde (see above)
War Child
War Child headquarters, Amsterdam, 9 August 2005, Abdullah Awil Mohamoud
· Wout Visser (Adviser Operations Department)
War Child headquarters, Amsterdam, 9 September 2005, Abdullah Awil Mohamoud
· Tjipke Bergsman (Director of Operations)
· Ans de Jager (Manager Methodology Department)
· Annemiek Feenstra (Project Manager of Sudan)
War Child headquarters, Amsterdam, 9 December 2005, Abdullah Awil Mohamoud and Gerd
Junne
· Tjipke Bergsma
· Ans de Jager
· Wout Visser
War Child headquarters, Amsterdam, 12 January 2006
· Annemiek Feenstra (Project Manager of Sudan)
Sudan, 15-21 January 2006 Abdullah Awil Mohamoud
· War Child Holland Office Khartoum: Marianne de Klerk (Head of Mission), Marina
Doris (Program Advisor), Neslihan Ozgunes (Peace building & Media Officer), Ernst
Stuur (Project Coordinator/ Trainer Darfur) and Mona Ayad Mohamed (Information
Officer)
· Sjoerd Smit, Second Secretary Peace Building, Embassy of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, Khartoum
· Unicef-Sudan Country Office, Khartoum: Paula Claycomb (Communication Officer),
Justus Olielo (Programme Communication Office)
· Prof. Gasim Badri (President), Ahfad University for Women, Khartoum
· Sandrine Lecomte, Acting Head of Mission, Enfants du Monde, Khartoum
· Hope Sudan Organisation, Khartoum: Edwin Edward Baime, Executive Director and
Hon. Ambrose Raphael Tamania Hirifug, MP Sudan National Assemby for SPLM
· Friends of Children Society (Amal), Khartoum: Mohammed Jadalla, Executive
Director,
· Mahassin Siddig, Alternative Family Coordinator, Nafisa Sulaman, Coordinator and
Fathia Haj Hmed, Psychologist
· Yemane Andretsion, Coordinator, War Child Canada, Khartoum
121
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
Dr. Alsadiq Osman Ibrahim, Sudan Friends Charity Organisation (CBO), Gabarona
Francis Tombe Lako, Project Manager, Boys Hope Centre, Khartoum
William Abba KuKu, Director of Entertainment, SEEDS Association (CBO),
Khartoum
Godwin Menasoma Bona, Headmaster, Luis Self-help Basic School (Preschools and
Basic), Gabarona
Hope Sudan Foster Parent’s Home in Fitai hab, Omdurman
Joseph Orphonage Centre in Salaam IDP Camp, Jebel Awlia
IDP camp in Omdurman El Salaam, Gabarona
International Alert
International Alert Headquarters, London, 29 July 2005, Richard Jones
· Dan Smith OBE (Secretary General)
· Andrew Webb (Development Manager)
Bujumbura, Burundi, 13-15 December 2005, Richard Jones
· Goretti Ndacaysiaba, Head of Programme, Dushirehamwe
· Christine Miturumbwe, Coordinator, Dushirehamwe
· Scholastique Harushiyakira, Head of Programme for Building the Capacities of Women
through Promoting Socio-economic Development
· Marie Goretti Nduwayo, Programme Officer, UNIFEM Burundi
· Catherine Mabobori, Member of Parliament,
· Jean-Marie-Vianney Kavumbagu, President, Ligue ITEKA (Human Rights League)
Burundi
· Fabian Grasser and Isobel Cridli, Independent journalists specialising in refugees and
human rights in Burundi
Rutana Province, Rutana Ville, Burundi, 13–15 December 2005, Richard Jones
· Marianna Nijinbeare, Vice President of Dushirehamwe, Rutana Province, Rutana Ville
· Rose Nyandwe, Secretary for Rutana Dushirehamwe Association, Rutana Province,
Rutana Ville
· Paticie Nupitanga, member of Rutana Dushirehamwe Association, Rutana Province,
Rutana Ville
· Pieare Barampenda, Programme Coordinator, ActionAid Burundi, Rutana Province,
Rutana Ville
· Protais Niyongabo, Head Administrator Bukemba Commune, Rutana Province
· Dushirehamwe Association, Bukemba Commune, Rutana Province (two associations)
· Dushirehamwe Association Mikurerua Commune, Rutana Province
Saferworld
Saferworld Headquarters, London, 29 July 2005, Richard Jones
· Paul Eavis (Director)
· Sue Maskall (Head of Operations)
Telephone interview, Richard Jones
122
·
Thomas Asger, Saferworld, Nairobi, Kenya
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 21st November 2005, Richard Jones
· Bizuwork Ketete, Formerly Saferworld, IAG
· Jalal Latif, Formerly IAG
· Dr Horst Matthaeus, Programme Coordinator of Capacity Building and Governance
Programme, GTZ
· Fikre Zewdie, Country Director, Action Aid
123
Annex 4: Missions and strategies of the six TMF- organisations
The European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) was founded in 1997 as the
secretariat for the European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. ECCP is a
non-governmental organisation that promotes effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding
strategies, and actively supports and connects people working for peace worldwide. ECCP
aims at
- strengthening regional networking in order to achieve effective conflict prevention and
peacebuilding strategies
- influencing policymakers
In recent years the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) has
become ECCP’s major programme that overarches and integrates all other activities. The
Global Partnership is the first global network of organisations working in conflict prevention
and peacebuilding. The global network adds value according to ECCP because it enables civil
society in the field of conflict prevention and peacebuilding to speak with one voice and
influence agenda setting. It also makes the documentation of lessons learned and best
practices easier and more comprehensive.
A large part of GPPAC is in fact advocacy work. Regional action agendas and a global action
agenda have been formulated. The network is the messenger, and ECCP facilitates (although
it is sometimes accused of having too strong a voice of its own).
The aims of lobby and advocacy are
1. to achieve a shift from reaction to prevention, and
2. to draw attention to the role of civil society.
Advocacy is aimed at various recipients:
- the field itself: recommendations, action plans
- governments
- the EU (the Dublin Action Agenda was aimed at this actor)
- other regional organisations
- the UN: there is a broader project aimed especially at the UN. A number of
recommendations have been formulated by this project. They can be found in one of
the background readers to the NY conference.
- The general public globally. For this, the People Building Peace website is being
developed.
- The Dutch public. Among other things there is a partnership with War Child, a
campaign about conflict prevention (Gaandeweg campaign).
International Alert is an independent peacebuilding organisation working in over twenty
countries and territories around the world. In its vision, lasting peace has to be built in a
continuing process that encourages the attitudes, the behaviour and the structural conditions in
society that lay the foundations for peaceful, stable and prosperous social and economic
development. International Alert works to encourage and facilitate this process, either during
violent conflict, once the fighting is over, or in order to prevent it from erupting. This involves
working together with people who live in areas affected or threatened by armed conflict as
well as improving both the substance and implementation of international policies that affect
peacebuilding and the prospects for peace.
124
Alert does this in a number of ways:
· Dialogue – creating safe spaces in which to bring together groups and people who are
divided by conflict and who would not otherwise be in dialogue with each other
· Accompaniment – working with diverse groups to strengthen their involvement in
peace processes.
· Capacity building – building organisations’ awareness of peacebuilding issues and
their capacities to strengthen prospects for peace.
· Research and analysis – a mutual process with local partners that is the basis of both
our work in conflict zones and our policy development.
· Policy and advocacy work at government, EU and UN levels, with the private sector
and with other NGOs to shape international policy.
· Public education – raising awareness both in conflict countries and in the UK of
peacebuilding, how it works, and why it matters
The regional work of Alert is based in the Great Lakes of Africa, West Africa, the Caucasus,
Colombia, Sri Lanka, Nepal and the Philippines. Alerts advocacy work focuses on the role of
business, humanitarian aid and development, gender and security in the context of building
peace. Public awareness raising takes place both in the UK and in countries affected by
conflict.
Pax Christi is an international movement for peace and reconciliation, non-violence and
human rights. It was founded after WWII by French lay Catholics whose example was soon
followed by people in other countries. Pax Christi Netherlands dates back to 1948 and
currently counts around 10.000 members – which makes it one of the largest branches of the
international Pax Christi movement. Pax Christi Netherlands is co-founder of IKV.
Pax Christi Netherlands is thus part of this international movement, called Pax Christi
International, with headquarters in Brussels. Pax Christi International consists of autonomous
national sections, local groups and affiliated organisations spread over 30 countries and 5
continents, with over 60.000 members world-wide. The Board consists for 50% of
representatives from national sections in the South. The movement works in all areas of
promoting peace and reconciliation, but has a specific focus on disarmament, security and
arms trade, development and human rights. Pax Christi International is co-founder of the
International Action Network Against Small Arms (IANSA) and participates in international
coalitions concerning nuclear disarmament, child soldiers and landmines. The international
movement also supports many local peace initiatives: "local capacities for peace".
Pax Christi has a special commitment to the victims of violence, peace groups, parties in
conflict looking for peace and reconciliation and socially committed religious leaders. Since
its foundation over 50 years ago, Pax Christi has been helping to find ways out of cycles of
violence by bringing together opposing parties. It does so by expressing solidarity through
concrete action, such as:
· Calling for dialogue;
· Organising capacity training for young people, women and NGO's;
· Supporting local civil peace initiatives in Europe (Balkans), Middle East
(Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq), Africa (Greater Horn, Central Africa)
and Latin America (Colombia and Cuba);
· Lobbying international organisations such as the EU and the UN.
125
Pax Christi has special consultative status at the United Nations in New York and Vienna, the
UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, the Council of Europe in Strasbourg,
UNESCO in Paris and the ILO in Geneva.
Pax Christi Netherlands (henceforth: PC) was founded in 1948, and since the 1960s has been
working with partners in various conflict areas such as the Middle East, Central and Eastern
Europe, Africa and later Latin America, Caucasus and Balkans. At first the interventions
focused on public awareness raising, education and lobby in the Netherlands, but since 1995 –
as the role of civil society in peacebuilding gained more recognition and more funds became
available – it has become increasingly active in the conflict areas themselves, working for the
de-escalation of violent conflicts, supporting local civil society initiatives in favour of a
democratic and pluralist society.
In 1998, Pax Christi Netherlands divided itself in an Association and a project organisation
(Foundation), in order to better deal with the expansion and professionalisation of its project
work while at the same time maintaining its strong roots in Dutch society. This societal
anchoring in Dutch civil society, especially but not exclusively its Catholic segment,
manifests itself not only in the one-way provision of information, but also in the active
involvement of its constituency in policy formulation and campaigning, as well as in
programmatic collaboration with other relevant and like-minded social actors in the
Netherlands.
The members of the Association elect a Council which looks after the organisation’s identity
and approves the main policy directions. The Council appoints a Board of Trustees, which is
responsible for the annual budget and accounts as well as for the quality of management. The
Board appoints both the Trustees of the Association and the Executive Directors of the
Foundation. PC has around 30 members of staff (fte), some of which are based abroad (in
Belgrade, Amman and Nairobi). Annual turnover is around €4 million.
The mission of PC, as an independent and dynamic movement in the Netherlands and in areas
of conflict, is to give voice to the hopes for peace, to work with partners towards
reconciliation, peace and justice, and to contribute to the establishment of an international
order based on peace and the rule of law.
In line with this mission statement, PC undertakes activities that contribute to:
· Preventing, de-escalating, demilitarising and ending armed conflicts, involving as well
an appeal to the Dutch government and civil society to play their part;
· Strengthening local forces for peace in (former) conflict areas, which can play a key
role in establishing a pluralist, democratic and just society;
· Elaborating a collective and integral security concept;
· Reinforcing the role of international law in the management and resolution of conflicts
and realising human rights in areas of conflict;
· Developing and shaping a spirituality of peace and inter-religious dialogue as the
foundations for and contribution to peace, justice and reconciliation;
· Awareness raising and mobilisation of people in the Netherlands and beyond who
want to be part of the (international) Pax Christi movement and support its activities,
and advising the Catholic Church in the area of peace and security.
126
PC applies the following arsenal of intervention strategies:
Internationally and in areas of armed conflict:
· Influencing policy: To influence the policies of political and social actors at national
and international levels at the request of and where possible in collaboration with
partner organisations;
· Conflict transformation: To contribute to the prevention and resolution of violent
conflicts;
· Capacity building: To strengthen the organisational capacity of local peace forces;
· Peacebuilding: The construction of sustainable peace by and in collaboration with
partner organisations and authorities;
In the Netherlands:
· Awareness raising: Educational policies and activities directed at particular target
groups and civil society organisations in order to increase their knowledge of and
engagement with areas of conflict and corresponding strategies of intervention;
· Mobilisation: To build public support and a constituency for specific interventions.
War Child Netherlands was founded in 1995. The organisation is part of a network of
independent international non-governmental organisations. War Child invests in the peaceful
future of children affected by war. Our vision is a peaceful future for all children.
We assume that the psychosocial well-being of children and youth is a prerequisite for
creating this peaceful world. Children whose rights are not met and who are not growing up
healthily in a safe and stable environment are less likely to become balanced adults, capable
of avoiding or resolving conflict situations in the future.
War Child’s goal is the empowerment of children in war-affected areas. Programmes and
projects are characterised by the application of the power of creative arts and sports
· to strengthen the children’s psychological and social development and well-being,
· to reconcile groups of children divided by war and
· to create public awareness on, and support for the plight of children in war affected areas.
War Child aims at enhancing healthy psychosocial development of children and the
prevention of future disorders, by strengthening protective factors within the child and the
community they belong to.
War Child’s psychosocial interventions operate at the dual levels of focusing on individual
health as well as community reconciliation and peace building. In fact, breaking the cycle of
violence, and preparing the ground for peace is the fundamental aim of War Child’s projects.
Since our foundation we have been developing and mainstreaming various methodologies in
this field of work. The reactions of children and youth, communities and other humanitarian
organisations have been very positive, also demonstrated by the fact that the War Child
approach has been integrated in various humanitarian and development programmes.
When debating the relevance of War Child programmes, the primary concern for the
fulfilment of basic needs is a returning issue. We put ourselves on the position that minimal
provision of shelter, food and water needs to be in place before War Child programmes can be
considered. Children and youth need to be physically able to join activities. On the other
127
hand, War Child strives to empower children and youth and to support their environments.
This can be, in itself, a contribution to the fulfillment of these basic needs. When designing
and implementing programmes we will make sure not to interfere with communities securing
their basic needs and actively seek partners to provide coordinated assistance.
War Child has adopted different modes of intervention in different countries:
· When local capacity is sufficiently available, the preferred way to operate is through local
partner organisations. In this situation War Child provides financial and/or technical
support to implement (psychosocial) projects. Through working with local partners War
Child strives to increase local capacity in a sustainable way.
· War Child also acts as an implementing organisation; identifying, developing, financing
and staffing projects itself. When implementing our own program or project, we still seek
national partners throughout the different phases of the program, for cooperation or
eventual handover of projects.
Through this variety of operating strategies in different countries, combining support to local
partners with self-implementation, an enriching environment of learning, development and
exchange is established, always with an eventual exit strategy in mind: ‘How to ensure
sustainable development of local capacity’. War Child interventions are in nature and
execution generally long term oriented. Thus, although working in conflict-affected areas,
War Child strives for a long term commitment to our partners and beneficiaries. In specific
circumstances War Child may also provide short term, relief oriented rapid interventions,
alleviating the living conditions of children and youth in humanitarian emergencies.
Depending on the specific characteristics of the program context, the main criteria for the exit
of War Child are:
§ the ability of children and youth to grow up healthily and thereby contribute to a
peaceful society and
§ the capacity at local level to take responsibility for the fulfilment of children’s needs
and the realisation of their rights.
War Child’s methods of work are creative, flexible and adapted to the specific situation in
which children are residing. War Child is an independent humanitarian NGO, assisting
children irrespective of their religious, ethnical, or social background.
The mission of the Inter Kerkelijk Vredesberaad (IKV) is to stimulate political solutions to
crisis- and war situations, and to involve citizens in questions of war and peace. The mission
statement reads as follows: ”War and conflicts are constant factors in history. Also in our
times states and groups of people massively use violence to reach their goals and defend their
interests. Peace, however is also a permanent historical factor. IKV is a Dutch peace
movement, mandated by the Dutch churches, that is involved in stimulating political solutions
to crisis and war situations. In this vein, it sets up projects and provokes society at large (and
the churchly community specifically) to take position and engage in activism.”
IKV has a threefold strategy: constituency, politics and projects. A new project is always
preceded by a political decision that can only come about when there is sufficient support for
it in the constituency. In this interface IKV develops and implements projects and campaigns
geared at peace building in conflict areas. In these projects, IKV works in close partnership
128
with local organisations. Through this partnership and the joint projects and campaigns, IKV
raises awareness about conflict areas and stimulates political analysis of these in the public.
IKV applies two leading principles in its work: civil society building and international
presence. Based on these principles and the long-standing and intense co-operation with a
network of partners in conflict areas, it carries out projects in the field of:
· Conflict prevention
· International presence and protection
· Democratisation and community building
· Harmonisation of inter-ethnic relations
· Improvement of the position of women in conflict
· Reconciliation through religion
· Globalisation of the education on peace issues
IKV aims to do this through
· political lobby (assisting political activists in conflict areas in their lobbying efforts; lobby
and activism in Dutch and international media and other public fora; and, to a lesser
extent, lobbying policymakers in The Hague and Brussels and at embassies and
international organisations)
· societal consciousness raising (engaging in public discussion; drawing attention to
questions of war and peace; drawing attention to less “sexy” conflicts and issues;
providing a platform to partners from conflict regions to spread their message both at
home and abroad; involving Dutch citizens directly in projects and programmes aimed at
finding solutions to conflicts)
· horizontal linking (linking Dutch groups and individuals to groups and individuals in
conflict areas --- examples: linking local governments for information exchange and
capacity building; sending Dutch lawyers or journalists to train and exchange with
colleagues in conflict areas; sending Dutch schoolchildren to Kosovo and Serbia to
participate in projects there. Increasingly thought is being given to creating opportunities
for horizontal linking over the internet)
· capacity strengthening (of partners in conflict regions, through joint strategy
development, managerial assistance, horizontal linking etc.)
· international networks (regional networks have been created to link partners within a
region; IKV would like to have a stronger global network to enable it and its partners to
join with others in common advocacy and exchange. Before, the Helsinki Citizens
Assembly provided a good framework for this, but now that it has decentralised it no
longer plays this role)
IKV works in the Netherlands, Southeast Europe (Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and
Herzogovina, Kosovo, Croatia, Macedonia), the South-Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia,
Azerbeijan), the broader Middle East (Israel/Palestine, Iraq, Morocco), Kashmir and the
Moluccas.
Saferworld is an independent foreign affairs think tank, founded in 1989, whose mission is to
identify, develop and publish more effective approaches to tackling and preventing armed
conflicts. Saferworld works with those involved at every level: international bodies,
governments and NGOs – including local organisations whose knowledge is vital to
complement Saferworld’s own research and experience.
129
Saferworld has programmes in Africa, Europe and South Asia. Through a combination of
research, advocacy and training Saferworld works to:
·
·
·
·
·
Develop and implement innovative local, national and regional strategies to tackle the
spread of small arms and armed violence
Help governments and regional organisations to address arms problems and prevent
violent conflict
Provide training and support for local civil society groups so they can take action on
armed violence and human security in their communities
Reform law enforcement agencies and increase trust between police, other security
agencies and local communities
Ensure that development programmes enhance prospects for peace.
