Fines, Imprisonment or Both: Civil vs. Criminal Contempt

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Fines, Imprisonment or Both:
Civil vs. Criminal Contempt
by Laura A. Thornton
M
y client has received a show-cause summons alleging that
he owes a substantial amount of child support. He is to
appear before the juvenile court judge on a specified date to
explain why he should not be held in contempt of court, fined,
imprisoned, or both, for failing to pay his child support as previously ordered. My client asks why he can be subject to jail time,
if he is not charged with a crime. In that question, he has summed
up the perceived quasi-civil, quasi-criminal nature of many contempt charges in the context of family law cases. Unfortunately,
there is no single test for distinguishing civil from criminal contempt and no simple answer to my client’s question.
In this article, I will attempt to provide you with an overview of
the distinctions between civil and criminal contempt, the elements
necessary for proving either case, the defenses thereto, the procedures, and the possible sanctions in each type of contempt case.
Basis of the Court’s Contempt Powers
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “contempt of
court” as: [A]ny act which is calculated to
embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in
administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or its dignity.
Committed by a person who does any act in
willful contravention of its authority or dignity, or tending to impede or frustrate the
administration of justice, or by one who,
being under the court’s authority as a party to
a proceeding therein, willfully disobeys its
lawful orders or fails to comply with an
undertaking which he has given.1
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Both the juvenile and the circuit courts of the Commonwealth
are vested with inherent contempt powers. Additionally, the
courts are granted statutory contempt powers.2 Such powers are
designed to vindicate the authority of the court and the rights of
the parties.3
Types and Forms of Contempt
There are two types of contempt proceedings: civil and criminal.
Civil contempt proceedings are utilized to enforce the rights of
private parties and to motivate an accused contemnor into doing
what he is required to do by court order. Such proceedings are
remedial in nature.4 Criminal contempt proceedings, on the
other hand, are prosecuted to preserve the power and vindicate
the dignity of the court.5 Such proceedings are punitive in
nature. Oftentimes, however, the same act or failure to act by a
party can justify either civil or criminal contempt proceedings.
There are also two forms of contempt: direct and indirect. Direct
forms of contempt take place in the presence and hearing of the
trial judge.6 Such contempt may be punished summarily, without
prior notice to the defendant.7 Indirect contempt is contempt at
least part of which takes place outside of the hearing and presence
of the trial judge.8 Such indirect contempt may be punished only
with prior notice to the defendant.
Distinguishing Civil from
Criminal Contempt
The best way to distinguish civil from criminal contempt is to
examine the penalty sought or imposed. If the defendant “holds
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the keys to the jail” and can purge himself from the contempt
finding by committing an affirmative act, the contempt is civil in
nature. An example of such civil contempt punishment is a judge’s
ruling that a defendant shall be incarcerated until he brings current his support arrearage. If the defendant brings his arrearage
current, he may be released. In this situation, the defendant has
an opportunity to purge himself of the civil contempt.
Conversely, if the defendant’s punishment is unmodifiable by
action from the defendant, then the contempt is criminal. Examples
of such criminal contempt are unconditional fines and fixed
unconditional jail sentences.9
In the case of Kessler v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 14, 441
S.E.2d 223 (1994), the court of appeals set forth the test for distinguishing civil from criminal contempt. In that case, the trial
court found the defendant in civil contempt for his willful failure
to pay child support as ordered. The trial court then sentenced
the defendant to eleven months in jail without any provision
allowing the defendant to purge himself of such contempt by
payment of all or a portion of his support arrearages. On appeal,
the court ruled that the contempt was criminal not civil since
there was no opportunity for the defendant to purge himself of
the contempt. The case was reversed and remanded to the trial
court to provide the defendant with the procedural protections
afforded a criminal defendant.
Elements of Civil Contempt
Under Virginia case law, to establish a case for civil contempt a
plaintiff must prove: the existence of a court order either prohibiting or mandating an act by the defendant10; the defendant’s
actual knowledge of such an order11; and violation of such order
by the defendant12.
In the case of Wilson v. Collins, 27 Va. App. 411, 499 S.E.2d 560
(1998), the Court of Appeals reversed a finding of contempt on
the ground that there was no violation of the express terms of the
court order by the defendant. In that case, the parties’ property
agreement had been incorporated into their final decree of divorce.
