14 Monopoly

14
Monopoly
Varian: Read the chapter on Monopoly. You may also want to go back and review elasticities.
Up to this point we have studied …rms that take all prices as given. While this may be a
reasonable approximation in highly competitive markets (which we think of as markets where
a large number of …rms produce some homogenous good), price taking doesn’t make much
sense in markets where there is some obvious “market power”, such as Microsoft, Terasen
Gas, Coca Cola, and pharmaceutical companies producing patented drugs.
To analyze monopoly pricing we will study a (partial equilibrium) model where a single
…rm is the only actor in the industry apart from consumers. The consumers will play a
passive role; their behavior is summarized by a demand function (which we think of as
generated by optimizing consumers) for the good. We will proceed as follows:
1. Study the standard textbook monopoly pricing model.
2. Make the observation that it is no longer obvious that the pricing scheme should be a
single price per unit sold. Some examples of various forms of price discrimination will
be given
3. Study a “durable good monopoly”, where the point is that market power is eroded
because the monopolist starts to “compete with itself”.
14.1
A Pro…t Maximizing Monopolist
Like a competitive …rm, we assume that the monopolist strives to generate as large pro…ts
as possible. That is, it seeks to maximize
py
C(y):
However, unlike a competitive …rm, a rational monopolist understands that it can only sell
what the consumers are willing to buy and, since it operates alone in the market, the …rm
can set both price and the level of production. We let D (p) denote the (direct) demand
1
for the product and note that the monopolist can sell at most D(p) units at price p. The
optimization problem for the monopolist is thus
max py
p;y
subj to y
C(y)
D(p):
Clearly, y = D(p) in a solution since otherwise the sales could be increased without lowering
the price, so we may rewrite the problem as
max pD(p)
C(D(p));
p
where we have price as the choice variable. Alternatively we may invert the demand (view
it as in the pictures where we have y as the independent variable and p as the dependent
variable). Then if p(y) is the inverse demand we can write the problem as
max p(y)y
p
14.1.1
C(y);
Inverse and Direct Demand
f
X
xt
}
R
f
ty
1
Y
Figure 1: The Inverse of a Function
Mathematically speaking, if y = D(p) is the direct demand function, the inverse of D is
2
a function p = D 1 (y) such that
D 1 ( D(p) ) = p:
| {z }
quantity
demanded
at price p
The concept is illustrated for a general function f in Figure 1. The point is that if the
function f takes x to a value y; then the inverse takes the value y back to the value x we
started with. This must be so for each x and each f (x) ; so the inverse reverts the operation
of the original function f: As an example, say that
D(p) = a
bp
Then, to …nd the inverse we only need to solve out p as a function of the quantity. That
means that
y = a
p(y) =
where A =
14.2
a
b
and B =
a
b
bp(y) ,
1
y=A
b
By
1
b
The Optimality Condition
Both versions of the problems are equivalent, so in principle it doesn’t matter which one to
solve. However, it turns out that it is somewhat more convenient to work with
max p(y)y
y
C(y);
The …rst order condition is
p0 (y)y + p(y)
c0 (y) = 0 ,
p0 (y)y + p(y) = c0 (y)
To interpret the condition note that p(y)y is the revenue the monopolist gets if selling y
units. Hence
3
d
p(y)y
dy
= p0 (y)y + p(y) is the marginal revenue. In words, the additional revenue the
monopolist gets for a small extra unit of output
C 0 (y) is just the marginal cost.
Thus, the optimality condition is the rather natural condition that the additional
revenue from the last small unit outweighs the cost.
Observe that the condition p = C 0 (y) has the exact same interpretation. The di¤erence
is that a competitive …rm treats price as given, while the monopolist picks price/quantity
combinations on a downward sloping demand curve. Hence the trade-o¤ is di¤erent for the
monopolist. If the monopolist sells few units it can charge a high price, but the more units it
sells the lower price it must charge. When it lowers the price to get one additional unit sold
it must lower the price for all units, so the loss in revenue associated with selling one more
unit will be higher the more units the monopolist sells. This logic is most easily understood
in an example with constant marginal cost and a linear demand.