130
Annex 5: Semi Structured Interviews with TMF-organisations
(Example of Saferworld and International Alert)
Saferworld
Saferworld concentrates on international disarmament, the prevention of the spread of small
arms, and the reform of local law enforcement agencies. It has programmes in Africa, Europe
and South Asia and combines research, advocacy and training.
International Alert
Alert originated from a human rights advocacy background. Alert seeks to strengthen people’s
ability to make peace by facilitating dialogue en enhance local capacities. It does international
advocacy and lobby work to create awareness and address issues. Alert works with
organisations and individuals in the Great Lakes Region, West Africa, the Caucasus, Sri
Lanka, Nepal, the Philippines and Colombia. Policy work is conducted at the global level.
The SSI will focus on five main issues:
1. The TMF policy and process from the viewpoint of the TMF organisations
2. The activities undertaken by the TMF organisations
3. The development of TMF organisations’ partnership and interaction with local
organisations
4. The learning capacity of TMF organisations
5. The results of these organisations’ own monitoring and evaluation of TMF-financed
activities.
1.0 General
Name:
Position:
Date:
Location:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
When did the TMF funding begin?
How much TMF funding has your organisation received?
What specific projects were funded by TMF (or was it only core funding)
Who are the key staff involved
What advantage do you see in TMF funding?
What disadvantage to you see in TMF funding?
How do you measure the impact of TMF funding in terms of a) as a funding mechanism
and b) of the project/programme funded (if applicable)
8. In what ways does the TMF funding relate to peace building and conflict prevention
Do you have any documents/reports/budgets that clarify the above
131
2.0 The TMF policy and process from the viewpoint of the TMF organisations
Objectives:
1. To find out more about the policy framing, selection and interaction processes that have
taken place in the context of the TMF programme.
2. To gain insight into the nature and dynamics of relationships between TMF organisations
and the Ministry.
Semi structured interviewing themes
1. Were civil society organisations involved in the creation of TMF policy principles? If so,
in what way?
2. What were the organisation’s main considerations and concerns when applying for TMF
support?
3. What was your organisations experience of the selection process for TMF funding?
4. How much interaction with the Ministry has taken place after the subsidy was allocated?
What are your perceptions about the nature of the interactions?
5. Have inputs from your organisation been taken into account in the development of
subsequent policy frameworks?
6. How flexible is the policy framework? In how far does it leave room for your organisation
to adjust to changing circumstances and needs?
7. What has been the most successful aspect of this policy from your organisations’
viewpoint?
8. What were the main problems/issues encountered?
9. When the general TMF principles were applied to the peace/security/advocacy fields,
what were the problems encountered?
10. With these answers in mind how does the TMF programme compare with other funding
mechanisms?
Are there any documents/reports/budgets that complement the above?
132
3.0 The types of activities undertaken by the TMF organisations
This part of the study will provide an overview of the range of activities that had been
undertaken with the TMF funds, and the aims and objectives that lie at the basis of these
activities. It will give clarity about the different characters and work methods of the
organisations evaluated. In addition to interviews, use will also be made of the organisations’
TMF applications and annual work plans, which include lists of planned activities, aims,
objectives and intended outcomes.
Objectives:
1. To create a picture of the range of organisations that have received TMF funds, including
their philosophies and work methods
2. To create a picture of the range activities that have been undertaken with TMF funds, and
the various aims and objectives that they serve.
Semi structured interviewing themes
1.
2.
3.
4.
What are the philosophies and general aims of your organisation?
What are the types of activities that you engage in?
Do you implement projects or give support to local partners (or both)?
What is the level of joint ownership of the programme, as experienced by the local
partners
5. Do local partners had clarity about each organisation’s role and responsibility
6. What are the types of partnerships that you have developed with actors in the field?
7. What were the proposed activities submitted for TMF funding?
8. What are the objectives of these activities?
9. How do these objectives relate to the general aims of the TMF programme?
10. In as far as you can judge, have the planned activities been carried out in accordance with
the original plan?
11. Have any changes in direction taken place since the TMF funding was granted? For which
reasons?
12. With all this in mind, what would you say is your best project? (location)
13. What makes this project the best?
14. What is your worst project? why?
Advocacy Work (If applicable)
1. What does you organisation mean by advocacy?
2. Who is the messenger (the organisation itself)?
3. Who is the recipient (who are you advocating to) (networking)?
4. Is your organisation a loudspeaker for local groups?
5. What is the impact of your advocacy work?
6. How do you measure the impact of your advocacy work?
Are there any documents/reports/budgets that complement the above?
133
4.0 The development of partnerships with local organisations
Building equal partnerships with local organisations in developing countries has been an
explicit aim of the TMF programme. This aim was made more explicit in the 2004-2007
round than it was in the 2003-2006 round. To analyse the degree of progress in this field, both
will have to be considered. In the field of conflict prevention and peace building activities,
however, activities diverge from the usual development cooperation context. Lobbying and
advocacy play an important role. Many activities can only be carried out by an outsider, not
by people within the country. These differences have to be taken into account in the
evaluation.
The TMF organisations will be asked about their past modes of cooperation with local
partners (before the TMF programme), and changes in these modes as a result of the TMF
programme (where this applies).
Objectives:
1. To map the activities supported directly and indirectly by the TMF programme
2. To gain insight into the nature and dynamics of partnerships with local organisations
3. To define selection criteria and to select countries and partner organisations to be visited
Semi structured interviewing themes
1. What does partnership mean to you? What are the main elements of a partnership
(collaboration, accountability, mutuality, etc)?
2. What is the current state of affairs with your local partners within your TMF funded
programme (or not)?
3. Which efforts have been undertaken to achieve a high degree of mutual accountability?
4. Which obstacles had to be overcome?
5. What is the direction of policy formulation? Top-down or as a result of the needs and
requests of partners?
6. Are funded activities primarily driven by local initiatives and energies or rather by donor
policies and requirements or other ‘Northern’ interests?
7. Which responsibilities have been shifted to Southern partners, which have not (and why)?
8. How could the shift of responsibilities be accelerated towards local partners, what
obstacles need to be removed?
Are there any documents/reports/budgets that complement the above?
134
5.0 The learning capacity of TMF organisations
One way to ensure that efficient and effective work will continue in the future is to have the
capacity to learn from experience and the flexibility to adjust behaviour as a response to this
learning. Writing “lessons learned” reports is not enough in this regard; the important thing is
that the lessons are taken into account in future policy making and practice. This requires
room for reflection and interaction with people facing similar challenges inside and outside
the organisation, an ability to conduct investigation about such challenges, an experimental
attitude, an openness to criticism and a willingness and organisational capacity to change and
adjust in response to lessons learned.
Objectives:
1. To analyse the learning capacity and practice of TMF organisations
2. To find out the degree of openness towards Southern knowledge and experience that exist
with the TMF organisations
3. To identify ways to increase the learning capacity
4. To contribute to an exchange of experience with regard to M+E procedures and results
Semi structured interviewing themes
In order to assess the learning capacity of TMF organisations, the evaluation will look at
whether the organisation has created space for interaction and reflection on actions and
underlying assumptions to make room for learning processes. While creating such space is
difficult considering the pressure to perform and deliver, it is nonetheless vital as only through
continuous trial-and-error adaptation is optimally effective action achieved.
1. Clarification of the internal monitoring and evaluation procedures (within the TMF joint
partnership programme)
2. What policy and programme adjustments as a result of such procedures (above) take
place?
3. What policy and programme adjustments as a result of the above specifically help to
assess the functioning of institutional mechanisms to draw and use lessons learned
4. What is your organisations’ involvement in knowledge exchange initiatives and their
success or failure?
5. How does your organisation mobilise southern knowledge. (Partner organisations after all
have a unique inside understanding of the society and situation they are part of and can
therefore feed back lessons and knowledge to Northern partners).
6. Has the learning led to changes in programme direction or activities?
7. What are the obstacles that hinder learning processes
8. How can these obstacles be overcome?
Are there any documents/reports/budgets that complement the above?
135
6.0 The results of monitoring and evaluation by TMF organisations
TMF organisations’ monitoring and evaluation mechanisms will not only be analysed in order
to establish their contribution to the learning capacity of the organisations, but also to look at
the content of the monitoring and evaluation results.
Objectives:
1. To find out how successful the TMF programmes are perceived to be by organisation
members, local partners and target groups, and on which grounds,
2. To have information that can be compared to the results with other similar programmes
(where similar programmes do exist)
3. To establish how effective the monitoring and evaluation mechanisms have been.
Semi structured interviewing themes
1. What form of monitoring and evaluation has been undertaken?
2. What role have local partners played in monitoring and evaluation?
3. What have been the main results of internal monitoring and evaluation of TMF
programmes?
4. How is the result explained by those responsible within the organisations for the TMF
programmes?
5. Have any adjustments been made as a result of monitoring and evaluation results?
Are there any documents/reports/budgets that complement the above?
136
7.0 Concluding Questions
With the above in mind
1. How does TMF funding compare with the other funding mechanisms that your
organisations benefits?
·
·
·
Are they better/worse
What are their characteristics
Are they more/less flexible
2. Can you illustrate how added value has been created as a result of TMF funding (i.e. is it
because its thematic and not just tied to one specific programme)
3. Is your organisations effectiveness/efficiency limited by the way TMF fund you?
Can you identify wasted resources?
4. How could the TMF mechanisms be improved? (Rank)
If it was improved what would this enable your organisation to do
5. In summary what have been the main lessons learned from your TMF experience for:
·
·
·
·
planning
project/programme implementation
working with partners
project/programme sustainability
Are there any documents/reports/budgets that complement the above?
137
Annex 6: Research Themes for the Field Visits
Analysis of activities of partner organisations
The country visits to the partner organisations of the selected TMF organisations have the objective of
assessing the TMF partnership’s impact on (a) the partner organisations’ capacities (organisational and
programmatic), (b) their project activities, and (c) the final target groups or wider society.
The various country visits will at least involve the following elements:
· Review of relevant documents of the partner organisation (project proposals, reports,
correspondence)
· Semi-structured interviews with leadership and relevant staff of the organisation
· Field visits (if relevant and feasible)
· Interviews with representatives of constituent or target groups
This information will be analyzed giving particular attention to issues such as ownership, capacity
enhancement, transfer of responsibilities from North to South, local capacities and practices for
monitoring and evaluation and the final impact of peace building activities.
In the detailed analysis of the activities of partners of the selected TMF organisations, particular
attention will be paid to:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
Quality of partnership
Analysis of activities
Gender sensitivity of activities
Synergy with other projects or duplication of activities
Relationship to embassies, degree of coordination
Analysis of impact with target groups
3.1 Quality of partnership
Based on interviews with local partner organisations, the analysis will establish the opinions of local
staff regarding the quality of the partnership.
Objectives:
· To reach a conclusion about the quality of the relationship between the TMF organisations and
their local partners
· To establish the degree of mutual accountability that exist between the two partners
· To establish the degree of capacity building achieved
Investigative themes:
This includes the following aspects:
The relationships between local staff and people at the TMF organisation
· How are these relationships perceived by the staff?
· How frequent are contacts?
· What type of contacts?
· Is the relationship considered to be equal?
The degree of mutual accountability
· To what extent are local partners held accountable for their activities?
· To what extent are local partners able to hold the TMF organisation accountable for its
activities?
· What mechanisms are there to ensure mutual accountability?
138
·
To what extent do the local partners feel that their needs are taken into account in the policy
formulation of the TMF organisation?
The degree of capacity building
· How is capacity defined?
· What measures are taken to build the capacity of the local partners?
· Are the local partners able to act increasingly independently of the TMF organisation?
· Do the local partners consider the capacity building effort to be successful?
· Why or why not?
· What could be improved?
3.2 Analysis of activities
In interaction with the staff members of the partner organisations, an analysis of the organisations’
activities undertaken in the framework of the TMF programme will be carried out.
Objectives:
·
·
·
To establish the partner organisations’ perspective on the activities carried out in the TMF
framework
To find out how far and in what way the activities of the partner organisations fit in with the
aims of the TMF programme.
To find out how far and in what way the activities of the partner organisations contribute to
the aims of the TMF programme
Investigative themes:
Particular attention will be paid to the following issues.
· What are the main aims and objectives of the partner organisations’ projects in the framework
of the TMF programme?
· How do these objectives contribute to the overall aims of the TMF programme?
· How are these objectives translated into action?
· How successful are the organisations’ projects, in relation to their objectives (according to the
organisations themselves)?
· What could be improved, and why is it not being done?
· What mechanisms of monitoring and evaluation are in place?
3.3 Gender sensitivity
An important objective of the TMF programme is to achieve more gender sensitivity of programmes.
Objective:
·
To establish the degree of gender sensitivity of the partner organisations’ projects in the
framework of the TMF programme
Investigative themes:
·
What measures are taken to ensure that activities take gender issues into account?
139
·
·
·
How far is Gender mainstreamed into the projects of the partner organisations?
How far is Gender being “imposed” by the TMF organisation, and to what extent is it a
priority with members of the partner organisation themselves?
Has the capacity of the organisation to address Gender issues grown?
3.4 Synergy with other projects or duplication of activities
Objectives:
· To find out whether there is a duplication of activities with other projects in the
region/country
· To find out whether synergies exist with other projects
Investigative themes:
·
·
·
·
·
·
How do the partner’s activities in the framework of the TMF programme relate to other
projects of the organisation?
How do the activities relate to projects by other organisations in the country or region?
Is there a duplication of activities?
Have there been any conflicts between different organisations or projects?
Has a synergy between different activities been achieved?
What challenges are keeping a synergy from being achieved?
3.5 Relationship to Embassies, degree of coordination
Another issue that can affect the effectiveness of TMF-sponsored projects is their coordination at the
local level.
Objective
· To establish the degree of coordination at local level with relevant institutions
Investigative themes:
·
·
·
·
·
How far are Embassies involved in providing guidance and coordination to local TMF
organisations on behalf of the Ministry?
Do the Embassies monitor the local activities in the TMF framework, in comparison to the
original criteria and guidelines set by the Ministry?
What is the extent of the Embassies role in feeding back the experiences, needs and ideas of
the local partners to the Ministry and TMF organisations?
Are there any coordination mechanisms in place involving the Embassy?
Are there any coordination mechanisms in place not involving the Embassy?
How do these mechanisms function and to what degree of effectiveness?
3.6 Analysis of impact with target groups
Objectives:
140
·
·
To find out how far, and in what way, the activities of the partner organisations contribute to
the aims of the TMF programme
To establish the opinions of the target groups about the impact of the TMF-sponsored projects
A composite methodological approach, involving interviews, group meetings and observations will be
used, to triangulate the views of the target groups of the TMF-sponsored projects. Some of these
questions overlap with those mentioned in section 3.0. This will enable the researchers to compare the
opinions and ideas of the staff of local TMF partners with those of members of the target groups:
Investigative Themes
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
Do the activities correspond to the target group’s priorities or are they ‘imposed’ by the
partner organisation?
Do mechanisms of monitoring and evaluation involve members of the target groups?
Do members of the target groups feel they can contribute to the policy making process?
How successful are the organisations’ projects in relation to their objectives?
What could be improved, and why is it not being done?
Are the projects considered to be gender sensitive?
What is the perceived impact of the TMF-sponsored projects on the target groups?
How does this impact compare to that of other (TMF and non-TMF) projects?
Have the projects contributed to peace and security in the region? In what way?
Have the projects increased people’s capacity to deal with threats against peace and security?
In what way?
Can you sum up the main “achievements” and “disappointments”?
141
Annex 7: Methodologies for the Evaluation of Peacebuilding Activities
Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment
(PCIA)34
Community-based Monitoring and
Evaluation System (MES)35
Level of analysis, target groups
The PCIA debate is very much focussing on
assessing impact on the macro peace process.
(Paffenholz 2005b – More field notes, p. 6)
Community Peace Groups
Kind of activities which are
evaluated
Conflict management capabilities, political
structures and processes, economic structures
and processes, social empowerment
Methods, tools
Participatory workshops with stakeholders,
field research
Concrete experience
Field testing (of “Aid for peace)” in Rwanda
(2001), Bosnia, Burundi, South Africa,
Nigeria, Angola, and Nepal (2002) Angola,
Sri Lanka, South Kivu, and Nepal (2003)
(Too) much oriented towards a broad
framework for a standardized approach to aid
in conflict situations
Improvement of interaction between
ethnic groups, analysis of root causes;
introduction of sustainable early warning
system for early action
Log Frames
Activity Interviews
Case Monitors
Participants’ Lists
The Community Peace Building and
Development Project in Western Kenya
has experimented with MES since 1999
Weaknesses
Examples of indicators
Proponents of PCIA have paid relatively little
attention to the development of suitable
indicators to measure the impact of
interventions
Log Frames are too much based on a
linear, development project model and do
not easily accommodate the flexibility of
a dynamic process
Ethnic diversity at meetings;
new community peace initiatives,
confessions of community members;
agreements over the use of resources
Outcome Mapping
(IDRC)36
“Sphere of influence” which each project
has: Outcome mapping aims to asses the
observable “behavioural changes” within
the boundary partners’ sphere
Programmes identify partners with whom
they work & then devise strategies to help
equip these partners with the tools and
resources to contribute to change.
Shift away from assessing the products of a
program (e.g. poverty alleviation, reduced
conflict) to focus on concrete changes in
behaviour, relationships, actions
Outcome mapping was applied to the
Belfast mobile phone project described in
People Building Peace II (435-440) at the
New York GPPAC session.
Focus on observable behaviour may
disregard structural changes (difficult to
see); seems to be based on external
perspective
Number of new ideas shared in the team,
number of key informants from which
programmes seeks feedback, number of
requests to share the program’s “wisdom”
34
„Under the label PCIA, we find quite different concepts and approaches. For some, PCIA is a toolset that is applied for programme planning, while others regard it as a
framework for evaluation and cross-country comparison”. See Schmelzle (2005) and Austin, Fischer Wils (2003).
35
MES has been developed by the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) Community Peace Building and Development Project (CPBD Project) and the Nairobi
Peace Initiative-Africa (NPI-Africa), see “Strategic and Responsive Evaluation of Peacebuilding. Towards a Learning Model” (2001).
36
International Development Research Centre, Ottawa (see http://www.idrc.ca/evaluation/).
142
Annex 8: Indicators of success (as mentioned by TMF-organisations in their application)
ECCP
IKV
International
Alert
Pax Christi
Saferworld
- number of publications, case studies and papers produced
- the number of regional meetings held, number and background of participants
- Regional Action agenda produced in all regions
for networks:
- how representative is the network’s structure?
- What is the history of the network?
- Who are the members, procedures and mechanisms to work together?
- What makes networks learn?
- Are networks inclusive or homogeneous?
- Aantal, doematigheid en doeltreffendheid van ondersteunde initiatieven
- Meer vrijheid van beweging en organisatie voor NGOs (vrij telefoon- en email verkeer)
- Meer partnerschappen met en presentie ter plekke van Europese NGOs
- Aantal lokale partners IKV en aantal projecten met deze partners
- Aantal publicaties in media, aantal gebruikers van de website
- Aantal deelnemers aan herdenkingsmanifestatie,
- Aantal leerlingen dat onderwijspakket gebruikt
- Aantal deelnemers aan bewustwordingsactiviteiten
- Aantal grensoverschrijdende projecten …..
