Technical and Safety Analysis

Transcription

HIGH SPEED RAIL
ASSESSMENT, PHASE II
Norwegian National Rail Administration
Report
JBV 900017
February 2011
HSR Assessment Norway, Phase II
Page 1 of (270)
Preparation- and review documentation:
Review documentation:
Rev.
1.0
Prepared by
Checked by
Approved by
Status
DEF/18.02.2011
RFL, KJ
GI
Final
List of versions:
Revision
Nr.
Date
Version
1
18.02.2011
1.0
2
3
4
Rev.
chapters
Description revision
Author
Delivery final version
DEF, RFL
Page 2 of (270)
Table of contents
List of tables .................................................................................................................. 8
List of figures............................................................................................................... 11
List of abbreviations ................................................................................................... 16
1
Subject – Technical solutions.............................................................................. 18
1.0 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 18
1.0.1
Brief description of scenarios....................................................................................19
1.0.2
World high speed rail (HSR) overview......................................................................20
1.0.2.1 Infrastructure............................................................................................................ 20
1.0.2.2 Traffic....................................................................................................................... 22
1.0.2.3 HSR and the Environment ....................................................................................... 23
1.0.2.4 Important HSR countries ......................................................................................... 24
1.1 Standards for high-speed railways ........................................................................ 32
1.1.1
Summary ..................................................................................................................32
1.1.1.1 Technical Specifications for the Interoperability (TSI) ............................................. 32
1.1.1.2 Norwegian Regulations “Teknisk Regelverk JDxxx“ ................................................ 36
1.1.1.3 Scenario related summary....................................................................................... 41
1.1.1.4 Previous studies carried out in Norway ................................................................... 42
1.1.2
Differences or Gaps between Norwegian norms and
European standards for High Speed Railways .........................................................43
1.1.2.1 Standards for HSR Infrastructure ............................................................................ 43
1.1.2.2 Standards for Technical Equipment......................................................................... 46
1.1.2.3 Standards for Rolling Stock ..................................................................................... 48
1.1.3
Recommendations for Solutions and Strategies to close the identified gaps ...........48
1.1.3.1 Extension of the existing standards according TSI specifications ........................... 48
1.1.3.2 Proposed Solutions for identified gaps .................................................................... 49
1.2 Climatic conditions – meteorological data ............................................................. 51
1.2.1
Summary ..................................................................................................................51
1.2.2
The climate in Norway ..............................................................................................51
1.2.3
Future climate change ..............................................................................................52
1.2.4
Topographic issues and mass wasting .....................................................................55
1.2.4.1 Mass wasting in Norway .......................................................................................... 55
1.2.4.2 Bedrock.................................................................................................................... 56
1.2.5
Climate change and extreme precipitation ...............................................................56
1.2.6
More about different types of mass wasting .............................................................57
Page 3 of (270)
1.2.7
Hazard mapping rockfall ...........................................................................................61
1.2.8
Climatic influence on the construction phase ...........................................................61
1.2.8.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 61
1.2.8.2 Important issues due to calendar and winter conditions in mountain areas ............ 62
1.2.8.3 Main disturbances in the construction phase due to climatic conditions.................. 62
1.2.9
Climatic influence on the rolling stock.......................................................................63
1.2.9.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 63
1.2.9.2 Main findings and problem areas............................................................................. 63
1.2.9.3 Matrix of problems and possible measures ............................................................. 64
1.2.10 Climatic influence on the operation of the rail system...............................................66
1.2.10.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 66
1.2.10.2 Main disturbances of the operation of the line .................................................... 66
1.2.10.3 Matrix of problems and possible measures......................................................... 67
1.2.11 Early warning systems – EWS..................................................................................70
1.2.11.1 Early warning systems ........................................................................................ 70
1.2.11.2 List of existing monitoring methods..................................................................... 70
1.3 Technical track solutions....................................................................................... 72
1.3.1
Summary ..................................................................................................................72
1.3.2
Description track construction types .........................................................................74
1.3.2.1 Ballast sleeper tracks............................................................................................... 74
1.3.2.2 Slab tracks ............................................................................................................... 78
1.3.2.3 Summary of described track systems ...................................................................... 91
1.3.3
Description of parameters influencing the track system ...........................................91
1.3.3.1 Operational parameters ........................................................................................... 92
1.3.3.2 Functional parameters ............................................................................................. 97
1.3.3.3 Geotechnical parameters....................................................................................... 104
1.3.3.4 Environmental parameters..................................................................................... 109
1.3.3.5 Service parameters................................................................................................ 111
1.3.3.6 Cost parameters .................................................................................................... 112
1.3.4
Analysis matrix........................................................................................................116
1.3.4.1 Methodology of the analysis .................................................................................. 116
1.3.4.2 Results of track assessment.................................................................................. 117
1.3.4.3 Explanation of the results ...................................................................................... 118
1.3.4.4 Sensitivity analysis................................................................................................. 119
1.3.5
Recommendations of track system according to scenarios....................................120
1.4 Infrastructure concepts........................................................................................ 123
1.4.1
Summary ................................................................................................................123
Page 4 of (270)
1.4.2
Infrastructure concepts – Alignment parameters ....................................................124
1.4.2.1 Definition of variants .............................................................................................. 124
1.4.2.2 Alignment parameters............................................................................................ 124
1.4.2.3 Analysis matrix....................................................................................................... 131
1.4.2.4 Effects of alignment parameters on structures, safety and control equipment ...... 134
1.4.2.5 Recommendations regarding the appropriate alignment parameters
in relation to scenarios and conventional / tilting train operation ........................... 134
1.4.3
Infrastructure Concepts - Case Studies tilting train ................................................137
1.4.3.1 Scope and objective of the survey......................................................................... 137
1.4.3.2 Tilting train concepts.............................................................................................. 138
1.4.3.3 Tilting train information and experience by country ............................................... 142
1.4.3.4 Manufacturers........................................................................................................ 155
1.4.3.5 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 156
1.5 Rolling stock........................................................................................................ 158
1.5.1
Summary ................................................................................................................158
1.5.2
Objectives of rolling stock assessment...................................................................158
1.5.3
Definition of concepts .............................................................................................158
1.5.3.1 Dedicated High Speed Trains................................................................................ 158
1.5.3.2 Tilting trains ........................................................................................................... 159
1.5.3.3 Other trains using high speed railways .................................................................. 159
1.5.3.4 Mixed traffic ........................................................................................................... 159
1.5.4
Assumptions ...........................................................................................................160
1.5.4.1 Scenarios given from JBV ..................................................................................... 160
1.5.4.2 Proven design solutions......................................................................................... 160
1.5.4.3 Compliance to TSI’s............................................................................................... 160
1.5.4.4 Particulars for Norway ........................................................................................... 161
1.5.5
Evaluation model, description.................................................................................161
1.5.5.1 Train concepts ....................................................................................................... 163
1.5.5.2 Train parameters ................................................................................................... 163
1.5.6
Critical parameters for train concepts .....................................................................164
1.5.6.1 Climate and environment....................................................................................... 164
1.5.6.2 Route alignment..................................................................................................... 166
1.5.6.3 Pressure pulses ..................................................................................................... 166
1.5.6.4 Collisions with animals........................................................................................... 167
1.5.6.5 Fire and evacuation - Potential for having longer tunnels for high speed? ............ 168
1.5.6.6 External noise ........................................................................................................ 168
1.5.6.7 Length of train........................................................................................................ 169
1.5.6.8 Signalling - ERTMS ............................................................................................... 169
Page 5 of (270)
1.5.6.9 Track impact .......................................................................................................... 169
1.5.6.10 Energy consumption ......................................................................................... 169
1.5.7
Information of existing & future trains .....................................................................170
1.5.7.1 Bombardier Transportation .................................................................................... 170
1.5.7.2 Siemens................................................................................................................. 170
1.5.7.3 AnsaldoBreda ........................................................................................................ 171
1.5.7.4 Alstom.................................................................................................................... 171
1.5.7.5 Stadler ................................................................................................................... 172
1.5.7.6 Hyundai Rotem ...................................................................................................... 172
1.5.7.7 Kawasaki ............................................................................................................... 172
1.5.7.8 China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Corporation Limited (CSR) ................... 173
1.5.7.9 Hitachi.................................................................................................................... 173
1.5.7.10 Mitsubishi .......................................................................................................... 173
2
1.5.8
Absolute requirements for Rolling Stock.................................................................174
1.5.9
Remember list when buying trains..........................................................................174
Subject – Risk Assessment ............................................................................... 176
2.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 176
2.1 Summary............................................................................................................. 176
2.2 Definitions ...........................................................................................................179
2.3 Purpose of the HSR-risk assessment ................................................................. 179
2.4 Scope of the HSR-risk assessment..................................................................... 179
2.4.1
System-variant 1.....................................................................................................180
2.4.2
System-variant 2.....................................................................................................180
2.5 Risk assessment, general approach ................................................................... 181
2.5.1
Risk acceptance criteria, general introduction ........................................................182
2.5.1.1 Risk Acceptance Criteria for Technical Systems (RAC-TS) .................................. 182
2.5.1.2 Explicit risk estimation and harmonized risk acceptance criteria ........................... 183
2.5.2
Risk assessment, bottom-up-approach for RAC-TS...............................................184
2.5.2.1 Hazard identification .............................................................................................. 184
2.5.2.2 Qualitative consequence (severity) estimation ...................................................... 185
2.5.2.3 Evaluation if RAC-TS is applicable for specific hazard .......................................... 187
2.5.2.4 Estimation / quantification of safety barriers and THR-allocation .......................... 187
2.5.2.5 Hazard List with THRs ........................................................................................... 188
2.5.3
Risk Assessment, Top-Down-Approach .................................................................188
2.5.3.1 Definition of Top-Events ........................................................................................ 189
2.5.3.2 Quantification of Top-Events ................................................................................. 190
Page 6 of (270)
2.5.3.3 Top-Event, evaluation of rail statistics ................................................................... 190
2.5.3.4 Evaluation of accident rate .................................................................................... 194
2.5.3.5 Consequence analysis for every Top-Event .......................................................... 195
2.5.3.6 Estimation / calculation of the collective risk.......................................................... 195
2.5.3.7 Residual collective risk for every system-variant ................................................... 196
2.5.3.8 Individual risk for every Top-Event ........................................................................ 196
2.5.3.9 Residual individual risk .......................................................................................... 197
2.5.3.10 Top-Event-specific risk assessment.................................................................. 198
2.6 Sensitivity analysis .............................................................................................. 224
2.7 Perspective ......................................................................................................... 226
3
Subject – HSR Contribution to transport safety and security......................... 228
3.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 228
3.0.1
Objectives & Scope ................................................................................................228
3.0.2
Limitations...............................................................................................................228
3.0.3
Definitions ...............................................................................................................229
3.1 Summary............................................................................................................. 229
3.2 Availability of input data ...................................................................................... 229
3.3 Transports ........................................................................................................... 230
3.3.1
Types of data and evaluation approach..................................................................230
3.3.2
Railway transport ....................................................................................................231
3.3.2.1 High speed railway ................................................................................................ 232
3.3.3
Road transport ........................................................................................................232
3.3.3.1 Car transport.......................................................................................................... 232
3.3.3.2 Bus transport ......................................................................................................... 233
3.3.3.3 Truck transport....................................................................................................... 235
3.3.4
Air transport ............................................................................................................235
3.3.5
Ferry transport ........................................................................................................236
3.4 Safety.................................................................................................................. 237
3.4.1
Types of data and evaluation approach..................................................................237
3.4.2
Railway transport ....................................................................................................237
3.4.2.1 Conventional rail .................................................................................................... 238
3.4.2.2 High speed railway ................................................................................................ 239
3.4.3
Road transport ........................................................................................................240
3.4.3.1 Car ........................................................................................................................ 241
3.4.3.2 Bus ........................................................................................................................ 243
3.4.3.3 Truck...................................................................................................................... 244
Page 7 of (270)
3.4.3.4 Dependencies........................................................................................................ 245
3.4.4
Air transport ............................................................................................................246
3.4.5
Ferry transport ........................................................................................................247
3.5 Model description ................................................................................................ 247
3.5.1
Model structure .......................................................................................................247
3.5.2
Uncertainty analysis................................................................................................248
3.6 Estimation of the future distributions between types of transport means ............ 249
3.6.1
Scenario 0...............................................................................................................250
3.6.2
Scenario 1...............................................................................................................250
3.6.3
Scenario 2...............................................................................................................251
3.7 Results ................................................................................................................ 252
3.7.1
Estimation of the current transport safety level and development ..........................252
3.7.2
Estimation of changes in safety and the consequences of the changes ................253
3.7.3
Uncertainty analysis................................................................................................255
3.8 Conclusions......................................................................................................... 261
3.9 Security of HSR Systems regarding sabotage and terrorism .............................. 262
Table of references.................................................................................................... 264
Annexes...................................................................................................................... 270
Page 8 of (270)
List of tables
Table 1: Main technical parameters of existing HS – lines; in ( ) exceptional values................. 21
Table 2: HSR Traffic 2009.......................................................................................................... 22
Table 3: Overview HSL in France .............................................................................................. 24
Table 4: Overview HSL under construction in France................................................................ 24
Table 5: Overview HSL in Germany........................................................................................... 25
Table 6: Overview HSL under construction in Germany ............................................................ 26
Table 7: Overview HSL in Spain ................................................................................................ 26
Table 8: Overview HSL under construction in Spain.................................................................. 27
Table 9: Overview HSL in Italy ................................................................................................... 28
Table 10: Overview HSL in Japan.............................................................................................. 28
Table 11: Overview HSL under construction in Japan ............................................................... 29
Table 12: Overview HSL in China .............................................................................................. 30
Table 13: Overview HSL under construction in China................................................................ 30
Table 14: Overview technical specifications for Interoperability................................................. 35
Table 15: Parameter requirements of the TSI SRT.................................................................... 38
Table 16: Parameter requirements of the TSI PRM ................................................................... 38
Table 17: Parameter requirements of the TSI CCS ................................................................... 39
Table 18: Parameter requirements of the TSI INF ..................................................................... 40
Table 19: Parameter requirements of the TSI ENE.................................................................... 41
Table 20: Limit value analysis .................................................................................................... 44
Table 21: Precipitation intensity in Norway ................................................................................ 52
Table 22: Problem / measure matrix for climatic influence on rolling stock................................ 64
Table 23: Problem/measure matrix of climatic influence for rail system operation .................... 67
Table 24: Summary of track types.............................................................................................. 91
Table 25: Components of the permanent way ........................................................................... 97
Table 26 Construction height of track systems .......................................................................... 98
Table 27: Requirements on super- and substructure of ballasted tracks ................................. 107
Table 28: Requirements on super- and substructure of slab tracks......................................... 107
Table 29 Mass-spring-systems ................................................................................................ 110
Table 30: Scoring values of track solutions according to scenario A - D ................................. 117
Table 31: Results sensitivity analysis....................................................................................... 120
Table 32: Parameter comparison of different standards .......................................................... 126
Table 33: Lower limit values (ENV / ÖBB / JBV)...................................................................... 126
Table 34: TSI limit value........................................................................................................... 126
Table 35: Comparison of the maximum permissible route gradients ....................................... 127
Table 36: Cant excess depending on speed ............................................................................ 127
Page 9 of (270)
Table 37: Possible speeds in curves R = 1’000 m ................................................................... 130
Table 38: Illustration of different characteristics for curves at 200 km/h .................................. 134
Table 39: Finnish tilting trains................................................................................................... 143
Table 40: Tilted regional trains in Germany ............................................................................. 144
Table 41: High speed tilting trains in Germany ........................................................................ 144
Table 42: Tilting trains currently in use in Great Britain............................................................ 146
Table 43: Tilting trains currently in use in Italy ......................................................................... 147
Table 44: Tilting trains in Norway ............................................................................................. 149
Table 45: Tilting trains in Portugal............................................................................................ 150
Table 46: Cant and maximum lateral accelerations in Spain ................................................... 150
Table 47: Tilting trains in Spain ................................................................................................ 151
Table 48: Tilting trains in Sweden ............................................................................................ 152
Table 49: Tilting trains in Switzerland....................................................................................... 153
Table 50: Tilting trains in the USA............................................................................................ 154
Table 51: Residual risk related to Top-Events, overview ......................................................... 176
Table 52: Residual collective risk, overview............................................................................. 177
Table 53: Residual collective risk, point estimate overview ..................................................... 177
Table 54: Residual collective risk of personal. overview .......................................................... 178
Table 55: Residual individual risk of passengers and 3rd persons. overview ........................... 178
Table 56: Definitions................................................................................................................. 179
Table 57: HSR-System, interfaces ........................................................................................... 185
Table 58: Hazard severity level, according to Table 3 in EN 50126-1 ..................................... 186
Table 59: Accident statistics UIC.............................................................................................. 193
Table 60: Accident statistics Norway ERADIS ......................................................................... 193
Table 61: Distribution of fatalities to person groups, UIC ......................................................... 193
Table 62: Collective Risk parameters Norway ......................................................................... 194
Table 63: Comparison of risk parameters ................................................................................ 194
Table 64: Operating figures...................................................................................................... 197
Table 65: Top-Event 1, statistical data ..................................................................................... 198
Table 66: Risk estimation, Top-Event 1 ................................................................................... 201
Table 67: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 1 ............................................................... 201
Table 68: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 1 ............................................................... 201
Table 69: Top-Event 2, statistical data [83] .............................................................................. 202
Table 73: Top-Event 3, statistical data [84] .............................................................................. 206
Page 10 of (270)
Table 97: Level of uncertainty for each influencing parameter
of the collective risk model (system variant 1) ......................................................... 224
Table 98: Level of uncertainty for each influencing parameter
of the collective risk model (system variant 2) ......................................................... 224
Table 99: Estimated changes when HSR combined with conventional rail is
implemented billion passenger and vehicle kilometres ............................................ 251
Table 100: Estimated changes when a separate HSR is implemented ................................... 252
Table 101: The calculated total current societal safety level of transport means in
Norway and the annual safety development. ........................................................... 252
Table 102: The total societal safety level of transport means in Norway for the different
scenarios presented as total number of fatalities during 25 years. .......................... 254
Page 11 of (270)
List of figures
Figure 1: CO2 Emissions by passenger kilometres and transport mode
23
Figure 2: 3-layers regulatory structure
33
Figure 3: Interoperability - Sub-systems
34
Figure 4: Structure of the Teknisk Regelverk
37
Figure 5: Principle of ETCS level 2
47
Figure 6: Expected percentage change in normal annual precipitation
from normal period 1961-1990 to 2071-2100.
53
Figure 7: Expected change in annual temperature
from normal period 1961-1990 to period 2071-2100.
53
Figure 8: Expected percentage change in mean winter
(DJF) runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071-2100.
54
Figure 9: Expected change in mean spring (MAM), summer (JJA) and autumn (SON)
runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071-2100.
54
Figure 10: The topography in Norway
55
Figure 11: Mass wasting records from the National Road Administration, various types
55
Figure 12: Excerpt of bedrock map of southern Norway
56
Figure 13: Soil/sediment slide
57
Figure 14: Rissa was the scene of the largest quick clay landslide
in Norway last century, 29 April 1978
58
Figure 15: Large rockfall at Mundheim in Hardanger in 2006
59
Figure 16: Trigger areas for avalanches in Jotunheimen
59
Figure 18: Comparison of slab, loose snow and slush flows
60
Figure 19: Example hazard maps from Hardanger
61
Figure 20: TGV track with Twinblock sleeper B450 (formerly U41 VAX)
75
Figure 21: Ballasted track with B 70 sleepers
75
Figure 22: B 70 pre-stressed concrete sleeper
76
76
Figure 24: Ballasted track with Y-steel sleepers
77
Figure 25: Wide Sleeper system
78
Figure 26: New high-speed line Cologne-Rhine/Main, Hallerbachtalbruecke, Germany
80
Figure 27: Cross section RHEDA 2000®
80
Figure 28: Cross section RHEDA 2000 (Turnout area)
80
Figure 29: New ICE high-speed line Nürnberg-Ingolstadt with System BÖGL
81
Figure 30: System Bögl detail and description
81
Figure 31: Cross-section on earth structure with system BÖGL
81
Figure 32: Finished system NFF Thyssen
83
Figure 33: Constructional principal of NFF structure
83
Page 12 of (270)
Figure 34: System overview PORR ÖBB
84
Figure 35: System PORR ÖBB on embankment
84
Figure 36: J-SLAB System on open track
85
Figure 37: J-SLAB System overview
85
Figure 38: J-SLAB (Taiwan HSL) with ballasted protection aside
85
Figure 39: System LVT-Track
86
Figure 40: System overview LVT-Track
86
Figure 41: System overview GETRAC (on asphalt support layer)
87
Figure 42: System overview of EDILON system
88
Figure 43: Top View EBS system
89
Figure 44: Cross section EBS-system
89
Figure 45: EBS system pictures from construction site
90
Figure 46: Details of the EBS-block
90
Figure 47: Impacts on earth structures
105
Figure 48: Acceleration and braking curve with line profile 1.25 % gradient
over a distance of 10 km
128
128
129
in the start zone
129
Figure 52: Limit values of the alignment parameters for variant 1
132
132
133
Figure 55: Radii to a scale of 1:5’000 from the table for change
of direction of 20, 30 and 40 degrees
135
Figure 56: Recommendation of alignment parameters
for conventional (non tilting) trains
136
Figure 57: Recommendation of alignment parameters for tilting trains
136
Figure 58: Active tilting system type Pendolino
140
Figure 59: Passive tilting system type Talgo
140
Figure 60: Wako tilting system/bogie
141
Figure 61: Icy bogie due to winter conditions
142
Figure 62: Part of the evaluation model as example
162
Figure 63: Number of animal collisions
167
Figure 64: Animal collisions 2009 according to type of animal
168
Figure 65: Zefiro train
170
Figure 66: Velaro train
171
Page 13 of (270)
Figure 67: V250
171
Figure 68: AGV train
172
Figure 69: Flirt to NSB
172
Figure 70: UK 395
173
Figure 71: Maglev train
174
Figure 72: Hazard identification
185
Figure 73: Risk matrix with RAC-TS reference value
186
Figure 74: Example for calibration of risk matrix
187
Figure 75: Risk matrix applied for hazard with lower severity
but credible immediate potential
188
Figure 76: Top-Events, overview
189
Figure 77: Fire, causes
194
Figure 78: Fire, consequence analysis
195
Figure 79: Derivation of the collective risk
196
Figure 80: Example of derivation of the residual collective risk
196
Figure 81: Example of derivation of the individual risk
197
Figure 82: Example of derivation of the residual individual risk
198
Figure 83: Top-Event 1 „Derailment“, system-variant 1
199
200
Figure 85: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, wrong switch position
203
Figure 86: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, stop signal passed
203
204
205
Figure 89: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, object on track
207
Figure 90: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, fire in rolling stock
210
Figure 91: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, fire at track
210
Figure 92: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, person injured at platform while entry /exit
213
Figure 93: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, person injured at platform by passing train
213
Figure 94: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, person(s) traverse level crossing
216
Figure 95: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, level crossing unsecured
216
Figure 96: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, person crosses track
218
Figure 97: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, objects / parts loosened / raised
219
Figure 98: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, electrocution accidents
221
Figure 99: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, dangerous goods accidents
222
Figure 100: Range of collective risks
225
Figure 101: Results of the sensitivity analysis for each Top-Event (system variant 1)
225
226
Figure 103: Billion railway passenger kilometres in Norway.
231
Page 14 of (270)
Figure 104: Billion railway vehicle kilometres in Norway.
232
Figure 105: Billion passenger kilometres (driver and passenger) in cars
on Norwegian roads.
233
Figure 106: Billion vehicle kilometres in cars on Norwegian roads.
233
Figure 107: Billion passenger kilometres in buses on Norwegian roads.
234
Figure 108: Billion vehicle kilometres in buses on Norwegian roads.
234
Figure 109: Billion vehicle kilometres in trucks on Norwegian roads.
235
Figure 110: Billion passenger kilometres with airplanes in Norway. 1970-2009.
236
Figure 111: Billion passenger kilometres with ferry transport in Norway. 2005-2008.
236
Figure 112: Number of fatalities on Norwegian railways during 1996-2003.
238
Figure 113: Passenger fatality per billion conventional rail passenger kilometres.
239
Figure 114: Fatality for others per billion conventional rail vehicle kilometres.
239
Figure 115: The number of persons killed in road traffic accidents in Norway
during 1970-2009.
241
Figure 116: Passenger and driver fatality for car traffic per billion passenger kilometres
242
Figure 117: The estimated number of fatalities for other persons per billion car vehicle
kilometres (“cars involved in killing others”) excluding passenger and
drivers in Norway during 2005-2009.
243
Figure 118: The estimated number of fatalities for other persons per billion bus vehicle
kilometres (“bus involved in killing others”) after accidents with cars; buses
and single bus accidents are excluded in Norway during 2005-2009.
244
Figure 119: The estimated number of fatalities for other persons per billion truck vehicle
kilometres (“trucks involved in killing others”) after accidents with cars are
excluded in Norway during 2005-2009.
245
Figure 120: The estimated number of international air plane passenger fatalities per
billion air plane passenger kilometres according to the ICAO
246
Figure 121: Fatalities on ferries in Norway during 2000-2009.
247
Figure 122: Schematic description of the approach for uncertainty analysis.
249
Figure 123: The calculated total current societal safety level of transport means in
Norway expressed as the expected number of fatalities for each means of
transport.
253
Figure 124: The total societal safety level of transport means in Norway for the different
scenarios presented as total number of fatalities for four different time
horizons.
254
Figure 125 Change in predicted societal transport safety S1 and S2 compared to S0 in
Norway for four different time horizons.
255
Figure 126: The economic consequences of transport safety level changes with the
implementation of HSR systems in Norway for different time periods.
255
Figure 127: The uncertainties of total societal safety level forecasts of transports,
presented as total number of fatalities during 25 years in Norway, for the
studied scenarios.
256
Figure 128: The uncertainties of economic consequences of safety changes for
Scenarios 1 and Scenario 2.
256
Page 15 of (270)
Figure 129: Uncertainty analysis of total safety for Scenario 0 during 25 years.
257
Figure 130: Sensitivity analysis of total safety for Scenario 0 during 25 years.
257
Figure 131: Uncertainty analysis of total safety for Scenario 1 during 25 years
258
Figure 132: Sensitivity analysis of total safety for Scenario 1 during 25 years
258
259
259
Figure 135: Uncertainty analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 1 during 25
years
259
Figure 136: Sensitivity analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 1 during 25
years
260
Figure 137: Uncertainty analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 2 during 25
years
260
Figure 138: Sensitivity analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 2 during 25
years
260
Page 16 of (270)
List of abbreviations
AAR
ATC
ATOC
AVE
CER
CSM
CST
CSI
DMU
EIM
EMU
EN
ERA
EqFa
ERADIS
ETCS
EU
FLIRT
FRA
HS
HSL
HSR
HVAC
IC
ICAO
ICE
IRMA
JBV
KIT
km
min
Mio.
MTBF
NRV
NNR
NSA
NSB
Pkm
OHL
Q
Association of American Railroads, US
Automatic Train Control
Association of Train Operating Companies in the United Kingdom
Alta Velocidad Español, Spanish HS train concept
Community of European Railway and Infrastructure Companies
Common Safety Methods
Common Safety Targets
Common Safety Indicator
Diesel Multiple Unit
European Rail Infrastructure Managers
Electric Multiple Unit
Euronorm
European Railway Agency
Equivalent Fatalities (means a measurement of the consequences of significant
accidents combining fatalities and injuries, where one fatality is considered
statistically 10 major or 100 minor injuries).
European Railway Agency Database of Interoperability and Safety
European Train Control System
European Community
Fast Light Innovative Regional Train, EMU produced by Stadler Rail AG
Federal Railroad Administration, US
High Speed
High Speed Line
High Speed Rail
Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning
InterCity
International Civil Aviation Organization
InterCity Express, German HS train concept
Structured outline of all train systems splitted in 14 sections; 1= Carbody, 2=
bogie and running gear, 3=brakes, etc.
Jernbaneverket, Norwegian Rail Infrastructure Operator
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
Kilometres
Minute
Million
Mean Time Between Failure
National Reference Value
Notified National Rules
National Safety Authority
Norwegian Rail Traffic Operator
Passenger kilometres
Overhead Line
Probability
Page 17 of (270)
RA
RAC-TS
RSSB
SCB
SI
SIL
SJT
SRA
SSB
TGV
THR
TSI
UIC
UK
UNIFE
Railway Authority
Risk Acceptance Criterion for technical systems
Railway Safety Standards and Boards, UK
Swedish Statistisk Centralbyrå
Safety Integrity
Safety Integrity Level
Statens Jernbanetilsyn (Norwegian Railway Inspectorate)
Safety Regulatory Authority
Statistisk sentralbyrå
Train à grande vitesse, French HS train concept
Tolerable Hazard Rate
Technical Specifications for Interoperability
Union Internationale des Chemins de fer, International Union of Railways
United Kingdom
Union des Industries Ferroviaires Européennes, Association of the European Rail
Industry
Page 18 of (270)
1 Subject – Technical solutions
1.0
Introduction
On the 19th of February 2010 Jernbaneverket got the mandate of assessing the issue of highspeed railway lines in Norway. The study is being organised as an independent project
organisation within Jernbaneverket´s “HighSpeed Rail Assessment Project 2010-12”. The
assessment shall include recommendations about which long term strategies shall form the
basis of the development of long distance passenger train transport in the southern part of
Norway. The project is due for completion in February 2012, in order to inform for the 2014-23
National Transport Plan.
The study work has been divided into three phases. The first phase began with the collation and
assessment of earlier studies by COWI. The report in hand is part of the second phase to
establish overall principles for high speed development, whilst the evaluation of specific routes
will form the final phase.
An important target in phase 2 is to identify which high-speed concepts are adaptable to
Norwegian conditions. The main assessment shall explain and analyse common problems and
prerequisites, followed by analyses of the different corridors in Phase 3.
Phase 2 was divided into six assignments which have been worked out in parallel under the
coordination of Jernbaneverket:
1. Market analysis: Atkins Group, with Ernst&Young, Temple, Rand Europe and ITS Leeds
from the UK.
2. Rail-specific planning and development analysis: WSP Samhällsbyggnad of Sweden, with
Transrail Sweden AB and Multiconsult AS of Norway.
3. Financial and economic analysis: the Atkins Group consortium plus Faithful+Gould of the
UK.
4. Commercial and contract strategies: PricewaterhouseCoopers of Norway and the UK.
5. Technical and safety analysis: Pöyry Infra of Germany, with Interfleet Technology, Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology and Sweco Norge AS.
6. Environmental analysis: Asplan Viak of Norway, with MISA, VWI of Germany and Brekke og
Strand Akustikk AS.
These different issues of the six assignments constitute a basis for corridor analysis. It was
hereby important that the premises may be used flexibly in the corridor analyses.
Work package 5 “Technical and safety analysis” has been worked out by a team of Pöyry,
Interfleet, Sweco and KIT. The report contains assessment of:
World overview of high-speed rail,
1. Technical tasks, namely:
•
Standards and norms that are needed for high-speed rail,
•
Aspects of Norway’s different weather and climatic conditions with regard to possible
high-speed rail construction,
•
Different technical track solutions,
•
Infrastructure concepts comprising a alignment parameter analysis and a case study of
tilting train operation in 10 different countries,
•
Rolling stock.
Page 19 of (270)
2. Risk assessment with regard to high-speed rail operation,
3. Safety analyses linked to different speeds and types of mixed traffic.
To provide a comprehensive report of the assignment all tasks were compiled in the document
in hand. However, every main tasks forms a self-contained chapter with an own summary to
facilitate reading.
1.0.1 Brief description of scenarios
Based on the mandate the assignment had to consider four different scenarios to assess which
action alternatives are best suited in order to obtain the goals for the transport politics in the
different corridors, namely:
A The reference alternative: based on the existing railway lines.
B A more offensive further development of the existing railway infrastructure, also outside the
IC area.
C High-speed concepts, which in part are based on the existing network and IC strategy.
D Mainly separate high-speed lines.
Following assignments and interpretations for the assessment have been made:
► Assignment of the scenarios
A. The reference alternative: based on the existing railway politics:
•
no new tracks built compared to the projects already started as of November 2010,
•
normal maintenance work of the tracks will continue as today, e.g. replacement of worn
tracks etc to keep the standard as the same level as today,
•
not relevant to the TSI for the trans-European high speed rail system,
•
speed < 160 km/h.
B. More offensive further development of the current railway infrastructure, also outside the
InterCity area:
•
in accordance with TSI-Category III:
specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h
•
e.g. removal of level crossings, increasing curve radius’s, increased cant etc.,
•
speed: 160 – 200 km/h.
C. High-speed concepts, which in part are based on the existing network and InterCity strategy:
•
high-speed concepts which partly incorporate the existing network.
Some new parts of the line which is built according to high speed concept without any
level crossings. The new lines will not necessarily be built in same alignment as the
existing track.
•
in accordance with TSI-Category II / III
specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h or
specially upgraded high-speed lines or lines specially built for high speed, which have
special features as a result of topographical, relief, environmental or town-planning
constraints, on which the speed must be adapted to each case.
•
speed: 200 – 250 km/h.
Page 20 of (270)
D. Mainly separate high-speed lines
•
High-speed lines largely separate from the existing network.
As scenario C but to be built for the complete corridor from start to end station.
•
In accordance with TSI-Category I:
Specially built high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or higher than
250 km/h.
•
speed: 250 – 350 km/h.
1.0.2 World high speed rail (HSR) overview
1.0.2.1 Infrastructure
In December 2010 a total of 6’637 km of new high speed lines (HSL) are in Europe in
commercial service; 2’527 km of HSL are under construction and another 8’605 km of HSL are
planned. The four countries France, Germany, Spain and Italy are operating 6’160 km HSL,
which means 93 % of the European total. Therefore this chapter will concentrate on these four
countries adding Japan, where HSR started already in 1964. Today Japanese railways are
operating 2’534 km HSL; 508 km of HSL are under construction. China has actually 4’079 km of
HSL in service and 6’154 km HSL are under construction.
The development of the European HSL has been done over a period of more than forty years.
During this period the design criteria have been modified as experience has been gained with
the different aspects of high speed running. In particular, the geometric parameters chosen for a
certain design speed of a new HSL permitted higher maximum speeds than those specified
when the line was opened. Experience shows that it is worth to keep a certain « reserve of
speed » for the future. Several European HSL are designed for 350 km/h, actually the maximum
speed is 320 km/h.
Parallel to the construction of HSL new HS trains were developed. The success of HSR is due
to the fact that HSL, HS train as well as HS services (station, ticketing) were handled together.
As far as traffic is concerned the HSL can be divided into three types:
Type 1: Exclusively high speed traffic (dedicated HSL). This is the case in France and Japan as
well as in Germany (Köln – Frankfurt) and new high speed lines in Spain.
Type 2: High speed passenger traffic, with conventional passenger trains at lower speeds. In
this group is Spain.
Type 3: Mixed traffic with high speed and conventional passenger and freight. This is the case
in Italy and Germany, as well as in France for the by-pass Nimes-Montpellier and the future line
to Italy Lyon – Torino.
In 2001 UIC has published the report "Mixed traffic operations on high speed lines: experience
and trends", relating experience with mixed traffic operations, trends in terms of design and
construction criteria and the technical aspects to be considered. In this report Prof. A. Lopez
Pita came to the recommendation: “Before selecting the geometrical parameters and in
particular the maximum gradient and length of gradient, where operating freight trains is
envisaged, proceed with an analysis of the actual impact of these parameters on the following
variables at least: investment into infrastructure, operating costs and hauled load of freight
trains.” In each individual case a decision-making process will be necessary.
The table below gives an overview of the main technical parameters of HSL:
Page 21 of (270)
Table 1: Main technical parameters of existing HS – lines; in ( ) exceptional values
Country
Operation
France
dedicated (SE)
300
3.5
4’000 (3’200)
180
85
dedicated
350
2.5
7’100 (5’500)
180
65
mixed traffic (HW)
250
1.25
7’000 (5’100)
90
80
dedicated (KF)
300
4
3’425
160 (170 slab)
150
dedicated (MS)
300
1.25
4’000
150
60 (65)
dedicated (MB)
350
2.5
7’250 (6’615)
140 (160)
60 (165)
mixed traffic (FR)
250
0.75
3’700
n.a.
n.a
mixed traffic
300
1.8
5’450
105
n.a.
dedicated
250 - 300
3.5
3’793 *
180
100 (130)
dedicated
350
3.5
5’596*
180
80
dedicated (T)
270
2
2’500
200
90
dedicated (S)
300
1.25
4’000
180
90
mixed traffic
250
1.25
4’000 (2’900)
90 (125)
100 (130)
Germany
Spain
Italy
EU TSI
Japan
Norway
Design Speed
[km/h]
Gradient
[%]
Radius
[mm]
Cant
[mm]
Cant deficiency
[mm]
* TSI contains no explicit value for the radius. This value is calculated with the other parameters in the table.
20 December 2007 the European Commission published the technical specification for
interoperability (TSI) relating to the ‘infrastructure’ sub-system of the trans-European HSR system. This TSI shall be applicable to all new infrastructure of the trans-European HSR
system. The values are valid up to a maximum speed of 350 km/h.
For the maximum gradient exists a very large margin of variation, between 1.2 % (mixed) and
4.0 % (dedicated), which clearly shows that it is difficult to fix a recommended value, because
traffic and topography of the region that a new line passes through play a major role in the
decisions taken. The TSI specifies a maximum gradient of 3.5 % over a continuous length not
exceeding 6 km; to which the condition is added that the average gradient should not exceed
2.5 % on 10 km.
The parameters essential to determine the other geometric characteristics, especially the radius
are cant and cant deficiency. There is a tendency to reduce the value of the cant deficiency as
the speed increases. However, it seems possible to design tilting trains in the future for speeds
above 300 km/h which could operate on the HSL with larger cant deficiencies than are allowed
for conventional HS trains.
Taken into account the cant and cant deficiency the regular radius for design speeds of
300 km/h to 350 km/h is between 3’500 m and 7’000 m.
The TSI specifies a minimum figure of 4.50 m for the distance between track centre lines (for
speed limits higher than 300 km/h). This value is used in France and Germany; in Italy 5.00 m
are realized. The economic implications can be considerable if the transverse section is
increased. Studies carried out for the international section Figueres - Perpignan of the
Barcelona - Perpignan HSL showed that a variation of the distance between track centres from
4.5 m to 4.8 m would involve an increase in cost of the whole civil engineering work of 1 %.
Some railways (DB, FS, SNCF, JR) have developed HS ballastless (slab) track. In particular,
in Germany the HSL Köln – Frankfurt is equipped with ballastless track, except for the zones
where the trains must travel at speeds of less than 200 km/h (stations, etc.). The cost for
building these tracks is up to 100 % higher than that for ballasted track, but experience shows
that, especially in tunnels, the maintenance costs are less than the costs of ballasted track (of
the order of 1/5th), due to the slower degradation of the geometrical parameters of these tracks.
According to Spanish estimates, the cost of slab track would be double and the maintenance
Page 22 of (270)
cost would be half. These estimates assume a life of 60 years for slab track against 30 years for
ballasted track. It is, however, premature to conclude that the overall life cycle cost of
ballastless track would be considerably less than that for conventional track.
New HSL are relatively expensive, with costs in Europe ranging from 10 to 40 million €/km.
The cost depends on whether the new lines are built for mixed traffic operations or for
passenger services alone, but also and particularly on the terrain they cross. Some country
specific values of HSL costs are mentioned in the following chapters.
1.0.2.2 Traffic
The HSL built to date have generally brought journey time reductions of 50 %. The phenomenal
success of HSR is borne out by traffic growth expressed as passenger-kilometres (Pkm). The
figure of 104.4 billion Pkm achieved in Europe in 2009 was doubled in only ten years. The
76 billion Pkm figures recorded in Japan (for a population of 127 million) demonstrate the
massive untapped potential for HSR in Europe (EU has a population of 500 million) and indeed
across the world. The Japanese use their HS trains six times as often as the Europeans. The
last column of the table below demonstrates the success of HSR. In these five countries HS
trains are responsible for 23 to 59 % of the whole railway’s passenger km (including short
distance traffic).
Table 2: HSR Traffic 2009 1
Country
Total trainset stock
Speed >230 km/h
Kilometres travelled High
Speed [Billion Pkm]
Kilometres travelled train
total country [Billion Pkm]
High Speed [%]
France
440
51.9
87.7
59.2
Germany
233
22.6
76.8
29.4
Spain
127
11.5
23
50
Italy
83
10.7
45.6
23.5
Japan
275
76
244.2
31.1
Short-haul journeys by air as well as car use are especially well-suited to a transfer to rail.
Some examples show the substantial shift in market share that followed the commissioning of
HSR. Shortly after its launch in 1994, Eurostar HS trains secured 60 % of the rail-air market on
the Paris to London route; today Eurostar holds 71 % of the market. Conventional trains had
only 12 % market share on the Madrid – Barcelona route, actually HSR’s share is higher than
50 % in relation to the air. The Madrid – Seville HSL has won over substantial market shares
from the airlines, buses and cars. Actually HSR secures 84 % of the rail-air market. Madrid –
Seville is the very best European HSR, enjoying a load factor of 75 % and a second-to-none
punctuality record of 99.8 %. In other European HS countries exists similar experience about
the transfer from air and road to the HSR.
In France, Germany and Italy HS trains also run on the conventional lines (at the normal
maximum speed for those lines) up to 200 or 220 km/h. By connecting with existing lines HS
trains can serve many more destinations and can access city centre stations. Therefore the time
savings of the HSL are brought to regions without HSL. In Spain the HS trains AVE
(AltaVelocidad Espagnol) are running only on the HSL, but there are trains from Talgo equipped
with an automatic gauge-switching system which allows using HSL and conventional lines. The
Japanese HS trains can only use the HSL.
1
Cp. [1].
Page 23 of (270)
Since the opening of the French Mediterranean HSL (2001) TGV passengers can cover the
750 km between Paris and Marseilles in a mere 3 hours. After completion of the whole Paris –
Strasbourg HSL French TGV and German ICE will link Paris to Strasbourg in 1h 50 min.
Today the first Spanish HSL Madrid – Seville is the very best European HSR service, enjoying
a load factor of 75 % and a second-to-none punctuality record of 99.8 %. This excellent
performance is due to the fact that Madrid – Seville line is a dedicated HSL. Non-stop AVE
trains take 2 hours 15 minutes to cover the 471 km, at an average speed of 209 km/h. The
timetable therefore incorporates sufficient slack time to absorb most delays.
1.0.2.3 HSR and the Environment
HS trains running at 250 – 350 km/h are not without consequences for the environment. The
first point to mention is the energy consumption. With their high load factors and the
regeneration of electrical energy during braking (ICE), these trains have a low specific energy
consumption. That of the German ICE, for example, is no more than about 2.4 litres of petrol
(roughly 1.6 litres for the French TGV) per 100 Pkm that means less than one-third that of a car
on a long-distance trip. HSR is energy efficient and produces a minimum of greenhouse gases
and thanks to electric traction can easily switch to renewable energies. The emissions
generated by trains depend on the power generation mix. ADEME (French environment
agency) published in 2008 a comparison of the energy efficiency of different modes in France
as well as the emission of the greenhouse gases, transferred in CO2 values. The picture
demonstrates the good record of HSR (TGV) compared to conventional trains (grandes lignes),
private car (vehicule particulier) and air (avions), unit: gCO2/Pkm..
Figure 1: CO2 Emissions by passenger kilometres and transport mode 2
In European Union transport is responsible for 25 % of all CO2 emissions; the part of rail is
small. A shift of traffic from the roads and airways to rail will support a sustainable mobility.
The construction of HSR always means encroaching on nature (land take, separation effects).
Environmental considerations have an important role to play in the planning of HSL. The aim of
the work is to avoid damage where possible and at least bring it down to a justifiable level. To
2
Cp.[2].
Page 24 of (270)
minimize the level of intrusion into nature and the use of land, attempts are also made to
combine HSL with existing rights of way. In France, the Paris-Lille HSL runs parallel to the
motorway over 135 km, the Paris-Lyons line for 60 km and the Paris-Atlantic line for 35 km. The
German Köln -Frankfurt HSL is extensively twinned with the motorway. The specific land take of
HSL is 3.2 ha/km (two German HSL), which is only one-third that of a motorway (9.3 ha/km for
German motorways). Since on electrified lines the air along the route is not polluted, some twothirds of the surface areas needed for a HSL remain intact as biologically-valuable habitat.
The aspect of the environment most affected by the increase in speed is the subject of noise.
Above 250/300 km/h the predominant noise is that of the pantograph and the aerodynamic
noise. Railways have been successful in cutting the noise produced by their trains. At 200 km/h,
the noise generated by the ICE is some 7 dB (A) lower than that of an IC trains at equivalent
speed. There are research programmes seeking to bring about further reductions in noise at
source. Where HSL generate excessive noise for line side residents, noise abatement screens
or walls are built.
Other, generally more minor environmental effects can also occur; such as vibrations, electrosmog and the use of herbicides (though not on slab track).
1.0.2.4 Important HSR countries
1.0.2.4.1 France
Table 3: Overview HSL in France
HSL in operation:
max km/h
Opening
Length km
Paris – Lyon (Sud Est)
300
1981/1983
419
Atlantique
300
1989/1990
291
By-pass Lyon
300
1992/1994
121
Nord – Europe
300
1994/1996
346
By-pass Paris (Interconnexion IDF)
300
1994/1996
104
Méditerranée
320
2001
259
Est (Paris – Strasbourg, 1. Section)
320
2007
332
Total km
1’872
max km/h
Opening
Length km
Spanish border – Perpignan
300
2011
24
By-pass Nimes – Montpellier
220/320
2016
70
Dijon – Mulhouse (Rhin – Rhone)
320
2011
140
Est (2. Section)
320
2016
100
Total km
334
Table 4: Overview HSL under construction in France
HSL under construction:
Page 25 of (270)
Actually the French network comprises 1’872 km of HSL managed by RFF (Réseau Ferré de
France), the French state owned infrastructure manager. Some 334 km HSL are under
construction and 2’516 km of HSL are planned until 2020/2025.
With the opening of the Paris – Lyons line in 1981/83 HSR began in Europe. With a gradient up
to 3.5 % the construction of tunnels could be avoided in a difficult terrain. This HSL as well as
the following HSL are dedicated, that means only used by the French HS train TGV. Due to a
less problematic terrain the maximum gradient of the HSL Atlantique and Nord could be
reduced to 2.5 %. These first three French HSL were realized with costs of less than
10 million €/km (prices of the 70th and 80th).
The first section of the Eastern HSL (TGV Est) Paris - Strasbourg until Baudrecourt (south of
Metz) is 300 km long with costs of 3.1 billion €. At around 10 million €/km, this line is in the
cheaper cost bracket for HSL construction. The terrain is admittedly unproblematic, with no
tunnels required and only a few long bridges, and the sparse population also makes matters
easier. Work for the second section of this HSL to Strasbourg (Vendenheim) started in
November 2010. The costs will be almost twice: 19 million €/km (total 2.01 billion €, 100 km),
due to a 3’900 m long tunnel through the mountain Vosges and a higher population density.
End of 2011 140 km of the 190 km Dijon – Mulhouse HSL (TGV Rhin – Rhone, Est) will be
opened, the costs are 2.312 billion €, that means 16.5 million €/km, this HSL has two tunnels
(1’870 m and 170 m length), only a few long bridges and a sparse population.
The by-pass Nimes – Montpellier will cost 1.62 billion €, that means 23 million €/km and this
HSL will be operated in mixed traffic. In 2016 HS – trains will run with 220 km/h (later on
320 km/h) and freight trains with 100 or 120 km/h. This line is realized in public private
partnership. Mixed traffic is also foreseen for the French – Italian HSL Lyon – Torino, passing
through the Alps.
1.0.2.4.2 Germany
Table 5: Overview HSL in Germany
HSL in operation:
max km/h
Opening
Length km
Fulda – Würzburg
280
1988
90
Hannover – Fulda
280
1991/1994
248
Mannheim – Stuttgart
280
1985/1991
109
Hannover (Wolfsburg) – Berlin
250
1998
189
Köln – Frankfurt (dedicated)
300
2002/2004
180
Köln – Düren
250
2003
42
(Karlsruhe –) Rastatt – Offenburg
250
2004
44
Leipzig – Gröbers (– Erfurt)
250
2004
24
Hamburg – Berlin
230
2004
253
Nürnberg – Ingolstadt
300
2006
89
Total km
1’285
Page 26 of (270)
Table 6: Overview HSL under construction in Germany
max km/h
Opening
Length km
München – Augsburg
230
2011
62
(Leipzig/Halle –) Gröbers – Erfurt
300
2015
98
Nürnberg – Erfurt
250
2017
218
Total km
378
Actually the German network comprises 1’285 km of HSL managed by Deutsche Bahn Netz,
the German infrastructure manager. About 378 km of HSL are under construction and 6 HSL
with a total length of 670 km are planned.
In Germany, HSR services began in 1991 with the launch of the "InterCityExpress" (ICE) on the
Hannover - Würzburg and Mannheim - Stuttgart HSL. Initially the reference speed was
250 km/h for HS trains and 80 km/h for freight trains. These speeds have been increased to
280 km/h and 120 km/h respectively in the last few years. These lines are also used by
conventional trains (Eurocity, Intercity) running with a maximum speed of 200 km/h. In Germany
all HSL are built for mixed traffic, with the exemption of the Köln – Frankfurt HSL.
The necessary parameters (gradient 1.25 %, radius 7’000 m, minimum 5’100 m) and the difficult
terrain caused 61 tunnels with a total length of 121 km, which means 37 % of the whole HSL
Hannover – Würzburg. For the Mannheim – Stuttgart HSL 15 tunnels with a total length of
31 km were built; 31 % of the whole HSL. The high percentage of tunnels and many bridges
caused average costs of about 19 million €/km (prices of the 80th).
Since August 2002, the most important German HSL between Cologne and the Rhine/Main
area has taken roughly an hour off Frankfurt-Cologne journey times (previously 2 hours 15
minutes). This is the first German dedicated HSL and equipped with slab track. Despite the
maximal gradient of 4.0 %, 30 tunnels with a total length of 47 km were necessary (26 % of the
HSL). The cost were about 6 billion €, that means 34 million €/km (prices of the 90th). This HSL
also links Köln/Bonn and Frankfurt Main’s airports.
The Nürnberg – Ingolstadt HSL was opened in 2006 for mixed traffic, which means with a
gradient of only 1.25 %. 9 Tunnels with a length of 27 km (30 % of the HSL) were built. The cost
were 3.5 billion €, that means 39 million €/km. This HSL featured the first German Regional
Express services running at up to 200 km/h.
1.0.2.4.3 Spain
Table 7: Overview HSL in Spain
HSL in operation:
max km/h
Opening
Length km
Madrid – Seville
270
1992
471
Madrid – Lleida
300
2003
519
Zaragoza – Huesca
200
2003
79
(Madrid –) La Sagra – Toledo
250
2005
21
Córdoba – Antequera
300
2006
100
Lleida – Camp de Tarragona
300
2006
82
Page 27 of (270)
HSL in operation:
max km/h
Opening
Length km
Madrid – Segovia – Valladolid
300
2007
184
Antequera – Málaga
300
2007
55
Camp de Tarragona – Barcelona
300
2008
88
By-pass Madrid
200
2009
5
Madrid-Valencia / Albacete
300
2010
432
Total km
2’036
max km/h
Opening
Length km
Figueres – Frontera (– Perpignan)
300
2011
20
Barcelona – Figueres
300
2011/2012
132
(Madrid –) Alicante / Murcia / Castellón
300
2012
470
Vitoria – Bilbao – San Sebastián
250
2012
175
Variante de Pajares
250
2012
50
Ourense – Santiago
300
2012
88
Bobadilla – Granada
250
2012
109
La Coruña – Vigo
250
2012
158
Navalmoral – Cáceres – Badajoz – Fr. Port.
300
278
Sevilla – Cádiz
250
152
Hellín – Cieza (Variante de Camarillas)
250
27
Sevilla – Antequera
300
128
Table 8: Overview HSL under construction in Spain
Total km
1’787
Actually the Spanish network comprises 2’036 km of HSL managed by Adif, the Administrator of
Railway Infrastructures, which is a state-owned company. 1’787 km HSL are under construction
and 10 HSL with a length of 1’702 km are planned. After the opening of the Madrid – Valencia
HSL in December 2010, Spain has the longest HSL network in Europe (2’036 km). In Spain
there is the political goal to link all major cities with HSL and to have 90 % of the population
within 50 km of a HS station.
All Spanish HSL are constructed at standard gauge (1’435 mm) to facilitate movement between
countries. In order to enable through-running into the existing Iberian Gauge (1’668 mm)
network variable gauge rolling stock Talgo trains has been developed.
Page 28 of (270)
The first Spanish HSL Madrid – Seville entered in service 1992. Today it is the very best
European HSR service, enjoying a load factor of 75 % and a second-to-none punctuality record
of 99.8 %.
Building on the huge success of this HSL, the Madrid – Barcelona HSL entered in service in
three stages from 2003 to 2008.To enable the train to compete effectively with the airlines, for
the first time a design speed of 350 km/h was chosen (actual commercial speed is 300 km/h),
slashing journey times between the two cities (620 km) from 6 hours and 30 minutes to 2 hours
and 30 minutes. The cost of each kilometer HSL is about 20 million €.
1.0.2.4.4 Italy
Table 9: Overview HSL in Italy
HSL in operation:
max km/h
Opening
Length km
Rome – Florence (First section)
250
1981
150
Rome – Florence (Second section)
250
1984
74
Rome – Florence (Third section)
250
1992
24
Rome – Naples
300
2006
220
Turin – Novara
300
2006
94
Milan – Bologna
300
2008
182
Novara – Milan
300
2009
55
Florence – Bologna
300
2009
77
Naples – Salerno
250
2009
47
Total km
923
Actually the Italian network comprises 923 km of HSL managed by Treno Alta Velocitô SpA
(TAV), two more HSL with 395 km length are planned. Italy was together with France and
Germany a European pioneer in HSR. The HSR era began with the 248 km Rome-Florence
(Direttissima) HSL, opened between 1981 and 1992. During the construction of this HSL a longterm plan for a HSR network "alta velocita" was born, based on two main routes forming a "T".
While the vertical part of the “T” is finished, the horizontal part from Torino via Milano to Venezia
is still in planning.
Work on the 210-km Rome - Naples HSL began in 1994, followed by Bologna – Florence in
1996. This line runs through the Apennine mountain chain with extensive tunnel sections, which
constitute over 73.3 km of the total line length of 78.5 km. After completion of these two lines
journey times from Milan to Rome stand at 2 hours 50 min and a Rome – Naples trip takes a
mere 1 hour 5 min.
1.0.2.4.5 Japan
Table 10: Overview HSL in Japan
HSL in operation:
Tokyo – Osaka (Tokaido)
max km/h
Opening
Length km
270
1964
515
Page 29 of (270)
HSL in operation:
max km/h
Opening
Length km
Osaka – Okayama (San-yo)
270
1972
161
Okayama – Hakata (San-yo)
300
1975
393
Omiya – Morioka (Tohoku)
275
1982
465
Omiya – Niigata (Joetsu)
240
1982
270
Takasaki – Nagano (Hokuriku)
260
1997
117
Morioka – Hachinohe (Tohoku)
260
2002
97
Yatsuhiro – Kagoshima (Kyushu)
260
2004
127
2010
82
Total km
2’227
max km/h
Opening
Length km
Hakata – Shin Yatsuhiro (Kyushu)
230
2011
130
Nagano – Kanazawa (Hokuriku)
300
2015
229
Shin Aomori – Shin Hakodate (Hokkaido)
250
2016
149
Total km
508
Hachinohe – Shin Aomori (Tohoku)
Table 11: Overview HSL under construction in Japan
Actually the Japanese network comprises 2’227 km of HSL, another 508 km of HSL are under
construction and 583 km of HSL are planned.
Worldwide Japan was the first nation to construct a HSR network. The Tokaido Shinkansen
from Tokyo to Osaka opened in 1964 for the Tokyo Olympic Games. It was an immediate
success, carrying 10 million passengers within 3 years and the network has been progressively
extended. All Japanese HSL are constructed with European standard gauge track (1’435 mm)
instead of the „Cape Gauge” (1’067 mm) of classic lines. From a first operating speed of
210 km/h, the HS train has steadily increased in speed. For Tokyo-Osaka passengers, this has
led to a reduction of travel time from 4 hours (1964) to 2 hours 30 minutes
In Japan the highest operating speed is actually 300 km/h on the Sanyo HSL. JR East railways
announced for the Tohoku HSL a commercial speed of 320 km/h in 2011. Throughout the day,
traffic on the Japanese HSL is extremely dense, and punctuality (between 0.4 and 0.6 minutes
delay per train) extraordinarily high.
Some areas in Japan have strong winter conditions. For the Tokaido Shinkansen there is a
heavy snow spot between Maibara and Kyoto, called "Sekigahara". The measures by JR
Central to avoid problems with the snow are as follows:
•
Sprinklers have been equipped along this snow spot. When it is snowing, water is
spread to melt snow.
•
The ballast has been treated by resin, so that there is a kind of film on the surface of the
ballast.
Page 30 of (270)
•
At some stations behind the heavy snow spot (for example: Nagoya) station staff puts
away snow blocks.
The Joetsu Shinkansen line is also operated in heavy snow areas. During the planning of this
HSL JR East took into account the snow experiences of the Tokaido Shinkansen. The
countermeasures for snow are:
•
For the rolling stock the so-called "body-mount" shape was adopted, which includes all
the devices inside of the train. Therefore the devices are not exposed to snow or ice.
•
Sprinklers were equipped from the beginning of the operation in 1982.
•
All the line is slab track.
1.0.2.4.6 China
Table 12: Overview HSL in China
HSL in operation:
max km/h
Opening
Length km
Beijing – Tianjing
350
2008
120
Jinan – Qingdao
200
2008
362
Nanjing – Hefei
250
2008
166
Hefei – Wuhan
200
2008
356
Shijiazhuang – Taiyuan
200
2009
190
Wuhan – Guangzhou
350
2009
968
Ningbo – Wenzhou– Fuzhou
250
2009
562
Zhengzhou – Xi’an
350
2010
458
Fuzhou – Xiamen
250
2010
275
Chengdu – Dujiangyan
250
2010
72
Shanghai – Nanjing
300
2010
300
Nanchang – Jiujiang
200
2010
92
Shanghai – Hangzhou
300
2010
158
Total km
4’079
max km/h
Opening
Length km
Guangzhou – ShenZhen (Xianggang)
350
2010
104
Changchun – Jilin
200
2010
96
Guangzhou – Zhuhai
200
2010/2012
142
Table 13: Overview HSL under construction in China
Page 31 of (270)
max km/h
Opening
Length km
Hainan east circle
200
2010
308
Wuhan – Yichang
300
2011
293
Beijing – Shanghai
350
2011
1’318
Tianjin – Qinhuangdao
350
2011
261
Nanjing – Hangzhou
350
2011
249
Hangzhou – Ningbo
300
2011
150
Hefei – Bengbu
300
2011
131
Mianyang – Chengdu– Leshan
250
2012
316
Xiamen – Shenzhen
200
2012
502
Beijing – Wuhan
350
2012
1’122
Haerbin – Dalian
350
2012
904
Nanjing – An’qing
200
2012
258
Total km
6’154
From 2008 to 2010 that means within only three years 4’079 km HSL were opened for the
commercial service with design speeds between 200 km/h and 350 km/h. China has the longest
HSR - network worldwide. Actually 6’154 km of HSL are under construction with the objective to
start commercial service within two years. 2’901 km of further HSL are planned. In the near
future Chinese railways will operate a HS network of 13’134 km.
It must be remembered that the era of high speed started in China by the Shanghai Maglev
Train Transrapid, in the year 2004. This was - and still is - the world's first commerciallyoperated high speed maglev. With speeds of more than 400 km/h Transrapid makes the 31 km
in less than 8 minutes. In 2006 the State Council ended the debate: conventional track HSR
technology versus maglev. Today China is undergoing a building boom of dedicated
conventional HSR lines.
The HSL from Wuhan to Guangzhou was opened in December 2009, thanks to a maximum
speed of 350 km/h the travel time is only 3 hours and 30 minutes. Actually this is the longest
HSL in China (968 km). Due to a difficult topography the line has many bridges with a length of
470 km and tunnels with a length of 165 km. The construction of this HSL took only four years
with costs of about 12 billion EUR. The HSL from Wuhan to Guangzhou is part of the corridor
Beijing – Honkong. The 1’122 km long section Beijing – Wuhan is under construction and will be
opened 2012.
The 458 km long HSL Zhengzhou – Xi’an has also a design speed of 350 km/h and was opened
in February 2010. The travel time is reduced from about six hours to less than two hours. 77 %
of the line is on bridges or in tunnels with costs of almost 4 billion EUR.
Page 32 of (270)
1.1
Standards for high-speed railways
The task of the assessment has been carried out for mapping standards and technical
regulations that exist and which are relevant for development of high-speed railways. It is
necessarily based on the basic boundary conditions fixed in the “Technical Specifications for the
Interoperability” (TSI) of European High-Speed-Rail-Systems but extended to related or extra
standard complexes.
All areas where standards or technical regulations do not cover the relevant requirements for
development and operation of high-speed railways in Norway are listed and described. The
need for new or modified Norwegian regulations for high-speed railways are studied and
evaluated.
1.1.1 Summary
1. Comparison in the main regulations and main parameters, not in all subsidiary standards,
norms, etc.
2. Main difference: the „new“ Regelverk from 01.07.2010 is valid for speeds up to 250 km/h, in
some cases we found references to 300 km/h (JD 530, 525)
3. Similar to other European countries the TSI seems to be the basis for the Regelverk, we
found some minor differences, but not in the main parameters
4. Conclusion:
•
Extend the existing Teknisk Regelverk for Category I high-speed lines equipped for
speeds generally equal to or greater than 250 km/h regarding to TSI (limit 350 km/h) and
change or adapt all speed related parameters.
•
This applies in particular to the Infrastructure section, but also to all speed-related
subsystems such as Energy, Safety in Tunnel, etc.
•
The subsystem Control and Signalling is currently revised regarding ERMTS respect.
ETCS, it is recommended to include the above mentioned speed range in the process.
•
The final and effective norm or at least a binding preliminary version should be available
before the start of the final, detailed planning.
•
TSI conformity checks should be done during the planning and the construction phase.
•
Minor differences could be discussed with the responsible within JBV organisation.
1.1.1.1 Technical Specifications for the Interoperability (TSI)
The European Community contributes to the development and expansion of Trans-European
networks in the area of transport infrastructure. To achieve these objectives, the European
Community takes all necessary actions to ensure the interoperability of networks, particularly in
the field of harmonisation of technical standards.
For the railway sector, the European Council took a first measure with the adoption of Directive
96/48/EC on the interoperability of the Trans-European high speed rail system (HGV) on the
23rd July 1996.
With the on the19th March 2001 adopted Directive 2001/16/EC on the interoperability of the
conventional railway system as well as with the introduced Directive 96/48/EC community
procedures for the preparation and adoption of technical specifications for interoperability (TSI)
and common rules for assessing conformity were introduced.
The two interoperability Directives 96/48/EC and 2001/16/EC have been amended several
times, today the directive 2008/57/EC of the 17th June 2008 is in effect.
To achieve the objectives of the interoperability directives for high speed railway systems the
European Association worked with the AEIF - Association Européenne pour l'Interopérabilité
Page 33 of (270)
Ferroviaire (European Association for Railway Interoperability), a body representing the
infrastructure managers, railway companies and the rail industry, to develop, implement and
revise the TSI for HSR traffic.
Since the implementation of Directive 2004/50/EC, the competent authority for the development
of the TSI is the European Railway Agency (ERA). It has been established to provide the EU
Member States and the EU Commission with technical assistance in the fields of railway safety
and interoperability. This involves the development and implementation of Technical
Specifications for Interoperability and a common approach to questions concerning railway
safety. The Agency's main task is to manage the preparation of these measures.
The development of technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) has shown the need to
clarify the relationship between the essential requirements and the TSIs on the one hand, and
the European standards and other documents of a normative nature on the other. In particular,
a clear distinction should be drawn between the standards or parts of standards which must be
made mandatory in order to achieve the objectives of this Directive, and the ‘harmonised’
standards that have been developed in the spirit of the new approach to technical
harmonisation and standardisation.
As a rule, European specifications are developed in the spirit of the new approach to technical
harmonisation and standardisation. They enable a presumption to be made of conformity with
certain essential requirements of this Directive, particularly in the case of interoperability
constituents and interfaces. These European specifications, or the applicable parts thereof, are
not mandatory and no explicit reference to these specifications may be made in the TSIs.
References to these European specifications are published in the Official Journal of the
European Union, and Member States publish the references to the national standards
transposing the European standards.
Figure 2: 3-layers regulatory structure 3
Technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) mean the specifications by which each
subsystem or part of subsystem is covered in order to meet the essential requirements and to
ensure the interoperability of the trans-European high speed and conventional rail systems.
Today the Agency works on drafting the third group of Conventional Rail Technical
Specifications for Interoperability concerning Infrastructure, Energy, Locomotives and
Passenger rolling stock, and Telematics applications for passenger services. The Agency is
also carrying out the revision of TSIs related to Freight wagons, Operation and traffic
3
Cp. [3].
Page 34 of (270)
management, and Noise. Further activities will include revision of earlier adopted TSIs with the
aim of extending their scope to the entire European railway network.
Figure 3: Interoperability - Sub-systems 4
The development of technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) has shown the need to
clarify the relationship between the essential requirements and the TSIs on the one hand, and
the European standards and other documents of a normative nature on the other. In particular,
a clear distinction should be drawn between the standards or parts of standards which must be
made mandatory in order to achieve the objectives of this Directive, and the ‘harmonised’
standards that have been developed in the spirit of the new approach to technical
harmonisation and standardisation.
As a rule, European specifications are developed in the spirit of the new approach to technical
harmonisation and standardisation. They enable a presumption to be made of conformity with
certain essential requirements of this Directive, particularly in the case of interoperability
constituents and interfaces. These European specifications, or the applicable parts thereof, are
not mandatory and no explicit reference to these specifications may be made in the TSIs.
References to these European specifications are published in the Official Journal of the
European Union, and Member States publish the references to the national standards
transposing the European standards. They are also published on the ERA website. 5 For the
HSR subsystems the applicable standards and UIC leaflets can be found in Annex 1.
The list below shows the Technical Specifications for Interoperability in force and in
development:
4
Cp. [4].
5
Cp. [4].
Page 35 of (270)
Table 14: Overview technical specifications for Interoperability
TSI - Technical Specifications
for Interoperability
Published in OJEU
Decision
number
Published documents
Date in force
Date
High Speed TSI HS
In force
TSI CCS HS - Control Command and
Signalling
2010/79/EC
10/02/2010
Official Journal - EC Decision amending Annex A
01/04/2010
2006/860/EC
07/12/2006
Official Journal - EC Decision and TSI (as Annex)
2007/153/EC
07/03/2007
2008/386/EC
24/05/2008
Official Journal - EC Decision modifying Annex A
07/11/2006
06/03/2007 for
revised Annex A
01/06/2008 for
revised Annex A
TSI ENE HS - Energy
2008/284/EC
14/04/2008
European Railw ay Agency - legal references for
ERTMS (approved documents and specifications)
TSI INF HS - Infrastructure
2008/217/EC
19/03/2008
01/07/2008
TSI RST HS - Rolling Stock
2008/232/EC
26/03/2008
01/09/2008
2008/231/EC
26/03/2008
2010/640/EU
26/10/2010
2002/730/EC
30/05/2002
Official Journal - EC Decision amending Decisions
2006/920/EC and 2008/231/EC
01/09/2008
25/10/2010 w ith
specified
01/12/2002
TSI OPE HS - Operation and Traffic
Management
TSI MAI HS - Maintenance
01/10/2008
Conventional Rail TSI CR
In force
2010/79/EC
10/02/2010
2009/561/EC
25/07/2009
2008/386/EC
23/04/2008
Official Journal - EC Decision amending Sections 7,1,
7,2 and 7,3 of the CR CCS TSI 2006/679/EC
2007/153/EC
07/03/2007
2006/860/EC
07/12/2006
2006/679/EC
16/10/2006
TSI WAG CR - Rolling Stock Freight
Wagons
2006/861/EC
08/12/2006
2009/107/EC
14/02/2009
European Railw ay Agency - legal references for
ERTMS (approved documents and specifications)
including all annexes to the TSI
Official Journal - EC Decision inserting Article 1a
01/07/2009
TSI NOI CR - Rolling Stock Noise
2006/66/EC
08/02/2006
23/06/2006
2006/920/EC
18/12/2006
11/02/2007
TSI OPE CR - Traffic Operation and
Management
2009/107/EC
14/02/2009
2010/640/EU
26/10/2010
Official Journal - EC Decision amending Annex P.5
Official Journal - EC Decision amending Decisions
2006/920/EC and 2008/231/EC
01/07/2009
25/10/2010 w ith
specified
TSI TAF CR - Telematic Applications
for Freight
62/2006/EC
18/01/2006
23/06/2006
TSI CCS CR - Control Command and
Signalling
01/04/2010
01/09/2009
01/06/2008
06/03/2007 for
revised Annex A
07/11/2006
28/09/2006
31/01/2007
EC transport w ebsite - six technical annexes to the
Under development
Anticipated to be
2010
Anticipated to be
2010
Anticipated late
2010
Anticipated late
2010
Anticipated to be
2010
TSI ENE CR - Energy
TSI INF CR - Infrastructure
TSR LOK CR - Rolling Stock
(Locomotives and Traction Units)
TSI RZW CR - Rolling Stock
(Passenger Carriages)
TSI TAP CR - Telematic Applications
for Passengers
Transverse TSI HS + CR
In force
TSI PRM - Persons w ith Reduced
Mobility
TSI SRT - Safety in Railw ay Tunnels
2008/164/EC
07/03/2008
01/07/2008
2008/163/EC
07/03/2008
01/07/2008
04/12/2010
Official Journal - EC Decision
01/01/2010
TSI Conformity Assessement Modules
In force
TSI Conformity Assessement Modules
2010/713/EU
Page 36 of (270)
This study is relevant for the development of high speed railways. In the present TSI for the
trans-European high-speed rail system the lines have been classified as category I, category II
and category III respectively.
The requirements to be met by the elements, subsystems, etc. characterising the infrastructure
domain shall match at least the performance levels specified for each of the following line
categories of the trans-European high-speed rail system, as relevant.
Category I:
specially built high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or
greater than 250 km/h.
Category II:
specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of
200 km/h.
Category III:
upgraded lines for higher speeds from 160 km/h to 200 km/h
All categories of lines shall allow the passage of trains with a length of 400 metres and a
maximum weight of 1’000 tonnes. The performance levels are characterised by the maximum
permissible speed of the line section allowed for high-speed trains complying with the HighSpeed Rolling Stock TSI. The values of parameters specified are only valid up to a maximum
speed of 350 km/h.
1.1.1.2 Norwegian Regulations “Teknisk Regelverk JDxxx“
Jernbaneverket’s technical regulations (Teknisk Regelverk JD5xx) include requirements for
design, construction and maintenance of infrastructure facilities on the public railway network in
Norway. The latest version of the technical regulations is in force since 01/07/2010. The next
release of the technical regulations will probably be published 01/03/2011. The regulations will
be set up in a new format.
The 2010 version of the technical regulations contains design rules for speeds up to 250 km/h
for all subsystems except for the control- and signalling-system (JD 550-553). The old version
for the old systems is still valid.
In anticipation of the design rules for ERTMS systems changes to JD 550 will be made that
makes it possible to project existing or new systems for speeds up to and including 250 km/h.
As part of the technical regulations are also JD590 Infrastructure document properties. This
document provides comprehensive information on infrastructure adapted to the needs of those
who will design, build and maintain rolling stock.
Similar to the TSI the technical regulations contain dated and undated references to normative
documents. It is referred to the documents in appropriate places and publications are listed in
separate appendices to Chapter 4 for each subject. For dated references, or publications
marked with revision number applies to issue that are described. For references that are not
dated or labelled terms of the latest edition of the publication referred to.
The structure of the Teknisk Regelverk is shown in the following picture:
Page 37 of (270)
Figure 4: Structure of the Teknisk Regelverk 6
The Technical specifications for interoperability (TSI) is implemented in Norway concerning to
the implementation Directive. The different TSIs specify minimum requirements that must be
met to ensure interoperability. By design, construction and maintenance of technical regulations
will satisfy the relevant TSI requirements. In some cases, the requirements of the Teknisk
Regelverk could be stricter than the TSI requirements without limiting the interoperability.
In the following tables various relevant TSI parameter requirements are compared and
addressed to the Norwegian Teknisk Regelverk: 7
6
Cp. [5].
7
Cp. [5].
Page 38 of (270)
Table 15: Parameter requirements of the TSI SRT
TSI SRT - Safety in Railway Tunnels
Vedlegg 2.m - Correspondence between technical regulations and TSI safety in railway
tunnels
Krav nr (TSI)
Parameter
JD 5xx Kap. nr
Avsn.
TSI krav
oppfyllt
(a) 3.
Grunnleggende krav
520
Ja
(b) 3.1.
Grunnleggende krav som fastsatt I direktiv 2001/16/EF
520
Ja
(c) 3.2.
Detaljerte grunnlegende krav knyttet til tunnelsikkerhet
520
10
(d) 4.2.2.1.
Installering av sporveksler og skinnekryss
(e) 4.2.2.2.
Hindring av ikke autorisert tilgang til nødutganger og utstyrsrom
520
4
Ja
Ja
3
Ja
(f) 4.2.2.3.
Brannbeskyttelse av konstruksjonen
520
10
2.11
Ja
(g) 4.2.2.4.
Brannsikkerhetskrav for byggematerialer
520
10
2.11
Ja
(h) 4.2.2.5.
Branndeteksjon
520
10
2.4
Ja
(i) 4.2.2.6.
Utstyr for selvredning, evakuering og rending I tilfelle av en hendelse
520
10
2.3
Ja
(j) 4.2.2.6.1.
Definisjon av sikkert område
520
10
(k) 4.2.2.6.2.
Generelt
520
10
(l) 4.2.2.6.3.
Lateral og/eller vertikale nødutganger til overflaten
520
10
520
(m) 4.2.2.6.4.
Tverrpassasjer mellom nabotunneler
(n) 4.2.2.6.5
Alternative tekniske løsinger
(o) 4.2.2.7.
Gangbaner for rømming
Merk
2.2
2.3
3.3
2.2
3
2.2
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
(p) 4.2.2.8.
Nødbelysning for rømmingsveier
520
10
2.2
23
2.6
(q) 4.2.2.9.
Merkning av rømmingsvei
520
10
2.7
Ja
(r) 4.2.2.10.
Nødkommunikasjon
520
10
2.8
Ja
520
10
Ja
Ja
(s) 4.2.2.11.
Tilgang for redningstjenster
520
10
2,2
Ja
(t) 4.2.2.12.
Redningsområder utenfor tunneler
520
10
(u) 4.3.2.1.
Gangbaner for rømming
520
10
3.3
23
2.5
Ja
Ja
(v) 4.3.2.2.
Inspeksjon av tunnelforhold
522
(w ) 4.3.5.1.
Beredskapsplaner og øvelser for jernbanetunneler
520
10
3.5
Ja
Ja
(x) 4.4.3.
Beredskapsplaner og øvelser for jernbanetunneler
520
10
3.5
Ja
Avsn.
TSI krav
oppfyllt
TSI PRM - People with Reduced Mobility
Vedlegg 2.n - Correspondence between technical regulations and TSI people with
reduced mobility
Table 16: Parameter requirements of the TSI PRM
Krav nr (TSI)
Parameter
JD 5xx Kap. nr
4.1.2.2
Parkeringsplasser
Stasjonshåndboka dekker dette emnet
4.1.2.3
Hinderfri adkomst
4.1.2.4
Dører og innganger/utganger
4.1.2.5
Gulvoverflater
4.1.2.6
Gjennomsiktige hindringer
4.1.2.7
Toalett- og stellerom
4.1.2.8
Møbler og frittstående gjenstander
4.1.2.9
Billettsalg, informasjons- og assistansepunkter
4.1.2.10
Belysning
543
2
2.1
2.2
2.5
Ja
4.1.2.11
Visuell informasjon (toganviseranlegg)
560
10
4.1.2.12
Taleinformasjon (høyttaleranlegg)
560
10
Ja
4.1.2.13
Nødutganger og alarmer
4.1.2.14
Gangveier (overganger og underganger)
4.1.2.15
Trapper
4.1.2.16
Rekkverk
4.1.2.17
Ramper, rulletrapper og heiser
4.1.2.18.1
Plattformhøyde
530
14
2.1
Ja
4.1.2.18.2
Horisontal avst. Plattformkant-spormidt
530
14
2.1
Ja
4.1.2.18.3
Sporgeometri langs plattform
530
14
2.3
Ja
4.1.2.19
Plattformbredde
530
14
2.5
Ja
4.1.2.20
Plattformende
530
14
2.6.1
Ja
4.1.2.21
Innretning for ombordstigning av rullestoler
4.1.2.22
Personoverganger på stasjoner
7.2
Ja
530
12
3
Ja
Merk
Page 39 of (270)
TSI CC Control Command and Signalling
Vedlegg 2.o - Correspondence between technical regulations and TSI management, control and signaling
Table 17: Parameter requirements of the TSI CCS
Krav nr (TSI) Parameter
JD
5xx
4.2.1
Sikkerhet
550
4.2.2
Funksjonalitet ETCS ombordutrustning
4.2.3
Funksjonalitet ETCS infrastruktur
4.2.4
EIRENE funksjoner
4.2.5
EIRENE og ETCS luftgapspesifikasjoner
4.2.6.1
Grensesnitt mellom ETCS og STM
4.2.6.2
Grensesnitt mellom GSM-R og ETCS
4.2.6.3
Odometri
3
4.2.7.1
Funksjonsgrensesnitt mellom radioblokksentraler
2
4.2.7.2
Teknisk grensesnitt mellom radioblokksentraler
4.2.7.3
Grensesnitt GSM-R – radioblokksentral
4.2.7.4
Grensesnitt Eurobalise - LEU
4.2.7.5
Grensesnitt Euroloop – LEU
2
4.2.7.6
Forberedelse for installasjon av ERTMS infrastruktur
3
4.2.8
Krypteringsnøkler, håndtering av
4.2.9
ETCS-identiteter, håndtering av
4.2.10
Lagervarmgangsdetektor (HABD)
Kap.
nr
Avsn.
RAMS.1
TSI krav Merk
oppfyllt
(Ja)
1,2,3
2,3
2,3
560
9
2
2
2
2,3
3
2,3
2
2,3
3
2,4
4.2.11
Kompatibilitet med togdeteksjon
550
7
3
4.2.12.1
EMC mellom systemer og delsystemer
510
4
2.1
Ja
Ja
4.2.12.2
EMC-kompatibiltiet mellom rullende materiell og infrastruktur
590
Vedlegg 5a
Ja
4.2.13
ETCS DMI
4.2.14
EIRENE DMI
2,3
4.2.15
Dataregistrering (Black Box)
2,3
4.2.16
Synbarhet av ETCS/signalinstallasjoner
3
3
Notes:
1
There is no consistency betw een EN and TSI in the security requirements. The requirements of technical regulations are based on
EN.
2
Requirements w ill be incorporated in rules for design, construction and maintenance of ETCS and ERTMS equipment.
3
Requirements are not prepared in this edition of TSI and w ill be incorporated in rules for design, construction and maintenance of
ETCS and ERTMS equipment w hen they are available.
4
Until further addressed in Jernbaneverkets detection strategy
Page 40 of (270)
TSI INF Infrastructure
Vedlegg 2p - Correspondence between technical regulations and TSI infrastructure
Table 18: Parameter requirements of the TSI INF
Krav nr (TSI)
Parameter
4.2.2
Nominell sporvidde
530
6
2.1
Ja
4.2.3
Minste tverrsnitt
520
5
2.1
Ja
4.2.4
Sporavstand
530
5
5.1
Ja
4.2.5
Maks stigning/fall
530
5
3.3.1
Ja
4.2.6
Min. horisontal kurveradius
530
5
3.2.1
Ja
4.2.7
Maks. overhøyde
530
5
3.2.1
Ja
4.2.8.1
Manglende overhøyde fri linje
530
5
3.2.1
Ja
4.2.8.2
Manglende overhøyde i avvik i sporveksler
530
5
3.2.7
Ja
3
4.2.9.2
Ekvivalent konisitet designkrav
530
6
2.1
Ja
4
4.2.9.3
Ekvivalent konisitet driftskrav
532
13
3.1.2
Ja
5
4.2.10.4.1
Vindskjevhet maks verdi
532
13
3.2.2
Ja/Nei
6
4.2.10.4.2
Sporvidde toleranser
532
13
3.1.2
Ja
7
4.2.11
Skinnehelning
530
6
2.1
Ja
8
4.2.12.2
Låsing og detektering i sporveksler
550
8
2.1
Ja
4.2.12.3
Bruk av bevegelig krysspiss
530
7
4.2.12.13
Geometriske krav i sporveksler
530
7
4.2.12.13
Geometriske krav i sporveksler
532
11
4.2.13
Sporets motstand mot vertikale laster
530
4.2.13
Sporets motstand mot langsgående krefter
530
4.2.13
Sporets motstand mot laterale krefter
530
4
6
10
6
10
4.2.14
Trafikklaster på nye bruer
525
5
4.2.15
Sporets stivhet
520
12
8.1.3
Ja
Åpent punkt/nasjonale regler
530
6
2.1
Ja
Åpent punkt/nasjonale regler
4.2.16
Maks. trykkvariasjoner i tunneler
4.2.17
Sidevind
4.2.18
Sporets elektriske isolasjon
4.2.19
Støy og vibrasjoner
JD 5xx Kap. nr
Avsn.
TSI krav oppfyllt Merk
Ingen krav
2.2.1
2.4
2
2.1
2
2.1
2
4
5
6
7
8
Åpent punkt
9
10
Ja
11
Ja
Ja
12
Ja
13
Ja
4.2.20.1
Maks hastighet av pass. tog langs plattform
530
14
2.5.1
Ja
Plattformlengde
530
14
2.2
Ja
4.2.20.3
Plattformbredde
530
14
2.5
Ja
4.2.20.4
Plattformhøyde
530
14
2.1
Ja
4.2.20.5
Horisontal avstand spormidt - plattformkant
530
14
2.1
Nei
4.2.20.6
Sporgeometri langs plattform
530
14
4.2.20.7
Beskyttelse mot elektrisk støt på plattform
4.2.20.8
Forhold til personer med redusert mobilitet
Se vedlegg 2.n
4.2.21
Krav i forhold til sikkerhet i tunneler
Se vedlegg 2.m
4.2.22
Planoverganger
530
12
4.2.23.1
Plass for evakuering - konstruksjoner
525
4
4.2.23.2
Plass for evakuering - tunneler
530
5
530
5
4.2.24
Km. merker
4.2.25.1
Lengde av hensettingsspor
4.2.25.2
Kurveradius hensettingsspor
2
3.5
Se vedlegg 2.m
2.3.1
Ingen krav
4.2.26.1
Toalett tømme fasiliteter
3.2
3.3
Ikke relevant for JBV
4.2.26.2
Vaskemaskiner for tog
4.2.26.3
Vannpåfyllingsanlegg
4.2.26.4
Sandpåfyllingsanlegg
4.2.26.5
Drivstoffpåfyllingsanlegg
4.2.27
Ballastopptak (”Flyvende ballast”)
2
Ja
4.2.20.2
2.3
Se vedlegg 2.q
1
14
15
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
16
Ja
Åpent punkt
Notes
1
Track structures indicated in the JD530 offers nominal gauge according to TSI requirements
2
3
TSI requirements fulfilled assuming "normal requirements"
Requirements are met for all types of track sw itch JD530, kap.7
4
Track construction w ith 60E1 skinner/NSB95 sleepers set in JD530 satisfy TSI requirements
5
Maintenance limit point value of the gauge is w ithin the requirements for my average over 100 yards
6
JD532 allow s higher "immediate" threshold w ind bias (up to 7 mm / m) than HS INF TSI (max mm/m) for speed> 200km / h. Claims JD532, how ever, w ithin
the requirements of CR INF TSI for speeds up to 250 km/h
7
JD532 allow s higher "immediate" limit gauge than HS INF TSI for speed > 160 km/h. Measures in JD532 requirements are for speeds> 160 km / h,
8
Track structures indicated in the JD530 offers a nominal skin inclination according to TSI requirements
9
Relevant only for v > 280 km/h
10
Our track sw itch design satisfy TSI requirements regarding groove w idth, ridge height and ledeskinnens height above rail top.
11
Max lead flat value ("free w heel passage") is derived from JD532 to my requirements. distance fraliggende tongue and stick the rail and the gauge
12
Track Structures specified in JD530 w ith requirements for ballast profile satisfies the creep resistance given in TSI
13
14
Track Structures specified in JD530 w ith requirements for ballast profile satisfies Lateral resistance provided in the TSI
Track Structures specified in JD530, Chapter 6 w ith concrete sleepers have insulation in fixing and thus satisfy TSI requirements
15
JD5xx have different requirements to reach the platform edge - center of the track in relation to HS INF TSI. Norw ay, how ever, granted a special case
16
TSI requirements, "length must be sufficient to accommodate high-speed rail" is not explicitly expressed in the technical regulations
Page 41 of (270)
TSI ENE Energy
Vedlegg 2q - Correspondence between technical regulations and TSI energy
Table 19: Parameter requirements of the TSI ENE
Krav nr (TSI)
Parameter
JD 5xx
Kap. nr
Avsn.
(A) 4.2.1
Generelle krav
546
2
2.2
(B) 4.2.2
Spenning og frekvens
546
5
(C) 4.2.3
Parametere knyttet til forsyningssystemets ytelse
546
11
(D) 4.2.4
Regenerativ bremsing
546
8
(E) 4.2.5
Harmoniske utslipp mot energiforsyning
(F) 4.2.6
Ekstern elektromagnetisk kompatibilitet
546
17
(G) 4.2.7
Kontinuitet for strømforsyningen ved feilsituasjon
546
3
(H) 4.2.8
Miljøvern
(I) 4.2.9.1
Generell utforming
540
4, 5
TSI krav oppfyllt Merk
Ja
Ja
11.2
Ja
Ja
17.4
3.1
Åpent punkt i TSI Energi
Ja
Ja
Ja
4
5
4.1
Ja/Nei
(J) 4.2.9.2
Geometri for kontaktledningsanlegget
540
5
(K) 4.2.10
Samsvar mellom kontaktledningsanlegget og frittromsprofil
540
5
(L) 4.2.11
Kontakttråd materiale
540
4.a
(M) 4.2.12
Kontakttrådens bølgeutbredelses hastighet
540
5.c
Ja
(N) 4.2.14
Statisk kontakt kraft
542
5.d
Ja/Nei
(O) 4.2.15
Gjennomsnittlig kontakt kraft
542
5.d
(P) 4.2.16
Dynamisk oppførsel og kvalitet på strøm opptak
542
5
(Q) 4.2.17
Vertikal bevegelse til kontaktpunkt
540
5.c
(R) 4.2.18
Strøm kapasiteten til kontaktledningssystemet
546
2
(S) 4.2.19
Strømavtageravstand benyttet for utforming av kontaktledningsanlegget
540
5
546
2
Ja/Nei
Nei
2.3
Nei
Ja
3
Ja
(T) 4.2.20
Strøm kapasitet, DC systemer, stillestående tog
Nøytralseksjoner
(V) 4.2.22
Død seksjoner
540
6
2.4.2
Ja
(W) 4.2.23
Elektrisk beskyttelses samordnings arrangementer
546
6
4
Ja
2.4.2
Effekter av DC på AC systemer
540
6
(Y) 4.2.25
Harmoniske og dynamiske effekter
546
2
546
2
Forvaltning av omformerstasjoner i tilfelle fare
Utførelse av arbeider
(ab) 4.5
Vedlikehold av omformerstasjoner og kontaktlednigsanlegg
(ac) 4.6
Profesjonell kompetanse
(ad) 4.7.1
Beskyttelses tiltak i omformerstasjoner og seksjonerings steder
Ja
(X) 4.2.24
(Z) 4.4.1
3
Ja
(U) 4.2.21
(aa) 4.4.2
2
Ja
Ja
Ja
5.3
Ja
Ja
542
548
542
548
510
546
Ja
6
12
(ae) 4.7.2
Beskyttelses tiltak i kontaktledningsanlegget
510
6
(af) 4.7.3
Beskyttelses tiltak i returledningskretsen
12
(ag) 4.7.4
Andre generelle krav
540
540
541
542
(ah) 5.4.1.1
Generell utforming
Ja
2
3
3
4
(ai) 5.4.1.2
Geometri
540
(aj) 5.4.1.3
Strøm kapasitet
546
4
5
5
5.c
2
(ak) 5.4.1.4
Kontakttråd materiale
540
4.a
540
1
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
Ja
(al) 5.4.1.5
Strøm kapasitet, DC systemer, stillestående tog
546
2
Ja
(am) 5.4.1.6
Bølgeutbredelses hastighet
540
5.c
Ja
(an) 5.4.1.7
Avstand mellom strømatagere
540
5
(ao) 5.4.1.8
Gjennomsnittlig kontakt kraft
542
5.d
(ap) 5.4.1.9
Dynamisk oppførsel og kvalitet på strøm opptak
542
5
(aq) 5.4.1.10
Vertikal bevegelse til kontakt punkt
540
5.c
(ar) 5.4.1.11
Rom for heving
542
5
3
Ja
Nei
2.3
3
Ja
Nei
2.3
Ja
Notes
1
Separate document management system - Qualification of personnel
2
Are also specified in the "Netw ork Statement" under NO1
3
Norw ay has set different requirements acc. normal contact force of 55 N
The „new“ Teknisk Regelverk from 01.07.2010 applies in large parts the TSI and is in principal
valid for speeds up to 250 km/h, in some cases references to 300 km/h (JD 530, chapter 4
“axleload”, chapter 5 “Routing Table”, JD 525, chapter 4 “Bredde”) could be found. The
Regelverk for Signalling and Control Systems is in revision for the ERTMS at the moment, the
differences are described above.
1.1.1.3 Scenario related summary
The scenarios for the four corridors to be examined in more detail in the following phase 3 are
described in chapter 1.0.1. In this case the high speed concepts are included in scenarios C
and D:
Page 42 of (270)
C
High-speed concepts, which in part are based on the existing network and IC strategy:
•
High-speed concepts which partly incorporate the existing network.
Some new parts of the line which is built according to high speed concept without any
level crossings. The new lines will not necessarily be built in same alignment as the
existing track.
•
in accordance with TSI-Category II / III
specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h or
special features as a result of topographical, relief, environmental or town-planning
•
speed: 200 – 250 km/h.