14.3
Example: Linear Demand
Let
p(y) = A
By
c(y) = cy
so the problem is
max (A By)y
y |
{z }
cy
p(y)
The …rst order condition is
By + A
By
c = 0
,
y
4
=
A c
2B
Note that (A
By)y is the revenue, so
A
2By
is the marginal revenue. The problem and its solution can thus be depicted in a graph as in
p 6
a c
T
Tcc
T c
T
cslope b
c
T
c
Pro…tT
c
T
c
c
T
c
slope
2b c
T
c
T
c
T MR
c
T
c Demand
cc
TT
y
y
Figure 2: A Pro…t Maximizing Monopolist
Figure 2, where the demand curve as well as the marginal revenue is drawn. To some of you
it may be geometrically obvious that the solution is to set the quantity halfway in between 0
and the quantity where the demand curve intersects the horizontal line at height c: Solving
c=A
By we get y =
A c
;
B
so y is indeed this middle point. To understand geometrically
that this is the solution to the pro…t maximization problem, observe that the monopolist
aims to make the rectangle representing pro…ts as large as it can.
If the quantity sold is small, the pro…t is a high “thin” rectangle and there are few
units to loose revenues from if the quantity is increased/price decreased.
If the quantity is close to A
By; then pro…ts is a low “fat” rectangle and there are
many units to gain revenues from if quantity is decreased/price increased
It may be visually clear that the pro…t is the higher with y at the midpoint between 0
and A
By and one can also show it by pure algebra (no derivatives involved) or elementary
(=pretty hard) geometric reasoning. Intuitively:
5
Additional revenue from extra unit due to increased sales is approximately
p(y + 1) = A
B(y + 1)
A
By
Loss in revenue in terms of lower price on all units is
(p(y + 1)
p(y)) y = (A
B(y + 1)
so the change in revenue is approximately a
14.4
A + By) y =
By
2By:
Elasticity
The basic trade-o¤ for a monopolist is that:
If the price is high, the pro…t per unit is high but it sells only a few units.
If the price is low, the pro…t per unit is low, but it sells many units.
The outcome of this trade-o¤ is as we saw a “compromise” between quantity sold and
pro…t per unit. Clearly, it is important for this trade-o¤ how responsive demand is to changes
in the price.
The most obvious measure of responsiveness to price is simple D0 (p); the derivative of
the demand function.
However, for several reasons (that I will not detail) economists usually measure responsiveness of demand in terms of elasticities.
The elasticity of a demand function D(p) is given by
D0 (p)p
dy p
e(p) =
=
=
D(p)
dp y
dy
y
dp
p
:
The reason why this is convenient is that the elasticity is a good approximation of the
percentage change in quantity demanded over the percentage change in price.
This can be seen by observing that for a small change in the price
D(p0 )
D(p) + D0 (p)(p0
6
p)
and putting this into the de…nition of the demand elasticity we get
y
e(p)
(D(p0 ) D(p)) p
=
D(p)(p0 p)
z
}|
{
D(p0 ) D(p)
D(p)
| {z }
p
(p0 p)
p
=
y
y
p
p
The main usefulness with the elasticity compared to the slope of the demand function is
that it is a unit-free measurement that makes it easy for economists to compare empirical
…ndings for di¤erent markets with each other and sometimes even get a sense for whether
…rms have monopoly power or not.
14.5
The elasticity of a linear demand function.
Let
D(p) = a
bp
) D0 (p) =
b
the elasticity is thus
D0 (p)p
bp
e(p) =
=
D(p)
a bp
Now, since elasticities are negative and it is easier to think about positive numbers we
typically convert elasticities to absolute values.
1. If je(p)j = 1 )
bp
a bp
= 1 , bp = a
bp , p =
2. je(p)j > 1 )
bp
a bp
> 1 , bp > a
bp , p >
a
2b
3. je(p)j < 1 )
bp
a bp
< 1 , bp < a
bp , p <
a
2b
4.
bp
a bp
! 0 as p ! 0
5.
bp
a bp
! 1 as p !
a
b
since bp ! a and a
DRAW!
