Document 6498400

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Document 6498400

The CERT® Guide to
Insider Threats
The SEI Series in
Software Engineering
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The CERT Guide to
Insider Threats
®
How to Prevent, Detect, and Respond to
Information Technology Crimes
(Theft, Sabotage, Fraud)
Dawn Cappelli
Andrew Moore
Randall Trzeciak
Upper Saddle River, NJ • Boston• Indianapolis • San Francisco
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The SEI Series in Software Engineering
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cappelli, Dawn.
The CERT guide to insider threats : how to prevent, detect, and respond to information technology crimes
(theft, sabotage, fraud) / Dawn Cappelli, Andrew Moore, Randall Trzeciak.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-321-81257-5 (hbk. : alk. paper) 1. Computer crimes—Prevention. 2. Employee crimes—Prevention.
3. Information technology—Security measures. 4. Computer networks—Security measures. 5. Data protection.
I. Moore, Andrew. II. Trzeciak, Randall. III. Title.
HV6773.C33 2012
658.4’78—dc23
2011047338
Copyright © 2012 Pearson Education, Inc.
All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. This publication is protected by copyright, and
permission must be obtained from the publisher prior to any prohibited reproduction, storage in a retrieval system,
or transmission in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or likewise. To obtain
permission to use material from this work, please submit a written request to Pearson Education, Inc., Permissions
Department, One Lake Street, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458, or you may fax your request to (201) 236-3290.
ISBN-13: 978-0-321-81257-5
ISBN-10:
0-321-81257-3
Text printed in the United States on recycled paper at Courier in Westford, Massachusetts.
Second printing, June 2014
For Fred, Anthony, and Alyssa. You are my life—I love you!
—Dawn
For those who make my life oh so sweet: Susan, Eric, Susan’s
amazing family, and my own Mom, Dad, Roger, and Lisa.
—Andy
For Marianne, Abbie, Nate, and Luke. I am the luckiest person in
the world to have such a wonderful family.
—Randy
This page intentionally left blank
Contents
Preface ........................................................................................................... xvii
Acknowledgments ..................................................................................... xxxi
Chapter 1. Overview..........................................................................................1
True Stories of Insider Attacks.......................................................3
Insider IT Sabotage........................................................................3
Insider Fraud.................................................................................4
Insider Theft of Intellectual Property.............................................5
The Expanding Complexity of Insider Threats...........................6
Breakdown of Cases in the Insider Threat Database..................7
CERT’s MERIT Models of Insider Threats...................................9
Why Our Profiles Are Useful.......................................................10
Why Not Just One Profile?..........................................................11
Why Didn’t We Create a Single Insider Theft Model?................12
Overview of the CERT Insider Threat Center............................13
Timeline of the CERT Program’s Insider Threat Work.............16
2000 Initial Research...................................................................16
2001 Insider Threat Study...........................................................16
2001 Insider Threat Database......................................................17
2005 Best Practices......................................................................17
2005 System Dynamics Models...................................................17
2006 Workshops...........................................................................17
vii
viii
Contents
2006 Interactive Virtual Simulation Tool....................................18
2007 Insider Threat Assessment..................................................18
2009 Insider Threat Lab...............................................................18
2010 Insider Threat Exercises......................................................18
2010 Insider Threat Study—Banking and Finance Sector..........19
Caveats about Our Work..............................................................20
Summary........................................................................................20
Chapter 2. Insider IT Sabotage......................................................................23
General Patterns in Insider IT Sabotage Crimes.......................28
Personal Predispositions..............................................................28
Disgruntlement and Unmet Expectations...................................31
Behavioral Precursors..................................................................35
Stressful Events...........................................................................37
Technical Precursors and Access Paths........................................40
The Trust Trap..............................................................................45
Mitigation Strategies.....................................................................46
Early Mitigation through Setting of Expectations......................47
Handling Disgruntlement through Positive Intervention..........49
Eliminating Unknown Access Paths...........................................50
More Complex Monitoring Strategies.........................................52
A Risk-Based Approach to Prioritizing Alerts.............................53
Targeted Monitoring....................................................................55
Measures upon Demotion or Termination...................................56
Secure the Logs.............................................................................56
Test Backup and Recovery Process...............................................57
One Final Note of Caution...........................................................59
Summary........................................................................................59
Chapter 3. Insider Theft of Intellectual Property.......................................61
Impacts............................................................................................66
General Patterns in Insider Theft of Intellectual
Property Crimes.............................................................................68
Contents
ix
The Entitled Independent.............................................................69
Insider Contribution and Entitlement.........................................70
Insider Dissatisfaction.................................................................72
Insider Theft and Deception.........................................................74
The Ambitious Leader..................................................................78
Insider Planning of Theft.............................................................79
Increasing Access.........................................................................80
Organization’s Discovery of Theft...............................................80
Theft of IP inside the United States Involving Foreign
Governments or Organizations...................................................83
Who They Are..............................................................................85
What They Stole...........................................................................86
Why They Stole............................................................................88
Mitigation Strategies for All Theft of Intellectual
Property Cases...............................................................................88
Exfiltration Methods....................................................................89
Network Data Exfiltration...........................................................90
Host Data Exfiltration.................................................................93
Physical Exfiltration....................................................................95
Exfiltration of Specific Types of IP...............................................95
Concealment................................................................................95
Trusted Business Partners...........................................................96
Mitigation Strategies: Final Thoughts........................................97
Summary........................................................................................98
Chapter 4. Insider Fraud...............................................................................101
General Patterns in Insider Fraud Crimes...............................106
Origins of Fraud........................................................................108
Continuing the Fraud................................................................110
Outsider Facilitation.................................................................. 111
Recruiting Other Insiders into the Scheme................................113
Insider Stressors.........................................................................115
Insider Fraud Involving Organized Crime..............................115
x
Contents
Snapshot of Malicious Insiders Involved with
Organized Crime.......................................................................116
Who They Are............................................................................117
Why They Strike........................................................................118
What They Strike.......................................................................118
How They Strike........................................................................118
Organizational Issues of Concern and Potential
Countermeasures.........................................................................120
Inadequate Auditing of Critical and Irregular Processes...........120
Employee/Coworker Susceptibility to Recruitment...................121
Verification of Modification of Critical Data..............................123
Financial Problems....................................................................124
Excessive Access Privilege.........................................................125
Other Issues of Concern.............................................................125
Mitigation Strategies: Final Thoughts......................................126
Summary......................................................................................127
Chapter 5. Insider Threat Issues in the Software
Development Life Cycle............................................................129
Requirements and System Design Oversights........................131
Authentication and Role-Based Access Control........................132
Separation of Duties...................................................................133
Automated Data Integrity Checks.............................................134
Exception Handling...................................................................135
System Implementation, Deployment, and Maintenance
Issues.............................................................................................136
Code Reviews.............................................................................136
Attribution.................................................................................137
System Deployment...................................................................137
Backups......................................................................................139
Programming Techniques Used As an Insider
Attack Tool....................................................................................139
Modification of Production Source Code or Scripts...................140
Obtaining Unauthorized Authentication Credentials...............141
Disruption of Service and/or Theft of Information....................141
Contents
xi
Mitigation Strategies...................................................................142
Summary......................................................................................143
Chapter 6. Best Practices for the Prevention and Detection
of Insider Threats ......................................................................145
Summary of Practices.................................................................146
Practice 1: Consider Threats from Insiders
and Business Partners in Enterprise-Wide
Risk Assessments.........................................................................151
What Can You Do?....................................................................151
Case Studies: What Could Happen if I Don’t Do It?.................152
Practice 2: Clearly Document and Consistently
Enforce Policies and Controls....................................................155
What Can You Do?....................................................................155
Practice 3: Institute Periodic Security Awareness
Training for All Employees........................................................159
What Can You Do?....................................................................159
Practice 4: Monitor and Respond to Suspicious
or Disruptive Behavior, Beginning
with the Hiring Process..............................................................164
What Can You Do?....................................................................164
Practice 5: Anticipate and Manage Negative
Workplace Issues.........................................................................168
What Can You Do?....................................................................168
Practice 6: Track and Secure the Physical Environment.........171
What Can You Do?....................................................................171
Practice 7: Implement Strict Password- and AccountManagement Policies and Practices..........................................174
What Can You Do?....................................................................174
xii
Contents
Practice 8: Enforce Separation of Duties and
Least Privilege..............................................................................178
What Can You Do?....................................................................178
Practice 9: Consider Insider Threats in the Software
Development Life Cycle.............................................................182
What Can You Do?....................................................................182
Requirements Definition............................................................182
System Design...........................................................................183
Implementation..........................................................................183
Installation.................................................................................184
System Maintenance..................................................................185
Practice 10: Use Extra Caution with System
Administrators and Technical or Privileged Users.................187
What Can You Do?....................................................................187
Practice 11: Implement System Change Controls....................191
What Can You Do?....................................................................191
Practice 12: Log, Monitor, and Audit Employee
Online Actions.............................................................................195
What Can You Do?....................................................................195
Practice 13: Use Layered Defense against Remote Attacks....200
What Can You Do?....................................................................200
Practice 14: Deactivate Computer Access Following
Termination..................................................................................203
What Can You Do?....................................................................203
Practice 15: Implement Secure Backup and Recovery
Processes.......................................................................................207
What Can You Do?....................................................................207
Contents
xiii
Practice 16: Develop an Insider Incident Response Plan.......211
What Can You Do?....................................................................211
Summary......................................................................................213
References/Sources of Best Practices........................................214
Chapter 7. Technical Insider Threat Controls...........................................215
Infrastructure of the Lab.............................................................217
Demonstrational Videos.............................................................218
High-Priority Mitigation Strategies..........................................219
Control 1: Use of Snort to Detect Exfiltration of
Credentials Using IRC................................................................220
Suggested Solution....................................................................221
Control 2: Use of SiLK to Detect Exfiltration of Data
Using VPN....................................................................................221
Control 3: Use of a SIEM Signature to Detect Potential
Precursors to Insider IT Sabotage..............................................223
Database Analysis......................................................................225
SIEM Signature.........................................................................227
Common Event Format..............................................................228
Common Event Expression........................................................229
Applying the Signature.............................................................230
Conclusion.................................................................................231
Control 4: Use of Centralized Logging to Detect Data
Exfiltration during an Insider’s Last Days
of Employment............................................................................231
Monitoring Considerations Surrounding Termination.............233
An Example Implementation Using Splunk..............................235
Advanced Targeting and Automation........................................237
Conclusion.................................................................................239
xiv
Contents
Insider Threat Exercises..............................................................239
Summary......................................................................................239
Chapter 8. Case Examples.............................................................................241
Sabotage Cases.............................................................................241
Sabotage Case 1..........................................................................243
Sabotage Case 2..........................................................................244
Sabotage Case 3..........................................................................244
Sabotage Case 4..........................................................................245
Sabotage Case 5..........................................................................245
Sabotage Case 6..........................................................................246
Sabotage Case 7..........................................................................246
Sabotage Case 8..........................................................................247
Sabotage Case 9..........................................................................247
Sabotage Case 10........................................................................248
Sabotage Case 11........................................................................248
Sabotage Case 12........................................................................249
Sabotage Case 13........................................................................249
Sabotage Case 14........................................................................250
Sabotage Case 15........................................................................250
Sabotage Case 16........................................................................251
Sabotage Case 17........................................................................252
Sabotage Case 18........................................................................252
Sabotage Case 19........................................................................253
Sabotage Case 20........................................................................253
Sabotage Case 21........................................................................254
Sabotage Case 22........................................................................255
Sabotage Case 23........................................................................255
Sabotage Case 24........................................................................256
Sabotage/Fraud Cases................................................................256
Sabotage/Fraud Case 1...............................................................257
Contents
xv
Theft of IP Cases..........................................................................258
Theft of IP Case 1.......................................................................259
Theft of IP Case 2.......................................................................260
Theft of IP Case 3.......................................................................260
Theft of IP Case 4.......................................................................261
Theft of IP Case 5.......................................................................261
Theft of IP Case 6.......................................................................262
Fraud Cases..................................................................................262
Fraud Case 1..............................................................................264
Fraud Case 2..............................................................................264
Fraud Case 3..............................................................................265
Fraud Case 4..............................................................................265
Fraud Case 5..............................................................................266
Fraud Case 6..............................................................................266
Fraud Case 7..............................................................................266
Fraud Case 8..............................................................................267
Fraud Case 9..............................................................................267
Fraud Case 10............................................................................268
Fraud Case 11.............................................................................268
Fraud Case 12............................................................................269
Miscellaneous Cases....................................................................269
Miscellaneous Case 1.................................................................270
Summary......................................................................................273
Chapter 9. Conclusion and Miscellaneous Issues....................................275
Insider Threat from Trusted Business Partners.......................275
Overview of Insider Threats from Trusted
Business Partners......................................................................278
Fraud Committed by Trusted Business Partners.......................279
xvi
Contents
IT Sabotage Committed by Trusted Business Partners..............280
Theft of Intellectual Property Committed by Trusted
Business Partners......................................................................281
Open Your Mind: Who Are Your Trusted
Business Partners?....................................................................282
Recommendations for Mitigation and Detection.......................283
Malicious Insiders with Ties to the Internet
Underground...............................................................................286
Snapshot of Malicious Insiders with Ties to the Internet
Underground.............................................................................287
Range of Involvement of the Internet Underground..................288
The Crimes.................................................................................288
Use of Unknown Access Paths Following Termination.............289
Insufficient Access Controls and Monitoring............................291
Conclusions: Insider Threats Involving the Internet
Underground.............................................................................293
Final Summary.............................................................................293
Let’s End on a Positive Note!.....................................................296
Appendix A. Insider Threat Center Products and Services...................299
Appendix B. Deeper Dive into the Data....................................................307
Appendix C. CyberSecurity Watch Survey...............................................319
Appendix D. Insider Threat Database Structure......................................325
Appendix E.Insider Threat Training Simulation:
MERIT InterActive.................................................................333
Appendix F. System Dynamics Background............................................345
Glossary of Terms.............................................................................................351
References..........................................................................................................359
About the Authors...........................................................................................365
Index...................................................................................................................369
Preface
A night-shift security guard at a hospital plants malware1 on the hospital’s
computers. The malware could have brought down the heating, ventilation, and cooling systems and ultimately cost lives. Fortunately, he has
posted a video of his crime on YouTube and is caught before carrying out
his illicit intent.
A programmer quits his job at a nuclear power plant in the United States
and returns to his home country of Iran with simulation software containing schematics and other engineering information for the power plant.
A group of employees at a Department of Motor Vehicles work together to
make some extra money by creating driver’s licenses for undocumented
immigrants and others who could not legally get a license. They are finally
arrested after creating a license for an undercover agent who claimed to be
on the “No Fly List.”
These insider incidents are the types of crimes we will discuss in this
book—crimes committed by current or former employees, contractors, or
business partners of the victim organization. As you will see, consequences
of malicious insider incidents can be substantial, including financial losses,
operational impacts, damage to reputation, and harm to individuals. The
actions of a single insider have caused damage to organizations ranging
from a few lost staff hours to negative publicity and financial damage so
extensive that businesses have been forced to lay off employees and even
close operations. Furthermore, insider incidents can have repercussions
beyond the victim organization, disrupting operations or services critical
to a specific sector or creating serious risks to public safety and national
security.
1. Malware: code intended to execute a malicious function; also commonly referred to as malicious
code. [Note: The first time any word from the Glossary is used in the book it will be printed in boldface.]
xvii
xviii
Preface
We use many actual case examples throughout the book. It is important
that you consider each case example by asking yourself the following questions: Could this happen in my organization? Could a night-shift security
guard plant malicious code on our computers? Do we have employees,
contractors, or business partners who might steal our sensitive information
and give it to a competitor or foreign government or organization? Do we
have systems that our employees could be paid by outsiders to manipulate?
For most of you, the answer to at least one of those questions will be an
unequivocal yes! The good news is that after more than ten years of research
into these types of crimes, we have developed insights and mitigation
strategies that you can put in place in your organization to increase your
chances of avoiding or surviving these types of situations.
Insider threats are an intriguing and complex problem. Some assert that
they are the most significant threat faced by organizations today. High-
profile insider threat cases, such as those conducted by people who stole
and passed proprietary and classified information to WikiLeaks, certainly
support that assertion, and demonstrate the danger posed by insiders in
both government and private industry.2
Unfortunately, insider threats cannot be mitigated solely through hardware and software solutions. There is no “silver bullet” for stopping insider
threats. Furthermore, malicious insiders go to work every day and bypass
both physical and electronic security measures. They have legitimate,
authorized access to your most confidential, valuable information and systems, and they can use that legitimate access to perform criminal activity.
You have to trust them; it is not practical to watch everything each of your
employees does every day. The key to successfully mitigating these threats
is to turn those advantages for the malicious insiders into advantages for
you. This book will help you to do just that.
In 2001, shortly before September 11, the Secret Service sponsored the
Insider Threat Study, a joint project conducted by the Secret Service and
the Software Engineering Institute CERT Program at Carnegie Mellon
University. We never dreamed when we started that study that it would
have such far-reaching impacts, and that we would become so passionate
about the subject that we would end up devoting more than a decade (to
date!) of our careers to the problem.
2. For information regarding the WikiLeaks insider threat cases, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wikileaks.
Preface
xix
When we started our work on the insider threat problem, very little was
known about insider attacks: Who commits them, why do they do it, when
and where do they do it, and how do they set up and carry out their crimes?
After delving deep into the issue, we are happy to say that we now know
the answers to those questions. In addition, we have come a long way in
designing mitigation strategies for preventing, detecting, and responding
to those threats.
We have the largest collection of detailed insider threat case files that we
know of in the world. At the time of this publication, we had more than
700 cases, and that number grows weekly. We’ve had the opportunity to
interview many of the victims of these crimes, giving us a unique chance to
find out from supervisors and coworkers how the insider behaved at work,
what precipitating events occurred, what technical controls were in place
at the time, what policies and procedures were in place but not followed,
and so on. We’ve also had the unique opportunity to actually interview
convicted insiders and ask them probing questions about what made them
do it, what might have made them change their mind, and what technical
measures should have been in place to prevent this from happening.
