Controlling a Complex Metropolis, 1650

Controlling a Complex Metropolis,
1650-1 750: politics, parishes and powers
VANESSA HARDING
T h e period from 1650 to 1'750 was not one characterised by major institutional
innovation in the government of London, let alone revolutionary structural change.
The contrast between the centralised and well-organised government of the City
and the atomised and somewhat improvised governmental institutions of the rest
of the metropolis was as striking at the end of the period as it was at the beginning.
Though the constitutional framework of the corporation by which the City was
governed was undoubtedly the focus of considerable contest and controversy, there
was in the event little lasting change. Nor was there real change to the situation
outside the City, where responsibility for local government was shared by parish
vestries and justices. However serious the problems that this structure, or lack of
structure, entailed, they had not yet generated enough urgency or concern to lead
to significant reform.
However, structural forms are not the only possible locus of change. The nature
of government changed and the power relations between national and local
government shifted, as did the scope and competence of administrative activity.
Many of the characteristic features of today's London's governance emerged or
became significant in this period and many aspects of the modern metropolitan
experience were formed then.'
Themes
This paper covers the period stretching from the Civil War of the 1640s, when popular
feeling in London sided decisively with Parliament against the Crown, to the 1740s,
when, though the capital nourished some Jacobite yearnings, the City establishment
effectively backed the Westminster government. The period embraces such episodes
on the national stage as the inception and collapse of the republic and the
Cromwellian protectorate, the Glorious Revolution of 1688-9, the effective
establishment of the Hanoverian dynasty, and Britain's commitment to a series of
major foreign and colonial wars and the building of an empire. It saw the capital's
population grow by half or two-thirds again, from some 400,000 in 1650 to 675,000
in 1'750.*It also saw this population decimated by the last great epidemic of the
European age of plague in 1665, when 69,000 people died. London made a
remarkable recovery from this and from the Great Fire of 1666 that devastated the
core of the walled city, centre of commerce and trade. The Fire resulted in a
rebuilding of the city to new standards of space and amenity, but it may also have
encouraged the westward spread of retail, entertainment and service industries. Over
the period 1650 to 1'750 London sprawled more widely, to east and west, and north
and south of the river and by the time ofJohn Rocque's map of 1746, the continuously
@London Journal 26, ( l ) , 2001
built-up area stretched from Hyde Park Corner in the west to Whitechapel and
Wapping in the east, and from Clerkenwell and Hoxton in the north to Smith Square
and the start of the Old Kent Road in the south. The centre of gravity shifted
westwards, into the West End with whose outlines we are all familiar."n physical terms,
modem Londoners would recognise much of the London of 1'750, at least in street
names and street pattern, as well as building type - the Georgian town-house or
terrace and its descendants - if not in presently surviving building^.^ We would
recognise many characteristics of mid-eighteenth century Londoners too: the growth
of a middling class, a consuming society, employed largely in service industries and
the professions, enjoying an increasing degree of domestic comfort and sharing in a
public culture of entertainment and sociability.
It was a century of immense political, economic, social and cultural change, but
in the context of London's government there were three main developments on
which this paper will focus. The overarching one is the politicisation of London
government, both as an issue and as a process: that is, the politicisation of the
process of choosing o r identifying the governors of London, and the increased
significance in national party-politics of the stance of London's governors.
Underpinning this, and enhancing its importance, is the financial revolution and
the invention of 'the City' as we understand the term. The period saw the
foundation of the Bank of England and of a new kind of government finance.
Relations between the government at Westminster and the City in this sense were
of paramount importance, but were complicated by the variable extent of overlap
between the great figures of the financial City and the leaders of the City as a
corporate local-government authority. Thirdly, I would argue that local government
in the rest of London, while still fairly ad hoe in its institutions, began to respond
to heightened expectations of the quality of life in the metropolis. In the process,
however, it encountered a number of new problems, notably that of accountability.
The politicisation of London government
English politics were polarised by the Civil War and the conflicts of the 1640s and
1650s. There were lasting and bitter antagonisms in post-Restoration England, and
no shortage of political issues to keep them alive. The Restoration settlement settled
very little in that key matters such as the royal prerogative, parliamentary authority,
and religious toleration remained controversial. It would be misleading to imply
that roundhead and cavalier simply mutated into the Whig and Tory of the later
seven teen th and eighteenth centuries: the situation was much more fluid. 'Court'
and 'Country' allegiances, the opposition between the landed and the so-called
'monied' interests, and simple rivalry between those who were in power and those
who were excluded from it, meant that identities and affinities were often shifting.