7
a
2b
bp ! 0 as p ! ab :
14.6
Elasticities and The Monopolist Problem
For this it is convenient to use the version of the monopoly problem with the direct demand,
i.e., we solve
max pD(p)
p
C(D(p))
The …rst order condition is
D(p) + pD0 (p)
C 0 (D(p))D0 (p) = 0:
The interpretation of this the same as in the previous version of the …rst order condition,
but it is a little harder to see:
D(p) + pD0 (p) is the change in revenue from a slight change in the price
C 0 (D(p))D0 (p) is the change in cost from a slight change in the price
Hence the condition has the same interpretation in terms of marginal revenue being
equalized to marginal cost (it is the same problem, so it should). The …rst order conditions
can be reorganized as
D(p) + pD0 (p) = C 0 (D(p))D0 (p) , /divide by D0 (p)/
D(p)
+ p = C 0 (D(p)) ,
D0 (p)
D(p)
p
+1
= C 0 (D(p)) ,
D0 (p)p
1
p
+1
= C 0 (D(p))
e(p)
:
D(p)
1
=
0
D (p)p
e(p)
Now this tells us that
1
+1>0
e(p)
since otherwise the marginal revenue is negative. Translating the negative elasticity to an
absolute value this means that
1
+1>0
je(p)j
8
or, je(p)j > 1: We can then rearrange the …rst order condition once more as
p=
je(p)j
je(p)j 1
C 0 (D(p));
which is often referred to as a “markup pricing” formula. The point with the expression is
that we see that price must exceed the cost. However, since the monopolist picks the elasticity
when picking a point on the demand curve we should keep in mind that the elasticity in
general varies (recall the linear example).
14.7
The Ine¢ ciency of Monopoly Pricing
Consumer(s) value the last unit produced at the monopoly price pm : However, the monopolist
only gives up the marginal cost C 0 (y m ) if producing an extra unit, which the consumer would
value at pm : Due to this “wedge” between the marginal cost and the willingness to pay for
the last unit all agents could be made happier if, in addition to the units traded at monopoly
price, the monopolist and the consumer(s) could trade some additional units at a lower price.
You may note that the problem is the di¤erence between the marginal cost and the price
the consumers pay, so a tax on a good sold by a competitive market (which in the constant
returns case would imply that the equilibrium price must be c + t) creates an ine¢ ciency
for exactly the same reason.
14.7.1
Justifying “Deadweight Loss Tringles”
Often times the distortion is quanti…ed in a graph using the “deadweight loss”, which is
illustrated for the case of a constant marginal cost in Figure 3. The intuitive idea is that
the demand curve gives the willingness to pay for the marginal unit, the that the distance
between the demand and the marginal cost curve gives the “dollars lost” for that unit not
being produced. To really make sense of this we’d have to do more careful “welfare analysis”.
However if utility is quasi-linear then it is rather easy to demonstrate that this is a valid way
to proceed. Suppose U (x; y) = x + v(y) and that the price of good x is normalized to one.
9
p 6
a c
T
Tcc
T c
T
cslope b
c
T
c
Pro…tT
c
T
c
c
T
c
slope
2b c
T
c
T
c
T MR
c
T
c Demand
cc
TT
y
y
Figure 3: The Deadweight Loss of a Monopoly
The problem for a utility maximizing consumer is then
max x + v(y)
s.t x + py
m
Plugging in the constraint and optimizing we get the …rst order condition
v 0 (y) = p
This condition de…nes the inverse demand function for y (as long as m is large enough so
as to guarantee that the solution is interior), that is
p(y) = v 0 (y)
Observe that
v(y)
v(0) =
Z
0
y
0
v (y)dy =
Z
y
p(y)dy = Area under inverse demand;
0
so since
x + v(y) is the utility of consuming (x; y)
m + v(0) is the utility of consuming x = m
10
and y = 0
we have that the consumer is happier if consuming (x; y) than (m; 0) if and only if
x + v(y)
Area under inverse demand = v(y)
v(0)
m + v(0) ,
m
x
Thus, the area under the inverse demand tells you how many units of the other
good the consumer would be willing to give up for y units of good y if facing an
“all-or-nothing choice”.