We have a comprehensive database—the CERT insider threat database—
where we track the technical, behavioral, and organizational details of every
crime. We have combined our technical expertise in the CERT Insider Threat
Center with psychological expertise from federal law enforcement, the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD), and our own independent consultants to
ensure that we consider the “big picture” of the problem, not just the technical details. We have created “crime models” or “crime profiles” that describe
the patterns in the crimes so that you can recognize an escalating insider
threat problem in your own organization. We have created an insider threat
lab where we are developing new technical solutions based on our models. We created an insider threat vulnerability assessment based on all of the
cases in the CERT database so that you can learn from past mistakes and not
suffer the same consequences as previous victim organizations. We publish
best practices for mitigating insider threats, hold workshops, and conduct
technical exercises for incident responders. Finally, we continue to collect
new cases of malicious insider compromises to track the changing face of
the threat.
We have been publishing our work for the past ten years; now we’ve
decided that for the tenth anniversary of the start of our work, it is appropriate to pull all of our most current information into a book. This book
provides a comprehensive reference for our entire body of knowledge on
insider threats.
xx
Preface
Scope of the Book: What Is and Is Not Included
Let’s begin by defining what we mean by malicious insider threats:
A malicious insider threat is a current or former employee, contractor, or
business partner who has or had authorized access to an organization’s
network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused that
access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of the organization’s information or information systems.
There are a few important items to note. First of all, malicious insider
threats are not only employees.3 We chose to include contractors in our
definition because contractors often are granted authorized access to their
clients’ information, systems, and networks, and the nontechnical controls
for contractors are often much more lax than for employees. Interestingly,
we did not include business partners in our original definition of insider
threats in 2001. However, over time we found that more and more crimes
involved not employees or contractors, but trusted business partners who
had authorized access to the organization’s systems, networks, or information. We encountered cases involving outsourcing, offshoring, and, more
recently, cloud computing. These cases raise complex insider threat risks
that should not be overlooked; therefore, we decided to add business partners to our definition.
Second, note that malicious insider attacks do not only come from current
employees. In fact, one particular type of crime, insider IT sabotage, is more
often committed by former employees than current employees.
Now that we have explained whom we will discuss in the book, let’s focus
on what types of crimes we will examine. Before we describe the types of
crimes, it is important that you understand why we categorized them the
way we have. Much of the success in our work is due to the identification
of patterns found in the insider threat cases. These patterns describe the
“story” behind the cases. Who commits these crimes? Why? Are there signs
that they might commit a crime beforehand, so-called observable behaviors,
in the workplace? When do they do it, where, and do they do it alone or
with others?
The important thing to remember is that the patterns are different for each
type of crime. There is not one single pattern for insider threats in general.
3. Henceforth, for simplicity, reference to insider threats specifically means malicious insider threats
unless otherwise specified.
Preface
xxi
Instead, we have identified three models, or profiles, for insider threats.
Those three types of crimes are as follows.
• IT sabotage: An insider’s use of information technology (IT) to direct
specific harm at an organization or an individual.
• Theft of intellectual property (IP): An insider’s use of IT to steal
intellectual property from the organization. This category includes
industrial espionage involving insiders.
• Fraud: An insider’s use of IT for the unauthorized modification, addition, or deletion of an organization’s data (not programs or systems)
for personal gain, or theft of information that leads to an identity crime
(e.g., identity theft, credit card fraud).
Note that this book does not specifically describe national security
espionage crimes: the act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent,
or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. Espionage is a violation of 18 United States Code sections 792–798 and Article 106, Uniform
Code of Military Justice.4 The CERT Insider Threat Center does work in
that area, but that research is only available to a limited audience. However, there are many similarities between national security espionage and
all three types of crimes: fraud, theft of intellectual property, and IT sabotage. Therefore, we believe there are many lessons to be learned from these
insider incidents that can be applied to national security espionage as well.
In addition, this book deals primarily with malicious insider threats. We
certainly recognize the importance of unintentional insider threats—
insiders who accidentally affect the confidentiality, availability, or integrity
of an organization’s information or information systems, possibly by being
tricked by an outsider’s use of social engineering. However, we only
recently began researching those types of threats; intentional attacks have
kept us extremely busy for the past ten years! In addition, we believe
that many of the mitigation strategies we advocate for malicious insiders could also be effective against unintentional incidents, as well as those
perpetrated by outsiders. And finally, it is difficult to gather information
regarding unintentional insider threats; because no crime was committed,
organizations tend to handle these incidents quietly, internal to the organization, if possible.
4. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. U.S. Department of Defense, 2005.
xxii
Preface
Finally, we use many case examples from the CERT database throughout
the book. Some of the examples go into greater detail than others; we
include only the details that serve to illustrate the point we are making
in that part in the book. We also have included a large collection of case
examples in Chapter 8, as we believe these will be of great interest to many
of you. Again, we stress that you should use that chapter to examine your
organization and decide if you need to take any proactive measures to
ensure that you do not fall victim to the same types of incidents.
As a matter of policy, we never identify the organizations or insiders involved in our case examples. Some, however, may be apparent
to readers, inasmuch as they are drawn from public records, including
court documents and newspaper accounts. For examples not in the public domain, we have further masked the targeted organizations to shield
their identities.
Intended Audience
A common misconception is that insider threat risk management is
the responsibility of IT and information security staff members alone.
Unfortunately, that is one of the biggest reasons that insider attacks continue to occur, repeating the same patterns we have observed in cases since
1996, the earliest cases in the CERT database. IT and information security
personnel will benefit from reading this book, as we will suggest new
technical controls you can implement using technology you are already
using in the workplace. In addition, this book can be used by technical
staffs to motivate other stakeholders within their organization, since IT and
information security cannot successfully implement an effective insider
threat mitigation strategy on their own.
We wrote this book with a diverse audience in mind. The ideal audience
includes top management, as their support will be needed to implement
the organization-wide insider threat policies, procedures, and technologies
we recommend. It is important that all managers understand the patterns
they need to recognize in their employees, and to advocate up the management chain for support for an insider threat program.
For the same reasons, government leaders will benefit from this book,
since they need to support the government-wide insider threat policies,
procedures, and technologies we recommend.
Preface xxiii
Human resources personnel need to understand this book, as they are
often the only ones who are aware of indicators of potential increased
risk of insider threats in individual employees. Other staff members who
should understand this information include security, software engineering,
and physical security personnel, as well as data owners. It is also essential to include your general counsel in any discussions about implementing
technical and nontechnical controls to combat the insider threat, to ensure
compliance with federal, state, and local laws.
In summary, an effective insider threat program requires understanding,
collaboration, and buy-in from across your organization.
Reader Benefits
After reading this book you will realize that the insider threat is real and
the consequences of malicious insider activities can be extremely damaging. Real-life case studies will drive home the point that “this could happen
to me.” Many organizations focus their technical defenses against outsiders attempting to gain unauthorized access. This book emphasizes the need
to balance defense against outsider threats with defense against insider
threats, understanding that insider attacks can be more damaging than outsider attacks.
After reading this book you also will be able to recognize the high-level
patterns in the three primary types of insider threats: IT sabotage, theft
of intellectual property, and fraud. In addition, you will understand the
details of how insiders commit those crimes. We present concrete defensive
countermeasures that will help you to defend against insider attacks. You
can compare your own defensive strategies to the controls we propose and
determine whether your existing controls are sufficient to prevent, detect,
and respond to insider attacks like those presented throughout the book.
Once you identify gaps in your defensive posture, you can implement
countermeasures we propose to fill those gaps.
Structure of the Book: Recommendations to Readers
We begin the book in Chapter 1, Overview, by describing the insider threat
problem, and raise awareness to the complexity of the problem—tangential
issues such as insider threats from trusted business partners, malicious
xxiv
Preface
insiders with ties to the Internet underground, and programming
techniques used as an insider attack tool. Next, we provide a breakdown
of the crimes in the CERT database, followed by an overview of the CERT
Insider Threat Center. Because our crime “profiles” or “models” have had
such an impact on the understanding of insider threats, we also provide a
short section describing why those models are so important. We end with
a brief timeline of the evolution of our body of work in the CERT Insider
Threat Center.
It is important that you read the first chapter so that you understand the
concepts and terminology used throughout the remainder of the book.
After that, you can use the book in various ways. If the first chapter has
been an eye-opener for you and you are interested in gaining a comprehensive understanding of insider threats, continue reading the book from
beginning to end. However, it is not necessary to read the book in that manner; it is designed such that Chapters 2 through 9 and the appendices can
be used as stand-alone references.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are devoted to the three types of insider threats: insider
IT sabotage, theft of intellectual property, and fraud. In each chapter we
describe who commits the crime so that you know which positions within
your organization pose that particular type of threat. We describe the patterns in how each type of crime evolves over time: What motivates the
insider, what behavioral indicators are prevalent, how do they set up and
carry out the crime, when do they do it, whether others are involved, and
so on. We also suggest mitigation strategies throughout each chapter.
We recommend that everyone reads Chapter 2, Insider IT Sabotage, as that
crime has occurred in organizations in every critical infrastructure sector.
Most organizations have some type of intellectual property that must be
protected: strategic or business plans, engineering or scientific information,
source code, and so on. Therefore, it is important that you read Chapter 3,
Insider Theft of Intellectual Property, so that you fully understand who
inside your organization poses a threat to that information.
Chapter 4, Insider Fraud, is applicable to you if you have information or
systems that your employees could use to make extra money on the side.
Credit card information and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) such
as Social Security numbers are valuable for committing various types of
fraud. However, it is also important that you also consider threats posed
by insiders modifying information for financial gain. Do you have systems
that outsiders would be willing to pay your employees to manipulate? Or
Preface
xxv
do you have systems that your employees could illicitly use for personal
financial gain, perhaps by colluding with other employees? If so, Chapter 4
is applicable to you. Note that Chapter 4 also describes the insider threats
in the CERT database involving organized crime, as all of those crimes
were fraud.
Chapter 5, Insider Threat Issues in the Software Development Life Cycle,
explores said issues. The Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) is synonymous with “software process” as well as “software engineering”; it is
a structured methodology used in the development of software products
and packages. This methodology is used from the conception phase to the
delivery and end of life of a final software product.5 We explore each phase
of the SDLC and the types of insider threats that need to be considered
at each phase. In addition, we describe how oversights at various phases
have resulted in system vulnerabilities that have enabled insider threats
to be carried out later by others, often by end users of the system. If your
organization develops software, you should carefully consider the lessons
learned in this chapter. It should make you look differently at the entire
SDLC: from how to consider potential insider threats in the requirements
and design phases, to potential threats posed by developers in the implementation and maintenance phases.
If you are looking for information on mitigation strategies, go to Chapters 6
and 7. You can use Chapter 6, Best Practices for the Prevention and Detection
of Insider Threats, to compare best practices for prevention and detection
of insider threats to your organization’s practices. Many of the best practices were described in previous chapters, but Chapter 6 summarizes all
of the suggestions in a stand-alone reference. This chapter is based on our
“Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats,”
for years one of the top downloads on the entire CERT Web site.
If you are in a technical security role and would like more detailed information on new controls you can implement, you should read Chapter 7,
Technical Insider Threat Controls. This chapter describes the technical solutions we have developed in the CERT insider threat lab. These technical
solutions are based on technologies that you most likely are already using
for technical security. We provide new signatures, rules, and configurations
for using them for more effective detection of insider threats.
5. Whatis.com
xxvi
Preface
Chapter 8, Case Examples, contains a collection of case examples from the
CERT database. We provide a summary table at the beginning of the chapter
so that you can reference specific cases by type of crime, sector of the organization, and brief summary of the crime. Many people have requested this
type of information from us over the years, so we believe this will provide
enormous value to many of you. We highly recommend that you review
these cases and consider your vulnerability to the same type of malicious
actions within your organization. Chapter 8 is also of value to researchers
who might want to use case examples for their own research.
Chapter 9, Conclusion and Miscellaneous Issues, contains a final collection of miscellaneous information that didn’t fit anywhere else in the book.
For example, we provide an analysis of insiders with connections to the
Internet underground. We also provide details on insiders who attacked
not their own organization, but trusted business partners that had a formal
relationship with their employer.
After the chapters, we provide a series of appendices.
Appendix A, Insider Threat Center Products and Services, contains information on products and services provided by the CERT Insider Threat
Center, including insider threat assessments, workshops, online exercises,
and technical controls. We also discuss sponsored research opportunities
for the Insider Threat Center. If you are extremely concerned about insider
threats and want immediate assistance from the CERT Program, be sure to
read this appendix.
Appendix B, Deeper Dive into the Data, contains interesting data mined
from the CERT database.
Appendix C, CyberSecurity Watch Survey, contains data collected from the
CyberSecurity Watch Survey, an annual survey we conduct in conjunction
with CSO Magazine and the Secret Service.6
Appendix D, Insider Threat Database Structure, contains the database
structure for the CERT database. If you are interested in exactly what kind
of data we track for each case, you should read this appendix. Also, we
frequently respond to queries to mine the CERT database for interesting
data—if you see a field or fields you would like us to explore with you,
please contact us. We can be reached via email at insider-threat-feedback@
cert.org.
Appendix E, Insider Threat Training Simulation: MERIT InterActive,
contains detailed information about an interactive virtual simulation we
6. Note that in some years Deloitte and Microsoft also participated in the survey.
Preface xxvii
developed for insider threat training. It is basically a prototype of a video
game for insider threat training. What do you need for a successful video
game? Good guys playing against the bad guys, complex plots, interesting
characters—that’s insider threat! We didn’t want to distract you with that
information in the body of the book, but some of you might find it interesting, so we included it in this appendix. In addition, if you are interested in
new and innovative training methods, this appendix should be of interest.
Appendix F, System Dynamics Background, provides background information on system dynamics.7 We provide brief references to system dynamics
throughout the book, but it is not necessary that you understand system
dynamics when you read the book. Nonetheless, we wanted to provide
more in-depth information for those of you who wish to learn more.
Finally, the book concludes with references, a glossary, and a complete
index.
Note that the accompanying Web site, www.cert.org/insider_threat, contains our system dynamics models for use by other researchers. It is also
updated regularly with new insider threat controls, best practices, and case
examples.
In summary, the book is intended to be a reference for many different types
of readers. It contains the entire CERT Insider Threat Center body of knowledge on insider threats, and therefore can be used as a reference for raising
awareness, informing your risk management processes, designing and
implementing new technical and nontechnical controls, and much more.
About the CERT Program
The CERT Program is part of the Software Engineering Institute (SEI), a
federally funded research and development center at Carnegie Mellon
University in Pittsburgh. Following the Morris worm incident, which
brought 10% of Internet systems to a halt in November 1988, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) charged the SEI with setting
up a center to coordinate communication among experts during security
emergencies and to help prevent future incidents. This center was named
the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC).
7. “System dynamics is a computer-aided approach to policy analysis and design. It applies to dynamic
problems arising in complex social, managerial, economic, or ecological systems—literally any dynamic
systems characterized by interdependence, mutual interaction, information feedback, and circular causality” (www.systemdynamics.org/what_is_system_dynamics.html).
xxviii Preface
While we continue to respond to major security incidents and analyze
product vulnerabilities, our role has expanded over the years. Along
with the rapid increase in the size of the Internet and its use for critical
functions, there have been progressive changes in intrusion techniques,
increased amounts of damage, increased difficulty of detecting an attack,
and increased difficulty of catching the attackers. To better manage these
changes, the CERT/CC is now part of the larger CERT Program, which
develops and promotes the use of appropriate technology and systems
management practices to resist attacks on networked systems, to limit
damage, and to ensure continuity of critical services.
When created, the CERT acronym stood for Computer Emergency
Response Team, originally focused on incident response. In the years since,
the CERT acronym continues to be used but it no longer represents the
single focus as we have expanded beyond incident response into areas
such as network situational awareness, malicious code analysis, secure
coding, resilience management, insider threat, digital investigations and
intelligence, and workforce development.
The CERT Insider Threat Center
The objective of the CERT Insider Threat Center is to assist organizations in preventing, detecting, and responding to insider compromises.
We have been researching this problem since 2001 in partnership with the
DOD, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), other federal
agencies, federal law enforcement, the intelligence community, private
industry, academia, and the vendor community. The foundation of our
work is the CERT database of more than 700 insider threat cases. We use
system dynamics modeling to characterize the nature of the insider threat
problem, explore dynamic indicators of insider threat risk, and identify
and experiment with administrative and technical controls for insider
threat mitigation. The CERT insider threat lab provides a foundation
to identify, tune, and package technical controls as an extension of our
modeling efforts. We have developed an assessment framework based
on the fraud, theft of intellectual property, and IT sabotage case data that
we have used to assist organizations in identifying their technical and
nontechnical vulnerabilities to insider threats, as well as executable countermeasures. The CERT Insider Threat Center is uniquely positioned as a
trusted broker to assist the community in the short term, and through our
ongoing research.
Preface
xxix
Dawn Cappelli and Andy Moore have been working on CERT insider
threat research since 2001, and Randy Trzeciak joined the team in 2006.
Dawn is the technical manager of the CERT Insider Threat Center, Andy
is the lead researcher, and Randy is the technical lead for insider threat
research. Although our insider threat team has now grown into an official
Insider Threat Center, for many years the CERT Program’s insider threat
team consisted of Andy, Randy, and Dawn, which is why we decided to
team up and capture our history in this book.
Summary
The purpose of this book is to raise awareness of the insider threat issue
from the ground up: staff members in IT, information security, and human
resources; data owners; and physical security, software engineering,
legal, and other security personnel. We strongly believe after studying
this problem for more than a decade that in order to effectively mitigate
insider threats it takes common understanding, support, and communication from all of those people across the organization. In addition,
buy-in is needed from upper management, as they will need to support
the cross-organizational communication required to formulate an effective
mitigation strategy. And finally, it requires awareness and consideration by
government leaders, as some of the issues are even larger than individual
organizations. Employee privacy issues and mergers and acquisitions with
organizations outside the United States are two such examples.
This book covers our extensive work in studying insider IT sabotage, theft
of intellectual property, and fraud. Although it does not deal explicitly with
insiders who committed national security espionage, many of the lessons
in this book are directly applicable to that domain as well.
Most of the book can be read and easily understood by technical and nontechnical readers alike. The only exception is Chapter 7. If you are not a
“technical” person you are best off skipping this chapter. However, we
strongly suggest you lend the book to your technical security staff so that
they can consider implementing these controls.