- meetings and workshops undertaken
- Training programmes completed, publications or policy papers produced
- New funds raised for new projects, Existing projects run successfully
- Fact finding missions, or other contributions to analysis undertaken
- establishment or development of partner organisations
- successful action by partner organisations
- practical changes on the ground (e.g. the arrival of humanitarian assistance to an
area, the opening of a road, children getting to school)
Starting point: “Guidance for evaluating humanitarian assistance in complex
emergencies”, DAC/OECD 1999 - “Two major elements of this approach are, on the one
hand, the use of a broader range of criteria for assessment (going beyond impact or
efficiency), and on the other hand, the strong reliance on the narratives of people involved
in or closely associated with the work.” …
Criteria of coherence, co-ordination and connectedness to the political context
- the coherence and focus of the programme, coverage and coherence
- effectiveness and appropriateness of activities,
- sustainability of the outcome,
- relations with partner organisations,
- profile and positioning within the i-NGO landscape
- and the relation to changing political circumstances.
“The indicators for an effort aimed at engaging people in an inter-ethnic dialogue are
quite different from the indicators for measuring the success of a campaign, which are
again quite different from the indicators aimed at establishing the degree to which a
conference series has changed participants’ knowledge of and attitudes to specific
problems.”
- Improved analysis of the risk of violent conflict in EU country and sectoral strategy
papers
-Increased consultation and strengthened mechanisms for dialogue between civil society,
Horn governments, the EU and regional organisations within the framework of the
Cotonou Agreement.
- Increased understanding of the EU, its development and conflict prevention policies by
“secondary” partners.
Consultations and dialogue meetings held and attended by a x number of “secondary”
143
War Child
37
37
partners and x number of high level representatives from target groups.”
- Strengthened constructive coping mechanisms of children
-Increased awareness about and support to psychosocial needs of children by community,
parents and caregivers
- (Para)professionals recognize psychosocial needs of children and are able to give
adequate support
- Increased interaction between divided groups of children
From: War Child. Methodology Working Paper, Version 2004, p. 10.
144
Annex 9
Concepts of post-war recovery and peacebuilding
by Sultan Barakat
Introduction
The last decade saw concepts of post-war recovery and peacebuilding becoming increasingly the
focus of international organisations, governments and NGOs, as well as an emerging important
area for research and academic studies (Barakat, 2005: 7). The Dutch government has made a
number of significant contributions in this respect, particularly in relation to the Theme-based
Co-financing (TMF) programme, which is the subject of our Evaluation.
This review argues that peacebuilding is bedevilled by divisions because it has been
overstretched in depth and scope, both as a concept and as a policy instrument. The term was
unclear from the start with its initial formal introduction by the United Nations (UN) in 1992.
Based on this, differing theoretical interpretations in addition to two main operational strategies
ensued, which have led to diverse policy implementations today. Nevertheless, this review also
acknowledges the prioritisation of poverty reduction and civil society development as two
necessary dimensions within peacebuilding.
This review traces the current confusion surrounding notions of peacebuilding back to its
inception within multilateral policy, through the UN Agenda for Peace in 1992. Second, theorists
are generally in agreement that peacebuilding should be multi-functional/dimensional and
propose the application of similar normative western values. However, notable discord in theory
emerged as a consequence of the amorphous definition of the term. The main fault line is
whether peacebuilding should be sequential, which entails following and adapting the Agenda’s
policy framework of the four pillars, or not. Accordingly, this Review separates theorists into:
‘sequentialists’ and ‘anti-sequentialists’. The dichotomy is not watertight but is useful in
understanding fundamental differences and when translating theories into practice. For each
division, the author examines the competing definitions of peacebuilding, and the scope and type
of activities assigned. Furthermore, this section recognises that peacebuilding has also evolved
through practice with a “very mixed record of international intervention” (Cousens, 2001: 2).
From the early 1990s, two main operational strategies, the integrative and the sectoral, have been
applied but have faced the common challenge of co-ordination among donors and deliverers.38
As an additional commonality, it is important to recognise the reasons for the prioritisation of
poverty reduction and civil society development as prerequisites to building.
38
This review identifies some of the major trends in strategy but recognises that operations must ultimately be
tailored to each context.
145
1.
A blurred introduction
From the start, peacebuilding was nestled in a comprehensive, though blindly ambitious, policy
framework. The UN Secretary-General’s 1992 Agenda for Peace represented a concerted effort to
break away from the international community’s inaction and powerlessness during the Cold War.
To this end, Boutros-Ghali added the temporally-defined “aftermath” instrument of
“postconflict peace-building” in order to complete the pillars of preventive diplomacy,
peacemaking and peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: Paragraph 56).
Second, it was proposed that the four actions together, with the backing of all member states,
would “offer a coherent contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter”
(Paragraph 22). However, by structuring the pillars in a linear sequence the Agenda proved too
rigid a response to the unanticipated complexities of post-Cold War conflicts, and therefore
failed to “address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political
oppression.”39
Furthermore and compared to the policy quartet, the definition of peacebuilding was unclear,
particularly in defining its own specific tasks relevant to the changing global context. It was
asked to build “bonds of peaceful mutual benefit”; “identify and support structures which will
tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict”; assume “a
mutually beneficial undertaking that can, not only contribute to economic and social
development, but also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to peace”; and reduce
“hostile perceptions through educational exchanges and curriculum reform”, which “may be
essential to forestall a re-emergence of cultural and national tensions” (Paragraph 56).40 Some
further detail was added but these cloudy goals glossed over its eventual responsibilities.41 This
was particularly inevitable as peacebuilding was grounded in the flawed expectation that war
would prevail to be international and interstate.42
Fourth, the only relatively clear task defined was “rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures
of nations torn by civil war and strife” (Paragraph 15). However, this “new requirement” was
unsuitably cast as a technical exercise and based on the “obvious” though simplistic “connection”
that “true peace and security” required the transformation of “deficient national structures and
capabilities” into “new democratic institutions”, as the cornerstone of “good governance”
39
Preventive diplomacy would seek “to resolve disputes before violence breaks out”; with peacemaking and
peace-keeping “required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: Paragraph
21). This was reinforced in Paragraph 57, which identified peacebuilding as the direct “counterpart” to
preventive diplomacy, which sandwiched the “mutually reinforcing efforts at peacemaking and peace-keeping”.
De-mining and demilitarised zones were the only noted exceptions, with the former recognised as the link
between peacekeeping and peacebuilding while the latter was a common concern for all four pillars (BoutrosGhali, 1992: Paragraph 58).
40
While not unproblematic, peacemaking and peacekeeping operations were more lucidly envisaged to act
“[t]hrough agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the
restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training
support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or
strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.”
(Boutros-Ghali, 1992: Paragraph 55).
41
For example, Paragraph 56 lists “cooperative projects… to develop agriculture, improve transportation or
utilize resources such as water or electricity that they need to share, or joint programmes through which barriers
between nations are brought down by means of freer travel, cultural exchanges and mutually beneficial youth
and educational projects.”
42
It was directed to focus on “among nations formerly at war”, to “link two or more countries” and implement
“projects that bring States together” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: Paragraph 56).
146
(Paragraph 59). Fifth, as Haugerudbraaten asserts, Boutros-Ghali outlined “short to medium
term intervention measures” but these “conflicted with the emphasis on sustainability within the
initial definition.” (Haugerudbraaten, 1998).
In 1995, the Secretary-General’s Supplement to an Agenda for Peace sought to clarify, though not
revise, the definition of peace building. Nevertheless, specific tasks were still unclear and the
Supplement complicated peacebuilding further by stretching it to areas “unforeseen” three years
earlier (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: Paragraph 6).43 Peacebuilding was granted the “essential goal” of
creating “structures for the institutionalisation of peace” by addressing “the root causes of the
conflict” through “long-term political, economic and social provisions” (Boutros-Ghali, 1995:
Paragraph 49).
Peacebuilding also gained greater interconnectedness with the other three pillars, thereby
significantly recognising that the quartet could not be applied in a neat linear fashion. First,
peacebuilding converged further with preventive diplomacy by involving: “[d]emilitarisation, the
control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring
of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development” (Boutros-Ghali, 1995:
Paragraph 47). Second, while it was recognised that peacebuilding could work alone, it was
considered more manageable when operating in tandem with peacekeeping. In a given context,
the latter would already enjoy local consent and have the mandate for overlapping activities, in
particular, the demobilisation of combatants (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: Paragraphs 49 and 50).
Last, the Supplement recognised the challenges posed to peacebuilding by: 1) peace agreement
spoilers; 2) the perception of politicised intervention and; 3) the external anxiety of long-term
commitment (Paragraph 51). However, these were merely acknowledged based on the
difficulties in “timing and modalities” between the transfer of complete responsibilities from
peacekeeping to peacebuilding (Boutros-Ghali, 1995: Paragraph 52). Similarly, it appreciated the
reluctance of donors towards difficult peacebuilding activities but could not recommend ways to
manage this beyond good planning (Paragraph 100).
By 2004, the UN was still struggling to address the difficulties raised in the Supplement and to find
a workable niche for its fourth pillar in order to promote collective peace and security. Based on
the report, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, peacebuilding was recommended to
assume a greater preventive role by proactively identifying countries “under stress and at risk”
while also assisting transitions from conflict (Cutter, 2005: 778).44
2.
Sequentialists
Sequentialists have tended to move away from the linear rigidness of the Agenda but still assert
that post-conflict peacebuilding needs to be arranged separately in relation to the three other
pillars. Spencer’s review of the literature concludes that this is the predominant approach
(Spencer 1998: 19-20). Fundamentally, this type of incremental or gradual approach needs
security before implementing all other peacebuilding activities. Its founding father, Galtung, preempted the UN’s procedural framework with his negative (cessation of direct violence) and
positive peace continuum (from the elimination of underlying causes to justice) (Atack, 2003/04:
17-18, 21). Ball and Halevy place peacebuilding firmly after the phase of negotiation and
43
Peacebuilding in contexts outside a UN mandate was highlighted as an important uncharted and thus vague
area (Paragraphs 55 and 56).
44
This echoed Anan’s June 2001 report The Prevention of Armed Conflict, which states that “conflict prevention
lies at the heart of the mandate of the UN in the maintenance of international peace and security.” (Atack,
2003/04: 20).
147
cessation of hostilities (cited in Cutter, 2005: 779-780), which Atack groups as “countries
emerging out of…conflicts” (Atack, 2003/04: 17-18). Similarly, Cousens and Kumar locate it to
somewhere between peacemaking and peacekeeping by limiting it to creating stable political
processes. This is based on the belief that external actors can only legitimately revive political
institutions towards managing conflict compared to the “internal processes” involving the
cultural and the spiritual (cited in Cutter, 2005: 783; and Cousens, 2001: 4).
David Last is committed overall to Galtung’s division but adds that ‘positive’ activities must
begin simultaneously although in a “catalytic and organising” role. Accordingly, this incremental
sequence is paralleled by the process of devolving authority from internationals to locals, which
can take three years (Last, 2000: 94). Jennings and Ruge lament that Last’s timeframe is
frequently the norm. They conclude that peacebuilding is typically a shorter-term project
undertaken in immediate proximity to a period of conflict and proceeded by development
(Jennings and Ruge, undated: 22). Kühne also assigns a short to medium timeframe, to be
proceeded by long-term development co-operation (Kühne, 2001: 383).
Darby and MacGinty tentatively suggest that peacebuilding “can occur at almost any stage” even
preceding a ceasefire or negotiations. Nevertheless, reluctant sequentialists, the authors affirm
that peacebuilding is based on the notion “that there is a peace to build upon” and thus locate it
within a “peace process” with its thrust in the post peace accord or latter-end phase (Darby and
MacGinty, 2003: 195). Similarly, SAIS equates it with “post-conflict reconstruction” and
describes it as “a process that facilitates the establishment of durable peace and tries to prevent
the recurrence of violence by addressing root causes and effects of conflict through
reconciliation, institution building and political as well as economic transformation.”45
As introduced in the Supplement and furthered in A More Secure World; for some, peacebuilding can
even come before the conflict in the form of prevention (Rotberg 1996: 32). For Kühne, it has
to start as early as possible and expects it “to prevent violent conflict from re-emerging and to
rebuild the capabilities of a society to resolve conflict without fighting” (Kühne, 2001: 383).
However, this “risky” component is ultimately restrained in practice by the barrier of state
sovereignty since it promotes the Westphalian model of the state, which “is often the precise
issue in dispute” (Atack, 2003/04: 18). Consequently, the positioning of peacebuilding through
state consent might be limited to post-conflict opportunities.
Sequential peacebuilding can focus more on political definitions. Darby and MacGinty expect it
to “regularize the transfer of power and facilitate the transition from a peace agreement to a
lasting peace settlement”. Key factors are political will, the ability of an accord to adapt to
changing circumstances “to develop a life of its own” and the reform of security and judiciary
institutions (Darby and MacGinty, 2003: 195). Focusing on the elites, Lumsden defines it as
moving towards “sustainable relationships between former adversaries” (cited in Jeong, 2005:
21). Cousens advocates a perceived back-to-basics approach, which needs “…to sharpen and
retain… its original purpose” on the “political dimension of conflict and its resolution.” He goes
on to define peace building as “the construction or strengthening of authoritative and, eventually, legitimate
mechanisms to resolve internal conflict without violence” (Cousens, 2001: 4). Moving away from the
limitations of inductive and deductive approaches, Cousens proposes peacebuilding as politics –
“a strategic framework of objectives for international assistance”, which prioritises conflict
resolution and requires trade-offs to accommodate weaknesses in international commitment.”
(Cousens, 2001: 10).
45
http://www.sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/approaches/peacebuilding/index.html.
148
More comprehensively, Kühne extends activities to include “emergency assistance,
demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, and the restoration of public order and
security”, even if it should transcend the “political domain” (Kühne, 2001: 383). While initially
limiting peacebuilding to socio-economic reconstruction and development, Galtung more
recently included the sweeping issues of culture, human needs, and “fault-lines of the human
condition such as gender” (cited in Llamazares, 2005: 4). For SAIS, “[r]econstruction” should
“address all dimensions of society – functional structures; emotional conditions and social
psychology; social stability; rule of law/ethics; and cultural dimension.”46
Emphasising its importance as a prerequisite to sustainable development, Jennings and Ruge
describe how peacebuilding typically “encompasses governance, security, and justice/rule of law
projects, in addition to poverty alleviation and other economic issues typical to development
activities” (Jennings and Ruge, undated: 22). Similarly, Atack recommends the provision of skills
and resources to rebuild and prevent the recurrence of political violence, thereby combining
“traditional development concerns with an understanding of the dynamics of social and political
conflict as well as innovative non-violent responses to it” (Atack, 2003/04: 17-18).
3.
Anti-sequentialists
Alternatively, anti-sequentialists completely reject the linear strategy of the four pillars and thus
the ordered positioning of peacebuilding. Lederach projects it as a “dynamic social construct”, a
process in itself, elusive to a specific condition and thus more than just “post accord
reconstruction” (Lederach, 2002: 20-21). Jeong follows this conceptualisation and subdivides the
peacebuilding process into a detailed sequence. He first prescribes the creation of “a shared
vision arising from mutual understanding and a collaborative spirit of problem solving” in order
to formulate the goal of peacebuilding (Jeong, 2005: 10). Then, the process “must give real
evidence that the dominant party cannot simply impose its will or eliminate the other side while
the weaker party is committed to non-violent structural transformation.” Despite inevitable
weaknesses, he proposes that peace agreements “should help provide a framework for continuing
efforts to transform unbalanced relationships” (Jeong, 2005: 10). Proceeding this should come
“postconflict reconstruction and rehabilitation”, which needs to be forward looking through
“[i]ntegrative social development, geared toward meeting human needs” (Jeong, 2005: 21).47 The
last part should focus on reconciliation, which is “necessary at the community level as a
prerequisite to fulfilling agreements made by the elite, that is, government and/or state security
representatives and insurgents” (Jeong, 2005: 10).
These exponents naturally reject short to medium-term timeframes. Lederach outlines a crisis
stage (2-6 months); people and relationships (1-2 years); institutions or sub-system (5-10 years);
and completed by the generational vision of peace and a desired future (cited in Jennings and
Ruge, undated: 22). Nevertheless, he cautions that the common measurement of connecting time
and outcome within a set timeframe is incompatible with a local context’s complex dynamics.
The concept of “polychronic simultaneity” (multiple people creating multiple events at the same
time) is proposed as an alternative (Lederach, 2002: 131). Paris coincides with Lederach’s
“decade” thinking by shifting from short-term to long-term approaches to peacebuilding
interventions. This challenges the focus on ‘dates’ by suggesting that international organisations
must revise their timeframes to link them to the accomplishment of specific objectives instead
(cited in Jennings and Ruge, undated: 22). However, Jeong blames the “artificial deadlines set up
46
http://www.sais-jhu.edu/cmtoolkit/approaches/peacebuilding/index.html.
Similarly, Maise separates post-conflict peacebuilding as a distinct aspect within the more generic term,
though as an overlap with peacekeeping (http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/peacebuilding.jsp).
47
149
by third parties” specifically on the “concerns of donor countries more than logistical realities.”
Alternatively, he unreservedly describes a long-term “open-ended” project with “sustained
investment of time and resources”, in particular since local capacity is insufficient, and “the
reality that reconciliation among former adversaries takes time” (Jeong, 2005: 27).
Anti-sequentialists naturally adopt more holistic definitions of peacebuilding. With a complete
rejection of the term, Lederach unfastens it as “a comprehensive concept that encompasses,
generates, and sustains the full array of processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform
conflict toward more sustainable, peaceful relationships” (Lederach, 2002: 20-21).48 For Jeong,
building sustainable peace is “a collective good to redress the past legacy of violent conflict,
helping the population overcome extreme vulnerability and move toward self-sufficiency.”
(Jeong, 2005: 10). O’ Reilly uses the working definition of “the outworking of a perspective or
vision that seeks restoration of economic, political, social, emotional and spiritual relationships
which may or may not be expressed by overt conflict (cited in Spencer, 1998: 33). Lund also
portrays a dynamic notion (Lund, 2001: 17) and the Canadian Peacebuilding Coordinating
Committee broadens peacebuilding as “the effort to strengthen the prospects for internal peace
and decrease the likelihood of violent conflict” (cited in Atack, 2003/04: 22).
Similar to the sequentialists, activities are multifunctional and share the same areas of security;
governance; justice and reconciliation; and economic and social well being. However, activities
are different because they can be conducted before, during and after armed conflict (Jennings and
Ruge, undated: 25). Lederach’s proposed “distinct though interrelated components” include
structure, process, relationship, resources, and co-ordination. Coming before and after accords,
activities should “address structural issues, social dynamics of relationship building, and the
development of a supportive infrastructure for peace.” (Lederach, 2002: 20-21). He advises
against the typical project-oriented activities (the “packaging of work and activities that lead to
proposed outcomes”) since peacebuilding “is fundamentally rooted in the building of relationship
and trust.” (Lederach, 2002: 130). In Jeong’s process, “[s]table relations between communities”
need “efforts to rebuild political, economic, and social structures”, the enhancement of public
security, and economic recovery. He therefore recommends addressing “[s]ocioeconomic
cleavages and regional animosities” by the “promotion of national reconciliation, social and
economic improvement and reform of state institutions and political representation strategies”
(Jeong, 2005:12-13). Furthermore, Lund gives it the tools of: official diplomacy; nonofficial
conflict management methods; military measures; economic and social measures; political
development and governance measures; judicial and legal measures; and communications and
education measures (Lund, 2001: 17). Similarly, Goodhand and Hulme find that overall it is a
term used loosely to encompass a range of activities which aim to prevent, alleviate, or resolve
conflict (cited in Spencer, 1998: 33).
4.