There is also the important fact that the Whig party moved from oppositionist,
libertarian criticism of the regime under Charles I1 and James I1 to being the party
of power and the author of notoriously anti-libertarian measures in the early
eighteenth century, while the Tory party gained popular backing especially for its
high-church position. Religious affiliation formed an intrinsic part of ideological
and political identities from the Civil War and well into the eighteenth century.
Differing attitudes towards toleration or conformity caused sharp divisions between
individuals and groups. There was a significant overlap between Whiggism and
Dissent and the monied interest, and a similar overlap between Anglicanism and
Toryism, but London contained multitudes and its political temper defies simple
or consistent characterisation. At different moments its rulers, its representatives,
and the popular voice - which were rarely identical - were parliamentarian,
monarchist, independent, presbyterian, Anglican, anti-Catholic, pro-Hanoverian,
or mildly Jacobite.
The Civil War had a long legacy in London. The decisive commitment of the
City and its resources to the parliamentarian side came about in a combination of
direct popular action (including mass petitioning of Parliament), and constitutional
upheaval, as a more radical group of citizens took power in Common Council and
overthrew the cautious conservatism of the aldermanic elite.5 Both popular protest
and political division within the governing class were to characterise London politics
over the next century. The development of adversarial politics also led to
constitutional change and experiment in the attempt to consolidate power in the
hands of a particular group; the fact that there appeared to be political polarisation
between the Court of Aldermen and Common Council focused constitutional
contest on the issue of their relative powers and independence. During the Civil
War years, Common Council established itself as a the principal authority in the
City, largely independent of aldermanic control. Although this position was lost at
the Restoration, it remained a significant issue." What also came to the fore in the
Restoration years was the importance of parliamentary contests in the City, which
returned four M.P.s. The outcome of both local and parliamentary elections could
be influenced, or even decided, by revising definitions of the civic franchise and
by the intervention of mayoraI or aldermanic authority, so several apparently internal
constitutional issues also had an outward impact.'
It is thus impossible to separate London politics from national politics under
Charles I1 and his successors. Not every manifestation of this can be illustrated, but
one can for example point to the important role that a parliamentarian/republican
faction in London, backed by strong popular anti-Catholic feeling, played in the
attempt to exclude the Catholic duke of York from the succession to the throne
in 1679-81. London's M.P.s were vociferous supporters of the Exclusion Bill, and
the City authorities themselves promoted several massive petitions; Charles's decision
to hold the third of three shortlived parliaments called during the crisis at Oxford
was undoubtedly motivated by fears of the likely intervention of the London crowd.
The Exclusion Crisis was also inextricably enmeshed in City politics: shrieval elections,
for example, had wide implications, since sheriffs impanelled juries and so could
affect the outcome of criminal trials with a political bearing.Wter the Exclusion
Crisis, the City and the crown went head-to-head again over the City's charter, which
the king suspended in 1683, imposing direct rule from Westminster. In this h e
was motivated possibly by a desire for revenge and certainly by the wish to ensure
that London's internal government was in the hands of 'safe men' and that London's
M.P.s would be chosen by an electorate purged of his opponents.'
