Europe and Its Borders: Historical Perspective

Journal of the Institute for Euregional Studies
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence
University of Oradea
University of Debrecen
Volume I
Europe and Its Borders:
Historical Perspective
edited by Ioan HORGA, Sorin ŞIPOS & Istvan SŐLI ZAKAR
Spring 2006
Oradea University Press
2
Eurolimes
Journal of the Institute for Euregional Studies
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence
Honorary Members
Paul Allies (Montpellier), Enrique Banus (Pamplona), Mihai Berinde (Oradea), Robert Bideleux
(Swansea), Jean Pierre Colin (Reims), George Contogeorgis (Athens), Gerard Delanty (Liverpool),
Richard Griffiths (Leiden), Gyula Horvath (Budapest), Ariane Landuyt (Siena), Christiane Lemke
(Hanover), Livio Missir de Lusignan (Bruxelles), Jean Nouzille (Strasbourg), Şerban Papacostea
(Bucuresti), Nicole Pietri (Strasbourg), Vladimir Pessenko (Rostow–on- Don), Vasile Puşcaş (ClujNapoca), Mercedes Samaniego Boneu (Salamanca), István Süli-Zakar (Debrecen), Maria Manuela
Tavares Ribeiro (Coimbra), Goran Therborn (Uppsalla), Jose Maria Tortosa (Alicante), Ion łurcanu
(Chisinau), Maurice Vaïsse (Paris), Vasile Vesa (Cluj-Napoca)
Advisory Committee
Bela Baranyi (Debrecen), Stephan Bielanski (Krakaw), Gabriela Dragan (Bucuresti), Anca Dodescu
(Oradea), Didier Francfort (Nancy),Tamara Gela (Orel), Juan Gay Armenteros (Granada), Ioan Horga,
Alexandru Ilieş (Oradea), Ines Kanthenusen (Hanover), Kormos Janos (Debrecen), Jaroslaw Kundera
(Wroclaw), Renaud de La Brosse (Reims), Stephan Malovic (Zagreb), Maria Marczewska-Rytko
(Lublin), Fabienne Maron (Bruxelles), Silvia Mihalikova (Bratislava), Ivan Nacev (Sofia), Zaneta
Ozolina (Riga), Procopis Papastratis (Athens), Alexandru-Florin Platon (Iasi), Mykola Palinchak
(Uzhgorod), Daniele Pasquinucci (Siena), Ioan-Aurel Pop (Cluj-Napoca), Nicolae Paun (Cluj-Napoca),
Chris G. Quispel (Leiden), Alla Roşca (Chişinau), Angelo Santagostino (Brescia), Grigore Silaşi
(Timisoara), Lavinia Stan (Halifax), Barbu Ştefănescu, (Oradea), Szabo Bela (Debrecen), MihaiRăzvan Ungureanu (Bucuresti), Erno Varnay (Debrecen), Jan Wendt (Gdnask)
Editorial Committee
Laurent Beurdeley (Reims), Mircea Brie, Rozalia Biro, Carmen Buran, Vasile Ciocan, Sorin Cuc
(Oradea), Vicent Climent-Ferrando (Barcelona), Vasile Croitoru (Chisinau), Klára Czimre (Debrecen),
Eliza Dumitrescu (Paris), Antonio Faur (Oradea), Kozma Gabor (Debrecen), Adriana Giurgiu, Stefan
Herchi (Oradea) Anamaria HerŃanu, Ovidiu Morar (Suceava), Catalina Iliescu (Alicante), Peter Kopekcy
(Bratislava), Florin Lupescu, Simona Miculescu, Adrian Niculescu (Bucuresti), Anca Oltean, Dana
Pantea, Adrian Popoviciu, Rodica Petrea, Delia Radu, Alina Stoica, Sorin Şipoş, LuminiŃa Şoproni, Mirel
Staşac, Constantin Toca, Laura Turdean, Ion Zainea (Oradea), Toma Tanase (Paris) Karoly Teperics
(Debrecen), Esther Gimeno Ugalde (Wien)
The full responsibility regarding the content of the papers belongs exclusively to the authors.
Address: University of Oradea
1, Universitatii st.
410087-Oradea/Romania
Tel/fax: +40.259.467.642
e-mail: ihorga@uoradea.ro
www.iser.rdsor.ro
Chernivtsi Square – colour lithography by F.X. Knapp (Lucian Blaga University Library Cluj-Napoca; fund, quota Stampe XVII/82) .
Stamp from the beginning of the 19th century
Eurolimes is published semestrially. The articles and book reviews referring to the journal topic may be sent to the
address above. You can get the journal by addressing the aditors. The price for an issue is 15 euro.
Journal of the Institute for Euregional Studies is issued
with the support of the Action Jean Monnet of the European Commission
© Copyright ISER. All right reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced.
Oradea Press University
ISSN: 1841 – 9259
3
Cuprins ◊ Contents ◊ Sommaire ◊ Inhalt ◊ Tartalom
Ioan HORGA (Oradea) ◄► Why Eurolimes .............................................................. 5
I. Studies and Articles
1. The European Borders between the Dynamics of Regions and the
Challenges of Globalization ................................................................................. 15
István SŐLI-ZAKAR (Debrecen) ◄► Regions for the United Europe .................... 16
Robert T. GRIFFITHS, Chris G. QUISPEL (Leiden) ◄► When Borders
Move: An agenda for historical research ................................................................ 34
Gerard DELANTY (Liverpool) ◄► Borders in a Changing Europe: Dynamics of
Openness and Closure............................................................................................. 46
Robert BIDELEUX (Swansea ) ◄► The Limits of Europe ...................................... 59
Maria MARCZEWSKA-RYTKO (Lublin) ◄► Europe and the challenges of
globalization ........................................................................................................... 77
2. Europe and Its Borders throughout History......................................................... 87
Toma TANASE (Paris) ◄► Les Balkans et l’Europe dans le discours des Frères
mendiants et de la papauté (XIIIe -XIVe siècle) ...................................................... 88
Jean NOUZILLE (Strasbourg) ◄► L’evolution de la frontière meridionale de
la Maison d’Autriche au XVIII-ème siècle........................................................... 106
Sorin ŞIPOŞ (Oradea) ◄► La frontière orientale de l’Europe dans le récit d’un
officier français au début du XIXe siècle ............................................................. 123
II. Varia about Borders
Vicent CLIMENT-FERRANDO (Barcelona), Esther Gimeno UGALDE (Wien)
◄► EU Enlargements and its Linguistic Borders: A Historical Review ............ 136
Ivan NACHEV (Sofia) ◄► A new neighbourhood policy? Redefining the limits
of political in Central and Eastern Europe in the EU integration process ............ 144
Mihai Răzvan UNGUREANU (Bucureşti) ◄► Eastern European Borders ........... 150
III. Focus
Livio MISSIR DE LUSIGNAN (Bruxelles) ◄► Reflexions sur l’Empire Ottoman
et sur l’Europe de l’Avenir ou Turky as European Border ? ................................ 155
Reviews and References ............................................................................................ 159
About the autors ........................................................................................................ 183
5
Why Eurolimes?
Ioan HORGA
Nowadays, to dedicate a journal to the issue of borders in Europe – as Eurolimes is –
seems to be an outdated question from both the point of view of the process of European
integration, or enlargement, and from the point of view of the expectations of the Europeans,
who wish to circulate, work, and live wherever they want to. But the issue of the border is much
more complex than we assume from the viewpoint of its essence and of the different
experiences of Europe as a whole. The specialists in border issues are convinced of the
revolutionary mutations that the borders will experience in the future, but they are very cautious
when it comes to stating that the integration and enlargement processes of the EU will lead to a
determinate “disappearance” of the borders1.
This “border” scepticism envisages the complexity of the interpretations given to the
notion of border and its evolution in the context of the present-day phenomena of globalisation
and integration.
A first argument for a cautious attitude resides in the examination of the notion of
border. In a dictionary such as Petit Robert, the border is the “limit of the territory of a State”.
In fact, the international law defines the State as compared to the territory where it exercises its
sovereignty2.
A second argument resides in the different linguistic interpretations of the notion of
border in English: boundary, corresponding to the border-limit; border, the State border;
frontier, territory neighbouring the border.
A third argument resides in the different meanings granted to the notion of border.
Jean Luc Piermay considers that the French – German border, for instance, does not bear the
same meanings from the perspective of a unitary State (France), moulded throughout centuries
by centralisation and founded on exclusive sovereignty from the perspective of a federal State
(Germany) made up of federal states, each claiming part of the sovereignty3. Jean Baptiste
Harguindeguy considers that the border may be interpreted according to different schemata:
ethno-national, state, or Euro-national4.
A fourth argument consists of the fact that the process of European integration will
bring about a re-definition of the role of the border by granting them a hierarchy. In the context
of European integration, the States will proceed to a gradual transfer of sovereignty to a
supranational structure (exclusive, or shared, competences of the European Union), or infranational (regions, Euroregions). Thus, the European Union engages in a three-levelled
sovereignty: the regional, the national, and the community ones. This will have consequences
on the regime of the borders5.
1
Jean Luc Piermay, Christiane Arbaret-Schulz, 2000: Les frontières de la ville européenne: des
révélateurs de mutation et d’invention urbaines, Strasbourg, 2001; Jean Luc Piermay, “Ces frontières qui
vous attendent. Recherches menées à Strasbourg”, in Europe between Millenniums. Political Geograpghy
Studies (ed. Alexandru Ilies, Jan Wendt), Oradea, 2003, pp. 163-170; Jean-Baptiste Harguindeguy, “La
coopération transfrontalière comme laboratoire de la construction européenne: le cas du Consorcio
Bidasoa-Txingudi dans le Pays Basque”, in Mosella (University of Metz), tome XXVII, nr. 3-4/2002, pp.
151-157; Stephan Rosière, “L’Union Européenne, laboratoire d’une nouvelle hierarchie des frontières”, in
Mosella…,pp. 47-52.
2
J.Luc Piermay, “Ces frontières qui vous attendent….”, p. 163.
3
Ibidem, pp. 163-164.
4
J.-B. Harguindeguy, op. cit., p. 157.
5
St. Rosière, op. cit., p. 48.
6
Starting from this brief analysis of the points of view which reject the idea of
“disappearance” of the border, we may formulate certain ideas which represent the consensus of
the editors and contributors to Eurolimes, with respect to the issue of the European borders.
First of all, Eurolimes considers the issue of the border as tightly related to the notion
of territory and sovereignty, widely analysed by history, geography, justice, political sciences,
and sociology until the end of the 20th century. Even in the context of the emergence of
globalisation, of the appearance of supranational forms of organisation, such as the European
Union, analysts in the field of international relations are compelled to re-conceptualise
territoriality in close connection with the idea of sovereignty and the idea of border6. They
respond to the points of view from the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century
foretelling “the end of territoriality”7. According to J.G. Ruggie, the contemporary sovereignty
is shared on multiple nodal points in an international system of power relations that first
“unbound” the relations between sovereignty and territoriality and, secondly, redesigns the
“single perspective” state as a “multi-perspective polity”8. The European Union is the best
example of this type of polity.
Following the point of view of Mabel Berezin, we have to underline that the territory,
and implicitly the border, has four main functions. The territory is a social entity, as the persons
living there represent a community. The territory is a political entity, as the groups living there
seek to preserve, or expand, it. The territory is a cultural entity, as it preserves the collective
memory of the inhabitants. The territory is a cognitive entity, due to its ability to make the
social, political, and cultural subject of the borders the core of public and private identitary
projects9. However, the territory is a dynamic entity continuously changing.
The re-settlement of the territory brings about changes of identities in two ways. On
the one hand, identities change when territorial borders change. Nobody considers themselves a
Yugoslavian, when Yugoslavia no longer exists. Nowadays, the inhabitants of the former
Yugoslavia have new identities corresponding more or less to the social, political, and cultural
entities they are attached to. What guarantees the new identities? Obviously, the new borders.
Another example is provided by the identity changes taking place in the great
metropolises and cities either due to economic migration (the appearance of genuine towns
within cities – such as China Town, or Muslim Area) or to political migration (cities of the
former soviet republics which have been russified). The latter example shows us how an
external border moves towards inside, as an external identitary border becomes an internal
identitary border10.
On the other hand, identities change due to the occurrence of change in institutions.
The process of institutional construction of the EU brings about the acceleration of the
identitary mutations. These mutations are so strong that they lead to a reconsideration of the
place of national borders11.
Secondly, Eurolimes considers that the role of the State border tends to fade away in a
manifold process of State relativisation encouraged by the multiplication of connections and
exchanges. This attenuation of the role of the State border takes place in the context of the
voluntary distribution of the State sovereignty with other supranational political structures in the
6
Mabel Berezin, Martin Schain, Europe without Borders. Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity
in Transnational Age, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 2003, p. 5sqq.
7
Dan Dungaciu, NaŃiunea şi provocările postmodernităŃii: istorie, concepte, perspective, Bucureşti, Ed.
Tritonic, 2004, p. 333.
8
John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations”,
in International Organization, 1993, 47 (1), pp. 139-174.
9
Mabel Berezin, “Territory, Emotion, and Identity. Spatial Recalibration in the New Europe”, in Europe
without Borders. Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in Transnational Age (ed. M. Berezin, M.
Schain)…., p. 7.
10
D. Dungaciu, op.cit, p. 312.
11
****Cross-border Co-operation – Schengen Challenges (edited by István Süli-Zakar), Debrecen,
Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2004
7
framework provided by the globalisation process. The relativisation of the State borders takes
place simultaneously with conditions of the worldwide affirmation of other factors arising from
the process of de-centralisation as a response to the process of globalisation. Due to this State
relativisation, another relativisation seems to be inevitable. It is the relativisation of one of the
State characteristic namely the border that we perceive more and more diffuse, although it used
to seem untouchable. At the same time, this relativisation of the State border does not
necessarily mean the disappearance of the border in itself; nevertheless, we may realise that we
witness a redefinition and a repositioning of the border12.
The process of the EU enlargement brings about mutations in our perception of the
change of borders from boundaries (which determine the practice of the principle of national
sovereignty) to limits combining local, regional and national responsibilities with community
responsibilities. From this point of view, Europe is a genuine laboratory; it is a supranational
experimental avant-garde, “a kind of meta-state-centric globalisation”13, where there is
transition from primary anthropocentrism, conceived as an exclusively State business, to open
anthropocentrism, to cosmocentric dynamics that are “heard amongst others on four
fundamental levels: identitary, state, political, and communicational”14.
Thirdly, Eurolimes considers that the idea that European borders represent obstacles,
or issues, in the building of the European identity actually represents a sign of understanding,
comparing and assuming the idea of Europe. Ideias de Europa: que fronteiras? (considered by
the colloquium organised in Coimbra on February 12 – 21, 200415) provides the perspective of
an intellectual synthesis which brings together not only the papers of the authors who attended
that colloquium, but presents an entire European reflection, and more, on the cognitive issue of
Europe’s borders.
Paraphrasing Massimo d’Azeglio who, in 1860, used to say in the context of Italy’s
unification: “Having made Italy, now we must make the Italians”, we may say that “Having
made Europe, now we must make the Europeans”16. The process for such an initiative is now
developing. If before the Maastricht treaty the central issue of the European discourse was
confined to the economic elements, then even the topic of the borders was subordinated to this
topic, today however the issues of European identity17 and European citizenship18 have now
begun to dominate the political and intellectual discourse of the elites19.
Despite this, the debate should also be expanded to include new topics and points of
view, especially those coming from Eastern and Central Europe. This region will be to the
forefront of the European scene for another two decades, following the process of enlargement
initiated on May 1st, 2004, and whose horizon in time and space is dominated by ambiguity.
On the one hand, this development of ideas is necessary since the concept of the
identity of Europe is dominated by “ambiguous territoriality”, where the quality of being an EU
member is based on the nation-state, and where European citizenship necessarily passes through
the quality of being a citizen of a European State, where trans-European mobility for work does
not always find a common language within the Schengen agreements20.
12
J.Luc Piermay, op.cit., p 164.
Georges Contogeorgis, “Identité nationale, identité “politéiene” et citoyenneté à l’époque de la
“mondialisation”, in Europa em Mutação. Cidadania. Identidades. Diversidade Cultural (ed. Maria
Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), Coimbra, 2003, p. 160
14
Ibidem
15
Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, Ideias de Europa: que fronteiras?, Coimbra, Cuarteto Editora, 2004
16
M. Berezin, op. cit., p. 15-16
17
Georges Contogeorgis, “L’Europe culturelle et la géopolitique », in Ideias de Europa: que fronteiras?
(ed. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), …pp. 71-86
18
Rui Manuel Moura Ramos, «A cidadania da União Europeia », in Ideias de Europa: que fronteiras?
(ed. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), …pp. 43-52
19
Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, London, Macmillan, 1995; Riva Kastoryano,
Quelle identité pour l’Europe? Le multiculturalisme à l’épreuve, Paris, Presse de Sciences-Po, 1998; Bo
Strath, Europe an the Othe rand Europe as the Other, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2000
20
M. Berezin, op. cit., p. 16,
13
8
On the other hand, Europe as a cultural space is dominated by an “emotional
attachment”21. Europe does not have a common civic area22, a common public space23, or a
common cultural one24, which would constitute the foundations for building a European
identity. There still are a lot of obstacles to the effective development of a European public area
which would form the foundation for a common identity. It is enough to remember that the
issue of the European public area was not a priority for the political and economic leaders
during the process of constructing Europe25. Paradoxically, a common European memory used
to exist only at the epoch of historical conflicts between the EU Member States26. It is the
preservation of the historical and national memory which contributes to the maintenance of the
nation-state. The ceaseless hegemony of the nation-state, even in the presence of the process of
European integration, underlines the fact that today and for a long time in the future, the issue
of the internal borders of the EU must be perceived only in a transnational manner, and only
timidly as a post-national attribute. Therefore, there still are several discourses to be resolved
before we can bring ourselves to establish a solid coherence over the internal borders of the EU
and a closure of its external borders27.
The topic of a European identity as part of the issue relating to borders has to be
expanded with viewpoints coming from the non-Europeans who live on the continent. The
adaptability of the non-Europeans will have deep consequences upon the inhabitants of
European origin, forcing them to rethink their own identity and maybe to make up a new one.
Naturally, the question is “what kind of entity is Europe”? There are two possible
answers. One is given by the majority of its members (the ones belonging to the old Europe,
stressing the unitary character of the European entity). The other answer is provided by the
newcomers to Europe (citizens of the new Member States and the non-Europeans settling in
Europe). They stress the plural character of the European entity based on the respect for
difference and diversity. If we look into the two answers, there is a common denominator given
by the cultural features of the European identity.
At the present stage of the process of European construction, two elements lie at the
basis of the European identity. These elements still form barriers between different
communities in Europe. Religion (particularly Christianity) is one of these elements. Europe has
been created by confronting and resisting other religions (especially Islam) ever since the
crusades of the Middle Ages which resulted in the blocking of the way of the Turks into Europe
by the Habsburg Empire at the end of the 17th century. But it was still religion which created
factions within Europe starting with the Great Schism by between the Oriental Orthodox
Christianity, and the Western Catholic Christianity in the year 1054, and continuing with the
Reform and the secularisation of the 18th and 19th centuries. If we add to this the ideological
division of Europe in the 20th century and the establishment of the European Community as a
Western European club, we may draw the conclusion that, beyond a fragile unity, time has
21
Ibidem.
Renaud de la Brosse, “Espace médiatique européen et « communauté de destines » : complémentarités
ou oppositions entre échelles continentales, nationales, régionales et locales ?», Ideias de Europa: que
fronteiras? (ed. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), …pp. 283-296.
23
Ioan Horga, “The National Media Impact on European Security”, in International and European
security versus the Explosion of Global Media (ed. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, Renaud de La Brosse,
Ioan Horga), Bruxelles, 2004, pp. 25-41
24
Mercedes Samaniego Boneu, « Las fronteras socio-culturales de la Unión Europea”, in Ideias de
Europa: que fronteiras? (ed. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), …pp. 87-98
25
Craig Calhon, « The Democratic Integration of Europe » in Europe without Borders. Remapping
Territory, Citizenship and Identity in Transnational Age (ed. M. Berezin, M. Schain), p. 272
26
Yann Laurent, “Existe-t-il une mémoire commune européenne?”, in le Monde, 5 mars 2003
27
C. Calhon, op. cit., p. 272
22
9
created numerous East – West “fault lines”, particularly in setting up the concept of European
civilisation, a concept which excluded Eastern Europe28.
The synthesis of national and ethnic identities is the second basic element of the
European identity. Europe is a family of cultures, a result of the mixture of historical tradition
and cultural inheritance. These cultural families owe a lot to certain foreign inheritances in
Europe, such as Islam. This has greatly contributed to shaping the European culture. According
to Krishan Jumar, the relationships between the Islam and Europe have to be conceived in the
context of a historical ambivalence dominated by hostility and cooperation at the same time29.
There would not have been a Mediaeval intellectual Europe without the contributions of
Avicenna, Averoes, Ibn Khaldun and other Arab thinkers that have been spreaders of the Greek
and Roman cultures. We could not speak of the Balkan civilisation, without the synthesis of the
Orthodox Christian traditions with the Ottoman ones30. Although each of these cultures and
traditions are barriers in themselves, history has shown that they are not necessarily everlasting,
since they are closely intertwined.
In the fourth place, Eurolimes considers that, although there are trends contradictory to
the process of demographic decline of nation-states, migrational borders will be preserved for at
least a few more decades.
The European nation-states are obliged to ensure the replacement of the population
that has left the labour market in order to support the need to maintain a constant labour force,
as well as to contribute to the pension funds for aged population. Without replacing the
population, the whole European system of social security will be in danger of catastrophe.
Paradoxically, immigrants and their communities – for at present, there are still labour
resources in Central and Eastern Europe – are the most important factor for sustaining state
social security. For economic and cultural reasons, immigrants who have settled in European
nation-states have a higher birth rate than the native indigenous European population. Integral
incorporation of immigrants to the European nation-states through citizenship will make them
legal participants in the labour market who will contribute the necessary taxes for the social
security system. Of course, there are a lot of people in the EU who think that the response to the
crisis of social security system will not result in demographic decline. Instead they wish to
preserve (even within the European area) barriers against the free circulation of persons, these
being presented as quotas, or contingents31.
These administrative barriers will enable the selection staff and specialist according to
the labour market needs. However, they will be more and more restrictive towards family unity.
There is a real campaign to banish people who are “without papers”, and to refuse free medical
assistance, which makes Jean-Pierre Colin state that “we are close to a French-style
apartheid”32. Both airborne and terrestrial barriers are created. We also have the blocking of
transport carrying Romanian citizens at the Spanish border in humiliating conditions, just to
echo a political triumph. Certain politicians have a desire to create the image that the borders
still work on our continent. This seems to turn Europe into an area where the regime of public
and private freedoms are a subjective factor solely dependant on a decision-making political
group, and which might look in a few years from a historical point of view to be a new form of
deportation.
Encouraging the immigration of specialists subject to the principle of quotas will only
be a temporary thing unless it is accompanied by family unity. It will change nothing in the
human universe, where migrants come or leave.
28
Norman Davis, Europe: A History, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.7-31; Krishan Kumar,
“The Idea of Europe”, in Europe without Borders. Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in T
ransnational Age (ed. M. Berezin, M. Schain), pp. 36-37
29
K. Kumar, op. cit., p. 38
30
N. Davis, op. cit., p. 256
31
Jean Pierre Colin, “La nouvelle frontière de l’immigration”, in Ideias de Europa: que fronteiras? ….,
pp. 257-266
32
Ibidem, p. 261
10
Maintaining these administrative barriers to migration (and migration is necessary to
maintain a progressing economic trend) represents a divergence between the expectations of
political leaders (with a pro-European position) and the mass of people who are more and more
sceptical and even hostile to the European project. In 2005, the European Constitution was
rejected in France and the Netherlands mostly because of the fear for the decrease in the level of
social security guaranteed by the national state and influenced by the ever increasing freedom of
movement required by the Community institutions.
This shows that there is a crisis of communication and information between political
leaders and public opinion, which works as a new type of border within the EU. This border is
determined on the one hand by the level of expectations of political leaders who wish to pass
quickly to a transnational perception of European realities and the population where public
opinion wishes to preserve national political mechanisms within the European area. On the
other hand, the barrier is determined by the level of understanding of the EU political area as a
new type of transnational community that no longer guarantees (and often is in contradiction
with) the ideas of the national public body. The EU is a vast area which includes the citizens of
the Member States and European and non-European immigrants. The emergence of the
European area is related to multiple and complex interactions between States and collective
identities expressed through groups of immigrants. Likewise, other transnational participants
(such as leaders of volunteer associations, businesspersons, or activists in development strategy)
expand their activities outside the nation-state and express their solidarity within transnational
networks based on joint identities and interests33.
The increase of human mobility and the development of the means of communication
have also contributed to increasing cross-border relationships by building up networks and
organising communities. Another element to motivate immigrants to set up transnational
networks is national, linguistic, or religious fragmentation, which makes political programmes
in the host country grant immigrants the status of minorities. The most active immigrants in
setting up transnational networks are the Turks34.
Institutionalisation of transnational communities requires coordination of the activities
based on common objectives and interests. At the same time, a coordination of resources and
information to cross-national borders is required35. There are several situations where
immigrants – not only the ones coming from the former communist countries, but also coming
from outside the EU – are more European in actions and thinking than the indigenous European.
Therefore, the objective of the transnational networks is to strengthen representation on a
European level as a fundamental premise to ensure their recognition on a national level. The
most active spokespersons of the immigrant networks on a European level consider that States
are the most powerful adversaries of their actions. Even though States are subject to European
norms, States seek to preserve their autonomy in internal decisions, while seeking to remain the
main participants in negotiations in international relations.
In the fifth place, Eurolimes starts from the premise that one has to make the
distinction between the physical, or territorial, borders and the identitary ones. By territorial
borders, one understands the institutional boundaries of a territory. They are frequently
associated with officially sanctioned boundaries separating one State from another. Identitarian,
or cultural, borders may correspond to territorial divisions issued only by differences amongst
identities and the “cluster of inhabitants within a physically undivided space”36 evolving
33
Riva Kastoryano, “Transnational Networks and Political Participation”, in Europe without Borders.
Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in Transnational Age…p. 67
34
Ibidem, p. 68
35
David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Gouvernance,
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995
36
Roy J. Eidelson, Ian S. Lustick, “National Identity Repertories, Territory, and Globalization”, in Europe
without Borders. Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in T ransnational Age…p. 98
11
37
towards the “parochialization of natives’ identities” . Territorial, or physical, borders cannot
stop the reception of identitary goods transmitted by means of mass communication.
That is why the perception of contemporary and future borders has to start from the
premise that the only barrier that may act in the world is represented by the identitarian
boundary between National Homeland and the World, “a barrier whose resistance to the smooth
transmission of patterns of change on the one side into patterns of change on the other is
produced only by the degree to which the patterns of identity activation and the composition of
identity repertories of National Homeland and World inhabitants differ”38.
In the sixth place, Eurolimes will seek to enrich the models of structuring the European
borders with new data.
By publishing topic surveys focused on the model of market border39, where Europe’s
internal borders disappear, while the external borders rise again, the mechanisms of crossborder communication and the elements specific for business management in the cross-border
area will come to the foreground.
By publishing surveys referring to Euroregions as expressions of subsidiarity; crossborder cooperation from the perspective of Community Laws; the issue of good governance in a
borderless Europe; public services in the cross-border area; persons’ freedom of movement in
the cross-border area; Jurgen Habermas’ civic model, where internal and external borders are
transnational, the database will be consolidated with recent details proving that there is the
perspective for the borders to disappear as the European political community evolves towards a
global community40.
Another aim is to publish surveys referring to the media and its voice in a borderless
Europe41; the Church and its voice in a borderless Europe; the demographical heritage and the
border identity and Europe and its borders: historical perspective42, the pluralist cultural model43,
where inclusion and exclusion areas remain clear and are marked by the attachment to a cultural
way of thinking, acquiring more consistency in the perspective of a Europe open to the world as
major actor in international relations44.
Finally, Eurolimes will seek to be an initiative ceaselessly open to reflection and
information, eliminating any barriers by bringing forward certain hot topics for the European
continent concerning the borders. This initiative will be debated in the Focus of each number. I
would like to thank for this idea to Professor Livio Missir de Lusignan, a well-known specialist
in the issue of Turkey’s European identity. He will commence the series of debates with a paper
referring to the historical arguments of Turkey’s integration to the EU. Eurolimes will receive
points of view referring to this topic on its address for a whole year; these opinions will be
published in two successive issues of the journal in a special Focus column called Pros and
Cons.
At the same time, Eurolimes will show an open interest – due to the reviews carried
out by the members of the editorial committee and other collaborators – in individual and
collective opinions in the field of borders and cross-border cooperation present in books and
37
Ibidem, pp. 106-111
Ibidem. P. 98
39
This is the most widely used model in the literature of the European Commission, as well as several
other political discourses referring to international trada and immigration.
40
Jürgen Habermas, “Citoyenneté et identité nationale”, in L’Europe au soir du siècle. Identité et
democratie (ed. Jacques Lenoble, Nicole Dewandre), Paris, Editions Espirit, 1992, pp. 17-39.
41
Will be the next volume of the Journal Eurolimes (2ed semester 2006)
42
Europe and Its Borders: Historical Perspective is the main topic of the 1st volume of the Journal
Eurolimes (1st semester, 2006)
43
J. Nicholas Entrikin, “Political Community, Identity and Cosmopolitan Place”, in Europe without
Borders. Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in T ransnational Age…, p. 61
44
Klára Czimre, Euroregional development at EU adhere moment - especially the Hungarian euroregions,
Studia Geographica, nr.15, Debrecen 2005, 223 p
38
12
magazines in the Eurolimes library. Scientific meetings in the field of borders and cross-border
cooperation to which the members of the board of Eurolimes participate will also be presented.
Of course, this is the result of a teamwork of the editorial staff of Eurolimes and
especially of the people who have decided to lay the bases for an Institute for Euroregional
Studies as a Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence oriented towards the study and
research of the issue of the European borders, both internal and external, and to train specialists
in the border-related issues.
Such a demarche is also a solidarity key of the people concerned with the issue of the
border in European and extra-European universities, institutes, and research centres with young
dynamic staff eager to debate upon ideas from a point of view specific to an area where border
mobility in the past hundred years has been present, and where citizens still live with the notion
of border in their identity card, or in personal or collective memory. You can ask a citizen from
Chernivtsi Square (Ukraine), born in 1917, which is his identity. He will answer that he was
born as a citizen of the Austro-Hungarian Empire; in 1918 he became a citizen of Romania; in
1940, he became a citizen of the USSR; from 1941 until 1944 he became a citizen of Romania;
from 1944 he become citizen of USSR and since 1991, he has been a citizen of Ukraine.
Bibliography
BEREZIN, M., “Territory, Emotion, and Identity. Spatial Recalibration in the New Europe”, in
Europe without Borders. Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in Transnational
Age (ed. M. Berezin, M. Schain), The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and
London, 2003, pp. 1-32;
BEREZIN, M.; SCHAIN, M., Europe without Borders. Remapping Territory, Citizenship and
Identity in Transnational Age, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London,
2003;
CALHON, C., « The Democratic Integration of Europe » in Europe without Borders.
Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in T ransnational Age ……., pp.. 243-274 ;
COLIN, J.P., “La nouvelle frontière de l’immigration”, in Ideias de Europa: que fronteiras?,
Coimbra, Ed. Cuarteto, 2004. pp. 257-266 ;
CONTOGEORGIS, G., “Identité nationale, identité “politéiene et citoyenneté à l’époque de la
mondialisation”, in Europa em Mutação. Cidadania. Identidades. Diversidade Cultural
(ed. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), Coimbra, 2003, p. 155-174;
IDEM, “L’Europe culturelle et la géopolitique », in Ideias de Europa: que fronteiras? (ed.
Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), Coimbra, Cuarteto Editora, 2004, pp. 71-86 ;
CZIMRE, K., Euroregional development at EU adhere moment - especially the Hungarian
euroregions, Studia Geographica, nr.15, Debrecen 2005;
DAVIS, N., Europe : A History, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996;
DELANTY, G., Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality, London, Macmillan, 1995;
DUNGACIU, D., NaŃiunea şi provocările postmodernităŃii: istorie, concepte, perspective,
Bucureşti, Ed. Tritonic, 2004;
EIDELSON, R.J., LUSTICK, I.S., “National Identity Repertories, Territory, and
Globalization”, in Europe without Borders. Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity
in T ransnational Age…pp. 89-117;
ENTRIKIN, J.N., “Political Community, Identity and Cosmopolitan Place”, in Europe without
Borders. Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in T ransnational Age…,p. 51-63;
HABERMAS, J., “Citoyenneté et identité nationale”, in L’Europe au soir du siècle. Identité et
democratie (ed. Jacques Lenoble, Nicole Dewandre), Paris, Editions Espirit, 1992, pp. 1739.
HARGUIDEGUY, J.-B., “La coopération transfrontalière comme laboratoire de la construction
européenne: le cas du Consorcio Bidasoa-Txingudi dans le Pays Basque”, in Mosella
(Universite de Metz), tome XXVII, nr. 3-4/2002, pp. 151-157;
HELD, D., Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan
Gouvernance, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995;
13
HORGA, I., “The National Media Impact on European Security”, in International and
European security versus the Explosion of Global Media (ed. Maria Manuela Tavares
Ribeiro, Renaud de la Brosse, Ioan Horga), Bruxelles, 2004, pp.25-41.
KASTORYANO, R., Quelle identité pour l’Europe? Le multiculturalisme à l’épreuve, Paris,
Presse de Sciences-Po, 1998;
IDEM, “Transnational Networks and Political Participation”, in Europe without Borders.
Remapping Territory, Citizenship and Identity in T ransnational Age…p. 64-88.
KUMAR, K., “The Idea of Europe”, in Europe without Borders. Remapping Territory,
Citizenship and Identity in T ransnational …., pp. 33-50 ;
LA BROSSE, R. de, “Espace médiatique européen et « communauté de destines » :
complémentarités ou oppositions entre échelles continetales, nationales, régionales et
locales ?», Ideias de Europa: que fronteiras? (ed. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), …pp.
283-296.
LAURENT, Y., “Existe-t-il une mémoire commune européenne?”, in le Monde, 5 mars 2003.
MOURA RAMOS, R.M., «A cidadania da União Europeia », in Ideias de Europa: que
fronteiras? (ed. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), …pp. 43-52.
PIERMAY, J.L., ARBARET-SCHULZ, Ch., 2000: Les frontières de la ville européenne: des
révélateurs de mutation et d’invention urbaines, Strasbourg, 2001;
PIERMAY, J.L., “Ces frontières qui vous attendent. Recherches menées à Strasbourg”, in
Europe between Millenniums. Political Geograpghy Studies (ed. Alexandru Ilies, Jan
Wendt), Oradea, 2003, pp. 163-170;
ROSIERE, S., “L’Union Européenne, laboratoire d’une nouvelle hierarchie des frontières”, in
Mosella (Universite de Metz), tome XXVII, nr. 3-4/2002, pp. 47-52.
RUGGIE, J.G., “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International
Relations”, in International Organization, 1993, 47 (1), pp. 139-174;
SAMANIEGO BONEU, M., « Las fronteras socio-culturales de la Unión Europea”, in Ideias de
Europa: que fronteiras? (ed. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro), …pp. 87-98.
STRATH, B., Europe an the Other and Europe as the Other, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2000;
TAVARES RIBEIRO, M.M., Ideias de Europa: que fronteiras?, Coimbra, Ed. Quarteto, 2004;
****Cross-border Co-operation – Schengen Challenges (edited by István Süli-Zakar),
Debrecen, Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2004
15
I. Studies and Articles
1. The European Borders between the Dynamics of Regions and
the Challenges of Globalization
István SŐLI ZAKAR (Debrecen) ◙ Regions for the United Europe
Robert T. GRIFFITHS and Chris QUISPEL (Leiden) ◙ When Borders Move: An
agenda for historical research
Gerard DELANTY (Liverpool), ◙Borders in a Changing Europe: Dynamics of
Openness and Closure
Robert BIDELEUX (Swansea ) ◙ The limits of Europe
Maria MARCZEWSKA-RYTKO (Lublin) ◙ Europe and the challenges of
globalization
16
Regions for the United Europe
Istvan SŐLI-ZAKAR
The term region became a fashionable expression, a vogue-word, a cliché in the
seventies and in the eighties. Even so, in the nineties it was a star expression used by many and
interpreted in numerous ways. This Latin word in the everyday language is used as a synonym
for area, land, zone, landscape, district or a territorial unit within states. Of course, for the
geographers, the terms landscape or district have completely different connotations and do not
regard them as technical terms with the same meaning. Therefore, it is important to make it
clear what the representatives of the various disciplines mean by the word region and what kind
of regions we may talk about when discussing the regional policy of the European Union.
Concept of regions
The disciplines using the concept of regions treat regions as particularly demarcated
territorial units separated from their environs, placing them somewhere between the local and
global levels. An area belonging to a region is united by multifactoral cohesion
comprehending the wide range of socio-economic processes, the regional identity
consciousness of the inhabitants and the system of regional institutions with real
independence. It is natural that the different disciplines emphasise different factors when
defining the word region (AMIN, A. – TOMANEY, J. 1995.).
When creating a regional unit, geographers rely on the basis of the physical
geographical endowments, the common history, the farming methods and structures and
the strong connection and interdependence based on them, the more or less homogeneous
system of the infrastructure and the regional consciousness existing in the heads of the
people. This definition makes it clear that regional geography emphasises the natural-socialeconomic (functional) interdependence of the components of the regions.
The representatives of sociology and cultural anthropology regard the spiritualmental and ethnic-cultural homogeneity, the similarity of the mental and cultural values as the
most important when defining a region. From the aspect of the theory of administration the
region is an institutionalised power-government-administration authority which is characterised
by a wide-scale regional self-governance. Political scientists attach great importance to the
demarcation of centres and the spatial division of power. Historians interpret regions as a
particular product of protracted historical processes.
In my opinion, the region is such a socio-economic territorial unit which is based on
the close co-operation and homogeneity in interest of its “components” but it cannot
always be defined by definite geographic boundaries. Resulting from their nature, in the
geographical space, the administrative units – counties, regions, provinces, countries – represent
regionalisation and the “constancy”, while the outcomes of the process of regionalism are the
macroregional spatial structures representing “inconstancy”. Nevertheless, the region in both
cases represents homogeneity manifested in the social-economic-cultural field experienced
within the geographical spatial heterogeneity (SÜLI-ZAKAR, I. 1994).
The region - according to the social geographers – is the functional connection or
integration of urban gravitation zones, settlement agglomerations and infrastructural
networks geographically located close to each other. The base of the evolution of a region is
the territorial interweaving of the (developed) society and economy and the recognition of
the close belonging to each other and interdependency resulting from the historical
antecedents of the local communities. Thus, the region is first of all a (social) geographical
integration with intensive inner cohesion. (SÜLI-ZAKAR, I. 1997)
The region developing as a consequence of the geographical integration is always
such a field in which the influence of the centrifugal forces is stronger than that of the
17
centripetal forces. Resulting from the nature of the forming of regions the borders of the
regions are elastic in the case of the regionalism. Partly, in the sense that the influence of
several region forming factors may be present at the same time in one segment defined as an
entity of the geographical space, on a geographically determined area but their “fields” do not
exactly coincide. It is especially possible since the role of the non-natural and social
environment became powerful in the creation of regions. On the other hand, the elasticity of the
regions is also valid with respect to the changes of the factors and their role in time – the
significance of some becoming moderated while others intensify. The sphere of operation and
attraction of the regional centres continuously changes depending on their “strength” and the
momentary result of the “struggle” with the rivals (ARMSTRONG, H. W. – VICKERMAN, R. W.
1995).
I do not agree with the weighed consideration of the physical geographical
endowments fortunate when analysing spatial structures – although the micro-landscapes might
have a determining role in the development of local patriotism. As opposed to the physical
geographical territorial units (landscapes), in the case of the birth of regions the institutional
and economic space plays a fundamental role since the actors of the institutionalorganisational-economic life (regional institutions, private entrepreneurs, firms, budgetary and
non-profit organisations) are the most active formers of regions. One may take it for certain –
based on the western examples- that in the future the basis of regional development will be
constituted by the region (or regions co-operating for reaching common goals) in Central
Europe, too (AMIN, A. – TOMANEY, J. 1995, HORVÁTH, GY. 1998).
The recognition appears in the Western – and more and more often in the Hungarian –
special literature that the existence of the regions and the urban centres is closely related. As
the vice-mayor of Lyon put it, “There is no strong region without a vigorous city of great
efficiency in its centre.” Therefore, the attraction influence, power and development of the
urban centres and their “spatial structural surplus” in comparison with the rivals are essential
from the aspect of the evolution and operation of the macroregional geographical structures
or regions (PÁLNÉ KOVÁCS, I. 1994).
The cities in a region or in the neighbouring region do not only co-operate and share
their tasks but also compete – or may compete – with each other. In my opinion, therefore, there
is a sharp rivalry between the urban centres (cities) for the innovations, well-paid jobs and the
acquisition of capital and development funds. A competitive city needs a special character,
advantages which are valuable on the market of capital and a well organised regional and place
marketing policy.
The region is the phenomenon of the mesolevel placed between the local and global
levels. It is a transmissional field through which – as through a special filter – the influences of
the global processes infiltrate into the local endowments and conditions and where the local
processes accumulate mostly on the regional level and thus they integrate into the global
systems (SÜLI-ZAKAR, I. 1999; TÓTH J. – GOLOBICS P. 1996).
It also comes from the dialectic approach of the region that there exists a hierarchical
system of the regions built up of levels. A region may consist of several subregions – where
the subregions partly coincide – and an area regarded as a region from various aspects may
constitute a subregion of another larger region. Although, the inner uniformity or homogeneity
is a common aspect when demarcating a region we must also admit due to the division of labour
between the regional centres and the peripheries related to them and their varying roles
essentially make all regions proportioned. The socio-economic structure and especially the
disparities in the level of development and the differences between controlling and being
controlled generate considerable dissimilarities between the regions. (NEMES NAGY, J. 1996).
The complexity of the question of regions is shown by the diversity of the views and
opinions of the regional researchers even with respect to the fact whether the regions may be
regarded as objective or subjective formations. József Tóth encourages the researcherspoliticians not to bother with the creation of regions but to recognise the objective reality in the
geographical space ((TÓTH J. – GOLOBICS P. 1996)). Nevertheless, Zoltán Cséfalvay says that
18
“The region is not a ready-made physical, economic and social phenomenon which may be
seized in an objective way but a construction resulting from a social process. The regions are
created by us. We add special connotations to a piece of the geographic space, we render a
certain content to it through which this piece of the space becomes a region. The regions are
created by us, by the people during a special economic, social, political and cultural
constructional method called regionalisation.” (CSÉFALVAY, Z. 2004).
László Faragó established that “the regionalisation is a hatalmi harc, the region is first
of all an administrational-political tool, social – here scientific-political – product, a discursive
product created with the help of linguistic terms which gains its final meaning in the praxis.”
(FARAGÓ, L. 2004).
The contradicting views may be “pacified” only if we acknowledge that there are at
least two types of regions co-existing in the geographical space – or we acknowledge that a
region may “behave” in two different ways, that is, it is a dual-faced phenomenon.
Regionalism and regionalisation
My observations and research experiences convinced me that the geographical
phenomena related to the regions are dual-faced. In his studies, the internationally
acknowledged regional expert, Lorenz, D. (1989, 1991, 1992) differentiates between the
phenomena of regionalisation and regionalism.
The process of regionalism is supported by a relatively permanently existing complex
system of physical, social, economic and cultural factors; as a result of which, the economic and
social relations between certain landscapes, settlement agglomerations and microregions may
become so intensive that these regions may be regarded as contiguous areas from the aspect
of regional structuring. Thus, there is a high level integration developing between the
components on the basis of the fundamental geographical-social-economic processes, values
and interests. Regionalism, as a process, basically means the development of natural (that is,
objective) relations relying on (geographically speaking) physical-social-economic laws.
As opposed to regionalism, the regionalisation is an institutionally administered and
controlled administrative-political process – just like the creation of the administrative regions
in Hungary. Such an administrative-political community of self-governments geographically
located nearby to each other which are led by professional politicians. The final objective in this
case is to achieve a more favourable position for the (local and regional) self-governments. As
far as regionalisation is concerned, therefore, the institutional regulation and political
administration are dominant – that is, these regions are really created by the people.
Regarding the essence of the process, the formation of regions – both from the aspect
of regionalism and regionalisation – means geographical integration. The Hungarian
terminology does not yet makes a difference between the two process, and even the foreign
literature tends to use only the concept of regionalism and refers to it as an antonym of the
global world economic processes (globalism).
Of course, I do not deny myself that these two processes – from a geographical
aspect, too – are related to each other; - partly as regionalism may contribute to the
acceleration of the political-social-economic processes, - and partly the success of the local and
regional self-governmental work and power conflict (i.e. the regionalisation) and the
democratisation of the public life create a proper basis for the full scale evolvement of
regionalism. In case it develops, the important institutional systems in Hungary, such as
regional development and regional planning will become almost “independent” from the local
self-governments and state administration.
In the case of the dual-faced regional phenomena, the essential links and relations
mean that regionalism is most of all a horizontal integration, while regionalisation is mainly
a vertical integration. This definition points out that in fact both phenomena are regional
integrations taking place in the geographical space but the process of the organisation of the
components significantly differ (SÜLI-ZAKAR, I. 1999).
19
Regionalisation is not the result of equal partners and the difference in the share from
the (regional) political power – even if there is a democratic structure – presupposes some
subordination. (This will – in Central Europe as well – require, for instance, the differentiation
between the local and regional governments “by levels”.)
Regionalism means a horizontal integration – i.e. equality– in spite of the existing
core-periphery relations. In Western Europe, the opportunity opened up – on the soil of the
common interests – for the settlements, communities, economic organisations, etc. to live and
plan in a strategic way. This, however, requires an existing regionalism which cannot simply
be declared but has to evolve as the consequence of socio-economic development. Of course, it
also must be kept in mind that as a result of the social changes and economic transformation the
spatial relations also change continuously.
As a result of regionalism a macroregional geographical structure evolves which
enables the optimal use of the human, ecological and economic resources. My experiences lead
me to believe that nowadays the self-governments are afraid of the horizontal relations, cooperations and integrations that rely on common goals. However, the willingness and capacity
to co-operate is the feature of the true self-governance. Therefore, the importance of cooperations within the regions must be improved in the future and the horizontal selfgovernmental, macroregional and international will get a strategic role.
Thus, being processes are dominant features of both regionalism and regionalisation
when keeping in mind the building of regions but in the case of regionalisation – from a
historical aspect – it is characterised by the interruption of the process. (The borders of states,
provinces and counties in some cases prove to be rather permanent.) Regionalism is
characterised by continuous changes and a regression in development – although, there
may occur rapid changes and leaps in the continuance of the regionalism as well. These may
be caused by new physical-social-economic processes, short or long events or even external and
forced interventions (destructive floods, construction of motorways, establishment of
universities, drawing of new borders, etc.).
This permanent or continuous change is well demonstrated by the studies on the
changes of the gravitation zones of the regional centres of Eastern Hungary calculated for
four time periods. In the geographical space the gravitation zones – in accordance with the
“power” of the macroregional and higher centres – are in the constant phase of expansioncontraction, i.e. in the state of territorial transformation.
We may expect efficient regional policy from the building out of regionalism and
regionalisation, the refining-forming mechanism of regional and settlement development and
catalyser role of the strengthening private economies. There are more and more of us who think
that one should not expect the administrative-institutional rationalisation attempts assuming the
modernisation of administration to improve regional policy. This essentially requires state
decentralisation in the course of which the forming (NUTS 2) regions steel themselves with
adequate “power” adopting the principle of subsidiarity.
The operation of the effective regional policy primarily requires the settlement of
(especially R&D) institutions with regional scope, universities, regional chambers, development
agencies, banks with regional interest and civil organisations. Unfortunately, today in the new
member states of the European Union, the harmonisation or even initiation of regional planning,
regional marketing and the development of the macroregional infrastructure – which actually
mean the basis of regionalism – are really underdeveloped and weak in comparison with the
sectoral policy and sectoral planning.
In Western Europe, the “scene” of the functioning and competing of the communities,
settlements and economy – confirmed by the results of many researches – are less represented
by the area of the countries enclosed by state borders but more likely the region formed on
the basis of the co-operation – which may even belong to several countries at the same time.
Regionalism became an organic part of the European thinking.
20
Western European regionalism
Throughout Western Europe, the “scene” of the operation and competition of the
communities, the settlements and the economy – as many research results support it – are not
as much the countries separated by the state borders but the regions that are developedformed on the basis of the co-operation (even on the area of more than one country).
Regionalism and regionalisation became an organic part of the European thinking. This
phenomenon does not lack traditions; even so we may establish that this specific European
model is built on a history of several centuries (ARMSTRONG, H. W. – VICKERMAN, R. W. 1995;
BERNEK Á.-SÜLI-ZAKAR I. 1997) .
The small area of Europe and its geographical indentation determines the
decentralised state structure due to its basic morphological endowments. The deepening
European integration exploited and intensified this structure which had regarded the
“supranational” ideology as its basic principle since the fifties. This notion realised the
opportunities hidden in the European regionalism relatively early. The forming integration
reduced the competency of the national level (national market, national borders, national
currency) and activated the “dormant” regional level opening new development ways for it.
The ideological-cultural-historical values appearing on the supranational level were
complemented with direct financial interests as a result of the establishment of the regional
support systems.
It is mainly due to the presidential activities of Jacques Delors (1985-1995) that we
can talk about the European Union resulting from the Maastricht Treaty as the “Europe of
Regions”. Delors often emphasised in his speeches that the Committee regards the NUTS 2
level regions as its primary partners and operates the Structural Funds through them. The
regions constitute the building stones of the construction of the new Europe, the “Europe of
Regions”.
Several types of regionalism evolved in Western Europe:
1) Chronologically, the national regionalism was the first to appear – with three different
forms:
a) Federalism – also known as bottom-up regionalism. In these countries
regionalism is usually based on very strong historical backgrounds (e.g.
Germany, Austria, Belgium).
b) Decentralised state – where the regionalism came into existence as a result
of the division of the basic state functions. This type of regionalism is called
top-down regionalism (e.g. France, the Netherlands).
c) In the case of the regionalised state, regionalism is based on the
reincarnation-renaissance of the historical cultural-political regions (e.g.
Spain, Italy).
It is mostly due to the successes of the above regions that many people say that Europe is
no longer the Europe of nations but the “Europe of regions”.
2) From the seventies another type of regionalism became stronger and stronger in
Europe: cross-border (transnational) regionalism. Nowadays, there are almost two
hundred CBC regions – or euroregions – on the continent which aim at the
diminishment of the socio-economic separation and inhibition of development caused
by state borders.
3) The most developed type of the European regionalism is represented by the
international regionalism which primarily means the borrowing of the state
functions and endowing them to the European Union. Most of the endowed tasks are
operated by the NUTS2 level regions.
One of the pillars of the European regionalism is constituted by decentralisation
which resulted in the formation of the new division of supremacy within the nation states.
Accordingly, in the eighties, the regional policies of the nation states was replaced by the own
policies of the regions. In the European Union, the most developed regions are the supporters of
21
the regional decentralisation since they are the primary winners of the united market and the
economic and monetary union.
The rapidly deepening organisational, operational and financial reform of the
European Union was the other vital source of the regionalism. From the eighties, the
bureaucracy of the European Union regarded the regions – which were gaining more and
more power – as partners instead of the nation states.
Following the Second World War, only one-fourth of the population of Western
Europe lived in federalised states. At present, more than sixty percent of the population live
in “federalised-decentralised-regionalised” states where state does not have an exclusive role in
the influencing of the socio-economic processes (AMIN, A. – THRIFT, N. 1994).
The European regions – in most countries – are based on considerable historic
antecedents. Many regions were formed as the renaissance of – mostly feudal – territorial units
and in many cases an almost perfect geographical matching may be disclosed between the
former Grand Duchy, province or kingdom and the present region. Those geographical and
ethnic endowments which partook in the creation of the provinces in the feudal times were
activated and revived in the creation of regions in the past decades. Accordingly, the Western
European special literature on regionalism attached great importance to the regional
consciousness living in the inhabitants in the process of the formation of the regions in whose
development the common history and the recognition of the geographical interdependence
had an outstanding role.
Regions in Hungary
Regional policy in Hungary has been based on the county system for centuries – up
until the past few years. Thus, the Hungarian counties were the executors of the regional
policies. There were no regions or provinces – in a Western European interpretation – in
Hungary at all. The Habsburg rulers – especially with the aim of decentralisation – made a few
attempts to create districts-provinces larger than the counties.
Joseph II suspended the county meetings in 1785 and divided Hungary into ten
districts (not including Transylvania). With the order of the emperor, the new administrative
division of Hungary was created. The administrative districts – “province” – were managed by
appointed royal commissioners who tried to modernise the Hungarian administration system in
accordance with the Josephinian aspects. When creating the districts, Caesar Joseph had a very
good eye to group the counties. It must be acknowledged – on the basis of the instructions sent
to the commissars – that the imperial government had an amazing survey about the Hungarian
circumstances and his measures certify about an intense geographical sensitivity. (Although,
some utopian unrealities can be found also.) The order on the administrative system issued by
Emperor Joseph was put in the wrong by many Hungarians and the fact that he annulled his
order on the Hungarian administrative system in 1790 before his death demonstrates the
uncertain nature of the imperial will.
Emperor Francis Joseph divided the “crown states” of its empire – including
Hungary as well – into administrative units, provinces – further divided into smaller units with
the consideration of their geographical size – which lacked any forms of autonomy in 1851 after
the repeal of the Olmutz Constitution. The appointment of all authorities – even of the city and
village principals – depended on the government. Thus, in the Bach period, the executors of the
absolutism regarded the division of the Hungarian core area – deprived of the Marches,
Transylvania and the Serbian Voivodina – as the most important in the area of administration.
Their aim was to cease all kinds of close relations between the Hungarian districts so that their
relationship with each other would be not more than with any other Austrian province.
Although, there were more or less rational administrative and economic aspects followed in the
regulation of the territorial division (e.g. the creation of Northern Bihar – the later Hajdú
county) but the main goal was still to push the “Hungarian element” into the background. The
seats of the districts were ruled by the district lord lieutenant endowed with all power. The
22
absolutist oppression resolved in the sixties and the county responsibility increased again – so in
1867, following the Compromise, the counties were reorganised.
As we have seen, the Habsburg kept dropping their regionalisation concepts in the
course of their reconciliations with the Hungarians and the reconstruction of the selfgovernment system as opposed to the absolutism resulted in the reconstruction of the county
system. As a matter of fact, this historic detail explains the crawling progress of the
Hungarian regionalisation and that in spite of the legal prescriptions we still cannot talk about
the role of regions in the Hungarian regional policy. Nevertheless, this also explains why the
counties – relying on the centuries old experiences as well – were the most intensive in the
development of the new regional policy after the change of regime and in the past few years
they have achieved spectacular results in this field (ENYEDI, GY. 1996).
It is often said that there are no real regions on the area of the present Hungary –
adding in fact that they cannot be created either. The small area, the slight physical geographic
structure, the linguistic-national-cultural homogeneity, the dominant capital, the lack of
territorial units with definite separateness and especially the state centralisation constitute the
main obstacle in the formation of regions. An often mentioned argument against the creation of
real regions is that the people in Hungary do not have personal regional experiences and have
no regional identity. Of course, it should also be considered that the counties and the regions
cannot represent the same weight on the mesolevel because that would result in permanent
tension in the competencies. In spite of the above described considerable obstacles and
inhibiting factors, I think that the creation of the real regions – i.e. the NUTS2 units – is
essential for the EU accession of Hungary and the required regional (statistical) information
service (CZIMRE K. 2003).
In 1990, the Committee on Regionalisation was created with the aim of creating the
real regions. The Committee – following the bottom-up principle – built the regions around the
provisory regional centres (BUDAPEST, Miskolc, Debrecen, Szeged, Pécs and Gyır) from the
gravitation zones of towns and rural key settlements. One of the weaknesses of this plan was
that 45% of the area of the country belonged to the Budapest Region and the other was that it
did not respect the county borders. These two “deficiencies” finally led to the rejection of this
regional division. As a result of the lobbying of the strengthening county self-governments, the
Committee on Regionalisation “constructed the new regions from the counties”. The concept
was brought out – and “dusted” – during the elaboration of the Act on Regional Development
and the Parliament accepted – in fact, only as planning-statistical regions – these seven regions
without changing any of the borders.
Defined by the NRDC (National Regional Development Concept), the planningstatistical regions are contiguous planning and statistical units covering more than one county
each bordered by the administrative boundaries of the member counties. As such, they ensure
the undisturbed operation of the statistical information system as stable and unchanging
territorial units in the long term. This territorial division may be fitted into the regional database
system of the EUROSTAT and all those representative data registration may be organised on
the basis of this which otherwise would not be manageable due to the size and costliness of the
sample on the county level. Furthermore, the regional data may be based on this seven-region
division and the comparability with the NUTS2 regions of the EU is enabled. The county level
regional development councils created regional development councils for handling the common
regional development tasks extending the county borders. Thus, the opportunity for the bottomup construction was not inhibited by the creation of the planning-statistical regions. Taking
into consideration the former experiences of the organisation of mesoregions and the average
size of the EU NUTS2 regions, in Hungary the creation of the seven planning-statistical
regions were found justified in the second half of the nineties (RECHNITZER J. 1993).
In addition to these, the Act on Regional Development and Planning named two
more development regions: the agglomeration of the capital and the high priority tourist district
of the Lake Balaton. Both regions require different development than the other regions of the
country due to their peculiar functions; therefore, they may be called functional regions.
23
It was a serious political will worded by the leaders of the county self-governments
that in the case of Hungary the counties should fulfil the tasks of the NUTS2 regions. Many of
us believed that that the Hungarian counties – which fulfilled not only administrative
functions but also had economic and financing tasks as well – cannot be regarded as regions
due to their size. The regional development system of the European Union regards the
NUTS2 level (the real regions) as the basis, so that the system of territorial preferences and the
regional development praxis are built on them. We do not see any chance to create 19 regions
in Hungary due to her size, number of population and underdeveloped economy – and
consequently there is no need for 19 (full scale) regional centres either.
Of course, one should not neglect the fact that the counties were based on peculiar
local value systems in the past centuries. In the socialist decades, these county level interests
further strengthened as a result of the redistribution (ENYEDI GY. 1994.). The opposition of
these county level interests were faced the most often during the deepening of
regionalisation when creating the administrative regions.
Yet, the statistical system elaborated by the European Union and the Hungarian
needs demand us to do research on the regions. However, the well-founded political
decisions require uniform and unanimous calculation and registration systems. These aspects
were kept in mind when we created the statistical data service units – the planning-statistical
regions – from the counties. I think that the most important advantage of this territorial
structure is that the data can be easily calculated – since they rely on the units created by the
administrative reform of 1949/50. Besides, the number of inhabitants in the units of the
system hardly differs from the European average – so they become comparable. And finally,
the units may be easily derived from one another and at the same time in most cases
constitute real social-economic-regional units, too.
The regional development councils require the review of the most important
resources of the regions and situation analysis and evaluation must be prepared for the regions.
These mean the basis for the oncoming regional and settlement development work and
programming. This work may be accelerated by the support of the European Union – or
significant results may be achieved in a relatively short time. For the precondition of the access
to the Structural Funds is the existence of the development concepts and programmes in the
regions. The use of the funds is regulated by strict financial and legal prescriptions and the
monitoring capacity related to the Structural Funds must be ensured on the regional level. The
progress of regionalisation in Hungary also requires the clarification of the criteria of NUTS2
regions applied in the EU, since the reinforcement of the Hungarian regional institutional
system – including the regional level, too – still faces many uncertainties (HORVÁTH, GY.
1998).
The weakness of the reinforcement of interests on the regional level is demonstrated
by the experiences of the planning process of the First Hungarian National Concept
(MÁRTON, GY. 2004). In the National Development Concept (NDC) prepared between 2000
and 2004 the regions were not given substantive role and thus no individual regional operative
programmes (ROP) were elaborated.
In accordance with the practice of the Structural Funds, the development concepts on
the national level are transformed to the level of sectoral and regional development priorities
through the operative programmes. In Hungary, the positions of the regional side rapidly
deteriorated in the planning stage of the NDC – just like the power of the regional development
agencies lessened. This considerably damaged the principle of partnership since the social
consultations were mostly organised by the agencies in the planning of the NDC (2002-2003).
During the “socialisation” of the planning documents, there were substantive debates – and
even professional proposals – which were collected by the agencies who forwarded them to the
planners. The shortness of the negotiation process, however, did not allow substantive feedback.
Besides, the rapidly changing plans also caused significant problems.
The ability of the regional actors to reinforce their interests was weak from the
beginning and it further deteriorated during the elaboration of the NDC. The sectoral
24
competition and growth oriented approach was more and more often given priority as opposed
to the policy of regional equalisation.
Regional policy of the European Union
The scientific foundation of regional policy is necessary in the new accession
countries, too – since the successful “interventionist” policy must be based on this. The question
of state intervention is often criticised by the researchers of the EU member states. In spite of
this, it is a rather generally accepted idea that without the active participation of the state and
the union the unequal development might lead to more and more considerable spatial
inequalities and – consequently – more and more severe social conflicts. Keeping these in
mind, the European Union realised a very successful regional policy in the past decades whose
study and knowledge are essential tasks for the new accession states (including Romania and
Bulgaria, of course). However, it is not only important to be acquainted with the regional policy
of the European Union but – as it is also expected by the community – also to raise the EU
conformity of the regional development praxis of the accession states to highest possible
level (HORGA, I. 2006).
