Sie können über eines dieser Themen schreiben oder einen

Sie können über eines dieser Themen schreiben oder einen eigenen
Themenvorschlag machen. Alle Themen können wahlweise auf Deutsch oder
Englisch geschrieben werden. Zu jedem Thema ist ein Ansprechpartner angegeben.
Bitte setzten Sie sich frühzeitig mit dem entsprechenden wissenschaftlichen
Mitarbeiter in Verbindung, um die organisatorische Vorgehensweise und die
Themenstellung zu besprechen. Obwohl diese Liste regelmäßig aktualisiert wird,
kann es vorkommen, dass einzelne Themen schon vergeben wurden.
Besondere Forschungsinteressen / Specific Research Interests
Kiryl Khalmetski
Belief-dependent preferences; Strategic communication; Deception
Mattia Nardotto
Behavioral consumers, contracting and consumer protection;
Time discounting, present bias and overconfidence; Nudging;
Estimation of games, in particular with application to IO
Andreas Pollak
Industrieökonomik; Marktdesign
Christoph Feldhaus
Feldexperimente; Verhaltensökonomik
Uta Schier
Bounded Rationality; Judgment and Decision-Making
Michael Cristescu
Reputation systems; Online Experiments
Time discounting and risk attitude.
Elicitation, in the lab and in the field.
(Contact: Mattia Nardotto, only in English, Bachelor/Master/Diploma)
Brief description: the candidate discusses the economic modeling of time and risk preferences
and the problems related to the estimation of utility functions and discount functions in practice.
Starting reference: Andersen, S., Harrison, G. W., Lau, M. I. and Rutström, E. E. (2008), Eliciting
Risk and Time Preferences. Econometrica, 76: 583-618.
Hyperbolic discounting. Implications for contracting, welfare and policy.
(Contact: Mattia Nardotto, only in English, Bachelor/Master/Diploma)
Brief description: the candidate discusses the broad literature on hyperbolic discounting, with a
particular focus on the implications for saving decisions and access to credit. In this light, he/she
draws and policy and welfare implications.
Starting reference: Laibson, D. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 443-477.
Game Theory
Belief-dependent preferences in strategic contexts.
(Contact: Kiryl Khalmetski, Master/Diploma)
Geanakoplos, J., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti (1989): "Psychological Games and Sequential
Rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 60 - 79.
Battigalli, P., and M. Dufwenberg (2009): "Dynamic Psychological Games," Journal of Economic
Theory, 141, 1 - 35.
Experimental Economics
Lying and deception in laboratory experiments.
(Contact: Kiryl Khalmetski, Master/Diploma)
Gneezy, U. (2005): "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, 95, 384-394.
Fischbacher, U., and F. Föllmi-Heusi (2013): „Lies in Disguise — An Experimental Study on
Cheating,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 525-547.
Utikal, V. and U. Fischbacher (2013): “Disadvantageous Lies in Individual Decisions,” Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 85, 108-111.
Industrieökonomik: Märkte mit unvollständiger
Organisation: Markets with Incomplete Competition
Konkurrenz
/
Industrial
Basisliteratur: Motta, M. (2004). Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Bündelung und Marktmacht mit Anwendung auf Microsoft.
(Ansprechpartner: Andreas Pollak, nur Bachelorarbeiten, bereits vergeben!)
Whinston, M. D. (1990): Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion. American Economic Review, 80, 837859.
Whinston, M. D. (2001): Exclusivity and tying in US vs. Microsoft: What we know, and don’t
know. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 63-80.
Der doppelte Preisaufschlag mit Anwendung auf die Korruption in Indonesien.
(Ansprechpartner: Andreas Pollak, nur Bachelorarbeiten, bereits vergeben!)
Schleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1993). Corruption. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 599-617.
Olken, B. A. & Barron, P. (2007). The simple economics of extortion. NBER working paper
#13145.
Marktabschottung in vertikalen Strukturen mit Anwendung auf die Zementindustrie
(Ansprechpartner: Andreas Pollak, nur Bachelorarbeiten, bereits vergeben!)
Ordover, J., Saloner, G. & Salop, S. (1990). Equilibrium vertical foreclosure. American Economic
Review, 80, 127-142.