It provided that the husband would obtain a life insurance policy,
as approved by the wife, naming the wife and children as beneficiaries at such time as the youngest child reached the age of
23. The husband obtained such a policy six months after he
should have done so, and did not provide wife with a copy of
the policy. The trial court found husband to be in contempt for
not providing wife with a copy of the policy. The court of appeals
reversed, stating that there was no express requirement that the
husband provide the wife with a copy of the policy: such a
requirement was only implied. The court said, “[b]efore a person
may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order
must be in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon
him and the command must be express rather than implied.” Id.
Quoting Taliaferro v. Horde’s Adm’r, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 242, 247
(1822).
There is no Virginia case directly related to the standard of proof
in civil contempt cases. The Virginia Civil Benchbook for Judges
and Lawyers 1999 Edition cites the Leisge child custody case for
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the proposition that the standard of proof is by a preponderance
of the evidence.13 However, such a standard is not plainly articulated in the Leisge case. In fact the necessary standard of proof
for civil contempt cases is not addressed at all in the Leisge case.
Rather, the case focuses upon the necessity of proving intent for
a civil contempt conviction.
In Leisge, a mother had been granted custody by the Virginia
trial court. The father removed the parties’ child to New Mexico
for a visit, and while there filed a petition for custody. The
Virginia court entered an order restraining the father from proceeding with litigation in New Mexico. The father nevertheless
continued his New Mexico litigation. The Virginia court found
the father to be in contempt, and fined him $500 per day with
imprisonment until he purged himself of the contempt. Eventually,
the New Mexico Supreme Court granted a writ prohibiting the
New Mexico District Court from holding a hearing on the father’s
custody petition and the mother regained custody. At trial in
Virginia on the contempt charge, the father’s fines were remitted
and his jail sentence suspended conditioned upon his good
behavior. The father was also ordered to pay a substantial portion
of mother’s legal fees. The father argued that he should not be
held in contempt because the Virginia custody order was void
and he did not possess the specific intent to violate the court
order. The court of appeals held that the custody order was valid
and that because the charge was for civil, not criminal, contempt,
specific intent was not necessary for conviction. “Since the purpose
is remedial, it matters not with what intent the defendant did the
prohibited act . . . . An act does not cease to be a violation of a
law and of a decree merely because it may have been done
innocently.” Leisge at 309, quoting, McComb v. Jacksonville Paper
Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949).
There is no Virginia case
directly related to the
standard of proof in civil
contempt cases.
In Virginia federal case law, there are additional elements and a
clearly articulated standard of proof. Under controlling federal case
law, the elements necessary to prove civil contempt include: the
existence of a valid decree of which the alleged contemnor had
actual or constructive knowledge; a showing that the decree was
in the movant’s ‘favor’; a showing that the alleged contemnor by
its conduct violated the terms of the decree, and had knowledge
(at least constructive knowledge) of such violations; and a showing that the movant suffered harm as a result.14 Each of these
elements must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.15
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Elements of Criminal Contempt
To establish a case for criminal contempt, the Commonwealth
must prove an intentional or willful act by the defendant.16 Such
act may be a violation of a court order or be conduct that undermines the integrity of the court, including those instances set
forth in Virginia Code Section 18.2-456 (i.e., misbehavior in the
presence of the court, violence or threats to a judge or court
officer, vile language, misbehavior of a court officer, disobedience or resistance to court process or orders). The standard of
proof, as with any criminal case, is beyond a reasonable doubt.17
In a recent case, Michaels v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 601,
529 S.E.2d 822 (2000), the court of appeals reversed a trial court
finding of contempt on the ground that the court order upon
which the contempt show cause was predicated did not expressly
impose a duty upon the defendant, which the defendant failed
to fulfill. In that case, the trial court, by order dated January 21,
1999 continued an inmate’s trial pending a psychological evaluation at Central State Hospital. The order was received by the jail,
but the inmate was not transferred. No separate order was entered
directing transport or scheduling the psychological evaluation.
Upon learning that the inmate had never been transferred, the
trial court issued a rule to show cause against the supervisor of
the records for the city jail, and subsequently found him in contempt for failing to transport the inmate. The court of appeals
reversed, stating that “[b]efore a person may be held in contempt
for violating a court order, the order must be in definite terms as
to the duties thereby imposed upon him and the command must
be expressed rather than implied.” Id. at 609.