It is a well known fact that the regional policy of the European Union has a history
of almost half a century which has undergone changes and obvious development – although
with lots of debates in the background. In the past few decades, the regional policy of the EU –
with some exaggeration – became a determining factor in the European Union as opposed to
its former peripheral role. Many agree that the regional policy is one of the most successful
from among the common policies (SÜLI-ZAKAR, I. 1999).
After the Second World War, the intensive economic upswing following the
reconstruction generated diverse processes in the regions of Europe characterised by different
development levels and endowments. The traditional industrial centres and their regions were
modernised, the backwardness of the peripheries further increased and the population
migrating from these areas settled down in the agglomerations of the big cities – adding more
and more to the social problems of the urban centres. Nevertheless, the steady development of
the sixties, the dominant political stream of the period and the economic policy of the welfare
state opened a new era in regional policy, too. The so far hidden, “sleeping” regional
development was replaced by the active state intervention policy. Extensive regional
development programmes were drafted in the countries of Western Europe. An increasing
ratio of the centralised incomes was spent on the transformation of the spatial structures and the
moderation of regional disparities.
The European experiences of the regional crisis management show that the solution
of the crisis situations may be only based on the elaboration and realisation of local and regional
strategies treating the different problems in a complex way, considering the local peculiarities
by all means and promoted the positive regional initiatives. All these necessitated the
decentralisation of the state administration – and within it especially of the decision-making
levels of regional development. In the course of the praxis of the EU regional policy, the
principles and conditions of the supporting of the regions were fixed for the sake of regional
equalisation, ensured partnership in the regional political decisions and decentralised the
regional political decision-making in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity.
In the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community in 1957,
the need for the creation of a common regional policy was not yet included – though the
Preamble already made references to the importance of diminishing regional disparities. Yet, in
the first years the regional development problems were regarded as domestic affairs and
hoped that the rapid economic development would automatically solve the problems of the
backward regions. The expectations were not fulfilled and therefore a common regional policy
was gradually created from 1969 and community funds were established for the economic
modernisation of the backward regions, creation of jobs, re-training and infrastructural
developments (SÜLI-ZAKAR, I. 1999).
25
Significant changes occurred in Western Europe with regard to the relationship
between the urban and rural regions. It is almost natural that following the Second World
War the urban-centred way of thinking became dominant as a consequence of the economic
development. The developments laid emphasis on the urban regions and the development of the
metropolises became intensive until the seventies. The urbanisation process mostly resulted in
the utilisation of the ecological capital and human resources of the rural areas and the
neglecting of the development of the rural regions.
Nevertheless, a new trend could be observed in Western Europe from the end of the
seventies. It urged the multi-polar and regionally more divided regional development as an
answer to the damages affecting the cities. It also paid more attention to the local
endowments, the natural environment and the specific needs of the rural regions. As a
consequence of this, a new type of relationship system evolved between the urban and rural
regions on the more developed areas of the EU by the nineties and the rural regions got new
and dynamic functions. The formerly unanimous flow of migrants to the cities changed, the job
opportunities improved in the rural regions where the economic structure was completely
transformed. Instead of the earlier dominant agrarian population, the rural regions also offered
tertiary – and even quaternary – jobs in a high ratio.
In the seventies, the large-scale manufacture based on mass production was replaced
with a decentralised economic development phase relying on the powerful role of the
differentiated market. The role of the former pull of the development – the raw material
demanding industry – diminished and the number of people employed by the service sector –
which was much more mobile and had new type of settlement factors – started to exceed that of
the employees of the traditional production processes. As opposed the Fordist large-scale
industries, the new economic paradigm – relying on small and medium sized enterprises – had a
great influence on the development of regional policy, too.
The transformation of the economic structure got into the foreground of the economic
policies of the central governments. The narrowing of the central budget and the favoured new
economic sectors (tertiary and quaternary sectors) forced the re-evaluation of the traditional
regional policy. The traditional methods (intense state role, centralised regional policy, topdown incentive system, capital investments, etc.) lost their former economic and political
motives and the outlines of new regional strategies evolved. It is not by chance that in the
eighties almost all Western European countries brought new acts on regional development or
at least largely modified its former laws and regulations, and changes were introduced in the
institutional system of regional policy, too. The economic transformation did not raise the
same regions into the van of development which were the leading provinces of the industrial
period. The centuries old citadels of the capitalist industry started to decline while so far almost
unknown regions moved upward in the list of the most developed European regions
(CAPPELLIN, R. 1993; PAASI, A. 1996).
When studying the regional policy of the European Union, it may be established that
regionalism became the determining and dynamising element of the political and economic
development of the post-war Western Europe. The triumphant regionalism in the past decades
proved to be suitable for the solution of the centuries old political, ethnic and regional
development acute problems. It is an especially important task for the euroregionalism to
diminish the inhibiting and dividing role of political borders in the socio-economic
processes and to strengthen cross-border co-operations (SÜLI-ZAKAR, I. 1992). We may word
our scientific conclusion on the basis of this: the regions and the regionalism had an essential
role in the creation of the European union.
As it is defined by Article 2 Convention 106 of the Council of Europe: “…
transfrontier co-operation shall mean any concerted action designed to reinforce and foster
neighbourly relations between territorial communities or authorities within the jurisdiction of
two or more Contracting Parties and the conclusion of any agreement and arrangement
necessary for this purpose. Transfrontier co-operation shall take place in the framework of
territorial communities’ or authorities’ powers as defined in domestic law. The scope and nature
26
of such powers shall not be altered by this Convention…” (European Outline Convention on
Transfrontier Co-operation between Territorial Communities or Authorities. ETS No. 106
Madrid, 21 May 1980)
Outline Convention #106 is one of the founding documents of the uniting Europe
since until the end of the Second World War the European unity and co-operation were
aggravated by territorial-ethnic problems inherited from the past. The most problematic barriers
to unity were those borders where the unsettled ethnic-social-economic issues accumulated.
The dreamers of Europe hoped that the deepening of the cross-border relations would
promote better understanding, the clarification of the situation and the expansion of the socialeconomic relations along the borders in addition to the full scale normalisation of the political
relations (ALBERT, M.-BROCK, L. 1996; ANDERSON, J. - O'DOWD, L. 1999).
The renewal of the regional policy of the European community happened in parallel
with the national regional political changes in accordance with the beginning of a new
economic era. The creation of the new strategy was partly the result of the need for the
harmonisation of the concepts of the member states and partly provided programmes and means
for the moderation of the regional differences sharpening due to the enlargement processes.
In the past decades the regional policy methods were refined in the European Union,
the conditions for the access to funds became stricter and a properly functioning monitoring
system was developed. At the same time, the continuous enlargements resulted in the accession
of new member states with varying development level which made the reinforcement of
cohesion more and more difficult. It may be established that the regional policy of the European
Union gradually became a policy focusing on conscious coordination and real European
integration as opposed to the former redistribution from a common hat. The awaiting Eastern
enlargement shall intensify the existing disparities, regional development problems and the
potential conflicts – accompanied by the aggravation of the community expectations from the
accession countries in relation to regional policy.
Due to its considerable social and economic successes, the European Union is
attractive for the accession countries. However, there are serious regional differences even
with its present composition. For instance, the income per capita in Hamburg is four times more
than in Alentejo (Portugal). There are huge regional differences in the fields of the
unemployment rate, training and professional training, the level of infrastructural systems and
research and technology. It became clear that if the Union wants to be more than a free trade
zone then it must endeavour at diminishing these differences.
The path to the formation of the current regional policy of the European Union was
paved by many debates and problems. In the initial phase, regional policy was executed on
the level of nation states and the diminishment of the regional disparities was hoped from the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). By the mid-seventies, however, it became clear that the
CAP was not only unable to fulfil the requirements but it generated further inequalities.
Following the recognition of the need for a community level regional policy, the
European Regional Development Fund was created in 1975. This Fund was dedicated to
harmonise the regional policies of the member states. Thus, a process evolved which stepped
over the frames of the local communities and provinces – and even the national frames. The
structure of the regions and microregions were created on the basis of transnational –
community – rationality (HAEGI, C. 1999; HORVÁTH, GY. 1998).
The problems experienced during the operation of the ERDF and the accession of
Greece, Spain and Portugal reinforced a new reform in regional policy and the increasing of the
available funds. The most important change occurring in the mid-eighties served the
harmonisation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF), the European Social Fund (ESF) and the
Financial Instrument for Fishery Guidance (FIFG) and their inclusion in one fund, called
Structural Funds.
The competitiveness on the world market is another aspect to be kept in mind since
lagging behind in the developments is a factor inhibiting growth as a consequence of which the
27
EU would not be able to utilise its economic and human resources at a maximum level. All
these made social cohesion between the member states especially important. From 1989 this
policy defines the operation of the Structural Funds. It is the result of this policy that the
supports coming from the Funds concentrate on high priority development objectives which
were defined in co-operation by the European Committee and the national and regional
authorities.
The Cohesion Fund was created in 1993 to provide further assistance to the four
poorest countries. In the programming period between 1994 and 1999, the cohesion policy had
a source of 170 milliard ECU and although it is a huge amount (one-third of the total
community budget) it was still not enough to satisfy all needs. It is an non-exemplary challenge
that the 10 new member states from 2004 are far away from the former members of the
European Union (including Greece and Portugal, too) with regard to their GDP per capita (30%
of the average).
One of the most important conditions of the EU regional policy is that planning,
development, financing and monitoring institutions and professional capacities are created on
the level of the regions. The regionalisation and the regions were rendered special role in the
EU regional policy from 1988 – though, the EU, of course, had financial instruments dedicated
to structural policy and regional development before 1988, too. These amounts, however, were
divided by national quotas which were controlled and managed by the national governments –
and the governments used the regional development funds for financing national projects
(ILLÉS, I. 1997).
The sectoral and regional distribution of the funds in the first years was done by the
governments, the Community did not even had an insight into it – not to mention influence.
This praxis encouraged the European Committee to search for another solution which led to the
regionalisation of the structural funds.
Already in the late seventies and early eighties, the European Committee tried to
convince the governments to divide their countries into comparable territorial units – so-called
NUTS units (Nomenclature des unites statistiques territorialis) – and to report their demands
for funding on the basis of that. Thus, it was fortunate that the statistical NUTS system was
already available and these originally exclusively statistical territorial units became the
subjects of the development policy. From among the units, the so-called NUTS2 units (regions)
became the objectives of funds aiming at the winding-up of backwardness, while the smaller
NUTS3 units became the objectives of funds promoting structural transformation. Nevertheless,
it also changed the character, role and aspects of regionalisation. From that on, the
development and support oriented instruments were not divided between countries but were
rendered to the backward NUTS2 level regions and criteria for the entitlement were established
by the Committee.
The changes were generated by the increased weight and power of the regions.
Besides, this change indirectly improved the position of the European Committee as opposed to
the national governments. With its criteria for funding, the Committee decided on the place and
ratio of the use of the Structural Funds – “crossing” the national governments. Thus, the
European Committee became the champion of regionalisation in the process of the reform of
the division and distribution of structural funds. At the same time, the regions got into a
competitive situation not only within their countries but also with all regions of the EU.
The European Committee never demanded changes in the administrative system of the
member states – which was unanimously regarded a national and not EU authority.
Nevertheless, it asked for the availability of professional institutions in the fields of planning,
programming, financing and monitoring on the regional level. Consequently, there are
neither administrative nor political conditions in connection with the creation of regions (ILLÉS,
I. 1997).
In the eighties and nineties, the so-called “euroregional approach” became more and
more widespread as an impact of the strengthening of the European regionalism. This approach
imagined the Europe of the future not as the Europe of nation states but as the Europe of
28
regions made up of (both border and cross-border) areas with the same economic interests. As
the experiences show, a euroregion crossing borders might be suitable for the handling of the
so far unsolved conflicts – within and between the countries. These positive Western European
examples had a great impact on the evolving regionalism in the eastern part of Central Europe –
especially on the formation of cross-border euroregions (CZIMRE, K. 2002; A, ILIEŞ 2004).
The term euroregion – or euregion – is used when such an area is to be demarcated
where there mutual interregional or cross-border (transnational) economic, social, cultural or
other type of co-operations between two or more states or their local governments. Thus, the
euroregion marks a well defined geographical area which includes areas from two or more
countries who agreed to harmonise their activities for the more successful development of their
common areas (CZIMRE, K. 2003).
The euroregions were first created in the post-war Western Europe to find new ways
to solve and avoid the devastations caused by the war, ethnic and other conflicts and thus the
hatred and prejudices between the various nations would be replaced by mutual peace and cooperation. The euroregions had a very special role in the unifying processes of Europe and
the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) was the most important actor in it. This
organisation collects and manages the euroregions (WILSON, T. M. - DONNAN H. 1998).
In the past 25-30 years – mainly as a result of the successes of transnational
regionalism – extremely fruitful multilateral industrial and trade co-operations, joint regional
development, infrastructural and environmental programmes were born in the border regions
Western Europe. The bi- or multilateral cross-border personal, economic and institutional
relations became integrated parts of the everyday life.
The founding documents of the euroregions created in the eastern part of Central
Europe in the nineties are also based on the Framework Agreement #106 of the Council of
Europe and the aim of the founders was to introduce the properly functioning Western
European transnational practice. It is not surprising, therefore, that more and more people
recognised the unbearable socio-economic barrier function of the political borders and the
importance of the diminishment of this dividing role in East Central Europe, too. The building
of closer co-operation – that is, the realisation of cross-border (transnational) regionalism –
became indispensable for rise and progress in the eastern part of Central Europe as well
(BARAN, V. 1995; PAASI, A. 1999).
The establishment of the AEBR is the result of the difference in the interpretation of
borders and regional developments in the eastern and western part of Europe after the Second
World War. While the primary aim in Western Europe was to “etherise” the borders, the barrier
functions of the political borders intensified inhibiting socio-economic development in the
eastern part of Europe. Following the reconstruction after the war, the opportunities offered by
the renewal of the co-operations existing in the previous centuries were realised in many
Western European border regions. In the early sixties, the liquidation of the barriers was started:
the political borders dividing the territorial units and communities began to disappear. Then the
endeavours started to improve the social, economic and cultural situation of these regions.
These were completed by the encouragement of infrastructural developments, thee construction
of cross-border links and the enabling of the permeability of the borders. In the beginning,
the aims were difficult to be fulfilled because of the lack of the necessary legal and
administrative competencies – since such problems had to be solved which belonged to the
tasks of the central governments of the member states. These problems included, for example,
the harmonisation of the administration and regional planning; the management of the problems
of the employees and cross-border commuters; the financing of the institutional system of the
joint education and training; the mutual recognition of qualification; and the harmonisation and
financing of the cross-border infrastructural developments. As a result of the achievements, the
support of cross-border co-operations was given more and more emphasis in the EU policies.
On the proposal of the Council of Europe, the Association of European Border Regions was
established in Gronau in 1971 (HANSEN, N. 1983, DONNAN, H. – WILSON, T 1994).
29
The INTERREG I co-operation was announced in 1990 with the active participation
of the AEBR. This initiative funded 31 programmes between 1990 and 1993, distributing 1.034
million ECU. For the INTERREG II program in the 1994-1999 period 3.4476 million ECU
was directed. The Phare CBC programmes were launched in 1994 which supported cooperations along the external borders of the EU in the non member states. The latter also
contributed to the joint financing and accomplishment of the programmes funded by the
INTERREG.
Thus, it became necessary to explore and open the border regions, to increase the
co-operation intensity, the more intensive utilisation of the human, natural and economic
resources and endowments. After 2000, the third phase of the INTERREG serves this purpose.
As a result of the developments of the past decades the interregional organisations became
the highest level co-operation structures. By today, they are recognised as such international
organisations which officially deal with the economic, environmental, social and institutional
problems of the given regions (SÜLI-ZAKAR, I. 1997).
The Western European euroregions/euregions and the entrepreneurial zones
founded in the border regions are long-term integrated cross-border structures. These cooperation forms were developed on the basis of experiences gained in the past decades – that is,
they gradually came into existence as a result of a long and organic development. Their most
important feature is that they have political decision-making power as well. These
organisations take part not only in the planning and elaboration of cross-border relations but –
especially in the case of the entrepreneurial zones – also in their realisation (CLEMENT, N.
1996).
Following the geopolitical changes in the early nineties, radical foreign political and
foreign trade orientation took place in the countries of the former Soviet sphere. The result of
this was that the primary aim of these countries became the EU accession. Thus, the crossborder contact renewed and co-operation became more intensive in East Central Europe.
Many countries – especially Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic – made attempts to create
cross-border organisations, too. Besides the joint utilisation of resources, the moderation of
the peripheral situation and the creation of a new economic space, the establishment of these
organisations were motivated by three other factors:
- access to the Phare CBC funds – since the funds may be only accessed through these
organisations and thus the inner lack of sources may be diminished
- the development level of the organisations and institutions which are compatible with
the EU system will be scrutinised thoroughly in the qualification of the new member
states
- a properly functioning cross-border co-operation causes economic and political
advantages both in the bilateral and multilateral relations
Just like in Western Europe, similar historical events played important role in the creation
of the East Central European cross-border co-operations. Since centuries ago there were
such state formations and regions created in the central part of the continent – where the proper
natural, economic geographical, cultural and other conditions were available – which were
characterised by dynamic development and properly functioning human communities. These
regions formerly belonging to one another were divided by the new borders – especially the
wars and peace treaties of the twentieth century – and the relations were hidden for a long time
and forced to vegetate (SÜLI-ZAKAR, I. 1994; O’DOWD, L. - WILSON, T. 1996).
Although the demolishment of the Iron Curtain opened the opportunities for East Central
Europe to produce a joint development, but the rigid dividing role of the state borders still
survived. Even so, the foundation of new states made the earlier internal virtual borders
separating macroregions into real borders (following the disintegration of Czechoslovakia,
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia). As a consequence of this, the spatial structure became even more
fragmented in Central Europe and natural relations ceased to exist in the past decade. This
regional disintegration, of course, considerably slows down the “real” accession of East
Central Europe to the United Europe (DAY, G. – THOMPSON, A. 2002).
30
Conclusion
From the end of the nineties, and especially after the millennium, there is less said
about the regions in the western part of Europe and many researchers think that the “European
motives of regionalisation seem to lose wind”. As a matter of fact, the Europe of regions is
really less often mentioned and it is more about the firmness of Europe in the global
competition.
Nevertheless, the region, the regionalism and the regionalisation mean the common
values for the uniting Europe. The regional equalisation and cohesion are one of the basic
principles of the European Union. The NUTS 2 regions have the disposal of 40% of the
financial share of the EU which represents considerable development sources on the global
level too. The decomposition of the state centralisation and the victory of the regionalisation
also meant the accomplishment of democracy in the more developed countries of Europe –
increasing the chances for the closing-up of the peripheral areas.
As a regionalist, I am convinced that the regionalism that gained victory in Western
Europe will break the trail in Central Europe, too – despite of the lack of the historic sound
foundations. Accordingly, in the eastern periphery of the European Union the significance of
the geographical co-operation and integration of the self-governments will definitely increase in
the future. The horizontal self-governmental co-operations (microregions, settlement
associations relying on the “city and its environs” relations, attraction zones) and especially the
regional and euroregional co-operations creating the real regions will get a strategic role. Thus,
the regions may be born bottom-up as the result of the geographical integration but the
implementation of the decentralisation opening grounds for the practice of subsidiarity is also
indispensable.
Therefore, I am convinced that the regions represent peculiar and important
European values and it would be a considerable loss if we did not exploit the possibilities
offered by regionalism for the sake of the Unifying European Union.
One of my “favourite” cartographic illustrations is a map of the Medieval Europe
which carries a very important ideological message. It is a centuries old wood engraving where
the artist-cartographer condensed the European continent into the figure of a woman (=Lady
Europe). In compliance with the intellectual conditions and ideology of the era the figure of the
lady represents the idea of the united Europe. This united Europe is not a centralised empire
but the confederation of the European communities and regions.
The participants of this conference in Oradea (official opening of “the Institute for
Euroregional Studies” – Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence; 19-20 January 2006.
came from those countries – Romania and Hungary) which have been located on the skirt of
Lady Europe – that is on the periphery of the European Union – even in the Middle Ages.
These countries and regions followed a western model in their development – although, being
late in time and having a far less effective impact on the whole of the society as in the West.
The centuries following that period, in the Modern Times, the East Central European region fell
behind the civic Western Europe even more spectacularly. This falling behind was further
deepened by the imperialism of the Soviet Union in the twentieth century which isolated our
region from Europe by the “Iron Curtain”.
Now, we got the chance to reunite with the more developed part of Europe within the
frames of the European Union. If we did not grasp the opportunity then we would commit a sin
and our backwardness would become conserved. However, it would be a mistake if our region
did not endeavour at influencing those decisions and processes of the EU which concern us and
of which we form an integrated part. Our common past should urge the countries of our
region to understand each other.
We chose the right path when we formed our organisation called Hajdú-Bihar–
Bihor Euroregion, Carpathian Euroregion, etc. which means the co-operation of regions that
are considered peripheries in their own countries. Our common goal is to intensify the
competitiveness of our regions and the joint improvement of the living standards and the quality
of life. We looked for relations and co-operation with each other – here in the periphery of the
31
European Union – to be able to exploit together the opportunities offered by the EU
membership and to set our regions on the way of a more rapid development progress through
activating especially the human resources.
References
ALBERT, M.-BROCK, L. (1996) Debordering the World of States: New Spaces in International
Relations. New Political Science 35 (Spring), pp.69-106.
AMIN, A. – THRIFT, N. (Eds.) (1994) Globalisation, Institutions, and Regional Development in
Europe. – Oxford, Oxford University Press
AMIN, A. – TOMANEY, J. (1995) The regional dilemma in a neo-liberal Europe. – European
Urban and Regional Studies 2. pp. 171-188.
ANDERSON, J. - HAMILTON, D. (1999) The Separation/Integration of ‘Economics’ and ‘Politics’
in Border Regions and Cross-Border Development. Paper presented at the RSA
International Conference (Regional Potentials in an Integrating Europe), 18-21 September
1999.
ANDERSON, J. - O'DOWD, L. (1999) Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory
Meanings, Changing Significance. In: Journal of the Regional Studies Association. 33(7)
pp.593-605.
ANDRESKI, S. (2002) The Influence of Eco-demographic Differences on the Freedom of
Migration Across Borders. In: Borland, J. et al. (Eds.) (2002) Political Borders and Crossborder Identities at the Boundaries of Europe. Rzeszów-Bangor. pp.26-30.
ARMSTRONG, H. W. – VICKERMAN, R. W. (Eds.) (1995) Convergence and Divergence Among
European Regions. – London, Jessica Kingsley Publishers
BARAN, V. (1995) The Function of State Border in Slovak-Hungarian Border Area from the
Geopolitical Aspect. In: Baran, V. (ed.) Boundaries and their Influence upon the Territorial
Structure of the State and Regions. Banská Bystrica, pp.22-25.
BERNEK Á.-SÜLI-ZAKAR I. (1997) Régiók, regionális folyamatok a világgazdaságban. – Tér és
Társadalom XI. évfolyam 4. sz. pp. 85-104.
BLATTER, J. – CLEMENT, N. (2000b) Cross-Border Cooperation in Europe: Historical
Development, Institutionalization, and Contrasts with North America. In: Journal of
Borderlands Studies, Special Issue on Research on European borders and borderlands. Vol.
XV., No.1, Spring 2000 pp.15-55.
CAPPELLIN, R. (1993) Interregional cooperation in Europe: an introduction. In: Cappellin, R. Batey, P. (Eds.): Regional networks, Border regions and European integration. Pion:
London, pp 1-20.
CLARK, T. (1994) National Boundaries, Border Zones and Marketing Strategy: A Conceptual
Framework and Theoretical Model of Secondary Boundary Effects. In: Journal of
Marketing. 58, pp.67-80.
CLEMENT, N. (1996) The Changing Economics of International Borders and Border Regions.
In: Scott, U.-Sweedler, A.-Ganster, P.-Eberwein, W. D. (Eds.): Border Regions in
Functional Transition European and North American Perspectives. Berlin, Series of IRS.
pp.41-53.
CZIMRE, K. (2002) Central European Euroregions in the Light of the EU Accession. In: SüliZakar I. (ed.) Borders and Cross-Border Co-oprations in the Central European
Transformation Countries. Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Kiadója, pp. 176-183.
CZIMRE K. (2003) Euroregionális fejlıdés az EU csatlakozás küszöbén – különös tekintettel
Magyarország eurorégióira. (Doktori PhD értekezés). Studia Geographica 15. sz.
Debrecen 2005, 223 p.
CSÉFALVAY Z. (2004) Globalizáció I.-II. – Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, Budapest 254p. és 311p.
DAY, G. – THOMPSON, A. (2002) Defining ’Europe’ and Policing Identity: Nationalism and
Politicisation of Borders. In: Borland, J. et al. (Eds.) (2002) Political Borders and Crossborder Identities at the Boundaries of Europe. Rzeszów-Bangor. pp.178-205.
32
DONNAN, H. – WILSON, T (EDS.) (1994) Border Approaches: Anthropological Perspectives on
Frontiers. University Press of America. New York&London.
ENYEDI GY. (1994) Területfejlesztés, regionális átalakulás a posztszocialista Magyarországon.
– Társadalmi Szemle IL. évfolyam 8-9 sz. pp. 133-139.
ENYEDI GY. (1996) Regionális folyamatok Magyarországon az átmenet idıszakában. – Bp.
Hilscher Rezsı Szociálpolitikai Egyesület
FARAGÓ L. (2004) A regionalizmus hajtóerıi Magyarországon. – Tér és Társadalom XVIII.
évf. 3. szám. pp. 1-23.
HAEGI, C. (1999) The current state of and prospect for regionalisation in Europe. Memo at the
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe. Strasbourg, 15-17 June 1999. 19p.
HAGGETT, P. (1979) Geography a modern synthesis - Harper International Edition, New York,
627p.
HANSEN, N. (1983) International co-operation in border regions: an overview and research
agenda. International Regional Sciences Review 8(3) pp.255-270.
HORGA, I. (2006) Teoria relatiilor internaŃionale. – Editura UniversităŃii din Oradea, Oradea.
334 p.
HORVÁTH GY. (1998) Európai regionális politika. – Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs, 501
p.
HOUTUM, H. VAN - BOEKEMA, F. (1994) Regions seen as laboratories for a new Europe: the
applicability of the flexible specialisation model. In: Van Dijck, J.J.J. - Groenewegen, J.:
Changing Business Systems in Europe, an institutional approach. Brussels: VUBpress,
pp.85-109.
HOUTUM, H. VAN (2000) An overview of European Geographical Research on Borders and
Border Regions. Journal of Borderlands Studies. Special Issue on European Perspectives on
Borderlands. Vol. XV, No.1, pp.57-85.
A, ILIEŞ (2004) Romania, Euroregiuni. – Editura UniversităŃii din Oradea, Oradea. 218 p.
ILLÉS I. (1997) A regionális együttmőködés feltételei Közép- és Kelet-Európában. – Tér és
Társadalom XI. évfolyam 2. szám pp. 17-28.
ISARD W. (1960) Methocs of Regional Analysis: an Introduction to Regional Sciences. – The
M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass.
KAMANN, D.J. (1993) Bottlenecks, barriers and networks of actors. In: Ratti, R. - Reichman, S.
(Eds.) Theory and Practice of Transborder Co-operation. Verlag Helbing & Lichtenhahn,
Basel und Frankfurt am Main, pp.65-102.
KRAMSCH, O. (2000) Towards Cosmopolitan Governance? Prospects and Possibilities for
Three Dutch/German/Belgian Euroregions. Paper presented at the Border Research Netwrk
Workshop in Aabenraa, May 24-27. 15p.
KRÄTKE, S. (1999) Regional Integration or Fragmentation? The German-Polish Border Region
in a New Europe. In: Journal of the Regional Studies Association. 33(7) pp.631-643.
LORENZ D. (1989) Trade in Manufactures, Newly Industrializing Economies and Regional
Development in the World Economy. A European View. – The Developong Economies, No.
3.
LORENZ D. (1991) Regionalisation versus Regionalism – Problems of Change in the World
Economy. – Intereconomics, Vol. 26. No. 1.
LORENZ D. (1992) Economic Geography and the Political Economy of Regionalization: The
Example of Western Europe. – The American Economic Review, May
LÖSCH A. (1938) The Nature of Economic Regions.- Southern Economic Journal,Vol.5.No. 1.
MÁRTON GY. (2004) Az Elsı Magyar Nemzeti Fejlesztési Terv tervezési folyamatának
tapasztalatai regionális szemszögbıl. – Falu Város Régió. 9. sz. pp.32-45.
NEMES NAGY J. (1996) Centrumok és perifériák a piacgazdasági átmenetben. – Földrajzi
Közlemények CXX(XLIV). Kötet, 1. sz. pp. 31-48.
O’DOWD, L. - WILSON, T. (1996) Frontiers of sovereignty in the new Europe. In: O’Dowd Wilson, T. (Eds.): Borders, nations and states. Avebury: Aldershot etc., pp.1-18.
33
PAASI, A. (1996) Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the
Finnish-Russian Border. John Wiley&Sons Ltd: Chichester.
PAASI, A. (1999) Boundaries as Social Practice and Discourse: The Finnish-Russian Border.
In: Journal of the Regional Studies Association. 33(7) pp.669-681.
PÁLNÉ KOVÁCS I. (1994) A területfejlesztés kihívásai elıtt az önkormányzati rendszer. – In: Tér
és Közigazgatás (szerk: Csefkó F.). MTA RKK - Magyar Közigazgatási Intézet. PécsBudapest, pp. 30-44.
RATTI, R. (1993) Strategies to Overcome Barriers: From Theory to Practice. In: Ratti, R. Reichman, S. (Eds.) Theory and Practice of Transborder Co-operation. Helbing &
Lichtenhahn, Basel und Frankfurt am Main, pp.?-?.
REBISZ, S. (2002) Cross-border Co-operation, the Way to a United Europe: The Case of the
Carpathian Euroregion. In: Borland, J. et al. (Eds.) (2002) Political Borders and Crossborder Identities at the Boundaries of Europe. Rzeszów-Bangor. pp.102-115.
RECHNITZER J. (1993) Szétszakadás vagy felzárkózás (A térszerkezetet alakító innovációk). –
MTA RKK, Gyır, 208. p.
SÜLI-ZAKAR I. (1994) Regionalizmus és régió. – In: Mátrai M. - Tóth J. (Eds.) A középszintő
közigazgatás reformja Magyarországon 2. Kötet - Térszerkezet-régió-vonzáskörzetekkistérség, Székesfehérvár-Pécs, 1994. pp. 14-24.
SÜLI-ZAKAR I. (1997) Régiók a földrajzi térben (Regions in the Geographical Space). – In:
földrajzhagyomány és jövı. Magyar Földrajzi Társaság, Budapest, pp. 59-90.
SÜLI-ZAKAR I. (1999) A régiók Európában és Magyarországon. – Debreceni Szemle. VII. évf.
3. sz. pp. 355-370.
TANNAN, E. (1995) EU regional policy and the Irish/Northern Irish cross-border administrative
relationship - Regional and Federal Studies 5(1), pp. 67-93.
TESCHKE, B. (1998) Geopolitical Relations in the European Middle Ages: History and Theory.
International Organization 52 (2): 325-358.
TÓTH J. – GOLOBICS P. (1996) Régiók és interregionális kapcsolatok a Kárpát-medencében. –
In: A Kárpát-medence történeti földrajza (Szerk.. Frisnyák S.). Nyíregyháza, pp. 107-119.
WILSON, T. M. - DONNAN H. (Eds.) (1998) Border Identities: Nation and State at International
Frontiers. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.301p.
34
When Borders Move: An agenda for historical research
Robert T. GRIFFITHS
Chris G. QUISPEL
In the first half of 2005 within the History Department we ran a seminar course entitled
“when borders move” as part of a framework for turning our own research towards this
relatively neglected area of historical investigation. The course, which attracted eighteen
students, concentrated on the European developments between 1871 (German unification) and
1990 (the end of the cold war). This article draws on that experience. It attempts to provide a
conceptual framework for historical analysis and to provide four examples from the wide and
divergent experience of Western Europe in the 20th century. Working from the assumption that
most of the readers of this Journal will be familiar with the border changes of East-Central and
South Eastern Europe, we have chosen to concentrate on examples from further afield. From the
interwar period, we examine the case of Ireland after independence and the Sudetenland. For
the post-war period we investigate the case of the Saar conflict and the partition of Cyprus.
This article focuses on the external state borders, which represent the limits of state
power and accountability in the territory within their confines. Within that area, the state
establishes and enforces laws national laws, rules and regulations applicable to the inhabitants
of the territory. Equally, within its borders, the state collects revenues through various
instruments of its own devise and dispenses expenditures on objects of its choosing. Of course
state power is exercised outside the border and of course territorial control is never absolute. In
the past, state sovereignty has been limited through the exercise of suzerainty and other (semi-)
imperialist constructions or been bent to the structural power of a hegemonic neighbour. More
recently, state power has increasingly been “pooled” or “shared” in various transnational
organisations, both intergovernmental and supranational. Concepts of sovereignty and
territoriality have traditionally been used in this discourse.
The state also polices the borders and controls traffic over them. In the past, this
applied especially to the movement of goods, through the discriminatory taxation of imports
and the exercise of quantitative controls and even prohibitions. Until the 1970s and 80s, the
central banks and financial institutions restricted the movement of capital into and out of the
state. More recently, in the field of migration, the “Schengen” states of the European Union
have simultaneously relaxed internal controls over the movement of peoples whilst intensifying
them at the (joint) external borders.
Finally, borders define citizenship. In an ideal world, citizenship can give the right to
vote, freedom of speech, freedom of expression and protection against the arbitrary exercise of
state power. Border change may suddenly deprive new inhabitants of citizen rights or diminish
the extent to which they are recognised and enforced. On the other hand, they may emancipate a
repressed minority as they join, or become, a majority within the new borders.
Borders mean a lot to the citizens of a state and they have generated considerable
academic literature in the social sciences, but not too often in the specific context of analysis
that we are employing. For example, much research has been devoted to the reduction of border
impediments, especially in the context of states joining regional groups or the reduction of
border impediments within them. At the other end of the spectrum, an equally voluminous
literature has grown up devoted to the erosion of state power under the impact of globalisation.
In both cases far-reaching economic, social and political consequences had been ascribed to
changes in the effectiveness of national borders. Imagine, therefore, the impact on society when
a border moves and inhabitants of one country find themselves transformed into citizens of
another.
The three most important variables determining the impact of border change on a
society are:
35
•
•
•
the circumstances in which it took place,
the nature of borders at the time of change, and
the relation of the ethnic, social and religious composition of the ‘new’
populations to that of their host.
On the circumstances leading to the locational shift in borders, it is possible to
envisage a spectrum of events ranging from invasion and violent secession, at the one extreme,
to peaceful secession and negotiated frontier adjustment at the other. In the middle of the
spectrum one would find post-war settlement, which was probably the most common form of
border change in the 20th century. Recent history is replete with examples across the entire
spectrum of experience. For four years between 1991 and 1995 the World witnessed in horror
the violent disintegration of the state of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, in 1990 formerCommunist East Germany was peacefully integrated into the Federal Republic and the Baltic
states seized their independence from the Soviet Union. Later, in 1993, Czechoslovakia
completed its “velvet divorce” and re-emerged as two separate states. Moreover, the
circumstances of the border change itself, need to be related to several exogenous variables
ranging from the ethnic composition of neighbouring ‘foreign’ populations to the existence of a
(regional) hegemoon that may serve to ‘police’ any new arrangements. For example, many
commentators attribute at least some of the credit for Yugoslavia’s survival to super-power
rivalry during the Cold War.
The nature of borders has also changed over time. In their function of frontier barriers,
borders became increasingly protectionist over the first half of the twentieth century. The range
and level of tariffs on imports rose throughout the period and the protectionist arsenal was
augmented in the 1930s by the imposition of quantitative restrictions and exchange controls. In
Western Europe, only in the 1950s were import quotas gradually removed. Meanwhile, new and
even more stringent border restriction emerged between East and Western Europe as the Soviet
Union redirected resources towards its own reconstruction and, within the “Eastern bloc” intraarea trade diminished as the economies of the countries concerned became subject to national,
central planning. After the 1960s, trade barriers in Western Europe were rapidly reduced under
the impact of regional groups as the EEC and EFTA and successful tariff rounds in the GATT.
By the 1970s and 80s most Western nations removed controls over capital movements as well.
On the other hand, as the situation of labour shortages turned to mass unemployment, under
the impact of the first two oil crises, borders increasingly became used as barriers against
immigration, first nationally and later coordinated within Schengen.
If, as frontier barriers, the impact of borders fell in the second half of the 20th century,
the same can not be said for the effect as borders as limits of state regulation and spending.
From the 1930s onwards, states assumed ever greater social and economic responsibilities
within their territories. By the 1970s, in many Western European countries, more than half of
national income passed through the hands of the state. A whole panoply of regulations, trade
credits, subsidies and tax-breaks distinguished the operation of economies on one side of a
border from another. Moreover, orders for state projects were often reserved for national
businesses. Within the EEC, concerns over the impact of these activities led to the adoption and
implementation of the Single European Act, intended to restrict the tradde distorting impact of
state activities.
Border changes can mean a sudden change in the ethnic composition of a nation, or a
region within a nation. In new nations it can mean that different ethnic groups, some of whom
never asked to become part of that nation in the first place, suddenly have to find a way to live
together. During the whole of the twentieth century Europe has been plagued by tensions,
conflicts, civil wars and international wars that resulted from ethnic conflicts triggered by
border changes. Nowadays borders and ethnicity are also connected in a different way. Border
crossing, legal, but often illegal, has become a major reason for the growth of ethnic majorities
within European countries. When borders change as often as happened in Europe in the
twentieth century, it is bound to have important effects on feelings of self determination and on
36
nation building. Governments, ethnic groups had to get to get to grips with these issues again
when they were confronted anew by a change of borders and a different ethnic composition.
1918-1945
It is difficult in a few sentences to do justice to the full range of border changes
occasioned by international treaties during and after World War I. It is equally difficult to
explain them. The American adherence to the principle of “self-determination” prior to
negotiating the treaties in which it was involved, did not prevent most of them bearing all the
hall-marks of punitive punishment inflicted upon the losers (see the Table below). Three treaties
fall outside the pattern of the Allied peace settlements. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was
imposed by the Germans on the new Bolshevik Government and was repudiated by it after
Germany’s eventual defeat. Although most of the Russian land was ceded originally to
Germany, the ensuing vacuum eventually allowed the creation and recognition of several new
states with their respective borders: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bellarus, Ukraine. The
Treaty of Riga marked the end of the Russian-Polish War whereby Poland sacrificed some of
the territory acquired at Brest-Litovsk whilst, at the same time, incorporating part of what had
become Lithuania. The Treaty of Lausanne marked the end of Greek-Turkish War and reversed
the territorial concessions to Greece made in the Treaty of Sèvres. The settlement also involved
the compulsory relocation of ethnic Greeks and Turks to their “home” countries; an early
example of “ethnic cleansing” in Europe.
Treaty
Date
BrestLitovsk
February
1918
Versailles
June 1919
Saint
Germain
September
1919
Neuilly
Riga
November
1919
June 1920
August
1920
March 1921
Lausanne
July 1923
Trianon
Sèvres
Main Territorial Changes by Treaty during and after World War I
Ceding
Gaining territory
territory
Russia
Finland, Turkey, Georgia and (after defeat of
Germany) Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Bellarus, Ukraine
Germany
France, Denmark, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Belgium, Lithuania, Free city of Danzig
Austria
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Italy,
Romania
Hungary
Austria
Bulgaria
Greece, Romania, Yugoslovia
Hungary
Turkey
Poland
Lithuania
Greece
Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia
Greece, Italy (and the dissolution of the Ottoman
Empire)
Belarus, Ukraine
Poland
Turkey
Falling outside the pattern of the post-war peace treaties, one should also mention the
Anglo-Irish Treaty of December 1921, creating the Irish Free State, but allowing the mixed
religious or protestant provinces in the North to opt out if they wished. The effect was to create
a religiously relatively homogeneous state of 3 million inhabitants in the South but a mixed
population in the North, which was to flare-up into violence in the 1960s. Meanwhile, the South
was left to forge a new state, whilst structurally still dependent for foreign markets in the
territory of its former ruler.
Ireland after independence, protection, free trade and economic war
Irish economist George O’Brien expressed a feeling that was shared by most Irishmen
when he wrote in 1921: “Ireland can never be a rich and prosperous country, until her
independence is restored “. The Irish economy had been made subservient to British industry
37
and had been reduced to providing agricultural products for the English market. To redress this
unacceptable situation and to stimulate economic, and especially industrial, growth, it was of
the utmost importance that Ireland obtain the right to formulate its own tariff policy. When this
right was gained there was a feeling of optimism about the future of the Irish economy.
However, not everybody wanted to use the new powers to alter import tariffs to the limit. The
Irish government preferred a policy of what can be called selective protection. Protective tariffs
were installed for a small number of goods, but there was nothing resembling a radical
departure from the principles of free trade.1 The Fiscal Inquiry Committee installed in 1923
backed the government’s hesitation to impose heavier tariffs. But in the eyes of the Irish
nationalists ties with the former colonising power remained too strong and only a determined
protectionist policy could change this situation.
During the twenties the Irish economy remained stable, with good performances by the
traditional export sectors, but showed no signs of change or growth. Industrial growth
especially remained low, which was even worse because only 14 per cent of the workforce of
the Irish Free State actually worked in industry.2 Moreover, income from agricultural exports
did not promote investments in other secrots of the economy. Worse still, large parts of
agriculture remained stubbornly conservative, there was little investment even in the
commercial regions and there was no expansion of the labour market. According to Brian
Girvin it was only in protected or semi protected areas that we find any increase in the labour
force, though even there growth was not very impressive.3
Voices for protection were never really silenced and after 1927 they once more gained
in strength. The parliamentary elections of that year were a triumph for Eamon de Valera and
his political party Fianna Fail. Though they did not win a majority and for the moment were left
out of government, they obtained an impressive 57 seats. Fianna Fails campaigned on the
platform of an economic policy in which a strong government would actively promote national
interests. After 1931, when the impact of the economic crisis began to be felt in Ireland also,
they advocated self sufficiency and protection. Ireland, De Valera declared, should be as self
sufficient as possible.4 When Fianna Fail won the 1932 elections and De Valera became prime
minister this almost immediately led to a sharp conflict with England. One of the first acts of
the new government was to suspend the payment of land annuities to Britain. One of the terms
of the agreements between the Irish and the British government considering the Irish
independence had been the forced sale of land by the British to Irish farmers. As compensation
the Irish promised to pay an annual sum of 5 million pound to the British government. This was
now stopped by De Valera. The British government reacted immediately and imposed a 20
percent duty on Irish agricultural products, which by 1935 had risen to between 68 and 88 per
cent.5 Cattle production was especially hard hit. The number of exported cattle falling from
229.652 in 1933 to 129.759 in 1934, forcing the government to introduce a calf slaughter
scheme.6 The Irish retaliated by raising duties on, among others things, coal, cement and sugar.7
A full blown economic war had started. By 1937 there were 1947 articles on which there was
some kind of import restriction and only Spain, Germany, Turkey and Brazil had higher tariff
1
J. Meenan, The Irish Economy since 1922, Liverpool, 1970, 142; B. Girvin, Between Two Worlds.
Politics and Economy in Independent Ireland, Dublin, 1989, 15.
2
D. Johnson, The Interwar Economy in Ireland Dublin, 1985, 20.
3
Girvin, op. cit., 64.
4
Ibid., 85
5
J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985; Politics and Society, Cambridge, 1989, 178; K. O’Rourke, Kevin (1991)
‘Burn everything British but their Coal: the Anglo-Irish economic war of the 1930s’ , Journal of Economic
History, 51, 2 (1991) 358.
6
D. McMahon, Republicans and Imperialists. Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s, New Haven and
London, 1984, 145.
7
O’Rourke, op. cit., 358.
38
levels than Ireland.8 But the Irish situation was different, because, as 80 per cent of the
imported goods came from England, the tariffs were effectively bi-lateral.
The economic war lasted until 1938 when Chamberlain and De Valera reached an
agreement in which the trade restrictions on both sides were substantially reduced and the
annuities were bought of by the Irish by a payment of 10 million pounds. Nowadays there is
little agreement among economic historians about the results of the economic war. According to
Girvin, “the willingness to impose protection was the basis for industrial expansion”.9 As a
result 50.000 new industrial jobs were created during the thirties. O’Rourke is especially
positive about the terms with which the economic war was ended, which according to him were
highly favourable to the Irish.10 Johnson is much less positive, though he acknowledges that
some of the government measures were inevitable and desirable, he casts doubt on the amazing
rise in industrial jobs. The true rise was probably not much more than 9000.11 He also points out
that some agricultural sectors actually suffered a lot. Meenan seems to be more neutral, but the
fact that Ireland survived the economic war “without economic collapse …or the breakdown of
confidence, is to him a positive thing.12
Czechoslovakia, German and Czech nationalism within new borders
Czech nationalist leaders in 1918 had no doubt in their minds that the historic
boundaries of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, should be included in the new to state of
Czechoslovakia. This meant that more than 3 million German speaking so-called Sudeten
Germans, would become inhabitants of the new state. Under the old Austrian regime tensions
between Germans and Czechs had already run high. Migration of Czechs to the industrial parts
of Bohemia and Moravia had worried the Germans, but they had been able to hold on to their
culture and most of their economic and political power.13 However, the arrival of large numbers
of Czech migrants before 1914 had meant that the Sudeten Germans did not live in a clearly
defined German area, but were spread over large areas of the border regions between Germany,
Austria and Czechoslovakia.
Sudeten German leaders refused to join the new Czechoslovakian state, which they
called “artificial” and “ephemeral”.14 Instead they opted for the new state of Austria and joined
the Vienna National Assembly, which passed a law declaring the Sudeten German areas to be
part of a new Austria-Germany. An angry French government independently recognized the
new state of Czechoslovakia, including the Sudeten German lands. The refusal of Sudeten
German leaders to become part of the new state and their subsequent failure to become part of
Austria or a German-Austrian state was a further strain on the ethnical relations within the new
state.
Before 1918 Czechs and Sudeten Germans had been forced to compromise on cultural
and political matters, but now the equilibrium was disturbed. Migration from Czechs to the
Sudeten German regions continued at an accelerated rate. The German enclave of Jihlava in
1980 held a Czech speaking minority of only 17.2 per cent, but after the First World War the
preportion of Czechs rose to 54.6 per cent. The Czech population of the city of Jihlava rose
form 3000 in 1880 to 18.000 in 1930.15 Czech nationalists counted on government support for
an aggressive anti-German policy. The Narodni Jednoty propaganda society wanted the “proud
8
Johnson, op. cit., 28.
Girvin, op. cit., 106.
10
O’Rourke, op. cit., 358.
11
Johnson, op. cit., 30.
12
Meenan, op. cit., 291.
13
M. Cornwall, “The Struggle on the Czech-German Language Border, 1880-1940” English Historical
Review, 109, 433 (1994) 950.
14
V.S. Mamatey, “The Establishment of the Republic” in: V.S. Mamatey and R. Luza, History of the
Czech Republic, 1918-1948, Princeton, 1973, 28
15
Cornwall, op. cit., 943.
9
39
16
flag” of Czechoslavakia to replace the “artificial” German majority. To them the victory of
the Czech language and culture over the Sudeten Germans was a moral right. Josef Vyborny,
government commissioner in Jihlava, dismissed all officials who failed a Czech language
exam.17 Czech nationalists however did not get full support from the new government. Thomas
Masaryk was conciliatory towards the Sudeten Germans, with whom he hoped to find some
understanding. On the other hand he often referred to them as immigrants and colonists,
implying they had not the same rights as the Czechs and in his inauguration address he warned
them that the government: “will and cannot sacrifice the large Czech minorities in the so-called
German area. For the Sudeten Germans it was more than enough to feel threatened.18
“Since the birth of Christ German tribes lived here and the German language was
heard from the wells of the Eger till deep into the Karpat mountains”, the Katechismus fur die
Sudetendeutschen proclaimed in 1920.19 Sudeten German writers glorified a past in which their
lands had been part of a greater German “Reich”, a time “when the Bohemian king wore the
crown of the German emperor”20 To them the Czechs were people of “halfasiatischen
Wildheit”, who had learned everything - Christianity, state building, economic behaviour, law
making - from the Germans, “The spirit that kissed awake the Czech people was the German
“Geist”.”21 No wonder all Sudeten German political parties favoured national autonomy and
cultural independency. Even so, a majority accepted the political status quo, and in 1926
Sudeten Germans began to take part in the Czechoslovak government.22 Before 1929, German
nationalists and national socialists never received more than 25 per cent of the votes.23 But the
potential for a quick growth of the Nazi party was always present. In 1933 Konrad Henlein
founded a political movement called the Sudeten German Party aimed at uniting all the
Germans living in Czechoslovakia. Membership of the new movement soon started to grow.
The economic crisis which had hit the industrial regions, in which the great majority of the
Germans lived, especially hard, was one of the main reasons of Henlein’s popularity. But the
increasing bitterness of the German Czech ethnic conflict and the success, just over the border,
of the German Nazi’s, were other important elements. Already in 1935, Konrad Henlein polled
a majority of the Sudeten German votes. In 1937, 25.43 per cent of the German population of
Czechoslovakia was member of the Sudeten German Party.24 Though Henlein at first expressed
loyalty to the Czechoslovakian state, he declared himself to be a national socialist in 1938. By
then the Sudeten German problem was about to be ‘solved’ by the Munich treaty of 1938 and
the assimilation of the region into Nazi Germany.
1945-1990
During the Second World War, there were border changes on both sides either as a
result of military action of new alliances. Many of those made by the Axis powers were
reversed after the War was over. Although seemingly fewer than the changes made in the wake
of the First World War, the impact was equally traumatic as they were accompanied by the
mass expulsion of Germans from non-German territory and of Ukrainians and citizens of the
Baltic states, reabsorbed into the Soviet Union, by Stalin. Moreover, the division of Europe into
‘spheres of influence’ soon brought an “iron curtain” across Europe. Churchill’s famous phrase
16
Ibid., 928.
Ibid., 947.
18
J.W. Bruegel, Czechoslovakia before Munich: The German Minority Problem and British Appeasement
Policy, London, 1973, 19.
19
R. Jaworski, “Historische Argumente in sudetendeutschen Kulturkampf, 1918-1938“,
Bohemia;
Zeitschrift fur Geschichte und Kultur de bohmischen Lander Band 28 (1987) 334.
20
Ibid., 336.
21
Ibid., 338.
22
R. M. Smelser, “At the Limits of a Mass Movement: the Case of the Sudeten German Party”, Bohemia;
Jahrbuch des Collegium Carolinum, Band 17 (1976) 247.
23
Bruegel, J.W. (1973, 2), ‘The Germans in Pre-war Czechoslovakia’ in: Mamatey and Luza, op. cit., 179.
24
Smalser, op. cit., 267.
17
40
might have been intended figuratively, but soon the border between East and West sliced across
the traditional pattern of transactions within Europe.
Main Territorial Changes by Treaty and Conferences during and after World War II
Treaty/
Date
Ceding
Gaining territory
Agreement
territory
Yalta
March 1945
Poland
Soviet Union
Potsdam
August 1945
Germany
Poland
Paris
February 1947 Finland
Russia (confirming gains of Winter War)
Hungary
Czechoslovakia, Romania
Romania
Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine
Ukraine
Czechoslovakia
Italy
France, Greece, Yugoslavia
Other border changes occurred outside the major peace treaties. For example, in 1944,
much to the chagrin of the Danish government-in-exile, the citizens of Iceland exercised their
right to a referendum and opted for independence. In 1947 France virtually annexed the Saar
region of Germany, which lay within its occupation zone. The history of that border change
forms the subject of the next case study. Finally, as historians from the Netherlands, we have to
admit that even the Dutch succumbed to temptation and in 1949 annexed a small area of
Germany under the pretext of implementing a “border correction”, only to return it in 1963.
The Saar: Europeanising a Border problem
The Saar forms part of a coal-rich area in Western Europe, lying between France and
Germany. For most of the 19th century it had been part of Bavaria and Prussia (and later,
Germany) but the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 deemed it an autonomous area under French
supervision. The area reverted to Germany in 1936, following a plebiscite in which no less than
90 per cent of the population had voted for reunion. After the War, the Saar region (whose total
area had been expanded by 33 per cent to 2500 km2 and containing 950,000 inhabitants), whilst
still formally autonomous, was placed under French military occupation.25 In 1947 the Saar
Statutes absorbed the region into an economic and monetary union with France whilst, at the
same time, instituting a measure of autonomous government.
At that time the border represented a serious line between two states. The demarcation
was not just territorial; it also reflected two distinct states of being. Germany was under military
occupation with low food supplies and with the Allies imposing “levels of industry” restrictions
on German industrial output, especially heavy industry. France, whilst still under rationing, was
at least actively engaged in a process of economic reconstruction. Moreover, the movement of
goods over borders was heavily restricted. In Germany, the Bizone operated a two-tier trading
system whereby only imports of essentials (a highly restrictive list) were paid for in dollars, and
the rest earned local German currency (of which France had already accumulated more than
enough during the War). Conversely, payments for exports from Germany fell mostly into the
hard currency category, which everywhere stimulated the search for alternative sources, often
through import substitution at home. Trade over the French border was also highly controlled.
Most trade in foodstuffs took place through government trading monopolies and more than half
of the rest was subject to quantitative trade controls. Moreover, export licences were required to
access foreign exchange, without which most commercial transactions were impossible.26
The French government was planning to use the opportunity of restrictions on German
heavy industry to expand its own steel output. One of the challenges it faced was a structural
25
H. Küppers, Heinrich, “Die Rolle Der Saar Als Politischer Faktor“, Revue d'Allemagne, 18, 1 (1986) 4649.
26
W. Diebold, Trade and Payments in Western Europe; a study in economic cooperation 1947-1950, New
York, 1952.
41
shortage of fuel, which it had traditionally obtained from Germany, but often under
unfavourable conditions. Even at this time, Germany was charging more for coal exports than
for domestic consumption. The Saar offered France an opportunity to lighten this painful
dependence and, to make sure that the source would remain secure, in 1949 the mines were
placed under direct administration from Paris. These arrangements were not completely onesided. There were benefits for the Saar as well. For a start, it would avoid falling under the
“limits of industry” policy. Moreover, the Saar had no indigenous production of iron ore for its
steel works whereas, within an economic union, it had access to ores from neighbouring
Lorraine or the higher quality ores from the West of France.27
For the citizens of the Saar, the balance of perceived advantage soon began to change.
In 1949 West Germany regained its sovereignty and this was accompanied by a rise in iron and
steel output and sales as the economy entered what was to become its “economic miracle”.
Moreover, after a balance of payments crisis in 1950/51, Germany began to remove its
quantitative trade controls. The opposite development occurred in France which became mired
in budget and balance-of-payments crises as a consequence of colonial wars in Indo-China. A
whole panoply of quantitative trade restrictions and manipulated exchange-rates was introduced
in an effort to stabilise the situation. Despite the fact that inhabitants in the Saar enjoyed better
pay and conditions than their counterparts in Germany, the change in the economic perspectives
prompted a groundswell reaction in favour of a return to Germany and, for the French
government, the conundrum became how to accommodate these sentiments without
endangering the domestic economy.28
The path chosen was an original one… the French wanted the problem solved within a
European framework. The Schuman Plan, for a European Coal and Steel community, launched
in May 1950 touched the heart of economic relations in the area. The opening of the
Community in 1952 guaranteed equal access to the resources of the Community, nondiscrimination in pricing and transport costs, transparent trade rules, the abolition of internal
trade barriers and the introduction of a common external commercial policy. The ECSC
completely transformed the entire context of the border question. For a time, the French
government baulked at returning the territory to Germany, proposing instead to give it a
“European” status under the leadership of a Commissioner appointed by the Western European
Union. However, this was rejected by the Saarlanders in a referendum in 1954. A subsequent
agreement between France and Germany secured the return of the Saar to Germany in January
1957,29 just months before the signature of the Treaty of Rome which would dissolve all
remaining economic barriers between France and Germany, within the European Economic
Community.
Cyprus: divided and partitioned
By the 1970s, with the creation (and enlargement) of the common market and the
appearance of large-scale labour migration, the popular perception was that state borders in
Western Europe were diminishing in importance. In Cyprus, however, a new, virtually
impermeable, border was about to appear, and to endure for almost three decades. It would split
an island and isolate one island community not only from its neighbours but, because of a
boycott, reduce its contacts with much of the rest of the World. Even today, with Cyprus a
27
A. Heinen, “Saarkohle für Frankreich: Thesen zur Französischen Saarpolitik, 1945-1950“ Revue
d'Allemagne 1993 25(4): 545-552; A.s. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51,
London, 1984, 131.
28
J. Freymond, The Saar Conflict 1945-1955, Westport Conn., 1976; R. Hudemann, R. Poidevin and A.
Maas (eds). Die Saar, 1945-1955: Ein Problem der Europäischen Geschichte/La Sarre, 1945-1955: Un
Problème de l'Histoire Européenne, Munich, 1992.
29
A. H. V. Kraus,“Ja Oder Nein Zum Saarstatut? Der Abstimmungskampf 1955 In Der Prodeutschen
Saarländischen Presse“ Revue d'Allemagne 18, 1 (1986) 72-93; B. Thoss, „Die Lösung der Saarfrage,
1954/55“, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 38, 2, (1990) 225-288.
42
member of the European Union, the border remains. Any settlement requiring the agreement of
both communities seems as far away as ever.
The Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in July 1974 was but the final act in a long
political struggle involving the two main ethnic groups on the island. In its immediate post war
manifestation, the struggle for power involved three parties: the British colonial power, the
Greek Cypriot Enosis movement that aimed at unification of the island with Greece and Turkish
Cypriot Taksim movement that envisaged an eventual partition of the island between Greeks
and Turks. At the time the island’s population numbered a little over 570,000 people, of whom
441,000 were Greek Cypriots and 104,000 Turkish Cypriots. The remainder belonged either to
small minority Armenian or Maronite groups or were foreigners.
In 1959, Cyprus became a unified independent state – a solution that satisfied neither
side of the independence movement. Before long, political violence resumed. Although the UN
provided peace-keepers, they had little effective control outside the capital, Nicosia. Threatened
Turkish Cypriots began to leave isolated settlements for the shelter and protection of larger
enclaves under the protection of ethnic Turkish resistance fighters. Whereas in 1946 the number
of “mixed” villages still numbered 162 (of a total of 602), by 1970 their number had been
reduced to 48. Moreover, no less than 25,000 people had moved into the Turkish Cypriot area
of Nicosia. As the violence threatened to spill-over into a direct confrontation between Greek
and Turkish troops, common sense prevailed and the two sides withdrew their armies. By now,
however, the island was effectively ruled by two separate, ethnically defined, administrations.30
Events escalated once more in 1974. In July the Greek military Junta sponsored a
coup-d’etat against the island’s government and installed the Enosis guerrilla-leader Nicos
Sampson as provisional president. The Turkish government responded by a military
intervention which eventually involved 30,000 troops. If the intention had been to restore the
status-quo ante, the operation was a spectacular success. The military Junta in Athens collapsed
three days later and Sampson resigned his position. However, during the negotiations with the
new Greek government, the Turks extended their occupation of the island until it covered 38 per
cent of the territory and effectively partitioning the island in two. Over 168,000 Greek Cypriots
fled from the North in the immediate aftermath of the occupation, while 34,000 Turkish
Cypriots moved in the opposite direction31 A new demarcation-line, supervised by UN troops,
became the new 300 km long border across the island. It was quickly acquired a permanent
appearance - a curious mixture of concrete walls, barbed-wire fencing and anti-tank ditches on
the one hand and pieces of piled-up corrugated metal on the other. For the next thirty years,
there was no movement, personal or commercial, of the inhabitants on either side of the
border.32
At first sight, the Turkish Cypriots seem to have gained from the invasion. They
represented 20 per cent of the population of the island, but now controlled 50 per cent of the
agricultural land (and 75 per cent of the output), nearly half of the industrial capacity and had
accommodated almost two-thirds of the tourist trade. They also held the main international port
of Famagusta.33 These ostensible benefits were outweighed by the ensuing international boycott
which cut the area off from international aid (such as from the World Bank) and made the
economy almost totally dependent on Ankara both for trade and for government revenues. In
addition, the population lacked the knowledge and entrepreneurial skills to manage all the
enterprises abandoned by Greek Cypriots.34 The tourist industry in the North was not given a
high priority. Besides, the Turkish occupation was not officially recognised (no consulate
30
R.J. Fisher, “Cyprus: the Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of Identity-Based Conflict to an
Adversarial Impasse” Journal of Peace Research, 38, 3 (2001) 309-311; N. Kliot and Y. Mansfield, “The
Political Landscape of Partition. The case of Cyprus” Political Geography, 16, 6 (1997) 499-503.
31
Kliot and Mansfield op. cit., 506.
32
Ibid., 503
33
D. Christodoulou, Inside the Cyprus Miracle. The labours of an embattled mini-economy, Minneapolis,
1992.
34
Kliot and Mansfield, op. cit., 515.
43
representation, no insurance cover for tourists) and there were no direct flights into the island
(all being routed through Turkey).35 Many of the displaced population had been in farming and
their numbers were augmented by immigration to the island from East Turkey. As a result,
agricultural development received priority in government planning, that and the creation of
public employment36These measures contributed to the growth of the economy, but it remained
truncated, lop-sided and dangerously dependent upon subsidies form Ankaka.