Now that you understand the purpose of the book and its contents, we will
begin to dig a little deeper into each type of insider crime, our modeling of
insider threats, and the CERT Insider Threat Center in Chapter 1. We recommend that you read that chapter next so that you understand the basic
concepts. After completing Chapter 1 you will have the foundation you
need so that you can explore the rest of the book in any order you wish!
Acknowledgments
We would like to start by thanking our amazing team at the CERT Insider
Threat Center. This book represents the hard work of many brilliant people. First, thank you to our current team in the Insider Threat Center, listed
here in the order in which they joined the team: Adam Cummings, Mike
Hanley, Derrick Spooner, Chris King, Joji Montelibano, Cindy Nesta, Josh
Burns, George Silowash, and Dr. Bill Claycomb. And a special thank you to
Tara Sparacino and Cindy Walpole, who helped us to keep our heads above
water at work while we wrote this book in our “spare time.” The CERT
Insider Threat Center is part of the Enterprise Threat and Vulnerability
Management (ETVM) team in the CERT Program. The ETVM team is
a very tight-knit group, and we would be remiss if we did not acknowledge these awesome, dedicated technical security experts, again listed in
the order in which they started on the team: Georgia Killcrece (retired, but
sorely missed!), Robin Ruefle, Mark Zajicek, David Mundie, Becky Cooper,
Charlie Ryan, Russ Griffin, Sandi Behrens, Alex Nicoll, Sam Perl, and Kristi
Keeler.
Thank you to the current and former CMU/SEI/CERT staff members
who have participated in our insider threat work over the years: Chris
Bateman, Sally Cunningham, Casey Dunlevy, Rob Floodeen, Carly Huth,
Dr. Joseph (“Jay”) Kadane, Greg Longo, David McIntire, David Mundie,
Dr. Dan Phelps, Stephanie Rogers, Dr. Greg Shannon, Dr. Tim Shimeall,
Rhiannon Weaver, Pam Williams, Bradford Willke, and Mark Zajicek. And
a special thank you to Dr. Tom Longstaff, who was the CERT technical
manager for the original Insider Threat Study, and worked on the CERT
Program’s original insider threat collaboration with the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) Personnel Security Research Center.
Thank you to the many fabulous graduate students who have worked on
our insider threat projects throughout the years, starting with our two current students: Todd Lewellen, Lynda Pillage, Jen Stanley, Chase Midler,
Andrew Santell, Luke Hogan, Jaime Tupino, Tyler Dean, Will Schroeder,
xxxi
xxxii Acknowledgments
Matt Houy, Bob Weiland, Devon Rollins, Tom Caron, John Wyrick,
Christopher Nguyen, Hannah Joseph, and Akash Desai. Many of those students were from the Scholarship for Service Program—we commend the
U.S. federal government for this program, which produces the most outstanding talent in the cybersecurity field.
A special thank you to Dr. Eric Shaw, who has been a Visiting Scientist in
the CERT Program and a clinical psychologist at Consulting & Clinical
Psychology, Ltd. Eric has been the guiding force in the psychological
aspects of our research since the conclusion of our first Insider Threat Study
with the Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center.
Thank you to Noopur Davis, Claude Williams, and Dr. Marvine Hamner,
who worked for us as visiting scientists.
Thank you to the CERT Program’s director, Rich Pethia, and deputy director, Bill Wilson, who have given us the autonomy and authority over the
past decade to take our research in so many exciting directions. Thank you
to our retired boss, Dr. Barbara Laswell, who helped us evolve from the
Insider Threat Team of three people into the CERT Insider Threat Center.
Thank you to SEI Director Dr. Paul Neilson and Deputy Director Clyde
Chittister, for their support and recognition. We’re extremely grateful to
Terry Roberts for the visibility she has brought to our work. And thank you
to Dr. Angel Jordan, former provost of Carnegie Mellon University, who
has been an advocate for our work over the years.
We would like to thank the Secret Service, our original partner in this quest
to understand and help organizations protect themselves from malicious
insider attacks. Thank you to National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC)
staff members who participated on the project, especially research coordinator Dr. Marisa Reddy Randazzo, who founded and directed the Insider
Threat Study within NTAC; Dr. Michelle Keeney, who took over when
Marisa left; Eileen Kowalski, who was the lynchpin throughout the project;
and Matt Doherty, the Special Agent in Charge of NTAC. Also, thank you
to Jim Savage, the sponsor of our original work with the Secret Service.
Finally, a big thank you to our Secret Service liaisons for the Insider Threat
Study, who moved to Pittsburgh and joined the CERT Program for a few
years: Cornelius Tate, Dave Iacovetti, and Wayne Peterson. What great
times we had in those good old days! And thank you to our current Secret
Service liaisons, Tom Dover and Ryan Moore.
A special thank you to Dr. Douglas Maughan and the DHS Science and
Technology (S&T) Directorate, who took over funding of the original
CERT/Secret Service Insider Threat Study shortly after DHS was formed.
Acknowledgments xxxiii
We’re especially excited that Doug came back to us last year and told us he
wanted to get the old team back together—and funded our current study of
insider threats in the financial sector. In addition, we’re receiving assistance
on that project from the Secret Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury,
and the financial sector. Thank you to Brian Peretti, who was in the very
first financial sector review of our work for the original study, and is now
back on the team in our current fraud project. And thank you to Ed Cabrera
and Trae McAbee from the Secret Service—we could not possibly succeed
in the current study without all of your hard work in gathering all of the
case files and scheduling the interviews. Thank you to Pablo Martinez for
being a strong supporter of our work, starting back in the original study,
and continuing today.
Thank you to the Army Research Office and Carnegie Mellon CyLab, especially Dr. Pradeep Khosla, Dr. Virgil Gligor, Dr. Adrian Perrig, Richard
Power, Gene Hambrick, and Dr. Don McGillen, who provided seed funding
for many of our insider threat projects that have grown into full bodies of
work. Your support sustained the insider threat database for years, enabled
us to experiment with our modeling work, provided the infrastructure
for the insider threat lab, and funded one of our most “fun” projects: our
insider threat “video game.”
We are especially grateful to our current sponsors at the U.S. DHS Federal
Network Security (FNS) branch, Matt Coos and Don Benack, as well as the
project leads, Rob Karas, Sean McAfee, and Will Harmon. Don and Matt
had the vision to step up to the plate three years ago and fund our work
“for the good of all.” They realized the importance of our work and were
willing to fund it before insider threats became a top-priority issue in the
current cybersecurity environment. Thanks to their foresight, we can offer
technical controls, assessments, and training to the community. We’re
excited about the opportunity to continue to make an impact together!
We are also thankful to our sponsors and collaborators in the DOD and
intelligence community: Dr. Deborah Loftis, Laura Sellers, Dr. Stephen
R. Band, Dr. Aaron J. Ferguson, Dr. Lynn Fischer, Dr. Howard Timm,
Dr. Katherine Herbig, Dr. Ron Dodge, and Dr. Kirk Kennedy. Their expertise and experience have enabled a much richer treatment of the insider
threat problem than would have otherwise been possible.
Our work in the system dynamics modeling of insider threats began
and continues to be influenced by the Security Dynamics Network
(SDN), a largely unfunded and loosely coordinated group of national
laboratories and universities applying system dynamics to explore issues
xxxiv Acknowledgments
of cybersecurity. In the past, the group has focused on malicious insider
threats and has been a source of expertise, information, and inspiration for
the insider threat models developed in this book. We are very thankful to
the members of the SDN, especially its founder, Dr. Jose Gonzalez of Agder
University College; Dr. David Andersen and Dr. Eliot Rich of the University
at Albany; Dr. Ignacio Martinez-Moyano of Argonne National Laboratory;
Dr. Stephen Conrad of Sandia National Laboratories; and Dr. Jose Maria
Sarriegui of the University of Navarra. A special thank you goes to Dr. Elise
Weaver of the Human Resources Research Organization, who worked with
us as a Visiting Scientist at the CERT Program and assisted us in our very
first system dynamics modeling efforts.
We would also like to thank all of the SEI business development staff members who have helped us with our insider threat work over the years: Jan
Philpot, Mike Greenwood, Joe McLeod, Frank Redner, David Ulicne, Bob
Rosenstein, Greg Such, Dave Scherb, and Angela Llamas-Butler. Thank you
to Summer Fowler and Lisa Marino, who have helped us with project management activities that have become increasingly complex over the years,
and Michele Tomasic, who has helped us with so many things over the
years. Thank you to Bill Shore and everyone in the SEI Security Office, and
Dave Thompson and everyone in SEI IT, especially Jerry Czerwinski and
Craig Lewis; and thank you to Linda Pesante and her staff, especially Ed
Desautels and Paul Ruggerio, who have helped us with editing and technical writing over the years. Also, thank you to David Biber for the wonderful
graphics he has created for us over the years, including nice crisp images
for this book!
Finally, we would like to thank Dr. Don Marinelli, cofounder of Carnegie
Mellon’s Entertainment Technology Center (ETC), and the ETC faculty
and students who worked with us to create the first video game for insider
threat training. Semester 1: faculty advisors Dr. Scott Stevens and Jessica
Trybus; student team Ankur Ahlawat, Chris Daniel, Aditya Dave, and
Todd Waits; and visiting scholars Soo Jeoung Kim and Michelle Macau.
Semester 2: faculty advisors Dr. Scott Stevens and Dr. Ralph Vituccio; and
student team Stephen Calender, Julie Charles, Evan Miller, and Todd Waits.
We still hope to interest a sponsor in turning that prototype into an operational system someday!
If we forgot someone who has helped us throughout the years, we apologize profusely! We tried hard to include everyone, but if we overlooked
you, please let us know.
Acknowledgments xxxv
From Dawn: Thank you to my wonderful husband and soul mate,
Fred—you’ve been inspiring me for 35 years and without you I can’t
imagine where I would be! To my daughter and best girlfriend, Alyssa—I
treasure all of our fun times together. To my son, Anthony—you are truly
the happiest person I know! Thanks to my sister, Cindy, who has always
been there for me. And finally, thank you to the greatest parents in the
world—whom I miss terribly. Your faith and encouragement made me
what I am today.
Thank you to Andy and Randy—how exciting to accomplish this together
after all of those years as team “Andy, Randy, and Dawn!”
From Andy: My heartfelt thanks go, most of all, to my beautiful wife,
Susan, for sharing our life adventure. Coming home to you each day is the
best thing in my life! And thanks to my incredible son, Eric, who put up
with my having my nose in a laptop during many early morning hours.
Your achievements continue to amaze me and your love and friendship
enrich our lives immeasurably. Finally, thanks to Dawn and Randy’s steadfast dedication and friendship. It is hard to believe how far we’ve come in
the ten years since it all started.
From Randy: Thank you, Marianne, for being my wife and best friend! You
are truly a blessing to me, to our family, and to all the other lives you touch.
To my daughter, Abbie, you are an amazing, intelligent, and strong young
lady. To Nate the Great, always keep those around you laughing. To Luke,
thank you for making every day fun. Thank you to my parents for all of the
hard work and sacrifices you made over the years!
Finally, thank you to Dawn and Andy for bringing me into the circle of
trust. It is truly a pleasure working with both of you!
Chapter 3
Insider Theft of
Intellectual Property
Insider theft of intellectual property (IP): an insider’s use of IT to steal
proprietary information from the organization. This category includes
industrial espionage involving insiders.
Intellectual property: intangible assets created and owned by an organization that are critical to achieving its mission.1
Types of IP Stolen
The types of IP stolen in the cases in our database include the following:
•
•
•
•
Proprietary software/source code
Business plans, proposals, and strategic plans
Customer information
Product information (designs, formulas, schematics)
1. While IP does not generally include individuals’ Personally Identifiable Information (PII),
which an organization does not own, it could include a database that the organization developed that
contains PII.
61
62
Chapter 3. Insider Theft of Intellectual Property
What if one of your scientists or engineers walked away with your most
valuable trade secrets? Or a contract programmer whose contract ended
took your source code with him—source code for your premier product
line? What if one of your business people or salespeople took your strategic
plans with him to start his own competing business? And possibly worst of
all, what if one of them gave your intellectual property to a foreign government or organization? Once your IP leaves the United States it’s extremely
difficult, often impossible, to get it back.
Those are the types of crimes we will examine in this chapter. Organizations
in almost every critical infrastructure sector have been victims of insider
theft of IP.
In one case of insider theft of IP, an engineer and an accomplice stole trade
secrets from four different high-tech companies they worked for, with the
intention of using them in a new company they had created with funding
from a foreign country. In another, a company discovered that an employee
had copied trade secrets worth $40 million to removable media,2 and was
using the information in a side business she had started with her husband.
In yet another, a large IT organization didn’t realize that it had been victimized until it happened to see a former employee at a trade show selling a
product that was remarkably similar to the organization’s!
When we began examining the theft of IP cases in our database we
surmised that insiders probably stole IP for financial reasons. We were very
wrong about that! We found that quite the opposite is true: Very few insiders steal intellectual property in order to sell it. Instead, they steal it for a
business advantage: either to take with them to a new job, to start their own
competing business, or to take to a foreign government or organization.
Very few insiders steal intellectual property in order to sell it. Instead, they
steal it for a business advantage: either to take with them to a new job, to
start their own competing business, or to take to a foreign government or
organization.
Another misconception about theft of IP is that system administrators are
the biggest threat, since they hold “the keys to the kingdom.” Not according
2. Removable media: computer storage media that is designed to be removed from the computer
without powering the computer off. Examples include CDs, USB flash drives, and external hard
disk drives.
Insider Theft of Intellectual Property
63
to our data! We don’t have a single case in our database in which a system
administrator stole intellectual property, although we do have a few cases
involving other IT staff members. However, keep in mind that we only
have cases in which the perpetrator was discovered and caught; it is possible that system administrators are stealing IP and are simply getting away
with it.
In fact, the insiders who steal IP are usually current employees who are
scientists, engineers, programmers, or salespeople. Most of them are male.
We checked the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to determine if most of those
types of positions are held by men, but the results, listed here for 2010, were
inconsistent.
• 12.9% of all architectural and engineering positions were held by
women.
• 45.8% of all biological scientists were women.
• 33.5% of all chemists and materials scientists were women.
• 26.2% of all environmental scientists and geoscientists were women.
• 39.5% of all other physical scientists were women.
• 49.9% of all sales and related occupations were held by women.3
Insiders who steal IP are usually current employees who are scientists,
engineers, programmers, or salespeople.
We are not suggesting that you assume men are more likely than women
to commit these types of crimes. On the contrary, we suggest that rather
than focusing on demographic characteristics, you should focus on the
following:
• Understanding the positions at risk for these crimes
• Recognizing the patterns and organizational factors that typically
surround insider theft of IP incidents
• Implementing mitigation strategies based on those patterns
These types of crimes are very difficult to detect because we found that
these insiders steal information for which they already have authorized
3. ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aat11.txt
64
Insiders steal information for which they already have authorized access,
and usually steal it at work during normal business hours. In fact, they
steal the same information that they access in the course of their normal
job. Therefore, it can be very difficult to distinguish illicit access from
legitimate access.
access, and usually steal it at work during normal business hours. In fact,
they steal the same information that they access in the course of their
normal job. Therefore, it can be very difficult to distinguish illicit access
from legitimate access.
Fortunately, we have come up with some good strategies based on our
MERIT model of insider theft of intellectual property that we will detail
in this chapter. The first half of this chapter describes the model at a high
level. In the second half of the chapter we will dig deeper into the technical methods used in committing these crimes and mitigation strategies that
you should consider based on all of this information.
The MERIT model describes the profile of insider theft of IP by identifying
common patterns in the evolution of the incidents over time. These patterns are strikingly similar across the cases in our database. Unfortunately,
we were not quite as lucky in creating our theft of IP model as we were in
creating our insider IT sabotage model. While we found one very distinct
pattern that was exhibited in almost every IT sabotage case, we could not
identify a single pattern for theft of IP. Instead, we ended up identifying
two overlapping models.
• Entitled Independent: an insider acting primarily alone to steal
information to take to a new job or to his4 own side business
• Ambitious Leader: a leader of an insider crime who recruits insiders to
steal information for some larger purpose
The cases in our database break up just about 50/50 between the two
models. In addition, the models have different but overlapping patterns;
the Ambitious Leader model builds from the Entitled Independent
model. This is good news, as our suggested mitigation strategies apply
to both models.
4. Most of the insiders who stole IT property were male. Therefore, male gender is used to describe the
generic insider in this chapter.
65
In this chapter we will describe the patterns identified in both
odels, and will present mitigation strategies that use those patterns to
m
your advantage.5 These techniques include a combination of automated
and manual countermeasures. In addition, some are focused on protection
of your most valuable information assets, while others are targeted at specific employees triggered by indicators that could suggest an increased risk
of attack.
For example, if you can identify your most critical assets, technical
solutions such as digital watermarking,6 digital rights management,7 and
data loss prevention systems8 can be implemented to prevent those assets
from leaving your network. There are several drawbacks to these technical
solutions, however. First of all, most organizations can’t or haven’t identified and located all of their most critical computer files. This can be an
overwhelming task, particularly in a large organization. In addition, many
of you have trusted business partners that legitimately move your critical files back and forth from their own networks to yours. Those types of
environments can complicate use of those types of technologies.
Because of the complexity of implementing a purely technical solution
focused on critical assets, we also suggest targeted monitoring of employees or contractors who are leaving your organization. We found that most
insiders steal intellectual property as they are leaving the organization,
suggesting that it could be beneficial to watch their actions more closely,
specifically those involving removable media, email, and other methods
used in exfiltrating information.
We will provide suggested countermeasures throughout this chapter, and
detailed technical information for the theft of IP cases in the section Mitigation
Strategies for All Theft of Intellectual Property Cases at the end of the chapter. The bottom line is that unlike IT sabotage, where the goal is to catch the
5. Material in this chapter includes portions of previously published works. Specifically, the insider
theft of intellectual property modeling work was published by Andrew Moore, Dawn Cappelli, Dr. Eric
Shaw, Thomas Caron, Derrick Spooner, and Randy Trzeciak in the Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks,
Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable Applications [Moore 2011a]. An earlier version of the model was
published by the same authors in [Moore 2009].
6. Digital watermarking: the process of embedding information into a digital signal that may
be used to verify its authenticity or the identity of its owners, in the same manner as paper bearing
a watermark for visible identification (Wikipedia).