Civil Contempt Proceedings
There are two types of civil contempt proceedings: summary and
plenary. Summary proceedings are instituted when a direct contempt has occurred. In this situation, the contumacious behavior
has occurred in the presence of the trial judge and the trial judge
may take evidence and punish the contemnor in the same proceeding. The contemnor, while not entitled to prior notice, is
entitled to be advised as to the specific charge of contempt and
shall be given an opportunity to be heard in his defense.18 If the
trial judge chooses to delay the contempt hearing until after the
proceeding in which the contumacious behavior occurred, then,
the contemnor will be entitled to notice and the judge shall
allow another judge to preside over the contempt proceeding.19
Plenary contempt proceedings are more common in family law
cases. Plenary proceedings are conducted in cases of indirect
contempt when the contumacious behavior has occurred, at least
in part, out of the presence of the trial judge. Plenary proceedings require prior notice and an opportunity to be heard by the
defendant. The most common procedure in the juvenile court
system is for the petitioner to request the issuance of a show
cause summons, or “rule to show cause.” The petitioner alleges,
often by a form petition, that the defendant has violated an
order of a certain date and requests that the court issue a rule or
summons to the defendant directing that he appear on a date
certain and explain to the court why he should not be held in
contempt for his failure to obey the order. The petitioner, or
someone, must sign the petition under oath. The petition and
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rule are then served on the defendant. Personal service of the
rule on the defendant is required.20 Service upon counsel of
record is insufficient.21
In the circuit court, a similar procedure is used to initiate a civil
contempt proceeding. If the contempt proceedings are ancillary
to the pending action, the petitioner shall proceed in the pending action. If, however, there is no matter pending on the active
docket, it is necessary to reinstate the underlying case. Virginia
Code Section 20-112 (1950, as amended) requires service of
process of the motion to reinstate where the purpose of reinstatement is to request additional orders to effectuate previous
orders entered pursuant to Virginia Code Section 20-107.3 (1950,
as amended).
Once the matter is on the court’s pending docket, the petitioner
files a motion requesting that the court enter a rule (order)
directing that the defendant appear at a certain date and time
and show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his
failure to obey the previous order. While it is not required by
statute or case law, many courts prefer that such motions be
supported by the affidavit of the petitioner or be verified by the
petitioner under oath. If a rule is issued without an affidavit, but
the defendant appears and participates in the proceeding, he is
deemed to have waived objection to the rule.22 Once the court
enters the rule, the defendant must be personally served therewith.23 Service upon counsel of record is insufficient.24
At the hearing, the burden of proof rests with the petitioner to
prove his prima facia case. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show justification for his actions or inactions
allegedly violative of the prior order.25 This principle of shifting
burdens was applied in the Alexander case. (See, Alexander v.
Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691, 406 S.E.2d 666 (1991)). In that case,
the mother sought to have the father held in contempt for failure
to pay child support in a timely manner. Upon hearing the testimony of the mother that the father had not paid his child support on time, the burden then shifted to the father to justify his
failure to pay support. The court then heard from the father who
testified that from the time the mother filed her show-cause
motion he had paid all of his child support payments. Based
upon the husband’s evidence, the court declined to hold him in
contempt.
The defendant has the right to present evidence in his defense,
to call witnesses, and to examine the opposing party.26 Examples
of a valid defense include the inability to obey the order due to
no fault of the defendant, the defendant’s lack of notice of the
order, and lack of jurisdiction of the court to enter the underlying
order (making the order void). (See Street v. Street, 24 Va. App.
14, 480 S.E.2d 118 (1997), where the court of appeals reversed
the trial court for refusing to allow the defendant to present evidence of his inability to pay support as a defense to a contempt
finding for failure to pay child support).
In support cases, should the defendant fail to appear, the court
may proceed with trial in his absence or continue the matter.27
Should trial proceed in the defendant’s absence in a support
matter and judgment of conviction be entered against him, the
defendant may within thirty days make application to have the
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case reopened, and after due notice to the original petitioner, for
good cause, the court may reopen the case and enter such judgment or order as is right or proper.28
The Virginia Court of Appeals
has found that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the United
States Constitution can apply in
criminal contempt proceedings
as in other criminal proceedings.
There is no Virginia case on whether defendants in civil contempt
proceedings are entitled to court-appointed counsel. However,
Virginia Code Section 14.1-183 gives the court discretion to
appoint counsel for indigent defendants in civil cases. (See also,
Virginia Code Section 16.1-266 (D), which grants juvenile and
domestic relations district courts authority to appoint counsel for
indigent children, parents or guardians.)