The South of the island seemed exceptionally disadvantaged. Not only did it lose
infrastructure and resources, but it also had to meet the housing demands of the displaced
population. Very early, however, the government decided to target the tourist industry as a
central part of its development strategy. Within years after the partition, tourist numbers had
recovered and they continued to expand by 18 per cent per annum over the following decade,
outstripping any other Mediterranean destination. By 1995, the sector accounted for 20 per cent
of GDP and 40 per cent of export earnings.37 The South has developed into a comparatively
prosperous part of Europe, able to negotiate its entry into the European Union. However,
scarred by the memories of the occupation, its population still resists all attempts at
reunification. Although the border was opened briefly in 2003, it still remains stubbornly intact,
with one border crossing point along its entire length.
Conclusion
In the introduction we mentioned three factors that are especially important when we
want to analyse the consequences of border changes. The circumstances under which the
changes have taken place, war, violence, treaties, the nature of the border at the time of change
and the position of ethnic, religious groups in the old and the new society. In our examples we
have tried to gain more insight in these processes. In the case of the Sudeten Germans after
WWI, we were confronted with an ethnic group that was not allowed to have any influence on
their situation. According to the Versailles treaty, they could not become part of the new state of
Austria and of Germany and had to settle instead for an uncertain future within another new
state, Czechoslovakia. Sudeten Germans only lived within one region of Czechoslovakia, where
their majority position was threatened by Czech migration and a rising Czech nationalism. On
the other hand, the Czech government was willing to cooperate with the Sudeten Germans.
Cyprus gave a totally different example of the way ethnic relations can be influenced
by border changes. In this case the changes did not take place through treaty or negotiations, but
through what almost amounted to open warfare, resulting in the occupation by the Turks of a
large part of the Island. A massive cross migration followed and nowadays the Turks and
Greeks Cypriots are almost totally segregated, in a situation that remains very tense. European
history of the twentieth century offers a wealth of other possibilities for research. In Bosnia
violence, civil war, ethnic cleansing and in the end international pressure have led to a situation
in which the different ethnic groups have tried to occupy segregated ethnically homogeneous
areas, but so far have only partially successful. Independence and border change in the Baltic
states came by negotiations and treaties. Nevertheless the presence of large numbers of ethnic
Russians, could easily lead to tensions that could be compared to the Czech, German conflict.
The Irish and Saar examples give other interesting possibilities for further research. In
the Irish case a situation arose in which almost all of the foreign trade of the newly independent
country was conducted with the former mother country. The resulting real, or presumed,
economic dependency was much maligned by nationalists. In the thirties Irish trade policy led
to a trade war, the results of which for the Irish economy are still debatable, but which certainly
boosted the Irish moral.
35
D. Ioannides. and Y. Apostolopoulos,(1999) “Political Instability, War and Tourism in Cyprus: Effects,
management and prospects for recovery” Journal of Travel Research, 38, (August 1999) 52-53.
36
B. Morvaridi, “Demographic Change, Resettlement and Resource Use” in C.H. Dodd (ed) The Political,
Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, Huntingdon, (1993) 2222-228.
37
Ioannides and Apostolopoulos, op. cit., 52-53.
44
The Saar case is different. Whereas normally we are dealing with independent nations,
in which at least a majority of the people greeted independence with happiness, here we have a
case of involuntary independence. Twice in the twentieth century the Saar was given some kind
of independence, albeit under a form of French supervision, while the Saar people preferred to
remain part of Germany. A complicating factor was the importance of the Saar for solving
French fuel problems. The Saar conflict never became nasty because it was solved as part of the
Schuman plan and the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community. Our examples offer
only a very first introduction to the complex economic consequences of border changes and the
factors influencing these processes. Alsace-Lorraine is another interesting example of a region
that changed borders repeatedly as a result of Franco-German rivalry. On the other hand there
are many examples in which border change resulted in a partial, or almost total, halt to
economic activities. One can think of Cyprus, which offers interesting insights in the way
separate, and separated, regions can adapt to such fundamental economic changes. The former
Yugoslavia also offers several possibilities to study the way regions react to the disappearance
in whole or in part, of formerly important forms of economic cooperation or even dependence.
In future publications we hope to be able to formulate a typology of the consequences
of border changes. For the moment we will concentrate on economic and ethnic problems.
Ethnic groups can become part of a new state that did not exist before, they can become part of
an already existing state, they can get their own state, they can become a minority in a larger
state, they can become a majority in a smaller state. They can wholeheartedly embrace the
border change or they can feel threatened by it. Economic situations can also change because
economic ties are broken, because a former mother country remains dependent of products from
the newly independent nation, because a newly independent nation’s economy remains to
tightly connected to the mother country, because tariffs and other frontier controls suddenly
hinder the exchange of goods. Analysing these possibilities we will take into account not only
the factors already mentioned in the beginning of this article, but also the role of the
international community. The international community can create new borders, as it did in the
post-war settlements, but they may also create arrangements that diminish the impact of existing
borders. The prospect of European Union membership (and membership itself) has become a
good example of this force in action, by offering market access and development support but
also by insisting upon respect of human rights and equality before the law. It may yet prevent
the reoccurrence of the kind of conflict we witnessed in former- Yugoslavia. It will not do so if
reduced borders within the Union are accompanied by raised barriers on its external frontiers.
Bibliography
BRUEGEL, J. W. Czechoslovakia before Munich: The German Minority Problem and British
Appeasement Policy, London, 1973.
IDEM, (1973, 2), “The Germans in Pre-war Czechoslovakia” in: V. S. .Mamatey and R. Luza,
A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948, Princeton, 1973.
CHRISTODOULOU, D., Inside the Cyprus Miracle. The labours of an embattled minieconomy, Minneapolis, 1992.
CORNWALL, M., “The Struggle on the Czech-German Language Border, 1880-1940” in:
English Historical Review, 109, 433 (1994) 914-951.
DIEBOLD, W., Trade and Payments in Western Europe; a study in economic cooperation
1947-1950, New York, 1952.
FISHER, R. J., “Cyprus: the Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of Identity-Based Conflict
to an Adverserial Impasse” Journal of Peace Research, 38, 3 (2001) 307-326.
FREYMOND, J., The Saar Conflict 1945-1955, Westport Conn., 1976
GIRVIN, B., Between Two Worlds. Politics and Economy in Independent Ireland, Dublin,
1989.
HEINEN, A., A. “Saarkohle für Frankreich: Thesen zur Französischen Saarpolitik, 1945-1950“
Revue d'Allemagne, 25, 4 (1993) 545-552.
45
HUDEMANN, R. R., Poidevin and A. Maas (eds). Die Saar, 1945-1955: Ein Problem der
Europäischen Geschichte/La Sarre, 1945-1955: Un Problème de l'Histoire Européenne,
Munich, 1992.
IOANNIDES, D.; APOSTOLOPOULOS, Y., “Political Instability, War and Tourism in
Cyprus: Effects, management and prospects for recovery” Journal of Travel Research, 38,
(August 1999) 51-56.
JAWORSKI,R., Historische Argumente in sudetendeutschen Kulturkampf, 1918-1938“ in:
Bohemia; Zeitschrift fur Geschichte und Kultur de bohmischen Lander Band 28 (1987)
331-344.
JOHNSON, D., The Interwar Economy in Ireland Dublin, 1985.
KLIOT,N.; MANSFIELD, Y., “The Political Landscape of Partition. The case of Cyprus”,
Political Geography, 16, 6 (1997) 495-521.
KRAUS, A. H. V., “Ja Oder Nein Zum Saarstatut? Der Abstimmungskampf 1955 In Der
Prodeutschen Saarländischen Presse“ Revue d'Allemagne 18, 1 (1986) 72-93
KÜPPERS, H., “Die Rolle Der Saar Als Politischer Faktor“, Revue d'Allemagne, 18, 1 (1986)
46-62.
LEE, J.J., Ireland 1912-1985; Politics and Society, Cambridge, 1989.
MAMATEY, V.S., “The Establishment of the Republic” in: V.S. Mamatey and R. Luza,
History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918-1948, 1973.
MCMAHON, D., Republicans and Imperialists. Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s, New
Haven and London, 1984.
MEENAN, J., The Irish Economy since 1922, Liverpool, 1970.
MORVARIDI, B., “Demographic Change, Resettlement and Resource Use” in C.H. Dodd (ed)
The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus, Huntingdon, 1993,
219-234.
MILWARD, A. S., The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, London, 1984.
O’ROURKE, K., “Burn everything British but their Coal: the Anglo-Irish economic war of the
1930s”, Journal of Economic History, 51, 2 (1991) 357-366.
SMELSER, R. M., “At the Limits of a Mass Movement: the Case of the Sudeten German Party”
in: Bohemia; Jahrbuch des Collegium Carolinum, Band 17 (1976) 240-267.
THOSS, B., "Die Lösung der Saarfrage, 1954/55", Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 38, 2,
(1990) 225-288.
46
Borders in a Changing Europe: Dynamics of Openness and Closure*
Gerard DELANTY
One of the most visible ways in which societal space is organized is in borders. While
many contributions to theories of space stress the openness of space, the border is one of the
abiding features of the spatial definition of societies. With the emergence of a European polity
in the making, the question of the borders of Europe has taken on a new significance. New
kinds of borders have come into existence, older borders disappear while others take on new
functions. Many former political borders between states have become little more than cultural
borders, while older cultural borders such as the one between Europe and the nonEurope are
taking more of a political character as the EU’s evolves a system of external governance.
For several centuries the question was asked where the borders of Europe lie. This
question was generally posed in terms of a civilizational notion of the unity of European
civilization and concerned the relationship between culture and geography. Cultural concepts of
Europe as Christian or as a civilization based on Rome and Athens were thus translated into
geographical terms, such as the notion of a continent or a western landmass separated from Asia
by territorial markers, ranging from rivers, mountains to seas. Depending on the purpose for
which it was intended, and this of course was determined by political motives on the part of
various groups, the definition oscillated from the cultural to the geographical. Imperial notions
were thus used to define Europe. What differed only was the empire in question. The Romavos
invoked a territorial concept of Europe that included Russia, while the Catholic Church and the
Christian states of the Middle Ages and Renaissance era invoked a cultural concept of Europe
to underline the political distinction between a westward expanding Islamic East and a
belligerent Christian West. For Napoleon, Europe was a limitless frontier that could be shaped
in the image of the French empire and which could push back the frontiers of the Ottoman
empire. But the idea Europe always remained primarily a cultural concept to describe a
civilization that could never be reduced to territory and rarely coincided for long with political
designs (Delanty, 1995). In the age of the Great Powers, but going back to the early inter-state
system since it emerged after 1648, the reality of this European civilization was not
Christendom or the vaguely and ever-shifting geographical limits of what ever was termed
Europe: it was a Europe of (largely imperial) states. The idea of Europe was merely a residual
category that served as a cultural reference point, but had little geopolitical weight.
In the twentieth century, especially since 1945, purely cultural definitions of Europe
gave way to stronger political definitions. First, there was the Cold War, which defined Europe
in geo-political terms as the eastern frontier of the United States and a very much truncated
western Europe emerged, bereft of much of the historical centre of what had been European
civilization. In this redefinition and reconfiguration of the borders of Europe, Europe was
subordinated to the West and to American leadership. Second, the rise of the European Union
since the Treaty of Rome (1957) led slowly to an economic and political conception of Europe
that was no longer defined in terms of nation. It was only with the consolidation of the
European Union as a transnational polity in the last two decades since the Maastricht Treaty
(1992) that the political definition of Europe took predominance over other definitions. Until
then it appeared to be the case that the cultural and the geographical dimensions had faded into
the background. This was because in the age of the nation-state that was the basis of the
European Union in its formative period, from 1950s to the mid-1980s, geographical borders
were largely a matter of national borders and the Cold War set the wider geopolitical limits of
*
To appear in: Comparative European Politics, special issue “Rethinking European Spaces”, Vol. 4 (2)
2006
47
Europe. Partly discredited as a result of the totalitarianism of the first half of the twentieth
century and partly because of the overwhelming appeal of American popular culture, questions
of European cultural identity were not centre of stage (De Grazia, 2005). Of course the relative
weakness of a cultural idea of Europe did not mean that the border did not have a cultural
dimension; it meant that the cultural presuppositions of the border reflected wider geopolitical
considerations.
This has changed today for several reasons. There is some evidence that American
social and cultural influence in Europe has waned and there is a growing confidence in certain
aspects of what can be called European society in terms of a way of life and a distinctive social
model. Most importantly because with the end of the Cold War, the hard border that separated
Europe from the East has disappeared and the EU has expanded into potentially open - and
some would say, limitless - territory. In addition to these reasons, there is the wider global
context of post-territorial globalization and developments in the direction of re-territorialization.
In sum, the political, social and cultural presuppositions of the twentieth century are no longer
valid when it comes to an analysis of the border in Europe today. The result of this is that the
border takes on a new significance.
So the current situation is marked by the return of the border on a European scale at
precisely the same time as the borders of the nation-state are being challenged by global
processes. In this changing context the European border has become intertwined with cultural
questions concerning the nature of Europe. With the return of the cultural question of the
meaning of Europe, inevitably the border too takes on a cultural dimension. It is obvious that
today Europe cannot be defined by settled political criteria anymore than it can be defined by
traditional cultural or geographical aspects. Since the enlargement process and the constitutional
debate on the on-going transnationalization of the state, the EU is no longer a clearly defined
economic and administrative organization and nor has it become a state contained by settled
territorial limits. The EU’s constitutive units, its member states, too have been transformed both
by the progressive movement towards the transnationalization of the state and by wider
processes of globalization. In this situation then the question of borders takes on a new
significance. Of the many aspects of borders in Europe today is the centrality of the cultural
dimension, which can be viewed, like Europeanization itself, as an open process characterised
by moments of closure. This paper attempts to outline the basis of a theory of changing borders
in Europe.
In recent years there has been a huge increase in research on borders (see Andreas,
2003; Newman, 2003, 2004b, Newman and Paasi, 1998; Paasi, 1996). Much of this has not yet
been incorporated into the debate about Europeanization. There is however an emerging but
relatively limited literature on borders with respect to Europeanization (see Anderson et al.,
2003; Berezin and Schain, 2003; Jönsson, 2000; Rumford, 2006; Zielonka, 2002). The overall
implications of all of this new work on borders suggests a challenge to many vague notions of
new spatial formations such as ‘Fortress Europe’ or the contrary notion of a ‘Europe without
borders.’ But even within this growing literature there is little or no consideration of the impact
of global borders in European space. This paper makes a modest contribution to a social theory
of borders with an application to Europe and its changing outer borders..
The central argument of the paper is that the border is becoming increasingly shaped
by the global context and that it is characterised by alternating hard and soft forms on one axis
and on another, open and closed forms. It is not possible to define the border in Europe as a
hard border – as reflected in the notion of a Fortress Europe whereby hard national borders are
simply transferred to the European level – and nor is it possible to define it as soft border, as in
the notion of Europe as a culturally defined area that has is essentially open. The border is a
process rather than a fixed line and is constituted in new and changing relations between cores
and peripheries and is the site of political contestations where power and culture interact. With
the growing importance of the global context, Europe’s external border takes on a post-imperial
form whereby inside and outside are not clearly delineated
48
The paper begins with a general theoretical outline of European borders. In the second
section this is developed around a discussion of the global context where the argument is that
the border in Europe is now inextricably connected with the global context. The subsequent
section takes up these theoretical arguments with respect to the question of the identity of
Europe, which, it is argued, changes as a result of the changing nature of the border, for borders
as boundaries are central to the systems of classification out of which identities are created in
dynamics of openness and closure.
Theorizing Borders
Borders are not natural but products of human agency. Although many borders appear
natural where geographical criteria are invoked, few borders are determined by geography
alone. As a political design, borders are like society itself; they are human artefacts. As societies
change, so too does the border. Borders are reflections of the cultural life of a society as much
of the territorial boundaries of the society. Definitions of insiders and outsiders are often related
to the border, which is also the site of memories and collective identities (Meinhof, et al. 2002;
Wilson and Donnan, 1998). Both memories and identities, themselves related, requires
boundaries and borders are one such system of classification and with symbolic and cognitive
implications. Different kinds of societies have different conceptions of their borders, some
viewing it as open and expanding and others as historically determined by geography. A border
is a line of demarcation and as such it creates a distinction between an inside and an outside.
But borders are also institutions. Geography, politics and culture are combined in different ways
in elaborating and sustaining the lines of the distinction (Bort, 1998; Coakley, 1982; Paasi,
1996). Borders are social, political and cultural; they are social in that they are a way of
organizing societies, political in that they are sites of conflicts, and cultural in the way they
embody memories and symbolic representations.
Borders have been seen as military and physical frontiers and as symbolic boundaries.
Anthropological studies on borders have noted the role of the boundary as a marker of the
collective identity of social groups (Barth, 1969; Cohen, 1985; Paasi, 1996). Boundaries are
more important than identity, it has been argued, in so far as they constitute the basic forms of
classification which identities need to distinguish self and other (see Newman and Paasi, 1998).
Borders thus have a symbolic role in marking the boundaries of the ‘we group’. As a
mechanism for establishing difference, the border functions to express the identity of the group
rather than being a structure that inheres in geography. In such cases, the physical nature of the
border is relatively unimportant. But borders also serve military and economic functions. They
serve as buffer-zones, lines of demarcation between centres and peripheries. Borders became
more and more central to societal organization with modernity. In earlier ages, the borders of
empires were relatively open and were fixed only at those points were they were weak, as in the
case of Hadrian’s Wall or the Great Wall of China. Although the Roman Empire is often
portrayed as having rigid borders, it was not based on a geographically defined area and the
imperial limes was a line of declining control rather than a frontier (Whittaker, 2000).
While the distinction between border and frontier is at best fuzzy, there is a general
tendency to view the border between states as a frontier. Borders refer to the outer part or an
edge of a territory, while frontiers refer to the border between two countries (see Newman,
2004b). In EU law the concept frontier tends to be the term used to refer to the borders between
states, while the external borders are simply called borders (Müller-Graff, 1998: 15). Frontiers
in Europe thus suggest limits zones, the end of a territory rather than points of transition. The
term was originally a military zone where the enemy was engaged (Anderson, 1996: 9). This
does not mean that frontiers cannot expand. A famous example of an expanding frontier is the
notion of the ‘limitless western frontier’ of the United States. Frederick Turner, in a classic
work on the American western frontier, noted how the American national character was shaped
in the nineteenth century with the expanding western frontier extending the American nation
(Turner, 1921). The frontier mentality was one of an open horizon of a limitless opportunities
that was conducive to a liberal national character. In this case the western frontier was an
49
example of an open border, until the threshold of closure was finally reached in the twentieth
century.
John Ruggie (1993) has argued that with modernity a territorial politics arose in which
sovereignty was invested in a single political authority, the sovereign state. This led to borders
having an added significance in maintaining the new territoriality. Ruggie draws attention to the
cognitive function of space in shaping modern politics. He argues modern territoriality was
characterized by a politics of perspectivism by which a single spatial perspective was
established and centred on the state which possessed this single perspective. Ruggie’s point is
that this has now been replaced by a ‘multi-perspectival polity’, of which in his estimation the
EU is the best example.
In sum, borders have symbolic roles in defining the political community; they have
functional roles with respect to the internal administration and political control of populations
and markets, and they have a geopolitical role in respect of territorial defence. The border
should be seen as a reflection of the historically contingent situation and is an on-going process
as opposed to being fixed or territorially determined by the physical facts of geography. None
of the great rivers or mountain ranges have served as a natural border. The seas that today
separate many countries once functioned as the waterways that connected the seafaring
civilizations of earlier times. Borders can be arbitrary: the Bosporus is supposed to separate
Europe from Asia and the Straits of Gibraltar a border between Europe and Africa, but the
larger Black Sea does not separate the Caucasus from the general idea of a geographical
Europe. The Ural Mountains are in fact low-lying hills that had no natural function and were
considered by the Romans to be insignificant.
In this paper a conceptional framework for theorizing borders in Europe is proposed.
The basis of this are two sets of distinctions, both of which refer to different conceptions of the
border as a networked process in which dynamics of openness and closure are played out. The
first concerns hard versus soft borders. The second concerns open versus closed borders.
Hard borders generally are military or political borders that separate states or state
systems. The Iron Curtain - while having also powerful symbolic resonances - is an example of
a hard border in which political and military functions combined to create a border that was
impermeable and rigid in separating two global blocs for forty years. An example of a soft
border would be symbolic borders, such as those that often mark the boundaries between ethnic
groups. The notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’, which is often held to replace Cold War hard
borders, is also a pertinent example - even if it is more a product of ideology than of political
analysis - of a soft border defined in cultural terms. Hard borders are thus closer to frontiers.
This leads to the second point.
Borders can be open or closed. Hard borders such as the borders of states will tend to
be on the whole closed, although this will vary depending on the various aspects of the border.
In terms of immigration policy this may vary from openness to closure, but in terms of territory
on the whole this will be relatively closed. As nation-states consolidated in the late-nineteenth
century hard borders became more central to the codification of citizenship. Passports were
introduced to regulate the movement of populations across borders (Torpey, 2000). The
passport is thus an example of a hard border, which distinguishes citizens from non-citizens.
The relation between open and closed borders is particularly relevant to the EU and to
the general context of Europeanization. The EU itself is an example of a state system that while
having relatively hard borders does not have fixed borders that are closed. The political borders
of the EU are not final frontiers, but open to new states. The EU member states themselves have
more open borders than nonEU states and within the category of EU member states, the
Schengen countries have more open borders than those that are not within this agreement.
Examples of open borders pertaining to culturally defined groups might be the Council of
Europe, which is more open than the EU and which has, what can be called, a soft definition of
Europe as a cultural and geographical area that includes some forty countries. While there are
many examples of soft cultural categories that are open, examples of soft borders that are closed
to outsiders are some kinds of ethnic groups and religious orders (not everyone can become
50
Japanese or Jewish while it is possible to become French and British by naturalization and, by
conversion, Islamic and Catholic).
The distinctions indicated by the polarities of hard/soft and open/closed should not be
seen in normative terms, as ‘good’ in the sense of more inclusive versus ‘bad’ in the sense of
more exclusive borders. War zones, for instance, are often defined by soft criteria with
relatively open borders. Detention camps and refugee camps are clearly hard as opposed to
culturally defined, but increasingly they are more likely to be open than territorially closed in
the sense that they are mobile and thus flexible with respect to territory. Another example of
hard but open borders are so-called ‘smart borders’, open points of access within closed and
hard closed borders (see below). On the other hand, the collapse of states and their borders leads
to the proliferation of ethnic enclaves, often with violent results as the examples of the collapse
of the Yugoslavian Federation and Iraq illustrate. As David Newman has argued, borders are
becoming more and more permeable than in the past, but they remain the hard lines which
determine the territorial limits of the state and the citizenship of those included within it
(Newman, 2004). New and less visible borders are emerging in the changing landscape of postterritorial space and in these often liminal spaces new kinds of exclusion are emerging. For
instance in the UK, as in many countries, the declining significance of the traditional borders
between states has been met with a move to create high-tech identity cards involving biometric
data and the increased use of profiling. Such new technologies of identification and surveillance
can be as an alternative to the passport, and will entail less closed - and also less visible - i.e.
‘smart borders’ for the global elite. But for amny people these will be more regulated and
controlled borders.
While these distinctions are to be viewed as a way of classifying different aspects of
bordering processes and regimes, it is possible to discern in current developments a movement
by which many hard/closed borders are moving in the direction of open/closed. As already
pointed out, this does not mean that these borders are becoming more liberal in the sense of
more inclusive and nor does it suggest in any way that there is an epochal shift in the nature of
the border. There is clearly an increase in hard borders that taken open forms, in the sense of
structures and regimes that are not constrained by territory. The rise in disciplinary zones, such
as detention camps for refuges, for instance, is an example of more open/hard zones.
Guantanamo Bay is the paradigmatic instance of such developments. The scale of such
developments cannot be easily assessed in quantitative terms and the observations made here
are intended to draw attention to the global increase in non-territorial forms of hard borders.
The changing logic of openness/closure is vividly reflected in developments related to soft
borders. Figure 1 draws attention to a two-way movement in soft borders from closed to open
and vice versa. The rise of nationalist movements can be seen in terms of a shift towards closure
while the reverse, as exemplified by the rise of European identities and multiple identities, can
be seen as an example of a shift towards openness. The significance of these trends will be
discussed further below.
With regard to Europe and the process of Europeanization the question of borders
clearly concerns changing relations between, on the one side, the internal borders of Europe
and, on the other side, the external borders of Europe. With regard to internal borders the
assumption can be made that there is a movement towards more open borders within the
countries of the EU and its associated states, such as Norway - a member of the Schengen group
of states but not an EU member state - and Switzerland. The argument can furthermore be made
that in the past Europe’s internal borders between states where largely hard and relatively
closed borders and that - with the exception of the Iron Curtain - Europe’s external borders were
soft and relatively open to changing circumstances. Notwithstanding this hard frontier, even
with the EU the outer border was fairly open to expansion, as the various enlargements of the
EU illustrate. Today, in contrast, the internal borders of Europe are becoming more open and in
some cases there is an indication of a move towards soft borders. Some dramatic examples of
this are the opening of the border between North and South Cyprus and the easing of security
on the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The point can also be
51
illustrated by reference to the borders between France and Germany, which today have ceased
to be war zones. The borders that demarcate European countries are now mostly devoid of any
military significance and have also lost their function as trading zones; to varying degrees are
now reduced to policing functions.
While this movement is clearly occurring, there is another, but less clear-cut
development in the direction of a hardening of the external border. It would be tempting to
argue that the former hard/closed border that separated the nation-states of Europe is being
transferred to the outer-border of the EU and that Europe is becoming like the United States a
fortress. The truth is less simple and there is no European Patriot Act. There is a general change
in the nature and function of borders in Europe. Europe’s external borders are not simply
replicating national borders, despite the obvious fact that the EU is spending more and more
money on border controls. One of the arguments of this paper is that the EU external border is
an open structure that responds to change. One of the major impacts on it – as well as on
internal borders – is the global context. Moreover, internal borders are not simply becoming
more open in the sense of becoming more inclusive. What is occurring is re-territorialization
whereby old borders overlap with new and less visible ones, such as increased policing and
security checks, leading to a networked border system in which inside and outside are less
clear-cut.
The Global Context
Borders in Europe can be seen as an influenced by three major forces: internal
developments relating to national borders, the rise of a European transnational state system in
which an external European border has been created, and the wider global context. A central
thesis of this paper is that the global context is becoming more and more important in the
shaping of borders today. The tendency until now is to concentrate on the national and EU
borders, but these borders do not take shape independently of global developments such as the
new kinds of borders produced by global markets and transnational movements of various kinds
such as mobile borders, networks, liminal zones, and invisible borders.
Following Urry (2003: 40-9) and Mol and Law (1994), global space can be seen in
terms of regions, networks and flows. Regions refers to the space of bounded societies;
networks refer to relational constancy between components; and flows refer neither to
boundaries not networks but movement and process. Much of global space can be
conceptualized as flows and thus suggests a notion of territory as fluid rather than a spatially
fixed. But networks, too, are central to global space, as Castells (2000) and Urry (2000, 2003)
have claimed. As Waters (2006) has argued, there is a new system of borders taking shape in
Europe around transport networks whereby ‘the entire road transportation system becomes a
kind of networked border. The border transforms into a mobile, non-contiguous zone
materializing at the very surface of the truck and every place it stops’ (Waters: 2006: ). Clearly
these notions have implications for Europeanization as a process that entails major re-scaling of
borders. Conventional conceptions of the internal and external borders of Europe tend to remain
on the level of a notion of regional space, neglecting these new kinds of space, which should be
seen as a re-terrritorialization of space in which policing is often central. Thus Canada and the
US are moving customs and immigration inspections away from the borders and in the USA
Patriot Act has created a category of ‘trusted travellers’ who through electronic identification
can quickly get through security checks. The resulting ‘smart borders’ occur within layered
levels of policing at land, sea and air ports of entry (Andreas, 2003: 98).
In addition to these new borders, which are generally products of re-territorialization,
there is also the increasing salience of the ‘imperial’ limes, the border as a diminishing zone of
control over which the centre loses control of the periphery. This border is less a new European
version of what Webb (1952) called the ‘Great Frontier’; rather it is the zone of semiperipheries, which in earlier times were buffer-zones but today are borderlands. In the terms of
Hardt and Negri (2000), this aspect of ‘Empire’ is a feature of states in the present day: ‘In
contrast to imperialism, Empire establishes no territorial centre of power and does not rely on
52
fixed boundaries or barriers. It is a decentred and deterritorialized apparatus of rule that
progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontier’ (Hardt
and Negri, 2000: xii). It designates a territorial situation in which there is a general weakening
of the border beyond the areas directly controlled by the centre, where the periphery fades into
an outer borderland. Although developed with reference to globalization and US hegemony, the
point has a more application and, with some qualifications, is relevant to Europeanization,
which due to its expanding logic has brought into play a range of forces operating within and
alongside its outer border. This will be discussed in detail in the next section. But for present
purposes the nature and logic of territory that is characteristic of the global context can be
summed as one that entails changing relations of interiority and exteriority beyond modern
territoriality. In these new borders it is more difficult to conceptualize borders as an edge or
frontier separating one region from another exterior space for the outside is often within the
inside. Instead it is more helpful to see the border in terms of interconnecting axis, such as those
discussed above. For example the central and eastern European countries who have recently
joined the EU provide a policing role to the rest of the EU, which provides subsidies for such
policing controls. However, the border that they establish is not a straightforward frontier but a
more complicated mechanism of control involving policing, economic and military functions.
In general the emphasis is less on the military and more on the policing (Andreas, 2003). It
needs also the considered that the EU is not a state as such and does not have the traditional
monopoly over the means of violence that Max Weber believed to be the defining feature of the
state. Another example of the changing relation of the centre to the periphery in Europe is the
emerging of a new kind of governance whereby the EU expands its governance beyond the
member states to neighbouring regions. Such regions, while being formally excluded from legal
membership, are also not excluded but part of a networked political system in which ‘fuzzy
borders’ come into play (Lavenex, 2004: 681). Examples of this are accession association (for
potential members), neighbourhood association (Mediterranean and near eastern countries),
development co-operation (Africa and wider Asian countries) and various kinds of co-operation
(see Lawson, 2003). In this context it makes little sense to speak of borders exclusively in terms
of the legal boundaries of a given territory. Stein Rokkan referred to these relations of cores
and peripheries as a European system of cleavages (Rokkan, 1999; cited in Eder, 2006).
Dynamics of Openness and Closure in Borders and Identities
On the basis of the analysis developed above how can European space be characterized
in terms of its borders and what are the implications for the very identity of Europe? In other
words, is Europe to be characterized as an open or as a closed structure? It is clear than on this
issue current political positions differ greatly, as is evidenced by the debate over the draft
Constitution of Europe and the issue of Turkish membership of the European Union.
One of the most commonly used metaphors to characterise the identity of Europe is the
spatial notion of Europe as a ‘fortress’, that is a new territorially distinct polity with external
borders akin to the frontiers of nation-states. Within the fortress, internal borders are eased,
while the external ones have become more pronounced. The notion of Fortress Europe is more
than an evocative metaphor to characterise European space, but has become closer to a
discursive strategy to express hostility to Europeanization. It expresses largely Left-wing
critiques Europeanization. For the Left, the danger is that Europe is closing itself off from the
rest of the world, including potential future member states. In this view, Europe is becoming a
suprastate that is reinventing the hard frontiers of the state in setting limits to who can be
included its polity. Fortress Europe is a protectionist barrier against imports from the
developing world. Thus, Fortress Europe is based on a trade-off of inclusion and exclusion: a
high degree of democracy and prosperity for those who belong to it is attained at the price of the
exclusion of non-Europeans and trade from the developing world. Securitization and trade
barriers must therefore become a priority and limits imposed on further enlargement, are among
the implications of Fortress Europe. Although largely a discourse of the Left, it is also implicit
53
in many populist positions of the Right where it is associated with a top-heavy state that is overriding national liberties.
Even influential postnational visions of a democratic and constitutionally based
European polity, such as Habermas’s, implicitly rely on notions of Europe as a polity that must
draw boundaries with the non-European. Thus in Habermas’s strongly republican conception of
a postnational Europe, the project of creating a trans-national European democracy should
confine itself to those countries that share the republican, democratic heritage. Although a critic
of the idea of an undemocratic Fortress Europe, Habermas argues for a strong notion of Europe
as bounded by a core group of nations which must overcome their internal difference in order to
resist the outside. So instead of a Europe of nations, Europe should itself become a new, albeit
post-national, nation with much the same structures of the national political community. One of
the fears – shared by both the right and the left – is that a larger EU will increase the so-called
democratic deficit and a big state will not be able to deepen democracy with the result that the
EU will become largely determined by market forces. The picture of the Fortress Europe is thus
on the whole one that is animated by anti-globalization sentiments and based on the belief that a
smaller and self-contained Europe – be it a Europe of nations or a post-national Europe - can
resist with the help of security measures and trade barriers globalization and Americanization.
As put forward in recent debates, a ‘core Europe’ – in effect the most influential Old European
countries, namely France and Germany – should provide the necessary leadership for the wider
New Europe (see Levy et al, 2005).
These debates on the identity of Europe are related to spatial notions and highlight the
cultural and political significance of borders. The perspective developed in this paper seriously
questions the articulation of any notion of Europe based on borders that can distinguish inside
from outside, including the distinction between Europe and the non-European. There are several
reasons why this is the case and why Europe will not be able to become in any straightforward
sense of the term a Fortress or a nation writ large, with closed and hard borders separating
Europe from the outside. There are also reasons to doubt that the transnational vision of a
republican European demos, as in Habermas’s model, will be possible.
To begin, the emerging European border is not taking the shape of a frontier in a sense
comparable to the frontiers of the nation-state. The European external border is not a clear-cut
line of demarcation that is capable of dividing an inside from an outside. The East-West axis roughly from the Baltic to the Adriatic - which is one of the main contours of the external
border has often been called a fault-line to indicate the reality of a complicated borderland that
has been the site of many conflicts (Delanty, 1996; Dingsdale, 2002; Meinhof, 2002). It is not a
settled ‘Great Frontier’, but has shifted many times in history. From the inter-war period to the
post-cold war period to the present enlargement, this axis witnessed continuous repositioning
(Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 33). The present contours of the EU do not amount to a final
frontier.
There is no point at which an Iron Curtain is reached. The southern frontier – the North
South border – has become more salient (Suarez-Navaz, 2004), but it is not a straightforward
replacement of the East-West axis. As noted above, the EU’s system of governance now
extends beyond EU space to the wider south and entails relations that are neither exclusively
open or closed. Despite an increased budget for such purposes, the EU does not possess a
security and defence policy comparable to nation-states and cannot therefore maintain closed
and hard borders. The capacity of nation-states to do this is greater, but as argued earlier is also
not unlimited. The EU’s external border and its internal national borders are inter-locking and
multi-perspectival. Some borders have disappeared altogether, such as the border between East
and West Germany, while others have become relaxed, such as the Greek-Turkish border
between North and South Cyprus, and alongside these developments new borders have arisen,
such as the border between the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and the now more rigid border
between Hungary and Romania. In this latter case a fairly flexible border, in effect a borderland,
has now become the site of the external border of the EU. The incorporation of the Baltic
countries into the EU has led to the isolation of Kalingrad, which has become a Russian enclave
54
not directly connected to the Russian Federation, the result of this being the creation of a
corridor connecting the two territories through Lithuania and Belarus. Enclaves of a different
nature are protectorates, such as Kosovo, which has become a new kind of European space. And
of course many EU member states are colonial powers with borders extending far beyond
Europe into the wider world (see Böröcz and Sarkar, 2005).
So it can be established that the EU’s external border is a complicated mosaic of
borders, including changing national borders, but it is also inter-continental. The proposed
European constitution has opened further prospects of enlargement with the result that the
borders of Europe will be extended further eastwards and will, with the eventual incorporation
of Turkey, include parts of Asia. Where then does Europe end? It is evident from this that the
outer border of Europe is an expanding one, that is in principle limitless (see Wallace, 2002).
The incorporation of Turkey will dilute the spatial distinction of Europe and Asia. The evidence
of history - the ever-shifting north-south axis that has defined the east-west border - is that
Europe’s borders, especially its eastern ones are mobile and not written in geography. There is
nothing guaranteed by either geography or culture that the Bosporus will be a closed frontier.
Europe’s borders not only lack permanency, but are also porous. It was the very permeability of
the Austro-Hungarian border in the summer of 1989 that eventually led to the break-up of the
communist state system. In this case the border marked the site of an opening in Europe out of
which a new European spatial configuration emerged in the following years. It is therefore
difficult to see how the notion of bounded Europe can be meaningfully related to the current
situation of constant re-bordering, expanding lines and changing relations of interiority and
exteriority. This situation underlines the notion of the border as a networked process rather than
a fixed structure.
The previous discussion has presupposed a modality of space as a regional, with the
emphasis being on territoriality. But as noted above, space is also organized as networks and as
flows. Such forms of space are present within European space and have implications for the
European border. Before considering these expressions of space on the European level, a few
more remarks can be made on regional space. Schengen is an example of a regional bloc
operating within the EU and associated countries in which internal borders have been largely
abolished. It is too an example of an internal division within Europe in that the bloc of member
states constitute a border with the rest of the EU. Europe’s borders are differentiated and
variable and, as the case of Schengen illustrates, designed to encourage mobility (see Hassner,
2002; Rumford, 2006). It is possible to see the field of Europe as made up of different
‘Europes’. In addition to the previously discussed Old Europe (the major western nation-states)
versus a New Europe (largely postcommunist countries) - with a Core Europe emerging within
Old Europe - there are the older geopolitical spatial configurations, such as Central Europe and
East Central Europe. Other relevant examples are mega-regional blocs, such as Nordic Europe,
Iberia, and TransAlpine region (Keating, 1998). Europe is not then spatially or territorially
unified as the notion of Fortress Europe suggests, but is a field of differences in which symbolic
battles continue to be fought on the multiple sites of the numerous borders that constitute it.
Borders exist not on the edge of the territory of the state, but in numerous points within and
beyond it.
This has led many critics to comment on Europe as a mosaic of differences which are
not bounded. Massimo Cassiari thus describes Europe as an archipelago of spaces connected by
various links (Cacciari, 1997). He argues Europe is a network of differences, a mosaic of
overlapping and connecting diversities. There is no overarching or underlying unity, only
connections. This notion of Europe is clearly different from the vision of a fortress in which
space is bounded by an outer frontier. More systematic applications of the notion of a network
are to be found in the work of Castells and Sassen. Castells sees Europeanization as organized
along the lines of a network with multiple connections between different spatial points
(Castells, 1998). In this view, cities, regions and states are connected vertically and horizontally
in new kinds of governance. While Castells stresses the political opportunities networks offer
for the mobilization of democratic projects, Sassen is more conscious of the wider global
55
context of global markets whose expansion creates new kinds of space and movements (Sassen,
1996, 2001).
It is for this reason that the global context must be considered in any discussion of
European borders. The European context cannot be disconnected from the wider global context,
as is the case in most discussions of Europeanization. This is particularly pertinent with respect
to networks, which are not contained within Europe but interconnect with the wider world
(Delanty and Rumford, 2005:132-3). The relation between Europe and the world is blurred
when it comes to networked space since it is the nature of the kinds of borders related to
networks that they do not take the same form as regional space. This is not to suggest that
networks are open structures and that the global world is radically borderless, as is often
suggested by the so-called hyper-globalist position. Global networks and flows produce borders
and also produce new kinds of closed systems as well as new kinds of hierarchies (Pryer and
Bos, 2001; Sassen, 2001). For example, networks produce lines of demarcation between
different networks and also between the spaces that are not networked, spaces in which
exclusion is more likely to be high. It is a striking feature of current patterns of territorialization
that these spaces can be found in national space, within cities, in abandoned territories, in rural
hinterlands. In other words, networks and flows produces less visible borders and ones that are
manifest in social fragmentation.
The relevant point here is that globalization operates within Europeanization as much
as outside it. Globalization does not stop at the frontiers of the EU, where a different logic
commences on which an integrated Europe is built. The argument advanced here is that the
external context of globalization has a major influence on borders in Europe, on both national
and European space. In this view the internal and external must be seen as a connected in
multiple ways. A single example of this is the importance of cross-border co-operation, both
within EU countries and between EU and nonEuropean partnerships. As Liam O’Dowd has
argued, such examples illustrate the ambiguous and contradictory nature of borders in Europe
(O’Dowd, 2002; Anderson et al, 2003).
One way in which to conceptualize the European border in a manner that is more in
tune with the different modalities of space and discontinuous relations of territory and borders is
the notion of a borderland (see Delanty and Rumford, 2005: 131-4). This is a new spatiality in
which discontinuities are more significant than a simple dividing line, as in a frontier defining
the edge of a given territory. The significance of the notion of the borderland is that it captures
much of the reality of European space on borders, where inside and outside are not easily
separated. According to Baibar (2004: 219) Europe is itself a borderland. This may be taking
the notion too far, for the networked space and the space of flows does not eliminate closed
borders and hard frontier, which continue to operate. What the notion of borderlands calls into
question, however, is the notion of Europeanization as a project that is comparable to nationstate formation in which territorial closure is the basis of the identity of the polity. This is not
compatible with the consolidation of multiple centres and geopolitical spatial patterns within
Europe and multidirectional movements. In sum, any clear cut separation of the European and
non-Europe must be questioned as a result of the various dynamics of openness and closure
identified in the fore-going.
Conclusion
The tentative conclusion of this exploratory paper is that the enhanced momentum of
Europeanization has neither eliminated borders not created a new external frontier. It would be
tempting to suggest that the appropriate metaphor for the European border – and of Europe
itself – is not the fortress – but the Deleuzean notion of a post-imperial ‘Empire’ as theorized
by Hardt and Negri (2000): the lack of frontiers and a movement that has no territorial limits
and which is not spear-headed by a state led project. While this concept has been overgeneralized to a global condition and can only be applied to Europe with some qualifications, it
captures something close to an open conception of space that has multiple dimensions and, in
addition, has resonances in European history in the Roman limes, that is, the expanding borders
of the empire. However, caution must be exercised in such notions of a tendentially open
56
Europe. The emphasis on mobility that has been a feature of recent social theory has led to an
over-emphasis on the disappearance of borders. Borders are not disappearing, but taking new
forms (Paasi, 2005; Rumford, 2006).
The theorization of space in this paper has drawn attention to the global context for an
understanding of the new kinds of borders that are taking shape in European space. The global,
the national and the European dimensions interact to produce a complex field of borders and
rebordering out of which emerges hard and soft border, open and closed ones and with different
degree of spatial intensity by which regions, networks and flows operate. The changing nature
of the border has implications for identity, since the system of classifications the border
establishes provides identities with means of distinguishing insiders from outsiders. The
emerging networked border challenges existing notions of a European identity built upon a
foundational assumptions about territory and culture. Inside/outside relations are not easily
distinguished neither in the domains of space nor identity/culture. The borders that constitute
the basic structures of space and culture are shaped in dynamics of openness and closure which
are particularly evident in the current phase of Europeanization. Only by recognizing the global
context in which this unfolds can such dynamics be linked to a project of identity building that
does not make the error of trying to reproduce on the European level the logic of nation
building. It may be finally suggested that the kinds of borders the EU should created in its outer
frontier are ones that reflect the emerging cosmopolitan and communicative sense of identity
that is emerging within Europe.
Acknowledgement
I am grateful to Chris Rumford and a reader’s report for helpful comments on earlier drafts.
References
ANDERSON, M., (1996) Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World.
Oxford: Polity.
ANDERSON, J.; O’DOWD, L.; WILSON, T. M., (eds) (2003) New Borders for a Changing
Europe: Cross-border Cooperation and Governance, London: Frank Cass.
ANDERSON, M.; BORT, E., (eds) (1999) The Frontiers of Europe. London: Pinter.
ANDREAS, P., (2003) ‘Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-first Century’
International Security 28(2) 78-111.
ANSELL, C.; DI PLAMA, G., (eds) (2004) Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United
States Compared. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
BALIBAR, E., (2004) We the People of Europe: Reflections on Transnational Citizenship.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
BARTH, F., (ed.) (1969) Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural
Difference. London: Allen and Unwin.
BEREZIN, M.; SCHAIN, M., (eds) (2003b) Europe without Borders: Remapping Territory,
Citizenship and Identity in a Transnational Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
CACCIARI, M. (1997) L’Arcipelago. Milan: Adephi.
BÖRÖCZ, J.; SARKAR, M. (2005) ‘What is the EU?’. International Sociology, 20 (2): 153-73.
CASTELLS, M. (1998) ‘The Unification of Europe.’ In End of the Millennium, Vol 3
The Information Age. Oxford: Blackwell.
CASTELLS, M. (2000) The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy,
Society and Culture: Volume 1 (Second Edition). Oxford: Blackwell.
COAKLEY, J. (1982) ‘Political Territories and Cultural Frontiers: Conflicts of Principle in the
Formation of States in Europe.’ West European Politics. 5 (4) 34-49.
COHEN, A. (1985) The Symbolic Construction of Community. London: Routledge.
DE GRAZIA, V. (2005) Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance Through 20th century Europe.
Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.,2005
DELANTY, G. (1995) Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality. London: Macmillan.
57
DELANTY, G. (1996) ‘The Frontier and Identities of Exclusion in European History.’ History
of European Ideas. 22 (2) 93-103.
DELANTY, G. and RUMFORD, C. (2005) Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the
Implications of Europeanization. London: Routledge.
DINGSDALE, A. (2000) Mapping Modernities: Geographies of Central and Eastern Europe,
1920-2000. London: Routledge.
EDER, K. (2006) ‘Europe’s Borders’. European Journal of Social Theory. 9 (2):
FOUCHER, M. (1998) ‘The Geopolitics of European Frontiers.’ In: Anderson, M. and Bort, E.
(eds) The Frontiers of Europe. London: Pinter.
HASSNER, P. (2002) ‘Fixed borders or moving borderlands?: a new type of border for a new
type of entity’, in J. Zielonka (ed.) Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the
Boundaries of the European Union, London: Routledge.
HARDT, M. and NEGRI, A. (2000) Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
JÖNSSON, C., TÄGEL, S. and TÖRNQVIST, G. (2000) Organizing European Space. London:
Sage.
KEATING, M. (1998) The New Regionalism in Western Europe. Cheltenham: Edgar.
Lavenex, S. 2004: ‘EU external governance in “wider Europe” Journal of European Public
Policy 11(4), 680-700.
LAWSON, S. (ed.) 2003 Europe and the Asia-Pacific. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
LEVY, D., PENSKY, M., and TORPEY, J. (eds) (2005) Old Europe, New Europe, Core
Europe: Transatlanitic Relations after the Iraq War. London: Verso.
MEINHOF, U. H. (ed.) (2002) Living (with) Borders: Identity Discourses on East-West
Borders in Europe. Aldershot: Ashgate.
MOL, A. and LAW, J. (1994) ‘Regions, Networks and Fluids: Anaemia and Social Topology’.
Social Studies of Science. 24: 641-71.
MÜLLER-GRAFF, P.-C. (1998) ‘Whose Responsibilities are Frontiers?’. In: Anderson, M. and
BORT, E. (eds) The Frontiers of Europe. London: Pinter.
NEWMAN, D. (2003) ‘On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework’. Journal of
Borderlands Studies, 18 (1): 13-25.
NEWMAN, D. (2004a) ‘Conflict at the Interface: The Impact of Boundaries and Borders on
Contemporary Ethno-National Conflict’. In: The Impact of Boundaries and Borders on
Contemporary Ethno-National Conflict, edited by C. Flint. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
NEWMAN, D. (2004b) ‘Boundaries’. In: A Companion to Political Geography, edited by T.
Agnew. Oxford: Blackwell.
NEWMAN, D.; PAASI, A. (1998) ‘Fences and Neighbours in the Postmodern World:
Boundary Narratives in Political Geography’. Progress in Human Geography 22 (2): 186207.
O’DOWD, L. (2002) ‘The Changing Sigificance of European Borders’. Regional and Federal
Studies, 12 (4): 13-36.
PAASI, A. (1996) Territory, Boundaries and Consciousness. New York: John Wiley.
PAASI, A. (2005) ‘The Changing Discourse on Political Boundaries’. In: H. van Houtum, O.
Kramsch, and W. Zierhofer (eds) B/Ordering Space. Aldershot: Ashgate.
TORPEY, J. (2000) The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Preyer, G. and Bos, M. (2001) ‘Introduction:
Borderlines in Time of Globalization.’ Protosociology Vol. 15.
ROKKAN, S. (1999) State Formation, Nation Building, and Mass Politics. The Theory of Stein
Rokkan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
RUGGIE, J. (1995) ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International
Relations’, International Organization 47 (1): 139-74.
RUMFORD, C. (2006) ‘Borders and ReBordering’. In: Europe and Asia Beyond East and West,
edited by G. Delanty. London: Routledge.
58
SASSEN, S. (1996) Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Gloablization. New York:
Columbia University Press.
SASSEN, S. (2001) ‘Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global Economy: Elements for a
Theorization’. In: A. Appadurai (ed.) Globalization. Durham, NC.: Duke University Press.
SUAREZ-NAVAZ, L. (2004): Rebordering the Mediterranean: Boundaries and Citizenship in
Southern Europe. New York: Berghahn Books.
TURNER, F. (1921) The Frontier in American History. New York: Holt.
URRY, J. (2000) Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Century.
London: Routledge.
URRY, J. (2003) Global Complexity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
WALLACE, W. (2002) ‘Where does Europe end? dilemmas of inclusion and exclusion’ in J.
Zielonka, J. (ed) Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the
European Union. London: Routledge.
WATERS, M. (2006) ‘Border/Control’, European Journal of Social Theory, 9 (2).
WEBB, W. P. (1952) The Great Frontier. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
WHITTAKER, C. (2000) ‘Roman Frontiers and European Perceptions.’ Journal of Historical
Sociology. 13 (4) 462-82.
WILSON, T. M. and Donnan, H. (eds) (1998) Border Identities: Nation and State at
International Frontiers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
ZIELONKA, J. (ed) (2002) Europe Unbound: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the
European Union. London: Routledge.
59
The Limits of Europe
Robert BIDELEUX
It has never been so crucial as at present to be considered ‘European’ or part of
‘Europe’. Conceptions and ‘meanings’ of Europe have become increasingly bound up with the
ongoing ‘construction of Europe’, which is often portrayed as the natural culmination of ‘the
European idea’ and of countless projects for its realisation, harking back to medieval
Christendom, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. After the demise of most of the
Communist ‘Second World’, moreover, EU membership became all the more important as a
badge of acceptance, respectability and First World status, as well as a ‘passport’ to unrestricted
access to European Union product, capital and labour markets. Promotion of stronger
conceptions of European identity has also come to be seen as a means of bolstering the internal
and external legitimacy of the EU. As the European Union’s rule-making and policy-making
remits have become increasingly extensive and pervasive, so it has been considered more
necessary to persuade its citizens to acknowledge the legitimacy of ‘Europe’ as the appropriate
source and vehicle of these rules and policies and to accept their binding nature. Amid
mounting public disquiet over the magnitude of the European Union’s perceived ‘democratic
deficit’, the fostering of a stronger ‘European identity’ and of stronger popular identification
with ‘Europe’ can be seen as attempts to camouflage and compensate for the weakness and
indirectness of the European Union’s mechanisms of democratic accountability, its perceived
lack of democratic legitimacy (as distinct from ‘functional’ or ‘perfomative’ legitimacy), and
the very low levels of either popular or parliamentary control over and participation in its
political processes. Preoccupation with conceptions of Europe, as well as with what it means to
be ‘European’ or to ‘belong’ to Europe, has further increased since the early 1990s as a result
of the recurrent ‘widening’ and ‘deepening’ of the European Union. To be able to claim that
one is ‘European’, and to be able to back up that claim with appropriate documentation, has
become almost as important as it was to be able to say ‘Civis Romanus sum’ in Roman times.
‘European identity’, the perceived possession or lack of it, increasingly determines who is
allowed to live and work in the European Union – and who is not. For many millions of people
in Latin America, East Slavic Eastern Europe and Africa, the question of whether or not they
can claim eligibility for the passport and full citizenship of a European Union Member State
now has a major bearing on their life chances (as I am acutely aware, since the birth of my
father and myself in Argentina and of my paternal great grandfather in Trieste means that my
own possession of British citizenship rests solely on the fact that my paternal grandfather was
born in Britain!). Current attempts to define and give stronger legal and cultural embodiments
to ‘Europe’ (and, within that, to the exalted ‘inner sanctum’ of the European Union) pose the
question of whether Europe is just a prosaic ‘geographical space’ in which to live, work and
trade, or whether it is or should become a more organic, communitarian and primordial cultural
entity to be belonged to, identified with, fought for and legally as well as militarily protected.
The founding treaties of the European Communities state that membership is open to any
‘European country’, and the European Council held in Luxembourg in December 1997 issued an
official declaration that ‘With the launch of the enlargement process, we can see the dawn of a
new era, finally putting an end to the divisions of the past.’ However, declarations of this sort beg
important questions concerning the geographical and cultural limits of the ‘Europe’ that is to be
unified, as well as the basis and criteria on which this ‘Europe’ is to be conceived and rights of
membership are to be judged. It is often assumed, particularly by people unfamiliar with the
history and geography of Europe’s Eastern and Southern flanks, that the geographical and cultural
limits and criteria of Europe are clear-cut and self-evident. This is the opposite of the truth. In the
extreme case of Europe’s westernmost territories, Britain’s Islas Malvinas, Portugal’s Ilhas dos
60
Açores, and the French island of St. Pierre, de facto rights of possession rather than any remotely
‘objective criteria’ determine that these ‘belong’ to Europe rather than to the Americas.
The ‘construction of Europe’ has involved some far from straightforward decisions as
to who or what is to be included or excluded, and the criteria to be employed. For example,
Morocco’s 1987 application for full membership of the EC was peremptorily rejected because it
was considered not to be a European country, even though its economy and its Francophone
elites were (and still are) much more heavily orientated towards Europe than towards the rest of
Africa or the Arab world. Likewise, notwithstanding its official adoption of a European identity
and a strongly secularist Constitution under Mustafa Kemal, and despite having been an
Associate Member of the European Community since 1964 as well as a longstanding member
of NATO, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, Turkey has been denied full membership of
the European Union partly because it is not regarded as not coming up to ‘European standards’
of respect for universal human rights, minority rights, and civilian rule, but also because of the
predominantly Muslim religious affiliation of its population. Conversely, ten East Central and
South-East European states been allowed to join the European Union, in large part because their
‘European credentials’ and their observance of ‘European standards’ of law, democracy and
human rights are seen as being much stronger than those of actual or potential applicants such
as Turkey, Morocco, Serbia, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia and Armenia. Unfortunately, the ways
in which issues such as these have been handled have on the whole been detrimental to the longterm interests of states such as Turkey and the Maghreb states and most Eastern Orthodox
countries, and will continue to have important impacts on their future options and development.
Since 1989 there have been various moves in western and central Europe’s Christian
Democratic circles to revive the long discredited notion that ‘Europe’ roughly corresponds to
Western Christendom (shorn of its extra-European offshoots), or to what Gonzague de Reynold
called ‘l’Europe européenne’. These moves are evidently meant to imply that (i) Turks and
Maghrebis are essentially ‘non-Europeans’ and that perhaps Albanian Muslims, Kosovar
Muslims and the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) are not ‘fully European’ either, mainly (though not
exclusively) on account of their predominantly and/or nominally Muslim faith; (ii) these peoples
ought therefore to be ineligible (or at best ‘less eligible’) for eventual membership of the EU; and
(iii) Eastern Orthodox countries have somewhat weaker claims to be considered ‘European’ than
do Roman Catholic and Protestant ones and are consequently also ‘less deserving’ of EU
membership.
These tendencies have been reinforced by Milan Kundera’s influential essay on ‘The
Tragedy of Central Europe’(New York Review of Books, 26 April 1994), which asserted that
predominantly Roman Catholic ‘Central Europe’ (including Poland, Hungary, former
Czechoslovakia, Slovenia and Croatia) had long been part of ‘the West’ and was thus more
‘European’ than were predominantly Eastern Orthodox countries such as Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia
and Romania. At its worst, this type of insistence on the distinctiveness, greater cultural
sophistication, higher economic attainments and supposed general superiority of Roman Catholic
‘Central Europe’ vis-à-vis its Eastern Orthodox and/or Muslim neighbours has fostered
conceptions of Europe which tend to marginalise the latter countries and could well result in the
long-term exclusion of some of them from the EU. This championship of the claims of ‘Central
Europe’ is not always as innocent or as high-minded as it might appear. Thus the late Franjo
Tudjman, speaking as president of Croatia in 1991, declared that ‘Croats belong to a different
culture – a different civilization from the Serbs. Croats are part of Western Europe, part of the
Mediterranean tradition. Long before Shakespeare and Molière, our writers were translated into
European languages. The Serbs belong to the East. They are Eastern people, like the Turks and
Albanians. They belong to the Byzantine culture … Despite similarities in language, we cannot
be together’ (quoted in Cohen 1993: 208). Such a mentality could even result in some so-called
Central European countries, now that they have been admitted to the European Union, joining the
ranks of those who might well oppose the admission of actually or nominally ‘Muslim’ countries
such as Albania, Bosnia or Turkey or even actually or nominally Eastern Orthodox countries such
as Serbia, Montenegro or Macedonia on the spurious grounds that they are insufficiently
61
‘civilized’ and/or ‘European’. Fortunately, there are also East Central European statesmen (above
all Vaclav Havel) who understand that this sort of exclusion would be as arbitrary, damaging and
unjust as the one East Central and South-Eastern Europe suffered for 45 years after the agreements
concluded between the Allies in Moscow, Yalta and Potsdam in 1944-45.
Regrettably, intellectuals and politicians from the likely-to-be-excluded countries
sometimes respond by arguing that their own country has special European connections or
characteristics that make it an exception to the rule, in contrast to countries further south or east
who are allegedly ‘more Asiatic’ or ‘non- European’ and thus ‘less civilised’ and ‘less worthy’ of
inclusion. The way out of this nefarious mindset is to understand that no part of Europe is innately
superior (or inferior) to other parts, or essentially more (or less) ‘européenne’ than other parts.
Indeed, there are no generally applicable criteria of ‘Europeanness’ on which such judgements
could be based. History, culture, identity and appeals to these supposed ‘inheritances’ from the
past have divided Europeans far more than they have ever been able to unite them. Even Serbia,
which undoubtedly perpetrated Europe’s worst ‘crimes against humanity’ during the 1990s, has
on a longer-term perspective been more sinned against than sinning. No nation is intrinsically
‘better’ or ‘worse’ than other nations. No part of Europe has a monopoly of virtue, nor are Europe
and virtue synonymous. Along with many finer achievements, Nazism, Fascism, the Inquisition,
witch-burning, ‘scientific’ racism, the Atlantic slave trade and various weapons-of-massdestruction have also been products of ‘the European tradition’ – and are actually more ‘Western’
than ‘Eastern’ in origin.
Nevertheless, the fact that so many western European organisations, politicians and
pundits have rather naively taken the ‘revival of Central Europe’ at face value, as a
straightforward and innocuous recovery of the region’s ‘true identity’ (in place of the allegedly
alien ‘East European’ one imposed on it by the east-west partition of Europe from the late 1940s
to 1989), has undoubtedly strengthened public perceptions that Europe’s Eastern Orthodox and
Muslim countries are intrinsically less Westernised, less European and less eligible for EU
membership than are the (at least nominally) Catholic east-central European states. Such
stereotyping ignores (i) the extent to which Roman Catholicism in ‘Central Europe’ and elsewhere
has often been tainted by absolutism, dogmatism, bigotry, xenophobia and anti-Semitism, (ii) the
fact that Roman Catholicism has played much smaller roles in shaping identity in Hungary and the
Czech Republic than it has done (sometimes for the worse) in Poland, Croatia and Slovakia, (iii)
the fact that well over ten million at least nominally Orthodox Christian Greeks and even more
Muslims already reside in the European Union, mostly as fully integrated EU citizens with no
other place to call ‘home’, and (iv) similar exceptions are being made for Bulgaria and Romania
(though not yet for the other Balkan Orthodox states). Narrow cultural definitions of Europe are
internally as well as externally divisive.
The influence of crude cultural stereotyping has been further increased since 1993 by
Samuel Huntington’s influential and xenophobic ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. This postulated
that the Cold War stand-off between communism and capitalism is being replaced by a similar
mutual incompatibility or antagonism between ‘the West’ (in which he includes Roman Catholic
Europe and its Protestant offshoots in North-Western Europe, North America and Australasia) and
the ‘non-Western civilisations’, which he lists as ‘Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, SlavicOrthodox, Latin American and possibly African’:
‘The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future … As the
ideological division of Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between
Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam, on the other,
has reemerged. The most significant dividing line in Europe … may well be the eastern
boundary of Western Christianity in the year 1500 … The peoples to the east and south of
this line are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically belonged to the Ottoman and Tsarist
Empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping events in the rest of Europe; they are
generally less advanced economically; they seem much less likely to develop stable
democratic political systems … As the events in Yugoslovia show, it is not only a line of
62
difference; it is also at times a line of bloody conflict …The central axis of world politics in
the future is likely to be …the conflict between “the West and the rest”.’ (Huntington1993:
22, 25, 29-31, 48-49).
Some readings of this thesis suggest that Western/Latin Europe should press ahead with
its own internal unification, rearm itself, and ‘pull up the drawbridges’ of the resultant ‘fortress
Europe’, so as to prevent it from being either corrupted or ransacked by the ‘less civilised
barbarians’ loitering with supposedly nefarious intent beyond its southern and eastern perimeter
fences. Such readings ignore the fact that the Eastern Orthodox countries have produced nothing
as lethal or barbaric as the Nazi and the Croatian-Catholic Ustasa regimes, which arose in parts of
what Huntingdon and Kundera regard as ‘the West’, perpetrated the worst crimes against
humanity that the world has ever witnessed, and included millions of eastern Orthodox Christians
among their victims.