D
High speed concept with mainly separate high-speed lines:
•
High-speed lines mainly separate from the existing network.
•
In accordance with TSI-Category I:
Specially built high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or higher than
250 km/h
•
Speed: 250 – 350 km/h
This concept will be applied in all four corridors. In the following phase 3 it will be determined
which scenario will be the most suitable solution for the respective corridor.
Concerning the technical regulations it must be ensured that at the time of planning but not later
than the tender and award of construction and implementation works, the appropriate version of
regulations is in force. At the moment the TSI covers the high speed railway lines for speeds up
to 350 km/h (scenario C and D), while the Norwegian Regulation at the moment cover speeds
up to 250 km/h (scenario D) and partially up to 300 km/h.
1.1.1.4 Previous studies carried out in Norway
The studies formerly carried out have been scrutinized to check if there are comments, conflicts
or gaps are stated regarding the technical regulations. These are the relevant studies we
checked:
•
VWI - Feasibility Study Concerning High-Speed Railway Lines in Norway
•
Funkwerk and Railconsult: High Speed Operations
•
Oppsummering av JBV (Summary report from JBV)
•
COWI report “Status of knowledge on high-speed rail lines in Norway”
The VWI study uses design parameters as a basis that would give a speed level of 200 to
300 km/h on new stretches of track, this refers to infrastructure regulations and requirements,
which are covered by the TSI but they are not in accordance with the present technical rules in
Norway. The VWI reports are more or less a pre-feasibility at an early stage and at a time where
Norwegian regulations were probably less developed than today.
The COWI study summarises these problems with regard to the new regulations in Norway for
speeds up to 250 km/h and describes the main changes compared with the old version. It is
mentioned that with effect from 01.07.2010 the Norwegian technical regulations also include a
routing table for 300 km/h. Also in Sweden, Svenske Trafikvärket, has decided that their highspeed will be 320 km/h. It is furthermore mentioned, that Høyhastighetsringen in its report "Den
nye Bergensbanen" described some design parameters like speed up to 300 km/h and curve
radius of 3’400 m and less due to the terrain.
Page 43 of (270)
Concerning requirements and regulations the COWI study [6] comes at least to the main
summary:
“The reports that have been prepared are not in accordance with the present technical rules for
speeds over 250 km/h. Most lines must be upgraded so that they are in line with the rules. The
stretches of line that lie in very meandering valleys will mainly have a higher proportion of tunnel
than stretches in wider valleys that have the possibility of increasing curve radius, while at the
same time having sufficient straight lines between the transitional curves.”
All comments in the reports are regarding to infrastructure requirements. None of the reports
refer to regulations, requirements or standards for Technical Equipment or Rolling Stock which
might cause problems, conflicts or where gaps exist. Hence there is nothing in the report to
comment on this subject to under this headline.
1.1.2 Differences or Gaps between Norwegian norms and European standards
for High Speed Railways
1.1.2.1 Standards for HSR Infrastructure
The most significant difference we observed between the TSI and the Norwegian regulations is
in the allowed speed parameters for high-speed operation. The Teknisk Regelverk has been set
up for a speed of up to 250 km/h (Intercity traffic). In some few cases we could find references
to 300 km/h (JD 530, 525). The TSI, in contrast, holds the frame parameters for high-speed
operation up to 350 km/h.
In this chapter, we have compared the TSI Infrastructure (INF), Safety in Tunnel (SRT) and
People with Reduced Mobility (PRM) with the corresponding Norwegian standards. In the
following table we have compiled the fundamental speed-related parameters derived from the
TSI Infrastructure 4.2.1 General Provisions and set up in contrast to the effective Teknisk
Regelverk.
Jernbaneverket has addressed the requirements with the transfer and implementation of the
TSI into the regulations in JD 501, chapter 2, addendum 2j – 2q in the Teknisk Regelverk and
checked if the TSI requirements are fulfilled. We have checked cases, in which no analogy
could be made with the TSI, randomly regarding their plausibility and attached in the following
table. Furthermore, we have listed topics that have caught our attention during the perusal of
the regulations. This, of course, does not ultimately rule out further differences or complements.
100 mm
150 mm
140 mm
165 mm
≤ 25 ‰ / length max 10.000 m
15.700 m
22.500 m
30.000 m
30.000 m
760 mm
760 mm
≥ 400 m
> 1650 mm
0 ≤ Tq ≤ 50 mm
550 mm / 760 mm
-30 mm < Th < 0 mm
R ≥ 500 m
R ≥ 500 m
≤ 2,5 ‰
normal
normal
maximum (production limit)
balast
4,50 m
160 kN
R ≥ 500 m
30.000 m
30.000 m
760 mm
80 mm
80 mm
3,80 m
3,80 - 4,20 m
3,80 m
5.600 m
8.100 m
5)
630 / 473 m
7)
350 / 263 m
70 m
140 m
180 mm
1435 mm
1434 mm
3,50 m
2.900 m
4.000 m
6)
248 m
8)
262 m
62,5 m
125 m
125 mm
90 mm
3,30 m
1.800 m
2.400 m
6)
214 m
8)
208 m
50 m
100 m
135 mm
105 mm
800 mm
400 m
1680 mm
3)
-10 ≤ Tq ≤ + 20 mm
550 mm / 760 mm
-20 mm < Th < 20 mm
R ≥ 2.000 m
4)
≤ 12,5 ‰
750 mm
100 mm
9
130 mm (160 mm ))
2)
≤ 20 ‰/ mixed traffic /
≤ 25 ‰ passenger traffic
≤ 12,5 ‰ mixed traffic /
≤ 20 ‰ passenger traffic
15.400 m
24.000 m
4,40 m
4,00 m
1)
4,70 m
4,50 m
1435 mm +/- 2 mm
4,40 m
4,56 m
4,60 m
180 kN
120 mm
85 mm
3,50 m
4.300 m
6.000 m
6
286 m )
8
307 m )
170 kN
V = 300 km/h
JD
V = 250 km/h
4,40 m
4,56 m
4,60 m
200 kN
V = 200 km/h
V = 350 km/h
1) JD532 allows higher "immediate" limit gauge than HS INF TSI for speed> 160km / h. Measures in JD532 requirements are for speeds> 160 km / h, however, with very good margins from the TSI requirement, so that this practice ensures
that the gauge will never exceed the TSI requirement in track at such high speeds.
2) ≤ 20 ‰/ length max 3.000 m mixed traffic / ≤ 25 ‰ passenger traffic
3) JD5xx have different requirements to reach the platform edge - center of the track in relation to HS INF TSI. Norway, however, granted a special case ("specific cases") for this parameter in relation to the TSI PRM
4) Gradient at platforms should not have greater rise / fall than 12.5 ‰. If there is any change of coaches at the platform, the rise / fall does not exceed 2 ‰.
5) Lenght of transition curve clotoide / bloss, is calculated with track cant = 180 mm (minimal)
6) Lenght of ramp concerning to JD 530 chapter 3.2, Tabell 5.1
7) Lenght of transition curve clotoide / bloss, is calculated with track cant = 100 mm (normal)
8) Lenght of ramp concerning to JD 530 chapter 3.2, Tabell 5.1
9) maximum cant deficiency on existing lines with modern rolling stock
R ≥ 500 m
≤ 35 ‰ / length max 6.000 m
100 mm
130 mm
3,80 m
3,80 - 4,20 m
3,80 m
3.800 m
5.400 m
5)
540 / 405 m
7)
300 / 225 m
60 m
120 m
180 mm
1435 mm
1434 mm
maximum
10.000 m
30.000 m
700 mm
3,80 m
3,80 - 4,20 m
3,80 m
2.700 m
3.700 m
5)
450 / 338 m
7)
250 / 188 m
50 m
100 m
180 mm
3,30 m
3,30 - 3,70 m
3,30 m
1.500 m
2.000 m
5)
360 / 270 m
7)
200 / 150 m
40 m
80 m
180 mm
normal
range (depending on cant / radius)
1435 mm
1432/1433 mm
1435 mm
1430 mm
normal
straight line / R > 10.000 m
minimum
normal
minimum
normal
minimum
normal
minimum
normal
normal
maximum
4,20 m
170 kN
V = 350 km/h
no further categorie for distance between track centres
4,00 m
4,00 m
R > 5.000 m
4.000 m - 5.000 m
1.000 m - 4.000 m
180 kN
180 kN
maximum
V = 300 km/h
TSI
V = 250 km/h
V = 200 km/h
REMARK (to TSI-value)
Ballast Thickness
platform length
Distance between track and platform
tolerance (Tq) for the distance between track and platform
platform height
tolerance (Th) of the platform height
Track arrangement along the platforms
Gradient at platforms
Vertical radius
Length of section with medium gradient
Gradient
Cant deficiency
Track cant
Railings and noise screenings on bridges
Horizontal radius
(dependent on cant deficiency)
Lenght of transition curve
(dependent on radius and cant)
Length of straight lines and circular curves
Distance to noise screening
Regular track gauge
Nominal track gauge
Distance between track centres tunnel section
Distance between track centres open section
Track resistance – vertical loads
CATEGORY
Limit values in accordances to Technical Regulations
Page 44 of (270)
Table 20: Limit value analysis
Page 45 of (270)
In addition to above shown table differences have been found:
•
JD 520:
Chapter 5, Task 4. “Normalsporprofiler”, figure 5.13 und figure 5.14
The minimum cross-section according TSI Infrastructure is maintained.
Both cross-sections show sidewise cable ducts constructed on the formation. The
standard cable duct width is 60 cm. The cross-section design is conflicting with the
sideway. According TSI INF, category I, there has to be a sideway along the operated
tracks. The sideway ensures the deboarding of the passengers to the nearest opposite
track.
The clearance of the sideway on main track is not specified further in the TSI INF. On
the basis of the TSI safety in railway tunnels, task 4.2.2.7, a sidewalk width of 0.75 m
with a clear height of 2.25 m is proposed. The height of the sidewalk is allowed to be
under rail foot bottom edge at formation height.
Therefore it is recommended to integrate the cable duct into the formation.
•
JD 530:
Chapter 6, Task 2.1 rail inclination
Within the TSI infrastructure, category I-III, a span of rail inclination from 1:20 to 1:40 is
defined. JD 530 is referring to rail profile UiC60E1. Definitions for rail inclination are
missing. For an inclination of 1:40 rail profile UiC60E2 has to be used.
According TSI INF also switches and crossings should have a rail inclination. This is especially
needed for speed limits v > 250 km/h.
•
JD 530:
Cross Wind
Crosswinds are influencing high speed operations. However TSI Infrastructure, task
4.2.17, is not giving standards within this context. As in Norway wind effects will have an
impact on HSR operation a national standard has to regulate this complex.
•
JD 530:
Noise and vibration
TSI Infrastructure, task 4.2.19 is referring to the different national regulations. The TSI
Noise for conventional rails can be mentioned as reference but is not worked out for high
speed rail systems. State of knowledge is the use of the Nordic rail prediction method in
Norway. Also additional rail traffic noise regulations are in place which most likely will
also be used for HSR projects.
•
JD 530:
Ballast pick-up
TSI Infrastructure, task 4.2.27, is an open point and not defining any regulations at the
moment. Here national standards have to be applied but have to be extended to high
speed rail systems.
•
JD 532:
Chapter 13, task 3.1.2 track gauge – single error
Definitions for allowed track gauge deviation are today only in place for quality class K 0,
v > 145 km/h. The allowed deviations for speed limits v > 230 km/h have to be added
(5 mm/m instead of 7 mm/m).
•
JD 532:
Chapter 13, task 3.2.2 lateral displacement
Definitions for allowed track lateral displacement are today only in place for quality class
K 0, v > 145 km/h. The allowable track lateral displacement for speed limits v ≤ 200 km/h
is according TSI HS in JD 532 defined. For speed limits v > 200 km/h those have to be
added.
Some of the references in JD 501, Chapter 2, Annex 2, could not be reproduced.
Page 46 of (270)
1.1.2.2 Standards for Technical Equipment
1.1.2.2.1 Signalling and ATC
The evaluation of the standards for signalling and ATC gives following main results:
•
The Regelverk for Signalling and Control Systems is in revision for the ETCS/ERTMS at
the moment, it couldn’t be checked.
•
Comprehensively the Norwegian Rail Standard (JD) includes no signalling regulations
and principles for speed limits v > 160 km/h. Thus the entire standard for signalling
should be revised for a development of state-of-the art high-speed railway operation.
•
Sub-systems of the ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System), here the
GSM-R are already in operation but are not further specified for high speed lines.
Document GSM-R Prosjektet (Doc.No. 3A-GSM-036) describes sufficiently the physical
composition of the Norwegian GSM_R network, statements regarding voice and data
parameters, however, are not being made here.
•
A uniform applicable ATP-system for HSL is not covered by the current standards.
Furthermore the following additional tasks for a high speed railway development have to be
adjusted in the Norwegian Rail Standards (JD):
•
JD 590:
Chapter 2, section 2 et seqq.
JD standard defines only the railroad control system EBICAB 700 with the specifications
DATC and FATC as punctiform control system in allowed speed limits from 130 km/h up
to 210 km/h. High speed lines need in principle continuous railroad control systems. For
high speed operation an appropriate standard should be aimed for.
So far the Norwegian standards are not describing the European standard for the coordination
of the rail traffic ERTMS (ETCS) railroad control system with its equipment levels 1 to 3.
•
JD 550:
Chapter 5, section 2.1 et seqq.
The standard is describing protective sections at signals. Resulting distances and
breaking times are based on the EBICAB specifications according FATC and DATC. For
HSR operation the standard needs adopted specifications.
•
JD 550:
Chapter 10, section 2 et seqq.
This chapter and following are related to the positioning of location transponders for the
national ATC (EBICAB). As the system is not qualified for HSR lines the standards have
to be extended and adopted accordingly.
The current JD set of regulations JD 5XX for technical equipment adequately describes the
design and realisation parameters in terms of conventional equipment for signalling technology,
track release signalling systems and train control and is for the most part not in conflict with the
future requirements and recommendations of the European Commission for Interoperability in
the Trans-European rail network. For the technical equipment and in particular with regard to a
standardised European train control system, which also complies to the requirements of highspeed operation, the European Train Control system (ETCS) was developed, which meets the
demands of the diverse speed levels of the rail systems with its applications (Level 0-3, STM).
While the applications Level STM for the migration phase from national system to a
standardised full ETCS system, level 1, are predominantly used for speeds up to 160 km/h in
conventional traffic, ETCS level 2 will be more and more put into service on diverse high-speed
railway lines in Europe. With regard to long braking distances and the visibility and recognition
of the signal aspects, trackside signalling is dispensable in level 2. Movement commands and
speed standards are transmitted to the driver via the MMI (Man Machine Interface) of the
onboard unit. Interface to the electronic signal box is the RBC, which issues the movement
authorities for the train.
Page 47 of (270)
Figure 5: Principle of ETCS level 2
Hence it is recommended to extend the JD regulations by the chapter ERTMS with main
categories ETCS and GSM-R and adapt it to the interoperability criteria.
Interoperability criteria are mainly defined in the sections – on board- and – track-.
-On board- assembly groups in terms of interoperability are e.g. the on-board safety platform,
data recorder, odometry and GSM-R, assembly groups track-side are e.g. RBC (Radio Bloc
Centre); Euro-Balise, Euro-Loop, LEU (Lineside Electronic Unit) and track-side safety platform.
Another aspect in terms of interoperability is the respective national train running regulations
and standards for railway operation. In the scope of harmonisation these should be studied and
revised, in addition to the criteria already mentioned above. However, this study is not subject of
this chapter.
1.1.2.2.2 Overhead contact lines and power supply
► Voltage and Frequency
Primarily, a nominal voltage of 25 kV with a nominal frequency of 50 Hz should be used for lines
of TSI category I.
In member states, whose network is electrified with AC 15 kV and 16.7 Hz, it is permissible for
this system to be used for new category I lines. The requirements are as specified in EN 50163.
► Performance characteristics and installed power for the Energy subsystem
The system shall be designed to meet the following in EN 50388 specified requirements:
•
line speed,
•
mean useful voltage,
•
maximum train current.
► Regenerative braking
AC system should be selected with regard to possible regenerative braking
Stationary facilities and their protective equipment have to be designed with the possibility for
regenerative braking.
Page 48 of (270)
► Continuity of power supply in case of disturbances
The power supply and the overhead contact line shall be designed to enable continuity of
operation in case of disturbances. Individual supply sections, switching, redundant supply
equipment in substations.
► Geometry of the overhead contact line
For lines of category I a nominal contact wire height of 5’080 mm to 5’300 mm shall be planned.
► Static contact force
For AC, 70 N needs to be observed.
► Mean contact force
For the mean contact force, no data are provided in the TSI for speeds exceeding 320 km/h.
National regulations are valid, as far as they exist.
For speeds up to 320 km/h the specifications of the TSI are binding (figure 4.2.1.5.1)
► Contact wire material
The contact wire shall comply with the requirements of EN 50149.
► Quality of current collection
The quality of current collection has a fundamental impact on the life of the contact wire and
shall comply with the specified parameters.
Conformity with the requirements on dynamic behaviour shall be verified in accordance with EN
50367.
1.1.2.3 Standards for Rolling Stock
A very thorough scrutiny of the latest standards and regulations used for Rolling Stock projects
in different European countries (including Norway) for tilting as well as high speed railways has
been conducted. The full list is given in the Annex 1. We have included in our considerations the
existing TSI as well as the two new TSI expected to come into force this year. These two are
nevertheless not applicable for this study as they cover a) the updated requirements for freight
wagons which shall not be considered (even that mixed traffic has been part of the overall
study, regarding standards only HSR is new for Norway and hence looked at) and b)
locomotives, which are as well not considered. We are assuming that only trainsets (EMUs) will
be considered in future Norwegian HSR.
Furthermore 57 UIC leaflets, 178 Euronorms (ENs), 1 preliminary EN, 31 IEC standards, 6
Norwegian standards and 21 other international / country-specific standards or regulations have
been analysed, compared with the matching Norwegian standards and all in all no conflicts and
only one significant gap has been identified: cross winds. The strategy to overcome this gap is
described in the respective later chapter below.
One UIC leaflet (UIC 812-1) that is commonly referred to in Rolling Stock new build projects we
deem as not applicable for safety reasons as tyred wheels are not recommendable for very high
speeds. As well one commonly in Norway referred to Norwegian standard (NS3919
“Brannteknisk klassifisering av materialer, byggningsdeler, kledninger og overflater”) we deem
obsolete in our case as the respective Euronorm will cover all aspects of this national norm.
1.1.3 Recommendations for Solutions and Strategies to close the identified gaps
1.1.3.1 Extension of the existing standards according TSI specifications
For the realisation of a HSR network or individual lines with a speed of 250 – 350 km/h within
the projected scenarios in Norway, it is imperative to extend the existing Teknisk Regelverk by
Page 49 of (270)
the above mentioned speed range, although there are some details are included for 300 km/h,
but it must be totally completed to enable a future high speed design. This applies in particular
to the Infrastructure section, but also to all speed-related subsystems such as Energy, Safety in
Tunnel, etc. The subsystem Control and Signalling is currently revised regarding ERMTS
respect. ETCS, it is recommended to include the above mentioned speed range in the process.
As it is expected that the revision and implementation of the existing regulations will require a
certain period of time, it is recommended to base the upcoming feasibility studies on the
parameters specified in the TSI. The most important design parameters may be taken from the
above table resp. the table in chapter 1.4.2. This is unobjectionable, as usually national
regulations hold stricter design parameters than the TSI. However, the final and effective norm
or at least a binding preliminary version should be available before the start of the final, detailed
planning.
It is recommended to conduct, for example, a first TSI conformity check in the planning phase
prior to the issuance of a construction permit, to detect and clear possible discrepancies in
detail as early as possible. A further TSI conformity check should be carried out prior to
respectively upon approval of the implementation planning.
1.1.3.2 Proposed Solutions for identified gaps
Some of the above mentioned gaps may be ascribed to the speed range > 250 km/h currently
missing in Norwegian regulations or to the revision of the control and signalling specifications.
Other topics suggest further discussion, as they seem to differ from the TSI. In addition, there
are open points, which currently are not addressed in the TSI. To exemplify, we have selected
one topic to show a possible approach:
► TSI Infrastructure, section 4.2.17, Effect of crosswinds (Sidevind)
As we have seen there is a gap for the cross wind issue because it is not solved in the TSI at
the moment and we have found no Norwegian standard or regulation referring to this. Looking
for samples in other countries we have had a development in Germany where in the mid of the
nineties cross wind safety of high speed railway operation gained more importance for German
Railways due to the introduction of modern high-speed trains with light weighted endcars.
Crosswind is an issue concerning both infrastructure and rolling stock. In parallel intense cross
wind studies were started and resulted in 2001 in a first “Handbook for the Safety Proof under
Cross Wind”. Additionally, so called wind protection walls were implemented on the HSR
Cologne - Frankfurt in certain sections before starting operation in 2002.
German Railways issued in 2006 a comprehensive guideline to assure cross wind safety of
passenger railway operation. This Guideline RiL 80704 (formerly known as RiL 401 03/01) was
declared by railway authority EBA as German state of the art for cross wind assessment.
Most of the methodological parts of the guideline had been transferred into the new European
draft standard on cross wind (prEN 14067-6).
Cross wind is actually the only gap that has been identified within the area of Rolling Stock. We
see the need to define a regulation for Norway that could be based for example on the above
mentioned German regulation as long as no mandatory Euronorm is in force. Other countries
faced the same problem and developed their own regulation. Irish Rail for example developed a
regulation that is less rigid than the German DB RiL but still practical for their country specific
conditions. Swiss railways is currently considering their own regulation as they recently have
been facing cross wind problems during operation for the first time. They as well are tempted to
develop a less rigorous regulation than the German version.
Page 50 of (270)
Nevertheless anticipating the rather harsh wind conditions combined with exposed infrastructure
we recommend the following: 8
•
as long as the EN 14067-6 is not in force or cancelled due to disagreements within the
standardisation process the DB RiL 80704 shall be used for Norwegian HSR,
•
when EN 14067-6 is in force Rolling Stock requirements shall be based on that norm.
► TSI Infrastructure, section 4.2.15, Global track stiffness – open point (Sporets stivhet)
The stiffness of the track structure is a key input for the development of designs and
maintenance plans to achieve optimum whole life performance.
Simplified, the track stiffness defines the impact of the trackway on the vehicle. This applies in
particular to high-speed and heavy goods traffic. It has to be pointed out that usually not the
specific stiffness is the determining factor, but variations in stiffness. Furthermore, the stiffness
varies according to the climate. A track stiffness that is too high or too low leads to increased
dynamic impact and therefore is an important cost factor.
In previous years studies have been carried out by the industry, organisations and scientific
institutions. The studies found that there were differing interpretations and opinions on the
relevance, importance and understanding of track stiffness. Measurement and evaluation
methods have been developed to better understand track stiffness and its impacts and to
optimise its distribution. Also, for the first time, the stiffness in turnouts has been compared on
an international basis. The result shows clearly that there is considerable potential for the
reduction of dynamic forces. First computer-based as well as empirical procedures have been
developed and evaluated.
Some of the studies have been proposed for use by the ERA drafting group for Rail
Infrastructure TSI, in connection with closing out the open point on track stiffness requirements.
National railway infrastructure companies have now the opportunity to use the available studies
and documents to complement their own national regulations, as long as the topic is not been
handled in full by the TSI.
8
Cp. [7] and [8].
Page 51 of (270)
1.2 Climatic conditions – meteorological data
In South and Central Europe adverse weather and extreme climatic conditions are handled
through temporary speed restrictions when needed. The number of days with such weather,
climate or special winter conditions is high in Norway. The ambition is therefore that the
technical solutions chosen for high-speed railways will enable normal operation under most
climate variations likely to occur here.
In the following chapter different issues are treated more complementary. First we will give an
overview of the Norwegian geographic conditions. It contains theme as Climatic conditions and
meteorological data, topographic issues and landslides. The following chapters will then outline
problems and solutions which must be regarded for planning of new high speed railway lines.
This part contains issues like climatic impact on the construction phase, rolling stock, operation
of railway systems and an overview of early warning systems (EWS).
For a summary of different problems, causes and possible measures it is refered to the matrices
in chapter 1.2.9.3 and 1.2.10.3.
1.2.1 Summary
Train operation in winter can be difficult as experienced in northern Europe in the winter
2009/2010. A study that examine the correlation between train delays and winter conditions in
Norway have been performed by SINTEF for the years 2005 - 2010 [9] as well as a study by the
Swedish Trafikverket to sum up their experience from the winter 2009/2010 [10].
The current solutions for operating trains in winter climate have been well covered in earlier
studies [44] [45]. This report acknowledges this work and has found some few “new” additions,
especially regarding high speed in exposed mountain environment. In the mountains it is
important to design the line to accommodate deep snow, wind in combination with snow and
plan how the line can be kept clear. Rolling stock that is designed using current guidelines will
technically be able to operate at full speed in most conditions as long as the lines can be kept
clear. In the winter it is however necessary to allow sufficient slack in the schedule to allow
proper maintenance and de-icing between the runs.
The current design of switches is vulnerable to snow and ice. High speed switches even more
so due to longer length. The moving tongue can easily be blocked by hard packed snow, ice
lumps from passing trains, ballast stones etc. Since a jammed switch has severe consequences
for the traffic, investing in research for a switch design which is less sensitive to foreign objects
can eventually benefit the whole industry. A revolving or sliding action to operate the switch in
stead of the sideways squeezing movement can be part of a solution.
A very important task will always be the necessary planning and organizing before the winter
season. Through traditional measures most problems can be solved before they cause delays
in the operation [10].
1.2.2 The climate in Norway
Norway's climate shows great variations. From its southernmost point Lindesnes, to its
northernmost North Cape, there is a span of 13 degrees of latitude, or the same as from
Lindesnes to the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore we have great variations in the level of
received solar energy during the year. The largest differences are found in Northern Norway
where there is midnight sun in the summer months and no sunshine at all during winter. The
rugged topography of Norway is one of the main reasons for large local differences over short
distances. Under follows a few extremes which are measured throughout the country [27][28].
Maximum temperature in Norway was recorded in Nesbyen, Buskerud 20.6.1970 at 35.6 ºC.
Minimum temperature in Norway was recorded as far back as 1886 and is still standing after
120 years. The record was observed in Karasjok, Finnmark, on 1th January 1886 at -51.4 ºC.
Page 52 of (270)
The precipitation record in Norway is from Indre Matre in Hordaland County on the western
coast of Norway. After several wet days, it was measured, from 08:00 on the 25 until 08:00 on
the 26 November 1940, 229.6 mm of rain. It has however fallen more because the measuring
cup was filled up and some spilled out. The next few days was also very wet and during this 5
day period of rain a total of 495.4 mm was measured [24]. The following table shows the
intensity in shorter periods of extreme precipitation. As the table shows, the extremes mostly
happen during summertime.
Table 21: Precipitation intensity in Norway
Duration in
minutes
Precipitation sum
in mm
Place
County
Date
Time of
start
1
4.3
Gardermoen 9
Akershus
08.jul.73
09:32
2
8.1
Nøisomhed i Molde
Møre og Romsdal
11.aug.86
17:11
3
11.9
Nøisomhed i Molde
Møre og Romsdal
01.aug.86
17:11
5
16.2
Nøisomhed i Molde
Møre og Romsdal
01.aug.86
17:11
10
25.6
Nøisomhed i Molde
Møre og Romsdal
01.aug.86
17:10
15
27.3
Asker
Akershus
15.jul.91
23:04
20
34.4
Asker
Akershus
15.jul.91
23:01
30
42.0
Asker
Akershus
15.jul.91
22:59
45
49.1
Asker
Akershus
15.jul.91
22:40
60
54.9
Asker
Akershus
15.jul.91
22:35
90
56.7
Asker
Akershus
15.jul.91
22:35
120
59.3
Gjettum
Akershus
17.jul.73
05:25
180
60.8
Grimstad
Aust-Agder
11.jul.78
01:29
360
87.8
Sømskleiva i Kristiansand
Vest-Agder
06.okt.87
00:15
In the winter season, precipitation is in the form of snow in all parts of the country. Generally
1mm of rain gives up to 10 mm of snow. However, a warm cloud with rain normally contains a
lot more precipitation than a cold cloud with snow. There exist large geographical snow
variations and variation of snow covered periods. In the southern and western coastal areas
snow is normally infrequent and the snow covered periods are normally not continuous
throughout the winter season. Nonetheless it can come to quite a lot of snow in a short time
frame, and sometimes 0.5-1.0 m of snow can be built up during a 24 hour period. Inland areas,
where temperatures are low, there are normally moderate snow; while the snow covered period
is long.
Generally the highest wind speeds occur in open areas near the sea and on the high mountain
routes. A maximum mean wind speed between 30-35 m/s is quite usual, even 45 m/s in some
cases. For extreme situations, gusts of wind can pass 60 m/s. For a new line, places where
heavy wind occurs should be avoided. This has to be evaluated for each line separately, giving
special attention to high bridges and embankments across vallies.
1.2.3 Future climate change
Systematic variation in the atmospheric circulation pattern over the North-Atlantic, The North
Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), is an important reason for the large natural year to year variation we
experience in wind, temperature and precipitation in mainland Norway.
These natural variations in air and ocean circulation give significant climate variation in Norway
for periods up to a few decades. For time periods up to 10-20 year these natural variations are
9
Tangert av Nøisomhed i Molde 1. august 1986.
Page 53 of (270)
of the same size or greater than the expected future human induced climate change. Therefore
a climate change assessment has to go beyond 2030 [24].
In general, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, concludes within its regional
climate projections for northern Europe that the annual mean temperatures in Europe are likely
to increase more than the global mean. The warming in northern Europe is also likely to be
largest in winter and the lowest winter temperatures are likely to increase more than average
winter temperature.
Annual precipitation is very likely to increase together with extreme levels of daily precipitation
in most of northern Europe.
Confidence in the forecast of future changes in wind scales is relatively low. It is however more
likely than not, that there will not be any increase in the average or extreme wind speeds in
northern Europe.
The duration of the snowy season is very likely to get shorter in all of Europe, and snow depth is
likely to decrease in at least most of Europe [22].
The annual mean temperature for mainland Norway has increased 0.8 ºC during the last
100 years. This is consistent with global mean change in the same period. Annual precipitation
has increased by around 20 % since 1900 with most of the increase in the period after 1980
[24].
Figure 6: Expected percentage change in normal
annual precipitation from normal period 1961-1990 to
2071-2100.
Figure 7: Expected change in annual temperature from
normal period 1961-1990 to period 2071-2100.
In Figure 6 [27] the map shows expected percentage change in normal annual precipitation
from normal period 1961-1990 to the normal period 2071-2100.The presented results are based
on the global climate model ECHAM4/OPYC3 from the German “Max-Planck-Institut für
Meteorologie”, the regional climate model HIRHAM, IPCC SRES scenario B2 for greenhouse
gas emissions to the atmosphere and the hydrological model HBV. [27]
In Figure 7 [27] the map shows change in annual temperature from normal period 1961-1990 to
period 2071-2100. The results are based on the global climate model HadAM3H, following
SRES emission scenario A2. The results are downscaled using met.no's HIRAM model; ~55km2
spatial resolution and 19 vertical levels. Finally the results are empirically adjusted to local
conditions to 1 km spatial resolution. [23]
Page 54 of (270)
In Figure 8 [27] the expected percentage change in
mean winter (DJF) runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071-2100
are shown. The presented results are based on the
global climate model ECHAM4/OPYC3 from the German
“Max-Planck-Institut für Meteorologie”, the regional
climate model HIRHAM, IPCC SRES scenario B2 for
greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere and the
hydrological model HBV. The changes during the winter
months seem to be much greater than for the other
seasons. The season’s spring, summer and autumn are
shown in Figure 9.
Figure 8: Expected percentage change in
mean winter (DJF) runoff from 1961-1990 to
2071-2100.
Figure 9: Expected change in mean spring (MAM), summer (JJA) and autumn (SON) runoff from 1961-1990 to 20712100. 10
For the amount of storms in our ocean and coastal areas there seems to be no clear trend since
1880. The climate models show little or no change in mean wind conditions in Norway in the
period towards 2100. Some results however indicate that high wind episodes might happen
more frequently [24].
10
[27].
Page 55 of (270)
1.2.4 Topographic issues and mass wasting
1.2.4.1 Mass wasting in Norway
Mass wasting or mass movement is rock and soil which is
moved naturally by gravity, often triggered by weather
conditions. This process is often called landslide, which
however has no specific definition in geology. In this
section we will also include ice and snow movements. The
geological composition, topography and climate vary
widely throughout Norway, from deep fjords and high
mountains to the more plain areas. Figure 10 [35] gives a
rough overview of the topographical situation, with
mountains over 2’000 m along the central mountain range
in southern Norway and plain, lower lying areas in south
and central Norway. Large temperature differences, locally
heavy rain, steep topography and unstable areas with
marine deposits make the country vulnerable to various
types of mass wasting that may occur, even in the flatter
parts of the country.
Much of the landslide activity is associated with the fjord
landscapes in Western and Northern Norway, but also the
East and the North are prone to mass wasting. In this area
though, it is often found to be a different type of land wasting.
Figure 10: The topography in Norway
In this chapter the most rapid types of mass movement has been shown greatest attention.
Mass movement also includes slow movements, which of course will be hazardous for the
operation of a high speed line if the track should be involved. The assessment of this is
however, a standard part of the construction phase, and appropriate measures will be taken to
prevent this.
The table and pie chart in Figure 11 shows the recorded mass wasting on Norwegian national
and county roads from 2000 to 2009. The data is derived from mass wasting Registry of NPRA,
where all the debris on the road is registered. The graphs give an indication of the occurrence of
different types of landslides in the country and will most likely also be able to represent mass
wasting pattern on the railroads in the country. It may be worth noting that the rockfalls and
icefalls of many places are under reported, since much of these are smaller blocks being
cleared away by the first car passing by.
Figure 11: Mass wasting records from the National Road Administration, various types 11
11
[36].
Page 56 of (270)
The mass wasting activities vary according to seasonal changes. Statistically, the mass wasting
activities are lowest in the summer. The danger of rock and earth slides increase during rainy
periods in the autumn. However, the statistics show that landslide activities are greatest during
snow melting periods in the spring. The snow melting period is characterized by continuous
water flooding during the day combined with frost expansion during the night.
1.2.4.2 Bedrock
The bedrock in Norway varies widely both locally and regionally. Bedrock map of southern
Norway (Figure 12) illustrates some of the variation in the bedrock.
The Caledonian mountain zone covers almost 2/3 of Norway's bedrock, the remaining 1/3
consists partly of older, Precambrian rocks (Precambrian = prehistoric time). There are also two
younger bedrock areas: the Oslo Region with its Permian eruptive rock and Trondheim field with
its Devonian sandstones and conglomerates.
Basement rocks are in some places more than 2’800 million years old. In general the rocks
formed in the late Precambrian time consist mainly of gneiss. Local is intrusive (magma that has
solidified below the earth) of granite or gabbro. In addition, there are also areas with quartzite,
amphibolite and marble [37].
The bedrock in Norway is generally classified as good in terms of stability although there are
local exceptions. Mass wasting is generally much more dependent on local topography and
fracturing. Deep glacial valleys combined with the fractured bedrock in many places are a
typical source for rock falls.
Figure 12: Excerpt of bedrock map of southern Norway 12
The bedrock of the country is varied, but mostly consists of good rocks in terms of stability.
Landslide activity therefore usually depends more on local topography and fracturing than on
various rock type.
1.2.5 Climate change and extreme precipitation
We have in recent years seen an increased frequency of cases of extreme precipitation in
Norway. The consequences of potential climate change with rising temperatures and more
precipitation will probably be an increase in flood and landslide frequency. Areas previously
12
[38].
Page 57 of (270)
considered stable can become unstable. In total, extreme precipitation is likely to increase the
risk for most types of avalanches in Norway over the next 50 years. This applies particularly to
periods of extreme rainfall.
More frequent occurrence of strong low pressure (precipitation and wind) from the Atlantic could
provide increased avalanche activity in vulnerable areas that are cold enough. In some
locations the type of avalanche will change, new locations will see avalanches and some places
are going to see a stop in avalanches where they have tended to be earlier (e.g. in lower areas).
Heavy rain and winds will lead to increased erosion and water pressure in rock cracks.
Increased pressure on relieving blocks and flakes will preach increase the frequency of rock
falls, especially along the coast where the climate is most humid.
Intense precipitation periods also increase water saturations in soils and sediments and we can
therefore expect more soil and flood slides throughout the country. Flooding is a risk factor for
clay slides. With any climate change and rising temperatures, the annual spring floods in the
lowlands is generally expected to come earlier in the following years. It is also common with
autumn and winter floods and the risk of flooding and increased pore pressure in clay will cause
the frequency of clay slides could increase.
The consequences of a rock avalanche can be very serious. In Norway, there have been many
examples of slides that have gone in the sea or water and have generated huge tsunamis and
wiped out entire villages. Examples of this are Loen in 1905 and 1936 (respectively 74 and 61
people were killed) and in Tafjord in 1934 (where 41 people died). Tafjord, Molde (island of
Otrøya) and Stranda/Hellesylt (Åkneset) are examples of places that are vulnerable to tsunamis
caused by avalanches.
1.2.6 More about different types of mass wasting
► Soil/sediment slides
Soil/sediment slides: Figure 13 shows a large sediment slides that have taken some houses.
Two or three streams in the slide path may indicate that the slide was triggered in a period with
intense rain. The slides consist of masses of stone, gravel, sand and soil with varying water
content. Soil slide is normally triggered by heavy showers over a short period of time, or in
combination with rapid snow melting. Slides are trigged by normal soil on slopes with a gradient
of 30° but in areas without forests landslides can occur on slopes that are down to 25°.
Normally, there is no danger of slides if the slope of the terrain is less than about 27°.
Figure 13: Soil/sediment slide 13
13
[39].
Page 58 of (270)
► Quick clay slides
Figure 14 shows the quick clay landslide in Rissa in Trøndelag 1978. The landslide swept along
8-9 farms. Quick clay is very sensitive. This means that it can be quite solid as long as it is
undisturbed, but loose its strength and become fluid when stirred. In contrast to landslides,
which require a certain slope angle to be triggered, quick clay landslides can be trigged in
nearly flat terrain.
Quick clay is formed by clay particles deposited in salt water during the last ice age. The salt
binds clay particles together so that the clay particles are stacked like a house of cards.
Because of the geological rising large areas consisting of marine clay has risen above sea level.
As the salt washed out, only an open and unstable structure like a house of cards is left behind.
Quick clay landslide usually occurs sudden, with little or no warning, and can develop very
quickly over a large area. Triggering mechanism is often a disturbance somewhere in the clay
package, for example that a riverbank along a stream in quick area falls out during a flood
period or by construction activity or stress of the sloping terrain so that some of the camp falls.
Slopes partly consisting of more stable materials than clay will during a landslide retain much of
its strength. One can often get warning signs like cracks in the ground. The development of the
slides like this will often be slower than in sensitive clays [40] [41].
Figure 14: Rissa was the scene of the largest quick clay landslide in Norway last century, 29 April 1978 14
► Rockfall
A rock is considered "smaller" blocks and block parties under 100 m³ [42]. Rock falls are
triggered by cracking processes such as congelifraction, water erosion etc. Most often individual
blocks of varying size breaks free, but sometimes more rocks loosen aggregate. Water pressure
and frost action is the most common triggering factor. Therefore, rock falls occur most often in
rainy periods or in the melting period in spring and autumn. There are also rock falls during the
summer, when the cracks are completely dry.
14
[38].
Page 59 of (270)
Figure 15: Large rockfall at Mundheim in Hardanger in 2006
► Rock Slides
If a greater batch of rock loosens at the same time, it is called a rock slide. Water pressure and
frost cracking are the most common triggering factors. Therefore rockslides, just as rock falls,
often happen during periods with heavy precipitation, especially if combined with snow melting.
Rock slides differs little from the rock falls, but the amount of stone is larger, from about 100 m³
up to 10’000 m³ [42].
► Rock avalanche
The rock avalanche is defined as large rock masses exceeding 10’000 m³ [42]. The largest rock
avalanches may include several million m3. Rock avalanches have a very rapid movement and
are moving farther out than regular slides. With a similar movement pattern as a snow
avalanche (with a large dust cloud in front) they can sometimes go across the valleys.
► Avalanche
Figure 16: Trigger areas for avalanches in Jotunheimen 15
15
Source Sørstø Roger Anderson.
Page 60 of (270)
A distinction is generally made between three forms of avalanches: loose snow avalanche, slab
avalanche and slush avalanches. The first two can be either dry or wet while the slush
landslides have very high water content. In particular, the dry snow avalanches can be
accompanied with severe detrimental winds.
Loose snow avalanche: starts at or near the surface of the snow that has very little bonding
between individual grains. These landslides involve usually only surface snow or snow near the
surface. Loose snow avalanche starts in a single area or point and spreads outward in a fan
shape as it moves down the slope. Loose snow avalanche can be triggered in both dry and wet
snow, but the failure mechanism is the same. Avalanches triggered in wet snow can be much
more massive than if the snow is dry. Required slope gradient
for release of loose snow avalanches will depend on the water
content of snow. For dry snow, which usually slopes over 35°,
but this angle will be instantly reduced with increasing water
content.
Slab Avalanche: When a larger portion of snow, a slab,
releases simultaneously along a moving plan (the collapse of a
weak layer of snow), it is called a slab avalanche. At the very top
of the avalanche it leaves a long edge with height that can vary
between 0.2 and 4.0 meters. Closest to the ground the particles
are moving in close contact with each other, and the snow has a
relatively high density. This is the element that determines the
avalanche speed and which has the maximum destructive
impact. Slab avalanche is considered to be the most dangerous
type of avalanche. Slab avalanches are mostly triggered in
Figure 17: Example loose snow
slopes between 25° and 55°. Winds arising in front of this type
avalanche
of landslides can be of great speed and damage buildings and
vehicles far ahead/ outside its path.
Slush flows: Slush flows are a mixture of water and water-saturated snow and usually
triggered by heavy rain, by snow or during springtime by strong solar heating and snow melting.
Slush flows can break out at slopes with just a few degrees and can be very destructive.
Figure 18: Comparison of slab, loose snow and slush flows 16
16
[39].
Page 61 of (270)
1.2.7 Hazard mapping rockfall
Hazard mapping for rockfall is the first map in a series produced by the national geological
hazard mapping program, which also includes avalanches and landslides.
The hazard mapping project started at NGU in 2007 with the development of the methodology
underlying the maps. The purpose of the hazard maps is to get an overview of potential
avalanche-prone areas (risk sites) at the national level. [43]
Hazard maps show potential source areas and discharge areas for rockfall. The maps are
drawn using a computer model that recognizes the potential source areas of rockfall in the slope
of the mountain and geological information. From each source area calculated discharge area
for rock falls automatically. It is not done field work in preparing the maps.
Figure 19: Example hazard maps from Hardanger 17
1.2.8 Climatic influence on the construction phase
1.2.8.1 Introduction
Norwegian topography and climate poses great challenges for not only for railway operations
but also for the construction work. This section looks into some of the most important aspects.
Some of the corridors for the possible HSR railway lines are exposed to varied climatic
conditions, since they go from regions of typical coastal climate through narrow valleys towards
high mountain areas and further through valleys ending in regions of more or less coastal
climate. It will be a challenge to maintain construction works during the winter in the mountain
area, in a landscape with low temperatures, deep snow and strong winds. The winter season
(length, amount of snow and temperature) varies from year to year. Due to common practice
with normal construction operations in the winter season this has to be considered and taken
care of in the planning of the implementation.
For construction sites (corridors) located in specific areas in the mountain, as well as close to
nature protection areas, building temporary local roads can be a challenge. This may affect the
distance between construction sites, temporary storage areas and rigging areas due to
evacuation of people and machines in extreme weather situations.
17
[43].
Page 62 of (270)
Construction work in tunnels can be carried out independent of outside weather conditions, but
is still depending on the logistics outside in relation to road access and the continuous running
of machines and other equipment in spite of ice, snow and heavy winds.
After a period with heavy snow it can be difficult to restart the construction work. Equipment for
thawing snow/ice from machines and equipment for removal snow from the roads/line is
strongly recommended as part of the rig.
At last it will be an economic question related to progress at site and required precautions
(weather conditions) to ensure safety for the staff and machines and to ensure correct
(acceptable) quality to the constructions as being carried out.
1.2.8.2 Important issues due to calendar and winter conditions in mountain areas
•
•
•
Rig location:
o
Distance from infrastructure and distance to site,
o
Communication lines (data, phone),
o
Evacuation plans,
o
People and machines,
o
Plans for people and machines when evacuation from site is impossible due to
bad weather conditions,
o
Access to temporary roads, open during bad weather,
o
Open access to temporary storages in bad weather.
Safety due to environmental conditions:
o
People,
o
Machines,
o
Plans for bad weather conditions,
o
Plans for excepted weather conditions due to accepted construction quality,
o
Plans for when evacuate from site, close down for the winter.
Quality:
o
•
Define acceptable amount of water, ice and snow mixed into the construction
(track formation).
Financial reviews:
o
Working in low temperature, frost issues,
o
Working in extreme snow/snow depth, mixing ice, snow and other frozen items
into the construction materials.
1.2.8.3 Main disturbances in the construction phase due to climatic conditions
1.2.8.3.1 Frozen soil
In winter there will be problems regarding the use of frozen soil in levelling and embankments.
The workers will not be able to compact the soil satisfactorily. The best solution for this is to
plan the building phases in a proper phase plan, making use of the soil in summertime when it
is not frozen.
1.2.8.3.2 Wet soil
The track foundation must always be exchanged with drained, frost free masses. However, for
embankments existing soil can most often be used. After heavy rainfalls and flooding, the soil
Page 63 of (270)
can get so wet that it is not usable for the construction work. Therefore other soil nearby has to
be used instead. This minor problem may cause some disturbance on the schedule.
Increased pore pressure in the soil will increase the risk of land slides, and should therefore be
paid special attention where this is likely to occur.
1.2.8.3.3 Snow and coldness/General winter problems
During the winter the projects generally will need to calculate with more time to get the work
done. Proper equipment for snow clearing and heating must be considered. This is a part of the
scheduling and phase planning. In some areas trouble with snow clearing can require so much
effort that it will be better to close down the construction area for a limited time. This will
primarily apply in the mountains, where the wind rapidly will cover construction site and roads
with snow. Tunnelling is an example of work which can be done in the winter, with only small
problems caused by winter conditions.
1.2.9 Climatic influence on the rolling stock
This section looks at the problems and possible solutions related to the rolling stock. Other
European high speed operations already have experience with high winds and heavy rain, so
the new challenge will be to combat the low temperatures, snow and ice that come with the
Norwegian winter. Interviews with other operations across the continent (see chapter 1.4.3) the
winter measures common in Europe are found to be the use of snow ploughs, high positioned
ventilation, de-icing facilities using steam or glycol. These measures are well known and in use
in both conventional trains as well as high speed and tilting train services. An interesting
observation is that operation of tilting trains is not differing much from regular trains with regards
to adverse weather.
There is a risk for snow packing between the carbody and bogie with tilting trains. This risk has
to be minimized in the design phase.
If problems occur due to adverse weather (Norwegian winter conditions), the general measure
in Europe is to reduce speed or even cancel trains and wait for the weather to improve. The
ambition for the Norwegian operation must be to operate normally in all normal winter
conditions, and this is achievable using current design guidelines.
1.2.9.2 Main findings and problem areas
Conversations with Norwegian personnel gave invaluable input on current practice, successful
measures, planned improvements and tests regarding winter operation. The Nordic report
“Winter durability of rolling stock” (1994) [44] and the Swedish study “High-speed operation in
winter climate” (2006) [45] has made good compilations of the winter challenges facing a train
operator in Norway. The Swedish report also gives a good presentation of the state of the art of
winterization of rolling stock and infrastructure.
•
Packing of snow and ice on carbody and bogies
The problem is often caused by snow in the air clinging to damp components of the train. The
snow can either be precipitation or snow smoke whirled up by wind or the train itself. The
packed snow which will turn into ice causes problems with moving parts particularly in the
bogies and can also contribute significantly to the load on the vehicle.
•
Packing of snow in air ducts.
Snow that is sucked in through ventilation can cause trouble. Placement of ventilation gaps high
on the vehicle sides and the use of filters can avoid the problem.
•
Humidity and risk of ice in air supply system
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The air supply compressor for the brakes and other auxiliary equipment will deliver air with
moisture. This moisture will freeze in pipes, hoses, low points and brake components, if allowed
into the pneumatic system. Filters and dryers will keep the moisture out and the functioning of
this can be monitored by dew point measurement.
•
Extreme temperature, -40 °C
The train must be designed to operate and be parked without power in temperatures as low as 40 °C. This means that materials and components must be selected which have acceptable
properties at low temperatures. Strategies for heating non safety related components if they
have narrower operating temperature ranges may be allowed, but nevertheless low
temperatures must not damage the components.
•
Brake system components
The brake system components must be designed for Nordic applications. Some components,
like friction materials, have unexpected poor performance under some weather conditions often
experienced in Norway.
•
Current collection, pantograph issues
The pantograph faces several challenges due to winter conditions. Rime on the over head line
(OHL) will generate arching with resulting wear and heat. The pantograph can hit ice on the
OHL, especially in tunnels, and this will probably destroy or severely damage a pantograph at
high speeds. Snow and ice on the pantograph will affect its function, including pressure on the
OHL, it’s up and down movement and tilting function if applicable. Our studies have not found
particular winter problems with the OHL in Europe, but further investigations on how the OHL
system will perform in high speed in very low temperatures should be considered.
•
De-icing and maintenance
Experience shows that more maintenance is needed during winter time and that de-icing is a
critical activity that takes time to accomplish successfully. The most successful technique seems
to be glycol based de-icing facilities. Winter schedules must allow sufficient time for proper deicing between runs.
•
High-speed issues (problems that can be expected to increase as speed increases)
The Swedish winter report from 2006 [45] points out the following rolling stock issues that
probably will increase severity with higher speed. Ballast pick-up, disc brakes not functioning
well under all circumstances, poor running dynamics due to snow packing etc, pantograph
issues due to ice and rime, and platform track issues.
1.2.9.3 Matrix of problems and possible measures
In the following different problems that can occur due to adverse weather conditions are
organised in a matrix. A short explanation of the problem and some possible measures are
described.
Table 22: Problem / measure matrix for climatic influence on rolling stock
Cause
Problem
Whirling, dry snow around Packing of snow and ice on carbody
the train (snow smoke)
and bogies. Hampered movement of
parts including suspension, brakes,
couplers and tilting mechanisms.
Pipes and cables can be damaged.
Possible measures
Train design:
Design the moving parts to crush the ice if packet or cover
them with repellent surfaces.
Cover parts with bellows
Design the underframe of the train as a closed box reducing
the surfaces and crannies that can gather snow and ice. Proof
and pressurize compartments to avoid snow from entering.
Track maintenance:
- Water spraying on powder snow along the lines to bind snow
that otherwise would whirl up around the train. This can be
effective when the wind is not strong enough to cover the area
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Cause
Problem
Possible measures
with new powder snow. Thus primarily in low land and not
mountain sections.
Maintenance:
- De-icing facilities and sufficient fleet size to allow trains to be
taken out and properly de-iced before reentering traffic [17].
High snow levels around
OHL masts
Weights for catenary system are
Weights where snow levels can be high can be protected by a
blocked by snow. Tension of the lines case.
is lost.
Wheels or brake disks
freeze to brake blocks or
pads
After standstill the wheel is blocked
as the brakes do not release. This
will cause wheel flats that can have
more serious consequences.
This is handled by braking procedures. Brakes to be released
at standstill immediately after stopping if possible. Frozen
wheels are difficult to detect, but can be jerked loose by a
combination of operating the brakes and reversing the train.
Water in the compressed
air for brakes
The water will freeze in the system
and hamper the flow of air with
malfunctioning brakes as result.
Air dryers, filters, train design and maintenance procedures.
The air quality can be constantly monitored by dew point
measurement etc.
Water on brake discs
The brake pads aquaplane, leading
to significantly longer brake
distances.
Manual or automatic exercising of the brakes during driving to
keep surfaces dry. Use the pneumatic brakes more and
dynamic brakes less in winter. Better brake pad materials and
designs.
Snow packing around
magnetic rail brakes
The magnetic rail brake may be
jammed.
Inspections, brake exercise and de-icing facilities. The driving
speed must take into account that magnetic rail brakes (and
other brakes) may be less effective under certain conditions.
Packing of snow in air
ducts
Ventilation openings and filters may
clog up and snow (water) enters the
ventilation system and other systems
using air for cooling (motors etc).
Place ventilation openings high on the vehicle to reduce
amount of snow being sucked in. Use filters and cyklon
arrangements to stop the snow
Snow and sand in door
and foot step mechanism
The snow, melting water and sand
following boarding passengers may
cause corrosion, wear and
mechanical problems in door and
step mechanisms.
The mechanisms must be properly designed for this.
Low temperatures affect
gangway properties
Gangways are stiffer in cold weather
and may be damaged in sharp
curves and large relative movements
between the cars.
Materials for the gangway must not be too stiff or brittle in low
temperatures
Typhoons packed with
snow
Roof mounted equipment like
typhoons can be muffled by a snow
cover. The snow can not be removed
during operation due to the high
voltage OHL.
Install typhoons protected in the nose of the train (Norwegian
type 71/73), install a filter. Heating if necessary.
Glass surfaces of
cameras, mirrors, head
lights, wind screens etc
get covered with
condense mist, snow or
ice
The glass will not be clear and
function as intended.
Such surfaces must be heated. Avoid overheating. Low
consumption light systems (LED, xenon etc) emit less heat
than conventional indescandent bulbs. Extra heating can be
necessary when using these light sources.
Animals in the track
Large animals like moose often
follow the track, especially when the
snow depth is high outside the track.
Collisions with large animals are
costly and can cause derailment.
Use fences. Keep vegetation away from the line. [20] Feed
animals to attract them away from the line. Construct animal
crossings (tunnels) at points on migration routes. Use
frightening smells, like wolf urine along the line
Train design:
Construct a snow plough that will keep the animal from
coming under the train (causing derailment, damages and a
mess). Construct the front (including couplers) to withstand a
collision with minimal damages.
Water condensating on
the train
A cold train running into a damp
tunnel will cause the water in the
tunnel air to condensate. The same
can happen when going in or coming
out of workshops. (Simplon effect).
Water on electric or electronic
equipment can damage or
temporarily cripple the train. Water
Protect air intakes (see "Packing of snow in air ducts"). Heat
and ventilate electric cabinets inside the train. Ventilate the
carbody with dry air.
Heating elements can be considered.
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Cause
Problem
Possible measures
entering the train this way can freeze
in unexpected places causing
blockages or even burst closed
compartments.
Rime and ice layer on the
overhead line from
moisture condensating on
the line.
There is arching when driving with
rime on the pantograph carbon strip.
This causes both high wear of the
carbon strip and high temperatures.
Damages to the carbon strip can
eventually tear down the OHL. The
damages can be expected to
increase with increasing speed.
Ice on pantograph air foils The pantograph forces are not
(spoilers)
correct due to altered air foil function.
The problem can be expected to
increase with increasing speed.
The ice on the OHL can be removed with scraper trains [16]. It
can be possible to monitor or predict the carbon strip wear
automatically. [14] The pantograph and carbon strip should be
properly designed (see [45]). Apart from the observed contact
strip wear, trains should be able to travel at full speed without
inducing problems due to rime or ice layer. [11][12][13]
De-icing maintenance. Stationary detectors can warn of wrong
pantograph forces.
1.2.10 Climatic influence on the operation of the rail system
This section considers how adverse weather and climatic conditions might affect the operation
of the HSR-line. Through different interviews and a literature study we found that extreme
weather conditions for railway transport do not always correlate with the extreme peaks, but
rather when sudden changes in weather conditions appears, or when bad weather lasts for a
long time. We have also found that troubles with adverse weather do not only happen in the
mountains, where the operator are used to it, but also in the lowland. The latter will sometimes
cause even more problems because the organization will not be that well prepared for it.
We have sorted out some main areas which we consider as extreme weather conditions for
railway construction and operation. For some of these situations, we have found different
solutions to deal with the weather. For other situations, it is mainly a question of good planning.
Especially in the construction phase a lot of problems will be avoided as a result of a well made
phasing plan.
1.2.10.2 Main disturbances of the operation of the line
1.2.10.2.1 Sudden changes in weather conditions
Sudden changes are among the main reasons for much of the winter problems. Changes in
precipitation will give peaks that can be hard to manage sufficiently, especially if the service
system of the line is not prepared for the peaks due to economic reasons. Even worse is when
the temperature changes from cold to warm, sometimes combined with rainy weather. This will
make snow partly melt, which causes different problems. Wet snow is much heavier than dry
snow, and can be a trigger for avalanches. Slush and ice plugs also often block the drainage,
and therefore causes flooding of the area around the infrastructure.
1.2.10.2.2 Long-lasting snow weather
When the snow weather last for days, the effort for snow clearance adds up and breaks the
capacity. This applies for snow on the line and in stations, but also for melting capacity of snow
from the trains. Both of this is hindering the traffic.
1.2.10.2.3 Wind gusts
Heavy wind gusts can make the train derail. This is even more critical when the trains are
running fast, because the kinetic energy of the train can superpose on the wind direction. This
has to be evaluated when the corridors are going to be set. Different measures can help in
some cases, but the best is always to avoid exposed locations.
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1.2.10.2.4 Ballast pickup
Ballast pick-up is a phenomenon first experienced with the Japanese Shinkansen [18] and has
also appeared in Sweden with X2000. Two mechanisms are thought to cause ballast stones
from the track to be thrown up. The ballast can be thrown up both by ice falling from the trains
and be sucked up by vacuum created by the trains aerodynamic properties. The flying stones
can hurt people and damage surrounding installations as well as the undercarriage and
windows of the train and passing trains. The train must be designed both to withstand ballast
rock hits and to avoid aerodynamic suction even with additional ice build-up underneath.
Ballast pickup is one of the main reasons that high speed trains in Germany [15] and France will
travel at a lower speed during winter periods. During summertime, most of the problems can be
handled through small measures, but it is hard to prevent ballast pickup caused by falling ice
from the trains. A good measure for reducing this problem is the use of slab track instead of
ballasted track.
1.2.10.2.5 General winter problems
A set of different problems that occurs in the winter season are listed in the following table. Most
of them can be minimized through thorough planning as well in the development of the line, as
in the operation and maintenance of the line.
1.2.10.3 Matrix of problems and possible measures
Table 23: Problem/measure matrix of climatic influence for rail system operation
Cause
Problem
Possible measures
Drifting snow builds
up on the track
behind objects and
equipment along the
line
Driving through snowdrifts causes the
trains to run unevenly, with noise,
bangs and trembling, so that the
speed has to be reduced. If
mechanically removed, the drifts will
re-establish in about one hour in
normal cold winter conditions.
Objects along the line should either be build on pillars or placed
on the opposite side of the track for the prevailing wind. Relatively
dense passing of trains with or without front and rear plough
would be effective to get rid of the drifting snow (The
Gardermobanen does not require much snow clearing due to the
train speed and frequency). Snow fences on the windward side of
the track can prevent the snow from drifting on to the track. The
fences should be designed to change the wind conditions so that
the drifting snow is deposited behind them. Simulation of wind
streams and local knowledge have to decide the optimal position
of the fences, which could be as far as 100m away from the track.
[19]
Snow fills up the track
Snow fills up the track during heavy
snow fall and because of drifting
snow. In bad weather, large drifts will
be re-established again in 30 minutes
after clearing.
Elevated tracks are the most effective, because the wind will blow
the snow away. Many places they have to be 3-5 m high to
accommodate the normal snow depth. Cuttings have to be well
designed, so that the railway still runs on an embankment in the
middle of the cut. If the track have to cut deep through
somewhere, the track should be covered or go through a tunnel.
Snow fences can help snow blowing away from the track. [19].
Small fences near the track are being developed, and can
probably be used as both snow fences as well as noise-deflection
wall. Dense passing of trains with a snow plough can normally
keep the track open. There are two different solutions for track
superstructure, respectively high and low track. With high track
we understand the standard, discrete bearing track, where the
railhead is about 20-25cm elevated above the sleeper and ballast
bed. With low track we understand slab track with continuous
supported embedded rail. The low track will gather less snow
than a normal track design. This should not be confused with
grooved rails that can lead to derailment due to ice in the groove.
Solutions of slab track and discrete bearing system which make
use of concrete plates to fill up the space between the rails can
also be considered. This solution unfortunately has the
disadvantages of an approximately 25cm open space on both
sides of the rail, needed for inspection and service of the rail and
rail fastening. Embedded rail do not need such a gap, due to the
continuous supported fastening system and thus also far less
problems with rail breakage. On non-electrified lines, the rail head
can be placed even lower than the surrounding track, on
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Cause
Problem
Possible measures
electrified lines the rail has to be about 4cm elevated from the
slab to secure contact points in the case of a fall down of the
catenary.
Snow load on trees
along the line
Trees close to the railway line bend or Keep vegetation away from the tracks [20].
fall across the tracks.
Switches blocked by
snow or ice
Switches will be blocked for
switching, caused by heavy snow fall,
drifting snow or ice falling from the
passing trains.
Critical switches have to be equipped with heavy heating systems
and covers [32]. Those systems still do not work satisfactorily,
especially on really cold days or on days with sticky snow. On
bad days there will be a need for switch guards to maintain the
switches by hand power. Some countries use to spread glycol
water or hot water over the switch area [46], but this do not work
very well on windy spots because of the cooling effect of wind.
Switches could be placed under shelters or in tunnels, but this
again means limited access for maintenance. [47] [48] Best
solution is to restrict the number of switches to be built. Research
for new switch designs can maybe help this problem in the future,
possibly with self clearing sliding movement of the tongues.
Investing in an improved design would benefit the whole industry.
Sudden change from
cold to warm weather,
or changes in
temperature around
zero
Snow and ice melts to slush, which
fills up and blocks the drainage. The
slush often freezes to ice when the
temperature goes down again. This
increase the problem. From the
heating of switches a similar problem
happens, when melt water freezes
again under the switch. If the water
don’t get away, the new ice will ad up
and block the normal movement of
the switch.
Drainage has to be oversized, so that slush can pass through the
bottlenecks. Open drainage with great capacity should be
considered.
Surface water finds new ways. This
can undermine the embankments, or
the water fills up the sub-base and
makes it less strong.
Ice in tunnels, caused
by running water
Ice blocks builds up near the track
and on the equipment.
Water proofing and insulation is essential. Water has to be guided
in to canals, which may be built under or beside the track. Those
canals have to be insulated or heated the last 500-600 m from the
tunnel portal, to make sure they do not get blocked by ice.
Ice on the catenary
Ice builds up on the catenary,
damaging the pantograph. The
damage can be expected to increase
with increasing speed.
Frequently traffic on the line will keep the ice away. Heating of the
line through a overvoltage (German patent number
DE10337937B4). Performing of ice punching, to get the catenary
free from ice. Reducing water drips in tunnels reduce a big part of
this problem at the root.
Ice falling off the train
The snow that ads on to the train
melts in long tunnels and stations,
and then freezes to ice when the train
runs on the open line. Because of
trembling in the train, this ice (also
running at high speed) falls in to the
ballast and causes the ballast stones
to fly up and in to the train, often
accelerated even more by the air
pressure along the train. Fragments
of the ice itself also behave this way.
Damages occur when the stones and
ice hit the train or equipment along
the line. This problem can be
expected to increase with increasing
speed. [18]
In France and Germany the trains will run at lower speed if these
problems occur. Lowering of the ballast level and keeping the
sleepers free from ballast stones can be helpful. Slab track
reduces the problem. Because this problem is likely to occur
when the trains run into tunnels, a wider tunnel portal to reduce
the sonic boom can be a part of the solution. Treating the ballast
with resin, a sticky stuff, makes a film on the ballast that prevents
ballast pickup. Fitting the train with stronger windows and to
protect vulnerable equipment under the train reduces potential
damage.
Page 69 of (270)
Cause
Problem
Possible measures
Snow and ice block
the air stream under
the train
Causes flying ballast. The air stream
underneath the train gets so strong
that some rocks are being picked up
and thrown through the air,
sometimes at even greater speed
than the train. The rocks reach up to
the side and windows, as well as to
surrounding structures and passing
trains. This problem can also occur if
the designs of the trains do not
regard this.
In France and Germany the trains will run at lower speed if these
problems occur. Lowering of the ballast level and keeping the
sleepers free from ballast stones can be helpful. Slab track
reduces the problem. Because this problem is likely to occur
when the trains run into tunnels, a wider tunnel portal to reduce
the sonic bang can be a part of the solution. Fitting the train with
stronger windows and to protect vulnerable equipment under the
train reduces potential damage.
Snow and ice
The accumulated snow and ice under
dropped from trains at the train has a tendency to thaw and
stations [45]
drop off at stations. At the stations the
brakes are hot, it is no chilling wind
and often there is a warmer climate. A
subsequent high speed train passing
in the same track can plough or whirl
up the ice onto the platform, causing
injury and damage. This problem can
be expected to increase with
increasing speeds.
Avoid snow build-up on trains
Tunnel portals etc fills Must be removed with snow blowers.
up with snow deposits
Available snow blowers. Heater cables on the ground in the portal
area. Fences or mounds to prevent snow drifting into the portals.
Wider portals have more space for snow deposit. Portals with a
collar on the end can prevent snowdrifts from entering the portal.
Wooden (not
windproof) snow
shelters
Snow shelters made of wood are not
wind proof. Snow that accumulates
through the walls is very difficult to
remove. Must be blown with snow
blowers all the way out - ploughs
cannot clear these drifts. The drifts
inside snow shelters cannot be
encountered at train speeds over 80
km/h.
Make snow shelter walls 100 % air tight. Heater cables in the
shelter.
Snow avalanche
Fills up the track and causes the train
to derail.
If possible there should be provided shelters against avalanches.
Snow sheds and shelters are the best. Supporting structures can
prevent the triggering of avalanches by anchoring the snow in the
starting zones. [19]
Rock fall
Rock fall can destroy the
infrastructure, cause derailment if a
train crash into a rock or a falling rock
can hit the train.
Rock fall catchment areas. Detection and warning systems to
stop the trains if the track gets destroyed.
Other mass wasting
Settlements in the ground under the
track. The embankment can collapse
and flow away. Landslides from
nearby terrain can block the line.
Most mass wasting happens after rain. Increases in pore water
pressure, higher weight when saturated with water and decreases
in strength are all important triggers for mass wasting. Really
good surface water control is important to reduce the effect of
heavy rain. Open ditches are important to handle storm water
run-off. Track must be built up on a solid foundation which leads
the water out of the embankment. A dense track (e.g. slab track)
will help this. New lines should not be planned in area
endangered by slides coming upon the track from nearby terrain.
Heavy gust of side
wind
Causes train to derail.
Important is wind following through valleys where the track
passes across it, especially on bridges or high embankments.
This should be avoided in the first place. Also places where the
wind will have a vector upwards must be assessed with this in
mind. Walls that guide the wind over, or at least higher up on the
train may solve the problem. A sag-curve on the alignment will
help keeping the trains on track in such areas, due to the dynamic
track forces which appears when the train runs through a sagcurve.
Reduced speed through stations
Separate high speed tracks away from platforms, possibly with
protective barriers
Frequent snow clearing of platform tracks
Page 70 of (270)
Cause
Problem
Possible measures
Incidents with land
wasting
All our effort to make the railway as
secure and reliable as possible
cannot for sure save us from any
incidents. Therefore it will be useful to
install early warning systems and
detection systems, to lower the
impact of an accident.
There are a few different systems on the market and in research.
Systems to detect land wasting as well as people and animals on
the track should be investigated. Cables of glass fibres in the
track are one promising solution, which can detect everything
entering the track.
1.2.11 Early warning systems – EWS
1.2.11.1 Early warning systems
When new high speed railway lines are planned, robust and reliable infrastructure should
always be the main goal. This includes bridges, tunnels and protecting embankments in places
where the surrounding nature and climatic conditions are demanding this. In a few cases
though, it is not technical or economical possible to build such infrastructure. In these cases an
early warning system could be an option. Early warning systems are built to monitor the ground
conditions, and give warnings as early as possible when land wasting happens. This can give
the railway operator a few, valuable seconds to protect the running trains on the railway line. In
most cases the train can be stopped on prepared stopping points before it runs into the problem
area. In some rare cases, the train will not be able stop at all, but should at least be able to slow
down the speed to reduce the damage of equipment and injuries of people.
There is different ways to monitor exposed areas. Generally initial deformations in the bedrock
indicate that something more will happen. This can be measured, but to make the system
reliable, it also has to be calibrated. The latter is a main issue, because a very sensitive system
will stop the trains far too often.
Monitoring has to be combined with local knowledge to make an appropriate warning system.
Simulation of different situations has to be accomplished, and also effects of different protecting
measures have to be evaluated. Safe positions of where to stop the trains has to be selected
and incorporated in the signal system.
As far as we know, avalanches can’t be monitored through a safe and reliable method. This has
to be monitored through metrological conditions and analysis of the snow cover, combined with
statistical methods. A somewhat reliable output will be achieved after a long period of
calibration.
The most common areas for monitoring are listed below [49]:
•
External factors, like weather conditions and ground water conditions
•
Deformation in the bedrock or the
•
Behavior of forces in the bedrock
•
Seismic activity (vibrations)
•
Early detection of land wasting after it has happened
•
Surveillance cameras
1.2.11.2 List of existing monitoring methods
1.2.11.2.1 External factors
Weather conditions are measured through different weather stations and statistical data are
collected and systemized.
Ground water and pore water pressure can be measured with a piezometer.
Page 71 of (270)
1.2.11.2.2 Deformation in the bedrock or the terrain
There are several different possibilities for monitoring of deformation in the terrain or the
bedrock. With use of GPS or laser changes in some specific points can be measured
continuously. Satellite radar or ground radar is another method for monitoring of greater areas.
Laser scanning from aeroplane can be an alternative, but this method is not updated
continually.
For monitoring of small deformation in the bedrock, we can make use of an extensometer. With
a crackmeter or jointmeter changes in cracks can be measured, and an inclinometer can give
data on angular deflection.
1.2.11.2.3 Behaviour of forces in the bedrock
Instrumentation rock bolt can give information on tensile stress in the bedrock. Axial stress can
be monitored with strain gauge measurement, and measurements based on the oscillating
string principle.
Changes in the bedrock can give a good warning of coming rock slides/falls.
1.2.11.2.4 Seismic activities
Before land wasting there will often be seismic activity in the ground. A geophone can listen to
this activity and give an early warning of an incident. A geophone can also be used to register
the occurrence of landslides and avalanches.
A seismometer will do the same measurements as the geophone, but is much bigger and very
sensitive. The sensitiveness is a problem, because it is a great source of error. Animals and
people are often regarded as a potential problem.
For all measurements of seismic activities the vibrations from passing trains must be sorted out.
Experiences from early warning systems for earthquakes have shown that the ballasted track
has to be replaced with slab track and embedded rail, to avoid too high disturbances from
passing trains. In an embedded rail construction, vibrations from the rail will be significantly
reduced. Another important option that comes with slab track is the opportunity to cast in glass
fibre cable for seismically monitoring. This way a good sensor can be installed, making use of
the track construction. A continually monitoring of the track can also be adjusted to monitor
animals, people and falling objects along the line, but this system is still not available on the
market.
1.2.11.2.5 Warning fences
Warning fences can give information when an event occurs. Two different types are common:
Fences consisting of electric wires that is being cut when an incident occurs, or poles with a
joint that breaks if they are being hit of something. In both cases, there is electrical current
flowing through the fence which will be interrupted if something happens.
Warning fences can also be monitored with a geophone.
1.2.11.2.6 Surveillance cameras
Manual or digital control through surveillance cameras can be an option in some situations. This
can also be an extra option in combination with some of the other systems.
Page 72 of (270)
1.3
Technical track solutions
In railway design increasing traffic loads and volumes and particularly the introduction of highspeed trains in the last decade, have resulted in the need for new approaches. In addition,
concern for the environment requires the concept of sustainability to be taken into account in
the design process.
Beside ballast-sleeper systems the slab track systems have been shown to provide good
technical alternatives for several elements of traditional railway construction.
Different systems have shown that these modern types of construction are able to meet the
requirements of modern railway tracks. These systems offer the advantage of superior stability
and almost complete absence of deformation. Thus also travel comfort is high. Ballastless track
systems incur significantly lower maintenance costs compared to ballasted track. Due to the
absence of any ballast, damage by flying ballast at speeds higher than 250 km/h is avoided. In
addition high lateral track resistance of slab tracks allows increase of speed in combination with
tilting technology. However, building a slab track is more expensive and modifications after
implementation of the system are much more complex than for traditional ballasted track
systems.
1.3.1 Summary
Different track solutions are investigated and studied taken into account various parameters
which are influencing the track systems (functional, operational, economical, technical, etc.).
The task is to evaluate the different superstructure systems with regard to the parameters.
Additionaly the relevance of the parameters with regard to a scenario has been weighted by a
factor. The methodology can be described as a point rating system or scoring-model. Hereby
the scoring value serves a grading of the different alternatives in an ordinal scale.
The weighted scores for all discussed parameters are in the end summed up to compile an
overall ranking which is documented in a total sum.
The following different track systems have been studied in detail:
Slab track:
•
Systems with supporting points and embedded sleepers (SES); e.g. Rheda 2000
•
Systems with supporting points, without sleepers and prefabricated slabs (PS); e.g.
Bögl, ÖBB-Porr, Shinkansen
•
System with continuous support, on longitudinal beams and stakes (NFF); NFF Thyssen
(New slab track Thyssen)
•
Systems with supporting points, prefabricated booted blocks embedded in slab (PBS);
e.g. EBS-Edilon, LVT
•
Systems with supporting points, sleepers, laid on asphalt layer (SA); e.g. Getrac, ATD
•
System with continuous support, prefabricated slab; embedded rails (SER); ERS-HREdilon
Ballasted track systems:
•
B 450 Twin Block Sleeper
•
B 90 Sleeper
•
NSB 95 Sleeper/ B 70 Sleeper
•
Wide sleepers/ Y-Steel-sleepers
Together with the influences out of:
Page 73 of (270)
•
Operational parameters (Lifetime, adjustment possibilities, availability, load, flexibility,
repairing possibilities, suitability for tilting train operation, )
•
Functional parameters (Cross section, station, tunnel, bridge, lateral track resistance,
eddy-current brakes, safety)
•
Geotechnical parameters (Adaption to soft soil and rock)
•
Environmental impact (Noise, vibration)
•
Service parameters (Comfort criteria)
•
Cost parameters (Investment, maintenance)
The main findings of this evaluation are:
Scenario A and B:
For both scenarios the track system with the highest ranking is the ballasted track with NSB 95
or B 70 sleepers. This system showed the highest scores and a stable result within the
sensitivity analysis. The result was mainly influenced by:
•
flexibility in operation programme,
•
change of cant or relocation of switches can be performed very easily,
•
repair after accidents/damages,
•
rehabilitation of existing tracks,
•
time duration for exchange and maintenance of components for a single event,
•
investment costs,
•
construction time and
•
airborne noise emissions.
These parameters are advantageous for the track system and are summarizing the strength of
it.
Scenario C
For scenario C slab track system with prefabricated elements (e.g. Bögl, ÖBB-Porr) has the
highest ranking based on the result of the point rating system. Nevertheless, in the next phases
planning within this scenario has to go into more detail and should consider and evaluate both
types of superstructure, slab tracks and ballasted tracks. Reason is that the final decision of the
recommended track system is influenced by the corridor, the route, the operational programme
etc. All related parameters should be scored and evaluated for each corridor individually.
Scenario D
In case of scenario D, where a pure high-speed line is built, the recommendation derived from
the scoring-model is a slab track systems with prefabricated slabs. It has to be assessed which
of the highest ranked systems are best suited for different segments with the varying conditions
of a corridor. Reasons for this recommendation are:
•
lifetime will be much longer than compared to ballasted tracks,
•
track availability is outstanding,
•
reduction of maintenance operations,
•
suitability with regard to both speed and load is excellent,
•
lateral track resistance is much higher than with the conventional ballasted track,
Page 74 of (270)
•
eddy-current brakes match very much together with slab tracks, so rolling stock might be
equipped with them,
•
emissions of structure borne noise in combination with a slab track system will achieve
best results; if a mass-spring systems is selected.
However, the track analysis was made without any reference to specific corridors with defined
requirements. This means, that in forthcoming design phases the evaluation matrix has to be
developed and applied with regard to specific corridors, lines and sections. Perhaps in a specific
section some parameters are not influencing the track system at all or there are additional which
might be introduced. Also the significance for a specific corridor or line might change.
Another task of the further design phases is to calculate investment costs and introduce them in
the decision matrix. Based on the approach in this analysis the track evaluation can be
supplemented by a cost-effectiveness-analysis for a corridor or defined sections.
1.3.2 Description track construction types
1.3.2.1 Ballast sleeper tracks
Now as before, concrete sleepers on ballast represent the classical, fundamental version of
track systems around the world. In many cases, conventional ballasted track systems fully
satisfy the requirements placed. Ballasted tracks offer great advantages where upgrading of
existing lines is involved: rail traffic can be partially maintained, even during the construction
phase. Total life-cycle costs are an important factor in the planning of new lines. Concrete
sleepers can be laid, for example, on a flexible and cost-reducing basis, "under the rolling
wheel" - i.e., without interruption of rail traffic.
Traditionally, railway track has consisted of rails laid on timber or concrete sleepers, supported
by a ballast bed.
The main advantages of this traditional type of track are:
•
cost-effective construction process,
•
high elasticity,
•
high maintainability at relatively low cost and
•
high noise absorption.
However, ballasted track also has a number of disadvantages:
•
Over time, the track tends to “float”, in both longitudinal and lateral directions, as a result
of non-linear, irreversible behaviour of the materials (this is also a result of temperature
differences);
•
Limited non-compensated lateral acceleration in curves, due to the limited lateral
resistance offered by the ballast;
•
Ballast can be churned up at high speeds, causing serious damage to rails and wheels;
•
Reduced permeability due to contamination, grinding-down of the ballast and transfer of
fine particles from the subgrade;
•
Ballast is relatively heavy, leading to an increase in the costs of building bridges and
viaducts if they are to carry a continuous ballasted track;
•
Ballasted track is relatively high, and this has direct consequences for tunnel diameters
and for access points;
The rate at which the track deteriorates is closely related to the quality of the original
construction, particularly the rail geometry, the homogeneity of the subgrade layers and the
Page 75 of (270)
supporting capacity of the sub-ballast. On bridges that include a continuous ballast bed, extra
elasticity must be created by:
•
laying a ballast mat between the ballast bed and the bridge,
•
increasing the elasticity of the fastenings.
Sleepers are the simplest and most secure method to set the required rail geometry for tracks.
Sleepers may be hung together with rails to form the track panel or they may be laid separately.
An advantage for track geometry is the fact that the use of pre-finished sleepers can provide a
consistent level of quality. It is possible to use different sleeper types for the various forms of
slab track manufacturing. Specially-suited pre-stressed concrete sleepers, twin-block sleepers
and steel sleepers are in use.
► BALLASTED TRACK SYSTEM RAIL TWINBLOCK WITH B450 (U41 VAX) BY SATEBA
Twinblock (bi-block) sleeper system is used in France for most new HSL. The sleeper can be
used in any configuration of ballasted embankment structure.
Figure 20: TGV track with Twinblock sleeper B450 (formerly U41 VAX)
The basic technical descriptions and information are related and copyright to [50].
► BALLASTED TRACK SYSTEM RAIL MONOBLOCK WITH B 70/90 SLEEPER
Concrete sleepers B 70 are the classic sleepers in Germany.
Type B 70 sleepers are pre-stressed concrete sleepers and are the simplest way to achieve a
finished track. The main advantage of these sleepers lies in their great flexibility. For new rail
lines or upgrading of existing tracks, for mainline tracks or urban transport, for trunk or
secondary lines, and for freight and passenger traffic: this concrete sleeper offers a fast and
reliable solution for any application. Simple assembly assures fast installation.
The sleeper can be used in any configuration of ballasted embankment structure.
Figure 21: Ballasted track with B 70 sleepers
Page 76 of (270)
The advantages:
•
Full performance capability, even for greatest operational demands;
•
Cost-effective optimization of the track, with maintenance at the same time of technical
permanence and operational safety;
•
Assurance of operational continuity;
•
Standardisation of operation and maintenance procedures;
•
Possibility of fully mechanical sleeper installation at the track construction site;
•
Capability of adapting track elasticity to special sub-grade conditions.
The maximum approved speed is up to 250 km/h. Elastic sole pads are also applicable if
needed.
The B 90 pre-stressed concrete sleepers have the same performance as the B 70 sleepers with
a higher persistence. Maximum approved speed is up to 300 km/h.
► BALLASTED TRACK SYSTEM RAIL WITH STEEL Y-SLEEPER
In comparison to conventional cross sleepers (wood, concrete or steel trough sleepers) Ysleepers have the following four key features:
•
basic body casting made of supportive girder profiles,
•
Y- bracket shape,
•
three rail support areas per sleeper,
•
double support for rails.
Page 77 of (270)
Figure 24: Ballasted track with Y-steel sleepers 18
The support profile has a double-T shape with a large flange width and a low construction
height (95mm). The “Y” shape together with the secondary support allows the rail to be
supported in two places – the “double support”. The connection between the two main supports
and the connection between the main and secondary supports is arranged through the upper
and lower cross bracket. The upper welded cross bracket serves to keep the rail in position and
transfer lateral forces from the rail to the sleeper. Below, the cross bracket is formed as a steel
L-bracket and ensures a high lateral displacement resistance for the Y-steel sleeper in a ballast
bed.
Through its design, the Y- sleeper has following advantages:
•
an above-average lifespan,
•
excellent level of position stability,
•
reduction of the number of sleepers needed by half in comparison to straight sleepers,
•
about 30 % less ballast required.
The sleeper design is also environmentally-friendly, e.g. the double support allows quieter
vehicle running, and thus less wear occurs. Additionally, in contrast to wooden sleepers, ballast
bed contamination through coal tar oil is prevented. Tamping efforts are lower due to longer
tamping intervals. Also, the Y-sleeper is nearly completely recyclable due to its relatively high
share of residual value. A disadvantage may be a tendency to higher noise emission, which has
to be contrasted to the advantages in further investigations.
Further, the Y-Sleeper design is for minor speed applications < 160 km/h only.
18
Cp. [52]
Page 78 of (270)
► BALLASTED TRACK SYSTEM RAIL WITH WIDE SLEEPERS
Figure 25: Wide Sleeper system
The sleepers are laid without ballasted space between them, but with uncovered middle zones.
These are located underneath the sleepers and do not contribute to the load.
The advantages of the wide sleeper system are:
•
simple installation with conventional track-construction technology,
•
constant quality and stability, and avoidance of continuous changes in the ballast
substructure,
•
up to 70 % higher resistance to lateral shift, plus less settlement,
•
significantly increased track availability,
•
high safety due to large mass of the sleepers and from continuous bearing-surface
support,
•
simple vegetation control and minimal cleaning work, as a result of the closed surface of
the track; no need for herbicides,
•
systematic drainage of surface water and other liquids and
•
considerably reduced emission of structure-borne noise into the soil foundation, owing to
the greater mass of the sleepers.
This type of sleeper can also be applied on asphalt layers as a ballastless track. Elastic sole
pads are also applicable if needed.
1.3.2.2 Slab tracks
Rail traffic is reaching out toward new horizons on ballastless track systems. The arguments are
indeed convincing: long life cycles, top speed, ride comfort, and great load-carrying capability.
Practically maintenance free, ballastless track systems ensure close to 100 % availability over
many years. A maintenance-free track system might be the more cost-effective solution over the
long run. Slab track is used for Japanese HSL as well as recent German HSL (Köln – Frankfurt;
Hannover – Berlin, Nürnberg-Ingolstadt).
The success of ballastless-track technology is primarily based on the following advantages:
•
Stability, precision, and ride comfort
Ballastless track assures a permanently stable track position and stands up to the loads
subjected by high-speed train traffic, with performance characterized by top quality,
functionality, and safety. Millimetre-exact adjustment of the track system during
Page 79 of (270)
assembly on the construction site is the prerequisite for high ride comfort in the train, and
for reduction of loads experienced by the rolling stock.
•
Long life cycles and practically no maintenance
With its aimed service life of 60 years - with little or no requirement for service or
maintenance on the slabs- ballastless track offers high availability and unmatched cost
effectiveness in high-speed operations.
•
Flexibility and end-to-end effectiveness in application
With its comparatively very low structural height, and with the possibility of achieving
optimal required track position, ballastless track technology offers highly attractive and
beneficial solutions as end-to-end systems technology for main-track and turnout
sections, for application on a uniform basis on embankments, bridges, and tunnels.
•
Basis for optimal routing of rail lines
For high-speed operations, ballastless technology enables more direct routing of train
lines, with tighter radii and higher gradients. These benefits enable reduction for civil
structures costs.
► Overview of ballastless track systems
Ballastless tracks can be built on either asphalt or concrete supporting layers. Track systems
installed on asphalt supporting layers predominantly feature direct-support configurations. On
the other hand, systems implemented with concrete supporting layers offer the selection among
an optimal diversity of models with homogeneous system structures.
Starting from the basis of traditional trough-track designs with mono-block sleepers, the
systems further developed to track systems with bi-block sleepers. Bi-block applications
guarantee a safe and reliable bond between the sleeper and the infill concrete as well as easier
handling. Further development resulted in design of the full-block bi-block sleepers. This sleeper
is characterized by reduction in total structural height.
► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM RHEDA 2000 BY RAIL.ONE (PFLEIDERER TRACK SYSTEMS)
RHEDA 2000® is a flexible system that can be individually adapted to the specific requirements
and the individual constraints of each project. The basic system structure, however, always
consists of modified bi-block sleepers which are securely and reliably embedded in a monolithic
concrete slab. Highly elastic rail fastenings are essential to achieve the vertical rail deflection
required for load distribution and for smooth train travel.
The B 355-M sleeper represents the core of the RHEDA 2000® system. Due to mass
production of these precast components, the sleeper provides both maximum concrete quality
and highest precision especially at the most critical rail seat area. The concrete sleeper blocks
are designed to effectively function with all widely used fastening systems and sleeperanchorage components. The lattice truss reinforcement between the concrete sleeper blocks,
the result of long years of development, takes full account of the stability aspects of transport
and construction, and of effective embedding for system reliability and durability.
The concrete track-supporting layer is the major load-distributing element of the system. Since it
is cast-in-place, it can be individually adapted to any substructure type and condition. For embankments, it is designed as a continuous slab with free crack formation. For highly compacted
soil – which is strongly advised for ballastless tracks to prevent settlement – the slab can be
constructed in unit dimensions of 2.8 m x 0.24 m. It fulfils even the most stringent demands for
durability and reliability under various climatic conditions and applicable concrete standards.
On embankments, an additional bonded support layer – often in the form of a hydraulically
bonded support layer – is installed in order to conform to the permitted levels of stress in the
supporting layers and in the subgrade.
Page 80 of (270)
Figure 26: New high-speed line Cologne-Rhine/Main, Hallerbachtalbruecke, Germany
System design and components overview/layout:
Figure 27: Cross section RHEDA 2000®
Figure 28: Cross section RHEDA 2000 (Turnout area)
► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM FF BÖGLBY MAX BÖGL
The System FF BÖGL is a ballastless track with concrete supporting layer on hydraulic
bounded layer.
Page 81 of (270)
Figure 29: New ICE high-speed line Nürnberg-Ingolstadt with System BÖGL
System design and components overview/ Layout:
Figure 30: System Bögl detail and description
Figure 31: Cross-section on earth structure with system BÖGL
The ballastless track system Bögl consists of prefabricated slab tracks which are coupled in
longitudinal direction. This construction method leads to a homogenous trackway with a good
long-term behaviour. The system can be used on earth structures, in tunnels and on bridges.
Page 82 of (270)
Earth structures are stabilised in such a way that the requirements for tolerable remaining
settlements are met with. The earth subgrade is covered with an anti-frost layer for protection
against climatic impacts (frost heavings). The slab tracks are placed on a hydraulically bounded
layer or alternatively on a reinforced concrete base layer. In tunnels and troughs, these
requirements are already fulfilled without further action. Standard slabs lie on bridges on a
gliding, reinforced concrete base layer which are anchored with the bridge superstructure in
defined spaces.
Both base layers provide continuously decreased stiffness and load transfer. At the same time,
they are blinding layers and support for the prefabricated slabs. In trough and tunnel structures,
the existing blinding concrete replaces the base layer.
The prefabricated slabs are installed with a standard spacing of 5 cm. Vertical and horizontal
adjustment takes place using spindle devices and a computer-aided surveying system. The
vertical gap between slab and base layer is sealed and subsequently fully filled using a specially
developed grout. Then the longitudinal coupling process of the slabs follows so that a
monolithic, continuous band is created with a high resistance to longitudinal and transverse
displacement. The longitudinal coupling counteracts the so-called “whipping effect”, which is a
warping of the slab ends due to thermal differences. A characteristic feature of the prefabricated
slabs is the predetermined breaking points that are arranged between the rail support points.
This will prevent an uncontrolled crack development primarily in the area of rail fasteners. The
slab track consist of standard concrete or prestressed concrete or alternatively of steel fibre
concrete. Results of different tests show that the train positioning systems were only
insignificantly affected by the FFB – Slab Track Bögl. In order to drain the surface water, every
slab is manufactured with a transverse slope of 0.5 % by default. The rail support points can be
mechanically processed via a computer-controlled grinding machine. This allows a high
accuracy of the track bed. The slab production is finished with the assembly of the rail
fastenings. All rail fastenings systems which are approved and suitable for ballastless tracks
can be used according to the track requirements.
After installation of the rail there is no need for further surveying or correction of the track bed.
The slabs are adjusted only on defined measuring points on the rail supporting points without
the use of a mounting rail. Therefore the main disadvantage of the mounting rail due to
deformation in temperature changes during fine adjustment of the slab tracks is solved.
Technical data of the FF Bögl System:
Construction height (top base layer to rail top):
474 mm
Slab length (System length: nominal 6.5 m):
6.45 m
Slab width:
2.55 m
Slab height:
0.20 m
Concrete class:
(B 55) C45/55
Rail supports:
10 pairs per slab; spacing 650 mm
Prestressing:
transversal
Longitudinal coupling:
GEWI steel
Optional noise-reduction systems can be applied
► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM NFF THYSSEN BY THYSSEN KRUPP GFT GLEISTECHNIK
The new slab track “System NFF” is comprised of the rails, the rail fastening (such as Rail
fastening system Krupp ECF), the longitudinal support unit "LTE", the cross bar and the deep
foundation consisting of drilling or piles. The LTE store on a two-span beam to the cross-stakes,
turn on the stakes supports.