London's support was, quite simply, crucial to the success of the revolution of
1688-9. As in the 1640s, this was due to a combination of, on the one hand, popular
action, including parliamentary petitioning, and, on the other, the participation
of an organised and articulate party of aldermen, common councillors, and
subsequently M.P.s in pushing forward a political solution. Equally, once the dust
had settled, the internal governance of the City was a pressing issue. James I1 had
32
VANESSA WING
restored the suspended charter but, as the act of a dethroned monarch, this
needed to be further secured. A Whig-dominated Court of Aldermen drafted a
constitutional bill that would have returned the balance of authority to Common
Council and the representatives of the City electorate, though - so quickly did
political fortunes change - a more conservative bill was in fact enacted. But there
had still been a signal victory for the Whig interest in both national and City politics.I0
The Invention of 'the City'
Party-politics and constitutional issues were not the only areas affected by the
Revolution of 1688-9. It had important financial aspects, including the invention
of 'the City' as we understand the term. 'Revolutionary finance' or 'the financial
revolution' are terms used by historians to denote the collaboration of moneyed
interests in London and the government at Westminster which greatly enhanced
the power of the state." The role of London and Londoners in lending financial
support - credit and credibility - to governments had been a significant feature
of their relationship over the cen turies.I2 The Civil War had demonstrated how
much could be extracted from the City when it was actively committed to supporting
the government at Westminster; but the vicissitudes of party strife and monarchical
government in the Restoration years had also shown up the precariousness of this
relationship. The wealth of late seventeenth-century London was enormous, but
for both technical and political reasons it could not be harnessed to the realisation
of government policy. Continuing suspicion about the king's internal and foreign
policies certainly played a part, especially since a significant number of wealthy
London merchants belonged to the dissenting interest.IYLondon's support for a
Williamite solution in 1688-9, therefore, was exceptionally important.
After the revolution, the securing of the constitution and the firm commitment
of the Whig interest in the City to William 111's government and its policies opened
the way to a real and lasting collaboration. This relationship was not a simple or
uncontested development, but within a few years it had led to the establishment
of the Bank of England and the creation of the national debt, and to a future in
which national government could fund its activities through the financial market
and public credit. With these resources at its command, William's government was
able to embark on a costly European war on a scale formerly inconceivable. These
developments established a close association between successive Whig ministries and
the moneyed interest in the city. The Whigs became identified as the party of power
and privilege, and could also be seen as in thrall to Dissent: the subscribers to and
directors of the Bank of England and the East India Company certainly included
numerous well-known Whigs and Dissenters, including some who also served as
aldermen in the period. The partisan nature of this collaboration, however, and
the huge scale of this novel enterprise, certainly gave rise to anxiety and to attempts
to divert o r re-form the direction that such matters were taking. The dominant
position of the Bank of England was resented in many quarters, as were its failings,
and alternative schemes to fund o r support government debt were floated.I4
It was in this context - of high taxation to finance European war from the 1690s
onwards, and a Dissenting/Whig hegemony in the city - that the Tories took o n
the mantle of defenders of the popular interest or at least of the small tradesman.
They were also able to tap into disgruntled Anglicanism, the ever present
xenophobia of some Londoners, and latent support for the Jacobite cause. The
rioting at the end of the trial for sedition of the inflammatory preacher Dr
Sacheverell in 1'710 graphically demonstrated the strength of popular Anglicanism
and hostility to the long ascendancy of the Whig interest.'Significantly, 1710-1 1
was also the moment when the government came closest to 'losing the City', in
the sense of losing the financial backing of the moneyed interest in the city. But ironically to modern eyes - this was a Tory ministry. Queen Anne was warned by
the Bank that changing h e r ministers would 'affect all the public credit'; the
subsequent Tory victory at the polls brought on a crisis of credit, only resolved by
hard negotiations between the Bank and the Treasury, and leading, among other
things, to the floating of the South Sea Company in 1'711 to take up further
government debt."jThe Company's scheme of 1719, which became the Bubble
that burst, disastrously, in 1720, was a dubious but not overtly fraudulent proposal
to redeem government credit after years of high war expenditure. In the event,
though, it proved a disaster for many smaller investors but left the Whig oligarchy
in the City and at Westminster strengthened but even more unpopular."
The Tory leadership had lost heavily in 1714-15, but popular Toryism remained
a feature of London politics and certainly influenced the attitude of Walpole's
ministry, engaging it, inevitably, in defence of the Whig and moneyed interest. The
perception that Common Council was dominated by Tories, o r at least by antiministry feeling, led to Walpole's City Elections Act of 1725, which in the name of
beneficial reform redrew the City franchise and asserted the aldermanic veto over
Common Council's actions. The balance of power between aldermen and Common
Council had been a recurrent theme in London politics since the 1640s and
although this act only remained in force until 1746, it demonstrates yet again how
London's government and constitution could be a pawn in manoeuvrings on the
national political board.18 In the longer term, however, the Corporation and the
financial City began to diverge: the great merchants and financiers no longer took
up public office, as they had in the past, and the financial institutions dealt directly
with national government rather than through the corporation. The national
significance of the politics of City government declined, though it could reappear
as a focus of political attention at moments of crisis.