For these and other reasons, it is crucial to resist and denounce blinkered and
exclusionary ‘Western supremacist’ ideas and policies which not only have divisive, alienating
and destabilising effects on Europe’s vulnerable and volatile eastern and southern flanks, but will
also exacerbate the already mounting tensions within the increasingly multi-racial, polyglot and
multi-denominational societies of north-western and west-central Europe. The EU of 15 Member
States has contained roughly 15 million residents without EU citizenship and about 50 million
residents who are members of linguistic minorities within the EU states they currently inhabit. It
would be much more advantageous to promote conceptions and geographical definitions of
Europe which are as inclusive as possible, both for the sake of internal harmony and maximum
identification with Europe and for the promotion of stable and harmonious relations with Europe’s
‘near abroad’. This would also be justifiable as a prudent acknowledgement of the importance of
the ways in which identities are shaped and perceived in setting the terms on which people relate
to and deal with one another, and a recognition of the elements of contingency and indeterminacy
in matters of identity. Europe is and should remain ‘a house with many rooms’, rather than a
culturally and racially exclusive club. Therefore, whether any particular country is to be
considered ‘European’ and a plausible candidate for membership of the European Union ought not
to be judged on the basis of specious geographical and essentialist criteria of ‘Europeanness’, but
rather on its ability and willingness to abide by the ‘house rules’.
Very unfortunately, the end of the Cold War and the demise of Communist rule in
Europe gave added impetus to a shift from ‘ideological politics’ to ‘identity politics’, from a
politics structured around a left-right spectrum of socialist, radical, liberal, conservative and
extreme right ideologies to one structured around ethnic, racial, cultural, religious and regional
identities, xenophobia, and the strengthening/protection of the collective rights of culturally or
racially defined groups. However, the resultant partial ‘de-ideologisation’ of European politics
and the increased saliency of ‘identity politics’ should be seen, not as ‘coming out of the blue’,
but rather as reviving and/or continuing trends which had already been underway in Europe
before. Regrettably, the increased attention given to various conceptions and criteria of
‘European identity’ have either deliberately (in the case of many racists and xenophobes) or
unintentionally (in the case of many anti-racist and anti-xenophobic liberals and radicals)
contributed to these dangerous tendencies. Indeed, even though the principal liberal centre-left
and centre-right champions of ‘European identity’ can legitimately claim that they are
endeavouring to promote cosmopolitan-universalist values and open, liberal and inclusive
conceptions of Europeanness (rather than new forms of particularism and exclusion), it needs to
be more widely recognised that they are playing with fire, inasmuch as even the most highminded concern to strengthen and protect European culture and identity can obviously be
exploited or even hijacked by racist and xenophobic movements and parties for their own
illiberal and demagogic purposes, such as the promotion of increasingly exclusive, closed,
introverted and non-negotiable conceptions of ‘European identity’ and so-called ‘Euro-racism’.
This is said not so much as a criticism or rebuke, as to highlight a major strategic-cum-moral
dilemma for liberal-minded Europeans and the need to proceed with extreme caution in this
63
regard. In terms of their own professed liberal values and aspirations, it would be utter folly on
their part to try to promote stronger and deeper popular conceptions of and allegiance to a
‘European identity’, if this simply strengthens and plays into the hands of Europe’s growing
armies of culturally ‘Euro-racist’ xenophobes and Islamophobes.
The Hazards of European ‘Essentialism’
It is both dangerous and futile even to try to uphold either clear-cut geographical
definitions or ‘essentialist’ cultural conceptions of Europe. As Jean Monnet famously wrote to
Robert Schuman and Georges Bidault in May 1950, ‘Europe has never existed … We must
genuinely create Europe.’ Europe has never been a fixed geographical area with permanent and
generally accepted boundaries. In ancient times the main focus of the prevailing elite conceptions
of ‘Europe’ – on the rare occasions that this term was used at all – was on the area which is now
somewhat disparagingly referred to as ‘the Balkans’. For the ancient Greeks, ‘Europe’ was an
area stretching to the north of the Aegean islands, probably including mainland Greece. This
appellation was slowly extended to other parts of what is now regarded as constituting Europe,
over the course of the next 1500 years. The Roman Empire, to whose heritage so much of Europe
would eventually lay claim, never referred to itself as ‘European’ because its centre of gravity was
the Mediterranean basin, including Asia Minor and North Africa. The Byzantine or Eastern
Roman empire, which endured without a break until the sack of Constantinople by western
European Crusaders in 1204 and was briefly revived in a much reduced form from 1261 to 1453,
became the principal heir and custodian of the Graeco-Roman heritage after the fifth-century
demise of the western Roman empire.
The north-western and northern European countries which now think of themselves as
constituting the ‘core’ of Europe were, at least until the ninth century, little more than ‘the
barbarian West’ and far less developed than Byzantium, China and the emerging centres of
Islamic civilisation. Within what is now regarded as the continent of Europe (extending from the
Atlantic to the Urals), the situation was precisely the reverse of the present-day dichotomy in
which many citizens of western, northern and central Europe seem to regard the inhabitants of
south-eastern Europe as alien and inferior species much given to killing one another. The latter
view unwarrantably overlooks the fact that western and central Europeans have had their own
‘wars of religion’ and genocidal tendencies, the latter until quite recently. Moreover, although
‘Europe’ eventually came to define itself in contradistinction to various conceptions of ‘the East’
or ‘the Orient’, the origins of the Christianity and of the ancient Greek philosophy which most
Europeans have come to regard as central planks of their ancestral cultural heritage are arguably
no less ‘Oriental’ than those of the Islam against which Europeans defined themselves for several
centuries. Islam itself was to a large extent elaborated and propagated in extensively Hellenised
and Christianised milieux. The Ottoman Empire, whose main power-base was always more
‘Balkan’ and ‘Anatolian’ than ‘Middle Eastern’ or ‘Asiatic’, served for a while as ‘Europe’s
defining other’, and yet by the nineteenth century it had come to be seen as ‘the sick man of
Europe’ – sick, perhaps, but part of ‘Europe’ nevertheless. Likewise, the origins of the Magyar
and Bulgar tribes that settled in what were to become Hungary and Bulgaria were clearly
‘Asiatic’, yet this did not seriously inhibit their subsequent assimilation into ‘European’
civilisation. Members of the seventeenth-century Polish nobility prided themselves on a
spuriously Asiatic ‘Sarmatian’ ancestry, in an endeavour to reinforce their claims to a supposedly
innate or racial superiority over their predominantly Slavic serfs, at roughly the same time that
members of the Hungarian nobility rather more plausibly (re)asserted and began to pride
themselves on their ‘Asiatic’ Magyar ancestry. (Numerous European doctrines of racial
superiority originated in attempts to substantiate claims to class – rather than national –
superiority.) For a time both of these nobilities adopted ‘pseudo-Oriental’ modes of dress, only to
reassert their ‘Europeanness’ when it suited them in later generations. One should never
underestimate the degrees of calculated opportunism involved in changing patterns of cultural
self-identification! Most tellingly of all, perhaps, the longstanding debates on whether Russia is
‘European’ or ‘Asiatic’ or a blend of the two – and precisely where on the map of Eurasia
64
‘European Russia’ gives way to ‘Asiatic Russia’ – are ultimately unresolvable because they rest
upon false dichotomies between ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’. The debates on Russia’s relationship to the
West, which have been going on since the 1830s, are in reality rather introspective or soulsearching debates about how Russia should see itself and how it should develop in the future.
Thus, culturally as well as geographically, there exists no hard and fast way of
distinguishing who or what is ‘European’ from who or what is ‘Asian’, or where Europe ends and
Asia begins. That is why the soundest perspectives on Europe are those that treat it as a large
promontory and cultural offshoot of Asia, analogous to ‘the Indian subcontinent’. However, one
must beware of the conceit which led Europeans to elevate the relatively small European
peninsula to the status of a continent in its own right, while denying such a status to the Indian
peninsula. The concept of ‘continents’ was developed by European geographers in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries as a way of visualising and subsequently mapping and categorising the
territories with which they were increasingly coming into contact and whose indigenous
inhabitants they soon came to regard as racial inferiors. Not surprisingly they went about their task
in a very self-exalting manner that greatly inflated Europe’s standing whilst lumping together the
rest of the vast and very diverse Eurasian landmass as ‘Asia’. Likewise, after European
philosophes had begun to develop a normative conception of ‘civilisation’ in the second half of
the eighteenth century, their successors went on to conceptualise the relationships between Europe
and other ‘civilisations’ (the plural soon acquired a different, more comparative and
anthropological meaning) in ways that were increasingly demeaning to the latter. They also began
to conflate ‘civilisation’ with ‘European civilisation’, arrogantly conferring upon Europe’s
particular values and norms a universal standing that set them above those of the rest of the world
– increasingly in conscious or unconscious justification of European ‘civilising missions’ and
cultural, military, territorial and economic imperialism.
Europe cannot be defined and has never been characterised by the predominance of a
single culture, whether religious, linguistic, artistic, musical or otherwise. Instead, like other
dynamic civilisations, it has always comprised a rich and complex mosaic of cultures – including
not just a profusion of languages and literatures, but a great variety of faiths (even if many of
them are variants of Christianity) and very varied scientific, artistic and musical traditions, within
individual states as well as across Europe as a whole. Indeed, a civilisation and/or (sub)continent
which prides itself on its capacity to nurture, accommodate, value and respect cultural diversity
cannot at the same time be defined in terms of some sort of fixed ‘essence’ or cultural
homogeneity. That would be not so much a paradox as a contradiction in terms. Moreover, the
specific content of Europe’s highly variegated cultural mix has changed considerably over time.
The values and ideas which might be said to characterise large swathes of Europe’s elites were
quite different in medieval Christendom than they were during the Renaissance. These underwent
further changes during the Enlightenment and during the brief ascendancies of the Holy Alliance
(1815-48), nineteenth-century liberalism (1850s-60s), conservative nationalism and imperialism
(1880s-1918), and fascism and etatism (1930s-early 1940s). All of these in turn differed
fundamentally from the ‘community of values’ which is said to underpin the European Union
today. It is self-contradictory for a Europe which prides itself on its vaunted capacity continually
to reinvent itself, in contrast to the presumed (but vastly exaggerated) long-term stasis of other
civilisations and continents, to claim at the same time to be based on eternal and/or essential ideas
and values.
Therefore, it should not be contended that Europe represents a particular idea and/or set
of values, norms and practices traceable from ancient Greece and Rome or Carolingian Western
Christendom or the Renaissance or the 1648 Peace of Westphalia or the Enlightenment, down to
the present day, as so many modern histories of Europe and/or the world have done. It would be
more accurate to say that Europe has been identified with a long succession of contending ideas
and competing values, norms and practices, most recently those associated with the development
of a distinctive European states system and legal order. ‘Europe’ is a programmatic concept
which has been used by a long succession of teleological, identity-building projects. In contrast to
the histories of other continents, which merely deal with conceptually neutral ‘geographical
65
spaces’, the history of (western) Europe, like that of the United States of America, has nearly
always been presented as a teleological movement towards a set of ideals or as the working out
of a high moral purpose or meaning. This lies at the root of the ‘moral exceptionalism’ of the
West, its overweening sense of moral as well as material, technical and military superiority over
non-Westerners – including eastern Europeans. The paradox is that the values and principles by
which Europe (like the USA) has come to define itself (most of the time) since the Enlightenment
are conceived as being universal and therefore ought to be intrinsically capable of being applied to
other civilisations and continents as well.
How Accurate and Helpful Is It to Emphasise Europe’s ‘Uniqueness’?
We must also beware of falling prey to fallacious Eurocentric assumptions that Europe’s
rich diversity and its vaunted capacity for self-renewal are uniquely European phenomena, or that
the temporary military, economic and technological ascendancy of western Europe during the
eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was attributable to essentially and uniquely
west European virtues or values. Close variants of these were to be found in other parts of the
Eurasian landmass. Moreover, it is increasingly recognised that China, Japan and parts of the
Islamic world came remarkably close to being the first areas to make the kinds of breakthrough to
the kind of agrarian, industrial and maritime capitalism that enabled modern western Europe to
steal a march on them. As late as the fifteenth century, it would have seemed churlish to predict
that north-western Europe would be the first area to achieve such breakthroughs. Too many
triumphalist and self-congratulatory west European histories of Europe and/or the world have
been based upon teleological assumptions that everything that has happened in world history has
been working towards the eventual rise of western Europe (and later ‘the West’) to a position of
global hegemony, or that western Europe was predestined to greatness.
Admittedly, the development of medieval and modern Europe was bound to exhibit
many unique or distinctive features, in the same way that other parts of the world have all
exhibited unique and distinctive features of their own. But this need not imply that the areas now
known as ‘Europe’ or ‘western Europe’ were in a league of their own, predestined eventually to
rise above the rest, or to house a single ‘civilisation’, or even to become parts of an overarching
entity known as Europe (Morin 1990; Dawson 1930).
There is a growing consensus that western European technology, military capabilities
and intellectual sophistication only began to bear comparison with those of the great powers and
civilisations of China and the Islamic world from the time of the Crusades and the so-called
‘twelfth-century Renaissance’, and that north-western Europe only began to move decisively
ahead of its rivals (including those in central, southern and eastern Europe) in military and
economic technology during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, even if it is
accepted that western Europe was not in some special sense ‘unique’ or predestined to
greatness, it is still necessary to explain how it was able to exploit the opportunities that came
its way, as well as the many products, techniques and ideas which it copied or imported from
elsewhere, so much more effectively and profitably than did its chief rivals, who had hitherto
represented more advanced civilisations. Paradoxically, part of the explanation seems to lie in
the nature of the political, social and economic structures which evolved more by accident than
by design in Western Europe, and which had previously helped to keep it weak, vulnerable, and
peripheral to the main currents of world history.
Since the Middle Ages, Europe has had much more fragmented and pluralistic states
systems than almost any other continent (the obvious exception being Africa, where settled
states-systems were late to develop). While other continents have usually been dominated by
large empires and/or strong hegemonic powers until quite recently, peninsular Europe has long
consisted of large numbers of small and medium-sized states. Only east-central, south-eastern
and eastern Europe have been ruled for long periods by imperial powers displaying some of the
characteristics and staying power of Asiatic empires. The Habsburgs, Napoleon and Hitler
achieved temporary hegemonic (‘superpower’) dominance of western and central Europe, but
66
their ascendancies were mercifully short-lived, because other European states joined forces to
defeat them and restore Europe’s more characteristic multi-states system.
The endemic political fragmentation of Europe has been a source of both weakness
and strength, disunity and cohesion, conflict and co-operation, beggar-my-neighbour
protectionism and healthy economic and political pluralism and competition. It has also given
rise to the circumstance that since 1950 west European integration has occurred, not between a
hegemonic power and its client or tributary states (as was or is the case within Comecon,
Mercosur and NAFTA, for example), but between essentially more equal small and mediumsized states who have encased themselves within a binding supranational legal framework of
unparalleled scope. For short periods, there have been fearfully destructive conflicts between
European states. In the twentieth century, these dragged other continents besides Europe into
two unprecedented World Wars. Over much longer periods, however, there have been mostly
creative or productive tensions, synergies and complementarities between European states.
Eric Jones, in his magisterial study of The European Miracle (Cambridge 1981), has
argued that the distinctive political fragmentation, cultural pluralism and economic diversity of
medieval and modern Europe and the correspondingly large scope for inter-regional trade,
specialisation and capital accumulation can be attributed primarily to its ‘special features of
site, location and resource endowment’ (p. 226). Large spatial variations in climate, geology,
soils and vegetation gave Europe an unusually diverse (if not especially rich) natural resource
base and, since not everything was found or produced in the same places, this gave rise to large
interregional complementarities and exceptionally extensive opportunities for interregional
trade. Moreover, intra-European transport costs have been much lower than those of other
(mostly much larger) continents, because Europe was ‘a peninsula of peninsulas’ (p. ??) with
an exceptionally long, indented coastline relative to its area and an abundance of navigable
rivers. Conditions of this sort were conducive to multilateral long-distance trade in mundane
bulk commodities such as grain, timber, dried fish, salt, wine, wool and, in modern times, ironore and coal. More by trial and error than by conscious design, European rulers eventually
discovered that it was more rewarding to tax such commodities than to appropriate them, to
encourage trade rather than to plunder or monopolise it, and to opt for low rather than high taxrates, in contrast to rulers in continents where trade mainly consisted of low-bulk/high-value
commodities such as gold, silver, herbs, spices, silk, tea and, most recently, oil. The
comparatively high profile and wide distribution of trade (and, as importantly, of tax revenues
derived from it) gave European rulers strong incentives to establish and uphold law and order
and to concentrate on developing what Michael Mann has aptly called the ‘infrastructural
power’ (as distinct from the fiercer ‘despotic power’ or ‘coercive power’) of states. Moreover,
the wide dispersal of river basins and level areas of fertile (often alluvial) soil, many of which
became medieval centres of political and economic power, fostered a plurality of European
states. Advances in both military and civilian technologies, which gradually increased the
optimum size of states, facilitated territorial amalgamation and conquest. This reduced the total
number of separate political units in Europe from about one thousand in 1300 to about five
hundred in 1500 and twenty-five by 1900, but this process of amalgamation ‘went so far but no
further: never to a single empire. Amalgamation costs were high. Major natural barriers protect
several parcels of territory the size of modern nation-states’, particularly in western Europe (p.
106).
In Jones’ view, the European ‘miracle’ consisted in the fact that, thanks to shifting and
balancing alliances and the emergence of a system of international law, a pluralistic European
states system and balance of power endured for so long, amid so many bids for the mastery of
Europe. In the words of Alfred Cobban, ‘Europe is unique in that nowhere else … has such a
considerable group of nation states survived in geographical contiguity and close association
with one another over a period of many centuries … if any state grew powerful enough to
threaten the balance, sooner or later it drew on itself the enmity of a more powerful coalition.’
(Cobban 1969: 30-31.) This pluralistic states system gave Europe important advantages over
continents dominated by great land empires. In the long run, the latter have tended to breed
67
debilitating court intrigue, sycophancy, vice, corruption, conspicuous consumption, even more
conspicuous construction, and stultifying cultural uniformity. In the pluralistic European states
system, by contrast, wrong-headed decisions could not be imposed on Europe as a whole by a
central authority. Europeans thereby avoided falling under the control of a single politicalreligious order. In spite of the attendant frictions, conflicts, carnage and waste, the resultant
diversity and pluralism gave Europeans some freedom of thought and an unusual diversity of
lines of enquiry. Above all, while all-powerful empires have minimal incentives to adopt new
methods of organisation, production and warfare, European states have always been surrounded
by actual or potential competitors. Competition for military, dynastic, commercial and industrial
advantage provided constant spurs to adaptation and innovation, while religious and later
political refugees and economic migrants repeatedly (and often unwittingly) transferred skills
and know-how from state to state. The competitiveness and ‘genetic variety’ of the states
system and the economic system, together with market integration, rising mobility of capital
and labour and increased contact, mixing and cross-fertilisation between countries and regions,
fostered innovation and the dissemination of best practice. At the same time, the emergence of
an increasingly elaborate system of international law helped to contain the destructive
conflictual tendencies of the European states system and prepared the ground for the eventual
acceptance of a more far-reaching supranational legal order as the basis of the European
Communities and the European Union, which has gradually metamorphosed relations between
hitherto formally sovereign states into the types of civil and ‘domesticated’ relationships
appropriate within a multinational legal federation.
The Member States of the EU would be foolish to throw away the vital age-old
strengths and advantages of the European states system by agreeing to transform the EU into an
over-arching ‘European superstate’. The continuing dynamism and vitality of the EU requires a
plurality of competing member states, albeit with the system’s centrifugal and conflictual
pontential constrained within a binding over-arching legal order and agreed ‘rules of the game’.
However, a pluralistic states system does not have to be based on nation-states. It can also
comprise plurinational political formations, along the lines of the Swiss Federation, the Spanish
‘nación de naciones’ and Bikku Parekh’s conceptualisation of the United Kingdom as a
‘community of communities’. And there are still areas of Europe (e.g., Macedonia, Romania,
Belgium, Spain and the British Isles) where, taken to its logical conclusion, any attempt to
(re)construct polities on the basis of the idea of the nation-state either has been or could yet be
a recipe for economic disaster and human tragedy – for further ‘Balkanisation’.
While there were inherent features of the states system which happened to arise in
response to Europe’s particular topography and physical environment and which helped it to
exploit to the full the products and technologies which became available to it through the gradual
emergence of increasingly integrated global markets from (at the latest) the thirteenth century
onwards (Abu-Lughod 1989), it has been persuasively demonstrated by various ‘world historians’
that the major economic and technological breakthroughs which laid the basis for Europe’s
eventual ‘global supremacy’ were in many ways anticipated and made possible by analogous
developments in certain other parts of the world, most notably Sung China and the Islamic world
in its prime, and that these were to considerable degrees matched by independent economic and
technological breakthroughs and achievements in Tokugawa Japan (Jones 1987; FernandezArmesto 1995; Ponting 2000 ; Pomeranz 2000; and on the prowess of the Islamic world, Lewis
2002, Ch. 1). None of these centres of innovation, adaptation and creativity was wholly
independent. Each drew upon and contributed to pools of innovations and products which were
sometimes quite rapidly diffused across the several ‘civilisations’ of the Afro-Eurasian landmass,
which ‘borrowed’ a great deal from each other. Like the USA today or the Islamic lands from the
ninth to the sixteenth centuries, Europe is best understood as a space which is characterized by
exceptionally vigorous economic, political and cross-cultural interaction which continually
renews and replenishes itself by sucking in products, people, ideas, inventions, technologies,
doctrines, practices, skills and talents originating from all over the world and melding them
together in increasingly sophisticated combinations. Monolithic homogeneity and conformity is
68
only a recipe for cultural, technological and economic stagnation. All the creative and dynamic
‘great civilisations’ of the past and the present have owed much of their greatness to their multiethnic, multi-denominational and multi-racial composition, which has helped to generate the
creative tensions, including those that Joseph Schumpeter called ‘creative destruction’, which help
to promote sustained self-renewal. Classifying civilisations on the basis of a single cultural
marker in each case (as in Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis) would therefore be
laughable were it not so dangerously simplistic, encouraging politicians and publics to think that
we must either fatalistically accept or militarily arm ourselves against supposedly ancient and
irreconcilable antagonisms between different religions and cultures which have actually managed
to coexist quite fruitfully for centuries at a time.
‘Europe’ has always been a somewhat elastic and kaleidoscopic entity, which has latterly
become roughly coterminous with the European product and labour markets and a broadly
corresponding European states system and legal order. The ‘Europeanness’ of a country should
therefore be judged, not in accordance with ‘fixed’ cultural or geographical criteria, but by an
empirical assessment of the extent to which it has actually been participating in, contributing to,
and abiding by the currently prevailing rules, norms and practices of the continually
metamorphosing civilisation, states system and ‘big market’ which go by the name of Europe.
Likewise, eligibility for formal membership of the European Union should be decided primarily
on the basis of an applicant’s actual willingness and capacity to contribute to the EU’s success and
to comply with its membership rules, norms and obligations, rather than on the basis of more
arbitrary cultural and/or geographical preconceptions and prejudices. Any country which is
meeting or demonstrably willing and able to meet the above criteria should be considered
‘European’ and eligible for membership of the EU. Any country which refuses or is unable to
meet these criteria simply debars or excludes itself from membership until such time as it is
prepared to make the necessary changes. Conceived in this way, it should be feasible for countries
such as Morocco, Algeria and Turkey eventually to become as much a part of Europe as, say,
France or Germany; and one could not rule out in principle the possibility that they could
eventually become more integrated into and convergent with the main torso of Europe than some
of the countries which more obviously conform to the currently prevailing cultural and
geographical stereotypes of ‘Europeanness’.
Enduring East-West Divisions: Is Europe Really Being Unified?
It has been widely assumed that the modern east-west division of Europe was
essentially a product of the Cold War and of communist ascendancy over central and eastern
Europe and that, with the end of the Cold War and of communist rule in Europe, the two halves
of Europe can simply be ‘reunited’ in the way that Germany was in 1990. Thus, in Aachen in
May 1991, President Havel declared that Europe was closer than ever before to realising ‘the
age-old hope of becoming an area of friendship and co-operation for all its inhabitants’ and that
central and east Europeans were seeking to return to a civilisation that they had helped to
develop. ‘This is not a question of... being fascinated by another world. It is just the opposite.
After decades of unnaturally following the wrong track, we are yearning to rejoin the road
which was once ours too’ (The Financial Times, 10 May 1992). East-central Europe has indeed
been home to some of Europe's greatest writers and intellectuals and to some of its oldest
universities, and the late Hugh Seton-Watson was right to insist that ‘nowhere in the world is
there so widespread a belief in the reality, and the importance, of a European cultural
community as in the countries lying between the EEC territory and the Soviet Union’
(Encounter, Vol 65, No. 2, 1985, p. 14). This belief in the ‘oneness’ of Europe has been very
important to the east-central European intelligentsia in its drive to strengthen democracy and
foster pan-European integration. Nevertheless, it rests on a somewhat questionable reading of
European history.
The Cold War certainly gave more definite institutional expression to the east-west
division of Europe, but there were deep-seated cultural, political, social and economic
differences between eastern and western Europe long before the epoch of communism and Cold
69
War. The traumatic experience of communist dictatorship was but a brief episode in the history
of central and eastern Europe, which has been much more enduringly marked by various
political, cultural and economic influences that lasted far longer than the communist
experiment. These older, profounder, temporarily suppressed influences resurfaced after 1989
and, the longer the central and eastern European countries are denied full access to western
European markets, capital and technology and thrown back on their own resources, the longer
this more deep-seated east-west divide will persist. Not even the impending ‘eastward
enlargement’ of the EU will suffice per se to overcome that divide. It will bring 25 states into a
single framework of law, policies and rules, but real convergence will take many decades – as
is far from guaranteed.
Europe’s east-west divide can in part be traced back to the east-west partitions of the
Roman Empire in 285 and in 395 AD and to the resultant gradual divergence and eventual
schism (in 1054 AD) between western Catholic and eastern Orthodox Christianity. The fifthcentury disintegration of the western Roman Empire paved the way for the gradual evolution of
western Europe through unusually fragmented and decentralised feudal polities to the
precocious development of capitalism within the interstices of late medieval feudal society. In
east-central, south-eastern and eastern Europe, by contrast, outwardly splendid but ultimately
stultifying imperial polities predominated until 1918. The eastern Roman Empire (alias
Byzantium) survived in full strength until 1204 and in a much more limited form until 1453,
only to be succeeded by the Ottoman Empire, while east-central Europe fell under absolutist
imperial control from the sixteenth to the early twentieth centuries.
Admittedly, there was a period when it seemed as if east-central Europe was being
fully assimilated into western or Latin Christendom, following the conversion of the emerging
kingdoms of Moravia, Bohemia, Poland and Hungary to Roman Catholic Christianity in the
course of the tenth and eleventh centuries. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries,
monarchical power and authority were circumscribed and eroded in Hungary, Poland and
Bohemia, which experienced significant expansions of commerce, crafts, mining, towns and
decentralised, autonomous activity. The region's educated elites vigorously participated in the
humanist intellectual currents that gave rise to the Reformation, the Renaissance and the early
stages of the Scientific Revolution. Unfortunately, these promising developments were nipped
in the bud by the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the expansion of
intolerant Eastern empires, the attendant reinforcement of estate-owners privileges and
emergence of a so-called ‘second serfdom’ in east-central and eastern Europe, and the
persecution and/or emigration of dissenters and free-thinkers, including large numbers of
merchants and skilled craftsmen. The latter increasingly took refuge in Protestant north-western
Europe, whose economic and intellectual gains were to be east-central Europe's loss.
The resultant cultural, political and social straitjackets cramped central and eastern
European development and this, together with the rise of west European maritime and colonial
trade (including the slave trade and the plantations and mines which slave labour worked),
displaced the major Afro-Eurasian trade routes toward Europe's Atlantic seaboard, which
enjoyed greatly increased power, capital accumulation, technological advancement,
entrepreneurial élan and economic prosperity. East-central, southeastern and eastern Europe
consequently fell far behind maritime western Europe, which developed increasingly secular
civil societies as well as freedom of thought and commerce. The subsequent western European
Industrial Revolution, coupled with central and east European specialisation in the exportation
of unsophisticated and less remunerative primary products, widened the east-west disparity in
per capita GNP from about 2:1 to about 3:1 during the nineteenth century (I. Berend). This
baleful economic disparity widened still further during the inter-war years and during the
Second World War. Regrettably, the east-west partition of Europe from 1947/48 to 1989/90,
combined with the ever-increasing affluence of much of western Europe since the mid-1950s, has
left west European governments and populations alike much more concerned to preserve and
protect their relative affluence, low levels of unemployment, substantial welfare benefits and
dominant positions in European and global affairs than to incorporate the current candidate states
70
fully and rapidly into the EU. The east-west disparity in per capita GDP had increased to a ratio of
1:6 or 1:7 (at market prices) by the 1990s, to the massive advantage of western Europe. Many
west Europeans seem reluctant either to give up those advantages or even to share them with
relatively impoverished easterners, as xenophobic hostility to ‘eastern’ migrants seems to confirm.
The west European game plan appears to have been to do and to give as little as possible, as late
as possible, or to be more reactive than proactive. Europe’s massive east-west economic
disparities will persist for several more decades, even if the east-central and south-east European
economies were to grow (hypothetically) by 5 or 6 per cent per annum. It will be an even longer
haul if these countries continue to be dogged by recurrent crises of the sort they experienced
during the twentieth century.
We inhabit a deeply asymmetrical Europe in an even more
asymmetrical world in which the rich and the strong are accustomed to getting their own way and
the poorest and weakest states and populations have usually had to bear the greatest burdens of
adjustment. This is most clearly visible in the highly asymmetrical way in which European Union
trade with the east-central and south-east European states has been liberalised: the weaker and
more vulnerable candidate countries completely opened their markets to exports from the much
richer and stronger EU states, whereas the EU has continued to restrict market access for the
principal exports of the candidate states (agricultural products, processed foods and drinks, coal,
steel, textiles and footwear). This need not mean that ‘eastward enlargement’ of the EU will come
to grief. However, it does suggest that (i) eastward enlargement will take place on terms which
are perceived as not diminishing the existing advantages of the relatively rich and powerful west
European states in any substantial respect or degree, or it will not take place at all; and (ii) the
new and prospective Member States will continue to suffer a great deal of economic and social
hardship both before and after they enter the European Union, bearing in mind that most of them
have only recently regained their (not very high) pre-1989 levels of per capita GDP and that since
1989 they have experienced greatly increased internal inequalities, with the result that most eastcentral and south-east Europeans are a great deal poorer now than they were in 1989. The
situation is reminiscent of the insistence of certain Christian churches that people must suffer
greatly and uncomplainingly before they can enter ‘the Kingdom of God’ – only in this case the
suffering is all in the name of the secular gods of ‘material progress’, ‘modernity’ and ‘Europe’.
In sum, the current ‘eastward enlargement’ process is not putting an end to the east-west
division of Europe. It could be incapable of doing so, and it might even reinforce it in a new
guise. We cannot rule out the possibility that a new pattern of Western European domination and
exploitation of Europe’s East may be what is really being established, as Adam Burgess was one
of the first to argue (Burgess 1997). Realistically, the most that can be achieved in the near future
is a lightening and eastward displacement of the ‘iron curtain’ which descended across Europe
after the Second World War. The new southern and eastern frontiers of the enlarged European
Union are being fortified and policed almost as assiduously as the old ‘iron curtain’ was, as a
mandatory requirement of EU membership. European countries which remain stranded to the east
or south of the new divide will find themselves even more disadvantaged and marginalised
(relatively speaking) than they were before, precisely because so many of the countries with which
they had close ties during the Communist era are being incorporated into the EU and NATO. The
list of excluded European countries is most likely to comprise Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova,
Georgia and Armenia. In addition, Serbia-Montenegro, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia and
Albania have been given no time-table for possible inclusion in the EU, although in Athens in
2003 the governments of the EU-15 did commit themselves in principle to bringing them into the
EU in due course. Other possible (though very unlikely) candidates for long-term exclusion are
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia, in that they could prove unable to accomplish sufficient political
and economic reform and economic recovery to be deemed ‘ready’ for full membership of the EU
by 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania) and 2008 or 2009 (Croatia), not least because EU assessments of
their capacity and willingness to meet the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ are likely to be very
exacting. However, the longer the current aspirants to eventual EU membership have to wait
before being admitted, the higher the entry requirements are likely to be, and the larger and the
more onerous the ‘acquis communautaire’ which they will have to adopt as a condition of entry.
71
Likewise, the larger the number of countries that succeeds in gaining entry into the European
Union, the greater will be the relative marginalisation of those left waiting outside it. The
severity of the current insistence that the Balkan post-Communist states must ‘put their own
houses completely in order’ before being allowed to enter fails to understand that many (perhaps
most) of their major problems can only be effectively resolved or surmounted after they have been
allowed to enter, within the larger, stronger, more stable and more accommodating framework of
the EU’s overarching cosmopolitan legal order, single market and single currency.
Nevertheless, we ought to be in the business of genuinely uniting Europe, rather than
erecting new barriers and divisions. In parallel with eastward enlargement of the EU, the
emphasis must be on the creation of a pan-European security community and a barrier-free single
European space in which all who are willing and able to abide by a set of common rules, norms,
values and reciprocal security guarantees should be allowed to participate on an equal footing.
This could link together several regional sub-groupings with varying commitments to deeper
integration. Admittedly, the elimination of the potentially destabilizing power vacuum in the area
between Germany and Russia is as much in the interests of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (all three
of which suffered devastating invasions by Central European powers during the two World Wars)
as it is in the interests of other European states. However, this ought to be accomplished in ways
that will not permanently disadvantage, marginalise or antagonize Russia, Ukraine and Belarus,
and certainly not by drawing new lines which formally proclaim these countries to be ‘outside
Europe’ (especially if the United States, through its membership of NATO and the OSCE, retains
a major presence within Europe!). Even if it were to be decided that Russia and perhaps Ukraine
are too big or too problematic to become full members of the EU, the West should not try to
freeze them out of the ‘common European home’. That would merely store up much bigger
problems and potential dangers for the future. Most dangerous of all is the type of attitude
expressed by General William Odom, a former director of the US National Security Agency:
‘Russia is a weak state with virtually none of the institutions essential for an
effective market economy: taxation, law enforcement, civil litigation, and so on. Its
population is dying young and declining in size. It retains a capacity to make trouble, for
example in Georgia, Nigeria, Nagorno-Karabakh, Central Asia and Chechnya; but it cannot
field a major military force, nor will it be able to do so at any time soon … This kind of
Russia can probably be excluded from the western security order for a long time without
unmanageable consequences. It simply lacks the power to overturn the west European
system.’(International Affairs, Vol 74(4), October 1998, p. 814).
The radical changes in the nature of Europe’s security problems since the end of the
Cold War era of east-west partition and confrontation make attitudes of this sort very
hazardous. A single, concentrated, external threat against which nuclear and conventional
military forces could be targeted has largely given way to much more numerous and diffuse
internal threats and a vastly diminished external threat. The new threats to security stem from
inter-ethnic conflict, human rights violations, international crime, drugs trafficking, mafias,
terrorism, the hazards of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and weapons technology
falling into the wrong hands or exploding by accident, the dangers of more nuclear melt-downs
or even explosions of nuclear power plants, problems arising from large-scale refugee flows and
illegal migration, and even problems of extreme poverty, inequality and economic collapse.
The major struggles and armed conflicts now take place within rather than between states.
Europe’s security remains indivisible, and that of western and central Europe is as bound up as
ever with the security of the east, including (indeed, especially) Russia and Ukraine. These
changing situations are resulting in the growing obsolescence and redundancy of NATO and the
increasing importance of different kinds of organisation, such as the EU, the OSCE and the
Council of Europe, which are more suitable than NATO for diminishing or dealing with the
new kinds of security problems in Europe. The military structures, training, mindset and
personnel of NATO are ill-suited to playing essentially political and civil roles, just as the
72
necessarily slow, consensual and cumbersome policy-making and decision-making structures
and procedures and the essentially civil(ian) mindset of the EU are ill-suited to playing military
roles – and least of all to effective direction and deployment of a Rapid Reaction Force.
What is needed is an over-arching purpose-built European collective security
organisation (perhaps with a European ‘security council’ patterned after the UN Security
Council), which would address and deal with pan-European security, trade, migration, crime,
and environmental and welfare concerns. The major dangers posed by post-Soviet Russia are
not the old military threats, but actual or potential loss of control over nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons and weapons technologies, nuclear plants, and the Russian mafia. The
control of such threats (potentially to the whole of Europe!) calls for maximum co-operation
rather than confrontation between Russia and the West, and for an augmentation rather than a
weakening of the ‘infrastructural power’ of the Russian state.
Regrettably, faced with opportunities to take advantage of the current humiliation,
impoverishment and extreme marginalisation of Russia, western Europe has for the most part
preferred to forget that it owes its present freedom, prosperity and integration to the paramount
role of the Russians in the defeat of Nazi Germany. For it was the Soviet Union that bore the main
burden of the land war against Nazi Germany from June 1941 to June 1944, often confronting 80
to 90 per cent of the Wehrmacht – and even after the Normandy landings the Western Allies
fought only one-third of the Wehrmacht while the Soviet Union fought two-thirds. Ukrainians,
Belarussians and other non-Russian citizens of the Soviet Union were less inclined to resist the
Germans and more inclined to welcome them as liberators from Stalinist terror and Russian
domination, thus leaving the Russians to take the lion’s share of the Soviet War effort and its
enormous loss of life and limb. Without these enormous and predominantly Russian sacrifices, on
a scale which Western liberal democracies could not have stomached, Britain and the USA might
well have come to terms with Hitler – and Europe would probably still be ruled by the Third
Reich. From the mid-1920s to 1943, the dominant trends in Europe were away from liberalism
and democracy towards various forms of authoritarian nationalism, fascism and beggar-myneighbour protectionism (Mazower 1998: 2-3, 20-27). It was the defeat of Nazi Germany
primarily by the Soviet Union which reversed these trends and set western Europe on a new
course towards liberal/social democracy, welfare states and economic integration (even though
that was not quite what Stalin had intended!). It is therefore shameful that the west European
freedom, prosperity and integration which the Soviet Union (albeit inadvertently) helped to make
possible have latterly been used not to integrate and assist but to humiliate and marginalise the
Russians, with barely a thought either for the potential consequences or for the huge ‘moral debt’
which the now liberal democratic parts of Europe implicitly owe them.
The True Importance of European Unification
Conceiving contemporary Europe as an evolving states system and economic space
with an evolving set of rules, norms and practices and a distinctive legal order, rather than as a
fixed geographical area with ‘essential’ values and cultural characteristics, is crucial to a proper
understanding of the major political and economic benefits which the current and prospective
members can gain from membership of the European Union. For the current aspirants to EU
membership, these benefits need to be large enough to persuade their peoples and politicians to
stay the course by providing significant compensation for the enormous economic and social
hardships which most of them will continue to endure for a long time to come – not least
because the existing members of the EU will continue to expect most of the burdens of
adjustment to fall on the candidate countries (who are in the invidious position of small and/or
poor and weak supplicants-at-the-gate) rather than on their much stronger and more affluent
selves.
Economically, the most important aspect of the European Union’s relations with
Europe's former Communist states is not the amount of EU aid and structural funding that is
granted to them (this never has been and for the foreseeable future will not be more than a few
drops in some very large buckets), but rather the degree to which these states are willing and able
73
to sign up to and participate in the rules and practices of the EU. Successful transitions from
highly centralized command economies to decentralized market systems that foster autonomous
entrepreneurial behaviour and decision-making not only depend upon the promotion of
appropriate and effective macro-economic policies and economic infrastructure, but also require
well-defined rules for integrating the decisions of decentralized agents. Most important of all is
rule certainty for all economic agents, in order to stabilise expectations and thereby to reduce risk,
risk premia, interest rates, the costs of borrowing and transaction costs and to increase business
confidence and investment – especially private foreign direct investment, which often transfers
technologies, products and management and marketing techniques.
It is in these respects that EU membership and preparations for entry can do most to
strengthen the development of market economies and a liberal order (although in the process the
scope for national democratic sovereignty and accountability will be curtailed) in east-central and
south-eastern Europe, since both are reinforced by increased adherence to and confidence in the
prevalence of rule-governed and law-governed behaviour. EU membership brings increased
certainty, clarity, transparency, uniformity and impartiality with regard to the rules that will
govern economic and political activity within and between its Member States. These rules, which
figure prominently in the conditions of membership, offer reassurance and encouragement to
private entrepreneurs (especially foreign investors). These have been the major factors in the huge
inflows of foreign capital into Spain, Portugal and Ireland since they became members of the
European Community (even outweighing the economic benefits conferred by the more highly
publicised inflows of EU ‘structural funds’). The scope for reaping such gains remains
intrinsically greater for poorer countries and regions than for richer ones, provided they can
muster and sustain the levels of fiscal and monetary discipline and entrepreneurial responsiveness
that will allow them to participate fully in the EU’s stringent and bracing supranational framework
of law and rules. This is another reason to admit Europe’s former Communist states to the EU as
soon as feasible, without waiting for them completely to ‘put their own houses in order’ before
entry .
Politically, the major benefit which EU membership can confer on the countries of eastcentral and south-eastern Europe is a means of transcending the limitations of the nation-state by
incorporating them in the large, stable, predictable and capacious framework of a highly
developed supranational legal order within which everyone is on an equal footing as a member of
an ethnic minority – there being no ethnic group even remotely big enough to dominate the EU.
In contrast to the nation-state framework (irrespective of whether it is ‘ethnic’, ‘civic’, federal,
‘consociational’ or committed to the recognition and protection of minority group rights), the EU
framework in a crucial respect does away with the distinction between dominant and subordinate
national or ethnic groups.
A special virtue of the European Union’s supranational legal order is that it places all EU
citizens, irrespective of their ethnicity, religion and race, on the same legal footing and within the
same legal framework, in all matters pertaining to that legal order. In the words of Commission
President Romano Prodi, the EU offers a ‘model of a consensual pooling of sovereignty in which
every one of us accepts to belong to a minority’ (Prodi 2000: 7). Moreover, as a result of the
ever-extending scope and reach of EC law and the fact that most of the policies and legislation
adopted in the Member States now originate at the EU rather than at the ‘national’ level, EC law
increasingly outweighs and overrides the more particularistic legal systems of the Member States.
This is the closest that human ingenuity has ever come to creating a system of ‘cosmopolitan law’
and ‘cosmopolitan law-enforcement’. All EU citizens, irrespective of creed, colour, nationality or
ethnicity, are subject to the same EC laws, and these laws cannot be embodiments of the values,
aspirations or interests of any dominant ethnic group, religion or nation, because no single group
is large enough to be capable of dominating the EU.
The European Union exists so as to enable a great diversity of populations and states to
co-exist in ways that maximise the scope for defining and pursuing their own widely differing
goals, values and projects, while minimising the scope for friction between them. The whole
point is to allow highly diverse Europeans to co-exist as harmoniously and profitably as
74
possible, rather than to try to impose a uniformity of goals, values and culture upon them. The
larger and the more diverse the European Union becomes, the more it will have to concentrate
on learning to accommodate cultural, ideological, social and economic heterogeneity, and the
less it will be able even to aspire to cultural, ideological, social and economic uniformity.
Indeed, the nature of the legal order that has gradually emerged in Europe since the sixteenth
and seventeenth-century ‘wars of religion’ has been shaped by the necessity to elaborate
principles of coexistence among individuals and groups committed to different conceptions of
truth and the good, and by the gradual discovery that, in the absence of agreement on ends,
agreement on procedures is required if destructive conflict is to be avoided (Nardin 1983). The
members of the EU are united not so much by engagement in common projects as by their
acceptance that they are all equal members of a civil order or ‘civil association’ defined by
adherence to a common set of rules and laws designed to allow each of them to pursue her own
interests and goals with the minimum of friction, conflict and mutual impairment (Bideleux
2001). What late modern plural societies need most is not some spurious communitarian
consensus on values and interests, but rather the development of common institutions within
which conflicts of values and interests can be mediated. They do not need common values,
belief-systems and projects in order to live together in peace. They need common institutions in
which increasingly diverse values, belief-systems, projects, orientations and forms of life can
peacefully and profitably coexist. An enlarged European Union is probably the only framework
capable of achieving such a desirable outcome and gradually extending its benefits to the
entirety of a Europe defined, not by exclusive and specious essentialist, culturalist or
civilisational criteria, but by the extent to which contiguous countries and regions actually
participate in it and willingly abide by its evolving ‘house rules’.
References
ALTERMATT, U., (2002), ‘Language and Nation’, in L. Boia & A. Pleşu (eds.), Nation and
National Ideology: Past, Present and Prospects, Bucharest: Centre for the History of the
Imaginary & New Europe College, 2002, pp. 323-51.
AMIN, A., TOMANEY, J., (eds.) (1995), Behind the Myth of European Union: Prospects for
Cohesion, London: Routledge, 1999.
ARDY, B., (1999), ‘Agricultural, Structural Policy, the Budget and Eastern Enlargement of the
European Union’, in K. Henderson (ed.), Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe and
the European Union, London: UCL Press, 1999.
BALDWIN R., FRANCOIS J. & PORTES R. (1997a), `The Costs and Benefits of Eastern
Enlargement: The Impact on the EU and Central Europe', in Economic Policy, No. 24, April
1997, pp. 125-76.
BALDWIN R. & PORTES R. (1997b), `More Pillars Needed to Build a United Europe', in The
Independent on Sunday (UK), 2 April 1997, p. 4.
BIDELEUX R. (1999), ‘La Grèce: Ni intérêts nationaux, ni idéaux fédéralistes’, in A. Landuyt
(ed.), Europe: Fédération ou nations, Paris: SEDES, 1999, pp. 205-27.
BIDELEUX R. (2000), ‘Dopo la democrazia: l’Unione Europea come ordine giuridico liberale
sovranazionale’, in A. Landuyt (ed.), L’Unione Europea tra rifflessione storica e prospettive
politiche e sociali, Siena: Protagon Editori, 2000, pp. 15-48.
BIDELEUX R. (2001a), ‘Civil Association: The European Union as a Supranational Liberal
Legal Order’, in M. Evans (ed.), The Edinburgh Companion to Contemporary Liberalism,
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001, pp. 225-40.
BIDELEUX R. (2001b), ‘What Does It Mean to Be European? The Problems of Constructing a
Pan-European Identity’, in G. Timmins & M. Smith (eds.), Uncertain Europe, London:
Routledge, late 2001, pp. 20-40.
BIDELEUX R. (2001c), ‘Europeanization and the Limits to Democratization in East-Central
Europe’, in G. Pridham & A. Agh (eds.), Ten Years After: Democtatic Transition and
Consolidation in East-Central Europe, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001, pp.
25-53.
75
BIDELEUX R. & JEFFRIES I. (1998), A History of Eastern Europe, London: Routledge, 1998.
BIDELEUX R. & TAYLOR R. (eds.) (1996), European Integration and Disintegration: East and
West, London: Routledge, 1996.
VAN BRABANT J. (1989), Economic Integration in Eastern Europe, London: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1989.
EU Commission (1997), `Agenda 2000: For a Stronger and Wider Union', in Bulletin of the
European Union, Supplement 5/97, May 1997.
European Council (1997), Presidency Conclusions: Luxembourg European Council, Brussels,
1997.
FAGERBERG J. & VERSPAGEN B., `Heading for Divergence? Regional Growth in Europe
Reconsidered', in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 34 (3), pp. 431-48.
BILDT C. (2001), ‘A Second Chance in the Balkans’, in Foreign Affairs, Vol 80 (1), Jan-Feb
2001, pp. 148-58.
COBBAN A. (1969), The Nation state and National Self-Determination, Glasgow: CollinsFontana, 1969.
COHEN L. (1993), Broken Bonds: the Disintegration of Yugoslavia, Boulder:Westview Press,
1993.
FERNÁNDEZ-ARMESTO F. (1995), Millennium, London: Bantam Press, 1995; Black Swan
paperback edition, 1996.
GRAY J., Two Faces of Liberalism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.
GROS D. and STEINHERR A. (1994), `In Favour of EMU: A Manifesto of European
Economists', in A. Steinherr (ed.), 30 Years of European Monetary Integration: From the
Werner Plan to EMU, London: Longman, 1994.
HUNTINGTON S. (1993), ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, in Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 2249, and the ensuing debates in Foreign Affairs, Sept-Oct 1993, pp. 1-26, and Nov-Dec 1993,
pp. 186-94.
HUNTINGTON S. (1996), ‘The West Unique, Not Universal’, in Foreign Affairs, Vol 75 (6),
1996, pp. 28-46
HUNTINGTON S. (1998), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, London;
Simon & Schuster, 1997; Touchstone Pbk, 1998.
JONES E.L. (1981), The European Miracle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
JONES E.L. (1987), Growth Recurring, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
KYMLICKA W. (1995), Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995.
KYMLICKA W. (2001), Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and
Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
KUNDERA M. (1984), ‘The Tragedy of Central Europe’, in New York Review of Books, 26 April
1994.
LEWIS B. (2002), What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response, London:
Pheonix, 2002.
MAJONE G. (1992), ‘Regulatory Federalism in the European Community’, in Government and
Policy, Vol 10, 1992, pp. 299-316.
MAJONE G. et al. (1996), Regulating Europe, London, Routledge, 1996.
MAYHEW A. (1998), Recreating Europe: The European Union's Policy towards Central and
Eastern Europe, Cambridge: CUP 1998.
Mark Mazower’s Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century (Harmondsworth: Allen
lane/Penguin, 1998.
MONNET J. (1976), Mémoires, Paris: Fayard, 1976.
MORIN E. (1990), Penser l’Europe, Paris: Gallimard, 1990.
NARDIN T. (1983), Law, Morality and the Relations of States, Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1983.
NEVEN D. & GOUYETTE C. (1995), `Regional Convergence in the European Community', in
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol 33 (1), 1995, pp. 47-65.
76
ODOM W. (1998), ‘Russia’s Several Seats at the Table’, in International Affairs, Vol 74 (4),
October 1998.
PAGDEN A. (ed.), (2002), The Idea of Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
POMERANZ K. (2000), The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern
World Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
PORTES R., `Transformation Traps', in Economic Journal, Vol 104, 1994.
PONTING C. (2000), World History: A New Perspective, London: Chatto and Windus, 2000.
PRESTON C. (1995), `Obstacles to EU Enlargement: The Classical Community Method and the
Prospects for a Wider Europe', in Journal of Common Market Sudies, Vol 33 (3), 1995, pp.
451-63.
PRESTON C. (1997), Enlargement and Integration in the European Union, London: Routledge,
1997.
PRODI R. (1999), Un idea dell’Europa, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1999.
PRODI R. (2000), ‘2000-06: Shaping the New Europe: Presentation to the European Parliament’,
in Bulletin of the European Union, Supplement 1/2000, 2000, pp. 5-13.
RODIK D. (1997), ‘Discussion’, in Economic Policy, N0. 24, April 1997, pp. 170-73.
TAVARES RIBEIRO M. M. (2003), A Ideia de Europa: Uma perspectiva histórica, Coimbra:
Quarteto, 2003.
WALLACE H. (1997), `Pan-European Integration: A Real or Imagined Community?', in
Government and Opposition, Vol 32 (2), 1997, pp. 214-33.
77
Europe and the challenges of globalization
Maria MARCZEWSKA-RYTKO
“If I knew about something that could be useful to me, but harmful to my family, I
would throw it out of my mind. If I knew about something that could be useful to my
family, but not to my motherland, I would try to forget about it. If I knew about
something that could be useful to my motherland but harmful to Europe, or useful to
Europe, but harmful to the humankind, I would consider it a crime”.
(Montesquieu, Pensée)
“Globalization is everything and its opposite. It can be incredibly empowering and
incredibly andincredibly corecive. It can democratize opportunity and democratize
panic. It makes the whales bigger and theminnows stronger. It leaves you behind faster
and faster, and it catches up to you faster and faster. While it is homogenizing cultures,
it is also enabling people to share their unique individuality farther and wider”.
(Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree.
Understanding Globalization)
The present paper aims at the identification of the challenges facing Europe in
connection with the globalization processes. I do not intend to formulate any concrete solutions,
but will attempt to present some questions, the answers to which do not seem unambiguous. My
considerations will focus on questions connected with the domain of ideas and the vision of
Europe of the future. Some scholars argue that after the collapse of grand ideologies we have
entered the period of political nihilism (Zachariasz, 2001, 27). Without trying to establish to
what extent their position is justified, we should draw attention to certain facts. First of all, the
grand ideologies such as communism or fascism (Nazism, in its German variety) were mainly a
European phenomenon, whose traces can still be found today. Second, apart from the pragmatic
tendency in the political and economic domains, which also constitutes a certain vision of the
world, there are various other ideas competing for people’s minds. Third, the very concept of
globalization has been elevated to the status of an ideology by dividing individuals and
communities into pro- and anti-globalists. The first part of the paper will identify the
characteristic features of globalising processes, and the second will be devoted to a discussion
of the importance of the opportunities and dangers facing Europe as a result of globalization.
***
The concept of globalization became fashionable in the final years of the twentieth
century and its use seems to be expanding (Waters, 2001; Baretta, 1998, 267-274; Langhorne,
2001). According to Martin Albrow’s definition globalization refers to all those processes by
which peoples of the world are incorporated into a single world society, global society (Albrow,
1990, 9; Albrow, 1993, 248-249). Ronald Robertson represents a similar point of view. He
maintains that globalization is a set of processes forming a common world (Robertson, 1992,
396; Robertson, 1990, 15-30; Robertson, Khonder, 1998, 25-40). On the other hand, Anthony
Giddens defines globalization as a process of global intensification of worldwide social,
economic, political, and cultural relations which link distant localities in such away that local
happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa (Giddens, 1990, 64
and next). Inter-civilisational interactions acquire significance, as pointed out by Samuel P.
Huntington (Huntington, 1996; Profesorska..., 1996, 1). Consequently, he poses a rather risky
thesis of the declining importance of the national state in favour of all kinds of ethnic, tribal, or
religious bonds (Karacasulu, 2000; Anioł 2002; Marczewska-Rytko, 2002, 173-190).
78
Some authors rightly point out that the concept of globalization does not, essentially,
refer to a homogeneous process, but rather denotes a number of heterogeneous, often
contradictory processes, which integrate particular national or cultural communities into the
global society. Jens Bartelson observes that the understanding of the complexity of the concept
of globalization is an important factor in understanding the reasons behind the emergence of
globalization (Bartelskon, 2000, 181; Mojsiewicz, 1998). Globalization denotes the expansion
and intensification of social, political, and economic relations on the regional and continental
scale. It is a multidimensional phenomenon encompassing many different processes functioning
in different time scales (Held, Mc Grew, Goldblatt, Perraton, 1999). Consequently, suggestions
are made to use the term in the plural rather than in the singular. Pieterse is one of those who
subscribe to this view (Pieterse, 1994, 161-184). He argues that what we are dealing with is not
a one-dimensional globalization but a set of globalizations. Globalization denotes hybridisation,
the process of the overlapping fragmentation and uniformisation of different social and cultural
forms. Wojciech J. Burszta points to a number of phenomena included in the concept of
globalization (Burszta, 1998, 138). First, globalization tends to be associated with globality
when some practices, values, or technologies spread throughout the globe, exerting increasing
influence on the quality and substance of people’s lives and when the world as a whole becomes
the point of reference for human activity. Second, the concept refers to a process invested with
its own inherent logic. Third, globalization is treated as the final period of the historical
transformation which began in the times of the modern capitalist-colonial economy.
Although the concept of globalization has become omnipresent during the last two
decades, it does not mean that its history is equally brief. The historical origins of globalization
go back to a much earlier period. Roman Kuźniar believes that the origins of globalization
processes can be found in the 19th century, because at that time the openness of national
economies was in many ways much the same as today (Kuźniar, 1998, 10). Immanuel
Wallerstein suggests that we should study the phenomenon of globalization adopting two
temporal perspectives as our point of departure: from 1945 until today, and from 1450
Wallerstein, 2000, 250). Moreover, in his studies he concentrates primarily on the development
of trade relations and the domination-relationship between countries. On the other hand, Göran
Therborn, paraphrasing Samuel P. Huntington, distinguishes six waves of globalization
(Therborn, 2000, 158-166). The first wave was connected with the process of the diffusion of
universalising religions and the formation of transcontinental civilisations. The second was
derived from the colonial conquests in the 15th century. The origins of the third wave can be
found, according to him, in a series of the first global wars between Great Britain and France
and their allies. Another wave began in the mid-19th century and ended in 1918. The period
after the First World is characterised as deglobalization (Therborn, 2000, 162). The fifth wave
began after the end of the Second World War. Since the mid-1980s we have been living in the
sixth wave of globalization. According to Therborn, periods of globalization alternate with
longer or shorter periods of deglobalization (Compare: Gabiś, 2003). Thus, it can be argued that
globalization is not only a problem of the last few decades. Different processes of globalization
have been with us for centuries. What is new is the perspective: their expansion to new areas,
and only partly the emergence of completely new processes. In this respect I entirely agree with
Jan Winiecki’s ideas, although he applies them to economic problems alone. Nevertheless, his
conception of cyclicity is closer to my position than the conceptions of linear development
(Winiecki, 1999, 116).
Two principal positions can be distinguished among scholars investigating the
processes of globalization (Kempny, 2000, 243). The first considers globalization as a process
resulting from modernisation and encompasses mainly the theories of world capitalism.
Generally speaking, globalization is seen as a process of economic integration (Hirst,
Thompson, 1999; Dicken, 1998; Porębski, 1998, 38-47; Bednarski, 1998). For example,
Ulderico Bernardi insists that the concept of globalization should be reserved exclusively for
processes in the economic domain (Bernardi, 1998, 267). He regrets that the concept has been
turned into an existential category. According to Bernardi, the globalization of technological
79
processes, economic relations and information should not be automatically transferred to
cultural relations (Bernardi, 1998, 280). Our planet essentially remains the global village of
many tribes, because it is in the local culture that the human person defines his or her identity.
That is why globalization is accompanied by a revival of ethnicity. The need for roots and
participation in the world confrontation strengthens the individual’s identity, unless he or she
has allowed himself/herself to succumb to uniformisation.
The second position is somehow opposed to the economic bias and stresses the cultural
issues. Culture is regarded as the most important factor affecting the processes of globalization
(Waters, 1995, 9). Kazimierz Krzysztofek states that in many cases globalization leads to
differentiation, and so „reducing it to the homogenising role is a gross oversimplification of the
roles of the modern market, or markets, and that of culture. This approach dates back to the time
when, for many years after the war, the modernisation or Westernisation of the world was
indeed a megatrend. The ideas of the levelling function of the market in relation to cultures
come from the times, when the market ‘produced’ the mass society and the cultural imperialism
of the West” (Krzysztofek, 2000, 80). Therefore, as Ryszard Kapuściński observes,
globalization, despite its promises, does not eliminate the division into the centre and the
periphery, but deepens it (Kapuściński, 2001, 4). In terms of this division the position of the
centre is occupied by the United States, the indisputable leader in economic and cultural
domains. Globalization gives the United States access to both cultural and economic markets of
the world. In fact, we witness the emergence of a new ruling class, the cosmopolitan class
which defines the ideology of globalism.
Some scholars attempted to combine the two approaches. Ronald Robertson
introduced the concept of glocalisation, the globalization of localisation. Thus, on the one hand,
we are dealing with the contraction of the world, and, on the other, with the growing awareness
of globalism. Aleksander Smolar points to the two sides of the same coin. According to him,
globalization denotes “the world without economic, informational, and environmental
boundaries; instantaneous transfer of billions of dollars from Tokyo to New York or London,
which leads to the destabilisation of countries and continents, but also offers great opportunities
for development; the globalization of information entails watching the events taking place
thousands of miles away in real time; it is the possibility of reading the ‘New York Times’,
‘Gazeta Wyborcza’, ‘Le Monde’, and ‘Rzeczpospolita’ at every point of the globe. The process
of globalization encompasses also environmental threats which know no boundaries, mass
culture, crime, etc. As a result of these processes a certain homogenisation of the world is
taking place.” (Smolar, 2000, 10; Armstrong, 1998, 461-478; Evans, 1997, 62-87). The
processes of globalization are accompanied by the processes of disintegration of nations,
breakdown of states, separatist movements, and ethnic, racial, and religious conflicts. In a
sense, they constitute a reaction to globalising processes. In the context of the present
considerations, Zygmunt Bauman is right, when he says that integration and disintegration are
complimentary processes (Bauman, 2000, 24; Bauman, 1998). According to him, they
constitute the two sides of the same process: a new distribution of power, sovereignty and
freedom of action. It must also be observed that globalization is a spontaneous process, which
means that it cannot be managed or controlled. According to Kuźniar, globalization is a matter
of the scale rather than substance, because it has no ideological or religious face. Kuźniar
supplements his considerations with the example of a Bedouin mounting his camel, whose
preference for drinking Coca-Cola does not turn him into an inhabitant of the global village
(Kuźniar, 1998, 19 and next). He argues that we should make a distinction between the two,
often identified, concepts: globalization and universalisation. He is also right in that even if we
accept the suggestion of the inevitability of market economy and democracy, they can appear in
different contexts determined by the variables of culture or religion. Thus, globalization appears
as a process which, combining the globalising and localising trends, determines the distribution
of privilege and deprivation, wealth and poverty, freedom and enslavement. Therefore, for
Zygmunt Bauman, the meaning of globalization consists in a vision of the world torn by diverse
80
forces, a vision of global disorder. He suggests that we are faced with the disorder different
from universalisation (Bauman, 1997, 55).