14.8
Price Discrimination
The basic reason why a monopoly (charging a uniform price) is ine¢ cient is that even though
it would be bene…cial for society, the monopolist doesn’t want to increase output since this
would reduce the pro…ts earned for all the units sold at the monopoly price.
However, if:
1. The monopolist can make the price contingent on quantity, and
2. “Individualize”price/quantity o¤ers (in case of more than one consumer),
then this trade-o¤ disappears. This is illustrated in Figure 4 where the horizontal line
indicates the (constant) marginal cost of production. If the market would be competitive,
then we know that the equilibrium price would equal; the marginal cost and that there
would be no distortion. The associated demands are given marginal cost pricing are given
by y1 ; y2 ; ::::; yn in the …gure.
The standard monopoly analysis would be to add up all the demand curves and then set
a price so that the pro…ts are maximized (given that the price is the same for all customers
and the same no matter how much each customer buys.
However, let Ai be the area under the demand curve in between 0 and yi for agent i and
suppose gives the following “o¤er”to each agent:
Consumer 1 can pay A1 and get y1 or pay nothing and get nothing (and this is a
non-negotiable o¤er)
11
p
p
6
p
6
6
...
y1
Consumer 1
y
y2
y
Consumer 2
yn
Consumer n
y
Figure 4: Perfect Price Discrimination
Consumer 2 can pay A2 and get y2 or pay nothing and get nothing (and this is a
non-negotiable o¤er)
and so on for all consumers in the economy. All consumers would be willing to buy
(strictly so if the monopolist sweetens the deal with a penny o¤)! Note,
This is fully e¢ cient! It is impossible to increase consumer surplus without reducing
the pro…t for the monopolist (which presumably has some owner or owners who would
have to decrease the consumption if the pro…ts would be reduced).
We say that the monopolist fully extracts the surplus from the consumers by
using the individualized “take it or leave it-o¤ers”.
The form of price discrimination considered in this example is referred to as perfect
price discrimination.
14.9
Is Perfect Price Discrimination Reasonable?
Most economists would probably say that perfect price-discrimination is unrealistic in most
circumstances. There are several reasons for this. For example:
1. The monopolist is assumed to know the demand function (that is know preferences)
for each and every individual in the economy. While …rms probably have a rather good
idea about the aggregate demand, this seems rather unreasonable.
12
2. Even if the monopolist could see who has what demand, the monopolist must somehow
prevent consumers from trading with each other.
However, the important insight from the example with prefect price discrimination is that
when we think about a monopolist there is no a priori reason to restrict attention to
trading mechanisms where the producer sets a price and customers decide how
much to buy. Explicitly introducing the considerations above (the reasons why perfect
price discrimination is not possible) into the formal model of a pro…t maximizing monopolist
we can allow more clever pricing schemes than a …xed per unit price equal for all customers.
Depending on details of the model we can then make sense of several pricing practices that
we do observe in the real world. For example:
1. If the monopolist can not see which consumer is high demand and which is a low
demand consumer, the monopolist can still capture some extra pro…ts compared to a
uniform price by non-linear pricing, which means that the pricing scheme involves
quantity discounts.
2. We can also make sense of student and senior citizen discounts by thinking of being a
student/senior citizen as an imperfect measure of willingness to pay.
3. Sometimes the quantity dimension may be replaced by a quality dimension (think of
demand for airline tickets) and here the same type of logic that rationalizes non-linear
pricing can be used to rationalize why airlines wants to make economy seats really
crummy in order to make business travellers to “self-select” into expensive but nice
seats with caviar and champagne served.
14.10
Justi…cations of the Standard Monopoly Model
Optional: Which problem that is the more appropriate description of monopoly pricing behavior depends
on what may appear as “tiny details”. As just mentioned various forms of price discrimination can be
rationalized as ways to increase the pro…ts for the monopolist: there are monopoly pricing models that can
13
explain student and senior citizen discounts, bundling (of for example browsers and operating systems),
frequent ‡yer programs, how a monopolist can sometimes spend extra money to make goods less useful,
etc.1
Becasuse of this plethora of models, it is of some interest to ask under what circumstances the standard
model described in the beginning of the section makes sense. There are essentially two ways to justify that
model:
1. Arbitrage possibilities: if consumers can trade with each other, this makes it very hard to price
discriminate. As an example, suppose that the per unit price would be decreasing in the number of
units sold. Then, a single consumer has an incentive to buy a large quantity of the good (at a low
price per unit) and resell to consumers that are facing higher prices per unit if buying directly from
the monopolist. Note: whether this is possible or not depends on the good in question. Airline tickets,
cable TV services, electricity are examples of non-transferable goods, and for these goods it is either
impossible or very hard/costly for the consumers to do arbitrage.