The Rest of London
What of the rest of London? It is not inappropriate that the politics of City
government has dominated this discussion, since that was arguably the most
significant arena of constitutional debate and development. But at the same time,
most Londoners were not directly party to these dissentions. Well over half the
population of London at the start of the period, and at least three-quarters or even
four-fifths by the end, lived outside the area of jurisdiction of the Corporation.
While Londoners in general might participate in political activity, especially in
Parliamentary elections in the Westminster constituency, which had a very wide
franchise, and in crowd action on numerous occasions, there was little connection
between party politics and the reality of local government in the rest of the
metropolis. Focusing on the City is relevant here as well, however, since it does
seem likely that the factious and contested condition of City politics, and the City's
significance to the Westminster government of the day, helped to postpone
consideration of London's government as a whole. If the government - whether
the Stuart monarchy o r the Whig ministerial oligarchy - believed that popular
political attitudes in London were essentially oppositionist and critical (which on
the whole they were) then there was little incentive to reform o r democratise
London's local government. This is not necessarily to say that national government
conspired to stifle real pressure for change, but in the existing circumstances
significant reform was unlikely.
The rest of London, therefore, had to make the best of its existing institutions.
Both inside and outside the city, a considerable degree of authority lay in the hands
of the parishes - tiny units of a few hundred houses within the walls, huge areas
of densely-built development outside the city. In both cases, the parishes came
under some superior authority, either the wardmotes and legislative councils of
the City, or the justices of the peace for Middlesex and Surrey, who often exercised
significant control.l"he
alliance of parishes and J.P.s, institutions of fundamentally
different origin, reflects the tendency of institutional evolution to co-opt useful
structures and adapt them to changing ends. And indeed, many of the issues with
which local government was confronted had both moral/religious and legal
dimensions. The problem of poverty, for example, was addressed partly by raising
and distributing monetary relief, and partly by disciplinary and punitive measures,
but also by agitation for moral reform and the reformation of manners. In
contemporary Paris the creation of a Lieutenant of Police, and the large-scale
enclosure or institutionalisation of the poor, embodied both these demands and a
means of solving them; in London, they had to be met by a much more ad hoc
series of measures, empowerments, and expedients. In practice this reaffirmed the
dependence of local authorities on the central state: in order to satisfy new needs,
existing i~istitutionsneeded new powers which could only be granted by the state.20
Conclusion
How effective was local government in later seventeenth and eighteenth-century
London? Certainly, major problems remained, but by the end of the period there
had been progress in several areas. One of these was the beginnings of
rationalisation of the parochial network to reflect the growth and shift of
population. New parishes were created west of the City and south of the river in
the later seventeenth century; more, both west and east, under the Fifty New
Churches Act of 1711 (itself a product of the then Tory government's concern with
the Church of England's loss of ground to Dissent in the capital)." Creating new
parishes had both religious and welfare dimensions, and though the effectiveness
of the measure depended on the local personnel, it did at least offer the chance
of an improved local context in which problems could be addressed. The period
saw an increasing demand for effective local government, as expectations of safety
and comfort rose. These expectations entailed the maintenance of order, protection
for individuals and property, increased environmental amenity, and the control of
poverty and the poor. The impression is that demands were growing stronger and
more articulate in the first half of the eighteenth century, and that the midpoint
of the century saw a critical advance o n several fronts - lighting, paving, police,
care of the poor. Because of the fragmentation of authority these advances were
mostly piecemeal and local, usually under powers granted by the central state but
sometimes the result of private initiative and charity. The City obtained a Lighting
Act in 1736, Spitalfields in 1738; Westminster got a Paving Act in 1762, and other
parishes followed. The Bow Street police office was set u p in 1749, and the
Foundling Hospital in 1745.22
Neither the parishes nor the benches of justices were democratic institutions;
both showed some strain under their new powers and responsibilities. A third or
more of the larger parish vestries were, or became, closed o r select vestries,
restricting administrative and executive decision-making to a small and often selfperpetuating group of ratepayers. Arguably, this could make for better, more
efficient administration, and it certainly helped to keep party political contest at
the local level to a minimum, but it also concentrated the profits and patronage
of the office in a few hands and could encourage venality or corruption, as the
complaints of excluded parishioners in certain cases make clear. Vestries were
sometimes literally, and often in a more general sense, unaccountable. As local
government became more active, in response to rising demands, and the sums of
money it handled increased, so the problem grew, and not only in relation to closed
vestries. One notorious feature was the manipulation of rating assessments, to favour
friends and associates and also, at times, to include or exclude voters. Similarly,
the benches of justices were made up by nomination and co-option, and the off~ce
was liable to subversion. In George Rude's words 'the fact remains that the
promotion of men of humble means to unpaid positions of authority, often
involving considerable out-of-pocket expenses, opened the way for the unsavoury
scandal of the "trading justice" ', who depended for his remuneration o n the
quantity of legal business h e transacted.'Vhere were certainly active, publicspirited, reforming justices, just as there must have been conscientious, responsible,
disinterested vestrymen, but the misdeeds of their opposites have attracted more
attention." Corruption of an explicit kind did become a feature of London's public
life in this period: though earlier practices had undoubtedly served the interests
of the 'better', senior, wealthier part of society, and disfranchised the rest, they
had probably not been overtly corrupt or corruptible in the same way. But as later
developments have shown, a rewards system is one incentive to participation in
public life; in the absence of an ethos of professionalised public sellice it is hard
to see how local administrations could otherwise have been filled.