A different view of the problem is offered by Eugeniusz Kośmicki, who says that
contemporary globalism is invested with a competitive or even destructive dimension. That is
why, according to him, fundamental significance should be attached to the idea of universalism
understood as searching for certain standards on the global scale, necessary to the processes of
cooperation which should replace one-sided competition and destruction on the global scale
(Kośmicki, 1999, 36).
***
In the light of the problems presented above, we shall consider the challenges to
Europe posed by them. First of all, we should consider the visions of the future: is the
unification of Europe possible on the political level, too; does the future of Europe consist in
multinationality or in the integration of diversity; will the economic inequalities grow. Ralf
Dahrendorf writes: “Why has Europe suddenly become so unpopular? Obviously, partly on
account of the old arguments: it is something distant and suspicious, a bureaucratic monster
deprived of any real democratic control. Partly, it is a response to the phenomenon of
globalization, manifesting itself in the discovery and appreciation of small organisational units,
regions, and local communities. Additionally, there is a growing need to protect one’s own
territory, which is connected with stemming the influx of foreigners. The wave of xenophobia
overwhelming the European countries, strengthening the already evident swing to the antiinternational right.” (Dahrendorf, 2000, 2; Marczewska-Rytko, 2002a, 73-87). In this way he
suggested the ambivalent nature of globalising processes connected with European unification
and the growth of centrifugal movements. According to him, Europe needs common values and
certainty that the European Union is open, liberal, and democratic. According to Dahrendorf,
the Union consists in supporting international cooperation, but also in the opening of borders to
the asylum-seekers, no discrimination of the minorities, responsibility before the citizens for the
decisions taken Dahrendorf, 2000, 2).
The Archbishop of Milan Carlo Maria Martini states that globalization is a process
which may lead to the realisation of the vision of unity promoted by Christian churches. His
considerations apply to both to the future of Europe and the humanity as a whole. According to
the Archbishop, the necessary cultural and spiritual conditions of the unity already exist, among
them the biblical tradition which “lies at the basis of the great spiritual unity of Europe as it was
shaped at the end of the first millennium. The Bible remains, regardless of all religious
divisions, the common book of all Christians of the second millennium”. (Martini, 2000, 3).
Thus, in Martini’s view, the future of Europe, determined by tradition, appears as a vision of
Christian unity and dialogue of different religions. That is why, according to him, one should
not be afraid of the confrontation of different cultures and religions, but rather of the lack of
identity and exchange of opinions. Consequently, Martini makes use of the concept of the
globalization of solidarity which he regards as a challenge facing Europe. I interpret Martini’s
position as an optimistic one. He recognises the conditionality of the development of the
processes of globalization, when he observes that they may lead the human kind to peaceful
unity. Thus, he allows the possibility of a different result. In connection with this he points to
the role of the participants in the decision-making processes. We should, according to him,
reconsider the role and tasks of economy. If we assume the supremacy of the market principles
over all other values, we will face many problems. That is why man should be in the centre of
interest. Consequently, the role of politics on the international stage should be reviewed. The
principles of common international market should be controlled by the international civil
society.
The problems identified by Martini are even more complex, since in practice we are
dealing with many models of capitalism. Michel Albert in his well-know book “Capitalism
versus Capitalism” distinguished two main models of capitalist economy: the neo-American
model and the Rhine model. The former is characterised by individualism, the importance of
81
financial markets and stock exchanges. The Rhine model is oriented towards the consensus of
different social groups, the dominant role of banks, and social safeguards (Albert, 1994, 22-25).
M. Albert points out that the fact that in the face of globalization the more controversial, the
less effective and the more brutal of the two models gains in influence, seems to constitute a
real danger (Albert, 1994, 276). Consequently, in the case of Europe, he stresses the necessity
of the citizens’ pressure on the government to join the political union. If this happens, Europe
will be on its way towards the United States of Europe with the best possible model which has
already proved its advantages (the Rhine model). Otherwise, we will be – according to his point
of view – overcome by the fears of our old Euro-pessimism and we will slide towards the neoAmerican model, the samples of which can be found today in the suburbs of Lyon, Manchester,
and Naples (Albert, 1994, 289; Zuba, 2000, 113-128). M. Albert’s thoughts are echoed in the
words of Giuliano Ferrara, a political scientist and editor-in-chief of the „II Foglio” daily, when
he says that Europe is slowly adjusting to the American model of the market-oriented liberal
economic policy (Mniej państwa..., 2001, 19-20).
Edward Luttwak goes even further. The main role in the global system outlined by him
is played by turbocapitalism. The concept denotes turbo-charged capitalism, constituting a
completely new quality in comparison with the capitalism of the 1980s. In short, it can be
represented by means of the following formula: Privatisation + Deregulation + Globalization =
Turbocapitalism = Prosperity (Luttwak, 2000, 40). The problem is that the followers of
turbocapitalism supporting private enterprises free from governmental regulations or pressures
exerted by trade unions, unrestricted by customs barriers, investment restrictions, paying the
least possible taxes, as well as the privatisation of all enterprises to make them profitable,
promise a dynamic development of the economy and growing wealth, without pointing to the
ways in which this wealth is to be distributed (Luttwak, 2000, 42). Consequently, they offer the
same prescription to every country, regardless of social or cultural differences. Therefore,
Luttwak points to the dangers connected not so much with uncritical acceptance of the
American solutions, as with their imperfect application. The followers of American solutions
seem to forget about at least two forces responsible for the fact that the majority of the
American society accepts the drawbacks of turbocapitalism (Luttwak, 2000, 19). These are the
American legal system and the Calvinist system of values. He finally concludes that “until now,
no Western government had a better idea than allowing turbocapitalism to develop without any
restrictions, hoping that the accelerated economic growth will cure all its ailments.
Unfortunately, all politicians ignore the obvious logical conclusion that turbocapitalism will
speed up the division of the society into the heroes of the Silicone Valley and the valley of
tears” ((Luttwak, 2000, 276). The same spirit pervades the observations of John Gray, the
classic author of British liberalism, who in his book The False Dawn criticises economic
globalization (Compare: Robin, 2001, 8-10).
Some authors argue that globalization becomes a trap for democracy. According to
Hans-Peter Martin and Harald Schumann, the promotion of global integration is accompanied
by the idea of economic-political salvation consisting in deregulation replacing state
supervision, liberalisation of trade, liberalisation of capital flow, privatisation of state
enterprises (Martin, Schumann, 1999, 13-14). This turbocapitalism, as suggested by Luttwak,
seems difficult to stop. Nevertheless, according to Martin and Schumann, one should be aware
that it destroys the efficiently functioning state and democratic stability. They maintain that the
protests of the losers in the process are addressed to the governments and politicians, whose
power is also becoming limited. Even attempts at international cooperation do little to improve
the situation. Martin and Schumann predict that “if in all existential questions concerning the
future the governments will shift responsibility to the overwhelming objective necessities of
supranational economy, politics will become a miserable spectacle of helplessness, and the
democratic state will lose its legitimisation” (Martin, Schumann, 1999, 15). They warn that
“only naive theoreticians or shortsighted politicians believe that it is possible, as in today’s
Europe, to deprive millions of people of jobs and social security each year, without having to
pay the political price in the future” (Martin, Schumann, 1999, 15).
82
This leads to a situation in which the confused citizens subscribe to visions promoting
xenophobia, separatism, and isolation from the global market. It is enough to mention the
success of populist politicians (Martin, Schumann, 1999, 16, 211-214; Marczewska-Rytko,
2001). Moreover, as Luttwak observes, the American version of monetarism is more flexible
towards populist demands than the European orthodoxy (Luttwak, 2000, 221). That is why,
according to H.-P. Martin and H. Schumann, the primacy of politics over economy should be
restored. In the present situation the state functions only as a ‘feeder’ at the service of
supranational economy, and the politicians themselves seem to reduce social benefits wherever
there are no strong interest groups capable of opposing the reductions (Martin, Schumann,
1999, 246-247). It is interesting to observe that both German scholars put their trust in the
United States, perceived as the only country which has managed to preserve considerable
national sovereignty and is capable of establishing the binding rules of global integration. That
is why the USA appears as the last pillar of order in the chaos of global interrelations. What do
the two scholars propose then? What are the most advantageous solutions from the point of
view of the state and the democratic system? They say that “the democratically constructed
society remains stable when the voters feel and know that everyone’s rights and interests
matter, not only those of the economic potentates. Therefore, democratic politicians must
conduct the policy of social compromise and restrict individual freedom for the sake of the
common good. At the same time, however, market economy needs, in order to function,
freedom for entrepreneurship. Only the prospect of individual profit liberates those forces
which through innovations and investments create our wealth” (Martin, Schumann, 1999, 271272). Thus, the desirable solution consists in the implementation of the principles of social
market economy. This has been one of the main ideas characteristic of ordoliberalism which for
over forty years guaranteed stability and order in the post-war Germany.
In the context of the above considerations the question of the so-called third way
deserves special attention. The concept is commonly used to denote the programmes of a
number of parties which gained power in the 1990s (Segal, 2000). It applies to the ideas
advanced by such politicians as Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, Gerhard Schröder in
Germany, Bill Clinton in the United States, or Lionel Jospin in France. Generally speaking, the
concept of the third way refers to the mode of government under the conditions of globalization.
The third way promotes individual property, public control of the corporations, and
responsibility. “The first way” can be said to stand for individualism, the second way for
collectivism or the state. In this context, the third way stands for global values. It calls for the
co-existence of different civilisations and cultures. Thus, it is a mode of thinking aimed at
adjusting the principles of social democracy to the world undergoing radical transformations
connected with the globalization processes (Marczewska-Rytko, 2002). Sometimes, it manifests
itself in the idea that the remedy for deficiencies of democracy is more democracy, or, the
democratisation of democracy (Król, 2001, 7-8). In fact, what is at stake here is the need to
overcome the belief that democracy can be reduced to the formal dimension, to the, to the act of
casting a vote, which has become its fundamental determinant. This leads, as Marcin Król
suggests, to a situation in which democracy begins to be seen as the counting of votes, and not
as a political community (Król, 2001, 5). That is why modern political parties are so widely
criticised. They are not seen as an indispensable element of democracy but as machinery used in
the elections. Politicians do not escape criticism either.
Jean Baudrillard, a French sociologist and philosopher, openly declares that although
the human rights and democracy have increased, their effectiveness vanished long ago (Partia...,
2001, 11). Consequently, the relationship between the political and economic domains needs to
be redefined. Marcin Król points out that the primacy of economy over politics leads to the
disappearance of the political domain (Król, 2001, 9). In a slightly different context, the same
problem is raised by J. Baudrillard: “The unfrozen freedom of the East and the sublimated,
museified freedom of the West are the two sides of the same coin” (Partia..., 2001, 10). He
observes that alongside the transformations initiated in 1989 we are faced with the ongoing
liquidation of the social domain, politics as an idea. This process denotes the victory of the
83
market, which leads to the universal exchangeability of all values, involving the clash of
different views and visions of the world. Criticism is mainly directed at the neo-liberals, who
pay their critics in kind. In this situation, Andrzej Waśkiewicz’s assessment of the neoliberals
seems well balanced (Waśkiewicz, 2001, 78-85). He observes that “the neo-liberals often treat
politics as an auxiliary discipline of economics and subordinate it to their economic visions,
and, more importantly, regard everything that does not correspond to their visions as
pathologies, manifestations of factiousness and fanaticism. The conservatives’ call for the
autonomy of politics, its uniqueness, and irreducibility to other domains is perhaps their most
important contribution to the public debate on the subject (Waśkiewicz, 2001, 81).
Talking to Francesco Rutelli, Norberto Bobbio observes that in the globalising
processes the state is absorbed by the big financial market, and politics is becoming
increasingly dependent on international economic-financial relations (Dialog..., 2001, 2).
Bobbio seems to endorse the idea of universalism, even though he is aware that universalisation
is a utopia, especially vis-à-vis the processes of globalization.
On the other hand, Francis Fukuyama adopts a pessimistic attitude towards the idea of
multiculturalism, pointing to the example of the Balkans. His words are highly symptomatic:
“It’s regrettable that the `welfare state civilisation’ turns against the ‘cowboy capitalism’, and
this has nothing to do with, for example, the ideological protest engendered by communism.
The Americans, the Europeans, or the French – we are all children of the Age of Enlightenment.
As far as America is concerned, regardless of what is said about it, it remains the future of
Europe. Emphases may be different, but there is only one system of values” (Świat..., 2001, 5).
Alain-Gérard Slama questions the idea of the cultural unity of Europe Slama, 2000,
15). He stresses the fact that the process of European unification constantly appeals to culture.
However, the arguments for the European unity have more to do with ensuring peace and
security, rather than with any cultural mission. What this means is that certain common cultural
characteristics do not imply a common culture. Consequently, we are dealing with the following
relationship: the more the European Union tries to unify its norms, the more opposition it
provokes on the part of national cultures, demanding respect for their identity. As a result, we
are observing the rise of nationalism or regional identification. The identity paradigm which can
be defined as a synthesis of individualistic egoism and tribal alienation becomes more
widespread. The solution to this problem should be looked for in a clear-cut separation of
certain cultural components such as language, law, beliefs, or customs from the material factors
characteristic of the economic civilisation. In this way, Europe would be first united
economically and socially, and only later politically and culturally. This would provide
protection against an increase in particularlist demands.
Otherwise, the situation described by French publicist Jean-Marc Ferry may occur:
“the usual transference of the functions of the state to the international level, unable to excite
enthusiasm comparable with the mystique of the unity of a national state, would be perceived as
the renunciation of the prerogatives of the state and would evoke hankering after the lost
sovereignty” (Ferry, 2001, 3). He regards appeals to the common culture in the process of
unification as uninspiring. He emphasises the arbitrariness of the cultural characteristics
supposedly constituting the European identity, which can lead to the defence of the community
regarded as homogeneous. On the other hand, the situation looks completely different when
“the societies of different religious beliefs, hierarchy of values and worldview, are made to
realise the existence of the common culture of public life and common politics” (Ferry, 2001,
3). Jürgen Habermas seems to be right when he says that “the decisions which increasingly
affect social life are made without any political participation of the citizens, that is, without any
discussions on the national forum, where opinions and the will are shaped” (Habermas, 2001,
2). Nevertheless, he remains an optimist, arguing that this deficit of democracy must be
reduced, because the only way left is the way forward, and “the post-national train has left the
station”.
***
84
Summing up the above considerations it should be observed that, in the most general
sense, two opposed positions can be identified: the first considers Europe in terms of the
institutional framework and the second views that part of the world as a political project. The
present paper has focused on the vision of Europe which, as L. Jospin points out “is the work of
the mind, a model of society, a vision of the world”, a vision, we can add, of a strong Europe
which “would will be capable of controlling globalization, protect its balanced model of
economic and social development, and prepared to assume the burden of its own defence”
(Propozycje..., 2001, 8; Gowin, 2003). Consequently, discussions concerning the problems of
democratic and social deficit are very important and the advanced opinions are far from being
unanimous.
References:
ALBERT, M., (1994). Kapitalizm kontra kapitalizm. Kraków: „Znak”.
ALBROW, M., (1990). Introduction. In: M. Albrow, E. King (eds.) Globalization, Knowledge
and Society:Readings from International Sociology. London; Newbury Park: Sage.
ALBROW, M., (1993). Globalization. In: W. Outhwaite, T. Bottomore (eds.) The Blackwell
Dictionary Twentieth-Century Social Thought. Oxford; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
ANIOŁ W., (2002). Paradoksy globalizacji. Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR.
ARMSTRONG, D., (1998). “Globalization and the Social State”. Review of International
Studies 24 (4).
BARETTA S., (1998). „Globalizacja i rozwój”. Społeczeństwo 2.
BARTELSON, J., (2000). “Three Concepts of Globalization”. International Sociology 15 (2).
BAUDRILLARD J., (2001). „Partia skończona, conversation with Jean Baudrillard”. Res
Publika Nowa 1.
BAUMAN, Z., (1998). Globalization. The Human Consequences. New York: Columbia
University Press.
BAUMAN Z., (1997). „Glokalizacja, czyli komu globalizacja, a komu lokalizacja”. Studia
Socjologiczne 3.
BAUMAN, Z., (2000). „Nowy nieporządek świata”. Gazeta Wyborcza 269.
BEDNARSKI, A., (1998). Pułapy i pułapki globalizacji. Toruń: TNOiK Dom Organizatora.
BERNARDI, U., (1998). „Globalizacja i kultury: Przeciw starym i nowym przesądom”.
Społeczeństwo 2.
BURSZTA, W. J., (1998). „Wspólna Europa, globalizacja i medialność”. Sprawy
Narodowościowe 12/13.
DAHRENDORF R., (2000). „Trudne jednoczenie Europy”. Forum 3 December.
Dialog o demokracji (2001). Forum 18 March.
DICKEN, P., (1998). Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy. New York: Guilford
Press.
EVANS, P., (1997). “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of
Globalization”. World Politics 50 (1).
FERRARA G., (2001). „Mniej państwa, a conversation with Giuliano Ferrara”. Wprost 27 May.
FERRY, J.-M., (2001). „Budować z wyobraźnią”. Forum 13 May.
FRIEDMAN, T.S., (2000). The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Understanding Globalization. New
York: Anchor Books, A Division of Random House.
GIDDENS, A., (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press.
GABIŚ T., (2003). Imperium Mundi jako polityczna forma globalizacji. In: (eds) R. Piekarski,
M. Graban. Globalizacja i my. ToŜsamość lokalna wobec trendów globalnych. Kraków:
„Znak”.
GOWIN J., (2003). „Globalizacja”. Znak 4.
GWIAZDA A., (2002). „Globalizacja a erozja władzy państwa narodowego”. Przegląd
Politologiczny 2.
HABERMAS J., (2001). „Republika Federalna Europy”. Forum 13 May.
85
HELD, D., MCGREW, A., GOLDBLATT, D., PERRATON, J., (1999). Global
Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press.
HELVACIOGLU, A., (2000). “Globalization in the Neighborhood. From the Nation-State to
Bilkent Center”. International Sociology 15 (2).
HIRST, P., THOMPSON, G., (1999). Globalization in Question: The International Economy
and the Possibilities of Governance. Oxford: Blackwell.
HUNTINGTON, S.P., (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order.
New York: Simon & Schuster.
KAPUŚCIŃSKI, R., (2001). „Dwadzieścia”. Res Publika Nowa 1.
KARACASULU, N., (2000). The State in the Era of Globalization. In: D. Apollon, O.-B. Fure,
L. Svåsand (eds.) Approaching a New Millennium: Lessons from the Past – Prospects for
the Future. Bergen: CD.
KEMPNY, M., (2000). Globalizacja. In: Encyklopedia socjologii. Warszawa: Oficyna
Naukowa.
KOŚMICKI E., (1999). „Globalizacja – próba diagnozy”. Dziś 12.
KRÓL, M., (2001). „Czy Ŝyjemy w demokracji?”. Res Publika Nowa 3.
KRZYSZTOFEK, K., (2000). „Globalna kultura i globalne zarządzanie. Sprawy
Międzynarodowe 1.
KUŹNIAR, R., (1998). „Globalizacja: Sprostać wyzwaniu”. Ad Meritum 6.
LANGHORNE R., (2001). The Coming of Globalization. Its Evolution and Contemporary
Consequences, New York.
LUTTWAK, E., (2000). Turbokapitalizm. Zwycięzcy i przegrani światowej gospodarki.
Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie.
MARCZEWSKA-RYTKO M., (2002). Globalisation Processes and Direct Democracy.In: M.
Pietraś (ed.). The Faces of Globalisation. Lublin: Maria Curie Sklodowska University
Press.
MARCZEWSKA-RYTKO, M., (2001). Ruch populistyczny wobec integracji europejskiej. In:
M. Marczewska-Rytko (ed.) Polska między Zachodem a Wschodem w dobie integracji
europejskiej. Lublin: Maria Curie Sklodowska University Press.
MARCZEWSKA-RYTKO, M., (2002a). The Problem of Xenophobia in the Context of
Populism and European Enlargement. In: M. Pajnik (ed.) Xenophobia and Post-Socialism.
Ljubljana: Peace Institut.
MARTIN, H.-P., SCHUMANN, H., (1999). Pułapki globalizacji. Atak na demokrację i
dobrobyt. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie.
MARTINI C.M., (2000). „Trudne jednoczenie Europy”. Forum 3 December.
MEYER, J.W., (2000). “Globalization. Sources and Effects on National States and Societies”.
International Sociology 15 (2).
“Mniej państwa, a conversation with Giuliano Ferrara”, (2001). Wprost 27 May.
MOJSIEWICZ, CZ., (1998). Globalne problemy ludzkości, Poznań: „Terra”.
PAPINI, R., PAVAN, A., ZAMAGNI S., (eds.), (1997). Living in the Global Society.
Aldershot: Ashgate.
“Partia skończona, conversation with Jean Baudrillard”, (2001). Res Publika Nowa January.
PIETERSE, J.N., (1994). “Globalization as Hybridisation”. International Sociology 9.
PORĘBSKI, CZ., (1998). „O globalizacji brzydkich słówek kilkanaście”. Znak 2.
“Profesorska recepta na wojnę światową, conversation with S. P. Huntington”, (1996). Forum
50.
ROBERTSON, R., KHONDKER, H.-H., (1998). “Discourses of Globalization: Preliminary
Considerations”, International Sociology 13 (1).
ROBERTSON, R., (1990). Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the Central
Concept. In: M. Featherstone (ed.) Global Culture, Nationalism, Globalization, and
Modernity. London: Sage.
ROBERTSON, R., (1992). Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, London: Sage.
ROBIN, C., (2001). „O dwóch takich, co skręcili w lewo”. Gazeta Wyborcza 134.
86
SEGAL G., (2000). Globalisation and the Third Way . In: D. Apollon, O.-B. Fure, L. Svåsand
(eds.) Approaching a New Millennium: Lessons from the Past – Prospects for the Future.
Bergen: ISSEI, CD.
SLAMA A.-G., (2000). „Europejski kurnik?”. Forum 11 November.
SMOLAR, A., (2000). „Nie odchodzi, nie umiera”. Gazeta Wyborcza 275.
„Świat według Fukuyamy”, (2001). Forum 11 March.
THERBORN G., (2000). “Globalizations. Dimensions, Historical Waves, Regional Effects,
Normative Governance”. International Sociology 15 (2).
WALLERSTEIN I., (2000). “Globalization or the Age of Transition? A Long Term View of
the Trajectory of the World-System”. International Sociology 15 (2).
WATERS M., (2001). Globalization, London: Routledge.
WAŚKIEWICZ, A., (2001). „Krytyka liberalnego rozumu”. Res Publica Nowa 3.
WINIECKI J., (1999). „Stary świat”. Przegląd Polityczny 42.
ZACHARIASZ A.L., (2001). Filozofia i polityka, czyli o potrzebie aksjologii politycznej. In:
(ed.) M. Szulakiewicz. Filozofia i polityka w XX wieku, Kraków: Aureus.
ZUBA, K., (2000). Eurosceptycyzm – pryncypia i postawy. In: W. Piątkowska-Stepaniak, L.
Rubisz (eds.) Europa i my. Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego.
87
I. Studies and Articles
2. Europe and Its Borders throughout History
Toma TANASE (Paris) ◙ Les Balkans et l’Europe dans le discours des Frères
mendiants et de la papauté (XIIIe -XIVe siècle)
Jean NOUZILLE (Strasbourg) ◙ L’évolution de la frontière méridionale de la maison
d’Autriche au XVIIeme siècle
Sorin SIPOS (Oradea) ◙ La frontière orientale de l’Europe dans le récit d’un officier
français au début du XIXe siècle
88
Les Balkans et l’Europe dans le discours des Frères mendiants et de la papauté
(XIIIe -XIVe siècle)
Toma TANASE
Rien n’est moins évident que l’emploi des termes « Balkans » et « Europe ». C’est
même à dessein que je parle ici de Balkans et d’Europe à une époque où ces derniers n’existent
pas tout à fait, et où l’emploi de ces termes pourrait presque passer pour un non-sens. Le terme
d’ « Europa » est hérité de l’antiquité gréco-latine, et désigne l’espace allant de l’Atlantique au
Don (ou au Tanaïs pour employer sa désignation latine), non sans que les auteurs de l’Antiquité
eux-mêmes ne se soient interrogés sur le flou de cette dénomination, qui n’a jamais correspondu
à aucune construction politique et qui est tirée du nom d’une princesse phénicienne et asiatique
(au sens antique du terme, c’est-à-dire proche-orientale). Si l’on peut parfois rencontrer le mot
dans les écrits du Moyen Âge, les catégories politiques pertinentes restent l’imperium, la
christianitas, le regnum, et le problème est de voir comment le sens du mot Europa a évolué
pour désigner aussi l’idée d’une unité, de quelque chose de commun à cet espace. De plus, s’il
est vrai que les médiévistes ont également pris l'habitude de parler des « Balkans », ce
néologisme géographique fabriqué à partir d’un mot turc ne se répand pourtant au sens où nous
l’entendons, pour qualifier l’ensemble d’une région, qu’au XIXe siècle, et témoigne ainsi de
l’empreinte d’une conquête ottomane qui n’a pas encore eu lieu à l’époque à laquelle nous nous
intéressons1. Il est vrai que nous ne disposons pas d’un autre terme pour désigner la région dans
son ensemble (tout au moins en français, où le décalque de l’allemand qui amène à l’expression
de « péninsule du sud-est européen » n’a pas vraiment pris et reste relativement flou).
Cependant, l’utilisation de ce nom qui à l’origine désignait une montagne pour qualifier
l’ensemble de la région n’est pas neutre, même une fois que l’on y a retranché l’empreinte
ottomane. Il s’explique également par une démarche que l’on peut observer dans plusieurs
ouvrages parlant des Balkans au Moyen Âge, qui s’ouvrent sur une étude du cadre
géographique (les Balkans, un paysage montagneux mais splendide), utilisée pour donner une
unité à la région et découper un objet d’étude. Parfois l’analyse va plus loin, et explique par le
relief montagneux et les difficultés de communications le caractère rural de la population et sa
diversité, sources de fragmentation et de faiblesse politique2 : ainsi, dès le Moyen Âge, les
Balkans, qui n’existent pas, sont pourtant bien balkaniques.
Si toutefois, partant du sens contemporain de ce terme, nous choisissons d’étudier la
péninsule du sud-est européen, de la plaine danubienne au Péloponnèse, et de l’Adriatique à la
mer Égée, au XIIe siècle nous sommes pour l’essentiel dans l’empire byzantin. Il n’en a pas
toujours été ainsi : les IXe et Xe siècles ont vu se dérouler une véritable lutte d’influence entre
Byzantins, Francs et papauté pour contrôler les Balkans et l’espace russe. Il est vrai que dans
l’entourage de Charlemagne on parlait déjà d’Europe, sans doute depuis la bataille de Poitiers
(rappelons que le terme est employé par un chrétien de la péninsule ibérique sous domination
musulmane pour qualifier les troupes de Charles Martel), et que l’on y identifiait l’empire
carolingien. Charlemagne avait conquis et converti la Saxe, détruit les Avars de la plaine
pannonienne; ses successeurs dans l’aire germanique ont essayé d’étendre l’Église franque (et
1
Il convient évidement de donner toute sa place ici à l’ouvrage de Maria TODOROVA, Imagining the
Balkans, Oxford University Press, 1997, pour sa réflexion sur la signification véhiculée par le concept et
l'image des « Balkans ». Sur l'analyse de l'histoire du terme voir plus particulièrement le premier chapitre.
Par ailleurs le texte ici proposé est une version allongée et remaniée d’une intervention faite au cours
d’une journée d’études de l’école doctorale de l’université de Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne consacrée aux
Balkans, et publiée dans la revue Hypothèses, 2005, publications de la Sorbonne.
2
C’est ainsi que commencent les ouvrages de John FINE, 1991 et de Dimitri OBOLENSKY, 2000. Mark
WITTHOW, 1996, fait démarrer son étude par une description de géographie physique de l'empire byzantin,
qui permet d'individualiser plusieurs ensembles : Balkans (montagneux), steppe, Anatolie.
89
son système politique) aux peuples slaves, ce qui fut réussi en Moravie (en chassant les
disciples des saints Cyrille et Méthode). Mais, outre le fait que l’empire carolingien ne dominait
vraiment qu’une partie réduite de l’Europe, il s’est rapidement écroulé de l’intérieur, donnant
naissance à la fragmentation extrême des pouvoirs que l’on qualifie de féodale. Cela ne signifie
en aucun cas que le projet carolingien n’ait pas laissé d’héritage ni que son idéal ait été oublié.
Lorsque vers l’an mil l’empire germanique revient sur le devant de la scène et réussit à imposer
une nouvelle alliance avec la papauté, en la personne du pape Sylvestre II, proche d’Othon III,
les royaumes hongrois et polonais se soumettent à l’obédience romaine. Si l’ancrage de ces
pays dans la latinité est un héritage de long terme, le projet d’unité se défait une nouvelle fois et
tandis que l’Occident latin du XIe siècle semble plus fragmenté politiquement que jamais (sans
que l’on puisse l’expliquer par sa géographie physique ou par la diversité intrinsèque de ses
populations), la papauté affirme au moment de la réforme grégorienne sa vocation à diriger
spirituellement et même politiquement l’Occident latin, donc à en faire l’unité au nom de la
christianitas dont elle se veut la tête, alors que l’opposition entre christianisme latin et
christianisme grec byzantin prend un nouveau tour avec le schisme de 1054. Si le terme de
christianitas est préféré, c’est que revendiquer un pouvoir sur la seule Europe au nom de la
chrétienté serait une limitation, et ce d’autant plus que lorsque le pape Urbain II, tout au moins
d’après le discours que lui prête Guillaume de Malmesbury, appelle à la croisade au concile de
Clermont de 1095, il le fait en évoquant la situation difficile d’une chrétienté réduite à une
partie seulement de l’Europe, alors qu’elle possède aussi en héritage et l’Asie et l’Afrique3. On
le voit, l’idée d’Europe et de chrétienté s’associent, mais sans qu’il soit encore possible d’aller
jusqu’au bout de la démarche et de considérer l’Europa comme un ensemble commun au
service de la tête de la christianitas, à savoir la papauté. C’est d’autant plus difficile que,
parallèlement à ces évènements, l’empire byzantin réussit lors de son redressement des Xe et
XIe siècles à constituer ce que Dimitri Obolensky a qualifié de « Commonwealth byzantin » :
non seulement la majeure part des Balkans, gagnée à l’orthodoxie grecque depuis la conversion
bulgare en 864/865, est directement intégrée à l’empire au début du XIe siècle, mais de plus la
politique de Manuel Comnène permet au cours de la seconde moitié du XIIe siècle au basileus
d’étendre son influence depuis le royaume hongrois jusqu’à la Russie. La chrétienté franque ou
latine n’a pas pu gagner l’ensemble du continent, et une large partie de l’Europa appartient à un
empire à cheval sur deux continents, ouvert sur l’Asie, et qui se réclame d’une chrétienté que
l’on ne peut ni ignorer ni marginaliser, alors qu’elle ne reconnaît pas la construction politique
qui a été faite autour de la papauté. A cet égard la conversion du royaume de Rus en 989 avait
été un tournant : l’entré de ce royaume dans l’aire d’influence du christianisme byzantin, malgré
des missions germaniques qui ont peut-être été à l’origine de cette conversion, mit un point final
à l’extension de la chrétienté franque vers l’Est, au moment où l’isthme russe de la mer Baltique
à la mer Noire était devenu une interface importante entre le monde musulman (comme en
témoigne le voyage d’ibn Fadlan), l’empire byzantin et l’Occident (à travers les Vikings et la
domination Varègue).
L’espace pontique se ferme ainsi aux chrétiens latins, et l’empire byzantin devient pour
eux un verrou incontournable dans leur route vers l'Asie des steppes comme vers le ProcheOrient. C’est bien le problème des croisés qui empruntent la voie continentale pour rejoindre
Jérusalem, et dont les soucis commencent généralement à Singidunum (Belgrade), une fois
entrés dans l’empire byzantin. La résistance de l’empire byzantin est aussi le principal obstacle
auquel se heurtent les Normands lorsqu’ils tentent de constituer un ensemble au centre de la
Méditerranée à partir du sud de l’Italie et de la Sicile, et de pénétrer dans la péninsule
3
Le texte est rapporté et analysé dans cette perspective par Denys HAY, 1968, p. 31 : Tertium mundi clima
restat Europa, cujus quantulam partem inhabitamus Christiani ? Nam omnem illam barbariem quae in
remotis insulis glacialem frequentat oceanum, quia more belluino victicat, Chritianam quis dixerit ? Hanc
igitur nostri mundi portiunculam Turci et Saraceni bello premunt ; jamque a trecentis annis Hispania et
Balearibus insulis subjugatis, quod reliquum est spe devorant homines inertissimi, et qui, cominus
pugnandi fiduciam non habentes, fugax bellum diligunt. Voir aussi Agostino PARAVICINI BAGGLIANI,
1997, p. 228.
90
balkanique (ils sont chassés de l’Épire et de Durazzo en 1085). Les Latins ne sont toutefois pas
complètement absents de la région : Venise et le royaume de Hongrie se disputent la Croatie,
une hiérarchie latine se maintient sur la côte adriatique (notamment avec l’archevêché de
Dubrovnik ou la création de celui d'Antivari à la fin du XIe siècle4). Mais c’est la décomposition
de l’ensemble byzantin à partir des années 1180 qui permet aux Latins de revenir vraiment sur
le devant de la scène dans la région. Une crise de succession et de pouvoir à Constantinople,
comme l’empire byzantin en a connu plusieurs, commencée avec la régence de Marie
d’Antioche, épouse de Manuel Comnène, à la mort de ce dernier, suivie d’une insurrection
violente et du massacre des Latins de Constantinople en 1182 ainsi que de mouvements de
rébellion en province, entraîne la réapparition d’un royaume bulgare indépendant,
l’émancipation de la Serbie, et pour finir la prise de Constantinople en 1204 par des croisés que
guide par un prétendant au trône impérial (Alexis IV), non sans avoir fait un détour par Zara
pour permettre à Venise de renforcer sa présence sur la côte adriatique. La chute de
Constantinople transforme cette crise en un effondrement définitif du pouvoir byzantin (en tout
cas pour cette large zone d’influence est-européenne qui fut la sienne au XIIe siècle), et fait
apparaître une carte politique complexe, et une région divisée entre Francs, Vénitiens, Grecs,
Bulgares, Serbes, avec un royaume de Hongrie en arrière-plan qui veut également tirer profit de
la situation pour s’étendre. La chute de l’empire byzantin laisse effectivement la place à une
large fragmentation des peuples et à une faiblesse structurelle des constructions politiques, et
c’est dans cet espace que pénètrent les Frères mendiants issus des deux grands ordres religieux
apparus dans l’Occident latin du XIIIe siècle, les dominicains et les franciscains, dont l’objectif
est de convertir et gagner les populations de la région au christianisme latin et à la papauté.
La présence mendiante dans les Balkans a été moins étudiée que dans d’autres régions.
Il faut dire que le sujet souffre de tomber à la ligne de partage entre plusieurs questions le plus
souvent traitées de manière séparée : il ne fait partie que marginalement de la question des
négociations d’union avec l’Église byzantine, de celle de l’expansion latine à l’Est de l’Europe,
ou de celle des croisades et de la présence de l'Église latine en Orient. Le terme de mission luimême ne va pas sans poser de problèmes, ne serait-ce que parce que, en théorie, ce terme ne
peut être employé pour des régions déjà christianisées, qui disposent de leur Église, et avec
lesquelles le pape mène à l’occasion des négociations d’union. Cependant, la mission ne se
réduit pas à l’évangélisation, mais requiert également la création de structures ecclésiales. En ce
sens le XIIIe siècle est un moment critique, qui voit la relance d'un idéal missionnaire défini
comme un effort permanent pour intégrer de nouveaux territoires à la chrétienté par la création
de structures relevant de l’Église romaine. Cette définition n’est pas neutre : elle repose sur une
assimilation (évangélisation = reconnaître l'Église romaine) qui fait virtuellement de tout ce qui
n'est pas romain terre de mission. Il faut la relier à l’affirmation exacerbée par la papauté de son
rôle à la tête de la chrétienté unie. Nous sommes en effet à l’heure de l’affirmation la plus
élaborée de la théocratie pontificale, qui repose sur la définition du concept de christianitas :
l’ensemble des croyants comme des pouvoirs laïques font partie d’une même corps chrétien,
avec l’Église romaine à sa tête5. Depuis la réforme grégorienne, le christianisme doit aussi
guider les affaires du monde, rôle qui revient à celui qui seul est désigné pour succéder au
Christ, le pape (qui n’est plus seulement désigné comme vicaire de saint Pierre, mais comme
vicaire du Christ). Qui plus est, il a été promis par le Christ à cette chrétienté qu’elle s’étendrait
au monde entier. Les ordres des Frères mendiants, utilisés par la papauté comme ses principaux
agents de centralisation et de réforme en Occident, se mettent aussi au service de la mission,
définie juridiquement et canoniquement par la bulle Cum hora undecima en 12356, destinée à
des dominicains partis pour le Proche-Orient. C’est en fait une véritable politique universelle
qui est proclamée notamment au concile de Lyon en 1245, à l'occasion duquel sont lancées des
4
Alain DUCELLIER, 1983 p. 3-4
Sur le concept de chrisianitas, et son extension virtuelle au monde entier, voir Agostino PARAVICINI
BAGGLIANI, 1997, et en particulier le chapitre 10, Il Papato, la cristianità e il concetto di Europa, p. 225247.
6
Pontifica commissio ad redigendum juris canonici orientalis (CICO), III, n° 210, p. 286, 15 février 1235.
5
91
missions jusqu’à la cour mongole au coeur de l’Asie et vers le Proche-Orient. Tandis que la
bulle Cum simus super définit la prééminence de la papauté sur les autres Églises chrétiennes, la
bulle Cum hora undecima est renouvelée pour l’ensemble des missionnaires en partance, avec
cette fois-ci une liste de peuples dans laquelle sont spécifiquement nommés les Grecs, les
Bulgares ou les Ruthènes, au côté des chrétiens orientaux, des Sarrasins et des païens7. A vrai
dire, ces bulles se veulent compréhensives de l’ensemble des cas, puisqu’elle sont valables pour
tous les peuples rencontrés, y compris ceux qui ne sont pas explicitement mentionnés (de
quelque nation ou de quelques infidèles qu’il s’agisse : aliarum infidelium nationum orientis
seu quarumcunque aliarum partium). Il ne faudra pas attendre longtemps pour que le terme
même de schismatique (c'est-à-dire les chrétiens de rite byzantin) soit ajouté à la liste. Croisade
(parfois prêchée par les Frères mendiants contre des souverains occidentaux), mission,
négociations d’union peuvent nous sembler des outils différents, mais ils sont en réalité
combinés au service de l’extension de la christianitas. Un personnage comme le célèbre Jean de
Plancarpin en est l’illustration. Il est connu pour son voyage chez les Mongols et le récit qu’il
en a fait, qui se révèle d’ailleurs à la lecture un formidable travail de renseignement (mœurs,
coutumes, et surtout équipement, tactiques de combat, et c’est bien pour faire part de son savoir
que Plancarpin à son retour en Occident circule à travers les différentes cours royales). Mais à
bien lire ce récit et la correspondance pontificale qui suit le retour du Frère mineur, on constate
vite qu’une part essentielle de son voyage consistait à négocier l’union des Églises avec les
souverains russes : il porte la bulle Cum simus super au souverain de Halicz, Daniel, et, selon
une lettre d’Innocent IV adressé à Alexandre Nevski, Placarpin aurait converti le père de ce
dernier au camp mongol, avant son empoisonnement par le chef mongol. Un homme comme
Plancarpin est en fait déjà un professionnel de la mission, qui commence sa carrière en étant le
maître d’œuvre de l’implantation franciscaine en Allemagne et en Europe orientale, et qui la
finit dans les Balkans, puisqu'on le retrouve à Antivari, où son expérience fait de lui l’homme
idéal pour ce point avancé de la hiérarchie religieuse latine dans les Balkans.
Les terres « schismatiques » sont donc bien des terres de mission, et dès leur apparition
les Mendiants s'installent aux marges de la chrétienté occidentale : dans Constantinople sous
domination latine (où les franciscains sont présents dès 1220, et les dominicains en 12308), dans
le royaume de Hongrie, ce qui veut aussi dire la Croatie (dès 1221 pour les dominicains et 1229
pour les franciscains9). A chaque fois les Mendiants sont très proches du pouvoir politique (les
dominicains sont au cœur de la monarchie hongroise, l'empereur de Constantinople Jean de
Brienne se fait franciscain sur son lit de mort). Les Frères mendiants s'installent en Grèce (on
retrouve par exemple les Frères prêcheurs à Thèbes dans les années 1230), en Albanie, où des
dominicains sont signalés à Durazzo dès 1230, et les franciscains point trop longtemps après10.
Ce sont dès lors eux qui récupèrent tout naturellement le problème des relations entres les
Églises de rite byzantin des Balkans et la papauté. En 1204, le schisme semblait sur le point
d’être résorbé. L’empire byzantin était tombé, et dans les mois qui suivirent le roi de Bulgarie
Kalojan reconnaissait la primauté romaine, tandis que la pression montait sur les princes serbes.
Mais la situation avait bien changé depuis le IXe siècle, quand le roi bulgare pouvait faire appel
à Rome pour défendre l’autonomie de l’Église bulgare et garder une marge de manœuvre face
aux volontés hégémoniques byzantines. La simple reconnaissance de la primauté romaine sur le
plan théorique ne suffisait plus, car ce qui était demandé c’était l'intégration dans cette
christianitas issue de la réforme grégorienne. L’Église bulgare ne pouvait rester inchangée,
mais devait adopter dogme et rite romains, se soumettre hiérarchiquement. Les souverains
bulgares devaient admettre de discuter des affaires politiques avec les souverains pontifes,
raison pour laquelle ils s’empressèrent d’ailleurs d’oublier leurs promesses. La situation n’était
pas plus simple en Serbie, où Etienne Ier Nemanjić, après avoir vaincu son frère Vukan
7
CICO IV, n° 19, p. 36, 21 mars 1245.
Girolamo GOLUBOVICH, I,1906, n°29 p. 297, et n°35, p. 128-9. Sur les débuts des dominicains à
Constantinople et en Grèce, Claudine DELACROIX-BESNIER, 1997, p. 5
9
Étude faite dans Erik FÜGEDI, 1970.
10
Alain DUCELLIER, 1981, p. 208-9
8
92
favorable aux Latins et soutenu par le roi de Hongrie, tentait lui-même un rapprochement avec
Honorius III pour consolider sa position, au point de se faire couronner en 1217 par un légat
pontifical (ce qui en droit canonique romain ne pouvait que signifier la reconnaissance de la
suprématie romaine). Mais là encore, il n'en sortit rien du point de vue pontifical, car en 1219 le
même Etienne Ier obtenait un archevêché orthodoxe autocéphale de la part du patriarche de
Constantinople pour son propre frère, le fondateur de l'orthodoxie serbe, saint Sava11 .
A la suite de ces échecs et tergiversations, la situation s'était dégradée au point que
Grégoire IX tenta une autre méthode et chercha à mobiliser en 1238 le royaume de Hongrie
dans une croisade contre la Bulgarie12, sans succès pour cette fois-ci : le royaume de Hongrie
était déjà engagé à ce moment là contre les hérétiques de Bosnie, toujours à la demande de
Grégoire IX d'ailleurs. Les troupes hongroises étaient de surcroît accompagnées par des
Prêcheurs, qui érigèrent à l'occasion une cathédrale à Vrhbosna (Sarajevo)13. En 1245, au
moment du concile de Lyon, c’est un franciscain qui est chargé d’aller porter au roi bulgare
Kaloman la bulle Cum simus super qui le rappelle à ses devoirs d'union14, preuve que les Frères
mendiants avaient achevé de récupérer la question des Balkans, et qu'elle était définitivement
versée au dossier des missions. Rappelons également que si les différents papes n'ont jamais
renoncé à protéger l'empire latin de Constantinople, cela n'a pas empêché Grégoire IX
d'envoyer une mission franciscaine à la cour impériale grecque en exil à Nicée pour négocier
l'union avec le patriarche Germain15, et Innocent IV de louer les efforts du roi de Hongrie Béla
IV auprès de son beau-frère, l'empereur grec Vatace16. Nous comprenons à travers ce très rapide
balayage que nous avons à faire à une politique globale, et de vaste ampleur, puisque les
dominicains de Hongrie participent également à la création de l’évêché des Comans, ouvert sur
la plaine russe jusqu’à la Volga. Nous pouvons voir cependant une mission de dominicains
partie pour les terres comanes s’attarder d’abord pour prêcher dans le Banat afin de convertir
ses habitants « schismatiques et hérétiques »17 avant d'entrer en terre comane à proprement
parler. Au même moment, à l'occasion de la campagne hongroise en Bosnie de 1238, la
hiérarchie religieuse latine de cette région est rattachée à l'évêché des Comans18, ce qui lie
clairement l'action mendiante dans les Balkans à celle entreprise auprès des peuples de la
steppe. Ainsi, plus encore que les Balkans, c’est virtuellement l’accès à la mer Noire et à l’Asie
centrale qui s’est ouvert aux Latins en 1204. L’arrivée des Mongols se révèle à cet égard une
heureuse coïncidence, puisque l’apparition de cet empire permet aux voyageurs latins de
circuler à travers toute l’Asie et jusqu’en Chine, malgré les divisions politiques qui
interviennent dès 1260 et la constitution de la Horde d’Or au nord de la mer Noire.
Pourtant, la Horde d'Or fait également peser une réelle menace sur les frontières de
l'Occident latin. La situation se dégrade encore plus lorsque Constantinople est reprise par
l'empereur byzantin Michel VIII en 1261, ce qui remet en cause les positions acquises par les
Frères mendiants. Ce dernier, après quelques tâtonnements, construit une politique d’alliance
avec l’homme fort de la Horde d’Or, le chef Nogaï qui s'est constitué une principauté aux
bouches du Danube et a réussi à faire passer par étapes la Bulgarie sous sa tutelle19. Michel VIII
accepte certes de célébrer l’union religieuse avec les Latins au deuxième concile de Lyon, en
1274, mais ce n'est que pour détourner les projets de croisade, sans que l’union n’entre dans les
11
John FINE, 1994, p. 108 et 116-117 ou Francis DVORNIK, 1970, p. 406-410
CICO, III, p. 327, n° 248b, 7 juin 1238.
13
John FINE, 1994, p. 144.
14
CICO, IV, n° 20, p. 43, 21 mars 1245.
15
Girolamo GOLUBOVICH, I, 1906, n° 45, p. 163-169.
16
La lettre est en fait adressée à la reine de Hongrie, dont l'action a été louée auprès d'Innocent IV par le
ministre de la province franciscaine de Hongrie. CICO, IV, n° 34, p. 77-78, 30 janvier 1247.
17
Şerban TURCUŞ, 2001, p. 298, d'après la Relatio Sviperti de missionibus provinciae Hungariae, dans
Simon Tugwell, Notes on the Life of St Dominic, Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum, LXVIII, p. 86-89
18
CICO, III, n° 238, p. 316, 26 avril 1238 episcopo Cumanorum facultas tribuitur episcopum terrae
Bosnae constituendi et consecrandi
19
Virgil CIOCÎLTAN, 1998, en particulier p. 232-233, et John FINE, 1994, p. 224-228.
12
93
faits. Si en terre byzantine ou mongole les Latins peuvent circuler, installer des comptoirs ou
des couvents, l'association de ces deux puissances est un sérieux obstacle pour faire entrer les
souverains balkaniques dans la christianitas : ensemble elles peuvent imposer leur volonté aux
potentats locaux. Si nous avons apparemment moins de traces de l’activité des Frères mendiants
dans la péninsule balkanique au cours de la seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle, il est cependant
discutable de voir dans cette période une véritable coupure dans leur action, alors que c'est à ce
moment-là qu'ils s'installent dans la Horde d'Or (la custodie de Gazarie est déjà en parfait état
de fonctionnement en 1287). Nous sommes gênés ici, comme ailleurs, par l’absence de sources
et le fait que nous sachions très peu des fondations de couvents avant le XIVe siècle. Mais nous
constatons tout de même une activité soutenue dans le royaume de Serbie, qui est le pôle de
résistance aux Tatares de Nogaï et aux Byzantins. Des missions y sont envoyées en 1288 et
1291 par le pape Nicolas IV, qui n’est autre que Jérôme d’Ascoli, le franciscain qui avait
négocié l’union des Églises en 1274. Elles disposent du soutien de la reine mère, une latine, qui
tente également de servir d'intermédiaire avec le souverain de Bulgarie, et qui soutient depuis
plusieurs années déjà une présence franciscaine à sa cour. La même année des Frères mineurs
sont envoyés en Bosnie depuis la Sclavonie pour servir d'inquisiteurs. Nous sommes ici en
présence d'une autre manière d'utiliser les jeux politiques avec les puissances laïques: le
mariage d’un prince orthodoxe avec une princesse latine permet de créer une implantation
missionnaire, dont le noyau est à la cour royale, et de faire pression sur le souverain lui-même,
son entourage et son Église pour négocier l'union20. Cependant, si l’activité mendiante dans la
région des Balkans connaît un ralentissement au cours de cette période, ce n’est peut-être pas
tant à cause de la reprise de Constantinople par Michel VIII que parce que au cours de la
seconde moitié du XIVe siècle la ligne de front s'est largement déplacée en Hongrie, ce qui est
lié au problème des Mongols.
Il est vrai que la papauté avait toujours regardé avec méfiance le royaume de Hongrie à
cause de son caractère culturellement mélangé21, ce à quoi s’ajoutait la politique souvent trop
indépendante du roi Béla IV (allant jusqu'à l'alliance avec Frédéric II). Béla n’en avait du coup
que plus joué la carte de protecteur des Frères mendiants et de soutien à l'extension de la
chrétienté, pour montrer aux souverains pontifes son engagement et consolider sa situation.
Cependant à partir de 1272 et du règne de Ladislas IV, la papauté ne voyait plus dans la
Hongrie que le cheval de Troie des peuples de la steppe, à cause de l'importance qu'y avaient
pris les Comans, proches du roi Ladislas (lui-même coman par sa mère), et des liens possibles
entre ce roi et le chef tatare Nogaï. En témoignent les termes qu'emploie l'évêque Bruno
d'Olomuc dans le rapport qu'il adresse à Grégoire X pour le concile de Lyon de 1274, qui se
passent de commentaire : la Hongrie est presque sortie de la chrétienté, preuve en est que la
famille royale est en partie comane et alliée par le sang aux schismatiques russes. De plus,
Bruno d’Olomuc fait un raisonnement géopolitique, en affirmant que la question hongroise doit
passer avant la question de la croisade, parce que la véritable frontière qu’il faut défendre pour
la chrétienté sous peine d’être envahie et menacée d’annihilation, c’est la frontière du Danube22.
20
CICO, V, n°76 et 77, p. 137-140 (23 juillet et 8 août 1288), et n° 96 à 101, p. 167-174, (13 mars, 15
mars, 23 mars 28 mars 1291). Pour les instructions aux inquisiteurs, n°105, p. 176-179.
21
Nora BEREND, 2001, p. 152-3.
22
Monumenta Germaniae Historiae Leges, IV, 3, 1906, p. 590-1 : Haec vero sunt pericula a regno
Ungarie christianitati imminentia: primum quod in ipso regno Cumani manutenentur, qui non solum
aliegenis, sed eciam ipsius regni incolis atrociter infesti, et modo apud alios minus solito preliandi,
infantibus et senibus non parcentes, iuventes et iuvenculas captivatos in sui ritus malicie deducunt
consuetudinem, ita quod potentiam suam taliter iam multiplicaverunt per eosdem, quod ipsi Ungarie
certum ex hoc imminet periculum et iactura et terris eciam convicionis. Item in eodem regno manifeste
heretici et scismatici confoventur terrarum profugi aliarum. Ecce ipsa regina Ungarie est Cumana,
proximi parentes eis gentiles sunt et fuerunt. Due filie regis Ruthenis, qui sunt scismatici, desponsate
fuerunt. Soror iuvenis huius regis Vathario est tradita ecclesie inimico. Rutheni sunt scismatici et
Tartarorum nichilominus servitores.(…) Ut ergo de principibus Teutonie taceamus, qui adeo inter se sunt
divisi, ut superiorem habere non intendant, quod desolationem et destructionem sue terre unus ab altero
expectare videtur(…). Certe par has terras fuit introitus Tartarorum et iterum expectatur. Nisi ergo vestra
94
Bien que Bruno d’Olomuc veuille en fait défendre l’Église impériale (et attaque dans la suite du
texte les Frères mendiants), cette analyse a aussi été celle de la politique pontificale, qui l’a
mise en pratique avec une véritable continuité. Grégoire X envoie en 1278 son légat Philippe de
Fermo remettre de l’ordre dans le royaume hongrois, puis Honorius IV et surtout Nicolas IV
reprennent une politique de lutte contre Ladislas IV23. Si une lettre missionnaire écrite de
Crimée en 1287 (à vrai dire la première que l’on possède24) nous montre les mesures
symboliques que Nogaï prend en faveur des franciscains (qui vont jusqu’au baptême d’une de
ses épouses), ce n’est peut-être pas un hasard, mais le témoignage d'un geste politique de Nogaï
envers les agents de la papauté, lesquels voient par là même s’ouvrir de nouvelles perspectives
de développement dans la Horde d'Or, et tiennent à en informer la cour pontificale, pour qu’elle
ne considère plus Nogaï seulement comme un ennemi à cause de son influence dans l’espace
est-européen. Notons toutefois que cette démarche de lobbying ne servit à rien, puisque les
différents papes qui se sont succédés, malgré leurs différences, n’eurent de cesse d’éliminer
Ladislas, et de soutenir l’arrivée sur le trône hongrois des Angevins de Naples. A l’inverse, les
franciscains de la Horde d’Or ne furent d’aucune utilité à leur protecteur, Nogaï, qui après avoir
perdu la partie en Hongrie finit par être lui-même éliminé, et les avantages acquis par les Frères
mineurs en Gazarie restèrent lettre morte. Le choix de la papauté se comprend : une occasion a
peut-être été perdue dans la Horde d’Or, mais en revanche la consolidation du pôle hongrois a
permis de rouvrir les Balkans au XIVe siècle. La papauté a cherché à définir un pré carré de la
chrétienté, une frontière infranchissable (dans un sens tout au moins : de l’extérieur vers
l’intérieur), face aux menaces venues de l'extérieur, et ce pré carré finit par s’identifier avec
l’Europe. En fait, les différents souverains pontifes ont pris au pied de la lettre le discours
adressé par Béla IV au pape Innocent IV : celui-ci rappelait en 1254 que la Hongrie était en
première ligne pour défendre face aux Mongols une chrétienté identifiée à l’Europe toute
entière ("totam Europam")25. Ils ont également hérité des constatations de Bruno d'Olomuc, qui
attirait l'attention sur l'importance de la frontière orientale de la chrétienté, et recommandait de
commencer par démêler la situation incertaine du royaume de Hongrie. Mais ils en ont tiré des
conséquences qui n’étaient évidement pas celles souhaitées par le souverain hongrois ou le
prélat d’Europe centrale. Toute influence mongole était à proscrire, et il fallait se livrer à un
travail en profondeur de conversion des Comans, qui passait aussi par un changement de mode
de vie et par la sédentarisation, parce que leur culture turque et nomade pouvait en faire des
agents d’influence des pouvoirs politiques de la steppe. Grâce à cette action, la monarchie
hongroise consolidée a même pu devenir le fer de lance de l'avancée latine dans les Balkans au
XIVe siècle, avancée qui relève de moins en moins de la négociation et de plus en plus de la
conquête directe par des monarchies qui se veulent au service de la papauté. Les limites de cette
Europe ont en effet vocation à se déplacer et à s’étendre au nom d’un christianisme à vocation
universelle, qui doit gagner les royaumes et les populations. Dès lors, une fois que la monarchie
hongroise se renforce au début du XIVe siècle, les Balkans se retrouvent de nouveau dans une
situation d'exclusion/ inclusion face à la chrétienté latine, à la marge, mais appelés à s'intégrer,
et ce d’autant plus qu’ils font partie de cet espace désigné par le terme d’ « Europa » et identifié
au christianisme latin.
Les Balkans deviennent en fait un objet de lutte entre réseaux concurrents. C’est ainsi
qu’une source exceptionnelle pour l’histoire de la région, la description de l’Europe orientale
paterna providentia cavere voluerit periculis iam vicinis, sic studens in acquisitione Terre Sancte, quod
non relinquat in periculo terras istas, volentes vitare Karibdim, in Ciliam utique incidemus.
23
Registres et Lettres des Papes du XIIIe siècle, 1886-1893, 8 août 1288, n° 201, p. 32. La lettre ne fait que
reprendre les termes d'Honorius IV, Registres et Lettres des Papes du XIIIe siècle, 1888, n° 761, p. 539, 12
mars 1287: Tartarorum, Sarracenorum, Neugeriorum et paganorum cum quibus se confederaverat,
dimissis erroribus, ad ecclesiam et mores christianos revertur lisons-nous chez Honorius IV.
24
Lettre du custode de Gazarie, dans Girolamo GOLUBOVICH, II, 1913, n° 148, p. 444-445.
25
Lettre de Béla à Innocent IV, CICO, IV, n° 112, p. 191, 11 novembre 1254. Sur Béla et Bruno
d’Olmutz voir aussi Jacques LE GOFF, 2003, p. 197.
95
26
rédigée par un Frère mendiant anonyme (peut-être dominicain) au plus tard au début de
l'année 1308, avoue très clairement le but de sa démarche : il s’agit d’un état des lieux pour
encourager et soutenir par ses conseils la croisade contre Constantinople préparée par Charles
de Valois, le frère de Philippe le Bel, et ce faisant aider à la réduction du schisme. Le tableau
très détaillé de la situation politique des Balkans, qui fait apparaître les différents peuples,
slaves, albanais, valaques, cherche à montrer qu'une alliance de Charles de Valois avec son
parent angevin de Hongrie, Charles-Robert, viendrait facilement à bout de l'empire byzantin, et
leur permettrait de se partager les différents royaumes "schismatiques" des Balkans, de la
Bulgarie aux Ruthènes, qui seraient du coup ramenés à l'union avec Rome27. Il convient de
souligner qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une description des Balkans pour les Balkans, mais d’un
mémoire dans lequel notre Frère mendiant, qui a sans doute fait œuvre de mission dans la
région est qui est manifestement informé par d’autres Frères de la situation en Hongrie, se fait
l’écho des Angevins de Hongrie, qui outre Constantinople, visent aussi la Horde d'Or (dont la
domination sur les princes ruthènes est rappelée), et cherchent à remodeler l'ensemble de la
région. La monarchie angevine a toutefois un rival dans la région : Venise. C'est sur cette toile
de fond que peut se comprendre la vision ecclésiale et géopolitique d’un personnage de premier
plan comme Jérôme de Catalogne, premier évêque franciscain de Caffa. Ce missionnaire, que
l'on voit d'abord à l'œuvre en Grèce de 1300 à 1310, qui prêche à Constantinople devant
l'empereur byzantin Andronic II, réussit grâce à son expérience à convaincre le pape Jean XXII
de créer un véritable évêché pontique, du Danube à la Volga. Mais Jérôme est aussi
l'intermédiaire entre Andronic II et Marino Sanudo, le propagandiste vénitien d’une croisade
qui s’allierait avec l’empire byzantin au lieu de l’attaquer (inutile de préciser que l’époque est
au réchauffement des relations entre Venise et Constantinople). Ainsi, un franciscain originaire
de Catalogne (rappelons que le royaume d'Aragon est le grand ennemi des Angevins), qui voit
le problème depuis la Grèce et la mer Noire au lieu de le voir depuis la Hongrie et sa mouvance
dans les Balkans milite pour une politique inverse de celle prêchée par notre Frère mendiant
pro-angevin28. En fait, les Frères mendiants ne peuvent tout simplement pas éviter d’être
impliqués dans des conflits politiques où les puissances laïques, dans les faits largement
indépendantes de la papauté, se doivent néanmoins de se justifier par l’idée de défense de la
chrétienté voulue par la papauté. Il ne faut pas imaginer que tous au sein d'un ordre partagent
une position commune; bien au contraire, nous pouvons entrevoir de véritables divergences,
liées aux lieux d'implantations. Au cours du XIVe siècle se dégage assez clairement un réseau
de franciscains liés à Constantinople, qui réussit à acquérir une position remarquable à la faveur
du parti pro-latin de la régente Anne de Savoie et de son fils Jean V, au point de servir de
médiateur au cours de la guerre civile qui éclate en 134129. Mais les franciscains doivent aussi
beaucoup au royaume de Hongrie, qui cherche à faire passer une bonne partie des Balkans sous
sa domination directe au cours de la première moitié du XIVe siècle, et sans le soutien duquel la
vicairie franciscaine de Bosnie ne pourrait exister. Il est non moins vrai que dans la seconde
26
Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis, ed. Olgierd GΌRKA, 1916. Pour l'apologie d'une expédition
contre Constantinople, voir p. 24 et 42.
27
Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis, ed. Olgierd GΌRKA, 1916. p. 42: Ex hiis satis aduerii potest,
quod bulgaria et ruthenia et rassia sunt inter greciam et ungariam et ideo ubi dominus karulus haberet
grecorum imperium, confederatione facta cum rege ungarie, idem dominus Karolus ex una parte et rex
Ungarie Karolus ex altera parte de facili haberent et subiugarent omnes illas scismaticas et barbaras
nationes, que tam opulenta et delicata regna, sicut iniusti possesores occupant. Et posito quod idem
dominus karolus dictum imperium grecorum non haberet totum, ipse ex una parte et dictus rex ungarie ex
altera parte preoccuparent imperium prefatum et omnes nationes dictas.