2. Unit demands and uncertainty about preferences. One can then show that, if the monopolist cannot
observe the preferences of the consumer, then the optimal pricing mechanism is applying the standard
monopoly pricing formula, where the demand function is given by
D (p) = 1
F (p) = 1
Pr [v
p] ;
that is, F is the cumulative distribution over possible valuations for the object.
14.11
A Durable Good Monopolist
Many goods are durable: cars, refrigerators, light bulbs, art, computers etc. all last for
some time. This “durability”introduces some quite interesting issues concerning the market
power (or lack thereof) for a monopolist. Intuitively, the main ideas are as follows:
Suppose that some customers purchase the product at date t: The crucial observation
is that, the customers that bought the product tend to be those with high valuations.
1
An example of the last practice was when the 486 chip was introduced. A cheaper, lower quality, variant,
486S, was also avaliable. This was produced by taking a regular 486 chip and disabling certain functions.
14
But then, at date t + 1 the monopolist has an incentive to lower its price to capture
some pro…t also from the customers with lower valuations.
But then,...., the problem is that all customers will look forward to the future decrease
in price, which erodes the monopoly power at date t:
This is referred to as a “time inconsistency problem”, which is similar to Birgittas
dilemma in the battle of the sexes game discussed in game theory. If Birgitta could credibly
commit to always go to the Opera, then she would get a higher payo¤ than in the backwards induction solution. Similarly, the durable good monopolist would do better if it could
commit never to descrease its price.
The main result in the literature is that, if the monopolist can change its price often
enough, then almost all customers will pay a price close to the marginal cost. That is, the
competition against future incarnations of itself makes the monopoly power go away almost
completely. This type of analysis is too advanced for the scope of this course. Instead, we
will show something weaker: that the monopoly pro…t is always less than commitment to
the static monopoly price in both periods. This we can do in a model with only two periods
by applying the backwards induction procedure previously discussed.
14.11.1
Model
1. There are two periods, indexed by t = 1; 2
2. Both consumers and the monopolist discounts future utility and pro…ts respectively at
a common discount factor
<1
3. Monopolist sells an indivisible good
4. The (direct) demand is given by D (p) = 1
p . For interpretation, it is a good idea
to think of D (p) as the probability that the valuation for the good is less than p.
5. For simplicity, we let the constant marginal cost be c = 0:
15
14.11.2
Static Benchmark (Commitment)
First consider the case where the monopolist commits to never changing the price. Since
consumers discount their utilities, nobody will then buy anything at time t = 2: The best
(common) price the monopolist can charge is then the solution to
max p (1
p)
p
This problem has solution p = 21 ; and the associated quantity sold is q = D(p ) = 1 p = 12 ;
so the monopolist makes a pro…t
=pq =
1
4
if it somehow can promise never to change
the price in the future (we have not shown it, but this is actually the best the monopolist
can do if it is able to commit to prices in both periods before any sales are made).