Individual contributions to a sequence of papers that deals with centuries of
chronology and development can hardly offer universal conclusions. However, each
one needs to make a point, to highlight the crucial events or developments in its
allotted span, before the next paper presents a different perspective. In the period
1650 to 1'750, then, London government changed, not so much in structure or
institutions, but in character: it became highly politicised, entangled with national
political issues, not least because of the development of revolutionary finance.
Expectations of what both the state and local government could deliver rose;
London's various authorities responded, often inventively and constructively, within
their limitations, but new problems, notably that of accountability, emerged.
NOTES
1. For what follows, in addition to specifically cited works, see Barry Coward, The Stuart Age.
England, 1603-1 714 (2nd. edn., Harlow, 1994);David L.Smith, A history of the modern British
Isles, 1603-1 707 (Oxford, 1998);J. R. Jones, Country and Court. England 1658-1 714 (1978);
F. O'Gorman, The long eighteenth century. British Political and Social History, 1688-1 832 (1997).
2. E. A. Wrigley, 'A simple model of London's importance in changing English society and
economy, 1650-1750', Past & h e n t 37 (l967), 44-70; V. Harding,'The population of London,
1550-1700: a review of the published evidence', London Journal, 15 (1990), 111-28.
3. N. G. Brett-James, The Growth ofStuart London (1935); Ralph Hyde, The A to Z of Georgian
London. (London Topographical Society 126, 1982); L. Stone, "Residential development of
the west end of London in the seventeenth century', in B. C. Malament (ed.), After the
R k f m a t i o n : essays i n honor ofJ. H. Hex& (Manchester, 1980), 167-21 2.
4. Cf. Elizabeth McKellar, The Birth of Modern London: the development and design of the
city, 1660-1 720 (Manchester, 1999).
5. R. Ashton, 'Insurgency, counter-insurgency, and inaction: three phases in the role of the
City in the Great Rebellion', in S. Porter (ed.), London and the Civil War (1996), 45-64; V.
Pearl, London and the outbreak ofthe Puritan Revolution (Oxford, 1961); R. Ashton, The city and
the court, 1603-43 (Cambridge, 1979);R. Brenner, Merchants and revolution: commercial change,
political conflict, and London overseas traders, 1550-1 6 5 3 (Cambridge, 1992).
6. Ashton, 'Insurgency, counter-insurgency,and inaction', 45-64; Pearl, London and the outbreak,
esp. 107-59, 246-50.
7. Henry Horwitz, 'Party in a civic context: London from the exclusion crisis to the fall of
Walpole', in Clyve Jones (ed.), Britain i n the First Age of PartyJ 1680-1 750: essays presented to
Geoffri Holmes (1987)' 173-94; Gary S. De Krey, A Fractured Society: the politics ofLondon i n the
first age of party, 1688-1 715 (Oxford, 1985).
8. Tim Harris, London Crowds in the Reign of Charles 11: politics and propaganda from the
Restoration until the Exclusion Crisis (Cambridge, 1987); D. F. Allen, 'Political clubs in
Restoration London', HistoricalJournal 19 (1976)' 561-80; M.Priestley, 'London merchants
and opposition politics in Charles 11's reign', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research,
29 (1956), 205-19.