7. Digital rights management (DRM): a term for access control technologies that are used by hardware
manufacturers, publishers, copyright holders, and individuals to limit the use of digital content
and devices.
8. Data loss prevention (DLP) systems: refers to systems designed to detect and prevent unauthorized
use and transmission of confidential information (Wikipedia). Also commonly called data leakage tools.
66
insider as he is setting up his attack—planting malicious code or creating a
backdoor account—you cannot really detect theft of IP until the information
is actually in the process of being stolen—as it is being copied to removable
media or emailed off of the network. In other words, your window of opportunity can be quite small, and therefore you need to pay close attention when
you see potential indicators of heightened risk of insider theft of IP.
We have some “good-news” cases that indicate that it is possible to
detect theft of IP using technical measures in time to prevent disastrous
consequences.
• An organization detected IP emailed from a contractor’s email account
at work to a personal email account, investigated, and discovered significant data exfiltration by the contractor. The organization found the
contractor was working with a former employee to steal information
to start a competing business. Obviously, the stolen IP was extremely
valuable, as the contractor was arrested, convicted, ordered to pay a
fine of $850,000, and sentenced to 26 years in prison!
• After a researcher resigned and started a new job, his former employer
noticed that he had downloaded a significant number of proprietary
documents prior to his departure. This led to his arrest before he
could transfer the information to his new employer’s network. The
information was valued at $400 million.
• During an organization’s routine auditing of HTTPS traffic9 it
discovered that an employee who had turned in his resignation had
exfiltrated proprietary source code on four separate occasions to a
server located outside the United States. Although the employee
claimed the transfer was accidental, and that he had only uploaded
open source information, he was arrested.
Impacts
The impacts of insider theft of IP can be devastating: Trade secrets worth
hundreds of millions of dollars have been lost to foreign countries,
competing products have been brought to market by former employees
and contractors, and invaluable proprietary and confidential information
9. HTTPS traffic: network traffic that is encrypted via the Secure Sockets Layer protocol.
Impacts
67
has been given to competitors. More than half of our theft of IP cases
involved trade secrets.
More than half of our theft of IP cases involved trade secrets.
In addition, impacts in these cases can reach beyond the victim organization.
Here are some examples.
• Source code for products on the U.S. Munitions List was shared with
foreign military organizations.10
• A government contractor stole passwords that provided unauthorized
access to sensitive, potentially classified information.
• Source code was added to software in a telecommunications company
that enabled the perpetrators to listen in on phone calls made by 103
high-ranking government and nongovernment officials.
Estimated financial impacts in the theft of IP cases in the CERT database
averaged around $13.5 million (actual) and $109 million (potential).11 The
median estimated financial impact was $337,000 (actual) and $950,000
(potential). This means that a few extremely high-impact cases skew the
average significantly. The highest estimated potential financial losses were
• $1 billion in a high-tech case in the IT sector
• $600 million in a telecommunications company
• $500 million in a pharmaceutical company
• $400 million in a chemical company
• $100 million in a biotech company
The highest estimated actual financial losses were
• $100 million in a manufacturing business
• $40 million in a manufacturing business
• $6 million in the financial services sector
• $1.5 million in a high-tech software development organization
10. In U.S. law, the U.S. Munitions List is the list of weapons and similar items that are subject to
l icensing because of the danger they pose. The U.S. Munitions List is related to the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations. Farlex Financial Dictionary. Copyright © 2009 Farlex, Inc.
11. Twenty-five of the 85 cases of theft of IP had known estimates on actual or potential financial impact.
68
These are only some of the cases with the highest financial consequences.
We provided this list for several reasons. First, we are frequently asked how
to calculate return on investment (ROI) for insider threat mitigation. That is
a very difficult question, and one that has not yet been answered adequately
for cybersecurity in general. To start, you should identify what your critical
assets are, and estimate the potential loss if those assets were to leave your
organization. The losses we listed from actual cases should help you to convince your management that insider threat is not to be taken lightly!
Second, although almost half of the insider theft of IP cases occurred
in the IT sector, we want to emphasize that these types of crimes have
resulted in significant losses in other sectors as well.
We strongly suggest that you pay close attention to this chapter if you
are concerned about the security of your proprietary and confidential
information. Now that we have caught your attention, let’s look at the
characteristics and “big picture” of insider theft of intellectual property.
General Patterns in Insider Theft of Intellectual
Property Crimes
The intent of our MERIT model of insider theft of intellectual property is to
describe the general profile of insider theft of IP crimes. The MERIT models
describe the patterns in the crimes as they evolve over time—profiling the
life cycle of the crime, rather than profiling only the perpetrator.
The MERIT model of insider theft of IP was first published in 2009. The
model was created using system dynamics modeling, which is described
in the original report and in Appendix F, System Dynamics Background.
Over the years, however, we have found that a higher-level view of that
model is more useful in describing the patterns to practitioners so that
clear, actionable guidance can be provided for mitigating these incidents.
That higher-level form of the model and accompanying countermeasure
guidance is presented in the remainder of this chapter.
As mentioned earlier, our overall model for theft of IP actually consists of
two models: the Entitled Independent and the Ambitious Leader; we will
present those one at a time. We have broken each model down into small
pieces in this chapter in order to make it more understandable. The full
model of the Entitled Independent is shown in Figure 3-1. Figure 3-2 shows
the full model of the Ambitious Leader.
General Patterns in Insider Theft of Intellectual Property Crimes
Organization’s
Denial of
Insider Request
Insider’s
Contribution
Insider’s
Entitlement
69
Precipitating Event
(e.g., Proposal by
Competitor)
Insider’s
Dissatisfaction
Insider’s
Planning to Go
to Competitor
Insider’s Desire
to Steal
Level of Technical
and Behavioral
Monitoring
Information
Stolen
Organization’s
Discovery of Theft
Opportunity
to Detect
Theft
Figure 3-1 MERIT model of insider theft of IP: Entitled Independent
Precipitating Event
(e.g., Proposal by
Competitor)
Insider’s
Contribution
Insider’s
Entitlement
Recruitment
of Other
Insiders
Information
Stolen
Increasing
Access to
Information
Insider’s
Planning to Go
to Competitor
Insider’s Desire
to Steal
Extent of
Planning to
Steal
Insider’s
Concern Over
Being Caught
Opportunity
to Detect
Theft
Perpetrated
Deceptions
Level of Technical
and Behavioral
Monitoring
Organization’s
Discovery of
Organization’s
Deceptions Discovery of Theft
Figure 3-2 MERIT model of insider theft of IP: Ambitious Leader
70
The Entitled Independent
This section describes the model of the Entitled Independent, an insider
acting primarily alone to steal information to take to a new job or to his
own side business.
NOTE
Most insiders felt entitled to take the information they were accused of
stealing.
Based on our review of incident descriptions and interviews with victim
organizations, investigators, and prosecutors of insider cases, we determined that most insiders felt entitled to take the information they were
accused of stealing. The majority of the insiders stole information that they
had worked on while employed by the organization.
Insider Contribution and Entitlement
Figure 3-3 shows how the insider’s feeling of entitlement toward the
i nformation he develops escalates over time. The employee comes into your
organization with a desire to contribute to its efforts. As time goes on and
he develops information, writes source code, or creates products, his contribution becomes more tangible. These insiders, unlike most employees and
contractors, have personal predispositions that result in a perceived sense of
ownership and entitlement to the information created by the entire group.
The longer he works on the product, the more his sense of entitlement grows.
This sense of entitlement can be particularly strong if the insider perceives
his role in the development of products as especially important. If his work
is dedicated to a particular product—for example, development of a software system, or the building of customer contact lists—he may have a great
sense of ownership of that product or information. This leads to an even
greater sense of entitlement. In addition, consistent with good management practice, individuals may receive positive feedback for their efforts,
Insider’s
Contribution
Insider’s
Entitlement
Figure 3-3 Insider entitlement
71
which may further reinforce their sense of ownership, because of their
predispositions.
Evidence of entitlement was extreme in a few cases. One Entitled
Independent, who had stolen and marketed a copy of his employer’s
critical software, created a lengthy manuscript detailing his innocence and
declaring that everyone at the trial had lied. After being denied a raise,
another insider stole the company’s client database and threatened to put
them out of business on his way out the door.
What Can You Do?
Knowing that insiders who steal IP tend to steal the assets they helped to
develop is a key factor in designing a mitigation strategy. If you can identify
your critical intellectual property, you can narrow down the list of employees and contractors who are at highest risk of stealing it to those who are
working on it now or have worked on it in the past.
In addition, keep in mind that people move around within your organization.
How good are you at adjusting access controls as those moves happen? Just
because someone has moved to another project or area of the organization
doesn’t mean he doesn’t still feel a sense of entitlement to his past work. Erosion of access controls is a problem that needs to be solved in order to reduce
risk of insider theft of intellectual property. Almost three-quarters of the
insiders in our theft of IP cases had authorized access to the information stolen at the time of the theft, but that doesn’t mean that all of them should have
had access. In many organizations, employees tend to transfer over time to
different parts of the organization. They often accumulate privileges needed
to perform new tasks as they move, without losing access they no longer
need. Unfortunately, many insiders, at the time when they stole information, had accesses above and beyond what their job descriptions required.
We suggest that you periodically review and adjust your access controls
for critical assets. We helped one organization set up an effective mechanism for controlling access once an employee transfers to another group.
The organization realized that it couldn’t disable the employee’s access
immediately upon transfer since there is typically a transition period in
which the employee still needs access to his old team’s information. So the
organization set up an automated email to be sent from its HR system to
the employee’s previous supervisor three months after the date of transfer.
This email lists all of the email aliases the employee is on, shared folders and collaboration sites to which the employee has access, and so on,
and suggests that the supervisor contact IT to disable any access that is no
72
longer necessary. This mechanism has been very successful in controlling
the erosion of access controls in the organization.
Some insiders exhibited an unusual degree of possessiveness toward their
work before stealing it. For instance, a few insiders kept all source code on
their own laptops and refused to store it on the file servers, so they would
have full control over it. This type of behavior should be recognized and
remediated as early as possible.
Insider Dissatisfaction
Dissatisfaction played a role in many of the Entitled Independent cases. Dissatisfaction typically resulted from the denial of an insider’s request, as shown
in Figure 3-4. Denial of an employee or contractor request can lead to dissatisfaction, which in turn decreases the person’s desire to contribute. This also
affects the person’s sense of loyalty to you. Dissatisfaction often spurred the
insider in our cases to look for another job; the majority had already accepted
positions with another company or had started a competing company at the
time of their theft. Once the insider receives a job offer and begins planning to
go to a competing organization, his desire to steal information increases. This
desire is amplified by his dissatisfaction with his current employer and his
sense of entitlement to the products developed by his group.
Dissatisfaction often spurred the insider in our cases to look for
another job.
In one-third of the cases, the insider actually used the proprietary
information to get a new job or to benefit his new employer in some way.
Organization’s
Denial of
Insider Request
Insider’s
Dissatisfaction
Precipitating Event
(e.g., Proposal by
Competitor)
Insider
Planning to Go
to Competitor
Figure 3-4 Insider dissatisfaction leading to compromise
73
Issues Leading to Dissatisfaction
Issues leading to dissatisfaction in the CERT database include the
following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Disagreement over ownership of intellectual property
Financial compensation issues
Disagreement over benefits
Relocation issues
Hostile work environment
Mergers and acquisitions
Company attempting to obtain venture capital
Problems with supervisor
Passed over for promotion
Layoffs
In more than one-third of the cases, the insider took the information just in
case he ever needed it, with no specific plans in mind. One insider actually
broke into his organization’s systems after he was terminated to find out
whether the organization had made any further progress on the product he
had helped develop while he worked there.
What Can You Do?
It is inevitable that many of your employees will find new jobs at some
point in time. Now that you understand that these departing employees could pose increased risk of insider theft of intellectual property, you
should consider a review of your termination policies and processes. As
soon as an employee turns in his resignation, you need to be prepared to
act, as you will see in the next section. If you can quickly and easily identify
the critical information that employee has access to, you can kick into prevention and detection mode.
Also, food for thought: Some of the insiders who stole IP were contractors.
How do you handle contractors when they leave your organization?
In our insider threat assessments we have discovered a disturbing trend
in ill-defined or loosely enforced procedures for contractor terminations. Although contractors only account for 12% of our insider theft
of IP crimes, the risk they pose should not be disregarded. Contract
award cycles can range from five years, to three, to even one year. Are
you able to track access granted to contractors and ensure appropriate
74
access even when contractors and contracting organizations change on a
frequent basis?
Insider Theft and Deception
NOTE
The insider’s plan to leave the organization, dissatisfaction, and his sense
of entitlement all contribute to the decision to steal the information.
As shown in Figure 3-5, eventually the desire to steal information becomes
strong enough, leading to the theft and finally the opportunity for you to
detect the theft. Perhaps someone observes an employee’s actions, or consequences of those actions, that seem suspicious in some way. The most
likely person to discover an insider theft according to our data is a nontechnical employee; in cases where we were able to isolate the person who
discovered the incident, 72% were detected by nontechnical employees.
Therefore, you should have processes in place for employees to report
suspicious behavior, employees should be aware of those processes, and
you should follow up on reports quickly, particularly if they concern an
employee who fits the profile described in our models.
Insider’s
Entitlement
Insider’s
Dissatisfaction
Insider
Planning to Go
to Competitor
Insider’s Desire
to Steal
Level of Technical
and Behavioral
Monitoring
Information
Stolen
Opportunity
to Detect
Theft
Figure 3-5 Insider theft and deception
Organization’s
Discovery of Theft
75
Our Entitled Independents did not exhibit great concern with being caught.
Even though signed IP agreements were in place in around 40% of the
cases, fewer than one-quarter of the Entitled Independents tried to deceive
the organization while taking their information. While explicit deception
is not a major factor in most of these crimes, the fact that it did occur in
one-fourth of them suggests that you need to anticipate it when designing
your countermeasures.
For example, upon announcing his resignation, one insider lied to his
manager and said he had no follow-on employment, even though he had
told a coworker about his new job at a competitor. If you become aware of
deliberate deception like this, it may be an indicator of problems to come.
Deceptions generally make it harder for you to sense the risk of theft, and
that is why the insider does it. But if you are vigilant, deceptions may be
discovered, alerting you to increased risk of insider threat. If the organization in this example had known that the insider had given contradictory
information to his manager and coworker, it may have been forewarned of
the heightened risk.
In general, your accurate understanding of your risk is directly related
to your ability to detect the insider’s illicit actions. With sufficient
levels of technical and behavioral monitoring, these actions may be
discoverable.
NOTE
Most information was stolen within one month of resignation using a
variety of methods.
Most of these crimes tend to be quick thefts around resignation. More than
one-half of the Entitled Independents stole information within one month
of resignation, which gives you a well-defined window of opportunity for
discovering the theft prior to employee termination. It is important that you
fully understand the one-month window, however, as it is a bit more complex than it first appears. First, the one-month window includes the month
before the insider turns in his resignation and the month after he resigns; actually two months total. This means that you need to have technical measures
in place at all times so that you can go back in time and review past online
activity. Second, some of these insiders stole IP long before resignation; just
because they stole it within one month of resignation doesn’t mean that
is when they first started stealing it. Some of them stole slowly over time,
76
committing their final theft right before resignation. However, fewer than
one-third of the insiders continued their theft for more than one month.
One insider planned with a competing organization abroad and transferred
documents to the company for almost two years prior to her resignation.
However, for the most part, the insiders did steal the information quickly
upon resignation.
NOTE
The one-month window includes the month before the insider resigns and
the month after he resigns—actually two months in total.
In one case the insider accepted a position with a competing organization,
resigned his position, and proceeded to download proprietary information
to take with him to the new company before his last day of work. He stole
the information despite warnings by his new employer not to bring any
proprietary information with him to his new position. When questioned
about the theft, the insider admitted to downloading the information,
saying that he hoped to use it if he ever started his own business.
In a similar case, the insider accepted a position with a competitor and
started downloading documents containing trade secrets the very next
day. A few weeks later, after several sessions of high-volume downloading,
the insider left the organization and started working for the competitor.
Just two days after starting his new job, the insider loaded the stolen files
onto his newly assigned laptop, and within a month had emailed the trade
secrets to his new coworkers. This exemplifies the lack of any effort to
conceal the theft.
A wide variety of technical means were used in the theft cases to transfer
information, including email, phone, fax, downloading to or from home
over the Internet, malicious code collection and transmission, and printing out material on the organizations’ printers. One particularly vengeful
insider acted in anger when his employer rewarded executives with exorbitant bonuses while lower-level employees were receiving meager raises
or being laid off. He began downloading confidential corporate documents to his home computer, carrying physical copies out of the offices,
and emailing them to two competitors. Neither of the two competitors
wanted the confidential information and both sent the information they
77
received back to the victim organization. This insider also made no attempt
to conceal or deny his illicit activity.
We will explore the technical details of the theft of IP cases later in this
chapter, following the Ambitious Leader model.
What Can You Do?
Our case data suggests that monitoring of online actions, particularly
downloads within one month before and after resignation, could be particularly beneficial for preventing or detecting the theft of proprietary
information. You need to consider the wide variety of ways that information is stolen and design your detection strategy accordingly. Data leakage
tools12 may help with this task. Many tools are available that enable you to
perform functions such as the following:
• Alerting administrators to emails with unusually large attachments
• Tagging documents that should not be permitted to leave the network
• Tracking or preventing printing, copying, or downloading of certain
information, such as PII or documents containing certain words such as
new-product codenames
• Tracking of all documents copied to removable media
• Preventing or detecting emails to competitors, to governments and
organizations outside the United States, to Gmail or Hotmail accounts,
and so on
You might also consider a simple mechanism to protect yourself from
being the unknowing recipient of stolen IP from another organization.
As part of your IP agreement that you make new employees sign, you
might want to include a statement attesting to the fact that they have not
brought any IP from any previous employer with them to your organization. We are heartened by the fact that many of the theft of IP cases in our
database were detected by the new employer, and reported to the victim
organization and/or law enforcement. You should be sure that you have a
process defined for how you would respond to that twist of insider threat.
In addition, you may consider asking departing employees to sign a new
12. Data leakage tools: systems designed to detect and prevent unauthorized use and transmission of
confidential information (Wikipedia). Also commonly called data loss prevention (DLP) systems.