14.11.3
Selling in Both Periods (Non-Commitment)
We will solve the problem by applying the backwards induction procedure that we discussed
in the section on game theory. To implement this, we must …gure out what happens in the
second period after any history of play. A history can be described as either a quantity
solved in the …rst period or a price. One can proceed either way, but I …nd it somewhat
easier to work with the quantity;
Consider the second period, and assume that in the …rst period the monopolist sold q1
units. That means that customers with valuations above q1 have left the market already, so
the second period inverse demand (as a function of the arbitrary q1 ) is
D2 (p; q1 ) =
q2
1 q
| {z }1
New intercept
Second period problem is thus
max q2 (1
q1
q2
q2 ) ;
which has a solution (which depends on q1 ) given by
q2 (q1 ) =
p2 (q1 ) =
16
(1
q1 )
2
(1
q1 )
2
:
The second period pro…t is thus
2 (q1 ) =
q1 )2
4
(1
Now, in the …rst period a consumer with willingness to pay v will buy the product if
v
p1
0 and
v
p1
(v
p2 )
The price in the second period will be below the price in the …rst period, so we can ignore
the …rst inequality. Now, if q1 is the quantity sold, it will be bought by the q1 agents with
the highest valuation, so the agents with valuation
1
q1
v
1
are the ones that buy in the …rst period, and
(1
q1 )
p1 = ((1
since the agent with valuation v = 1
q1 )
p2 ) ;
q1 must be indi¤erent between buying in period 1
and buying in period 2. But we know that when the monopolist re-optimizes in the second
period, then
p2 (q1 ) =
(1
q1 )
2
;
so, the indi¤erence condition becomes
(1
q1 )
p1 =
=
p1 =
2
((1
q1 )
(1
q1 ) )
1
2
p2 (q1 )) =
(1
(1
q1 )
1
q1
2
q1 ):
The …rst period pro…t maximization problem for the monopolist is thus
max q1 (1
q1
q1 ) 1
17
2
+
(1
q1 )2
;
4
which gives …rst order condition
(1
2q1 ) 1
2
2
(1
q1 ) = 0
,
q1 2
= 1
2
q1
2
2
=1
2(1
)
4 3
=
Now, when we have the solution in terms of the …rst period quantity we notice:
1. Previously, we expressed the second period price, quantity sold and pro…t as
1
q2 (q1 ) =
2
1
p2 (q1 ) =
2
q1
q1
2
1 q1
2
(q1 ) =
2
:
By evaluating these expressions at q1 we get the values that will be chosen after the
best …rst period choice as
q2 = q2 (q1 ) =
p2 = p2 (q1 ) =
2
=
2
1
q1
2
1
q1
2
1
(q1 ) =
=
=
q1
2
2(1 )
4 3
1
2
4 3
=
2(1
4 3
)
2
1 2
24 3
2
1 2
=
4 4 3
=
1 2
24 3
2
2. Next, we observe that the indi¤erence condition for buying in …rst versus second period
was
p1 =
1
2
(1
q1 )
so, the price charged at period 1 is
p1 =
=
1
2
2
(1
4
2(1
)
)
4 3
3
2
4
18
2(1
3
)
(2
=
2 (4
)2
:
3 )
3. Hence, the discounted value of the monopolists pro…t is (I write it as a function of
as that is a key parameter)
( ) =
1
+
2 =
2
p 1 q1 + p 2 q2
(2
)
=
2 (4 3
| {z
2(1
)
1
+
) | 4 {z3 }
4
}
|
1
(0) =
4
2
4
1
(1) =
4
2
4
1
4
1
1
p1
1
4
=
q1
2
2
4 3
[4 (1
2
2
4 3
{z
}
2
)+ ]
4. Observe that
=
2
4=
1
3
2
1
4
2
[4 (1
1) + 1]
1
[1] = ;
4
that is:
when
= 0; nobody cares about the next period so the problem becomes like the
static problem
when
= 1; the monopolist charges
(2 1)2
2(4 3)
1
2
=
(or higher) in the …rst period, so
nobody actually buys anything in the …rst period. The second period is then just
like the only period in the static model.
For intermediate values of
2
4 3
we have that 0 <
2
[4 (1
)+ ]=
(2
4
)2
3
=
4
2
< ; implying that
4 +
4 3
2
<
4
4 +
4 3
=1
Hence
1
( )=
4
2
4 3
2
[4 (1
1
)+ ]< :
4
That is, the option to sell to those customers who don’t buy at time 1 unambiguously hurts the monopolist.
19
14.11.4
Discussion
The conclusion that not selling in the second period is better for the monopolist is often
considered counter intuitive: ‡exibility, which is often times considered valuable, is bad.
The point is that consumers are not going to be fooled. If the monopolist will do what
is optimal in the second period, potential buyers will understand this, so the monopolist is
better o¤ if it can somehow commit not to change the price in the second period even though
the second period incentive obviously is to change the price to sell more units.
20