9. J. Levin, The Charter Controversy in the City of London, 1660-1688, and its Consequences (1969).
10. Honvitz, 'Party in a civic context'; R. A. Beddard, "The "Violent Party": the Guildhall
revolutionaries and the growth of opposition to James 11', Guildhall Miscellany 3 (2) (1970),
120-36; John Miller, The Glorious Retlolution (1983) ; De Krey, A Fractured Society, esp. 45-73.
11. Henry Roseveare, TheFinancial Revolution, 1660-1 760 (1991); P. G. M. Dickson, The Financial
Revolution i n England: a study in the development ofpublic credit, 1688-1 756 (1967); D. W. Jones,
'London merchants and the "crisis" of the 1690s', in Peter Clark and Paul Slack (eds), Crisis
and order i n English towns (1972), 311-55.
12. See R. R. Sharpe, London and the Kingdom (3 vols., 1894-5); E. J. Davies and M. I. Peake,
'Loans from the city of London to Henry VI, 1431-1449', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical
Research 4 ( 1926-7), 165-72; Caroline M. Barron, 'London and the Crown, 1451-61, in J. R
L. Highfield and R. Jeffs (eds), The Crmun and Local Communities i n England and France in the
Fifkenth Century (Gloucester, 1981), 88-1 09; G. D. Ramsay, The City of London i n Internationc~l
Politics at the Accession ofElizabeth Tudor (Manchester, 1975);Ashton, The City and the Cour2;R
Ashton, The Crown and the Monqr M a r h t , 1603-40 (Oxford, 1960).
13. Cf Roseveare, Financial Revolution.
14. Horwitz, 'Party in a civic context'; De Krey, A fractured society, esp. 74-212; Roseveare, financial
Revolution, 29-5 1.
15. G . Holmes, 'The Sacheverell riots: the crowd and the church in early eighteenthcentury
London', Past and Present 72 (1976), 55-85; De Krey, A Fractured Society, 247-58; W. Speck and
W. A. Gray, 'Londoners at the polls under Anne and George I,, Guildhall Studies i n London
History, 1 (1975), 253-62. Cf. Tim Harris, 'Was the Tory reaction popular? Attitudes of
Londoners towards the persecution of dissent, 1681-6', London Journal 13(1987-8), 106-20.
16. B. Hill, 'The change of government and the "Loss of the City", 1710-1 l', Economic History
Reuiau, 2nd. ser., 24 (1971)' 395-413.
17. Roseveare, Financial Revolution, 52-67 ; Cf. N. Rogers, 'Popular protest in earIy Hanoverian
London', Past and Present 79 (1978), 70-100.
18. Speck and Gray, 'Londoners at the polls under Anne and George"; I. G. Doolittle, 'Walpole's
City Elections Act (1725)', Englkh Historical Review 97 (1982), 504-29; N. Rogers, 'The City
Elections Act (1725) reconsidered', English Historical Revim 100 (1985), 604-17; idem,
'Resistance to oligarchy: the City opposition to Walpole and his successors, 1725-47, in J.
Stevenson (ed.), London in the Age o f R e f m (Oxford, 1977), 1-29.
19. George Rude, Hanoverian London, 1714-1808 (197 l ) , 118-42.
20. P. Slack, Poverty and Policy in Tudor and Stuart England (Harlow, 1988); idem. From
Reformation to Improvement: public welfare in early modern England (Oxford, 1999);D.
George, London Life in the Eighteenth Century (1925; Peregrine Books, 1966), 213-61; L.
Bernard, The Emerging City. Paris in the age of Louis XIV (Durham, N.C., 1970), 29-55,
132-55.
21. E. G. W. Bill (ed.), The @mmAnne Chumhs (1979); M . Port (ed.), The Commissionsfi Building
FiftyNew Churches (London Record Society 23,1986).
22. Rude, Hanoverian London, 134-42.
23. Rude, Hanoverian London, 128-349.
24. Cf. R. Paley (ed.) Justice in Eighteenth-century Hackney: the justicing notebook of Henry
Norris and the Hackney Petty Sessions Book (London Record Society 28,1991).