In many family law contempt proceedings, the petitioner seeks
enforcement of a separation agreement that was previously
made part of the parties’ final decree of divorce. In this year’s
Shoup case, the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that in cases
where the petitioner seeks enforcement of a written agreement
which has been incorporated into a court decree, such agreements
are enforceable even in the absence of a finding of contempt.
Shoup v. Shoup, 31 Va. App. 621, 525 S.E.2d 61 (2000). In Shoup,
the petitioner, husband, sought enforcement of the parties’ property settlement and modification agreement, both of which had
been affirmed, ratified, and incorporated into a decree of the
court. The husband filed a rule to show cause requesting an
order compelling wife to comply and a money judgment. Upon
interpretation of the agreement, the court declined to find wife
in contempt. The court did, however, enter an order requiring
wife to comply with the agreement and to pay a sum certain to
husband. The wife asserted that when the trial judge ruled she
was not in contempt, the court lacked authority to grant any
relief to husband. The court of appeals held that the trial judge
had the authority to enforce the personal obligations of the parties
created by the agreements, which were incorporated into the
court’s decrees.
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of the plaintiff, to prosecute the action.29 Summary criminal proceedings are conducted just as summary civil proceedings,
except that the Commonwealth must prove its case against the
defendant by a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.30
The majority of criminal contempt proceedings require plenary
proceedings, including informing defendant that the proceeding
is criminal,31 transfer to the law side, and substituting the
Commonwealth as a party. The defendant in such case must
have prior notice of the proceedings, be personally served, and
be advised of the details of his alleged contumacious behavior.32
Such notice must advise whether the defendant is facing the
possibility of jail time.
In the case of Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va. App. 42, 461 S.E.2d
421 (1995) the defendant appealed his criminal contempt conviction for failing to comply with orders regarding child support and
visitation on the ground that the court did not follow the proper
procedure for criminal contempt proceedings; in particular, that
he was not provided notice, nor was he indicted or arraigned.
The court of appeals upheld the defendant’s conviction, pointing
out that Mr. Steinberg had been provided with a show cause
order specifically setting forth the details of his alleged offense,
that he had knowledge prior to the hearing that the case was
being tried as a criminal contempt, and that for due process purposes, he did not have to be indicted or arraigned. The court
distinguished the facts in Mr. Steinberg’s case from the facts in
the case of Powell v. Ward, 15 Va. App. 553, 425 S.E.2d 539
(1993) where a contempt conviction was reversed because the
trial court did not adequately articulate the nature of the proceedings at the commencement of the hearing. The court of
appeals pointed out that Mr. Steinberg did not request a continuance and did not show that his defense was compromised by
any lack of notice. He was able to prepare his defense and personally appeared and fully presented his defense. Accordingly,
his due process challenge was denied.
According to Virginia law, the defendant in criminal contempt
cases has a right to counsel.33 Likewise under federal law, the
defendant has a right to counsel and the appointment of counsel
in a criminal proceeding in which he is facing jail time.34
Criminal Contempt Proceedings
Under federal law, if the defendant faces the possibility of more
than six months in jail or a ”serious contempt fine,” then the
defendant has a right to a jury trial.35 The Virginia Court of
Appeals has ruled similarly.36 (See, Kessler v. Commonwealth, 18
Va. App. 14, 441 S.E.2d 223 (1994), wherein the Virginia Court of
Appeals overturned a defendant’s contempt conviction and
eleven month jail sentence for his failure to pay support on the
ground that the defendant was denied a jury trial.) The federal
courts have not defined a “serious contempt fine.” In the Muniz
case, $10,000 fine was held insufficient to warrant a jury trial. In
the Bagwell case, however, a $52,000 fine was held sufficient to
warrant a jury trial.37
In all criminal contempt proceedings, whether summary or plenary, the court must advise the defendant of the criminal nature
of the proceedings. The court must then transfer the case from
the equity side of the court to the law side of the court. Next,
the court must substitute the Commonwealth as a party in place
The Virginia Court of Appeals has found that the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the United States Constitution can apply in criminal
contempt proceedings as in other criminal proceedings. In
Courtney v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 561, 478 S.E.2d 336
(1996), the appellate court reversed the conviction of a defendant
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found in contempt for failure to comply with the trial court’s
order regarding visitation on this ground.