28
Pour un rappel des dates et faits de la vie de Jérôme de Catalogne, voir Girolamo GOLUBOVICH, III,
1921, et Jean RICHARD, 1998, p.157-160.
29
Je fais ici référence aux ambassades menées par Henri de Savoie auprès de Jean Paléologue en 1345.
Voir Girolamo GOLUBOVICH, III, 1921, n° 92, p. 291-303 pour l'ensemble de la carrière de ce franciscain
(inutile de préciser que son origine commune avec la régente de l'empire n'est pas pour rien dans la
position prise par les Frères mineurs à Constantinople), et en particulier p. 297 pour les ambassades de
1345.
96
moitié du XIVe siècle le royaume de Hongrie doit faire face à la concurrence du royaume de
Pologne, notamment pour le contrôle de la Moldavie et des bouches du Danube, royaume qui a
bien entendu ses propres soutiens franciscains. Une nouvelle fois, il s'agit d'un échange de bons
procédés : si nous reprenons l’exemple de la monarchie angevine de Hongrie, une des lignes
d'argumentation majeure pour justifier son extension, c'est la lutte contre l'hérésie en Bosnie et
contre le schisme, prétention justifiée par le soutien apporté à la vicairie franciscaine de Bosnie.
Fort logiquement, cette dernière et les couvents des marges des Balkans deviennent une
pépinière de futurs missionnaires dans ces régions jusque tard dans le XVe siècle.
De son côté, la papauté reste dans un rôle d’arbitre, lié au fait que toute extension de la
latinité se fait au nom de Rome. Elle pratique l’équilibre des pouvoirs entre les royaumes de
Hongrie et de Pologne promus au rôle de défenseur de la foi, et elle peut à l'occasion défendre
des princes schismatiques pour peu que ceux-ci promettent de se convertir30. Mais surtout, la
hiérarchie religieuse installée à l'occasion des missions des Frères mendiants ne dépend
hiérarchiquement parlant que de la papauté, ce qui maintient cette dernière en position de
définir les règles du discours diplomatique avec les Balkans comme avec l'extérieur de la
chrétienté et de coordonner les différentes actions. Dans l'ensemble, elle soutient activement la
politique des Angevins de Hongrie, dont elle fait son bras armé dans les Balkans. Cependant, ce
soutien n'est pas aveugle, et la papauté réagit vivement contre les tentatives de Louis Ier de
Hongrie d'utiliser sa position pour forcer la main des souverains pontifes. Ainsi, en 1345,
Clément VI se plaint auprès de Louis de ce qu'il ait retenu des lettres pontificales envoyées aux
dignitaires de la principauté de Valachie, et en particulier à l'héritier du trône, Nicolas
Alexandre, après les grands succès obtenus par les franciscains en Transylvanie, en Valachie et
à Sirmium, liste qui montre que l'action auprès des principautés roumaines était liée à celle des
franciscains de Bosnie31. Cela n'empêche pas Innocent VI quelques années plus tard de soutenir
Louis Ier, en guerre contre Venise. Comme cette dernière s'est bien évidement rapprochée de la
Serbie, avec laquelle elle a le même adversaire, Innocent confie au patriarche d'Aquilée et à
l'archevêque de Salzburg le soin de rappeler et d'appliquer les interdits très lourds qui pèsent
contre les alliés des schismatiques. Puis il propose sa médiation à Louis et à Venise, écrivant
une lettre très dure au doge pour se plaindre de son alliance avec les Serbes32, dans une guerre
où Louis Ier est pourtant clairement l'agresseur et cherche avec succès à prendre le contrôle de
la Dalmatie. Par la même occasion, Innocent rappelle à Louis qu'il doit combattre l'hérésie et le
schisme, et lui demande son soutien pour la reconquête de l’Italie entreprise par le cardinal
Albornoz 33. Je donnerai un autre exemple pour montrer que le rapport n'est pas univoque. En
1374 Grégoire XI demandait à Louis de l'aider à créer un évêché pour la nation des Roumains
(Valaques), et exigeait que les prélats s'adressent à leurs ouailles dans la langue de ces derniers.
Grégoire explique en outre que le peu de succès rencontré vient du fait que les missionnaires
s'obstinent à parler le hongrois, ce qui comporte une critique implicite des méthodes de Louis
d'Anjou. Ainsi, cette lettre peut être interprété comme une tentative de rééquilibrage et de
contrôle des menées de la monarchie hongroise dans la région. Mais en même temps, c'est à
deux archevêques de Hongrie qu'est confié le soin de contrôler cette fondation et l'action du
missionnaire franciscain Antoine de Spalato (Split)34.
La politique pontificale ne peut cependant vraiment se mesurer qu’à l’aune d’une
échelle globale. Ainsi, de décembre 1369 à avril 137035, de nouvelles missions sont envoyées
vers les pays "tartares", et notamment vers Khanbaliq (Pékin). Pour soutenir l'entreprise, les
30
C'est une des options des princes roumains : ainsi en Moldavie, Latzco (1367-1375) se convertit, et
Alexandre (1400-1432), marié à une princesse polonaise promet d'en faire autant, sans jamais tenir sa
promesse. Voit Jean NOUZILLE, 2004, p. 30-32.
31
N. BOCŞAN, I. LUMPERDEAN, I. A POP, 1996, p. 23-24
32
Lucas WADDING, 1931 p. 131-139 (p. 112-119 2 e édition).
33
CICO, X, n° 89, p. 169-170, 16 août 1356.
34
CICO, XII, n°118 et 118a, p. 223-224, 13 octobre 1374.
35
CICO, XI, n°173, p. 297, 5 décembre 1369 et 6 décembre 1369 et p. 298-9 pour le vœu d'Elisabeth de
Serbie.
97
franciscains sur le départ ont le droit de collecter les aumônes de toutes les églises et couvents à
Constantinople ou dans la Horde d’Or, et sont recommandés aux dirigeant des communautés
vénitiennes et génoises de Constantinople et Caffa : l'ensemble du réseau latin autour de la mer
Noire est mis à contribution. Mais il faut ajouter à cela une autre source de financement : une
comtesse de Serbie, non identifiée, est priée de racheter un vœu de pèlerinage à Jérusalem et de
faire parvenir la somme à Rome, où se rassemblent les missionnaires sur le départ. Au regard de
ce qui a été dit plus haut, on comprend que nous avons à faire ici à la mise à contribution des
réseaux diplomatiques latins dans les Balkans au service de la mission. Qui plus est, quelques
mois auparavant, le 28 juillet 1369, Urbain V envoyait des missionnaires franciscains en Serbie,
Bosnie et Valachie, en leur renouvelant la bulle Cum hora undecima36, avant d'envoyer à
nouveau des franciscains en Valachie, Russie et Lituanie le 4 août 1370, puis en Albanie, le 25
du même mois37. Mais au moment même où les franciscains en partance pour Constantinople et
les régions tatares se trouvent à Rome, l’empereur byzantin Jean V s'y trouve également, pour
se convertir à titre personnel à la chrétienté latine, accompagné du dominicain grec, Démétrios
Kydones, qui écrit vers les Balkans byzantins et Constantinople pour tenter de désamorcer le
mécontentement que la conversion du souverain risque de causer38. Il me semble évident que
l’ensemble de ces faits doit être relié, au lieu d’être traité de manière éparse, et que nous voyons
en fait se dessiner une politique pontificale globale dans laquelle l’ensemble des éléments,
avancée latine dans les Balkans, présence missionnaire (des Balkans à la Chine), négociations
d’union des Églises, forment un tout dont les éléments se soutiennent et se comprennent les uns
les autres. C'est ce dont témoigne également le fameux registre 62 des archives vaticanes,
compilé toujours vers 1370, qui recopie les documents les plus significatifs de la politique
pontificale envers l'extérieur, et qui aux côtés des documents ayant trait à la croisade, aux
missions mongoles, à l'union avec Constantinople ou avec l'Église arménienne a aussi enregistré
des envois de missionnaires vers les Balkans39.
J'ai eu cependant l'occasion de dire que l'étude de ce sujet était souvent
compartimentée, et faisait apparaître assez peu les Balkans. Il faut bien avouer que l'origine en
est dans ces mêmes sources qui montrent si bien que tous ces problèmes sont liés. Clairement,
elles préfèrent mettre en scène le thème de la mission chez les Mongols, avec tout ce qu’elle a
d’exotique, ou les négociations avec l’Église byzantine, qui ont demandé un effort d’élaboration
intellectuelle intense, pour aboutir à la proclamation de l’union des Églises au concile de
Florence. Mais d’une certaine manière, la lutte se fait d’égal à égal, et l’Église byzantine
représente une autre moitié du christianisme qu’il faut se rattacher. Les Balkans quant à eux
sont quelque peu absorbés par ces figures du Grec schismatique et perfide ou des "Tartares".
D’une certaine manière tout est déjà dit dès la lettre de 1234 envoyée par Grégoire IX au prince
de Hongrie Béla (le future Béla IV), qui se plaint des Valaques de rite orthodoxe dans l’évêché
des Comans40. Cette lettre, ajoutée à un témoignage de 1278 qui fait mention de la ville de
Milcov, sur la courbure des Carpates, comme siège épiscopal des Comans, laisse à penser qu'en
36
CICO, XI, n°159, p. 262, 28 juillet 1369,
CICO, XI, p. 347, 4 août 1370, et n°212 p. 352, 25 août.
38
Donald M. NICOL, 1996, p. 154-5.
39
Feuillet 87 r: félicitations au provincial franciscain de Hongrie pour l'action des Frères mineurs en
Comanie et en Bulgarie. Feuillet 97 v: envoi de missionnaires pour la Serbie, l'Albanie et la Sclavonie.
Voir aussi James MULDOON, 1979, p. 125-195
40
CICO, III, n° 209, p. 284, 14 nov 1234 : In Cumanorum episcopatu, sicut accepimus, quidam populi,
qui Walati vocantur, existunt, qui etsi censeatur nomine christiano, sub una tamen fide varios ritos
habentes et mores, illa commitunt, quae huic sunt nomini inimica. Nam Romanam ecclesiam
contemnentes, non a venerabili fratre nostro episcopo Cumanorum, qui loci diocesanus existit, sed a
quibusdam pseudoepiscopis Graecorum ritum tenentibus, universa recipiunt ecclesiastica sacramenta, et
nonulli de regno Ungariae, tam Ungari quam Theutonici et alii orthodoxi, morandi causa cum ipsis,
transeunt ad eosdem et sic cum eis, quasi populus unus facti cum eisdem Walatis, eo contempto,
praemissa recipiunt sacramenta, in grave orthodoxorum scandalum et derogationem non modicam fidei
christianae. Sur l’évêché des Comans, voir Jean RICHARD, 1998, p. 21 à 26, et sur la présence de
populations roumaines, Şerban TURCUS, 2001, p. 158-170 et 284-302
37
98
fait de steppe l’essentiel de l'action de cet évêché se déroulait aux frontières danubiennes du
royaume hongrois et de la Transylvanie. Elle met en lumière un peuple "schismatique" de la
région qui jusque là passait inaperçu là où est célébrée une action missionnaire lointaine, auprès
d’un peuple nomade. Autre élément caractéristique : cette lettre parle de peuples valaques (au
pluriel), donc d'une réalité politique qui existe, mais n'en est pas moins fragmentée, quelque peu
informe, qui ne peut être mise sur le même plan qu’une monarchie ou une principauté. Ces
peuples suivent des "pseudo-évêques grecs" (rappelons qu'au yeux de Rome, leur patriarcat
légitime en 1234 ne peut être que le patriarcat latin de Constantinople), et reçoivent de plus
dans leurs églises des chrétiens de rite latin, des Saxons, des Hongrois. A la dénonciation de
l’orthodoxie qualifiée de schismatique, s’ajoutent des spécificités propres à la région : une
Église irrégulière, mal formée, y compris même en comparaison de l’Église grecque, ce qui,
ajouté à une proximité douteuse entre chrétiens, donne un caractère amorphe au christianisme
de ces régions. Le ton de la lettre est purement disciplinaire, et donne l'image d'un problème de
rusticité, non traité par négligence, mais dont la résolution ne peut guère poser de problèmes : il
s'agit d'une simple remise en ordre. Au même moment, se développe la dénonciation de
l'hérésie en Bosnie qui sert de justification à l'intervention latine pendant l'ensemble de la
période. A vrai dire, il semblerait que cette Église décrite comme bogomile par les sources
latines ait été avant tout une Église nationale, coupée de la latinité grégorienne, et ce plus
encore après qu'en 1252 l'évêque de Kalocsa, en Hongrie, ait obtenu juridiction sur elle41. Mais
l'utilisation du thème de l'hérésie est fondamentale, car cette situation alimente l'image d'une
région à la situation ecclésiale floue. De plus, l'orthodoxie des Balkans, décrite elle aussi
comme une forme d'ignorance de populations peu développées et peu au courant des enjeux
ecclésiastiques, peut dès lors tout naturellement être assimilée à cette hérésie née d'une position
trop floue vis-à-vis de Rome. Tout cela a une conséquence : si la latinisation est décrite
essentiellement en termes de restauration disciplinaire pour des sujets rebelles, cela permet un
degré de violence supplémentaire. Si nous avons à faire à une hérésie, alors l'action des Frères
mendiants est comparable aux missions intérieures et aux croisades contre les hérésies dans la
chrétienté latine, et l'action de la monarchie hongroise dans les Balkans assimilable aux
croisades contre les hérétiques, à l'image de celle contre les Albigeois. L'utilisation
systématique au XIVe de la formule "schismatiques et hérétiques" dans les bulles destinées aux
Balkans n'est donc pas anodine.
Avec des arguments différents, sur des tons différents, plus ou moins bienveillants,
avec plus ou moins de violence, tous les écrits que j'ai cités jusqu'à présent reprennent ce cadre
de pensée. J'en prendrai pour preuve le tableau de la région fait par le Frère mendiant de 1308 :
les côtes de l'Adriatique, parce qu'elles sont urbanisées sont catholiques42, elles sont presque
latines (je souligne le presque : nous ne sommes pas encore tout à fait dans l'Occident latin, et
trop près des Balkans). Mais il y a le monde des montagnes, des places fortes, vide de
civilisation, dont une bonne part est tenue par des pasteurs itinérants et sauvages (Albanais,
Valaques), décrits comme étant résistants, simples, se nourrissant de lait. Entre les deux un
espace dont les populations "nec sunt pure catholici, nec pure scismatici", mais (je traduis) il
suffirait de leur apporter la parole de Dieu pour qu'elles redeviennent parfaitement catholiques,
car par nature elles aiment les Latins43. Je crois qu'il convient ici de rappeler l'analyse que fait
Alain Ducellier de ce passage, souvent présenté comme la preuve du caractère pastoral et
nomade de la population albanaise44. Sur la côte (autour de Durazzo), où notre auteur parle de
population latine, nous avons de nombreuses preuves par ailleurs que la population est
albanaise. Les populations de la zone intermédiaire, qui ne reçoivent pas de nom, sont bien
41
John FINE, The late medieval Balkans, , 1994, p. 144-146.
Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis, ed. Olgierd GΌRKA, 1916, p. 30: in hanc maritima regione
habitatores sunt puri catholici et quasi latini. Ceteri autem eiusdem regni sunt scismatici perfidi. (Durazzo
est d’ailleurs placée sous la rubrique Serbie).
43
Ibid. p. 28 : Homines istarum provinciarum…nec sunt pure catholici, nec pure scismatici. Si tamen esset
qui verbum dei proponeret, efficerentur puri catholici, quia naturaliter diligunt latinos ut dictum est.
44
Alain DUCELLIER, 1979, p. 23-36
42
99
évidement là encore albanaises. Mais ce qualificatif est gardé pour les seuls bergers nomades,
dont le nomadisme est décrit dans le détail pour devenir l'attribut de la population albanaise45.
En fait, la description précise de notre Frère mendiant nous montre que la majeure part de
l'Albanie et de la population albanaise n'est pas nomade. Mais, indépendamment de cela, les
Albanais sont inscrits dans un discours essentialiste qui attribue aux Albanais le rôle de
nomades éternels, et en fait des populations rustiques au christianisme impur. Le schisme quant
à lui, qui a son noyau dans les montagnes serbes, tire sa force de deux phénomènes : l'influence
des hérétiques bosniaques qui y fuient l'inquisition, et qui renforcent la résistance
"schismatique" à l'Église latine; un souverain perfide, violent, lubrique et ennemi des Latins, qui
a renversé son frère, excellent, fidèle et ouvert aux catholiques, et qui domine une population
servile (où l'on rappelle la vieille idée que la Serbie tire son nom de sa population servile) 46. Le
souverain serbe ne fait d'ailleurs que reproduire à une plus petite échelle la perfidie de la grande
nation orthodoxe, l'empire byzantin, mais avec un caractère plus violent et plus montagnard,
puisque les Grecs sont connus pour être efféminés et incapables de se battre47. Si l'objectif
proposé par le traité c'est une croisade gagnée d'avance contre un empire byzantin
uniformément schismatique, une intervention chemin faisant contre la Serbie pour faire tomber
ce monarque serait chose aisée et salutaire. En ce sens notre Frère mendiant nous décrit déjà
une région qui est certes faible politiquement, divisée, mais où le désordre subsiste parce que
les grandes puissances de l’Occident latin choisissent de ne pas intervenir. Le plus intéressant
est peut-être de voir que notre auteur parle d’Europe et donne un contenu à ce terme. Il nous dit,
justement d'ailleurs, que l'empire byzantin était à cheval sur l'Asie et l'Europe. Mais de ce
dernier, il ne reste plus que des lambeaux européens, à cause de l'avancée des Turcs. Notre
Frère mendiant souhaite donc sauver la partie thrace de l'empire et les îles grecques, en les
intégrant à la latinité européenne grâce à la conquête angevine, tandis que la partie asiatique de
l’empire, peuplée désormais de Turcs, serait extérieure à cet ensemble. Dès cet écrit de 1308, le
christianisme latin est utilisé pour substantialiser, catégoriser l'ensemble du continent européen,
et la scène est prête pour l'affrontement avec l'Asie, c'est-à-dire avec les Turcs. Je mentionne
aussi cet aspect pour montrer qu'on ne peut pas comprendre la place prise par la région des
Balkans dans la vision géographique de nos auteurs si on l'étudie comme un morceau à part,
détaché de l’ensemble duquel elle fait partie. C'est parce que l'Europe latine s'oppose à l'Asie
des Turcs et des "Tartares", et parce qu'il n'y a plus de place pour une puissance et une culture à
cheval sur les deux ensembles, que la région des Balkans devient une marge, caractérisée par sa
latinisation inachevée. La région apparaît dès lors faible politiquement, divisée entre des petits
peuples « barbares » (le terme est dans le texte), dominés par des régimes hostiles à l'Occident
latin et de ce fait brutaux, que l'on peut légitimement déposséder.
C'est à Bartholomé d'Alverne, vicaire franciscain de Bosnie qu'il revient de tirer les
conclusions extrêmes de cette situation, lorsqu'il écrit vers 1380 contre les schismatiques du
royaume de Hongrie. Ceux-ci commettent un certain nombre de graves erreurs qui leurs sont
spécifiques, comme de croire que chaque homme peut se sauver avec son propre rite48 ou de ne
pas reconnaître le pouvoir sacerdotal supérieur du pape et des évêques en comparaison des
simples prêtres49. Cette situation est comme il se doit due à l'irrégularité des consécrations, qui
45
Ibid. p. 33 « Il en résulte que le terme d' albanenses, utilisé par l'auteur anonyme, a moins un sens
ethnique qu'un sens social et qu'il désigne par excellence l'élément nomade du pays par rapport aux
cultivateurs sédentaires ».
46
Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis, ed. Olgierd GΌRKA, Cracovie, 1916, p. 30: Seconda pars
huius regni vocatur servia a conditionibus populorum sic dicta, quia quasiomnes sunt servilis conditionis.
On aura reconnu dans l'opposition des deux souverains l'évocation des luttes entre Etienne Dragutin et
Etienne Uroš Milutin.
47
Ibid. p. 24 : greci communiter sunt effeminati et in nullo ad arma apti, sunt tamen astuti et dolosi.
48
Denys LASIC, 1962, p. 66 : Asserunt unumquemque hominem posse salvari in suo ritu, qui dicunt
impossibile fieri, quod Deus omnes alios homines damnaret praeter christianos
49
Ibid. p. 68 : Quod unusquisque presbyter tantum posset absolvere, quantum quiscumque sub caelo, sive
Papa, sive Episcopus, aut Archiepiscopus.
100
induit une irrégularité de rite due à l'ignorance et à la rusticité50. Mais il est également vrai que
(je traduis) « il n'y eut jamais de nations qui puissent se convertir aussi facilement que celles des
Slaves et des Valaques. Nul besoin du glaive, de la prison, des coups, ils pourraient tous être
convertis rien qu'avec la parole et les discours ». Dès lors, pour paraphraser le texte, l'emploi de
la force, déjà légitime contre les Sarrasins et les Gentils, est encore plus justifié ici, où il
suffirait de si peu pour gagner ces populations, et où refuser l'emploi de la force s'assimile à de
l'incurie51. Louis de Hongrie, nous rappelle le vicaire franciscain de Hongrie, s'est trouvé une
caution : ce même empereur byzantin Jean V dont nous avons parlé plus haut, et qui au cours de
son voyage en Hongrie de 1365 estimait publiquement, d'après notre auteur, que (je traduis) "le
roi fait bien de faire baptiser ces Slaves qui ne suivent ni le rite grec, ni le rite romain", vision
soutenue de manière encore plus violente par les prêtres grecs qui l'accompagnaient, qui parlent
d'un double baptême. L'assimilation des figures de l'hérétique bosniaque et de l'orthodoxe des
Balkans est ici achevée52. Remarquons cependant que le ton polémique du texte est tourné
contre ceux qui ne partageaient pas cet enthousiasme missionnaire dans le royaume de Hongrie,
qui sont montrés du doigt et accusés de préférer laisser les schismatiques dans leur état, plutôt
que mettre en danger les redevances que ceux-ci leurs paient. C'est à cause de ce manque
d'engagement, de cette indifférence, nous dit Bartholomé, que des puissances politiques
redoutables (royaume de Serbie et royaume de Bulgarie), ont pu par le passé s'élever et contrer
l’extension de la chrétienté romaine dans cette région, raison de plus pour rendre à Louis Ier
l'hommage qu'il mérite, lui qui a permis de rompre la superbe de ces puissances. Cependant si
cette vision marque un aboutissement, elle est également rendue caduque au moment même où
elle est écrite par l’avancée ottomane dans la région. De fait, si le royaume de Serbie est devenu
accessible aux ambitions de Louis en 1380, ce n'est pas après s'être effondré sous les coups de
ce dernier, mais sous ceux des Turcs, à la bataille de la Maritsa de 1371. L’avancée ottomane
coupe la route de l'Asie et menace le continent européen, ce qui oblige à nuancer et à adapter le
projet d'extension d’une chrétienté latine passée sur la défensive
C'est ce que constate un grand missionnaire dominicain comme Jean de Sultanieh, qui
a voyagé à la cour de Tamerlan, lorsqu'il fait l’état des lieux de la chrétienté dans le monde au
début du XVe siècle. Sa description de la région des Balkans aboutit à la conclusion que les
peuples ne sont ici empêchés de se convertir qu'à cause de l'influence byzantine, mais que la
tendance pourrait très facilement être inversée53. Ce qui nous intéresse surtout dans cet ouvrage,
c'est la comparaison entre l'extension de l'islam dans le monde et celle du christianisme. En
1404, même si Jean nous parle encore des missions en Chine, il doit bien constater que
l’expansion religieuse de l’Occident latin s’est réduite à peu de choses. En fait, comme ses
contemporains, Jean de Sultanieh accepte que le christianisme se soit identifié au continent
européen. Mais à leur différence, Jean estime que les chrétiens sont plus nombreux et plus
puissants car l'Europe est la région la plus densément peuplée au monde, et elle est entièrement
chrétienne, à l'exception de quelques juifs, auxquels s'ajoutent quelques musulmans chez les
50
Ibid. p. 74 : Isti sacerdotes Sclavorum propter ignorantiam et rusticitatem multam nullam debitam
formam et certam servant.
51
Ibid. p. 74 : Quia nec est nec umquam fuit natio, quae sic de facili converteretur sicut isti Sclavi et
Vlachi. Non cum gladio, non carcere, non verberibus, sed semplici verbo vel praecepto conversi essent
etiam omnes. Item perfecti cristiani essent, et nullus remansisset in regno schismaticus, si non impediret
negligentia dominorum et praelatorum, ac avarita seu potis simonia aliquorum, de quibus taceo.
52
Ibid. p. 75 : Etiam Ioanes, imperator Constantinopolitanus, quando ad regem venit, dixit, audientius
multis "bene facit rex baptizare istos Sclavos, quia nec Graecam nec Romanam formam sequntur". In
super pridie in Ceni coram fratribus nostris dixerunt calugeri, venientes de confinibus Greciae contra
istos sacerdotes: "Isti non sunt sacerdotes, sed canes; nec vere baptizant. Propterea nos eos baptizamus
sub conditione, quia non dicitur iteratum, quod ignoratur esset factum".
53
Anton KERN, 1938. Sur les Valaques des Balkans, après avoir rappelé leur origine romaine, p. 103: in
spiritualibus sequerentur Latinos et non Graecos nisi quia Grecos habent confines, et cito convertuntur ad
nos ut probavimus. Quant aux principautés roumaines, Jean de Sultanieh rappelle la présence de Frères
mendiants en Moldavie, qui ont obtenu, nous dit-il, la conversion de la reine Marguerite puis celle
d'Alexandre (conversion dont a rappelé plus haut le caractère aléatoire)
101
Tatares. C'est même la spécificité de l'Europe qu'à la différence des empires musulmans, qui
comprennent de larges populations de rites chrétiens divers et variés, parfois majoritaires, il n'y
ait sur ce continent-ci aucune diversité religieuse : tout le monde suit le même rite54. Si les
chrétiens doivent se défendre contre les Turcs, dans l'écrit, l'Europe est devenue unie et
chrétienne (romaine, cela va de soi, à la différence de la diversité des christianismes en terre
d'islam), et ce jusqu’au Don (on aurait envie de dire jusqu’à l’Oural). Non pas que Jean de
Sultanieh ne sache pas que les peuples des Balkans ne sont pas des chrétiens latins, puisque
c'est lui-même qui nous le dit par ailleurs. Cependant cette constatation n'est pas prise en
compte dans le raisonnement général qui oppose une Asie pour l’essentiel du Proche-Orient,
diverse, fragmentée religieusement, et l'Europe uniforme religieusement et culturellement. Les
Balkans, par leur sous-développement, sont une marge non significative, en voie de résorption
et d'assimilation. C'est là me semble-t-il l'élément fondamental. Non pas que les voyageurs
n'aient pas depuis toujours décrit les montagnes de la péninsule, ou que les Byzantins aient
manqué de qualificatifs méprisants pour les peuples de la région. Sans doute pourrait-on même
trouver des parallèles dans les écrits de certains auteurs byzantins au moment de la
réaffirmation de l’empire et de la reconquête de Bulgarie (je pense par exemple à la
correspondance de Théophylacte d’Ohrid). En effet, la tendance a toujours existé à
Constantinople de considérer que l’orthodoxie véritable était grecque, et aux XIe et XIIe siècles
les Balkans sont dans les faits une périphérie au sein de l’empire. Cependant ce processus n’a
pas pu aller jusqu’à son bout dans l’empire byzantin, c’est-à-dire jusqu’à annexer les Balkans
par l'écrit à un continent identifié à une religion et une civilisation face auxquels ils soient par
définition marginaux. La raison n’en est pas seulement que l’empire byzantin n’a pas pu les
garder dans l’empire (les royaumes latins n’ont pas pu non plus conquérir les Balkans), mais
elle est aussi liée aux cadres mentaux de la pensée byzantine : les Byzantins, bien qu’ils aient eu
un véritable savoir géopolitique et diplomatique, n’ont apparemment pas eu une littérature
géographique comparable à celle de l’Occident latin des XIIIe et XIVe siècle, qui cherche à
catégoriser et essentialiser les régions du monde. L’élément pertinent dans la vison du monde
byzantine, c’était une division entre empire et Barbares qui ne laissait pas la place à une
caractérisation réelle de la région des Balkans pour la partie qui restait en dehors de l’empire
(c’était une région barbare comme une autre, et de surcroît toujours menaçante) 55. Inclus à
l’intérieur de l’empire, les Balkans pouvaient être décris comme arriérés parce que européens
(la civilisation étant perçue comme asiatique, ce qui était à la fois un héritage et un reversement
de valeurs par rapport à la pensée antique). Mais là encore la pensée byzantine ne pouvait aller
jusqu’au bout et identifier sa propre civilisation (et son expression grecque), l’empire romain,
qu’elle voulait perpétuer, ainsi que le christianisme avec un seul continent, que ce soit l’Asie ou
l’Europe, et ce d’autant plus que, depuis les saints Cyrille et Méthode, l’existence d’Églises de
langue non grecque était reconnue canoniquement, et si beaucoup pouvaient les mépriser, leur
54
Ibid. p. 121-122, Hic ultimate notandum de comparatione Christianorum et Sarracenos, scilicet que
pars sit maior. Et circa hoc opinio multorum est quod Sarraceni sunt multo plures Christianis ex hoc quia
habent plures provincias et regna et spacia maxima et dominium multarum gentium et in tribus partibus
mundi, scilicet Assia, Europa et Africa habitantes sive occupantes. Cuius opinionis contrarius ego sum,
plurimis de causis et rationibus. Et primo quantum ad provincias et regna plurima concedo, sed ut
manifestum est, et in maiori parte vidi ac fide dignis audivi in nostris temporibus, quod in aliquibus
provinciis dictis et pro maiori parte sunt plures Chritiani, ymo in aliquibus provinciis in quintuplo et
ultra diversi Christiani,ut manifeste apparet infra hunc libellum in diversis locis, et specialiter in magna
Tartaria, in Armenia maiori, in Asia minori, que es Turquia, in Suria alta et in aliis partibus idem notatur.
In contrarium est de Christianis nostris in quorum dominiis et terris omnes sunt unius cultus, omnes
intrant ad unam ecclesiam nisi in aliquibus partibus pauci Iudei sunt. (...) Quantum autem ad tres partes
Asie, Europe et Affrice quas inhabitant, hec non concedo quia in Europa- quod est de Anglia et Hyspania
usque ad flumen Thanay est Europa- et infra istos terminos non sunt Sarraceni nisi paucissimi in
Cumania Tartari et super Greciam paucissimi Thurci, (...) Quantum ad Asiam dico quod maiores
provincie et regna et que sunt bene populata non sint Sarracenorum, ut sunt India maior, Catay maxima
pars, Ethiopia maxima, ubi est presbyter Ioahannes(...). Les termes en gras sont soulignés par moi.
55
Alain DUCELLIER, 1994, p. 1-8.
102
héritage ne pouvait cependant pas être réduit à une affaire d’hérésie. En revanche, lorsque dans
la seconde moitié du XIVe siècle l’empire byzantin se réduit à Constantinople, apparaît une
pensée qui identifie l’empire à la nation hellène et l’orthodoxie à un christianisme grec,
susceptible d’être réuni au christianisme universel de Rome. Dans cette perspective, il devient
plus aisé d’envisager le christianisme des Balkans comme un christianisme bâtard, car ni latin
ni grec, ainsi que l’ont apparemment pensé Jean V et son entourage, en accord avec Louis Ier de
Hongrie et Bartholomé d’Alverne, ainsi qu’on l’a rappelé plus haut.
Pour finir, qu'avons-nous appris de notre voyage dans les Balkans ? Pour commencer
la cohérence et la continuité du projet d'extension de la latinité entendu comme affirmation de la
chrétienté universelle autour de la papauté, qui fixe le cadre, les règles du jeu politiques et
discursives, ce qui n'empêche pas une très large autonomie des acteurs non seulement étatiques,
mais même des réseaux locaux au sein des ordres mendiants : le jeu est assurément complexe. Il
s’agit à vrai dire d’un processus sur le long terme, commencé au XIe siècle avec la Reconquista
et les croisades (qui posaient le problème des relations avec les chrétiens byzantins qu’elles
étaient supposées protéger). Mais il importe pour notre propos qu’à partir de la seconde moitié
du XIIIe siècle, ce processus ne se fasse plus seulement au nom du christianisme, mais qu’il
commence aussi, quoique plus timidement, à s’attacher à l’idée d’un territoire, avec des
frontières, l’Europe.
La réapparition dans la lettre de Béla IV du terme d’ « Europe », relativement rare
jusque là, sa reprise dans des textes aussi importants que la description de l’Europe orientale de
1308 ou la description du monde de Jean de Sultanieh ne sont pas anodines. La référence à
l’Europe réapparaît, comme autrefois face aux conquérants arabes, à l’occasion de la menace
mongole. La confrontation avec un peuple aussi différent permettait de mieux prendre
conscience de la spécificité de l’Occident latin et de son unité. De plus les dimensions du
monde ont bougé : pour les hommes des XIe ou XIIe siècles, le monde est essentiellement le
monde méditerranéen. A leurs yeux, si la Reconquista allait à son terme et détruisait le pouvoir
musulman qui dominait en al-Andalus et au Maghreb, si les croisades réussissaient à prendre
l’Égypte et que l’union se faisait avec Constantinople, alors le monde entier aurait été réuni à
l’Occident latin. La seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle voit d’une part l’échec de ces tentatives
(péninsule ibérique exceptée) et, d’autre part, l’ouverture du gigantesque espace eurasiatique
qui fait prendre conscience du caractère limité de ces conflits. Même si, à l’image de Jean de
Sultanieh, les auteurs latins veulent encore voir dans l’Europe le continent le plus peuplé et le
plus puissant, ils sont néanmoins obligés d’élargir leurs horizons et de prendre conscience que
face à des civilisations radicalement différentes et à peine soupçonnées jusque-là, l’Occident ne
se définit plus seulement par l’idée d’une christianitas toujours appelée par ailleurs à s’étendre,
mais aussi par une culture commune sur un territoire pour lequel on recommence à employer le
vieux terme d’Europe. Dès lors, ce mot n’est plus seulement une simple référence de
géographie physique (un des trois continents) même si cela reste son sens premier, mais il
implique également pour ceux qui l’emploient l’idée d’une aire de civilisation, celle de la
chrétienté latine, face aux Mongols puis face aux Turcs, essentialisés comme nomades et
asiatiques. Il n’en reste pas moins que le christianisme latin est au fondement de la culture
européenne de l’époque, et qu’il est impossible de le séparer des institutions politiques et de la
vie de cette Europe dont la langue commune demeure le latin ecclésiastique. De plus, à la
différence du VIIIe siècle, le christianisme latin est désormais lié à une papauté qui a derrière
elle plusieurs siècles d’affirmation théocratique, d’élaboration du droit canonique et de pratique
politique au point d’avoir définitivement vaincu l’universalisme impérial. Ainsi, même si c’est
Béla IV qui utilise le mot d’Europe pour défendre son royaume, c’est la papauté qui est la plus à
même de définir une politique globale grâce aux ordres mendiants et à leurs réseaux
transnationaux, au nom de la défense de cette Europe identifiée au christianisme latin. Cela
n’est d’ailleurs pas contradictoire avec l’idée d’extension universelle du christianisme, mais au
contraire complémentaire : la défense d’un noyau européen face aux Mongols puis aux Turcs va
de pair avec l’organisation de missions vers ces régions éloignés que l’on espère bien un jour
103
pouvoir faire entrer dans la christianitas – et l’on retrouve ici le paradoxe d’une affirmation
parallèle de la spécificité du continent européen et de l’universalisme de sa civilisation.
Dans cette perspective, les peuples de la région des Balkans se sont retrouvés
confrontés à l’expansion des Latins à double titre : non seulement ils étaient bien évidement
l’objectif le plus accessible de par leur position frontalière, mais de plus dans une situation
ambiguë, surtout depuis l’affaiblissement de l’empire byzantin, puisque ils font partie de
l’Europe (au sens antique : ils étaient la partie européenne de l’empire byzantin) sans en faire
vraiment partie (au sens d’une Europe identifiée au christianisme latin), d’où cette vision si
caractéristique d’une spécificité appelée à être vite résorbée. De fait, l'effort des Latins dans les
Balkans ne s'est jamais vraiment interrompu, depuis 1204 jusqu'à la mobilisation lancée par le
franciscain saint Jean de Capistran pour sauver Belgrade des Turcs en 1458, et il faut replacer
cet effort dans une politique d'ensemble aux marges de l'Europe latine: les Balkans étaient au
carrefour des routes qui menaient vers l'Orient, l'Asie centrale, la Chine. Ainsi, l’expansion
latine n'aurait pu se faire sans l’ouverture des Balkans, et sans la décomposition du
Commonwealth byzantin. Au fur et à mesure de la déliquescence de l’empire byzantin, barrière
à cheval sur l'Europe et l'Asie et contrepoids politique et de civilisation à l'Occident, les Latins
se sont retrouvés face à un ensemble qui à leurs yeux ne faisait pas le poids, qui était destiné à
être vite résorbé politiquement et religieusement : ce que nous appelons les Balkans. Malgré
l'importance de la région, les chroniqueurs Mendiants, à moins d'y être des liés par des intérêts
particuliers, ont préféré décrire des missions lointaines, dans des pays exotiques, chez les
Mongols, parler des Sarrasins, des Byzantins. Si les peuples des Balkans commencent toutefois
à apparaître dans les sources latines (on peut presque parler d'une renaissance après une longue
période d’absence pour certains d’entre eux -Roumains, Albanais), ils n'y apparaissent qu'à la
marge d'un Occident latin qui s’identifie à la chrétienté romaine, et réduit l'Europe à cette même
chrétienté. Les Grecs sont pour une part byzantins, (c'est-à-dire des rivaux chrétiens qui
appartiennent au passé), pour une part balkaniques (lorsqu'ils sont envisagés en dehors de
l'empire), et l’identification de l’Europe au christianisme latin implique aussi la marginalisation
de l’héritage du christianisme byzantin qui, une fois l’empire byzantin à prétention universelle
disparu, n’est plus perçu que comme une spécificité régionale, appelé à revenir au sein de la
seule Église universelle, l’Église romaine. Il est vrai que la Russie n’est pas encore devenue la
troisième Rome, et que les principautés russes forment une unité avec la région des Balkans et
en partagent la plupart des caractéristiques au sein de ce que notre Frère mendiant de 1308
appelle l’Europa orientalis. Les peuples des Balkans sont ou européens (presque européens,
pour paraphraser nos sources) ou amorphes et violents, en un mot, dans le langage européen de
l'époque : hérétiques. Fragmentés et affaiblis politiquement, les peuples des Balkans posent des
problèmes d'intégration, d'organisation, et sont irritants, parce que voués à faire partie de
l'Occident latin, toujours sur le point d’y entrer, mais qu'ils ne s'y intègrent pas vraiment. En
revanche, toute menace sérieuse et consciente d'elle-même vient du dehors et des figures
asiatiques que sont les Mongols ou les Turcs.
Or le paradoxe, c'est qu'au moment où nos auteurs ont tendance à considérer le
problème des Balkans comme presque réglé, la fin de la domination byzantine et l'essor des
routes commerciales permettent justement aux peuples de la région de constituer de nouveau
des États, des cultures et des Églises nationales. Ainsi, la Serbie décrite comme sousdéveloppée connaît son siècle de gloire, de saint Sava à l'empereur Etienne Duşan, tout comme
le XIVe siècle voit la naissance des principautés roumaines. Évidemment, les Balkans n'ont pas
un héritage qui puisse impressionner nos auteurs autant que Constantinople, l'Égypte ou la
Chine du XIVe siècle. Les faits mentionnés par ces derniers, l'opposition entre les côtes et les
montagnes, la description de la culture pastorale, les mélanges de populations, sont souvent
justes. Mais l'ensemble de ces éléments est intégré à un paradigme, catégorisé pour nourrir une
vision qui malgré sa réalité dans le détail est en définitive incapable de voir et d'expliquer les
transformations de la région. C'est pourquoi nos textes nous montrent des Balkans incapables de
se défendre, n'attendant qu'un conquérant, même si Louis Ier de Hongrie, quelle qu'ait été la
faiblesse de ses adversaires, n'a jamais été capable de remporter de victoire décisive ni sur les
104
Serbes, ni sur les principautés roumaines. En revanche, une fois la Serbie vaincue par les Turcs,
le royaume de Hongrie sera directement menacé et finalement lui aussi incapable de faire face
et de préserver son indépendance. De même, la pression latine a vraisemblablement contribué
au renforcement des identités de la région, y compris sur un plan religieux, et l’on ne peut pas
dire l'union signée à Florence en 1439 ait disposé de beaucoup de soutien ou laissé des traces
dans ces Balkans que nos auteurs nous montrent si proches du ralliement.
Vivant dans un lieu de passage, de mélange et d'affrontement, les peuples des Balkans
sont perçus comme rudimentaires parce qu'ils ne sont pas assez latins, mais pas assez non plus
autre chose pour pouvoir incarner l’altérité. Si le Moyen Âge n’avait pas encore le mot de
Balkans, il avait du moins l'idée de la balkanisation, parce que les Balkans sont un espace qui
n'est défini et regardé qu'à travers sa marginalité, que ce soit vis-à-vis de la chrétienté latine ou
du concert des nations européennes de la Belle Époque. Manque toutefois encore le nom, la
substantialisation, qui fasse de cette région un idéal-type. C'est qu'il manque une dernière
étape pour séparer le destin des Balkans de celui des autres espaces aux marges de l'Europe : la
conquête ottomane. Ce n'est qu'au XIXe siècle, avec l'affaiblissement ottoman, que les Balkans
et leurs peuples peuvent de nouveau apparaître dans leur irréductible diversité et leur position
géographique marginale, et prêter d’ailleurs nombre de leurs caractéristiques à un Proche-Orient
lui-même "balkanisé", à travers la marginalisation et la stigmatisation de l'héritage ottoman.
Bibliographie
SOURCES
BRUNO D’OLMUTZ, Relatio de statu Ecclesiae in Regno Alemanniae, Monumenta Germaniae
Historiae Leges, IV, 3, ed. Jacob Schwalm, 1906, n° 620, p. 589-594.
GOLUBOVICH G., Biblioteca bio-bibliografica della Terra Sante e dell'Oriente francescano, vol.
I, Quaracchi, 1906, vol. II, Quaracchi, 1913, vol. III Quaracchi, 1921
GΌRKA O. (ed.), Anonymi Descriptio Europae Orientalis, Cracoviaea Accademia litterarum,
Cracovie, 1916
Eglise catholique, Pontifica commissio ad redigendum juris canonici orientalis (CICO),
FONTES, series III,
-vol. III, Acta Honorii III et Gregorii IX, éd. Aloisio TAUTU, Rome, 1950
-vol. IV, 1, Acta Innocentii IV, éd. Théodose HALUŠČYNSCKYI et Meletius WOJNAR, Rome,
1962
-vol IV, 2, Acta Alexandri IV, éd. Théodose HALUŠČYNSCKYI et Meletius WOJNAR, Rome, 1966
-vol. V, 1, Acta Urbani IV, Clementis IV, Gregorii X, éd. Aloisio TAUTU, Rome, 1953
-vol. V, 2, Ab Innocentio V ad Benedictum XI, éd. Ferdinand Delorme et Aloisio TAUTU, Rome,
1954
- vol. X, Acta Innocentii VI, éd. AloisioTAUTU Rome, 1961
- vol. XI, Acta Urbani V, éd. Aloisio TAUTU, Rome, 1964
- vol. XII, Acta Gregorii XI, éd. Aloisio TAUTU, Rome, 1966.
Registres et Lettres des Papes du XIIIe siècle (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et
de Rome, série 2)
Registres de Nicolas IV, ed. Ernest LANGLOIS, 1886-1893.
Registres d’Honorius IV, ed. Maurice PROU, 1888.
KERN A., "Der Libellus Notitia Orbis", Archivum fratrum praedicatorum, VIII, 1938
LASIC D., "Fr. Bartholomaei de Alverna, Vicarii Bosniae 1367-1407", Archivum Franciscanum
Historicum, LV, 1962
WADDING L., Annales Minorum , vol VIII, 3 e édition, Quaracchi, 1931.
OUVRAGES CITÉS
BEREND N., At the gate of Christendom, Jews, Muslims and "Pagans" in Medieval Hungary, c.
1000-c. 1300, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001
BOCSAN N., LUMPERDEAN I., POP I. A, Ethnie et confession en Transylvanie, Cluj, 1996
105
CIOCILTAN V., Mongolii şi Marea Neagră în secolele XIII-XIV (Les Mongols et la mer Noire
aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles), Editura Enciclopedica, Bucarest, 1998
DELACROIX-BESNIER C., Les Dominicains et la chrétienté grecque aux XIVe et XVe siècles,
École française de Rome, Rome, 1997
DUCELLIER A., "Les Albanais du XIe au XIIIe siècle : nomades ou sédentaires ?", Byzantinische
Forschungen, VII, Amsterdam, 1979 (repris dans l'Albanie entre Byzance et Venise Xe-XVe
siècles, Londres, Variorum, 1987.)
DUCELLIER A, La façade maritime de l'Albanie au Moyen Age, Durrazo et Valona du XIe au
XVe siècle, Institute for Balkan studies, Thessalonique, 1981
DUCELLIER A., "Aux frontières de la romanité et de l'orthodoxie au Moyen Age: le cas de
l'Albanie", Entre l'Occident et l'Orient, collections du centre d'études "Tourisme et
civilisations", Série Actes, n°5, Nice, 1983 (repris dans L'Albanie entre Byzance et Venise,
Xe -XVe siècles, Variorum, 1987)
DUCELLIER A., La notion d’Europe à Byzance des origines au XIIIe siècle. Quelques réflexions,
Byzantinoslavica, n°55, Prague, 1994, p. 1-8
DVORNIK F., Les Slaves, histoire et civilisation de l'Antiquité aux débuts de l'époque
contemporaine, Seuil, Paris, 1970
FINE J., The early medieval Balkans, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1991
FINE J., The late medieval Balkans, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1994
FÜGEDI E., La formation des villes et des ordres mendiants en Hongrie, Annales, Économies,
Sociétés, Civilisations, XXV, Paris, 1970 (repris dans Kings, Bishops and Burghers in
Medieval Hungary, Londres, Variorum 1986)
HAY D., Europe, the emergence of an idea, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2 e édition,
1968
LE GOFF J., L’Europe est-elle née au Moyen- Âge ? Seuil, Paris, 2003
MULDOON J., "The Avignon Papacy and the Frontiers of Christendom: The evidence of Vatican
Register 62", Archivium Historiae Pontificiae, 17, Rome, 1979, p. 125-195
NICOL D.M., The reluctant Emperor: a biography of John Cantacuzene, Byzantine emperor and
monk, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996
NOUZILLE J., La Moldavie, Bieler, Paris 2004
OBOLENSKY D., The Byzantine Commonwealth, Eastern Europe, 500-1453, 2e édition Phoenix
Press, Londres, 2000.
PARAVICINI BAGGLIANI A., Il trono di Pietro. L'universalità del papato da Alessandro III a
Bonifacio VIII, La nuova Italia scientifica, Rome, 1997
RICHARD J., La papauté et les missions d'Orient (XIIIe-XVe siècles), 2e édition, collection de
l'École française de Rome, Rome, 1998.
TODOROVA M., Imagining the Balkans, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997
TURCUS Ş., Sfântul Scaun şi românii în secolul al XIII-lea (Le Saint-Siège et les Roumains au
XIIIe siècle), Editura Enciclopedica, Bucarest, 2001
WITTHOW M., The making of Orthodox Byzantium, MacmillanPress, Londres, 1996
106
L’evolution de la frontière meridionale de la Maison d’Autriche
au XVIII-ème siècle
Jean NOUZILLE
Les frontières, qui partagent l'espace et marquent les limites de la puissance des Etats,
sont aussi des lieux de contact, d'échange et d'affrontement. <<Les peuples primitifs ignorent le
tracé linéaire et conventionnel, ils sont coutumiers de l'ourlet (Saum) fréquemment vidé de sa
population et isolé des deux Etats par des croyances religieuses... Ratzel avait déjà montré dans
Über allgemeine Eigenschaften der geographischen Grenze (Des propriétés de la frontière
géographique) combien cette évolution de l'ourlet à la ligne fut longue...>>1.
La création, la fixation et le maintien des frontières dépendant des rapports de force
entre Etats voisins. Les frontières du passé, comme celles d'aujourd'hui, ont une relation avec la
politique et avec l'histoire. <<Maintenir et agrandir l'Etat relevait de l'office du prince; et la
frontière s'arrêtait là où surgissait l'obstacle qui arrêtait la puissance>>2.
Les frontières séparant les Etats ont toujours fait l'objet de contestations et de conflits
au cours des siècles et elles ont évolué de la zone floue à la ligne frontière précise. <<Rien n'est
plus familier aux hommes du XXè siècle que l'idée de frontière linéaire. Le mot est à peine
employé dans ce sens au début du XVIIè siècle>>3 d'autant plus qu'il est souvent impossible de
déterminer les contours exacts des circonscriptions administratives à l'intérieur des Etats. De
même, <<l'incertitude qui règne sur les territoires s'étend aux hommes. Le concept de
nationalité, qui paraît si clair aujourd'hui, l'est peu au XVIIè siècle. Les Lorrains, certains
Rhénans (Fürstenberg), Transylvains, Hongrois ou Lithuaniens hésitent entre la France et
l'Empire, l'Autriche, la Pologne et l'Empire ottoman. Sans compter que des <<aventuriers>>,
souvent des soldats, acquerront une nationalité nouvelle et joueront parfois un rôle essentiel : le
prince Eugène, Savoyard, en Autriche, le Tchèque Wallenstein, à la cour de Vienne>>4.
Le concept de frontière militaire ou de confins, partie d'un territoire situé à son
extrême limite et à la frontière d'un autre, est beaucoup plus ancien et ses caractères sont
beaucoup plus complexes que celui de frontière politique. Se présentant sous la forme d'une
bande de terrain plus ou moins profonde, les confins peuvent aussi bien être une base de départ
pour des opérations militaires dans un pays voisin qu'un système défensif fortifié destiné à
enrayer une attaque adverse5.
Les premiers confins militaires, ceux de Croatie et ceux de Hongrie, contiennent
l'avance turque au XVIè et XVIIè siècles. A partir de la fin du XVIIè siècle, les nouveaux
confins militaires autrichiens constituent une barrière destinée à endiguer le flot turc et à isoler
le royaume de Hongrie de tout contact avec l'Empire ottoman. Les confins militaires sont une
véritable zone tampon dépendant directement du Conseil de la guerre (Hofkriegsrat) de Vienne,
étant hors de tout système féodal, et ils sont une partie intégrante de l'armée de l'empereur. Ils
offrent une certaine similitude avec le limes romain, dont la sécurité était assurée par une armée
de mercenaires souvent recrutés localement et par des colonies de limitanei, exploitant les terres
voisines de leurs garnisons pour se procurer leur propre ravitaillement. Comme l'Empire
romain, celui des Habsbourg recherche une frontière naturelle, si possible protégée par un
glacis. Ils forment un Etat militaire autonome, réservoir humain et pépinière de cadres pour
l'armée impériale et royale des Habsbourg.
1
Michel KORINMAN, Quand l'Allemagne pensait le monde. Grandeur et décadence d'une géopolitique,
Paris, 1990, p. 48.
2
Jean DABIN, L'Etat ou le politique, Paris, 1957, p. 30.
33
Edmond PRÉCLIN et Victor-L. TAPIÉ, Le XVIIè siècle, Paris, 1943, p. XI.
4
Ibidem.
5
Jean NOUZILLE, Histoire de frontières. L'Autriche et l'Empire ottoman, Paris, 1991, p. 13.
107
I. - Les premiers confins militaires
Aux XIVè et au XVè siècle, le déferlement des armées turques sur l'Europe du Sud-Est
est à l'origine de nombreux déplacements de population vers le nord et le nord-ouest et nécessite
la création, au sud du royaume de Hongrie, d'une frontière militaire qui s'appuie sur une ligne
de châteaux forts construits sur la ligne du Danube, entre les Portes de Fer et le confluent du
Danube et de la Drave6.
La menace se rapproche rapidement des Etats héréditaires des Habsbourg lorsque les
Ottomans s'emparent en 1463 de Jajce, capitale de la Bosnie, dix ans après la prise de
Constantinople. En 1471, les Turcs pénètrent en Styrie, franchissant ainsi pour la première fois
la frontière du Saint-Empire.
L'un des plus grands dangers qu'aient connus l'Occident et la Chrétienté, le péril turc,
va provoquer l'institution d'un nouveau système défensif, les confins militaires7, destiné à
protéger à la fois le Saint Empire romain germanique et les Etats héréditaires des Habsbourg,
qui en deviennent le bastion avancé.
1.1. - Les confins militaires de Croatie
Dès le 22 décembre 1522, le roi Louis II de Hongrie8 a confié à son beau-frère, l'archiduc
Ferdinand Ier d'Autriche9, la défense de la frontière du royaume de Croatie entre la mer
Adriatique et la Drave. Cette frontière, dont la défense est essentielle pour la sécurité des
possessions des Habsbourg, variera peu de 1522 à 1878. Dès 1523, des troupes autrichiennes
occupent les localités et les châteaux qui jalonnent l'avance turque en Croatie. Les possessions
des Habsbourg et celles du sultan sont séparées par une zone déserte, la nicija zemlja (no man's
land), dans laquelle les villages ont été détruits. Le dépeuplement des confins est dû à la fois
aux massacres perpétrés par les Turcs et à la tactique de la terre brûlée, qui est la seule forme de
défense efficace contre les razzias turques, posant ainsi des problèmes logistiques aux
6
Gjuro SZABO, Srednjovjekovnij gradovi na Dunavo (Les châteaux forts médiévaux sur le Danube),
Belgrade, 1964.
7
Jean NOUZILLE, Le prince Eugène de Savoie et les problèmes des confins militaires autrichiens 16991739, Thèse de doctorat d'Etat, Strasbourg, 1979, 1335 pages; Jean NOUZILLE, <<Les confins militaires
de l'empire des Habsbourg (XVIè-XIXè siècles)>>, in Jean-Christophe ROMER (dir.), Face aux
Barbares, marches et confins d'empires. De la Grande Muraille de Chine au Rideau de Fer, Paris, 2004,
pp. 115-140.
8
Louis II Jagellon (1506-1526), roi de Bohême et de Hongrie de 1516 à 1526, a succédé à son père
Vladilas II (Ulászló II), élu à la mort de Mathias Corvin en 1490 parce que la noblesse hongroise espérait
que la réunion de la Bohême, de la Pologne et de la Hongrie dans la famille des Jagellons permettrait une
meilleure résistance contre les Turcs. Mais Louis II hérite d'un pouvoir royal annihilé par les empiètements
de la grande noblesse et par la révolte des paysans de 1514. En 1522, il épouse Marie de Habsbourg, soeur
de Charles Quint, et fiance sa soeur Anne à Ferdinand d'Autriche, son beau-frère. Battu à Mohács par
Soliman le Magnifique, il se noie en essayant de fuir.
9
Ferdinand Ier (1503-1564) est roi des Romains en 1531 et empereur germanique de 1556 à 1564. Petitfils préféré de Ferdinand II d'Aragon, il est élevé en Espagne. A la suite de son mariage avec Anne de
Hongrie en 1521, son frère Charles-Quint lui reconnaît, par le traité de Worms de 1521, la possession, en
toute souveraineté, des cinq Etats des Habsbourg (Haute- et Basse-Autriche, Carinthie, Styrie, Carniole),
puis, par les conventions de Bruxelles de 1522, le titre de gouverneur des contrées d'Allemagne du Sud, du
Tyrol à la Haute-Alsace. En 1522, sa sœur Marie épouse Louis II de Hongrie. La vie de Ferdinand Ier est
marquée par une double lutte. La première est dirigée contre l'islam, sur le front du Danube, où, après la
mort de Louis II, à Mohács en 1526, il est élu roi de Bohême et de Hongrie, acte de naissance de la
monarchie danubienne, qui, sous le nom d'Autriche-Hongrie à partir de 1867, se maintiendra jusqu'en
1918. Ferdinand doit d'abord contenir la poussée ottomane aux abords de Vienne en 1529 et en 1532. En
1541, il ne peut s'emparer de Buda et doit signer en 1562 une trêve de huit ans contre le versement d'un
tribut annuel au sultan et la reconnaissance, en Transylvanie, de la dynastie rivale de Jean Zapolya. La
deuxième lutte de Ferdinand est dirigée contre les protestants. Il applique à ses Etats la réforme catholique,
inspirée de ses maîtres jésuites. Il accède à l'Empire en 1556 lors de l'abdication de Charles-Quint, mais
cette renonciation à son profit ne sera ratifiée définitivement qu'en 1558. Il assure la succession impériale
à son fils Maximilien II.
108
Ottomans. D'importants mouvements de population ont lieu. <<De cette mêlée de peuples, dont
les dialectes, les religions, les genres de vie sont si variés, sortira la carte démographique et
ethnique du XVIIIè siècle qui, subissant elle-même quelques retouches, ne diffère guère de la
carte actuelle>>10.
A partir de 1530, les milliers de réfugiés chrétiens serbes s'enfuient au fur et à mesure de
l'avance turque vers la Hongrie et vers la Croatie. En 1538, l'archiduc Ferdinand Ier d'Autriche
accorde aux Serbes de Croatie un privilège. En échange de leur service de garde à la frontière, il
leur attribue des terres et autorise le libre exercice de leur religion. En 1563, 55 châteaux,
maisons fortes ou localités fortifiées assurent la défense des confins. Ferdinand Ier décide que
l'Autriche intérieure (Carinthie, Carniole et Styrie) assurera le financement des confins de
Croatie où la milice soldée compte 4 008 hommes armés11. En 1579, la forteresse de Karlstadt
(aujourd'hui Karlovac) est érigée. Elle sera le siège du commandement des confins de Croatie.
La paix de Zsitvatorok du 11 novembre 1606 marque un changement important dans
les relations entre les deux empires, le sultan acceptant pour la première fois de traiter d'égal à
égal avec les Habsbourg. Ce traité confirme les frontières antérieures entre les deux empires. En
ouvrant une ère de paix, le traité de Zsitvatorok permet de poursuivre l'organisation des confins
militaires de Croatie.
Pour mettre un terme aux prétentions de la diète de Croatie, qui réclame le retour des
confins à l'administration civile, l'empereur Ferdinand II12 accorde, le 5 octobre 1630, une
charte dénommée Statuta Valachorum, qui précise les devoirs et les droits des soldats des
confins (Grenzer). Le statut reconnaît le caractère militaire des confins, placés sous le
commandement du colonel général de Karlstadt. L'unité de base des confins est la zadrouga,
communauté qui, unie par les liens du sang, exploite collectivement des biens indivis dont elle
partage équitablement les revenus entre ses membres. Plusieurs communautés forment un
village, qui élit ses chefs civils et militaires. En cas d'alerte, tous les Grenzer âgés de plus de 18
ans doivent prendre les armes et gagner immédiatement les emplacements fixés pour leur
rassemblement. En 2 ou 3 heures, 6 000 à 7 000 hommes armés peuvent ainsi être réunis pour
faire face à une menace turque. En cas de guerre, les Grenzer doivent servir sans solde pendant
les 14 premiers jours.
Occupant une position stratégique importante du système défensif des Habsbourg, les
confins militaires de Croatie bloquent, de 1538 à 1683, les tentatives turques de pénétration en
direction de l'Autriche intérieure et de l'Italie du Nord. Les Habsbourg, dont les problèmes
financiers sont considérables, utilisent la forme de vie en société des Slaves du Sud pour
favoriser la défense de leurs possessions au moyen d'un système efficace et économique.
1.2.- Les confins de Hongrie
Au XVè siècle, la défense des frontières de la Hongrie est assurée par des forteresses
dans lesquelles sont placées des garnisons dont les effectifs, répartis en petites unités de 10 à
100 hommes, appartiennent à la petite noblesse et à la paysannerie.
La prise par les Turcs, en 1521, des importantes forteresses de Belgrade et de Šabac
prépare la voie de leur pénétration en Europe centrale. De Belgrade vont partir toutes les
expéditions turques en direction de la plaine hongroise et du bassin de Vienne.
Le 15 juillet 1526, le château fort de Petrovaradin est pris d'assaut par les Turcs.
Désormais la route de la Hongrie est ouverte. Le 29 août 1526, dans la plaine de Mohács, au
bord du Danube, l'armée hongroise est écrasée par celle de Soliman le Magnifique. Le roi Louis
10
Jugoslavenska Akademija Znanosti, Zagreb, Sign. XVI, 34, Général Raimund (Rade) GRBA, Die
Militärgrenze, Manuscript, Zagreb, s.d., folio 12.
11
Franz VANICEK, Specialgeschichte der Militärgrenze aus Originalquellen und Quellenwerken
geschöpft, Vienne, 1875, tome I, p. 38.
12
Ferdinand II (1578-1637), petit-fils de Ferdinand Ier et neveu de Maximilien II, est empereur
germanique de 1619 à 1637. Il a conservé de son séjour chez les jésuites d'Ingolstadt une foi militante qui
fera de lui, pendant toute sa vie, le champion intransigeant de la Contre-Réforme et sera à l'origine de la
guerre de Trente Ans.