Page 83 of (270)
Diameter, length, number and inclination of the piles to the respective soil conditions, the
legislative requirements and the course of the rails have to be adjusted. The inclination of the
piles in the soil can be both vertical and horizontal forces on the stakes, the transverse yokes
are attached. The transverse yokes in turn, serve as support for the LTE. LTE and cross bar are
made of precast concrete elements in the work be prepared under optimal conditions and can
be delivered with consistent quality.
Conventional ballasted and slab track systems differ in the interface under track: Hydraulically
bound base instead of formation protection layer and concrete base instead of gravel. Gravel
roads can be repaired within limits by plugs in height and position; in spring-mass systems it is
possible with reductions in the rail fastening but limited. The gravel path requires more
maintenance and has a shorter lifetime or complete restoration, Slab track systems have a
longer life, require less repair, but a more elaborate preparation of the base (soil improvement,
compaction, exchange, etc.).
Figure 32: Finished system NFF Thyssen
Figure 33: Constructional principal of NFF structure
► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM PORR-ÖBB BY PORR PTU TECHNOBAU
The ÖBB-Porr elastic stored slab track is based on a low settlement substructure such as a
tunnel floor, bridge construction or hydraulically bound base layer. Main element of the system
is elastically supported slab track. The slab track system ÖBB / Porr is based on a 5.16 m long,
reinforced precast slab. Eight couples of supporting points (type Vossloh 300-1) are integrated
with a distance of 65 cm. The precast slabs are adjusted in their position by spindles and
afterwards backfilled with concrete through conical grouting openings. To decouple the concrete
Page 84 of (270)
backfill an elastic separating layer is applied on both the sole plate and on the conical grouting
openings .This causes a reduction of the emitted into the ground vibrations (noise insulation).
With a ton of weight per running meter the system can be classified as a light mass-spring
system.
As a rule the layer of poured concrete is minimum 8 cm thick and thus the total height of the
system sums up to 47.3 cm to the rail top. Another advantage of the elastic separating layer is
an easy replacement of single slabs. This ensures a fast renewal e.g. after an accident. 19
Figure 34: System overview PORR ÖBB
Figure 35: System PORR ÖBB on embankment
19
Cp. [55].
Page 85 of (270)
The laying on earthworks carried out on a load distribution plate or a hydraulically bound base
layer. Due to the high quality level of the prefabricated slab structure and the relatively small
grouting openings the impairment of weather is low. This is of course also valid for installation
on bridges.
► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM J-SLAB (SHINKANSEN)
The J-Slab system is another elastically supported slab track analogue to the system ÖBBPORR. The system is basically of the same design as the ÖBB-PORR System with just an
adjustment by connecting two slabs with a concrete cone.
Figure 36: J-SLAB System on open track
Figure 37: J-SLAB System overview
Figure 38: J-SLAB (Taiwan HSL) with ballasted
protection aside
► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM LOW VIBRATION TRACK (LVT) BY SONNEVILLE
The LVT-System consists of a concrete block, a resilient pad and a rubber boot, surrounded by
unreinforced concrete (2nd stage concrete). No special demands on the rail fixation are made;
merely an elastic rail pad is used. For each specific project, these two elastic components are
matched to each other, thus bestowing upon the system the properties characteristic of duallevel elasticity.
Page 86 of (270)
Figure 39: System LVT-Track
The resilient pad provides for the load distribution analogous to the ballasted track and reduces
the influence of low frequency vibrations. The rail pad in turn protects against the effects of
higher frequencies.
The rubber boot allows an unhindered deflection that, together with the high quality of the
resilient pad, leads under dynamic loads to a very low system stiffening (c dyn/c stat < 1.5).
All necessary functions for the track are taken over by the decoupled concrete block. This
reduces the demands made on the 2nd stage concrete.
Efficient surface drainage can be installed depending on the slope of the slab or specific ground
conditions in the middle or along the side. Drainage gutters can also be installed in the turnout
area up to the turnout's interior.
Efficient surface drainage can be installed depending on the slope of the slab or specific ground
conditions in the middle or along the side. Drainage gutters can also be installed in the turnout
area up to the turnout's interior.
Figure 40: System overview LVT-Track
► SLAB TRACK SYSTEM CONCRETE SLEEPERS ON ASPHALT SUPPORTING LAYER;
GETRAC BY RAIL.ONE (PFLEIDERER TRACKS SYSTEMS)
GETRAC® A1 is a non-ballasted track system with direct support of the track panel on an
asphalt supporting layer. This configuration is build-up to guarantee safe and permanent
positioning of the track. It can also be installed on an extremely cost-effective basis.
Page 87 of (270)
The GETRAC® A1 ballastless track system is characterised by solid track support that retains
its high levels of quality and safety throughout the entire life cycle. The technology is based on
the development of anchoring prestressed-concrete sleepers to an asphalt layer. The
prestressed-concrete sleepers are installed onto the asphalt supporting layer and are
permanently and elastically attached to this layer by means of so-called anchor blocks made of
special high-strength concrete. The anchor blocks are designed such that the longitudinal and
lateral forces from the traffic loads are transferred into the asphalt supporting layer without any
displacement of the sleepers.
As a result of decades of experience gained in the emplacement of asphalt layers in traditional
road construction, installation of asphalt track-supporting layers with conventional road-building
machinery is fully unproblematic for GETRAC® technology. Installation of the asphalt layers
takes place in several layers by an automatically controlled asphalt-laying machine guided by
control cables. A ballast layer, or hydraulically bonded layer, serves as support for the asphalt
layer above. The top layer consists of fine asphaltic concrete; the tolerance for unevenness is
only ± 2 mm.
Installation of the track panels likewise takes place with conventional civil-construction
equipment. GETRAC® also allows sleepers to be laid individually – or by means of
prefabricated track sections, in order to reduce construction time. These options guarantee fast
availability of the track system.
Figure 41: System overview GETRAC (on asphalt support layer)
► SLAB TRACK EMBEDDED RAIL SYSTEM – ERS-HR BY EDILON SEDRA
INFUNDO is a Dutch development of a slab track system. The EDILON Corkelast ® Embedded
Rail System (ERS) involves embedding the rails in a plastic medium.
The INFUNDO slab track system features continuously-supported rails. Rail fastening is
achieved by covering rails in an elastic, two-compound mass. A special feature is that no
additional rail-fastening components are required. Rails are thus no longer mounted on
sleepers, but are embedded elastically along their entire length. The durable elastic material
guarantees that the rails remain homogeneously supported, and its elasticity can be specifically
adjusted by a spring compression rubber pad. This unique material which has been tested over
many decades combines the special characteristics of natural cork with specially-developed
Page 88 of (270)
polymers. The INFUNDO system uses traditional slab track layer design with a frost protection
layer, a hydraulically-bonded layer and a concrete support slab. The concrete support slab is
formed in-situ continuously without construction joints, and with a height of 40 cm and a width of
2.62 m. The rail fastening system features the following design:
•
guidance of rails within a trough,
•
continuous elastic support of rails and defined spring compression on rubber pad,
•
fixation of rail using elastic poured mass.
The trough set in the concrete bed determines only approximately the position of the rail fine
positioning within the trough defines the rail’s height, alignment, track gauge and inclination
exactly and is fixed by pouring the rail into the polymer mass. Horizontal and vertical rail forces
are absorbed by the elastic, two-component mass. The elasticity of the embedding medium may
be adjusted by altering the component proportions. The ERS-HR system has several
advantages:
•
lower wear of rails (use of smaller rail profiles possible),
•
reduction of noise emissions,
•
minimisation of components used,
•
short construction times with prefabricated – economical solution,
•
reduced height of track bed.
The ERS-HR system can be used for conventional rail and HSR-systems with the INFUNDO
slab track structure or an individual designed concrete slab track. Thus it is also excellently
suitable for railway crossings and tunnels. Additional areas of application are connective rails
and industrial tracks.
Figure 42: System overview of EDILON system
Page 89 of (270)
► SLAB TRACK EMBEDDED BLOCK SYSTEM – EBS BY EDILON SEDRA
The Edilon Corkelast ® Embedded Block System (EBS), has pursued the concept of elastically
supported sleeper blocks. This elastic support claims to provide the same dynamic spring and
damping behaviour of ballasted track under traffic loads.
As earlier demonstrated by the transition from monoblock to bi-block sleepers in ballasted track
systems, the EBS solution is based on individual blocks. Due to the stable integration in a
concrete slab structure, these blocks do not require additional alignment elements such as
gauge bars.
Corkelast provides elastic bonding of the individual blocks and the supporting concrete slab.
The unique, proven, reliable, two component embedding compound assures outstanding
position stability over decades - along with simple installation, low system costs, and minimum
maintenance.
Cross section
Top view
Figure 44: Cross section EBS-system
Figure 43: Top View EBS system
The advantages of the EBS-system can be summarised as follows:
•
embedded blocks not subject to wear,
•
no joint or gap problems,
•
no moisture, frost or corrosion damage,
•
no dirt or sludge to foul the block bearing area,
•
equivalent spring and damping characteristics compared to ballasted track,
•
no need for highly elastic rail fastenings,
•
favourable airborne noise behaviour,
•
simple concrete slab design,
•
electrical insulation of the rails,
•
low structural system height,
•
simple installation,
•
cost-effective, mechanised, large-series production and
•
the possibility of using all common discrete rail fastening systems.
The Embedded Block System is designed to meet the requirements of heavy freight passenger
and high-speed trains. The structural engineering features are designed conform to Load Model
71, as stipulated in UIC Code 702.
Page 90 of (270)
It is possible to control the static stiffness of Embedded Block System (EBS). This enables
adjustment of the track to meet various requirements such as ride comfort or structure-borne
noise behaviour.
Figure 45: EBS system pictures from construction site
Figure 46: Details of the EBS-block
Page 91 of (270)
1.3.2.3 Summary of described track systems
In the last chapters different track systems where introduced. Some of the slab tracks share the
same features, particularities and limits. Thus for the further discussion the different systems
introduced are summarised in track types. Definition and classification is documented in the
following table.
Table 24: Summary of track types
Design Types of
Track/ Slab Track
Examples
Elements/ Particularities/
Limits
Applications
Supporting points, with
embedded sleepers
(SES)
Rheda 2000
In situ construction; reinforced
concrete slab;
In Germany the main solution on HSR
lines and tunnels; also other European
countries, Taiwan, China;
Supporting points,
without sleepers,
prefabricated slabs (PS)
Bögl, ÖBB-Porr,
Shinkansen
Prefabricated reinforced concrete
slabs
In use in Germany, Japan and Austria
on HSR lines and tunnels; HSR in
China;
Continuous support, on
longitudinal beams and
stakes (NFF)
NFF Thyssen (New
slab track Thyssen)
In situ construction; no
underground preparation
needed; for use in soft and
difficult soils;
In soft and difficult soil;
prefabricated booted
blocks embedded in slab
(PBS)
EBS-Edilon, LVT
In situ construction; blocks
resting elastically within a “shoe”;
embedded in reinforced concrete
slab;
On main lines in different European
countries; in tunnels all over the world,
especially Switzerland; LVT in the
Channel tunnel;
sleepers, laid on top of
asphalt layer (SA)
Getrac, ATD
In situ construction; on asphalt
layer; anchor blocks connecting
sleeper with asphalt layer;
In Germany for rehabilitation of
superstructures in existing tunnels;
slab; embedded rails in
U-like channels (SER)
ERS-HR-Edilon
In situ construction; rail
embedded in U-channel; rail
fastening by elastic twocompound mass (Corkelast);
On main High Speed Rail lines;
tunnels; bridges; railway level
crossings;
Ballasted Track
B 450 Twin Block
Sleeper
(2.40m/245 kg)
Max axleload=17 t,
v(max)=350 km/h; Two blocks
which increases the lateral
resistance;
On HSR lines in France;
Ballasted Track
B 90 Sleeper
(2.60 m/340 kg)
Max axleload = 25 t;
v(max)= 250 km/h;
On main lines;
Ballasted Track
NSB 95 Sleeper
(2.60 m/270 kg)/B 70
Sleeper
(2.60 m/280 kg)
Max. axleload=25 t;
v(max)= 250 km/h;
On main lines: on high speed lines in
Germany;
Ballasted Track
Wide sleepers
(2.40m/560kg)/YSteel-sleepers
Max. axleload=25 t;
v(max)= 120 km/h for Y-sleeper
and 160km/h for Wide sleeper;
70 % larger lateral resistance
compared to B70 sleeper; applied in
Germany for testing only;
1.3.3 Description of parameters influencing the track system
To meet the requirements given, first of all relevant information referring to the Norwegian
conditions (e.g. geotechnical parameters bedrock and soil) are evaluated. For that reason
emphasis is put on all accessible data and information from related studies (e.g. operational
concepts, geological and hydro geological surveys and maps). Cost aspects through the life
cycle of the systems are brought in by international scientific studies and benchmarks from
railway net operators.
Page 92 of (270)
The understanding of making decisions on technical track solutions has to be prepared by a
multi dimensional analysis of different parameters influencing the decision on a HSR track
system. A matrix approach will guide through the combination of parameters which have been
set for Norwegian local context.
This track solution matrix has the dimensions:
•
operational parameters (speed, load, downtime),
•
functional parameters (Open section, station, tunnel, bridge, loop),
•
geotechnical parameters (Quick clay to solid rock),
•
environmental impact (Noise, vibration),
•
service parameters (comfort criteria),
•
cost parameters (Construction, operation, maintenance).
Based on this study the matrix will show recommendations to the appropriate superstructure
(conventional track with ballast, slab track) in relation to the scenarios A, B, C and D.
In the following chapters the different parameters will be discussed, before the matrix be
developed, explained and evaluated.
In order to describe the suitability of the superstructure systems towards the evaluation
parameters and vice versa scores will be assigned.
In order to describe the significance of the evaluation parameters towards the scenarios A – D
weights are introduced and assigned.
The scoring and weighting is explained in detail within chapter 1.3.3.1.
1.3.3.1 Operational parameters
► Possibilities for adjustments in lateral and vertical directions
Superstructures suffer heavy loads, high speeds and cyclical-dynamic impacts. This results at
the end in deformations of the track. In special cases the track has to be adjusted and the
alignment has to be brought back to the target parameters. For this extreme case the
superstructure systems need possibilities to adjust the rail in lateral and vertical directions.
Traditional ballasted track offer good possibilities for the adjustment of the track; whereby the
Wide sleepers and Y-sleepers need special machinery.
The slab track systems have reduced possibilities to adjust in vertical and lateral direction. In
Germany for instance all systems are required to allow adjustments in lateral directions of a
minimum of ±40 mm; in vertical direction the minimum adjustment has to be +20 mm.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10, for the ballasted systems, except the Wide and Y-sleeper - 8
scores - , because of their “closed” surface.
•
Minimum score: 2; for all slab track systems, because of the limited possibilities of
adjustment.
Awarded weights:
•
Scenario A: 3, important if existing track has to be improved
•
Scenario B: 2, needed if alignment is not amended
•
Scenario C: 2, needed if alignment is not amended
•
Scenario D: 1, new line is constructed precisely and with high quality.
Page 93 of (270)
► Lifetime
The slab track systems are dimensioned generally for a longer life time of the superstructures
without heavy maintenance. The newly designed slab tracks are required to have a life time of
at least app. 60 years. This request generally results from the business case which is applied by
the infrastructure manager, before initiating an investment.
Experiences with a long observation period do not exist until now.
In the case of ballasted tracks, the ballast needs to be renewed after approximately 30 years.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10; for the slab tracks. Asphalt layers, constructed without
reinforcement, might suffer cracks; water and frost will impact on asphalt layer.
Therefore these systems gain 8 scores.
•
Minimum score: 4, 5 and 6; for the ballasted tracks. The heavy sleepers (Wide sleepers
and B 90) will last longer.
Awarded weights:
Lifetime is most essential to all scenarios.
•
Scenario A: 3
•
Scenario B: 3
•
Scenario C: 3
•
Scenario D: 3
► Track availability / Frequency of maintenance / Downtime
The majority of the ballasted track problems are well-known. They are related to the ballast
contamination by fine particles, an instability under vibrations produced by vehicles and reduced
lateral track resistance.
The higher the speed the higher the contact stresses at the sleeper’s lower surface and on the
ballast particles, which result in a faster track deterioration.
The reduced uniformity of track elasticity results in irregular elastic deformations as well as an
increase of dynamic loads from vehicles.
Limited lateral track resistance of the ballasted track makes the track vulnerable to buckling
phenomenon when rails are subject to high variation of temperature or when braking systems
are applied using frictional or eddy-current brakes. Especially higher lateral forces due to tilting
train operation and temperature differences in Norway are adding to a critical combination for
ballasted tracks. All the aforementioned actions in combination with high speed and vibrations
deteriorate the track stability increasingly.
These problems can be solved by reducing speed or by implementing regular maintenance.
Both solutions lead to a loss of track availability of the ballasted track.
Slab track constructions avoid those problems.
Operational downtimes usually occur, when the alignment has to be reconstructed. Because of
the above mentioned reasons this will be more often the case with a ballasted track than it will
be with a slab track.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10; for the slab tracks. Asphalt layers, constructed without
reinforcement laid on embankment are somewhat softer and therefore cause more likely
deformations. These systems gain 8 scores.
Page 94 of (270)
•
Minimum score: 3, 4, 5 and 6; for the ballasted tracks. The heavier the track, the more
scores the system obtained, except for the Wide- and Y-sleepers.
Awarded weights:
Track availability is most essential to all scenarios.
•
Scenario A: 3
•
Scenario B: 3
•
Scenario C: 3
•
Scenario D: 3
► Load
The classic ballasted track is built-up of rails, sleepers and ballast. These tracks exist now since
more than 150 years. The general maximum speed is 160 km/h to 200 km/h. Lots of
experiences were gained during the years and the infrastructure managers are able to provide
safety operations with reasonable costs.
When talking about higher speeds of up to 250 km/h or even speeds of more than 250 km/h,
forces acting on the rail become increasingly higher. 20
In order to transmit the lateral, longitudinal and vertical forces safely into the underground, slab
track systems were introduced worldwide. Concrete slabs, together with highly elastic rail
fastening systems offer a higher degree of track bed stability than ballasted tracks.
Due to rolling stock design and the design of bridge constructions, the loads are generally
limited. The load model (UIC 71) requires designing of railway infrastructure with a maximum
axle load of 250 kN.
Whereby the ICE1 in Germany had an axle load of 200 kN, the axle load of the ICE 3 is already
reduced to 160 kN.
Nevertheless the higher speeds of modern HSR trains leads to higher loads. Load requires
stable superstructures, which resist deformations. If an operational concept should be changed
to higher loads and/or speed the slab track systems have a higher upwards compatibility.
Among ballasted tracks it is the heavier track, which is advantageous and the one which has a
larger sleeper undersurface.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10; for the first 4 slab tracks and the SER systems of the matrix. The
track type with the asphalt layer is without reinforcement and obtains 8 scores.
•
Minimum score: 4, 5 and 6; for the ballasted tracks. The heavier the track, the more
scores the system will obtain, except for the Wide- and Y-sleepers.
Awarded weights:
The load and therefore the freight traffic will be programmed on scenario A and B.
20
•
Scenario A: 3
•
Scenario B: 3
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 1; only high speed rail.
Cp. [60] p. 80.
Page 95 of (270)
► Flexibility in operation programme (Change of speed and cant, relocation of turnout
etc.)
During the lifetime of superstructures the infrastructure manager might be forced to change the
operation programme; freight trains will be redirected and the speed of passenger trains has to
be increased.
Here ballasted tracks show a high flexibility. Because sleepers resting without fixed connection
in the ballast bed, the infrastructure manager are open for changes at any time without much
effort, neither in money nor in time. Naturally slab tracks are fixed to a certain alignment; no
changes are possible without a comprehensive re-construction. A certain decision regarding
the alignment of the line with its comfort parameters etc cannot be changed over the whole
lifetime.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10 for the light monoblock sleeper B 70; 9 scores for the second
lightest sleeper B 450; 8; for the B 90 sleeper and only 6 scores for the Wide sleepers
and the Y-sleepers, which are generally not so flexible.
•
Minimum score: 2; for all the slab tracks.
Awarded weights:
Flexibility in operation programme will involve particularly the scenario A with its relatively low
speed.
•
Scenario A: 3
•
Scenario B: 3
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 1, since this will be a new line with a new alignment. No changes should
occur!
► Repair after accidents/damages (costs and time)
This parameter has a strong interrelation to both parameters already discussed and to the
maintenance parameters still ahead.
Ballasted systems do not show many problems with regard to repair and replacement.
Depending on the kind of damage the different components can quite easily be exchanged or
renewed.
In case of the slab tracks the situation is different and usually more complicated. Eventually
whole reinforced concrete slabs have to be demolished and replaced. Therefore heavy
machinery and high amount of working time is needed. Some systems have taken necessary
precautions to deal with this problem.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10; for the first 3 ballasted tracks of the matrix. The Wide sleepers and
the Y-sleepers have higher complexity and obtain 8 scores.
•
Minimum score: 2 and 4; for the slab tracks. Systems with prefabricated elements are able
to exchange slab segments. The asphalt layer system is easier to demolish and
reconstruct.
Awarded weights:
•
•
Scenario A: 3, because in case of an accident the line will be closed, speed will be
reduced.
Scenario B: 2
Page 96 of (270)
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 2, because traffic can be redirected to parallel line.
► Suitability of permanent way for tilting trains
Since tilting trains induce higher lateral, vertical and probably even longitudinal forces, the track
bed must be constructed as stable as possible. The significance will increase in mountainous
regions, with small radii and large gradients.
These requirements are met best with heavy slab track systems. Ballasted tracks (in
combination with high speeds) are showing problems with the higher dynamic loads due to
tilting train operation.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10; for 4 slab track systems; 8 scores for the asphalt layer systems,
because of their softer support. 7 scores for the NFF Thyssen track, because the forces
have to be transmitted from the rail to the piles into the soft underground.
•
Minimum score: 5 and 6 for the ballasted tracks.
Awarded weights:
Tilting train operational concepts are more interesting for the higher speed scenarios.
•
Scenario A: 1
•
Scenario B: 2
•
Scenario C: 3
•
Scenario D: 3
► Adaptability of the permanent way for operation of tilting trains
The question regarding this parameter is: Is it possible to adapt the existing permanent way for
tilting trains? This question is close connected to the evaluation parameter: Flexibility in
operation programme.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10; for the first 3 ballasted tracks of the matrix. The Wide sleepers and
the Y-sleepers are generally not so flexible than the other systems and therefore obtain
8 scores.
•
Minimum score: 2; for all the slab tracks.
Awarded weights:
Tilting trains are generally more interesting for the higher speed scenarios.
•
Scenario A: 1
•
Scenario B: 2
•
Scenario C: 3
•
Scenario D: 3
Page 97 of (270)
1.3.3.2 Functional parameters
► Cross section
Discussion on cross section is related to the height and width of the superstructure with its
permanent way.
For the outline of the substructure reference is made to the chapter with the geological
parameters.
The following table shows the different components of the two principle track systems: ballasted
and slab track. The comparison shows the substantial differences and the common generic
terms. Furthermore it shows the components which are belonging to the superstructure and
which will be compared with each other.
Table 25: Components of the permanent way
Superstructure
Substructure
Ballasted Track
Slab Track
Top of rail until the top of substructure:
Top of rail until the top of substructure:
-
Rail
-
-
Rail fastening systems
-
Rail fastening systems
-
Sleeper
-
-
Ballast
Sleeper, bi-block sleeper or single
support
-
Upper unbonded formation protective
layer
From top of substructure downwards:
Rail
-
Concrete slab
-
Hydraulically bonded bearing layer
From top of substructure downwards:
-
Unbonded frost protective layer
-
-
Lower unbonded bearing layer
-
Lower unbonded bearing layer
-
Improved embankment
-
Improved embankment
-
Improved subsoil
-
Improved subsoil
-
Underground
-
Underground
The average construction height of the different systems is stated below. These heights are the
basis for the scores in the matrix of chapter 1.3.4
Page 98 of (270)
Table 26 Construction height of track systems
Design types of slab
track
Examples
embedded sleepers (SES)
Rheda 2000
Supporting points, without
sleepers, prefabricated
slabs (PS)
Bögl, ÖBB-Porr,
Shinkansen
stakes (NFF)
NFF Thyssen
(New slab track
Thyssen)
prefabricated booted blocks
embedded in slab (PBS)
EBS-Edilon, LVT
asphalt layer (SA)
Getrac, ATD
slab; embedded rails in Ulike channels (SER)
ERS-HR-Edilon
B 450 Twin Block Sleeper
(2.40m/245 kg)
Construction height bottom
edge of rail –top frost
protective layer [mm]
Width [mm]
759
3’400 incl.
Hydraulically bonded
bearing layer
4’159
849
3’250 incl.
Hydraulically bonded
bearing layer
4’099
602/628
Crossbar: 3’000
longitudinal support
unit: 2’165
3’602
590/570
2’500
441
3’200
696
2’620
Sleeper + Ballast + Upper
unbonded formation protective layer
3’400
220 + 300 + 300 = 820
B 90 Sleeper (2.60 m/340 kg)
3’600
180 + 300 + 300 = 780
NSB 95 Sleeper (2.60 m/270 kg) /
B 70 Sleeper ( 2.60 m/280 kg)
3’600
175 + 300 + 300 = 775
Wide sleepers (2.40m/560kg) /
Y-Steel-sleepers
Width +
construction
height [score]
214 + 300 + 300 = 814
3’400
(5)
(6)
(8)
3’070
(10)
3’641
(7)
3’316
(9)
4’220
(3)
4’380
(1)
4’375
(2)
4’214
(4)
A low construction height will directly positive influence the investment costs and will allow
smaller overall construction heights (for instance: tunnel, railway bridges, points with constraints
etc.). Additionally it will reduce the dead load on bridges.
A small width of the superstructure is the basis of a general small overall construction which
directly influences the land use and the land acquisition in a positive way. The width of the
superstructure on the surface is indicated in the table above.
The addition of the width and the construction height links directly to the awarded scores.
Awarded scores:
Reference is made to the table above.
Awarded weights:
The cross section is of utmost importance for all scenarios, since it is directly connected to the
investment.
•
Scenario A: 3
•
Scenario B: 3
Page 99 of (270)
•
Scenario C: 3
•
Scenario D: 3
► Lateral track resistance
Since the superstructure has to transmit the forces from the train and the rail to the
substructure, the ability to resist these forces and to directly transmit them to the next
component, is definitely an extremely important parameter.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: highest scores for the slab track system (with marginal differences of
the systems) as they have highest resistance for lateral forces.
•
Minimum score: 3; for the B 70-sleeper ballasted track, since this system is the one with
the lowest resistance. The other systems are somewhere in between.
Awarded weights:
Lateral track resistance becomes more important with higher speeds.
•
Scenario A: 1
•
Scenario B: 1
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 3
► Bridges
Special problems related to ballasted tracks on bridges are not known. With increasing speeds
and axle loads the ballast between the sleepers and the concrete bridge deck will wear out in a
relatively short time. Reference is made to the parameter: Adaption on solid rock.
Problems occur at the end of bridges on the transition from the bridge with a completely stable
base construction to the earthwork with its relatively soft basis compared to the bridge’s
concrete slab structure 21 .
On these points a lack of comfort usually occurs in combination with increasingly deterioration
of the whole track.
Slab track systems on bridges need special coordination with national rail authorities. Special
attention has to be paid to the bridge structure type and the alignment of the track.
The design is influenced by the way in which the longitudinal forces are transmitted to the
abutments or the supports between them. In some cases there is no need to transmit the
horizontal forces to the bridge at all; for instance in case of a short bridge.
Lateral forces also need to be transmitted to the bridge deck. Drainage system has to be
installed and perhaps structure born noise has to be damped.
All these very special requirements need special system solutions.
Today a variety of solutions for different situations are available.
The following systems have special solutions for bridges: Rheda 2000, Bögl, ÖBB-Porr,
Shinkansen, ERS-HR Edilon.
The following systems have no special solutions for bridges. EBS-Edilon, NFF-Thyssen (system
is not intended for bridges), LVT, Getrac, ATD.
21
Cp. [62] p. 22.
Page 100 of (270)
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10; for the systems with special solutions.
•
Minimum score: 0; for systems which cannot be applied on bridges.
•
8 scores for the Wide-/ Y-sleeper system, because it is in the testing phase.
Awarded weights:
Bridges are relevant for all scenarios.
•
Scenario A: 2
•
Scenario B: 2
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 2
► Tunnels
Tunnels can be compared with bridges; so the problems for the different superstructure systems
are similar.
In Germany and Switzerland for instance, the infrastructure managers consider tunnels as ideal
and generally equips them with slab tracks because of their stable subconstruction.
Other requirements are related to drainage, to safety parameters like derailments or trafficability
of the tracks.
Open tracks, where the rail is in an elevated position, require special guide rails to prevent
derailments. The systems in a U-like channel have the advantage not to require special guide
rails.
For the construction of a trafficability special concrete slabs are needed. They will be fixed
between the rails and between the outer rails and the emergency escape route. These slabs
need a sound foundation to carry heavy fire brigade trucks and ambulances. A ballasted track is
therefore not suitable at all.
Awarded scores:
•
Slab tracks: 10; for the ballastless tracks with a concrete slab, except the NFF-Thyssen,
which obtains 0 scores, because it cannot be applied in tunnels. The asphalt layer tracks
obtain 4 scores, because these systems might raise problems regarding the fire
resistance. Getrac-systems were used quite often in the past for rehabilitation purposes
of old tunnels. Fire resistance of all applied materials has to be kept in mind!
•
Ballasted tracks: 6 scores for the ballasted tracks, except the Wide sleeper track, which
obtains 8 scores, because of the closed track surface, which might carry slabs for the
trafficability more easily and the ballast, which is less stressed than the other ballasted
systems.
Awarded weights:
Tunnels are relevant for all scenarios.
•
Scenario A: 2
•
Scenario B: 2
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 2
Page 101 of (270)
► Stations/switches
The definition of a station includes the switch as a track element.
Ballasted switches are well-known and standard products with no special problems.
Switches for slab track structure are relatively new developments. In the past switches within
slab track systems were handled as isolated application and were generally constructed with
ballast.
Apart from some attempts in the 1970’s, the first massive developments in switch construction
on slab tracks started in the 1990’s. Since then many switch manufactures developed slab track
solutions. Today’s competitive situation shows a variety of switch systems. Some constructors
are in the position to handle all special problems related to the construction of switches on slab
tracks.
The following systems provide switches: Rheda 2000, Bögl, EBS-Edilon, LVT, B 70- and B 90ballast-sleeper systems.
The following systems do not provide switches: ÖBB-Porr, NFF-Thyssen. ERS-HR Edilon,
Getrac, ATD, Wide- and Y- ballast-sleeper systems, B 450 ballast-sleeper systems.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10; for the systems with special solutions.
•
Minimum score: 0; for systems which do not provide solutions.
Awarded weights:
Stations are relevant for all scenarios.
•
Scenario A: 2
•
Scenario B: 2
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 2
► Crossings and constructions carried out after the construction of the superstructure
In case of a newly constructed railway line this problem should not occur, since the different
elements of the railway and the technical equipment will be constructed in a bottom-up method.
The scenarios A – C allow the rehabilitation, extension and modernisation of existing railway
lines. In such cases it is most likely that all kinds of technical equipment must be installed by
undercutting the existing superstructure. This leads to a punctually poor stability of the
superstructure and to a non-linear behaviour of the bearing capacity.
This way of construction must be considered a comprehensive change of the system and must
be avoided, if possible. If not, the construction of a slab track is almost impossible or should be
resigned.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 6; for the ballasted systems; except the Wide and Y-sleeper, they will
get 4 scores, since reconstruction of the permanent way is more complicated.
•
Minimum score: 1; for the slab tracks, except the NFF-Thyssen will obtain 8, since the
crossings etc will not affect the stability of the construction.
Awarded weights:
•
Scenario A: 3, because the rehabilitation of existing lines are involved.
•
Scenario B: 3, because the rehabilitation of existing lines are involved.
Page 102 of (270)
•
Scenario C: 3, because the rehabilitation of existing lines are involved.
•
Scenario D: 1, because new lines will be constructed.
► Eddy-Current brakes
The performance of conventional air brake systems have well understood limitations related to
speed, weight and length.
Therefore modern rolling stock provides eddy-current brakes. The reasons comprise following
aspects but are not limited to:
•
Rail safety is being improved by enabling shorter stopping distances when applied,
•
Rail safety is being improved by enabling reduced dependency between stopping
distance and rail/ wheel adhesion, particularly during adverse adhesion conditions (for
example caused by moisture, ice, leaves or other pollution on the rail head),
•
The use of the eddy-current brakes mitigates the thermal capacity problems of brake
pads and discs associated with conventional friction braking systems,
•
The use of eddy-current brakes avoids harder application of conventional friction brakes
leading to excessive wear of the pads and discs.
In a position paper of the European Rail Infrastructure Managers (EIM) from June 2009 the use
of eddy-current brakes is restricted because of some issues of compatibility between the
braking system and the infrastructure. These include:
•
Electromagnetic compatibility with train detection installations (for example track circuits
and axle counters);
•
Electromagnetic and physical compatibility with line side equipment for train condition
monitoring (for example hot wheel detection);
•
Elevated temperatures in the rail head, which can lead to buckling;
•
The uplift of the track panel can lead to a reduction of lateral stability and increased track
distortion or buckling.
This has lead to restriction of the use of eddy-current brakes for instance in Germany to slab
track systems only 22 .
In France, the use of eddy-current brakes is not allowed at all, because of their ballasted high
speed lines.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10 for the slab track systems; except the asphalt layer systems with 6
scores, because the track is laid on top and not embedded in a slab (uplift forces !!) and
the embedded rail systems with 4 scores, because the head of the rail is embedded in
an elastic two component mass.
•
Minimum score: 1 and 2; for the ballasted tracks. The B 90 and the Wide and Y-sleepers
are quite stable and have a better lateral resistance than the other two ballasted tracks.
Awarded weights:
The importance increases with the speed.
22
•
Scenario A: 0
•
Scenario B: 1
Cp. [61].
Page 103 of (270)
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 3
► Safety: Access for road vehicle/ Protection against derailment
For safety reason it is quite common to equip the track with concrete slabs in order to obtain
trafficable track panels for safety cars (fire brigade, ambulance, etc.) in tunnels or on bridges or
in section where it is impossible to access the track from outside areas (for example cuts, noise
barriers, etc.).
These concrete slabs can be easily integrated in a slab track system, but only with high efforts
in a ballasted track.
Additionally, tracks have to be equipped with special guard rails to prevent derailment on
bridges, in tunnels, next to columns or supports for structures etc. Usually guard rails are used
for this purpose; but for instance the ERS-Edilon system is already equipped with an U-like
channel which prevents derailing.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10 for the embedded rail slab track systems, because this track
provides a trafficable panel as well as a U-like channel against derailing.
•
Minimum score: 2 for the ballasted tracks.
•
The other slab tracks obtain 6 scores and the NFF-Thyssen only 1, because of the
limited range of application.
Awarded weights:
•
Scenario A: 1
•
Scenario B: 1
•
Scenario C: 1
•
Scenario D: 2, because of speed and new lines, where actual safety requirements must
be implemented.
► Flying ballast/ Ice-blocks
Problems have been experienced with flying ballast. The air turbulences caused by high-speed
trains may be sufficient to lift up individual ballast stones from the track bed. These single
stones are then accelerated by the air, dropping down and impacting the ballast bed and
dislodging other stones. In this way a chain reaction is being initiated.
Ballast stones are ejected at high velocity, which results in serious damages:
•
Damages to the rail head
•
Damages to anything in the vicinity of the track
•
Damages to the rolling stock
The same problems can occur when ice blocks during winter times dropping down from the
rolling stock onto the track bed (the ballast).
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10 for the slab track system,
•
Minimum score: 2 for the ballasted tracks; except the Wide-sleeper systems, they obtain
6 scores, because ballast is only found on the shoulder of the track.
Awarded weights:
Page 104 of (270)
The importance increases directly with speed.
•
Scenario A: 0
•
Scenario B: 0
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 3
► Catchment area for snow
Too much snow within the track bed leads to risks in operation and might cause derailment.
This has to be avoided.
Snow heights of up to probably 20 - 30 cm above top of rail are not problematic, the train itself
or wind can sweep away the snow. Problems occur earlier when snow has an icy consistency.
Snow above this level needs to be cleared by a special snowplough or rotary snowplough.
Permanent ways with rails above the surface of the superstructure, like the traditional ballasted
track have the advantage of a “catchment area”, which can be filled with snow before the top of
rail is covered. This “design advantage” applies to all track systems, except the ERS-HR Edilon
system.
If the design type of the track is equipped with a “shoulder”, then there is an additional space for
snow.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10 for the slab track and the ballasted system, except the U-like
channel system and the Wide-sleeper/ Y-steel sleeper systems;
•
Minimum score: 4 for the U-like channel system and 6 scores for the Wide sleeper and
the Y-steel sleeper, because the catchment area is reduced compared to the other
ballasted respectively ballastless system.
Awarded weights:
This parameter is essential for all scenarios.
•
Scenario A: 3
•
Scenario B: 3
•
Scenario C: 3
•
Scenario D: 3
1.3.3.3 Geotechnical parameters
► Adaption on soft subsoil
On the earth structures the requirements are set to occur over the life cycle no impermissible
deformations on the open section and the transitional areas on structures (tunnels, bridges,
etc) 23 .
Train services produce cyclical - dynamic effects on the superstructure and substructure.
Reasons and effects on the earthwork are summarized by the following figure.
23
Cp. [63] p. 270, pp. 272.
Page 105 of (270)
Figure 47: Impacts on earth structures
The load cycles are irregular, because they are significantly determined by the operation. The
dynamic effects are caused by the vehicle speed, vehicle weight and the condition of the track
and rolling stock. These cyclic and dynamic impacts cause vibrations and stresses in the track
and in the earth structures, which are depth-dependent. As a result, the infrastructure possibly
does not meet the geometric requirements anymore because of a deformation which is
associated with a compression or a flow of soil. With progressive change in soil structure even a
threat to stability can be awaited due to decrease of shear strength.
The permissible deformation of the substructure therefore corresponds to the maximum
compensation tolerances at the rail fastenings, less the adjustability kept available for the
construction tolerance in the case of slab track.
Under the assumption that the comfort criteria of the driving dynamics are not violated, largescale trough-shaped deformations can be allowed.
In the classical ballasted track the loads are guided by the rails and the sleepers discretely and
thus selectively into the ground. In contrast to this is the slab track, which guides the load
usually by a concrete slab and a hydraulically bound base course over a large surface in the
underground. Thus for the same guided load the stress in the ground is larger for the ballast
track than for the slab track. But the effort to prepare a suitable subgrade is for the slab track
system higher.
Thus the adaption of slab track constructions for soft soils is higher than for the ballasted
systems.
Substructures which are not free of deformations and/ or for which an Ev2 value of 100 N/mm2
to 120 N/mm2 on the top-edge of the frost protection layer cannot be obtained, a slab track
system should not be constructed [64].
In contrast the preparation of the subgrade for the ballasted track is easier. Corrections can be
made relatively simple, quick and cheap when deformations occur.
Page 106 of (270)
Awarded scores:
•
10 scores: fort he NFF-Thyssen system, because it is dedicated for this application.
•
8 scores: for the Wide and Y-steel sleeper systems, because of their reduced stress
input into the substructure and additionally their possibility of easily reconstruction when
deformed.
•
6 scores: for all other ballasted systems
•
2 scores for the slab track systems
Awarded weights:
•
Scenario A: 2
•
Scenario B: 2
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 3, because with higher speeds possible problems are increasing intensively.
► Adaption on solid rock
Solid ground, i.e. all types of rock, is usually an excellent ground for of the rail superstructure. A
functioning drainage is assumed as well, which should consider gaps in the rock.
For ballasted track a hard underground will lead to a sustainable and early wear of the ballast.
The separate ballast stones are exposed to high forces on the contact surfaces, which
subsequently lead to a breaking of the edges; the higher the guided loads and the speeds
driven, the stronger and faster runs this process.
The solid underground of rock can be compared with bridges and tunnels, where the same
problems occur.
Awarded scores:
•
10 scores: for the slab tracks with a concrete slab, because it can be best adapted on
solid rock and the behaviour is very much similar to rock.
•
9 scores: for the asphalt layer slab track system, because the substructure is more
complicated to design and construct. This system needs a separate layer between the
rock and the asphalt layer.
•
0 scores: for the NFF-Thyssen system. It can not be used at all.
•
Regarding the ballasted tracks: the larger the areas of the bottom of the sleepers, the
less are the tensions entering the ballast structure. This means:
o
8 scores for the Wide sleeper;
o
7 scores for the B 90 sleeper;
o
6 scores for the B 70 sleeper, because the width of the bottom is 20 mm
smaller than the B 90 sleeper;
o
5 scores for the B 450, because of its 2 blocks only.
Awarded weights:
This parameter is relevant for all scenarios.
•
Scenario A: 2
•
Scenario B: 2
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 2
Page 107 of (270)
► Requirements on the formation layer and the subconstruction
The superstructure rests on the formation layers and the subconstruction. The figure within the
parameter “Cross section” shows the different components of the ballasted track and the slab
track.
The requirements on the components differ according to the design and the purpose: ballasted
track, slab track, speed, load etc.
The following tables show the requirements on the different components of the super- and
substructure for the ballasted track and the slab track.
► Ballasted Track
Table 27: Requirements on super- and substructure of ballasted tracks
Superstructure
Substructure
Components
Quality requirements
Thickness
Ballast
Ballast 31.5/63 mm
30.0 cm below bottom of sleeper
Upper unbonded
formation protective
layer
Gravel with low hydraulic permeability;
Deformation modulus of the surface:
25.0 cm to 35.0 cm
New lines: Ev2 = 120 MN/m² to
Upgraded lines: Ev2 = 80 MN/m²
Unbonded frost
protective layer
Gravel with low hydraulic permeability;
Deformation modulus of the surface
New lines: Ev2 = 120 MN/m² to
Upgraded lines: Ev2 = 80 MN/m²
25.0 cm to 35.0 cm
Lower unbonded
bearing layer
New Lines: Ev2 ≥ 60 MN/m² und
Upgraded Lines: Ev2 ≥ 45 MN/m²
Substructure must be compressed:
Improved
embankment
Ev2 ≥ 45 MN/m²
Improved subsoil
Densification of substructure,
eventually particular measures for
improvement, for example: lime,
cement, vibratory gravel columns etc;
Underground
The underground must be stable. The
expected deformations must be
balanced within the rail fastening
system.
New Lines ≥ 3,0 m with a deformation
modulus Dpr = 1.00 to 0.98
Upgraded Lines ≥ 2,5 m with deformation
0.50 m to 1.00 m
► Slab Track
Table 28: Requirements on super- and substructure of slab tracks
Superstructure
Substructure
Components
Thickness
Concrete slab
Strength class C 35/45
Share of reinforcement:
0.8 – 0.9 % of the cross section;
In accordance with the calculation (app.
200 mm)
Hydraulically
bonded bearing
layer
The compressive strength has to be in
accordance with the concrete strength
class C16/20. Necessity according to
calculations.
If necessary: app. 300 mm
Unbonded frost
protective layer
produced out of weather-resistant and
frost-resistant gravel with a hydraulic
-5
permeability of k ≥ 5x10 m/s / k ≥
4
5x10 m/s.
400 mm
Page 108 of (270)
Components
Thickness
Deformation modulus on the surface:
New Lines: Ev2 ≥ 120 MN/m²
Lower unbonded
bearing layer
Deformation modulus of the surface
New Lines: Ev2 ≥ 60 MN/m²
Improved
embankment
Ev2 ≥ 45 MN/m²
Improved subsoil
Densification of substructure,
eventually particular measures for
improvement, for example: lime,
cement, vibratory gravel columns etc;
Underground
The underground must be stable. The
expected deformations must be
balanced within the rail fastening
system.
Substructure must be compressed:
New Lines ≥ 3.0 m with a deformation
Upgraded Lines ≥ 2,5 m with deformation
modulus Dpr = 1,00 to 0,95.
0.50 m to 1.00 m
The requirements for the ballasted tracks are generally lower.
Awarded scores:
•
10 scores: for the NFF-Thyssen, because the forces are transferred to load bearing
layers in the underground; so the top layers must not be prepared.
•
8 scores: for the “Wide sleepers”, because of its low pressure being entered into the
ballast and subsequently into the subsoil.
•
7 scores: for the B 90 sleeper system, because the width of the sleeper is 320 mm,
compared to B 70, which is only 300 mm.
•
6 scores for the B 70 and B 450 sleeper systems.
•
2 scores: for the slab track systems, since these systems need a stable and firm
substructure.
Page 109 of (270)
Awarded weights:
The higher the speed and the load the more important is a stable substructure. For the scenario
B and C the axle loads will probably be low, because of possible separate lines for freight traffic.
•
Scenario A: 3
•
Scenario B: 2
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 3
1.3.3.4 Environmental parameters
► Airborne noise emissions
Rail vehicles produce at the contact area of wheel and rail airborne noise.
The size of the airborne noise is influenced, among others, by the surface condition of the track
bed. Generally a hard and smooth surface – such as it is a feature of a slab track – induces
higher noise emissions. A highly structured and broken surface – like the ballasted track –
however, absorbs part of the airborne sound, and thus reduces the airborne noise emissions.
In Germany, for example, in the federal emission regulation noise emission values are defined
for different types of tracks.
The ballasted track with wooden sleepers is thereby assigned a base value and the other types
of tracks are provided with a correction value to this base value. The ballasted track with
concrete sleepers therefore receives a correction of +2 dB (A) and the slab track of +5 dB (A) 24 .
Many solutions exist for the absorption of noise, so called noise absorber. They are laid on top
of the slab track and are trafficable.
Awarded scores:
•
8 scores: for the ballasted track systems except the Wide sleeper system.
•
7 scores: for the Nff-Thyssen system, because is relatively open surface.
•
4 scores: for the Wide sleeper system, because of their relatively closed surface.
•
2 scores: for the slab track systems, because of their closed surface.
Awarded weights:
•
Scenario A: 1; existing routes will most likely profit from right of continuance
•
Scenario B: 3; any upgraded line will have to take mitigation measures into
consideration.
•
Scenario C: 3; any upgraded line will have to take mitigation measures into
consideration.
•
Scenario D: 3, any new line will have to take mitigation measures into consideration.
► Structure borne noise emissions
In congested areas, the close vicinity of rail tracks to buildings and structures and thus to people
or sensitive facilities often leads to conflict in respect of the transmission of noise and vibrations.
Protection can be provided by the deployment of vibration isolation systems either to the source
or to the receiver. Regarding the first case, there are quite a number of techniques available.
24
Cp. [65] p. 23.
Page 110 of (270)
However, in many cases the best performances can be expected from low-tuned floating track
beds.
Noise and vibrations spread by rail tracks are mainly generated by the contact between wheels
and rails. In the long run rail corrugation and deformation of wheels are almost unavoidable. A
great deal of maintenance is required to keep the quality of the contacting surfaces within
acceptable limits. The periodical grinding of rails in long track sections within sensitive areas is
as expensive as the after-treatment of the wheels. Finally the application of other vibration
attenuation measures may be more practicable and cost saving. Quite a number of techniques
have been developed which differ significantly in efficiency and costs. Rail and baseplate pads
mainly provide elasticity to the track as especially required in the case of a slab track system
rather than reduce noise and vibration radiation. In this respect other systems like embedded
rails or ballast mats can be expected to be more effective but at a higher cost.
There is no doubt that the best performances in terms of vibration attenuation can be achieved
by floating track bed systems if they are well designed.
These mass-spring-systems (MSS) consist of floating slabs with the rails mounted on top.
The slabs are usually constructed of massive concrete. Together with the dead load of rails,
sleepers (if any) and fastenings (and the ballast, if any), they form dynamically active masses
which are isolated from the sub-structure by elastic mounts which may be of rubber, elastomeric
material or steel.
In order to construct effective MSS a concrete slab is needed to provide the basis. With such a
slab either so called “light”, “medium” or “heavy” mass-spring-systems can be constructed. The
kind of MSS depends on the purpose and will generally be designed on the basis of a special
survey.
The different possibilities are shown in the following table:
Table 29 Mass-spring-systems
Slab Track systems
Light MSS
Medium MSS
Heavy MSS
•
•
•
Baseplate pads
•
Rail pads
•
Embedded rails
•
Full-surface support by
Continuous rail support
by antivibration mats
•
Full-surface support by
antivibration mats
Point-like support of
heavy concrete slab
•
With elastomeric plats
•
With steel springs
•
Point-like support of
antivibration mats
Ballasted Track systems
•
Rail pads
•
Rail pads
•
Sub-ballast mats
•
Sub-ballast mats
•
Sleeper pads
•
Sleeper pads
•
Sleeper boots
•
Sleeper boots
•
Insertion plates for
•
Insertion plates for
sleeper boots
ballasted heavy concrete
trough
•
With elastomeric plats
•
With steel springs
sleeper boots
The above table shows that generally both systems can match the different purposes.
In the case of medium and heavy MSS it is obvious that a concrete slab is needed. This
requires height; in case of a ballasted track this means: additional height. The additional height
sums up to 25 cm or even more.
A slab track in order to fit the purpose of a MSS has only to be strengthened by reinforcement
or additional few centimetres in height.
Page 111 of (270)
Therefore slab track systems are much more suitable than ballasted track systems in case a
medium or a heavy MSS is required.
Awarded scores:
•
8 scores: for the embedded block systems and the embedded rail systems, because
these systems have got already an integrated resilient function.
•
6 scores: for the other slab track systems, except the NFF-Thyssen.
•
4 scores: for the NFF-Thyssen.
•
2 scores: for the ballasted track systems, because of their limited possibilities towards a
sound reduction of structure borne noise.
Awarded weights:
•
Scenario A: 1; existing routes will most likely profit from a “protection of the existing
situation”.
•
Scenario B: 3; any upgraded line will have to take mitigation measures into
consideration.
•
Scenario C: 3; any upgraded line will have to take mitigation measures into
consideration.
•
Scenario D: 3; any new line will have to take mitigation measures into consideration.
1.3.3.5 Service parameters
► Comfort Criteria
The different national railway technical guidelines established parameters for the design of the
alignment. For the selection of the parameters maximum, minimum and nominal values and
production values exist, which have to be met.
Following this values no disadvantages in terms of safety, comfort and maintenance are
expected. The planned and implemented parameters of the alignment exist only at the time of
initial operation of the track and represent the ideal state of the track. During operation, the
condition of the track deteriorates rapidly, which also decreases the comfort for passengers. A
variety of negative influences on the track position have to be answered for by different other
elements. But decisive influences on the track position arise from the superstructure.
The ballasted track requires intensive care in order to ensure a durable planned track position.
The higher the speeds driven and the axle loads are, the faster the deterioration of track
position, the more suffers the comfort 25 .
Slab track on the other hand ensures a good track position for long periods without any
maintenance. 26
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10 for the slab track system.
•
Minimum score: 7 for the B 90 and the Wide-/Y-sleeper; 6 scores for the B 70 sleepers
and 5 scores for the B 450 sleepers. Decisive is the weight.
25
Cp. [66] pp 20.
26
Cp. [62] p. 36.
Page 112 of (270)
Awarded weights:
The demands of the passengers for comfort increases with the speed.
•
Scenario A: 1
•
Scenario B: 1
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 3
1.3.3.6 Cost parameters
► Rehabilitation of existing tracks
Depending on the category of the planned railway line two possibilities for the construction
might occur:
•
the construction of a new line as a green-field project or,
•
the rehabilitation, modernisation or upgrading of an existing line.
The first case will normally not cause any problems; the substructure will be built according to
the required design parameters. The construction of every kind of track system is possible.
The second case is more complicated. Difficulties will be faced in areas with problematic
underground conditions. Usually it will not be possible to exchange or to improve the
underground up to the required depths without causing problems to the neighbouring track.
Due to these reasons reductions of the quality of the substructure will be inevitable. On the
other hand will this limit the use of slab track systems, because their requirements on the
stability of the substructures are high. Reference is also made to the before mentioned
parameters.
But also the use of ballasted tracks might cause problems, for instance if fine soil cannot be
exchanged and these fine soil particles are penetrating the ballast (so called „pumping“).
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 8 for the Wide sleepers; least requirements. 6 scores for the B 70 and
the B 450 sleepers and 5 scores for the B 90 sleepers. B 90 sleeper need a better
prepared substructure, at least theoretically.
•
Minimum score: 2 for the slab track systems; 1 for the NFF-Thyssen system.
Awarded weights:
•
Scenario A: 3, current railway policy is continued and this requires rehabilitation of the
existing tracks.
•
Scenario B: 3, offensive further development of current railway infrastructure needs
rehabilitation of existing track.
•
Scenario C: 1; will include special built lines or complete upgrading of a line thus with
renewed superstructure.
•
Scenario D: 1; mainly separate high speed lines.
► Vegetation
A cost-intensive factor is the elimination or reduction of plant cover. Undisturbed growth affects
the infrastructure; the resulting decomposition products – in the case of the ballasted track – fill
the cavities of the gravel bed, reduce the shear strength, affect the drainage and reduce the
frost resistance.
Page 113 of (270)
In the case of slab track, plant cover arises hardly, usually because of lack of space for
breeding ground. In addition, potential effects are harmless.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: 10 for the slab tracks, except the NFF-Thyssen.
•
Minimum score: 8 for the Wide sleeper system, because of the relatively closed surface.
6 scores for the NFF-Thyssen track and 4 scores for the other ballasted tracks. Decisive
is the kind of surface: is it more open or closed, rough or slick.
Awarded weights:
•
Scenario A: 1; considered as not essential.
•
Scenario B: 1; considered as not essential.
•
Scenario C: 2; for higher speeds this parameter becomes more important, since
vegetation can influence the stability of the track.
•
Scenario D: 2; for higher speeds this parameter becomes more important, since
vegetation can influence the stability of the track.
► Costs for maintenance of components
The measures for the ballasted track generally consist of cleaning or replacement of the ballast,
rail grinding and possibly replacement of single rail fasteners. Occasionally, an underground
rehabilitation will be required which restores the strength of the gravel or prevents the
penetration of fine particles into the gravel (soil replacement, installation of geotextiles).
Furthermore, measures to correct the track position and height are needed to restore the
planned alignment parameters.
The slab track will serve for many years without any restrictions [62]. The maintenance effort is
usually limited to rail grinding and possibly to the replacement of single rail fasteners.
Corrections in the track position and height that have to be made in the support bases are the
exception. Slab track systems with continuous support and elastic (em-) bedded rails (massspring systems) have less wear than rigid systems with discrete rail support.
In conclusion, it can be stated that the maintenance costs of ballasted tracks are much higher
than for slab track.
Awarded scores:
•
Maximum score: embedded continuous support scores highest, other slab track system
score from 9 to 8 depending on their elastic support.
•
Minimum score: for the ballasted tracks from 6 to 4 scores dependant on the stability of
the track system.
Awarded weights:
Maintenance costs have a high importance when higher investment costs are involved.
•
Scenario A: 2
•
Scenario B: 2
•
Scenario C: 3
•
Scenario D: 3
► Investment costs
The following figures shall serve as an overview and give an idea of the unit prices of the
different systems. For the track analysis in hand only qualitative price differences are relevant.
The price basis is the year 2010 of Western European countries. Reference is made to the so
Page 114 of (270)
called “Kostenkennwertekatalog”, which means catalogue with cost characteristic values, of the
Deutsche Bahn AG; to the “Track Compendium” by Bernhard Lichtberger and results from
tender submissions.
The unit price contains:
•
for ballasted systems the rail, the fastenings, the sleepers and the ballast;
•
for ballastless systems the rail, the fastenings, the discrete or longitudinal support
(monoblocksleepers, the bi-blocksleepers, the blocks) and the slab (concrete or asphalt).
The unit price amounts:
•
Ballasted track:
350.- ... 500.- Euro/m
•
Slab tracks:
800.- ... 1.000.- Euro/m
The actual unit price of a certain project is influenced by a wide variety of parameters. Some of
them might not be directly connected to the place of the specific project, the technical nature of
the project, the unit price of steel or concrete, the specific difficulties of the project (location,
seasons, the specific technology of the constructor) etc., but influenced by subjective
parameters like the situation of the market at a certain time, the workload of a company, the will
of a company to enter into a certain market etc.
Instead, the different systems will be evaluated by their components (price) and the technology
(time, manpower etc) which can be used to construct them.
After all, only the ranking of the superstructure systems is decisive.
These are the unit price influencing parameters with the delimitations from each other and the
explanations for the scoring:
•
The cheapest ballasted track system is the one with the B 450 sleeper, because least
concrete is used and the 2 concrete-blocks are not pre-tensioned. This means: 10
scores.
•
The production costs of the B90 sleepers are slightly higher than the B 70 sleeper,
because of the concrete volume and the weight. This results in 9 scores for the B 70 and
8 scores for the B 90 sleeper system.
•
The production costs of the Wide sleepers should be the most expensive of the ballasted
track system, because of the volume and weight. The sleepers are pre-tensioned. This
leads to 7 scores.
•
Regarding the slab track systems it is obvious that the NFF-Thyssen is the most
expensive, because of its special features. This means only 1 score.
•
Systems with supporting points and embedded sleepers [A] are “cast in situ” systems
with a heavy concrete slab and additional reinforcement.
•
Systems with supporting points with prefabricated blocks [B] are also “cast in situ”
systems, were the prefabricated blocks are embedded in a heavy concrete slab. The
slab is reinforced.
•
Systems with supporting points without sleepers on prefabricated slabs [C] are systems
were the prefabricated slabs are brought to the construction site and the gap between
the hydraulically bonded layer and the prefabricated slab is filled in situ by a special
grout. From system [A] to [B] / [C] there is an increasing degree of prefabrication and
mechanization and therefore the unit price should drop. This means: 2 for the system [A]
and 4 scores for [B] and [C].
•
Systems with supporting points with sleepers laid on top of asphalt layers should
generally be less expensive than the concrete slab systems, because asphalt is cheaper
Page 115 of (270)
than concrete (app. 50 %) and because of the high degree of automation by using
pavers. This results in 5 scores.
•
Continuous support on slab in U-like channel; this system is constructed in situ within
only two steps. In a first step the reinforced concrete slab with the U-like channel is
constructed. In a second step the rail is laid into the channel and embedded in a special
elastic compound mass. This results in 6 scores.
Awarded weights:
Investment costs getting less important when complete new lines are constructed:
•
Scenario A: 3
•
Scenario B: 3
•
Scenario C: 2
•
Scenario D: 2
► Construction time
The time for the construction of ballasted tracks is definitely shorter, because the requirements
on the substructure is less strong, no concrete work has to be carried out and the requirements
on the precision of the whole construction is less demanding.
Of course, the “New slab track” of the Thyssen type is very special and with its deep foundation
extremely time consuming.
On the other hand the prefabricated slab track systems are perfected and the construction
process is widely mechanized. The prefabricated slabs are installed within a just-in-time
process.
Awarded scores:
•
10 scores for the B 450 and the B 70 sleepers. 9 scores for the Wide sleepers because
of special adoptions regarding the machinery for the Wide and Y-sleepers. And 8 for
B 90 sleeper systems, because the construction time of the heavy B 90 sleepers will be
slightly higher.
•
7 scores for the prefabricated slabs.
•
6 scores for the asphalt layer system, because of the use of road pavers.
•
5 scores for the concrete slab systems.
•
2 scores for the NFF-Thyssen system, which is – of course – most complex.
Awarded weights:
•
Scenario A: 3; very important, because of reconstruction of existing lines. Downtime
must be kept low.
•
Scenario B:3
•
Scenario C:3
•
Scenario D: 2; new greenfield lines do not influence existing operation.
► Life cycle costs
Theory and calculations of life cycle costs are complex and differ a lot by author and by country.
Also the considered parameters itself differ as no standardised system exists.
Some results of various studies:
Page 116 of (270)
“Bringing objectivity into system decision between ballasted track and slab track at Deutsche
Bundesbahn” Rail Technical Review, 2-3 (2003): Comparing the business cases of both
systems in the narrow sense shows, that there are only very few cases involving the building of
new lines to carry extremely dense traffic, in which the slab track has a slight cash-value
advantage over ballasted tracks.
“Track Compendium” by Bernhard Lichtberger (2005): However, the final margin is nowhere
near enough – even for very optimistic estimations of increase in life time – to replace the
ballasted track by slab track on earth formation. This economic inefficiency is caused by the
substructure treatment required to a great depth and by the long track closures.
These results were obtained by taking into account not only the kind of superstructures but
whole projects; the structures, the substructure, the traffic profile, etc. The analysis within this
chapter evaluates the superstructures systems only independent of their actual location within a
certain line. Therefore a reliable evaluation of life-cycle costs is not possible and the parameter
has to be calculated and implemented in a later stage.
1.3.4 Analysis matrix
1.3.4.1 Methodology of the analysis
Objective of the task is to give recommendations on the appropriate superstructure for each of
the different scenarios A – D.
As already mentioned before, the recommendation is influenced by all the discussed decisionrelated parameters. All relevant parameters were described and discussed in the chapters
before. The relevance of the parameters with regard to a scenario has been weighted by a
factor.
The task is to bring the different superstructure systems and the parameters in a relation. As a
logic consequence this can be done within a two-dimensional evaluation matrix. The
methodology can be described by a point rating system or scoring-model. Hereby the scoring
value serves only a grading of the different alternatives in an ordinal scale. Thus it is not
feasible to state that an alternative with a value of 10 is twice as good as one with a value of 5.
► Description of Scores
In order to describe the suitability of the superstructure systems towards the evaluation
parameters and vice versa scores will be assigned. If a track system is with regard to the
described parameter more suitable the score will be higher.
The scores range from:
1 = suitability is very low; the parameter does not suit the superstructure system or vice versa;
10 = highest suitability; the parameter suits the superstructure system very well.
► Description of Weighting
Now the scenarios A – D have to be introduced, since it is obvious that not all evaluation
parameters are equally significant to the different scenarios. One parameter, for instance the
“speed”, is of course much more significant for High Speed Lines (= scenario D) than it is for
scenario A (where the current railway politics is being continued). These particularities are being
described by introducing weights for the significance of the evaluation parameter with regard to
the scenarios A – D. The more significance a certain evaluation parameter has for a scenario,
the higher will be the weight.
The weighting ranges from:
0 = not relevant; the parameter is not relevant for the specific scenario.
1 = low relevance; the parameter is of low relevance for the specific scenario.
Page 117 of (270)
2 = medial relevance; the parameter is of medial relevance for the specific scenario.
3 = strong relevance; the parameter is of strong relevance for the specific scenario.
Scores and weights will be multiplied for each of the evaluation parameters and summed up for
the different superstructure systems. The result is a scoring of the different track systems for
one scenario. Hence a comparison of scores from two different scenarios has no informative
value.
For instance: Taking a certain evaluation parameter, e.g.: speed; the weight of scenario D = 3
multiplied with the unweighted scores of the superstructures, for instance the embedded
sleepers (Rheda 2000) = 10, results in “weighted score” of 3*10 = 30.
The weighted scores for all discussed parameters are in the end summed up to compile an
overall qualitative ranking which is documented in total sum.
1.3.4.2 Results of track assessment
The summarised quantitative ordinal results of the evaluation parameters for the different
systems according to scenarios A–D are shown in the table. The matrix including all parameters
can be found as Annex 3 attached to this document.
Table 30: Scoring values of track solutions according to scenario A - D
Types of track
Examples
Scenario A
Rheda 2000
345
7
377
6
439
4
468
3
Bögl,
ÖBB-Porr,
Shinkansen
366
4
396
4
455
1
480
1
310
9
337
9
394
9
422
5
EBS-Edilon,
LVT
349
6
385
5
445
2
473
2
Getrac,
ATD
292
10
316
10
445
2
391
8
ERS-HRslab; embedded rails in
Edilon
U-like channels (SER)
341
8
371
7
425
5
452
4
B 450 Twin Block Sleeper (2.40m/245
kg)
391
3
401
3
396
8
378
10
B 90 Sleeper (2.60 m/340 kg)
414
2
423
2
421
6
407
6
NSB 95 Sleeper (2,60 m / 270 kg) /
B 70 Sleeper ( 2,60 m / 280 kg)
417
1
427
1
421
6
400
7
Wide sleepers (2,40m / 560kg) / YSteel-sleepers
355
5
358
8
379
10
385
9
Ballasted Track
Slab Track
embedded sleepers
(SES)
Supporting points,
without sleepers,
prefabricated slabs
(PS)
NFF
Thyssen
stakes (NFF)
prefabricated booted
blocks embedded in
slab (PBS)
asphalt layer (SA)
Scenario B
Scenario C
Scenario D
For scenario A and B a ballasted track with monoblock concrete sleepers, namely NSB 95 and
B 70 sleeper has a high ranking showing clear advantages for the project purpose.
Page 118 of (270)
For scenario C ballasted track systems and slab track systems are coming closer together in
the ranking but scoring of the slab track systems is higher.
Within scenario D the prefabricated slab track systems have the highest ranking and are under
consideration of the parameters discussed most advantageous.
1.3.4.3 Explanation of the results
The starting points for the achieved results are the weights for the different scenarios. Secondly
the scores for the parameters have to be checked. The results will be explained in the following
paragraph.
Scenario A and B ranking resulted in the general recommendation to make use of a ballasted
track system with NSB 95 or B 70 sleeper type. It should be mentioned that this track system
achieved more scores than the other ballasted tracks. The decisive parameters have been:
•
Flexibility in operation programme,
•
Maintainability i.e. repair after accidents/ damages,
•
Rehabilitation of existing tracks,
•
Time duration for exchange and maintenance of components for a single event,
•
Investment costs,
•
Construction time.
These parameters are advantageous for the track system and are summarising the strength.
Scenario C and D ranking resulted in in the general recommendation to make use of the
prefabricated slab track systems. The decisive parameters have been:
•
Lifetime,
•
Track availability,
•
Speed,
•
Load,
•
Lateral track resistance,
•
Suitability of permanent way for tilting trains,
•
Eddy-current brakes,
•
Comfort criteria,
•
Construction time
•
Life-cycle costs,
Page 119 of (270)
1.3.4.4 Sensitivity analysis
In order to derive stable and reliable results from a model, in this case the point rating system,
the sensibility of the calculation should be checked. This means, it has to be identified whether
small changes in the distribution of the scores or weights have a strong impact on the results.
Secondly, it has to be determined whether changes occur quickly and in which direction. In
other words it is tested how sensible the calculation reacts.
The scores and the weighting within the three dimensions of the table were changed in the
following way:
•
•
•
•
Table 1: Change in minimum scores:
o
Scores: max. scores fixed; the minimal scores were increased by 1-2 scores,
depending on the absolute figure.
o
Weighting: no changes.
Table 2: Change in maximum scores:
o
Scores: min. scores fixed; the maximal scores were decreased by 1-2 scores,
depending on the absolute figure.
o
Weighting: no changes.
Table 3: Change in minimum weight
o
Scores: no change
o
Weighting: the minimum weight (0=not relevant) will be changed to 1 = low
relevance.
Table 4: Change in maximum weight
o
Scores: no changes.
o
Weighting: the max. weight (3=strong relevance) will be changed to 2 = medial
relevance
Page 120 of (270)
Table 31: Results sensitivity analysis
Basic
Ballasted Track
Slab Track
Design types of track / slab track
Examples
Supporting points, with embedded
sleepers (SES)
Rheda 2000
Supporting points, without sleepers,
A
Scenario
B
C
D
Change in maximum
scores
Scenario
A
B
C
D
D
377
439
468
407
437
499
524
280
304
352
375
Bögl, ÖBB-Porr,
Shinkansen
366
396
455
480
426
454
514
537
292
315
361
380
Continuous support, on longitudinal
beams and stakes (NFF)
NFF Thyssen (New
slab track Thyssen)
310
337
394
422
370
394
454
478
250
269
313
335
Supporting points, with prefabricated
booted blocks embedded in slab (PBS)
EBS-Edilon, LVT
349
385
445
473
405
437
497
522
279
307
355
377
Supporting points, with sleepers, laid on
top of asphalt layer (SA)
Getrac, ATD
292
316
445
391
362
387
497
466
223
240
355
297
Continuous support, on slab; embedded
rails in U-like channels (SER)
ERS-HR-Edilon
341
371
425
452
401
429
485
509
277
300
343
365
B 450 Twin Block Sleeper (2,40m / 245 kg)
391
401
396
378
440
447
469
459
301
311
319
306
B 90 Sleeper (2,60 m / 340 kg)
414
423
421
407
453
461
488
484
314
323
337
329
NSB 95 Sleeper (2,60 m / 270 kg) / B 70 Sleeper ( 2,60 m /
280 kg)
417
427
421
400
462
468
490
477
324
334
342
327
Wide sleepers (2,40m / 560kg) / Y-Steel-sleepers
355
358
379
385
428
435
471
480
281
286
305
311
Slab Track
Table 2:
345
Basic
Ballasted Track
Table 1:
Change in minimum
scores
Scenario
A
B
C
Examples
sleepers (SES)
Rheda 2000
A
Scenario
B
C
D
Table 3:
Table 4:
Change in minimum
weight
Scenario
A
B
C
Change in maximum
weight
Scenario
A
B
C
D
D
345
377
439
468
365
387
439
468
282
312
370
361
Bögl, ÖBB-Porr,
Shinkansen
366
396
455
480
386
406
455
480
296
326
382
373
Continuous support, on longitudinal
beams and stakes (NFF)
NFF Thyssen (New
slab track Thyssen)
310
337
394
422
330
347
394
422
234
264
318
297
EBS-Edilon, LVT
349
385
445
473
369
395
445
473
279
311
368
359
Getrac, ATD
292
316
445
391
308
326
445
391
227
251
368
295
ERS-HR-Edilon
341
371
425
452
355
381
425
452
276
302
354
349
B 450 Twin Block Sleeper (2,40m / 245 kg)
391
401
396
378
382
391
392
374
287
313
326
299
B 90 Sleeper (2,60 m / 340 kg)
414
423
421
407
403
410
416
402
309
335
351
323
NSB 95 Sleeper (2,60 m / 270 kg) / B 70 Sleeper ( 2,60 m /
280 kg)
417
427
421
400
408
417
417
396
312
338
350
321
Wide sleepers (2,40m / 560kg) / Y-Steel-sleepers
355
358
379
385
369
370
385
389
280
301
328
308
The results for the scenarios A, B, C and D with regard to the quantitative ranking are stable
and did not change the ordinal values.
1.3.5 Recommendations of track system according to scenarios
It is recommended to use ballasted track systems of the light type (NSB 95/B 70 sleepers or
similar) for scenario A and B, because of:
•
flexibility in operation programme is high. Change of cant or relocation of switches can
be performed very easily,
•
repairs after an accident or damages on the superstructure are easy, the required time
and necessary costs are much lower compared to slab track systems,
•
airborne noise emissions are lower,
Page 121 of (270)
•
construction time is shorter,
•
time duration for exchange and maintenance of components is shorter compared to slab
track systems.
For scenario C the prefabricated slabs can be recommended based on the result of the point
rating system. Nevertheless, in the next phases planning within this scenario has to go into
more detail and should consider and evaluate both types of superstructure, slab tracks and
ballasted tracks. The reason is that the final decision of the recommended track system is
influenced by the corridor, the route, the operational programme etc. All related parameters
should be scored and evaluated for each corridor individually.
In case of scenario D, where a pure high-speed line is built, the recommendation is clearly a
slab track systems with prefabricated slabs. It has to be assessed which of the highest ranked
systems are best suited for different segments with the varying conditions of a corridor.
Reasons for this recommendation are:
•
lifetime will be much longer than compared to ballasted tracks,
•
track availability is outstanding,
•
behaviour with regard to speed and load is excellent,
•
lateral track resistance is much higher than with the conventional ballasted track,
•
eddy-current brakes match very much together with slab tracks, so rolling stock might be
equipped with them,
•
emissions of structure borne noise in combination with a slab track system will achieve
best results; if a mass-spring systems is selected.
The choice of a track system without ballast for a new HSL is often supported on the basis that
higher initial investments will be counterbalanced with the reduction of maintenance costs and
with greater track availability, which is the case for the Japanese network. Another situation
relates with the need to run a great amount of freight traffic during the night, like in the German
network. In these cases, maintenance operations are restrained by short periods of track
availability. Moreover, the circulation of freight vehicles leads to faster track deterioration. This
situation becomes more relevant if heavier axle loads are allowed. It may also be one of the
reasons why France and Spain continue to build new high-speed lines with ballast, because in
these countries there is almost a total segregation of the lines by traffic type. External
constraints and specific technical considerations of each project influence the choice between
ballasted and ballastless track.
For reasons given in chapter 1.3.3 (regarding parameters “tunnel” and “bridges”) tracks in
tunnel and on bridges should be equipped with slab track systems, since they produce more
advantages than the ballasted tracks. Consequently, in high-speed projects with greater
extension of track running on viaducts or in tunnels, the construction of ballastless track in these
sections will most certainly be more favourable.
The fact that leading countries on high-speed industry, such as France, continue to build
railways on ballast is the evidence that the choice between ballasted and ballastless track is not
consensual. The answer to that is not limited to a life-cycle costs analysis, but also requires the
consideration of many other parameters and specific elements of each project.
Some additional explanations and findings regarding the different track types are given in the
next paragraph.
Supporting points with embedded sleepers (SES): The characteristic feature is the monolithic in
situ construction. The disadvantage therefore compared with the prefabricated systems is the
inflexibility in case of exchange or maintenance. Additionally, a few cases occurred where the
prefabricated bi-block detached from the concrete slab and the dowels, which fixe the fastening
plate to the block, were unfastened.
Page 122 of (270)
Supporting points, without sleepers, prefabricated slabs (PS): Advantage of the system is the
prefabricated slab, which ensures short construction times and high quality.
NFF Thyssen slab track: This type is a very special application and suitable for poor soil
conditions.
Supporting points, with prefabricated booted blocks embedded in a slab (PBS): The main
feature of this system is the booted block embedded in a reinforced concrete slab. The
difference to the SES system is that the prefabricated block in the PBS system is jacketed by a
rubber boot. This ensures that the vibrations induced by the rail are absorbed and transmitted to
the reinforced concrete slab a homogeneous and smoothed way.
Supporting points, with sleepers, laid on top of an asphalt layer (SA): The most important
component of this system is the asphalt layer. It ensures relative elasticity and also a short
construction time, but the bearing capacity is limited. Asphalt layers cannot be reinforced. In the
long run, especially in combination with embankments, deformations, frost etc cracks might
occur. Generally, this system can not be recommended for Norwegian winter conditions.
Continuous support, on slab, embedded rails in U-like channels (SER): The highlight of these
systems is the usage of an elastic polymeric embedding compound, which fixes the rail within
the U-like channel. In this way the rail is supported continuously and conventional fastening
systems are not needed any more. Apart from that the track shows a very high lateral
resistance.
B 450 Twin Block Sleeper: This type of sleeper is quite light with the typical characteristic the
two blocks as support for the rails. Even so the lateral resistance is increased with the two
blocks, the overall stability is judged to be not convincing. Maintenance is enormous [67].
B 90 Sleeper : Are quite similar to the NSB 95 and B 70 sleeper type. Only difference is the
weight and the width of the bottom of the sleeper. These two parameters are slightly higher
compared to the two other sleepers. This gives the B 90 sleeper more stability and the pressure
induced to the ballast is lower. On the other hand side, the price is also higher. The main
applications are therefore mixed traffic with both high axle loads and high speeds.
NSB 95 Sleeper/B 70 Sleeper: These are the standard types in Norway and Germany and
therefore suitable for the standard conditions of scenario A and B.
Wide Sleeper/Y-Steel Sleeper: These two sleepers are quite new developments. Their field is
obviously the upgrading or renewal of existing lines, especially if the available width is small and
limited. Another field of applications are reconstructions of the substructure in areas with bad
soil conditions, since the Wide sleeper has a large undersurface.
► Some remarks for the further design phases:
The scope of this chapter was to investigate and asses different state-of-the-art superstructure
systems. In a second step parameters were described which are influencing the track systems.
The third step resulted in the scoring of the point rating system, where the superstructure
systems and the influencing parameters were linked and evaluated for their suitability.
Additionally the significance for the scenarios A – D was assessed. Result was to obtain a
ranking of the superstructure systems according to the scenarios.
However the track analysis was made without any reference to specific corridors with defined
requirements. This means, that in forthcoming design phases the evaluation matrix has to be
developed and applied with regard to specific corridors, lines and sections. Perhaps in a specific
section some parameters are not influencing the track system at all or there are additional which
might be introduced. Also the significance for a specific corridor or line might change.
Another task of the further design phases is to calculate investment costs and introduce them in
the decision matrix. Based on the approach in this analysis a track evaluation matrix for a costeffectiveness-analysis has been prepared for the phase 3.
Page 123 of (270)
1.4
Infrastructure concepts
1.4.1 Summary
Travel quality, comfort and investment costs of a railway line basically depend on the line
layout. The determination of the parameters for the alignment thus represents an elementary
basis for the success of every railway construction project.
Case studies of countries where tilting trains are operated are collected to educe the experience
of rail net providers and railway operators with tilting train infrastructure.
For the determination of the line layout the alignment parameters for both conventional railway
and tilting train operation have been assessed and described for three train service concepts.
Under consideration of thresholds for alignment parameters for an interoperable rail service
different European standards have been evaluated.
It is assessed that the decisive thresholds like cant, cant deficiency and gradient for the line
layout have been risen constantly. For both new and upgraded lines the layout could be
developed with a reduction of investment costs for tunnel and bridge structures. As a matter of
fact special thresholds of the alignment parameters for a pure HSR line with tilting train
operation obviously will lead to minimum investment cost for a speed maximum. However the
increase of the alignment thresholds causes operational limitations with regard to freight traffic.
Furthermore it implicates higher applied loads on the superstructure and can lead to a reduction
of travel comfort.
Experts from manufacturers, railway infrastructure providers and railway operators of ten
different countries have been interviewed in order to get an integrated view on tilting train
operations.
The case study shows that tilting train technology was developed to achieve increased speed
on existing lines without or only small upgrading investments. Mainly for countries or areas with
low population density and wide meshed railway networks these have been the decisive factors.
An example for an existing or planned special new tilting train line could not be found. However
Switzerland has chosen a renewal model by re-aligning two lines to implement tilting trains.
Objective was to reach a defined travel time. Also in the United States and Spain are taking
such re-alignments into account.
Cost effects could not be quantified as many countries are not compiling detailed data with
regard to tilting train operation as the delimitation of tilting bound effects from conventional
operation effects can not sufficiently differentiated.
Nevertheless qualitative result is that most important aspect for running a successful tilting train
network is to consider the strong interdependency of infrastructure, rolling stock and operational
concept. Only if all three fit together, a high profit tilting train operation can be achieved. This
includes the importance of alignment parameters such as cant, cant deficiency and lateral
acceleration.
To achieve benefits in travel time the curviness of a line has to be in an appropriate range for
the tilting system. Even though few tilting train exist which can reach a curve speed of up to
250 km/h (e.g. Alstom ETR 600) non of the interviewed railway operators is driving with these
high curve speeds. Italy is operating tilting trains with the highest curve speed of 200 km/h. The
Norwegian class 73 tilting train is operated up to 210 km/h. However rolling stock technology
could also be developed further to use tilting mechanism with higher speeds if the dedicated line
is designed to utilise fully alignment thresholds. If transverse forces are utilised to a maximum
track set has to be on a high quality level. Also travel comfort has to be considered carefully as
utilisation of these parameters can lead to motion sickness (Kinetose).
Page 124 of (270)
For the development of an existing railway network and for new lines alignment parameters
have to be determined taking into consideration the operational concept and a balanced costbenefit ratio over the life-cycle.
Based on today’s state-of-the-art line layouts can be designed with smaller curve radii and
higher gradients as they have been aligned in past decades. However for the determination of a
line the rail engineer has to take into consideration travel comfort and the forces acting on track
and rolling stock.
The use of limiting values for an alignment variant is reasonable. But it has to be considered
that the line layout with limiting values for the alignment is only one variant which has to be
compared to a line layout with standard values. Based on this the final optimal alignment
elements have to be decided in the specific line corridor.
1.4.2 Infrastructure concepts – Alignment parameters
The quality and the investment costs of a railway line basically depend on the line layout. The
determination of the parameters for the line layout thus represents an elementary basis for the
success of every railway construction project.
The requirements on the layout of a railway line vary in accordance with what the track is to be
used for.
To assess the alignment parameters, a study is made taking into consideration the following
variants:
1.4.2.1 Definition of variants
1.4.2.1.1 Variant 1: Dedicated high speed tracks
Variant 1 includes tracks built solely for high speed traffic. Freight traffic and regional passenger
services are run on the existing railway network. A uniform speed level and low train loads can
thus be assumed for these lines.
1.4.2.1.2 Variant 2: High speed tracks with regional passenger services
Variant 2 covers tracks used for high speed traffic as well as for regional passenger services.
Freight traffic takes place on the existing railway network. These lines are thus suitable for a
passenger transport system with two different levels of speed.
1.4.2.1.3 Variant 3: New line for mixed passenger and freight traffic
Variant 3 includes tracks used for conventional mixed passenger and freight traffic. The line
layout must therefore be designed for a broad level of speed and high train loads.
1.4.2.2 Alignment parameters
A set of basic requirements entitled “Technical specifications for interoperable railway traffic“
(TSI) has been defined for the European railways.
For the route alignment, only the main safety-relevant parameters for cant and cant deficiency
in curved tracks and points as well as the maximum longitudinal grades have been defined in
the TSI infrastructure.
To assess the TSI limit values, the main alignment parameters of the TSI are compared below
with the technical limit values of other standards.
Page 125 of (270)
1.4.2.2.1 Comparison of TSI / ENV / JBV/ other (DB AG / SNCF / RENFE) main alignment
parameters for conventional trains
In the subsequent text, the technical parameters of the following specifications or organizations
are compared:
TSI:
Technical Specifications for Interoperability
ENV 13803-1: European Norm, Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –
Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 1: Characterisation of track geometry
JBV:
Jernbaneverket, Norway
ÖBB:
Österreichische Bundesbahn, Austria
HL-AG:
Eisenbahn-Hochleistungsstrecken AG, Austria
DB AG:
Deutsche Bahn AG, Germany
SNCF:
Société Nationale des Chemins de fer français, France
RENFE:
Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles, Spain
► Cant (D) and Cant deficiency (I)
Cant and cant deficiency are the main parameters for determining the geometrical properties of
the line layout. The influences of the dynamics of vehicle movement are briefly described.
When travelling along a curved track, the centrifugal force has an influence on the
superstructure in addition to the vertical weight of the vehicle. The load on the superstructure
from the centrifugal force increases as a square in accordance with the formula F = M * V² / R
as the speed increases.
Where a cant exists and the resultant force of weight and centrifugal force act at right angles to
the plane of the track, the lateral acceleration can be compensated.
The compensated cant is calculated in accordance with the formula Do = 11.8 * V² / R.
Do = Compensated cant (mm); V = Speed (km/h); R = Radius (m)
For a speed of 120 km/h, a curve of 1’000 m results in a compensated cant of 170 mm.
As the cant of a track is limited, a cant of for example 70 mm is compensated by a cant
deficiency of 170 – 70 = 100 mm.
In the case of a cant deficiency of 100 mm, an uncompensated lateral acceleration of 0.65 m/s²
acts on the vehicle (aq = I * g / e).
aq = Uncompensated lateral acceleration at track level (m/s²); g = Gravitation (9.81 m/s²); e = Distance between wheel treads of an
axle (1’500 mm); I = Cant deficiency (mm)
For route alignment in the layout location diagram, the following dependencies between the
maximum permissible travel speed and the curve apply where the cant and cant deficiency are
limited:
R = 11.8 * V² / D + I
R = Radius ( m); V= Speed (km/h); D = Cant (mm); I = Cant deficiency (mm)
If the speed in a curve is to be increased without changing the radius, the cant and/or the cant
deficiency can thus be increased.
The table below compares the maximum permissible cant and cant deficiencies for tracks out of
various technical standards.
Since the TSI and the ENV (13803-1) as well as other technical standards define the speed
ranges differently, the limit values are assigned to the scenarios considered in this report. To
Page 126 of (270)
illustrate this, where limit cases exist, the nearest values of the respective standard are shown
to ensure uniformity of the table.
Table 32: Parameter comparison of different standards
D (mm)
I (mm)
Speed (km/h)
TSI
ENV 13803-1
160 < V < 200
160 < V < 250
250 < V < 350
TSI III
TSI II or III
TSI I
180
165
(130 Ballast / 150 Slab)
100 (80 V>300)
160 (Recommendation)
150 (Recom)
100 (Recom)
80 (Recom)
180 (Maximum)
165 (Max)
150 (Max)
(130 Ballast / 150 Slab)
JBV
150 (160)*
100 (130)
100 (130)
ÖBB (HL-AG)
160
100
DB AG
160 (Ballasted Track)
130
130
130
170 (Slab Track)
150
150
150
SNCF
180
100 (130)
100 (130)
85 (100) / 65 (85) V=350
RENFE
150
100 (65 v>300)
*existing tracks - plussmaterial
It can be seen from the table that the limit values of the TSI are at a very high level and in many
cases the technical standards of the railways are below these values.
The standards of the JBV and the ÖBB for high speed tracks are primarily designed for mixed
traffic in terrains with high topographical demands. The limit values have been carefully
selected, but inevitably result in a “more expensive line layout“ which can only be implemented
with a number of tunnels and bridge constructions in a topographically demanding terrain.
The required enlargement of the curve with increasing speed partly using the limit values is
shown below based on the example of R= 1’000.
Lower limit values (ENV / ÖBB / JBV)
Table 33: Lower limit values (ENV / ÖBB / JBV)
V (km/h)
D (mm)
I (mm)
min R (m)
120
70
100
1000
140
130
100
1006
160
150
100
1208
200
150
100
1888
250
150
100
2950
TSI limit value
Table 34: TSI limit value
V (km/h)
D (mm)
I (mm)
min R (m)
140
130
100
1006
160
170
130
1007
200
180
165
1368
250
180
130
2379
300
180
80
4085
Page 127 of (270)
► Gradient (G)
The following is a comparison of the maximum permissible route gradients taken from the
various technical standards.
Table 35: Comparison of the maximum permissible route gradients
max. G (‰)
TSI
35 (max. 6 km) / 25 (max. 10 km)
ENV 13803-1
-
JBV
12.5 (25 exceptional case)
ÖBB (HL-AG)
8
DB AG
12.5 (40 exceptional case)
SNCF
35
RENFE
12.5 (25)
Station tracks (TSI)
2.5
A route alignment according to TSI limit values appears convincing. Using minimum radii and
maximum route gradients, the number of tunnel and bridge constructions can be kept to a
minimum in a topographically demanding terrain. However, it is necessary to note the following
effects.
► Uncompensated lateral acceleration (aq)
If the cant deficiency is increased from 100 mm to 130 mm, the uncompensated lateral
acceleration increases from 0.65 m/s² to 0.85 m/s². Following an increase from 100 mm to
165 mm, the lateral acceleration increases from 0.65 m/s² to 1.08 m/s²! Hereby, the maximum
cant deficiency / uncompensated lateral acceleration refers to track level not to floor level inside.
The lateral acceleration acts directly as a horizontal force on the passenger and the track
superstructure. In a number of standards the uncompensated lateral acceleration is limited to
1.00 m/s² (corresponds to I = 150mm). The 1.08 m/s² in the case of I = 165 mm should be
regarded as the maximum limit value.
► Cant excess (E)
The cant excess limit values limit the gradient accelerating forces, i.e. the load on the inner
curve rail in the case of rails with a very high excess, for routes with passenger and freight
traffic.
In the TSI there are no limit values defined for cant excess. The ENV recommends a cant
excess of max. 110 mm with an upper limit of 130 mm. The ÖBB has limited the cant excess to
85 mm. JBV has limited the cant excess to 90 mm (R<600 m) resp. 110 mm (R>600 m).
Determination of the cant excess for freight trains with max. 80 or 100 km/h with reference to
radii for route alignment limit values correspond to TSI.
Table 36: Cant excess depending on speed
V (km/h)
D (mm)
R (m)
E (mm)
80
130
1006
55
80
170
1007
95
80
180
1368
125
80
180
2379
148
100
130
1006
13
100
170
1007
53
100
180
1368
94
100
180
2379
130
300
km/h
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
0
Figure 49: Acceleration and braking curve with line profile 2.5 % gradient over a distance of 10 km
0,9
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,2
0,2
13,3 stat 2
12,4 km 49
12,0 km 48
11,8 km 47
11,5 km 46
11,3 km 45
11,1 km 44
10,9 km 43
10,7 km 42
10,5 km 41
10,3 km 40
Tfz. GEC.TGV-A25; 300 km/h; Last=0 t; Länge=238 m;
Brh=200 %; Brs=R; Zuschlag linear=3 %; Lastzuschlag=0 %
0,2
km 38
km 37
km 36
km 35
km 34
km 33
km 32
km 31
km 30
km 29
km 28
km 27
km 26
km 25
km 24
km 23
km 22
km 21
km 20
km 19
km 18
km 17
km 16
km 15
km 14
km 13
km 12
km 11
km 10
km 09
km 08
km 07
km 06
km 05
km 04
km 03
km 02
10,1 km 39
9,8
9,6
9,4
9,2
8,9
8,7
8,5
8,2
8,0
7,8
7,6
7,4
7,1
6,9
6,7
6,5
6,3
6,1
5,9
5,7
5,5
5,3
5,1
4,9
4,7
4,5
4,2
4,0
3,8
3,5
3,3
3,0
2,8
2,5
2,2
1,9
1,5
km 01
stat 1
0,9
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,3
0,3
0,3
0,3
0,3
0,4
0,5
km39
km38
km37
km36
km35
km34
km33
km32
km31
km30
km29
km28
km27
km26
km25
km24
km23
km22
km21
km20
km19
km18
km17
km16
km15
km14
km13
km12
km11
km10
km09
km08
km07
km06
km05
km04
km03
km02
km01
stat 1
13,0 stat 2
12,2 km49
11,8 km48
11,5 km47
11,3 km46
11,1 km45
10,9 km44
10,6 km43
10,4 km42
10,2 km41
10,0 km40
9,8
9,6
9,4
9,2
9,0
8,8
8,6
8,4
8,2
8,0
7,8
7,6
7,4
7,1
6,9
6,7
6,5
6,3
6,1
5,9
5,7
5,5
5,3
5,1
4,9
4,7
4,5
4,2
4,0
3,8
3,5
3,3
3,0
2,8
2,5
2,2
1,9
1,5
1,0
min
0,0
1,0
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,3
0,3
0,3
0,3
0,3
0,4
0,5
1,0
min
0,0
1,0
Page 128 of (270)
In the case of large excesses it can be seen from the table that use of the tracks for mixed
traffic would have to be avoided or excluded.