Poverty reduction and civil society development as prerequisites to peacebuilding
Poverty reduction and civil society development are essential linkages between development and
peace. It was perhaps the concerted realisation that peacebuilding needed to provide more than
conflict resolution that prioritised poverty reduction and civil society development within
48
Similarly, Barakat acknowledges the perception of peace building as an imported and tainted concept and
prefers ‘post-war reconstruction’, which is defined more openly as: “a range of holistic activities in an integrated
process designed not only to reactivate economic and social development but at the same time to create a
peaceful environment by addressing the emerging deficits in security and political and institutional capacity that
will prevent a relapse into violence” (Barakat, 2005: 573).
150
peacebuilding policy. Although, this coming to the fore can be explained by several other
factors49
Poverty reduction has a dual role in development and peace building, and forms multiple linkages
with governance; economics; socio-cultural factors; and security. As an enabler, post conflict aid
can help “build trust in the peace process by offering real material improvements to people” and
by making sure that the “peace dividend” is distributed equally among the population.” This can
involve alleviating “… the material conditions of violence (lack of opportunities) and
empowering people to resolve their conflicts peacefully.” (Leonhardt, 2001: 241 and 243).
It also has an oversight role. For example, at the macroeconomic policy level, Jeong writes that
the “distributional aspects” have to be considered in the context of social and political needs if
inequity and animosities are to be reduced” (Jeong, 2005: 12). If there is inequality in economic
growth and resource distribution, then there is a clear risk of normalising unjust situations by
merely helping people to cope with the consequences of globalisation and more specifically, “war
economies” (Duffield, 2000: 69-75). Berdal and Malone concur and blame the political economy
as the key source of “protractedness”, which remains unchallenged by current peacebuilding
approaches (2000: 2). Similarly for Collier, good peacebuilding must reduce incentives for those
benefiting from war in order to reduce their influence over the process (2000: 91 and 105).
Brown also perceives a greater threat to peace from the political manipulation of, for example,
economic or social cleavages, than the cleavages themselves (cited in Llamazares, 2005: 7-8).
Nevertheless, the OECD recognises the need for a more “systematic approach to reducing
poverty”.50
Civil society development is crucial though often overlooked through donor bias. This causes
neglect of the inter-personal and psycho-social dimensions of peace building (Ryan, 1990). The
latter need to be restored while complementing processes of reconstruction at all levels of the
intervention, from leadership (Track I) to grassroots (Track III) (Llamazares, 2005: 9-10). A state
can derive significant legitimacy by establishing sufficient capacity to reconstruct, which is in turn
a building block for sustainability. Jeong agrees and in particular cautions that civil society
development is an important balance to the promotion of democratic formal institutions, rules
and political representation through elections and the wider neo-liberal peacebuilding model,
since a “plurality of groups and associations need to be promoted to balance out any abusive
power of the state.” More obviously, local involvement discourages “an unhealthy dependency”
and is a functional necessity since external actors have limited knowledge of the local setting and
constrained moral authority (Jeong, 2005: 12). Therefore, building capacities in general can
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of assistance but Smillie emphasises “the context into
which they must fit.” (Smillie, 2001: 15).51
49
They are also important components of the international “liberal democratic peace” of open economies and
open societies, built around democratic principles, and offering improved standards of living (Duffield, 2002,
and Paris, 2002 cited in Llamazares, 2005: 26).
50
http://www.oecd.org
51
Smillie uses Deborah Eade’s definition of capacity building, which “involves the whole network of
relationships in society” and “creating new relationships of mutuality and reciprocity within a given society and
beyond.” (cited in Smillie, 2001: 16). However, it is noted that meanings are often confusing and definitions
unclear. Smillie argues that capacity building was treated traditionally as more of a ‘means’ which stunted its
reach. He therefore welcomes the shift to focusing on the ‘ends’ after the Capacities and Vulnerability Analysis
in 1989, which urges interveners to focus on vulnerabilities and capacities “building the former and reducing the
latter.” It is based on the rationale “that outsiders cannot develop others, but that they can help to create an
environment and processes that help people on the path to their own development.” This was furthered still by
the War-Torn Societies Project (1994-1998), which aimed to strengthen the ability of primary stakeholders “to
engage and influence the political arena and the socioeconomic system in accordance with their interests”
(Smillie, 2001:11-12).
151
Moreover, it needs to be appreciated that local capacity building is difficult because of the
“underdeveloped nature of civil societies and weak administrative structures” (Jeong, 2005: 195196). Alternatively, such a concentration of activities may endanger “the strengthening of the
state as an effective monopoly of power as well as of its legal control.” (Ropers, 2001: 524).
Smillie agrees that “[c]hanneling bilateral and multilateral resources through international NGOs
can shift accountability and responsibility away from national and local leaders, undermining local
capacity and creating further dependence.” (Smillie, 2001: 7). With direct relevance to donorship,
Jeong asserts that “development assistance programs bring about positive changes on a larger
scale but generally have a less intensive impact on interpersonal processes.” (Jeong, 2005: 23).
Last, inclusive definitions of peacebuilding recognise poverty reduction and civil society
development as two essential goals and tools but also as part of a multidimensional process. For
example, Pugh (1995: 18) believes that an emphasis on structural causes of conflict underplays
the “psychological, spiritual and cultural determinants of violence”, and that “reconciliation
between social groups previously at war, requires more than money”. Jeong adds that “[w]here
there is insufficient institutionalisation of the political process…, personal and patrimonial links
have an impact on the distribution of assets and access to economic gains as well as political
positions.” Alternatively, a “stable political order does not necessarily emerge from a new
constitutional framework.” (Jeong, 2005: 12).
Therefore, it is appropriate to examine briefly the two main opposing operational strategies for
peacebuilding.
5.
The integrative operational strategy
Anti-sequentialists advocate an integrative operation based on their holistic definitions of
peacebuilding. However, this operation has been implemented predominately by the UN and is
thus sequential in delivery. It is typically characterised as short-term involvement by the
international community, centralist and with political measures, and efforts mainly by external
agents (Haugerudbraaten, 1998). The strategy stems from the conclusion that multiple
(symptoms and root) causation calls for multidimensional interventions to address “peacebuilding deficits” (Miall cited in Llamazares, 2005: 10). The integrative strategy has predominated
in theory, as propelled by the Agenda and the Supplement. A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility in 2004 recommended the formation of a new inter-governmental body, a
‘Peacebuilding Commission’, whose core functions should be:
. . . to identify countries which are under stress and at risk of sliding towards State
collapse; to organize, in partnership with the national Government, proactive assistance
in preventing that process from developing further; to assist in the planning for
transitions between conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding; and in particular to marshal
and sustain the efforts of the international community in post-conflict peacebuilding over
whatever period may be necessary (cited in Cutter, 2005: 779).
A More Secure World identifies peace building as an institutional deficit in the UN system and
claims that the large number of states recovering from conflict places an obligation on this intergovernmental body to tend to the unique needs of these countries. The Secretary-General
welcomed the idea of developing a new multilateral capacity to support countries in their efforts
to make a successful transition from war to peace (Cutter, 2005: 779-780). Similarly, the US Bipartisan Commission on Post-conflict Reconstruction recognised the misguided reconstruction
152
of the past decade and proposed to establish a permanent mechanism and a formal process
within the US government for post-conflict reconstruction efforts. It identified four focus areas:
security; justice and reconciliation; economic and social well-being; and governance and
participation (Cutter, 2005: 783).
While it has not been acceptable to advocate the tackling of a chosen area of intervention to the
exclusion of all others, ‘complementarity’ is frequently called for and this requires co-ordination
between agencies (Miall cited in Llamazares, 2005: 10). However, the required level of coordination is typically weak if not absent from multilateral, multifunctional peacebuilding
operations. Baker notes the tension between the two necessary sub-processes within the
integrated strategy: neutral conflict management and democratisation. The first promotes an
inclusive pragmatic approach, is aimed at reconciliation, emphasises the process, engages local
cultures and norms, and presumes the moral equivalence of parties. Alternatively, the latter
adheres to universal norms and values, employs an exclusive approach, aims for justice,
emphasises the outcome, insists on moral accountability, believes justice to be non-negotiable,
and relinquishes neutrality in favour of a principled stance (cited in Llamazares, 2005: 5). Based
on these strains and weaknesses, the integrative is often associated with inefficiency and
ineffectiveness in addition to suffering restrictions from state sovereignty. This has led to
growing frustration and strains in the commitment and resources (human and financial) of
member states (Jeong, 2005: 188). Further threats stem from the current international context,
“with the resurrection of war as a deliberate instrument of foreign policy (in the form of the Bush
doctrine of pre-emptive strikes)”. For example, the restricted involvement of the international
community in post-Taliban Afghanistan provides a stark contrast with the role of ONUMOZ in
Mozambique (Atack, 2003/04: 18).
Jeong stays within an integrated policy framework but advocates a “goal-oriented process” based
on a “synergetic approach” for a more concerted strategy rather than “a checklist of a vast array
of tasks” (Jeong, 2005: 19). While demanding harmonisation, the operational level deals with
orchestrating field elements, with activities at the tactical level achieving outcomes. The basis of
the strategy is simply that appropriate logistics and means to the pursuit of the objectives are
based on the “identification of actors and the coordination of activities in various sectors within a
given time frame according to priorities.” (Jeong, 2005: 20).
6.
The sectoral operational strategy
The sectoral strategy stemmed from strains in integrated multilateral operations although it still
faces the challenge of co-ordination. Moreover, it could be argued that the sectoral operation has
been the actual strategy on the ground. For example, while the World Bank emphasises
“economic recovery and normalisation”, the UN prioritises “political reform”, which has also
contributed to the “notable imprecision” in the “terminology used to describe the process of
rebuilding war-torn societies” (Barakat, 2005: 572).
Furthermore, the phase between transition and consolidation has traditionally been split between
humanitarian relief agencies and development agencies. However, Cutter raises the gradual
realisation of a gap or break between these two responses, which has led to a number of
specialised units and the need for increased communication and planning (Cutter, 2005: 779-780).
Traditionally, the sectoral operation consists more of long-term efforts by mainly local actors to
promote political and economic development towards a sustainable solution to the root causes of
conflict, with an emphasis on emergence of local NGOs and civil society (Haugerudbraaten,
1998).
153
This review has demonstrated that different types of peacebuilding have emerged: post-conflict,
preventive, sequenced within a policy framework and as a dynamic process. The initial cloudy
description of peacebuilding made it difficult to prevent its gradual conceptual confusion.
However, this has been compounded by its aimless evolution in policy and practice. As
Llamazares asserts, the umbrella term of peacebuilding is in danger of becoming meaningless
because of the inclusion of so many activities, levels and actors (Llamazares, 2005: 3).
154
Bibliography
Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi,Ed Garcia, and Rupesinghe Kumar (2001) ‘Nonviolent Diplomacy:
Experiences of NGOs and People’s Participation in Selected Peace Processes,’ Journey through
Conflict: Narratives and Lessons, R. Hayward Alker, TE Gurr, and Rupesinghe Kumar, eds.,
(Lanaham, MD, Rowman and Littlfield), pp. 196-239.
Atack, Iain (2003/04) ‘Peacebuilding as conflict management or political engineering?’, Trócaire
Development Review, pp. 17-32.
Anderson, Mary (2001) ‘Enhancing Local Capacity for Peace: Do No Harm’, Peacebuilding: A Field
Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers),
pp. 259-264.
Barakat, Sultan (2005) “Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq: an introduction”, Third World Quarterly,
Vol. 26, No. 4-5, pp. 565 – 570.
Barakat, Jones, Junne, Meijer, Mohamoud & Verkoren (2005), ‘Evaluatie Thematisch
Medefinancieringsprogramma (TMF) Deelstudie (A) Vredesopbouw,’ 14 June, pp. 1-34.
Boutros Boutros Ghali (1995) ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the
Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations’, Report of
the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, 3 January, A/50/60 - s/1995/1.
Boutros Boutros Ghali (1992) ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and
peace-keeping’, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of
the Security Council on 31 January 1992, 17 June, A/47/277 - S/24111.
Boyce, James K. (2002) ‘Aid Conditionality as a tool of Peacebuilding: Opportunities and
Constraints’, Development and Change, 33(5), pp. 1025-1048.
Cousens, Elizabeth, M. (2001) ‘Introduction’, Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile
Societies, Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar, eds., pp. 1-20.
Cutter, Ana (2005) ‘Peacebuilding: A Literature review’ Development in Practice, Vol. 15, No. 6, pp.
779-784.
Darby, John and Roger MacGinty, eds., (2003) Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace
Processes (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan).
Duffield, M., (2002) ‘Social Reconstruction and the Radicalisation of Development Aid: Aid as a
Relation of Global Liberal Governance’, Development and Change, 33(5), pp. 1049-1071.
Eade, Deborah (1997) Capacity Building; An Approach to People-Centred Development (Oxford: Oxfam).
Harmer, Adele, and Cotterrell, Lin (2005) ‘Diversity in donorship: The changing landscape of
official humanitarian aid’, HPG Research Report, September, pp. 1-46.
Harvey, (1998) ‘Rehabilitation in Complex Political Emergencies: Is Rebuilding Civil Society the
Answer?’, Disasters, 22(3).
155
Haugerudbraaten, Henning (1998) ‘Peacebuilding: Six dimensions and two concepts’ African
Security Review, 7(6).
Jennings, Kathleen M. and Christian H Ruge (undated) ‘Killing many birds with few stones:
Integrating ERW and SALW actions with peace-building efforts’, Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention
and Development, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, pp. 21-34.
Jeong, Ho-Won., (2005) Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process (Boulder and
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers).
Junne, Gerd and Verkoren, Willemijn (2005) ‘TMF Evaluation Sub-Study on Peacebuilding
Concept Interim Report’, 1 October, pp. 1-50.
Junne, Gerd and Verkoren, eds., (2005) Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges (Boulder and
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers).
Kapungu, Leonard (2001) ‘Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, and the Lessons-Learned Process’,
Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne
Rienner Publishers), pp. 435-440.
Kühne, Winrich (2001) ‘From Peacekeeping to Postconflict Peacebuilding’, Peacebuilding: A Field
Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers),
pp. 376-388.
Lautze, Sue and John Hammock (1996) Coping with Crisis, Coping with Aid: Capacity Building, Coping
Mechanisms, and Dependency, Linking Relief and Development (New York, UNDHA).
Lederach, John Paul (2002) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington
D.C., United States Institute of Peace).
Leonhardt, Manuela (2001) ‘The Challenge of Linking Aid and Peacebuilding’, Peacebuilding: A
Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner
Publishers), pp. 238-245.
Llamazares, Monica (2005) ‘Post-War Peacebuilding Reviewed: A Critical Exploration Of
Generic Approaches To Post-War Reconstruction’, Centre for Conflict Resolution Working
Paper 14, February (Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford), pp. 1-37.
Lumsden, Malevern (1999) ‘Breaking the Cycle of Violence’, Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process,
and Structure, Ho-Won Jeong, ed., (Ashgate, UK: Aldershot), pp. 131-152.
Lund, Michael (2001) ‘A Toolbox for Responding to Conflicts and Building Peace’, Peacebuilding:
A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner
Publishers), pp. 16-20.
Macrae, Joanna, Sarah Collinson, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Nicola Reindorp, Anna Schmidt,
Tasneem Mowjee and Adele Harmer (2002), Uncertain Power: The Chnaging Role of Official Donors in
Humanitarian Action, HPG Report, No. 12, December.
156
Maise, Michelle (undated) ‘Peacebuilding’ Beyond Intractability, Conflict Research Consortium, Guy
Burgess and Heidi Burgess, eds., (University of Colorado, Boulder)
http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/peacebuilding.jsp.
Morgan, Peter (1994) ‘Capacity Development – An Introduction’, Emerging Issues in Capacity
Development, Ottawa: Institute on Governance.
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Framework for Strategic Alliances with International
NGOs (SALIN) for 2006-2010, http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?/CMS.
Paffenholz, Thania (2001) ‘Peacebuilding: A Comprehensive Learning Process’, Peacebuilding: A
Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner
Publishers), pp. 535-543.
Pankhurst, D. and Pearce, J. (1997) ‘Engendering the analysis of conflict: perspectives from the
south’, Women and Empowerment, Afshar, H., ed., (London, Routledge).
Ropers, Norbert (2001) ‘Enhancing the Quality of NGO Work in Peacebuilding’, Peacebuilding: A
Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner
Publishers), pp. 520-531.
Smillie, Ian, ed., (2001) Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in Humanitarian Crises,
(Bloomfield. CT, Kumarin Press).
Spencer, Tanya (1998) ‘A Synthesis of Evaluations of Peacebuilding
Activities Undertaken by Humanitarian Agencies and Conflict Resolution Organisations’ Active
Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action, 13 November, Final
Version, pp.1-53.
Stiefel, Matthias (2001) ‘Participatory Research as a Tool for Peacebuilding: The WSP
Experience’, Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder,
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 265-276.
Woroniuk, Beth (2001) ‘Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective’, Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc
Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 61-71.
157
Annex 10
Benchmarking the TMF:
A Comparative Review of Donorship for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding with particular
reference to the African Great Lakes Region
by Sultan Barakat
To assess the scope for effective peacebuilding assistance, we must jettison the assumption that the obstacles
lie entirely on the recipient side, and recognise that the policies and practices of aid donors can be part of
the problem as well as part of the solution (Boyce, 2002: 1026).
1. Introduction
To enable further insight into the effectiveness and efficiency of the TMF programme, this
Review examines the policy and institutional arrangements introduced by other donors in
support of peacebuilding. The objective is to provide a comparative analysis that would help
determine the standing of the TMF in relation to other best practice.
To help focus the scope of this Review, the author covers a sample of donors who: 1) belong to
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development’s (OECD), which have sought to influence country policies on structural
poverty reduction and civil society development; and 2) have funded post-conflict peacebuilding
in the African Great Lakes region. This Review is based on the principle that insightful lessons
can be drawn from comparing and contrasting other examples of similar practice. Furthermore,
the scope is intentionally limited in order to produce lessons specifically relevant to the TMF,
which stem mainly from the strategic choice of cross-cutting themes. Therefore, it is proposed
that there is greater comparable insight by examining donor countries within the DAC umbrella,
selecting their government departments and/or development agencies as the type of institution,
while keeping to the post-conflict contexts of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo
(DRC), Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and Tanzania.52 The selection of the World
Bank and the European Commission are obvious exceptions but provide crucial insight into this
type of donorship. While the short and long-term dimensions to post-conflict peacebuilding are
easily recognised (Jeong, 2005: 13), the author acknowledges the difficulty in isolating
peacebuilding activities (singularly and collectively) (Junne and Verkoren, 2005: 12), especially in
the context of multi-sectoral funding and the variable of opaque motivations.
This review is structured in three sections. The next section introduces the selected DAC
countries that fund peacebuilding in the Great Lakes region. It begins by identifying the
prioritisation of poverty reduction and civil society development in this type of bilateral
donorship. This is followed by profiles of the government departments and agencies, and an
analysis of each functionally equivalent approach based on the policy, Official Development
Assistance (ODA) framework, mechanisms and activities.
52
The decision to focus on donorship for post-conflict peace building and countries within the African Great (er)
Lakes region follows on from the preceding reports: Barakat, Jones, Junne, Meijer, Mohamoud and Verkoren
(2005); and Junne and Verkoren (2005).
158
Based on the overview of theory, policy and practice, Section Three focuses on five salient crosscutting themes in donorship for post-conflict peacebuilding: conditional and unconditional aid;
capacity building with a focus on the different forms of partnership with NGOs; gender; coordination; and the learning capacity of government institutions and international organisations.
The final section consolidates the main points within theory and practice, and provides a set of
lessons learnt.