109
II de Hongrie meurt dans cette bataille décisive pour le royaume de Hongrie et pour l'Europe
centrale13. Aucun système défensif n'arrête plus l'armée du sultan, qui remonte le cours du
Danube jusqu'à Vienne, qui est assiégée pour la première fois, du 23 septembre au 16 octobre
1529. La défaite de Mohács a de graves conséquences pour la Hongrie. Les délégués de la petite
noblesse, réunis à Székesfehérvar le 10 novembre 1526, désignent comme roi le voïvode de
Transylvanie, Jean Zapolya (en hongrois Szapolyai), tandis que la haute noblesse, assemblée à
Bratislava le 17 décembre 1526, élit roi de Hongrie l'archiduc Ferdinand Ier d'Autriche, beaufrère de Louis II. Le 18 août 1529 à Mohács, Jean Zapolya doit prêter hommage au sultan. En
août 1532, Ferdinand doit se reconnaître vassal de l'Empire ottoman. En 1541, Soliman le
Magnifique et Ferdinand Ier se partagent la Hongrie. Ferdinand conserve la Hongrie royale,
constituée de la Transdanubie occidentale et des montagnes slovaques, qui s'étend en arc de
cercle de la Drave à la frontière de la Transylvanie. Le sultan maintient sa souveraineté sur la
plus grande partie de la plaine hongroise. La Hongrie turque, dont les limites occidentales sont
fixées approximativement sur la ligne du lac Balaton, incluant les places fortes de
Székesfehérvár, Tata, Esztergom et Visegrád14, bénéficie d'une large autonomie. La principauté
de Transylvanie continue à bénéficier de son autonomie. Le gouvernement de la Hongrie royale
s'installe à Bratislava tandis que le primat de l'Eglise catholique hongroise se replie d'Esztergom
à Nagyszombat (aujourd'hui Trnava).
A l'origine, les confins de Hongrie sont divisés en deux circonscriptions, celle de
Cisdanubie et celle de Transdanubie. Au milieu du XVIè siècle, un certain nombre de
forteresses hongroises tombent aux mains des Turcs, modifiant les limites entre la Hongrie
royale et l'Empire ottoman. En 1552, Mehmed Pacha Sokolovic s'empare des forteresses de
Temesvár (aujourd'hui Timisoara) et de Szolnok ainsi que Arad, Lippa (Lipova) dans la vallée
du Maros, Fâget dans la vallée de la Bega et Caransebes dans la haute vallée du Timis15. tandis
qu'Ali Pacha occupe les forteresses qui commandent la vallée de l'Ipoly, telles que Dregely;
Gyarmat et Salgó, repoussant les limites de l'Empire ottoman vers le nord. En 1566, Pertev
Mehmed Pacha occupe la place forte de Gyula tandis que Soliman le Magnifique s'empare de
Szeged et de Szigetvár.
En 1576, il existe 15 forteresses entre la Drave et la chaîne des Carpates : Kanizsa,
Veszprém, Várpalota, Tata, Pápa et Györ entre la Drave et le Danube, Komárom, Neuhaeusel
(aujourd'hui Nové Zamky), Léva (Levice), Korpona, Eger, Szendrö, Tokaj, Kalló et Szathmár
(Satu Mare) entre le Danube et la frontière de la principauté de Transylvanie. Dans leurs
intervalles et le long du territoire de séparation entre les deux Hongries, ou senki földje (no
man's land), de nombreuses palanques ou châteaux constituent une importante zone de défense
d'une profondeur d'environ 50 km dans les régions les plus menacées par les Turcs, c'est-à-dire
entre la Drave et Szendrö, au nord d'Eger. Du côté turc, la défense contre les Impériaux est
assurée par un système de châteaux et de palanques beaucoup moins dense qu'en Hongrie
royale et dont les points d'appui principaux sont, de l'ouest à l'est, Szigetvár, Pécs, Ercsi, Buda,
Pest, Visegrád, Fülek (aujourd'hui Filakovo), Hatvan et Szolnok, qui font face à la Hongrie
royale, Gyula, Lippa et Temesvár, qui surveillent la frontière de la Transylvanie. En arrière de
la frontière, les forteresses de Becse (Becej), Becskerek (Zrenjanin) et de Belgrade sont plutôt
des bases logistiques contrôlant une partie du cours du Danube.
Le 17 février 1568, le grand vizir Mehmed Pacha Sokolovic16 et Antal Verancsics
(Antun Vrancic), futur archevêque d'Esztergom17 et cardinal primat de Hongrie, négocient dans
13
Ervin LIPTAI, Magyarország hadtörténete (Histoire militaire de la Hongrie), t. I, Budapest, 1984, pp.
157-173.
14
Kálmán BENDA, Magyarország történeti kronológiája (Chronologie de l'histoire de Hongrie),
Budapest, 1982, p. 374.
15
Történelmi Atlasz (Atlas historique), Budapest, 1984, carte 24 a.
16
Mehmed Pacha Sokolovic, en turc Sokullu Mehmed Pacha (1505-1579, issu d'une famille chrétienne
bosniaque, a été enlevé au titre de la devsirme et élevé au sérail. Grand vizir en 1565, il conserve sa
fonction sous le règne des sultans Soliman Ier, Selim II et Murad III, et est le véritable maître de l'Empire
110
leur langue maternelle la paix d'Andrinople18, dont la conclusion permet à la Hongrie de
connaître un quart de siècle sans invasion turque. En 1606, par le traité de paix de Zsitvatorok,
les Turcs, qui renoncent à la Hongrie royale, tandis que le traité de Vienne reconnaît
l'autonomie de la Transylvanie19. La paix de Zsitvatorok du 11 novembre 1606 marque un
affaiblissement de la puissance ottomane face aux Habsbourg et contribue à une relative
stabilité des frontières.
La désignation de Mehmed Köprülü Pacha comme grand vizir, le 15 septembre 1656,
marque le début du redressement politique et militaire de l'Empire ottoman. En 1657, l'armée
turque intervient en Transylvanie où le prince Georges II Rákóczi est entré en rébellion contre
le sultan. L'immixtion de l'empereur Léopold Ier dans les affaires de Transylvanie à partir de
1661 conduit à une nouvelle guerre austro-turque. La campagne de 1663 permet aux Turcs de
s'emparer de plusieurs places fortes, dont celle de Neuhaeusel, en Slovaquie, le 25 septembre.
Malgré les victoires de Léva (Levice, en Slovaquie), le 19 juin 1664, et de SaintGotthard, sur la Rába, le 1er août 1664, l'armée impériale ne peut exploiter ses succès et
l'empereur Léopold Ier doit accepter de signer, le 10 août, la paix de Vasvár, par laquelle il
remet au prince de Transylvanie toutes les forteresses et les palanques occupées par les troupes
impériales depuis 1661 et cède à l'Empire ottoman les places fortes de Neuhaeusel et
d'Oradea20.
La frontière de la Hongrie royale est protégée par une ligne de palanques en arrière de
laquelle sont érigées des forteresses destinées à freiner une avance turque. Les palanques sont
des fortins entourés d'un mur de défense, haut de deux mètres environ, fait de troncs d'arbres.
Ce mur est précédé d'un fossé. De construction aisée dans les régions boisées, la palanque
permet de résister à des raids de troupes légères, mais offre une faible protection contre
l'artillerie lourde turque. En plus des garnisons des forteresses et des palanques, une milice
paysanne peut être levée en cas de danger. Il n'est pas possible de comparer l'organisation des
confins de Hongrie avec les confins militaires de Croatie.
II. - La guerre austro-turque de 1683-1699
La guerre, qui oppose de 1683 à1699 les sultans ottomans21 à l'empereur Léopold Ier
(1658-1703), apporte d'importants changements en Europe centrale où les confins deviennent
mouvants à partir de 1684. Les opérations qui se déroulent dans les confins de Croatie sont de
faible amplitude et se bornent, le plus souvent, à des coups de main et à des razzias. Néanmoins,
le<<pivot>> des confins militaires maintient une grande activité contre les Turcs de Bosnie.
La victoire remportée sur les Turcs, le 12 septembre 1683 sur le Kahlenberg, à l'ouest
de Vienne, marque un tournant décisif de l'histoire de l'Europe22. Consacrant la supériorité de
l'armée des Habsbourg et des contingents alliés, en particulier de l'armée polonaise de Jean III
Sobieski, sur celle des Ottomans, elle encourage une nouvelle politique de la maison d'Autriche,
la politique du Sud-Est ou Südostpolitik. Cette dernière doit déterminer la politique extérieure,
mais aussi intérieure, des Etats héréditaires des Habsbourg, leur évolution future et sceller leur
destin.
Cette nouvelle politique sera caractérisée par :
ottoman. Il renouvelle les traités de paix avec Venise en 1573 et 1575, avec l'Iran en 1574 et avec les
Habsbourg en 1577.
17
Antoine Verancsics est archevêque d'Esztergom du 17 octobre 1569 à sa mort lr 15 juin 1573.
18
Radovan SAMARDJITCH, Mehmed Sokolovitch. Le destin d'un grand vizir, Paris, 1994, p. 254.
19
Kálmán BENDA, op. cit., pp. 430-432.
20
Jean NOUZILLE, <<La politique étrangère de l'empereur Léopold Ier : les années d'impuissance (16581665)>>, in France-Autriche, n° 10, Université de Rouen, 1989, pp. 23-31.
21
Mehmed IV règne de 1648 à 1687, Süleymân II de 1687 à 1691, Ahmed II de 1691 à 1695 et Mustafâ II
Ghazi de 1695 à 1703.
22
Jean NOUZILLE, <<Un combat pour l'Europe : le siège de Vienne, 1683>>, in Revue internationale
d'histoire militaire, n° 83, Vincennes, 2003, pp. 167-196.
111
- la recherche, au Sud du royaume de Hongrie, d'une frontière naturelle, si possible protégée par
un glacis;
- l'implantation aux frontières de colons serbes chargés de la défense des confins et dépendant
directement du Conseil de la guerre (Hofkriegsrat) de Vienne;
- la colonisation et la mise en valeur par des Serbes et des Allemands des régions désertes et
dévastées qui sont reconquises sur les Turcs;
- la mise au pas de la turbulente noblesse hongroise.
A partir de 1683, la frontière austro-turque pivote autour de l'axe fixe que constituent les
confins militaires de Croatie et, par un vaste mouvement tournant dont l'aile gauche s'appuie à
la chaîne des Carpates, se porte successivement :
- en 1699, sur la ligne de la Save, de la Tisza et du Maros (Mures);
- en 1718, au delà de la Save et du Danube pour englober la Serbie septentrionale et la Valachie
occidentale jusqu'à l'Olt;
- en 1739, sur la Save et le Danube, où elle va se stabiliser jusqu'en 1878.
En arrière de la nouvelle frontière, et même à l'intérieur des confins, l'implantation,
désirée par le prince Eugène de Savoie, de colons d'origine germanique, en particulier dans le
Banat et dans la Backa, vient jalonner la progression autrichienne dans le Sud-Est européen.
2.1. - La reconquête de la Hongrie
Après la victoire du Kahlenberg, la poursuite de l'armée ottomane en retraite n'est pas
immédiatement engagée pour des raisons tactiques, logistiques et politiques. Ce n'est que sous
l'impulsion du pape Innocent XI que l'empereur Léopold Ier se décide à poursuivre les
Ottomans. Le 5 mars 1684, une Sainte Ligue est conclue entre le pape, l'empereur, le roi de
Pologne, la République de Venise, puis la Moscovie. Le duc Charles V de Lorraine23 entreprend
le 19 juin le siège de Buda, qui doit être levé le 3 novembre car l'armée impériale est décimée
par les maladies. En quelques semaines, 20 000 hommes et 30 000 chevaux meurent devant
Buda24.
En 1685, grâce à la trêve conclue à Ratisbonne avec la France, l'empereur peut
repousser les offres de paix faites par le sultan. Tandis que les Turcs viennent assiéger Visegrád
et Esztergom, sur le Danube, les Impériaux assiègent Neuhaeusel. Le 19 août, Neuhaeusel est
prise et <<la garnison a esté passée au fil de l'épée>>25.
Au mois de mai 1686, Charles de Lorraine décide d'assiéger Buda26. Après plusieurs
tentatives, les troupes impériales partent à l'assaut de la citadelle, le 2 septembre 1686. A 17
heures, Buda est aux mains des Impériaux qui <<avaient passé au fil de l'épée tous les Turcs et
les Juifs>>27. A la suite de la prise de Buda, la plus grande partie de la Hongrie est libérée à
l'exception de Székesfehérvár28.
Au début de 1687, les Turcs font des offres de paix sur les bases du traité de Vasvár de
1664, mais elles sont rejetées par la cour de Vienne. Le 12 août 1687, le duc de Lorraine bat les
Turcs, à l'ouest de Mohács, près de Nagyharsány. Exploitant rapidement ce succès, le duc fait
occuper Osijek, sur la Drave, le 29 septembre. En octobre, la moyenne Slavonie est libérée par
les Impériaux. Avec le gros de ses troupes, le duc de Lorraine pénètre en Transylvanie et, le 18
octobre, fait occuper sa capitale Klausenbourg (aujourd'hui Cluj-Napoca). Sans l'appui des
Turcs, le prince Michel Apafi ne peut résister aux Impériaux. Le 27 octobre, par le traité de
Blasendorf (aujourd'hui Blaj), Michel Apafi accepte l'entrée des troupes impériales dans 12
23
Jean NOUZILLE, <<Charles de Lorraine, les Habsbourg et la guerre contre les Turcs de 1683 à
1687>>, in Les Habsbourg et la Lorraine, Presses universitaires de Nancy, 1988, pp. 109-121.
24
Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères (AE), Paris, Correspondance politique (CP), Autriche,
vol. 56, folio 256.
25
Ibid., Autriche, vol. 59, folio 32.
26
Ibid., Turquie, vol. 18, folio 53.
27
Ibid., Autriche, vol. 59, folio 294.
28
Jean NOUZILLE, <<Les Impériaux et la reconquête de la Hongrie>>, in Cahiers d'histoire hongroise,
Université de Paris III, 1989, n° 1, pp. 16-35.
112
forteresses transylvaines, s'engage à approvisionner une partie importante de l'armée impériale
et à verser 700 000 florins à l'empereur29. Le 9 mai 1688, par le traité d'Hermannstadt (Sibiu), la
Transylvanie est placée sous le protectorat de l'empereur30.
En quatre ans, les Turcs ont été rejetés à 350 km au sud-est de Vienne grâce aux
victoires du duc de Lorraine. Le but de la prochaine campagne doit être la prise de Belgrade. Le
6 octobre 1688, Belgrade est prise après 167 années d'occupation turque.
Lorsque l'armée impériale pénètre en Serbie et en Bosnie en 1689, des milliers de
Serbes prennent les armes pour conduire des opérations de guerilla contre les Ottomans au
profit des Autrichiens. En novembre 1689, le patriarche serbe, Arsène III Crnojevic, prête
serment de fidélité à l'empereur. Il lie ainsi son sort et celui de son peuple à l'empereur, ce qui
aura des conséquences incalculables pour la destinée ultérieure des Serbes. Le ralliement du
patriarche entraîne le soulèvement des Serbes et des Albanais orthodoxes contre les Turcs. Le
16 avril 1690, Léopold Ier adresse une proclamation aux peuples des Balkans et précise le but
de la guerre contre les Ottomans. Il promet à tous les peuples de leur rendre la liberté ancestrale,
de rétablir la liberté confessionnelle et l'ordre juridique antérieur à la conquête ottomane. Mais
le sort des armes est défavorable à l'armée impériale qui est contrainte à la retraite sur la ligne
du Danube. L'armée impériale est suivie par le patriarche de Pec et par une nombreuse
population serbe et albanaise, effrayée par les massacres commis par les Turcs et les Albanais
musulmans sur les Albanais chrétiens qui s'étaient révoltés en 168931. Le repli des Serbes,
venant notamment du Kosovo, s'effectue en direction de Belgrade, où ils commencent à arriver
le 18 juin 1690. Le nombre des réfugiés serbes a été très discuté. Le patriarche parle de 40 000
familles qui l'auraient suivi et certains historiens serbes affirment que le nombre des réfugiés
serbes aurait atteint 400 000 personnes. Le 21 août 1690, Léopold Ier fait publier un diplôme
impérial, dans lequel il prend connaissance de l'intention des Serbes de vouloir vivre sous sa
protection et décide de faire droit à leurs demandes et de leur assurer différentes libertés. C'est
la première charte de l'autonomie des Serbes dans les possessions des Habsbourg.
La forteresse de Belgrade, clé de la Hongrie méridionale, est de nouveau aux mains
des Ottomans le 9 octobre 169032. Les réfugiés serbes franchissent le Danube et la Save pour
rester sous la protection des Impériaux. Après l'arrivée des Serbes en Hongrie, Léopold Ier
ordonne, dans sa charte de protection signée le 11 décembre 1690 et transmise à la chancellerie
hongroise, aux autorités ecclésiastiques et laïques de Hongrie de respecter les privilèges
accordés aux Serbes. A tous ces privilèges s'ajoute le diplôme de confirmation publié le 4 mars
1695 par l'entremise de la chancellerie hongroise. Se référant aux décrets de Mathias Corvin de
1481 et de Vladislas II de 1495, Léopold Ier accorde à toute la nation serbe l'exemption de la
dîme au clergé catholique et ordonne en même temps aux Serbes d'employer cette dîme à
l'entretien de leur propre clergé.
Les opérations militaires ne permettant pas de rejeter les Turcs, l'empereur décide, le
1er mai 1694, que les réfugiés serbes recevront des terrains entre le Danube et la Tisza dans les
comitats de Bács, Bodrog, Csongrád, Csanád et Arad où ils peuplent des régions désertes le
long du Danube. Une commission d'inspection rapportera, en 1699, que les Serbes ne possèdent
aucune maison forte, mais qu'ils logent sous la tente ou dans des abris creusés dans la terre pour
pouvoir changer facilement d'emplacement en cas de besoin33.
L'épiscopat et les grands propriétaires nobles de Hongrie protestent contre l'exemption
de la dîme et de la contribution accordée aux Serbes et contre le fait qu'ils sont indépendants des
comitats hongrois. Mais les exemptions sont confirmées par les patentes impériales du 16 juin
29
Kálmán BENDA, op. cit., p. 510.
Ibid., p. 511.
31
Joseph von HAMMER-PURGSTALL, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, Pest, 1827-1835, tome III,
p. 839.
32
Ibid., pp. 843 et suivantes.
33
Karl von CZOERNIG, Ethnographie der oesterreichischen Monarchie, Vienne, 1885, tome III, pp. 9597.
30
113
34
et du 1er juillet 1698 et des 20 mars, 2 juin et 21 juillet 1699 . La patente la plus intéressante
est celle du 1er juillet 1698, par laquelle le comte Guido de Starhemberg est chargé d'installer
les Serbes le long de la future frontière de telle manière que ceux qui sont aptes à porter les
armes soient astreints à monter la garde à la frontière, les autres devant s'adonner à l'agriculture.
Pour inciter les Serbes à se rendre dans les confins austro-turcs, la patente précise qu'ils ne
seront exempts d'impôts et de charges que dans cette région. Finalement, les Serbes préfèrent la
vie libre du soldat à celle du paysan hongrois taillable et corvéable à merci. Jusqu'à la paix, les
Serbes ne sont en Hongrie que des hôtes temporaires placés sous la protection de l'empereur-roi,
mais ils se rapprochent de la frontière où ils vont jouer un rôle primordial dans la défense de la
Chrétienté contre les Turcs.
Le 5 juillet 1697, l'empereur Léopold Ier nomme le prince Eugène de Savoie
commandant de l'armée impériale en Hongrie. Le 26 août, il est rejoint par le corps d'armée du
comte de Vaudémont et, le 1er septembre, par celui du comte Jean-Louis de Bussy-Rabutin,
commandant les troupes de Transylvanie. Le 11 septembre, le prince Eugène surprend l'armée
ottomane lorsqu'elle franchit la Tisza à Zenta et lui inflige une sévère défaite. Le grand vizir
Elmas Mehmed Pacha est tué et le sultan Mustafa II s'enfuit en direction de Timisoara35. Le
prince Eugène effectue un raid en Bosnie, s'emparant, le 22 octobre, de Sarajevo qu'il incendie
avant de se replier en Slavonie.
A Vienne, le Conseil de la guerre se prépare à une nouvelle campagne contre les Turcs
et décide de porter les effectifs de l'infanterie à 60 000 hommes et de la cavalerie à 30 000
hommes. Mais le gouvernement de Vienne éprouve de graves difficultés en raison de
l'épuisement des pays héréditaire des Habsbourg et sa mauvaise administration financière. A la
fin du mois de juillet 1698, il n'est plus question pour le prince Eugène d'envisager
d'entreprendre le siège de Belgrade. Du côté turc, l'armée ottomane est incapable de reprendre
l'offensive. Le nouveau grand vizir, Hüseyin Pacha, entame des négociations de paix par
l'intermédiaire des ambassadeurs d'Angleterre et des Provinces-Unies à Constantinople.
2.2. - La paix de Karlowitz
Le traité de paix de Karlowitz (aujourd'hui Sremski Karlovci) du 26 janvier 1699,
conclu pour une période de 25 ans, reconnaît à l'empereur la possession de la principauté de
Transylvanie (article 1) et du royaume de Hongrie, à l'exception du Banat. L'article 2 précise
que les Autrichiens ne doivent pas construire de forteresses le long de la Tisza et du Maros,
cours d'eau dont l'usage est commun aux deux empires. L'article 3 indique que l'empereur
conserve la Backa sans pouvoir y édifier de fortifications. Le texte du traité définit la nouvelle
frontière entre les deux empires. De l'ouest vers l'est, elle est marquée par le cours de la Save,
de la Tisza et du Maros (en roumain Mures). Les possessions des Habsbourg sont séparées de la
Bosnie et de la Serbie par le cours de la Save jusqu'au confluent avec la rivière Bosut. En
Syrmie, selon l'article 4, la frontière est matérialisée par le cours de la Bosut sur une vingtaine
de kilomètres jusqu'au village de Morovic. De là, le tracé de la frontière est artificiel et relie, en
ligne droite, Morovic au confluent du Danube et de la Tisza, près de Titel. Ensuite, en direction
du nord, la frontière est marquée par le cours de la Tisza jusqu'à son confluent avec le Maros,
sur une distance d'environ 130 km. Au nord du Banat, la frontière est matérialisée par le cours
du Maros (en roumain, Mures) sur environ 200 km jusqu'à la frontière avec la Transylvanie36.
Sur la Save, d'après l'article 5, les fortifications de Bosanski Brod doivent être détruites lors de
l'évacuation par les troupes impériales. Du côté autrichien, le commissaire général de la
délimitation des frontières méridionales est le comte Luigi Ferdinando de Marsigli37. Le traité
34
Johann Heinrich SCHWICKER, Politische Geschichte der Serben in Ungarn, Budapest, 1880, p. 15.
Kálmán BENDA, op. cit., pp. 520-521.
36
Gabriel Efendi NORADOUNGHIAN, Recueil d'actes internationaux de l'Empire ottoman, tome I,
Paris-Leipzig, 1897, pp. 193-196.
37
Luigi Ferdinando de Marsigli est né et mort à Bologne (1658-1730). En 1679, il accompagne à
Constantinople le sénateur Ciurani, ancien gouverneur de la Dalmatie vénitienne, qui est nommé
ambassadeur dans la capitale ottomane. Après avoir séjourné onze mois à Constantinople, il entre au
35
114
de paix de Karlowitz est suivi d'actes, de conventions et de règlements qui sont destinés à
consolider la paix et à fixer avec précision les limites entre les deux empires, notamment l'acte
général du 15 avril 1701 concernant la délimitation entre l'Autriche et la Turquie sur la base de
la paix de Karlowitz.
Il est certain que les mémoires demandés par l'empereur à trois maréchaux - LouisGuillaume de Bade, Aeneas Caprara et Eugène de Savoie - ont influencé le tracé de la nouvelle
frontière austro-turque. Dans son mémoire du 28 août 1698, le prince Eugène de Savoie estime
qu'il faut fortifier trois frontières : l'une dans le quadrilatère formé par le Danube, la Tisza, le
Maros et les frontières de la Transylvanie, la seconde entre la Drave, le Danube et la Save, c'està-dire la Slavonie, et la troisième sur le cours de l'Una en Croatie38. La demande du prince
Eugène ne peut être complètement réalisée et il faudra attendre le traité de paix de Passarowitz,
en 1718, pour acquérir le Banat. La demande du prince Eugène semble s'inspirer des principes
alors chers à Louis XIV et au maréchal de Vauban. En effet, <<fort logiquement, Vauban
considérait qu'une frontière linéaire serait d'autant plus efficace qu'elle s'appuierait sur un
accident naturel du terrain, eau ou montagne, et le contrôlerait parfaitement>>39. Si le tracé de
la frontière est linéaire, sa défense est organisée en profondeur et le prince Eugène sait très bien
que <<du XIVè au XVIIè siècle, les frontières de la France se marquent dans les esprits comme
dans les faits par une ligne de plus en plus épaisse>>40. Il en sera de même pour la frontière
méridionale des possessions des Habsbourg, où s'organiseront et se développeront
progressivement les confins militaires. Dans l'immédiat, le Conseil de la guerre de Vienne
dispose, le long de la nouvelle frontière, des postes de surveillance occupés par des réfugiés
serbes, qui assurent ainsi la sécurité des confins où il n'est pas possible de construire des
forteresses ou de maintenir des unités de l'armée impériale, les finances autrichiennes étant dans
un désordre extraordinaire41.
III. - La mise en place des confins
Avant la fin de la guerre austro-turque, le gouvernement de Vienne envisage de porter
la nouvelle frontière des possessions des Habsbourg sur la Save et le Danube. Des projets sont
élaborés pour y implanter les Serbes et pour les charger de défendre les nouveaux confins.
3.1. - Les préparatifs
Le comte Heissler von Heitersheimb a préparé un plan pour transformer la milice serbe
en troupe régulière. Il suggère de former 24 compagnies de 100 fantassins et 5 compagnies à
cheval de 50 hussards pour occuper des garnisons le long de la frontière du Danube, de la Tisza
et pour couvrir le secteur de Syrmie42. Mais les moyens financiers font défaut43. En 1695, le
service de l'empereur en 1680. Fait prisonnier en 1683 près de Györ par les Tatares, il est vendu par eux au
pacha de Timisoara. Il assiste du côté turc au siège de Vienne. Libéré en 1684, il reprend du service dans
l'armée autrichienne. Ses connaissances de la Hongrie et des provinces frontières de l'Empire ottoman le
font employer à la conférence de paix de Karlowitz et il est chargé de négocier la fixation des nouvelles
frontières austro-turques. Général, géographe et naturaliste, il sera plus tard membre de l'Académie des
sciences de Paris et de la Société royale de Londres. En 1711, il fonde l'Institut des arts et des sciences de
Bologne. Son ouvrage Breve ristretto del saggio fisico intorno alla storia del mare, traduit en 1725 sous le
titre d'Histoire physique de la mer, fait de lui le vrai fondateur de l'océanographie. Il est également l'auteur
de L'état militaire de l'Empire ottoman, ses progrès et sa décadence, paru à La Haye et à Amsterdam en
1732.
38
Feldzüge des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen (Feldzüge), tome II, Supplément, pp. 102-105; Friedrich
Jakob HELLER von HELLWALD, Militärische Korrespondenz des Prinzen Eugen von Savoyen, Vienne,
1848, tome I, pp. 175-180.
39
Bernard GUÉNÉE, <<Les limites>>, in La France et les Français, Paris, 1972, p. 63.
40
Ibid., p. 64.
41
Max GRÜNWALD, Samuel Oppenheimer und sein Kreis, Vienne-Leipzig, 1913.
42
Kurt WESSELY, <<Neuordnung der ungarischen Grenzen>>, in Die k. k. Militärgrenze, Vienne, 1973,
p. 44.
43
KA, Vienne, Hoffinanz Hungarn, Rote Nr 366, folios 121-130.
115
comte Heissler propose d'installer les Serbes à la frontière sud-est de la Hongrie pour la défense
de laquelle il prévoit 6 100 Serbes. Ce plan est accepté par l'empereur, mais ne peut être réalisé
faute d'argent. Cependant, le Conseil de la guerre ordonne au général Guido von Starhemberg,
commandant la Slavonie, et au général Léopold Schlick, commandant la Backa, de favoriser
l'installation des Serbes le long de la frontière méridionale44.
Le 30 mai 1697, le général Guido von Starhemberg souhaite renforcer la défense le
long du Danube et de la Save par l'occupation de postes de surveillance et envisage la
séparation des Serbes en deux catégories, les paysans dépendant de la Chambre des comptes de
Vienne et les soldats subordonnés directement à l'empereur et à ses officiers. Le plan
Starhemberg accorde, à côté du paiement de la solde, la libre jouissance d'un terrain45.
Conformément aux résolutions des 18 octobre et 7 décembre 1697, la Commission
d'inspection et d'organisation des nouvelles acquisitions en Hongrie, Croatie et Slavonie
(Commission zur Visit und Einrichtung der neuen Acquisiten in Hungarn, Croatien und
Slavonien), envoyée par la Chambre des comptes de Vienne sous la présidence du comte
Ferdinand Caraffa, commence l'organisation de la Slavonie. Le général Guido von Starhemberg
est adjoint à cette commission46. Starhemberg a obtenu du gouvernement de Vienne que le
territoire militaire des confins soit une bande de terrain d'une heure de marche, mais les
commissaires de la Chambre des comptes estiment cette largeur exagérée car elle ferait perdre
un certain nombre d'impositions à la Chambre. Ils estiment également que les effectifs
demandés par Starhemberg, au total 6 550 hommes, sont excessifs car leur entretien se
monterait à 142 678 florins par an. Starhemberg transmet à Vienne un nouveau rapport et
demande au gouvernement de prendre une décision au sujet de la séparation de la Slavonie en
territoire civil et territoire militaire. Pour calmer l'impatience des Serbes, le gouvernement de
Vienne les assure, le 21 juillet 1698, que la désignation de leurs futures résidences est
terminée47.
Tandis qu'une partie des régiments hongrois est dissoute en 1699 pour des raisons
d'économie et que la destruction des forteresses, rendues inutiles par le déplacement de la
frontière vers le sud, doit commencer en 1702, le Conseil de la guerre de Vienne envisage la
création d'un district frontière fortifié, qui pourrait être dirigé aussi bien vers l'extérieur que vers
l'intérieur des possessions des Habsbourg. Les Serbes, qui ont combattu contre les Turcs aux
côté de l'armée impériale, craignent d'être défavorisés par l'élaboration d'un système défensif
d'autant plus que leurs privilèges sont de plus en plus combattus par la noblesse hongroise.
Profitant de cette situation, les Turcs s'efforcent avec un certain succès d'inciter les réfugiés
serbes à revenir en Serbie pour mettre le pays en valeur. L'ensemble du pays situé à proximité
de la nouvelle frontière est un véritable désert. Le maréchal de Villars, ambassadeur de France à
Vienne, donne une explication de ce dépeuplement. <<La désertion est grande des peuples
voisins de la frontière des Turcs qui quittent autant qu'ils peuvent les terres de la domination de
l'Empereur pour passer sous celle du Sultan. Il est vray que les troupes, les gouverneurs et les
seigneurs du pays traitent ces peuples avec une vigueur outrée>>48. C'est la raison pour laquelle,
le 2 juin 1699, Léopold Ier accorde un nouveau privilège aux Serbes installés en Syrmie et, le
21 juillet 1699, à toute la nation serbe, qui a rendu des services considérables aux Habsbourg au
cours de la guerre contre les Turcs.
Les acquisitions de la paix de Karlowitz nécessitent la mise en place aux frontières
d'une garde permanente. C'est dans ce but que sont créés les confins militaires de la Save, du
Danube ainsi que de la Tisza et du Maros. Les Serbes, qui tiennent déjà des positions
échelonnées le long de la frontière, sont immédiatement disponibles pour remplir cette mission
44
KA, Vienne, HKR, Prot., Reg., 1695, folios 312-355.
KA, Vienne, HKR, Prot., Reg., 10. Juni 1697.
46
KA, Vienne, Chronologische Aktenauszüge Slawonien, Ordre du Conseil de la guerre au général Guido
von Starhemberg en date du 27 juin 1698.
47
KA, Vienne, Insinuat des Hofkriegsrates an die oesterreichische Hofkanzlei vom 26. Juli 1698,
Kanzleiakt 154/1.
48
AE, Paris, CP, Autriche, vol. 72, folio 77, 20 juin 1699.
45
116
défensive. Le Conseil de la guerre estime que les confins de la Tisza et du Maros devraient être
fortifiés en priorité car ils défendent les communications par la plaine entre la Hongrie centrale
et la Transylvanie. C'est la raison pour laquelle <<l'on envoye le comte Schlick pour faire
travailler vivement aux fortifications de Szegedin (Szeged) et d'Harad (Arad). L'on a fait un
fonds de 400 000 florins et l'on doit faire camper près de ces deux places la plupart des troupes
qui sont sur les frontières de Hongrie et dans la Transylvanie>>49. Pour la Slavonie, les
premières mesures de protection concernant la nouvelle frontière méridionale sont prises par
une commission itinérante des frontières (Grenzbereisungscommission), présidée à tour de rôle
par le comte de Marsigli et par le comte Rabatta. Cette commission propose d'établir un fort
cordon de surveillance et de démolir les châteaux et tours de garde qui pourraient servir de
points d'appui aux Turcs en cas de reprise des opérations militaires. Les rives de la Save, en
Slavonie, et du Danube, en aval de Vukovar, offrent un terrain propice à l'édification d'une ligne
fortifiée.
Le 26 juin 1699, le Conseil de la guerre de Vienne demande au général Guido de
Starhemberg, commandant militaire de la Slavonie, et au général Léopold Schlick, commandant
des troupes stationnées le long de la Tisza et du Maros, de rédiger un rapport concernant la
milice serbe, en se prononçant sur son maintien éventuel, sur son installation dans les confins et
sur une possible séparation des Serbes en deux catégories, l'une destinée à fournir les soldats
des confins, l'autre destinée à retourner à l'état de paysan. Le Conseil de la guerre envisage la
séparation des territoires des confins en deux parties, l'une devant être soumise à
l'administration militaire, l'autre devant être rendue à l'administration civile50. Après l'étude des
rapports des deux généraux par la Conférence secrète du 29 août 1699, l'empereur demande au
Conseil de la guerre et à la Chambre des comptes de se mettre d'accord afin de séparer la
Slavonie en territoire civil et en territoire militaire51. Considérée comme un bien appartenant en
propre à l'empereur, la Slavonie voit son administration confiée à la Chambre des comptes de
Vienne, qui partage le pays en un certain nombre de districts. A l'intérieur de ces districts, la
Chambre des comptes crée de grands domaines qui font l'objet de donations de la part de
l'empereur ou de ventes réalisées à son profit. De grandes familles nobles acquièrent
d'immenses domaines de Slavonie.
La délimitation des frontières et la préparation de leur défense sont confiées à une
commission présidée par le comte Luigi Ferdinando de Marsigli. Cette commission est chargée
d'étudier la création de deux généralats des confins, celui de la Save et du Danube, en SlavonieSyrmie, et celui de la Tisza et du Maros52. Dans les instructions qui lui ont été données, il est
demandé à la commission de constituer une milice locale et un cordon de surveillance de la
frontière, de veiller à ce que les nouveaux confins soient indépendants des comitats hongrois et
de laisser aux populations des confins à la fois la jouissance de la propriété foncière et la libre
disposition de la forêt. Le recensement de la population de la Slavonie par les Autrichiens
constate l'existence de 143 462 habitants. La Slavonie est un véritable désert. En 1777,
Friedrich Wilhelm von Taube écrit que vingt ans plus tôt la Slavonie a été tirée du chaos et
semble avoir été récemment créée53. En 1809, Johann Andreas Demian le confirme en affirmant
<<qu'il n'y a pas soixante ans que l'on ne voyait pas un seul village dans toute la Slavonie. Les
hommes vivaient dans des huttes de terre comme les sauvages. Ce n'est que depuis peu qu'ils
49
AE, Paris, CP, Autriche, vol. 72, folio 77, 20 juin 1699.
Aleksa IVIC, <<Istorija Srba u Vojvodini od najstarijih vremena do osnivanja potisko-pomoriska
granice>> (Histoire des Serbes de Voïvodine des temps anciens à la création des confins militaires de la
Tisza et du Maros), in Knijige Matice Srpske, n° 50, Novi Sad, 1929, p. 5719.
51
Kriegsarchiv (KA), Vienne, Hoffinanz Hungarn, 14.735, Nr 403, folio 157.
52
Arhiv Hrvatske Zagreb (Archives de Croatie), Slavonska Generalkomanda (Commandement général de
Slavonie), Année 1701, Boîte 1, Année 1702, Boîte 1, Kriegsartikel, Année 1728, Boîte 2, Actes 8-9.
53
Friedrich Wilhelm von TAUBE, Historische und geographische Beschreibung des Koenigreiches
Slavonien und des Herzohthumes Syrmien, Leipzig, 1777, tpme I, p. 5.
50
117
ont commencé à se réunir dans des villages et à bâtir des maisons comme les autres peuples de
l'Europe>>54.
En 1699, la sécurité de la frontière méridionale est assurée par un cordon de tchardaques (du
serbe cardak, tour), postes de garde entourés de palissades, situés le long de la Save à un quart
d'heure les uns des autres. Dans l'impossibilité de solder les Serbes, le Conseil de la guerre
décide de les rétribuer en nature en leur attribuant des terres, ce qui a aussi l'avantage de les
sédentariser. Cependant, il est porté à la connaissance de la milice des confins qu'elle pourrait
être astreinte à servir hors des confins55. Le 24 janvier 1702, la commission des frontières a
terminé ses travaux.
3.2. - Les nouveaux confins méridionaux
L'instruction publiée par le Conseil de la guerre le 23 mai 1702 libère les Serbes de
l'administration des comitats hongrois, garantit le libre exercice de la religion orthodoxe et
prépare la reconnaissance de la zadrouga comme élément de base des confins militaires56. Elle
fixe l'organisation du système de défense, les effectifs, l'emplacement des retranchements et des
tours de garde ainsi que les postes de la milice à l'intérieur des confins, la répartition de la
population des confins et l'attribution des terres en usufruit.
Un général doit être placé à la tête des deux généralats, celui de Slavonie ayant son
poste de commandement à Osijek et celui de la Tisza et du Maros, dont le poste de
commandement est à Szeged. Les forteresses de Slavonski Brod et d'Osijek sont placées sous
les ordres du général commandant en Slavonie, celles d'Arad, de Szeged et de Zabalj sont
subordonnées au général commandant les confins de la Tisza et du Maros. Les effectifs
purement autrichiens s'élèvent à 21 hommes en Slavonie et 18 hommes dans l'autre généralat.
A. Les confins de la Save et du Danube
Les effectifs des confins de la Save et du Danube, articulés en trois capitaineries
supérieures (Oberkapitanate) et neuf capitaineries, sont répartis en 14 garnisons et comprennent
19 compagnies de 50 cavaliers (hussards) et 15 compagnies de 100 fantassins (haïdouks), soit
un total de 2 450 Grenzer pour surveiller une frontière de plus de 400 km..
Le <<peuple des tchardaques>> (Tschardakenvolk) n'est prévu que pour les confins de
Slavonie. Un cordon de tchardaques est installé le long de le frontière à une distance d'une
demi-heure de marche entre elles, soit de 2 à 3 km. La chaîne de postes de garde, qui conduit de
Kosutarica, en aval de Jasenovac sur la Save, à celle de Zarusavi sur le Bosut près de Morovic
appartient aux confins de la Save, celle qui conduit de Morovic jusqu'au confluent du Danube et
de la Tisza forme les confins du Danube57. Les 90 tchardaques des confins de la Save figurent
dans la liste d'août 170358 et sont réparties en 15 compagnies de 6 tchardaques chacune. Chaque
tchardaque est occupée par un caporal et 30 hommes et six tchardaques forment une compagnie
de 191 hommes avec son état-major. <<Le service de sentinelle se faisait au moyen de tours de
garde que l'on voit encore pour la plupart et qui étaient munies d'un système de signaux au
moyen desquels toute la population valide de l'Adriatique aux Carpathes pouvait être appelée
aux armes en quelques heures>>59. Les tchardaques resteront en service jusqu'à la dissolution
des confins militaires de Slavonie en 1881.
54
Johann Andreas DEMIAN, Tableau géographique et politique des royaumes de Hongrie, d'Esclavonie
et de la grande principauté de Transylvanie, Paris, 1809, tome II, chapitre III.
55
Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA), Vienne, Illyrico-Serbica, Fasc. 1, Conv. B, folios 136-137.
56
KA, Vienne, Hofkriegsrat (HKR), Expedit, August 1703, Nr 547, 23 mai 1702.
57
Ibid., Actum Morovic (311 pages), Organisierung der Save- und Donau-Grenze. Cet acte comprend la
Résolution du 15 août 1700, Kzl A VII 161 (36 pages) et la Résolution du 23 mai 1702, Kzl A VII 169 (62
pages) et il donne la liste des tchardaques.
58
Ibid., folios 9-10.
59
A. de CAIX de SAINT-AYMOUR, Les pays slaves de l'Autriche-Hongrie, Paris, 1883, p. 32.
118
L'acte de constitution des confins militaires, rédigé par la commission itinérante des
frontières le 30 novembre 1702, fixe les effectifs affectés à la défense des confins militaires de
Slavonie.
La milice locale régulière (reguläre Landmiliz), qui est stationnée dans des postes
situés à l'intérieur des confins, comprend 1 500 fantassins et 950 cavaliers tandis que le
<<peuple des tchardaques>>, répartis dans les tours de garde le long de la frontière, s'élève à 3
199 hommes. Outre la garde à la frontière, la milice doit assurer la garde des magasins
d'approvisionnement, patrouiller à l'intérieur du pays pour lutter contre les brigands et les
contrebandiers, participer aux travaux de fortification à partir de 1714. Les redoutes de Backa
Palanka, Vilova, Kovilj et Titel, le retranchement de Petrovaradin et la capitainerie d'Ilok sont
incorporés aux confins du Danube. Les confins du Danube et de la Save sont placés sous les
ordres du commandant général en Slavonie, dont le premier titulaire est le feld-maréchal Guido
de Starhemberg de 1698 à 1734.
Dans les confins militaires, seuls les généraux, les commandants des forteresses et les
membres de l'état-major perçoivent un traitement en espèces. Les officiers et les sous-officiers
serbes ne reçoivent qu'un tiers de leur solde en espèces. Pour l'équivalence des deux autres tiers,
ils reçoivent en usufruit une certaine superficie de terrains labourables et de prairies. A titre
d'exemple, un Oberkapitän reçoit 312 arpents de terres labourables et 69 arpents de prairies,
l'arpent valant 57, 554 ares60. Le hussard reçoit 24 arpents de terres labourables et 5 arpents de
prairies, le haïdouk respectivement 18 et 4 arpents.
En comparant les soldes des Grenzer à celles des troupes régulières de l'armée
impériale, il est facile de constater l'importante économie réalisée par l'empereur pour l'entretien
de plusieurs milliers de soldats installés en permanence à proximité immédiate de la frontière
austro-turque et pour lesquels il n'est pas nécessaire d'assurer un ravitaillement coûteux dont le
transport est difficile à réaliser. Un capitaine de hussards des confins coûte presque cinq fois
moins cher qu'un capitaine de hussards de l'armée impériale. Un sous-officier de cavalerie des
confins coûte trois fois moins cher qu'un sous-officier de cavalerie de l'armée impériale. Enfin,
un cavalier des confins coûte la moitié de celui de l'armée impériale tandis que la solde du
fantassin représente les 4/7è de celle du fantassin régulier.
60
L'arpent de terre labourable est appelé Joch et celui de prairie est dénommé Tagwerk.
119
Les frais d'entretien des confins militaires de Slavonie sont supportés par les sept
comitats hongrois voisins, par l'intermédiaire desquels la Chancellerie hongroise souhaiterait
conserver une certaine influence sur ces territoires61.
B. Les confins de la Tisza et du Maros
La navigation sur la Tisza, aur 130 km, et sur le Maros, sur 200 km, étant autorisée aux
ressortissants des deux empires, les Autrichiens ne doivent construire aucune forteresse sur les
bords de ces deux cours d'eau, de même que dans la Backa.
Les effectifs des confins de la Tisza et du Maros sont répartis dans sept postes placés
sous les ordres d'un Oberkapitän et comptent 10 compagnies de 100 haïdouks et 18 compagnies
61
Alfons von WREDE, Geschichte der k. u. k. Wehrmacht, Vienne, 1898-1903, tome I, p. 201.
120
de 50 hussards, soit un total de 1 900 hommes. L'extension des confins du Maros vers l'est
entraîne une augmentation du nombre des haïdouks. Les confins du Maros sont défendus par 1
100 haïdouks et 900 hussards. Dès 1703, ces effectifs passent à 2 525 hommes dont 1 125
cavaliers après l'incorporation de la milice bulgare62. En étendant les confins vers l'est, l'élément
roumain fait son apparition parmi les Grenzer. Dans la liste nominative établie à la fin de 1701,
on trouve déjà quelques noms roumains63. Vers le milieu du XVIIIè siècle, sept villages
militaires auront une majorité roumaine, dont celui de Nadlac entre Szeged et Arad. Cette
entreprise débute en 1714 et se termine par l'annexion de quelques villages au profit de la milice
des confins. Au début de 1713, le général Löffelholz, commandant de la Slavonie, reçoit l'ordre
de procéder à la séparation de la milice des confins et des paysans64.
En février 1716, les effectifs des confins de la Tisza et du Maros, commandés par le
comte Ernest Herberstein, s'élèvent à 2 741 Grenzer, répartis en 19 compagnies de haïdouks et
17 compagnies de hussards et stationnés dans 14 postes au lieu de 10 en 1703. Sombor et
Subotica restent considérées comme des localités frontalières bien qu'elles soient éloignées, la
première de 60 km et la seconde de 30 km de la Tisza. La dissolution des confins de la Tisza et
du Maros interviendra à la suite de l'article 18 de la loi hongroise de 1741. De nombreux
Grenzer serbes émigreront en Russie.
C. Les problèmes des confins méridionaux
Au cours de la période qui va de la paix de Karlowitz, en 1699, à celle de Passarowitz,
en 1718, et qui est marquée par les tâtonnements des officiers autrichiens chargés d'organiser
les confins militaires, de sérieuses difficultés sont à surmonter. Elles sont dues aux inondations
de la Save65, deux fois par an, à la lutte contre la peste et à l'insurrection de François II Rákóczi,
qui a des conséquences néfastes sur les confins, dont l'organisation est négligée.
62
Ibid., folio 5.
KA, Vienne, HKR, Exp., August 1703, Nr 547.
64
KA, Vienne, HKR, Reskripte des Hofkriegsrates vom 8. März 1713, vom 5. Jänner und vom 24. Jänner
1714.
65
A. de CAIX de SAINT-AYMOUR, op. cit., pp 44 et 50; KA, Vienne, HKR, Exp., März, 424, Compte
rendu du général Löffelholz du 10 mars 1714 (33 pages); ibid., Generalkomando Temesvár, 1717, 12-4.
63
121
Les inondations de la Save. Le peuple des tchardaques a été installé sur un terrain très
défavorable le long de la Save. De fortes pluies pendant une longue durée et des changements
brusques de température accompagnés par une fonte rapide des neiges dans la région de la
source de la Save provoquent de graves inondations, deux fois par an, surtout sur le cours
moyen de la Save. Les postes de garde, constitués la plupart du temps par des miradors
construits sur pilotis, sont quelquefois emportés par les eaux. Ces inondations seront encore
fréquentes au XIXè siècle puisqu'en 1879 un voyageur français écrit que Kobas est un village
qui, par miracle, n'est pas inondé66. Parlant plus loin de la haute vallée de la Save, il écrit :
<<On y cultive un peu de maïs, mais elle est surtout utilisée en mauvais pâturages que les
grenouilles disputent la moitié de l'année à de maigres chevaux, de petites vaches, de chétifs
moutons et d'énormes pourceaux, richesse du pauvre dans tous les pays du monde>>67. En
1714, une commission coprésidée par l'inspecteur de la Chambre des comptes, Alexandre von
Kallanek, et le général Löffelholz, découvre de nombreux villages inondés et les terres
recouvertes par les eaux68. L'inspecteur von Kallanek et le général Löffelholz proposent au
gouvernement de Vienne de céder aux Grenzer des localités inondées des villages et des
terrains non inondables appartenant à la Chambre des comptes. Ces cessions n'interviendront
qu'au début de 171669 et leurs propriétaires seront dédommagés70.
La lutte contre la peste appartient aux confins. Cette lutte se manifeste par des
patrouilles, l'augmentation des postes de garde, la surveillance des chemins détournés et par le
contrôle des personnes et des marchandises, qui ne peuvent pénétrer à l'intérieur des
possessions des Habsbourg sans avoir subi la quarantaine ou une désinfection.
Pour organiser la protection contre ce fléau, une patente impériale contre la peste (Pestpatent)
sera publiée en 170971. Cette patente ordonne aux commandants des confins de prêter assistance
à la commission de lutte contre la peste, créée par le gouvernement de Vienne, de rendre
compte sans délai au Conseil de la guerre de tous cas d'infection survenus à l'intérieur des
confins, d'être en liaison avec les commandements de Petrovaradin et de Karlstadt pour qu'ils
puissent prendre les mesures qu'impose la situation sanitaire. Les commandants des confins
doivent indiquer aux troupes impériales un itinéraire ne traversant pas les zones contaminées
par l'épidémie (eine pestfreie Reise-Route). La patente de 1709 ne prescrit pas encore la création
d'établissements de quarantaine, qui seront appelés Kontumazanstalten, et dans lesquels on
imposera un isolement provisoire des personnes et des marchandises provenant des régions de
l'Empire ottoman touchées par les maladies contagieuses et particulièrement par la peste. Ce
n'est qu'après la grande épidémie de peste de 1713 et après la paix de Passarowitz que le
gouvernement de Vienne songera à faire des confins à la fois un cordon militaire et un cordon
sanitaire par la patente impériale du 22 octobre 172872.
L'insurrection de Rákóczi. Alors que les confins militaires sont en cours
d'organisation, l'insurrection de François II Rákóczi surprend le gouvernement de Vienne et le
contraint de lutter de toutes ses forces contre les insurgés hongrois en engageant les soldats
serbes des confins. Ces derniers confirment pour la première fois leur rôle de zone tampon entre
l'Empire ottoman et le royaume de Saint-Etienne. Cette insurrection va définitivement séparer
66
A. de CAIX de SAINT-AYMOUR, op. cit., p. 44.
Ibid., p. 50.
68
KA, Vienne, HKR, Exp., 1714, März, 424, Compte rendu du général Löffelholz, 10 mars 1714 (33
pages).
69
Franz VANICEK, op. cit., tome I, p. 166
70
Archives du Generalkomando de Temesvár (Timisoara), 1717, 12-4.
71
KA, Vienne, HKR, Exp. 1709, Dezember, 300. La patente comprend 7 pages, 58 avec les actes annexes.
72
KA, Vienne, HKR, Exp., 1709, Dezember, 300. La patente contre la peste comprend 7 pages, 58 avec
les actes annexes; Erna LESKY, <<Die œsterreichische Pestpatent an der k. k. Militärgrenze>>, in
Saeculum, Jahrbuch für Universalgeschichte, Vienne, 1957, Heft 1, p. 82.
67
122
les territoires des confins militaires du royaume de Hongrie, mais elle aura pour conséquence de
retarder car les crédits seront consacrés en priorité à la lutte contre les rebelles.
En 1703, la milice des confins, principalement celle de Haute-Slavonie, participe au
nettoyage du <<triangle de la Mur>> (Muraköz), entre la Drave et la Mur, se distinguant lors de
la prise de Csakathurn (aujourd'hui Cakovec) et lors de la bataille de Vasvár, qui voit la défaite
du général rebelle Alexandre Károlyi. Tous les appels faits par François II Rákóczi aux Serbes
pour les inciter à rejoindre les insurgés hongrois restent sans réponse. En juin 1703, François II
Rákóczi lance un raid contre les Serbes et ses troupes commettent des atrocités pour tenter de
les rallier par la force. A Szeged, tous les habitants serbes s ont massacrés. Le général von
Nehem met en place, le long de la Drave, un cordon de 6 postes de 41 hommes, 4 postes de 30
hommes, un de 20 hommes, avec une réserve mobile de 150 fantassins et 200 cavaliers, soit un
total de 736 hommes, renforcés par 736 soldats de l'armée impériale, pour protéger la Slavonie
contre les Hongrois73. Cette Postirung met fin aux incursions des rebelles hongrois en
Slavonie74. Jusqu'à la paix de Szatmár (Satu Mare) du 2 mai 1711, qui met fin à la rébellion
hongroise, les Grenzer participent aux opérations de l'armée impériale. Mais l'organisation des
confins a été négligée.
Conclusion
Les confins militaires autrichiens présentent des similitudes avec le limes romain. Nés
en Croatie au début du XVIè siècle, ils ont été ensuite organisés sur les frontières méridionales
des possessions des Habsbourg à la fin du XVIIè siècle et les ont protégées jusqu'à la fin du
XIXè siècle.
A l'origine, le limes romain était une frontière provisoire, qui devait servir de base de
départ pour de nouvelles conquêtes. <<Le limes fut une organisation créée pour contrôler les
mouvements de populations, les migrations, les infiltrations, les allées et venues des
commerçants... Ce qui n'empêcha pas souvent le limes de prendre l'aspect d'une muraille
défensive continue, mais ce n'était ni sa forme ni sa vocation premières>>75. A partir du IIè
siècle après J.-C., le limes devient un instrument de la défense et de la stabilisation de la
frontière romaine.
A la fin du XVIIè siècle, après la levée du siège de Vienne en 1683, l'armée des
Habsbourg exploite lentement son succès en direction du Sud-Est européen. La victoire décisive
remportée à Zenta en 1697 par le prince Eugène de Savoie donne à l'empereur Léopold Ier une
nouvelle frontière fixée par la paix de Karlowitz en 1699 sur les limites naturelles que sont la
Save, la Tisza, le Maros et les Alpes de Transylvanie.
Comme le limes romain, cette nouvelle frontière, sur laquelle sont établis des confins militaires
peuplés de réfugiés serbes, va servir de base pour de nouvelles conquêtes. La guerre austroturque de 1716-1718 permettra aux Habsbourg, grâce aux victoires remportées par le prince
Eugène de Savoie à Petrovaradin et à Belgrade, d'acquérir par la paix de Passarowitz en 1718
un glacis protecteur composé de la Serbie septentrionale et de la Petite-Valachie ou Olténie.
Mais la malheureuse guerre de 1737-1739, conclue par la désastreuse paix de Belgrade76 du 18
septembre 1739, reporte la frontière sur la Save jusqu'en 1878 et sur le Danube jusqu'en 1918,
transformant les confins militaires autrichiens en une organisation défensive jusqu'à leur
dissolution en 1881.
73
Feldzüge, tome XVI, Vienne, 1891, pp. 174-175.
Feldzüge, tome XVI, Vienne, 1891, pp. 174-175.
75
Jean-Pierre MARTIN, Les provinces romaines de l'Europe centrale et occidentale, 31 avant J.-C.-235
après J.-C., Paris, 1990, p. 44.
76
AE, Paris, CP, Autriche, vol. 220, folios 106-119 (texte en latin).
74
123
La frontière orientale de l’Europe
dans le récit d’un officier français au début du XIXe siècle
Sorin ŞIPOŞ
L’espace roumain a suscité l’intérêt des grands pouvoirs Européens pendant la reprise
de l’offensive contre l’Empire Ottoman à la fin du XVIIIe siècle. Ensuite, comme la crise à
l’intérieur de l’empire devenait de plus en plus forte, ces grands pouvoirs qui se disputaient
l’héritage des possessions turques en Europe, ont cherché les meilleures sollutions afin de
dominer ces espaces. Pour légitimer la nouvelle réalité politique, la Russie, l’Autriche et la
France ont intensifié leurs efforts de se rapprocher l’élite politique des Principautés Roumaines,
en lui promettant le maintien des anciens privilèges et la reconnaissance d’une large autonomie
des pays. Pourtant, l’argument fondamental – pas du tout négligeable – pour lequel cette élite
politique devait être reconnaissante, était la libération des provinces roumaines de la domination
de la Porte. Depuis des décennies, les Pays Roumains avaient représenté pour les Sultans et les
hauts dignitaires ottomans seulement une source de vénit obtenu par des efforts minimes. Les
voyageurs étrangers traversant l’espace roumain pour de diverses missions ont été
impressionnés par la variété de ses ressources. En même temps, ils remarquent surpris que les
richesses ne sont pas exploitées d’une manière efficiente, et les habitants, en majorité paysans,
les principaux et, peut-être, les seuls producteurs des biens, vivaient dans une pauvreté difficile
à décrire, méprisés et opprimés par l’élite politique. Le rapport, rédigé par Armand-Charles
Guilleminot, adjudant commandant, à Paris, le 27 septembre 1807, confirme la plupart des
remarques des voyageurs par les Pays Roumains. Avant d’analyser le rapport de Guilleminot
sur les Roumains, nous allons diriger notre attention sur celui qui l’a rédigé. Qui est son auteur,
dans quelles circonstances est-il arrivé dans les Principautés, quelles sont ses impressions de
voyage?
Armand-Charles Guilleminot, fils de Claude et d’Isabelle Barbe Lanscotte, est né à
Dunkerque, le 2 mars 17741. Selon une autre opinion, le lieu de sa naissance serait Brabant,
hypothèse assez plausible, car plus tard il prend part à la révolte contre la Maison d’Autriche.
Son père, Claude Guilleminot, était originaire de Bourgogne, né à Estais, paroisse de St.
Barthélemy2, et sa mère, Isabelle Barbe Lanscotte, était native de Ghivelde3. Ses parrains
étaient Arman Lefebre et mademoiselle Rose Marescaux4.
1
Service historique de l’armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, Dossier No 7 yd 578 Armand-Charles
Guilleminot, Extrait des régistres aux actes de naissance de la ville de Dunkerque, Paris, le 4 Octobre,
1826. On a plus d’informations sur la date et le lieu de sa naissance de sa fiche personnelle se trouvant au
Ministère de la Guerre, Direction du personnel et des opérations militaires, Bureau des États-majors et des
Écoles militaires, Section des États-majors, État-Major Général, Comte Guilleminot (Armand-Charles),
Lieutenant général. Voir aussi les quelques dates biographiques sur Armand-Charles Guilleminot dans
Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, nouvelle édition, tome dix-huitième, Paris, 1857, p. 185-187.
Une courte biographie d’Armand-Charles Guilleminot, réalisée après la Biographie universelle ancienne
et moderne, se trouve dans Călători străini despre łările Române în secolul al XIX-lea. Serie nouă, vol. I
(1801-1821). Tome sous la direction de Georgeta Filitti, Beatrice Marinescu, Şerban Rădulescu-Zoner,
Marina Stroia. Rédacteur en chef: Paul Cernovodeanu, Bucarest, 2004, p. 361.
2
Service historique de l’armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, Dossier No 7 yd 578 Armand-Charles
Guilleminot, Extrait des régistres aux actes de naissance de la ville de Dunkerque. Ministère de la guerre,
Direction du personnel et des opérations militaires. Bureau des États-majors et des Écoles militaires,
Section des États-majors, État-Major Général, Comte Guilleminot (Armand-Charles), Lieutenant général.
3
Ibidem.
4
Service historique de l’armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, Dossier No 7 yd 578 Armand-Charles
Guilleminot, Extrait des régistres aux actes de naissance de la ville de Dunkerque.
124
La vie d’Armand-Charles Guilleminot a été exceptionnelle. À 16 ans, il prend part à la
révolte contre la Maison d’Autriche5. La révolte est étouffée et le jeune Guilleminot s’enrôle
dans l’armée française comme sous-lieutenant au 4e bataillon du Nord, le 23 Juillet 17926. Le 9
Août 1792, il passe au 12e Régiment d’Infanterie et le 19 Juin 1749 il est nommé adjoint à
l’État-major général de l’Armée du Nord. Le 15 Octobre 1795 on le nomme adjoint à
l’Adjudant général Desplanques7. Promu au grade de Lieutenant, le 3 Avril 1796, et de
Capitaine, le 5 Octobre 17978. Il est promu Chef de bataillon après la bataille de Vérone, à 26
Mars 1799. Le 31 Décembre 1799, on le nomme aide de camp du général Moreau9, pour qu’au
20 Janvier 1803 il soit attaché aux Dépôts de Guerre10. À partir du 9 Septembre 1805, ArmandCharles Guilleminot est employé au Grand État-major général de la Grande Armée. Jusqu’au
moment où il allait médier les rapports entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie, Armand-Charles
Guilleminot reçoit encore quelques tâches. Le 9 Janvier 1807, on le nomme Adjudant
Commandant11, comme gratification pour les résultats obtenus pendant la campagne
d’Allemagne, mais aussi aux insistences de Guilleminot et de ses supérieures auprès le Ministre
de la Guerre. Le 14 Janvier 1806, Guilleminot envoie au Ministre de la Guerre une lettre dans
laquelle il le prie de proposer à Napoléon sa nomination comme Major d’Infanterie12. Comme
arguments, l’officier français invoque sa formation en infanterie, ainsi que la bonne volonté de
ses supérieurs à son égard, c’est-à-dire, la bonté du Ministre de la Guerre13. Il n’oublie pas a
rappeler le fait qu’on lui avait donné, plusieurs fois, l’espoir d’un prochain avancement, mais
que son implication dans une série d’événements politiques auxquelles il n’avait rien à faire,
c’est-à-dire les procès de ses anciens commandants Pichegru et Moreau, a remis cet avancement
à l’infini14. Son supérieur même, Nicolas-Antoine Sanson, le général majeur en charge du
service topographique, est intervenu en faveur de l’avancement de Guilleminot. Dans sa lettre
au Ministre de la Guerre, parmi d’autre problèmes en question, le général Sanson manifeste de
nouveau son intérêt pour l’avancement de Guilleminot15. L’avancement est arrivé seulement le
5
Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, nouvelle édition, tome dix-huitième, Paris, 1857, p. 185.