► Effect of gradient on the capacity of the route
The speed/distance charts below show the effect of route gradient on high speed trains (TGVA25) in relation to different gradients.
theor. Energiebedarf: 1193 kW h
mittl. Energiebedarf: 23,9 W h/m
300
km/h
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
-10
0
Page 129 of (270)
13,3 stat 2
12,4 km 49
0,9
11,7 km 47
11,5 km 46
11,3 km 45
12,0 km 48
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,2
10,9 km 43
10,7 km 42
10,5 km 41
11,1 km 44
0,2
0,2
0,2
0,2
10,3 km 40
0,2
km 38
km 37
10,1 km 39
0,2
0,2
0,2
9,9
km 36
9,7
km 35
9,4
0,2
km 34
9,2
0,2
km 33
9,0
0,2
0,2
km 32
8,8
km 31
8,5
0,2
km 30
8,3
0,2
km 29
8,1
0,2
0,2
km 28
7,8
km 27
7,6
0,2
km 26
7,4
0,2
km 25
7,2
0,2
0,2
km 24
6,9
km 23
6,7
0,2
km 22
6,5
0,2
km 21
6,3
0,2
0,2
km 20
6,1
km 19
5,9
0,2
km 18
5,7
0,2
km 17
5,5
0,2
0,2
km 16
5,3
km 15
5,1
0,2
km 14
4,9
0,2
km 13
4,7
0,2
0,2
km 12
4,5
km 11
4,2
0,2
km 10
4,0
0,2
km 09
3,8
0,2
0,2
km 08
3,5
km 07
3,3
0,2
km 06
3,0
0,3
km 05
2,8
0,3
0,3
km 04
2,5
km 03
2,2
0,3
km 02
1,9
0,3
1,5
0,4
0,5
1,0
1,0
min
0,0
stat 1
km 01
300
km/h
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
14,2 stat 2
0,9
13,3 km 49
13,0 km 48
0,4
12,7 km 47
0,3
12,4 km 46
0,2
0,2
12,2 km 45
12,0 km 44
0,2
11,8 km 43
0,2
11,6 km 42
0,2
0,2
11,4 km 41
11,2 km 40
0,2
11,0 km 39
0,2
10,8 km 38
0,2
0,2
10,6 km 37
0,2
10,4 km 36
10,1 km 35
0,2
km 34
9,9
0,2
km 33
9,7
0,2
km 32
9,5
0,2
km 31
9,3
0,2
km 30
9,0
0,2
km 29
8,8
0,2
km 28
8,6
0,2
km 27
8,4
0,2
km 26
8,2
0,2
km 25
7,9
0,2
km 24
7,7
0,2
km 23
7,5
0,2
km 22
7,2
0,2
km 21
7,0
0,2
km 20
6,8
0,2
km 19
6,5
0,2
km 18
6,3
0,2
km 17
6,0
0,2
km 16
5,8
0,2
km 15
5,6
0,2
km 14
5,3
0,3
km 13
5,0
0,3
km 12
4,8
0,3
km 11
4,5
0,3
km 10
4,2
0,3
km 09
4,0
0,3
km 08
3,7
0,3
km 07
3,4
0,3
km 06
3,1
0,3
0,3
km 05
theor. Energiebedarf: 1557 kWh
mittl. Energiebedarf: 31,1 Wh/m
2,8
km 04
2,4
0,3
km 03
2,1
0,4
km 02
1,6
0,4
km 01
1,1
0,5
stat 1
1,1
min
0,0
300
km/h
280
260
240
220
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
440
400
360
320
280
240
200
160
120
80
40
0
Figure 51: Acceleration and braking curve with line profile 1.25 % gradient in the start zone
The speed/distance charts show that route gradients in the TSI limit range can lead to clear
drops in speed. In the case of a route gradient of 1.25 % in the start zone, it is hardly possible to
reach the maximum speed.
In addition to the main alignment parameters, a number of alignment rules must be met with
regard to transition curve, minimum lengths of the route elements, point geometry, transition
from one gradient to another etc.
Page 130 of (270)
Almost every railway company has established its own rules for these alignment elements.
In addition to the above-mentioned main alignment parameters, the following alignment
elements have been taken into consideration for the analysis matrix:
► Length of transition curve (L)
Different types of calculation have been used in the standards to determine length of the the
transition curve.
The limit values are between
L = 5.5 * V * D / 1’000 (rate of rise = 50 mm/s)
ENV
JBV / DB AG (max.)
DB AG / ÖBB / JBV (reg)
► Length of alignment elements - straights and curve – (Li)
0.40 * V
DB AG
0.50 * V
ENV (max.) / JBV
0.70 * V
ÖBB / ENV (rec)
► Radius of vertical curve (Rv)
0.35 * V²
ENV
0.40 * V²
JBV / DB AG
0.60 * V²
ÖBB
1.4.2.2.2 Limits to alignment parameters for tilting trains
In the TSI there are no special alignment parameters or exceptions to limit values for tilting
trains.
In the ENV 13803 the following limit values for cant and cant excess are described according to
an assessment of the current rules of the various railway organisations.
Maximum cant:
150 to 160 mm
Maximum cant deficiency:
275 to 300 mm
On the basis of the above-mentioned example, the possible speed in a curve of 1’000 m is
investigated with different limit values.
Table 37: Possible speeds in curves R = 1’000 m
D (mm)
I (mm)
R (m)
V (km/h)
150
275
1’000
189.8
160
275
1’000
192.0
150
300
1’000
195.3
160
300
1’000
197.4
Limits of alignmenment parameters for R = 1’000 m for conventionnel train operation is shown
in Table 33 and Table 34.
The speed of 140 or max. 160 km/h for conventional trains at R = 1’000 m can be increased for
tilting trains up to 190 km/h.
Page 131 of (270)
For the length of transition curves (L) it should be aimed to design L = 10.0 * V * D / 1’000. A
maximum threshold of L = 6.0 * V * D / 1’000 should only be used for straight ramps.
In the case of these large increases in speed it must be remembered, however, that the
centrifugal forces, e.g. for an increase in speed from 140 km/h to 190 km/h (36 %) in a curve of
1’000 m, increase by approx. 84 %. To prevent the maximum total loads on the superstructure
exceeding the loads from conventional operation, the axle loads of the tilting trains should be
limited to 160kN.
Tilting trains are operated today for maximum curve speeds of 200 km/h up to 210 km/h (e.g.
Italy and Norway).
In the case of a maximum rail cant of 150 mm and a maximum cant deficiency of 275 mm, a
speed of 230 km/h can be reached in a radius of 1’465 m. For conventional trains it is possible
to travel along this radius at approx. 185 km/h with a cant deficiency of 130 mm. A freight train
travelling at 80 km/h would have a cant excess of 98 mm.
1.4.2.3 Analysis matrix
1.4.2.3.1 Methodology of the analysis
The descriptions of the alignment parameters indicate that a route study with alignment
parameters in the TSI limit range can lead to considerable savings in costs.
However, the cost savings are obtained at the expense of operational performance, ride quality
and load on the superstructure.
An analysis of the above-mentioned alignment elements for all variants in a table does not
produce a clear result because of the many combinations.
The limit values of the alignment parameters are assessed individually below for the different
variants according to their effect on alignment, taking into consideration the superstructure load
and the ride quality. The examples are explained with reference to the alignment parameters
“cant deficiency (I)“ and “cant (D)“.
► Variant 1
In the speed range exceeding 250 km/h the cant excess is limited to between 0 and 80 mm. In
the case of a cant deficiency I=0 the maximum ride quality and the lowest load on the
superstructure result from the compensated cant (no horizontal forces). For the alignment,
however, even with large cants I=0, a rigid system results with extremely large radii as a result
of R = 11.8 * V² / D max.
► Variant 2
For the speed range up to 250 km/h a maximum cant excess of 165 mm is permitted. In the
case of a cant excess of 165 mm the maximum limits are used for the uncompensated lateral
acceleration which lead to the maximum horizontal forces on the passengers and on the
superstructure. For the alignment, high speeds result with minimum possible radii
(R min = 11.8 *V² / I max + D max) in combination with the maximum permissible cant.
► Variant 3
For mixed traffic, limits are set for the cant and cant excess which must simultaneously meet the
requirements for slow freight and high speed passenger services. These have advantages for
comfort criteria and superstructure load, but have a negative effect on the alignment.
Taking 160 km/h as an example, the limit values for the minimum possible track radii are
calculated as follows:
•
V = 160 km/h, D = 180mm, I = 0 mm, R = 1’678 m
•
V = 160 km/h, D = 180mm, I = 80 mm, R = 1’162 m
Page 132 of (270)
•
V = 160 km/h, D = 180mm, I = 165 mm, R = 876 m
•
V = 160 km/h, D = 150 mm, I = 130 mm, R = 1’079 m
Variant 1: Pure high speed tracks 250 < v < 350
Variant 2: High speed tracks with regional passenger service 160 < v < 250
Page 133 of (270)
Variant 3: New line for mixed passenger and freight traffic v < 160 km/h
1.4.2.3.2 Interaction between alignment parameters and scenarios
In the course of the study the four scenarios were developed while the analysis of the alignment
parameters was coupled to the three defined variants. Therefore the four scenarios and the
variants of the alignment have to be connected:
•
Scenario A: Further use of the existing track at v < 160 km/h
•
Scenario B: Minor adaptation of the existing track for speeds up to 200 km/h
•
Scenario C: Expansion of the existing track for speeds of 200 - 250 km/h
•
Scenario D: New line for speeds of 250 - 350 km/h.
Since it is very difficult to combine the operation of freight and high speed services, variant 1
would equate to scenario D.
With respect to the above-mentioned criteria, variant 2 should be used for scenario C.
Variant 3 apply to scenarios A and B.
1.4.2.3.3 Explanation of the results
It can be seen in the diagrams that the maximum alignment advantages result in variant 2.
In pure high speed services with speeds of > 250 km/h the route study is characterised by a
markedly reduced cant deficiency.
In mixed traffic the cant, making simultaneous allowance for cant excess for the slow freight
service, the cant deficiency and in particular the route gradient set the limits for the railway
layout.
The limit values for the element lengths of straight tracks and curves are practically pure
comfort criteria. In designing the transition curves the short element lengths lead to
considerable advantages in the alignment particularly in the case of reverse curves (S curves).
Page 134 of (270)
The limits for the route gradient are of great importance for the efficiency of the line.
To summarise it must be said that for high speed trains with limitation of the alignment
parameters as seen from a travel-dynamic point of view a layout in a terrain posing high
topographical demands is only possible with a number of way structures.
Given that the “high speed level“ is limited to 200 - 250 km/h it is possible to design a technically
and economically balanced railway layout with the maximum permissible alignment parameters
for radii in excess of approx. 2’000 m.
However, the use of extreme cants excludes mixed traffic (passenger and freight services).
An overview of the different main parameters in combination with the scenarios A-D and their
concerns to tilting and non tilting train operation is shown in Annex 4.
1.4.2.4 Effects of alignment parameters on structures, safety and control equipment
Existing technical standards include in part exclusion criteria for the construction of bridges in
curves, changes in gradient/ vertical radii on bridges etc. It was necessary to adapt the layout of
the railway line to the limits of the building construction.
On the basis of the standard/ possible bridge constructions today, the buildings can be largely
adapted to the layout of the railway line. Regardless of this, the rail layout should make
allowance for basic requirements such as gradients in tunnels with respect to safety and
economic viability.
Planning parameters for inter-track spacing and point geometry/ point arrangement are largely
dependent on speed and widely influenced by tunnel and bridge constructions. In stations,
allowance must be made for minimum radii and maximum track gradients when designing
platforms as well as for locations and visibility of signalling systems.
With regard to the definition of the railway layout parameters for alignment, these planning
details are still neglected. Details of the planning fundamentals should be established in the
next planning steps.
1.4.2.5 Recommendations regarding the appropriate alignment parameters in relation to
scenarios and conventional / tilting train operation
The explanations and examples of alignment parameters described above illustrate the
alignment limits and their effects on the travel quality and load on the track superstructure.
The experience gained from planning projects shows that the starting point for determining the
railway layout is often the calculation of the limit radii and thus the design of the route.
It is therefore advisable to define alignment parameters that permit a “balanced layout“ and only
in extreme cases make provision for the use of limit values.
The example below illustrates the different characteristics for a curve designed for travelling at
200 km/h.
Table 38: Illustration of different characteristics for curves at 200 km/h
R (m)
1’400
D (mm)
lc (m)
Delta lc (m)
re (m)
Delta re (m)
460
7
1’400
20
704
23
1’400
30
949
51
1’400
40
1’193
91
1’400
50
1’437
146
10
459
-1
7
0
20
738
34
26
3
1’600
150
157
alpha (deg)
10
1’600
180
I (mm)
145
Page 135 of (270)
R (m)
D (mm)
I (mm)
alpha (deg)
lc (m)
Delta lc (m)
re (m)
Delta re (m)
1’600
30
1’017
69
57
6
1’600
40
1’296
104
104
13
1’600
50
1’576
138
166
21
10
511
51
8
1
1’900
20
843
138
30
7
1’900
30
1’174
226
68
17
1’900
40
1’506
313
123
32
1’900
50
1’837
400
197
54
10
522
62
9
2
2’100
20
889
184
33
10
2’100
30
1’255
306
75
24
2’100
40
1’621
428
135
44
2’100
50
1’988
551
218
75
1’900
2’100
150
130
98
95
Alpha = Change of direction (Degrees); lc = Length of curve (circular curve and transition curves); re = Retraction of tangent
intersection to curve; Delta lc / re = Difference of length or retraction in relation to Radius 1’400m
In the diagrams below the radii are shown to a scale of 1:5’000 from the table for change of
direction of 20, 30 and 40 degrees.
Even to this scale which is very detailed for preliminary planning it is hardly possible to show
axle shifts for small changes of direction.
Figure 55: Radii to a scale of 1:5’000 from the table for change of direction of 20, 30 and 40 degrees
It can be seen from the example that an alignment with curves exceeding the limit radii and
clearly more comfortable alignment parameters with small changes of direction only leads to
Page 136 of (270)
relatively small changes of position. In a preliminary plan for the layout of the railway line to a
scale of 1: 25’000 it is almost impossible to view position changes of less than 25 m.
The differences in length of the curves are admittedly clear but inevitably lead to a “curved”
layout in the alignment.
Since the preliminary plan normally consists in defining the layout of the railway line for the
subsequent planning phases and is fundamentally used in the further phases it is advisable to
work initially with “comfortable parameters“ and first use higher values at the detailed planning
stage for route obstacle solutions.
Taking all the above explanations into consideration, limit values for the alignment parameters
are recommended below.
Use of the limit values in brackets is left to the planner’s discretion but they should be used for
investigating route obstacles starting at the project planning stage.
► Conventional – non tilting – Trains
V = Speed (km/h); D = Cant (mm); E = Cant excess (mm); I = Cant deficiency (mm); L = Length of transition curve (m); Li = Length
of alignment elements - straight and curves - (m); G = Gradient (%); Rv = Radius of vertical curve (m)
Figure 56: Recommendation of alignment parameters for conventional (non tilting) trains
► Tilting Trains
Not recomm.
V = Speed (km/h); D = Cant (mm); E = Cant excess (mm); I = Cant deficiency (mm); L = Length of transition curve (m);
Li = Length of alignment elements - straight and curves - (m); G = Gradient (%); Rv = Radius of vertical curve (m);
Figure 57: Recommendation of alignment parameters for tilting trains
Page 137 of (270)
1.4.3 Infrastructure Concepts - Case Studies tilting train
1.4.3.1 Scope and objective of the survey
Objective of the tilting train case studies is to gain an overview of the worldwide use of tilting
trains which could be relevant for the decision of future High Speed Rail development in
Norway. A basis of themes concerning the use of tilting trains in the categories of infrastructure,
operation, vehicles and economics should be covered.
Therefore the countries with the most important tilting train operation have been studied and
technical as well as strategic data was collected.
This is done by literature studies and most important by direct interviews with railway experts of
each country.
The interviews were held in the form of semi structured interviews, taking into account the
expertise of each interviewed. The interviews were carried out as face-to-face or telephone
interviews.
The questionnaire was elaborated with support of the whole project team. Thus a broad basis of
competence was given.
The main topics of the questionnaire have been
•
Infrastructure
•
Rolling Stock
•
Background Information
Before the interviews started the questionnaire was cleared with Jernbaneverket.
During the interviews some points emerged to be difficult:
Cost-benefit analyses on the use of tilting trains are rare and normally not accessible to the
study. This applies to wear and maintenance cost too. The available data in literature
respectively given by interview partners about the economical benefits of introducing tilting
trains instead of re-location of a line are very poor. Often these comparative assessments do
not exist or are for internal company use only.
The information has been collected amongst others in interviews with the following
organisations:
► Finland:
•
VR Group Ltd/VR Engineering Head of division and Oy Karelian Trains Ltd
•
Pöyry Finland Railway department
► Germany:
•
DB Competence centre tilting trains
•
DB Netz Infrastructure Planning
► Great Britain:
•
Interfleet Technology Railway department
► Italy:
•
FS Rete Ferroviaria Italiana in combination with FS Trenitalia
► Norway:
•
JBV Passenger traffic (Persontrafikk)
Page 138 of (270)
•
National Rail Administration of Norway, Planning and Development (JBV, Plan og
utvikling)
•
JBV Passenger traffic, planning and route plans (Persontog Plan)
► Portugal:
•
CP-Rolling stock Alfa Pendular
•
REFER Communications department (Infrastructure company)
► Spain:
•
ADIF (Infrastructure Company) and Ineco (Infrastructure planning department) in
combination with Renfe Division Rolling Stock
► Sweden:
•
SJ AB Division Rolling Stock and Division Business Development
•
Banverket
► Switzerland:
•
SBB Infrastructure Department for infrastructure planning and interoperability
•
SBB Passenger traffic Department for Rolling stock
► USA:
•
Volpe National Transportation Systems Centre (Part of US Ministry of Transportation;
Planning and Research Centre for Railway Systems in USA) in combination with Amtrak
1.4.3.2 Tilting train concepts
The way tilting train operation has developed is country specific. This results in different
technical, operational and infrastructural solutions. The chapter gives an overview on the main
tilting train trends to provide a clearer understanding of the following national descriptions.
1.4.3.2.1 Use of tilting trains
The use of tilting trains is a relatively new kind of railway operation. When introduced the railway
network was already well developed in most countries but often had the drawback that it was
designed for lower speeds than with current rolling stock achievable.
Three main technical reasons can be found for the introduction of tilting trains:
•
Increased speed
•
Increased passenger comfort
•
Reduction of infrastructure cost on new lines
In most countries the reason for the start of tilting train operation was to increase speed on
existing (old) lines with preferably low infrastructure adaptations. Sometimes additionally a gain
of passenger comfort is also welcome.
The third point “Reduction of infrastructure cost on new lines” is imaginable if new lines are
planned in difficult terrain. At the same design velocity the alignment parameters of a tilting train
track allow narrower curves and thus a better adaption to the landscape than conventional
alignment parameters.
Page 139 of (270)
1.4.3.2.1.1 Increased speed
Tilting of trains gives the only possibility of increasing speed on existing lines with narrow curves
without expensive re-alignment of the track. The speed limit of trains is normally bound to the
passenger comfort criterion which limits the maximal lateral forces on a passenger.
The realizable gain of travel time depends on multiple points in the fields of infrastructure, type
of train and operation. For example:
•
The infrastructure should have curves with adequate radiuses. This means radiuses in a
similar range and of notable number. The radius should be narrow enough to allow
higher speeds than for conventional trains. Furthermore the allowed lateral forces have
influence on the gain of travel time.
•
The infrastructure should be of good quality to meet the higher lateral forces.
Discontinuities in curves like turnouts or level crossings should be avoided.
•
Depending on the tilting system of the train different tilting angles can be realized.
•
The reliability of the tilting system (and the whole tilting train) should be high to avoid
delays due to failures in the tilting system.
•
The higher speed of tilting trains can cause operational problems due to higher speed
differences between the trains. This can cause capacity problems.
For these reasons the gain of travel time with tilting trains can not be given in general. In some
special cases reductions up to 30 % can be reached
1.4.3.2.1.2 Increased comfort
Another possibility to use tilting trains is to increase the passenger comfort while the train
rounds a curve due to reduced lateral accelerations. This type of tilting is sometimes used in
sleeping cars. Deutsche Bahn used it for example in their passive tilted “DB-Nachtzug”, a Talgo
based trainset used between 1994 and 2009.
Often tilting trains have a speed limit up to which they can use tilting for increased speed. In
Germany and Switzerland for example this limit is 160 km/h. Often these limits are bound to the
capabilities of signalling systems. Beyond the limits a cab signalling system could be needed for
example and it would not be efficient to adapt such a system to tilting trains. In these cases
tilting is used at higher speed too but only for comfort reasons.
1.4.3.2.2 Rolling stock
During the last decades mainly two types of tilting systems have been implemented, a third is in
development.
1. Active tilting
2. Passive tilting
3. Wako (in development)
The active tilting system uses electromechanical or hydraulic systems to tilt the car body (see
Figure 58). Most trains in use with this system have tilting angles up to 8°. Active tilting needs
control equipment to operate the tilting system. Compared to the other tilting systems this
system can achieve the highest gain of speed but is also technical ambitious.
Page 140 of (270)
Figure 58: Active tilting system type Pendolino 27
Passive tilting uses the lateral forces when running through a curve to tilt the body by centrifugal
forces (see Figure 59). The most common trains of this type are the “Talgo” trains. The tilting
angle normally can not exceed 3.5°. This leads to a smaller realizable gain of speed compared
to active systems
Figure 59: Passive tilting system type Talgo 28
The third system is the Wako-System which is currently under development (see Figure 60).
This system tries to compensate the natural roll movement of the car body, integrated into the
secondary suspension. It is integrated within the bogie and independent of the body structure.
The first operator will be the SBB in Switzerland. “Wako” is an abbreviation for the German
“Wankkompensation” which means compensation of the roll movement.
27
Source Alstom.
28
Source Talgo.
Page 141 of (270)
Figure 60: Wako tilting system/bogie 29
1.4.3.2.3 Infrastructure
Tilting trains can be used for different infrastructure strategies.
•
Speed optimization on existing lines without expensive infrastructure cost
•
Cost reduction on new built lines due to better adaption at the landscape (narrower
curves at same speed)
•
To achieve travel time goals on existing lines eventually with selective alignment
upgrades.
Important to the benefits of tilting train operation is the configuration of alignment parameters for
tilting trains.
On track level the allowed lateral acceleration can limit the use of tilting operation.
Another restriction can be “discontinuities”. These are elements within the track which do not
allow increased speed compared to conventional trains. Examples are turnouts or level
crossings. These discontinuities only exist in some countries. In the USA for example they do
not lead to speed reductions.
Maintenance of the track is normally increased when tilting trains are introduced. The higher
lateral forces on the track need a good quality of position and level of the track. In some cases
this leads to a double number of track inspections. The wear rate can be increased due to tilting
train operation.
1.4.3.2.4 Operation
If tilting is used for increased speed in most cases the signalling system has to be upgraded. As
tilting trains pass signals at higher speed than allowed for conventional trains an exception case
has to be implemented or a signalling system has to be installed that is capable to operate with
different braking distances.
Scheduling of tilting trains can be a problem for two reasons:
•
29
Speed differences between the different trains on a line grow. As a result the capacity
decreases due to higher gaps necessary between the trains.
Source Bombardier.
Page 142 of (270)
•
Reliability of the tilting trains can be a problem which gives instability to the overall
timetable when tilting trains can not run with (the scheduled) increased speed. This is
observed in some cases.
Figure 61: Icy bogie due to winter conditions 30
Winter conditions can cause reduced reliability of tilting trains due to iced tilting systems. This
can lead to reduced speed or complete train breakdowns.
1.4.3.3 Tilting train information and experience by country
In the following the tilting train systems are described per country.
1.4.3.3.1 Finland
1.4.3.3.1.1 General Data
The Finish railway infrastructure is relatively wide meshed and has a network length of 5’919 km
(2008, destatis). With a population of about 5 million people and a population density of 16 per
km the transport demand on the great lines is fairly low.
Tilting operation was introduced in 1995 to reduce travel times on the existing railway network
without expensive infrastructure reconstruction.
1.4.3.3.1.2 Infrastructure
Finland uses the Russian broad gauge with 1’520 mm.
The maximum cant is 120 mm (150 mm by permission). The maximum cant deficiency is
105 mm (130 mm on slab track) for conventional trains. For tilting trains the maximum cant
deficiency can reach up to 293 mm and a maximum uncompensated lateral acceleration of
1.8 m/s².
Track transition curves are mostly clothoides with a minimum length of 30 m or 1 second of
travel time.
Most of the tracks allow a maximum speed between 120 and 200 km/h for conventional trains
and between 120 and 220 km/h for tilting trains.
Finland does not have different alignment parameters for the introduction of tilting trains on
existing lines nor for the construction of new lines. As superstructure only ballasted track is used
in Finland. Most of the Finish railway infrastructure can be used with tilting trains.
Important lines with tilting operation are:
30
Source SBB.
Page 143 of (270)
•
Helsinki – Turku
•
Helsinki – Tampere – Oulu
•
Helsinki – Jyväskylä – Kuopio
•
Helsinki – Kouvola – Kajaani
The climatic requirements are the same for conventional and tilting trains.
1.4.3.3.1.3 Rolling stock
Table 39: Finnish tilting trains
Class
Number of trainsets
Introduction
Manufacturer
Max Speed [km/h]
Sm3
18
1995
Fiat
220
The Sm3 is powered electrically and has an active tilting system with tilting angles up to 8°.
The operator VR regards the difference in maintenance cost and reliability between
conventional and tilting trains as huge. The tilting system needs intensive maintenance and thus
higher maintenance cost. By provident repairs in combination with cyclic maintenance the
availability rate is nevertheless high.
In case of failures in the tilting system the train can continue moving although the tilting system
does not work. In these cases the train operates as a conventional train. In Finland it is
acknowledged that in these cases the punctuality is lower.
The absolute additional maintenance cost compared to conventional trains can not be given but
is stated as “remarkable”.
1.4.3.3.1.4 Construction of new lines
The Kerava – Lahti line has been constructed for the use of tilting and conventional trains. The
alignment parameters have been adapted for that and allow maximum speeds up to 250 km/h.
The current strategy for line upgrades is to achieve higher maximum speeds with tilting trains
than with conventional trains.
The construction of new lines designed for tilting trains is not considered as reasonable in
Finland. The passenger potential and the geographic obstacles are too low. For the conditions
in Norway this is regarded as possible due to the more demanding topography.
1.4.3.3.2 Germany
The German railway infrastructure has a network length of 33’721 km (DB, 2009) and is the
largest network in Western Europe. It is affected by most lines constructed 100 years or more
ago as well as some new high-speed lines. Despite technical upgrades the speed levels of
many older lines are fairly low (80-160 km/h) giving the network a broad variety in maximum
speed.
This was the reason for some early tests on tilting trains in the 1960s and the later introduction
of scheduled tilting trains in 1992.
These first tilting trains were fast regional DMUs with the aim of speeding-up the existing older
lines with limited alignment parameter using narrow curves. They have a top speed of 160 km/h.
The operation of the first high-speed tilting train in Germany began in the year 2000 which can
reach up to 230 km/h (class 411 electrically powered).
Page 144 of (270)
This shows that the tilting technology is used for both: High speed as well as standard speed in
Germany. In contrast the advantage of increased speed due to tilting is only used up to
160 km/h. On higher speeds the trains are tilted as well, but only for comfort reasons with the
same speed limits as conventional trains.
The reason for the limited use of increased speed is mainly based on signalling. Currently two
main signalling systems are used in Germany: PZB for speeds up to 160 km/h and LZB for
speeds up to 300 km/h (ETCS is in introduction but not widespread yet). Only the PZB system
was retrofitted with the additional GNT system to allow differing speed limits compared to the
conventional speed limit of the track. Thus only the speed limits up to 160 km/h can be
influenced.
There are no plans to retrofit the LZB-system or to use the tilting technology beyond 160 km/h
for increased speed.
In the medium term the GNT system will be the only system allowing increased speed for tilting
trains until ETCS gets a wide distribution and is adapted for tilting trains.
Germany has the most advanced alignment parameters for tilting trains in terms of lateral
acceleration on track level.
With non-tilted trains the maximum lateral accelerations are limited to 1.0 m/s² (for passenger
comfort reasons). For tilting trains the lateral accelerations are limited to 2.0 m/s². These are the
highest lateral accelerations observed worldwide.
The maximum cant is 160 mm and the cant deficiency for tilting trains 300 mm.
The maximum axle load is 16.0 tons +5%.
When tilting operation is introduced on a line normally there are no expensive upgrades. The
signalling system has to be adapted. In some cases discontinuities (e.g. turnouts) are replaced
and cant ramps are adapted to allow increased speed for tilting trains.
Currently mainly five types of tilting trains are used in Germany. Three of these are regional
trains.
Table 40: Tilted regional trains in Germany
Class
Number of trainsets
Introduction
Manufacturer
Max Speed [km/h]
610
20
1992
MAN, Siemens
160
tilting: Fiat
611
50
1996
Adtranz (now Bombardier)
160
612
192
1998
Bombardier
160
All trains are DMUs with active tilting and a tilting angle of about 8°.
Table 41: High speed tilting trains in Germany
Class
411/415
Number of trainsets
Introduction
71
1999
Manufacturer
MAN, SIEMENS
Max Speed [km/h]
230
tilting: Alstom
605
20
2001
Siemens, Bombardier
200
tilting: Siemens
Class 411/415 are electrically powered high-speed trains with active tilting. The tilting angle is
up to 8°. Class 605 is a diesel powered train with tilting of 8° too.
Page 145 of (270)
The reliability of the German tilting trains is mixed. DB states that most of the problems are not
directly bound to the tilting system. Due to problems of axles and bogies the tilting mechanism
is not used for many years in sum.
Class 605 is currently operated between Hamburg and Aarhus, running without tilting on
conventional speed. The tilting system of class 605 will not be used in future and there are
plans of DB to dismantle the tilting system.
There are no new lines in Germany that have been aligned and constructed especially for tilting
trains, nor are there plans to do so. The use of tilting trains is limited to the speeding up of
existing tracks with as little infrastructure investments as possible.
However there are a few small investments in the upgrade of turnouts if this is necessary and
economically justifiable.
1.4.3.3.3 Great Britain
The British railway infrastructure has a network length of 16’321 km (2008, destatis). The
railway system is affected by its liberalization and a spread market of railway companies.
Tilting train operation was introduced to reduce journey time on the West coast main line
between London to Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool and Glasgow, without the need for
expensive re-building of infrastructure. This route has many horizontal curves that would be
very difficult and prohibitively expensive to straighten.
There is no mandatory limit on the length of a curve, but it is recommended that, for both tilting
trains and conventional trains, it is not normally of a length equal to less than 2 seconds
travelling time at maximum speed.
The transition curve should normally be of the clothoid form, but the cubic parabola is
acceptable. Many existing transitions on the routes used by tilting trains are of this form. Cant
must increase (or decrease) linearly with distance along the transition. These rules apply
equally to routes used by conventional trains; the transition design must be able to cater for
such trains - which include a tilting train with the tilt mode isolated.
Where a transition curve is provided, the normal minimum length is 30 m, but 25 m is permitted
in exceptional conditions. Tilting trains are permitted to operate in "tilt" mode when taking the
diverging route at a turnout, but must conform to the same speed as conventional trains.
There are three rates quoted for the rate of change of cant deficiency, subject to increasingly
onerous conditions, including, for the highest rate, a risk assessment and determination of
ameliorating mitigation. The normal design value is 35 mm/s, the maximum design value is
110 mm/s and the exceptional design value is 150 mm/s. Conventional trains are limited to
35 mm/s, 55 mm/s and 70 mm/s respectively.
The maximum speed is 125 mph (~200 km/h). This is the maximum permitted by current
standards in Great Britain for lineside signals and applies to both tilting trains in "tilt" mode and
conventional trains. Any greater speed would require cab signalling.
The maintenance cost of the track may rise when introducing tilting train operation due to the
higher speed: Where conventional trains run at a speed of "x"km/h, and tilting trains in "tilt"
mode may run at "x+y"km/h, the track maintenance standards are those applying to "x+y"km/h.
If the increase form "x"km/h to "x+y"km/h means that the track remains in the same
maintenance speed band group, there is no change in maintenance parameters. However, for
the routes where tilting trains run in "tilt" mode, there is an additional requirement to ensure that
Page 146 of (270)
the track is maintained to the Absolute Track Geometry design, and special rules apply to
deliver this. There was a significant increase in service frequency and local speeds when tilting
trains were introduced. These were mainly the reasons rather than operation in "tilt" mode that
led to a change in inspection practice. It changed to more night-time and possession inspection
which is more expensive than the previous day-time inspections under traffic. At the same time,
the Absolute Geometry system, NR/L3/RK/0030, was introduced. There were significant costs
in establishing the base, but much of that would have been necessary for monumenting any
new track design. As the track machines used are fitted with appropriate software, they can
survey, design and implement tamping that returns the track to its defined design position
without much additional cost.
The signalling system was upgraded with the Tilt Authorisation & Speed Supervision that
enables trains to tilt if the necessary conditions are met. In addition, the train is provided with
an active and safety critical tilt management system. Special lineside indicators are provided to
remind drivers where trains fitted with a working TASS system can operate at higher speeds.
Different types of tilting trains may be authorised to travel at different speeds.
No British tilting trains currently operate in "tilt" mode over single lines.
Tilting trains are only operated by the operator “Virgin”
Table 42: Tilting trains currently in use in Great Britain
Class
Number of trainsets
Introduction
Manufacturer
390
53
2002
Alstom / Fiat
Max Speed [km/h]
225 (registration)
200 (in operation)
The trains are based on the “APT” (Advanced Passenger Train) developed in Great Britain in
the 1970s and on the Italian Pendolino from Fiat. They are active tilted with electro mechanic tilt
instead of hydraulic tilt of most other Pendolino-based trains.
Tilting rolling stock have additional on-board equipment (to enable them to tilt), which equates to
about a 20 % increase in mass (compared to non-tilt). The risk of reducing train reliability (due
to more equipment) can be offset by increased equipment reliability requirements and use of
degraded modes. Train reliability can be affected by many things and it would be difficult to
pinpoint the exact reliability impact of tilt equipment fitted to a tilting train compared to a nontilting train. Train reliability reported in January 2009 indicates that reliability of intercity type
tilting and non-tilting trains is broadly similar.
There is limited available data on the relative maintenance costs for tilting versus non-tilting
trains. Maintenance costs for tilting trains are typically around 5 %-10 % greater than non-tilting
trains due to maintenance required for the additional tilting equipment and the need for
dedicated tilt train test equipment, usually on a dedicated track in the maintenance depot.
Regarding climatic condition tilting trains are treated in the same way as any other train without
a miniature snow plough.
Tilting trains have been introduced to reduce travel time without expensive infrastructure
reconstruction. There are no new lines that have been designed with alignment parameters for
tilting trains.
HS2, the government organisation developing the case for a new north-south high speed line in
GB has established that the costs for building a 300 kph or greater dedicated high speed
railway are only a marginal increase compared to those for a new 200 kph railway. A large
proportion of costs relate civil works to establish the line of route, track bed, which are broadly
the same irrespective of speed.
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The key consideration regarding new built lines for tilting trains is value for money across the
lifecycle for the new railway and the determining factors are what is the topography and line of
route, required end-end journey time and what are the objectives for the future of the new
railway. A new line should only be built for tilting operation if the costs to provide a straighter
higher speed railway are prohibitively expensive. It will be necessary to compare and make an
informed decision on construction costs and future operating costs for a railway with many
curves that requires tilt to achieve the required end-end journey time and a straighter higher
speed railway.
1.4.3.3.4 Italy
The Italian railway infrastructure has a network length of 16’862 km (2008, destatis). The
network consists of slow regional lines up to high-speed lines with speeds to 300 km/h. Italy has
a long history in the use of tilting trains. The tests with the beginning of the 1970s led to an
important development of tilting trains. The Fiat tilting trains (now part of Alstom) were an
important basis for active tilting trains used all over the world.
Tilting trains in Italy have always been long distance trains for higher speeds, some up to
250 km/h. They are all active tilting trains with maximum tilting angles about 8°. Tilting is used
up to 200 km/h for increased speed. At higher speeds tilting is used for comfort reasons.
Italy did not construct new lines especially for tilting trains, nor are there plans to do so. What
has been done is to refit existing lines from class C with a non compensated lateral acceleration
of 1.0 m/s² to class P with a maximum non-compensated lateral acceleration of 1.8 m/s².
The maximum cant is 160 mm. The maximum cant deficiency on track level is 275 mm.
The main lines with tilting train operation in Italy are:
•
Transversal Turin – Milan – Venice – Trieste,
•
Milan – Bologna – Florence – Rome,
•
Dorsal tirrenica (in the south of Italy between Salerno and Reggio Calabria),
•
Dorsal adriatica (southern north-east coast of Italy from Ancona to Otranto),
•
Transversal Caserta – Foggia – Bari,
•
Transversal Rome – Ancona,
•
Other minor lines.
Currently four types of tilting trains are operated by the Italian operator FS.
Table 43: Tilting trains currently in use in Italy
Class
Number of trainsets
Introduction
Manufacturer
Max Speed [km/h]
ETR 460
10
1994
Fiat
250
ETR 485
15
2005
Fiat / Alstom
250
ETR 600
12
2008
Alstom
250
ETR 610
14
2008
Alstom
250
All the tilting trains currently in operation in Italy are electrically powered long distance trains
with a top speed of 250 km/h.
Page 148 of (270)
The reliability is stated as “very good success for the trains in use since the 1990s”. This led to
a higher realizable gain in the scheduled travel times.
The construction of new lines is not specially addressed.
1.4.3.3.5 Norway
The Norwegian railway infrastructure is affected by a mountainous terrain, sparse population
and has a network length of 4’114 km (2009, UIC).
The reason for the introduction of tilting operation was the desire to reduce travel time and
increase comfort, which could result in increased demand and better the competitive advantage
for NSB. Further goals where attracting business people and an increased and regular service.
First tests of the tilting technology with the Swedish X2000 were conducted in autumn 1996.
The regular operation with the class 73 was started in 1999.
In summer 2000 a class 73 derailed at low speed (about 30 km/h in a curce R = 190 m) due to a
broken axle at Nelaug station. Even if not caused by the tilting mechanism this created great
uncertainty with respect to tilting trains.
Today the tilting trains use the same speed as conventional trains. The tilting trains have
permission to use the higher speed but due to passenger comfort (seasickness) NSB C to use
the same speed as conventional trains.
The alignment parameters for tilting trains have been developed in the last years for safety and
cost reasons.
The maximum cant deficiency for tilting trains was decreased from the original value of 280 mm
due to the shaft fracture in 2000. This, of course, reduced the possible gain of travel time.
The travel time through different alignment elements (circles and straight lines) should be at
least one second. It turned out later that the original value of two seconds was too expensive
due to the necessary alignment upgrades.
Level crossings have to be adapted as a result of higher speed (visibility as well as safety
systems) or are partly closed.
The signalling system had to be adapted to the higher maximum speed, e.g. by repositioning.
The lines Sørlandsbanen and Dovrebanen do still have the so called blue speed signs, allowing
higher speeds for tilting trains. This advantage will only be used when the trains are delayed,
but on a regular basis the trains only run at standard speeds. The tilting technology is still being
used for comfort reasons. Winter problems related to the tilting equipment are not known.
To test the tilting technology, test operation of the Swedish X2000 on Sørlansbanen were
conducted in autumn 1996. The testing was carried without major problems but caused a
number of motion sickness among passengers. This was regarded as unproblematic.
Page 149 of (270)
Table 44: Tilting trains in Norway
Class
Number of trainsets
Introduction
Manufacturer
Max Speed [km/h]
73 A
16
1999
Adtranz (now Bombardier)
210
73 B
6
2002
Bombardier
210
93
15
2000
Bombardier
140
The two classes of tilting trains in Norway have only minimal technical differences. Class 73 B
was ordered a few years after class 73 A and has e.g. some additional seats.
Both trains are electrically powered trains with active tilting. Class 93 is a DMU with a tilting
angle of max 5°.
Problems occurred when running double sets of tilting trains in certain higher speeds, due to
mechanical fluctuations in the catenary. Having the tilting train technology limited to only single
sets, the NSB found it better to stay with a schedule based on normal train speeds.
There are no objections to resuming active use of the tilting trains. This could result in reduced
travel time, which may lead to increased demand.
NSB's new trainsets, FLIRT will be delivered in spring 2011 and put into operation/ normal traffic
in January 2012. It was not considered to integrate tilting mechanisms in these train sets. The
trains were upgraded to run 200 km/h, and have a good acceleration.
Trains are not seen as a high end concept, and cannot compete with aircraft on travel time due
to relatively low line speed. It is, however, important to take on the competition offered by bus
services with approximately the same travelling time. Tilting trains must therefore be a cheap
alternative.
The additional costs of tilting trains are estimated based on a rough assessment of class 73 with
15-20 % compared to conventional trains.
The strategy for planning and construction of new lines are under consideration.
Up to now no new lines with special tilting train alignment parameters have been built. If this is
reasonable is one question of the current project HSR Norge.
In the future a clear route model will have to be worked out before a possible introduction of
tilting. In the Intercity Triangle (Oslo-Skien, Oslo-Lillehammer, Oslo-Halden) it will be mixed
traffic, therefore it is not easy to fully make use of the speed potential in this area. The route
model must therefore take this into account (also, the same principles for high-speed train
apply). Outside the Intercity Triangle (Lillehammer, Skien, Halden) the ability to take out the
speed potential is much greater.
1.4.3.3.6 Portugal
The Portuguese railway infrastructure has a network length of 2’842 km with different gauges
(2008, destatis). The railway network is relatively wide meshed. The tilting trains are used on
the Iberian gauge with 1’668 mm.
The motivation for the introduction of tilting trains was to increase speed without construction of
new lines or intensive upgrade works. For this reason CP ordered the Alfa Pendular at Fiat and
took up service in 1999.
The maximum cant on the Iberian gauge is 180 mm (this corresponds to about 155 mm in the
standard gauge). The maximum lateral acceleration is 1.0 m/s² on passenger level as well as on
Page 150 of (270)
track level for conventional trains. For tilting trains the maximum lateral acceleration on track
level is 1.8 m/s².
Tilting is used on the following lines:
•
Braga – Faro (600 km)
•
Lisbon – Oporto (336 km)
The only tilting train in Portugal is the Alfa Pendular.
Table 45: Tilting trains in Portugal
Class
Number of trainsets
4000
(Alfa
Pendular)
10
Introduction
1999
Manufacturer
Max Speed [km/h]
Fiat / Adtranz
(now Alstom and
Bombardier)
220
The tilting system is based on the Italian Fiat tilting technology with active tilting and tilting
angles up to 8°. Tilting is used for speeds between 65 km/h and 220 km/h.
The reliability is relatively high: The trains have 6 breakdowns on 1 million km on average. The
contribution of the tilting mechanism for this figure is 13 %. CP rates these figures as good
according to their standards.
Up to now tilting is only used on existing lines and there are no new built lines especially for
tilting trains in Portugal. On the other hand the Alfa Pendular is currently the only high speed
train in Portugal. The separation between high-speed and tilting effects is therefore not easy.
The currently planned new lines (Lisbon – Porto; Lisbon – Madrid) will not be designed with
special tilting train parameters.
1.4.3.3.7 Spain
The Spanish railway infrastructure has a network length of 15’046 km (2008, destatis) with
different gauges. Most parts use the Iberian gauge of 1’668 mm whereas a new built high-speed
network which has been built in the last 20 years uses standard gauge. Some parts of the
network mainly in the north-west parts of Spain use the metre gauge.
The tilting system in Spain is different to most other countries using tilting trains. The Spanish
system is passive tilted without any active steering mechanism. The lateral forces in curves lead
to a tilting of the car body. The only manufacturer of this special system is the Spanish company
Patentes Talgo S.L.
The alignment parameters in Spain are varying on the gauge used.
Table 46: Cant and maximum lateral accelerations in Spain
Gauge / type of line
Normal cant
Maximum cant
Max. lateral acceleration for passenger
Standard gauge / HSR 350 km/h
140 mm
160 mm
0.39 m/s²
Standard gauge / HSR 300 km/h
140 mm
160 mm
0.46 m/s²
Iberian gauge / 160 – 200 km/h
160 mm
180 mm
0.65 m/s²
(0.9 m/s² extreme)
Metre gauge
110 mm
Page 151 of (270)
The maximum lateral acceleration on track level is 1.5 m/s² for tilting trains.
On the Iberian gauge lines tilting is used up to 160 km/h for increased speed; at lower speeds
for comfort reasons.
The Spanish tilting trains are all of the type talgo pendular with its different variants.
Table 47: Tilting trains in Spain
Class
Number of trainsets
Talgo 4
24
Introduction
1980
Talgo
Manufacturer
Max Speed [km/h]
Talgo 5
6
1981
Talgo
Talgo Pendular 200
28
1989
Talgo
200
Talgo 250 (S-130)
45
2007
Talgo / Bombardier
250
Talgo 350 (AVE S102)
46
2005
Talgo / Bombardier
350
The passive tilting allows tilting angles up to 3.5°. Compared to active tilting systems this leads
normally to a lower gain of travel time. The advantage is a technically easier system with a high
reliability. The speed can be increased by approximately 10-20 %.
Some of the Talgo trains can change their gauge between standard and Iberian gauge.
Spain has huge investments in the introduction and extension of their high-speed-railway
network. The use of the standard gauge is an important contrast to the residual network.
Despite this radical change in planning principles and though Spain has an important use of
tilting trains Spain did not built its lines especially for tilting trains nor are there plans to do so.
Currently a study in the North of Spain with the Cantabrico railway line of FEVE (Narrow gauge)
is conducted where an old metre gauge railway line has to be adapted to develop a maximum
speed of 160 km/h. In this case an early proposition is made to retrofit this line for tilting trains.
1.4.3.3.8 Sweden
During the last three decades the Swedish railway infrastructure with a network length of
9’830 km in 2008 (destatis) has been modernized. Especially the main lines have been
upgraded with new signalling systems allowing higher speeds. Very important was the
introduction of the Swedish X2000 high-speed tilting train in the early 1990s.
The aim of the introduction of the high speed tilting train was to create a traffic system that can
compete with air transport without building new high speed lines.
In the 1960s Sweden decided to develop rolling stock instead of building new lines. This led to
the development of the X2000. The infrastructure was upgraded (e.g. signalling systems) for the
higher speed levels but there where no special alignment adaptations for the tilting operation.
The effect of tilting operation is a reduced travel time.
The current lines with tilting operation are:
•
Stockholm – Malmö,
•
Stockholm – Gothenburg,
Page 152 of (270)
•
Stockholm – Karlstad,
•
Stockholm – Sundsvall – Ostersund.
Due to the limited number of trainsets and to weak traffic demand on other destinations, the
tilting trains are reserved for the above listed destinations.
The maximum lateral acceleration is 1.6 m/s² on track level. On passenger level it is 0.65 m/s²
for conventional and tilting trains.
The maximum cant is 150 mm and the track transition curve is clothoid with a length of
l = 5× r
The maximum speed is 200 km/h and tilting is used up to 200 km/h.
The maintenance costs and efforts are not documented specifically for tilting trains.
The Swedish tilting train is the X2000. It is currently the only tilting train in use.
Table 48: Tilting trains in Sweden
Class
Number of trainsets
X2000 (X2)
40
Introduction
1990
Manufacturer
Bombardier
Max Speed [km/h]
200
The X2000 has an active hydraulic tilting mechanism which is used between 70 and 200 km/h
for increased speed. The tilting angle is between 6° and 8° depending on speed, curve radius
and cant.
A specific feature of the X2000 is the non tilted motor coaches at the rear end of the train. The
driver has a special seat to compensate the increased lateral accelerations.
The availability rate compared to conventional trains running 200 km/h like the Bombardier
“Regina” trains X50-X55 is lower for the X2000. The reasons are the tilting system and the
higher age of the trainsets.
Currently the SJ has no open orders for tilting trains and does not plan to buy new tilting trains.
Sweden did not build new lines especially for tilting trains nor are there plans to do so. Since
1990 some new lines for speeds up to 200 km/h have been built, e.g. the Øresund-Line and the
Svealand-Line which are partly operated by the X2000 tilting train. None of them was
constructed especially for tilting operation.
Another new line is the Arlanda Express connecting Stockholm Central Station with the airport
Stockholm-Arlanda. The trains used are X3 trains for speeds up to 200 km/h without tilting.
This is one example for the Swedish strategy of using tilting trains for higher speeds on existing
lines but to construct new lines with alignment parameters based on conventional trains.
Strategic decisions for the future use of high speed tilting trains are under consideration. Trains
for new lines with speeds higher than 250 km/h will most probably not use tilting technique.
1.4.3.3.9 Switzerland
The Swiss railway operation is highly developed. Its infrastructure has a network length of
3’499 km in standard gauge (2008, destatis) and is one of the most dense networks in the
world.
Page 153 of (270)
First operational tilting trains were introduced in 1996 to reduce travel on the North – South
corridor between Stuttgart and Mailand.
A new type of tilting trains with the “WAKO” called tilting technology is ordered and will be
introduced in 2013 (see below).
The min. curve radius for tilting trains (with tilting for higher speed) is 250 m.
Other curve parameters depend on the line-specific alignment parameters and are the same for
tilting and conventional trains.
Track transition curves are the same for tilting and conventional trains.
Important is the criteria “torsion”:
δ uf
; on new lines this criteria should be limited to 150 mm/s.
δt
Maximum cant for tilting and conventional trains is 150 mm normally, 160 mm by SBB limit and
180 mm limited by federal regulation.
The maximum track level uncompensated side acceleration is for:
•
150 mm for conventional trains,
•
275 mm for tilting trains,
•
210 mm for Wako.
As for the track transition curves the torsion criteria is also important for the cant ramp (for
conventional and tilting trains):
δu
; on new lines this criteria should be limited to 90 mm/s.
δt
Between two curves should be a length of at least 1 second travel time or 20 meters.
The wear of the tracks used for tilting trains is comparable to the wear caused by freight trains.
Table 49: Tilting trains in Switzerland
Class
Number of trainsets
Introduction
Manufacturer
Max Speed [km/h]
ETR 470
9
1996
Alstom
200
ICN (RABDe 500)
44
2000
Bombardier
200
ICE-T (DB AG)
owned by DB for details see chapter Germany (class 411/415)
ETR 610
14
2009
Alstom
250
All tilting trains currently used in Switzerland are active tilted electrical powered trains with tilting
angles up to 8°.
They use the tilting technology up to 160 km/h for increased speed. Beyond it is used for
comfort reasons. There currently no plans to use tilting for increased speed beyond 160 km/h
due to higher cost in signalling systems and the lack of lines where this could give significant
advantages.
Reliability is varying: The most common ICN which serves the national market has a failure rate
of the tilting system of 2’000 h MTBF which causes about 4 breakdowns per year. This is a rate
which should be improved in future tilting trains.
Page 154 of (270)
An important new development is the planned introduction of the “WAKO” technology to
compensate the natural roll movement of the carbody. This new type of tilting systems is
planned to be introduced in 2013 by 59 trainsets of the type TWINDEXX from Bombardier.
Switzerland did not construct new lines dedicated for tilting trains nor are there plans to do so.
But there have been important reconstructions of existing lines with special alignment
parameters for tilting trains. These lines are the Jura south foot line (Olten – Geneva)
reconstructed at the early 2000s and the line Bern – Lausanne which is under construction.
The goal was to reach a targeted travel time which was needed for the integrated schedule. On
the Jura south foot line the cost could be reduced by 50 % through the introduction of tilting
trains instead of constructing a new line.
1.4.3.3.10 USA
1.4.3.3.10.1
General Data
The American railway infrastructure has a network length of 227’058 km (2008, destatis). It is
very different to European railway systems as the fright transport is much more important than
passenger transport.
Nevertheless some lines with an important passenger train service exist especially at the
densely populated northeast corridor Washington – New York – Boston.
Tilting was introduced to reduce travel times on existing lines without expensive infrastructure
cost. Two tilting trains were introduced: The Amtrak Cascades and the Acela Express (also
operated by Amtrak) as the Acela Express is much more important than the Amtrak Cascades
the focus is on the Acela.
1.4.3.3.10.2
Infrastructure
The infrastructure of the USA normally is optimised for freight trains. This even led to reduced
cant when passenger trains lost importance. The track is heavy and allows axle loads up to 39
tons.
Between Boston and Washington (Northeast Corridor) is the only line where the Acela is
operated.
The maximum cant deficiency on the Northeast Corridor is 178 mm for tilting trains (Acela). For
conventional trains the maximum cant deficiency is normally 102 mm and at maximum 127 mm.
The goal was to achieve a 229 mm maximum cant deficiency which could not be achieved.
Track maintenance is increased due to higher quality parameters. Wear is even a bit lowered.
The cab signalling was refitted to allow higher speed.
1.4.3.3.10.3
Rolling stock
Table 50: Tilting trains in the USA
Class
Number of trainsets
Introduction
Manufacturer
Max Speed [km/h]
Acela Express
20
1999
Bombardier / Alstom
240
Cascades
4
1994
Talgo
200
The Acela Express is an active tilted high speed train with maximum tilting angles of 6.5°. Due
to envelope restrictions only a smaller tilt angel can be used. The tilting is used up to 240 km/h
with 25 tons axle load.
The reliability and availability is quiet well. Detailed data to maintenance cost is not available.
Page 155 of (270)
1.4.3.3.10.4
Construction of new lines
The USA did not construct new lines especially for tilting trains.
Even if there were some early ideas for a tilting train track layout for the Southeast High Speed
Rail it is not expected to construct new lines with special alignment parameters for tilting trains.
1.4.3.3.11 Development in further countries
► Japan
Japan has a wide use of tilting trains with many different types of tilting trains. Active and
passive tilting can be found. In most cases the tilting is controlled by track switches instead of
the most commonly used accelerometers.
► Poland
Poland wants to introduce tilting train operation. The Ministry of Infrastructure signed a 10-year
contract for PKP Intercity to provide long distance train services. The trains will be 20 Pendolino
trainsets from Alstom which should reach a top speed of 230 km/h.
► Taiwan
Taiwan had introduced tilting train operation in 2007 with six Japanese tilting trains from
Marubeni and Hitachi on their east coast line.
In January 2011 the Taiwan Railway Administration ordered 17 inter-city tilting trainsets capable
of operation at 150 km/h on their 1’067 mm gauge.
1.4.3.4 Manufacturers
In the following some tilting train specific information to manufacturers is given.
1.4.3.4.1 Alstom
As Alstom acquired the Italian Fiat Ferroviaria in 2000 they grew to the world leader in tilting
technology.
Currently the Tiltronix technology used for Pendolino trains allows increased speed up to
250 km/h.
The Tiltronix system can be built in two modes:
In reactive mode, bends in the track are detected by gyroscopes, which determine their precise
angle, and by accelerometers situated on the first bogie of the lead car. The onboard computer
ascertains the tilt angle required and transmits an order to each car’s bogie cylinders, timed
according to their position and speed of the train.
In anticipative mode, the system relies on a database of the line’s parameters. By comparing
the data to information received by onboard sensors, the system can pinpoint the train’s exact
position on the line at any moment and order the corresponding tilt for the route as it is reached.
By reacting quicker at approaching bends, it is less sensitive to track irregularities and so can
offer a smoother transition, for greater passenger comfort.
1.4.3.4.2 Bombardier
Bombardier is developing (in cooperation with SBB) the Wako technology. They see a high
potential in this technology which can possibly exceed the currently limited tilting angles due to
the double deck coaches developed for SBB.
Another emphasis is set to the reliability which should be increased to a multiple of active tilting
trains. Bombardier talks about MTBFs of more than 20’000 h for the tilting system.
Page 156 of (270)
Unique to their technology is the possibility to combine the Wako-bogie with trains from other
manufacturers as the tilting system is integrated in the bogie
1.4.3.4.3 Siemens
Siemens had developed its own active tilting train bogie and used one version for the German
class 605.
The Siemens system is up to date and currently offered to clients.
1.4.3.4.4 Talgo
Talgo gave some input to the case study. To the question of new high speed lines Talgo
remarked:
“It is advisable to optimize all the capital investments and number of km of new lines to be
constructed. Some parts of older conventional lines could be reused with minor needs for
infrastructure improvements. In summary tilting technology helps to lower infrastructure
investments even allowing the same travel times as may be achieved without tilting technology
on tracks with less curves. We recommend to just have one line (and no separate lines) for high
speed, regional and freight operation. This is no contradiction and only if capacity limits are
reached a second track (or separate freight tracks) will get necessary.”
1.4.3.5 Conclusions
Regarding possible economic effects and the operational benefits of tilting train operation it is
very important to regard the overall interrelationship in the specific railway system. This includes
infrastructure, rolling stock, operation and economical aspects.
1.4.3.5.1 Infrastructure
The case study revealed a wide variety in the use of tilting trains. The studied countries had all
well developed railway systems before the introduction of tilting trains. Noticeable is the fact that
especially the countries with a low population density and a wide meshed railway network
introduced tilting trains to increase the top speed of their railway systems without expensive
infrastructure investments. Examples are Finland and Portugal.
Another occurrence is tilting as speed-up in the “second level”: A conventional high speed
system without tilting trains already exists and has partly its own network. Tilting trains are then
introduced to speed up regional and inter-city traffic mainly on existing lines. Example to this is
Germany.
A wide variation can be found in the alignment parameters observed. Some countries have
ambitious limits in the allowed lateral accelerations others less. This could even lead to the
curious situation that the lateral acceleration limits in the USA are nearly half of the limits in
Germany.
It is obvious that for the success of tilting train operation the strong relationship between
infrastructure and rolling stock has to be considered. Only if both fit together a high profit of
tilting operation can be achieved. This includes the importance of alignment parameters such as
cant, cant deficiency and lateral acceleration as well as the layout of the line. For high benefits
in travel time the curvature has to be in a capable range for the tilting system.
Another limiting factor can be the signalling system. As seen in Switzerland and Germany for
example the signalling system can limit the speed range in which tilting trains can operate with
increased speed. This has to be considered when travel time savings are estimated.
Page 157 of (270)
1.4.3.5.2 Tilting train rolling stock
The reliability of tilting trains is varying. Especially some older active tilting systems have failure
rates of less than 2’000 h MTBF and lead to a reduced reliability compared to conventional
trains.
An important point on the assessment of tilting train reliability is the differentiation between
tilting related effects and other effects. The difficulty is the overlapping of tilting technology with
ambitious, fast trains. Often it is stated that not the tilting mechanism directly is the problem but
the conventional system of the car. At some components like e.g. the axels the assignment of
failure to the tilting system or the conventional system is not well defined. This could lead to
false estimations about the reliability of the tilting mechanism.
Often tilting trains are within the fastest train classes of a country. This may lead to new
“conventional” problems with pressure-tight doors for example which could wrongly be assumed
as tilting problems.
1.4.3.5.3 Construction of new lines
The conclusion for construction of new lines especially for tilting trains can be stated more
clearly than for rolling stock.
No country constructed a new line with dedicated tilting parameters.
Switzerland has chosen a mixed model: They are re-aligning the track at some parts of the line
Bern – Lausanne in combination with the introduction of tilting trains. The goal had been to
reduce the travel time by 10 minutes. Five minutes can be achieved by the introduction of tilting
trains and the other five are generated by as many track re-alignments as necessary. This led to
cost savings compared to a more expensive reconstruction without tilting trains.
Often it was stated that the construction of new lines should be driven by a lack of capacity. The
design of new lines should then be oriented at the operational needs (types of train).
Another point is the future suitability: With tilting train alignment parameters the line can only be
operated with tilting trains at the design speed. This influences strongly the future use of train
types on the whole network. With trains not only running on the tilting lines but also long
distances in the conventional network a high number of tilting trains is necessary to operate the
tilting line at design speed.
In contrast some interviewees stated that demanding topography (e.g. mountainous areas,
coastlines) are restrictive conditions for high speed railways. In these cases it should be studied
if a special tilting train alignment shows economical advantages.
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1.5
Rolling stock
1.5.1 Summary
The work presented in this report is mainly focused on the specific requirements and needs of
the Norwegian Railway.
An evaluation model has been used to identify potential issues or parameters that might be
challenges when combining various kinds of rolling stock with various kinds of potential
scenarios. The potential issues are in most cases connected to climate and/or topography but
also other parameters have been assessed. These areas must be addressed in the
specification phase not only for rolling stock but for the complete railway system.
The group has not identified any issues that can be seen as a major obstacle concerning rolling
stock for high speed railways in Norway.
A large portion of the potential issues identified in this report must be seen in close connection
with infrastructure issues. It is vital that the further work is done with not only the rolling stock or
only the infrastructure in mind, but to look at the system as one including infrastructure, rolling
stock and maintenance.
1.5.2 Objectives of rolling stock assessment
The objective of the study is to identify rolling stock technical and safety issues that might be
relevant for high speed rail concepts in Norwegian conditions. These issues will be presented in
a format so that they can be used in a flexible manner in the specific corridor analysis to be
carried out in phase 3 of the project.
The study includes the following types of Rolling stock:
•
Dedicated high speed trains
•
Tilting trains, and
•
Other trains using high speed railways (Including High Speed Freight)
Specifically the study includes:
•
Assess the technical requirements and assumptions related to the rolling stock to be
used for high speed railways in Norway.
•
Consider to what extent tilting trains could be appropriate in certain concepts
•
Review general technical requirements for high speed freight trains
•
Consider comfort criteria in relation to large sudden pressure changes in trains with
passengers through tunnels at speeds over 250 km/h
•
Map, analyse and evaluate different concepts for rolling stock for the high speed line.
•
Develop an evaluation model
1.5.3 Definition of concepts
For the purposes of this report, the following definitions have been assumed.
1.5.3.1 Dedicated High Speed Trains
High speed trains will have a typical maximum speed of greater than 250 km/h when operating
on dedicated high speed lines and be capable of operating at 200 km/h or higher when
operating on upgraded track.
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The trains will be compliant with the requirements of the High Speed Rolling Stock TSI and will
use proven technology and be similar to existing trains already operating around the world.
It has been assumed that all train concepts are based on steel wheel on steel rail technology
and other concepts such as Maglev have not been considered.
1.5.3.2 Tilting trains
Tilting trains achieve reduced journey times by negotiating curves at higher speeds and cant
deficiencies than conventional non tilting trains. Passenger comfort is maintained by the use of
a powered or non-powered mechanism to incline the vehicle body when negotiating curves.
Tilting trains can be used to reduce journey times on both new high speed lines and upgraded
lines.
The tilting trains in Norway today are running at speeds up to 210 km/h but it is assumed that a
new tilting train will potentially run at speed up to 300 km/h and will be compliant with
appropriate elements of either the high speed or conventional rolling stock TSI’s.
Tilting trains are used in Norway today. Hence an assessment for today’s service is not needed.
The use of tilting trains on high speed lines will require an assessment to be undertaken to
ensure that the trains are compatible with the infrastructure in areas such as vehicle gauging
and lateral track forces. The outcome of these assessments could result in either design
changes to the infrastructure or ongoing increased infrastructure maintenance costs.
1.5.3.3 Other trains using high speed railways
There may be a requirement for trains other than high speed trains to use the new high speed
lines. This report has considers both freight and passenger trains but has not considered
infrastructure maintenance machines.
It is assumed that the trains will not be designed to the requirements of the High Speed Rolling
Stock TSI and will typically operate at speeds lower than 200 km/h.
New trains may be built to the requirements of the Conventional Rolling Stock TSI or the Freight
Wagon TSI, but an assessment may be required to ensure that the trains are compatible with
the new high speed infrastructure. For example, the High Speed Infrastructure TSI permits track
cants of up to 180 mm and the assessment would need to make sure that the trains could
negotiate these curves in a safe and acceptable manner.
1.5.3.4 Mixed traffic
There is no common opinion in Europe if mixed traffic should be used. In Germany most HSL
are used with mixed traffic. Spain and France prefer dedicated HSL. In France the high speed
trains are allowed to use the conventional lines but the other trains are not allowed to run on the
high speed lines. If mixed traffic is to be used the demand for double track and more passing
tracks increases to uphold the capacity on the line.
The question of the feasibility of running freight trains on a high speed line is not really a
question of the rolling stock. For the rolling stock itself it is not identified as a problem related to
e.g. availability or any of the technical systems onboard. The issues with running freight trains
on high speed lines is more likely to be linked to the overall utilization of capacity of the line and
the impact to the line.
The freight trains are not running at the same top-speed as the high speed trains and this will
obviously generate additional hindrances when planning the service. One option is to have
freight trains running at night time when normally the high speed trains are not in operation. This
is affecting the planning of the service and is not within the scope of this report.
The physical impact to the line might also be an issue. In many cases the axle load for freight
trains are higher than normal passenger trains. In order to run freight trains on a high speed line
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the high speed lines must be classified for higher loads, resulting in higher cost, and the
maintenance of the lines will probably increase due to higher wear and tear of the track.
1.5.4 Assumptions
1.5.4.1 Scenarios given from JBV
JBV has provided four scenarios as a basis for the studies (see chapter 1.0.1). Additional
interpretations of the scenarios for rolling stock are listed below.
A. A continuation of current priorities and policies in the railway sector.
There will be no new tracks built compared to the projects already started as of November
2010. The normal maintenance work of the tracks will continue as today, e.g. replacement
of worn tracks etc to keep the standard at the same level as today.
B. A more ambitious development of the existing network.
Compared to scenario A there will be some additional work for increasing the maximum
speed. Such work can be removal of level crossings, increasing curve radii, increased cant
etc. The line will still follow the existing one, meaning no new alignments.
C. High-speed concepts which partly incorporate the existing network.
Some new parts of the line which is built according to high speed concept without any level
crossings and with double track. The new lines will not necessarily be built in same
alignment as the existing track. The new line will only be built for part of the 6 major
corridors.
D. High-speed lines largely separate from the existing network.
1.5.4.2 Proven design solutions
The assumption of the necessity of choosing proven design is based on the fact that the order
for new trains will probably be limited in quantity compared to other nations e.g. Germany,
France or Spain. The positive effect of choosing proven design are most likely to be seen in
cost, reliability and more controllable risk connected to delivery schedule and products
complying to international standards making the approval process smother.
The negative side of the choice is of course that the trains will not be “tailor-made” both
compared to physical appearance and special functional/technical requirements the operators
have. This report does not include a detailed assessment of advantages and disadvantages for
this topic; it only highlights the importance of awareness when choosing rolling stock. However,
looking briefly at this item it seems likely that the advantages are greater than the
disadvantages and therefore it has been assumed in this report that a proven design will be
emphasized when the decision is made. JBV also made it clear when choosing the new intercity
and regional EMU (FLIRT concept) from Stadler, that one of the major reasons was that the
train was a proven design. This also supports the assumption made in this report and it is
strongly recommended that a proven design should be chosen.
Due to the fact that the time schedule for commencing a potential high speed railway is likely to
be 15-20 years ahead it is difficult to say what proven design will be in the that time. The
existing high speed trains will certainly be obsolete for new build HS trains within the next 15-20
years.
1.5.4.3 Compliance to TSI’s
The assumption has been made are that all trains or concepts are in compliance with the
following TSI’s and this task is concerning major aspects outside of the TSI’s:
•
TSI High speed rolling stock
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•
TSI High speed energy
•
TSI-High speed operation
•
TSI-traffic operation and management
•
TSI-High speed infrastructure
•
TSI People with reduced mobility
•
TSI Safety in Railway Tunnels
•
TSI Control - Command and Signalling Subsystem High speed railway
•
TSI Control - Command and Signalling Subsystem Conventional railway
•
TSI Noise
•
TSI-Telematic application conventional railway
1.5.4.4 Particulars for Norway
The group has focused on the specific parameters that exist for Norway, and not included all
aspects with high speed trains.
The reason for not including all aspects of high speed service is that high speed trains have
been running for many years in other parts of the world and it is not necessary to map and
assess areas of concern related to issues that have been solved many years ago. E.g. absolute
speed is not a potential parameter assessed in the model. The reason is simply that due to the
fact that high speed railway exist in other countries the aspect itself of “running in high speed” is
already mapped and identified. Said in layman’s terms, high speed railways work in other
countries, but what are the challenges for Norway?
1.5.5 Evaluation model, description
The intention of the evaluation model is to map and identify the combinations of concepts and
scenarios that might lead to challenges (potential issues), that are not solved as of today or
where the level of information or experience is not sufficient.
The model is used as a tool for identifying and prioritising of areas that will need future
investigations. In Annex 6 the model is documented.
A systematic assessment of the potential parameters has been done based on IRMA-structure
(14 systems) in addition to functional requirements with the intention of identifying relevant
parameters for Norway. A list of all parameters is shown in Annex 7. The relevant parameters
are further investigated in the evaluation model.
The model is built up as a matrix with the four service scenarios as superior groups and the
three train concepts as sub-groups in each of the four scenarios in columns. See example
below.
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Potential issue scenario D
Other trains,
freight, pass.
High speed Tilting train coaches etc
Comments to scenario D
[>250km/h] [<210km/h] [<160km/h]
Parameters
Climate and environment
Temperature range
Temperature and humidity variations, in/out long
tunnels and on/off long bridges
Ice and snow-packing, both catenary and rolling stock
issues
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Check reference high speed
train with similar temp.range
Possibly first train of the day
slower speed? Panth wear due
to "bounces" and light
arcs.Undulations of OHL due to
snow load, disconnection.
Icicle collisions pantograph.
All red marked areas are transferred to and described in chapter 1.5.6.
The green marked areas are defined as not critical.
The striped areas are not assessed (high speed trains on conventional lines)
Figure 62: Part of the evaluation model as example
By presenting this model as a matrix all combinations are shown and all critical combinations
can easily be identified and assessed. The combinations that are not fully known today are seen
as potential issues and marked red. All combinations known today are seen as non potential
issues and marked green. Hence most of the combinations that include the concepts with high
speed trains are marked red due to the fact that those combinations are not proven in Norway.
The red marked combinations are issues for further considerations.
Assessing high speed trains in combination with scenario A and B is not done. It would not
make commercial sense to buy high speed trains capable of running at 300km/h and only
operate them at a conventional speed.
Looking into the comparison between scenario C and D seen from a rolling stock perspective
there is not any major difference. The only difference is the proportion of high speed track. In
scenario D it is assumed new high speed railway for the complete corridor and in scenario C it
is assumed new line for parts of the corridor. In that case the new built line should be in
accordance with the high speed TSI’s.
One of the major dimensioning criteria for rolling stock is maximum speed. Since the maximum
speed in scenarios C and D would be identical the trains have to accommodate the same
requirements, hence the parameters when choosing train concept will most likely be the same.
The differences in scenario C and D will obviously be cost and average speed and both will be
determined by the portion of new build line in scenario C.
A systematic assessment of the potential parameters has been done based on 14-system
structure in addition to functional requirements. A list of non critical parameters has also been
assessed.
All potential parameters for rolling stock are presented in rows so that a full matrix with all crosschecks is achieved. The methodology of identifying which parameters are to be cross-checked
with the concepts and scenarios are consequently based on the thought: “What is special for
Norway?” Comparing Norway to other countries the major differences are seen in climate,
topography and low population density, hence most of the parameters are derived out of those
areas.
The complete evaluation model is shown in Annex 6.
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1.5.5.1 Train concepts
For assessing the future variance in rolling stock running on Norwegian railway the following
concepts are defined:
•
High speed trains (speed > 250 km/h)
•
Tilting trains (speed < 210 km/h)
•
Others, passenger coaches, freight etc (speed < 160 km/h)
1.5.5.2 Train parameters
The identified train parameters that are special for Norway are:
•
o
Temperature range
o
Temperature and humidity variations, in/out long tunnels and on/off long
bridges
o
Ice and snow-packing, both catenary and rolling stock issues
o
Ventilation inlets
o
Train picking up ballast and snow blasting between underframe and track
o
Crosswinds on exposed areas
o
Maintenance concepts concerning de-icing
•
Route alignment
•
Pressure pulses
•
o
Entering tunnels and passing train in tunnels
o
Passing fixed installations
“Animal protection”
o
•
Fire and evacuation
o
•
•
External noise
Coupler
o
•
Potential for having longer tunnels for high speed?
Noise
o
•
Plough to prevent the obstacle to get under the train in case of a collision
Coupler for rescue of train
Length of train
o
Pantograph spacing in case of multiple service
o
Platform lengths
Signalling
o
ERTMS
•
Track impact
•
Energy consumption
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1.5.6 Critical parameters for train concepts
When assessing which parameters that are seen as critical, the evaluation model is used as a
basis. Combinations of scenarios, concepts and parameters that might have potential risks or
challenges (red marked in model) are selected and described more in detail in this chapter.
1.5.6.1 Climate and environment
The climatic and topographical challenges that exist in Norway include high mountains, bridges
crossing open water, low temperature and numerous tunnels. The following areas have been
identified as potential issues.
1.5.6.1.1 Temperature range
This has been identified as potential issue for high speed trains. For tilting trains and others like
coaches, freight this is not considered as an issue due to the long experience with these types
of vehicles in Norway. It does not mean that there are no issues with this in service today, but
that it is a known challenge.
Given the Nordic climate the normal specification of temperature range should follow class T2 in
EN50125-1 which is -40 to +35 ºC. This is also in accordance with TSI for rolling stock.
1.5.6.1.2 Temperature and humidity variations, in/out long tunnels and on/off long
bridges
This has been identified as potential issue for high speed trains. For scenarios D and C there
might be longer tunnels and bridges than existing railway today. That might lead to unknown
conditions concerning ice/snow growth due to fluctuations of temperature and humidity with
different frequencies than existing today.
Some of the systems that might be affected by these conditions are:
•
wind screens
•
brakes system
•
air pneumatic system
•
train electrical system
•
door steps
1.5.6.1.3 Ice and snow-packing, both catenary system and rolling stock issues
The issue of ice-growth on the catenary system is a well known problem with the existing
railway in Norway. This causes both pantograph-bounces and light arcs with the result that the
wear of the “carbon strips” will increase and the transformers and line converters will have
increased problems with keeping the power supply for other equipment such as motors etc.
stable.
This problem will become more severe on a dedicated high speed railway due to the lower
frequency of trains. Normally the problem is worst for the first train in the morning.
The snow packing is also a well known problem. Depending on the location of the snow packing
it might also be a safety issue. E.g. if the snow packing is located in the bogie it might lead to a
negative effect for the running comfort including stability.
As it is today the use of dynamic brake system vs. the pneumatic brake is a potential issue
during wintertime. Maximising the dynamic brake is positive due to cost savings, less wear of
brake pads and discs. Unfortunately this can have a negative effect on the pneumatic brake
performance. With long distances between stops the result can be that ice building up on brake
pads will lower the brake performance. The lowered brake performance is only revealed when
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the pneumatic brake is applied and the initial performance is lower than the system (e.g.
ATC/ERTMS) anticipated.
To avoid this on the Class 73/73B in Norway an automatic de-icing function has been included
that applies a low brake force for some seconds every 3-4 minutes to ensure that the friction
coefficient is as anticipated.
Some other systems that might be affected by these conditions are:
•
main transformer
•
line converters
•
suspension
•
air supply system
•
tilting
1.5.6.1.4 Ventilation inlets
This has been identified as potential issue for high speed train. In existing trains in Norway the
ventilation inlets for passenger HVAC system and for cooling technical equipment are usually
placed high up on the coach side or integrated in the roof. One of the reasons for this choice of
locations is to reduce the risk of snow and ice getting into the ventilation inlets and further on
into the ventilation system.
1.5.6.1.5 Train picking up ballast and snow blasting between underframe and track
This has been identified as a potential issue for high speed trains. The problem is that the
packed snow and ice under the trains falls down and together with the ballast bounces between
the track and the underframe of the train.
This can result in:
•
Damage to hatches and other equipment located in the underframe or bogies.
•
Damage to the rail because of ballast coming between the wheels and rail.
•
The ballast and ice being thrown away from the train. This can cause safety issues for
people standing near the track e.g. on stations when a train is passing.
Obviously this is also a risk for existing trains running in “conventional speed” but the probability
and consequences will increase with higher speed. A reduction of this probability involves
infrastructure (ballast level), shape of the rolling stock’s underframe and lowering of speed.
1.5.6.1.6 Crosswinds on exposed areas
This has been identified as a potential issue for all kind of trains for scenario C and D.
Assuming a new high speed line is built one has to consider if the new route also will lead to
potential increased crosswinds from the infrastructure such as on bridges over open water.
The risk of rolling stock impact from crosswinds increases with increased running speed. Since
the factor of crosswinds is more likely to be an issue in curves the combination of crosswinds,
tilting trains and curves is a potential issue.
The general aerodynamic design of the train will affect the impact from crosswinds.
1.5.6.1.7 Maintenance concepts concerning de-icing
This has been identified as potential issue for all three concepts of trains both for scenarios C
and D.
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Given scenarios C and D the maintenance concept for de-icing of all concepts of trains could
possibly be affected. For high speed trains the potential issues are related to the items above
such as snow packing etc. The concerns for tilting trains and others in this matter are related to
new railway lines and if this will have an impact to the known issues that exist in service today.
E.g. will the new line have the result that the ice/snow growth on existing trains will change in
any way and by that realize so far unrevealed problems with those trains?
Another topic is the future capacity and method of de-icing the trains. This is linked to the
question of building new workshops for maintenance or incorporating the maintenance in
existing facilities which also relies on which operator will service the line. The length of existing
high speed trains is varying but on average they are approximately 200 m. This creates the
demand for a rather large facility for the maintenance. Also the need for special equipment in
maintaining future trains is not known today, hence the feasibility of incorporating maintenance
in existing workshops with modifications is not known. It is likely that the new trains will need
totally new workshop and this requires a large free land area.
1.5.6.2 Route alignment
This has been identified as a potential issue for all kind of trains for scenarios C and D. When
building new high speed lines one should be aware of the impact the max gradient will have on
brakes and traction system.
The route alignment and stopping pattern will have an impact on both the acceleration and
deceleration duty cycle. A route containing more gradients and more frequent stops will
increase the energy consumption and result in increased maintenance cost due to higher wear
and tear of brake and bogie equipment.
Long gradients are a potential issue for all kinds of trains for scenarios C and D. With long
downhill slopes the risk of overheating the brake discs is always a factor; it could be reduced by
recuperation brakes. If the new high speed railway is built and it deviates from the existing
railway when it comes to extended length of slopes, this might add an additional requirement on
the trains of today concerning brake performance.
For the high speed trains this potential additional requirement can be added in the specifications
to the suppliers but one should be aware of the potential cost increase resulting from deviating
from proven design. Seen from that perspective a new high speed railway must not be made in
a way that excludes the possibility of using existing train concepts with proven design.
The number and radius of curves will affect the average speed. This is also linked to energy
cost and passenger comfort with rapid speed changes. The maintenance cost for the track will
also be affected in the case of a tilting train which has the possibility for higher speed through
curves which will lead to increased lateral track forces.
It is important to look at the railway system as one system including infrastructure and rolling
stock when deciding the route alignment.
1.5.6.3 Pressure pulses
1.5.6.3.1 Entering tunnels and passing trains in tunnel
This has been identified as a potential issue for all kind of trains in scenarios C and D.
The primary pressure pulse is generated by the train front and secondary by the train tail. In
multiple services the coupling area can also result in a pressure pulse. For a line only operated
with high speed trains the potential issues are not seen as special for Norway. There are
several high speed railways currently operating with extensive tunnelling e.g. the Shinkansen
services in Japan.
The current high speed trains (including Airport Express train and Class 73/73B in Norway) are
equipped with pressure protection systems to reduce the impact from sudden changes in
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pressure when travelling through tunnels or passing other trains. These protection systems can
be pressure sealed external doors and gangways. The trains should be designed to be aerodynamical efficient to reduce the impact from pressure changes.
If existing trains including freight trains are running on the high speed lines it should be noted
that the existing trains might not be designed for the pressure pulses that can occur when
meeting a high speed train at full speed in tunnels. This could cause discomfort for passengers
and train crew.
Reference is made to the TSI relating to the rolling stock subsystem of the transeuropean high
speed rail system section 4.2.6.4 where the requirements are listed.
Due to the fact that the aerodynamic forces introduced are dependant on speed, shape of the
rolling stock and shape/size of the cross-section it is recommended that an aerodynamic
analysis is done when the railway system is specified.
1.5.6.3.2 Passing fixed installations
This has been identified as a potential issue for all kind of trains in scenario C and D. The effect
passing trains could have on fixed installations like noise barriers should be assessed from the
infrastructure perspective. Repeated passing with high forces acting on fixed installation could
lead to a fatigue issue.
1.5.6.4 Collisions with animals
This has been identified as a potential issue for high speed trains. In the evaluation model this
issue is not classified as critical for tilting trains and other trains. Norwegian operators have
experience of collisions with animals at speeds up to 210 km/h. This leads to service
disturbances and additional maintenance cost but is not seen as a safety issue today.
There is limited experience with collisions at 300 km/h. The energy released in a collision in
300 km/h is significantly higher than at 200 km/h. Information of animal collisions in Norway
from the recent years is compiled in the following:
Figure 63: Number of animal collisions 31
31
Cp. [68].
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Figure 64: Animal collisions 2009 according to type of animal 32
Looking at high speed trains, the probability of hitting an obstacle is maybe the same but the
consequences are more critical and the risk for derailment increases.
One potential solution to this is to build fences combined with animal bridges along the track to
prevent animal access to the track but this solution might not be feasible due the hindrance of
migration of wild animals such as reindeers and moose. Also the cost for fencing would be high.
Even with fencing the trains have to be capable of withstanding a hit at maximum speed since a
fence is not 100 % safe when it comes to stopping animals accessing the track. This is
something that has to be evaluated in the specification and design phase for the rolling stock.
The existing tilting trains (73/73B) in Norway have a reinforced steel plough to prevent damages
to the front of the train and to reduce the risk of obstacles getting under the train. Besides the
task of preventing obstacles getting under the train the plough also have a task of clearing the
track of snow.
1.5.6.5 Fire and evacuation - Potential for having longer tunnels for high speed?
This has been identified as a potential issue for all kind of trains for scenarios C and D. The
tunnel length will probably increase when building a high speed line compared to existing
infrastructure. This will also lead to a more demanding evacuation scenario in case of fire
compared to today’s solution. In what way this will affect the new trains and the existing on, is
not assessed but it might have an impact. This is depending on the length, width, type of tunnel,
evacuation possibilities, smoke removal systems etc.
The requirement today in TSI for Safety in railway tunnels is that the tunnels should be
equipped with a platform running through the tunnel if the tunnel length exceeds 500 m.
The general comment is that the evacuation strategy for tunnels must be a common one
between infrastructure and rolling stock.
1.5.6.6 External noise
The emitted noise from a train comes from train systems (engines etc), wheel rail interface and
aerodynamic effects. The emitted noise is higher for high speed trains and the noise from
aerodynamic effects becomes more significant with higher speed.
32
Cp. [68].
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For high speed trains the requirements for noise are specified in the TSI for high speed rolling
stock and for conventional trains in the TSI for noise.
1.5.6.7 Length of train
1.5.6.7.1 Pantograph spacing in case of multiple service
This has been identified as a potential issue for high speed trains and tilting trains for scenarios
C and D. It is not linked to tilt or not, more linked to length of the trains.
The potential issue is the minimum distance between pantographs when running in multiple
operation, given one pantograph per train. The potential problem is the setting of an oscillation
in the overhead line resulting in pantograph bouncing on the second pantograph and damage to
the overhead line.
As long as most of the high speed trains today are approximately 200 m long the potential issue
can be disregarded. For the other EMU’s operating on the same line the issue can rise if the
distance between pantographs in multiple operation is less than in today’s service.
1.5.6.7.2 Platform lengths
This has been identified as a potential issue for high speed trains for scenario C. Where high
speed trains run on existing track it might be an issue with the existing stations that do not have
platform lengths to align with the new trains.
1.5.6.8 Signalling - ERTMS
This has been identified as potential issue for scenario D regarding tilting and other trains and
also potential issue for all trains in scenario C.
For trains (new or old) running on track equipped with other signalling system (ERTMS or ATC)
than fitted to the trains the rolling stock needs to be equipped with a translator module. (E.g. for
existing trains with ATC, a STN device must be installed to be able to run on line with ATC2
installed.)
This depends on the general strategy and time schedule for the implementation of ERTMS in
Norway and is not seen as critical.
1.5.6.9 Track impact
The track impact is both the forces acting on the track from the rolling stock affecting the track
alignment and the wear of the rail. This has been identified as a potential issue for all trains for
scenarios C and D.
The track impact and consequently the maintenance cost for the track is dependant on speed
and axle load amongst others. The impact from the heavy freight trains will probably be most
significant resulting in higher maintenance cost and more time consuming work on the line
which will affect the overall capacity on the line.
Also the fact that the lateral forces to the track are higher for tilting trains than others it is
recommended that this should be assessed.
1.5.6.10 Energy consumption
This has been identified as a potential issue for all trains for scenarios C and D, and for tilting
trains and others for scenario B. Due to the fact that the energy consumption is highly
dependant on the service speed it is obvious that a high speed train will consume more energy
than a conventional train running at 160 km/h. The alignment of the track will also affect the
energy consumption.
Page 170 of (270)
The potential issue for existing trains for scenarios C and D is more linked to the overall energy
consumption of building a new railway, hence not fully belonging to the trains. The potential
issue with scenario B is due to the overall speed increase it is hoped to gain from making
smaller adjustments to the track.
All electrical trains and locomotives running on Norwegian tracks have an energy meter
connected to JBV for automatic measurement of actual used energy. This is to secure that the
operators pay for the actual usage of energy provided.
1.5.7 Information of existing & future trains
This section contains a brief description of the existing and future high speed concepts “to
come” from some manufacturers. It has been difficult to get information concerning the future
concepts and products due to confidentiality issues. Some of the manufacturers are working on
new concepts including high speed tilting trains (approx 250km/h) but it has not been possible
to obtain more information.
The full list with the obtained information is shown in Annex 8.
1.5.7.1 Bombardier Transportation
Bombardier Transportation is a rolling stock company with head office for railway industry in
Berlin. It is owned by Bombardier Inc., Montreal, Canada. Bombardier bought Adtranz from
Daimler Chrysler in 2001 with Scandinavian Sites in Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Adtranz
delivered the Airport Express train and tilting Class 73/73B to Norway.
The concepts name for the Bombardier very high speed trains is Zefiro (up to 350 km/h).
Zefiro is delivered to several operators. One is 50 trainsets of the V300 in a co-operation
between Bombardier and AnsaldoBreda for the Italian railways Trenitalia. Bombardier also has
other products in the speed range of up to 250 km/h including double deckers that are planned
to be delivered to SBB (Swiss railways) in 2013-2014.
Figure 65: Zefiro train 33
1.5.7.2 Siemens
Siemens AG is a German engineering company that is the largest in Europe, active in various
sectors like transport and energy.
The concept name for the Siemens actual high speed train family is Velaro.
It is in use in several countries like Spain (AVE, S 103), Germany (ICE 3) and Russia (Sapsan).
Specifically the trains to Russia should be of interest due to its low temperature requirement of
-50ºC.
33
Source: Bombardier.
Page 171 of (270)
Siemens has delivered the new metro car to Oslo, the MX3000.
Figure 66: Velaro train 34
1.5.7.3 AnsaldoBreda
AnsaldoBreda SPA is a transport company based in Italy. It was formed in 2001 by the merger
of Ansaldo Trasporti and Breda Costruzioni Ferroviarie.
The high speed train V 250 (called Fyra) from AnsaldoBreda is today in service between the
Netherlands and Belgium. It connects Amsterdam and Brussels via Schipol, Rotterdam and
Antwerp.
AnsaldoBreda has delivered the IC4 diesel inter city train to Denmark. This project is delayed
several years.
Figure 67: V250 35
1.5.7.4 Alstom
Alstom is a French multinational company and active within the energy and transport sector.
The new AGV is an EMU and partly based on the design philosophy of the TGV and fully in
compliance with TSI. It can be delivered as single or double-decker for even more dense
service. The Italian newcomer NTV (Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatore) has ordered 25 AVE
trainsets.
Alstom has delivered all TGV’s (push and pull trains) to SNCF, Eurostar and Thalys.
34
Source: Yrithinnd, wikipedia.de.
35
Source: AnsaldoBreda.
Page 172 of (270)
Figure 68: AGV train 36
1.5.7.5 Stadler
Stadler is a Swiss owned company that have been successful and growth a lot the last 10
years.
Stadler focus on delivering regional trains and trams. They do not have a dedicated high speed
concept.
Stadler will deliver the new NSB regional / intercity train FLIRT (Class 74). Maximum speed is
200 km/h. Stadler also delivered trams to Bergen Bybane.
Figure 69: Flirt to NSB 37
1.5.7.6 Hyundai Rotem
Hyundai Rotem is a South Korean company manufacturing rolling stock, defence products and
plant equipment. It is part of the Hyundai Motor Group.
It has delivered trains to KORAIL Korea Train eXpress (KTX) which is the South Korea's highspeed rail system.
1.5.7.7 Kawasaki
Kawasaki is an international company based in Japan.
36
Source: Alstom.
37
[69].
Page 173 of (270)
They have been involved in the Shinkansen project together with Hitachi and in the delivery to
Taiwan High Speed rail.
1.5.7.8 China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Corporation Limited (CSR)
CSR is state own Chinese company that produces a lots of rolling stock for the Chinese market
and also abroad.
The Polaris family is currently offered for sale in Europe. As of today the Polaris is not fit for
purpose concerning the UIC-profile but an upgrade will be developed that will meet the
demands regarding profile, platforms etc. Today the power car is electro-diesel, but will be
made available as only electro version, enabling passenger seats also in the power cars. New
version of Polaris will also be delivered with optional tilt.
1.5.7.9 Hitachi
Recently Hitachi delivered the latest Shinkansen Series E5 and E6 high speed trains. These
trains are supposed to partially run in areas with winter conditions similar to northern Europe.
The UK Class 395 was delivered for service on CTRL (Channel Tunnel Rail Link), the first
dedicated high speed railway in UK. The fleet introduction was in two stages.
•
A preview service with a limited number of trains (carrying passengers) started in June
2009 and
•
The full fleet service started in December 2009.
Figure 70: UK 395 38
1.5.7.10 Mitsubishi
Mitsubishi is a Japanese company who has delivered Maglev both for Airport Services and for
intercity service. Maglev is a relative new technology using magnetic levitations. This method
has the potential to be faster, quieter and smoother than wheeled rail systems.
38
Source: Sunil060902, en.wikipedia.org.
Page 174 of (270)
Figure 71: Maglev train 39
1.5.8 Absolute requirements for Rolling Stock
The absolute requirements for future trains are dependant on a variety of factors like
commercial, technical and environmental requirements.
The aspect of choosing proven design is certainly important and must play a vital roll when
rolling stock is to be specified and procured.
Today’s standards and norms including TSI’s might change in the future. New trains for Norway
will be required to be specified and built in accordance with the standards at that date.