Hortacsu, A. & Syverson, C. (2007). Cementing relationships: vertical integration, foreclosure,
productivity and prices. Journal of Political Economy, 115, 250-301.
Economic Engineering
Matching Märkte
(Ansprechpartner: Andreas Pollak, nur Bachelorarbeiten, bereits vergeben!)
Becker, G. 1973. A Theory of Marriage. Journal of Political Economy, 81(4), 813‐846.
Gale, D. & Shapley, L. 1962. College admissions and the stability of marriage, American
Mathematical Monthly, 69(1), 9‐15.
Kagel, J. H. & Roth, A. E. 2000. The dynamics of reorganization in matching markets: A
Laboratory experiment motivated by a natural experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
115(1), 201-235.
Trust and Reputation Systems in online markets
(Ansprechpartner: Michael Cristescu, nur Bachelorarbeiten)
Introduction: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=355122
Dellarocas, C. (2003). The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online
Feedback Mechanisms. Management Science, 49(10), 1407–1424.
Dellarocas, C., & Wood, C. A. (2008). The Sound of Silence in Online Feedback: Estimating
Trading Risks in the Presence of Reporting Bias. Management Science, 54(3), 460–476.
Bolton, G., Greiner, B., & Ockenfels, A. (2013). Engineering trust: reciprocity in the production of
reputation information. Management Science, 59(2), 265–285.
Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K. (2006). The value of reputation on eBay:
A controlled experiment. Experimental Economics, 9(2), 79–101.
Soft paternalism and nudge
(Contact: Mattia Nardotto, only in English, Bachelor/Master/Diploma)
Brief description: the candidate is expected to discuss the recent debate on soft paternalism and
the use of nudges to achieve policy goals. The candidate can also focus on a specific domain of
his/her interest.
Starting reference: Camerer, C., Issacharoff, S., Loewenstein, G., O’Donoghue, T., & Rabin, M.
(2003). Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric
Paternalism.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1211-1254.
Behavioral Economics
Behavioral economics and consumer protection
(Contact: Mattia Nardotto, only in English, Bachelor or Master/Diploma)
Brief description: the candidate is expected to discuss the relevant literature in behavioral
economics analyzing markets where consumers have behavioral biases and firms design their
offers accordingly. The candidate then discusses the implications in terms of welfare and for
consumer protection policies.
Starting reference: Eliaz, K., and Spiegler, R. (2006). Contracting with diversely naive agents. The
Review of Economic Studies, 73(3), 689-714.
Bargaining Theory
Social Preferences in Bargaining
(Ansprechpartner: Michael Cristescu, nur Bachelorarbeiten)
Overview Article: Camerer, C., & Thaler, R. H. (1995). Anomalies: Ultimatums, dictators and
manners. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 209-219.
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: Experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton
University Press. Chapter 2 and 4.
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J. L., Savin, N. E., & Sefton, M. (1994). Fairness in simple bargaining
experiments. Games and Economic Behavior, 6(3), 347-369.
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 817-868.
Bolton, G. E., & Ockenfels, A. (2000). ERC: A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition.
American Economic Review, 166-193.
Bounded Rationality
Self-control and economic decision making
(Ansprechpartner: Uta Schier, nur Bachelorarbeiten, bereits vergeben!)
Dohmen, T., Falk, A., Huffman, D. & Sunde, U. (2010). Are risk aversion and impatience related to
cognitive ability? American Economic Review, 100(3), 1238-1260.
Sutter, M., Kocher, M., Glatzle-Rutzler, D. & Trautmann, S. (2013). Impatience and uncertainty:
experimental decisions predict adolescents‘ field behavior. American Economic Review, 510-531.
Shane, F., Loewenstein, G. & O’Donoghue, T. (2002). Time discounting and time preference: a
critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 40(2), 351-401.
Preference reversals in economics
(Ansprechpartner: Uta Schier, nur Bachelorarbeiten)
Grether, D. M. & Plott, C. R. (1979). Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal
phenomenon, American Economic Review, 69(4), 623-638.
Tversky, A., Slovic, P. & Kahneman, D. (1990). The causes of preference reversals, American Economic
Review, 80(1), 204-217.