2.
DAC Donors with a Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Focus
This section primarily focuses on the government foreign department and/or development
agency as a key actor within the broad peacebuilding family, and its unique mechanism of
bilateral donorship. First, it is important to trace briefly why poverty reduction and civil society
development came to the fore of policy.
2.1 Prioritisation of Poverty Reduction and Civil Society Development in bilateral
donorship for peacebuilding
The DAC intergovernmental forum is significant because it groups together the wealthiest and
most generous country contributors. It is also insightful and instructive for this review because it
is intended to enable “donors to share experience and develop best practice in aid
management”.53 An analysis of DAC practice during the past 15 years points to two emphatic
shifts within bilateral donorship, which have shaped peacebuilding policy and naturally impacted
on the role of implementing organisations (international and local NGOs).54
First, the “heightened commitment to poverty reduction” stemmed from the 1990s, beginning
with the World Bank’s 1990 Development Report. This was furthered by the broad-based support
for the ‘International Development Targets’, as set out in the DAC’s 1996 Shaping the 21st Century
and the DAC Informal Network on Poverty Reduction (June 1998). The latter was a response to
the goal of establishing more effective approaches to poverty reduction.55
As the second and interlinking priority, the development of civil society has come to the fore
because government development agencies made increasing efforts to involve developing partner
governments and the poor themselves in designing and implementing approaches to poverty
reduction. This entailed, “rejecting supply-led solutions and instead assessing the nature and
causes of poverty and prioritising activities accordingly”. Accordingly, donors have made links to
poverty reduction at the micro or project level, for example, through basic education, creating
access to credit and improving basic needs of the poor, illiterate and the excluded.56
As the overarching challenge, ODA and co-operation are still perceived to be closely related to
foreign policy and security objectives because it is implemented without a legal framework and its
objectives are rarely articulated. Flexibility, timing and visibility may be the fundamental goals of
53
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/dfidwork/bilateraldonors.asp
The DAC was established in 1961 to consult on methods for improving local access to national resources
towards economic development (http://www.oecd.org). To count as ODA, funds must be in the form of grants
or concessional loans with a grant element of at least 25 per cent and must have the promotion of economic
development and the welfare of developing countries as their main objective (DAC Secretariat, 2000).
55
http://www.oecd.org
56
http://www.oecd.org
54
159
bilateral donorship but these advantages are infrequently realised while such “mutuallybeneficial” partnerships can remain unclear (Harmer & Cotterrill, 2005: 5, 27).
2.2
DAC donor institutions, policies and frameworks
This subsection compares and contrasts a selection of the DAC countries active in the Great
Lakes region by providing a brief profile of each government donor institution and agency. It
then examines the policies or approaches to incorporating poverty reduction and civil society
development towards peacebuilding, the wider development policy frameworks in addition to the
mechanisms and activities.
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Netherlands MFA is the implementing government institution for the second most generous
bilateral donor among the DAC Members, and its development assistance has traditionally relied
on widespread public and political support.57 The MFA’s “organisational setting” was attributed
to improving “the coherence of policy”; however the 2001 DAC Peer Review also noted some
operational challenges. In general, the automatically expanding level of ODA during national
economic growth placed pressure on Dutch management systems.58
The Netherlands tackles poverty and conflict together and supports African countries mainly in
the field of education, health, the environment and employment.59 The percentage of funding
relating to peacebuilding increased from 10 to 16 per cent between 2003-2004 (Junne and
Verkoren, 2005: 14). However, in taking its lead from the Millenium Development Goals
(MDGs), poverty reduction is the “overarching rationale for its development assistance” policy.
In addition, the alliance and partnerships with civil society (enterprises and knowledge institutes)
was a noted strength of its development co-operation, which “historically evolved flexibly”. For
example, in 1995 and 1998, there was decentralised delegation of authority to the field, the
promotion of host country ownership and an emphasis on sectoral strategies.60 However, the
2001 DAC Peer Review recommended a more action-oriented dialogue on policy coherence
issues, a lower number of beneficiary countries and clearer justification for placing some
countries in “certain theme categories” (http://www.oecd.org).
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) was promoted as a framework for
implementation, monitoring and evaluation, donor co-ordination and policy dialogue in priority
countries. However, as a consequence, the Dutch faced a “challenge in terms of risk
management whenever the implementation of such models proves difficult”.61 Accordingly, the
57
Dutch annual ODA is benchmarked against a fixed percentage of GNP, which creates an automatically
expanding level of ODA during national economic growth (http://www.oecd.org). 0.8 per cent of its GNP goes
to fighting to poverty, and half of this goes to Africa (http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?/CMS).
58
The main goals of the Dutch MFA is: to strengthen the international legal order and respect for human rights;
to promote security and stability, effective humanitarian assistance, and good governance; to strengthen
European co-operation; more wealth, les poverty; to promote human and social development; to protect and
improve the environment; to promote the welfare and safety of Dutch nationals abroad and to regulate the
persons; to raise the Netherlands’ cultural profile and help create a positive image within the Netherlands
(http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?/CMS).
59
http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?/CMS
60
The Dutch vision of aid has been heavily influenced by DAC strategic principles and by the International
Development Goals and indicators (http://www.oecd.org).
61
http://www.oecd.org. Poverty reduction was based on four themes: education, sexual and reproductive health
and rights, HIV/AIDS and the environment. The two essential conditions for implementing sustainable poverty
reduction policy are good governance (including human rights and peacebuilding) and sustainable economic
160
TMF policy framework for subsidy period 2003-2006 aimed at “the strengthening, reforming and
creation of institutional capacity and of the needed instruments to achieve sustainable peace.”
(Junne and Verkoren, 2005: 13).
For activities, Junne and Verkoren (2005: 13) note that the TMF should “first of all make a
contribution to the development of conflict analysis and – prevention [...] be aimed at the role of
development cooperation as an instrument of conflict prevention and at deepening the theme of
business and conflict.” Temporary activities can also include efforts towards the “creation and
consolidation of peace”: strengthening of democratic structures and processes and of institutions
which can contribute to reconciliation; democratic control of the security sector; DDR; and
strengthening of the role of media.
British Foreign Office and DFID
The British Foreign Office and Department for International Development (DFID) also
administer ODA through its Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) and the Conflict,
Humanitarian and Security Department.62 The UK’s creation of specialist units was an attempt
to improve its international responses and maximise best outcomes by contributing expertise in
specific post-conflict situations; working on long-term preventative approaches to stabilise
Countries at Risk of Instability within the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit; having individual
Government Departments contribute though their Departmental work and joint initiatives; and
continuing to review its overall approach to insecurity.63
Britain provides ODA to all the selected countries in the African Great Lakes region. Poverty
reduction, “as a foundation for peace and security”, represents a major policy focus.64 This was
demonstrated by a ten-year memorandum (2003) for direct contributions to the Ethiopian
Government’s budget for its Sustainable Development Poverty Reduction Plan.65 It similarly
supported Tanzania’s second-generation PRS (National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of
Poverty). The UK’s bilateral allocation rose from £80 million in 2003/04 to £110 million for
2005/06, with around 70 per cent going to general budget support. It also had a targeted
programme of technical and financial assistance that supported: the further development and
embedding of PR processes; increased and sustained economic growth; and effective and
accountable government.66
Good governance and several initiatives to strengthen civil society were also vital elements of its
peacebuilding donorship (see below). From 2002-2003, DFID broadened aid to include direct
support for Sudan’s peace process and its monitoring mechanisms, and confidence-building
measures, for example, support for the education system. From April 2003, UK allocated £118.5
million on humanitarian operations in Sudan and its Darfur region. In addition, resources
managed by the DFID/FCO Sudan Unit (created 2002) have “a greater emphasis towards
longer-term development” and will gradually increase the amount towards governance and
policies. £50 million was allocated to the UN’s 2005 ‘Workplan for Sudan and Eastern Chad’.67
development (‘Policy Framework for Strategic Alliances with International NGOs (SALIN) for 2006-2010’,
http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?/CMS).
62
UK ODA increased in 2002 by £1.5 billion to reach £4.6 billion a year by 2005-06, which was an average
increase of more than 8 per cent a year in real terms (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/mdg/aid.asp).
63
http://www.postconflict.gov.uk/background/wider.asp
64
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/burundi.asp
65
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/ethiopia.asp
66
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/tanzania.asp
67
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/sudan.asp
161
The UK’s ODA policy framework also incorporates anti-corruption policies, the stimulation of
economic growth, improving public financial management, a special focus on stabilising
HIV/AIDS (Kenya) and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of basic services.68
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and DANIDA
The Danish MFA and Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) are the
government institution and agency for ODA and co-operation. Denmark focuses on a select
number of programme developing countries, with 60 per cent of bilateral ODA pledged to Africa
and it works with long-term national strategies for poverty reduction.69
Through its ‘New Africa Policy’, development assistance has had three recent priorities: ‘World
of Difference (2004-2008)’; ‘Security, Growth - Development (2005-2009)’; and ‘Globalisation –
Progress through Partnership’ (2006-2010).70 For the latter, partnerships was seen as the key to
poverty reduction and the basis for development co-operation, which was deemed achievable
through sustainable development (growth, innovation, concern for the environment, and equal
participation for men and women); and democratisation and respect for human rights. Denmark
considers poverty reduction as the “fundamental challenge” for development cooperation in
addition to responding to the effect of globalisation, armed conflicts, children and young people
and HIV/AIDS.71 Accordingly, the goal is to help the poor by providing critical investments in
education, health, and infrastructure while supporting the development of a private sector as an
engine of growth.
As its policy framework, Denmark plans to focus development assistance on five areas: 1) social
and economic development; 2) human rights, democratisation and good governance; 3) stability,
security and the fight against terrorism; 4) refugees, humanitarian assistance and regions of origin;
and 5) the environment. In particular, in response to the threat of terrorism, Denmark has
“enhanced the development efforts to prevent and manage violent conflict, to stabilise and
consolidate peace, and to promote reform and modernisation in developing countries which
appear particularly vulnerable to political radicalism and religious extremism.”72
The European Commission
The European Union’s vision of peacebuilding entails long-term efforts aimed at preventing
armed conflict from erupting in the first place by addressing its deep-rooted structural causes.
This includes broader measures in the political, institutional, economic and developmental fields,
such as combating poverty, promoting an equitable distribution of resources, pursuing justice and
reconciliation, upholding the rule of law, supporting good governance and human rights. The
Commission promotes accountability and transparency in public decision-making, political
pluralism and the effective participation of civil society in peacebuilding (cited in Llamazares,
2005: 25).
In February 2000, the EU, African, Caribbean and Pacific states signed the Cotonou Agreement,
thereby replacing the Lomé Convention. Set to run until February 2020, it introduced radical
changes and ambitious objectives to combat poverty based on five interdependent pillars: an
enhanced political dimension, increased participation, a more strategic approach to cooperation
68
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/kenya.asp; http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/uganda.asp
http://www.um.dk/en/menu/Developmentpolicy/DanishCooperation/Der...
70
http://www.um.dk/en/menu/Developmentpolicy/DanishDevelopmentPolicy/Priorities
71
http://www.um.dk/en/menu/Developmentpolicy/DanishCooperation/Der...
72
http://www.um.dk/en/menu/Developmentpolicy/DanishCooperation/Der...
69
162
focusing on poverty reduction, new economic and trade partnerships and improved financial
cooperation.73
German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and GTZ
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) operates the Crisis Prevention and Conflict
Transformation Programme on behalf of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and
Development (BMZ). From 2000, the programme’s main focus was to “mainstream the theme
of peace development and crisis prevention in the institutions of German Development
Cooperation”.74 It values its training concept (target group-specific and implementationoriented) as one of its most important pillars of the mainstreaming and dissemination strategy.
Other main services include: instruments, funds for peacebuilding institutions and peace
initiatives, country and sector strategies, and further education concepts.75
GTZ addresses poverty through harmonised and co-ordinated action on part of all stakeholders,
and this joined up approach is a cross-cutting issue anchored in all activities. It demands
improvement in co-operation between the various policymaking areas and institutions, and for
causes to be recognised by the countries affected. Key factors for success are sustainable
economic growth, fair distribution of resources and services and improved governance.76 The
development of civil society was also prioritised since good governance implies effective political
institutions and the responsible use of political power and management of public resources by
the state and all public and private actors, to be guided by human rights and by principles of the
rule of law. This is treated as an aim and key factor in human development and in successful
poverty reduction and peacebuilding.77 Government and administrative reforms, decentralisation
and regionalisation of state power and the development of local and municipal government are
supported. It also promotes locally appropriate approaches, co-operates with government
institutions and civil society actors.78
GTZ also focuses directly on crisis prevention measures to help prevent setbacks to the
development efforts and this forms one of their cross-cutting themes in German Development
Cooperation by: further development of practice-relevant concepts and instruments for
integrating crisis prevention, conflict transformation and peace development. This involves
working on related themes such as small arms control, security sector reform and disaster
preparedness. It also backs the development of measures to prevent violence and new conflicts:
“in effect aiming for processes of societal reconciliation”. This approach integrates the various
groups affected by the conflict and is designed to gradually break the vicious circle of escalating
violence, as designed in Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Programme.79
The policy framework includes a broad range of specialised topics: rural development (poverty
and hunger, agriculture and food, regionalisation, natural resources); economic development and
employment (economic policy, vocational training, private sector, ICT and economy, financial
systems, globalisation); environment and infrastructure (environmental policy, eco-efficiency etc)
73
http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/index_en.htm
http://www.gtz.de.en.themen/uebergreifende-themen/krisenpraevention/3947.htm
75
http://www.gtz.de.en.themen/uebergreifende-themen/krisenpraevention/4076.htm;
http://www.gtz.de.en.themen/uebergreifende-themen/krisenpraevention/4060.htm
76
For more on its PRS, see http://www.gtz.de.en.themen/uebergreifende-themen/902.htm
77
http://www.gtz.de.en.themen/857.htm
78
http://www.gtz.de.en.themen/politische-reformen/882.htm
79
http://www.gtz.de.en.themen/uebergreifende-themen/krisenpraevention/898.htm
74
163
social development (health and population, social protection etc); and other cross-sectoral themes
(gender, youth, HIV/AIDS control, emergency aid, poverty, food and nutrition security).80
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NORAD
Until recently the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) was the
government agency responsible for preparing and co-ordinating all ODA. However, in April
2004, the Norwegian MFA took overall responsibility for the allocation and management of
bilateral development co-operation, leaving NORAD to focus on supporting Norwegian NGOs
and giving advice to good dialogue partners.
Within the group of countries selected for the purposes of this review, Norway provides bilateral
ODA mainly to Tanzania and Uganda, with Ethiopia and Kenya as additional partner countries.81
Its primary focus is to narrow the gap between the world’s richest and poorest, based on the
principles of equality and solidarity.82 For example, NORAD channelled its 2003 budget
support for Uganda to the Poverty Action Fund (for health care, basic education, rural roads and
monitoring and control mechanisms) to make sure that it was protected from expenditure cuts.83
However, since 2000 in Tanzania, development co-operation was based on Tanzania’s PRSP.
NORAD claims that the promotion of peace, democracy and human rights form a main goal for
its assistance and therefore demands that projects must reflect this in all forms of development
co-operation, regardless of level, sector or co-operation partner.84 In Ethiopia, Tanzania and
Uganda, good governance is promoted as a traditionally well funded sector (19.5 per cent, 6.5 per
cent 9.5 per cent for 2003, respectively), although health and education typically received the
most.
As the policy framework, NORAD’s aim is to “contribute towards improvements in economic,
social and political conditions for the populations of developing countries” making sure that
development benefits the poorest. In sum, NORAD’s concept of development cooperation is
based on three broad goals: 1) to promote the responsible management and utilisation of global
and biological diversity; 2) to contribute towards preventing hardship and alleviating distress in
conflicts and natural disasters; and 3) to contribute towards promoting equal rights and
opportunities for women and men in all areas of society.85
Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and SIDA
The Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA) is responsible for
Sweden’s bilateral support, which consisted of 2/3 of its 2004 international development
budget.86
The overarching goal of SIDA is to “…help the poor improve their living conditions by reducing
injustices and poverty throughout the world and creating better opportunities for development,
peace and security for all people and nations”.87
80
http://www.gtz.de.en.themen/857.htm
http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1211
82
http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1218
83
http://www.norad.no
84
http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1620
85
http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1284
86
http://www.sida.se/?d=108&language=en_US
87
http://www.sida.se/?d=105&language=en_US
81
164
SIDA supported the November 2003 East African Community Agreement to consolidate and
formalise mutual co-operation between Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Rwanda and Burundi. It also
supported the signature of the Customs Union Agreement, or the Lake Victoria Initiative, where
it shared its experience of a comparable project around the Baltic Sea. To this end, combating
poverty was placed within the context of sustainable development, while emphasising East
African ownership and donor coordination as the key prerequisites of effective development
cooperation.88
In addition, SIDA has supported activities to deal with radical changes in Uganda’s social
structure since 1986, with 1) human rights; 2)democracy and good governance; and 3) conflict
management and security as the three policy factors. From 1994, it has provided development
support to Rwanda (reconciliation and building state institutions) as well as economic and
education reforms based on democracy and popular participation.89 Ethiopia also received
support for educational, healthcare and agricultural initiatives , while Burundi was mainly targeted
in terms of humanitarian assistance90.
In December 2003, the Swedish Parliament adopted its ‘Shared Responsibility – Sweden’s policy
for global development’ policy. This innovative framework made global development a task for
the whole government, stating that “all policy areas have a common overall objective for global
development policy: to contribute to equitable and sustainable global development”. Therefore,
ODA policies should: 1) aim to meet the MDGs, while stressing coherence in all policies towards
equitable and sustainable global development and; 2) incorporate the two perspectives of human
rights and of pro-poor development. The other five main policy factors are: gender equality,
sustainable use of natural resources and concern for the environment, economic growth, social
development and welfare, and Global Public Goods.91
Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs and SDC
The Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC) finances programmes both directly and
in partnership with other agencies, as part of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs.
It aims to fight poverty through participatory programmes, creating sustainable improvements in
peoples’ lives by involving them in the process. The main intentions are to improve access to
education and basic health care, to promote environmental health, to encourage economic and
governmental autonomy and to improve equity in labour. The Swiss provides services though
direct operations, by supporting the programmes of multilateral organisations and by cofinancing and making financial contributions to the programmes of both Swiss and international
private assistance agencies.92 Its thematic framework for Development Cooperation consists of
poverty reduction, information and communications technologies and conflict prevention.93
U.S. State Department and USAID
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the federal government
agency that receives foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State.94
88
http://www.sida.se/sida.jsp?d=858&language=en_US
http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=299&language=en_US
90
http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=279&language=en_US;
http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=275&language=en_US
91
http://www.sweden.ov.se/sb/d/3102;jsessionid=a84cfqYHP_Rc
92
http://web.mit.edu/urbanupgrading/upgrading/resources/organisations/sdc.html
93
http://www.deza.admin.ch/index.php?userhash=36842217&navID=21239&langID=1
94
http://www.usaid.gov/about_usaid
89
165
USAID (Office for Transition Initiatives) lists the following key peacebuilding target issues in its
post-war interventions: citizen security, reintegration of ex-combatants, mine action, internally
displaced persons, democratic political processes, transparency/good governance, civil society
development, civilian-military relations, human rights, media, community impact activity, women,
children and youth. One of its main areas of engagement in peacebuilding is
interethnic/interfaith reconciliation, which is considered a major cornerstone in “building
democratic institutions, reintegrating communities, healing physical and psychological wounds,
and promoting a sense of hope for a better future” (cited in Llamazares, 2005: 24).