If the train was to be decided today the absolute requirement should have been derived out of
the following regulations:
1. TSI’s adopted by Norway
2. Technical regulation JD5xx by JBV
3. Safety regulations by NRI (Statens Jernbanetilsyn Sikkerhetsforskriften)
A reference is also made to the part concerning standards.
This is also applicable for future potential high speed freight trains.
1.5.9 Remember list when buying trains
This list includes some areas that are important when buying trains. The list can be extended in
the next phase of the project.
39
•
Evaluate if magnetic track brake is needed and what kind, conventional or eddy current
•
New workshops, maintenance facility, location, de-icing capacity
•
Train capacity, train length, seating density, single or double decker
•
Requirements for RAMS
•
Requirements for redundant systems
•
People with reduced mobility, low floor area and entrance
•
Platform heights
•
Tilting or non tilting
•
Width of the train, gauging
Source: Stahlkocher, en.wikipedia.org.
Page 175 of (270)
•
Signalling system
•
•
Total power consumption including regenerative brake
•
Adaption’s for Norwegian winter conditions, snow plough, snow packing, crash
worthiness due to avalanches
•
Sanding system: Sanding on rails gives a better friction during acceleration and braking.
Page 176 of (270)
2 Subject – Risk Assessment
2.0
Introduction
Purpose of the High-Speed Rail Assessment Phase 1 was to give a total overview and
presentation of the knowledge base that exists in Norway, including the final report on highspeed rail in Sweden [70].
Within the task of the Technical and Safety Analysis of Phase 2 a risk analysis according to the
RAMS standard EN 50126 was carried out for high-speed operations on a Norwegian highspeed infrastructure.
The analysis identifies relevant hazards and its associated incident rates and consequences.
Incident rates and consequences are integrated into a judgement, or estimation, of risk levels.
The risk analysis considered two different system variants and eight top-events.
Through the elaboration of the model the assessment provides the following results:
•
Definition of Risk Acceptance Criteria;
•
Hazard Identification;
•
Consequence Analysis;
•
Residual risk, calculation model
The generic calculation model is fitted to ensure changes in top-events and / or scenarios in
later project phases.
2.1
Summary
Chapters 2.5.3.4 to 2.5.3.10.8 include detailed descriptions regarding the underlying model for
the estimation/calculation of the residual risk (collective and individual risk) for every defined
top-event.
Table 51 subsume the results and give an overview of the residual risks determined by point
estimate of the two different potential high-speed system variants (see chapter 2.4) as well as
the status quo 40 concerning the risk in the Norwegian railway system (existing net).
Table 51: Residual risk related to Top-Events, overview
Top-Event
Residual Risk
Derailment
Collision train-train
Collision train-object
Fire
Passenger injured at
platform
40
41
41
Existing Net
System-Variant 1
System-Variant 2
Collective risk
0.322
0.900
1.578
Individual risk
6.95E-06
1.95E-05
3.41E-05
Collective risk
0.042
0.118
0.045
Individual risk
3.61E-06
1.01E-05
3.89E-06
Collective risk
1.155
3.235
5.668
Individual risk
2.27E-05
6.35E-05
1.11E-04
Collective risk
0.049
0.090
0.131
Individual risk
1.21E-07
2.22E-07
3.23E-07
Collective risk
3.891
4.094
3.911
Individual risk
2.25E-05
2.37E-05
2.26E-05
Values for collective and individual risk evaluated on base of ERADIS-statistics [83].
Values for collective risk are given as “Equivalent fatalities/year”, values for individual risk are given as “Equivalent
fatalities/person * year”.
Page 177 of (270)
Top-Event
Residual Risk
Level crossing accidents
Collective risk
41
Individual risk
System-Variant 1
System-Variant 2
0.982
1.033
Not applicable
1.11E-06
1.17E-06
Not applicable
1.900
1.999
1.949
Individual risk
5.69E-06
5.98E-06
5.83E-06
Collective risk
0.333
0.350
0.350
Individual risk
2.10E-06
2.21E-06
2.21E-06
Person injured at track side Collective risk
Other accidents
Existing Net
In Table 52 the results regarding the estimated residual collective risk 42 for the different groups
of persons are subsumed. Table 53 shows the determined residual collective risk-values for the
different rail-systems und benchmarks the point estimated results as well as the lower end
estimations (see also chapter 2.6) with the tolerable number of 11 fatalities per year defined by
JBV (see chapter 2.5.1.2).
Table 52: Residual collective risk, overview
Rail-System
Residual collective risk for
passengers
Residual collective risk
for 3rd persons
Residual collective risk
for personal
Existing Net
0.677
7.531
0.465
System-Variant 1
1.120
9.778
0.920
System-Variant 2
1.555
11.733
1.327
Table 53: Residual collective risk, point estimate overview
Rail-System
Residual collective risk,
overall, point estimation
Residual collective risk,
overall, lower end
Comment
Existing Net
8.674
-
JBVs collective risk criteria fulfilled
System-Variant 1
11.818
8.731
considering lower end risk estimation.
Slightly exceedance of criteria by point
estimate
System-Variant 2
14.615
8.764
considering lower end risk estimation.
Significant exceedance of criteria by
point estimate
An extrapolation of the collective risk of the Norwegian railway net assuming 5% additional
mixed traffic as in the existing railway net results in an expected higher residual collective risk
(9.125 equivalent fatalities per year) compared to the lower end estimations shown in the above
table.
JBVs risk acceptance criteria regarding personal (1st persons) is defined as less than
12.5 fatalities per 100’000’000 working hours (see chapter 2.5.1.2), respectively 1.25E-07
fatalities/working hour. As shows this risk criteria is fulfilled for both assumed system-variants.
42
Values for collective risk are given as “Equivalent fatalities / year”.
Page 178 of (270)
Table 54: Residual collective risk of personal 43 . overview
Rail-System
personal [EqFa / year]
personal [EqFa / working hrs]
Comment
0.465
3.45E-08
JBVs individual risk criteria for 1
persons fulfilled
st
Existing Net
0.920
6.81E-08
persons fulfilled
st
System-Variant 1
1.327
9.83E-08
persons fulfilled
st
System-Variant 2
Table 55 shows the estimated residual individual risk-values 44 for the different rail-systems und
benchmarks the results with the respective boundary value (0.0001 fatalities / person * year) by
JBV (see chapter 2.5.1.2).
Table 55: Residual individual risk of passengers and 3rd persons. overview
Rail-System
Residual individual risk.
Residual individual Residual individual
passengers & 3rd persons risk for passengers risk for 3rd persons
Comment
Existing Net
2.74E-06
2.26E-07
2.51E-06
JBVs individual risk
criteria fulfilled
System-Variant 1
3.63E-06
3.73E-07
3.26E-06
criteria fulfilled
stem-Variant 2
4.43E-06
5.18E-07
3.91E-06
criteria fulfilled
43
Residual collective risk fro personal based on assumed 13.5 Mio. working hours per year [83].
44
Values for individual risk are given as “Equivalent fatalities / person * year”.
Page 179 of (270)
2.2
Definitions
Table 56: Definitions
Term
Description
accident
an unintended event or series of events that results in death, injury, loss of system or service, or
environmental damage [71]
collective risk
the risk from a product, process or system to which a population or group of people (or the society as a
whole) is exposed [71]
Comment: Collective risk is often termed as societal risk
commercial risk
the rate of occurrence and the severity of financial loss, which may be associated with an accident or
undesirable event [71]
environmental risk
the rate of occurrence and the severity of extent of contamination and/or destruction of an natural habitat
which may arise from an accident [71]
equivalent fatality
a convention for combining injuries and fatalities into one figure for ease of processing and comparison [71]
failure
A failure is the termination of the ability of an item to perform the required function [71]
hazard
a condition that could lead to an accident [71]
hazardous event
“Hazard event” is used but not be defined in EN 50126-1. It should be noted that the term, as used in the
standard, is not consistently related to a hazard only. In most cases, the term has been used in the standard
to mean an “accident” and should be interpreted as such [71]
individual risk
the risk from a product, process or system to which an individual person is exposed [71]
Railway Authority
In EN 50126-1 this term is defined as:
The body with the overall accountability to a Regulator for operating a railway system. [71]
risk
the rate of occurrence of accidents and incidents resulting in harm (caused by a hazard) and the degree of
severity of that harm (interpretation according to [71])
safety barrier
a system or action, intended to reduce the rate of an hazard or a likely accident arising from an hazard
and/or mitigate the severity of the likely accident The effectiveness will depend on the extent of the
independence [71]
tolerable risk
EN 50126-1 [72] defines this term as the maximum level of risk of a product that is acceptable to the
Railway Authority (RA)
The RA is responsible for agreeing the risk acceptance criteria and the risk acceptance levels with the
Safety Regulatory Authority (SRA) and providing these to the Railway Support Industry (RSI). Usually, it is
the SRA or the RA by agreement with the SRA that defines risk acceptance levels. Risk acceptance levels
currently depend on the prevailing national legislation or national/other regulations. In many countries risk
acceptance levels have not yet been established and are still in progress and/or under consideration [71]
2.3
Purpose of the HSR-risk assessment
The risk assessment at hand shall provide a calculation model which is suitable to determine an
expected residual risk of a new High-Speed-Rail-System in Norway. The result shall consider as
well the risk for a single person (individual risk) as also the risk for the society (collective risk).
As another aspect the estimated risk shall be comparable with risk acceptance criteria. As it is
an attribute of any risk analysis- or prediction-model the quality of the result of the suggested
models strongly depends on the quality / reliability of the available input parameters. In this
phase of the risk assessment all values shall be interpreted as examples only.
2.4
Scope of the HSR-risk assessment
As a requirement on the part of JBV [73] the risk assessment should contain concepts based on
the existing network and InterCity strategy and on the other side mainly separated high-speed
lines. Due to the fact that according to JBV specific corridors shall not be considered for the
analysis at this phase and a final decision concerning technical solutions is not available at the
time of the performance of this risk assessment. Two principal system-variants have been
Page 180 of (270)
appointed in order to have a principal differentiation for the risk assessment. Both systemvariants represent “extreme” developments and all other potential concepts can be analyzed
using the risk model described in chapter 2.5.3 et seq.
•
System-variant 1: The first principal variant is represented by an upgrade of an existing
track to be a High Speed Rail track.
•
System-variant 2: The second variant is represented by a complete new track, which is
used exclusively by high speed trains.
The following descriptions identify the typical attributes of both variants.
2.4.1 System-variant 1
Attributes of the rolling stock in system-variant 1 are:
•
maximum speed is 200 km/h for high-speed-trains
•
mixed traffic (high-speed-trains, conventional passenger trains, freight trains)
•
mainly tilting vehicles used for high-speed-trains
•
F-ATC on the system-level
•
ETCS not used
Attributes of the track are:
•
mixture of single and double track line
•
ballasted track
•
signalling allows trains operating in both directions
•
several (old) level crossings on the not upgraded part of the line
•
higher number of stations (for passenger and for crossing of trains) compared to systemvariant 2
•
higher time and effort related to track maintenance
•
long period for upgrade of the existing system while operation at the same time
•
increased passing of urban agglomerations compared to system-variant 2
•
lower maximum incline compared to system-variant 2
•
less percentage of tunnel trackway compared to the system-variant 2
•
maximal length of tunnels less compared to the system-variant 2
•
percentage of bridges trackway less compared to the system-variant 2
•
maximal length/maximal height of bridges less compared to the system-variant 2
Attributes of the traffic mode are:
•
bimodal passenger traffic (long-distance and local transport)
•
bimodal traffic (freight trains/mass passenger transport/HSR-trains)
•
transit of regional stations with stopping or speed reduction
2.4.2 System-variant 2
Attributes of the high speed rolling stock in system-variant 2 are:
•
maximum speed is 300 km/h
Page 181 of (270)
•
none-tilting vehicles
•
ETCS at all trains
Attributes of the track are:
•
single track line
•
exclusively slab track
•
very stable track leads to decreased maintenance compared to system-variant 1
•
passing points allow trains operating in both directions
•
no level crossings
•
reduced passing of urban agglomerations compared to system-variant 1 (fractional track
routing parallel to speedway or highway)
•
increased contingent of profile fixing (lanes/embankments) compared to the systemvariant 1
•
increased contingent compared to scenario of parts of track with increased sensitivity to
side wind
•
higher maximum incline compared to system-variant 1
•
increased percentage of tunnel trackway compared to the system-variant 1
•
maximal length of tunnels higher compared to the system-variant 1
•
increased percentage of bridges trackway compared to the system-variant 1
•
maximal length/maximal height of bridges higher compared to the system-variant 1
Attributes of the traffic mode are:
•
no regional transport
•
exclusively High Speed traffic
•
no transit through regional stations (trains circumscribe without stopping or any speed
reduction)
•
complete new stations (platform not in curves)
2.5
Risk assessment, general approach
General approaches for risk assessments for railway systems are described in various
standards and vary in different industrial sectors [74]. The risk assessment for HSR Norway,
which is described in this document, is based on the European railway standard [72] and
consists of four work packages:
•
Definition of risk acceptance criteria;
•
Hazard identification and assessment of consequences;
•
Probability and frequency;
•
Determination of risks.
Due to the fact that European Standards, particularly [72], do not provide a normative risk
tolerability criterion a suggestion has been developed concerning risk tolerability for the planned
Norwegian high speed rail project. This suggestion considers as well Common Safety Methods
(CSM) of the European Railway Authority (ERA) as safety guidelines of the Norwegian National
Rail Administration Jernbaneverket (JBV).
Page 182 of (270)
2.5.1 Risk acceptance criteria, general introduction
The construction of a safe, modern integrated railway network is one of the EU’s major
priorities. Railways must become more competitive and offer high quality, end-to-end services
without being restricted by national borders. The European Railway Agency (ERA) was set up
to help create this integrated railway area by reinforcing safety and interoperability. With the
final constitution of the ERA in 2006 major safety tasks, such as to establish Common Safety
Targets (CST) and monitor the safety performance on Europe’s railways, have been assigned
to this organisation. Internationally a number of different risk assessment methodologies and
risk acceptance criteria have been used to date. Examples for risk acceptance criteria given in
[71] are Minimum Endogenous Mortality (MEM), Globalement Au Moins Equivalent (GAME) and
As Low As Reasonable Practicable (ALARP). For all risk assessments it is essential to establish
the methodology followed by the definition of targets of risk acceptability. Due to different
national laws and provisions even in the recent past no Europe-wide risk acceptance criteria
has been accepted and practised. As a result of this situation safety targets vary and they
usually base on the same principle as the chosen methodology for the risk assessment. To this
day safety targets are derived for example as tolerable limits for a whole system, e.g. for the rail
system in a specific country, or they are allocated to specific risk causes, e.g. hazards related to
the system or sub-systems.
With date of 24.04.2009 and the regulation No. 352/2009 [75] of the commission of the
European community a binding base for the performance of risk analysis is available.
http://www.eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:108:0004:0019:DE:PDF
The European Railway Agency has also published a common method for the evaluation and
assessment of risk in a guideline [76] at the date of 06.01.2009.
http://www.era.europa.eu/Document-Register/Documents/ERA-2009-0048-00-00-EN.pdf
Considering the common safety methods for the evaluation and assessment of risks in
accordance to the EC-regulation [75] one of the following three risk acceptance criteria can be
used:
•
Code of practice (TSI, notified national regulations, European standards);
•
Similar reference system;
•
Explicit risk estimation and harmonized risk acceptance criteria.
These three principles are exchangeable and there is no demand for a ranking between them.
For the HSR Norway risk assessment the team proposes explicit risk estimation and the
comparison of the estimated risks with harmonized risk acceptance criteria regarding collective
and individual risk. In addition the Risk Acceptance Criteria for Technical Systems (RAC-TS)
[75] [91] shall apply for functional safety aspects. Both approaches are described in the
following chapters.
2.5.1.1 Risk Acceptance Criteria for Technical Systems (RAC-TS)
For the HSR Norway risk assessment the team proposes the appliance of explicit risk
estimation and the harmonized Risk Acceptance Criteria for Technical Systems (RAC-TS) [75]
[91].
Risk Acceptance Criteria for Technical Systems (RAC-TS):
Any failure mode of a function resulting in a hazard that has a credible immediate potential for
catastrophic consequences shall not occur with a rate of occurrence higher than 10-9 per
operating hour.
The decision for the usage of RAC-TS is mainly justified on the following aspects:
Page 183 of (270)
•
Codes of practice (for example TSI, NNR, European Standards) describe various technical
and operational requirements for rail-systems but they do not consider any quantitative
safety targets or safety integrity requirements.
•
A similar reference system for the planned Norwegian high speed rail project is not
available and sufficient convincing data of such a system are missing not least due to the
short time of operation.
•
RAC-TS has been agreed by UNIFE in the meantime;
•
TSI [77] for High-Speed-Systems give a reference for a tolerable risk which could be
generally applied to new functions or systems: “For the safety related part of one onboard
unit as well as for one trackside unit, the safety requirement for ETCS Level 2 is a tolerable
hazard rate of 10-9 / hour …”.
•
Various projects in different countries have proposed the same target for safety critical
functions (e.g. electronic interlocking) in the railway sector.
•
The approach is used for more than 20 years successfully in the civil-aviation-sector and is
standardized in [78].
For the understanding of RAC-TS the significant notions and the reference conditions have to
be defined:
•
A technical system is a product developed by a supplier including its design,
implementation and support documentation.
1. The development of a technical system starts with its System Requirements
Specification and ends with its safety approval.
2. Human operators and their actions are not part of a technical system.
3. Maintenance is not included in the definition, although maintenance manuals are.
•
[79] defines a function as a specific purpose or objective to be accomplished that can be
specified or described without reference to the physical means of achieving it.
•
[72] describes catastrophic consequences as “Fatalities and/or multiple severe injuries
and/or major damage to the environment”.
•
Credible potential means that it must be likely that the particular failure mode will result in
an accident with catastrophic consequences.
•
Immediate potential in this context means that no credible barrier exists that could prevent
an accident.
It has to be mentioned that the appliance of RAC-TS is limited to functional safety, which can be
seen as the inherent safety aspect of a technical system. All other safety aspects issues, e.g.
operational safety, have to be considered using an alternative risk approach because in those
cases (e.g. avoidance of collisions with 3rd persons on track) RAC-TS is not applicable.
2.5.1.2 Explicit risk estimation and harmonized risk acceptance criteria
Widely used risk acceptance criteria are boundary values for either risk concerning single
persons (individual risk) which are using a (technical) system and for the risk related to a society
(collective risk). Descriptions concerning the usage of boundary values for individual / collective
risks are given amongst others in [72], [74] and [80].
As a further risk acceptance criterion (beside RAC-TS) the following tolerable boundary values,
accepted and used in Norway [81], provide the basis for the risk assessment at hand:
Individual risk:
•
1st person less than 12.5 fatalities/ 100’000’000 working hours;
Page 184 of (270)
•
2nd person (passengers) and 3rd person less than 0.0001 fatalities for the most exposed
individual.
Collective risk:
•
less than 11 fatalities per year for the total railway net
Considering the collective risk it has to be mentioned that for any additional technical system,
such as a potential new high speed rail system, existing risk acceptance values have to be
proofed and where necessary adjusted.
2.5.2 Risk assessment, bottom-up-approach for RAC-TS
As described before, the risk acceptance criteria RAC-TS is proposed for functional safety
aspects of a potential new high-speed railway system in Norway. By the usage of RAC-TS so
called tolerable hazard rates (THR) shall be identified. The bottom-up-approach in this regard
covers the following steps and is described afterwards.
RAC-TS-approach:
1. Hazard-identification;
2. Qualitative consequence (severity) estimation;
3. Evaluation if RAC-TS is applicable for specific hazard;
4. Estimation / quantification of safety barriers and THR-allocation.
2.5.2.1 Hazard identification
Precondition for a risk assessment related to RAC-TS is the correct and complete identification
of all relevant hazards. The hazard identification process used for the HSR-Norway risk analysis
is in line with the approach described in [82]. An empirical phase using structured analysis
(Interface Analysis) and exploiting past experience and a creative phase (brainstorming of
safety experts combined with analysis of different hazard-checklists) increase confidence that
all significant hazards have been identified.
As long as a technical system is not finally defined, the hazard identification has to be
performed on a functional system level. Therefore the system, in this case the planned
Norwegian High-Speed-Rail-System, can be seen as a “Black box”. Hazards depend in
particular on the system boundary and the respective interfaces.
Page 185 of (270)
cause
cause
cause
cause
HSR-systemboundary
sub-system A
cause
cause
22ndnd- levelUrsache
levelUrsache
hazard
hazard
cause
cause
systemsystemlevellevelhazard
hazard
accident
accident
sub-system B
cause
cause
cause
cause
22ndnd- levellevelhazard
hazard
external
external
event
event
Railway-system in total
Figure 72: Hazard identification
System-level-hazards occur at the HSR-systems-boundary while 2nd-level-hazards occur at subsystems-boundary. Generally hazards are directed to the outside. Causes for hazards on the 2nd
level can be divided in internal and external causes.
For a pragmatically approach a high speed rail system, and so the HSR-system, can be divided
in two major sub systems:
•
Rolling stock;
•
Infrastructure.
While rolling stock consists of locomotives/traction vehicle and wagons, the appropriation of
constituent parts of the infrastructure is more complex. Principally all technical parts which are
not related to rolling stock but are needed / used for the operation of the HSR-system, e.g.
tracks, bridges, tunnels, rails, railway control centre, stations, power supply etc., shall be
appropriated to the infrastructure. Considering these aspects the following interfaces at systemboundary can be described:
Table 57: HSR-System, interfaces
No.O
External Interface
1
vehicle ⇒ passenger
2
vehicle ⇒ personnel
3
vehicle ⇒ third party
4
vehicle ⇒ environment
5
infrastructure ⇒ passenger
6
infrastructure ⇒ personnel
7
infrastructure ⇒ third party
8
infrastructure ⇒ environment
2.5.2.2 Qualitative consequence (severity) estimation
The classification of severity level is an essential requirement for the application of RAC-TS,
respectively a risk matrix. Normative classifications are currently not available in the railway
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sector. Corresponding delineations, e.g. in [72] have to be seen only as examples. Concerning
classification / gradation of the different consequences to persons a factor 10 is given
exemplarily in [71] and widely used especially in the rail sector:
1 Equivalent fatality = 1 fatality = 10 major injuries = 100 minor injuries
This consequence classification has been used in the further analysis in this document. If any
other gradations shall apply, the calculation model allows an easy appliance.
Table 58 describes the classification of severity level, which is given exemplarily in [72].
Table 58: Hazard severity level, according to Table 3 in EN 50126-1 45
Severity Level
Consequence to persons or environment
Catastrophic
Fatalities and/or multiple severe injuries and/or major damage to the environment
Critical
Single fatality and/or severe injury and/or significant damage to the environment
Marginal
Minor injury and/or significant threat to the environment
Insignificant
Possible minor injury
So called risk matrices are common tools to express risks in several industry sectors. The semiqualitative matrix which is given as an example in [72] can be adjusted with the target value for
the frequency of occurrence of a hazardous event in order to appoint the reference rate of
occurrence 10-9 per operating hour for catastrophic consequences.
Frequency of occurance of a
hazardous event
Risk Level
Frequent (tbd)
Probable (tbd)
Occasional (tbd)
Remote (tbd)
Improbable (tbd)
Incredible (10-9 per hour)
RAC-TS
tbd
tbd
tbd
Insignificant
Marginal
Critical
> 1 fatality
or multiple
severe
injuries
Catastrophic
Figure 73: Risk matrix with RAC-TS reference value
RAC-TS can be used to calibrate the risk assessment method. For the calibration the tolerable
field “RAC-TS” can be extrapolated linear within the matrix. This means that all fields on that
line or there under represent tolerable risks. Precondition for the extrapolation is that the
categories for severity level at one hand and for the frequency of hazardous events on the other
hand are separated by the same factor. An example is shown in Figure 74.
45
Cp. [72].
Page 187 of (270)
hazardous event
Factor
10
Factor
10
Factor
10
Factor
10
Factor
10
Risk Level
Frequent (10-4 per hour) intolerable
intolerable
intolerable
intolerable
Probable (10-5 per hour) intolerable
intolerable
intolerable
intolerable
Occasional (10-6 per hour)
tolerable
intolerable
intolerable
intolerable
Remote (10-7 per hour)
tolerable
tolerable
intolerable
intolerable
Improbable (10-8 per hour)
tolerable
tolerable
tolerable
intolerable
tolerable
tolerable
tolerable
RAC-TS
Insignificant
Marginal
Critical
Catastrophic
Factor 10
Factor 10
Factor 10
Figure 74: Example for calibration of risk matrix
2.5.2.3 Evaluation if RAC-TS is applicable for specific hazard
RAC-TS can be applied for the risk assessment directly if
46
•
the failure mode relates to a function of the High Speed Rail system and
•
the potential is catastrophic and
•
there are no credible barriers to prevent an accident.
If these aspects apply, a tolerable hazard rate (THR) of THR < 10-9 per hour can be allocated to
the technical function which is related to the specific hazard.
Examples for such functions -> hazards are:
•
Ensure correct setting of points -> undetected wrong setting of points in main line operation;
•
Ensure adequate breakage -> Loss or inadequate breakage;
2.5.2.4 Estimation / quantification of safety barriers and THR-allocation
As described before only in case of immediate potential for a hazardous event the frequency of
occurrence for that specific hazardous event can be deducted directly by reading off the
corresponding value from the risk matrix (see Figure 75). In all other cases of functional safety
the risk matrix has to be applied in respect to the parameters severity level and influence of
barriers. Examples for functions that have no credible immediate potential are
•
Loss of fire extinguishing function;
•
Loss of emergency exit function;
•
Loss of service brake.
The following example describes the THR-allocation in respect to the parameters severity level
and influence of barriers: An actual potential 10 times less than catastrophic consequence
would reduce the requirement also by the factor 10 to 10-8 per hour (see example in Figure 75).
An additional safety barrier which is effective in 50 % of all cases would reduce the requirement
to finally to 5*10-7 per hour.
46
-9
RAC-TS (THR < 10 per hour) can not be applied directly, if either the hazard consequence is not catastrophic or there are
credible barriers to prevent an accident. In those cases the THR has to be adapted as described in chapter 2.5.2.4.
Page 188 of (270)
hazardous event
Risk Level
Frequent (10-4 per hour) intolerable
intolerable
intolerable
intolerable
Probable (10-5 per hour) intolerable
intolerable
intolerable
intolerable
Occasional (10-6 per hour)
tolerable
intolerable
intolerable
intolerable
Remote (10-7 per hour)
tolerable
tolerable
intolerable
intolerable
Improbable (10-8 per hour)
tolerable
tolerable
tolerable
intolerable
tolerable
tolerable
tolerable
RAC-TS
Insignificant
Marginal
Critical
Catastrophic
Severity levels of hazard consequence
Figure 75: Risk matrix applied for hazard with lower severity but credible immediate potential
For the risk assessment at hand and particularly for the identification and dimensioning of
potential consequences the evaluation of data/statistics (see chapter 2.5.3.3) has been used.
The existence and potential of credible barriers to prevent accidents depends significantly on
the architecture / design of a technical system. The influence of safety barriers regarding the
safety of a potential new high-speed rail system in Norway has to be evaluated in a later project
phase considering more detailed information concerning the technical solution.
2.5.2.5 Hazard List with THRs
As the result of the above described bottom-up-approach a semi-qualitative risk assessment
has been worked out. The assessment includes a hazard identification which has been
supplemented by qualitative risk estimation. Out of the hazard summary all hazards, which are
related to functional safety aspects, have been identified and tolerable hazard rates (THR) for
the related system functions have been dedicated. All other hazards that are not related to
functional safety aspects are indicated in the hazard list as not applicable for RAC-TS.
The hazard list, which represents Annex 9 of the document at hand, is directly linked to the
performed top-down risk assessment described in the following chapters. The list includes
information regarding causes as well as regarding potential consequences of hazards. This
information has also been used to quantify the risks in the different system-variants.
Furthermore the hazard list should be seen as a base for following tasks, such as the definition
of tolerable hazard rates for safety functions. For this task detailed information regarding the
technical design of a potential new high-speed rail system is required in order to determine /
quantify the residual risk reduction factors.
2.5.3 Risk Assessment, Top-Down-Approach
In addition to the identification of system-level-hazards by the described bottom-up-approach
the expected residual risk of a new HSR-system has been evaluated using a top-downapproach for the explicit risk estimation. The purpose of this risk estimation is the calculation of
either the expected risk for single persons (individual risk) as well as the risk for the society
(collective risk). The top-down-approach for the risk assessment is characterized by the steps
described in chapter 2.5.3.1 to chapter 2.5.3.8. The model described in the following is suitable
to be fitted accordingly to the awareness / knowledge related to the foreseen technical solution /
planning of a potential new Norwegian high-speed rail system in later project phases. A more
detailed and / or higher quality of data for key figures (values of calculation parameters) should
also be used for an adoption of the suggested calculation model.
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2.5.3.1 Definition of Top-Events
In a first step all relevant so-called Top-Events have been defined. Top-Events can be seen as
accidents with potential severe consequences. Due to the fact that consequences of specific
accidents (e.g. collision) may vary extensively, a differentiation for “collision” as well as for
“injury of person / passenger” seems to be reasonable. For the risk assessment at hand the
following Top-Events have been identified by evaluation of the hazard identification (see chapter
2.5.2.1 and hazard table in the Annex 9). The list of Top-Events is also in accordance with input
on side of JBV. At this point it should be mentioned that in particular JBV’s
Sikkerhetshandboken [81] has been very helpful for this risk assessment.
•
Derailment;
•
Collision train-train;
•
Collision train-object;
•
Fire;
•
Passenger injured at platform;
•
Level crossing accidents;
•
Person injured at track side;
•
Other accidents.
Figure 76: Top-Events, overview
The Top-Event 8 “Other accidents” has been defined in order to consider accidents scenarios
which are not related to the first seven Top-Events. For this phase of the risk assessment
electric shock accidents and affection by dangerous goods are included in the assessment.
Accidents in warehouses, workshops and depots are excluded due to the fact that they are not
captured in the available data [83] [84]. The performed top-down-approach considers the
different system-variants respectively their specific attributes as described in chapter 2.4. For
example the Top-Event “Level crossing accidents” is only relevant for the system variant 1
(upgrade of existing system) because corresponding directives exclude the planning of level
crossings for new high-speed rail systems (system-variant 2). Also the scenarios (effects) in
case of the occurrence of a Top-Event have to be differentiated in respect of the systemvariants (see chapter 2.5.3.4).
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2.5.3.2 Quantification of Top-Events
The top-down-approach is based on the expected occurrence of defined Top-Events itself as
well as on the supposed severity of potential consequences.
For every Top-Event the number of expected events per year had to be determined. In an ideal
case this parameter could have been evaluated by analysis of railway statistics of a comparable
rail system. At this point it has to be mentioned that European statistics [83] mainly allude to
mixed traffic rail systems. Due to this fact those statistics do not enable to directly draw
conclusions regarding a potential exclusively high-speed rail system. On the other hand existing
Norwegian statistics / data [84] do not consider any high-speed aspects. For the risk
assessment at hand the relevant input parameter (number of events per year) has been
evaluated by different activities that complement one another:
•
Analysis of rail statistics and accident reports;
•
Estimations based on judgement.
The first point has been done by evaluation/analysis of available Norwegian rail statistics [84]
(see chapter 2.5.3.3.1) as well as other European statistics [83] (see chapter 2.5.3.3.1 and
2.5.3.3.2) and accident reports. On base of those data the expected frequency of occurrence of
every Top-Event has been estimated for both system-variants 1 and 2. The main question in
this context is, if a potential new High Speed Rail operation would presumably cause changes
of the specific accident rates and / or a change of consequences of accidents, which are
quantified as equivalent fatalities, compared to the actual Norwegian rail situation. In those
cases, where presumable no change is expected, the evaluated data [83] [84] for either
accident rates or number of equivalent fatalities have been applied. For all other cases the
degree of the presumable change of both aspects has been determined by estimation. Reasons
and underlying thoughts/considerations are stated as well as suggestions regarding possible
adoptions of the risk model in further project phases. Evaluations of further and more detailed
statistics, e.g. JBV accident /incident statistics and reports, are advised to minimize the level of
uncertainty of the risk assessment for a potential new Norwegian high-speed rail system.
2.5.3.3 Top-Event, evaluation of rail statistics
2.5.3.3.1 Top-Event, Norwegian rail statistics
For this analysis local data with focus on the Norway Rail System is crucial. The national rail
safety authority “Statens Jernbane tilsyn” releases annual reports concerning safety and
accident statistics [84]. Events per year can be evaluated by analysis of this railway statistics.
According to the scope of work appropriate figures are needed in relation to the determined
Top-Events. The data source [84] provide figures and detailed description incidents but in a
difficult way to evaluate statistically. Reasons for that are:
•
No existence of figures with direct, clear relation to mentioned Top-Events;
•
Different type of data is reported in different ways during the years;
•
Change of definitions (e.g. “railway accident”, and “severe injury”) in the meantime;
•
Change of classifications of events (damage) and definition of requirements for the
classification;
•
Only accidents or events over a certain size (severity) are reported.
This statistic data is published with direct relation to any damage. The total railway traffic is
considered in this report. So events which appear without mentioning and notification are
disregarded. For an exact consideration that part has to be measured. In addition there exists
lack of data. So a continuous and transparent evaluation isn’t possible. Because of that the
following evaluations were made and some conclusions were drawn:
Page 191 of (270)
Average number of derailments has decreased over the last 50 years (40 per year to 5 to 10 per
year in 2009). The most derailments today appear on freight trains. Furthermore it becomes
considerable that today’s derailments don’t cause any fatalities or severe injuries under normal
circumstances. Damages on material and/or environment are the consequences which have to
be considered.
Also the number of level crossing accidents has decreased during the last 50 years from an
average of 40 per year to 5 to 10 per year. During the years 1995 and 2004 a sum of 116 level
crossing accidents occurred. Because of that, a number of 28 persons were killed and 8
persons were severely injured.
The outcome of the Top-Event “collision train-train” varies in the period 1978 to 2005 between 0
and 5 accidents per year. The trend is constant with an average of slightly more than one
collision per year. This is the type of accident that has caused the most fatalities (passengers
and employees). Due to the fact of the difficult evaluation it has not been possible to extract the
exact numbers of fatalities. Catastrophic collisions with multiple fatalities occur, but not
frequently, the latest occurred in year 2000.
The occurrence of “collision train-object” varies extremely over the last years. Between 1978
and 2005 an amount of 0 to 17 accidents appears per year. The trend is slightly increasing with
an average level around 6 accidents per year. It has been estimated that about the half of these
accidents are due to slide of snow, ice or stone.
One scenario for person injured at platform is when using the entrance system to get in or off
the train. Since the changed definition of railway accidents in this statistic this Top-Event
presumes only vehicle in motion. That means, accidents related to the entrance system are not
reported in the reports after 2003. Before 2003 several severe injuries were mentioned in the
description (employees and 3rd party), unfortunately no figures were presented.
Also no figures were published concerning the Top-Event “fire”. For fire in vehicle some severe
injuries are mentioned because of the consequence of smoke inhalation. We also know that
there has been a severe fire accident in Åsta.
It has not been possible to separate the Top-Event “person injured at track side” from “person
injured at level crossing” before year 2006. In addition several (84) incidents without
consequences mentioned in year 2000 normally closed to Top-Event “person injured at track
side”. But in the same year there have been some fatalities and severe injuries.
2.5.3.3.2 Other Data Sources
The following data sources have been assessed additionally to the statistical data above:
•
ERADIS - Common Safety Indicators Database from ERA (ERADIS-CSID)
•
UIC Safety Database (UIC-SDB)
Up to the year 2005 information on safety performance of the European railways has been
difficult to find. The Safety Directive 2004/49 introduces common safety indicators (CSIs), which
have to be collected by the national safety authorities and delivered to the ERA. Due to this fact
a standardized method for collecting and reporting accident data has been accomplished for the
years 2006-2009. The ERADIS-CSID reports accumulated accident data for each supplying
country (29 countries + Eurotunnel). For the report at hand, the accident statistics of Germany,
France, Norway and Sweden have been evaluated.
The UIC Safety Database (UIC-SDB) is an internet application organised within the
Infrastructure Forum activities. It is continuously maintained and developed in agreement with
the Safety Platform, according to the necessities introduced by safety managers and EU bodies.
The Safety Platform brings together safety directors (or employees with a comparable remit in
line with the job titles used and corporate structure) from member companies of the UIC.
Amongst these is a mixture of Infrastructure Managers and Railway Undertakings as well as a
Page 192 of (270)
number of organisations such as ATOC in the UK, representing groups of railway companies.
This plenary structure is then supported by a core group made up of UIC member companies
based in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Italy, Japan, Poland, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland and United States of America. Considerable additional independence is
provided by having representatives from organisations such as the Community of the European
Railways (CER), European Rail Infrastructure Managers (EIM) and Railway Safety Standards
and Boards (RSSB) in Europe and FRA/AAR in the USA.
Overall 20 European countries supply accident data to the UIC-SDB and for the statistical
analysis all data has been evaluated.
2.5.3.3.3 Definitions
The UIC database collects all significant accidents (any accident causing at least one fatality or
serious injury or damage over 150 k€ or tracks blocked for more than 6 hours). Accidents in
warehouses, workshops and depots are excluded. Accident classifications used are:
•
Collisions
o
train collision with an obstacle
o
train collision with another train
•
Derailment
•
Accidents to person caused by rolling stock in motion
o
individual hit by train
o
individual falling from a train
•
Fire in rolling stock
•
Accidents involving dangerous goods
o
without dangerous goods release
o
in which dangerous goods are released
•
Electrocution by traction power
•
Other
The ERADIS database uses another definition of typical accidents according to the Safety
Directive 2004/49:
•
Collisions of trains, including collisions with obstacles within the clearance gauge
•
Derailments of trains
•
Level-crossing accidents, including accidents involving pedestrians at level-crossings
•
Accidents to persons caused by rolling stock in motion, with the exception of suicides
•
Fires in rolling stock
•
Others
2.5.3.3.4 Evaluation procedure
UIC (20 supporting countries) and ERADIS (as already stated Germany, France, Norway and
Sweden) accumulated accident data (number of accidents, fatalities and serious injuries divided
in passengers, staff and third persons) from the years 2006-2009 were imported into an MSExcel database together with the accumulated train kilometres for each year. Then accident
rates in number of accidents per train km for each type of accident were calculated by
calculating accident rates for each year and taking the mean over four years. Equivalent fatality
Page 193 of (270)
rates based on the commonly known approach to count 10 seriously injured persons as
equivalent to 1 fatality were calculated for each group of affected persons based on the UIC
database. To be able to compare the results of the different accident definitions a mapping table
was introduced, as well as a mapping table with the top event definition introduced with the
report at hand. The results based on the UIC database are shown in the following table:
Table 59: Accident statistics UIC
Top-Event
Accident rate per train km
Fatality rate per train km Fatality rate per accident
2.0E-08
4.3E-09
0.21
7.4E-09
8.8E-10
0.12
Derailment
2.3E-08
3.1E-09
0.14
Other
1.2E-08
6.9E-09
0.60
Passenger injured at platform
1.7E-07
8.1E-08
0.48
Person injured at level crossing
1.4E-07
8.7E-08
0.63
Person injured at track side
2.0E-07
1.5E-07
0.72
6.3E-09
1.5E-10
0.02
Accident rates for the Norwegian rail network based on the ERADIS database:
Table 60: Accident statistics Norway ERADIS
Top-Event
Accident rate per train km
1.1E-07
7.4E-09
Derailment
4.9E-08
Other
1.2E-08
1.7E-07
3.3E-08
5.5E-08
4.3E-08
If we now assume that the fatalities per type of accident should be the same for Norway as
compared to 20 European countries and the distribution of the fatality rates for the different
exposed person groups follows the same patterns as well, we get the following risks of fatality
per year (assuming accumulated 48 Mio. train km) and person group:
Table 61: Distribution of fatalities to person groups, UIC
Top-Event
Other
Passengers
Staff
73.9%
11.6%
14.5%
14.3%
21.4%
64.3%
Derailment
62.0%
22.0%
16.0%
Other
91.9%
3.6%
4.5%
86.6%
9.3%
4.1%
99.1%
0.2%
0.6%
95.7%
2.3%
2.0%
8.9%
89.4%
1.6%
Page 194 of (270)
Table 62: Collective Risk parameters Norway
Top-Event
Accident rate Fatalities per
per train km
year-collective
Fatalities per Fatalities per
year-other
year-passengers
Fatalities per
year-staff
1.1E-07
1.16
0.85
0,13
0,17
7.4E-09
0.04
0.01
0,01
0,03
Derailment
4.9E-08
0.32
0.20
0,07
0,05
Other
1.2E-08
0.33
0.31
0,01
0,02
1.7E-07
3.89
3.37
0,36
0,16
3.3E-08
0.98
0.97
0,00
0,01
5.5E-08
1.90
1.82
0,04
0,04
4.3E-08
0.01
0.00
0,01
0,00
7.53
0.64
0.46
Comparing the results with the mean number of fatalities and severe injuries reported in [84]
during the same period 2006-2009 we note a good correlation keeping in mind that accidents at
platforms with train not moving (stations) are no longer reported in [84]:
Table 63: Comparison of risk parameters
Fatalities per year other
Fatalities per year passengers
Fatalities per year staff
Risk model
7.53
0.64
0.46
Norwegian data source [94]
1.60
0.60
0.33
2.5.3.4 Evaluation of accident rate
This chapter includes a description of evaluation of accident rates using the example of the TopEvent “Fire”. Based on the accident rates evaluated by available statistical data [83] [84], a
prediction of the expected change of the specific accident rate related to the system-variant 1 or
2 has been the next step within the risk assessment. In this context the hazards as well as
causes related to each Top-Event have been examined. The number of causes and the
character of the causes itself has been considered for the estimation of the expected accident
rates. As an example for the principal approach the following figure shows the fault trees for the
Top-Event “Fire”. The green colour is used to label elements in the diagrams (fault trees as well
as event trees) which can be quantified by the evaluation of the statistical data [83] [84].
Figure 77: Fire, causes
Page 195 of (270)
“Fire at track” is not specifically comprehended in the available data and therefore this aspect
could not be quantified. It is supposed that “fire at track” does not influence the resulting risk
related to fire significantly. As it can be seen in the figure above, two different major events may
cause fire. None of both events is specifically related to high-speed rail systems and therefore
for the Top-Event “Fire” no presumable change of the accident rate compared to the existing
railway net has to be expected and the parameter can be estimated as:
Δ λA = 1
2.5.3.5 Consequence analysis for every Top-Event
Another core area within the risk assessment has been the prediction of potential
consequences. Consequences can be expressed as described before as equivalent fatalities
(see chapter 2.5.2.2) per accident. For every Top-Event presumable changes of the so called
fatality rate have been evaluated for the defined system-variants. Therefore it has been
necessary to proof if the new potential high speed traffic would influence directly the number of
(equivalent) fatalities in case of an accident. As an example for the principal approach the
following figure shows the event tree for the hazard “fire in rolling stock”.
Figure 78: Fire, consequence analysis
As it can be seen different accident scenarios may occur. “Severe fire” represents fire in a train,
which is stuck inside a tunnel or can not leave it. The second scenario represents fire inside a
car in open track or at station/depot. For the system-variant 1 no presumable change of the
fatality rate compared to the existing rail net has to be expected.
Δ λF = 1
For the system-variant 2 a potential increase of the fatality rate (Δλf > 1) is expected due to an
increased percentage of track inside tunnels for the new system compared to the existing rail
net and due to the expected higher number of passengers which may be exposed to the
hazard.
2.5.3.6 Estimation / calculation of the collective risk
According to CLC/TR 50126-2 [71] risk mathematically is represented as
Risk = Rate (of accidents ) × Degree of severity (of harm )
The collective risk has been determined for every Top-Event and if relevant data were available
also for specific scenarios. The multiplication of the accident rate (evaluated / estimated number
of events per year of every Top-Event) with the fatality rate (number of equivalent fatalities per
accident) results in a value for the collective risk (equivalent fatalities (EqFa) per year).
Rcoll . Top − Event i = Δ λ A Top i ⋅ λ A Top i ⋅ Δ λF Top i ⋅ λF Top i
λA Top i = Accident rate (for a specific Top-Event i); λF Top i = Fatality rate (for a specific Top-Event i)
Due to the fact that accidents may affect passengers and/or personal and/or 3rd persons, a
differentiation of the collective risk value between these groups has been done for every Top-
Page 196 of (270)
Event. The differentiation is based on the percentage distribution regarding affected persons
which has been evaluated by European data (see Table 61).
Collective risk
for passengers
Collision
train –train
Consequences
Collective risk
Collective risk
for 3rd people
Collective risk
for personal
Fatality rate
[ Equivalent fatalities
/ year]
Accident rate
[ Events / year]
/ year]
/ year]
Figure 79: Derivation of the collective risk
2.5.3.7 Residual collective risk for every system-variant
By calculation of the resulting collective risk for every system-variant the proof of the first risk
acceptance criteria (see chapter 2.5.1.2) can be achieved.
n
Rcoll . res. = ∑ λ A Top i ⋅ λF Top i
i =1
The addition of all determined collective risks of the different Top-Events results in an indication
for the resulting collective risk (equivalent fatalities per year). This calculation has been done for
both system-variants. An overview of the residual collective risk is shown in Table 52.
Resulting collective
risk for Top-Event 1
x Fatalities /
year
x Fatalities /
year
x Fatalities /
year
x Fatalities /
year
..
.
System-variant
specific residual
collective risk
x Fatalities /
year
..
.
Figure 80: Example of derivation of the residual collective risk
2.5.3.8 Individual risk for every Top-Event
As described in chapter 2.5.3.6 the collective risk related to passengers and/or personal and/or
3rd persons has been determined. By calculation of the resulting individual risk for the specific
groups of persons and of every system-variant the proof of the second risk acceptance criteria
(see chapter 2.5.1.2) can be achieved. Therefore the division of the calculated collective risk
(equivalent fatalities per year) values with the number of affected persons (passengers,
personal, residents etc.) 47 results in the individual risk.
47
The assumed number of passengers per year shall be seen exemplarily. The authors advise further evaluation of statistics in
order to justify the assumptions.
Page 197 of (270)
assumed
3.000.000
passengers / year
Resulting collective risk
3,15
Equivalent Fatalities / year
Resulting individual risk
1,05e-7 Equivalent Fatalities /
person * year
passengers
Figure 81: Example of derivation of the individual risk
Mathematically the coherency between collective and individual risk can be simplified described
as following:
Rind ; system− var iant j . =
Rcoll ; system− var iant j .
n
Rind; system-variant j individual risk for a single user of the system (-variant) j or an individual which is affected / exposed
by the system(-variant) j
Rcoll; system-variant j
collective risk of the system (-variant) j
n
number of users of the system(-variant) j or number of individuals which are affected / exposed by the
system(-variant) j
The calculations regarding the individual risk for the different groups of persons is based on the
operating figures:
Table 64: Operating figures
Persons
Number
Comment
Passengers
3’000’000 (individual)
passengers
According to "Presentasjon av Jernbaneverket mai 2010", presented on JBV home
page, more than 5’.000’000 passengers travelled by train in 2009. The supposed
number of 3 Mio. (individual) passengers is deduced by a average of approximately
20 train rides per individual and year.
Personal
13’500’000 working
hours
Source: ERADIS [83]. The number of working hours is considered to include all
personal of JBV and outside companies.
3rd people
3’000’000 people
Conservative estimation considering that not every person in Norway (∼ 5’000’000
residents) is exposed and / or affected by the railway system.
An overview of the resulting individual risks fort he different Top-Events is shown in Table 52.
2.5.3.9 Residual individual risk
Analogous to the calculation of the resulting collective risk for every system-variant in
compliance to the second risk acceptance criteria (see chapter 2.5.1.2) can be checked.
n
RPG ind . = ∑ RPG ind . Top i
i =1
The sum of all determined individual risks of the different Top-Events considering the different
groups of individuals results in an indication for the resulting individual risk (fatalities per person
* year). This calculation has been done for both system-variants.
Page 198 of (270)
Resulting individual
x Fatalities /
person * year
x Fatalities /
person * year
x Fatalities /
person * year
x Fatalities /
person * year
...
System-variant
specific residual
individual risk
x Fatalities /
person * year
...
Figure 82: Example of derivation of the residual individual risk
An overview of the residual individual risk is shown in Table 52.
2.5.3.10 Top-Event-specific risk assessment
The following chapters 2.5.3.10.1 to 2.5.3.10.8 include detailed descriptions regarding riskevaluation and –predictions for the two system-variants considered in this document. It should
be noted that at this stage of the risk assessment the shown combined fault and event trees are
not exhaustive and are shown only to facilitate information of possible risk influencing factors.
The calculated (equivalent) fatalities per year and following the values concerning residual
individual risks are based on the Norwegian average of 48 Mio. train kilometres per year and a
supposed5% additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway.
2.5.3.10.1 Top-Event 1, Derailment
“Derailment” is defined as a Top-Event by JBV [81] and it is identified (see chapter 2.5.3.1) as
the Top-Event 1 in this risk assessment. Based on Norwegian statistics [84] and the data
related to “Derailment” the parameters for the risk assessment of Top-Event 1 as shown in
Table 65 have been evaluated.
Table 65: Top-Event 1, statistical data 48
Top-Event
λa per train km
Fatality rate per train km
Fatalities per accident
Fatalities per year
Derailment
4.9E-9
3.1E-9
0.14
0.32
As described in chapter 2.5.3.2 the risk assessment at hand focuses on presumable changes of
either the specific accident rate (Δλa) and/or the expected consequences given in fatalities per
year. Due to the fact that those values could not be determined by the evaluation of statistical
data [59] [60], estimations by expert judgement have been required. The reasons and
underlying thoughts / considerations regarding the taken estimations are described in the
following for both system variants. For all blocks displayed in green colour in the following
diagrams, the available statistics [83] [84] include information regarding frequency of occurrence
and/or consequences. On the other hand the diagrams consist of some elements (displayed in
white colour), which do influence either the hazard rate or the consequences can not be
quantified by the available statistics [83] [84].
System-variant 1:
Figure 83 combines a fault tree to show causes which might lead to derailment as well as an
event tree to display potential consequences related to system-variant 1.
48
Cp. [84].
Page 199 of (270)
The evaluation of Norwegian statistics [83] shows that derailments are mainly caused by
failures of infrastructural equipment (e.g. rail, switches, interlocking blocks etc.). A minor
contingent is related to technical failures onside rolling stock (e.g. breakage of
wheels/axles/rail). The speed itself has not been identified as a major factor/cause for
derailment even if considering that a derailment might be caused by overspeed through a speed
restriction. The higher forces on e.g. wheels or axles have to be compensated by adequate
dimensioning/design. Due to an increased average speed the risk of derailment caused by side
wind is supposed to be slightly higher as in the existing rail net, but appropriate windbreaks
could be used to avoid a higher risk. Considering these aspects a differentiation regarding the
accident rate for derailment on existing mixed rail traffic on one hand and for system-variant 1
on the other hand seems not to be required and in this phase of the risk assessment factor 1
regarding the potential change of the accident rate has been estimated:
Δ λA = 1
The evaluation of Norwegian statistics [59] further shows that the major contingent of
derailments is supposed not to be followed by collisions. Anyway, the fatality rate per derailment
is supposed to be higher in a High Speed Rail system as in the existing Norwegian Rail system
due to the possibility of derailments followed by crashes and / or collisions, which would include
higher kinetic energy due to an increased speed (estimated average speed of 120 km/h for
system-variant 1 compared to an estimated average speed of 50 km/h in the existing net). The
proportion of the masses of new high speed trains to conventional passenger trains (estimated
to 1.5) is another factor which has to be considered. The accident rate also depends on the
number of exposed persons, which presumably would be higher in system-variant 1 compared
to the existing net (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated
100 passengers in conventional passenger trains).
Δ λ F Top 2 = 1.5 ⋅
120 2 400
⋅
50 2 100
An estimated increase as shown in the formula above results in an order of magnitude of about:
ΔλF = 35
Page 200 of (270)
System-variant 2:
Regarding to “Derailment” Figure 84 shows causes as well as potential consequences related to
system-variant 2. The main difference to system-variant 1 is the exclusion of derailments
followed by collisions with other trains on adjacent track.
For system-variant 2, the consequence analysis should consider higher average speed and the
higher number of tunnels. As an influencing parameter a potential higher risk due to side wind
have to be considered. In this phase of the risk assessment these factors can not be quantified
due to lack of data. On the other hand for a new (exclusively) high-speed rail system, the
probability of derailment and so the accident rate is supposed to be lower than in systemvariant 1 as well as in the existing railway net, due to a more stable track and a reduced number
of equipment (e.g. switches, interlocking blocks etc.) and less maintenance. As these factors
influence the accident rate but can not be quantified at this phase of the risk assessment a
factor 0.5 regarding the potential change of the accident rate for system-variant 2 has been
estimated:
ΔλA = 0.5
The authors advise further analysis of causes, particularly side wind effects, related to
derailment as well as the evaluation off reliable data / statistics concerning probability/frequency
of derailment in exclusively high-speed rail systems in order to justify the assumptions.
The fatality rate per derailment for system-variant 2 is influenced by different factors such as:
•
Accident scenario after derailment (crash and/or following collisions);
•
Higher kinetic energy in case of crash or collision may increase the fatality rate;
•
Higher number of exposed passengers may increase the fatality rate;
•
A higher percentage of railroad embankments, cambers, tunnels and bridges may
increase the fatality rate because of potential more serious crashes/collisions after
derailment;
•
Reduced passing of urban agglomerations and industrial areas may decrease the fatality
rate.
Analogous to the evaluation of system-variant 1 the major factors influencing the consequences
which can be quantified are the resulting kinetic energy and the exposed passengers.
Page 201 of (270)
Δ λ F Top 2 = 1.5 ⋅
250 2 400
⋅
50 2 100
ΔλF = 150
It should be noted that the risk of a violation of the train envelope may increase at higher train
speed as well due to the fact that there exists a linear relationship of the quantity of derailed
cars in relation to train speed which ultimately enhances the fatality rate per derailment.
Table 66 gives an overview of the chosen parameters as well as the estimated values and the
calculated risk given in fatalities per year for both system-variants, based on the assumption of
supposed 5% additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway.
Table 66: Risk estimation, Top-Event 1
Top-Event 1: Derailment
λa per
train km
Rail-System
Δλa-hs1
λa per train
km (HSR)
Fatalities per Δλf-hs1
accident
Fatalities per
accident (new)
Fatalities per
year
Existing system
4.9E-8
-
-
0.14
-
0.14
0.32
System-Variant 1
4.9E-8
1
4.9E-8
0.14
35
4.71
+ 0.579
System-Variant 2
4.9E-8
0.5
2.5E-8
0.14
150
20.44
+ 1.256
Considering the percentage distribution evaluated by European data (see Table 61) the
resulting collective risk as shown in Table 66 can be allocated to the different groups of affected
persons as described in Table 67.
Table 67: Distribution of collective risk, Top-Event 1
Top-Event 1: Derailment, collective risk
Persons
Fatalities
per year
others
Passengers
0.322
Personal
Distribution
Fatalities per year,
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
62.0%
0.199
0,559
0,979
22.0%
0.071
0,197
0,346
16.0%
0.051
0,143
0,251
0.322
0.899
1.576
The individual risk depends on the number of exposed/affected persons.
Table 68: Distribution of individual risk, Top-Event 1
Top-Event 1: Derailment, individual risk
Number of exposed Individual risk [Fatalities / person * year]
/ affected persons
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
others
3’000’000
6.65E-08
1.86E-07
3.26E-07
Passengers
3’000’000
2.36E-08
6.60E-08
1.16E-07
Personal
7’500
6.86E-06
1.92E-05
3.37E-05
6,95E-06
1.95E-05
3.41E-05
Persons
In order to minimize existing uncertainties of the risk assessment at hand it is essential to
continue the analysis regarding expected changes of the specific accident rates (Δλa) and the
Page 202 of (270)
expected consequences given in fatalities per year by evaluation of more detailed data as they
are given in [83] [84].
As accident statistics [83] [84] show, consequences in case of a derailment may come up in
very different spectrums. Derailment with only minor or severe outcome is possible, but also
catastrophic outcome like rollover are realistic. At the end of the consequences spectrum worst
case accidents, e.g. derailment followed by collision with edifices (buildings, bridges etc.) or with
other train on adjacent track are extreme unusual but can not be excluded completely. It has
also to be mentioned that any catastrophic accident like for example the ICE-accident in
Germany, Eschede [86] would lead to a massive exceedance of defined risk acceptance criteria
(either individual or collective risk).
2.5.3.10.2 Top-Event 2, Collision train-train
“Collision train-train” is defined as a Top-Event by JBV [81] and it is identified (see chapter
2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 2 in this risk assessment. Due to no data related to “Collision traintrain” in Norwegian statistics [84] the accident rate evaluated in [83] , which is shown in Table
69, has been used as the basis for the risk assessment for Top-Event 2.
Table 69: Top-Event 2, statistical data [83]
Top-Event
λa per train km Fatality rate per train km Fatalities per accident
7.4E-9
8.8E-10
0.12
Fatalities per year
0.04
either the specific accident rate (Δλa) and / or the expected consequences given in fatalities per
and/or consequences. On the other hand elements of the diagrams (displayed in white colour),
may influence either the hazard rate or the consequences but the influence of these elements
could not be quantified by the available statistics [83] [84].
Page 203 of (270)
System-variant 1:
Figure 85 and Figure 86 combine fault trees to show causes which might lead to collisions traintrain as well as an event tree to display potential consequences related to system-variant 1.
Collision HStrain with freight
train
Wrong switch
position
Automatic train
stop
no
Train approaching
on other track
yes
no
yes
Side
collision
Rear end
collision
Head-on
collision
Collision HStrain with
maintenance
vehicle
Collision HStrain with conv.
passenger train
Collision HStrain with other
HS-train
Human error
Switch failure
Collision HStrain with freight
train
Command
failure
yes
Train approaching
on other track
no
Side
collision
Rear end
collision
Head-on
collision
maintenance
vehicle
Collision HStrain with conv.
passenger train
HS-train
Safe state
The evaluation of Norwegian statistics [59] shows that collisions train-train are mainly caused by
failures of infrastructural equipment (e.g. rail, switches, interlocking blocks etc.). The speed itself
has not been identified as a major factor / cause for collision train-train. A small influence might
be the higher braking distance at higher speeds.
Page 204 of (270)
Considering this aspect a differentiation regarding the accident rate for collision train-train on
existing mixed rail traffic on one hand and for system-variant 1 on the other hand seems not to
be required and in this phase of the risk assessment factor 1 has been estimated:
Δ λA = 1
The fatality rate per collision train to train is supposed to be higher in a High Speed Rail system
as in the existing Norwegian Rail system. Reasons may be on one hand higher kinetic energy in
case of collision due to due the higher average speed (estimated 120 km/h for system-variant 1
compared to estimated 50 km/h in the existing net) and on the other hand the presumed higher
number of potentially affected persons (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains
compared to estimated 100 passengers in conventional passenger trains). The proportion of the
masses of new high speed trains to conventional passenger trains (estimated to 1.5) is another
factor which has to be considered.
Δ λ F Top 2
120 2 400
= 1.5 ⋅ 2 ⋅
50 100
It is supposed that a major contingent of collisions between train in the existing Norwegian net
as well as in other countries is related to collisions of shunting locomotives at low speed. An
estimated increase as shown in the formula above results in an order of magnitude of about:
ΔλF = 35
System-variant 2:
Figure 87 and Figure 88 combine fault trees to show causes which might lead to collisions traintrain as well as an event tree to display potential consequences related to system-variant 2.
Wrong switch
position
Automatic train
stop
no
Train approaching
on other track
yes
no
yes
Side
collision
Rear end
collision
Head-on
collision
Human error
Switch failure
maintenance
vehicle
HS-train
Command
failure
yes
Train approaching
on other track
no
Side
collision
Rear end
collision
Head-on
collision
Safe state
maintenance
vehicle
HS-train
Page 205 of (270)
As described before collisions train-train are mainly caused by failures of infrastructural
equipment (e.g. rail, switches, interlocking blocks etc.). Considering this aspect the accident
rate for collision train-train in system-variant 2 is supposed to be lower due to a reduced number
of potential collision points (train passing points) and less trains in operation. As a first
consideration in this phase of a risk assessment, a reduction by the factor 100 for the accident
rate of collision train-train seems to be justifiable and sufficient.
ΔλA = 0.01
The fatality rate per collision train to train is supposed to be even higher as it has been
estimated for the system-variant 1. Collisions in system-variant 2 may only occur between high
speed trains or maintenance vehicles and high speed trains. Analogous to the evaluation of
system-variant 1 the major factors influencing the consequences are the resulting kinetic energy
and the exposed passengers.
Δ λ F Top 2 = 1.5 ⋅
250 2 400
⋅
50 2 100
ΔλF = 150
Table 70 gives an overview of the parameters as well as the estimated values and the
supposed 5 % additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway.
Top-Event 2: Collision train-train
Rail-System
λa per
Δλa-hs1
train km
λa per train km Fatalities per Δλf-hs1
accident
(HSR)
Fatalities per
accident (new)
Fatalities per
year
Existing system
7.4E-9
-
-
0.12
-
0.12
0.04
System-Variant 1
7.4E-9
1
7.4E-9
0.12
35
4.10
+ 0.076
System-Variant 2
7.4E-9
0.01
7.4E-11
0.12
150
17.79
+ 0.003
Page 206 of (270)
Persons
Fatalities
per year
others
Passengers
0.042
Personal
Distribution
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
14.3%
0.006
0.017
0.006
21.4%
0.009
0.025
0.010
64.3%
0.027
0.078
0.029
0.042
0.120
0.045
Number of exposed /
affected persons
Individual risk [Fatalities / person * year]
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
others
3’000’000
2.00E-09
5.61E-09
2.16E-09
Passengers
3’000’000
3.00E-09
8.39E-09
3.23E-09
Personal
7’500
3.60E-06
1.01E-05
3.88E-06
3.61E-06
1.01E-05
3.89E-06
Persons
2.5.3.10.3 Top-Event 3, Collision train-object
“Collision train-object” is defined as a Top-Event by JBV [81] and it is identified (see chapter
2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 3 in this risk assessment. On base of Norwegian statistics [84] and
the data related to “Collision train-object” the parameters for the risk assessment of Top-Event 3
as shown in Table 73 have been evaluated.
Table 73: Top-Event 3, statistical data [84]
Top-Event
Fatalities per year
1.1E-7
1.16
4.3E-9
0.21
either the specific accident rate (Δλa per train km) and / or the expected consequences given in
fatalities per year. Due to the fact that those values could not be determined by the evaluation of
statistical data [59] [60], estimations by expert judgement have been required. The reasons and
underlying thoughts/considerations regarding the taken estimations are described in the
Figure 89 combines a fault tree to show causes which might lead to collisions train-object as
well as an event tree to display potential consequences. The diagram is related to both systemvariants 1 and 2.
Page 207 of (270)
Figure 89: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, object on track
System-variant 1:
Collisions train-objects are mainly caused by environmental / climatic situations or human
failures. Human failures in this context may be on one hand lost or forgotten parts / tools mainly
related to repair- and maintenance activities and on the other hand lost freight or lost train-parts.
Heavy snowfall and very low temperatures are the main reasons for collisions with banks of
snow and/or ice. Landslip and/or falling rocks represent another main cause for Top-Event 3.
The specific Norwegian environmental/climatic situations are supposed to be responsible for a
higher accident rate for “collision with object” compared to the European average (see Table 59
and Table 60). Regarding the causes displayed in Figure 18 a differentiation between systemvariant 1 and the existing railway system in Norway seems not to be required. As a first
consideration in this phase of a risk assessment, a factor 1 for the accident rate of collision
train-object seems to be justifiable and sufficient.
ΔλA = 1.0
The fatality rate per collision train to object is supposed to be higher in a High Speed Rail
system as in the existing Norwegian Rail system. As for other Top-Events (derailment, collision
train-train) reasons may be on one hand higher kinetic energy in case of collision due to due the
mass ratio (estimated to 1,5 for new high speed trains compared to conventional passenger
trains), the higher average speed (estimated 120 km/h for system-variant 1 compared to
estimated 50 km/h in the existing net) and on the other hand the presumed higher number of
potentially affected persons (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to
estimated 100 passengers in conventional passenger trains).
Δ λ F Top 2 = 1.5 ⋅
120 2 400
⋅
50 2 100
An estimated increase of the fatality rate as shown in the formula above results in an order of
magnitude of about:
ΔλF = 35
System-variant 2:
The accident rate for collision train-object in system-variant 2 is supposed to be lower as in the
existing net. The exclusively operation of modern high speed trains should lead to a perceptible
decreased probability of lost train-parts. The loosening of freight can be more or less excluded
and due to less maintenance work at the more stable track the probability of lost or forgotten
tools / parts should also lead to a reduced accident rate. As for other Top-Events, respectively
their potential causes the problem is the missing quantification of these aspects due to missing
Page 208 of (270)
data. As a first consideration in this phase of a risk assessment, a reduction by the factor 2 for
the accident rate of collision train-object seems to be justifiable and sufficient.
ΔλA = 0.5
The fatality rate per collision train to objects is supposed to be even higher in as it has been
estimated for the system-variant 1. Analogous to the evaluation of system-variant 1 the major
factors influencing the consequences are supposed to be the resulting kinetic energy and the
exposed passengers.
Δ λ F Top 2 = 1.5 ⋅
250 2 400
⋅
50 2 100
ΔλF = 150
Top-Event 3: Collision train-object
Rail-System
λa per
train km
Δλa-hs1
λa per train
km (HSR)
accident
Fatalities per
accident (new)
Fatalities per
year
Existing system
1.1E-7
-
-
0.21
-
-
1.16
System-Variant 1
1.1E-7
1
1.1E-7
0.21
35
7.29
+ 2.079
System-Variant 2
1.1E-7
0.50
5.7E-8
0.21
150
31.62
+ 4.513
As an important further conclusion of the calculation the relatively high influence of Top-Event 3
“collision train-object” to the overall residual risk of a potential new high speed rail system can
be stated.
Persons
Fatalities
per year
others
Passengers
Personal
1.160
Distribution
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
73.9%
0.854
2.390
4.189
11.6%
0.134
0.375
0.657
14.5%
0.168
0.469
0.822
1.160
3.235
5.668
The individual risk depends on the number of exposed / affected persons.
Page 209 of (270)
/ affected persons
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
others
3’000’000
2.85E-07
7.97E-07
1.40E-06
Passengers
3’000’000
4.47E-08
1.25E-07
2.19E-07
Personal
7’500
2.23E-05
6.25E-05
1.10E-04
2.27E-05
6.35E-05
1.11E-04
Persons
2.5.3.10.4 Top-Event 4, Fire
“Fire” is identified (see chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 4. Norwegian statistics [84] as well as
the available European data [83] do only specify „Fire in rolling stock“. The data as shown in
Table 77 have been evaluated for the risk assessment of Top-Event 4.
Top-Event
Fatalities per year
4.3E-8
0.05
1.5E-10
0.02
either the specific accident rate (Δλa) and/or the expected consequences given in fatalities per
and / or consequences. On the other hand elements of the diagrams (displayed in white colour),
Figure 90 and Figure 91 combine fault trees to show causes which might lead to fire as well as
event trees to display potential consequences. The diagrams are related to both systemvariants 1 and 2.
49
Cp. [84].
Page 210 of (270)
Fire extinguished
by system or
person
Train stuck in
tunnel or can not
leave it
no
yes
Severe fire
no
yes
Fire in car
Safe state
Fire in rolling
stock
equipment
Fire due to
unruly person
Figure 90: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, fire in rolling stock
Fire extinguished
by system or
person
Fire at track
yes
no
Train affected by
fire
yes
Train stuck in
tunnel or can not
leave it
no
yes
Severe fire
no
Fire in car
Fire at
infrastructure /
environment
Fire in trackequipment
Fire along the
trackside
Fire due to
unruly person
Safe state
Figure 91: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, fire at track
System-variant 1:
Fires in rolling stock or at track are mainly caused by overheating of technical equipment and /
or leakage of easily flammable substances (e.g. fuel). The major contingent is supposed to be
human misbehaviour (e.g. smoking or malicious arson), but the available data [83] [84] do not
include information concerning the detected causes of fires in the past. A higher number of
passengers (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated 100
passengers in conventional passenger trains) may implicate a higher risk for fire caused by
persons. As a first consideration in this phase of a risk assessment, a factor 4 for the accident
rate of fire in rolling stock seems to be justifiable and sufficient.
ΔλA = 4.0
The fatality rate in case of fire in rolling stock is supposed to be higher in system-variant 1 as in
the existing Norwegian Rail system due to the presumed higher number of potentially affected
persons (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated
100 passengers in conventional passenger trains). Another aspect is the design of modern high
speed trains which is typically represented by continuously open compartments. This aspect
which may increase the risk of expansion of fire to other vehicles still can not be quantified on
base of the evaluated statistics [83] [84] and therefore an estimated increase of factor 4 (based
on the supposed number of passengers) for the fatality rate seems to be justifiable and
sufficient.
ΔλF = 4.0
Page 211 of (270)
System-variant 2:
Considering the aspects described above for the system-variant 1 a factor 4 (ratio of exposed
number of passengers) for the accident rate of fire in rolling stock in system-variant 2 seems to
be justifiable and sufficient.
ΔλA = 4.0
The fatality rate in case of fire in rolling stock is supposed to be higher in system-variant 2 as in
the existing Norwegian Rail system due to the presumed higher number of potentially affected
persons (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated
100 passengers in conventional passenger trains) and the design of modern high speed trains
with continuously open compartments. This aspect as described before may increase the risk of
expansion of fire to other vehicles. On the other hand modern high speed trains are rigged with
fire alarm- and extinguishing systems. Another factor which may increase the fatality rate is the
supposed higher percentage of track inside tunnels. A quantification of these aspects has not
been possible on base of the evaluated statistics [83] [84] and therefore an estimated increase
of factor 8 (factor 4 based on the supposed number of passengers and factor 2 considering the
higher contingent of tunnels) for the fatality rate seems to be justifiable and sufficient.
ΔλF = 8.0.
Top-Event 2: Fire in rolling stock
Rail-System
λa per
train km
Δλa-hs1
λa per train
km (HSR)
accident
Fatalities per
accident (new)
Fatalities per
year
Existing system
4.3E-8
-
-
0.02
-
-
0.05
System-Variant 1
4.3E-8
4.00
1.7E-7
0.02
4.00
0.10
+ 0.041
System-Variant 2
4.3E-8
4.00
1.7E-7
0.02
8.00
0.19
+ 0.082
As an important further conclusion of the calculation the minor influence of Top-event 4 “Fire” to
the overall residual risk of a potential new high speed rail system can be stated.
Top-Event 4: Fire
Persons
Fatalities
per year
others
Passengers
Personal
0.049
Distribution
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
8.9%
0.004
0.008
0.012
89.4%
0.044
0.081
0.117
1.6%
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.049
0.090
0.131
Page 212 of (270)
Top-Event 4: Fire
/ affected persons
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
others
3’000’000
1.46E-09
2.67E-09
3.89E-09
Passengers
3’000’000
1.46E-08
2.68E-08
3.91E-08
Personal
7’500
1.05E-07
1.92E-07
2.80E-07
1.21E-07
2.22E-07
3.23E-07
Persons
2.5.3.10.5 Top-Event 5, passenger injured at platform
“Passenger injured at platform” is defined as a Top-Event by JBV [81] and it is identified (see
chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 5 in this risk assessment. Due to no data related to
“Passenger injured at platform” in Norwegian statistics [84] the accident rate evaluated in [83] ,
which is shown in Table 81, has been used as the basis for the risk assessment for Top-Event
5.
Top-Event
Fatalities per year
platform
1.7E-7
3.89
8.1E-8
0.48
either the specific accident rate (Δλa per train km) and/or the expected consequences given in
fatalities per year. Due to the fact that those values could not be determined by the evaluation of
statistical data [59] [60], estimations by expert judgement have been required. The reasons and
Figure 92 and Figure 93 combine fault trees to show causes which might lead to persons
injured at platform as well as event trees to display potential consequences. The diagrams are
related to both system-variants 1 and 2.
50
Cp. [84].
Page 213 of (270)
Figure 92: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, person injured at platform while entry /exit
Figure 93: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, person injured at platform by passing train
System-variant 1:
As statistics show the most injuries at platforms are related to entries/exits of passengers.
Causes can be inadequate operation processes/human failures as well as technical failures of
the door system and its monitoring equipment. Regarding these aspects a differentiation
between system-variant 1 compared to the existing railway net seem not to be required. The
second case, persons may come inside the train clearance profile can also be caused by
different aspects as shown in figure 22. High speed of passing trains can lead to pulls at the
platform. Especially small children and older persons may be affected by this scenario. Anyway
a quantification of a potential increase of risk is not possible at this phase of the risk
assessment and therefore as a first consideration a factor 1 for the accident rate of “persons
injured at platform” seems to be justifiable and sufficient.
ΔλA = 1.0
The fatality rate for “persons injured at platform” is also not supposed to be higher in systemvariant 1 and therefore a factor 1 for a potential change of the fatality rate seems to be
justifiable and sufficient.
ΔλF = 1.0
Page 214 of (270)
System-variant 2:
The accident rate in system-variant 2 is influenced by different aspects:
•
A reduced number of stops of high speed trains and so less entries / exits may decrease
the accident rate;
•
Longer stops and special operation processes may decrease the accident rate;
•
Suction at platform is expected to be higher and may increase the accident rate.
These potential causes are displayed in white colour in figure 21 and 22 and can not be
quantified by the evaluation of the available data. As first estimation for the change of the
accident rate of “persons injured at platform” a reduction by factor 10 in system-variant 2 seems
to be justifiable and sufficient.
ΔλA = 0.1
The fatality rate for “persons injured at platform” is also not supposed to be higher in systemvariant 2 and therefore a factor 1 for a potential change of the fatality rate seems to be
ΔλF = 1.0
Top-Event 5: Persons injured at platform
Rail-System
λa per
Δλa-hs1
train km
λa per train
km (HSR)
accident
Fatalities per
accident (new)
Fatalities per
year
Existing system
1.7E-7
-
-
0.48
-
-
3.89
System-Variant 1
1.7E-7
1.00
1.7E-7
0.48
1.00
0.48
+ 0.203
System-Variant 2
1.7E-7
0.10
1.7E-8
0.48
1.00
0.48
+ 0.020
As an important further conclusion of the calculation the minor influence of Top-event 5
“Persons injured at platform” to the overall residual risk of a potential new high speed rail
system can be stated.
Persons
others
Passengers
Personal
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
86.6%
3.370
3.545
3.387
9.3%
0.362
0.381
0.364
4.1%
0.160
0.168
0.160
3.891
4.094
3.911
Fatalities per Distribution
year
3.891
Page 215 of (270)
/ affected persons
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
others
3’000’000
1.12E-06
1.18E-06
1.13E-06
Passengers
3’000’000
1.21E-07
1.27E-07
1.21E-07
Personal
7’500
2.13E-05
2.24E-05
2.14E-05
2.25E-05
2.37E-05
2.26E-05
Persons
2.5.3.10.6 Top-Event 6, Passenger injured at level crossing
“Passenger injured at level crossing” is defined as a Top-Event by JBV [81] and it is identified
(see chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 6 in this risk assessment. On base of Norwegian
statistics [84] and the data related to “Passenger injured at level crossing” the parameters for
the risk assessment of Top-Event 6 as shown in Table 85 have been evaluated.
Top-Event
λa per train km
Fatalities per year
level crossing
3.3E-8
8.7E-8
0.63
0.98
injured at platform as well as event trees to display potential consequences. The Top-Event 6
and so the shown diagram is only related to system-variant 1.
51
Cp. [84].
Page 216 of (270)
Person(s) traverse
level crossing
yes
Train approaching
Collision
with
person(s)
no
Safe state
Unruly person
Figure 94: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, person(s) traverse level crossing
Figure 95: FTA / ETA system-variant 1, level crossing unsecured
As described before, accidents at level crossing can be excluded for system-variant 2 due to
regulations that not allow installing level crossing at new high speed rail systems. This means in
the context with system-variant 1 that only the actual existing cross levels have to be
considered. The accident rate may be influenced by the following aspects:
•
A increased average speed of passing trains may increase the accident rate;
•
The fast approaching of trains in combination with a reduced noise level may increase
the accident rate.
Again these aspects can not be quantified by the evaluation of the available data and a
significant change of the accident rate compared to the existing railway net in Norway seems
not required.
ΔλA = 1.0
The fatality rate for “persons injured at level crossings” is also not supposed to be higher in
system-variant 1 and therefore a factor 1 for a potential change of the fatality rate seems to be
ΔλF = 1.0
Page 217 of (270)
Top-Event 6: Persons injured at level crossings
Rail-System
λa per
Δλa-hs1
train km
λa per train
km (HSR)
accident
Fatalities per
accident (new)
Fatalities per
year
Existing system
3.3E-8
-
-
0.63
-
-
0.98
System-Variant 1
3.3E-8
1.00
1.7E-7
0.63
1.00
0.63
+ 0.051
As an important further conclusion of the calculation the minor influence of Top-event 6
“Persons injured at level crossing” to the overall residual risk of a potential new high speed rail
system can be stated.
Top-Event 6: Persons injured at level crossing
Persons
Fatalities
per year
others
Passengers
0.982
Personal
Distribution
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
99.1%
0.974
1.025
not applicable
0.2%
0.002
0.002
not applicable
0.6%
0.006
0.006
not applicable
0.982
1.033
not applicable
Top-Event 6: Persons injured at level crossing
Number of exposed
/ affected persons
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
others
3’000’000
3.25E-07
3.42E-07
not applicable
Passengers
3’000’000
6.55E-10
6.89E-10
not applicable
Personal
7’500
7.86E-07
8.27E-07
not applicable
1.11E-06
1.17E-06
not applicable
Persons
Page 218 of (270)
2.5.3.10.7 Top-Event 7, Person injured at track side
“Person injured at track side” is defined as a Top-Event by JBV [81] and it is identified (see
chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 7 in this risk assessment. On base of Norwegian statistics
[84] and the data related to “Person injured at track side” the parameters for the risk
assessment of Top-Event 7 as shown in Table 89 have been evaluated.
Top-Event
Fatalities per year
track side
5.5E-8
1.90
1.5E-7
0.72
injured at platform as well as event trees to display potential consequences. The shown
diagrams are related to both system-variants 1 and 2.
Figure 96: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, person crosses track
52
Cp. [84].
Page 219 of (270)
Figure 97: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, objects / parts loosened / raised
System-variant 1:
As shown in the diagrams above loosened parts or falling objects like snow represent potential
causes for “persons injured at track side”. These aspects are not supposed to be different in
system-variant 1 compared to the existing rail net. In contrast higher speed of passing high
speed trains may lead to more raised ballast, but a significant change of the accident rate
seems not to be required.
ΔλA = 1.0
The main aspect concerning the fatality rate is the presence of persons on or beside the track
when trains are approaching / passing. The higher speed of high speed trains and their reduced
noise level may increase the accident rate, but in this phase of the risk assessment a significant
change of it seems not to be required.
ΔλF = 1.0
System-variant 2:
The system-variant 2 is characterized by a more or less separated track. Due to this a reduction
of the accident rate seems to be justifiable. The grad (factor) of the reductions depends
massively on the technical realization. A reduction of the accident rate for the system-variant 2
by factor 2 seems to be sufficient at this phase of the risk assessment.
ΔλA = 0.5
As described before, the higher speed of high speed trains and their reduced noice level may
increase the accident rate in system-variant 2 too, but in this phase of the risk assessment a
significant change of accident rate seems not to be required.
ΔλF = 1.0
supposed 5 % additive train kilometres for a new high-speed rail system in Norway.
Page 220 of (270)
Top-Event 7: Person injured at track side
Rail-System
λa per
Δλa-hs1
train km
λa per train
km (HSR)
accident
Fatalities per
Fatalities
accident (new) per year
Existing system
5.5E-8
-
-
0.72
-
-
1.90
System-Variant 1
5.5E-8
1.00
5.5E-8
0.72
1.00
0.72
+ 0.099
System-Variant 2
5.5E-8
0.50
2.7E-8
0.72
1.00
0.72
+ 0.049
As an important further conclusion of the calculation the minor influence of Top-event 7 “Person
injured at track side” to the overall residual risk of a potential new high speed rail system can be
stated.
Persons
Fatalities
per year
others
Passengers
1.900
Personal
Distribution
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
95.7%
1.818
1.913
1.865
2.3%
0.044
0.046
0.045
2.0%
0.038
0.040
0.039
1.900
1.999
1.949
Persons
Number of exposed /
affected persons
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
others
3’000’000
6.06E-07
6.38E-07
6.22E-07
Passengers
3’000’000
1.46E-08
1.53E-08
1.49E-08
Personal
7’500
5.07E-06
5.33E-06
5.20E-06
5.69E-06
5.98E-06
5.83E-06
2.5.3.10.8 Top-Event 8, Other accidents
“Other accidents” is identified (see chapter 2.5.3.1) as the Top-Event 8 in this risk assessment.
The risk assessment concerning Top-Event 8 focuses on electrocution accidents and
dangerous goods incidents. Accidents in warehouses, workshops and depots are excluded due
to the fact that they are not captured in the available data [83] [84].
Page 221 of (270)
Top-Event
Other hazards
λa per train km
1.2E-08
6.9E-09
0.60
Fatalities per year
0.33
Figure 98vand Figure 99 combine fault trees to show causes which might lead to fire as well as
event trees to display potential consequences. The diagrams are related to both systemvariants 1 and 2.
Figure 98: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, electrocution accidents
53
Cp. [84].
Page 222 of (270)
Figure 99: FTA / ETA system-variant 1/2, dangerous goods accidents
System-variant 1:
As the above figures show, electrocution accidents and dangerous good incidents may be
caused by technical failures or human failures. It is supposed that human failures cause the
majority of accidents. A higher number of passengers (estimated 400 passengers in high speed
trains compared to estimated 100 passengers in conventional passenger trains) may implicate a
higher risk regarding dangerous good incidents, but it seems not to be required to increase the
accident rate due to this aspect. A differentiation between system-variant 1 and the existing net
regarding electrocution accidents is also not advisable. As a first consideration in this phase of a
risk assessment, a factor 1 for the accident rate of fire in rolling stock seems to be justifiable
and sufficient.
ΔλA =1.0
The fatality rate in case of fire in rolling stock is supposed to be approximately the same in
system-variant 1 as in the existing Norwegian Rail. The presumed higher number of potentially
affected persons (estimated 400 passengers in high speed trains compared to estimated
100 passengers in conventional passenger trains) is not supposed to influence the fatality rate
significantly and therefore an estimated factor 1 for the fatality rate seems to be justifiable and
sufficient.
ΔλF = 1.0
System-variant 2:
The accident rate in system-variant 2 may be lower than in system-variant 1 and the existing
railway system in Norway, due to the fact that the contingent of potential dangerous goods or
substances in high-speed trains is less than in mixed traffic with wagon trains. More secured
tracks in system-variant 2 should reduce the probability of electrocution accidents of 3rd
persons, but anyway, both aspects can not be quantified due to missing data. As a conservative
estimation in this phase of a risk assessment, a factor 1 for the accident rate of other hazards
seems to be justifiable and sufficient.
ΔλA =1.0
The fatality rate for other hazards may be lower in system-variant 2 as in the existing Norwegian
Rail due to the exclusion of dangerous goods incidents in the context with freight trains.
Considering that the majority of serious accidents is related to electrocution and not to
dangerous goods, a significant change of the fatality rate seems not to be required. As a
Page 223 of (270)
conservative estimation in this phase of a risk assessment, a factor 1 for the fatality rate of other
hazards seems to be justifiable and sufficient.
ΔλF = 1.0
Top-Event 8: other hazards
Rail-System
λa per
Δλa-hs1
train km
λa per train
km (HSR)
accident
Fatalities per
accident (new)
Fatalities per
year
Existing system
1.2E-8
-
-
0.60
-
-
0.33
System-Variant 1
1.2E-8
1.00
1.2E-8
0.60
1.00
0.60
+ 0.017
System-Variant 2
1.2E-8
1.00
1.2E-8
0.60
1.00
0.60
+ 0.017
As an important further conclusion of the calculation the minor influence of Top-event 8 “other
hazards” to the overall residual risk of a potential new high speed rail system can be stated.
Persons
Fatalities
per year
others
Passengers
0.333
Personal
Distribution
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
91.9%
0.306
0,322
0,322
3.6%
0.012
0,013
0,013
4.5%
0.015
0,016
0,016
0,333
0.350
0.350
Number of exposed
/ affected persons
existing rail net
System-variant 1
System-variant 2
others
3’000’000
1.02E-07
1.07E-07
1.07E-07
Passengers
3’000’000
4.00E-09
4.20E-09
4.20E-09
Personal
7’500
2.00E-06
2.10E-06
2.10E-06
2.10E-06
2.21E-06
3.23E-07
Persons
Page 224 of (270)
2.6
Sensitivity analysis
The following equation (risk model for collective risk) provides the basis for a sensitivity
analysis.
RC = ∑1 Δ λA Top i ⋅ λA Top i ⋅ Δ λF Top i ⋅ λF Top i
8
λA Top i = Accident rate (for a specific Top-Event i)
λF
Top i
= Fatality rate (for a specific Top-Event i)
By systematically changing parameters in the model to determine the effects of such changes
the level of uncertainty and robustness of the model is analyzed. As already discussed in the
previous chapters the Top-Event “collision train-train“ does not have a significant influence to
the overall residual risk and is therefore taken out of consideration for the sensitivity analysis.
The Top-Event “other accidents” is also not considered here because of the general uncertainty
which accidents are included in the available statistics.
Therefore the risk model for the sensibility analysis reduces to the following equation:
RC = ∑1 Δ λA Top i ⋅ λA Top i ⋅ Δ λF Top i ⋅ λF Top i
6
The following tables classify each influencing parameter to a particular level of uncertainty:
Table 97: Level of uncertainty for each influencing parameter of the collective risk model (system variant 1)
Δλa-hs1
Top-Event
Level of
uncertainty
Parameter
variation
Δλf-hs1
Level of
uncertainty
Parameter
variation
1
medium
0.5..1
35
high
3.5..50
Derailment
1
high
0.1..2
35
high
10..50
1
medium
0.5..1
1
low
-
1
medium
0.5..1
1
low
-
1
medium
0.5..1.5
1
low
-
4
high
0.4..4
4
high
0.4..10
Table 98: Level of uncertainty for each influencing parameter of the collective risk model (system variant 2)
Top-Event
Δλa-hs1
Level of
uncertainty
Parameter
variation
Δλf-hs1
Level of
uncertainty
Parameter
variation
0.5
high
0.05..1
150
high
10..300
Derailment
0.5
high
0.05..0.5
150
high
20..300
0.1
medium
0.05..0.5
1
low
-
0
low
-
0
low
-
0.5
medium
0.1..2
1
low
-
4
high
0.4..4
8
high
0.8..10
The accumulated results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in the following diagram for the
two system variants (collective risk):
Page 225 of (270)
System variant 2
0,39
3,14
System variant 1
5,28
0,09
5,94
0
20,99
5
10
15
20
25
Figure 100: Range of collective risks
The range of possible outcomes is huge because of the high level of uncertainty of many
influencing parameters as discussed before. If all parameters are at the low end of the range
(most optimistic scenario) the collective risk for system variant 1 would be lower than a scenario
with conventional passenger trains (0.45 equivalent fatalities per year) and the most optimistic
scenario for system variant 2 is even lower adding negligible risk to the current situation.
The main drivers of the risk are the two accident scenarios derailment and collision train-object
as can be seen in the following two diagrams:
Passenger injured at platf orm
Derailment
2,08
0,11
0,58
0,02
1,67
0,10
0,03
0,20
0,05
0,05
0,00
0,000
3,01
0,15
0,10
0,001
0,010
0,100
1,000
10,000
Page 226 of (270)
-
Passenger injured at platf orm
Derailment
4,51
0,03
0,02
0,01
2,51
0,10
0,01
0,00
0,000
18,05
1,26
0,20
0,10
0,001
0,010
0,100
1,000
10,000
To keep the above values in context, analysing the ICE accident statistics in Germany reveals
the following:
The point estimates of the proposed risk model for derailment (system variant 1) for Norway is
predicted to be twice as high as the risk in Germany (8 accidents recorded with 110 equivalent
fatalities) whereas the risk for collision train-object is predicted to be higher by a factor of 1.000
(Germany: 6 accidents recorded with 1 equivalent fatality)! Especially 1 severe accident
collision train-object in 2008 (collision with a herd of sheep with a speed of 215 km/h, 12 of 14
cars derailed, has had only mild consequences mainly because the derailed train approached a
tunnel and was therefore kept on track) could have changed the picture massively and the risk
difference between the predicted model and statistical evidence would be only a factor of
8 instead of 1’000.
Analysing the different accident scenarios from different sources of statistics and here
especially derailments and collisions, the distribution of fatalities per accident follow a power-law
model. This means that very few accidents cause the majority of fatalities. Finding the
parameters of the power-law model for the fatality distribution over the different accident
scenarios for a high-speed network could lead to a lower uncertainty regarding the proposed
risk model.
2.7
Perspective
With the risk analysis included in this document potential factors which are supposed to
influence the risk and in the following the safety level regarding the operation of a new highspeed railway system in Norway have been identified. Collective and individual risks have been
estimated for two assumed system-variants. Therefore the evaluation of events which may
cause accidents and the prediction of potential consequences have been done. The perceptions
out of these analyses allow limiting the scope of further safety studies by focusing on the
significant accident scenarios which are
•
Derailment and
•
Collision train-objects.
As described before these both accident scenarios are supposed to play a major role regarding
the residual risk of a potential new high-speed railway system. Detailed information regarding
the foreseen architecture / design of the system should be used to precise the risk analysis and
to limit uncertainties. The further analysis of influencing factors would deliver precious
information for the specification of safety requirements of a new system. Therefore it would be
Page 227 of (270)
necessary to refine and parameterise the combined event- and fault trees for a complete risk
model with a full composition of causes, hazards and accidents. In this context, beside the
described results, the risk assessment at hand provides an excellent basis for the following
safety process.
Page 228 of (270)
3 Subject – HSR Contribution to transport safety and security
3.0
Introduction
An important basis for decisions regarding possible future high-speed rail operations in Norway
is the impact of such an operation on the total transport safety in society. Subject 3 of the
Technical Safety Analysis therefore comprises of a comparative study of comprehensive
transport safety applied on present and possible future transport scenarios.
3.0.1 Objectives & Scope
The overall objective of the study is to estimate the effect of a high speed railway operation on
the total transport safety. This is accomplished by analysing the following three scenarios:
•
Future safety level of transport with present relevant means of transport.
•
Future safety level of transport with high-speed train operations on combined tracks as a
part of the transport service.