As with all criminal proceedings, the Commonwealth must first
establish its prima facia case against the defendant. As part of
such case, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant
violated an order or engaged in conduct that undermined the
integrity of the court. The Commonwealth must further prove
that the defendant’s actions were willful and intentional.38 The
defendant must then justify his behavior. He has an opportunity
to present evidence in his own behalf and to cross-examine the
Commonwealth’s witnesses.39 The Commonwealth of course
must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Sanctions
A sanction imposed on a party held to be in civil contempt generally may serve either or both of two purposes: to coerce the
contemnor into complying with the Court’s order, or to compensate the complainant for losses resulting from the contemnor’s
past noncompliance.40 Moreover, “a court has broad discretion to
fashion a remedy based on the nature of the harm and the probable effect of alternative sanctions.”41 Sanctions in a contempt
proceeding are left to the discretion of the trial court, unless
specifically mandated by statute. Such sanctions may include fines,
imprisonment, or both. Virginia Code Section 18.2-456 sets forth
the sanctions for “Class 1” misdemeanor contempt and limits such
sanctions to up to ten days in jail and/or a fine of up to $50.
In Brown v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 758, 497 S.E.2d 147
(1998), the Virginia Court of Appeals reduced the fine imposed
upon a defendant for a contempt conviction imposed pursuant
to Virginia Code Section 18.2-456. In that case, an attorney was
held in civil contempt for interrupting the administration of justice
by failing to appear on time at a hearing that he scheduled. The
trial court imposed a fine of $400 ($10 for every minute the court
found the defendant to be late). The court of appeals found the
evidence supporting the contempt conviction to be sufficient,
but reduced the fine to $50, the statutory limit.
Other statutes set forth the particular sanctions for failure to pay
fines, costs, forfeitures, restitution or penalty 42; jurors who fail
to appear 43, fiduciaries who fail to timely file their required
reports 44, and debtors who fail to appear and answer debtor
interrogatories.45 The only limitation for sanctions in a civil
contempt proceeding, as in a domestic case, is that the sanction
be reasonable.
Counsel Fees
Judges presiding over contempt proceedings in divorce suits also
have the discretion to award counsel fees.46 The recent court of
appeals case of Sullivan v. Sullivan, (Record No. 0027-00-4, Va.
Ct. App., November 21, 2000), affirmed prior holdings that it is
not necessary for the defendant to be held in contempt for the
plaintiff to receive an award of fees. In that case, the plaintiff
sought to have the defendant held in contempt for his failure to
maintain life insurance pursuant to the parties’ property settlement
that had been incorporated. The trial judge did not find the
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defendant in contempt, but instead ordered the defendant to
purchase a life insurance policy or post a bond to ensure performance of the obligation and to pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.
The defendant argued that the fee award was not appropriate
because the issues were close, and the trial judge made no specific finding of contempt. The court of appeals upheld the trial
court finding that the issue of fees is solely in the discretion of
the trial court and will not be reversed unless there has been an
abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
Virginia circuit and juvenile courts are vested with inherent and
statutory contempt powers for the purpose of vindicating the
authority of the court and the rights of litigants. To determine
whether civil or criminal, one must examine the penalty sought
or imposed. It is up to the court and counsel to clarify the nature
of the proceedings at the beginning of the proceedings. Laura A. Thornton is a member of the
Franklin R. Blatt Law Firm in Harrisonburg.
She is a graduate of the University of Virginia
and the University of Richmond Law School,
where she served as managing editor of the
Richmond Law Review. She also served as a
law clerk to Judge Daffron of the Circuit Court
of Chesterfield County.
ENDNOTES
1
Black’s Law Dictionary 288 (5th ed. 1979).
2
See, Va. Code Section 18.2-456 (Summary Contempt for misbehavior in the
presence of the court, violence or threats of violence to a judge, juror, party
or officer of the court, vile language, misbehavior of an officer of the court,
disobedience or resistance to court order); Va. Code Section 16.1-69.24 (granting district courts the same authority as circuit courts to punish summarily for
contempt); Va. Code Section 8.01-271.1 (Bad faith in pleadings and motions);
Va. Code Sections 8.01-407, 19.2-267, 19.2-267.1, 8.01-356, 8.01-401, 118.2445, 19.2-215.7 (Failure to obey subpoenas and summonses and failure to testify); Va. Code Section 16.1-278.16 (granting district courts contempt powers
over persons failing to comply with orders regarding support obligations);
Va. Code Sections 20-71 and 20-115 (granting circuit courts contempt powers
for pendente lite and permanent support orders and orders granted pursuant
to Va. Code Sections 20-103 or 20-107.3); Va. Code Section 19.2-358 (Failure
to pay fines, costs, or restitution in timely manner); and Va. Code Section 20124.2 (Authority to effectuate and enforce custody and visitation orders).