The U.S. aims to reduce poverty through higher levels of long-term economic growth to increase
incomes and reach the potential in trade and investment. For example, it focuses on reducing
mass poverty in Uganda with three objectives: economic growth, improved human capacity and
effective governance. The latter addresses accountability and improved legislative oversight,
increased political pluralism, district-level management and the informed participation of civil
society in processes of governance at both the national and local levels (as detailed below).95
Democracy and governance was the biggest funded sector in Burundi, represented one-third in
Sudan, the third highest in Kenya and the lowest in Ethiopia during 2004-2006.96
As for direct investment in peace building, conflict management was one of USAID’s crosscutting programmes and represented 7 per cent of the 2004 budget.97 There were two types of
activities: conflict response and mitigation programmes that aim to avert imminent violence,
mitigate ongoing violence or address its immediate aftermath, for example, mediation,
community-based reconciliation, peace media and reintegration. Second, conflict management
programmes addressed the underlying causes and consequences of conflict, for example, youth
employment, ethnically based economic competition, and natural resources such as a land, water
and forests.98 USAID targeted “conflict affected areas by systematically developing integrated
treatment strategies that address the underlying problems fuelling violent conflict”. $14.8 million
was allocated from the 2003 budget for the African Conflict and Peace Building Fund for
Northern Uganda, Eritrea-Ethiopia and Burundi, DRC, Sudan and will help Kenya mitigate
destabilising conflicts. Across Africa, the U.S. will also expand its efforts to develop tools to help
countries prevent and address conflict by better understanding its root causes and to assist them
with post-conflict confidence building measures.99
For the DRC, USAID supported the roadmap, Global and All-Inclusive Agreement (AID) of
Sun City, signed December 2002. USAID’s Integrated Strategic Plan for 2004-2008 supported
two objectives contained in the joint State-AID Strategic Plan 2004-2009: achieve peace and
stability; and advance sustainable development and global interests. It provided funding for
increased access to and the use of quality health services; support for the transition to peace,
stability and democratic governance; improved livelihoods of rural Congolese; improved basic
education, especially for girls; and the reintegration of ex-combatants.100
95
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/ug.html
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/; http://www.usaid.gov/policy/cbj2006/afr/bi.html);
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/ke.html; and
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/sd.html. In 2006 Ethiopia will receive Transition Initiative
funding, with the prime aim to increase stability and improve performance through reform and capacity
development
(http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/et.html).
97
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/
98
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sectors/cm/index.html
99
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/overview.html
100
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/cd.html
96
166
It also facilitated a Tripartite Agreement between Rwanda and Uganda and DRC in 2004 to
address regional border issues.101 For Uganda specifically, the Bureau for Africa’s Conflict Fund
and Conflict Management and Mitigation sought to reduce the impact of conflict in selected areas
by promoting reconciliation and reintegration, peace dialogues and support for vulnerable
children and victims of torture.102
Furthermore, in Sudan, the U.S. encouraged the peace agreement between the government and
the SPLM. Its peace programme focused on short-term conflict mitigation, humanitarian relief
and rehabilitation through more responsive and participatory governance, improved equitable
access to quality education, increased use of health, water and sanitation services and practices
and establishing a foundation for economic recovery.103 Last, Ethiopia received $1.34 million in
2003 from Africa’s Conflict Fund and $250,000 in 2004 from the Office of Conflict Management
and Mitigation funds, which supports local and federal level conflict mitigation and management
activities.104
As its framework in Africa, it strives to assist the building of regional stability, strengthen
democratic institutions, preserve the environment, promote economic growth, advance food
security, educate children, and ensure better health. It strongly endorses the new African-led
approach represented by the New Partnership for African Development, a strategy that offers
concrete approaches to address some of the continent’s fundamental development issues.105
More broadly, it seeks to promote democracy and good governance on four distinct, but related,
goals: strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; promoting more genuine and
competitive elections and political processes; increased development of a politically active civil
society; and more transparent and accountable governance.106
World Bank
The World Bank operates through its specialist Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit and
Post-Conflict Fund. An equally important body is the Task Force on Low Income Countries
Under Stress (LICUS), established in late 2002. The initiative works “to catalyze forces of change
from within […] the most difficult environments” by working with development partners to
create the right tools. The LICUS Trust Fund ($25 million) supports democratic reformers “who
require modest but timely international support to build momentum efforts.” For countries in
arrears, grants are important in assisting basic reforms, preparing for arrears clearance and
creating a “track record for subsequent access to international development assistance financing
and debt relief. The Trust Fund focuses on capacity-building for governance reform and
improving support for service delivery “with strong preference given to strategies reflecting
robust multi-donor approaches.”107
As a policy framework, post-war interventions attempt to rebuild economic and physical
infrastructure, strengthening institutional capacity and providing a base for sustainable
development. Furthermore, it has added demobilisation of soldiers, de-mining and displaced
population re-integration to its core activities while making ‘peace and social harmony’ and
integrative objective for its policies and programs. It describes its objectives as “the
101
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/rw.html
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/ug.html
103
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/sd.html
104
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/et.html
105
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/subsaharan_africa/overview.html
106
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance
107
http://web.worldbank.org
102
167
consolidation of peace, the fostering of social reconciliation and the initiation of sustainable
growth” where it intervenes (cited in Llamazares, 2005; 25).
The implementation principles for LICUS involve: maintaining engagement even when lending
programmes are inappropriate; strong political, economic and social analysis-based strategies;
close donor co-ordination; contextualised intervention; and using an appropriate mix of financing
instruments, that is, loans and grants.108
This section started by showing how poverty reduction and civil society development had
become priority policies for the DAC countries. Nevertheless, the sample of eight country
institutions and agencies, in addition to the European Commission and the World Bank, clearly
finance a range of sectors and activities through broad ODA policy frameworks. Therefore,
donorship for peace building is dynamic and multifunctional within the African Great Lakes.
3.
Five Cross-cutting Themes
This section draws on five salient cross-cutting themes, which provide further detail into
donorship for peacebuilding. The themes focus on poverty reduction and civil society
development but recognise the linkages to other sectors and activities, and are illustrated by
examples of practice within the African Great Lakes region.
3.1
Conditional (tied) versus unconditional (untied) aid
Governments shape the global peacebuilding agenda through donor conferences around
programme areas or specific interventions that impact on the priorities adopted by international
NGOs, intergovernmental organisations and other non-state actors. The knock on effect on
local NGOs is eventually felt through processes such as conditionality of aid or strict funding
criteria, thus completing the top-down transmission of policy to the grassroots (Llamazares,
2005: 28).
Theorists concur with the untying of aid in principle. Paris criticises the practice of conditioning
economic assistance to governance, and the undue pressure that restructuring measures place on
post-war societies. However, he proposes a softer approach to market reform and structural
adjustment and a tougher stance on democratisation and institution building (cited in Llamazares,
2005: 7-8). Jeong adds the caveat that “[p]lacing conditions on the use of aid has short-and longterm consequences for political and economic stability”, which are “not uniformly recognized”.
Therefore, withholding aid as a means to pressure the recipient governments should balance
potential negative and positive impacts on various sectors and thereby need to be carefully
examined (Jeong, 2005: 194). For example, in tackling spoilers: “[b]y altering the incentives
forced by the parties, peace conditionality can strengthen the momentum of the peace process”
(Boyce, 2002: 1026). As the overriding principle, Lederach asserts that funding should focus on
the “quality of focus and centrality of activity to long-term sustainability of the processes to be
generated.” (Lederach, 2002: 120). Jeong agrees and asserts that local and international actors
must share expectations (Jeong, 2005: 194). “[S]trategic funding” is proposed as a different
technique, that is, the “capacity to pinpoint funding in ways that support and encourages the
movement toward long-term peace.” (Lederach, 2002: 120).
108
http://web.worldbank.org
168
The Netherlands and the UK
The DAC noted that the Dutch took the lead in untying aid in 2001 and re-allocated the funds
previously used for tied-aid projects in landlocked developing countries to a special facility for
infrastructure development in those countries.109 The UK supports the consensus that aid works
better if donors attach minimal conditions to their aid, strengthen accountability between
government and citizens and ensure policies are joined up behind a country’s PRS.110
3.2
Capacity building through partnerships with NGOs
As examined above, capacity building has become a key issue in peacebuilding and a priority
within donorship. As partners, it has been recognised that NGOs “have unique advantages in
civil society building through their conscious efforts to establish relationships between adversarial
communities, foster mutual confidence, and provide peaceful mechanisms of dispute resolution.”
(Anderlini, Garcia and Kumar cited in Jeong, 2005: 217).
In explaining the emergence of this trend, Macrae et al state that humanitarian issues were
attracting more donor interest and more ODA, with the U.S., Netherlands, UK, Sweden and
Norway dominating. It is asserted that these changes in the policy priorities and disbursement
preferences can have a considerable influence throughout the humanitarian system. Accordingly,
the authors point to the significant expansion of the NGO sector, the increased engagement of
military and paramilitary actors and in some cases the development of the donor’s own
operational capacity (2002: 15). Duffield traces the trend in sub-contracting to the overall fall of
development aid and a growing disengagement from direct bilateral assistance by donor
governments. Nevertheless, he considers this to have aided the process of convergence and cooperation amongst diverse organisations (Duffield, 2002: 54, 73). The UNDP agrees that this
donor driven process has resulted in closer relationships between state and non-state actors
involved in post-war peacebuilding but believes that this centralisation of limited funds has
created “uneasy alliances” (UNDP, 2001: 124).
One significant effect was the change in the way that donors formulated procedures for which
agencies submit requests for funding. Macrae et al observe that until the mid-1990s, many
agencies submitted proposals in their own formats, which varied in emphasis on contextual and
programming analysis and the presentations of budgets. The majority of donors now require their
implementing partners to clearly present their objectives and how the proposed programme and
inputs will serve to achieve them. There is an increased emphasis on argumentation, justification
and quantitative analysis (2002: 21). Boyce’s specific criticism centres on the damaging effects of
the “approval and disbursement culture” involving the “high volume of resource transfer,
measured in relation to a predefined ceiling” (Boyce, 2002: 1038-1039). Macrae et al qualify that
not all donors demand the same degree of formality and specificity. For example the European
Commission Humanitarian Aid department’s (ECHO) guidelines for the completion of project
proposals are relatively tight, which contrast with DFID’s, as furthered below (2002:22).
The Netherlands
The number of implementing organisations for Dutch ODA remained limited up to 2001. 20
per cent of bilateral funds targeted private and nongovernmental organisations in implementing
its programmes, and 10 per cent was traditionally allocated to the ‘Four Pillars+1’ group of
109
110
http://www.oecd.org
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/mdg/aid.asp
169
NGOs.111 From the start of the 2006-2010 TMF round, international NGOs are no longer
eligible for TMF grants. Instead, the grant programme, ‘Strategic Alliances with International
NGOs’ (SALIN) for 2006-2010, offers a framework for goal-oriented co-operation with a limited
number of international NGOs in the form of strategic alliances.
The overriding factor in selecting international NGOs is their strategic added-value of the
partnership for Dutch development co-operation and theme-based priorities, either directly or as
enablers. This was based on the recognition that international NGO partnerships are not suited
to all policy priorities but can provide “strategic added value” in influencing international policy
or promoting sensitive international themes. Strategic alliances with the international NGOs are
formed because during the implementation stage the policy theme departments will regularly
consult regarding implementation and policy. Therefore, the role of both parties should go
beyond carrying out and monitoring specific activities. Overall, this is to ensure development aid
reaches the right people, while improving national financial management in collaboration with
national governments, Dutch and African civil society organisations, private sector and
international NGOs.112
Germany
GTZ defines capacity development as “the process of strengthening the abilities or capacities of
individuals, organisations and societies to make effective and efficient use of resources, in order
to achieve their own goals on a sustainable basis”. It represents one of their core tasks and is
implemented on an individual and collective basis. That is, it recognises that sustainable
development demands strengthening people and organisations through training and through the
transfer of technical and organisational expertise in combination with technical resources and the
right political and institutional frameworks. The experience of GTZ and that of other bilateral
and multilateral organisations is incorporated.113
111
http://www.oecd.org/documentprint
http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?/CMS
113
http://www.gtz.de.en.themen/uebergreifende-themen/911.htm
112
170
Figure 1: GTZ’s Capacity Building and Governance Programme, and
the Partnership between Municipalities and CSO Programme
In Ethiopia, the Capacity Building and Governance Programme (CBG) has been
operating for a year and is part of GTZ’s wider programme on support to the
government. However, the current situation means that there is a high level of
uncertainty over the programme’s activities.
The Partnership between Municipalities and CSO Programme (PMC) has been
running for 2.5 years. It focuses on facilitating Municipal Government and CSOs
to work together and build capacity through ‘learning by doing’. The work is
aimed at the urban level and the project received 300,000 Euros. There was some
initial scepticism but both the municipal government and CSOs have co-operated
on many different projects including water improvement, small scale construction
and action against domestic violence. In general the projects were small scale with
immediate, tangible and measurable impacts. The dialogue between civil society
and municipal government increased as a result. Unfortunately the programme has
stopped as funding has ceased. Although some of the CSOs are considered to be
capable of submitting their own proposals, the Project Coordinator acknowledged
the programme will certainly be more difficult to continue given the current
situation. Nevertheless, GTZ is circulating the project proposal to several donors
to be considered for further funding.
The projects and programmes of GTZ Ethiopia receive funding through two main
mechanisms: direct funding from GTZ (sometimes in collaboration with other
bilateral donors such as the Dutch Government); and through external agencies.
Quite simply, GTZ like NGOs will submit funding proposals to international and
some local NGOs, bilateral and multilateral donors. As such, there is little
difference between GTZ (perceived as a donor) and a local/international NGO
(perceived as a recipient) for both GTZ and the NGO require funding for their
specific programmes and are willing to solicit any potential external donor.
GTZ’s strategy for crisis prevention and conflict transformation is: the promotion of structural
stability as a basis for sustainable development; promotion of social groups and of local and
regional institutions to enhance their crisis prevention and conflict transformation skills; and the
systematic consideration of aspects of crisis prevention and conflict transformation in traditional
and tried and tested fields of technical operations. These three elements are complementary and
overlap at the level of activity areas and measures. Activities for structural stability include social
and economic justice, promoting political participation/democracy, the rule of law, human rights,
government and administrative reforms, decentralisation/advisory services to promote
federalism, promoting civil society and media. To strengthen post-conflict capacities among civil
society groups and local and regional institutions, GTZ aims to transform war alliances and
promote peace constituencies, local and regional institutions and mechanisms, public relations,
171
education and youth promotion, trauma healing, reconciliation, training and professionalisation
for conflict transformation and security sector reform.114
Norway
Through multi-level co-operation, Norway’s aim is to avoid a donor-recipient relationship. The
Norwegian MFA and NORAD try to reach the poorest through partners in co-operation, that is,
central governments, local authorities and the business sector since they are ultimately
responsible for administering Norwegian development funds. In government-to-government
cooperation, Norway bases its approach on conventions ratified by its partner countries and the
degree to which international obligations are reflected in their national legislation and fulfilled in
practice. It aims to promote workers’ rights based in the ILO conventions but conditions for cooperation and obligations and practices vary.115 The Norwegian MFA and NORAD typically
work with multiple international and national NGOs, as Figure 2 illustrates.
Figure 2: Partnerships with Norway
In Ethiopia, important partners were Norwegian Church Aid, Save the Children
Norway, Norwegian People’s Aid, Norwegian Lutheran Missions and the
Norwegian Missionary Society in addition to several others (see all partner
countries, ‘Ethiopia’ in http://www.norad.no). In Uganda, partners include
Statistics Norway, Statskog SF, Norwegian Water Resources and Energy
Directorate in addition to at least 22 other Norwegian institutions (see all partner
countries, ‘Uganda’ in http://www.norad.no).
Sweden
SIDA’s development co-operation is “governed by the explicit needs and wishes of the poor
themselves”. It is implemented through the agency of 1400 (often Swedish) partners financed by
SIDA.116 The main responsibility lies with the government of each country and its population,
then NGOs, civil society and the business sector.117
United Kingdom
DFID’s Development Awareness Fund is open to any UK-based organisation or network, which
shares its commitment and understanding of development. The funding criteria overall is
activities aimed at promoting public knowledge and understanding of development issues. Out
of £1.5 million per annum, between £10,000 to £100,000 is allocated per activity, which has a
maximum timeframe of three years.
The Conflict and Humanitarian Fund (CHF) run by the Conflict, Humanitarian and Security
Department for civil society organisations, funds projects working on conflict prevention and
humanitarian affairs. It is open to non-profit organisations that work in conflict prevention and
humanitarian assistance. The CHF aims to support: efforts to build the capacity of southern
community-based organisations to prepare for and respond to crises and to represent the views
114
http://www.gtz.de.en.themen/uebergreifende-themen/krisenpraevention/4043.htm
http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1620
116
http://www.sida.se/?d=106&language=en_US
117
http://www.sweden.ov.se/sb/d/3102;jsessionid=a84cfqYHP_Rc
115
172
of the poor about these issues at the national and international levels; research and evidence
based policy development to further the understanding of key issues and influence international
conflict and humanitarian system; advocacy – drawing on experiences and opinions of those
affected by crises in poor and vulnerable communities; innovation in new approaches to
problems; and lesson learning.118
Figure 3: DFID’s Partnership Fund in Ethiopia
Through its Partnership Fund (funding to organisations that work together to
establish good governance and combat poverty in their countries), DFID supports
the Ethiopian Woman Lawyers Association (EWLA) to raise awareness of
women’s legal rights. Established in 1995, the fund helped the EWLA set up
newsletters, media and Internet access to get its message across. The EWLA also
played a key role in drafting a new family law and penal code reform and set up
regional branches and voluntary support committees across Ethiopia to improve
women’s access to legal services
(http://www.dfid.gov.uk/casestudies/files/africa/ethiopia-rights.asp).
In addition, the Partnership Fund supported a federation of traditional community
groups in Ethiopia, as spearheaded by CARE Ethiopia. It aimed to cut urban
poverty, improve relationships between various government and civil society
organisations, raise awareness of HIV, and help older people become selfsufficient by, for example, providing credit and encouraging less expensive funeral
customs (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/ethiopia-care.asp).
In southern Sudan, Population Services International (PSI), which works in close collaboration
with the southern Sudanese Secretariat of Health, UNICEF and Roll Back Malaria, received £2.5
million towards long-lasting insecticidal bednets. Towards sustainability, the PSI developed a
distribution strategy, which taps into local commercial and community-based distribution
networks.119
118
119
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/funding/conflict-humanitarian.asp
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/sudan-nets.asp
173
Figure 4: Capacity Building in Tanzania
DFID has also tried to tailor capacity building to aligning or harmonising donor
support with Tanzanian priorities. In Tanzania, it was working with the
government and other development partners to develop a Joint Assistance Strategy
to make the goals, processes and procedures in aid more effective, in line with the
Paris Declaration. It also works with civil society to enable it to engage in poverty
reduction policy dialogue, to hold the government to account and allow the
participation of the extremely vulnerable
(http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/tanzania.asp). For example, along with
Raising Irrigation Productivity and Releasing Water for Intersectoral Needs, DFID
co-funds the River Basin Game for farmers and water planners. This project
supports local dialogue and planning to help Tanzanian policymakers and water
managers better understand and address the needs of the different water users in
the basin (http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/tanzania-water.asp). In the
Southern Uplands, the UK funds a public-private partnership for tea
smallholders/businesses, which focuses on improving access to the market
(http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/tanzania-tea.asp).