•
Future safety level of public transport with high-speed train operations on separate
tracks as a part of the public transport service.
The study includes the development of a detailed methodology for the assessment,
accompanied by a description and reasoning on decision. The model is then applied to quantify
the expected change in transport safety due to the operation of a high-speed rail system.
An economic valuation of the change in transport safety due to the implementation of highspeed rail operation is calculated as a function of the expected change in transport safety,
expressed as the expected number of fatalities and the value of a statistical life (VSL) used in
Norway.
Additional safety factors that will follow from an introduction of a high speed railway are
assessed and included in the analysis. Examples of such factors are: possible increase in
safety level for road traffic caused by more goods transported on the railways and fewer trucks
occupying roads.
To accomplish the objectives, the study includes the following six major steps:
•
Estimation of the current transport safety level and development.
•
Estimation of the future distributions between types of transport means.
•
Estimation of future transport safety levels without high-speed operations.
•
Estimation of the future transport safety including high-speed operations.
•
Estimation of changes in safety and the consequences of the changes.
•
Uncertainty analysis.
3.0.2 Limitations
During this phase of the project there will be no quantitative information available from the
market analysis of the project on the expected future distribution of transports between different
transport means due to the implementation of a high-speed rail system. In addition the
assessment of the HSR future safety levels in Subject 2 could only be made on a general level
in this phase of the project since no detailed information regarding the HSR operation is yet
available. Therefore the safety analysis is subject to two important limitations:
•
The safety calculations had to be performed on a set of possible hypothetical future
transport scenarios rather than quantitative forecasts of future transport volumes in
different transport modes.
Page 229 of (270)
•
The safety calculations for the three scenarios and the economic consequences of the
expected changes in safety levels should be regarded as generic at this stage rather
than forecasts suitable for supporting decisions on a detailed level.
As a result of the data limitations the work has been primarily directed at preparing a model for
safety forecasts that can be updated as new information becomes available during later phases
of the project. The model has been developed as an assessment tool that can be used to model
different future transport scenarios for specific corridors of future HSR operations.
3.0.3 Definitions
Passenger kilometres
- Number of passengers multiplied by the distance in km
Vehicle kilometres
- Number of vehicles multiplied by the distance in km
Road transport
- In Subject 3 road transport is considered to be car, bus and truck
traffic
The two principal system-variants that have been described in Subject 2 are also used in
subject 3.
•
System-variant 1: The first principal variant is represented by an upgrade of an existing
track to be a High Speed Rail track. In Subject 3 called “HSR combined”.
•
System-variant 2: The second variant is represented by a complete new track which is
used exclusively by high speed trains. In Subject 3 called “HSR separate”.
3.1
Summary
The possibility of introducing High Speed Rail (HSR) connections in Norway has to be carefully
analyzed and all economic and safety aspects have to be taken into account when choosing (or
rejecting) different options considered.
The safety of a HSR system can be looked at in isolation where fatality rates per passenger
kilometre or train kilometre can be estimated. This has been done in Subject 2 of this work. The
safety analysis evaluates the impact of a HSR system on the entire transport safety level. Any
change in global safety level can be economically valued using the value of a statistical life.
The total transport safety level reflects how many people are killed, when travelling, using
available means of transportation. Means of transportation can be cars, busses, trains,
airplanes, ferries etc. So the total safety level is the sum of the safety levels of all means of
transportation. Any change in distribution between the means of transportation used affects the
total safety level as will a transfer of passengers from existing means of transportation to a new
mean of transportation like a HSR system. A typical example would be a transfer of passengers
from cars to trains: this is a transfer to a safer system which would increase total transport
safety.
In this perspective a generalized assessment model has been developed that calculates the
current transport safety level as well as estimates future levels of transport safety as a function
of transport mode distributions and the introduction of different options for HSR. Economic
valuation of this safety level is also performed by the model based on the value of a statistical
life.
This generalized approach enables the estimation of a total general transport safety level by
combining safety calculations for HSR solutions current transport safety levels and future traffic
and mode distribution forecasts as these become available in phase three of the project.
3.2
Availability of input data
To determine the total safety level of the current transportation system and how this has
developed over time, two main types of data have been collected for different types of
Page 230 of (270)
transportation means. The first type concerns the number of fatal accidents per year and the
second the total quantity of transported person/passenger and vehicle kilometres per year.
The availability of data varies. For example, data concerning private car transports are quite
extensive whereas data is limited for other transport means.
Due to data limitations, interactions and dependencies between different types of statistical
information a number of simplifications and assumptions have been necessary. These are
explained in the appropriate section below.
The available data on the quantities of transport kilometres both passenger and vehicle
kilometres vary greatly. This means that the estimates of transport kilometres and future
transport kilometres are uncertain to evaluate the sensitivity of the model results due to
uncertain parameter inputs a sensitivity analysis using Monte Carlo simulations has been
performed see 3.5.2.
Statistics for transports in Norway have been collected from Statistisk sentralbyrå (SSB) and
Jernbaneverket. In statistics from SSB concerning passenger kilometres only passengers that
have starting point and final destination in Norway are included.
Due to limited or incomplete Norwegian transport data additional information has been gathered
from Swedish and international data sources. Statistics concerning road and rail data from
Trafikanalys, the Swedish Statistisk Centralbyrå (SCB) and Trafikverket (the Swedish Transport
Administration) were used to estimate historical road and rail transport safety development.
International aviation statistics from ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) was used to
estimate the historical safety development in air traffic.
3.3
Transports
3.3.1 Types of data and evaluation approach
Estimations of the transported kilometres were made for the following means of transport:
•
Railway transport
o
•
Conventional rail
Road transport
o
Car
o
Bus
o
Truck
•
Air transport
•
Ferry
To estimate the current and predict the future transport kilometres for the selected means of
transport the following historical information is necessary for each transport type:
•
Annual number of passenger transports
•
Annual number of vehicle kilometres
•
Annual changes of different types of transportation means
The passenger transport information is needed to estimate the current and future passenger
safety whereas the number of vehicle kilometres is needed as input for estimations of current
and future safety levels for others e.g. workers and third party representatives (see section 3.4).
The annual historical changes in transport kilometres (passenger and vehicle) display past
development of different means of transport and are used for forecasts of the future transport
and safety levels; see section 3.4). Since no detailed market analysis of future transports could
Page 231 of (270)
be performed within this phase of the project, the forecasts of future transport and safety levels
had to be primarily based on historical data.
Based on the historical transport information the current number of transport kilometres was
estimated as the arithmetic mean of the last three years of historical data. The three-year mean
value was used in order to get a representative value for the most recent period of the historical
data while simultaneously achieving a reasonable reduction in the uncertainty of the estimate
due to data variability. The outcome of this analysis was used to represent the current transport
situation and as a starting point (first year) in the forecasts of future transports.
Calculations of the annual change of transport kilometres over available periods of historical
data were made using the Kendall slope factor analysis [95]. All observed slope estimates bi.j
between years i and j in the observation period were calculated as:
bi , j =
xi − x j
i− j
where xi and xj are the log-transformed measurements for years i and j. where i < j. The median
B of all bi.j provides an estimate of the annual change in %:
K = 100(1 − e − B )
Since data availability varies greatly between different means of transport the annual changes
should only be used generically for the 0-alternative, i.e. the current transport system. New
values should preferably be calculated for the scenarios including HSR-transport, i.e.
Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 once a more detailed market analysis of future transports has been
performed.
3.3.2 Railway transport
In Norway railway transports accounts for a relatively small part of the total quantity of
passenger kilometres. A comparison between railway transport and air transport during the last
20 years shows that the passenger kilometres on rail are 70 % of the air plane passenger
kilometres. In Figure 103 the passenger kilometres during 1970-2009 is presented and in Figure
104 the railway vehicle kilometres during 2005-2009 is presented. The three year average trend
line is inserted in the diagrams.
Figure 103: Billion railway passenger kilometres in Norway 54 .
54
Cp. [96].
Page 232 of (270)
The current annual number of train passenger kilometres on conventional rail was calculated to
be 2.99 billion. This figure was used as a starting point on rail passenger kilometres in the 0alternative. The annual increase in passenger kilometres was calculated to be 1.5 %.
Figure 104: Billion railway vehicle kilometres in Norway. 55
The current annual train vehicle kilometres on conventional rail has been determined to be 0.05
billion. This figure was used as a starting point on rail vehicle kilometres in the 0-alternative. The
annual increase in train vehicle kilometres was calculated to be 2.2 %.
3.3.2.1 High speed railway
The passenger kilometres and vehicle kilometres in scenario 1 and scenario 2 for future HSR
have been estimated in chapter 3.6.
3.3.3 Road transport
Road transports accounts for the largest part of the total transported kilometres concerning both
passenger kilometres and vehicle kilometres in Norway. The largest part of road passenger
kilometres are made up of car transports (driver and passengers are counted) and a smaller
quantity by bus transport. When looking at vehicle kilometres cars also make up the dominating
part, however trucks contribute significantly.
3.3.3.1 Car transport
Norwegian statistics for passenger kilometres in cars are available from 1970-2009. The
statistics concerning car vehicle kilometres are more limited and were available only for the
period 2005-2009. In Figure 105 the total passenger kilometres in cars in Norway is presented
and in Figure 106 the total car vehicle kilometres.
55
Cp. [97].
Page 233 of (270)
Figure 105: Billion passenger kilometres (driver and passenger) in cars on Norwegian roads. 56
The current annual passenger kilometres of cars were calculated to be 55.78 billion. This figure
was used as a starting point on car passenger kilometres in the 0-alternative. The annual
increase in car passenger kilometres was calculated to be 2.3 %.
Figure 106: Billion vehicle kilometres in cars on Norwegian roads. 57
The current annual car vehicle kilometres were calculated to be 32.53 billion. This figure was
used as a starting point on car vehicle kilometres in the 0-alternative. The annual increase in car
vehicle kilometres was calculated to be 3.70 %. Since data concerning vehicle kilometres only
consist of five years. 2005-2009. it should be noted that the annual increase is rather uncertain.
The increase is fairly consistent with the annual increase of passenger kilometres. 2.30 %.
3.3.3.2 Bus transport
Norwegian statistics for passenger kilometres in buses are available from the period 1970-2009.
The statistics concerning bus vehicle kilometres are more limited and were only available from
56
Cp. [96].
57
Cp. [98].
Page 234 of (270)
2005-2009. In Figure 107 the total passenger kilometres in buses in Norway is presented and in
Figure 6 the total bus vehicle kilometres.
Figure 107: Billion passenger kilometres in buses on Norwegian roads. 58
The current annual passenger kilometres in buses were calculated to be 4.34 billion, in the 0alternative. This figure was used as a starting point on bus passenger kilometres in the 0alternative. The annual increase in bus passenger kilometres for the last five years was
calculated to be 0.3 %.
Figure 108: Billion vehicle kilometres in buses on Norwegian roads. 59
The current annual bus vehicle kilometres was calculated to be 0.69 billion, in the 0-alternative.
This figure was used as a starting point on bus vehicle kilometres in the 0-alternative.
The annual change in bus vehicle kilometres for the last five years was calculated to be 4.45 %. A decrease of this degree may seem somewhat unrealistic perhaps the amount of
seats in buses has increased. Since no other data are available this value was used for the
present calculations.
58
Cp. [96].
59
Cp. [98].
Page 235 of (270)
3.3.3.3 Truck transport
No passengers (of note) use trucks as a means of transport. Therefore only vehicle kilometres
are an important factor for trucks. The statistics concerning truck vehicle kilometres are limited
and have only been available from 2005-2009. There are two types of trucks mentioned in the
statistics and these are merged to simplify the final model and enable calculations. The types of
trucks are “small trucks” (Norwegian: “små godsbiler”) and “large trucks” (Norwegian: “store
lastebiler”). In Figure 109 the total truck vehicle kilometres is presented.
Figure 109: Billion vehicle kilometres in trucks on Norwegian roads. 60
The current annual truck vehicle kilometres were calculated to be 9.45. This figure was used as
a starting point on truck vehicle kilometres in the 0-alternative. The annual increase in truck
vehicle kilometres for the last five years was calculated to be 4.1 %.
3.3.4 Air transport
Air transport in Norway has increased steadily during the latter part of the 20th century with
some exceptions. Also during the first decade of the 21st century an increase can be noted. In
Figure 110 the yearly total air plane passenger kilometres in Norway is presented for the years
1970-2009.
60
Cp. [98].
Page 236 of (270)
Figure 110: Billion passenger kilometres with airplanes in Norway. 1970-2009. 61
The current annual airplane passenger kilometres were calculated to be 4.48 billion. This figure
was used as a starting point on airplane passenger kilometres in the 0-alternative. The annual
increase in air plane passenger kilometres was calculated to be 5.4 %.
3.3.5 Ferry transport
It is assumed that ferry transports will only have an effect on the future transport scenarios
studied in this project if a high speed rail system is implemented between cities where major
ferry lanes operate. The overall correlation effect between HSR and ferry transports is therefore
assumed to be limited. Furthermore the amount of passenger kilometres on ferries is relatively
limited as shown in Figure 111. Ferry transports have therefore not been included in the safety
calculations.
Figure 111: Billion passenger kilometres with ferry transport in Norway. 2005-2008. 62
61
Cp. [96].
62
Cp. [99].
Page 237 of (270)
3.4
Safety
3.4.1 Types of data and evaluation approach
Estimations of the current and future transport safety levels were made for the following means
of transport.
•
•
Railway transport
o
Conventional rail
o
High speed railway
Road transport
o
Car
o
Bus
o
Truck
•
Aviation
•
Ferry
Estimations concerning safety levels for the selected means of transport that are needed for the
estimations and forecasts of current and future safety levels for the studied scenarios are:
•
Fatalities per passenger kilometre.
•
Fatalities per vehicle kilometre.
•
Annual change of fatalities per passenger and vehicle kilometre.
This information is needed for each of the different means of transportation included in the
model.
For transport means not concerning high speed rail (HSR) the safety level and annual safety
change per passenger and/or vehicle kilometre were calculated. Since quantification of the HSR
safety levels are not possible at this stage the safety forecast performed in the current phase of
the project were based on subjective estimations of the safety of the HSR, see below.
The reported number of annual fatalities of the different means of transportation was used to
calculate the fatalities per passenger kilometres and vehicle kilometres. For passenger fatalities
safety levels are expressed per passenger kilometre and for other fatalities per vehicle
kilometre. Consequently, both passenger safety and other people’s safety are included in the
model.
Some assumptions have been necessary in order to make estimations of the safety levels and
are stated in the appropriate sections below. In some cases Swedish and International statistics
have been used to complement the Norwegian statistics.
The calculations of the current safety level for each transport means were made in analogy with
the calculations of the transport see section 3.3.1.
Calculations of the annual change of transport kilometres over available periods of historical
data were made using the Kendall slope factor analysis [95], see 3.3.1
3.4.2 Railway transport
The statistics on railway safety in Norway was gathered from Jernbaneverket for the years
1996-2009. Changes in reporting on accidents were made in 2003 after which only accidents
with moving trains were reported. In Figure 112 the fatalities on Norwegian railways for
passengers, employees and other persons are presented.
Page 238 of (270)
Figure 112: Number of fatalities on Norwegian railways during 1996-2003. 63
Trains affect the number of fatalities in the transportation system in two ways. The first fatality
category concerns passengers. The safety level for this category is dependent on the total
number of passenger kilometres. The second category concerns fatalities where trains are
causing fatalities among other people. This safety level is dependent on the total number of
vehicle kilometres. Travel with train is safe but railways are less safe for people in the vicinity.
3.4.2.1 Conventional rail
Determining the safety level for conventional rail passengers was made by using Norwegian
statistics concerning fatality of passengers during 1996-2009 [97]. During this period one
disastrous accident occurred. In the Åsta-accident which happened in 2000, 16 passengers and
3 employees were killed [100]. This means that the period contains one large scale accident. It
should be noted that after 2003 the definition of a railway accident was changed. From 2004 a
railway accident must involve a moving train. Fatality levels calculated in subject 2 of the project
were used to calculate the safety level of conventional rail.
The current safety level for conventional rail passenger which is equal to the first year of the
model calculations was calculated by using the arithmetic mean of the last three years of
passenger kilometres and the fatality level for passengers calculated in subject 2. The starting
safety level for conventional rail passengers was calculated to be 0.23 fatalities per billion
passenger kilometres. The annual train passenger safety improvement was calculated to be
11.1 %. Due to the high variability of data concerning fatalities the trend analysis of safety
development for conventional rail is not considered relevant. Therefore the goal on annual
safety improvement given in Sikkerhedshandboken [101] 3.5 % was used. The annual fatality
level per billion kilometres for conventional rail passengers is presented in Figure 113.
63
Cp. [100].
Page 239 of (270)
Figure 113: Passenger fatality per billion conventional rail passenger kilometres.
The current safety level for other persons (employees and third persons) which is equal to the
first year of the model calculations was calculated by using the arithmetic mean of the last three
years of passenger kilometres and the fatality level for others (others and staff) calculated in
subject 2. The starting safety level for other persons was calculated to be 176.43 fatalities per
billion train vehicle kilometres. The annual train passenger safety improvement was calculated
to be 15.8 %. Due to high variability of data concerning fatalities the trend analysis of safety
development for conventional rail is not considered relevant. Therefore the goal on annual
safety improvement given in Sikkerhedshandboken [101] 3.5 % was used. The annual fatality
level for other persons per billion vehicle kilometres for conventional rail is presented in Figure
114.
Figure 114: Fatality for others per billion conventional rail vehicle kilometres.
3.4.2.2 High speed railway
A prerequisite for real-world forecasts of the effect on transport safety in Norway with and
without HSR operations is that a future safety level of HSR can be determined. Detailed
information on future HSR levels will be available in later phases of the project. Therefore
estimations of future HRS safety at the present phase have to be based on expert judgement in
order to enable development and testing of the assessment tool presented here see also
Page 240 of (270)
subject 2 of the report. The safety estimations for HSR presented here thus need to be updated
once the future HSR safety levels have been quantified in detail.
Approximate estimations were made of safety levels where HSR are combined with
conventional rail (“HSR combined”, scenario 1) and where HSR operate on separate tracks
(“HSR separate”, scenario 2).
It was assumed that the main differences between a future HSR system and the present rail
system are that level crossings will be removed and that improved warning systems will be
applied on the HSR. In Norwegian Sikkerhedshandboken [101] safety goals are given regarding
how many fatal accidents a year are acceptable. Of these fatalities 30 % constitute of level
crossings fatalities. It was therefore assumed that if a HSR system is built the safety level per
billion vehicle kilometres for other persons will be improved by 30 % compared to conventional
rail.
Concerning passenger safety the same safety level was used for all scenarios. This assumption
can be questioned since it can be argued that the safety level may both increase and decrease;
accident frequency may be reduced in HSR operations but at the same time the consequences
(no. of fatalities) in case of an accident may increase, see also subject 2. Given the absence of
specific information regarding the design and operation of future HSR in Norway at this stage, it
was concluded that the current knowledge regarding passenger safety levels of future HSR
operations only allows for hypothetical assumptions of differences between different railway
means. The future safety levels were therefore set to be constant between the different railway
transport means.
However, although the passenger safety may not be reduced going from conventional to HSR,
for the reasons mentioned above, it was found reasonable to assume that HSR will be built with
a high initial safety standard and that the annual safety improvement therefore should be
limited. It was assumed that both passenger safety and safety for others will be improved with
0.5 % annually for both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 over the studied time horizons.
For the scenario ”HSR combined” the starting safety level for passengers was estimated to be
0.23 fatalities per billion passenger kilometres. The starting safety level for other persons was
estimated to be 123.50 fatalities per billion vehicle kilometres.
For the scenario ”HSR separate” the starting safety level for passengers was estimated to be
0.23 fatalities per billion passenger kilometres. The starting safety level for other persons was
estimated to be 123.50 fatalities per billion vehicle kilometres.
3.4.3 Road transport
A dominating part of the total number of persons killed in transports related accident in Norway
is killed by road transport, car; bus or truck. In Figure 115 the total number of people killed in
road traffic accidents during 1970-2009 is presented.
Page 241 of (270)
Figure 115: The number of persons killed in road traffic accidents in Norway during 1970-2009. 64
The available data on road traffic accidents where people are killed vary greatly. To estimate
the current and future safety level some adjustments have been necessary. These will be
explained in the following sections. In addition Swedish statistics have been used in some
instances to predict Norwegian levels.
3.4.3.1 Car
Cars affect the number of fatalities in the transportation system in two ways. The first and
largest fatality category concerns drivers and passengers. The safety level for this category is
dependent on the total number of passenger kilometres (driver and passenger). The second
category concerns fatalities were cars are causing fatalities among other people which use
roads or are close to roads. This safety level is dependent on the total number of vehicle
kilometres.
The safety level for car drivers and passengers was calculated by using Norwegian statistics
concerning killed drivers and passengers during 1970-2009. The current safety level, which is
equal to the first year of the model calculations, was calculated by using the arithmetic mean of
the last three years. The starting safety level for passengers and drivers was calculated to be
2.81 fatalities per billion car passenger kilometres. The annual car passenger safety
improvement was calculated to be 3.3 %. The annual fatality level for car passengers is shown
in Figure 116.
64
Cp. [102].
Page 242 of (270)
Figure 116: Passenger and driver fatality for car traffic per billion passenger kilometres
Calculation of the safety level for others than car drivers and passengers that are exposed to
car vehicles (“cars involved in killing others”) was made by using both Norwegian and Swedish
[103] statistics. The reason for this is that no Norwegian statistics concerning fatalities involving
cars was available. An assumption was made that the relative frequency between fatalities in
cars (passengers and drivers) compared to others are approximately the same in Norway and
Sweden. To strengthen this argument the proportion of drivers and passengers that was killed
in road traffic between 2003 and 2009 in Norway and Sweden were compared. In Sweden
65.1 % of the people killed in traffic accident were drivers or passengers in cars and in Norway
the corresponding proportion was 67.5 %.
It was assumed, with the help of Swedish statistics, that most of the fatalities with cars involved
excluding the car driver or passenger, are persons walking, biking or otherwise “unprotected”.
According to Swedish statistics, based on the years 2003-2009, 13.4 % of the total numbers of
fatalities in Swedish road accidents are car accidents where other persons than the car driver or
passenger are killed.
Since the total numbers of fatalities on Norwegian roads are known the number of persons
killed by cars can be estimated. The estimated fatalities are presented in Figure 117.
Page 243 of (270)
Figure 117: The estimated number of fatalities for other persons per billion car vehicle kilometres (“cars involved in
killing others”) excluding passenger and drivers in Norway during 2005-2009.
The reason that the only estimated numbers of “cars killing others” presented are for the years
2005-2009 are that the vehicle kilometres in Norway are only known for this period.
With the estimation of fatalities caused by cars and the known vehicle kilometres the safety
level and the annual change of “cars involved in killing others” was calculated. For the starting
year the safety level for “cars involved in killing others” was calculated to be 0.96 fatalities per
billion vehicle kilometres. The annual safety increase was calculated to be 4.1 %. Due to the
small amount of data available of car vehicle kilometres the annual safety improvement for
others is somewhat unreliable.
3.4.3.2 Bus
Buses affect the number of fatalities in the transportation system in two ways. The first fatality
category concerns drivers and passengers. The safety level for this category is dependent on
the total number of passenger kilometres. The second category concerns fatalities were buses
are causing fatalities among other people which use roads or are close to roads. This safety
level is dependent on the total number of vehicle kilometres. A comparison of fatalities between
buses and cars show that the number of fatalities caused by buses is very small compared to
fatalities caused by cars.
No Norwegian statics concerning the quantity of bus passengers could be identified in this
study. The Swedish statics cover a short time span and were therefore not used to calculate the
passenger safety. However, in the report Nasjonal Tiltaksplan for trafikksikkerhet på veg [104]
the number of passenger and driver fatalities per person kilometre in Norway during 1998-2002
is stated to be 0.93 fatalities per billion passenger kilometres. This figure was used to represent
the current safety level for bus passengers in this study.
Since no yearly statics were identified concerning bus safety the annual bus passenger safety
improvement was estimated to be the same as for car passengers, i.e. 3.3 %.
Determining the safety level for others than bus passengers that are exposed to bus vehicles
(“buses killing others”) was made by using both Norwegian [102] and Swedish [103] statistics.
The reason for this is that no Norwegian statistics concerning fatalities involving buses were
available. An assumption was made that the relative frequency between fatalities in buses
(passengers and drivers) compared to other fatalities on roads is approximately the same in
Norway and Sweden.
It was assumed, with the help of Swedish statistics, that most of the fatalities with buses
involved, buses and single bus accidents are excluded, are accidents with cars, persons
walking, biking or otherwise “unprotected” persons. According to Swedish statistics, based on
the years 2003-2009, 1.51 % of the total numbers of fatalities in Swedish road accidents are
bus accidents where other persons than the bus driver or passengers are killed.
Since the total numbers of fatalities on Norwegian roads are known the number of persons
killed by buses can be estimated. The estimated fatalities are presented in Figure 118.
Page 244 of (270)
Figure 118: The estimated number of fatalities for other persons per billion bus vehicle kilometres (“bus involved in
killing others”) after accidents with cars; buses and single bus accidents are excluded in Norway during 2005-2009.
The reason that the only estimated numbers of “bus involved in killing others” presented are for
the years 2005-2009 is that the vehicle kilometres in Norway are only known for this period.
Based on the estimation of fatalities involving buses and the known vehicle kilometres the
safety level and the annual safety change of “buses involved in killing others” were calculated.
For the starting year the safety level for “buses involved in killing others” was calculated to be
5.15 fatalities per billion vehicle kilometres. The annual safety change was calculated to be 4.4 %, i.e. a decrease in safety. It should be emphasized that this figure is based on a very
limited statistical sample and that a more detailed study on bus safety should be performed in
the subsequent phase of the project.
3.4.3.3 Truck
Trucks affect the number of fatalities in the transportation system in two ways. The first fatality
category concerns truck drivers. This category is not calculated separately because it was
assumed that the number of truck drivers that are killed constitute a small part of the total
fatalities where trucks are involved.
The second category concerns fatalities were trucks are causing fatalities among other people,
which use roads or are close to roads. This safety level is dependent on the total number of
vehicle kilometres. A comparison of fatalities between trucks and cars show that the number of
fatalities caused by trucks is small compared to fatalities caused by cars.
Determining the safety level for others that are exposed to truck vehicles (“trucks involved in
killing others”) was made by using both Norwegian [102] and Swedish [103] statistics. The
reason for this is that no Norwegian statistics concerning fatalities involving trucks was
available. An assumption was made that the relative frequency between fatalities caused by
trucks compared to others is approximately the same in Norway and Sweden.
Two important factors should be noted about this safety level concerning cars and trucks.
Accidents involving cars are subtracted from the number of fatalities involving trucks because
these fatalities are already accounted for in the calculations of the car safety level. Concerning
trucks, the safety level for “trucks involved in killing others” also includes truck drivers killed in
truck-truck and single truck accidents.
It was assumed with the help of Swedish statistics, that most of the fatalities with trucks
involved, after accidents with cars are excluded, are persons walking, biking or otherwise
“unprotected”. Also truck drivers are counted in these fatalities. According to Swedish statistics,
Page 245 of (270)
based on the years 2003-2009, 7.94 % of the total numbers of fatalities in Swedish road
accidents are truck accidents where other persons than car drivers and passengers are killed.
Assuming that the fraction of truck fatalities of the total number of road fatalities is
approximately the same in Norway and Sweden, the number of persons killed where trucks are
involved was estimated, see Figure 119.
Figure 119: The estimated number of fatalities for other persons per billion truck vehicle kilometres (“trucks involved
in killing others”) after accidents with cars are excluded in Norway during 2005-2009.
The reason that the numbers of “trucks involved in killing others” presented is restricted to the
years 2005-2009 is that the vehicle kilometres in Norway are only known for this period.
With the estimation of fatalities involving trucks and the known vehicle kilometres the safety
level and the annual change of “trucks involved in killing others” was calculated. For the starting
year the safety level for “trucks involved in killing others” was calculated to be 1.96 fatalities per
billion vehicle kilometres. The annual safety increase was calculated to be 4.3 %. It should be
emphasized that this figure is based on a very limited statistical sample and that a more detailed
study on truck safety should be performed in the subsequent phase of the project.
3.4.3.4 Dependencies
The number of road accidents is affected by several different means of transportation and also
both the quantity of passenger kilometres and vehicle kilometres among other things. In addition
there are some dependencies between the different categories of accidents that need to be
addressed in the calculations of the present and future safety levels. The following
dependencies affecting the quantity of road and total fatalities have been identified:
•
Some fatalities in road traffic are probably also counted as level crossing accidents in
railway statistics. Since this number is assumed to be small compared to the total
number of fatalities in the transport system no special attention is given to this issue. In
the Swedish statistics concerning fatalities involving different types of road transport no
separate category deals with level crossing accidents.
•
In the safety level for both trucks and buses no correction have been made for accidents
were both bus and truck are involved. This means that a few fatalities can be included in
the calculations of both safety levels. In the statistics concerning fatalities involving
buses and trucks no separate category deals with accidents involving buses and trucks.
It is therefore assumed that the effect this will cause on the total number of fatalities is
very limited.
•
Since buses and trucks are involved in several accidents with cars per year a decrease
in the quantity of bus and truck traffic will lead to less car fatalities. To correct for this the
Page 246 of (270)
quantity of car accidents involving trucks and buses, respectively have been calculated
from Swedish statistics.
It is assumed that the relative frequency of traffic elements involved in fatal car accidents are
approximately the same in Norway and Sweden. Trucks are involved in 21.76 % of the fatal car
accidents and it was assumed that all of the fatalities in these accidents are car drivers or
passengers. Buses are involved in 2.93 % of the fatal car accidents and it is assumed that all of
the fatalities in these accidents are car drivers or passengers. It is possible that some of the
fatalities in these accidents are truck drivers, bus drivers or passengers. However these
fatalities are estimated to constitute only a small part of the total number of fatalities. With the
help of these estimations a correction of the safety levels of cars when truck and bus traffic
change was made.
Based on these assumptions the change in number of fatal car accidents, Fo→s , from
Scenario 0 to Scenario s[1,2] can be calculated as:
⎛ D − DT ,s
F0→s = ⎜ T ,0
⎜
DT ,0
⎝
⎞
⎟ × 0.218 × Fc ,0
⎟
⎠
where DT. 0 is the number of truck vehicle kilometres in Scenario 0. DT.s is the number of truck
vehicle kilometres in s and Fc.0 is the number of car passenger fatalities in Scenario 0.
The car fatalities involving buses change analogously.
3.4.4 Air transport
The dominating part of accidents with air planes concerns passengers. This means that
fatalities that occur due to air transport are related to the safety level for passengers. The
number of fatalities is governed by the quantity of passenger kilometres.
Few fatal air plane accidents occur in Norway. The safety level for air plane passengers was
therefore approximated by using international statistics from ICAO [105]. Norwegian statistics
concerning transported passenger kilometres were also used. The starting safety level for air
plane passengers was calculated with the fatalities per billion air plane passenger kilometres
2008 and 2007 to 0.10 fatalities per billion air plane passenger kilometres. The annual air plane
passenger safety improvement was calculated to be 7.5 %. The annual fatality level for
international air plane passengers is shown in Figure 120.
Figure 120: The estimated number of international air plane passenger fatalities per billion air plane passenger
kilometres according to the ICAO
Page 247 of (270)
3.4.5 Ferry transport
Statistics concerning fatalities for all persons on Norwegian ferries are available for the years
during 2000-2009. It is probable that these fatalities also include staff persons. The fatalities are
presented in Figure 121. Since the quantity of ferry passenger kilometres transported has not
been available no estimation of the safety level has been made.
Figure 121: Fatalities on ferries in Norway during 2000-2009. 65
3.5
Model description
3.5.1 Model structure
A model for calculations of current safety levels and forecasts of future safety levels was
developed in Excel format. The model was developed to facilitate efficient updating once new
information on safety and transport data becomes available. The model is able to calculate
present and future safety levels for three different scenarios:
•
Future safety level of transport with present relevant means of transport.
•
Future safety level of transport with high-speed train operations on combined tracks as a
part of the public transport service.
•
Future safety level of transport with high-speed train operations on separate tracks as a
part of the public transport service.
Safety calculations can be made for these three scenarios on several different scales. In the
present report the model was used for safety calculations on a national level, given the used
input estimates on transport and safety levels and predicted future changes. When more
specific information concerning the details regarding future high-speed operations the predefined scenarios can be updated and the model can be used for specific corridors and
stretches of future HSR operations. The current model does not include ferry transport due to
lack of information on the quantity of passenger kilometres and the assumption that future HSR
operations have a rather limited correlation to safety on ferries.
The model consists of four major parts:
•
Input data on safety information
o
65
Cp. [106].
Safety per billion person kilometres (bpkm) for road, rail and air travel.
Page 248 of (270)
•
•
•
o
Safety per billion vehicle kilometres (bvkm) for road and rail transports.
o
Annual safety change for the different transport means.
Input data on transports
o
Person kilometres for road, rail and air travel.
o
Vehicle kilometres for road and rail transports.
Input on economic factors
o
Value of Statistical Life (VSL)
o
Discount rate
Output data
o
Total current societal safety level for the different transport means and in total.
o
The predicted societal safety levels for the three scenarios without HSR
operations
o
The predicted societal safety levels for the three scenarios without HSR
operations
o
The changes in safety levels due to HSR operations
o
The economic consequences of the changes in safety levels due to HSR
operations
o
Uncertainty estimations of the economic consequences of the changes in safety
levels due to HSR operations.
The total societal safety levels and the economic consequences of the changes in levels due to
HSR operations were calculated for four different time horizons: 25, 40, 60 and 100 years. A
specific time horizon for the HSR operations could not be defined at this stage of the project and
therefore four alternative time horizons were used.
The economic consequences of changed societal safety levels due to operation of HSR were
calculated as the net present value (NPV) over the specific time horizon T for each scenario
s=[1,2]:
T
1
Fo→s (t ) ⋅ VSL
t
t =0 (1 + r )
NPVs = ∑
where r is the discount rate, t represents the specific years of the time horizon T, Fo→s is the
change in safety level between scenario 0 and s, and VSL is the value of a statistical life.
The model was developed to facilitate a user-friendly application and the input and output
information is compiled on a four-page printable form. The Transport Safety Model is shown in
the Annex 11.
The economic consequences of changed safety level were calculated using the Value of
Statistical Life (VSL). A VSL [101] of ~ 20 MNOK is currently applied in Norway and was used in
the model calculations. However, this value can be changed according to changes in statistical
life valuations. A discount rate of 4.5 % with possible changes to 3.5 % and 5.5 % was used for
the calculations.
3.5.2 Uncertainty analysis
An important feature of the safety forecasts is the ability to account for the inherent uncertainties
in the estimations of input data. The principal approach for managing the uncertainties is shown
in Figure 122.
Page 249 of (270)
Variable 1
0.00
0.22
Variable 2
0.44
0.67
Most likely
Minimum
0.89
Max
Simulation
10
20
30
40
50
Safety level
Figure 122: Schematic description of the approach for uncertainty analysis.
The input parameters are regarded as random variables and their uncertainties are represented
by statistical distributions. The uncertainties of the input percentages, e.g. the annual safety
changes, are represented by beta-distributions [107] and the uncertainties of the transport
kilometres are represented by lognormal distributions. The uncertainties of the passenger safety
levels are represented by lognormal distributions. The VSL was represented by a normal
distribution and the discount rate was represented by a discrete custom distribution with equal
probabilities for possible discount rates.
The resulting uncertainty of the model results is calculated by statistical simulation (Monte
Carlo). The method allows for sensitivity analysis of the modelling in order to identify the most
uncertain variables in the calculation of the transport safety and its economic consequences.
This information is then used in selecting variables most relevant for further studies and data
collection in order to achieve more reliable model results.
The safety modelling tool was developed to facilitate an efficient updating procedure as soon as
new and more detailed information becomes available. The tool is an Excel spreadsheet model
that includes Monte Carlo simulation. To facilitate the Monte Carlo simulation and sensitivity
analysis the Crystal Ball © software is needed as an add-in to Excel.
3.6
Estimation of the future distributions between types of transport means
The three different scenarios that were studied are described in this section. The estimated
values of the input parameters for Scenarios 1 and 2 are also given here. Many of these input
values were based on subjective judgement and should be updated when a more detailed
safety analysis and market analysis of future transports have been made in subsequent phases
of the project. The subjective judgment has been made with the help of a document produced in
phase 1 66 and general documentation on HSR 67 . At present, the model can be used for generic
66
Cp. [108].
67
Cp. [109].
Page 250 of (270)
calculations and to investigate what are the most important input parameters to the
uncertainties of the model results.
The studied scenarios are:
•
Transport with present relevant means of transport – Scenario 0.
•
Transport with high-speed train operations on combined tracks as a part of the public
transport service (“HSR combined”) – Scenario 1.
•
Transport with high-speed train operations on separate tracks as a part of the public
transport service (“HSR separate”) – Scenario 2.
3.6.1
Scenario 0
Transport with present relevant means of transport means that no HSR system is built. The
expected quantity of transported kilometres and annual changes are for different means of
transports are stated in section 3.3 Transports.
3.6.2 Scenario 1
When a “HSR combined” system, Scenario 1, is built it is assumed that parts of other means of
transports are moved to HSR. It was assumed that no changes of the annual changes of
transported kilometres on the different means of transports will take place which probably is a
conservative assumption. The only change accounted for is the amount of transported
kilometres year 0. Note that these estimates are primarily based on subjective judgements
without detailed research of future transport patterns. The estimated changes are as follows:
•
“HSR combined” transports are estimated to transport 0.5 billion passenger kilometres
the first year of operation. This gives an estimate of 0.005 billion vehicle kilometres
assuming 100 passengers per vehicle.
•
The addition of HSR is assumed to increase the total quantity of travel in Norway with
0.06 billion passenger kilometres.
•
Passenger transports with conventional rail are assumed to decrease with 0.06 billion
passenger kilometres to 2.93 passenger kilometres which are transferred to HSR traffic.
The transported vehicle kilometres do not decrease since goods instead of passengers
will be transported on the available rail capacity.
•
Air transports are assumed to decrease with 0.06 billion passenger kilometres to 4.41
billion passenger kilometres. These transports are transferred to HSR.
•
Car transports are estimated to decrease with 0.25 billion passenger kilometres to 55.53
billion passenger kilometres which are transferred to HSR. The car vehicle kilometres
will decrease accordingly by 0.15 billion vehicle kilometres.
•
Bus transports are estimated to decrease with 0.06 billion passenger kilometres to 4.28
billion passenger kilometres which are transferred to HSR. The transported bus vehicle
kilometres will decrease accordingly by 0.01 billion vehicle kilometres.
•
Truck transports are estimated to decrease with 0.08 billion vehicle kilometres. The
reasoning for this is as follows: According to Norwegian statistics approximately 89 % of
the transports on railways are passenger transports. This means that almost the entire
part of the vehicle kilometres that is made available by transferring passenger traffic
from conventional rail to HSR will be available for new goods transport. A goods train is
assumed to be able to transport the same amount as 100 trucks.
Page 251 of (270)
Table 99: Estimated changes when HSR combined with conventional rail is implemented billion passenger and
vehicle kilometres
"HSR combined"
Billion Passenger
km
0.50
Conventional rail
Air
Billion Vehicle km
Billion Passenger km
Billion Vehicle km
0.005
-0.061
-
-0.061
Car
Billion Passenger
Billion Vehicle km
km
-0.25
-0.146
Bus
Truck
Billion Vehicle km
Billion Vehicle km
-0.061
-0.010
-0.0825
3.6.3 Scenario 2
When a “HSR separate” system, Scenario 2, is built it is assumed that parts of other means of
transports are moved to HSR. It was assumed that no changes of the annual changes of
transported kilometres on the different means of transports will take place which probably is a
conservative assumption. The only change accounted for is the amount of transported
kilometres year 0. Note that these estimates are primarily based on subjective judgements
without detailed research of future transport patterns. It was assumed that the number of
passenger kilometres on HSR is doubled compared to scenario 1. The estimated changes are
as follows:
•
“HSR separate” transports are estimated to transport 1 billion passenger kilometres the
first year of operation. This gives an estimate of 0.01 billion vehicle kilometres; this
corresponds to 100 passengers per vehicle.
•
The addition of HSR is assumed to increase the total quantity of travel in Norway with
0.25 billion passenger kilometres.
•
Passenger transports with conventional rail are assumed to decrease with 0.125 billion
passenger kilometres to 2.87 passenger kilometres which are transferred to HSR traffic.
The transported vehicle kilometres do not decrease since goods instead of passengers
will be transported on the available rail capacity.
•
Air transports are assumed to decrease with 0.13 billion passenger kilometres to 4.35
passenger kilometres. These transports are transferred to HSR.
•
Car transports are estimated to decrease with 0.25 billion passenger kilometres to 55.28
billion passenger kilometres which are transferred to HSR. The car vehicle kilometres
will decrease accordingly by 0.29 billion vehicle kilometres.
•
Bus transports are estimated to decrease with 0.125 billion passenger kilometres to 4.22
billion passenger kilometres, which are transferred to HSR. The transported bus vehicle
kilometres will decrease accordingly by 0.02 billion vehicle kilometres.
•
Truck transports is estimated to decrease with 0.17 billion vehicle kilometres. The
reasoning for this is as follows. According to Norwegian statistics approximately 89 % of
the transports on railways are passenger transports. This means that almost the entire
part of the vehicle kilometres that is made available by transferring passenger traffic
from conventional rail to HSR will be available for new goods transport. A goods train is
assumed to be able to transport the same amount as 100 trucks.
Page 252 of (270)
Table 100: Estimated changes when a separate HSR is implemented
"HSR separate"
Conventional rail
Air
Billion Vehicle km
Billion Vehicle km
1.00
0.010
-0.125
-
-0.125
Car
Bus
Truck
Billion Vehicle km
Billion Vehicle km
Billion Vehicle km
-0.50
-0.292
-0.125
-0.020
-0.1684
3.7
Results
3.7.1 Estimation of the current transport safety level and development
The total society safety level of the current transport system without any HSR operations was
calculated based on the input data described in chapter 3.3 and 3.4. The calculations show that
in total 217 fatalities are expected to occur annually in the current Norwegian transport system.
The annual safety development, based on available information, varies between 3.3 % and
7.5 % for studied transport means excluding bus safety for others. The calculated development
for bus safety for others than passengers is based on a very limited statistical sample and not in
correspondence with the trend on safety developments for other means of transport. The results
of the calculations are shown in Table 101 and in Figure 123.
Table 101: The calculated total current societal safety level of transport means in Norway and the annual safety
development.
Transport type
Current societal safety level
fatalities
Safety development
annual change in fatalities per
Billion passenger/vehicle km
Railway tranpsport
Conventional rail
Passengers
Others
Road transport
Car
Passenger
Others
Bus
Passenger
Others
Truck
Others
Air transport
Passengers
Total
0.7
8.0
3.5%
3.5%
156.7
31.2
3.3%
4.1%
4.0
3.5
3.3%
-4.4%
18.5
4.3%
0.4
223.2
7.5%
Page 253 of (270)
Current societal transport safety
250.00
223.17
Annual Fatalities
200.00
156.73
150.00
100.00
50.00
31.24
0.68
18.51
8.00
4.04
3.53
0.45
0.00
s
es
er
th
ng
O
l
e
i
s
Ra
as
lP
i
Ra
s
s
er
er
th
ng
O
e
r
ss
Ca
Pa
r
Ca
s
Bu
s
s
er
er
th
ng
O
e
s
ss
Bu
Pa
k
uc
Tr
rs
he
Ot
Ai
s
er
ng
e
s
as
rP
l
ta
To
Figure 123: The calculated total current societal safety level of transport means in Norway expressed as the expected
number of fatalities for each means of transport.
3.7.2 Estimation of changes in safety and the consequences of the changes
The total societal safety levels and economic consequences concerning fatalities of transport
systems with HSR operations are presented here. Observe that the estimated changes in
passenger kilometres and vehicle kilometres if HSR systems are implemented have been based
on subjective judgement. The results should therefore be seen as generic rather than results to
support real decisions.
Given the input data used, the societal safety level of transport means in Norway for the
different scenarios shown as total amounts of fatalities during 25 years are presented in
Table 102 and in Figure 124 for 25, 40, 60 and 100 year time horizons. In Figure 125 the
changes in predicted societal transport safety levels are presented. The implementation of
either “HSR combined” (Scenario 1) or “HSR separate” (Scenario 2) in Norway would lead to a
reduction in loss of life with 14 lives in S1 and 28 lives in S2 lives when studying the first 25
years and given the input information used here.
Page 254 of (270)
Table 102: The total societal safety level of transport means in Norway for the different scenarios presented as total
number of fatalities during 25 years.
Transport type
Safety level S0
Railway tranpsport
"HSR combined"
Passengers
Others
"HSR separate"
Passengers
Others
Conventional rail
Passengers
Others
Road transport
Car
Passenger
Others
Bus
Passenger
Others
Truck
Others
Air transport
Passengers
Total
Safety level S1
Safety level S2
total fatalities during 25 years
total fatalities during 25 years
-
2.8
15.3
-
-
-
5.7
30.7
13.3
170.1
13.1
170.1
12.8
170.1
3'451.7
731.5
3'428.2
728.2
3'404.4
724.9
71.7
7.7
70.7
7.6
69.6
7.5
442.4
438.6
434.5
8.4
4'896.8
8.3
4'882.9
8.2
4'868.4
Total fatalities of scenarios
14'198
14'177
14'155
14'000
Total fatalities
12'000
25 years
10'000
40 years
8'000
60 years
100 years
6'000
4'897
4'883
4'868
4'000
2'000
0
S0
S1
Scenarios
S2
Figure 124: The total societal safety level of transport means in Norway for the different scenarios presented as total
number of fatalities for four different time horizons.
Page 255 of (270)
Change in predicted societal transport safety,
S1 and S2 compared to S0
50
45
Change in fatalities
40
35
25 years
30
40 years
60 years
25
100 years
20
15
10
5
0
S1
S2
Scenarios
Figure 125 Change in predicted societal transport safety S1 and S2 compared to S0 in Norway for four different time
horizons.
The economic consequences of safety changes resulting from implementation of HSR systems
were estimated by integrating the expected safety changes with the Value of Statistical Life
(VSL). The VSL currently used in Norway is 20 MNOK. Given the input data used. the
implementation of either “HSR combined” (Scenario 1) or “HSR separate” (Scenario 2) in
Norway would for a 25-year time horizon lead to a societal benefit of approximately 175 MNOK
for Scenario 1 (net present value) and 360 MNOK for Scenario 2 (net present value) due to
decreased fatality rates. The results are presented in Figure 126.
Economic consequences (net present value) of scenarios
450
400
350
MNOK
300
25 years
40 years
250
60 years
200
100 years
150
100
50
0
S1
S2
Scenarios
Figure 126: The economic consequences of transport safety level changes with the implementation of HSR systems
in Norway for different time periods.
3.7.3 Uncertainty analysis
Uncertainty analysis was made for safety calculations for the three scenarios and for the
calculations of economic consequences of safety changes in Scenarios 1 and 2. Due to the
limitations of the input data, a detailed uncertainty analysis of each input parameter was not
possible. Instead all input parameters were assigned an uncertainty of ±10 % of the input value.
Page 256 of (270)
A more detailed uncertainty assessment of each input parameter should be performed when
more detailed information on the future HSR operations becomes available. As a consequence
of this the uncertainty analysis should be considered as generic at this stage. The model can be
easily updated to incorporate more detailed uncertainty assessments.
Uncertainty analysis was made for the 25-year time horizon. The uncertainty analysis was
performed on 10’000 Monte Carlo runs of the model. The model is structured so that uncertainty
analysis can easily be made also for the other time horizons but was not considered to provide
any substantial information to the present assessment.
Figure 127 displays the 5-percentile, median and 95-percentile values for the safety forecasts
for a time horizons of 25 years. Figure 128 displays the corresponding results for the
calculations of economic consequences of safety changes for Scenarios 1 and 2.
Uncertainty analysis, Total Safety, T = 25 Years
6'000
5'000
4'861
4'875
4'889
Fatalities
4'000
5-percentile
3'000
Median
95-percentile
2'000
1'000
0
S0
S1
S2
Scenarios
Figure 127: The uncertainties of total societal safety level forecasts of transports, presented as total number of
fatalities during 25 years in Norway, for the studied scenarios.
Uncertainty analysis, Economic consequences, T = 25 Years
5000.00
4000.00
3000.00
MNOK
2000.00
5-percentile
1000.00
Median
0.00
-1000.00
95-percentile
S1
S2
-2000.00
-3000.00
-4000.00
Scenarios
Figure 128: The uncertainties of economic consequences of safety changes for Scenarios 1 and Scenario 2.
Below the uncertainty analyses of the total safety and economic consequences are presented
for each scenario. Figure 129, Figure 131 and Figure 133 figures show the histograms for total
transport safety from 10’000 Monte Carlo runs for the three studied scenarios. Figure 135 and
Page 257 of (270)
Figure 137 show the histograms for the economic consequences of safety changes for
Scenarios 1 and 2.
Sensitivity analyses based on rank correlation were made for both safety and economic
calculations. The sensitivity analysis identifies the parameters that for which more detailed
studies are most important in order to perform model calculations with a higher degree of
certainty.
Based on the assigned an uncertainty of ±10 % of each input value of the model and the
selected statistical distributions described above the parameters contributing most to the
uncertainty of the calculations are shown in the sensitivity charts of Figure 130, Figure 132,
Figure 134, Figure 136 and Figure 138.
Figure 129: Uncertainty analysis of total safety for Scenario 0 during 25 years.
Figure 130: Sensitivity analysis of total safety for Scenario 0 during 25 years.
Page 258 of (270)
Page 259 of (270)
Figure 135: Uncertainty analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 1 during 25 years
Page 260 of (270)
Figure 136: Sensitivity analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 1 during 25 years
Figure 137: Uncertainty analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 2 during 25 years
Figure 138: Sensitivity analysis of economic consequences for Scenario 2 during 25 years
Page 261 of (270)
A full uncertainty analysis could not be performed due to the limited information on several input
parameters. However, the sensitivity analysis where each input value was given an uncertainty
of ±10 % of the input value identified the parameters most sensitive to the final model results. It
was shown that the inputs on car transport will be of great importance to the reliability of the
model calculations. The reason for this is that a dominating part of the total person transports is
made by car and that the safety level is relatively low compared to other transport means.
3.8
Conclusions
The study on transport safety has primarily been directed at developing an assessment tool for
calculations of the current safety transport level, forecasts of future transport safety levels with
and without HSR operations, evaluation of economic consequences due to changed future
safety levels and uncertainty analysis of the results.
The assessment tool handles information on the following transport means:
•
Road transports and safety including cars, buses and truck transports.
•
Rail transports and safety including conventional rail, HSR on tracks with combined HSR
and conventional rail operations and HSR operations on separate tracks.
•
Air transport and safety.
The input information that could be collected within the scope of this project was in some
instances rather limited regarding transport information and safety levels for different means of
transport. The calculations and forecasts presented in this study should therefore be considered
as generic. When more detailed information becomes available in subsequent phases of the
project regarding risk and safety levels of future HSR operations and expected distributions
between transport means the input information and model calculations can be updated to a
higher degree of certainty.
In this study the model was used for safety calculations on a national level given the available
information on transport and safety levels and predicted future changes. When more specific
information concerning the details regarding future high-speed operations the pre-defined
scenarios can be updated and the model can be used for specific corridors and stretches of
future HSR operations. The current model does not include ferry transport due to lack of
information on the quantity of passenger kilometres, the relatively small amounts of passenger
transport and the assumption that future HSR operations will have a rather limited correlation
with safety on ferries.
In addition to the transport and safety information the assessment tool also uses inputs
regarding the time horizon of interest and economic valuation of forecasted safety changes due
to HSR operations. The model was set up to facilitate forecasts for 25, 40, 60 and 100 year time
horizons. The economic consequences of changed safety levels were calculated using the
Value of Statistical Life (VSL). A VSL of 20 MNOK is currently applied in Norway and was used
in the model calculations. However, this value can be changed according to changes in
statistical life valuations. A discount rate of 4.5 % with possible changes to 3.5 % and 5.5 % was
used for the calculations.
The model was developed in Excel-format for easy access and application. Further, the model
was developed to be able to facilitate uncertainty analysis based on Monte Carlo simulation.
The add-in software Crystal Ball © is necessary to run the uncertainty analysis.
Given the input information used the model calculations show that implementation of HSR
operations may have a positive effect on the total transport safety. From the uncertainty
analysis it can be seen that the probability of a positive net present value is in the order of 53%
for Scenario 1 and 56 % for Scenario 2. This means that with these input values there is a
slightly larger probability of positive societal economic effects than negative from HSR
operations with respect to safety. Given the input data used the total economic benefit of the
Page 262 of (270)
operations was assessed to be in the order of 175 MNOK for Scenario 1 and 360 MNOK for
Scenario 2 for a 25 year time horizon.
It should be emphasized that these results may not be representative of a true future transport
situation since fundamental information regarding the future transport conditions and HSR
safety are not yet available.
A full uncertainty analysis could not be performed, due to the limited information on several
input parameters. However, a sensitivity analysis using Monte Carlo simulation, where each
input value was given an uncertainty of +/- 10 % of the input value, identifies the parameters
most sensitive to the final model results. It was shown that the inputs on car transport will be of
great importance to the reliability of the model calculations. The reason for this is that a
dominating part of the total person transports is made by car and that the safety level is
relatively low compared to other transport means.
The model described here should be an important tool in assisting decisions on future HSR
operations and can be used on both a national level and for specific HSR corridors.
3.9
Security of HSR Systems regarding sabotage and terrorism
Sabotage and terrorism are elements which have not been included in the current assessment
model due to the difficulty quantifying their probabilities and extents.
Rail transport systems are more vulnerable to sabotage and terrorist attacks than air transport
systems, due to their size and extent as well as their accessibility along the entire travel paths.
An overall and permanent surveillance and protection is very difficult to render, if it is not
impossible.
It is conceivable that if a significant amount of travellers transfer from road and air towards High
Speed Rail one would have more ‘easy targets’ with potentially high media impact compared to
the current situation, due to the possible higher occupancies and operational speeds and
therefore possibly larger numbers of fatalities and attack consequences.
The protection of railway infrastructure systems is compared to aviation more extensive as
railway infrastructure is spacious and includes a number of hard controllable system
components:
•
Railway line,
•
Station areas,
•
Rail operation areas (depots, shunting yards, holding siding etc.),
•
Operation buildings (control centre, energy distribution stations etc.),
•
Passenger trains.
Already this overview list makes it clear that a entire and complete protection of all rail system
components can hardly be reached.
There have been some sabotage and terrorist attacks on HSR systems so far. Some of the
notable ones were a bomb in France in a TGV luggage area and a concrete object lain on the
tracks and also a bomb found on the high speed line Madrid – Sevilla [110]. Catastrophic
consequences had the bombing in Russia on the Moscow – St. Petersburg line [111] with a lot
of dead and injured persons. Only the latter of these examples has caused a significant death
toll, even though the line was under surveillance by the army. However, it has to be noted that
most of the “successful” terrorist attacks so far have been against commuter rail or metro
systems, mostly in station areas, where significant numbers of passengers are present [112],
[113], [114], [115] or against conventional railway lines like in India.
The only major differences between a HSR system and a conventional rail system are,
otherwise as often assumed not the speed, but the separate tracks and corridors. Thus it is
Page 263 of (270)
reasonable to assume that attack patterns on a high speed rail system are similar to those on a
conventional rail system.
However, depending on the risk exposure preventive measures have to be taken to protect
passengers and safeguard rail operation. The preventive measures are planned under
consideration of their operational costs and the assessment of risk potential. Measures from
different countries practise could be:
•
Introducing an overall security concept including a security centre responsible for all
security aspects over the entire system and lines.
This security centre should not be directly involved in traffic operations but be in
permanent contact with operations personnel, and must have a global coordination and
surveillance role over the entire system. It should also coordinate any emergency
response.
•
Ensuring permanent communication between the security centre, operation centre and
the trains (redundant radio system, emergency frequency)
•
Redundancy of all telecommunication and signaling systems and cables, as well as
ensuring that these systems and cables are resistant to attack, sabotage and vandalism.
•
Ensuring quick emergency access to all areas and tracks, in case of an accident or
attack, and that an appropriate emergency response is possible, especially in remote
areas.
•
Applying of existing security concepts whose aim it is to prevent assaults on the station
architecture as described in [116] and [117] in all stations and buildings.
•
Security areas or enclosures in stations.
•
Security check of baggage resp. security check equivalent to air transport.
•
Access control to platforms e.g. closed ticketing system.
•
Complete fencing in all high speed track sections to prevent easy access, if possible
including intrusion detection.
•
Fencing on bridges to prevent throw of objects on the train and to avoid suicides.
•
Prevention of collisions with vehicles went astray by constructing of crash barriers /
walls.
•
Countries with high risk exposure are planning or operating following measures::
o
Permanent operation of patrol services (incl tracking dogs in Russia)
o
Drones to detect bombs along the line (Russia)
o
Permanent CCTV control of the line (planned in Russia)
•
Preventing tampering with rolling stock when not in use.
•
Coordination of measures with other countries.
With the implementation of the Task Force on Rail Security, Jernbaneverket took first step to
define where rail security has to be improved based on risk exposures. Right now station areas
are in the focus of discussions but with entering into the design phase of HSL the handbook for
“Security on Rail” should include HSR related aspects. Support is given by the discussion and
working group at UIC [118] on the subject of HSR safety and security. In addition to this the risk
assessment within subject 2 provides a sound basis to develop the security handbook further.
Especially by filling and developing the risk assessment with transportation data out of the
corridor analysis.
Page 264 of (270)
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Page 270 of (270)
Annexes
Annex 1
Subject 1 Task 1 Standard Evaluation
Annex 2
Subject 1 Task 2 Weather & climate– base information
Annex 3
Subject 1 Task 3 Track Evaluation Matrix
Annex 4
Subject 1 Task 4 TSI INS Parameter matrix
Annex 5
Subject 1 Task 4 Questionnaire
Annex 6
Subject 1 Task 5 Evaluation model
Annex 7
Subject 1 Task 5 All parameters
Annex 8
Subject 1 Task 5 Existing trainconcepts
Annex 9
Subject 2 Hazard list
Annex 10
Subject 3 Report uncertainty model
Annex 11
Subject 3 Model Transport Safety
Annex
Annex 1
Subject 1 Task 1 Standard Evaluation
Annex 1 Subject 1 Task 1
Standard Evaluation
Applicable standards in HS Infrastructure subsystem TSI
TSI section
Standard-No.
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INTEROPERABILITY
TSI Infrastructure - High Speed-Rail System
MANDATORY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IN THE HS INFRASTRUCTURE TSI PROPOSED BY THE ERA
Railway applications – Wheelsets and bogies – Wheels – Tread profile
4.2.9
prEN 13715
4.2.9.2
Railway applications - Method for determining the equivalent conicity
4.2.9
EN 15302:2006
4.2.9.2
Actions on structures 4.2.13
EN1991-2:2003 Eurocode 1
Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges - clause 6.5.4
4.2.13.1
c)
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
Description
as / in
JD 530
JD 532
JD 520
JD 525
Overbygning, Prosjektering
Overbygning, Vedlikehold
Underbygning, Prosjektering og bygging
Bruer, Prosjektering og bygging
Equivalent conicity
Design values
Equivalent conicity
Design values
Track Resistance
Lines of category 1
Longitudinal forces due to interaction between
structures and track
NS-EN 13715:2006
NS-EN 15302:2008
NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010
4.2.14
4.2.14.1
Actions on structures Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges - paragraphs 6.3.2 (2), 6.3.3 (3); paragraphs 6.3.2 (3) and 6.3.3 (5) ;
paragraphs 6.4.3 (1) and 6.4.5.2 (2)
Traffic load on structures
Vertical loads
NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010
4.2.14
4.2.14.2
Actions on structures Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges - section 6.4.4; paragraphs
6.4.6.1.1 (3), (4), (5) and (6); paragraph 6.4.6.2 (1) ;
paragraph 6.4.6.5 (3)
Dynamic analysis
NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010
4.2.14
4.2.14.3
4.2.14
4.2.14.4
4.2.14
4.2.14.5
4.2.14
4.2.14.6
Actions on structures - Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges - paragraph 6.5.1 (4)
4.2.14
4.2.14.7
Centrifugal forces
Actions on structures - Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges - paragraphs 6.5.2 (2) and (3).
Nosing forces
Actions on structures - Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges - paragraphs 6.5.3 (2), (4), (5) and (6) ; paragraph 6.5.3 Traffic load on structures Actions due to traction
(6).
and braking (Longitudinal loads)
Actions on structures - Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges -clause 6.5.4.
Longitudinal forces due to interaction between
structures and track
NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010
Actions on structures - Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges -section 6.6.
Traffic load on structures Aerodynamic actions
from passing trains on line side structures
NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010
4.2.14
4.2.14.8
Actions on structures - Part 2: Traffic loads on bridges + national application documents
Traffic load on structures Application of the
requirements of EN 1991-2:2003
NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010
4.2.14
4.2.14.1
4.2.14
4.2.14.2
5.3.1
5.3.1.1
a)
EN 1990: 2002/ - annex A2
NS-EN 1990:2002+NA:2008
EN13674-1:2003
Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 1: Vignole railway rails 46 kg/m and above – Annex A
Vertical loads
Dynamic analysis
The rail
Railhead profile
Plain line
5.3.1
5.3.1.3
a)
EN13674-1:2003
Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 1: Vignole railway rails 46 kg/m and above – Chapter 5
The rail
Steel grade
Plain line
NS-EN 13674-1:2003+A1:2007
EN 1990: 2002/ - annex A2
NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010
NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010
NS-EN 1991-2:2003+NA:2010
NS-EN 1990:2002+NA:2008
NS-EN 13674-1:2003+A1:2007
A1-1 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
6.2.5
Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 1: Vignole railway rails 46 kg/m and above – rail sections 60 E 1 and
EN 13674-1:2003
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
INTEROPERABILITY
60 E 2
6.2.5.2
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
Technical solutions given presumption of
conformity at design phase
Assessment of equivalent conicity
NS-EN 13674-1:2003+A1:2007
5.3.1
5.3.1.1
b)
EN13674-2:2003
Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 2: switch and crossing rails used in conjunction with flat-bottom
symmetrical railway rails 46 kg/m and above – Annex A.
The rail
Railhead profile
Switches and crossings
NS-EN 13674-2:2006+A1:2010
5.3.1
5.3.1.3
b)
EN13674-2:2003
symmetrical railway rails 46 kg/m and above – Chapter 5
The rail
Steel grade
NS-EN 13674-2:2006+A1:2010
5.3.2
a)
5.3.2.
b)
5.3.2.
d)
6.2.6
EN 13481-2:2002
Railway applications – Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 2: Fastening systems for
concrete sleepers
concrete sleepers
Railway applications – Track – Test methods for fastening systems – Part 5: Determination of electrical
resistance
Railway applications/Track - Track geometry quality - Part1: Characterization of track geometry- section 4.2.2
The rail fastening system
Minimum Resistance to rail longitudinal slip
Resistance to repeated loading
Minimum electric resistance
Particular requirements for conformity
assessment
Assessment of minimum value of mean track
gauge
NS-EN 13481-2:2002
Design linear mass
Design linear mass
NS-EN 13674-1:2003+A1:2007
NS-EN 13674-2:2006+A1:2010
Minimum resistance to rail longitudinal slip
Resistance to repeated loading
Dynamic stiffness of the rail pad on concrete
sleepers
NS-EN 13146-4:2002
Railway applications - Track - Concrete bearers and sleepers - Part 1: General Requirements
(Revision under process – published next year)
Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality – Part 1:Characterisation of track geometry
(+ Amdt A1/2008)
Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 1:
Characterisation of track geometry
Railway applications - Track alignment design parameters –Track gauges 1435 and wider - Part 2: Switches
and crossings and comparable alignment design situations with abrupt changes of the curvature
Mass and dimensions
NS-EN 13230-1:2009
Nominal track gauge
NS-EN 13848-1:2003+A1:2008
Minimum radius of curvature
NS-EN 13803-1:2010
Track cant
NS-EN 13803-1:2010
Cant deficiency
NS-EN 13803-1:2010
Maintenance rules
NS-EN 13803-1:2010
Minimum radius of curvature
NS-EN 13803-2:2006/AC:2007
Track cant
NS-EN 13803-2:2006/AC:2007
EN 13481-2:2002
EN 13146-5
EN 13848-1:2003
6.2.6.2
VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS NOT REFERRED TO IN THE HS INFRASTRUCTURE TSI PROPOSED BY THE ERA
5.3.1.2
Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 1: Vignole railway rails 46 kg/m and above
EN13674-1:2003+A1:2007
5.3.1.2
EN13674-2:2006
symmetrical railway rails 46 kg/m and above.
Railway applications - Track - Test Methods for Fastening Systems - Part 1: Determination of longitudinal rail
5.3.2
EN13146-1:2002
restraint
a)
5.3.2
Railway applications - Track - Test Methods for Fastening Systems - Part 4: Effect of repeated loading
EN13146-4:2002+ A1:2006
b)
5.3.2
EN13481-2:2002 +A1:2006
c)
concrete sleepers
5.3.3
EN13230-1:2002
4.2.2
EN13848-1:2003
4.2.6
EN 13803-1:2010
4.2.7
ENV 13803-1:2002
4.2.8
ENV 13803-1:2002
4.5
ENV 13803-1:2002
4.2.6
EN 13803-2: 2006+ AC2007
4.2.7
EN 13803-2:2006 + AC 2007
NS-EN 13481-2:2002/A1:2006
NS-EN 13146-5:2002
NS-EN 13848-1:2003+A1:2008
NS-EN 13146-4:2002/A1:2006
NS-EN 13481-2:2002/A1:2006
A1-2 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
4.2.8
EN 13803-2:2006/
AC 2007
INTEROPERABILITY
Cant deficiency
NS-EN 13803-2:2006/AC:2007
4.2.12
EN 13803-2:2006/ AC 2007
NS-EN 13803-2:2006/AC:2007
4.2.13
EN 13803-2:2006/AC 2007
Track resistance
NS-EN 13803-2:2006/AC:2007
4.5
EN 13803-2:2006 /AC 2007
Maintenance rules
NS-EN 13803-2:2006/AC:2007
4.2.7
EN 14363:2005
Track cant
NS-EN 14363:2005
4.2.8
EN 14363:2005
Cant deficiency
NS-EN 14363:2005
4.2.13
EN 14363:2005
Track resistance
NS-EN 14363:2005
4.2.9.2
EN 15302: 2008
Railway application – Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Testing of
running behaviour and stationary tests
Railway applications –Method for determining the equivalent conicity
NS-EN 15302:2008
4.2.10
EN13848-5:2008
Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality – Part 5: Geometric quality levels
4.2.9.3
4.2.9.3.1
4.2.9.3
4.2.9.3.1
4.2.10
EN13848-5:2008
Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality – Part 5: Geometric quality levels
EN13848-1:2003+A1 2008
EN13848-1:2003/ A1 2008
4.5
4.2.12
EN13848-1:2003/AC2007
EN 13232-2:2003
Railway applications – Track – Switches and crossings – Part 2: Requirements for geometric design
Equivalent Conicity
Design values
Track geometrical quality and limits on isolated
defects
In service values
Minimum values of mean track gauge
In service values
Minimum values of mean track gauge
Track geometrical quality and limits on isolated
defects
Maintenance rules
4.2.12
4.2.12.3
4.2.12
4.2.12
4.2.12.3
4.5
4.2.12
4.2.12.1
4.2.12
4.2.12.3
4.2.12
4.2.12.2
4.2.12
4.2.12.3
4.2.12
4.2.12.3
4.2.12
4.2.12.3
EN 13232-2:2003
Railway applications – Track – Switches and crossings – Part 2: Requirements for geometric design
NS-EN 13232-2:2003
EN 13232-9:2006
EN 13232-9:2006
Railway applications – Track – Switches and crossings – Part 9: Layouts
EN 13232-9:2006
EN 13232-4: 2005
Railway applications – Track – Switches and crossings – Part 4: Actuation locking an detection
EN 13232-4:2005
Railway applications – Track – Switches and crossings – Part 4: Actuation locking an detection
prEN13232-7:2006
Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 7: Crossings with movable parts
EN13232-5: 2005
Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 5: Switches
EN13232-6:2005
Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 6: Fixed common and obtuse crossings
EN 13232-7:2006
Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 7: Crossings with movable parts
Geometrical characteristics
Maintenance rules
Means of detection and locking
Use of swing nose
NS-EN 13848-5:2008+A1:2010
NS-EN 13848-5:2008+A1:2010
NS-EN 13848-1:2003+A1:2008
NS-EN 13848-1:2003+A1:2008
NS-EN 13848-1:2003+A1:2008
NS-EN 13232-2:2003
NS-EN 13232-9:2006
NS-EN 13232-9:2006
NS-EN 13232-9:2006
NS-EN 13232-4:2005
NS-EN 13232-4:2005
NS-EN 13232-7:2006
NS-EN 13232-5:2005
NS-EN 13232-6:2005
NS-EN 13232-7:2006
A1-3 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
Standard-No.
TSI section
Description
4.2.13
prENV 13803-1:2002
INTEROPERABILITY
4.2.16
Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 5: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics in tunnel
EN14067-5:2005
4.2.17
Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 6: Cross wind effects on railway operation (In preparation in TC 256
prEN 14067-6: 2006
WG6)
4.4.3
Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 4: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics on open
EN14067-4:2005/prA1 2008
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
Track resistance
NS-EN 13803-1:2010
Maximum pressure variations in tunnels
Effect of crosswinds
NS-EN 14067-5:2006
NS-EN 14067-6:2010
Protection of workers against aerodynamic
NS-EN 14067-4:2005+A1:2009
FURTHER STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS
UIC LEAFLETS
UIC 505-1
UIC 505-4
UIC 506
UIC 510-2
UIC 527
UIC 606
UIC 716
UIC 741
UIC 779-11
OTHER EUROPEAN NORMS
Eurocode 1
Rolling stock construction gauge
Effects of the application of the kinematic gauges defined in the 505 series of leaflets
Rules governing application of the enlarged GA, GB and GC gauges
Trailing stock: wheels and wheelsets. Conditions concerning the use of wheels of various diameters
Coaches, vans and wagons - Dimensions of buffer heads - Track layout on S-curves
Consequence of the application of the kinematics gauges defined by UIC leaflets in the 505 series on the
design of the contact lines
Maximum permissible wear profiles for switches
Passenger stations - Height of platforms - Regulations governing the positioning of platform edges in relation to
the track
Determination of railway tunnel cross-sectional areas on the basis of aerodynamic considerations
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne laster - Tetthet, egenvekt og
nyttelaster i bygninger
NS-EN 1991-1-1:2002/AC:2009
Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne laster - Tetthet, egenvekt og nyttelaster i bygninger
NS-EN 1991-1-1:2002+NA:2008
Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Allmenne laster - Laster på konstruksjoner ved brann
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-3: Allmenne laster - Snølaster
Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-3: Allmenne laster - Snølaster
Endringsblad A1 - Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-4: Allmenne laster - Vindlaster
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-4: Allmenne laster - Vindlaster
Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-4: Allmenne laster - Vindlaster
Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-5: Allmenne laster - Termiske påvirkninger
NS-EN 1991-1-2:2002+NA:2008
NS-EN 1991-1-3:2003/AC:2009
NS-EN 1991-1-3:2003+NA:2008
NS-EN 1991-1-4:2005/A1:2010
NS-EN 1991-1-4:2005/AC:2010
NS-EN 1991-1-4:2005+NA:2009
NS-EN 1991-1-5:2003+NA:2008
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-6: Allmenne laster - Laster under utførelse
Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-6: Allmenne laster - Laster under utførelse
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-7: Allmenne laster - Ulykkeslaster
Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 1-7: Allmenne laster - Ulykkeslaster
Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 3: Laster fra kraner og maskineri
Eurokode 1: Laster på konstruksjoner - Del 4: Siloer og beholdere
Eurokode 2: Prosjektering av betongkonstruksjoner
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 2: Prosjektering av betongkonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for
bygninger
NS-EN 1991-1-6:2005/AC:2008
NS-EN 1991-1-6:2005+NA:2008
NS-EN 1991-1-7:2006/AC:2010
NS-EN 1991-1-7:2006+NA:2008
NS-EN 1991-3:2006+NA:2010
NS-EN 1991-4:2006+NA:2010
Eurokode 2: Prosjektering av betongkonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for bygninger
NS-EN 1992-1-1:2004+NA:2008
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 1
Eurocode 2
Eurocode 2
NS-EN 1992-1-1:2004/AC:2008
Eurocode 2
A1-4 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
Eurokode 2: Prosjektering av betongkonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering
Eurocode 2
INTEROPERABILITY
Eurokode 2: Prosjektering av betongkonstruksjoner - Del 2: Bruer
Eurocode 2
Eurokode 2: Prosjektering av betongkonstruksjoner - Del 3: Siloer og beholdere
Eurocode 2
Eurokode 3 - Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner
Eurocode 3
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for
bygninger
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for bygninger
Eurocode 3
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-10: Materialets slagseighet og
egenskaper i tykkelsesretningen
Eurocode 3
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-10: Materialets bruddseighet og egenskaper i
tykkelsesretningen
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-11: Kabler og strekkstag
Eurocode 3
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-11: Kabler og strekkstag
Eurocode 3
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-12: Konstruksjoner med høyfast
stål
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-12: Konstruksjoner med høyfast stål
Eurocode 3
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering
Eurocode 3
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-3: Konstruksjoner av kaldformede
tynnplateprofiler
Eurocode 3
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-3: Konstruksjoner av kaldformede tynnplateprofiler
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-4: Konstruksjoner av rustfritt stål
Eurocode 3
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-5: Plater påkjent i plateplanet
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-5: Plater påkjent i plateplanet
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-6: Skallkonstruksjoner
Eurocode 3
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-6: Skallkonstruksjoner
Eurocode 3
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-7: Plater påkjent normalt på
plateplanet
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-7: Plater påkjent normalt på plateplanet
Eurocode 3
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-8: Knutepunkter og forbindelser
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-8: Knutepunkter og forbindelser
Eurocode 3
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-9: Utmattingspåkjente
konstruksjoner
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 1-9: Utmattingspåkjente konstruksjoner
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 2: Bruer
Eurocode 3
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 2: Bruer
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 3-1: Tårn og master
Eurocode 3
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 3-1: Tårn og master
Eurocode 3
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 3-2: Skorsteiner
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 4-1: Siloer
Eurocode 3
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 4-1: Siloer
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 4-2: Tanker
Eurocode 3
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 4-2: Tanker
Eurocode 3
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 4-3: Røranlegg
Eurocode 3
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 4-3: Røranlegg
Eurocode 3
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
NS-EN 1992-1-2:2004+NA:2010
NS-EN 1992-2:2005+NA:2010
NS-EN 1992-3:2006+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-1:2005/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-1:2005+NA:2008
NS-EN 1993-1-10:2005/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-10:2005+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-11:2006/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-11:2006+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-12:2007/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-12:2007+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-2:2005/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-2:2005+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-3:2006/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-3:2006+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-4:2006+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-5:2006/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-5:2006+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-6:2007/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-6:2007+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-7:2007/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-7:2007+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-8:2005/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-8:2005+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-9:2005/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-1-9:2005+NA:2010
NS-EN 1993-2:2006/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-2:2006+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-3-1:2006/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-3-1:2006+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-3-2:2006+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-4-1:2007/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-4-1:2007+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-4-2:2007/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-4-2:2007+NA:2009
NS-EN 1993-4-3:2007/AC:2009
NS-EN 1993-4-3:2007+NA:2009
A1-5 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 5: Peler (spunt)
Eurocode 3
INTEROPERABILITY
Eurokode 3: Prosjektering av stålkonstruksjoner - Del 6: Kranbaner
Eurocode 3
Eurokode 4 - Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong
Eurocode 4
Eurocode 4
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 4: Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong - Del 1-1: Allmenne
regler og regler for byginger
Eurocode 4
Eurokode 4: Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for
byginger
Eurocode 4
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 4: Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong - Del 1-2:
Brannteknisk dimensjonering
Eurocode 4
Eurokode 4: Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering
Eurocode 4
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 4: Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong - Del 2: Bruer
Eurokode 4: Prosjektering av samvirkekonstruksjoner av stål og betong - Del 2: Bruer
Eurocode 4
Eurokode 5 - Prosjektering av trekonstruksjoner
Eurocode 5
Eurokode 5: Prosjektering av trekonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler og regler for bygninger
Eurocode 5
Eurocode 5
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 5: Prosjektering av trekonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering
Eurokode 5: Prosjektering av trekonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering
Eurocode 5
Eurokode 5: Prosjektering av trekonstruksjoner - Del 2: Bruer
Eurocode 5
Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 2: Valg av materialer og utførelse av murverk
Eurocode 5
Eurokode 6 - Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner
Eurocode 6
Eurocode 6
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler for armerte og
uarmerte murkonstruksjoner
Eurocode 6
Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler for armerte og uarmerte
murkonstruksjoner
Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering
Eurocode 6
Eurocode 6
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 2: Valg av materialer og utførelse av
murverk
Eurocode 6
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 3: Forenklede beregningsmetoder for
uarmerte murkonstruksjoner
Eurocode 6
Eurokode 6: Prosjektering av murkonstruksjoner - Del 3: Forenklede beregningsmetoder for uarmerte
murkonstruksjoner
Eurokode 7 - Geoteknisk prosjektering
Eurocode 7
Eurokode 7: Geoteknisk prosjektering - Del 1: Allmenne regler
Eurocode 7
Eurocode 7
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 7: Geoteknisk prosjektering - Del 2: Regler basert på grunnundersøkelser og
laboratorieprøver
Eurocode 7
Eurokode 7: Geoteknisk prosjektering - Del 2: Regler basert på grunnundersøkelser og laboratorieprøver
Eurokode 8 - Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning
Eurocode 8
Eurocode 8
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 1: Allmenne
regler, seismiske laster og regler for bygninger
Eurocode 8
Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 1: Allmenne regler, seismiske laster
og regler for bygninger
Eurocode 8
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 2: Bruer
Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 2: Bruer
Eurocode 8
Eurocode 8
Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 3: Vurdering og forsterkning av
eksisterende bygninger
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
NS-EN 1993-5:2007+NA:2010
NS-EN 1993-6:2007+NA:2010
NS-EN 1994-1-1:2004/AC:2009
NS-EN 1994-1-1:2004+NA:2009
NS-EN 1994-1-2:2005/AC:2008
NS-EN 1994-1-2:2005+NA:2009
NS-EN 1994-2:2005/AC:2008
NS-EN 1994-2:2005+NA:2009
NS-EN 1995-1-1:2004+A1:2008+NA:2010
NS-EN 1995-1-2:2004/AC:2009
NS-EN 1995-1-2:2004+NA:2010
NS-EN 1995-2:2004+NA:2010
NS-EN 1996-2:2006+NA:2010
NS-EN 1996-1-1:2005/AC:2009
NS-EN 1996-1-1:2005+NA:2010
NS-EN 1996-1-2:2005+NA:2010
NS-EN 1996-2:2006/AC:2009
NS-EN 1996-3:2006/AC:2009
NS-EN 1996-3:2006+NA:2010
NS-EN 1997-1:2004+NA:2008
NS-EN 1997-2:2007/AC:2010
NS-EN 1997-2:2007+NA:2008
NS-EN 1998-1:2004/AC:2009
NS-EN 1998-1:2004+NA:2008
NS-EN 1998-2:2005/AC:2010
NS-EN 1998-2:2005+A1:2009+NA:2009
NS-EN 1998-3:2005
A1-6 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
Eurocode 8
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 3: Vurdering og
INTEROPERABILITY
forsterkning av eksisterende bygninger
Eurocode 8
Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 4: Siloer, beholdere og rørledninger
Eurocode 8
Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 5: Fundamenter,
støttekonstruksjoner og geotekniske forhold
Eurocode 8
Eurokode 8: Prosjektering av konstruksjoner for seismisk påvirkning - Del 6: Tårn, master og skorsteiner
Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner
Eurocode 9
Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-1: Allmenne regler
Eurocode 9
Eurocode 9
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk
dimensjonering
Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-2: Brannteknisk dimensjonering
Eurocode 9
Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-3: Utmattingspåkjente konstruksjoner
Eurocode 9
Eurocode 9
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-4: Konstruksjoner av
kaldformede tynnplateprofiler
Eurocode 9
Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-4: Konstruksjoner av kaldformede
tynnplateprofiler
Eurocode 9
Rettelsesblad AC - Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-5: Skallkonstruksjoner
Eurokode 9: Prosjektering av aluminiumskonstruksjoner - Del 1-5: Skallkonstruksjoner
Eurocode 9
Maling og lakk Termer og definisjoner for beleggmaterialer DEL 1 - Generlle termer
EN 971-1
Termisk sproyting Pulver Sammensetning Tekniske angivelsesbetingelser
EN 1274
Railway applications - Track - Wood sleepers and bearers
EN 13145:2001
EN 13146-1:2002
Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 1: Determination of longitudinal rail
restraint
EN 13146-2:2002
Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 2: Determination of torsional
resistance
EN 13146-3:2002
Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 3: Determination of attenuation of
impact loads
EN 13146-6:2002
Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 6: Effect of severe environmental
conditions
EN 13146-7:2002
Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 7: Determination of clamping force
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
NS-EN 1998-3:2005/AC:2010
NS-EN 1998-4:2006
NS-EN 1998-5:2004+NA:2008
NS-EN 1998-6:2005+NA.2008
NS-EN 1999-1-1:2007+A1:2009+NA:2009
NS-EN 1999-1-2:2007/AC:2009
NS-EN 1999-1-2:2007+NA:2010
NS-EN 1999-1-3:2007+NA:2010
NS-EN 1999-1-4:2007/AC:2009
NS-EN 1999-1-4:2007+NA:2010
NS-EN 1999-1-5:2007/AC:2009
NS-EN 1999-1-5:2007+NA:2010
NS-EN 971-1
NS-EN 1274
NS-EN 13145:2001
NS-EN 13146-1:2002
NS-EN 13146-2:2002
NS-EN 13146-3:2002
NS-EN 13146-6:2002
NS-EN 13146-7:2002
EN 13146-8:2002
EN 13146-8:2002/A1:2006
Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 8: In service testing
Amendment A1 - Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 8: In service testing
NS-EN 13146-8:2002
NS-EN 13146-8:2002/A1:2006
EN 13146-9:2009
Railway applications - Track - Test methods for fastening systems - Part 9: Determination of stiffness
NS-EN 13146-9:2009
EN 13230-1:2009
EN 13230-2:2009
Railway applications - Track - Concrete sleepers and bearers - Part 1: General requirements
Railway applications - Track - Concrete sleepers and bearers - Part 2: Prestressed monoblock sleepers
NS-EN 13230-1:2009
NS-EN 13230-2:2009
EN 13230-3:2009
Railway applications - Track - Concrete sleepers and bearers - Part 3: Twin-block reinforced sleepers
NS-EN 13230-3:2009
EN 13230-4:2009
Railway applications - Track - Concrete sleepers and bearers - Part 4: Prestressed bearers for switches and
crossings
Railway applications - Track - Concrete sleepers and bearers - Part 5: Special elements
Railway applications - Track - Acceptance of works - Part 1: Works on ballasted track - Plain line
NS-EN 13230-4:2009
EN 13230-5:2009
EN 13231-1:2006
NS-EN 13230-5:2009
NS-EN 13231-1:2006
A1-7 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
EN 13231-2:2006
Railway applications - Track - Acceptance of works - Part 2: Works on ballasted track - Switches and crossings
INTEROPERABILITY
EN 13231-3:2006
EN 13232-1:2003
EN 13232-3:2003
EN 13232-8:2007
EN 13450:2002+NA:2009
EN 13481-1:2002
EN 13481-1:2002/A1:2006
EN 13481-2:2002
EN 13481-2:2002/A1:2006
EN 13481-3:2002
EN 13481-3:2002/A1:2006
EN 13481-4:2002
EN 13481-4:2002/A1:2006
EN 13481-4:2002/AC:2004
EN 13481-5:2002
EN 13481-5:2002/A1:2006
EN 13481-7:2003
EN 13481-7:2003/A1:2006
EN 13481-8:2006
EN 13597:2003
EN 13674-2:2006+A1:2010
EN 13674-3:2006+A1:2010
EN 13803-1:2010
EN 13803-2:2006+A1:2009
EN 13848-2:2006
Railway applications - Track - Acceptance of works - Part 3: Acceptance of rail grinding, milling and planing
work in track
Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 1: Definitions
Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 3: Requirements for wheel/rail interaction
Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Part 8: Expansion devices
Aggregates for railway ballast
Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 1: Definitions
Amendment A1 - Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 1:
Definitions
Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 2: Fastening systems for
concrete sleepers
Fastening systems for concrete sleepers
wood sleepers
Fastening systems for wood sleepers
steel sleepers - (Corrigendum AC:2004 incorporated)
Fastening systems for steel sleepers
Corrigendum AC - Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 4:
Fastening systems for steel sleepers
slab track
Fastening systems for slab track
Railway applications - Track - Performance requirements for fastening systems - Part 7: Special fastening
systems for switches and crossing and check rails
Special fastening systems for switches and crossings and check rails
track with heavy axle loads
Railway applications - Rubber suspension components - Rubber diaphragms for pneumatic suspension
springs
Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 2: Switch and crossing rails used in conjunction with Vignole railway
rails 46 kg/m and above
Railway applications - Track - Rail - Part 3: Check rails
Railway applications - Track - Track alignment design parameters - Track gauges 1435 mm and wider - Part 1:
Plain line
Railway applications - Track - Track alignment design parameters - Track gauges 1 435 mm and wider - Part 2:
Switches and crossings and comparable alignment design situations with abrupt changes of curvature
Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality - Part 2: Measuring systems - Track recording vehicles
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
NS-EN 13231-2:2006
NS-EN 13231-3:2006
NS-EN 13232-1:2003
NS-EN 13232-3:2003
NS-EN 13232-8:2007
NS-EN 13450:2002+NA:2009
NS-EN 13481-1:2002
NS-EN 13481-1:2002/A1:2006
NS-EN 13481-2:2002
NS-EN 13481-2:2002/A1:2006
NS-EN 13481-3:2002
NS-EN 13481-3:2002/A1:2006
NS-EN 13481-4:2002
NS-EN 13481-4:2002/A1:2006
NS-EN 13481-4:2002/AC:2004
NS-EN 13481-5:2002
NS-EN 13481-5:2002/A1:2006
NS-EN 13481-7:2003
NS-EN 13481-7:2003/A1:2006
NS-EN 13481-8:2006
NS-EN 13597:2003
NS-EN 13674-2:2006+A1:2010
NS-EN 13674-3:2006+A1:2010
NS-EN 13803-1:2010
NS-EN 13803-2:2006+A1:2009
NS-EN 13848-2:2006
A1-8 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
EN 13848-3:2009
Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality - Part 3: Measuring systems - Track construction and
INTEROPERABILITY
maintenance machines
EN 13848-5:2008+A1:2010
Railway applications - Track - Track geometry quality - Part 5: Geometric quality levels - Plain line
EN 14033-1:2008
Railway applications - Track - Railbound construction and maintenance machines - Part 1: Technical
requirements for running
EN 14033-2:2008
Railway applications - Track - Railbound construction and maintenance machines - Part 2: Technical
requirements for working
EN 14033-3:2009
Railway applications - Track - Railbound construction and maintenance machines - Part 3: General safety
requirements
EN 14067-1:2003
Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 1: Symbols and units
EN 14067-2:2003
Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 2: Aerodynamics on open track
EN 14067-3:2003
Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 3: Aerodynamics in tunnels
EN 14067-4:2005+A1:2009
Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 4: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics on open
track
EN 14067-5:2006
Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 5: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics in tunnels
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
NS-EN 13848-3:2009
NS-EN 13848-5:2008+A1:2010
NS-EN 14033-1:2008
NS-EN 14033-2:2008
NS-EN 14033-3:2009
NS-EN 14067-1:2003
NS-EN 14067-2:2003
NS-EN 14067-3:2003
NS-EN 14067-4:2005+A1:2009
NS-EN 14067-5:2006
EN 14067-6:2010
Railway applications - Aerodynamics - Part 6: Requirements and test procedures for cross wind assessment
NS-EN 14067-6:2010
EN 14587-1:2007
Railway applications - Track - Flash butt welding of rails - Part 1: New R220, R260, R260Mn and R350HT
grade rails in a fixed plant
Railway applications - Track - Flash butt welding of rails - Part 2: New R220, R260, R260Mn and R350HT
grade rails by mobile welding machines at sites other than a fixed plant
Railway applications - Track - Qualification system for railway trackwork contractors
Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 1: General Principles
Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 2: Parts lists
Corrigendum AC - Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 2: Parts lists
Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 3: Handling of modifications of technical documents
NS-EN 14587-1:2007
EN 14587-2:2009
EN 14969:2006
EN 15016-1:2004
EN 15016-2:2004
EN 15016-2:2004/AC:2007
EN 15016-3:2004
EN 15016-4:2006
EN 15227:2008
EN 15273-1:2009
EN 15273-2:2009
EN 15273-3:2009
EN 15302:2008
EN 15528:2008
EN 15594:2009
EN 15610:2009
Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 4: Data exchange
Railway applications - Crashworthiness requirements for railway vehicle bodies
Railway applications - Gauges - Part 1: General - Common rules for infrastructure and rolling stock
Railway applications - Gauges - Part 2: Rolling stock gauge
Railway applications - Gauges - Part 3: Structure gauges
Railway applications - Line categories for managing the interface between load limits of vehicles and
infrastructure
Railway applications - Track - Restoration of rails by electric arc welding
Railway applications - Noise emission - Rail roughness measurement related to rolling noise generation
NS-EN 14587-2:2009
NS-EN 14969:2006
NS-EN 15016-1:2004
NS-EN 15016-2:2004
NS-EN 15016-2:2004/AC:2007
NS-EN 15016-3:2004
NS-EN 15016-4:2006
NS-EN 15227:2008
NS-EN 15273-1:2009
NS-EN 15273-2:2009
NS-EN 15273-3:2009
NS-EN 15302:2008
NS-EN 15528:2008
NS-EN 15594:2009
NS-EN 15610:2009
EN 15611:2008
EN 15686:2010
Railway applications - Braking - Relay valves
Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles with cant
deficiency compensation system and/or vehicles intended to operate with higher cant deficiency than stated in
EN 14363:2005, Annex G
NS-EN 15611:2008
NS-EN 15686:2010
EN 15687:2010
Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of freight vehicles with static axle
loads higher than 225 kN and up to 250 kN
Railway applications - Track - Switches and crossings - Crossing components made of cast austenitic
manganese steel
Railway applications - Track - Road-rail machines and associated equipment - Part 1: Technical requirements
for running and working
NS-EN 15687:2010
EN 15689:2009
EN 15746-1:2010
NS-EN 15689:2009
NS-EN 15746-1:2010
A1-9 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
EN 15746-2:2010
Railway applications - Track - Road-rail machines and associated equipment - Part 2: General safety
INTEROPERABILITY
requirements
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
NS-EN 15746-2:2010
A1-10 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
Applicable standards in HS Energy subsystem TSI
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
as / in
JD 510
JD 540
Felles elektro – Regler for prosjektering og
bygging
Kontaktledning - Regler for prosjektering
JD 541
Kontaktledning - Regler for bygging
JD 542
Kontaktledning - Regler for vedlikehold
JD 546
Banestrømforsyning - Regler for
prosjektering
Banestrømforsyning - Regler for vedlikehold
TSI Energy
JD 548
MANDATORY STANDARDS OR OTHER DOCUMENTS
4.2.2
RA - Supply Voltages of Traction Systems, clause 4
EN 50163:2004
4.2.3
RA - Power Supply and Rolling Stock –
EN 50388:2005
Technical Criteria for the Coordination Between Power
Supply (Substation) and Rolling Stock to Achieve Interoperability - clauses 6, 8.3, 8.4, 14.4.1, 14.4.2, 14.4.3
4.2.4
EN 50388:2005
4.2.6
EN 50121-2:1997
4.2.9.1
EN 50119:2001
4.2.9.2
4.2.9.2
EN 50119:2001
EN 50367:2006
4.2.9.2
EN 50122-1:1997
4.2.11
EN 50149:2001
4.2.14
EN 50206-1:1998
4.2.14
EN 50317:2002
4.2.16
EN 50367:2006
4.2.16
4.2.16.1
4.2.16
4.2.16.1
4.2.16
4.2.16.1
4.2.16.2
4.2.16.2.1
4.2.16.2
4.2.16.2.1
EN 50317:2002
EN 50318:2002
EN 50119:2001
EN 50317:2002
EN 50318:2002
Voltage and frequency
System performance and installed
power
NEK EN 50163:2004
NEK EN 50388:2005
RA - Power Supply and Rolling Stock – Technical Criteria for the Coordination Between Power
Supply (Substation) and Rolling Stock to Achieve Interoperability - clauses 12.1.1, 14.7.2.