3
Potts v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 855 (1946); Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.
App. 392 (1986); and Baugh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 368 (1992).
4
U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) cited in United Mine Workers
v. Covenant Coal Corp., 12 Va. App. 135 (1991); Leisge v. Leisge, 224 Va. 303
(1982); Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986).
5
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Carter v.
Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986).
6
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Greene v. Tucker, 375 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Va.
1974); Davis v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 395 (1978).
7
Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
8
Greene v. Tucker, 375 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Va. 1974); Burdett v.
Commonwealth, 103 Va. 838 (1904); Davis v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 395
(1978).
9
Richmond Black Police Officers Ass’n v. City of Richmond, 548 F. 2d 123 (4th
Cir. 1977); Steelworkers v. Newport News, 220 Va. 547 (1979); and Mine
Workers v.Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
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10 French v. Pobst, 203 Va. 704 (1962); Winn v. Winn, 218 Va. 8 (1977).
11 Kidd v. Virginia Safe Deposit & Trust Corp., 113 Va. 612 (1912).
12 Wilson v. Collins, 27 Va. App. 411 (1998).
13 Virginia Civil Benchbook for Judges and Lawyers (1999 ed.), citing, Leisge v.
Leisge, 224 Va. 303 (1982).
Designed to meet the needs of Virginia’s
Spanish-speaking elder citizens, the
14 Colonial Williamsburg Foundation v. Kittinger Co., 792 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D.
Va. 1992).
15 Id.
16 Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986).
17 Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 315 (1947); Salyer v. Commonwealth, 209
Va. 662 (1969).
18 Virginia Code Sections 18.2-456 and 18.2-457 (1950, as amended); Taylor v.
Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) Greene v. Tucker, 375 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Va.
1974).
19 Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400
U.S. 455 (1971).
Libreto para los Ciudadanos
de Tercera Edad
contains information about:
20 Virginia Code Section 19.2-11 (1950, as amended). Higginbotham v.
Commonwealth, 206 Va. 291 (1965).
• Social Security
21 Virginia Code Section 8.01-314 (1950, as amended).
• Landlord/Tenant Issues
22 Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 4 Va. 408 (1824).
23 Virginia Code Section 19.2-11 (1950, as amended). Higginbotham v.
Commonwealth, 206 Va. 291 (1965).
• Food Stamps
24 Virginia Code Section 8.01-314 (1950, as amended).
• Choosing a Care Facility
25 Alexander v. Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691 (1991).
26 Street v. Street, 24 Va. App. 14 (1997).
27 Virginia Code Section 20-66 (1950, as amended).
28 Virginia Code Section 20-66 (1950, as amended).
29 Powell v. Ward, 15 Va. App. 553 (1993).
• Estate and Gift Taxes
• Advance Directives
• Medicare & Medicaid
30 Street v. Street, 24 Va. 14 (1997).
31 Powell v. Ward, 15 Va. App. 553 (1993).
32 Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va. App. 42 (1995).
• Protecting Yourself as a Consumer
33 Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va. App. 42 (1995).
• Alzheimer’s Disease
34 Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965); Richmond Black Police Officers Ass’n v.
City of Richmond, 548 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1977).
• Age & Disability Discrimination
35 Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988);
Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975); Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.
821 (1994).
• Elder Abuse
36 Baugh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 368 (1992).
• Helpful Contacts
37 Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975); Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.
821 (1994).
38 Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986).
39 Street v. Street, 24 Va. 14 (1997).
40 Colonial Williamsburg Foundation v. Kittinger, Co., 792 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D.
Va. 1992).
41 Id., quoting, Connolly v. J.T. Ventures, 851 F.2d 930, 934-35 (7th Cir. [F. Supp.
1407] 1988).
42 Virginia Code Section 19.2-358 (1950, as amended).
43 Virginia Code Section 8.01-356 (1950, as amended).
44 Virginia Code Section 26-13, 26-18 (1950, as amended).
45 Virginia Code Section 8.01-508 (1950, as amended).
46 Carswell v. Masterson, 224 Va. 329, 332, 295 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1982).
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