DfID’s funding deadlines are significantly more straight forward and flexible, compared to
ECHO and recognise that not all questions are necessarily relevant to all types of project.
Although differences between donors exist there remain common themes that are relevant to the
majority of donors. Figure 5 below highlights DfID’s Civil Society Challenge Fund (CSCF).
Similar to the TMF, there is emphasis on poverty reduction, partnership, relevance to DfID’s
goals, lesson learning and sharing, sustainability, gender mainstreaming and human rights.
Although not stated as a theme, DfID’s Civil Society Challenge Fund is part of its broader
funding schemes which include Development Awareness Funding, Emerging Africa
Infrastructure Fund and the Conflict and Humanitarian Fund.
174
Figure 5: DFID’s Civil Society Challenge Fund
Since 1997, DFID has focused its development effort on the internationally agreed
Millennium Development Goals to eradicate poverty. In order to achieve this, it
has been engaging directly with a wider range of organisations across civil society
both in the UK and in the developing world. DFID supports them in their role of
helping poor and excluded people to enhance their capacity to organise and get
their voice heard, and to demand better services and better access to them.
As well as these ‘rights based’ activities, DFID also supports innovative service
delivery projects that provide lasting benefits through the inclusion of key
elements of empowerment, advocacy and capacity building. The development
agency also appreciates that, in certain circumstances, basic service delivery is, at
least initially, the only viable approach and is willing to consider such applications
on a case by case basis.
The CSCF is DFID’s main central channel of support for UK based civil society
organisations’ programmes and is managed by its Information and Civil Society
Department. Per activity, there is 100 per cent funding up to £500,000 for a
maximum of 5 years. For projects beginning in April 2007, the deadline for receipt
of Concept Notes is the end of June 2006. The deadline for full proposals is the
end of July 2006. It funds NGOs, community-based organisations and groups,
faith groups, trade unions and other segments of civil society.
DFID can fund individual projects that seek to improve: the capacity of Southern
civil society to engage in the local decision-making processes (local or national);
international linkages through global advocacy; and the provision of innovative
service delivery, especially in difficult environments. Applications must aspire to
eradicate poverty and share lessons learnt, be coherent with DFID Country
Assistance Plans, and demonstrate feasibility, sustainability, and special awareness
(gender, disability and HIV/AIDS) in the design and implementation of initiatives
(http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/civilsocietycfguide.pdf)
175
U.S.
USAID seeks to strengthen the policy environment for effective economic reform by working
with African policy analysts and policymakers to increase the knowledge needed to manage open,
free market economies. It also supports research networks to
strengthen African countries’ capacity to improve and implement economic policies. It
concentrates economic growth efforts on “expanding openness to trade and investment,
improving the enabling environment for the private sector, and increasing agricultural
productivity and trade”.120 In particular, USAID looked to Tanzania because it housed refugees
and played a constructive role in resolving conflicts in the region. It helped Tanzania tackle
health and income-generating opportunities for small farmers; enabling market reforms and
creating space for effective governance and strengthened civil society. Governance programmes
will focus on governmental accountability. Increased community participation in the
management of and benefits from natural resources will be a funding priority.121
Where there is decentralisation of government functions, USAID promotes policy dialogue
between citizens and public officials at the local level.122
Figure 6: Capacity Building Through Decentralisation
In Rwanda, USAID’s goal is to increase economic growth and improve the wellbeing of the population, focusing on three strategic objectives: improved
governance and reconciliation; increased use of health services; and rural
economic growth. All three use decentralisation to promote change and improve
livelihoods. USAID supports governance by increasing citizen participation,
strengthening civil society, rebuilding the justice sector and assisting the
government with decentralisation
(http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/rw.html).
In Ethiopia, USAID increased focus on decentralisation by providing support to
community development in areas of health and education, using an expenditure
management and control reform programme. Activities were implemented with
the private sector and policy reform partners at both national and regional levels
(http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/et.html).
The approach of Global Partnerships is central to USAID and it networks with African partners
and promotes local ownership.123 Towards democracy and governance, USAID provides
technical assistance to field missions and grants to African NGOs for human rights, democracybuilding and governance activities, for example, elections support and civic education. Funding
levels range from small grants under such programmes as the Democracy and Human Rights
120
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sectors/eg/index.html
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/tz.html
122
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/overview.html
123
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/; and http://www.usaid.gov/locations/subsaharan_africa/sectors/cm/index.html
121
176
Fund to multi-year, multi-million dollar projects such as the Anti-Corruption Initiative.124 In
Sudan, USAID will encourage public-private partnerships. With appropriate NGOs, it will
implement an integrated response to mitigating trans-border conflict dynamics and increased
market activity, particularly with response to northern Uganda.125
Figure 7: Integrated Approach to Capacity Building in Burundi
The USAID programme in Burundi is an integrated set of activities supporting
three strategic objectives implemented by more than 18 different NGO and UN
partners. Activities strengthen democracy, governance and conflict mitigation;
provide humanitarian relief; enhance food and livelihood security; and provide
access to basic health services and HIV/AIDS care and prevention
(http://www.usaid.gov/policy/cbj2006/afr/bi.html).
USAID also provided technical expertise and material and logistical support for
the 2005 electoral process, promoting peace and reconciliation, good governance
and strengthening civil society. It assists the University of Ngozi and WHO. Its
OTI also supports the ongoing peace process by strengthening local capacities –
OTI’s Community-Based Leadership Program – to encourage broad participation,
local-level cooperation for mutual problem solving, generation of new non-farm
income. OTI works closely with community groups, government entities, media
outlets, local and international NGOs.
Furthermore, the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation processes funding
for activities to mitigate land-related conflict, enhance food security and livelihood
opportunities for participatory dialogue. The USAID’s Office of Private and
Voluntary Cooperation – supports to strengthen the managerial and advocacy
capacity of organisations working in areas of health, human rights and conflict and
technical support to micro-finance institutions
(http://www.usaid.gov/policy/cbj2006/afr/bi.html).
3.3
Gender
As a Millennium Development Goal, gender is obviously an important cross-cutting theme
affecting all aspects of peacebuilding. The gender dimension has been recognised by both the
European Parliament and the UN Security Council (Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and
Security). First, it has been suggested that conflict affects men and women differently precisely
because of the different social roles assigned to them and relations of power between them.
Correspondingly, such gender relations can also permeate efforts to emerge from and overcome
violent conflict through peacebuilding. Atack reminds that building peace must address the
124
125
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sectors/dg/index.html
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/sd.html
177
problem of “gendered peace” (Pankhurst and Pearce, 1997), for example, “the conventional
wisdom is that men negotiate the peace while women build it.” (Atack, 2003/04).
To this end, the Canadian International Development Agency framework “assumes that
participatory approaches are more effective than top-down initiatives and that both women and
men must be involved in building peace and gender equality.” Ultimately, gender equality requires
changes in “institutional practices and social relations” and the facilitation of “a strong voice for
women in shaping their societies.” Woroniuk advises that all initiatives should incorporate a
gender analysis into assessments; increase women’s participation in conflict resolution at
decision-making levels; promote women as actors and protagonists (not as a vulnerable group);
ensure “gender-equality considerations are present at the level of results”; and aim to provide sexdisaggregated data (Woroniuk, 2001: 61-63).
Germany
GTZ uses BMZ’s ‘Concept of Gender Equality’ (2001) as its basis and works towards equality in
access to project services and participation in project design and development. Projects were
systematically targeted at several levels in order to establish political structures and framework
conditions that promote gender equality. Current priority is to provide advisory services to
partner countries wishing to integrate gender into policy and decision-making at the national
level. Accordingly, GTZ has designed a number of practical instruments designed to mainstream
gender into a variety of sectors.126
Norway
Women and gender equality are one of six priority areas in Norway’s overall development
cooperation, as set out in the ‘Strategy for Women and Gender Equality in Development
Cooperation’ (1997-2005). Moreover, NORAD asserts that international development poverty
reduction goals can only be achieved through strong focus on women and gender equality, and
this is therefore a criterion in the assessment of all projects supported.127
U.S.
Women in Development is a cross-cutting programme for USAID. All project and other
programme designs must consider women’s and men’s participation.128 Women’s rights are also
specifically addressed in the sectors of education, economic growth, health/HIV/AIDS, and
trafficking.129
3.4
Co-ordination
The common focus on co-ordination stems from the Agenda’s emphasis on the “segmented”
pillar approach (Cousens, 2001: 6). Boutros-Ghali highlights the “complicated…implementation
of post-conflict peace-building”, which demands “integrated action and delicate dealings between
the United Nations and the parties to the conflict” (Boutros Ghali, 1992: Paragraph 48).
Nevertheless, it is a problem within both the integrative and sectoral operational strategies since
neither tend to be concise nor tailored. It is also challenging as an “activity-oriented rather than
126
http://www.gtz.de.en.themen/uebergreifende-themen/897.htm
http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1651
128
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work
129
http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2004/fs040308.html
127
178
process- or policy-oriented”, which is conducted by various sectors and actors (Jennings and
Ruge, undated: 25). When such a multitude of organisations “take simultaneous action to achieve
opposing goals” then the “maximisation of efforts fails”, as Jeong asserts (2005: 204).
To overcome this obstacle, Jeong recommends vertical and horizontal policy co-ordinating
structures or co-ordinating partnerships at sectoral or institutional levels. He advises that both
types are needed when there are a large number of organisations with diverse responsibilities.
The horizontal can take place across levels up to strategic decision-making whereas strategic-level
co-ordination can create balance between different sectors and the arrangements within a given
sector. For a decentralized decision-making structure at the higher levels, “collaborative
arrangements can be developed on an ad hoc basis at the operational and tactical levels.” (Jeong,
2005: 208-10).
For donorship in particular, joint or co-ordinated assistance operations “must include provisions
for the flexible allocation of authority from headquarters and capitals to field offices” so
operational decisions can be made as close as possible to the field level (Stiefel, 2001: 271). Jeong
concurs especially for development and civil society development, where for small NGOs
“hierarchical structures with links to central headquarters are less effective at developing
appropriate local strategies.” (Jeong, 2005: 217). Notwithstanding, Stiefel also advises the
simultaneous balance of “improved and more regular reporting and communication to ensure
accountability.” (Stiefel, 2001: 271). For aid conditionality at the country level, “[d]onor
coordination is more effective if it is based on common understandings of the types of
conditions to be placed on aid, the timing of sanctions in the event of non-compliance, and the
ultimate objectives of such actions.” Politics typically decides if consensus is possible, that is,
“[d]onors’ leverage over a recalcitrant government may depend on their ability to issue a credible
threat to withdraw support in the event of non-compliance.” (Jeong, 2005:193-194). Perhaps as
the most significant threat, the trend towards greater coherence and co-ordination amongst
international peace building agencies further challenges the ownership of the process by local
actors (Llamazares, 2005: 12). Therefore, external assistance must be “timed to local dynamics”
(Stiefel, 2001: 272).
Netherlands
The Dutch have been very active in linking their perspective on developing world issues to the
key multinational fora and over a wide variety of themes. Co-ordinated action has been a
particular focus with its multilateral partners. However, in the 2001 DAC Peer Review, it was
recommended that the Minister for Development Co-operation increased his/her authority in
several critical organisational areas, for example, personnel. Another weakness was that the aid
portfolio usually represented the majority of ODA while delegations of authority remained with
the ambassador. Improvement in communications between headquarters and the field was also
required in addition to noted conflict between financial versus management decentralisation.130
Denmark
In 2003, administration of ODA was decentralised, with authority transferred from Copenhagan
to missions in the Danish programme countries. The greater emphasis on donor co-ordination
and harmonisation “has significantly reduced the need for personnel assistance, whereby
Denmark has obtained a substantial efficiency gain”.131
130
131
http://www.oecd.org
http://www.um.dk/en/menu/Developmentpolicy/DanishCooperation/Der...
179
Norway
The Norwegian government proposes guidelines governing development co-operation through
parliamentary propositions and bills and draws up proposals for the development budget. It is
then the parliament that determines the objectives, deciding which countries and regions to be
prioritised and the allocation of money. Its MFA administers the long-term grants; is
responsible for the formulation of development policy and strategies for co-operation with
individual countries; and administers Norway’s multilateral development co-operation and
disaster relief. It works through the embassies and co-operates (to a varying degree) with local
sectors for evaluations and follow-ups.132
Switzerland
The SDC recognises that complexity demands co-ordination and coherence. Accordingly,
successful efforts to fight poverty depend directly on other policy sectors, for example, decisions
in trade, finance, agriculture, environment, migration and health have an impact on the
effectiveness of its development policy and ability to reduce poverty. For co-ordination, the
SDC has the instrument of the Interdepartmental Committee for International Development and
Cooperation, which consists of representatives of all federal offices concerned to discuss
questions related to such issues as the MDGs and development financing with the aim of
reaching a coherent Swiss position on these development policy matters.133 The most important
SDC partner within the federal administration is the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, as
both are responsible for dealing with general development policy issues at the international level.
They are also joined by several other offices on the environment, Federal Office of Public
Health, Federal Office of Agriculture, State Secretariat for Education and Research and the
Federal Office of Justice.
Equally, the SDC has a strong tradition of working closely with Swiss NGOs both at the
operational and policy levels. To this end, an important partner is the Swiss Coalition of
Development Organisations (a platform of six leading Swiss development organisations). The
Advisory Committee on Development and Cooperation also plays an important role in Swiss
development policy, mainly by advising the Federal Council on the relevant issues.134
United Kingdom
During 2003, the UK worked with donors and partner governments as they put into practice
guidelines on the “harmonisation of donor procedures”. DFID has traditionally joined up the
implementation of activities with other bilateral donors in the order to improve co-ordination.
For example, it provides assistance for education on behalf of SIDA in Rwanda so the Rwandan
Government only has to deal with one donor while SIDA does not have to set up extra
administrative structures. It also plans to fund a governance advisor with SIDA in Burundi.
DFID has worked closely with other bilateral donors individually at headquarters level, for
example, with France to explore new ways to promote private sector involvement in the
development of African infrastructure. Similar to the Netherlands and Denmark, DFID
devolved management of Burundi from London in late 2005 while working with a range of
partners.135
132
http://www.norad.no/default.asp?V_ITEM_ID=1210
http://www.deza.admin.ch/index.php?userhash=36842217&navID=22683&langID=1
134
http://www.deza.admin.ch/index.php?userhash=36842217&navID=22596&langID=1
135
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/aboutdfid/dfidwork/bilateraldonors.asp; and
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/africa/burundi.asp
133
180
U.S.
USAID asserts its commitment to discussing and co-ordinating ideas and programmes with
regional organisations and international bodies (the DAC, G8 and at the UN global summits).136
In Africa, it participates in several donor co-ordination arrangements including weekly
humanitarian response co-ordination meetings, the Country Coordinating Mechanism for the
GFATM, the World Bank Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme and the
UN-led weekly election planning meetings. It also works in close co-ordination with other
donors in the preparation of the PRSR.137 A major component is the Trade for African
Development and Enterprise initiative, which helps increase import and export opportunities and
improve integration into world markets. For example, it has located three regional Hubs for
Global Competitiveness in Botswana, Kenya and Ghana to provide technical assistance to
African governments, the private sector and regional organisations. Trade Hub programmes are
designed to reinforce regional and bilateral efforts to strengthen Africa’s economic
competitiveness and assist the nations of the area to take greater advantage of the trade
opportunities provided by the African Growth and Opportunity Act and other global trade
initiatives.138
World Bank
For the LICUS initiative, the World Bank states that co-ordination “demands donors to unite
behind a smaller number of priority reforms”. It promotes the Transitional Results Matrix as a
planning tool to integrate political, economic, security and social dimensions of recovery and
claims this facilitates “close donor coordination behind government-agreed priorities, flexibility
and monitoring of progress.”139
3.5
Learning capacity
The emphasis in transferring knowledge between organisations involved in peacebuilding
through field evaluation and consultation has produced influential policy documents such as the
OECD 1997 Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation and the 2000 UN
Brahimi Report (Llamazares, 2005: 28). The DAC uses the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency,
impact and sustainability criteria.140
Nevertheless, there is a consensus within the literature that the learning capacity of peace builders
is beset by overwhelming shortcomings. First, some authors assert that the convergence of
criteria for ‘good’ peacebuilding means that often the same lessons keep being re-learnt and
policy regurgitated (Llamazares, 2005: 28). Conversely, others find that there is no norm for
evaluating peacebuilding, which presents real problems for comparing evaluations (Spencer,
1998: 8). The latter problem stems from the lack of an established understanding or definition of
peacebuilding and baseline data. This is compounded by the inability to clearly establish links
between inputs and outcomes and the difficult isolation of activities for the purpose of analysis.
136
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/donor.html
http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2006/afr/cd.html
138
http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sectors/eg/index.html
139
http://web.worldbank.org
140
http://www.oecd.org/documentprint/0,2744,en_2649_34435_2086550_1_1_1_1,00.htr...
137
181
More fundamentally, in terms of methodological shortcomings and from a rational science
perspective, it is a significant weakness that there is an inability to prove in a methodical and
technical fashion that an intervention builds peace. This has knock-on effects on the
intervention with the belief that “if it cannot be put in a box and measured, then it should not be
done.” – a trend that has led to the concern that the method for evaluating and verifying funded
work in principle inadvertently drives the agenda. Examples include stunted goals through the
targeting of groups and the “demand for quick results, especially in sectors oriented toward longterm qualitative changes.” (Jeong, 2005: 217). Last and as a consequence of these shortcomings,
Spencer asserts that there are relatively few (available) evaluations of peacebuilding programmes.
The established requirement of demonstrating a linear relationship between cause and effect and
the competitive aid market means negative lessons learnt are “closely guarded secrets.” Moreover,
there is a risk that positive lessons become distorted out of the context of the whole picture
(Spencer, 1998: 8).
It is thus appropriate to conclude that there is a need for “the realisation of appropriate
methodologies to evaluate peacebuilding.” Towards improvement, an appropriate evaluation
needs to be based on the approach and level of the peacebuilding efforts. This involves a
definition of the problem and the objective of the intervention which, in turn, serves as a basis to
measure performance (Spencer, 1998: 26-27). Cutter agrees and adds the need to consider the
commitment and political will of the warring parties actually to make peace, as the key elements
that make peace work in post-conflict situations (Cutter, 2005: 783). In more practical terms,
resources for evaluations need to be made more consistently available and the assessment of a
peacebuilding activity should start in the planning stages. Last, the contributions of local inputs
should be sufficiently represented in the current OECD criteria (Spencer, 1998: 26-27). This also
requires “[f]lexibility in partnerships” when working with small NGOs “since their activities
cannot be easily judged by rigid organisational models.” (Jeong, 2005: 217).
Netherlands
In the 2001 DAC Peer Review, the Dutch MFA’s M&E system was criticised as “conceptually
disconnected and minimally co-ordinated operationally”.141 In 2005, Junne and Verkoren found
that ther “emphasis on sound management practices and working quality assurance schemes
stimulated the organisations to professionalise their activities further”. However, the M&E
procedures needed to be improved and made more systematic and related to institutional
capacities (Junne and Verkoren, 2005: 1-2).