RA - Electromagnetic compatibility
Part 2: Emission of the whole railway system to the outside world
RA - Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines - clauses 5.1, 5.2.1.2, 5.2.4.1 to 5.2.4.8,
5.2.5, 5.2.6, 5.2.7, 5.2.8.2, 5.2.10, 5.2.11 and 5.2.12
RA - Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines - clause 8.5.1
RA - Current Collection Systems – Technical Criteria for the Interaction Between Pantograph and
Overhead Line (to Achieve Free Access) Annex A.3
RA - Fixed installations. Protective provisions relating to electrical safety and earthing clauses 4.1.2.3, 5.1.2.3
Regenerative braking
NEK EN 50388:2005
External electromagnetic compatibility
Overhead Contact Line – Overall
Design
Geometry of overhead contact line
NEK EN 50121-2:2006
_
RA – Fixed installations – Electric traction – Copper and copper alloy grooved contact wires: clauses 4.1
to 4.3 & 4.5 to 4.8.
EN 50206-1:1998 – RA – Rolling Stock – Pantographs: Characteristics and Tests; Part 1:Pantographs
for mainline vehicles, clause 3.3.5
EN 50317:2002 – RA – Current Collection Systems – Requirements for and Validation of
Measurements of the Dynamic Interaction Between Pantograph and Overhead Contact Line
RA - Current collection systems - Technical criteria for the interaction between pantograph and overhead
line (to achieve free access)
Contact Wire Material
NEK EN 50149:2001
Static Contact Force
NEK EN 50206-1:1998
Static Contact Force
NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004
Dynamic Behaviour and Quality of
Current Collection
NEK EN 50367:2006
RA - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the dynamic
interaction between pantograph and overhead contact line
RA – Current Collection Systems – Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between
Overhead Contact Line and Pantograph
RA – Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines, clause 5.2.1.3
Current Collection - Requirements
Current Collection
Current Collection
Railway applications - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the Conformity assessment
dynamic interaction between pantograph and overhead contact line
Interoperability Constituent Overhead
Contact Lineassessment
Current Collection Systems – Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between Overhead Contact Conformity
Line and Pantograph
Interoperability Constituent Overhead
Contact Line
NEK EN 50119:2001
NEK EN 50119:2001
NEK EN 50367:2006
NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004
NEK EN 50318:2002
NEK EN 50119:2001
NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004
NEK EN 50318:2002
A1-11 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
4.2.16.2.2
Railway applications - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the
EN 50317:2002INTEROPERABILITY
4.2.16.2.3
Current Collection Systems – Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between Overhead Contact
EN 50318:2002
Line and Pantograph
4.2.16.2.3
EN 50317:2002
4.2.16.2.4
EN 50317:2002
4.2.16.2.5
RA – Rolling Stock – Pantographs: Characteristics and Tests; Part 1:Pantographs for mainline vehicles
EN 50206-1: 1998
4.2.17
EN 50317:2002
4.2.17
EN 50318:2002
4.2.18
EN 50388:2005
4.2.18
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
as / in
Interoperability Constituent Pantograph
NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004
Interoperability Constituent Pantograph
NEK EN 50318:2002
IC OCL in a newly installed line (Integration
into a Subsystem)
IC Pantograph integrated in new rolling stock
NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004
IC Pantograph integrated in new rolling stock
NEK EN 50206-1:1998
NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004
RA - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the dynamic
Vertical movement of the contact point
interaction between pantograph and overhead contact line
RA – Current Collection Systems – Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between Overhead Vertical movement of the contact point
Contact Line and Pantograph
RA – Power Supply and Rolling Stock – Technical Criteria for the Coordination between Power Supply
Current capacity of the overhead contact line
(Substation) and Rolling Stock to achieve Interoperability, clause 7.1
system: AC and DC systems, trains in motion
NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004
EN 50119:2001
RA – Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines, clause 5.2.9, Annex B
NEK EN 50119:2001
4.2.18
EN 50149:2001
RA – Fixed installations – Electric traction – Copper and copper alloy grooved contact wires, clause 4.5,
tables 3 & 4
NEK EN 50149:2001
4.2.20
EN 50367:2006
4.2.20
EN 50119:2001
4.2.21
EN 50367:2006
4.2.23
EN 50388:2005
4.2.25
EN 50388:2005
4.7.1
EN 50122-1:1997
4.7.2
EN 50119:2001
4.7.2
EN 50122-1:1997
7.4.6
EN 50163:2004
7.4.7
EN 50388:2005
7.4.12
EN 50367:2006
Annex B
EN 50317:2002
Annex B
EN 50318:2002
RA – Current Collection Systems – Technical Criteria for the Interaction between Pantograph and Overhead Current capacity, DC systems, trains at
Line (to Achieve Free Access), clause 6.2, Annex A.4.1
standstill
RA – Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines, Annex B see clause 5 in pr50199
Current capacity, DC systems, trains at
standstill
RA – Current Collection Systems – Technical Criteria for the Interaction Between Pantograph
Phase Separation Sections
and Overhead Line (to Achieve Free Access), Annex A.1.3, Annex A1.5
RA – Power Supply and Rolling Stock – Technical Criteria for the Coordination between Power
Electrical Protection Coordination
Supply (Substation) and Rolling Stock to achieve Interoperability, clause 11, 14.6
Arrangements
Harmonics and Dynamic Effects
(Substation) and Rolling Stock to achieve Interoperability, clause 10, 10.4
RA Fixed installations. Protective provisions relating to electrical safety and earthing, clauses 8 (excluding
Protective provisions of substations and posts
EN 50179) and 9.1
RA – Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines, clause 5.1.2
Protective provisions of overhead contact line
system
RA. Fixed installations. Protective provisions relating to electrical safety and earthing, clauses
Protective provisions of overhead contact line
4.1, 4.2, 5.1 (excluding 5.2.1.5), 5.2, 7
system
Particular features of the British Network Voltage and frequency
Particular features of the British Network (Substation) and Rolling Stock to achieve Interoperability
Voltage and frequency
RA – Current Collection Systems – Technical Criteria for the Interaction between Pantograph and
Particular features of the Polish Network
Overhead Line (to achieve Free Access), Annex B, Figures B.8 and B.3
Railway applications - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the Conformity Assessment of Interoperability
Constituents: Overhead Contact Line
Current Collection Systems – Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between Overhead Contact Conformity Assessment of Interoperability
Line and Pantograph
Constituents: Overhead Contact Line
NEK EN 50318:2002
NEK EN 50388:2005
NEK EN 50367:2006
NEK EN 50119:2001
NEK EN 50367:2006
NEK EN 50388:2005
NEK EN 50388:2005
_
NEK EN 50119:2001
_
NEK EN 50163:2004
NEK EN 50388:2005
NEK EN 50367:2006
NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004
NEK EN 50318:2002
A1-12 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
Annex
C
Railway applications - Current collection systems - Requirements for and validation of measurements of the Assessment of the Energy Subsystem
EN 50317:2002INTEROPERABILITY
TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS
Annex C
RA – Current Collection Systems – Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between Overhead
Assessment of the Energy Subsystem
EN 50318:2002
Contact Line and Pantograph
RA – Environmental conditions for equipment – Part 2: Equipment in fixed installations
4.2
EN 50125-2;2002
4.2.1
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
as / in
NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004
NEK EN 50318:2002
Functional and technical specifications of the
subsystem
General Provisions
NEK EN 50125-2:2002
4.2.6
EN 50121-1
RA – EMC Part 1 General
External Electromagnetic Compatibility
NEK EN 50121-1:2006
4.2.6
EN 50121-5
RA – EMC Part 5 Fixed Installations
External Electromagnetic Compatibility
NEK EN 50121-5:2006
4.2.7
EN 50126-1
EN 50122-2:1998
Continuity of Power Supply in case
of disturbances
Protection of the environment
_
4.2.8
4.2.9
EN 50345
RA The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS) – Part
1: Basic requirements and generic process
RA Fixed Installations – Part 2 Protective Provisions against the effects of stray currents caused by dc traction
systems
RA Fixed Installations – Electric traction - Insulating synthetic rope assemblies for the support of overhead
contact lines
Overhead Contact Line
NEK EN 50345:2009
4.2.24
EN 50122-3
Effects of DC Operation on AC systems
NEK EN 50122-3:2010
4.2.24
EN 50122-2:1998
4.7.1
EN 50122-2:1998
4.7.1
NEK EN 50122-2:1998
NEK EN 50122-2:1998
EN 50122-3
RA Fixed Installations – Part 2 Protective Provisions against the effects of stray currents caused by dc traction Effects of DC Operation on AC systems
systems
RA Fixed Installations – Part 2 Protective Provisions against the effects of stray currents caused by dc
Protective Provisions of substations and posts
traction systems
Protective Provisions of substations and posts
4.7.2
EN 50151
RA Fixed Installations – Electric traction - Special requirements for composite insulators
NEK EN 50151:2003
4.7.2
EN 60383-1:1998
4.7.2
EN 60383-2:1998
4.7.2
EN 50124-1:2001
4.7
4.7.4
4.7
4.7.4
EN 50124-1:2001
Insulators for overhead lines with a nominal voltage above 1000 V. Part 1: Ceramic or glass insulator units for
a.c. systems. Definitions, test methods and acceptance criteria
Insulators for overhead lines with a nominal voltage above 1000 V. Part 2: Insulator strings and insulator sets
for a.c. systems. Definitions, test methods and acceptance criteria
RA – Insulation Coordination – Part 1: Basic requirements – Clearances and creepage distances for all
electrical and electronic equipment
RA – Insulation Coordination – Part 1: Basic requirements – Clearances and creepage distances for all
electrical and electronic equipment
RA – Insulation coordination – Part 2: Overvoltages and related protection
EN 50124-2
Protective Provisions of overhead contact line
system
system
system
system
Health and Safety conditions
Other general requirements
Health and Safety conditions
Other general requirements
NEK EN 50122-2:1998
NEK EN 50122-3:2010
_
_
NEK EN 50124-1:2001
NEK EN 50124-1:2001
NEK EN 50124-2:2001
A1-13 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
Applicable standards in HS Safety in Railway Tunnels subsystem TSI
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
TSI on Safety in Railway Tunnels in the trans-European conventional and high-speed rail System
1.1.3
Railway applications/Fire protections on railway vehicles –
prEN 45545-1 TS 45545-1
part1: General
4.2.5.3.2.
Fire resistance tests, Part 1: General requirements
EN 1363-1:1999
4.2.2.4.
Fire classification of construction products and building elements - Part 1: Classification using data from
EN 13501-1:2002
reaction to fire tests
4.2.2.9
Graphical symbols -- Safety colours and safety signs -- Part 1: Design principles for safety signs in workplaces
ISO 3864-1
and public areas
4.2.3.4.
Common test methods for cables under fire conditions - Tests on gases evolved during combustion of
EN 50267-2-1:1998
materials from cables - Part 2-1: Procedures - Determination of the amount of halogen acid gas.
Common test methods for cables under fire conditions - Tests on gases evolved during combustion of
EN 50267-2-2:1998
materials from cables - Part 2-2: Procedures - Determination of degree of acidity of gases for materials by
measuring pH and conductivity.
EN 50268-2:1999
6.2.8.2
EN 401:1994
EN 402:2003
EN 403:2004
UIC leaflet 779-11
UNECE document
TRANS/AC.9/09:2003
as / in
JD 520
Underbygning - Regler for prosjektering og
bygging
Driver’s protection
Fire safety requirements for building material
-
Escape signage
-
Requirements for electrical cables in tunnels
-
Common test methods for cables under fire conditions. Measurement of smoke density of cables
burning under defined conditions Part 2: Procedure.
Respiratory protective devices for self-rescue. – Self-contained closed-circuit breathing apparatus –
Self-rescue device
Chemical oxygen escape apparatus – Requirements, testing, marking
Respiratory protective devices for escape – Self-contained open-circuit compressed air breathing
apparatus with full face mask or mouthpiece assembly - Requirements, testing, marking
Respiratory protective devices for self-rescue – Filtering devices with hood for self rescue from fire
- Requirements, testing, marking
General
Safety in Railway Tunnels
UIC leaflet 779-9 R :2003
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
Recommended measures for safety in new and
existing tunnels. Covers the subsystems of
infrastructure, energy,
rolling stock and operation.
-
-
Determination of railway tunnel cross-sectional areas on the basis of aerodynamic considerations
A1-14 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
Applicable standards in TSI relating to ‘Persons with Reduced Mobility’
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
TSI relating to ‘persons with reduced mobility’ in the trans-European conventional and high-speed rail
System
Subsystem Infrastructure:
4.1.2.11.1
Safety rules for the construction and installations of lifts - Particular applications for passenger and good
EN 81-70:2003
passengers lifts - Part 70: Accessibility to lifts for persons including persons with disability ; Appendix E.4
4.1.2.17
EN 81-70:2003
4.1.2.18.2
Annex F
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
Visual information: signposting, pictograms,
dynamic information
as / in
JD 543
Lavspenning - Regler for prosjektering
JD 560
JD 530
Tele - Regler for prosjektering
Overbygning - Regler for prosjektering
-
pr EN 15273-3:2006
Safety rules for the construction and installations of lifts - Particular applications for passenger and good
Ramps, escalators, lifts, travelators
passengers lifts - Part 70: Accessibility to lifts for persons including persons with disability ; clause 5.3.2.1 table
1
Railway Applications – Gauges – Part 3: Structure gauges
Platform offset
NS-EN 15273-3:2009
EN ISO 9001:2000
Quality management systems - Requirements
Procedures for assessment of conformity and
suitability for use
-
Railway applications – Structural requirements of railway vehicle bodies
Newly built rolling stock of an existing design
NS-EN 12663-1:2010
Subsystem Rolling Stock:
7.1.2.2
EN 12663:2000
-
7.4.1.3.4
pr EN 15273-2:2005
Railway Applications – Gauges – Part 2: Rolling stock gauge; Annex related to Portuguese Kinematics
Gauges (CP)
Specific case for Rolling Stock intending to
operate on the existing conventional rail
network in Portugal
NS-EN 15273-2:2009
Annex F
EN ISO 9001:2000
Quality management systems - Requirements
Procedures for assessment of conformity and
suitability for use
-
Parking facilities for PRM
Obstacle-free route
Obstacle-free route
Route identification
Doors and entrances
Floor surfaces
Floor surfaces
Transparent obstacles
Toilets and baby-changing facilities
Furniture and free-standing devices
Ticketing, Information desks and Customer
Assistance points
Ticketing, Information desks and Customer
Assistance points
Lighting
dynamic information
dynamic information
-
Subsystem Infrastructure:
4.1.2.2
Measures to facilitate travel by rail
UIC Code 413
4.1.2.3
Eurostations - Accessibility to stations in Europe
UIC Code 140
4.1.2.4
UIC Code 413
4.1.2.3.2
Tactile paving surface indicators from concrete, clay and stone
CEN/TS 15209:2008
4.1.2.4
UIC Code 140
4.1.2.5
UIC Code 140
4.1.2.5
Tactile paving surface indicators from concrete, clay and stone
CEN/TS 15209:2008
4.1.2.6
UIC Code 140
4.1.2.7
UIC Code 140
4.1.2.8
UIC Code 141
4.1.2.9
UIC Code 140
4.1.2.9
UIC Code 413
4.1.2.10
4.1.2.11
UIC Code 140
UIC Code 140
4.1.2.11
UIC Code 413
-
A1-15 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
Standard-No.
TSI section
Description
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
as / in
4.1.2.11
Safety rules for the construction and installations of lifts - Part 70: Particular applications for passenger
EN 81-70: 2003 INTEROPERABILITY
and good passenger lifts - Accessibility to lifts for persons including persons with disability.
dynamic information
-
4.1.2.12
4.1.2.12
4.1.2.13
4.1.2.13
4.1.2.14
4.1.2.15
4.1.2.16
4.1.2.17
4.1.2.17
4.1.2.17
UIC Code 140
UIC Code 413
UIC Code 140
UIC Code 413
UIC Code 140
UIC Code 140
UIC Code 140
UIC Code 140
UIC Code 413
EN 81-70: 2003
Safety rules for the construction and installations of lifts - Part 70: Particular applications for passenger
and good passenger lifts - Accessibility to lifts for persons including persons with disability.
Spoken information
Spoken information
Emergency exits, alarms
Emergency exits, alarms
Geometry of footbridges and subways
Stairs
Handrails
-
4.1.2.19
4.1.2.21
UIC Code 140
UIC Code 140
-
4.1.2.21
UIC Code 413
4.1.2.22
UIC Code 140
4.1.2.23
UIC Code 413
4.1.2.24
UIC Code 413
4.1.6
UIC Code 413
Annex M
prEN 12184
Annex N
UIC Code 140
Annex N
ISO TR 7239:1984
Subsystem Rolling Stock:
4.2.2.3
UIC 565-3
Electrically powered wheelchairs, scooters and their chargers – Requirements and test methods
Development and principles for application of public information symbols
Platform width and edge of platform
Boarding aids for passengers using
wheelchairs
Boarding aids for passengers using
wheelchairs
Level track crossing at stations
Commercial outlets, restaurant area
Clean, smoke-free stations
Professional qualifications
Transportable wheelchair
PRM signage
PRM signage
Indications for the lay out of coaches suitable for conveying disabled passengers in their wheelchairs
Wheelchair spaces
-
4.2.2.4.2
4.2.2.4.2
4.2.2.4.2
EN 14752:2005
UIC Code 413
UIC Code 580
Exterior doors
Exterior doors
Exterior doors
NS-EN 14752:2005
-
4.2.2.4.3
4.2.2.5
4.2.2.5
4.2.2.6.3
UIC Code 413
EN 12665:2002
EN 13272:2001
UIC 565-3
Railway applications – Bodyside entrance systems
Inscriptions and markings, route indicators and number plates to be affixed to coaching stock used in
international traffic
Light and lighting - Basic terms and criteria for specifying light requirements
Railway applications - Electrical lighting for rolling stock in public transport systems
Indications for the lay out of coaches suitable for conveying disabled passengers in their wheelchairs
Interior doors
Lighting
Lighting
Universal toilet
NS-EN 13272:2001
-
4.2.2.8
4.2.2.8
4.2.2.8
UIC Code 140
UIC Code 413
UIC Code 580
Customer Information
-
4.2.2.8.2
ISO
Inscriptions and markings, route indicators and number plates to be affixed to coaching stock used in
international traffic
Graphical symbols – safety colours and safety signs – Safety signs used in workplaces and public areas
Information (signage, pictograms, inductive
loops and emergency call devices)
-
4.2.2.8.2
ISO 17398:2004
Safety colours and safety signs – Classification, performance and durability of safety signs
-
7010:2003
-
A1-16 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
Standard-No.
TSI section
Description
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
as / in
4.2.2.8.2
ISO TR 7239:1984
INTEROPERABILITY
-
4.2.2.9
UIC
565-3
Indications for the layout of coaches suitable for conveying disabled passengers in their wheelchairs
Height changes
-
4.2.2.11
UIC
565-3
-
4.2.2.12
EN 14752:2005
Railway applications – Bodyside entrance systems
Wheelchair Accessible sleeping
accommodation
Step position for vehicle access and egress
4.2.2.13
UIC
Boarding aids
-
4.3
4.3
4.2.6
Annex M
EN 12665:2002
EN 13272:2001
UIC Code 413
prEN 12184
Light and lighting - Basic terms and criteria for specifying light requirements
Electrically powered wheelchairs, scooters and their chargers – Requirements and test methods
Definitions of the terms used in the TSI
Definitions of the terms used in the TSI
Professional qualifications
Transportable wheelchair
NS-EN 13272:2001
-
Annex N
UIC Code 140
PRM signage
-
Annex N
ISO TR 7239:1984
PRM signage
-
565-3
NS-EN 14752:2005
A1-17 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
Applicable standards in HS Control-Command and Signalling TSI
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
as / in
JD 510
JD 550
JD 560
Felles elektro – Regler for prosjektering og
bygging
Signal - Regler for prosjektering
Tele - Regler for prosjektering
JD 590
Infrastrukturens egenskaper 01.07.10
TSI Control-Command and Signalling - High Speed-Rail System
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 4: Emission and immunity of the signalling and
4.2.12.2
EN 50121-4: 2000
telecommunications apparatus
Index A7
Electromagnetic Compatibility between Rolling
Stock and Control-Command Track-side
equipment:
General immunity characteristics of equipment
NEK EN 50121-4:2006
4.2.16
Index 38
4.3.2.5
Index A4
4.3.2.5
Index A5
4.3.2.6
Index A6
Reserved 06E068
ETCS marker board definition
Visibility of track-side Control-Command
-
EN 50125-1: 1999
Railway applications – Environmental conditions for equipment – Part 1: equipment on board rolling stock
NEK EN 50125-1:1999
EN 50125-3 : 2003
Railway applications – Environmental conditions for equipment – Part 3: equipment for signalling and
telecommunications
Railway applications – Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 3-2: Rolling stock – Apparatus
Interface to the Subsystem Rolling Stock:
Physical environmental conditions
Interface to the Subsystem Rolling Stock:
Physical environmental conditions
Electromagnetic Compatibility between Rolling
Stock and Control Command On-Board
equipment
4.3.4.1.
Index A7
4.3.4.1.
Index A6
6.1.2
Index A1
EN 50121-4: 2000
6.1.2
Index A2
6.1.2
Index A3
6.2.2.3
Index A1
6.2.2.3
Index A2
6.2.2.3
Index A3
EN 50128: 2001
EN 50121-3-2: 2000
EN 50121-3-2: 2000
EN 50126: 1999
EN 50129: 2003
EN 50126: 1999
EN 50128: 2001
EN 50129: 2003
NEK EN 50125-3:2003
NEK EN 50121-3-2:2006
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 4: Emission and immunity of the signalling and Interfaces to Subsystem Energy:
Electromagnetic Compatibility:
Railway applications – Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 3-2: Rolling stock – Apparatus
Interfaces to Subsystem Energy:
Electromagnetic Compatibility:
Interoperability constituents: Modules
Railway applications – The specification and demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability
and safety (RAMS)
Part 1: Basic requirements and generic process
Part 2: Guide to the application of EN 50126-1 for safety (CLC/TR)
Part 3: Guide to the application of EN 50126-1 for rolling stock RAM (CLC/TR)
NEK EN 50121-4:2006
Railway applications – Communication, signalling and processing systems – Software for railway control
and protection systems
Railway applications – Communication, signalling and processing systems – Safety related electronic
systems for signalling
Railway applications – The specification and demonstration of reliability, availability, maintainability
and safety (RAMS)
Railway applications – Communication, signalling and processing systems – Software for railway control
and protection systems
Railway applications – Communication, signalling and processing systems – Safety related electronic
systems for signalling
NEK EN 50128:2001
Interoperability constituents:
Modules
Interoperability constituents:
Modules
Conditions for use of Modules for onboard
and trackside Assemblies
NEK EN 50121-3-2:2006
NEK EN 50126-1:1999
NEK EN 50129:2003
NEK EN 50126-1:1999
NEK EN 50128:2001
NEK EN 50129:2003
A1-18 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
Applicable standards in HS Control-Command and Signalling TSI
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
Railway applications – Compatibility between rolling stock and train detection systems
ANNEX
C
EN 50238: 2003INTEROPERABILITY
TECHNICAL
SPECIFICATIONS
Parts added: Part 2: Compatibility with track circuits
List, N° 9
Part 3: Compatibility with axle counters (version 2003 will become Part 1)
Index A8
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
List of specific technical characteristics and the
requirements associated with an interoperable
line and with an interoperable train
Susceptibility of track-side C/C equipment to
emission from trains in terms of EMC
Electromagn. emission of the train with respect
to admission of the trains in terms of EMC
NEK EN 50238:2003
ANNEX C
List,N° 10
Index A5
EN 50125-1: 1999
Climatic conditions and physical conditions
along the line
NEK EN 50125-1:1999
ANNEX C
List,N° 10
Index A4
EN 50125-1: 1999
Climatic conditions and physical conditions in
which the on-board assembly can work
NEK EN 50125-1:1999
A1-19 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
Applicable standards in HS Rolling Stock subsystem TSI
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
TSI Rolling Stock
as / in
JD 550
JD 590
4.2.2.3.3
Railway applications - Structural requirements of railway vehicle bodies
EN 12663:2000
Longitudinal and vertical static loads of category P II
4.2.3.1
prEN 50367:2006
Clause 5.2
4.2.3.3.2.3.2
Railway applications - Axle boxes – Performance testing
EN 12082: 1998
Annex 6
4.2.3.3.2.3.6
EN ISO 2813: 1998
Paints and varnishes – Determination of specular gloss of non-metallic paint films at 20 degrees, 60 degrees
Clause 3.1
and 85 degrees
4.2.3.4.1
EN 14363: 2005
Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles –
Clauses 5.2.2, and annex C
Testing of running behaviour and stationary tests
4.2.3.4.2
EN 14363: 2005
Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Testing of
Clauses 4.1.3, 5.5.1, 5.5.2,
and appropriate sections of
5.3.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.4, 5.5.5 and 5.6
4.2.3.4.3
EN 14363: 2005
Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Testing of running behaviour and
Clauses 5.5.1, 5.5.2 and
stationary ests
appropriate sections of clauses
5.3.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.4, 5.5.5 and 5.6
4.2.3.4.7
EN 13674-1: 2003
4.2.3.4.7
prEN 13715: 2006
4.2.4.3
4.2.5.2
EN 50163: 2004
Clause 4.1
ISO 3864-1: 2003
4.2.6.1
EN 50125-1: 1999
4.2.6.4
EN 14067-5 : 2006
4.2.6.5.2
Signal, Prosjektering
Rullende materiell, Infrastrukturens
egenskaper
Strength of vehicle structure
Specifications
Kinematic gauge
NS-EN 12663:2010
Axle bearing health monitoring
Functional requirements for the vehicle
Axle bearing health monitoring
Emmissivity
Rolling stock dynamic behaviour
General
Limit values for running safety
NS-EN 12082:2007
NEK EN 50367:2006
NS-EN 14363:2005
NS-EN 14363:2005
Track loading limit values
NS-EN 14363:2005
Railway applications - Track – Rail – Part 1: Vignole railway rails 46kg/m and above
Rail section 60 E 1
Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies – Wheels – Tread profile
S1002 and GV1/40 profiles
Railway applications - Supply voltage of traction systems
Design values for wheel profiles
Design values for wheel profiles
Brake system requirements
NS-EN 13674-1:2003+A1:2007
Passenger information signs
-
Environmental conditions
NEK EN 50125-1:2002
Maximum pressure variations in tunnels
NS-EN 14067-5:2006
EN ISO 3095: 2005
Graphical symbols – Safety colours and safety signs –
Part 1: Design principles for safety signs in workplaces and public areas
Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment
Part 1: Equipment on board rolling stock
Railway applications - Aerodynamics
Part 5: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics in tunnels
Acoustics – Measurement of noise emitted by railbound vehicles
NS-EN ISO 3095:2005
4.2.6.5.3
EN ISO 3095: 2006
Acoustics – Measurement of noise emitted by railbound vehicles
4.2.6.5.4
EN ISO 3095: 2005
Acoustics – Measurement of noise emitted by rail bound vehicles
4.2.6.6.2
EN 50121-3-1: 2000
4.2.6.6.2
EN 50121-3-2: 2000
Electromagnetic interference
NEK EN 50121-3-2:2006
4.2.7.2.3.2
EN 3-3:1994
Electromagnetic compatibility
Part 3-1: Rolling stock – train
Electromagnetic compatibility
Part 3-2: Apparatus
Portable fire extinguishers – Construction, resistance to pressure, mechanical tests
Exterior noise
Limits for stationary noise
Exterior noise
Limits for starting noise
Exterior noise
Limits for pass-by noise
Electromagnetic interference
Fire extinguisher
-
NS-EN 13715:2006
NEK EN 50163:2004
NS-EN ISO 3095:2005
NS-EN ISO 3095:2005
NEK EN 50121-3-1:2006
A1-20 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
4.2.7.2.3.2
EN 3-6:1995 amended
in 1999 Portable fire extinguishers – Part 6: Provisions for the attestation of conformity of portable fire
INTEROPERABILITY
extinguishers in accordance with EN 3 part 1 to part 5
4.2.7.2.3.2
Portable fire extinguishers – Part 7: Characteristics, performance requirements and test methods
EN 3-7:2004
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
as / in
Fire extinguisher
-
Fire extinguisher
-
Fire resistance
Specific measures for tanks containing
flammable liquids
Specific measures for tanks containing
flammable liquids
Protection against electric shock
Emergency lighting system
-
NEK EN 50128:2001
NEK EN 50155:2007
NEK EN 50163:2004
4.2.7.2.3.3
4.2.7.2.5
EN 1363-1: 1999
EN ISO 2719
Fire resistance tests – Part 1: General requirements
Determination of flash point - Pensky-Martens closed cup method (ISO 2719:2002)
4.2.7.2.5
ISO 11014-1
Safety data sheet for chemical products -- Part 1: Content and order of sections
4.2.7.3
4.2.7.12
EN 50153: 2002
EN 13272 : 2001
Clause 5.3
EN 50128 : 2001
EN 50155 : 2001/A1 : 2002
EN 50163: 2004
Clause 4
Railway applications - Rolling stock – Protective provisions relating to electric hazards
Software
Software
Voltage and frequency of the electricity
supply
Energy supply
4.2.8.3.1.2
EN 50388: 2005
Clauses 12.1.1 and 14.7.1
Railway applications - Power supply and rolling stock
Technical criteria for the coordination between power supply (substation) and rolling stock to achieve
interoperability
Voltage and frequency of the electricity
supply
Energy recuperation
NEK EN 50388:2005
4.2.8.3.2
EN 50388: 2005
Clauses 7 and 14.3
interoperability
Maximum power and maximum current that it is
permissible to draw from the catenary
NEK EN 50388:2005
4.2.8.3.3
EN 50388: 2005
Clauses 6 and 14.2
interoperability
Power factor
NEK EN 50388:2005
4.2.8.3.4.1
EN 50388: 2005
Clause 10
interoperability
Harmonic characteristics and related overvoltages on the overhead contact line
NEK EN 50388:2005
4.2.8.3.6.3
EN 50163: 2004
Clause 4
EN 50124-1: 2001
Table A2
Insulation of pantograph from the vehicle
NEK EN 50163:2004
Railway applications - Insulation coordination
Part 1: Basic requirements – Clearance and creepage distances for all electrical and electronic equipment
Insulation of pantograph from the vehicle
NEK EN 50124-1:2001
4.2.8.3.6.4
EN 50206-1: 1998
Clauses 4.8, 4.9, 6.3.2, 6.3.3
Railway applications - Rolling stock – Pantographs: characteristics and tests
Part 1: Pantographs for main line vehicles
Pantograph lowering
NEK EN 50206-1:1998
4.2.8.3.6.4
EN50119:2001
Table 9
EN 50388: 2005
Clauses 11, 14.6
Railway applications – Fixed installations – Electric traction overhead contact lines
Pantograph lowering
NEK EN 50119:2001
interoperability
Electrical protection coordination
NEK EN 50388:2005
EN 50206-1: 1998
Clause 4
EN 50367: 2006
Clause 5.2
EN 50206-1: 1998
Clauses 3.3.5, 6.3.1
Overall Design (Pantograph)
Railway applications - Current collection systems – Technical criteria for the interaction between pantograph Pantograph head geometry
and overhead line (to achieve free access)
Pantograph static contact force
4.2.7.13
4.2.7.13
4.2.8.3.1.1
4.2.8.3.6.3
4.2.8.3.6.6
4.2.8.3.7.1
4.2.8.3.7.2
4.2.8.3.7.3
NEK EN 50153:2002
NS-EN 13272:2001
NEK EN 50206-1:1998
NEK EN 50367:2006
NEK EN 50206-1:1998
A1-21 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
as / in
4.2.8.3.7.4
EN 50206-1: 1998
Working range of pantographs
INTEROPERABILITY
Clauses 4.2, 6.2.3
4.2.8.3.7.5
EN 50206-1: 1998
Current capacity
Clauses 6.13.
4.2.8.3.8.1
EN 50405: 2006
Railway applications - Current collection systems – Pantographs, testing methods for carbon contact strips General (Contact strip)
Clauses 5.2.2 to 5.2.4 and 5.2.6
and 5.2.7
NEK EN 50206-1:1998
4.2.8.3.8.3
NEK EN 50206-1:1998
NEK EN 50405:2006
Railway applications - Current collection systems – Technical criteria for the interaction between pantograph Material (Contact strip)
Railway applications - Current collection systems – Pantographs, testing methods for carbon contact strips Detection of contact strip breakage
NEK EN 50367:2006
Railway applications - Current collection systems – Pantographs, testing methods for carbon contact strips
Current capacity
NEK EN 50405:2006
Electrical Sockets
(Train interior cleaning)
Rolling stock being upgraded or renewed
-
Protection against a low obstacle
NS-EN 12663-1:2010
F
EN 50367: 2006
Clause 6.2
EN 50405: 2006
Clause 5.2.5
EN 50405: 2006
Clause 5.2
CEE 7
Standard Sheet VII
EN 14363: 2005
Clause 5.5.5 and table 3
EN 12663: 2000
Clause 3.4.2
EN/ISO 9001:2000
Quality management systems – Requirements
Modules for the EC Verification of Subsystems
-
G.5.1.1
EN 14067-1: 2003
Railway applications - Aerodynamics Part 1: Symbols and units
Assessment of Characteristic Wind Curves
Aerodynamic properties determination
NS-EN 14067-1:2003
G.5.4.3
EN 14363: 2005
Clauses 5, 5.5
Assessment of Characteristic Wind Curves
Vehicle dynamics determination
NS-EN 14363:2005
G.8
EN 14363: 2005
Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles – Testing of Effects of Cross Winds
Clause 5.6
Required Documentation
CIE Publication No2 15.2-1986 (CIE means International Commission on Illumination )
Definitions (Front and rear lamps)
CIE1931
4.2.8.3.8.4
4.2.8.3.8.5
4.2.9.4.2
7.1.4
A.1.1
H.1
Railway applications - Structural requirements of railway vehicle bodies
H.2
H.3
H.4
CIE S004/E-2001
CIE S004/E-2001
CIE Publication No. 15.2
Colours of light signals
Colours of light signals
H.4
CIE 69:1987
H.4
ISO/CIE CD 10527
Methods for characterising illuminance meters and luminance meters; performance, characteristics and
specifications
CIE standard colorimetric observers (under development; stage CD = study/ballot initiated)
J.1.1
J.1.1
ECE R 43 A3/9.2
ISO 3538:1997
J.1.3
J.1.4
J.1.4
ECE R 43 A3/4
ECE R 43 A3/9.1
ISO 3568:1997
Clause 5.1
EN ISO 3095: 2005
N1
NEK EN 50405:2006
NS-EN 14363:2005
NS-EN 14363:2005
-
Front Lamps
Rear Lamps
Conformity type testing of interoperability
constituents (lamps)
Optical Distortion (Windscreens)
Optical Distortion (Windscreens)
-
Road vehicles -- Safety glazing materials -- Test methods for optical properties
Haze (Windscreens)
Transmittance (Windscreens)
Transmittance (Windscreens)
-
Acoustics – Measurement of noise emitted by railbound vehicles (ISO/FDIS 3095:2005)
Measuring Conditions for Noise Deviations
NS-EN ISO 3095:2005
Road vehicles -- Safety glazing materials -- Test methods for optical properties
Section 5.3
-
A1-22 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
N2.2
prEN ISO/IEC 17025:2000
General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories
INTEROPERABILITY
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
Measuring Conditions for Noise Measurement
system
Measuring Conditions for Noise Test report
as / in
-
N2.4
IEC 60263: 1982
Scales and sizes for plotting frequency characteristics and polar diagrams
N2.4
EN ISO 3740: 2000
Acoustics – Determination of sound power levels of noise sources – guidelines for the use of basic standards Measuring Conditions for Noise Test report
-
P.2.2
prEN15328:2005
Annexes A, B
Railway applications — Braking — Brake pads
Rig test for determining the effects of
reduced friction (Brakes)
-
Buffing and draw gear components
Buffing and draw gear components
Towing coupler for recovery and rescue
NS-EN 15566:2009
NS-EN 15551:2009
NS-EN 15020:2006
Wind screen
Lights and horn: Devices
NS-EN 15152:2007
NS-EN 15153-1:2007
Lights and horn: Devices
NS-EN 15153-2:2007
Interoperability
constituents
4.2.2.2.2.2
Railway applications - Railway rolling stock - Draw gear and screw coupling
prEN 15566:2008
4.2.2.2.2.2
Railway applications - Railway rolling stock - Buffers
prEN 15551:2008
4.2.2.2.2.3
Railway applications - Rescue coupler - Performance requirements, specific interface geometry and test
EN 15020:2006
methods
4.2.2.7
Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Wheels - Product requirements
EN 15152:2007
4.2.7.4
Railway applications - External visible and audible warning devices for high speed trains - Part 1:
EN 15153-1:2007
Head, marker and tail lamps
4.2.7.4
Railway applications - External visible and audible warning devices for high speed trains - Part 2: Warning
EN 15153-2:2007
horns
Parameters of
the rolling stock
subsystem
-
4.2.2.3.3
EN 15227:2008
Strength
of
vehicle
structure. Specification
NS-EN 15227:2008
4.2.2.3.3
prEN 12663-1:2007
Structural requirements of railway vehicle bodies. Part 1 Railway vehicles other than Freight wagons
Strength
of
vehicle
NS-EN 12663-1:2010
4.2.2.3.3
prEN 15663:2008
Definition of vehicle reference masses
Strength
of
vehicle
NS-EN 15663:2009
4.2.2.4.2
4.2.2.6
EN 14752
EN 15152:2007
Railway applications - Bodyside entrance systems
Cab windscreens of high speed trains
NS-EN 14752:2005
NS-EN 15152:2007
4.2.2.7
EN 15152:2007
Railway applications – Front windscreen for trains cab
External access door
Driver’s cab
b – External visibility
Wind screen
-optical quality
-ability to resist to impacts
4.2.3.2
4.2.3.2
4.2.3.3.1
4.2.3.3.1
EN 50215:1999
prEN 15663:2008
EN 13260:2003
prEN 15313:2008
Static axle load
Static axle load
Electrical resistance
Electrical resistance
NEK EN 50215:1999
NS-EN 15663:2009
NS-EN 13260:2009
NS-EN 15313:2010
4.2.3.3.2.2
prEN 15437-1:2008
EN 12082:2007
EN 13103:2001
4.2.3.4.1
EN 13104:2001
Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Powered axles - Design method
Axle bearing health monitoring.
Class2 train
Hot axle box detection for Class 2 trains
General
General
NS-EN 15437-1:2009
4.2.3.3.2.3
4.2.3.4.1
Definition of reference vehicle masses
Wheelsets and bogies - Wheelsets - Products requirements
Railway applications - In-service wheelset operation requirements - In-service and off-vehicle wheelset
maintenance
Railway applications - Axlebox condition monitoring - Performance requirements - Part 1: Track side
equipment
Railway applications - Axle boxes- Performance testing
Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Non-powered axles - Design method
NS-EN 15152:2007
NS-EN 12082:2007
NS-EN 13103:2009
NS-EN 13104:2009
A1-23 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
4.2.3.4.1
Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Wheelsets - Products requirements
EN13260:2003 INTEROPERABILITY
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
as / in
General
General
General
Wheel/rail interface
Definition of equivalent conicity
Wheelsets
Wheelsets
NS-EN 13260:2009
Interoperability Constituent Wheels
Flange lubrication
Suspension coefficient
NS-EN 13262:2004+A1:2008
NS-EN 15427:2008
NS-EN 14363:2005
Minimum braking Characteristics
NS-EN 14531-1:2005
Minimum braking Characteristics
NS-EN 14531-6:2009
Minimum deceleration
Maximum braking distance
NEK EN 50215:1999
Service braking performance
NS-EN 15179:2007
NS-EN 15220-1:2008
NS-EN 15355:2008
NS-EN 15595:2009
NS-EN 15611:2008
NS-EN 15612:2008
NS-EN 15625:2008
NEK EN 50215:1999
4.2.3.4.1
EN13261:2003
Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Axles - Product requirements
NS-EN 13261:2009
4.2.3.4.1
prEN 15313:2008
4.2.3.4.4
4.2.3.4.6
4.2.3.4.9.1
4.2.3.4.9.1
EN 13715:2006
EN 15302:2008
EN 13260:2003
prEN 15313:2008
4.2.3.4.9.2
4.2.3.8
4.2.3.9
4.2.4.1
EN 13262:2004
EN 15427 :2008
EN 14363: 2005
Clauses 4.3
EN 14531-1 :2005
4.2.4.2
prEN14531-6:2008
Railway applications - In-service wheelset operation requirements - In-service and off-vehicle wheelset
maintenance
Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Wheels – Wheel tread
Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Wheelsets - Products requirements
Railway applications - In-service wheelset operation requirements - In-service and off-vehicle
wheelset maintenance
Railway applications - Wheelsets and bogies - Wheels - Product requirements
Wheel/Rail Friction Management - Flange Lubrication
Railway applications - Testing for the acceptance of running characteristics of railway vehicles –
Testing of running behaviour and stationary tests
Railway applications - Methods for calculation of stopping distances, slowing distances and immobilization
braking - Part 1: General algorithms
Methods for calculation of stopping distances, slowing distances and immobilization braking - Part 6: Step
by step calculations for train sets or single vehicles
4.2.4.1.c
EN50215:1999
4.2.4.1.c
prEN 15663:2008
4.2.4.1.c
UIC 544-1
Trains
Brakes- Braking power
4.2.4.1.c
UIC 544-2
Brakes- Dynamic brake
4.2.4.3
EN 14198 :2004
4.2.4.3
4.2.4.3
4.2.4.3
4.2.4.3
4.2.4.3
4.2.4.3
4.2.4.3
4.2.4.4
EN 15179:2007
EN 15220-1:2008
EN 15355:2008
prEN 15595:2008
EN 15611:2008
EN 15612:2008
EN 15625:2008
EN50215 :1999
(FprEN 50215:2008 under vote)
Railway applications - Braking – Requirements for the brake system of trains hauled by a locomotive Trains
Railway applications - Braking- Requirements for the brake system of coaches
Railway applications - Brake indicators - Part 1: Pneumatically operated brake indicators
Railway applications - Braking – Distributor valves and distributor isolating devices
Braking – Wheel slip prevention equipment
Railway applications - Braking- Relay valves
Railway applications - Braking- Brake pipe accelerator valve
Railway applications - Braking- Automatic variable load sensing devices
4.2.4.8
EN 15220-1:2008
Railway applications - Brake indicators - Part 1: Pneumatically operated brake indicators
Brake requirements for rescue purposes
NS-EN 15220-1:2008
4.2.4.8
EN 15355 :2008
Railway applications - Braking – Distributor valves and distributor isolating devices
NS-EN 15355:2008
4.2.4.8
EN 15611:2008
Railway applications - Braking- Relay valves
NS-EN 15611:2008
4.2.4.8
EN 15612:2008
Railway applications -Braking- Brake pipe accelerator valve
NS-EN 15612:2008
4.2.5.3
EN 15327-1 :2008
Railway applications - Passenger alarm subsystem - Part 1: General requirements and passenger
interface for the passenger emergency brake system
Passenger alarm
NS-EN 15327-1:2008
NS-EN 15313:2010
NS-EN 13715:2006
NS-EN 15302:2008
NS-EN 13260:2009
NS-EN 15313:2010
NS-EN 15663:2009
NS-EN 14198:2004
A1-24 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
Standard-No.
TSI section
Description
4.2.6.2
Railway applications - Aerodynamics – Part 2: Aerodynamics on open track
EN 14067-2:2003
INTEROPERABILITY
4.2.6.2
Railway applications - Aerodynamics – Part 4: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics on
EN 14067-4:2005/prA1:2008
open track
4.2.6.4
Railway applications - Aerodynamics – Part 3 : Aerodynamics in tunnels
EN 14067-3 :2003
4.2.6.4
Railway applications - Aerodynamics – Part 4: Requirements and test procedures for aerodynamics in
EN 14067-5 :2006
tunnels
4.2.6.5.4
Railway applications - Characterisation of the dynamic properties of track sections for pass by noise
EN 15461:2008
measurements
4.2.6.5.4
Railway applications - Noise emission - Rail roughness measurement related to rolling noise generation
prEN 15610
(foreseen date of availability 2009-05)
4.2.7.2
TS 45545-1 to 4, 6&7:2008
Fire protection of railway vehicles
and TS 45545-5:2005
4.2.7.6
Acoustics – Measurement of noise inside rail bound vehicles
EN ISO 3381: 2005
4.2.7.7
Railway applications - Air conditioning for driving cabs – Part 1: Comfort parameters
EN 14813-1 :2006
4.2.7.7
EN 14813-2 :2006
Railway applications - Air conditioning for driving cabs – Part 2: Type tests
4.2.7.7
EN13129-1 :2002
Railway applications - Air conditioning for main line rolling stock – Part 1: Comfort parameters
4.2.7.7
EN13129-2 :2002
Railway applications - Air conditioning for main line rolling stock – Part 2 : Type tests
4.2.7.8
4.2.8.1
UIC 641
prEN 15663:2008
Conditions to be fulfilled by automatic vigilance devices used in international traffic
4.2.8.3.4
EN50124-2:2001
Railway Applications – Insulation Coordination
4.2.8.3.6.8
EN 50119:2001
Will be superseded by revised version EN 50119:200x; voted, to be ratified in 2008-10
–
Part
adopted in Norway
Characteristics
2:
Overvoltages
and
related protections
as / in
Train aerodynamic load in open air
Train aerodynamic load in open air
NS-EN 14067-2:2003
NS-EN 14067-4:2005+A1:2009
Maximum pressure variation in tunnels
Maximum pressure variation in tunnels
NS-EN 14067-3:2003
NS-EN 14067-5:2006
Exterior noise
Exterior noise
Fire safety
NS-EN 15461:2008
Interior noise
Boundary characteristics linked to air
conditioning
conditioning
conditioning
conditioning
Driver vigilance device
Traction and electrical equipment. Traction
performance requirements
Short over-voltages generated
NS-EN ISO 3381:2005
NS-EN 14813-1:2006
Running through system separations
NEK EN 50119:2001
NS-EN 15610:2009
-
NS-EN 14813-2:2006
NS-EN 13129-1:2002
NS-EN 13129-2:2004
NS-EN 15663:2009
NEK EN 50124-2:2001
UIC LEAFLETS
UIC 606
UIC 641
UIC 796
UIC 797
EUROPEAN NORMS
EN 13298:2003
EN 13597:2003
Gestaltung des Oberleitungssystems unter Berücksichtigung der Auswirkungen der Kinematik der Fahrzeuge
Conditions to be fulfilled by automatic vigilance devices used in international traffic
Spannung am Stromabnehmer
Koordinaten der elektrischen Schutzeinrichtungen Unterwerk
EN 15016-1:2004
EN 15016-2:2004
EN 15016-2:2004/AC:2007
EN 15016-3:2004
Railway applications - Suspension components - Helical suspension springs, steel
Railway applications - Rubber suspension components - Rubber diaphragms for pneumatic suspension
springs
Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 1: General Principles
Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 2: Parts lists
Corrigendum AC - Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 2: Parts lists
Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 3: Handling of modifications of technical documents
NS-EN 13298:2003
NS-EN 13597:2003
NS-EN 15016-1:2004
NS-EN 15016-2:2004
NS-EN 15016-2:2004/AC:2007
NS-EN 15016-3:2004
EN 15016-4:2006
Technical drawings - Railway applications - Part 4: Data exchange
NS-EN 15016-4:2006
A1-25 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
EN 15153-1:2007
Railway applications - External visible and audible warning devices for high speed trains - Part 1: Head, marker
INTEROPERABILITY
and tail lamps
EN 15153-2:2007
Railway applications - External visible and audible warning devices for high speed trains - Part 2: Warning
horns
EN 15227:2008
EN 15273-1:2009
Railway applications - Gauges - Part 1: General - Common rules for infrastructure and rolling stock
EN 15273-2:2009
Railway applications - Gauges - Part 2: Rolling stock gauge
EN 15273-3:2009
Railway applications - Gauges - Part 3: Structure gauges
EN 15461:2008
Railway applications - Noise emission - Characterisation of the dynamic properties of track sections for pass by
noise measurements
EN 15528
Railway applications - Corresponding load limits for railway vehicles and payloads for freight wagons
EN 50119:2001
EN 50119:2009
EN 50121-1:2006
EN 50121-2:2006
EN 50121-3-1:2006
EN 50121-4:2006
EN 50121-5:2006
EN 50122-2:1998
EN 50122-2:1998/A1:2002
EN 50122-2:2010
EN 50122-3:2010
EN 50123-1:2003
EN 50123-2:2003
EN 50123-3:2003
EN 50123-4:2003
EN 50123-5:2003
EN 50123-7-2:2003
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electric traction overhead contact lines
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electric traction overhead contact lines
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility -- Part 1: General
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility -- Part 2: Emission of the whole railway system to the
outside world
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility -- Part 3-1: Rolling stock - Train and complete vehicle
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility -- Part 4: Emission and immunity of the signalling and
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility -- Part 5: Emission and immunity of fixed power supply
installations and apparatus
Railway applications - Fixed installations -- Part 2: Protective provisions against the effects of stray currents
caused by d.c. traction systems
Railway applications - Fixed installations -- Part 2: Protective provisions against the effects of stray currents
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electrical safety, earthing and the return circuit -- Part 2: Provisions
against the effects of stray currents caused by d.c. traction systems
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electrical safety, earthing and the return circuit -- Part 3: Mutual
Interaction of a.c. and d.c. traction systems
Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 1: General
Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 2: D.C. circuit breakers
Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 3: Indoor d.c. disconnectors, switchdisconnectors and earthing switches
Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 4: Outdoor d.c. disconnectors, switchdisconnectors and earthing switches
Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 5: Surge arresters and low-voltage limiters
for specific use in d.c. systems
Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 7-2: Measurement, control and protection
devices for specific use in d.c. traction systems - Isolating current transducers and other current measuring
devices
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
NS-EN 15153-1:2007
NS-EN 15153-2:2007
NS-EN 15227:2008
NS-EN 15273-1:2009
NS-EN 15273-2:2009
NS-EN 15273-3:2009
NS-EN 15461:2008
NS-EN 15528:2008
NEK EN 50119:2001
NEK EN 50119:2009
NEK EN 50121-1:2006
NEK EN 50121-2:2006
NEK EN 50121-3-1:2006
NEK EN 50121-4:2006
NEK EN 50121-5:2006
NEK EN 50122-2:1998
NEK EN 50122-2:1998/A1:2002
NEK EN 50122-2:2010
NEK EN 50122-3:2010
NEK EN 50123-1:2003
NEK EN 50123-2:2003
NEK EN 50123-3:2003
NEK EN 50123-4:2003
NEK EN 50123-5:2003
NEK EN 50123-7-2:2003
EN 50123-7-3:2003
Railway applications - Fixed installations - D.C. switchgear -- Part 7-3: Measurement, control and protection
devices for specific use in d.c. traction systems - Isolating voltage transducers and other voltage measuring
devices
NEK EN 50123-7-3:2003
EN 50124-1:2001
Railway applications - Insulation coordination -- Part 1: Basic requirements - Clearances and creepage
distances for all electrical and electronic equipment
NEK EN 50124-1:2001
EN 50124-1:2001/A1:2003
NEK EN 50124-1:2001/A1:2003
A1-26 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
EN 50124-1:2001/A2:2005
INTEROPERABILITY
EN 50124-2:2001
Railway applications - Insulation coordination -- Part 2: Overvoltages and related protection
EN 50125-2:2002
Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment -- Part 2: Fixed electrical installations
EN 50125-3:2003
Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment -- Part 3: Equipment for signalling and
telecommunications
EN 50128:2001
Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Software for railway control and
protection systems
EN 50129:2003
Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Safety related electronic systems
for signalling
EN 50149:2001
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electric traction - Copper and copper alloy grooved contact wires
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
NEK EN 50124-1:2001/A2:2005
NEK EN 50124-2:2001
NEK EN 50125-2:2002
NEK EN 50125-3:2003
NEK EN 50128:2001
NEK EN 50129:2003
NEK EN 50149:2001
EN 50151:2003
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electric traction - Special requirements for composite insulators
NEK EN 50151:2003
EN 50152-1:2007
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear -- Part 1: Single-phase
circuit-breakers with Un above 1 kV
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear -- Part 2: Single-phase
disconnectors, earthing switches and switches with Un above 1 kV
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear -- Part 3-1:
Measurement, control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Application guide
NEK EN 50152-1:2007
EN 50152-2:2007
EN 50152-3-1:2003
NEK EN 50152-2:2007
NEK EN 50152-3-1:2003
EN 50152-3-2:2001
Measurement, control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Single-phase current
transformers
NEK EN 50152-3-2:2001
EN 50152-3-3:2001
Measurement, control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Single-phase inductive
voltage transformers
NEK EN 50152-3-3:2001
EN 50159:2010
Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Safety-related communication in
transmission systems
Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems -- Part 1: Safety-related
communication in closed transmission systems
Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems -- Part 2: Safety related
communication in open transmission systems
Voltage characteristics of electricity supplied by public distribution systems
Railway applications - Supply voltages of traction systems
Railway applications - Rolling stock - Pantographs: Characteristics and tests -- Part 1: Pantographs for main
line vehicles
Railway applications - Rolling stock - Pantographs: Characteristics and tests -- Part 1: Pantographs for main
line vehicles
Railway applications - Rolling stock - Testing of rolling stock on completion of construction and before entry into
service
Railway applications - Compatibility between rolling stock and train detection systems
Railway applications - Radio remote control system of traction vehicle for freight traffic
Railway applications - Railway rolling stock power and control cables having special fire performance -- Part 32: Cables with crosslinked elastomeric insulation with reduced dimensions - Multicore cables
NEK EN 50159:2010
EN 50159-1:2001
EN 50159-2:2001
EN 50160
EN 50163:2004
EN 50163:2004/A1:2007
EN 50206-1:1998
EN 50206-1:2010
EN 50215:2009
EN 50238:2003
EN 50239:1999
EN 50264-3-2:2008
EN 50305:2002
Railway applications - Railway rolling stock cables having special fire performance - Test methods
NEK EN 50159-1:2001
NEK EN 50159-2:2001
NEK EN 50163:2004
NEK EN 50163:2004/A1:2007
NEK EN 50206-1:1998
NEK EN 50206-1:2010
NEK EN 50215:2009
NEK EN 50238:2003
NEK EN 50239:1999
NEK EN 50264-3-2:2008
NEK EN 50305:2002
A1-27 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
EN 50317:2002/A1:2004
INTEROPERABILITY
EN 50318:2002
Railway applications - Current collection systems - Validation of simulation of the dynamic interaction between
pantograph and overhead contact line
EN 50327:2003
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Harmonisation of the rated values for converter groups and tests on
converter groups
EN 50328:2003
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electronic power converters for substations
EN 50329:2003
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Traction transformers
EN 50329:2003/A1:2010
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Traction transformers
EN 50345:2009
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Electric traction - Insulating synthetic rope assemblies for support of
overhead contact lines
EN 50367:2006
Railway applications - Current collection systems - Technical criteria for the interaction between pantograph
EN 50388:2005
Railway applications - Power supply and rolling stock - Technical criteria for the coordination between power
supply (substation) and rolling stock to achieve interoperability
EN 50405:2006
Railway applications - Current collection systems - Pantographs, testing methods for carbon contact strips
EN 50500:2008
EN 60000-6-2
EN 61000-6-3
EN 60383
EN 62267:2009
EN 301515:2002
CLC/TR 50451:2007
CLC/TR 50506-1:2007
CLC/TR 50506-2:2009
CLC/TR 50511:2007
CLC/TR 50542:2010
CLC/TS 50206-3:2010
CLC/TS 50238-2:2010
CLC/TS 50238-3:2010
CLC/TS 50459-1:2005
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
NEK EN 50317:2002/A1:2004
NEK EN 50318:2002
NEK EN 50327:2003
NEK EN 50328:2003
NEK EN 50329:2003
NEK EN 50329:2003/A1:2010
NEK EN 50345:2009
NEK EN 50367:2006
NEK EN 50388:2005
NEK EN 50405:2006
Measurement procedures of magnetic field levels generated by electronic and electrical apparatus in the
railway environment with respect to human exposure
Elektromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - General standards - Immunity for industrial environment
Elektromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - General standards - Emission standard for domestic, commercial and
light industrie
Insulator for overhead lines with a nominal voltage above 1 kV
Railway applications - Automated urban guided transport (AUGT) - Safety requirements
Globales System für mobile Kommunikation (GSM): Requirements for GSM operation on railways
Railway applications - Systematic allocation of safety integrity requirements
Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Application Guide for EN 50129 -Part 1: Cross-acceptance
Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Application Guide for EN 50129 -Part 2: Safety assurance
Railway applications - Communications, signalling and processing systems - ERTMS/ETCS - External
signalling for lines equipped with ERTMS/ETCS Level 2
Railway applications - Communication means between safety equipment and man-machine interfaces (MMI)
NEK EN 50500:2008
Railway applications - Rolling stock - Pantographs: Characteristics and tests -- Part 3: Interface between
pantograph and rolling stock for rail vehicles
Railway applications - Compatibility between rolling stock and train detection systems -- Part 2: Compatibility
with track circuits
Railway applications - Compatibility between rolling stock and train detection systems -- Part 3: Compatibility
with axle counters
Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - European Rail Traffic Management
System - Driver-Machine Interface -- Part 1: Ergonomic principles for the presentation of ERTMS/ETCS/GSMR information
NEK CLC/TS 50206-3:2010
NEK EN 62267:2009
NEK CLC/TR 50451:2007
NEK CLC/TR 50506-1:2007
NEK CLC/TR 50506-2:2009
NEK CLC/TR 50511:2007
NEK CLC/TR 50542:2010
NEK CLC/TS 50238-2:2010
NEK CLC/TS 50238-3:2010
NEK CLC/TS 50459-1:2005
CLC/TS 50459-2:2005
System - Driver-Machine Interface -- Part 2: Ergonomic arrangements of ERTMS/ETCS information
NEK CLC/TS 50459-2:2005
CLC/TS 50459-3:2005
System - Driver-Machine Interface -- Part 3: Ergonomic arrangements of ERTMS/GSM-R information
NEK CLC/TS 50459-3:2005
A1-28 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
CLC/TS 50459-4:2005
INTEROPERABILITY
System - Driver-Machine Interface -- Part 4: Data entry for the ERTMS/ETCS/GSM-R systems
NEK CLC/TS 50459-4:2005
System - Driver-Machine Interface -- Part 5: Symbols
System - Driver-Machine Interface -- Part 6: Audible information
Railway applications - Generic system architectures for onboard electric auxiliary power systems
Railway applications - Onboard auxiliary power converter systems
Railway applications - Mounted parts of the traction transformer and cooling system -- Part 1: HV bushing for
traction transformers
Railway applications - Mounted parts of the traction transformer and cooling system -- Part 2: Pump for
insulating liquid for traction transformers and reactors
Railway applications - Mounted parts of the traction transformer and cooling system -- Part 3: Water pump for
traction converters
Railway applications - Mounted parts of the traction transformer and cooling system -- Part 4: Gas and liquid
actuated (Buchholz) relay for liquid immersed transformers and reactors with conservator for rail vehicles
NEK CLC/TS 50459-5:2005
CLC/TS 50459-5:2005
CLC/TS 50459-6:2005
CLC/TS 50534:2010
CLC/TS 50535:2010
CLC/TS 50537-1:2010
CLC/TS 50537-2:2010
CLC/TS 50537-3:2010
CLC/TS 50537-4:2010
NEK CLC/TS 50459-6:2005
NEK CLC/TS 50534:2010
NEK CLC/TS 50535:2010
NEK CLC/TS 50537-1:2010
NEK CLC/TS 50537-2:2010
NEK CLC/TS 50537-3:2010
NEK CLC/TS 50537-4:2010
IEC 60077-1
Railway applications - Electric equipment for rolling stock - Part 1: General service conditions and general rules
NEK IEC 60077-1
IEC 60494-1
Railway applications - Rolling stock - Pantographs - Characteristics and tests - Part 1: Pantographs for
mainline vehicles
Power convertors installed on board railway rolling stock - Part 2: Additional technical information
Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 1: General
Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 2: DC circuit-breakers
Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 3: Indoor d.c. disconnectors, switchdisconnectors and earthing switches
Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 4: Outdoor d.c. disconnectors, switchdisconnectors and earthing switches
Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 5: Surge arresters and low-voltage limiters for
specific use in d.c. systems
Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 6: DC switchgear assemblies
Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC switchgear - Part 7-1: Measurement, control and protection
devices for specific use in d.c. traction systems - Application guide
devices for specific use in d.c. traction systems - Isolating current transducers and other current measuring
devices
NEK IEC 60494-1
IEC 60850
IEC 61287-2
IEC 61992-1
IEC 61992-2
IEC 61992-3
IEC 61992-4
IEC 61992-5
IEC 61992-6
IEC 61992-7-1
IEC 61992-7-2
NEK IEC 60850
NEK IEC 61287-2
NEK IEC 61992-1
NEK IEC 61992-2
NEK IEC 61992-3
NEK IEC 61992-4
NEK IEC 61992-5
NEK IEC 61992-6
NEK IEC 61992-7-1
NEK IEC 61992-7-2
IEC 61992-7-3
devices for specific use in d.c. traction systems - Isolating voltage transducers and other voltage measuring
devices
NEK IEC 61992-7-3
IEC 62128-1
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Part 1: Protective provisions relating to electrical safety and earthing
NEK IEC 62128-1
IEC 62128-2
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Part 2: Protective provisions against the effects of stray currents
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 1: General
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 2: Emission of the whole railway system to the
outside world
NEK IEC 62128-2
IEC 62236-1
IEC 62236-2
NEK IEC 62236-1
NEK IEC 62236-2
A1-29 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
IEC 62236-3-1 INTEROPERABILITY
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 3-1: Rolling stock - Train and complete vehicle
IEC 62236-3-2
IEC 62236-4
IEC 62236-5
IEC 62279
IEC 62280-1
IEC 62280-2
IEC 62290-1
IEC 62313
IEC 62425
IEC 62427
IEC 62486
IEC 62497-1
IEC 62497-2
IEC 62498-1
IEC 62498-2
IEC 62498-3
IEC 62499
IEC 62505-1
IEC 62505-2
IEC 62505-3-1
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 3-2: Rolling stock - Apparatus
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 5: Emission and immunity of fixed power supply
Railway applications - Communications, signalling and processing systems - Software for railway control and
protection systems
Railway applications - Communication, signalling and processing systems - Part 1: Safety-related
Railway applications - Urban guided transport management and command/control systems - Part 1: System
principles and fundamental concepts
supply (substation) and rolling stock
for signalling
Railway applications - Insulation coordination - Part 1: Basic requirements - Clearances and creepage
Railway applications - Insulation coordination - Part 2: Overvoltages and related protection
Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 1: Equipment on board rolling stock
Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 2: Fixed electrical installations
Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 3: Equipment for signalling and
telecommunications
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear - Part 1: Single-phase
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Particular requirements for a.c. switchgear - Part 3-1: Measurement,
control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. tractions systems - Application guide
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
NEK IEC 62236-3-1
NEK IEC 62236-3-2
NEK IEC 62236-4
NEK IEC 62236-5
NEK IEC 62279
NEK IEC 62280-1
NEK IEC 62280-2
NEK IEC 62290-1
NEK IEC 62313
NEK IEC 62425
NEK IEC 62427
NEK IEC 62486
NEK IEC 62497-1
NEK IEC 62497-2
NEK IEC 62498-1
NEK IEC 62498-2
NEK IEC 62498-3
NEK IEC 62499
NEK IEC 62505-1
NEK IEC 62505-2
NEK IEC 62505-3-1
IEC 62505-3-2
control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Single-phase current transformers
NEK IEC 62505-3-2
IEC 62505-3-3
control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Single-phase inductive voltage
transformers
NEK IEC 62505-3-3
IEC 62589
converter groups
Railway applications - Automated Urban Guided Transport (AUGT) safety requirements
NEK IEC 62589
IEC 62590
IEC/PAS 62267
NEK IEC 62590
NEK IEC/PAS 62267
A1-30 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
PRELIMINARY EUROPEAN NORMS
OTHER INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS / REGULATIONS
ASTM A729/A729M:09
Standard Specification for Alloy Steel Axles, Heat-Treated, for Mass Transit and Electric Railway Service
IEC 60850 Ed. 3.0
IEC 61375-1 Ed. 2.0
Electric railway equipment - Train bus - Part 1: Train communication network
ASTM A729/A729M:09
IEC 60850 Ed. 3.0
IEC 61375-1 Ed. 2.0
IEC 61375-2 Ed. 1.0
Electric railway equipment - Train bus - Part 2: Train communication network conformance testing
IEC 61375-2 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61991 Ed. 1.0
Railway applications - Rolling stock - Protective provisions against electrical hazards
IEC 61991 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61992-1 Ed. 2.0
Railway applications - Fixed installations - DC s
IEC 61992-1 Ed. 2.0
IEC 61992-2 Ed. 2.0
IEC 61992-2 Ed. 2.0
IEC 61992-3 Ed. 2.0
IEC 61992-3 Ed. 2.0
IEC 61992-4 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61992-4 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61992-5 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61992-5 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61992-6 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61992-6 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61992-7-1 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61992-7-1 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61992-7-2 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61992-7-2 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61992-7-3 Ed. 1.0
IEC 61992-7-3 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62128-1 Ed. 1.0
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Part 1: Protective provisions relating to electrical safety and earthing
IEC 62128-1 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62128-2 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62128-2 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62236-1 Ed. 2.0
Railway applications - Fixed installations - Part 2: Protective provisions against the effects of stray currents
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 1: General
IEC 62236-1 Ed. 2.0
IEC 62236-3-2 Ed. 2.0
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 3-2: Rolling stock - Apparatus
IEC 62236-3-2 Ed. 2.0
IEC 62236-4 Ed. 2.0
Railway applications - Electromagnetic compatibility - Part 5: Emission and immunity of fixed power supply
Railway applications - Automated urban guided transport (AUGT) - Safety requirements
IEC 62236-4 Ed. 2.0
IEC 62236-5 Ed. 2.0
IEC 62267 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62279 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62280-1 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62280-2 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62313 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62425 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62427 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62486 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62497-1 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62497-2 Ed. 1.0
Railway applications - Communications, signalling and processing systems - Software for railway control and
protection systems
supply (substation) and rolling stock
for signalling
Railway applications - Insulation coordination - Part 1: Basic requirements - Clearances and creepage
Railway applications - Insulation coordination - Part 2: Overvoltages and related protection
IEC 62236-5 Ed. 2.0
IEC 62267 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62279 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62280-1 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62280-2 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62313 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62425 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62427 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62486 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62497-1 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62497-2 Ed. 1.0
A1-31 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
IEC 62498-2 Ed.INTEROPERABILITY
1.0
Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 2: Fixed electrical installations
IEC 62498-3 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62498-3 Ed. 1.0 Cor.1
IEC 62499 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62505-1 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62505-2 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62505-3-1 Ed. 1.0
Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 3: Equipment for signalling and
telecommunications
Corrigendum 1 - Railway applications - Environmental conditions for equipment - Part 3: Equipment for
signalling and telecommunications
control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. tractions systems - Application guide
IEC 62505-3-2 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62505-3-3 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62589 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62590 Ed. 1.0
ISO 6305-4:1985
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
IEC 62498-2 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62498-3 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62498-3 Ed. 1.0 Cor.1
IEC 62499 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62505-1 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62505-2 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62505-3-1 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62505-3-2 Ed. 1.0
control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Single-phase current transformers
control and protection devices for specific use in a.c. traction systems - Single-phase inductive voltage
transformers
converter groups
UNISIG SUBSET-023 -V200
Railway components -- Technical delivery requirements -- Part 4: Untreated steel nuts and bolts and highstrength nuts and bolts for fish-plates and fastenings
Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations – 03 2002
UNISIG SUBSET– 026-V222
ERTMS/ETCS functional statements – 03 2002
FFFIS juridical recorder downloading tool – 03 2002
ERTMS/ETCS SSRS, Part 1: system macro functions overview – 03 2002
ERTMS/ETCS SSRS, Part 2: Onboard-subsystem requirements specification – 03 2002
ERTMS/ETCS SSRS, Part 3: trackside subsystem requirements specification – 03 2002
FIS for the man-machine
FIS for the train interface – 03 2002
Specific transmission module FFFIS – 03 2002
06 2002
Euroradio FIS – 06 2002
UNISIG SUBSET-040 -V200
Dimensioning and engineering rules – 06 2002
Performance requirements for interoperability – 06 2002
FFFS for Euroloop subsystem – 06 2002
FFFIS ‘A’Euroloop
FFFIS ‘C’Euroloop L subsystem 06 2002
Radio infill FFFS – 06 2002
Trackside-trainborne FIS for radio infill 06 2002
Trainborne FFFIS for radio infill – 06 2002
Radio infill FIS with LEU/interlocking – 06 2002
Description for the Euroloop system
IEC 62505-3-3 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62589 Ed. 1.0
IEC 62590 Ed. 1.0
ISO 6305-4:1985
A1-32 of A1-33
Standard Evaluation
TSI section
Standard-No.
Description
Characteristics
adopted in Norway
as / in
UNISIG SUBSET–
051-V200
FIS key management second phase – 06 2002
INTEROPERABILITY
Assignment of values to ETCS variables – 06 2002
Clarification and amendment specification – 06 2002
STM FFFIS safe timer layer – 06 2002
STM FFFIS safe link layer – 06 2002
FFFIS STM application layer supervision connection – 06 2002
Performance requirements for STMs – 06 2002
Key management migration – 06 2002
MORANE A11T6001-3 (July 98)
ETSI EN300 330-1: 2000
– Frequency used
EUROSIG/WP3.1.2.3 ABB007
EUROSIG/WP3.1.2.3 GA0347
CEPTTR25-09
A1-33 of A1-33
Annex
Annex 2
Subject 1 Task 2 Weather & climate– base information
Annex 2 Subject 1 Task 2 Weather and Climate
A2-1 of A2-17
Table of contents
Table of contents........................................................................................................... 1
List of tables .................................................................................................................. 2
List of figures................................................................................................................. 2
1.
General climatic conditions in Scandinavia ......................................................... 3
2.
The climate of Norway ............................................................................................ 4
3.
Observations of weather in Norway and Sweden ................................................ 5
4.
Extreme weather and weather records ................................................................. 6
4.1. Temperature............................................................................................................ 7
4.1.1. Maximum temperature.......................................................................................................7
4.1.2. Minimum temperature........................................................................................................8
4.2. Precipitation ............................................................................................................ 8
4.2.1. Daily precipitation sums.....................................................................................................8
4.2.2. Monthly precipitation sums ..............................................................................................10
4.2.3. Precipitation intensity.......................................................................................................10
4.2.4. Maximum snow depth......................................................................................................11
4.3. Wind...................................................................................................................... 11
5.
Future climate change .......................................................................................... 15
Table of references......................................................................................................17
A2-2 of A2-17
List of tables
Table 1: Beauforts scale............................................................................................................. 12
Table 2: Wind measurement ...................................................................................................... 12
List of figures
Figure 1: Scandinavian relief map................................................................................................ 3
Figure 2: World map of the Köppen-Geiger climate classification................................................ 4
Figure 3: Weather normal 1971-2000 for the parameters mean annual temperature,
mean annual precipitation and normal annual maximum snow depth. ........................ 5
Figure 4: Norwegian Counties...................................................................................................... 7
Figure 5: Daily mean temperature - 20.06.1970........................................................................... 7
Figure 6: Daily mean temperature - 10.01.1987........................................................................... 8
Figure 7: Daily precipitation - 18.09.1978..................................................................................... 9
Figure 8: Daily precipitation - 25.08.1996..................................................................................... 9
Figure 9: Daily precipitation 21.06.1977....................................................................................... 9
Figure 10: Daily precipitation - 14.02.1961................................................................................... 9
Figure 11: Precipitation, monthly deviation in % of normal (1971-2000) in January 1989 ......... 10
Figure 12: Snow depth in Norway - 31.3.1989 ........................................................................... 11
Figure 13: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust
at 16610 Fokstugu, Oppland county .......................................................................... 13
Figure 14: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 39040 Kjevik, Vest-Agder county ........ 13
Figure 15: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 27470 Torp, Vestfold county................ 14
Figure 16: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 17150 Rygge, Østfold county .............. 14
Figure 17: Expected percentage change in normal annual precipitation
from normal period 1961-1990 to 2071-2100.[6]........................................................ 15
Figure 18: Expected change in annual temperature from normal period 1961-1990 to
period 2071-2100. [6] ................................................................................................. 16
Figure 19: Expected percentage change in mean winter (DJF)
runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071-2100. [6] ................................................................... 16
Figure 20: Expected change in mean spring (MAM), summer (JJA) and autumn (SON)
runoff from 1961-1990 to 2071-2100. [6] ................................................................... 16
A2-3 of A2-17
1. General climatic conditions in Scandinavia
The Scandinavian Peninsula is a geographic region in northern Europe, consisting of Norway,
Sweden and part of northern Finland. It is the largest peninsula in Europe, stretching from 55º
latitude in southern Sweden to 71º latitude in northern Norway. The peninsula stretches 1’850
kilometres from south to north and with a width varying from 350 – 800 km.
Figure 1: Scandinavian relief map
The geography of Scandinavia is extremely varied; with long and deep fjords and a high
mountain range in the west along the Norwegian coast, gentler eastward slopes along the east
coast of Sweden, flat and low areas in Denmark and a relatively flat and forested Finland with
many lakes. All these are geographic elements which affects the general climatic conditions.
The climate varies greatly from north to south and from west to east; a marine west coast
climate (Cfb) typical of western Europe dominates in Denmark, southernmost part of Sweden
and along the west coast of Norway reaching north to 65° northern latitude, with orographic lift
giving up to 5’000 mm precipitation per year in some areas in western Norway. The central part
– from Oslo to Stockholm – has a humid continental climate (Dfb), which gradually gives way to
subarctic climate (Dfc) further north and cool marine west coast climate (Cfc) along the northwestern coast. A small area along the northern coast east of the North Cape has tundra climate
(Et) as a result of a lack of summer warmth. The Scandinavian Mountains block the mild and
moist air coming from the southwest, thus northern Sweden and the Finnmarksvidda plateau in
Norway receive little precipitation and have cold winters. Large areas in the Scandinavian
mountains have alpine tundra climate. All abbreviations refer to the Köppen- Geiger climate
classification system shown in Figure 2.
A2-4 of A2-17
Figure 2: World map of the Köppen-Geiger climate classification 1
The warmest temperature ever recorded in Scandinavia is 38.0 °C in Målilla (Sweden) [1]. The
coldest temperature ever recorded is −52.6 °C in Vuoggatjålme (Sweden) [2]. The warmest
month on record was July 1901 in Oslo, with a mean (24hr) of 22.7 °C, and the coldest month
was February 1985 in Vittangi (Sweden) with a mean of -27.2 °C. [2]
2. The climate of Norway
Because of Norway’s northern location, is often regarded as a cold and wet country. In some
aspects this is true, because we share the same latitude as Alaska, Greenland and Siberia. But
compared to these areas we have a pleasant climate. Thanks to its location in the westerly’s, on
the east side of a vast ocean, with a huge, warm and steady ocean current near its shores,
Norway has a much friendlier climate than the latitude indicates.
Norway's climate shows however great variations. From its southernmost point, Lindesnes, to
its northernmost, North Cape, there is a span of 13 degrees of latitude, or the same as from
Lindesnes to the Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore we have great variations in received solar
energy during the year. The largest differences we find in Northern Norway, having midnight
sun in the summer months and no sunshine at all during winter. The rugged topography of
Norway is one of the main reasons for large local differences over short distances. [7]
As a short description of the variability in Norwegian weather, the weather normal’s for the
period 1971-2000, for a selected few parameters are shown in Figure 3.
The highest annual temperatures can be found in the coastal areas of the southern and western
part of Norway. Skudeneshavn (Rogaland) has a normal temperature of 7.7 °C. In 1994
Lindesnes lighthouse (Vest-Agder) recorded the highest annual temperature ever, with 9.4 °C.
1
Source: Peel, M. C., Finlayson, B. L. and McMahon, T. A. (University of Melbourne).
A2-5 of A2-17
Figure 3: Weather normal 1971-2000 for the parameters mean annual temperature, mean annual
precipitation and normal annual maximum snow depth.
Excluding mountain areas, the coldest areas throughout the year is the Finnmark Plateau. One
of the stations, Sihccajavri, has an annual temperature of -3.1 °C. The coldest year ever was in
1893, when Kautokeino (Finnmark) recorded a mean temperature of -5.1 °C. Sihccajavri
equaled this in 1985. In the mountains, large areas have an annual temperature of -4 °C or less.
There are large differences in the normal annual precipitation in Norway. The largest amounts
are found some kilometres inland from the coast of Western Norway. In these areas the frontal
and orographic precipitation dominates, and most of the precipitation is received during autumn
and winter. Showery precipitation occurs most frequently in the inner districts of Østlandet and
Finnmark. Here, summer is the wettest part of the year, and winter and spring the driest.
The largest normal annual precipitation occurs in the area from the Hardanger fjord to the Møre
area. These amounts are also among the highest in Europe. Brekke in Sogn og Fjordane
county has an annual precipitation of 3575 mm, and several other stations in this area follow
close behind. However, based on measurements of annual run-off, some glaciers must have an
annual precipitation of about 5’000 mm. Brekke has also the record for one year precipitation,
with 5’596 mm in 1990.
The inner part of Østlandet, the Finnmark Plateau, and some smaller areas near the Swedish
border, are all lee areas in relation to the large weather systems mainly coming from the west.
Common for these areas is the low annual precipitation and that showery precipitation during
summer is the largest contributor. Øygarden (Oppland) has the lowest annual normal
precipitation with 278 mm. Other noteworthy dry places are Dividalen (Troms) 282 mm,
Kautokeino (Finnmark) 360 mm and Folldal (Hedmark) 364 mm. The lowest recorded
precipitation for one year is only 118 mm, measured at Saltdal (Nordland) in 1996.
3. Observations of weather in Norway and Sweden
Observations of weather in Norway are primarily done by the Norwegian Meteorological
Institute. Information and data is available at the following web addresses http://met.no/ [7] and
data freely available at http://sharki.oslo.dnmi.no/ [12]. Weather forecast and data are also
found at http://www.yr.no/ [13].
Observations of weather and climate in Sweden are primarily done by the Swedish
Meteorological and Hydrological Institute. Information and data (to some extent) are freely
available at their web-site http://www.smhi.se/ [8].
A2-6 of A2-17
4. Extreme weather and weather records
Climate is more than mean values and seasonal variation, also more rare events with extreme
weather is part of the climate. Extremes can be local and violent, but extreme events can also
be less violent but stretch out in both time and space such as for example heat waves and
drought.
For this study we have concentrated on the somewhat more violent events with the exception of
heat and cold which can affect the project.
► Temperature
•
There is several ways to describe temperature extremes. Here only daily maxima and
minimums are described for each county in Norway. Monthly and annual means also have
extremes which are not given here.
► Precipitation
•
Precipitation extremes can be given in several different ways, daily and monthly maxima for
each county are given here, sums can also be given as yearly and monthly maxima but
also conditions with very little rain or snow (drought) can be described if need be.
•
Precipitation intensity is also of interest; short time rain events can cause serious problems
with regards to erosion, floods, landslides and avalanches.
•
Snow and snow depth can also cause problems and annual maximum snow depth is given
for each county and maximum amount for each month.
► Wind
•
Adverse wind conditions such as highest recorded mean wind speed (measured over a
period of 10 minutes) and wind gusts.
A2-7 of A2-17
Figure 4: Norwegian Counties
4.1. Temperature
4.1.1. Maximum temperature
Maximum in Norway was recorded in Nesbyen, Buskerud 20.6.1970 at 35.6 ºC.
County
Maximum Daily
Temperature
(°C)
Place
Date
3. august 1982
Østfold
34.2
Rygge flystasjon
Akershus
35.2
Fornebu
27. juni 1988
Oslo
35.0
Observatoriet
21. juli 1901
Hedmark
35.0
Staur forsøksgård
6. august 1975
Oppland
34.0
Lillehammer
19. juni 1970
Buskerud
35.6
Nesbyen
20. juni 1970
Vestfold
33.1
Melsomvik
3. august 1982
20. juni 1970
Telemark
34.6
Vefall i Drangedal
Aust-Agder
33.7
Byglandsfjord
11. juli 1986
Vest-Agder
32.6
Kjevik
11. august
1975
10. august
1975
5. juli 1889
Rogaland
33.5
Sola
Hordaland
34.0
Voss stasjon
Sogn og Fjordane
33.3
Fortun i Luster
8. juli 1933
Møre og Romsdal
33.8
Tafjord
16. juli 1945
Sør-Trøndelag
35.0
Trondheim
22. juli 1901
Nord-Trøndelag
34.5
Stjørdal
17. juli 1945
Nordland
33.1
Finnøy i Hamarøy
3. juli 1972
Troms
31.7
Fagerlidal
20. juni 1939
Finnmark
34.3
Šihččajávri
23. juni 1920
Figure 5: Daily mean temperature 20.06.1970
A2-8 of A2-17
4.1.2. Minimum temperature
Minimum temperature in Norway was recorded as far back as 1886 and is still standing after
120 years. The record was observed in Karasjok, Finnmark, on 1st January 1886 at -51.4 ºC.
County
Minimum Daily
Temperature
(°C)
Place
Date
Østfold
–34.9
Båstad
9. februar 1966
Akershus
–37.5
Vormsund
9. februar 1966
6. januar 2010
Oslo
–27.7
Bjørnholt
Hedmark
–47.0
Drevsjø
10. januar 1987
Oppland
–45.0
Lesjaskog
6. januar 1982
Buskerud
–39.8
Dagali flyplass
7. januar 2010
Vestfold
–33.3
Lauvkollmyra i Sande
4. januar 2003
Telemark
–37.8
Gvarv
9. februar 1966
Aust-Agder
–38.0
Hovden
8. januar 1982
Vest-Agder
–33.0
Tjørhom i Sirdal
8. januar 1982
Rogaland
–28.8
Høgaloft
10. januar 1987
Hordaland
–39.6
Finse
7. januar 1982
Sogn og Fjordane
–34.3
Myklemyr i Luster
7. januar 1982
Møre og Romsdal
–29.2
Aursjøen
9. februar 1966
Sør-Trøndelag
–50.4
Røros
13. januar 1914
Nord-Trøndelag
–40.7
Nordli
15. mars 1940
Nordland
–44.5
Svenningdal
Troms
–44.1
Øverbygd
30. desember 1978
Finnmark
–51.4
Karasjok
11. januar 1886
30. desember 1978
Figure 6: Daily mean temperature 10.01.1987
4.2. Precipitation
4.2.1. Daily precipitation sums
In Norway, precipitation for the past 24 hours is measured at 08:00 each morning. That also
means that much of the precipitation can have fallen on the date before.
County
Daily
precipitation
(mm)
A2-9 of A2-17
Place
Date
Østfold
96.6
Trolldalen i Moss
23. august 1988
Akershus
95.0
Dikemark i Asker
5. oktober 1905
Oslo
104.3
Bjørnholt i Nordmarka
29. august 1901
25. august 1996
Hedmark
149.5
Magnor i Eidskog
Oppland
109.1
Tyinkrysset
4. februar 1993
Buskerud
113.2
Heggelia i Nordmarka
28. oktober 1959
Vestfold
139.1
Natvoll i Sandar
25. august 1950
Telemark
168.6
Drangedal
15. august 1896
Aust-Agder
173.2
Mykland
28. august 1939
Vest-Agder
159.2
Bakke
15. desember 1936
Rogaland
190.0
Jørpeland
26. november 1940
Hordaland
229.6
Indre Matre i
Kvinnherad 2
26. november 1940
Sogn og Fjordane
207.8
Hovlandsdal
26. november 1940
Møre og Romsdal
178.5
Eide på Nordmøre
18. september 1978
Sør-Trøndelag
143.9
Momyr i Åfjord
31. januar 2006
Nord-Trøndelag
129.5
Brattingfoss i Verran
25. november 1983
Nordland
181.8
Lurøy på Helgeland
14. februar 1961
Troms
110.1
28. januar 1992
Finnmark
98.5
Kobberpollen på
Skjervøy
Lanabukt i SørVaranger
21. juni 1977
Figure 7: Daily precipitation - 18.09.1978
The precipitation record in Norway is from Indre Matre in Hordaland County on the western
coast of Norway. After several wet days, it was measured, from 08:00 on the 25th until 08:00 on
the 26th November, 229.6 mm of rain. It has however fallen more because the measuring cup
was filled on some spilled out. The next few days was also very wet and during this 5 day period
of rain a total of 495.4 mm was measured. [3]
Figures for dates marked with yellow in the table above are showed in figures below.
Figure 8: Daily precipitation 25.08.1996
2
Figure 9: Daily precipitation
21.06.1977
The observation cup was filled up and spilled over. The actual amount could be higher.
Figure 10: Daily precipitation 14.02.1961
A2-10 of A2-17
4.2.2. Monthly precipitation sums
County
Monthly
precipitation
(mm)
Place
Date
Østfold
351
Moss
november 2000
Akershus
507
Jeppedalen i Hurdal
november 2000
Oslo
564
Bjørnholt i Nordmarka
november 2000
Hedmark
380
Storåsen på Sjusjøen
november 2000
Oppland
357
Nordre Etnedal
Buskerud
612
Mykle
november 2000
november 2000
august 1951
Vestfold
553
Hedrum
Telemark
582
Farsjø
november 2000
Aust-Agder
670
Nelaug
november 2000
Konsmo
november 2000
Vest-Agder
711
Rogaland
1049
Ulladal i Suldal
januar 1983
januar 1989
Hordaland
1150
Haukeland i
Masfjorden
Sogn og Fjordane
1190
Grøndalen i Flora
januar 1989
Møre og Romsdal
797
Overøye i Stordal
desember 1975
Sør-Trøndelag
665
Hemne
desember 1975
Nord-Trøndelag
715
Follavatn i Verran
desember 1975
Nordland
965
Strompdal i Velfjord
mars 1953
Troms
466
Eidet i Gullesfjorden
desember 2003
Finnmark
265
Gamvik
mars 1953
Figure 11: Precipitation, monthly deviation in %
of normal (1971-2000) in January 1989
4.2.3. Precipitation intensity
The data is solely based on measurements from observation stations with pluviometers. Of the
meteorological surveys some 400 precipitation stations only around 40 is equipped with such
instruments and they have relatively few years of measurements.
There are also a few higher measurements done manually such as 14 millimetres in three
minutes in Tana in Finnmark County, 3rd July 1916 and in Folldal in Hedmark County they
measured 100 millimetres in 90 minutes on 27th June in 1935.
3
Duration in
minutes
Precipitation sum
in millimetre
1
4.3
Akershus
08.jul.73
09:32
2
8.1
Nøisomhed i Molde
Møre og Romsdal
11.aug.86
17:11
3
11.9
Nøisomhed i Molde
Møre og Romsdal
01.aug.86
17:11
5
16.2
Nøisomhed i Molde
Møre og Romsdal
01.aug.86
17:11
10
25.6
Nøisomhed i Molde
Møre og Romsdal
01.aug.86
17:10
15
27.3
Asker
Akershus
15.jul.91
23:04
20
34.4
Asker
Akershus
15.jul.91
23:01
30
42.0
Asker
Akershus
15.jul.91
22:59
45
49.1
Asker
Akershus
15.jul.91
22:40
60
54.9
Asker
Akershus
15.jul.91
22:35
90
56.7
Asker
Akershus
15.jul.91
22:35
120
59.3
Gjettum
Akershus
17.jul.73
05:25
180
60.8
Grimstad
Aust-Agder
11.jul.78
01:29
360
87.8
Sømskleiva i Kristiansand
Vest-Agder
06.okt.87
00:15
Place
Gardermoen
Tangert av Nøisomhed i Molde 1. august 1986.