78
IP agreement, reminding them of the contents of the IP agreement while
they are walking out the door.
The Ambitious Leader
This section describes the Ambitious Leader model. These cases involve a
leader who recruits insiders to steal information with him—essentially a
“spy ring.” Unlike the Entitled Independent, these insiders don’t only want
the assets they created or have access to, they want more: an entire product
line or an entire software system. They don’t have the access to steal all that
they want themselves, so they recruit others into their scheme to help.
We omitted the What Can You Do? section from most of the Ambitious
Leader scenarios because it is so similar to the Entitled Independent model.
But we provide extensive advice at the end of the chapter when we explore
the technical details in all of the cases.
More than half of the Ambitious Leaders planned to develop a competing
product or use the information to attract clients away from the victim organization. Others (38%) worked with a new employer that was a competitor.
Only 10% actually sold the information to a competing organization.
About one-third of our theft of IP cases were for the benefit of a foreign
government or organization. The average financial impact for these cases
was more than four times that of domestic IP theft. In these cases, loyalty to
the insider’s native country trumped loyalty to the employer. Insiders with
an affinity toward a foreign country were motivated by the goal of bringing
value to, and sometimes eventually relocating in, that country.
In general, the cases involving a foreign government or organization fit
the Ambitious Leader model. However, because the consequences of these
crimes are much more severe, and both government and private organizations are so concerned about this threat, we have included a separate
section at the end of the Ambitious Leader model that analyzes those
crimes in a bit more depth.
About one-third of our theft of IP cases were for the benefit of a foreign
government or organization. The average financial impact for these cases
was more than four times that of domestic IP theft.
79
The rest of this section describes additional aspects of the Ambitious
Leader model not exhibited by Entitled Independents. These cases are
more complex than the Entitled Independent cases, involving more intricate planning, deceptive attempts to gain increased access, and recruitment
of other employees into the leader’s scheme.
The motivation for the Ambitious Leader is slightly different from that of
the Entitled Independent. There was little evidence of employee dissatisfaction in the Ambitious Leaders. Insiders in this scenario were motivated
not by dissatisfaction, but rather by an Ambitious Leader promising them
greater rewards.
In one case, the head of the public finance department of a securities firm
organized his employees to collect documents to take to a competitor. Over
one weekend he then sent a resignation letter for himself and each recruit
to the head of the sales department. The entire group of employees started
work with the competitor the following week.
In another case, an outsider who was operating a fictitious company
recruited an employee looking for a new job to send him reams of his current employer’s proprietary information by email, postal service, and a
commercial carrier.
Except for the dissatisfaction of the Entitled Independent, the initial patterns for Ambitious Leaders are very similar. In fact, the beginning of
the Ambitious Leader model is merely the Entitled Independent model
without the “organization denial of insider request” and “insider dissatisfaction.” Most Ambitious Leaders stole the information that they worked
on, just like the Entitled Independents. The difference is that they were
not content only to steal the information they had access to; they wanted
the entire system, program, or product line, and needed a more complex
scheme to get it.
Theft took place even though IP agreements were in place for almost half
(48%) of the Ambitious Leader cases. In at least one case, the insider lied
when specifically asked if he had returned all proprietary information and
software to the company as stipulated in the IP agreement he had signed.
He later used the stolen software to develop and market a competing product in a foreign country.
Insider Planning of Theft
The Ambitious Leader cases involved a significantly greater amount of
planning than the Entitled Independent cases, particularly the recruitment
80
of other insiders. Other forms of planning involved creating a new
business in almost half of the cases, coordinating with a competing organization in almost half of the cases, and collecting information in advance
of the theft.
This aspect of the insider behavior is reflected in Figure 3-6, which describes
the Ambitious Leader formulating plans to steal the information prior to
the actual theft. This extensive planning is an additional potential point
of exposure of the impending theft, and therefore results in measures by
the insider to hide his actions. In most of the Ambitious Leader cases, the
insider was planning the theft a month or more before his departure from
the organization.
The one-month window surrounding resignation holds for most Ambitious
Leaders just as it does for Entitled Independents.
Increasing Access
In more than half of the Ambitious Leader cases, the lead insider had
authorization for only part of the information targeted and had to take steps
to gain additional access. In one case involving the transfer of proprietary
documents to a foreign company, the lead insider asked her supervisor to
assign her to a special project that would increase her access to highly sensitive information. She did this just weeks prior to leaving the country with
a company laptop and numerous company documents, both physical and
electronic.
Insider’s Desire
to Steal
Information
Stolen
Extent of
Planning to
Steal
Insider’s
Concern Over
Being Caught
Opportunity
to Detect
Theft
Figure 3-6 Theft planning by Ambitious Leader
81
As shown in Figure 3-7, the recruitment of additional insiders is the primary
means Ambitious Leaders use to gain access to more information. The need
for recruitment increases the amount of planning activity necessary to coordinate insider activities.
Organization’s Discovery of Theft
There are many more avenues for you to detect heightened risk of insider
theft of IP in Ambitious Leader cases than in Entitled Independent cases.
Entitled Independents are often fully authorized to access the information
they steal, and do so very close to resignation with very little planning.
In addition, Entitled Independents rarely act as if what they are doing is
wrong, probably because they feel a proprietary attachment to the information or product. Ambitious Leaders, on the other hand, often have to gain
access to information for which they are not authorized. This involves, in
part, coordinating the activities of other insiders and committing deception
to cover up the extensive planning required.
What Can You Do?
Figure 3-8 illustrates the avenues available for you to continually assess the
risk you face regarding theft of IP. Because deception is such a prominent
factor in Ambitious Leader cases, its discovery may be a better means to
detect heightened insider risk here than in Entitled Independent cases.
Recruitment
of Other
Insiders
Insider’s Desire
to Steal
Information
Stolen
Increasing
Access to
Information
Opportunity
to Detect
Theft
Figure 3-7 Increasing access by the Ambitious Leader
82
Information
Stolen
Increasing
Access to
Information
Extent of
Planning to
Steal
Insider’s
Concern Over
Being Caught
Opportunity
to Detect
Theft
Perpetrated
Deceptions
Level of Technical
and Behavioral
Monitoring
Organization’s
Discovery of Theft
Figure 3-8 Organization’s discovery of theft of IP in Ambitious Leader cases
In some of the cases we reviewed, the organization only found out about
the theft when the insider took his competing product to market or solicited
business from his previous employer’s customers. While this detection is
later than one would prefer, it is still not too late to take action and prevent
further losses. However, we strongly suggest that you consider the countermeasures at the end of this chapter to facilitate earlier detection. Many of
the incidents in our database were detected by nontechnical means, such as
the following:
• Notification by a customer or other informant
• Detection by law enforcement investigating the reports of the theft
• By victims
• Reporting of suspicious activity by coworkers
• Sudden emergence of new competing organizations
You can use technical monitoring systems to detect insider theft of IP.
More than one-half of the Entitled Independents and almost two-thirds
of the Ambitious Leaders stole information within one month of resignation. Many of these involved large downloads of information outside
the patterns of normal behavior by those employees. In more than onequarter of the Ambitious Leader cases, an insider emailed or otherwise
electronically transmitted information or plans from an organizational
computer.
Keeping track of backups of critical information is also important—in one
case an insider took the backup media from his computer on his last day of
work. Understanding the potential relevance of these types of precursors
Theft of IP inside the United States Involving Foreign Governments or Organizations
83
provides a window of opportunity for you to detect theft prior to employee
termination.
Of course, the earlier you can become aware of illicit plans the better. Early
awareness depends on behavioral as well as technical monitoring and is
more likely to catch incidents involving Ambitious Leaders than Entitled
Independents. In Ambitious Leader scenarios, you need to look for evolving plans and collusion by insiders to steal information, including attempts
to gain access to information over and above that for which an employee is
authorized. There were behavioral or technical precursors to the crime in
all of the Ambitious Leader cases.
One insider, over a period of several years, exhibited suspicious patterns
of foreign travel and remote access to organizational systems while claiming medical sick leave. It is not always this blatant, but signs are often
observable if you are vigilant.
Theft of IP inside the United States Involving Foreign
Governments or Organizations
This section focuses on cases of malicious insiders who misused a
c ompany’s systems, data, or network to steal intellectual property from an
organization inside the United States for the benefit of a foreign entity—
either an existing foreign organization or a new company that the insiders
established in a foreign country.13 These cases fit the problem described in
the Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial
Espionage, FY07 prepared by the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive.
The United States remains the prime target for foreign economic collection and industrial espionage as a result of its worldwide technological
and business leadership. Indeed, strong US international competitiveness
underlies the continuing drive by foreign collectors to target US information and technology.14
13. Material in this section includes portions from a previously published work. Specifically, a joint
CyLab and CERT Program article was published as “Spotlight On: Insider Theft of Intellectual Property
inside the U.S. Involving Foreign Governments or Organizations” by Derrick Spooner, Dawn Cappelli,
Andrew Moore, and Randy Trzeciak [Spooner 2008].
14. See www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/fecie_2007/FECIE_2007.pdf.
84
These cases also include activities defined by the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive as economic espionage or industrial
espionage.
Economic Espionage—the conscious and willful misappropriation of trade
secrets with the knowledge or intent that the offense will benefit a foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent.15
Industrial Espionage—the conscious and willful misappropriation of trade
secrets related to, or included in, a product that is produced for, or placed in, interstate or foreign commerce to the economic benefit of anyone other than the owner,
with the knowledge or intent that the offense will injure the owner of that trade
secret.16
NOTE
We have not included any cases of national security espionage in
this book.
Cases that involve foreign beneficiaries can differ from other theft of IP
cases because the insiders may have a sense of duty or loyalty to their
countries of origin that overrides any loyalty to their employer. Moreover, some of these cases suggest that some foreign entities appear to be
interested in recruiting insiders to steal IP to advance businesses in that
particular country. Competing loyalties, coupled with recruitment of
employees in U.S. businesses by foreign nations or organizations, make
this type of crime a potent threat for organizations that rely on IP for competitive advantage.
There are several reasons for heightened concern about this kind of crime.
The impact of a crime that extends outside the jurisdiction of U.S. law
enforcement on an organization can be substantially greater than a case
that remains within U.S. jurisdiction. Insiders who leave the United States
may be difficult or impossible to locate and arrest. And even if the insider
were located and arrested, extradition to the United States would be
required. Therefore, there can be more risk from an employee who intends
to leave the United States following the theft than from employees contemplating criminal acts against their employer who remain in the United
States.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
85
In addition, it can be very difficult to recover stolen IP once it leaves the
United States. In cases within U.S. borders, companies that receive the stolen IP can suffer similar consequences under the same laws as the insiders
if they use the stolen IP for their own advantage. Thus, domestic organizations are under greater obligation to cooperate with authorities and return
all stolen IP than foreign organizations might be.
Who They Are
The majority of the insiders worked as either a scientist or an engineer.
Males committed most of the incidents. Of the cases that identify citizenship, about half were foreign nationals, about 40% were naturalized U.S.
citizens, two were U.S. citizens, and the rest were resident aliens or had
dual citizenship.
The insiders’ countries of origin, for cases in which the information was
available, are shown in Table 3-1.
About one-fourth of the cases involved at least one accomplice who was
also an insider. Some of those involved multiple insiders; one case involved
14 insiders in all! Almost 40% had at least one external accomplice.
Table 3-1 Countries of Origin (When Known)
Country
China
Number of Cases
13
United States
2
Taiwan
2
Canada (naturalized citizen from China)
2
South Korea
1
Germany
1
Russia
1
Iran
1
Ecuador
1
India
1
Dual citizenship, China and United States
1
86
Chapter 3.
Note that when multiple insiders are involved in a case we only code it as
a single case, and code details for the primary insider. Additional information about conspirators is also coded for the case. If you are interested in
a detailed description of the information coded for each case, please see
Appendix D, Insider Threat Database Structure.
What They Stole
All of these insiders stole intellectual property in digital form, physical
form, or both. The methods used were consistent with those described elsewhere in this chapter.
Table 3-2 contains the details known for these cases. Damage amounts are
supplied when they were available. We only used the term trade secrets
when that term was used in the case file; otherwise, we used the description supplied in the case file.
Table 3-2 Breakdown of Cases17
Sector
Information and
telecommunications
Number
of Cases
11
Damages17
What Was Stolen
1 case,
$1 billion
Trade secrets
(4 cases)
1 case,
$600 million
Source code
(3 cases)
1 case,
$1 million
Confidential product
information
(3 cases)
1 case,
$100,000
1 case, $5,000
6 cases,
Unknown
Confidential
manufacturing
information (1 case)
Proprietary
documents and
source code
(1 case)
17. In the majority of the cases, damages reported were in the form of potential loss to the organization
as reported in court documents.
Chemical industry and hazardous
materials
7
1 case,
$400 million
Trade secrets
(5 cases)
1 case,
$100 million
Sensitive product
information
1 case,
$50 million to
$60 million
(1 case)
4 cases,
Unknown
Manufacturing
3
Confidential
documents
(1 case)
1 case,
$40 million
Trade secrets
(2 cases)
1 case,
$32 million
Confidential
documents
(1 case)
Banking and finance
1
$5,000
Source code
Commercial facilities
1
Unknown
Trade secrets
Defense industrial
base
1
Unknown
Source code
Education
1
$3 million
Patentable
proprietary
information
Energy
1
Unknown
Sensitive software
Government–Federal
1
Unknown
Government
restricted
information
Public health
1
$500 million
Trade secrets
Water
1
$1 million
Trade secrets and
source code
87
88
Why They Stole
The specific motives fall into several categories.
• To form a new competing business: One-third of the insiders stole the
IP to establish a new business venture in a foreign country that would
compete with their current employer. In all of these cases, the insiders
had at least one accomplice who assisted them with their theft, with
forming and/or running the new business, or with both. All but one
of these insiders had already started their business before they left the
victim organization; in fact, some of them had already established the
business and had made money for quite some time.
• To take to a new employer in a competing business: More than 40% of
these insiders stole IP to take to their new employers, businesses located
outside the United States that competed with their current employer. In
all but two of these cases, the insiders had already accepted jobs with
the competitors before leaving the victim organization.
• To take to their home country: In three of the cases, this was the
somewhat vague reason they gave for their theft. In another case, the
insider stated he wanted to “benefit the homeland.”
• To sell to a competitor: In two cases, the insider stole the information to
sell to a competitor in another country outside the United States.
Mitigation strategies for these cases are the same as for any other cases of
insider theft of intellectual property, which is covered in the next section.
Mitigation Strategies for All Theft of
Intellectual Property Cases
The intent of the MERIT models is to identify the common patterns of each
type of insider threat over time based on our analysis of the cases in our
database. We have found that the models suggest key mitigation strategies
for you to defend yourself against these types of threats. We therefore propose countermeasures based on expert opinions in behavioral psychology,
organizational management, and information security.
Your insider threat mitigation strategies should involve more than technical
controls. An overall solution should include policies, business processes,
and technical solutions that are endorsed by senior leadership in HR,
Mitigation Strategies for All Theft of Intellectual Property Cases
89
legal, data owners, physical security, information security/information
t echnology, and other relevant areas of the organization. It is critical that
all levels of management recognize and acknowledge the threat posed by
their current and former employees, contractors, and business partners,
and take appropriate steps to mitigate the associated risk. It may not be
realistic to expect that all intellectual property exfiltrated by insiders will
be stopped before the information leaves your network, but it is realistic to
expect that you can implement countermeasures into your infrastructure
and business processes to allow you to detect as many incidents as possible, thereby minimizing the financial impact on your organization.
An overall solution should include policies, business processes, and technical solutions that are endorsed by senior leadership in HR, legal, data
owners, physical security, information security/information technology,
and other relevant areas of the organization.
The remainder of this chapter describes potential countermeasures that we
believe could be effective in mitigating insider theft of intellectual property.
Exfiltration Methods
We begin this section by providing more in-depth details of the technical
methods used by insiders to steal IP in our database. Methods varied
widely, but the top three methods used were email from work, removable media, and remote network access. Table 3-3 describes the primary
methods of exfiltration.
Table 3-3 Exfiltration Methods
Exfiltration Method
Description
Email
Insiders exfiltrated information through their work
email account. The email may have been sent to a
personal email account or directly to a competitor or
foreign government or organization. Insiders used
email attachments or the body of the email to transmit
the sensitive information out of the network.
Continues
90
Table 3-3 Exfiltration Methods (Continued)
Exfiltration Method
Description
Removable media
Common removable media types were USB devices,
CDs, and removable hard drives.
Printed documents
Insiders printed documents or screenshots of
sensitive information, and then physically removed
the hard copies from the organization.
Remote network
access
Insiders remotely accessed the network through a
virtual private network (VPN) or other remote channel
to download sensitive information from an off-site
location.
File transfer
The insider was at work, on the company network, and
transferred a file outside of the network using the Web,
File Transfer Protocol (FTP),18 or other methods.
Although email could potentially fit this category, we
thought that email should be considered separately
due to the large number of crimes that used email.
Laptops
Insiders exfiltrated data by downloading IP onto a
laptop at work and bringing it outside the workplace.
For example, one insider was developing an application for his company on a laptop and later purposely
leaked the source code. In other cases the insiders
simply downloaded sensitive files onto their laptops
for personal or business use later.
We dug a little deeper into those methods to determine where our mitigation
strategies need to be focused—on the host, the network, or the physical removal of information—and found that more than half involved the
network, 42% involved the host, and only 6% involved physical removal.
Network Data Exfiltration18
Data exfiltration over the network was the most common method of
removing information from an organization, used by more than half of
18. File Transfer Protocol (FTP): a communication standard used to transfer files from one host to
another over a network, such as the Internet (Wikipedia).
91
the insiders in the database who stole IP. Removal methods included in
this category were email, a remote network access channel (originating
externally), and network file transfer (originating outside the network).
About one-fourth of the insiders used their work email account to send the
IP outside the network, either sending IP to their personal email account,
or directly emailing the IP to a competitor or foreign government or
organization.
About one-fourth of the insiders used their work email account to send the
IP outside the network.
For example, an insider in one case sent customer lists and source code he
had written from his work email account to his personal email account.
During this time, he was being recruited by a competing organization. He
accepted the competitor’s offer and took the customer lists and source code
to his new job to help him get a head start there.