Denmark
DANIDA has two M&E objectives: the accumulation of experience and documentation. It
defines evaluation as a systematic and objective assessment of on-going or completed activities,
their design, implementation and result. The aim is to determine the relevance and fulfilment of
objectives, development, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability. To this end, its
Evaluation Secretariat (ES) plans, conducts, disseminates, contributes to development strategy,
builds and maintains an electronic database of evaluations, develops and improves methods of
evaluation and contributes to development capacity etc. Evaluations are required to be objective
and transparent, impartial and independent. Before an evaluation, the ES prepares objectives in
consultation with the relevant interested parties. They are typically conducted in two phases
using a focusing-down approach: a reporting and follow-up stage, which is proceeded by
publication.142
141
142
http://www.oecd.org
http://www.um.dk/en/menu/DevelopmentPolicy/Evaluations/Objective/
182
4.
Main Lessons
At this point, it is important to present some lessons for the TMF funding mechanism by
consolidating the main findings on donorship for post-conflict peacebuilding.
4.1
143
Process design
·
There must be a clear conceptualisation of each peacebuilding process, for example, using
specialised units for reconstruction or the aim of brokering peace processes.
·
“Objective standards and subjective criteria should be synthesized within a consolidated
needs assessment.” (Jeong, 2005: 24).
·
Causes of conflict and its context must be understood; national stakeholders must share a
vision of reconstruction for it to take root; the effective implementation of reconstruction
needs “institutions and mechanisms for collaborative governance”; and reconstruction
must induce development (Barakat, 2005: 573).
·
“unintended, as well as intended, effects need to be considered.” (Jeong, 2005: 24). For
functional interdependencies, “[e]ach measure has to be implemented to be compatible
with the conditions required by other aspects of building sustainable peace.” – one can
harm each other “if not integrated in a complementary manner” (Jeong, 2005: 27).
·
Projects for reconciliation and civil society building require transformative perspectives
(Jeong, 2005: 29).
·
There should not be gaps in the aid to development continuum although this is not
always linear (Jeong, 2005: 30 and 32).
·
The DAC recognises that poverty reduction needs a more systematic approach based on
an assessment of the avenues and skills of implementers. Accordingly, DAC members
need to ensure policy consistency (that the full range of policies match the poverty
reduction focus espoused by their development ministries); a better understanding of the
needs of the poor when providing macro-level support or working at the meso-level;
donor clarity regarding “pro-poor enabling environment”; agencies working closely with
national and regional governments and with civil society representatives to promote a
domestic economic and social policy environment which improves opportunities for the
poor and marginalised to obtain better livelihoods and increased access to resources,
knowledge and rights. The DAC thereby recommends increasing the accountability of
the political system to the needs of the poor and changes in law to reduce the exclusion
of women and particular ethnic groups, more efficient and accountable public
administration at central, regional and local levels and greater weight placed on bottomup approaches.143
http://www.oecd.org
183
·
Organisations have to tailor project proposals to current funding trends, which can mean
that high impact projects of great potential value do not get funded because they do not
conform.
·
Civil society programmes are much more difficult to measure than more tangible
development programmes with greater reliance on quantitative indicators. As such some
organisations reported a funding bias towards programmes with easy to define
quantitative indicators.
·
There is always pressure to constantly include the latest development fads in proposals.
On occasions their inclusion is for no other reason than because it is expected. (Examples
include ‘gender mainstreaming’, ‘the rights based approach’, ‘PCIA’, ‘livelihoods’, etc).
This can detract from the real focus of the proposal and potential impact of the
programme/project.
·
Some of the donors are keen to publicize their involvement in such a way that
undermines the activities of the funded organisation particularly when political sensitivity
is required e.g. in Uganda and Ethiopia.
4.2
4.3
Making aid unconditional
·
Untying aid is crucial as flexibility allows greater space and scope for peace building
activities. However, this does not completely prevent resource transfers and implicit
ethnical messages from fuelling the conflict (Anderson, 2001: 258–259). Bilateral
donorship must reflect and instil appropriate codes of conduct based on transparency and
accountability (Paffenholz, 2001: 540-541).
·
The priority given to peacebuilding must be “tempered by the humanitarian imperative of
assisting people whose lives are in imminent danger.” Therefore, aid must be smart, with
the selective application of peace conditionality to aid that is not beneficial to leaders and
political elites and at least vital to civilians (Boyce, 2002: 1037). Although difficult, there
must be efforts to try and measure the distribution of benefits and costs that “affect
vertical disparities of class and horizontal cleavages of ethnicity, religion, race and region”
(Boyce, 2002: 1042).
·
The majority of instances demonstrate that funding is relatively restrictive in terms of
funds given and timeframe. However, some recipient organisations feel that funders do
not appreciate the many external factors that impact upon a project over which funded
organisations have little control. This for example, is the case in Ethiopia where recent
events have negatively impacted upon civil society projects. Some of the organisations
feel that the decisions about funding take place outside the country where the project is
implemented and staff are not appreciative of the difficult circumstances
·
Many donors want immediate results, they do not seem to appreciate that initially staff
have to be trained and physical and technical resources have to be procured, all of which
takes time but is fundamental to the success of the project.
Using NGOs as partners to build capacity
184
·
Partnerships with NGOs is useful – being there the longest can bring credibility and
neutrality. Nevertheless, this should not be a substitute for sustained attention. Peace
processes are not one to two-year events. It can take ten years or more for the objectives
of a peace agreement to be ingrained in society (Cutter, 2005: 783). “Successful
peacebuilding cases are characterized by a sufficient level of commitment of time and
resources as well as political will both on the part of external and internal actors.” (Jeong,
2005: 34).
·
In building civil society: it must be clear in purpose; the target must also be clear; the time
required and the complexity depend on the “depth of change envisaged”; and “[o]utsiders
need to build their own understanding while exercising caution”, for example, “[t]raining
is not a panacea” and approaches must be tailored to the context (Smillie, 2001: 21). You
need to know who to work with and how to prevent enhancing the wrong capacities
(Smillie, 2001: 7). At the same time, a strong civil society does not prevent conflict, as
demonstrated by Sri Lanka and Rwanda (Smillie, 2001: 14).
·
“Political legitimacy can be based on external norms but has to be supported by the local
reality”, that involves being realisitic about terms such as ‘accountability’ and ‘good
governance’. (Jeong, 2005: 35).
·
Good relationships between donor and recipient are key to the success of the project
funding.
4.4
Smart co-ordination
·
Efficiency demands clear and desirable co-ordination. All operations and actions must be
linked to a vision for peace, and all relevant actors (lowest to highest level) need to
participate in the planning and decision-making. Equally important, the outcome ought
to be achievable within an acceptable timeframe but timeframes must also be flexible
(Paffenholz, 2001: 536-541).
·
“Resource allocation needs to reflect the salience and difficulties of the tasks as well as
their sustainability” (Jeong, 2005: 24).
·
On occasions it is difficult to disperse all the money in the given timeframe due to a lack
of absorptive capacity of project beneficiaries, related stakeholders and external factors.
In some instances the donor does not appreciate such reasons and subsequently reduces
the next round of funding when for maximum impact the funding should have been
increased or maintained on the previous level.
·
The level of sustained efforts that is expected in pursuit of any goal should be
commensurate to the difficulty involved, according to strategic and logistic definitions of
the tasks.
·
Developing long-term policy goals thus relates closely to supporting the constituents of
peacebuilding (Jeong, 2005: 24).
185
·
4.4
Recipients approach a wide variety of bilateral, multilateral and other NGOs as potential
donors. A great deal of time is spent completing often unnecessarily complicated
applications for funding and many applications are not successful.
Mainstreaming gender
·
4.5
Gender must be included at all levels of planning and action (Paffenholz, 2001: 538-539).
Making evaluations valid and constructive
·
The criteria for evaluations needs to be reviewed
·
Success is a relative concept. Disagreement on criteria and timeframe means different
interpretations of success (Jeong, 2005: 35).
·
Benchmarks exist but thresholds differ in each context. Possible comparative areas: goals
and objectives; direct and tangible outcomes; nonmaterial, qualitative elements. Progress
can be assessed separately in each category; improvements in different dimensions can be
compared to their overall impact on the process; separate areas can be measured
according to different timeframes; and some components may be considered more
important than others in determining success (Jeong, 2005: 35).
·
In many cases the actual practicalities of finding out information from websites (often the
first means of information checked is not straightforward. Some organisations like DfID
have clear links for potential recipients, whilst others such as USAID, GTZ and JICA
appear to have no clear link for potential recipients.
·
Recipient organisations can find the need for frequent reporting to be time consuming
and in some instances the recipients felt that the reports were not read by the donors. As
such the frequent reporting had limited value while putting extra pressure on local staff.
Conclusions
Refer back to Boyce quote.
To assess the scope for effective peacebuilding assistance, we must jettison the assumption that the obstacles lie
entirely on the recipient side, and recognise that the policies and practices of aid donors can be part of the problem as
well as part of the solution (Boyce, 2002: 1026).
- Conclude on the main gaps in the TMF by drawing together the review of donors,
the theory and the case studies.
Peace building as a concept versus practice
Poverty reduction
186
·
·
Recognition of tangible benefits: The case studies show that peacebuilding needs poverty
reduction, therefore, there is an emphasis on interventions that bring tangible ‘development’
gains even in the context of civil society development.
Integrating with existing development plans: Many donor organisations integrate their plans
with the PRSPs to ensure that activities are not duplicated and real needs are addressed.
Capacity building
The case studies demonstrate that capacity building was defined in a variety of ways and based on
an array of activities. Significant attention was given to co-operation with NGOs, and from this,
there were some interesting networks to create close links with government institutions.
What was the nature of the relationships – the elements, the frequency and type of contact,
equality in the relationships, in particular, the degree of mutual accountability – to what extent
were local partners and donors held accountable in terms of mechanisms and practice?
Was civil society involved in the creation of policy principles? If so, in what way?
What was the perception of the relationship by locals?
How can it be considered successful, why or why not/obstacles, what could be improved?
Gender
Key questions are: how gender-sensitive were the activities, how far was it mainstreamed into the
projects of the partner organisation and to what extent was it a priority with members of the
partner organisation? Has the capacity of the organisation to address gender issues grown?
Co-ordination
The synergy and co-ordination or duplication of activities? (if so, how did they relate to projects
by other organisations? Any conflicts?, Co-ordination – embassies involved to what extent,
effective?
Also, between donors, political dimensions (how do the different donors co-operate with each
other?)
Learning capacity
Policy and programme adjustments as a result of such procedures, (local and international)
organisations’ involvement in knowledge exchange initiatives and their success or failure; results
of internal M&E?; how were results explained by those responsible to all affected; adjustments
been made?
The learning capacity of the organisation involved/M&E mechanisms (to enhance the learning
capacity) in place and how well they functioned – internal and external? (what evaluation criteria
have been developed for this kind of activity?, types and forms of (room for reflection,
interaction, investigation, openness to criticism, responding to lessons learned)?
How did they systematise lessons learned, how are they spread, how are they updated? Direction
of policy formation? Top-down or based on needs/requests of donors)
General Recommendations for TMF
Based on analysis of the benchmarking review a number of recommendations can be made to
increase the effectiveness of TMF funding:
187
Continued appreciation of the operating environment: The TMF desire to see government
control being replaced by a policy dialogue from which both government and CSOs benefit is
not only reliant upon the effective partnerships between northern and southern organisations.
For example, the current situation in Ethiopia demonstrates the need, importance and dangers of
civil society engagement with governing institutions who are relatively new to such concepts as
good governance, democracy and participation. Therefore the need for the TMF funded work
that is undertaken by organisations advocating civil society development remains acute but is
nonetheless heavily reliant upon external factors over which international, national and regional
actors have little control.
Integrating the benefits of practical short term impact: One of the difficulties some TMF
organisations experience is that the results of the project, while of great importance at a regional
and national level, are nonetheless fairly abstract at the community level where the civil society
groups are based. In addition, the way the project has been set up means that measurement is
relatively difficult.144 Feedback from some actors highlight how engaging civil society, through a
process which gives tangible and rapid benefit, is more conducive to the effectiveness and
measurement of civil society engagement. This is because the benefits of the engagement are
demonstrated practically as in the case of the GTZ partnership between Municipalities and
CSOs.
Advocating the importance of tangible benefits: Impact is greater when there are tangible
immediate benefits that directly improve people’s lives at the community level. In such a context
it is much easier to discuss ‘gender,’ ‘empowerment,’ and ‘participation’ as people’s receptive
capacity is greater. In addition a logical approach such as that adopted by some partners of
focusing on basic needs in parallel to a more abstract influencing of policy has a greater impact
amongst target groups.
Autonomy should be balanced: There needs to be a balance between the levels of autonomy
that the northern organisation gives to its southern local partner. It should not be assumed that
high levels of autonomy and ‘space to achieve own goals and policies’ will result in the best
impact.
(Re)emphasise the importance of management at local level: Without effective local
management, direction is lost, team spirit is reduced and impact is more limited.
Greater coordination requires flexibility: Co-ordination will remain difficult until there is
greater flexibility of funding amongst donors and NGOs. Most initiatives have set rationales and
relative financial inflexibility, as such their scope for co-ordination with other activities remains
limited. As a consequence there is often a duplication of activities.
144
A point confirmed by the evaluation of the Horn of Africa Project 2002
188
Bibliography
Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi,Ed Garcia, and Rupesinghe Kumar (2001) ‘Nonviolent Diplomacy:
Experiences of NGOs and People’s Participation in Selected Peace Processes,’ Journey through
Conflict: Narratives and Lessons, R. Hayward Alker, TE Gurr, and Rupesinghe Kumar, eds.,
(Lanaham, MD, Rowman and Littlfield), pp. 196-239.
Atack, Iain (2003/04) ‘Peacebuilding as conflict management or political engineering?’, Trócaire
Development Review, pp. 17-32.
Anderson, Mary (2001) ‘Enhancing Local Capacity for Peace: Do No Harm’, Peacebuilding: A Field
Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers),
pp. 259-264.
Barakat, Sultan (2005) “Reconstructing Post-Saddam Iraq: an introduction”, Third World Quarterly,
Vol. 26, No. 4-5, pp. 565 – 570.
Barakat, Jones, Junne, Meijer, Mohamoud & Verkoren (2005), ‘Evaluatie Thematisch
Medefinancieringsprogramma (TMF) Deelstudie (A) Vredesopbouw,’ 14 June, pp. 1-34.
Boutros Boutros Ghali (1995) ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the
Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations’, Report of
the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation, 3 January, A/50/60 - s/1995/1.
Boutros Boutros Ghali (1992) ‘An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and
peace-keeping’, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of
the Security Council on 31 January 1992, 17 June, A/47/277 - S/24111.
Boyce, James K. (2002) ‘Aid Conditionality as a tool of Peacebuilding: Opportunities and
Constraints’, Development and Change, 33(5), pp. 1025-1048.
Cousens, Elizabeth, M. (2001) ‘Introduction’, Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile
Societies, Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar, eds., pp. 1-20.
Cutter, Ana (2005) ‘Peacebuilding: A Literature review’ Development in Practice, Vol. 15, No. 6, pp.
779-784.
Darby, John and Roger MacGinty, eds., (2003) Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace
Processes (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan).
Duffield, M., (2002) ‘Social Reconstruction and the Radicalisation of Development Aid: Aid as a
Relation of Global Liberal Governance’, Development and Change, 33(5), pp. 1049-1071.
Eade, Deborah (1997) Capacity Building; An Approach to People-Centred Development (Oxford: Oxfam).
Harmer, Adele, and Cotterrell, Lin (2005) ‘Diversity in donorship: The changing landscape of
official humanitarian aid’, HPG Research Report, September, pp. 1-46.
Harvey, (1998) ‘Rehabilitation in Complex Political Emergencies: Is Rebuilding Civil Society the
Answer?’, Disasters, 22(3).
189
Haugerudbraaten, Henning (1998) ‘Peacebuilding: Six dimensions and two concepts’ African
Security Review, 7(6).
Jennings, Kathleen M. and Christian H Ruge (undated) ‘Killing many birds with few stones:
Integrating ERW and SALW actions with peace-building efforts’, Peace-Building, Conflict Prevention
and Development, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, pp. 21-34.
Jeong, Ho-Won., (2005) Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process (Boulder and
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers).
Junne, Gerd and Verkoren, Willemijn (2005) ‘TMF Evaluation Sub-Study on Peacebuilding
Concept Interim Report’, 1 October, pp. 1-50.
Junne, Gerd and Verkoren, eds., (2005) Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges (Boulder and
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers).
Kapungu, Leonard (2001) ‘Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, and the Lessons-Learned Process’,
Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne
Rienner Publishers), pp. 435-440.
Kühne, Winrich (2001) ‘From Peacekeeping to Postconflict Peacebuilding’, Peacebuilding: A Field
Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers),
pp. 376-388.
Lautze, Sue and John Hammock (1996) Coping with Crisis, Coping with Aid: Capacity Building, Coping
Mechanisms, and Dependency, Linking Relief and Development (New York, UNDHA).
Lederach, John Paul (2002) Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Washington
D.C., United States Institute of Peace).
Leonhardt, Manuela (2001) ‘The Challenge of Linking Aid and Peacebuilding’, Peacebuilding: A
Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner
Publishers), pp. 238-245.
Llamazares, Monica (2005) ‘Post-War Peacebuilding Reviewed: A Critical Exploration Of
Generic Approaches To Post-War Reconstruction’, Centre for Conflict Resolution Working
Paper 14, February (Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford), pp. 1-37.
Lumsden, Malevern (1999) ‘Breaking the Cycle of Violence’, Conflict Resolution: Dynamics, Process,
and Structure, Ho-Won Jeong, ed., (Ashgate, UK: Aldershot), pp. 131-152.
Lund, Michael (2001) ‘A Toolbox for Responding to Conflicts and Building Peace’, Peacebuilding:
A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner
Publishers), pp. 16-20.
Macrae, Joanna, Sarah Collinson, Margie Buchanan-Smith, Nicola Reindorp, Anna Schmidt,
Tasneem Mowjee and Adele Harmer (2002), Uncertain Power: The Chnaging Role of Official Donors in
Humanitarian Action, HPG Report, No. 12, December.
190
Maise, Michelle (undated) ‘Peacebuilding’ Beyond Intractability, Conflict Research Consortium, Guy
Burgess and Heidi Burgess, eds., (University of Colorado, Boulder)
http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/peacebuilding.jsp.
Morgan, Peter (1994) ‘Capacity Development – An Introduction’, Emerging Issues in Capacity
Development, Ottawa: Institute on Governance.
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Framework for Strategic Alliances with International
NGOs (SALIN) for 2006-2010, http://www.minbuza.nl/default.asp?/CMS.
Paffenholz, Thania (2001) ‘Peacebuilding: A Comprehensive Learning Process’, Peacebuilding: A
Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner
Publishers), pp. 535-543.
Pankhurst, D. and Pearce, J. (1997) ‘Engendering the analysis of conflict: perspectives from the
south’, Women and Empowerment, Afshar, H., ed., (London, Routledge).
Ropers, Norbert (2001) ‘Enhancing the Quality of NGO Work in Peacebuilding’, Peacebuilding: A
Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner
Publishers), pp. 520-531.
Smillie, Ian, ed., (2001) Patronage or Partnership: Local Capacity Building in Humanitarian Crises,
(Bloomfield. CT, Kumarin Press).
Spencer, Tanya (1998) ‘A Synthesis of Evaluations of Peacebuilding
Activities Undertaken by Humanitarian Agencies and Conflict Resolution Organisations’ Active
Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action, 13 November, Final
Version, pp.1-53.
Stiefel, Matthias (2001) ‘Participatory Research as a Tool for Peacebuilding: The WSP
Experience’, Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder,
London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 265-276.
Woroniuk, Beth (2001) ‘Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective’, Peacebuilding: A Field Guide, Luc
Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, eds., (Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers), pp. 61-71.
191
192