County
3
Date
Time of start
A2-11 of A2-17
4.2.4. Maximum snow depth
County
Snow depth in
centimetres
Place
date
Østfold
165
Ørje
1. februar 1920
Akershus
235
Asker batteri
31. mars 1988
Oslo
302
Tryvannshøgda
8. april 1951
Hedmark
225
Os i Østerdalen
25. mars 1902
31. mars 1989
Oppland
394
Sognefjellhytta
Buskerud
300
Geilo
6. mars 1936
Vestfold
180
Hedrum i Larvik
26. februar 1900
Telemark
340
Aust-Agder
290
Haukeliseter
brøytestasjon
Bjåen i Bykle
24. mars 1993
Skreådalen i Øvre
Sirdal
Suldalsvatnet
25. mars 1994
Vest-Agder
263
Rogaland
176
27. mars 1989
12. april 1962
Hordaland
585
Grjotrusti
3. april 1918
Sogn og Fjordane
395
Myrdal i Aurland
15. februar 1925
Møre og Romsdal
270
Innerdal
29. februar 1924
Sør-Trøndelag
329
Lysvatnet i Åfjord
1. mars 1940
Nord-Trøndelag
310
16. februar 1976
Nordland
370
Sandåmo i
Namsskogan
Dunderlandsdalen
Troms
260
Innset i Bardu
1. april 1943
Finnmark
246
Porsa gruber i
Kvalsund
1. april 1911
Month
Snowdepth in
centimeters
Place
date
12. mars 1920
January
486
Grjotrusti, Hordaland a
February
572
Grjotrusti, Hordaland
februar 1918
March
576
mars 1918
April
585
april 1918
May
490
mai 1920
June
341
juni 1927
Luly
190
juli 1923
August
106
august 1962
September
168
October
200
November
210
Fannaråki, Sogn og
Fjordane
Fannaråki, Sogn og
Fjordane
Innerdal, Møre og
Romsdal
December
365
januar 1918
Figure 12: Snow depth in Norway 31.3.1989
Some years the Norwegian Water
Resources and Energy Directorate
has measured up to 12 meters of
snow depth on the glaciers
Svartisen and Ålfotbreen.
september 1962
oktober 1997
november 1916
desember 1917
4.3. Wind
Wind is a parameter with great variations in both regional and local scale. Small variations in
topography or altitude can give highly variable results. Wind is also highly variable parameter in
a temporal scale and wind measurements are for that reason measured as mean wind speed
over a 10 minute period at both 2 and 10 meters height above ground. Wind direction and max
speed in the same period is also recorded. Wind speed is often measured in the Beaufort scale,
shown below in Table 1 .
Wind data, such as mean wind and maximum wind speed (gusts), are shown for a few selected
stations along the proposed railroad corridors. For the each one of these observation stations,
the one year of data with the highest recorded wind gusts, are shown. Other wind statistics and
also real time data can be found on http://nb.windfinder.com/ [11]
A2-12 of A2-17
Table 1: Beauforts scale
Beaufort
Description
Wind speed
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Calm
Light air
Light breeze
Gentle breeze
Moderate breeze
Fresh breeze
Strong breeze
High wind, moderate gale, near gale
Gale, fresh gale
Strong gale
Storm, whole gale
Violent storm
Hurricane-force[6]
km/h
< 1 km/h
1.1-5.5 km/h
5.6-11 km/h
12-19 km/h
20-28 km/h
29-38 km/h
39-49 km/h
50-61 km/h
62-74 km/h
75-88 km/h
89-102 km/h
103-117 km/h
> 118 km/h
m/s
< 0.3
0.3 - 1.5
1.6-3.4 m/s
3.4-5.4 m/s
5.5-7.9 m/s
8.0-10.7 m/s
10.8-13.8 m/s
13.9-17.1 m/s
17.2-20.7 m/s
20.8-24.4 m/s
24.5-28.4 m/s
28.5-32.6 m/s
? 32.7 m/s
As can be seen from the table below, most of the high measurements are from the coast or at
islands (lighthouses).
Table 2: Wind measurement
County
Mean wind (m/s)
Place
4
date
Wind gust (m/s)
Place
Date
Østfold
30.9
Jeløya
26 september 1963
33.4
Gullholmen fyr
5 oktober 2008
Akershus
22.6
Gardermoen3
5 november 1957
31.9
Fornebu
Oslo
26.8
Tryvannshøgda3
18 desember 1992
28.8
Blindern
Hedmark
28.8
Sæter i Kvikne3
29 januar 1989
-
-
6 desember
1986
16 oktober
1987
--
Oppland
35.0
Sognefjellhytta3
29 desember 1980
40.6
Fokstugu
18 januar 1993
Buskerud
26.8
Geilo3
21 januar 1957
-
-
--
Vestfold
35.0
Færder fyr3
20 desember 1968
35.0
Færder fyr
14 januar 2007
Telemark
30.9
Langøytangen fyr3
13 januar 1984
37.5
Møsstrand
14 januar 2007
Aust-Agder
35.0
Torungen fyr3
13 januar 1957
38.1
Torungen fyr
12 januar 2005
30 oktober
2000
16 oktober
1987
14 januar 2007
Vest-Agder
35.0
Lista fyr3
22 september 1969
41.7
Lista fyr
Rogaland
37.0
Obrestad fyr
16 oktober 1987
42.7
Utsira fyr
Hordaland
35.8
Slåtterøy fyr
14 januar 2007
47.6
Slåtterøy fyr
Sogn og Fjordane
43.9
Kråkenes fyr
3 januar 2000
60.1
Kråkenes fyr
3 januar 2000
Møre og Romsdal
46.0
Svinøy fyr
1 januar 1992
62.0
Svinøy fyr
1 januar 1992
Sør-Trøndelag
40.0
Halten fyr
1 januar 1992
55.0
Halten fyr
1 januar 1992
Nord-Trøndelag
41.2
Nordøyan fyr
1 januar 1992
45.3
Sklinna fyr
12 januar 1983
Nordland
37.0
Myken fyr
11 januar 2005
51.4
Andøya
1 februar 1993
Troms
37.0
Torsvåg fyr
15 november 1996
46.3
Fugløykalven fyr
31 januar 1997
Finnmark
35.0
Slettnes fyr3
20 desember 1992
43.7
Vardø radio
3 januar 1993
The strongest mean winds are however seldom measured because the capacity of the
traditional measurement instruments is exceeded.
4
Visual observation. The factual wind speed might have been higher or lower.
A2-13 of A2-17
Figure 13: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 16610 Fokstugu, Oppland county 5
Figure 14: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 39040 Kjevik, Vest-Agder county 6
5
Cp. [5].
6
Cp. [5].
A2-14 of A2-17
Figure 15: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 27470 Torp, Vestfold county 7
Figure 16: Highest mean wind speed and wind gust at 17150 Rygge, Østfold county 8
7
Cp. [5].
8
Cp. [5].
A2-15 of A2-17
5. Future climate change
Systematic variation in the atmospheric circulation pattern over the North-Atlantic, The North
Atlantic Oscillation (NAO), is an important reason for the big natural year to year variation we
experience in wind, temperature and precipitation in mainland Norway.
These natural variations in air and ocean circulation give significant climate variation in Norway
for periods up to a few decades. For time periods up to 10-20 year these natural variations are
of the same size or greater than the expected future human induced climate change. So a
climate change assessment has to go beyond 2030 [4].
In general, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC, concludes within its regional
climate projections for northern Europe that the annual mean temperatures in Europe are likely
to increase more than the global mean. The warming in northern Europe is also likely to be
largest in winter and the lowest winter temperatures are likely to increase more than average
winter temperature.
Annual precipitation is very likely to increase together with extremes of daily precipitation in
most of northern Europe.
Confidence in future changes in windiness is relatively low, but it seems more likely than not
that there will be an increase in average and extreme wind speeds in northern Europe.
The duration of the snow season is very likely to shorten in all of Europe, and snow depth is
likely to decrease in at least most of Europe. [1]
The annual mean temperature for mainland Norway has increased 0.8 ºC in the last 100 years.
This is consistent with global mean change in the same period. Annual precipitation has
increased by around 20 % since 1900 with most of the increase in the period after 1980. [4]
In Figure 17 the map shows expected
percentage change in normal annual
precipitation from normal period 1961-1990
to the normal period 2071-2100.The
presented results are based on the global
climate model ECHAM4/OPYC3 from the
German
“Max-Planck-Institut
für
Meteorologie”, the regional climate model
HIRHAM, IPCC SRES scenario B2 for
greenhouse
gas
emissions
to
the
atmosphere and the hydrological model
HBV. [6]
normal annual precipitation from normal
period 1961-1990 to 2071-2100.[6]
In Figure 18 The map shows change in
annual temperature from normal period 19611990 to period 2071-2100. The results are
based on the global climate model
HadAM3H,
following
SRES
emission
scenario A2. The results are downscaled
using met.no's HIRAM model; ~55km2 spatial
resolution and 19 vertical levels. Finally the
results are empirically adjusted to local
conditions to 1 km spatial resolution. [2]
Figure 18: Expected change in annual
temperature from normal period 1961-1990 to
period 2071-2100. [6]
A2-16 of A2-17
mean winter (DJF) runoff from 1961-1990 to
2071-2100. [6]
In Figure 19 the expected percentage change in mean winter (DJF) runoff from 1961-1990 to
2071-2100 are shown. The presented results are based on the global climate model
ECHAM4/OPYC3 from the German “Max-Planck-Institut für Meteorologie”, the regional climate
model HIRHAM, IPCC SRES scenario B2 for greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere and
the hydrological model HBV. The changes during the winter months seem to be much greater
than for the other seasons. The season’s spring, summer and autumn shown are shown in
Figure 20.
Figure 20: Expected change in mean spring (MAM), summer (JJA) and autumn (SON) runoff from 19611990 to 2071-2100. [6]
For the amount of storms in our ocean and coastal areas there seem to be no clear trend since
1880. The climate models show little or no change in mean wind conditions in Norway in the
period towards 2100. Some results however indicate that high wind episodes might happen
more frequent. [4]
A2-17 of A2-17
Table of references
[1]
Christensen, J.H.; B. Hewitson, A. Busuioc; A. Chen; X. Gao; I. Held; R. Jones; R.K.
Kolli; W.-T. Kwon; R. Laprise; V. Magaña Rueda; L. Mearns; C.G. Menéndez; J.
Räisänen; A. Rinke; A. Sarr and P. Whetton (2007): Regional Climate Projections. In:
Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
[Solomon, S.; D. Qin; M. Manning; Z. Chen; M. Marquis; K.B. Averyt; M. Tignor and H.L.
Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York,
NY, USA.
[2]
Engen-Skaugen,T.; Haugen, J.E. & Hanssen-Bauer, I. (2008): Dynamically downscaled
climate scenarios available at the Norwegian Meteorological Institute. Met.no report
24/2008.15 pp.
[3]
Mamen, J. (2006): Dypdykk i klimadatabasen. Rekorder og kuriositeter fra Meteorologisk
Institutts klimaarkiv. Naturen nr.8/2006. 17 pp.
[4]
Miljøverndepartementet, NOU 2010: 10 Tilpassing til eit klima i endring. Samfunnet si
sårbarheit og behov for tilpassing til konsekvensar av klimaendringane. 240 pp.,
15.november 2010.
[5]
http://eklima.met.no (Norwegian meteorological data). Date 25.11.2010.
[6]
http://senorge.no (Norwegian meteorological and hydrological data). Date 15.11.2010.
[7]
http://www.met.no (Norwegian Meteorological Institute). Date 15.11.2010.
[8]
http://www.smhi.se (Swedish Meteorological Institute). Date 15.11.2010.
[9]
http://www.dmi.dk (Danish Meteorological Institute). Date 15.11.2010.
[10]
http://www.verogvind.net (Norwegian weather, run by weather statistician Bernt Lie).
Date 15.11.2010.
[11]
http://nb.windfinder.com/ (Wind, waves and weather worldwide). Date 25.11.2010.
[12]
http://sharki.oslo.dnmi.no (Norwegian meteorological data). Date 15.11.2010.
[13]
http://www.yr.no (Weather forecast and data). Date 15.11.2010.
Annex
Annex 3
Subject 1 Task 3 Track Evaluation Matrix
Annex 3 Subject 1 Task 3 Track evaluation matrix
Continuous support, on longitudinal beams
NFF Thyssen (New slab track Thyssen)
and stakes (NFF)
EBS-Edilon, LVT
Getrac, ATD
Ballasted Track
Scores
Rheda 2000
A
B
C
D
2
6
4
4
2
2
6
4
4
2
6
4
2
6
2
2
Examples
sleepers (SES)
A
B
C
D
D
A
B
C
D
10 30 30 30 30
10 30 30 30 30
0
0
0
0
10 30 30 20 10
2
10 30 30 30 30
10 30 30 30 30
0
0
0
0
4
2
10 30 30 30 30
10 30 30 30 30
0
0
0
4
4
2
10 30 30 30 30
10 30 30 30 30
0
0
6
4
4
2
8
8
24 24 24 24
0
6
4
4
2
10 30 30 30 30
10 30 30 30 30
24 24 24 24
A
B
C
A
B
C
A
B
C
D
2
6
6
4
2
10 30 30 20 10
2
6
6
4
0
10 30 30 20 10
2
6
6
0
0
10 30 30 20 10
2
6
0
0
0
8
2
0
0
0
0
10 30 30 20 10
24 24 16
D
A
B
C
D
2
6
4
4
4
10 10 20 30 30
2
4
12
8
8
8
4
2
2
6
4
4
6
4
2
2
6
4
6
6
4
2
4
12
2
6
6
4
2
2
6
4
9
27 27 18
9
24 24 16
8
8
A
A
B
C
D
2
2
4
6
6
10 10 20 30 30
2
2
4
6
6
4
7
14 21 21
2
2
4
6
6
4
4
10 10 20 30 30
2
2
4
6
6
8
8
8
8
16 24 24
2
2
4
6
6
4
4
4
10 10 20 30 30
2
2
4
6
6
10 30 20 20 20
6
6
12 18 18
9
9
18 27 27
10 30 20 20 20
5
5
10 15 15
9
9
18 27 27
7
8
B
C
D
ERS-HR-Edilon
B 450 Twin Block Sleeper (2.40m / 245 kg)
10 30 20 20 10
4
12 12 12 12
4
12 12 12 12
0
0
0
0
4
12 12
B 90 Sleeper (2.60 m / 340 kg)
10 30 20 20 10
5
15 15 15 15
6
18 18 18 18
0
0
0
0
6
18 18 12
6
8
10 30 20 20 10
4
12 12 12 12
5
15 15 15 15
0
0
0
0
5
15 15 10
5
10 30 30 20 10
10 30 20 20 20
5
5
10 15 15
10 10 20 30 30
8
6
18 18 18 18
3
9
0
0
0
0
4
12 12
4
6
8
6
6
12 18 18
7
NSB 95 Sleeper (2.60 m / 270 kg) / B 70 Sleeper ( 2.60 m / 280 kg)
Scores
Slab Track
Wide sleepers (2.40m / 560kg) / Y-Steel-sleepers
24 16 16
8
9
9
9
8
8
18 18 12
6
24 16 16 16
7
14 21 21
Scores
Scenario A:
The reference alternative: continuing the current railway politics
• not relevant to the TSI
• Speed < 160 km/h
3
3
3
0
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
unweighted scores
2
2
unweighted scores
0
2
unweighted scores
3
3
unweighted scores
3
3
unweighted scores
2
0
unweighted scores
High-speed concepts, which in part are based on the existing network and InterCity
strategy:
• in accordance with TSI-Category II / III
2=medial relevance specially upgraded high-speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h or
3=strong relevance special features as a result of topographical, relief, environmental or town-planning
• speed: 200 – 250 km/h.
1=low relevance
3
unweighted scores
Scenario C:
3
unweighted scores
0=not relevant
2
unweighted scores
Weighting of the
Scenario:
More offensive further development of the current railway infrastructure, also outside the
InterCity area:
• in accordance with TSI-Category II:
• speed: 160 – 200 km/h.
Weighting
Scenario B:
3
3
Mainly separate high-speed lines
• In accordance with TSI-Category I:
Specially built high-speed lines equipped for speeds generally equal to or greater than 250
km/h
• Speed: 250 - 350 km/h
Weighting
Scenario D:
1
3
3
0
1
1
2
3
3
Suitability of
permanent way for
tilting trains
Adaptability of the
permanent way for
operation of tilting
trains
Weighting
Evaluation parameters
Possibilities for
adjustments in lateral
and vertical directions
Lifetime
Track availability /
Frequency of
maintenance /
Downtime
Speed
Load
Flexibility in operation
programme (Change Repair after accidents
of speed and cant,
/ damages (costs and
relocation of
time)
turnouts…)
Operational parameters
A3-1 of A3-4
Slab Track
Rheda 2000
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
5
15 15 15 15
10 10 10 20 30
10 20 20 20 20
10 20 20 20 20
10 20 20 20 20
1
3
3
3
1
10
0
10 20 30
6
6
6
6
12
10
0
0
20 30
6
18 18 18 18
8
8
8
16 24
10 20 20 20 20
10 20 20 20 20
10 20 20 20 20
1
3
3
3
1
10
0
10 20 30
6
6
6
6
12
10
0
0
20 30
and stakes (NFF)
8
24 24 24 24
9
9
9
18 27
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
24 24 24
8
10
0
10 20 30
1
1
1
1
2
10
0
0
20 30
EBS-Edilon, LVT
10 30 30 30 30
9
9
9
18 27
0
0
0
0
0
10 20 20 20 20
10 20 20 20 20
1
3
3
3
1
10
0
10 20 30
6
6
6
6
12
10
0
0
20 30
Getrac, ATD
7
21 21 21 21
7
7
7
14 21
0
0
0
0
0
4
8
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
3
1
6
0
6
12 18
6
6
6
6
12
10
0
0
20 30
9
27 27 27 27
10 10 10 20 30
10 20 20 20 20
10 20 20 20 20
0
0
0
0
0
1
3
3
3
1
4
0
4
8
12
10 10 10 10 20
10
0
0
20 30
3
9
9
9
9
5
5
5
10 15
10 20 20 20 20
6
12 12 12 12
0
0
0
0
0
6
18 18 18
6
1
0
1
2
3
2
2
2
2
4
2
0
0
4
6
B 90 Sleeper (2.60 m / 340 kg)
1
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
8
12
10 20 20 20 20
6
12 12 12 12
10 20 20 20 20
6
18 18 18
6
2
0
2
4
6
2
2
2
2
4
2
0
0
4
6
2
6
6
6
6
3
3
3
6
9
10 20 20 20 20
6
12 12 12 12
10 20 20 20 20
6
18 18 18
6
1
0
1
2
3
2
2
2
2
4
2
0
0
4
6
4
12 12 12 12
6
6
6
12 18
8
8
16 16 16 16
0
4
12 12 12
4
2
0
2
4
6
2
2
2
2
4
6
0
0
12 18
Ballasted Track
A
Examples
sleepers (SES)
0
8
0
8
0
8
0
0
0
0
ERS-HR-Edilon
16 16 16 16
0
0
0
0
Scores
Scenario A:
3
1
2
2
2
3
0
1
0
Scenario B:
3
2
0
unweighted scores
2
1
unweighted scores
2
1
unweighted scores
2
3
unweighted scores
2
2
unweighted scores
3
2
unweighted scores
strategy:
• speed: 200 – 250 km/h.
1=low relevance
2
unweighted scores
Scenario C:
1
unweighted scores
0=not relevant
3
unweighted scores
Weighting of the
Scenario:
InterCity area:
• speed: 160 – 200 km/h.
1
2
Scenario D:
km/h
• Speed: 250 - 350 km/h
3
3
2
2
2
1
3
2
3
Weighting
Cross section
Lateral track
resistance
Bridges
Tunnels
Stations / switches
Crossings and
constructions carried
out after the
construction of the
superstructure
Eddy-Current brakes
Safety: Access for
road vehicle /
Protection against
derailment
Flying ballast / Iceblocks
Functional parameters
A3-2 of A3-4
Slab Track
Rheda 2000
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
10 30 30 30 30
2
4
4
4
6
10 20 20 20 20
2
6
4
4
6
2
2
6
6
6
6
6
18 18 18
10 10 10 20 30
2
6
6
2
2
10 10 10 20 20
10 30 30 30 30
2
4
4
4
6
10 20 20 20 20
2
6
4
4
6
2
2
6
6
6
6
6
18 18 18
10 10 10 20 30
2
6
6
2
2
10 10 10 20 20
and stakes (NFF)
10 30 30 30 30
10 20 20 20 30
0
10 30 20 20 30
7
7
21 21 21
4
4
12 12 12
10 10 10 20 30
1
3
3
1
1
6
EBS-Edilon, LVT
10 30 30 30 30
2
4
4
4
6
10 20 20 20 20
2
6
4
4
6
2
2
6
6
6
8
8
24 24 24
10 10 10 20 30
2
6
6
2
2
10 10 10 20 20
Getrac, ATD
10 30 30 30 30
2
4
4
4
6
9
18 18 18 18
2
6
4
4
6
2
2
6
6
6
6
6
18 18 18
10 10 10 20 30
2
6
6
2
2
10 10 10 20 20
4
12 12 12 12
2
4
4
4
6
10 20 20 20 20
2
6
4
4
6
2
2
6
6
6
8
8
24 24 24
10 10 10 20 30
2
6
6
2
2
10 10 10 20 20
10 30 30 30 30
6
12 12 12 18
5
10 10 10 10
6
18 12 12 18
8
8
24 24 24
2
2
6
6
6
5
5
5
10 15
10 30 30 10 10
4
4
4
8
8
B 90 Sleeper (2.60 m / 340 kg)
10 30 30 30 30
6
12 12 12 18
7
14 14 14 14
7
21 14 14 21
8
8
24 24 24
2
2
6
6
6
7
7
7
14 21
10 30 30 10 10
4
4
4
8
8
10 30 30 30 30
6
12 12 12 18
6
12 12 12 12
6
18 12 12 18
8
8
24 24 24
2
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
12 18
10 30 30 10 10
4
4
4
8
8
6
8
16 16 16 24
8
16 16 16 16
8
24 16 16 24
4
4
12 12 12
2
2
6
6
6
7
7
7
14 21
8
8
8
8
16 16
Ballasted Track
A
Examples
sleepers (SES)
0
0
0
0
6
6
12 12
ERS-HR-Edilon
18 18 18 18
24 24
8
8
Scores
Scenario A:
3
2
2
3
1
1
1
3
1
Scenario B:
3
2
1
unweighted scores
3
3
unweighted scores
2
1
unweighted scores
2
3
unweighted scores
2
3
unweighted scores
3
2
unweighted scores
strategy:
• speed: 200 – 250 km/h.
1=low relevance
2
unweighted scores
Scenario C:
2
unweighted scores
0=not relevant
3
unweighted scores
Weighting of the
Scenario:
InterCity area:
• speed: 160 – 200 km/h.
1
2
Scenario D:
km/h
• Speed: 250 - 350 km/h
3
3
2
3
3
3
3
1
2
Weighting
Catchment area for
snow
Adaption on soft
subsoil
Adaption on solid
rock
Geotechnical parameters
Requirements on the
formation layer and
the subconstruction
Airborne noise
emissions
Structure borne noise
emissions
Environmental impact
Comfort Criteria
Rehabilitation of
existing tracks
Vegetation
Service parameters
A3-3 of A3-4
Slab Track
Rheda 2000
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
Scenario A
Scenario B
Scenario C
Scenario D
8
16 16 24 24
2
6
6
4
4
5
15 15 15 10
0
0
0
0
345
7
377
6
439
4
468
3
9
18 18 27 27
4
12 12
8
8
7
21 21 21 14
0
0
0
0
366
4
396
4
455
1
480
1
and stakes (NFF)
8
16 16 24 24
1
3
3
2
2
2
6
4
0
0
0
0
310
9
337
9
394
9
422
5
EBS-Edilon, LVT
9
18 18 27 27
4
12 12
8
8
5
15 15 15 10
0
0
0
0
349
6
385
5
445
2
473
2
Getrac, ATD
8
16 16 24 24
5
15 15 10 10
6
18 18 18 12
0
0
0
0
292
10
316
10
445
2
391
8
10 20 20 30 30
6
18 18 12 12
5
15 15 15 10
0
0
0
0
341
8
371
7
425
5
452
4
4
8
10 30 30 20 20
10 30 30 30 20
0
0
0
0
391
3
401
3
396
8
378
10
B 90 Sleeper (2.60 m / 340 kg)
5
10 10 15 15
8
24 24 16 16
8
24 24 24 16
0
0
0
0
414
2
423
2
421
6
407
6
5
10 10 15 15
9
27 27 18 18
10 30 30 30 20
0
0
0
0
417
1
427
1
421
6
400
7
6
12 12 18 18
7
21 21 14 14
7
0
0
0
0
355
5
358
8
379
10
385
9
Ballasted Track
A
Examples
sleepers (SES)
6
6
ERS-HR-Edilon
8
12 12
21 21 21 14
Scores
Scenario A:
2
3
3
0
Scenario B:
3
2
0
unweighted scores
strategy:
• speed: 200 – 250 km/h.
1=low relevance
3
unweighted scores
Scenario C:
3
unweighted scores
0=not relevant
2
unweighted scores
Weighting of the
Scenario:
InterCity area:
• speed: 160 – 200 km/h.
3
0
Scenario D:
km/h
• Speed: 250 - 350 km/h
3
2
2
0
Weighting
Maintenance of
components
Investment costs
Construction time
Life cycle costs
Cost parameters
A3-4 of A3-4
Annex
Annex 4
Subject 1 Task 4 TSI INS Parameter matrix
Annex 4 Subject 1 Task 1 and 4
Infra parameters TSI
Criteria of the EC Test Procedure on Conformity Assessment of the Subsystem Infrastructure
1
2
3
TSI "Infrastructure"
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
Description / Test parameters
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
High-speed concepts, which in part
are based on the
existing network and
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
Technical compatibility
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
Relevant for the topic
160 - 200 kph
160 - 250 kph
Issue 1: Track, superstructure, installations, operation and maintenance
Track
[1]
Minimum
infrastructure
gauge
4.2.3
6.2.6.1
[2]
Distance
between track
centres
4.2.4
[3]
Maximum
rising and
falling
gradients
4.2.5
Minimum infrastructure gauge (GC reference kinematic profile)
*Requirements for pantograph gauge and electrical insulation
clearance
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Minimum distance between main track centres:
if < 4.00 m,
(V 230 km/h)
Regulations determined on the basis of the reference kinematic
profile
4.00 m
(230 < V
250 km/h)
4.20 m
(250 < V
300 km/h)
4.50 m
(V> 300 km/h)
for different track cants: minimum distance between main track
centres + distance measurement according to [1]
Maximum rising and falling gradients:
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
35 ‰
Maximum rising and falling gradients of tracks in train stations:
2.5 ‰
Slope of the moving average profile over 10 km:
25 ‰
Maximum length of continuous 35‰ gradient
6’000 m
For higher values because of specific local conditions the limiting
characteristics of the rolling stock of the high speed system in traction
and braking have to be taken into account.
Consideration of non-interoperable trains
in the choice of the maximum value of the gradient
[4]
Minimum
radius of
curvature
4.2.6
min R (m) = 11.8 ve
u
ve
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
2
zul u f
local design speed [km/h]
Page A4-1 of A4-13
1
2
3
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
are based on the
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
[5]
Track cant
4.2.7
[6]
Cant deficiency
4.2.8.1
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
160 - 200 kph
160 - 250 kph
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
u
cant [mm]
zul uf admissible cant deficiency [mm]
Tracks in draft:
u 180 mm
Tracks in operation:
u
180 mm and tolerance
20 mm, with
u
190 mm or
u
200 mm (pure passenger transport)
Plain line track and main track of switches:
[a]
[b]
160 mm
180 mm
v
160 km/h
140 mm
165 mm
160 < v
200 km/h
120 mm
165 mm
200 < v
230 km/h
X
X
X
X
100 mm
150 mm
230 < v
250 km/h
X
X
X
X
100 mm
130 mm*
250 < v
300 km/h
80 mm
80 mm
v > 300 km/h
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
[a] - normal limit
[b] - maximum limit
* for slab track 150 mm
[7]
Sudden
change of the
cant deficiency in the
branch track
of switches
4.2.8.2
[8]
Effects of
crosswinds
4.2.17
Rolling stock for HSR with compensation of lateral acceleration
(NeiTech): highest cant deficiency has to take into account the
acceptance criteria according to 4.2.3.4 of HSR TSI RST
Branch track of switches:
[a]
Speed
uf
120 mm
30
uf
105 mm
70 < VAbzw.
85 mm
170 < VAbzw.
uf
VAbzw.
X
X
X
X
70 km/h
170 km/h
230 km/h
Crosswind stability must be guaranteed for the HS trains running
on the track even under critical operating conditions
Crosswind safety of vehicles is subject to national regulations
If crosswind stability cannot be established, the infrastructure
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Page A4-2 of A4-13
1
2
[9]
Noise and
vibrations
4.2.19
6.2.6.6
[10]
Access to or
intrusion into
line installations
4.2.22
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
3
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
are based on the
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
160 - 200 kph
operator must take measures to ensure the required level of
crosswind stability, e.g.:
- local reduction of train speeds, possibly temporarily in weather
conditions with risk of storms
- constructions to protect the section of track concerned against
crosswinds
- other appropriate measures
and keep a safety analysis log
Noise:
Proof of permitted noise emissions of HS trains taking into account
the sound level at locally permissible speeds
Further taking into account:
- other trains running on this section of track
- the actual quality of the track bed
- the topological and geographical constraints
Vibrations:
National vibration limit values must not be exceeded by HS trains in
transit in compliance with HGV TSI RST
There must not be any level crossings.
Further measures in order to prevent
- people
- animals and
- vehicles from accessing and undesirable
intrusion
into line installations are subject to national regulations.
National regulations apply.
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
[11]
Lateral space
for passengers and
onboard staff
in the event of
detrainment of
passengers
between
stations
4.2.23.1
[13]
Ballast pickup
4.2.27
[17]
Stabling
Lateral space must be provided along all tracks designated for HS
trains
Lateral space must permit passengers to alight from the train on
the non-track side if the nearest tracks continue to be in operation
during detrainment
Lateral space on railway bridges and on constructions with risk of
falling for passengers must be equipped with railings on the nontrack side
Lateral space must be provided wherever possible at reasonable
cost and effort
160 - 250 kph
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
No regulation in the TSI. National regulations apply.
Presence and position of sidings, beyond handling and stabling
sidings, that comply with HGV TSI Infrastructure:
Page A4-3 of A4-13
1
2
3
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
are based on the
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
tracks and
other locations with
very low
speed
4.2.25.1
4.2.25.2
4.2.25.3
6.5
Annex D
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
160 - 200 kph
Stabling tracks must tally with the length of the trains to be stabled in
accordance with HGV TSI vehicles
Maximum rising and falling gradients of stabling tracks:
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
2.5 ‰
The following applies for station and overtaking tracks:
Curve radius
150 m
Reverse curves without straight track in between must be planned
with radii of
190 m.
If the radius of one of the curves is
190 m, a straight track of
m must be planned in between.
The following applies for stabling and feeder tracks:
Vertical curve radius:
Crest
Trough
[18]
Fixed installations for
servicing
trains
4.2.26
6.5
Annex D
160 - 250 kph
600 m
7
900 m
Presence and position of fixed installations for servicing trains that
comply with HGV TSI Vehicles
Note: detailed requirements not illustrated.
Page A4-4 of A4-13
1
2
3
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
are based on the
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
160 - 200 kph
160 - 250 kph
Superstructure
[22]
Track gauge
4.2.2
4.2.9.3.1
4.2.9.3.2
6.2.6.2
[23]
Equivalent
conicity
4.2.9
4.2.9.1
4.2.9.2
6.2.5.2
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
Nominal track gauge
1435 mm
Minimum values of the mean track gauge in operation over a section
of 100 m on straight stretches of track and on curved track of R >
10,000 m
1’430 mm
(V
160 km/h)
1’430 mm
(160 < V
200 km/h)
1’432 mm
(200 < V
230 km/h)
X
X
X
X
1’433 mm
(230 < V
250 km/h)
X
X
X
X
1’434 mm
(250 < V
280 km/h)
X
X
X
X
1’434 mm
(280 < V
300 km/h)
X
X
X
X
1’434 mm
(V> 300 km/h)
X
X
X
X
Dynamic running characteristics of a rail vehicle on straight stretches
of track on curved track with a large radius
X
X
X
X
230 km/h)
X
X
X
X
(230 < V
250 km/h)
X
X
X
X
0.20
(250 < V
280 km/h)
X
X
X
X
0.10
(280 < V
300 km/h)
X
X
X
X
0.10
(V > 300 km/h)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
0.20
(160 < V
200 km/h)
0.20
(200 < V
0.20
X
X
Calculation of limit values based on the amplitude (y) of the lateral
deflection of the wheelset:
- y = 3 mm if (TG – SR)
- y = ((TG - SR) - 1) / 2
7 mm
X
X
X
X
if 5 mm
(TG - SR) < 7 mm
- y = 2 mm if (TG - SR) < 5 mm
TG - track gauge
SR - wheelset gauge
Page A4-5 of A4-13
1
2
[24]
Track geometrical quality
and
limits on
isolated
defects
4.2.10
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
3
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
are based on the
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
160 - 200 kph
Calculation with the wheelset gauges (SR) specified for the wheel
profiles below as per the definition in prEN 13715:
- S 1002 with SR = 1420 mm
- S 1002 with SR = 1426 mm
- GV 1/40 with SR = 1420 mm
- GV 1/40 with SR = 1426 mm
The railway infrastructure company must define appropriate limit
values for threshold of immediate action, threshold of action and
action value for the parameters below in the maintenance schedule:
- taking into account HGV TSI RST and
- combined occurrence of isolated defects
Longitudinal level (standard deviation AL)
Track alignment (direction) (standard deviation AL)
Track alignment (isolated value)
Longitudinal level (isolated defect)
Track distortion (isolated defect)
Distortion limit value = (20/l + 3) with
l as the measurement basis 1.3 m l 20 m and the distortion limit
values
- 7 mm/m for VStretch 200 km/h
- 5 mm/m for VStretch > 200 km/h
Measurement basis l is to be specified in the maintenance schedule
Track gauge (isolated defect) in mm
V (km/h)
Minimum gauge
Maximum gauge widening
narrowing
V 80
-9
+ 35
80 < V 120
-9
+ 35
120 < V 160
-8
+ 35
160 < V 230
-7
+ 28
V > 230
-5
+ 28
Mean track gauge over 100 m (isolated defect)
Requirements as per test point [22]
160 - 250 kph
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Page A4-6 of A4-13
1
2
3
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
are based on the
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
160 - 200 kph
without
tilting
[25]
Rail inclination
4.2.11
6.2.6.4
Plain line track:
rail inclination of a specific stretch of track with value in the range
between 1:20 and 1:40 (inclination towards track axis)
with
tilting
X
160 - 250 kph
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
Switches and crossings:
rail inclination corresponds to that of plain line track with the following
exceptions:
- Inclination can be achieved by grinding/milling the active side of the
railhead profile
- V 200 km/h
without inclination in switch and crossing area and permissible on
the short stretch of the plain line track
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
- 200 < V
250 km/h
without inclination in switch and crossing area and permissible on
the short stretch (L
[26]
Switches and
crossings
4.2.12
4.2.12.1
4.2.12.2
4.2.12.3
50 m) of the plain line track
The tongues of switches and crossing switches as well as movable
frog noses must be equipped with locking devices
The correct position for locking the locking devices of movable
parts must be clearly indicated
Implementation of movable frog noses:
- V 280 km/h
Switches and crossings must be equipped with movable frog noses
- Stretches with V < 280 km/h
Switches and crossings with rigid frog nose can be implemented
Track guidance dimensions (operating limit values):
- free run-through in
tongue region
1’380 mm
- Check rail gauge in region of
frog nose
1’392 mm
- Check rail gap in
region of frog nose
1’356 mm
- free run-through in region
of check rail/wing rail
1’380 mm
- Flangeway
38 mm
- Calculation of the max. permissible length of the frog nose gap
Page A4-7 of A4-13
1
2
3
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
are based on the
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
160 - 200 kph
160 - 250 kph
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
(corresponding to a switch inclination of 1:9 with 45 mm check
rail cant and minimum wheel diameter of 330 mm)
[27]
4.2.13
4.2.13.1
6.2.5.1
[28]
Track resistance – longitudinal loads
4.2.13
4.2.13.1
6.2.5.1
- Flange depth
40 mm
- Check rail cant
70 mm
Tracks including switches and crossings must bear the following
loads:
- maximum static wheelset load according to HGV TSI RST 4.2.3.2,
Table 1:
225 kN
(maximum value specified here)
- maximum dynamic wheel load in accordance with HGV TSI RST
4.2.3.4.3:
180 kN
(190 < V
250 km/h)
170 kN
(250 < V
300 km/h)
160 kN
(V > 300 km/h)
- maximum quasi-static wheel force in accordance with HGV TSI
RST 4.2.3.4.3:
145 kN
National requirements for other trains that do not comply with HGV
TSI RST
Tracks including switches and crossings must bear the following
loads:
a) Acceleration and braking forces
- Minimum braking power as per HGV TSI RST 4.2.4.1
(requirements not illustrated)
- Minimum deceleration for service braking as per HGV TSI RST
4.2.4.4
(requirements not illustrated)
- Trains with brake independent of wheel/rail traction (eddy-current
brake) as per HGV TSI RST 4.2.4.5:
Minimum deceleration:
< 2.5 m/s²
Maximum braking force:
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
105 kN at 2/3 of full service braking
linear between > 105 and
full service braking
180 kN for braking between 2/3 and
180 kN full service braking
360 kN for emergency braking
Page A4-8 of A4-13
1
2
3
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
are based on the
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
[29]
4.2.13
4.2.13.1
6.2.5.1
[30]
Global track
stiffness
4.2.15
5.3.2
6.2.6.3
[31]
Electrical
characteristics
4.2.18
ENE 4.7.2
ENE 4.7.3
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
160 - 200 kph
b) Thermal longitudinal forces from temperature
change
- due to local environmental conditions
- through activation of braking systems whose braking effect causes
heating of the rails
- implementation of eddy-current brakes as service brake:
specification of max. permissible braking force for the track (less
than permitted by HGV TSI RST) taking into account the projected
number of repeated brakings
c) Longitudinal forces from interaction
between constructions and tracks in compliance with
EN 1991-2:2003: 6.5.4:
Longitudinal forces from interaction
between bridge and track
TSI RST
- maximum total dynamic lateral force exerted by a wheelset (without
cant equalisation)
( Y2m)lim = 10 + (P/3) (kN)
where P = maximum static wheelset load (in kN) of each individual
vehicle approved for the stretch of track
- quasi-static guidance force (Yqst)
(Y/Q)lim = 0.8 as per HGV TSI RST
TSI RST
160 - 250 kph
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Requirements for maximum stiffness of the rail ties as per paragraph 5.3.2
Minimum electrical resistance:
Track:
3
km
rail tie system: 5 k
(The track must maintain the insulation value required for the
coded track circuits used for train location systems:
the infrastructure operator can demand a higher value in both
cases for specific systems for train control/train safety and signalling.)
Page A4-9 of A4-13
1
2
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
3
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
are based on the
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
160 - 200 kph
160 - 250 kph
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
The provisions of HGV TSI ENE for the safety devices of the overhead contact systems* in particular for civil engineering structures
apply:
EN 50122-1:1997, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 7, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6
(without EN 50179)
Design review: proof that the return current circuit for each system
is adequate
Construction: proof that the safety devices and rail potential meet
design specifications
Further requirements for installations along the tracks
EN 1991-2:2003, 6.6 in combination with national appendix:
6.6.1 General information
Paragraphs (1) to (5)
Paragraph (3) with national appendix
6.6.2 Simple vertical surfaces parallel to the track (e.g. noise
barriers):
[33]
Aerodynamic
effects of
passing trains
on lineside
structures
4.2.14.7
4.2.14.8
q1k as per paragraphs (1) to (3)
6.6.3 Simple horizontal surfaces over the track (e.g. shock-hazard
protection):
6.6.4 Simple horizontal surfaces close to track (e.g. platform roofs
without vertical walls):
6.6.5 Multiple-surface constructions along the track with vertical
and horizontal or inclined surfaces (e.g. angled noise barriers,
platform roofs with vertical aprons etc.):
q1k as per paragraphs (1) and (2)
6.6.6 Surfaces that enclose the infrastructure gauge for a limited
length (up to 20 m) (horizontal surfaces over the tracks and at
least one vertical wall, e.g. scaffolding, construction apparatus
etc.):
k4 q1k and
k5 q2k as per paragraph (1)
Further requirements for tracks in stations
Page A4-10 of A413
1
2
3
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
are based on the
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
[34]
Distance of
the platform
INS 4.2.20.5
PRM 4.1.2.18
PRM 4.1.2.18.2
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
160 - 200 kph
160 - 250 kph
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Nominal distance L from the track axis parallel to top of rail:
L (mm) = 1’650 + 3'750 g 1'435
R
2
R - curve radius [m]
g - track gauge [mm]
L must be kept below the height of 400 mm above top of rail
(Tolerance -0 mm / + 50 mm)
Distance of platform from the track axis for the conventional HighSpeed network:
bq0 = 1’650 + 3’750 / R
with R = curve radius in m
with bqlim as per EN 15273-3: 2006
with bq with fluctuation Tq and standard
without: - track widening on curved track
- cant
- switches and crossings
- quasi-static inclination
- design-specific and maintenancespecific tolerances
bqlim
bq
bqlim + T q
for Tq it applies that 0 T q 50 mm
Note:
Infrastructure gauge according to national regulations insofar as
EN 15273-3:2006 is not enforced
Quasi-static lateral inclination of infrastructure gauge due to cant
u 25 mm is to be compensated by corbelling the platform edge
on the outer side of the curve
Tracks as straight as possible along stations;
[35]
Track arrangement
along the
platforms
INS 4.2.20.6
PRM 4.1.2.18
PRM 4.1.2.18.3
R < 500 m possible if required by present track layout;
maintain minimum infrastructure gauge regarding installation
dimensions for heights and gaps of platform edges (see test point
[1])
Tracks as straight as possible along stations.
[36]
Protection
against electric shock on
The provisions of HGV TSI ENE for the safety devices of the overhead contact systems* apply:
EN 50122-1:1997, 4.1, 4.2, 5.1, 5.2, 7, 9.2, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6
(without EN 50179)
R
500 m
R must be at least
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
300 m
Page A4-11 of A413
1
2
platforms
INS 4.2.20.7
ENE 4.7.2
ENE 4.7.3
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
3
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
are based on the
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
160 - 200 kph
160 - 250 kph
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Design review: proof that the return current circuit for each system
is adequate
Construction: proof that the safety devices and rail potential meet
design specifications
Operation and maintenance
[37]
Construction
and maintenance measures
4.4.1
[38]
Hints for the
railway transport companies
4.4.2
[39]
Protection of
workers
against aerodynamic
effects
4.4.3
In the scope of the initially planned work there might be temporary
deviations from the requirements of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the TSI;
In this case the railway infrastructure company must define extraordinary operating conditions to ensure safety (see HGV TSI OPE for
regulations);
- non-TSI-conform extraordinary operating conditions must be
planned beforehand and limited in time
- railway transport companies plying the stretches of track concerned
must be informed about temporary extraordinary operating conditions (type of restriction, geographical location, type and form of
signalling)
The railway infrastructure company must inform the railway transport
companies about temporary restrictions that might be caused by
unforeseen events and which affect the infrastructure
The railway infrastructure company defines protection measures
for track workers against aerodynamic effects
For trains as per HGV TSI RST the limit values for aerodynamic
effects as per HGV TSI RST, 4.2.6.2.1, are to be taken into account (requirements not illustrated)
Page A4-12 of A413
1
2
[40]
Maintenance
plan
4.5.1
6.4
[41]
Maintenance
requirements
4.5.2
6.4
[43]
Health and
safety conditions
4.7
Environmental
protection
Health protection
Safety
TSI/RL
Point
No.
Reliability
Availability
3
4
Scenario B
5
Scenario C
6
Scenario D.1
7
Scenario D.2
A more offensive
further development
of the current
infrastructure
are based on the
IC strategy
Pure high-speed on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
Mixed traffic on
mainly separate
high-speed lines
250 - 350 kph
160 - 350 kph
160 - 200 kph
Maintenance schedule must include the following:
Standard limit values
Explanations of the methods, expertise of personnel and safety
measures for protection of personnel
Rules for the protection of track workers on and alongside the track
Means for checking that operating values are adhered to
Measures to be taken if prescribed values are exceeded
Specifications must refer to:
- Cant [5]
- Quality of track bed [24]
- Switches and crossings [26]
- Platform edges [34], [35]
- State of tunnels [97]
- Curve radius of stabling tracks [17]
Technical procedures and the products used in maintenance / service must not be a hazard to human health and must not exceed limit
values for environmental protection.
National requirements apply.
Health and safety measures specially for maintenance personnel
on and along the tracks
Maintenance personnel must wear reflective clothing with "CE"
mark
160 - 250 kph
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
without
tilting
with
tilting
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Page A4-13 of A413
Annex
Annex 5
Subject 1 Task 4 Questionnaire case study
Annex 5 Subject 1 Task 4 Questionnaire
A5-1 of A5-4
Questionnaire
Introduction
The present survey studies the national experiences in tilting train operation. It addresses to rail
companies as well as railway infrastructure companies and manufacturers with experiences in
tilting train operation.
The questioning is organized as semi-structured interview. Depending on the conversational
partner the interview takes about 90 minutes and will be carried out as face-to-face or telephone
interview.
Questions
Infrastructure
Alignment parameters for tilting trains and conventional lines
o Curve radius (Minimum curve radius, optimized curve radius, length, reversed
arch)
o Track transition curve (type, length)
o Cant / superelevation (type, max. cant)
o Cant ramp
o Gradient
o Speed
o Lateral acceleration
o Allowed variation (can tilting trains operate on conventional tracks (alignment)
with increased speed?)
Track
o Track systems used for tilting train operation (e.g. ballasted track / slab track)
o Requirements on lateral resistance (resistance of the track to lateral
displacement)
o Switches
o Stations
o Maintenance/Wear (maintenance efforts / cost, wear rate compared to
conventional operation)
o Track development (new track system concepts for tilting trains, specifications for
future track systems)
Signalling
o Additional safety and control equipment for tilting train operation
o Additional operational regulation in the signalling system
o Interoperability between conventional and tilting train equipment
o Cost comparison conventional vs. tilting train track equipment
Number of tracks / passing loops/stations
o Number of tracks (single/double track) normally used with tilting train operation
o Passing / Crossing of trains
o Passing loop distances (pure tilting train operation / mixed with conventional
passenger trains / mixed with fright trains)
A5-2 of A5-4
Weather & Climate
o Technical solutions regarding adverse weather situations like ice, snow, heavy
rain
Rolling Stock
Types of tilting trains in use
o Regional tilting trains (type of vehicle, type of tilting mechanism)
o Long-distance tilting trains (type of vehicle, type of tilting mechanism)
o Tilting angle
Availability rate
Failure causes due to
o Vehicle construction
o Wear / Maintenance
o Weather conditions (ice, snow, rain)
o Accidents
o Other
Additional safety and control equipment for tilting train operation an signalling
Decision making
o Choice reasons for tilting trains in use
o Compared alternatives
o Cost comparison
Future
o Open orders
o Specifications for future tilting trains
Operation
Service concepts (pure tilting train operation / mixed with conventional passenger trains /
mixed with fright trains)
Railway network requirements for optimal gain of travel time
Operational effects
o Gain of travel time / percentage of increased speed, method of calculation
o Buffer times (in particular compared to conventional operation)
o Reliability of tilting train operation (availability rate, failure cause)
o Tilting for speed or comfort reasons
o Occupancy of vehicles
Weather & Climate
o Operational methods (e.g. to keep tracks clear of snow)
o Special regulations during adverse weather situations e.g. due to higher lateral
forces
o Critical points during adverse weather situations
A5-3 of A5-4
National tilting train development
National history of introducing tilting trains
o Background of existing railway network
o Topographical reasons
o Cost reasons
o Political reasons
Current tilting train operation
o Number of connections on regional/long-distance relations
o Percentage of regional/long-distance rail transport
o Percentage (or km) of railway tracks equipped for tilting train operation
National technical development regarding tilting trains
o Tracks
o Signalling
o Rolling stock
o Operation
o Regulation
Future use of tilting train concepts
o Development of tilting train operation
o Refitting of conventional tracks for tilting train operation
o Construction of new lines dedicated for tilting trains; interoperability with nontilting trains
National experiences to actual cost effects of tilting train operation
o Alignment
o Buildings and Structures
o Track systems (construction, maintenance)
o Signalling systems (construction, maintenance)
o Rolling stock (purchase, maintenance)
o Ex post analysis of estimated and realized cost effects with tilting trains
Current regulation
o Overview over national regulation for tilting trains
o Influence of transnational regulation (e.g. EU-Regulation, TSI)
Passenger acceptance
o System acceptance (acceptance of high-speed traffic, tilting trains, etc.)
o Motion sickness
Recommendations to the use of high speed tilting trains in Norway
Recommendations to the introduction of high speed tilting trains in Norway
o General recommendation
o Construction of dedicated tilting train lines with special alignment parameters
o Integration in the conventional rail-network
Recommendations to infrastructure
o Alignment parameters
o Track systems (in particular due to the special climatic conditions in Norway)
o Signalling
o Number of tracks
o
Distances of passing loops
Recommendations to Operation
o Service concepts
o Operation on adverse weather situations
Recommendations to Rolling Stock
o Types of tilting trains
o Safety and control systems
o Climatic adaptation
A5-4 of A5-4
Annex
Annex 6
Subject 1 Task 5 Evaluation model
Annex 6 Subject 1 Task 5 Evaluation model
Potential issue scenario D
Parameters
Other trains,
freight, pass.
[>250km/h] [<210km/h] [<160km/h]
Comments to scenario D
Potential issue scenario C
Other trains,
freight, pass.
[>250km/h] [<210km/h] [<160km/h]
Comments to scenario C
Potential issue scenario B
Other trains,
freight, pass.
[>250km/h] [<210km/h] [<160km/h]
Comments to scenario B
Potential issue scenario A
Other trains,
freight, pass.
[>250km/h] [<210km/h] [<160km/h]
Comments to scenario A
Temperature range
Temperature and humidity variations, in/out long
tunnels and on/off long bridges
Ice and snow-packing, both catenary and rolling
stock issues
Ventilation inlets
Train picking up ballast and snow blasting between
underframe and track
Crosswinds on exposed areas
Maintenance concepts concerning de-icing
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Check reference high speed
train with similar temp.range
Possibly first train of the day
slower speed? Panth wear due
to "bounces" and light
arcs.Undulations of OHL due to
snow load, disconnection. Icicle
collisions pantograph.
Speed restrictions due to
frequent "collisions" with
smaller snow drifts across
track? No problem in 120, but
uncomfortable in 160. Damage
to train in 250? No experience
with >160 on mountain lines.
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Same as scenario D
N/A
No
No
No
N/A
No
No
No
No
No
N/A
N/A
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Same as scenarion D
N/A
No
No
No
N/A
No
No
No
No
No
N/A
N/A
No
No
No
N/A
N/A
N/A
No
No
No
No
No
No
N/A
N/A
N/A
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Route alignment
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
No
No
N/A
No
No
Pressure pulses
Entering tunnels and passing trains in tunnel
Passing fixed installations
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
N/A
No
No
No
No
N/A
No
No
No
No
“Animal protection”
Plough to prevent the obstacle to get under the train
in case of a collision
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
N/A
No
no
N/A
No
no
Fire and evacuation
Potential for having longer tunnels for high speed?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Yes
No
No
N/A
No
No
N/A
No
No
No
No
No
Same as scenario D
N/A
No
No
N/A
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Same as scenario D
Same as scenario D
N/A
N/A
No
No
No
No
N/A
N/A
No
No
No
No
N/A
No
No
N/A
No
No
N/A
No
No
N/A
No
No
Same as scenarion D
Noise
External noise
Yes
No
No
Potential new requirements if
new track is built with up to
date noise requirements
No
No
No
Must be covered when buying
new trains
Coupler
Same as scenario D
Same as scenario D
Length of train
Pantograph spacing in case of multiple service
Platform lengths
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Most of high speed trains today
are approx 200m, means no
issue
Signalling
ERTMS
Track impact
Energy consumption
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes if the trains are "old"
Yes
Yes
Yes
1) Yes if new high speed trains
running on tracks without
ERTMS
2&3) Yes if the trains are old
and running on new line with
ERTMS
Yes
Increased maintenance cost for
higher speed and/or higher
axleload
Yes
Yes
Yes
Same as scenario D
N/A
No
No
Yes
Linked to the total consumtion
including construction of new
line and service consumption
Yes
Yes
Yes
Same as scenario D
N/A
Yes
Yes
Same as scenario D
A6-1 of A6-1
Annex
Annex 7
Subject 1 Task 5 All parameters
Annex 7 Subject 1 Task 5 All parameters
List of parameters that have to be assessed when specifing train for Norway
The comments in column "Comment" should be seen in relation to the basic question of "what is special for Norway"
System (no. refers to
maintenance system IRMA) Comment
No. Parameter
1 Carbody, pressure sealing
1.Carbody
Relevant
2 Gangways
1.Carbody
Not relevant
3 Couplers (between coaches)
1.Carbody
Not relevant
4 Side window
1.Carbody
Not relevant
5 Front window
1.Carbody
Not relevant
6 Front window heaters
1.Carbody
Not relevant
7 Entrance step
1.Carbody
Not relevant
8 Plough
1.Carbody
Relevant
9 Passenger doors, number of doors, width
1.Carbody
Not relevant
10 Insulation
1.Carbody
Not relevant
11 Wheelchair lift/ramp
1.Carbody
Not relevant
12 Bogie
2.Running gear
Not relevant
13 Suspension
2.Running gear
Not relevant
14 Wheelset
2.Running gear
Not relevant
15 Traction motor
6.Traction
Not relevant
16 Anti roll bar
2.Running gear
Not relevant
17 Carbody-bogie bolster
2.Running gear
Not relevant
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
Running performance incl. yaw-damping (bog-rotation), vertical/lateral
movements
Bogie mounted tilt-components
Guard iron
Dynamic brake
Pneumatic brake incl pads and discs
WSP - wheel slide protection
Magnetic Track Brake
Emergency brake passenger
Emergency brake override
Compressed air reservoirs
Air compressor
Pantograph
Main transformer
Converters
Carbody tilt equipment
Seats
Internal doors
HVAC
Air pressure protection - doors
Air pressure protection - ventilation inlet
Air pressure protection - exhaust air
Fire detection system
PA-system
ERTMS
Tyfon
Trip recorder (TELOC)
Front window viper
Pressure waves in tunnels
Climate impact, e.g. snow packing, ice-growth etc
Instant monitoring of lateral acceleration
Max speed
Number of passengers
Comfort requirements
Maintenance concept and workshops
Availiability and reliability requirements
Proven design solutions
Tilting train or not
Energy consumption
Running resistance
External noise
Internal noise
Recyclable material used
Track alignment
Fire and evacuation, tunnels
Train length
2.Running gear
2.Running gear
2.Running gear
3. Brakes
3. Brakes
3. Brakes
3. Brakes
3. Brakes
3. Brakes
4. Compressed air
4. Compressed air
5.High voltage
5.High voltage
6.Traction
9.Tilt equipment
10.Interior
10.Interior
11.HVAC
1.Carbody
11.HVAC
11.HVAC
13.Safety/communication
Functional requirement
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Not relevant
Relevant
Not relevant
Relevant
Not relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Not relevant
Relevant
Relevant
Relevant
A7-1 of A7-2
Annex 7 Subject 1 Task 5 All parameters
List of parameters that have to be assessed when specifing train for Norway
The comments in column "Comment" should be seen in relation to the basic question of "what is special for Norway"
System (no. refers to
maintenance system IRMA) Comment
No. Parameter
63 Track forces etc.
Relevant
A7-2 of A7-2
Annex
Annex 8
Subject 1 Task 5 Existing trainconcepts
Annex 8 Subject 1 Task 5 Existing trainconcepts
Information of existing &
future trains
360 km/h
Siemens Velaro D
(Germany)
320 km/h
AnsaldoBreda
V 250
250 km/h
Alstom
AGV
360 km/h
8
8
8
7, 8, 10, 11 or 14
460 (111/349)
546
E.g. approx 460 seats for
11 coaches
Bombardier V300 Zefiro
Max speed
Number of coaches pr. trainset
Hyondai Rotem
KORAIL KTX-II
330 km/h
CSR
Polaris
225 km/h with upgrade
Hitachi UK Class 395
225 km/h
Two power cars + max 12
trailor cars
Custom made, max 82
6
Standard 298 + priority 42
Number of seated passengers pr. 600
trainset (first/second class)
Yes
Disabled people area
202 m
Length of trainset or coach
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
200 m
200 m
442 t
485 t
Power car ~20 m
Trailor car ~24 m
Power car ~64 t
Trailor car ~33 t
122 m
Total weight pr. trainset or coach 500 t
132 m (7coach) - 252 m (14
coach)
E.g. approx 41 t for 11
coaches
Max width
Max height
Max coach length
Floor height from t.o.r.
Max axleload
Carbody material
Number of passenger doors pr
trainset or coach
Door width
Track gauge
Line voltage
Traction motor efford
Temperature range
268.5 t plus 3% tolerance
2'924 mm
2'950 mm
2'870 mm
2'985 mm
2'970 mm
2'810 mm
4'080 mm
3'890 mm
4'080 mm
4'125 mm
3'750 mm
3'817 mm
26'300 mm end car
24'900 mm intermediate car
1'260 mm
17'300 mm for internediate
cars, 22'800 mm for end
cars
1'150 mm
20'100 mm
1'240 mm
23'535 mm end car
24'175 mm intermediate
car
1'250 mm
17 t
17 t
17 t
17 t
Aluminum
Aluminium (welded
aluminium extrusion
profile)
Aluminum + Steel (cab
structure)
Aluminum
26+2+2
20
24
10
24'000 mm
20'000 mm
1'235 mm
Stainless steel
(locomotive) and
aluminum (passenger
coaches)
16 t
14.5 t
Stainless steel
Aluminum
4 doors pr coach
4 doors pr coach
900 mm
800 / 900 mm
900 mm
900 mm
1'435 mm
1'435 mm
1'435 mm
1'435 mm
25 kV AC; 15 kV AC; 3 kV
DC; 1.5 kV DC
Max tractive efford 320 kN
25 kV AC; 15 kV AC; 3 kV 25 kV 50 Hz or 3 kV-1.5
DC; 1.5 kV DC
kV DC
300 kN
300 kN
25 kV, 15 kV, 3 kV or 1.5
kV
270 kN
-25°C to 45°C
Range -25°C +45°C
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
~ 15 kWh/km depending on
operation mode
Yes
TBD
Yes
Yes
~0.6 m/s2
0.8 m/s2
0.7 m/s2
Tilt (yes/no)
TSI compliant (yes/no)
Energy consumption pr.km
No
-25°C to +45°C
('-50°C to +40°C for
Russian market)
No
Yes
Yes
Possibility for multiple trainsets
Yes, 2 trainsets
Max acceleration
Emitted noise in max speed
Pressure protection for
passengers
0.7 m/s²
Yes
acc. TSI HS
0.58 m/s2
acc. TSI HS
High degree of pressure
tightness, compliant with UIC
660.
good pressure comfort,
especially on tunnels
Yes
Yes
1'435 mm
1'100 mm
1'100 mm
1'435 mm
1'435 mm
25 kV
25 kV
2 * 2.4 MW
16 * 210 kW
Range -17°C +35°C
No, but will come
No
92 dB[A] at 330km/h
72 dB[A]
Yes
Yes
A8-1 of A8-1
Annex
Annex 9
Subject 2 Hazard list
Annex 9 Subject 2 Hazard list
ID
System Level
Hazard
1 guidance of
vehicle not
ensured
2nd Level Hazard
Cause
Accident
loss of structural
integrity of wheel
or axcles
breakage of wheel derailment
rim or axcles
loss of structural
integrity of bridge
earthquake /
landslip
derailment
loss of structural
integrity of track /
rail
earthquake /
landslip
derailment
rail fracture
derailment
undercutting of
track
derailment
deformation of rail high temperature
(lateral buckling)
loss of structural
integrity of switch
component
derailment
breakage of switch derailment
tongue
Effect after accident
Severity
multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic
over; collision with 3rd properties possible ;
vehicle(s) may come into the other track and
collision with mixed traffic possible (only in
system-variant 1)
multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling catastrophic
over; in worst case vehicle falling from bridge
multiple effects possible: sliding and / or rolling
system-variant 1)
system-variant 1)
system-variant 1)
system-variant 1)
system-variant 1)
Functional safety measurements
wheel defect detection system on
train and hot box detectors and
wheel defect detection on strategic
places
other safety measurements
periodic inspections / maintenance
signalling system for detection of rail periodic inspections / maintenance
brakage
catastrophic
landslide warning system on critical
parts of track
catastrophic
signalling system detects rail
brakage in case of total fracture
catastrophic
parts of track
catastrophic
_
catastrophic
none (because end position detector,
tongue detectors are not efficient for
this hazard in case of switch of
tongue while train movement)
none (because end position detector,
tongue detectors are not efficient for
this hazard in case of switch of
tongue while train movement)
A9-1 of A9-6
ID
System Level
Hazard
2nd Level Hazard
climbing
Cause
obstacle (e.g.
stones, wood) on
track
Accident
derailment
Front or rear
collision train
train
system-variant 1)
system-variant 1)
system-variant 1)
system-variant 1)
system-variant 1)
multiple effects possible: structural
deformation of vehicle(s) may followed by
derailment and / or fire, explosion or pollution
train detection
failure
Front or rear
collision train
train
failure of brake
system
failure of brake
system
severe snow /
derailment
large amount of ice
on track, heavy
snowfall,
foreign object (e.g. derailment
stones, snow, ice)
in switch
inadequate high
speed in curves
2 vehicle´s stability
not ensured
too high lateral
forces
3 adequate forward
ordering not
ensured
erroneous "system signalling failure
track holding/train
routing"
4 inadequate braking insufficient brake
force
too high
deceleration
derailment
too high side wind derailment
Severity
catastrophic
parts of track
periodic inspections / maintenance;
falling-object protective systems
catastrophic
snowslide warning system, snow
shelter
periodic inspections / maintenance;
snowshells
catastrophic
end position detector, tongue
detector at switches
periodic inspections / maintenance.
catastrophic
ETCS or F- ATC
catastrophic
catastrophic
_
walls, windshells, closing track if
information of heavy wind; no double
tracks on one bank
ETCS or F- ATC
catastrophic
axel counter at station
Front or rear
collision train
train
catastrophic
emergency brake sytem
tumble of
passengers
None
marginal
_
A9-2 of A9-6
ID
System Level
Hazard
2nd Level Hazard
5 objects / obstacle vehicle on level
in or besides track crossing
Cause
level crossing
failure/ human
error
loss of train
integrity
failure of coupling
system
loss structural
integrity of tunnel
rocks in track
inadequate secure
of construction
(e.g. falling of
rocks)
rock slide
trees in track
storm
animals in track
missing fencing
ice in track
vehicle in track
(outside level
crossings)
Severity
Side collision train only relevant in system-variant 1, multiple
catastrophic
effects possible: structural deformation of
vehicle
vehicle(s) may followed by derailment and / or
fire, explosion or pollution
Front or rear
catastrophic
collision train
external coach
level crossing monitoring system /
equipment (induction loops, infrared
lightbarriers, radar etc.)
ETCS or F- ATC
ETCS or F- ATC
lost of loading /
parts of trains
catastrophic
Front or side
collision train
obstacle
catastrophic
Front or side
collision train
obstacle
marginal
_
safety corridor at relevant track
sectors
damage on train
_
fences
Collision train
person(s)
Collision train
person(s)
Collision train
person(s)
Front collision train
train / vehicle
marginal
multiple effects possible: force effect on third critical
party and/or derailment and / or fire, explosion
or pollution
catastrophic
_
Front or side
collision train
obstacle
Collision train
animal(s)
snowslide
Front or side
collision train
obstacle
accident / defect of Front collision train
vehicle
vehicle
missing fencing
person intrudes
track
person on platform inadequate
process
personal in track
inadequate
process
maintenance
inadequate
vehicle / machines process
in track
loading / parts of
trains in track or
dispersing
Accident
parts of track
_
vehicle detection system on bridges
that crosses the rail track
_
None
critical
_
_
None
critical
_
_
None
catastrophic
_
_
derailment, damages on train, inadequate
catastrophic
force effect on third party, explosion (not
meaning accident), fire (not meaning accident)
Front collision train derailment, damages on train, inadequate
force effect on third party
obstacle
catastrophic
special requirements for operation /
signalling
_
signalling
_
A9-3 of A9-6
ID
System Level
Hazard
6 loss of fire
prevention
2nd Level Hazard
Cause
Accident
loss of onboard fire-loss of /
alarm- / fighting
errouneous
system
sensoring
fire in rolling stock multiple effects possible: smoke emission,
loss of structural integrity of vehicle,
inadmissibly increase of temperature, pollution
(not meaning accident)
failure of fire
fire in rolling stock multiple effects possible: smoke emission,
extinguishing
system
loss of tunnel fire- loss of /
fire
multiple effects possible: smoke emission,
alarm- / fighting
errouneous
system
sensoring
failure of fire
fire
multiple effects possible: smoke emission,
extinguishing
system
7 adequate
adequate
loss or failure of
multiple scenario multiple effects possible: inadmissibly
evacuation of
evacuation of
onboard
possibles
increase of temperature and / or smoke
passengers in
passengers by
evacuation system
emission in case of fire; panic reaction of
case of emergency onboard
/ equipment
passengers; passengers my stand on
not ensured
evacuation system
adjacent track(s)
in case of
emergency not
ensured
adequate
loss or failure of
evacuation of
tunnel evacuation possibles
passengers by
system /
tunnel evacuation equipment
passengers; passengers my stand on
system in case of
adjacent track(s)
emergency not
ensured
adequate
loss or failure of
evacuation of
bridges evacuation possibles
passengers while system /
train on bridge in equipment
passengers; passengers may stand on
adjacent track(s) (only in system-variant 1)
case of emergency
not ensured
8 safe entry / exit of entry / exit system loss / failure of
passengers /
failure
door system
personal not
ensured
operation failure
inadequate
process
Severity
catastrophic
fire-alarm- / fighting monitoring
system
catastrophic
system
catastrophic
system
catastrophic
system
catastrophic
_
operational procedure
catastrophic
_
catastrophic
_
None
improper force
effect to passenger
/ personal
critical
door monitoring system
pinched passenger None
critical
pinched passenger None
critical
A9-4 of A9-6
ID
System Level
Hazard
9 electrical hazards
10 chemical hazards
11 structural integrity
of vehicle
subsystems /
components not
ensured
12 other hazards
2nd Level Hazard
inadequate
distance to
overhead line
Cause
Accident
Severity
track workers (incl. electrocution
machines) in track
fire (not meaning accident)
critical
_
signalling
third party in track electrocution
critical
_
fencing, information
electrocution
critical
_
fencing, information
thightness of
vehicle
subsystems /
components not
ensured
third party on
bridges overtrack
subsystem- /
component failure
(e.g. hydraulic
system, electrical
power system etc.)
emission of
dangerous goods
(e.g. cooling
medium, oil etc.),
explosion
pollution, intoxication
marginal
_
thightness of
infrastructure
subsystems /
components not
ensured
subsystem- /
component failure
(e.g. hydraulic
system, electrical
power system etc.)
emission of
dangerous goods
(e.g. cooling
medium, oil etc.),
explosion
pollution, intoxication
marginal
_
thightness of
vehicle
subsystems /
components not
ensured
thightness of
infrastructure
subsystems /
components not
ensured
disperse of ballast
subsystem- /
component failure
(e.g. pneumatic
system)
improper force
None
effect to passenger
/ personal / third
party
critical
_
periodic inspections / maintenance.
subsystem- /
component failure
(e.g. pneumatic
system)
improper force
None
effect to passenger
/ personal / third
party
critical
_
high speed and ice improper force
None
on the train
effect to personal /
third party
inadeqaute noise noise limit
None
protection
exceeded
critical
_
marginal
_
adeqaute noise
level not ensured
_
A9-5 of A9-6
Annex 9 Subject 2 RAC-TS
ID
System Level Hazard
Severity
1 guidance of vehicle not
ensured
catastrophic
2 vehicle´s stability not
ensured
catastrophic
3 adequate forward ordering catastrophic
not ensured
4 inadequate braking
catastrophic
5 objects / obstacle in or
besides track
catastrophic
6 loss of fire prevention
catastrophic
7 adequate evacuation of
passengers in case of
emergency not ensured
8 safe entry / exit of
passengers / personal not
ensured
9 electrical hazards
catastrophic
critical
10 chemical hazards
marginal
11 structural integrity of
vehicle subsystems /
components not ensured
12 other hazards
critical
critical
critical
RAC-TS statement
THR (without
consideration of risk
reduction factors)
Risk reduction (credible / immediate potential)
THR (with
consideration of risk
reduction factors)
Hazard partially related to functional 1*10-9 1/h
safety aspects, RAC-TS partially
applicable
n.a.
Hazard not related to functional
safety aspects, RAC-TS not
applicable
Hazard related to functional safety 1*10-9 1/h
aspects, RAC-TS applicable
tbd. in later project phases considering detailled information concerning tbd.
the technical solution
applicable
applicable
Hazard related to functional safety 1*10-9 1/h
_
n.a.
applicable
Hazard related to functional safety
n.a.
applicable
applicable
applicable
applicable
n.a.
_
n.a.
n.a.
_
n.a.
n.a.
_
n.a.
n.a.
_
n.a.
1*10-8 1/h
_
n.a.
A9-6 of A9-6
Annex
Annex 10
Subject 3 Report uncertainty model
Annex 10 Subject 3 Report uncertainty model
Crystal Ball Report - Custom
Simulation started on 2/8/2011 at 14:00:55
Simulation stopped on 2/8/2011 at 14:02:10
Run preferences:
Number of trials run
Monte Carlo
Random seed
Precision control on
Confidence level
Run statistics:
Total running time (sec)
Trials/second (average)
Random numbers per sec
Crystal Ball data:
Assumptions
Correlations
Correlated groups
Decision variables
Forecasts
10'000
95.00%
74.88
134
12'019
90
0
0
0
5
A10-1 of A10-44
Forecasts
Worksheet: [S3_Model_PSL_Uncert_110208.xls]Inputs and results
Forecast: Economic consequences S1, 25 Years
Cell: W127
Summary:
Certainty level is 90.00%
Certainty range is from -3518.48 to 3944.48
Entire range is from -8765.40 to 11823.36
Base case is 174.29
After 10 000 trials, the std. error of the mean is 22.55
Statistics:
Trials
Mean
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Coeff. of Variability
Minimum
Maximum
Range Width
Mean Std. Error
Forecast values
10'000
172.04
184.27
--2255.07
5085330.61
0.0248
3.20
13.11
-8765.40
11823.36
20588.76
22.55
A10-2 of A10-44
Forecast: Economic consequences S1, 25 Years (cont'd)
Percentiles:
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Cell: W127
Forecast values
-8765.40
-2637.67
-1703.11
-989.98
-394.96
184.05
716.53
1305.74
2031.25
3044.11
11823.36
A10-3 of A10-44
Forecast: Economic consequences S2, 25 Years
Cell: X127
Summary:
Certainty range is from -3342.27 to 4053.96
Entire range is from -9939.67 to 8432.76
Base case is 354.53
After 10 000 trials, the std. error of the mean is 22.63
Statistics:
Trials
Mean
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Minimum
Maximum
Range Width
Mean Std. Error
Forecast values
10'000
337.66
313.54
--2263.00
5121164.77
-0.0020
3.22
6.70
-9939.67
8432.76
18372.44
22.63
A10-4 of A10-44
Forecast: Economic consequences S2, 25 Years (cont'd)
Percentiles:
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Cell: X127
Forecast values
-9939.67
-2539.27
-1519.19
-795.19
-247.90
313.31
903.89
1522.55
2209.05
3185.94
8432.76
A10-5 of A10-44
Forecast: Total Safety S0, 25 Years
Cell: V118
Summary:
Certainty range is from 4 454 to 5 461
Entire range is from 4 092 to 6 938
Base case is 4 897
After 10 000 trials, the std. error of the mean is 3
Statistics:
Trials
Mean
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Minimum
Maximum
Range Width
Mean Std. Error
Forecast values
10'000
4'913
4'889
--309
95'457
0.6218
4.07
0.0629
4'092
6'938
2'846
3
A10-6 of A10-44
Forecast: Total Safety S0, 25 Years (cont'd)
Percentiles:
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Cell: V118
Forecast values
4'092
4'540
4'653
4'740
4'815
4'889
4'963
5'045
5'149
5'316
6'938
A10-7 of A10-44
Cell: W118
Summary:
Base case is 4 883
Statistics:
Trials
Mean
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Minimum
Maximum
Range Width
Mean Std. Error
Forecast values
10'000
4'900
4'875
--309
95'445
0.5832
4.05
0.0631
3'976
7'219
3'243
3
A10-8 of A10-44
Percentiles:
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Cell: W118
Forecast values
3'976
4'527
4'641
4'727
4'802
4'875
4'950
5'036
5'146
5'298
7'219
A10-9 of A10-44
Cell: X118
Summary:
Base case is 4 868
Statistics:
Trials
Mean
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Kurtosis
Minimum
Maximum
Range Width
Mean Std. Error
Forecast values
10'000
4'886
4'861
--310
95'965
0.5925
3.94
0.0634
3'948
6'974
3'027
3
A10-10 of A10-44
Percentiles:
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Cell: X118
Forecast values
3'948
4'518
4'628
4'710
4'784
4'861
4'938
5'020
5'128
5'292
6'974
End of Forecasts
A10-11 of A10-44
Assumptions
Worksheet: [S3_Model_PSL_Uncert_110208.xls]Inputs and results
Assumption: Air safety (pass)
Lognormal distribution with parameters:
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: E14
0.10
0.00
(=E14)
(=E14*0.03333)
Assumption: Air safety change (pass)
Beta distribution with parameters:
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
Cell: H14
6.8%
8.3%
2
3
(=H14*0.9)
(=H14*1.1)
Assumption: Bus safety (other)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: K14
5.15
0.17
(=K14)
(=K14*0.0333)
A10-12 of A10-44
Assumption: Bus safety (pass)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: E12
0.93
0.03
(=E12)
(=E12*0.03333)
Assumption: Bus safety change (other)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
Cell: N14
-4.8%
-4.0%
2
3
(=N14*1.1)
(=N14*0.9)
Assumption: Bus safety change (pass)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
Cell: H12
3.0%
3.6%
2
3
(=H12*0.9)
(=H12*1.1)
A10-13 of A10-44
Assumption: Car safety (driver and pass)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: E10
2.81
0.09
(=E10)
(=E10*0.03333)
Assumption: Car safety (other)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: K10
0.96
0.32
(=K10)
(=K10*0.3333)
Assumption: Car safety change (other)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
Cell: N10
3.7%
4.5%
2
3
(=N10*0.9)
(=N10*1.1)
A10-14 of A10-44
Assumption: Car safety change (pass)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
Cell: H10
3.0%
3.6%
2
3
(=H10*0.9)
(=H10*1.1)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Air bpkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: K57
4.41
0.15
(=K57)
(=K57*0.0333)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Air bpkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
4.9%
5.9%
2
3
Cell: K72
(=K72*0.9)
(=K72*1.1)
A10-15 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Bus bpkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
4.28
0.14
Cell: I57
(=I57)
(=I57*0.0333)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Bus bpkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
0.3%
0.3%
2
3
(=I72*0.9)
(=I72*1.1)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Bus bvkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
0.68
0.02
Cell: I72
Cell: J57
(=J57)
(=J57*0.0333)
A10-16 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Bus bvkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
-4.1%
-3.3%
2
3
(=J72*1.1)
(=J72*0.9)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Car bpkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
55.53
1.85
Cell: G57
(=G57)
(=G57*0.0333)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Car bpkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
2.1%
2.5%
2
3
Cell: J72
Cell: G72
(=G72*0.9)
(=G72*1.1)
A10-17 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Car bvkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
32.38
1.08
Cell: H57
(=H57)
(=H57*0.0333)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Car bvkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.3%
4.1%
2
3
(=H72*0.9)
(=H72*1.1)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Train bpkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
0.50
0.02
Cell: H72
Cell: E57
(=E57)
(=E57*0.0333)
A10-18 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Train bpkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
0.5%
0.6%
2
3
(=E72*0.9)
(=E72*1.1)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Train bvkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
0.01
0.00
Cell: F57
(=F57)
(=F57*0.0333)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Train bvkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
0.4%
0.5%
2
3
Cell: E72
Cell: F72
(=F72*0.9)
(=F72*1.1)
A10-19 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Truck bvkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
9.37
0.31
Cell: L57
(=L57)
(=L57*0.0333)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S1 Truck bvkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.7%
4.5%
2
3
(=L72*0.9)
(=L72*1.1)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Air bpkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
4.9%
5.9%
2
3
Cell: L72
Cell: K75
(=K75*0.9)
(=K75*1.1)
A10-20 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Bus bpkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
0.3%
0.3%
2
3
(=I75*0.9)
(=I75*1.1)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Bus bvkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
-4.1%
-3.3%
2
3
2.1%
2.5%
2
3
Cell: J75
(=J75*1.1)
(=J75*0.9)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Car bpkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
Cell: I75
Cell: G75
(=G75*0.9)
(=G75*1.1)
A10-21 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Car bvkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.3%
4.1%
2
3
(=H75*0.9)
(=H75*1.1)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Train bpkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
0.5%
0.6%
2
3
0.4%
0.5%
2
3
Cell: E75
(=E75*0.9)
(=E75*1.1)
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Train bvkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
Cell: H75
Cell: F75
(=F75*0.9)
(=F75*1.1)
A10-22 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail + HSR S2 Truck bvkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.7%
4.5%
2
3
(=L75*0.9)
(=L75*1.1)
Assumption: Common rail S0 Air bpkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: K55
4.48
0.15
(=K55)
(=K55*0.0333)
Assumption: Common rail S0 Air bpkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
Cell: L75
4.9%
5.9%
2
3
Cell: K70
(=K70*0.9)
(=K70*1.1)
A10-23 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail S0 Bus bpkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: I55
4.34
0.14
(=I55)
(=I55*0.0333)
Assumption: Common rail S0 Bus bpkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
0.3%
0.3%
2
3
Cell: I70
(=I70*0.9)
(=I70*1.1)
Assumption: Common rail S0 Bus bvkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: J55
0.69
0.02
(=J55)
(=J55*0.0333)
A10-24 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail S0 Bus bvkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
-4.1%
-3.3%
2
3
Cell: J70
(=J70*1.1)
(=J70*0.9)
Assumption: Common rail S0 Car bpkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: G55
55.78
1.86
(=G55)
(=G55*0.0333)
Assumption: Common rail S0 Car bpkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
2.1%
2.5%
2
3
Cell: G70
(=G70*0.9)
(=G70*1.1)
A10-25 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail S0 Car bvkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: H55
32.53
1.08
(=H55)
(=H55*0.0333)
Assumption: Common rail S0 Car bvkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.3%
4.1%
2
3
Cell: H70
(=H70*0.9)
(=H70*1.1)
Assumption: Common rail S0 Train bpkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: E55
2.99
0.10
(=E55)
(=E55*0.0333)
A10-26 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail S0 Train bpkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
1.4%
1.7%
2
3
Cell: E70
(=E70*0.9)
(=E70*1.1)
Assumption: Common rail S0 Train bvkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: F55
0.05
0.00
(=F55)
(=F55*0.0333)
Assumption: Common rail S0 Train bvkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
2.0%
2.4%
2
3
Cell: F70
(=F70*0.9)
(=F70*1.1)
A10-27 of A10-44
Assumption: Common rail S0 Truck bvkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: L55
9.45
0.31
(=L55)
(=L55*0.0333)
Assumption: Common rail S0 Truck bvkm change
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.7%
4.5%
2
3
Cell: L70
(=L70*0.9)
(=L70*1.1)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: E58
2.93
0.10
(=E58)
(=E58*0.0333)
A10-28 of A10-44
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
1.4%
1.7%
2
3
Cell: E73
(=E73*0.9)
(=E73*1.1)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: F58
0.05
0.00
(=F58)
(=F58*0.0333)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
2.0%
2.4%
2
3
Cell: F73
(=F73*0.9)
(=F73*1.1)
A10-29 of A10-44
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: E61
2.87
0.10
(=E61)
(=E61*0.0333)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
1.4%
1.7%
2
3
Cell: E76
(=E76*0.9)
(=E76*1.1)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: F61
0.05
0.00
(=F61)
(=F61*0.0333)
A10-30 of A10-44
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
2.0%
2.4%
2
3
Cell: F76
(=F76*0.9)
(=F76*1.1)
Assumption: Common Rail safety change S0 (other)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.2%
3.9%
2
3
Cell: N21
(=N21*0.9)
(=N21*1.1)
Assumption: Common Rail safety change S0 (pass)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.2%
3.9%
2
3
Cell: H21
(=H21*0.9)
(=H21*1.1)
A10-31 of A10-44
Assumption: Common Rail safety change S1 (other)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.2%
3.9%
2
3
Cell: N30
(=N30*0.9)
(=N30*1.1)
Assumption: Common Rail safety change S1 (other) (N39)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.2%
3.9%
2
3
(=N39*0.9)
(=N39*1.1)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.2%
3.9%
2
3
Cell: N39
Cell: H30
(=H30*0.9)
(=H30*1.1)
A10-32 of A10-44
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.2%
3.9%
2
3
Cell: H39
(=H39*0.9)
(=H39*1.1)
Assumption: Common Rail safety S0 (other)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: K21
176.43
5.88
(=K21)
(=K21*0.0333)
Assumption: Common Rail safety S0 (pass)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: E21
0.23
0.01
(=E21)
(=E21*0.03333)
A10-33 of A10-44
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: K30
176.43
5.88
(=K30)
(=K30*0.0333)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: E30
0.23
0.01
(=E30)
(=E30*0.03333)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: K39
176.43
5.88
(=K39)
(=K39*0.0333)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: E39
0.23
0.01
(=E39)
(=E39*0.03333)
A10-34 of A10-44
Assumption: Common Rail safety S2 (pass) (cont'd)
Cell: E39
Assumption: Discount rate (%)
Cell: F85
Custom distribution with parameters:
Value
Probability
3.5%
0.33
4.5%
0.33
5.5%
0.33
Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety change S1 (other)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
0.5%
0.6%
2
3
Cell: N32
(=N32*0.9)
(=N32*1.1)
A10-35 of A10-44
Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety change S1 (pass)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
0.5%
0.6%
2
3
(=H32*0.9)
(=H32*1.1)
Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety change S2 (other)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
0.5%
0.6%
2
3
0.5%
0.6%
2
3
Cell: N41
(=N41*0.9)
(=N41*1.1)
Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety change S2 (pass)
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
Cell: H32
Cell: H41
(=H41*0.9)
(=H41*1.1)
A10-36 of A10-44
Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety S1 (others)
Mean
Std. Dev.
123.50
4.11
(=K32)
(=K32*0.0333)
Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety S1 (pass)
Mean
Std. Dev.
0.23
0.01
Cell: E32
(=E32)
(=E32*0.03333)
Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety S2 (others)
Mean
Std. Dev.
123.50
4.11
0.23
0.01
Cell: K41
(=K41)
(=K41*0.0333)
Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety S2 (pass)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: K32
Cell: E41
(=E41)
(=E41*0.03333)
A10-37 of A10-44
Assumption: HSR Combined Tracks safety S2 (pass) (cont'd)
Cell: E41
Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Air bpkm
Cell: K60
Mean
Std. Dev.
4.35
0.14
(=K60)
(=K60*0.0333)
Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Bus bpkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
4.22
0.14
Cell: I60
(=I60)
(=I60*0.0333)
Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Bus bvkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
0.67
0.02
Cell: J60
(=J60)
(=J60*0.0333)
A10-38 of A10-44
Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Bus bvkm (cont'd)
Cell: J60
Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Car bpkm
Cell: G60
Mean
Std. Dev.
55.28
1.84
(=G60)
(=G60*0.0333)
Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Car bvkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
32.24
1.07
Cell: H60
(=H60)
(=H60*0.0333)
Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Train bpkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
1.00
0.03
Cell: E60
(=E60)
(=E60*0.0333)
A10-39 of A10-44
Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Train bpkm (cont'd)
Cell: E60
Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Train bvkm
Cell: F60
Mean
Std. Dev.
0.01
0.00
(=F60)
(=F60*0.0333)
Assumption: HSR Separate Tracks S2 Truck bvkm
Mean
Std. Dev.
9.28
0.31
Cell: L60
(=L60)
(=L60*0.0333)
Assumption: Truck safety (other)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: K12
1.96
0.07
(=K12)
(=K12*0.0333)
A10-40 of A10-44
Assumption: Truck safety (other) (cont'd)
Cell: K12
Assumption: Truck safety change (other)
Cell: N12
Minimum
Maximum
Alpha
Beta
3.9%
4.7%
2
3
(=N12*0.9)
(=N12*1.1)
Assumption: Value of Statistical Life (VSL)
Mean
Std. Dev.
Cell: F82
20.00
0.67
(=F82)
(=F82*0.0333)
End of Assumptions
A10-41 of A10-44
Sensitivity Charts
A10-42 of A10-44
A10-43 of A10-44
End of Sensitivity Charts
A10-44 of A10-44
Annex
Annex 11
Subject 3 Model Transport safety
Annex 11 Subject 3 Model Transport Safety
Inputs
Safety information - Assign input values in grey cells.
For all scenarios
Passenger Safety (f/bpkm)
Expected annual passenger safety change
Safety for others (f/bvkm)
Expected annual safety change others
Car safety (driver and pass)
2.81
Car safety change (pass)
3.3%
Car safety (other)
0.96
Car safety change (other)
4.1%
Bus safety (pass)
0.93
Bus safety change (pass)
3.3%
Truck safety (other)
1.96
Truck safety change (other)
4.3%
Air safety (pass)
0.10
Air safety change (pass)
7.5%
Bus safety (other)
5.15
Bus safety change (other)
-4.4%
0.23
Conventional Rail safety
change S0 (pass)
Scenario 0
Conventional Rail safety S0
(pass)
3.5%
S0 (other)
176.43
change S0 (other)
3.5%
Scenario 1 - Combined tracks
(pass)
HSR Combined Tracks safety S1
(pass)
0.23
0.23
change S1 (pass)
HSR Combined Tracks safety
change S1 (pass)
3.5%
0.5%
S1 (others)
HSR Combined Tracks
safety S1 (others)
176.43
123.50
change S1 (other)
HSR Combined Tracks safety
change S1 (other)
3.5%
0.5%
Scenario 2 - Separate tracks
(pass)
HSR Separate Tracks safety S2
(pass)
0.23
0.23
change S2 (pass)
HSR Separate Tracks safety
change S2 (pass)
3.5%
0.5%
S2 (others)
HSR Separate Tracks
safety S2 (others)
176.43
123.50
change S2 (other)
HSR Separate Tracks safety
change S2 (other)
3.5%
0.5%
A11-1 of A11-5
Inputs
Transport information - Assign expected transport values in billion passenger km (bpkm) or billion vehicle kilometers (bvkm) in grey cells for first year in time horizon.
Train
Scenarios
Car
Passenger km
Vehicle km
Scenario 0 (Present)
Conventional rail
2.99
Scenario 1 (Combined tracks)
HSR + Conventional rail
Conventional rail
Scenario 2 (Separate tracks)
HSR Separate tracks
Conventional rail
Bus
Air
Truck
Passenger km
Vehicle km
Passenger km
Vehicle km
Passenger km
Vehicle km
0.05
55.78
32.53
4.34
0.69
4.48
9.45
0.50
2.93
0.01
0.05
55.53
32.38
4.28
0.68
4.41
9.37
1.00
2.87
0.01
0.05
55.28
32.24
4.22
0.67
4.35
9.28
Air
Truck
Transport information - Assign expected annual change in transport values (%)
Train
Scenarios
Car
Passenger km
Vehicle km
Scenario 0 (Present)
Conventional rail
1.5%
Scenario 1 (Combined tracks)
HSR + Conventional rail
Conventional rail
Scenario 2 (Separate tracks)
HSR Separate tracks
Conventional rail
Bus
Passenger km
Vehicle km
Passenger km
Vehicle km
Passenger km
Vehicle km
2.2%
2.3%
3.7%
0.3%
-3.7%
5.4%
4.1%
0.5%
1.5%
0.5%
2.2%
2.3%
3.7%
0.3%
-3.7%
5.4%
4.1%
0.5%
1.5%
0.5%
2.2%
2.3%
3.7%
0.3%
-3.7%
5.4%
4.1%
Economic information
Value of statistical life, VSL (MNOK)
Discount rate (%)
20
4.5%
A11-2 of A11-5
Results
Predicted societal transport safety (no of fatalities)
Safety level
(fatalities per
year)
Safety
development
(%)
0.68
8.00
3.5%
3.5%
156.73
31.24
3.3%
4.1%
4.04
3.53
3.3%
-4.4%
18.51
4.3%
0.45
223.17
7.5%
3.1%
Railway transport
Passengers
Others
Road transport
Car
Passengers
Others
Bus
Passengers
Others
Truck
Others
Air transport
Passengers
Total
S0
4'897
7'310
10'038
14'198
Time horizon (years)
25 years
40 years
60 years
100 years
S1
4'883
7'291
10'015
14'177
Total fatalities of scenarios
250.00
14'198
223.17
Total fatalities
150.00
100.00
10'000
25 years
40 years
8'000
6'000
60 years
100 years
4'897
4'883
4'868
4'000
50.00
31.24
18.51
8.00
0.68
4.04
2'000
3.53
0.45
0.00
l
ta
To
S0
S1
S2
Scenarios
Ai
rP
as
se
ng
er
s
O
th
er
s
Tr
uc
k
rs
s
Bu
se
Pa
s
s
O
ng
e
th
e
rs
ge
rs
C
ar
O
th
er
s
Bu
C
ar
R
ai
Pa
ss
en
lO
er
th
e
s
s
0
se
ng
lP
as
Annual Fatalities
14'155
12'000
156.73
ai
14'177
14'000
200.00
R
S2
4'868
7'271
9'992
14'155
A11-3 of A11-5
Results
Change in predicted societal transport safety (no of fatalities)
25 years
40 years
60 years
100 years
Change S1
14
19
22
21
Economic consequences of societal transport safety change (MNOK)
Change S2
28
38
46
43
S0
0
0
0
0
25 years
40 years
60 years
100 years
Change in predicted societal transport safety,
S1 and S2 compared to S0
S2
355
404
421
421
Economic consequences (net present value) of scenarios
450
50
45
400
40
350
35
300
25 years
30
40 years
25
60 years
100 years
20
MNOK
Change in fatalities
S1
174
198
206
206
25 years
40 years
250
60 years
200
100 years
150
15
10
100
5
50
0
0
S1
S2
Scenarios
S1
S2
Scenarios
A11-4 of A11-5
Uncertainty analysis
Uncertainty analysis, Total Safety, T = 25 Years
Uncertainty analysis, Economic consequences, T = 25 Years
5000.00
6'000
5'000
4'889
4'875
4000.00
4'861
3000.00
2000.00
5-percentile
3'000
Median
95-percentile
MNOK
Fatalities
4'000
5-percentile
1000.00
Median
0.00
2'000
95-percentile
S1
S2
-1000.00
1'000
-2000.00
-3000.00
0
S0
S1
Scenarios
S2
-4000.00
Scenarios
A11-5 of A11-5

Technical and Safety Analysis

Transcription

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