In another case, an insider asked his superiors for confidential data about
their product costs and materials. Two months later, he accepted a new
job with a competitor. The original employer warned him against taking
or distributing any of its proprietary information. However, the insider
emailed internal business information from his work email account to two
of his new supervisors before he started at the new company.
Interestingly, almost half of the cases involving email exfiltration also
involved another type of exfiltration. This suggests that if you suspect an
insider is stealing information you should check other communication
channels for similar activity. Most frequently, the additional exfiltration
path involved stealing information on a laptop, but use of remote access
channels and theft of printed documents each happened a few times in
combination with theft via email.
The second most frequent network exfiltration method was remote network
access. As in the MERIT model, many of these cases occurred immediately
before resignation or shortly after acceptance of a new job at a competitor.
In more than one-third of these cases, the remote connections were established after normal work hours; in almost one-third of the cases, the time of
exfiltration was unknown.
During the remote sessions, insiders downloaded sensitive documents
to their remote computers. In one case, an insider and a coworker were
92
employed as contract software developers for the victim organization.
Their contracts were periodically renewed when modifications to the
software were needed. Each time their contracts ended, the victim
organization neglected to disable their remote access to the network since
the organization knew they would be contracted again in the near future.
However, at one point both insiders suddenly claimed that the programs
they developed belonged to them, and requested that the organization
cease using them. The company continued to use the applications, and the
insider and accomplice were able to remotely access and download the
proprietary source code they claimed to own.
The least common method of network data exfiltration was transferring
data outside the network through outbound channels such as FTP, the
Web, or instant messaging. These crimes were all perpetrated by more
technically skilled insiders. Examples include the following.
• A computer programmer at an investment banking organization
submitted his letter of resignation to his manager. He then used a script
that copied, compressed, and merged files containing source code,
and then encrypted, renamed, and uploaded the files using FTP to an
external file hosting server.
• An insider transferred trade secrets and source code to a
password-protected Web site using standard HTTP. The insider
intended to start a side business with the company’s stolen IP.
• An insider who failed to receive a raise and whose request for transfer
was rejected submitted his resignation and downloaded proprietary
information from his organization for potential use in a new job. He
used FTP to transfer the data to his home computer.
What Can You Do?
Most cases that involved use of the network to perpetrate the theft involved
email and remote access over VPN. Given that several cases involved email
to a direct competitor, you should consider at least tracking, if not blocking,
email to and from competing organizations. Our cases did not explicitly
show sophisticated concealment methods, such as use of proxies19 or
extensive use of personal, Web-based email services. However, we did find
that insiders periodically leverage their personal, Web-based email as an
19. Proxies: A proxy server, more commonly known as a proxy, is a server that routes network traffic
through itself, thereby masking the origins of the network traffic.
93
exfiltration method. You should carefully consider the balance between
security and personal use of email and Web services from your network.
As mentioned, most insiders steal IP within 30 days of leaving an
organization. You should consider a more targeted monitoring strategy for
employees and contractors when they give notice of their exit. For instance,
check your email logs for emails they sent to competitors or foreign
governments or organizations. Also check for large email attachments they
sent to Gmail, Hotmail, and similar email accounts.
Further, you should consider inspecting available log traffic for any indicators of suspicious access, large file transfers, suspicious email traffic,
after-hours access, or use of removable media by resigning employees.
Central logging appliances and event correlation20 engines may help
craft automated queries that reduce an analyst’s workload for routinely
inspecting this data.
Host Data Exfiltration
Host-based exfiltration was the second most common method of removing
IP from organizations; close to half of the cases involved an insider
removing data from a host computer and leaving the organization with
it. In these cases, insiders often used their laptops to remove data from
the organization. We had difficulty determining the exact ownership
and authorization of the laptops used. However, we do know that about
one-sixth of the insiders who stole IP used laptops taken from the organization’s site during normal work hours. Half of them transferred proprietary
software and source code; the other half removed sensitive documents
from the organization.
In one case, the insider worked for a consulting company and stole
proprietary software programs from a customer by downloading them to
a laptop. He attempted to disguise the theft by deleting references to the
victim organization contained in the program, and then attempted to sell
portions of the program to a third party for a large sum of money.
Another case involved an insider who accessed and downloaded trade
secrets to his laptop after he accepted an offer from a foreign competitor. He
gave his employer two weeks’ notice, and continued to steal information
until he left.
20. Event correlation: a technique for making sense of a large number of events and pinpointing the
few events that are really important in that mass of information (Wikipedia).
94
By far, the most common method of host-based exfiltration in the database
was removable media; 80% of these cases involved trade secrets, and the
majority of those insiders took the stolen trade secrets to a competitor. The
type of removable media used varied. Where information was available,
we determined that insiders most often used writable CDs. Thumb drives
and external hard disks were used in just 30% of the cases. However, the
type of removable media used has changed over time. Insiders primarily
used CDs prior to 2005. Since 2005, however, most insiders using removable media to steal IP use thumb drives and external hard drives. This
trend indicates that changes in technology are providing new and easier
methods of stealing data from host computers.
In one case, an insider resigned from his organization after accepting a
position at another organization. He downloaded personal files as well
as the organization’s proprietary information onto CDs. Despite signing a
nondisclosure agreement, the insider took the trade secrets to a competitor.
In a similar example, an insider received an offer from a competitor three
months prior to resignation. He lied about his new position and employment status to coworkers. Only days before leaving the organization, he
convinced a coworker to download his files to an external hard drive,
supposedly to free up disk space. He came into work at unusual hours
to download additional proprietary information onto a CD. Finally,
he took this information with him to his new position at a competing
organization.
What Can You Do?
It is unlikely that the victim organizations in our database prohibited
removable media in their daily computing environments. You should
consider carefully who in your organization really needs to use removable media. Perhaps access to removable media is a privilege granted
only to users in certain roles. Along with that privilege could come
enhanced monitoring of all files copied onto such devices. In addition,
understanding who requires removable media and for what purposes can
help you to determine what may constitute normal and healthy business
use, and to monitor for usage patterns that deviate from that. Inventory
control, as it pertains to removable media, may also be helpful. For example, you could allow use of removable media only on company-owned
devices prohibited from leaving your facility. Organizations requiring
the highest-assurance environment should consider disallowing removable media completely, or allowing it only in special situations that are
carefully audited.
95
Finally, recall the 30-day window in our theft of IP cases. Can you log all file
transfers to removable media? You might not have the resources to review
all of those logs (depending on how restricted your use of such media is).
However, if the logs exist, you can audit them immediately on the hosts
accessed by any employee who has announced his resignation. This would
provide one quick mechanism for detecting IP that might be exfiltrated by
an employee on his way out the door.
Physical Exfiltration
Only 6% of the theft of IP cases involved some sort of physical exfiltration.
We found that physical exfiltration usually occurs in conjunction with
some other form of exfiltration that would have produced a more obvious
network or host-based observable event.
Exfiltration of Specific Types of IP
Once we determined what kinds of IP were stolen and how, we determined
what methods of exfiltration were associated with the different types of IP.
Several interesting findings surfaced. In particular, business plans were
stolen almost exclusively through network methods, particularly using
remote access. Conversely, proprietary software and source code involve a
much higher use of non-network methods. This may be due in part to the
volume of data associated with different asset types. Software and source
code files are often large, but business plans are usually smaller documents
that are easier to move over a VPN or as an email attachment. Enumerating
the most frequent methods by which particular assets are exfiltrated may
help steer monitoring strategies with respect to computers that house particular types of assets or are allowed to access given assets over the network.
Concealment
Some insiders attempted to conceal their theft of IP through various
actions. These cases signify a clear intent to operate covertly, implying
the insiders may have known their actions were wrong. In one case, an
insider was arrested by federal authorities after stealing product design
documents and transferring them to a foreign company where he was to be
employed. After being arrested, he asked a friend to log in to his personal
email account, which was used in the exfiltration, and delete hundreds of
emails related to the incident.
Another case involved an insider who used an encryption suite to mask the
data he had stolen when moving it off the network.
96
Trusted Business Partners
Trusted business partners accounted for only 16% of our theft of IP cases,
but this is still a complicated insider threat that you need to consider in
your contracting vehicles and technical security strategies.
For example, a telecommunications company was involved in a lawsuit,
and had to hand over all of its applicable proprietary information to its
attorneys, which it did in hard-copy form. The law firm subcontracted
with a document imaging company to make copies of all of the information. One of the employees of the document imaging company asked his
nephew, a student, if he would like to make a little extra spending money
by helping him make the copies at the law firm. The nephew realized that
he had access to proprietary access control technology that the telecommunications company used to restrict its services based on fees paid by
each individual customer. He felt, like many others, that the company
unfairly overcharged for these services, so he posted the information
online to the Internet underground. This basically released the telecommunications company’s “secret sauce,” and now it was easy for members
of that community to obtain free services. When the post was discovered,
law enforcement investigated the source of the post and traced the activity
back to the student.
It is important that you consider these types of threats when drawing
up contracts with your business partners. Could that scenario happen
to you? Do you write legal language into your contracts that dictates
how your confidential and proprietary information can and cannot be
handled?
It is important that you understand the policies and procedures of your
trusted business partners. You establish policies and procedures in order
to protect your information. When you enlist the support of a trusted business partner, you should ensure that their policies and procedures are at
least as effective as your safeguards. This includes physical security, staff
education, personnel background checks, security procedures, termination,
and other safeguards.
In addition, you should monitor intellectual property to which access is
provided. When you establish an agreement with a trusted business partner, you need assurance that IP you provide access to is protected. You
need to get assurances that access to and distribution of this data will be
monitored. You should verify that there are mechanisms for logging the
dissemination of data, and review their procedures for investigating
possible disclosure of your information.
Mitigation Strategies: Final Thoughts
97
These are just a few recommendations. We detail eight recommendations
in Chapter 9, Conclusion and Miscellaneous Issues, regarding trusted
business partners.
Mitigation Strategies: Final Thoughts
We devoted a good deal of this chapter to technical countermeasures.
igure 3-9 depicts organizational issues of concern in the theft of intelF
lectual property cases in our database. We addressed the technical issues
in the previous section, but there are nontechnical issues worth noting as
well. For instance, notice that the most prevalent issue of concern is an
employee who went to work for a competitor. Therefore, you might want
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
Figure 3-9 Issues of concern
Concerning Behavior or Activity
Concealment of Current Illicit
Activity—Nontechnical
Unauthorized Data Exports—Unknown
Employee Side Business
Unauthorized Data Exports—Digital
Equipment/Media
Failure to Protect Critical Files
Planning with Competitor
Email/Chat with Competitors or
Conspirators
Employee Sought Other Employment
Unauthorized Data Download to Media
Unauthorized Data Download
to/from Home
Employee/Coworker Susceptibility
to Recruitment
Foreign National/Non-U.S. Native
Change of Employment Status
Employee Went to Work for a
Competitor
0
98
to monitor emails going to a competitor. We provide a control for doing
that in Chapter 7, Technical Insider Threat Controls. Also, note the second
most prevalent issue of concern: change in employment status, which
would account for the insiders who stole information within 30 days of
resignation. The third most prevalent issue is foreign national/non-U.S.
native, which we covered in depth in the section Theft of IP inside the
United States Involving Foreign Governments or Organizations earlier in
this chapter. The fourth issue, employee/coworker susceptibility to recruitment, applies in all of the Ambitious Leader cases.
One final thought regarding the 30-day window: You should review your
access-termination procedures associated with employee and contractor exit
procedures. Several cases provided evidence that insiders remotely accessed
systems by using previously authorized accounts that were not disabled
upon the employee’s exit. Precautions against this kind of incident seem to be
common sense, but this trend continues to manifest in newly cataloged cases.
NOTE
For more details of technical controls you can implement to prevent or
detect insider theft of IP, see Chapter 7, where we describe new technical
controls from our insider threat lab.
Summary
Insiders who steal intellectual property are usually scientists, engineers,
salespeople, or programmers. The IP stolen includes trade secrets, proprietary information such as scientific formulas, engineering drawings, source
code, and customer information. These insiders typically steal information
that they have access to, and helped to create. They rarely steal it for financial gain, but rather they take it with them as they leave the organization
to take to a new job, give to a foreign government or organization, or start
their own business.
These insider threats fall into two groups. The first is the Entitled
Independent, an insider who acts alone to take the information with him as
he leaves the organization. The second is the Ambitious Leader, an insider
who creates a “ring” of insiders who work together to steal the information.
Ambitious Leaders want to steal more than just the information they
created—they want the entire product line, or whole suite of source code,
for example.
Summary
99
A portion of this chapter was devoted to insiders who stole IP to take to
a foreign government or organization. These crimes can be particularly
disastrous, since it is much more difficult to recover the information once it
leaves the United States. We described the countries involved, the positions
of the employees, and the methods of theft.
The most useful pattern we found in modeling these crimes was that most
of the insiders stole at least some of the information within 30 days of resignation. That time frame actually encompasses a 60-day window: 30 days
before turning in their resignation, and 30 days after. Our mitigation strategies use that time frame; we recommend logging of all potential exfiltration
methods, especially emails off of the network and use of removable media,
so that you can audit the information when an employee who has access
to your critical information resigns. You need to be able to go backward in
time when such an employee resigns to make sure he has not emailed your
IP outside the network—for example, to competitors, to governments or
organizations outside the United States, or to Gmail or Hotmail accounts.
You also need to be able to identify information that was copied to
removable media during that time frame. Finally, you need to do real-time
alerting when such online activity takes place in that period between when
the insider resigns and when his employment actually terminates.
The next chapter turns to insider fraud. Insider fraud involves theft as
well, but theft of a different type of information: Personally Identifiable
Information (PII), credit card information, and other data that could be
used to commit fraud. It also includes crimes in which an insider modified
information for financial gain, often for pay by outsiders.
Index
A
Acceptable use policies for sabotage, 42, 48
Acceptable workplace behavior, 168
Access and access controls
Ambitious Leader model, 80–81
description, 179
erosion of, 71, 189
fraud, 125
Internet underground, 291–292
logs, 172–173
remote, 90–92, 200–201
SDLC, 132–133
separation of duties and least privilege,
178–181
source code, 131, 142
system change controls, 193
after termination, 203–206
Access paths
eliminating, 50–52
sabotage, 40–45
Access rights management, 284
Accomplices
fraud, 103, 121, 269
information collection on, 328
theft of IP, 86
Accountability of third-party vendors, 57
Accounts and account management
expiration dates, 234
organized crime, 118
policies and practices, 174–177
for sabotage, 45, 52
terminated employees, 203–204
Accumulation of privileges, 71
ACH (Automated Clearing House)
system, 276
Active Directory, 234–235, 237
Administrator passwords for unknown
access paths, 50
Advanced targeting for centralized logging,
237–238
Aggressive behavior as sabotage
precursor, 36
Agreements, IP, 157, 168–169
Agricultural products firm fraud case,
266–267
Alarms, 172
Alerts, prioritizing, 53–54
Ambitious Leader model
access, 80–81
organization discovery of theft, 81
overview, 78–79
risk assessment, 81–83
theft of IP, 64, 68–70
theft planning, 79–80
American Institute for Certified Public
Accountants, 108
“Analysis of Technical Observations in
Cases,” 216
Annual Report to Congress on Foreign
Economic Collection and Industrial
Espionage, FY07, 83
Anonymous remailer fraud, 109
Anti-spam blacklists, 26
ArcSight environment, 223, 228, 230
Arrests history in background checks, 164
Arrows in system dynamics
modeling, 347
Assessment, risk and threat, 81–83, 151–154,
304–305
369
370
Index
Attachments
detecting, 235–236
fraud case, 109, 265–266
large, 77, 93, 197
logging, 233–234
theft of IP, 81, 89, 95
Attribution in SDLC, 137
Audits
critical and irregular processes, 120–121
database transactions, 123
employee online actions, 195–199
HTTPS traffic, 66
passwords and account management, 175
for sabotage, 24
Authentication
multifactor, 172
SDLC, 132–133
social engineering, 126
unauthorized credentials, 141, 271
Authenticity, digital watermarking for, 65
Author biographies, 365–367
Authorization
DNS registration, 291
maintaining, 185
online, 179
remote access, 200
SDLC, 130
updating, 56
Authorized system overrides
SDLC, 132
system design, 183
Auto parts manufacturer theft of IP case, 262
Automated Clearing House (ACH)
system, 276
Automation
backdoor account detections, 195
centralized logging, 237–238
email for access control, 71
integrity checking, 134, 195
limitations, 14
separation of duties in, 131
system change controls monitoring, 193
Availability
SDLC, 130
threats impact on, 152
B
Backdoors
automated detection, 195
government theft of IP cases, 260–261
Internet underground, 290
logistics company sabotage case, 256
privileges, 175–176
remote attacks, 201–202
sabotage, 24, 40, 44–45
SDLC, 136, 184
terminated employees, 203
Background checks
financial problems, 124
functions, 164
sabotage, 30–31
subcontractors, 166–167
Backups
best practices, 207–210
change, 192
fraud case, 268–269
physical protection, 172
sabotage, 24, 40, 44–45, 139, 208, 256
sabotage/fraud case, 258
SDLC, 138–139
single system administrators, 205
testing, 57–59
Badges, 171
Balancing loops in system dynamics
modeling, 347
Banking and finance industry
case prevalence, 307
foreign theft of IP, 87
fraud cases, 264–265
fraud losses, 104–105
Insider Threat Study, 19
miscellaneous case, 270–271
sabotage cases, 243–245
sabotage/fraud cases, 257
Basic Analysis and Security Engine (BASE)
user interface, 221
Behavioral concerns
monitoring and responding to, 164–167
sabotage precursors, 35–37
security awareness training for, 159
Beneficiary organizations, 327
Index
Benefit disagreements as dissatisfaction
factor, 73
Best practices
in 2005, 17
backup and recovery processes, 207–210
enterprise-wide risk assessments, 151–154
incident response plans, 211–213
monitoring and responding to suspicious
and disruptive behavior, 164–167
negative workplace issues, 168–170
overview, 145–146
password and account management
policies and practices, 174–177
physical environment, 171–173
policies and controls, 155–158
SDLC, 182–186
security awareness training, 159–163
178–181
summary, 146–150, 213–214
system administrators and technical and
privileged users, 187–190
system change controls, 191–194
termination, 203–206
“Big Picture” of Insider IT Sabotage Across
U.S. Critical Infrastructures, 12
Bizarre behavior as sabotage precursor, 36
Bonus issues
fraud case, 265
policies, 155
sabotage from, 32–34, 158, 189, 244–245, 253
SDLC, 136, 142, 185
British Petroleum Refinery, 335
Business advantage, theft of IP for, 62
Business management training simulation,
335
Business partners. See Trusted business
partners (TBPs)
Business plans theft, 95
C
Cameras
cell phone, 281
closed circuit, 172
371
Canada, theft of IP in, 85
Cappelli, Dawn
best practices, 145
biography, 365
SDLC, 139
theft of IP, 65, 83
trusted business partners, 276
Caron, Thomas
SDLC, 139
theft of IP threats, 65
Case-based training simulation, 336
Case breakdown
country, 316–317
current employees vs. former, 314
employees vs. contractors, 313
international cases, 315–317
sectors, 307–309
technical vs. nontechnical insiders,
314–315
trends over time, 312–313
type of crime, 309–312
Case examples, 241
enterprise-wide risk assessments, 152–154
fraud. See Fraud cases
incident response plans, 212–213
miscellaneous, 269–273
monitoring and responding to suspicious
and disruptive behavior, 166–167
policies, 176–177
physical environment, 173
policies and controls, 156–158
positive outcomes, 296–297
sabotage cases. See Sabotage cases
sabotage/fraud cases, 256–258
SDLC, 185–186
security awareness training, 162–163
180–181
system administrators and technical and
privileged users, 189–190
terminated employees, 205–206
372
Index
Case examples (contd.)
theft of IP. See Theft of IP cases
trusted business partners, 276–277
Categories of threats, 8–9
ccTLD (code top-level domains), 235
CEE (Common Event Expression), 223,
229–230
CEF (Common Event Format), 223, 228–229
Centralized logging
advanced targeting and automation,
237–238
appliances, 197
conclusion, 239
overview, 231–233
Splunk rules, 235–237
termination monitoring, 233–235
CERT
insider threat center. See Insider threat
center
MERIT. See MERIT (Management and
Education of the Risk of Insider
Threat) project
Changes
change management software, 53–54
controls, 191–194
in employment status, theft of IP, 98
in policies and controls, sabotage
from, 35
Changing passwords for sabotage, 42
Characterization of configurations, 191–192
Chemical industry cases, 87, 258–259
China, theft of IP in, 85
Cigarettes, low-nicotine, 345
Citizenship in theft of IP, 85
City government fraud losses, 105
Classified information, theft of, 67
Closed circuit cameras, 172
Code, defined, 326
Code reviews
benefits, 10–11
formal, 142
SDLC, 136–137
Code top-level domains (ccTLD), 235
Coding process
incident data, 329–331
organization data, 327–328
subject data, 328–329
Collection of data, 325–326
Collusion, 1
complexity of, 6
fraud, 111–113, 117, 134–135, 294
SDLC, 183
separation of duties, 179–180
system design, 183
theft of IP, 194
Commercial facilities industry
case prevalence, 308–310
fraud cases, 263, 265–266
sabotage cases, 242, 245
trusted business partner cases, 278
Common Event Expression (CEE), 223,
229–230
Common Event Format (CEF), 223, 228–229
“Common Sense Guide to Prevention and
Detection of Insider Threats,” 17
Communication for sabotage, 34
Compensating measures for
disgruntlement, 49
Competing businesses, foreign theft of IP
for, 88
Competitors, email to, 77
Complexity of insider threats, 6–7
Compromised accounts in organized
crime, 118
Compromised passwords in fraud, 125–126
Concealment in theft of IP, 95
Conditional projections, 346
Confidentiality
in reporting, 161
SDLC, 130
training about, 162
Conflicts, sabotage from, 35
Consistency checks in SDLC, 183
Consistent enforcement for sabotage, 34, 168
Conspirators in theft of IP, 86
Consultants
food industry sabotage case, 248
information technology sabotage case,
250–251
source code modification, 140–142
Consumer credit database fraud case, 264
Contentious employee terminations, 35
Contractors and third parties
background checks, 166–167
Index
backups, 57
defense industrial base sabotage case, 246
vs. employees, 313
energy industry sabotage case, 247–248
enterprise-wide risk assessments, 152
fraud cases, 266
government sabotage case, 248–249
government theft of IP cases, 260–261
health care fraud case, 269
kiosk access case, 153
ownership case, 156–157
policies, 175–176
password cracking case, 154
physical security, 173
sabotage, 39, 44–45
theft of IP, 73
unauthorized access case, 272–273
Contracts with trusted business partners, 285
Contribution perception in Entitled
Independent
model, 70–72
Controlled information documents, 173
Controls
access. See Access and access controls
change, 191–194
documenting, 155–158
Copied documents as theft of IP indicator, 77
Corporate fraud, 103
Countries
case breakdown by, 316–317
cultural differences, 6
in theft of IP, 85
Coworkers in fraud recruitment, 113–115,
121–123
Crackers, 40
Credentials
information technology sabotage case, 255
Snort for, 220–221
termination sabotage case, 245
unauthorized, 141
Credit card debt as fraud factor, 109
Credit card number verification program
case, 255
Credit database fraud case, 264
Credit histories fraud losses, 105
Cressey, Donald, 106
373
Crime
case breakdown by, 309–312
types, 8–9, 116
Criminal history
in background checks, 164
30–31, 255–256
Critical business functions, outsourcing, 152
Critical data modification verification, 123
Critical infrastructure, protecting, 172
Critical processes, auditing, 120–121
Cultural differences in threats, 6
Cummings, Adam, 102
Currency trader case, 180
Current employees vs. former, 314
Custodial staff training, 162–163
Customer records stolen cases, 272
Customer service processes, training for,
160–161
CyberCIEGE game, 336
CyberSecurity Watch Survey, 319–323
CyLab
fraud modeling, 105
insider threat assessment sponsored by,
17–18
MERIT InterActive. See MERIT InterActive
tool
workshops, 17
D
Dashed arrows in system dynamics
modeling, 347
Data audits, 195
Data collection for database, 325–326
Data integrity in SDLC, 134, 183
Data leakage tools, 65, 77, 197
Data loss prevention (DLP) systems, 65, 77
Database administrators
government sabotage case, 249
privileges, 149
shared accounts, 44, 52
Database breakdown of cases, 7–9
country, 316–317
current employees vs. former, 314
374
Index
Database breakdown of cases (contd.)
employees vs. contractors, 313
international cases, 315–317
sectors, 307–309
technical vs. nontechnical insiders, 314–315
trends over time, 312–313
type of crime, 309–312
Databases, 325
coding process, 327–331
data collection, 325–326
password cracking case, 154
SIEM analysis, 225–227
transactions auditing, 123
DC (domain controller), 235–236
DC3 (Defense Cyber Crime Conference), 219
Deactivating access after termination,
203–206
Dean, Tyler, 216
Deception in Entitled Independent model,
74–78
Defense Cyber Crime Conference
(DC3), 219
Defense industrial base
fraud cases, 266
theft of IP case, 260
Deleted backups, 58
Demonstrational videos, 218–219
Demotions as sabotage precursor, 38, 56
Denial-of-service attacks, 288
Departing employees. See Termination
Detection
automated, 14, 195
fraud, 127
IDS, 220–221
malicious code, 193
sabotage, 53
Dictionaries in Common Event
Expression, 229
Digital rights management (DRM), 65
Digital watermarking, 65
Directory services, 234
Disability fraud cases, 105, 267–268
Disabling
known paths, 51–52
remote access, 200–201
system logs, 42
Disagreements as dissatisfaction factor, 73
Discrimination complaint in government
sabotage case, 249
Disgruntlement issues
defense industrial base sabotage cases,
246–247
fired employee sabotage case,
243–244
government case, 271–272
password theft, 176–177
positive intervention for, 49–50
resigned employee case, 169–170
as sabotage factor, 31–34, 37–38, 40–42
system administrators and other
privileged users, 190
Disposal of controlled information
documents, 173
Disruption of service in SDLC, 141–142
Disruptive employees
as sabotage precursor, 37
Dissatisfaction in Entitled Independent
model, 72–74
DLP (data loss prevention) systems, 65, 77
DNS
registrations redirection, 291
suffixes, 236
Document imaging company in theft of IP
case, 96, 261–262
Documentation
policies and controls, 155–158, 161
SDLC, 138
Domain controller (DC), 235–236
Domain names, in sabotage, 26
Doors, locking, 172
Downsizing, sabotage from, 33
Downward spiral situations in sabotage, 42
Driver’s licenses case, 105, 186, 266
DRM (digital rights management), 65
Dynamic trigger hypotheses, 349
E
E-commerce developer in sabotage
case, 250
Economic espionage, 84
Index
Ecuador, theft of IP in, 85
Education industry
miscellaneous case, 271
EEOC complaint in government sabotage
case, 249
Email
for access control, 71
attachments. See Attachments
eavesdropping case, 270–271
fake addresses cases, 153–154, 266
pornographic images case, 201
theft of IP, 89, 91, 93
theft of IP indicator, 77
Emergency services fraud cases, 266
Employee assistance programs
for disgruntlement, 49
for disruptive employees, 166
for fraud, 124–125
Employees
vs. contractors, 313
disgruntlement. See Disgruntlement issues
online actions best practices, 195–199
protecting, 171
security awareness training for, 159–163
susceptibility to recruitment, 121–123
susceptibility to social engineering, 126
termination. See Termination
Encryption
backups, 58, 208
theft of IP, 95
End user source code access, 131
Energy industry
sabotage case, 247–248
Enforcement of policies in sabotage, 34, 168
Engineers, theft of IP by, 63, 85
Enterprise-wide risk assessments, 151–154
Entertainment Technology Center (ETC),
18, 336
Entitled Independent model in theft of IP
contribution perception in, 70–72
deception, 74–78
dissatisfaction, 72–74
overview, 68–70
threats, 64
375
Erosion of access controls, 71, 189
Espionage
foreign governments and organizations, 84
prevalence, 8
ETC (Entertainment Technology Center),
18, 336
Event correlation engines, 93, 197
Events
MERIT InterActive, 338–339
SIEM signature, 228–230
Exception handling
SDLC, 132, 135
system design, 183
Excessive access privileges, 125
Expectations
policies and controls for, 156
setting, 47–49
unmet. See Unmet expectations
Expedite function in SDLC, 135
Expiration dates of accounts, 234
External hard disks for theft of IP, 94
External organizations
attacks against, 196
email to, 77
External partners. See Trusted business
partners (TBPs)
Extortion
manufacturing plant case, 212–213
two-person rule for, 44
F
Fake email addresses, 153–154, 266
Fake vendor fraud losses, 105
FCI (Force Concept Inventory), 335
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
organized crime definition,
115–116, 286
Federal Network Security (FNS) branch, 17
Federally Funded Research and
Development Center (FFRDC), 219
Feedback loops in system dynamics
modeling, 347–348
File integrity checkers, 191
File transfer, 90–91
File Transfer Protocol (FTP), 90
Finance industry. See Banking and finance
industry
376
Index
Financial compensation as dissatisfaction
factor, 73
Financial gain as motive, 139
Financial impact
Ambitious Leader model, 78
fraud, 103–105
theft of IP, 67
Financial problems
in background checks, 165
fraud from, 111, 124–125
non-sharable, 106
FIRST (Forum of Incident Response and
Security Teams), 219
Flagging database transactions, 123
Flood control, 345
FNS (Federal Network Security)
branch, 17
Food industry
sabotage case, 248
Force Concept Inventory (FCI), 335
Foreign-currency trader fraud
case, 265
Foreign governments and organizations
theft of IP, 67, 83–88, 261–262
threat complexity, 7
Foreign nationals asylum case, 181, 267
Formal code reviews, 142
Former employees vs. current, 314
Forum of Incident Response and Security
Teams (FIRST), 219
Fraud
auditing for, 120–121
continuing, 110–111
defined, 101
description, 4
excessive access privileges, 125
financial problems, 124–125
impacts, 103, 105
insider stressors, 115
models, 13
organizational issues, 120–126
organized crime, 115–119
origins, 108–110
outsider facilitation, 111–113
overview, 101–106
patterns, 106–108
perpetrator characteristics, 1
recruiting others, 113–115, 121–123
verification of modification of critical
data, 123
Fraud cases, 4–5, 262–263
banking and finance industry, 264–265
commercial facilities industry, 263,
265–266
defense industrial base, 266
emergency services, 266
food industry, 266–267
government, 267–269
health care industry, 166, 269
lottery agency, 212
positive outcome, 296–297
prevalence, 8, 310–312
Fraud Triangle, 106–108
From Modeling to Managing Security: A
System Dynamics Approach, 349
FTP (File Transfer Protocol), 90
Full disclosure by third-party vendors, 57
G
Games. See MERIT InterActive tool
GFIRST (Government Forum of Incident
Response and Security Teams), 219
Globalization issues, 176
Glossary of terms, 351–357
Gmail accounts as theft of IP indicator, 77
Gonzalez, Jose, 349
Government
defense industrial base sabotage cases,
246–247
espionage, 84
fake email addresses case, 153–154
fraud, 104–105, 267–269
miscellaneous case, 271–272
theft of IP cases, 260–261
Government Forum of Incident Response
and Security Teams (GFIRST), 219
Group modeling, 349
Guards
Index
for deterrence, 171
security awareness training for, 162–163
H
Hanley, Michael
insider threat lab, 216
Hazardous material sector, 87
Headers in Common Event Format, 228
Health industry
claims fraud case, 166, 269
Help desk fraud cases, 266
High-priority mitigation strategies, 219–220
Hiring process, 164
Host data exfiltration, 93–95
Hostile work environments
case study, 169–170
dissatisfaction factor, 73
Hotmail accounts as theft of IP indicator, 77
Houy, Matt, 216
HTTPS traffic, 66
Human resources (HR) department
account expiration dates, 234
MERIT InterActive, 337, 339
for sabotage, 39
I
IDC (Interactive Data Corporation)
survey, 278
Identity crimes. See also Personally
Identifiable Information (PII)
defined, 101
prevalence, 113–114
Identity management systems, 24
IDS (intrusion detection system),
220–221
Immigration asylum case, 181, 267
Impacts, 152
fraud, 103–105
SDLC, 130
theft of IP, 66–68
377
Implementation in SDLC, 183–184
Incident data in coding process, 329–331
Incident management process, 124
Incident response plans, 211–213
Inconsistent enforcement of policies,
sabotage from, 34, 168
Industrial espionage, 84
Information and telecommunications
industry
Information overload, 196, 198
Information technology departments,
MERIT InterActive for, 337
Information technology industry cases
miscellaneous, 272–273
sabotage, 250–256
sabotage/fraud, 257–258
Infrastructure
insider threat lab, 217–218
protecting, 172
Insider and Cyber Security: Beyond the
Hacker, 23
Insider threat assessment in 2007, 18
Insider threat center, 3
exercises, 303–304
objectives, 13–14
products and services, 299–301
sponsored research, 306
teams, 15
threat assessment, 304–305
workshops, 301–303
Insider threat exercises in 2010, 18–19
Insider threat lab, 15–16
in 2009, 18
centralized logging. See Centralized
logging
demonstrational videos, 218–219
exercises, 239
high-priority mitigation strategies,
219–220
infrastructure, 217–218
overview, 215–216
purposes, 216–217
SIEM signature. See Security Information
and Event Management (SIEM)
signature
378
Index
Insider threat lab (contd.)
SiLK tool, 221–223
Snort tool, 220–221
Insider Threat Outreach and Transition
Team, 15–16
Insider threat research in 2000, 16
Insider Threat Research Team, 15
Insider Threat Study (ITS)
in 2001, 16
banking and finance sector, 19
fraud modeling, 105
profiles from, 11
Insider trading, 103
Installation in SDLC, 184
Insurance fraud case, 166, 269
Integrity
SDLC, 130
training on, 162
Integrity checks
automated, 134, 195
database transactions, 123
SDLC, 134
Intellectual property agreements, 157,
168–169
Intellectual property theft. See Theft of
intellectual property (IP)
Interactive Data Corporation (IDC)
survey, 278
Interactive virtual simulation tool.
See MERIT InterActive tool
International cases, 315–317
International Traffic in Arms
Regulations, 67
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels, 255
Internet service providers (ISPs) cases
customer information, 220–221
sabotage, 251–252, 255–256
source code modification, 140
threatening email, 176
Internet underground threats
access controls and monitoring, 291–292
complexity of, 7
conclusions, 293
crimes, 288–289
insider characteristics, 287
insider involvement, 288
overview, 286–287
sabotage cases, 245, 251–252
unknown access paths, 289–291
Intrusion detection system (IDS), 220–221
Inventory control, 94
IRC (Internet Relay Chat) channels, 255
Irregular processes, auditing, 120–121
ISPs. See Internet service providers (ISPs)
cases
ITS. See Insider Threat Study (ITS)
J
Job performance declines as sabotage
precursor, 35
Job responsibilities descriptions, 49
Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks,
Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable
Applications, 65
K
Key-value pairs in Common Event
Format, 228
Keystroke loggers
system change control cases, 194
theft of IP, 160
King, Christopher, 116
Kiosk access case, 153
Known-bad domain names, 235
L
Laptops for theft of IP, 90–91
Large attachments as theft of IP indicator, 77
Last days of employment
centralized logging. See Centralized
logging
precautions, 98
theft of IP, 76, 95, 98
Lax overtime controls, 185
Layered defense for remote attacks, 200–202
LDAP directory service, 234
Least privilege best practices, 178–181
Legal firm theft of IP case, 261–262
Legal issues, 152
Index
Lessons learned step for financial
problems, 124
Limiting accounts, 45
Loan officer fraud case, 264
Locking doors and windows, 172
Logic bombs
defense industrial base sabotage case,
246–247
description, 9
government sabotage case, 248–249
252–253
placement, 53
positive outcome case, 25, 297
SDLC case, 185–186
system administrator case, 189, 244–245
unmet expectations, 33
Logistics company sabotage case, 256
Logs and logging
access, 172–173
centralized. See Centralized logging
change, 192
Common Event Expression, 229
reviewing, 166
sabotage, 37, 42, 56–57
SDLC, 137
theft of IP, 93, 95
Loops in system dynamics modeling,
347–348
Lottery
fraud case, 212, 268–269
fraud losses, 105
Low-nicotine cigarettes, 345
Lower-level employees, 104–105
M
Macro-lab, 218
MAILHOST server, 235–236
Maintenance phase in SDLC, 136
Malicious activity in system design, 183
Malicious code
description, 10
expected bonus sabotage case, 244–245
fraud case, 265–266
379
252–253
network manager sabotage case, 244
unauthorized access case, 271
Management and Education of the Risk of
Insider Threat (MERIT) project, 9
development of, 17
insider threat models, 9–12, 27
Managers as organized crime
participants, 117
Manufacturing sector
extortion case, 212–213
terminated employee case, 205
Market trend product analysis organization
sabotage case, 253–254
Meadows, Dennis, 346
Media
backups, 208
theft of IP, 62, 90, 94
Mergers and acquisitions
complexity of, 6
as dissatisfaction factor, 73
MERIT (Management and Education of the
Risk of Insider Threat) project, 9
development of, 17
insider threat models, 9–12, 27
MERIT InterActive tool, 18
conclusion, 343
effectiveness, 334–336
overview, 333–334
prototype, 336–340
stages, 339–342
Micro-lab, 217–218
Military equipment fraud losses, 105
MIS Training Institute InfoSec World, 219
Miscellaneous cases, 8, 269–273
Missing work as sabotage precursor, 35
Mitigation strategies
insider threat lab, 219–220
SDLC, 142
Modification
production source code and scripts,
140–142
verifying, 123
380
Index
Monitoring
network traffic for sabotage, 51
strategies, 52–53
suspicious and disruptive behavior,
164–167
targeted, 55
for theft of IP, 95
Montelibano, Joji, 216
Monthly auditing, 196
Mood swings as sabotage precursor, 36
Moore, Andrew P.
best practices, 145
biography, 366
fraud modeling, 102
SDLC, 139
theft of IP, 65, 83
Motives
Internet underground insiders, 287
SDLC, 139
Moves in MERIT InterActive, 338
Multiple roles in fraud cases, 267–268
N
National Threat Assessment Center
(NTAC), 16
Negative influences in system dynamics
modeling, 347
Negative workplace issues
managing, 168–170
sabotage from, 35
Network sniffers, 221, 255, 304
Networks
252–253
monitoring, 51
sabotage, 41
Nigerian Mafia, 122
911 system case, 209, 254
NOC system administrators sabotage
case, 254
Non-sharable financial problems, 106
Noncompete agreements, 168–169
Nonpublic sources of information, 326
Nonrepudiation techniques
benefits, 187
for sabotage, 42–43
Nontechnical employees, insider theft
discovered by, 74
Nontechnical insiders vs. technical, 314–315
NTAC (National Threat Assessment
Center), 16
Ntop tool, 304
O
OCTAVE (Operationally Critical Threat,
Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation)
technique, 195
Office of National Counterintelligence
Executive, 83
Office trash, 173
One-month termination window
precautions, 98
theft of IP, 76, 95, 98
Online actions best practices, 195–199
Operationally Critical Threat, Asset, and
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE)
technique, 195
Opportunity in Fraud Triangle, 106–107
Organization data coding process, 327–328
Organization-issued badges, 171
Organizational issues in fraud, 120–126
Organized crime, 286–287
fraud, 115–119
malicious insiders, 116–117
methods, 118–119
motives, 118
participants, 117
prevalence, 116
targets, 118
Index
Origins of fraud, 108–110
Outreach and Transition Team, 15–16
Outsider facilitation of fraud, 111–113
Outsourcing
critical business functions, 152
and password and account management
policies, 176
Overtime, lax controls on, 185
Ownership disagreements, 73, 156–157
P
Packet sniffers, 221, 255, 304
Partners. See Trusted business partners
(TBPs)
Password cracking, 40, 154
Password-protected screen savers, 172
Passwords, 42
auditing, 44
customer records stolen cases, 272
food industry case, 266–267
fraud, 125–126
government case, 271–272
policies and practices, 45, 174–177
student unauthorized access case, 271
system administrator termination
sabotage case, 245
withheld pay case, 152–153
Patterns
fraud, 106–108
sabotage, 28–29
Performance reviews for sabotage, 49
Periodic security awareness training, 159–163
Personal information in fraud, 103–104
Personal predispositions for sabotage, 28, 30
Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
access control case, 292
fraud, 111, 121, 279
future threats, 315–316
255–256
positive outcome case, 296–297
prevalence, 113–114
trusted business partner access to, 279
381
Personnel policies for trusted business
partners, 284
Physical environment, tracking and
securing, 171–173
Physical exfiltration, 95
Physical media for backups, 208
PII. See Personally Identifiable
Information (PII)
Planned layoffs, sabotage from, 33
Planning in Ambitious Leader model, 79–80
Police communications operator case, 132,
186, 266
Policies and procedures
documenting, 155–158
passwords and account management,
174–177
reporting suspicious behavior, 165–166
SIEM, 225
training based on, 161
Pornographic images case, 140, 201, 254
Positive influence in system dynamics
modeling, 347
Positive intervention for disgruntlement,
49–50
Possessiveness in Entitled Independent
model, 72
Postal and shipping industry sabotage
case, 256
Potential precursors to sabotage, 37–42,
223–231
PowerShell AD administration tools,
237–238
Precipitating events for sabotage,
31–34
Precise predictions in system dynamics, 346
Precursors to sabotage, 37–42, 223–231
Predictions in system dynamics
modeling, 346
Preliminary Model of Insider Theft of
Intellectual Property, 12
Prescription benefit plans sabotage
case, 252
Pressure in Fraud Triangle, 106
Preventive controls for fraud, 126
Printed documents for theft of IP, 90
382
Index
Prioritizing alerts in risk-based approach,
53–54
Prison inmate cases, 282–283
Privileges
accumulation of, 71
backdoor accounts, 175–176
excessive, 125
hacking case, 157–158
least privilege best practices, 178–181
Proactive monitoring of employee online
actions, 199
Production source code modification, 140
Profiles in MERIT threat models, 10–12
Programmer theft of IP threats, 63
Programming techniques for attacks,
139–142
Progress Measure in MERIT InterActive, 338
Project managers in government sabotage
case, 249
Promotion disagreements as dissatisfaction
factor, 73
Proprietary software in theft of IP, 95
Prototypes in MERIT InterActive,
336–340
Proxies in theft of IP, 93
Public health industry
Public sources of information, 326
Q
Quarterly auditing, 196
R
Random auditing, 196
Rationalization in Fraud Triangle,
106–107
Recovery processes
SDLC, 142
testing, 57–59
Recruitment
fraud, 113–115, 121–123
theft of IP case, 261
References, 359–364
Reinforcing loops in system dynamics
modeling, 348
Relocation issues as dissatisfaction
factor, 73
Remailers, 109
Remote network access
layered defense for, 200–202
for theft of IP, 90–92
Remote network administration tools for
sabotage, 40
Removable media for theft of IP, 62, 90, 94
Reorganization, sabotage from, 33
Reporting
confidential, 161
suspicious behavior, 165–166
Reprimands as sabotage precursor, 38
Requirements in SDLC, 131–132, 182–183
Research by insider threat center, 306
Research chemist case, 198
Research deleted case, 166
Research Team, 15
Resignations in theft of IP, 73, 76
Responding to suspicious and disruptive
behavior, 164–167
Responsibilities removal as sabotage
precursor, 38
Return on investment (ROI) in theft of IP
mitigation, 68
Revenge
Internet underground insiders, 287, 293
sabotage cases, 243–244, 250, 257, 280
SDLC, 139
Risk assessments
enterprise-wide, 151–154
process, 304–305
Risk-based approach in prioritizing alerts,
53–54
Risk Measure in MERIT InterActive, 338
ROI (return on investment) in theft of IP
mitigation, 68
Role-based access control
description, 179
fraud, 125
SDLC, 132–133
Index
Role playing, 334
Rootkits, 41
S
Sabotage
backup and recovery process tests, 57–59
backups, 24, 40, 44–45, 139, 208, 256
behavioral precursors, 35–37
demotion measures, 56
description, 3
disgruntlement strategies, 49–50
expectations setting, 47–49
impacts, 26–27
mitigation strategies, 46–47
monitoring strategies, 52–53
of other organizations, 59
overview, 23–28
patterns, 28–29
perpetrator characteristics, 1, 27
personal predispositions, 28, 30
precipitating events, 31–34
profiles for, 11
reducing, 30–31, 34–35
risk-based approach to prioritizing alerts,
53–54
secure logs, 56–57
SIEM signature for, 223–231
from stressful events, 37–39
targeted monitoring, 55
technical precursors and access paths,
40–45
termination measures, 35, 40, 56
time and attack location, 225–227
Trust Trap, 45–46
trusted business partners, 44–45, 280–281
unknown access paths, 41–42, 50–52
Sabotage cases, 3–4, 241–243
banking and finance industry, 243–245
commercial facilities industry, 242, 245
defense industrial base, 246–247
energy industry, 247–248
food industry, 248
information technology industry, 250–256
positive outcome, 297
postal and shipping industry, 256
383
Sabotage/fraud cases, 256–258
Salary and compensation as sabotage
factor, 34
Salespeople theft of IP threats, 63
Sanctions as sabotage precursor, 38–39
Schroeder, Will, 216
Scientists in theft of IP, 63, 85
Screen savers, password-protected, 172
Scripts modification, 140
SDLC. See Software Development Life
Cycle (SDLC)
SDMIS (System Dynamics Modeling for
Information Security), 348–349
SDN (Security Dynamics Network), 348–350
Secret Service
fraud modeling, 106
National Threat Assessment Center, 16
Sectors, case breakdown by, 307–309
Secure logs for sabotage, 56–57
Security
awareness training, 159–163
bypassing in organized crime, 118
SDLC, 131, 138–139
Security Dynamics Network (SDN), 348–350
Security guards
for deterrence, 171
training for, 162–163
Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) signature,
223–225
application, 227–228, 230–231
Common Event Expression, 229–230
Common Event Format, 228–229
database analysis, 225–227
overview, 223–225
Sense of ownership in Entitled Independent
model, 70
Separation of duties
backups, 58
fraud, 125
for sabotage, 43
SDLC, 133
system administrators, 188
system design, 183
384
Index
Shared accounts
audits for, 175
Sharing passwords in sabotage, 42
Shaw, Eric, 65
Shimeall, Timothy J., 145
SIEM. See Security Information and Event
Management (SIEM) signature
SiLK tool, 221–223, 304
Sim City-styled simulation, 336
Simulation. See MERIT InterActive tool
Snort tool, 220–221, 304
Social engineering
fraud, 126
sabotage, 44
Software Development Life Cycle
(SDLC), 129
attribution, 137
authentication and role-based access
control, 132–133
automated data integrity checks, 134
backups, 138–139
code reviews, 136–137
disruption of service and theft of
information, 141–142
exception handling, 132, 135
mitigation strategies, 142
modification of production source code
and scripts, 140
overview, 129–131
programming techniques, 139–142
requirements and system design
oversights, 131–132
separation of duties, 133
system deployment, 137–139
unauthorized authentication
credentials, 141
Software Engineering Institute, 219
Software keystroke loggers
system change control cases, 194
Software ownership issues, 73, 156–157
Sole system administrators
backups, 205
sabotage, 44
sabotage/fraud case, 257–258
Solid arrows in system dynamics
modeling, 347
Source code
access control, 142
backups, 138
defense industrial base sabotage case, 247
deleted, 163
end user access, 131
modification, 140
shared, 67
theft of IP, 95
Special Publication 800–53: Recommended
Security Controls for Federal Information
Systems and Organizations, 214
Special treatment of employees, sabotage
from, 34, 168
splunk-powershell project, 238
Splunk tool, 232
Sponsored research for insider threat
center, 306
Spooner, Derrick
fraud modeling, 102
theft of IP, 65, 83
“Spotlight On: Insider Theft of
Intellectual Property inside the U.S.
Involving Foreign Governments or
Organizations,” 83
“Spotlight On: Insider Threat from Trusted
Business Partners,” 276
“Spotlight On: Malicious Insiders and
Organized Crime Activity,” 116
“Spotlight On: Malicious Insiders with
Ties to the Internet Underground
Community,” 286
“Spotlight On: Programming Techniques
Used as an Insider Attack Tool,” 139
Stages in MERIT InterActive, 339–342
Star performer treatment, sabotage from,
34, 168
Stolen backup media, 58
Stressful events
fraud from, 115
sabotage from, 37–39
Index
Strict password policies and practices,
174–177
Students unauthorized access cases, 271
Subcontractors
background checks, 166–167
policies, 175–176
Subject data in coding process, 328–329
Supervisors as dissatisfaction factor, 73
Supply chain management, 176
Surveys
CyberSecurity Watch Survey, 319–323
IDC, 278
Suspensions as sabotage precursor, 38
Suspicious behavior
Entitled Independent model, 74
reporting, 165–166
System administrators
backups, 205
sabotage, 44
theft of IP threats, 62–63
System change controls, 191–194
System deployment in SDLC, 137–139
System design in SDLC, 131–132, 183
System dynamics modeling, 12
in 2005, 17
MERIT InterActive based on, 335
overview, 345–348
Security Dynamics Network, 348–350
System Dynamics Modeling for Information
Security (SDMIS), 348–349
System Dynamics Society, 348–349
System Dynamics Society Conference, 349
System logs for sabotage, 42
System maintenance in SDLC, 185
System overrides in system design, 183
T
Tagging documents for theft of IP, 77
Targeted monitoring for sabotage, 55
Targeting centralized logging, 237–238
TBPs. See Trusted business partners (TBPs)
385
Team-oriented, role-playing
experiences, 334
Teams in CERT Insider Threat Center, 15
Technical controls. See Insider threat lab
Technical insiders vs. nontechnical,
314–315
Technical monitoring in Ambitious Leader
model, 83
Technical precursors for sabotage, 40–45
Technical users best practices, 187–190
Technology solution limitations, 14
Telecommunications company
Temporary staff, threats from, 278
Termination
monitoring, 233–235
property retrieval in, 169
remote access, 200–201
sabotage, 35, 40, 56
theft of IP, 73
unknown access paths, 289–291
Termination cases
backups, 209–210
commercial facilities sabotage, 245,
289–290
eavesdropping, 270–271
information technology sabotage,
250–251
logistics company sabotage, 256
theft of IP, 260
trusted business partner, 277
unauthorized access, 272–273
Terms, glossary, 351–357
Testing backup and recovery process,
57–59
Theft of information
employee remote access case, 198–199
SDLC, 141–142
Theft of intellectual property (IP)
concealment, 95
description, 5
Entitled Independent model. See Entitled
Independent model in theft of IP
386
Index
Theft of intellectual property (IP) (contd.)
foreign governments and organizations,
83–88
host data, 93–95
impacts, 66–68
methods overview, 89–90
mitigation strategies, 88–97
models, 12–13
network data, 90–93
overview, 61–66
patterns, 68–69
perpetrator characteristics, 1
physical theft, 95
trusted business partners, 96–97, 281–282
types, 61
Theft of IP cases
chemical industry, 258–259
customer information, 5–6
defense industrial base, 246, 260
fraud, 265–266
information technology industry, 261–262
ownership issue, 156–157
positive outcome, 297
Theft ring in fraud case, 264
Third-parties. See Contractors and third
parties
30-day window
precautions, 98
theft of IP, 76, 95, 98
Threads in MERIT InterActive, 339
Threat models, 9–12, 27
Threatening emails case, 201
Thumb drives for theft of IP, 94
TIFF images, 261
Time frame in fraud, 110–111
Tracking
access paths, 52
controlled information documents, 173
theft of IP, 92
Trade secrets. See Theft of intellectual
property (IP)
Trader fraud case, 265
Training
effectiveness of, 334–336
security awareness, 159–163
simulation for. See MERIT
InterActive tool
supervisors for sabotage, 36
Transactions
auditing, 123
verifying, 154
Trash, office, 173
Trends
cases breakdown by, 312–313
system dynamics modeling, 346
Trigger hypotheses, 349
True stories. See Case examples
Trust Trap in sabotage, 45–46
Trusted business partners (TBPs)
complexity of threats, 6
customer records stolen cases, 272
fraud, 5, 279–280
identifying, 282–283
mitigation and detection
recommendations, 283–285
overview, 275–277
policies, 175–176
sabotage, 44–45, 280–281
theft of IP, 96–97, 281–282
threat overview, 278–279
Trzeciak, Randall F.
best practices, 145
biography, 366
insider threat lab, 216
SDLC, 139
theft of IP, 65, 83
Two-person rule
backups, 58, 208
description, 178
for sabotage, 43–45
Type of crime, case breakdown by, 309–312
U
UIDs (userids)
converting, 234
Index
Unauthorized authentication
credentials, 141
Undercover agent fraud case, 296–297
Unknown access paths
eliminating, 50–52
sabotage, 41–42
Unmet expectations
logic bomb sabotage cases, 244–245
policies and controls for, 156
sabotage from, 31–34
SDLC case, 185–186
system administrator case, 189
U.S. Munitions List source code theft, 67
Userids (UIDs)
converting, 234
V
Validation of configurations, 191–192
Vendors
backup services, 57
policies, 175–176
sabotage, 44–45
Verification
modification of critical data, 123
transaction, 154
Victim organizations, 327
Videos at insider threat lab, 218–219
Violent behavior
arrests for, 30
Virtual private networks (VPNs)
attack prevalence, 225–227
387
sabotage, 24
theft of IP case, 221–223
Virtual simulation tool, 18
Virtual world, 179
Visual simulation company theft of IP
case, 260
Voice-mail system case, 201–202
VPNs (virtual private networks)
attack prevalence, 225–227
sabotage, 24
theft of IP case, 221–223
Vulnerabilities assessments, 152
W
Water sector
fraud, 104
Web site for insider threat controls, 216
Weiland, Robert, 276
Windows, locking, 172
Wireless networks
information technology sabotage cases,
251–253
Wireshark packet sniffer, 221, 304
Withheld passwords case, 152–153
Workshops
insider threat center, 301–303
SDMIS, 349
Writable CDs for theft of IP, 94
X
XNET platform, 18–19, 218, 239, 304

Document 6498400

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