Service historique de l’armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, Dossier No 7 yd 578 Armand-Charles
Guilleminot, Ministère de la guerre, Direction du personnel et des opérations militaires. Bureau des
États-majors et des Écoles militaires, Section des États-majors, État-Major Général, Comte Guilleminot
(Armand-Charles), Lieutenant général.
7
Ibidem.
8
Ibidem.
9
Ibidem.
10
Ibidem; Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, nouvelle édition, tome dix-huitième, Paris, 1857,
p. 185.
11
Service historique de l’armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, Dossier No 7 yd 578 Armand-Charles
Guilleminot.
12
„Le Général Sanson a bien voulu vous adresser une demande pour l’obtention, en ma faveur, du Grade
d’Adjudant-Commandant, mais le nombre de ces officiers ne paraissant pas devoir être augmenté, j’ose
supplier son Excellence de vouloir bien proposer à sa Majesté Impériale et Royale ma nomination à l’une
des places de Major vacantes dans l’Infanterie”. Service historique de l’armée de Terre, Château de
Vincennes, Dossier No 7 yd 578 Armand-Charles Guilleminot, À Son Excellence le Ministre de la Guerre,
Wels le 14 Janvier 1806.
13
„Mes services dans cette armée, que je n’ai cessé d’étudier quoique je l’ai quittée, et les bontés dont son
Excellence a bien voulu, parfois, m’honorer, me font espérer d’obtenir d’elle cette grace”. Ibidem.
14
„Que Monseigneur daigne me permettre de lui rappeller, à cette occasion, l’espoir qu’on m’a plusieurs
fois donné d’un avancement prochain, avancement que j’eusse peut-être obtenu sans de malheureux
événements politiques auxquels j’aurais été absolument étranger si je n’en avais été victime”. Ibidem.
15
„Monsieur le Maréchal, j’ai l’honneur de vous prévenir que sa Majesté ayant demandé au Dépôt général
de la guerre une bonne carte sur la Dalmatie vénétienne et que n’ayant rien trouvé de bon à lui offrir sur ce
pays, j’en ai fait de suite rédiger une ici, par le Chef de Bataillon Guilleminot d’après des reconnaissances
faites par des officiers autrichiens [...] je profite avec plaisir de cette occasion, Monsieur le Maréchal, pour
rappeller à votre souvenir le Chef de Bataillon Guilleminot à l’avancement duquel je m’intéresse et qui
désire l’obtenir de votre bienveillance”. Ibidem. À Son Excellence le Ministre de la Guerre, Major Général
de la Grande Armée, Strasbourg, le 20 Mars 1806.
6
125
9 Janvier 1807, lorsque Napoléon, se trouvant à Varsovie, nomme le Chef de Bataillon
Guilleminot dans le grade d’Adjudant Commandant16, à la suggestion du Ministre de la Guerre.
Le 28 Février, c’est-à-dire bientôt après la fin de la mission aux Pays Roumains,
Guilleminot reçoit aussi l’ordre de se rendre à Bayonne, auprès du Prince de Neufchatel, pour
qu’il soit nommé Chef d’État major du Corps d’armée des Pyrénées Occidentales en Juin
180817. Dés ce moment, la carrière de Guilleminot suit une évolution remarquable. Le 19 Juillet
1808, on le nomme Général de Brigade18, grâce, tout d’abord, à sa bravoure durant la bataille de
Medina del Rio-Seco19. Après la bataille d’Espagne, il est décoré avec la Légion d’Honneur, au
grade de Commandeur, le 29 juillet. Il prend aussi part à la campagne de Russie, finie par un
désastre pour Napoléon, en qualité de Chef d’État-major du 4e Corps de la Grande Armée20. Le
28 mai 1813, Napoléon le nomme Général de Division21.
On le nomme Commandant de la 14e Division d’Infanterie du 12e Corps de la Grande
Armée, le 8 Juillet 1813, le 17 Septembre 1813 il reçoit la commande de la 13e Division
d’Infanterie du 7e Corps et depuis le 16 Octobre 1813 il est Commandant de la 13e Division
d’Infanterie du 4e Corps22. Après la Restauration, la carrière de Guilleminot n’est pas
particulièrement influençée du fait qu’il a servi Napoléon. Au contraire, le roi Louis XVIIIe le
nomme Grand Officier de la Légion d’honneur, le 24 Novembre 1814, et Chevalier de l’Ordre
royal et militaire Saint Louis, le 27 Juin 181423. Entre les années 1818 et 1835, lorsqu’il est
disponibilisé des fonctions militaires et civiles detenues, Guilleminot est chargé des plus hauts
dignités24. Peu de temps après l’abdication de Napoléon, Guilleminot prend la charge des
travaux de délimitation des frontières de l’est, le plus probablement grâce à son expérience et
formation25. Après le retour de Napoléon, il est nommé Chef de l’État-major général du 3e
Corps d’Observation, le 4 Avril 1815, et le 6 Juin il est employé au Grand Quartier Général de
16
„Napoléon, Empéreur des Français et Roi d’Italie, Sur la proposition du Ministre de la Guerre, Art. 8.1.
Les militaires et ingénieurs géographes ci-après désignés, sont nommés savoir M.M.Guilleminot, Chef de
Bataillon, Adjudant-Commandant. Art. 8.2. Votre Ministre de la Guerre est chargé de l’exécution du
présent Décret. Ibidem. Extrait des Minutes de la Secretairerie d’État, Napoléon, Empéreur des Français
et Roi d’Italie, Palais de Varsovie, le 9 Janvier 1807.
17
Ibidem. Ministère de la guerre, Direction du personnel et des opérations militaires. Bureau des Étatsmajors et des Écoles militaires, Section des États-majors, État-Major Général, Comte Guilleminot
(Armand-Charles), Lieutenant général.
18
Ibidem.
19
Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, nouvelle édition, tome dix-huitième, Paris, 1857, p. 186.
20
Ibidem.
21
„Napoléon, Empéreur des Français et Roi d’Italie, Protecteur de la Confédération du Rhin, Médiateur de
la Confédération Suisse, Nous avons décrété et décrétons ce qui suit: Art. 1: Le Général de Brigade
Guilleminot est nommé Général de Division”. Service historique de l’armée de Terre, Château de
Vincennes, Dossier No 7 yd 578 Armand-Charles Guilleminot, Ministère de la guerre, Direction du
personnel et des opérations militaires. Bureau des États-majors et des Écoles militaires, Section des Étatsmajors, État-Major Général, Comte Guilleminot (Armand-Charles), Lieutenant général. Extrait des
Minutes de la Secrétairerie d’État, le 28 Mai 1813.
22
Ibidem. Ministère de la guerre, Direction du personnel et des opérations militaires. Bureau des Étatsmajors et des Écoles militaires, Section des États-majors, État-Major Général, Comte Guilleminot
(Armand-Charles), Lieutenant général.
23
Ibidem.
24
Le 28 Mai 1818 il est nommé Lieutenant général au Corps Royal d’État-major et le 18 Décembre de la
même année il devient Inspecteur général des ingénieurs géographes. Le 30 Décembre 1818 il est compris,
en ces deux dernières qualités, dans le cadre de l’État-major général de l’Armée. Le 12 Février 1823, on le
nomme Major général de l’Armée des Pyrénées et le 30 Novembre 1823 il est désigné Ambassadeur du
Roi au Constantinople. Il revient dans l’armée et le 7 Février 1831 il est compris dans le cadre d’activité
de l’État-major général.
25
Ibidem. Ministère de la guerre, Direction du personnel et des opérations militaires. Bureau des Étatsmajors et des Écoles militaires, Section des États-majors, État-Major Général, Comte Guilleminot
(Armand-Charles), Lieutenant général.
126
l’Armée du Nord26. Quelques jours avant la bataille de Waterloo, c’est-à-dire le 13 Juin, il est
nommé Commandant de la 6e Division du 2e Corps, sous les ordres supérieurs du Prince
Jérôme27.
Après la capitulation, le général Guilleminot a déclaré son adhésion au gouvernement
royal. Rentré aux grâces du Gouverne, il est envoyé avec des comissaires étrangers,
probablement aussi grâce à son instruction et expérience, pour la démarcation de la frontière
estique, selon le traîté de 181528. Du retour de cette mission, il est nommé Directeur général du
Dépôt de la Guerre29, Lieutenant général au Corps Royal d’État-major, le 27 Mai 1818, et le 18
Décembre de la même année il devient Inspecteur général des ingénieurs géographe. Le 30
Décembre 1818 il est compris, en ces deux dernières qualités, dans le cadre de l’État-major
général de l’Armée. Le 12 Février 1823, on le nomme Major général de l’Armée des Pyrénées
et le 30 Novembre 1823 il est désigné Ambassadeur du Roi au Constantinople30. En cette
qualité, il essaie d’aider le Sultan Mahmut dans ses premières tentatives de réforme. La
Révolution de Juillet 1830 le trouve toujours à Constantinople. Il revient dans l’armée et le 7
Février 1831 il est compris dans le cadre d’activité de l’État-major général31.
Il est disponibilisé le 16 Juillet 1831, mais deux anées plus tard on le met à la disposition du
Ministre des Affaires Étrangères pour être employé comme Commissaire du Roi à la
Démarcation des limites entre la France et le Grand Duché de Bade32. Quelques mois plus tard,
le général Guilleminot est nommé membre d’une commission mixte pour l’examen du
réglement du service des troupes en campagne, ensuite, le 1er Juillet 1835, il est disponibilisé33.
Comme récompense pour les services rendus au nouveau régime, Guilleminot est
nommé pair en 1825. On lui confère aussi l’Ordre Royal et Militaire St. Louis en grade de
Commandeur, le 1er Mai 1821 et la Grande Croix de l’Ordre Royal de la Légion d’honneur, le 3
Septembre 182334. Armand-Charles Guilleminot est mort le 14 Mars 1840 à Baden, dans le
Grand Duché35. Selon ses biographes, l’intelligence, la discrétion, les connaissances diverses, la
capacité de travail, l’oeil pénétrant, la supplesse, étaient seulement quelques unes des qualités
d’Armand-Charles Guilleminot36. Voilà, tout bref, le destin d’un officier français qui, à côté de
beaucoup autres, a servi d’abord Napoléon et la Révolution, et ensuite le roi Louis XVIIIe dans
les nombreuses campagnes militaires auxquelles il a pris part depuis 179237.
26
Ibidem.
Ibidem.
28
Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, nouvelle édition, tome dix-huitième, Paris, 1857, p. 186187.
29
Ibidem.
30
Ibidem.
31
Service historique de l’armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, Dossier No 7 yd 578 Armand-Charles
Guilleminot, Ministère de la guerre, Direction du personnel et des opérations militaires. Bureau des
États-majors et des Écoles militaires, Section des États-majors, État-Major Général, Comte Guilleminot
(Armand-Charles), Lieutenant général.
32
Ibidem.
33
Ibidem.
34
Ibidem. Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, nouvelle édition, tome dix-huitième, Paris, 1857,
p. 186-187.
35
Service historique de l’armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, Dossier No 7 yd 578 Armand-Charles
Guilleminot, Ministère de la guerre, Direction du personnel et des opérations militaires. Bureau des
États-majors et des Écoles militaires, Section des États-majors, État-Major Général, Comte Guilleminot
(Armand-Charles), Lieutenant général.
36
Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne, nouvelle édition, tome dix-huitième, Paris, 1857, p. 185.
37
Dans les années 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 et 9 de la Révolution il a pris part aux campagnes militaires des
Armées du Nord, de Sambre et Meuse, de Mayence, d’Italie et du Rhin. En 1806 et 1807, il a participé aux
campagnes de la Grande Armée, en 1808 il a lutté dans l’armée d’Epagne et en 1809 dans l’armée d’Italie
et dans la Grande Armée. En 1812, 1813 et 1814 il a lutté dans la Grande Armée, en 1815 en Belgique et
en 1823 aux Pyrénées.
27
127
Armand-Charles Guilleminot est également important pour l’histoire des Roumains au
début du XIXe siècle. Lorsqu’il se trouvait dans le camp français de Tilsit, l’été de 1807, il a été
chargé par Napoléon de convaincre la Russie et la Turquie de conclure la paix38. Sa mission sur
la Basse Danube commence à Tilsit, localité où, peu de temps avant, le 11 Juillet 1807, la paix
avec la France avait été signée39. En cette mission, Armand-Charles Guilleminot était
accompagné par Simmer, Chef d’Escadron, le Capitaine Aubert, tous les deux officiers de
l’État-major de la Grande Armée et d’un officier russe40.
À la fin de la mission, Armand-Charles Guilleminot a rédigé un rapport à Paris, le 27
Septembre 1807. Ce rapport a 44 pages et contient des informations détaillées sur le tracé
parcouru par la délégation officielle, les autorités rencontrées par les membres de la délégation,
parfois même des dates sur le contenu des discussions eues. Guilleminot y ajoute de
nombreuses considérations politiques, religieuses et économiques sur les pays qui se trouvaient
lors à la frontière orientale de l’Europe, eespace disputé par la Sublime Porte et la Russie, mais
pour lequel la France avait aussi manifesté de plus en plus son intérêt. Guilleminot consacre à la
Moldavie, la Valachie et la Bessarabie 18 pages des 44 du rapport, signe clair de l’importance
accordée par la France aux Provinces roumaines. Autrement dit, le rapport est formé de deux
parties, la première dédiée au tracé et aux rencontres officielles, et la seconde contenant la
description des Provinces, où l’auteur s’avère être un observateur avisé.
Après avoir quitté le Quartier Général de Tilsit, la délégation officielle devait arriver à
Slobozia, localité située sur la rive droite du Danube, où elle devait prendre part aux discussions
des représentants de la Sublime Porte avec ceux de la Russie et, s’il fallait, devait exerciter des
pressions sur la délégation ottomane pour qu’elle signe l’armistice avec la Russie.
De Tilsit, la délégation française, en route pour Slobozia, passe par une série de
localités, ce qui donne à Guilleminot l’occasion de faire de courtes descriptions des lieux et des
gens qu’il connait. Après Tilsit, Guilleminot traverse Grodno, Bresez, Dubno et Kaminieck41.
Pour l’auteur, la ville de Grodno „d’une importance majeure pour l’armée russe, sous le rapport
des subsistances, était dénué de troupes; on les avait toutes portées en avant en opposition du
Corps d’armée de Monsieur le Maréchal Massena”42. Il constate, aussi, que derrière la ligne de
défense russe il n’y a pas de troupes de réserve43. Ce qu’il observe sur place pousse,
naturellement, l’auteur à aller plus loin avec ses considérations et à affirmer que dans le cas
d’une possible offensive vers la Basse Danube, les troupes français n’auraient pas rencontré de
grands obstacles. „On eut, au contraire, trouvé des ressources dans la disposition des habitants à
notre égard”, écrit l’observateur français. „Malgré la sévérité avec laquelle on les traitait, ils
manifestaient ouvertement leur attachement à la France”44. En bonne mesure, Guilleminot avait
raison d’être optimiste au sujet de la sympathie dont la France jouissait parmi les Polonais. La
division de Pologne avait généré un fort sentiment de haine envers/pour les Russes et les
Allemands. En échange, les déclarations favorables à la réunification de Pologne ont augmenté
la sympathie des patriotes polonais pour la France et Napoléon.
38
„Sa Majesté, ayant daigné m’honnorer d’une mission près du Général en Chef Michelson et son Altesse
le Grand Visir...”. Service historique de l’armée de Terre, Château de Vincennes, Fond Turquie et
Péninsule Illyrienne, Mémoire de l’Adjudant-Commandant Guilleminot, sur les observations qu’il a faites
et les renseignements qu’il a recueillis, pendant son voyage en Turquie, p. 1.
39
Ibidem.
40
Ibidem.
41
„Nous primes notre direction par Grodno, Volkvysk, Bresez, Dubno, et sortîmes de la Pologne Russe
par Kaminieck-Podolski”. Ibidem, p. 1.
42
Ibidem.
43
„De Grodno à Kaminieck-Podolski, nous ne trouvâmes que quelques Dépôts, ou Détachements Russes,
dont les plus forts ne dépassaient pas 400 hommes. Il n’y avait point de réserve dans le pays, tout en avait
été rétiré pour renforcer l’armée; de sorte que le mouvement que l’on a supposé, dans le temps, devoir être
fait par le Maréchal Massena, pour se porter, à travers la Volhynie et la Podolie, sur la Turquie, n’aurait
point éprouvé de grands obstacles”. Ibidem, p. 2.
44
Ibidem.
128
La suivante ville à susciter l’intérêt de Guilleminot a été Kaminieck. Ses remarques sur
le système de fortification de Kaminieck sont, généralement, négatives45. On nous suggère
aussi, indirectement, les coupables des erreurs de construction: „C’est un Juif qui est l’ingénieur
et l’entrepreneur des travaux que l’on fait à cette citadelle. Comment l’intérêt ne l’éclaire-t-il
pas sur l’absurdité du transport des terres à bras, sans même établir des relais ? On sent ici
l’influence du voisinage de la Turquie”46. Autrement dit, c’est le Juif et l’attitude méprisante
envers les ouvriers existante en Turquie, et contaminant aussi les provinces avoisinantes, qui
étaient coupables de cette situation, dans la vision du voyageur occidental.
Les suivantes localités importantes que Guilleminot parcourt sont Chotin, GalaŃi,
Brăila, Silistra, Rusciuc, Slobozia et Bucarest. Le principal but du voyage de l’officier français
dans les Principautés roumaines était la conclusion de l’armistice de Slobozia et, ensuite, sa
ratification à Bucarest par les représentants de la Turquie et de la Russie. Guilleminot s’avère
être très avare avec les informations sur les discussions portées47. Heureusement pour nous, il
est beaucoup plus généreux avec les détails lorsqu’il décrit les Principautés roumaines. Arrivé à
Bucarest après la ratification, il jouit, au moins formalement, de la sympathie des officiers
supérieurs russes. Il note scrupuleusement ce nouvel état d’esprit manifesté après la signature de
l’armistice. Aussi lui que le pays qu’il représente sont au centre de l’attention. „L’échange ayant
eu lieu, je me rendis à Buckarest, où je fus reçu avec la plus grande distinction par les généraux
Meyendorf, Mileradovitz, Cicerov et, en général, par tous les officiers russes qui se trouvaient
dans cette capitale de la Valachie. Ils cherchaient par les égards avec lesquels ils mes traitaient à
témoigner leur satisfaction du rétablissement de la bonne harmonie entre les deux Empires
Russe et Français”48. Il s’avère être un homme qui n’aimait pas l’inactivité et profite, selon ses
mots, de son séjour à Bucarest „pour recueillir des informations sur la Moldavie, la Valachie et
la Bessarabie”49. Il est néanmoins un officier avec de vastes connaissances de topographie,
ayant longtemps travaillé aux Dépôts généraux, l’institution chragée de réaliser des cartes des
provinces occupées par la France ou de celles situées dans sa sphère d’intérêt. Il essais de
profiter de sa situation pour amasser les informations sur les Principautés roumaines si
nécessaires à la France. Pour lui, la Moldavie et la Valachie, „deux Principautés si importantes
pour la Sublime Porte, tant par leur position, leur étendue, que par la fertilité de leur sol, n’ont
point été décrites jusqu’ici de manière à en donner une idée exacte”50. Si l’on est d’accord avec
lui quant à l’importance des deux pays pour la Sublime Porte, on doit objecter sur le défaut
d’information sur l’espace roumain. Soit qu’il ne connaissait guère la littérature de voyage et les
rapports diplomatiques, où qu’il désirait, par une telle assertion, se placer parmi les gens ayant
le pouvoir de résoudre les problèmes existants, dans ce cas, ceux de l’espace roumain.
Une autre question importante que l’on doit éclaircir est celle des sources que l’auteur utilise
pour sa description de l’espace roumain. Malheureusement, Guilleminot n’en est pas très
explicite. À la fin du texte il y a, pourtant, une courte note sur l’élaboration de certaines cartes
selon les informations reçues des officiers russes51. L’on peut cependant supposer qu’à côté des
45
„Cette place, très ancienne, est prequ’entièrement demantelée. Elle est, en partie, taillée dans le roc, et a
des tours en pierre. À l’ouest, son approche est défendue par un ravin profond, dans lequel on descend par
une belle rampe d’environ 200 toises de longueur. Au bout de cette rampe est un pont que défend deux
vieux ouvrages circulaires et en maçonnerie. L’intérieur de la place est vu de la campagne de la manière la
plus désavantageuse, ce qui rend ce poste insoutenable”. Ibidem, p. 2.
46
Ibidem.
47
„Ce fut au château de Slobozia, sur la rive gauche du Danube, que se tinrent les conférences pour la
conclusion de l’armistice auquel j’étais chargé d’assister. Elles durèrent depuis le 12 d’août jusqu’au 24 et
l’échange des ratifications des deux généraux en chefs respectifs ne fut effectuée que le 6 de septembre.
Monsieur le général Meyendorf ratifia au défaut du général Michelson qui mourut à Buckarest peu de
jours après la signature de l’armistice”. Ibidem, p. 24.
48
Ibidem, pp. 24-25.
49
Ibidem, p. 25.
50
Ibidem, p. 25.
51
„Elle sera suivie par la carte des Provinces de Moldavie et de Valachie que je fais construire d’après les
extraits que j’ai pris sur la carte levée par les officiers russes”. Ibidem, p. 44.
129
informations topographiques reçues des officiers russes, Guilleminot a recouru à d’autres dates
encore, en particulier d’ordre géographique. Et l’on peut supposer qu’il a reçu des informations
de la part de l’élite politique des pays et des oeuvres consacrés à l’espace roumain, qu’il
trouvait dans des bibliothèques privées. D’une grande importance se révèlent être aussi ses
observations et remarques personnelles sur les réalités des Principautés et sur leurs rapports
avec la Sublime Porte, la Russie et la France. Dans l’économie du rapport, les remarques
personnelles sont, sans doute, les plus importantes. Les constatations directes du voyageur
français apportent un plus de fraîcheur au document officiel et révèlent ses sentiments les plus
intimes sur l’espace et les habitants qui ont attiré son attention.
Le rapport est, sans doute, complexe; il comprend de nombreuses considérations
géographiques, géo-politiques, des descriptions plus ou moins originelles des qualités et défauts
des Roumains et des autres habitants, des analyses du système politique des Principautés
roumaines, ainsi que de courtes références aux plus importantes villes. Les considérations
géographiques sur l’étendue, la position, la population, les principales rivières, ont leur
importance dans de pareils récits. La formation de Guilleminot comme ingénieur topographe lui
offre la chance d’exprimer des opinions avisés sur ces questions. Il ne reste, pourtant, l’adepte
des descriptions techniques. Au contraire, là où il s’avère nécessaire, Guilleminot en présente
clairement et même emphatiquement ses opinions. Il n’hésite, parfois, à critiquer, il donne des
solutions où il s’y connait et, très important, il possède une image relativement bien claire sur ce
que les Principautés pourraient être à l’avenir. Sa perspective d’ingénieur topographe l’aide à
radiographier exactement la situation géopolitique des Principautés, à encadrer cette situation
dans le contexte général européen et à la mettre en rapport avec les ressources de la terre et du
sous-sol. Une pareille association et comparaison pousse l’auteur à faire la remarque suivante:
„Baignées par le Danube, arrosées par des rivières navigables ou qui pourraient le devenir avec
peu de dépense, placées entre deux grands Empires, la Russie et l’Autriche, communiquant avec
Constantinople par le Danube et la Mer Noire, les deux Provinces de Moldavie et de Valachie,
dirigées par un gouvernement sage, deviendraient, par la fertilité prodigieuse de leur sol et leur
commerce que l’avantage de leur situation topographique leur permettrait de faire, l’un des pays
les plus riches de l’Europe”52. Donc, la position géopolitique et les ressources des Pays
roumains, sous un gouvernement sage, pourraient en faire les provinces les plus riches de
l’Europe. L’avenir promettait être faste pour les Pays roumains. On peut supçonner l’auteur de
partialité ou d’exaggérations quant à leur avenir. Malheureusement pour les Principautés,
Guilleminot décrit avec une extrême objectivité la situation du moment: „elles ne présentent, en
ce moment, que le tableau affligeant de la dévastation, de la misère et de l’abandon”53. L’image
en est négative et, par malheur, est confirmée aussi par des sources documentaires internes et
par d’autres récits de voyage.
L’auteur ne se contente seulement de constater, au contraire, il essaie à identifier les
causes de la situation difficile des Pays roumains. Selon lui, „plusieurs causes ont contribué à
l’état déplorable où se trouvent actuellement ces deux belles Provinces. Les guerres fréquentes
dont elles ont été le théâtre, et que la Sublime Porte a eu à soutenir contre la Pologne, la Russie
et l’Autriche, l’indiscipline des troupes Ottomanes, les incursions des Tartares du Budgiac qui
emmenaient les habitants en esclavage, les brigandages de Passwan-Oglou et des garnisons des
forteresses turques sur le Dniestr et le Danube; les corvées excessives pour la réparation de ces
forteresses, les changements fréquents des princes Grecs à qui le gouvernement est confié,
l’insatiable avidité du clergé, la rapacité des boyards, enfin toutes ces causes, en montant le
comble aux maux des habitants, les ont contraints à différentes époques à chercher un asyle
dans les pays voisins; aussi les deux Provinces ne contiennent-elles pas la cinquième partie des
habitants qu’elles pourraient nourrir”54.
52
Ibidem, p. 26.
Ibidem.
54
Ibidem, pp. 27-28.
53
130
L’auteur identifie, donc, les facteurs qui ont contribué à la situation difficile des Pays
roumains, notamment les guerres dévastatrices, l’indiscipline des troupes ottomanes, les
fréquents changements des monarques, l’avidité du clergé et des boyards qui ont graduellement
mené à l’appauvrissement des pays et de leurs habitants qui choisissaient de s’expatrier. On se
demande si ces causes sont réelles ou non. Sans doute que les nombreuses confrontations
militaires déroulées sur le territoire des Provinces, indépendamment de leur intérêt, ont
engendré des destructions, des pertes de vies parmi la population civile et, aussi, la migration
d’une importante partie des habitants de l’espace en conflit.
Quant aux destructions causées par les troupes ottomanes et les Tartares, ils traitaient
les habitants qu’ils devaient défendre pire que les armées envahisseuses. Les institutions
internes des pays, qui devaient, en fait, assûrer leur bon fonctionnement, ne s’élevaient pas aux
exigences du moment. Le clergé supérieur, pour la plupart d’origine grecque, les boyards du
Conseil princier, en majorité allogènes, poursuivaient non pas le bien être commun, mais leurs
prôpres intérêts. Arrivés à l’administration supérieure du pays en achetant leurs fonctions, ceuxci voulaient récupérer les sommes investies le plus tôt possible. Cela explique leur attitude dure
et souvent méprisante envers le contribuable. La situation de l’institution du pouvoir était
semblable. Après avoir définitivement éliminé les Princes régnants autochtones, la Sublime
Porte a nommé à la tête des Principautés des gens qui provenaient, généralement, du monde
grecque, lévantin. La dignité suprême dans l’État s’obtenait par l’achat du trône. À son tour, le
nouveau monarque essayait de vendre les fonctions administratives supérieures du pays pour
récupérer son argent ou pour payer les dettes qu’il avait contactées. Le statut du monarque, en
relation tant avec le Sultan qu’avec ses propres sujets, est très bien surpris par l’auteur
français55. Rien n’encourage l’ascension des gens décidés à changer quoi que ce soit et si,
pourtant, de tels gens parvenaient au gouvernement, les Sultans n’étaient pas inclinés à accepter
des réformes pour améliorer le système. Sans une élite politique et culturelle désireuse à faire
des efforts pour le bien être commun, les chances de sortir de cette crise étaient minimes.
Guillaume n’hésite pas à condamner le manque de responsabilité de l’élite des Principautés.
„Quant aux riches et aux grands” – conclut le voyageur français – „ils sont pour la plupart
lâches et rampants devant ceux qui peuvent leur nuire ou les protéger. L’intérest et la crainte
sont les deux puissants mobiles qui les font agir. Ils sont intriguants, cabaleurs, oppresseurs
impitoyables du faible, sévères envers envers leurs sujets et tyrans dans leurs maisons; enfin, ils
ont tous les vices que doit produire la tyrannie sous laquelle les tiennent les Turcs, leurs
maîtres”56.
Peu d’auteurs étrangers ont réussi en si peu de mots à surprendre les vices des influents
du moment aux Pays roumains. Lâches et serviles devant ceux plus forts, ils sont intrigants et
cruels envers leurs propres sujets. L’intérêt et la peur guident leurs activités quotidiennes. Il
n’est moins vrai qu’une telle élite, conclût l’auteur, a accéléré la dépendence des Principautés
de la Sublime Porte et, par sa conduite irresponsable, a contribué à l’aggravation du statut des
Pays roumains. Malheureusement, le présent contraste avec le passé et les ressources humaines
et naturelles des provinces. Guilleminot n’oublie pas à rappeler le fait que les habitants de ces
pays „descendent de la Colonie Romaine établie par l’Empéreur Trajan, après qu’il en eut
55
„Chacune des deux Provinces est gouvernée par un Prince Grec, choisi par la Sublime Porte, et qui pour
parvenir à cette dignité doit avoir été premier Dragman. Sa puissance est d’autant plus précaire qu’il ne la
doit qu’à ses intrigues et à l’or qu’il a répandu pour l’obtenir, et que de nouvelles intrigues et plus d’or
peuvent la lui ravir. Son étude consiste à pressurer le peuple pour en tirer les sommes destinées à payer le
tribut à la Sublime Porte, à satisfaire l’avidité des hommes en place, celles des commandants des places
frontières, et à s’assurer une retraite aisée en cas de déposition, si, toutefois, il en est quitte à si bon
compte. Il doit être continuellement en garde contre les intrigues de la Cour de Constantinople, et à ne
donner aucune jalousie à ses maîtres. La plus simple démarche qui dénotterait en lui l’intention
d’améliorer le sort des peuples par une administration mieux entendue, et par les lumières qui leur
manquent, serait imputé à crime par les stupides Ottomans, dont la politique barbare ne permet pas d’avoir
sur leurs frontières un peuple éclairé et florissant”. Ibidem, p. 29.
56
Ibidem, p. 27.
131
expulsé les Daces. Leur langue est un Latin corrompu mêlé de beaucoup de mots étrangers
également défigurés”57. S’il est assez exacte sur le rôle de l’élément romain dans l’ethnogénèse
et glotogénèse des Roumains, dans la question de l’apport de la civilisation des Daco-Gètes il
prend la part des spécialistes qui considèrent qu’après la fin des guerres entre les Daces et les
Gètes, la population autochtone a été décimée, argument qui ne correspond pas aux réalités du
moment.
Guilleminot s’avère être généreux aussi dans la description des Moldaves et des
Valaches qu’il a rencontrés dans son voyage. Il manifeste une sympathie visible pour les
habitants des deux provinces58. Il n’hésite à transmettre à la postérité les défauts les plus
communs attribués à ces habitants. Dans ce cas non plus il ne donne pas l’impression de se
rallier aux critiques faites aux Roumains. „On les accuse”, écrit l’observateur français, „d’être
paresseux, avars et adonnés au vin; mais ils sont du reste assez bons gens”59. Mais n’entend pas
la même raison envers les autres habitants des Principautés60.
L’auteur n’oublie pas à mettre en évidence les richesses des Principautés roumaines61.
L’intéressant c’est que l’énumération des ressources du sol et du sous-sol n’est pas ostensible.
Au contraire, les sentiments qui ressortent de ces lignes sont complexes et pleins de
compréhension et d’humanité envers les habitants d’un pays riche en ressources mais où l’on vit
si mal. La douleur de Guilleminot est amplifiée par le fait que les artisans des biens sont les plus
57
Ibidem, pp. 26-27.
„Ils sont en général bien constitués, robustes, grands, et d’un bon tempérament. Ces avantages, joints au
goût qu’ils ont généralement pour la chasse, doivent en faire de bons soldats. La peste, si fréquente en
Turquie, n’est connue parmi eux que lorsque les Troupes d’Asie leur apportent ce fléau. On les accuse
d’être paresseux, avars et adonnés au vin; mais ils sont du reste assez bons gens. Il faut néanmoins refuser
cette qualité aux Juifs, Grecs, Arméniens que l’on trouve parmi eux et qui, comme partout ailleurs
excellent dans l’art de faire des dupes”. Ibidem, p. 27.
59
Ibidem.
60
„Il faut néanmoins refuser cette qualité aux Juifs, Grecs, Arméniens que l’on trouve parmi eux et qui,
comme partout ailleurs excellent dans l’art de faire des dupes”. Ibidem.
61
„Les Plaines qui forment, comme nous l’avons vu, un quart de la Moldavie et un peu plus de la moitié
de la Valachie sont extrêmement fertiles. Elles fournissent abondament aux besoins des habitants lorsque
la paix permet de les cultiver. Les grains qu’elles produisent sont: le froment, le maïs, l’orge, le sarrazin, le
millet et quelque peu d’avoine. L’orge, ainsi que dans le reste de la Turquie, sert ordinairement à la
nourriture des chevaux. On ne cultive que peu de seigle parce qu’on y mange que du pain de froment et de
millet, et que le plus grand nombre se nourrit d’une espèce de pâte de maïs nommé coucourouse. Le lin et
le chanvre se sèment en grande partie pour les besoins domestiques.
Le foin se trouve dans le pays en si grande quantité et si bonne qualité qu’indépendamment des
troupeaux nombreux qu’y élèvent les indigènes il en arrive encore toutes les années que les voisins y
envoient pâturer pour une petite redevance, pendant toute la belle saison.
Le vin y est bon et abondant. Des forêts entières sont composées d’arbres fruitiers, tels que les
cerisiers, poiriers, pommiers, abricotiers et les melons et surtout les melons d’eau y sont d’une bonté
exquise et d’une grosseur extraordinaire. Le miel, la cire, le beurre, le suif, le sel fossille, et une couleur
rouge qu’on nomme Patzkin et qu’on emploie pour la teinture, le boeuf salé, les peaux de moutons et de
lièvres composent une grande partie de la richesse territoriale. Il faut surtout ajouter les nombreux
troupeaux que les habitants élèvent. Les chevaux sont excellents pour la Cavalérie légère. Les Puissances
voisines et même la Prusse y viennent faire des remontes. Les chevaux se vendent 6 à 7 ducats pièce. Les
boeufs, qui y sont de la plus riche taille, se vendent 8 à 10 ducats la paire. On les emploie au transport
ainsi que les buffles qu’on y trouve aussi en une assez grande quantité. Les moutons, chèvres et cochons y
sont nombreux. Leur chair est renommée. Le gibier de toute espèce y abonde.
On trouve dans ces deux Provinces et particulièrement dans la Valachie, des mines d’or,
d’argent, de cuivre, de vif-argent, de fer, mais les Princes tiennent la main à ce qu’elles demeurent
cachées. Ils craignent que les Turcs ne viennent les faire exploiter pour leur propre compte. Peut-être que
ces derniers n’en ignorent pas l’existence et qu’ils ne se soucient pas d’ouvrir de pareils trésors sur leurs
frontières. Les rivières d’Olt, d’Argeş, de Doumbovitza et de Ialomitza, qui coulent en Valachie, charient
des sables d’or, dont le produit estimé à 15,000 piastres, ou 22,500 francs environ, est affecté aux épingles
de la Princesse. Ce sont les Tzyganes, ou Égyptiens, qui ont depuis longtemps le privilège de pécher ce
métal”. Ibidem, pp. 33-34.
58
132
opprimés et persécutés. L’officier français remarque des choses qui pourraient constituer de
remarquables avantages pour les Principautés roumaines. „Quand on considère que ces deux
Provinces sont baignées par le Danube, l’un des plus grands fleuves de l’Europe, et le plus
heureusement dirigé pour faciliter le commerce entre cette partie du monde et l’Asie, et qu’on
les voit arroées par nombre de rivières navigables, on conçoit aisément à quelle commerce
immense, sous un gouvernement mieux entendu, elles pourraient prendre part”62. Ainsi, les
ressources du pays et sa position géopolitique, mises en valeur par un gouvernement sage de ces
provinces seraient un avantage essentiel dans leur développement. L’observateur français
remarque avec tristesse l’absence de l’industrie, la branche essentielle des économies
prospères63. Il constate aussi que les meilleurs ouvriers des Principautés sont Allemands, Juifs
et Arméniens. Voilà qu’en ce cas l’auteur admet la qualité de bons artisans des habitants
alogènes de ces endroits. Même si dans une certaine situation il a critiqué la population
autochtone, on doute donc qu’il puisse être suspecté d’attitude hostile envers les étrangers.
La nature a été jusqu’au bout généreuse avec les Principautés roumaines. Même leurs
frontières sont entourées soit par des chaînes montaigneuses, soit par de grands cours d’eau. La
générosité de la nature est pleinement remarquée par Guilleminot dans les mots suivants: „ La
nature qui semble s’être complue à prodiguer à ces deux Provinces tout ce qu’il fallait pour les
rendre florissantes, sous un gouvernement qui saurait profiter de ses faveurs, leur a également
accordé des frontières respectables pour les mettre à l’abri des incursions des Puissances
voisines. Du côté de l’Autriche elles sont garanties par la chaîne des monts Carpats. Ces
montagnes élevées sont couvertes d’épaisses forests et quoique terreuses en général elles ne
présentent que peu de passages pour l’artillerie, et que la moindre pluie rend impracticables. Du
côté de la Russie, le pays est couvert par le Dniestr, qui pris en ligne droite depuis Chotin
jusques à la Mer Noire, présente une frontière d’environ 75 lieues, sur laquelle il y a trois places
de construites, savoir Chotin qui est en Moldavie, Bender et Ackermund qui sont en
Bessarabie”64. Autrement dit, dans les zones menacées, vers Russie et Autriche, les Principautés
roumaines avaient l’avantage d’une défense naturelle, des barrières naturelles représentées par
les Monts Carpates à l’ouest et le Dniestr à l’est. Pendant les siècles antérieurs, lorsque les Pays
roumains jouissaient d’une indépendence ou une autonomie très grande, la frontière méridionale
était facile à défendre, car le Danube représentait une barrière naturelle difficile à surmonter.
Mais les Principautés ne pouvaient être défendues seulement par les barrières naturelles. Les
frontières situées sur les grands cours d’eau ou sur les sommets des montagnes facilitaient la
défense, mais ne l’accomplissaient totalèment. Il y avait besoin d’une armée forte et des
fortifications périphériques pour compléter les avantages naturelles et augmenter les chances de
gagner les guerres contre les forces envahisseuses. Ce n’est pas par hasard que, lorsqu’il décrit
la frontière avec la Russie et ses places, Guilleminot propose la construction d’une autre
fortification entre Chotin et Bender, pour surveiller d’une manière plus efficace la frontière et
de mieux protéger même la place de Chotin que les Russes pourraient isoler et, évidemment,
conquérir plus aisément65. Les nombreux cours d’eau à l’intérieur des Principautés pourraient
aussi constituer des lieux favorables pour une défense efficiente. Les Turcs sont coupables de
manque de vision et d’encore beaucoup autre chose, croit le voyageur français.
Nous doutons que l’auteur de ce rapport ait quelque chose contre ce peuple. Son
mécontentement est dû au fait que les Turcs, les maîtres de ces provinces, c’est-à-dire ceux qui
profitaient le plus de leurs ressources, avaient aussi le devoir de les protéger. Mais, en réalité,
62
Ibidem, p. 34.
„Quant à l’industrie il y en a peu ou point dans le pays. On avait bien cherché à établir quelques
fabriques ou manufactures, mais les troubles, la guerre, le défaut de fonds et surtout de sujets les ont fait
tomber. Le peu d’ouvriers qu’on trouve sont d’une maladresse extrême. Les moins mauvaisd’entre eux
sont Allemands, Juifs ou Arméniens”. Ibidem, p. 35.
64
Ibidem, pp. 36-37.
65
„Mais il en faudrait au moins une encore pour couvrir l’intervalle entre Chotin et Bender et empêcher
les ennemis de pénétrer tout à coup de Iampol jusque à Iassy, et couper ainsi la communication de Chotin
avec le Danube”. Ibidem, p. 37.
63
133
cela n’arrivait pas. Plus probablement, l’auteur, arrivant d’un monde qui savait utiliser ses
ressources et apprécier les artisans des biens, ne peut pas comprendre les anachronismes de
l’Empire Ottoman. La tyrannie, le despotisme, la corruption, l’inefficacité sont contraires au
monde de Guilleminot et, par conséquent, ne peuvent pas être compris ou acceptés par lui. Ce
sont les raisons qui déterminent l’auteur français à être critique envers le système ottoman et à
manifester de la compassion et même de la sympathie pour les Roumains dominés par la
Sublime Porte.
L’auteur éprouve de l’inquiétude et ne comprend pas pourquoi dans les deux pays il
n’y a aucune chaussée construite pour assûrer une communication efficiente entre les diverses
localités. Or, dans une société moderne, la qualité des voies de communication est vitale et
dénote aussi de la civilisation. Sans doute que les routes, les conditions de transport en général,
indiquent la mentalité de la population et la qualité du système politique d’un pays ou d’un
autre.
135
II. Varia
Vicent CLIMENT -FERRANDO (Barcelona), Esther GIMENO UGALDE (Wien) ◙
EU Enlargements and its Linguistic Borders: A Historical Review
Ivan NACEV (Sofia) ◙ A new neighbourhood policy? Redefining the limits of political
in Central and Eastern Europe in the EU integration process
Mihai Razvan UNGUREANU (Bucureşti) ◙ Eastern European Borders
136
EU Enlargements and its Linguistic Borders: A Historical Review
Vicent CLIMENT-FERRANDO
Esther Gimeno UGALDE
The European Union is founded on respect for its diversity: diversity of cultures,
customs, beliefs and languages. The EU also claims that it is this diversity that makes the
European Union what it is: not a ‘melting pot’ in which differences are rendered down, but a
common home in which diversity is celebrated, and where the many languages are a source of
wealth and a bridge to greater solidarity and mutual understanding1. As stated by the first ever
Commissioner with specific responsibility for multilingualism, “there is no such thing as a
superior or inferior language. Each language is a unique cultural expression with its own
characteristics and singularly adapted to the needs of its speakers. As well as a means of
expression, it is also a channel of self-expression”2.
Despite these positive statements, the question of which languages should the EU use
is a hotly debated issue, especially when new Member States join the EU. Official languages,
working languages, Treaty languages, or regional/minority languages are just a few examples
of the vast and complex terminology used to refer to the EU’s linguistic diversity.
What are the practical differences between all these terms? How does the EU manage
its multilingualism? The following paper aims to highlight the different degrees and levels of
recognition granted to languages and analyses the organizational structure and functioning of
the EU’s linguistic regime.
1. Introduction: the Language Status in the EU
The European Union has always attached importance to multilingualism. No other
body at regional or global level uses as many languages. No other body devotes as much money
to translation and interpretation as the EU. As an example, the cost of the EU’s multilingual
policy (currently 20 official languages), i.e. the translators and interpreters is €1.178 Million,
which is 1.05% of the annual general budget of the European Union. Divided by the population
of the EU, this comes to € 2.58 per person per year3. The question of multilingualism is not
new. As we shall see in the following section, it has been tackled – either implicitly or explicitly
– since the creation of the European Communities.
The 1957 Treaty of Rome was the starting point of today’s European Union. Article
217 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (the EEC treaty) formulated
its linguistic regime in which all official languages of the then six Member States, except for
Luxembourgish4, became official.
The 1973 enlargement, which included Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, the
language regime was modified. Danish and English became official languages. Irish, however,
was granted a particular status: only primary law would be translated into this language. The
number of official languages, therefore, amounted to six – Danish, Dutch, English, French,
German and Italian. When Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) joined the European
Union, the number went up to nine.
1
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic
and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions - A New Framework Strategy for
Multilingualism /* COM/2005/0596 final */
2
Extract from the Conference “Multilingualism: a vibrant and dynamic idea in an enlarged EU” given by
Commissioner Ján Figel in Brussels on March 4 2005. p. 2
3
Portal Languages and Europe http://europa.eu.int/languages/en/document/59 (consulted 11/01/06)
4
Luxembourgish became official in Luxembourg in 1984
137
When Austria, Finland and Sweden became members, they only added two new
languages: Finnish and Swedish, given that German was already an official language. Austria,
however, demanded a special clause in which some Austrian-German expressions should also
be valid within the EU framework. This matter became a source of political dispute and a
political campaign for the Austrian referendum was created5.
As a result, Austria’s Accession Treaty included Protocol Number 10 through which
23 genuinely Austrian-German expressions in the field of food could also be used along with
their German counterparts. Examples of these would be Erdäpfeln as opposed to Kartoffeln
(potatoes) or Paradeiser as opposed to Tomaten (tomatoes), among others. This shows how
politically sensitive the language issue is.
The more recent 2004 enlargement has brought 9 new official languages to the EU:
Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Slovak and Slovenian,
making it a total of 20 official languages. In 2007, however, this figure will be increased as
three new official languages will be added: Irish, Romanian and Bulgarian, amounting to 23
official languages6.
2. Treaty languages and article IV 448 (1)
So far, we have dealt with the EU’s 20, soon to be 23 official languages. There is,
however, another layer of recognition: the EU’s Treaty languages, also known as languages of
the Constitution.
Paragraph 1 of article IV-448(1) of the Constitution, which was article 314 of the EC
Treaty, states that the Treaty shall be authentic in the following 21 languages: Czech, Danish,
Dutch, English, Estonian, Finish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian,
Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish, Swedish.
This article does not confer official status to these languages since it is Council
Regulation 1/58 which establishes so. Article IV-448(1) only determines which Constitutional
texts shall be authentic.
As we can see, the list of Treaty languages does not coincide with the list of the official
languages stated in the previous section. Today’s Treaty languages are all the EU’s official
languages plus Irish. There are, therefore, 21 Treaty languages.
Treaty languages enjoy certain rights such as eligibility for the Lingua programme7 or
full consideration as authentic texts of the Treaties and the Constitution, as opposed to
translations. It must be said that the consideration of Irish as Treaty language, which dates back
from 1973, will disappear as of January 1 2007. Following a formal request by the Irish
government and after the Council of Ministers on June 13 it should be the year “2005”, Irish
will become the EU’s 21st official language.
This change will theoretically give Irish the same status as the rest of the EU’s official
languages. It should be noted that Irish will not be dealt with in the exact same way as the other
official languages. The Council regulation states that “for practical reasons and on a transitional
basis, the institutions of the European Union are not to be bound by any obligation to draft and
translate all acts,…, in the Irish language”8. The Regulation also states that this “derogation is
partial and excludes from its scope Regulations adopted jointly by the European Parliament and
the Council”. The Council will determine unanimously in 2011 whether to put an end to this
derogation.
5
The campaign used a genuine Austrian German expression: Erdäpfelsalat bleibt Erdäpfelsalat
Assuming that Romania and Bulgaria will join the EU as of January 1 2007
7
Programme devoted to the promotion of language teaching and learning
8
Council Regulation (EC) 920/2005 of June 13 2005
6
138
3. The other articles of the EU Constitution
Articles I-10, II-101 and III-128
The second set of articles of the EU’s linguistic regime is articles I-10 II-101 and II128 of the EU Constitution, in which citizens are granted the right to use the EU languages.
Article I-10 refers to EU citizenship and acknowledges the right to address the
European Parliament, the European Ombudsman, as well as other institutions and consultative
bodies in one of the EU Constitution languages and receive an answer in the same language
(I.10.2.d).
Within the framework of Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union we
find article II-101 which refers to the right to good administration. It stipulates, in paragraph 4,
that “every person may write to the institutions of the Union in one of the languages of the
Constitution and must have an answer in the same language”.
Article III-128 stipulates that the languages in which all citizens shall address the EU
institutions or consultative bodies, according to article I-10, are those listed in article IV-448 (I).
4. The special status of Luxembourgish: a third level of recognition
The Luxembourgish language, declared official in Luxembourg in 1984 also has a
special status in the EU. It is eligible for certain language programmes such as the Lingua
programme cited above.
Despite being a State language, however, Luxembourgish has never been put forward
for official EU language status by the country’s authorities.
5. The so-called regional/minority or lesser-used languages of the EU
It would be rather imprecise to state that the EU’s linguistic diversity narrows down to
23 official languages in 2007. Europe has a wealth of other languages, the so-called regional,
minority or lesser-used languages (see Annex I).
The UE bases the concept of “regional/minority language” on the definition given by
the Council of Europe in the European Charter of Regional or Minority Languages9, that is,
“languages traditionally used within a given territory of a State by nationals of that State who
form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the State's population; and different from the
official language(s) of that State; it does not include either dialects of the official language(s) of
the State or the languages of migrants”.
According to official information10 there are approximately ninety minority language
groups in the Europe of 25, as opposed to 48 in the Europe of 15. The accession of Bulgaria and
Romania will also increase Europe’s linguistic diversity. It is estimated that Romania hosts
around 25 national minorities, some of them already present in the current Member States. The
largest groups are the Hungarian community, the Romany (also referred to as Roma or
Gypsies), or the Turkish, to name a few11.
The Constitution does not grant any significant right to these languages. Special
attention deserves, however, article IV-448(2), which contributes “to fulfilling the objective of
respecting the Union’s rich cultural and linguistic diversity”12. In practical terms, this article
offers the possibility that Member States provide a translation of the Constitution into those
languages which enjoy official status in all or part of the territory of Member States. It must be
said that this clause is rather symbolic in nature and does not confer any right to the so-called
9
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Local_and_regional_Democracy/Regional_or_Minority_languages/
(Consulted 05/12/05)
10
Euromosaic II http://www.uoc.edu/euromosaic/web/homean/index1.html
and Euromosaic III:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/languages/langmin/euromosaic/index_en.html
11
European Centre for Minority Issues http://www.ecmi.de/emap/download/Romania_Background.pdf
12
Declaration No 29 of the Final Act of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe
139
regional/minority languages other than a translation – which is not considered as an official text
– of the Constitution.
Quite recently there has been substantial improvement in the recognition of these
languages. Following a Spanish proposal launched in December 2004, the European Council of
Foreign Ministers decided, on June 13 2005, to allow the use of official regional/minority
languages in certain European institutions. This decision stands as a Council “conclusion”13 and
paves the way for these languages to be used in the European Parliament and the Committee of
the Regions.
Thanks to the Council conclusion, The Committee of the Regions President Peter
Straub signed an agreement with the Spanish Ambassador to the EU approving the use of three
languages Catalan (also known as Valencian), Basque and Galician on November 16 2006.
These arrangements have several shortfalls: the costs associated with their implementation are
borne by the requesting Member States and it is up to the Member States to decide whether or
not to implement the new provisions. The new linguistic landscape following the Council
decision throws, therefore, another level of recognition in the EU’s linguistic hierarchy.
6. The institutions and the promotion of multilingualism: de jure vs de facto
The fact that the EU has 20 official languages may lead us to believe that all 20
languages are involved in all contexts of communication and action. As we shall illustrate below,
that is not so. Based on article 6 of the very first Regulation of the Council (1/1958), each
institution has adopted its own language regime and language arrangements in their Rules of
Procedure, without officially limiting (but pragmatically doing so) the number of languages.
The Commission’s rules concerning language14 can be divided into three main
categories: language of instruments of general application (proposals for directives, regulations,
etc.), languages used in decisions which address specific countries, companies, etc., and internal
language procedure.
The language arrangements differ for these three cases: in the case of instruments of
general application, the languages used are all official languages of the Communities. When the
Commission establishes communication with a particular country, company, etc., the language
used is that of the entity which is addressed. As for internal written procedure, it is stipulated that
the current language regime be English, French and German. As for internal meetings (oral
procedure), the Commission laid down the arrangements15 in 1984. These arrangements show
that it is not possible to ensure systematic interpretation in all official languages. Meetings are
always conducted in English, French or German.
The European Parliament (EP) possesses the strictest language regime since
multilingualism is considered the cornerstone of the Parliament. It is stipulated in its Rules of
Procedure that all documents and speeches must be translated / interpreted into all official
languages. Otherwise a vote cannot be taken16. The EP, however, also has a pragmatic approach.
During meetings, arrangements are made according to the needs of those taking part in them.
However, in those meetings where legislative and financial decisions are to be taken,
Parliamentarians always resort to the interpretation services, provided in all official languages.
The intergovernmental nature of the Council makes this institution to work in all official
languages in formal ministerial meetings. The importance of official language parity can be
illustrated in article 10.2 of the Council’s Rules of Procedure, which gives the right to any
member of the Council to oppose a discussion if the text or interpretation is not provided in the
member’s own language. When ministers meet informally, these rules do not apply. In Council
meetings below ministerial level, the approach is also more pragmatic since interpretation is only
provided in a limited number of languages. At COREPER level, interpretation is provided in
13
Council conclusion of June 13 2005 on the official use of additional languages within the Council and
possibly other Institutions and bodies of the European Union
14
Art. 16 (OJ L230/18, 1993) of its Rules of Procedure
15
See minutes of the 760th meeting of the Commission
16
Non-translated documents may be voted but not if 12 MEP’s object
140
English, French and German, although translation is available in all official languages. At high
level groups, the language combination narrows down: meetings are conducted in French only,
without interpretation service and “discussions often start in Council working groups before
documents are available in all languages” 17.
The language regimes of these three European institutions vary substantially, depending
on both the nature of the institution and the level of formality in which the communication takes
place. The higher the level of formality, the more respect to full (official) multilingualism. This
is, again, due to the political sensitivity of the language issue. The language parity principle
claiming that all official languages have equal status seems to be, therefore, more in theory than
in practice, more a presumption than a principle. The institutions’ Rules of Procedure and
communication within them confirm the pragmatic approach that the EU has adopted within its
institutions, except in those situations, needles to say, in which language is not a mere instrument
of conveying information but a politically-sensitive issue. We can state therefore, that the de jure
situation differs substantially from the de facto one.
7. A kaleidoscopic review of the EU’s linguistic hierarchy
As we have seen in the previous sections, far from having an equal status, the
languages of the EU fall have different categories, establishing a language status hierarchy.
The tables belowillustrate both the current and the future EU’s language regime.
Current hierarchy (2006) 18
Main Language rights
Languages
Level 1
20 official languages:
Czech, Danish, Dutch,
Estonian, Finish, French,
Greek, Hungarian, Italian,
Lithuanian,
Maltese,
Portuguese,
Slovak,
Spanish, Swedish
English,
German,
Latvian,
Polish,
Slovene,
Level 2
Irish (Treaty language)
Level 3
Luxembourgish
Level 4
Regional/minority languages official
in part of the territory of a Member
State
Level 5
17
18
Authentic text of all Treaties and the
Constitution
Use within the institutions, with exceptions
(see Rules of Procedure)
Right to send documents to the institutions
and receive an answer in the same language
Drafting of EU Regulations and documents
of general application
Publishing of the Official Journal of the
European Union
Eligible for all Education programmes
Authentic text of all Treaties and the
Constitution
Right to address the institutions and receive
a reply in the same language (right of
petition)
Official in the Court of Justice and the Court
of First Instance
Eligible for the Lingua Programme
Certified translation of the Constitution
Eligible for the Lingua Programme
Certified translation of the Constitution
Sporadic use in certain EU institutions (prior
to an arrangement with the institution, as
established by the Council conclusion of June
13 2005)
Non-official languages
Sofia Moratinos op. cit., note 79 p. 29
Adaptation from PUJADAS, BERNAT (see bibliography)
141
Hierarchy starting in 2007
Level 1
Languages
22 official languages19:
Bulgarian, Czech, Danish,
Dutch,
English,
Estonian,
Finish, French, German, Greek,
Hungarian, Italian, Latvian,
Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish,
Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak,
Slovene, Spanish, Swedish
Level 2
Irish 21st official language
with a derogation
Level 3
Luxembourgish
Level 4
Regional/minority languages
official in part of the territory
of a Member State
Level 5
Non-official languages
Main Language rights
Authentic text of all Treaties and the Constitution
Use within the institutions, with exceptions (see
Rules of Procedure)
Right to send documents to the institutions and
receive an answer in the same language
Drafting of EU Regulations and documents of
general application
Publishing of the Official Journal of the European
Union
Eligible for all Education programmes
Same rights as level 1 languages but with a
derogation, to be reviewed in 2011 “the
institutions of the European Union are not to be
bound by any obligation to draft and translate all
acts,…, in the Irish language”.
Certified translation of the Constitution
Eligible for the Lingua Programme
Certified translation of the Constitution
Sporadic use in certain EU institutions (prior to an
arrangement with the institution, as established by
the Council conclusion of June 13 2005)
8. Concluding remarks
As we have seen in the above sections, the EU, far from taking a holistic approach to
languages, it keeps adding layers and granting different status, which makes the EU’s linguistic
regime more and more complex.
While it is true that the EU makes great efforts in keeping multilingual communication,
the current language status does nothing but establish a hierarchy between all the languages
spoken in the EU. Any decision on the future of the EU’s language policy will eventually have
to get to grips with the dichotomy of, on the one hand equality, democracy and true respect for
diversity (not as the sum of State languages but as the sum of Europe’s language mosaic), and
on the other the need for efficiency. The former can be achieved by addressing all language
policy actions to all of Europe’s languages – adapting of course to each of their sociolinguistic
situations – while the latter could be done by reducing the number of working languages,
considering them as mere neutral instruments of communication. An unlikely situation today,
given the strong political and power-related connotations of language.
As an illustrative example of the strong political connotations of the language issue:
when the accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden was to raise the number of official
languages to 11, the attempt made in 1994 during the French Presidency of the Council by Mr.
Alain Lamassoure – French Minister of European Affairs – resulted in a high political conflict.
His proposal consisted of reducing the number of languages to five (needless to say that French
was among those five). The European Parliament, and more specifically its Belgian and Dutch
members, claimed that they would combat any initiative to establish discrimination among the
languages of the European Union. In an attempt to smooth ruffled feathers, President Mitterrand
intervened before the Parliament in 199520 by acknowledging the need of preserving Europe’s
linguistic diversity – quite a paradoxical statement, given France’s domestic record on the
respect and protection of linguistic diversity in its own territory.
It seems evident that no government is willing to relinquish its State language and,
following the current language rules, future candidates to the EU such as Croatia and Turkey
19
20
Assuming that Romania and Bulgaria will join the EU as of January 1 2007
17 January 1995. Source: Debates of the European Parliament 1994/95, no. 4-456/45-51
142
will bring more official languages to the list, making it both inefficient and unsustainable. As it
stands today, the EU’s language policy is neither equal, nor efficient for Europe’s languages.
In our view, an in-depth analysis of the language regime should be carried out. Today,
not all languages are treated equally. Only when this condition is met will we be able to assert
that the EU possesses a rational, comprehensible and respectful language policy for all citizens.
ANNEX I : UE’s Language Mosaic
A. Member States
Member
State
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Czech
Republic
Official
language/s
German
French, Flemish
Greek, Turkish
Czech
Denmark
Estonia
Danish
Estonian
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Finnish
French
German
Greek
Hungarian
Ireland
Italy
Irish, English
Italian
Latvia
Latvian
Lithuania
Lithuanian
Luxembourg
French, German,
Luxembourgish
English, Maltese
Dutch
Polish
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Portuguese
Slovak
Slovenia
Slovene
Spain
Spanish
Regional/Minority language/s*
Croatian, Czech, Hungarian, Slovak, Slovene
German
Other languages: Armenian, Cypriot Arabic, Romani
German, Polish, Romani, Slovak
Other languages: Bulgarian, Croatian, Greek, Hungarian,
Russian, Ruthenian, Ukrainian
German
Russian
Other languages: Belorussian, Finnish, German, Latvian,
Lithuanian, Polish, Romani, Swedish, Tartar, Ukrainian, Yiddish
Saami, Swedish
Basque, Breton, Catalan, Corsican, Flemish, German, Occitan
Danish, Frisian, Sorbian
Albanian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Turkish, Walachian
Croatian, German, Romani, Romanian, Serbian, Slovak,
Slovenian
Other languages: Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Polish,
Ruthenian, Ukrainian
Irish
Albanian, Catalan, Croatian, Franco-provençal, Friulian,
German, Greek, Ladin, Occitan, Sardinian, Slovene
Bielorussian, Polish, Russian, Ukrainian
Other languages: German, Latgalian, Lithuanian, Livonian,
Yiddish, Romani
Polish, Russian
Other languages: Bielorussian, German, Yiddish, Karaim,
Romani, Tartar, Ukrainian
Luxembourgish
-Frisian
Bielorussian,
German,
Kashubian,
Lithuanian,
Ruthenian/Lemkish, Ukrainian
Other languages: Armenian, Czech, Karaim, Roma-languages,
Russian, Slovak, Tartar, Yiddish
Mirandese
German, Hungarian, Romani
Other languages: Bosnian, Croatian, German, Serbian
Hungarian, Italian, Romani
Other languages: Bosnian, Croatian, German, Serbian
Aragonese, Asturian, Basque, Berber, Catalan, Galician,
Occitan, Portuguese
Finnish, Saami
Cornish, Gaelic, Irish, Welsh
Sweden
Swedish
United
English
Kindgom
* Own adaptation from the Euromosaic-Study III:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/languages/langmin/euromosaic/fi1_en.html
143
A) Acceding Countries
Acceding coutries
Official language/s
Bulgaria
Bulgarian
Regional/Minority language/s*
Macedonian, Romani, Turkish
German, Hungarian, Romani
Romania
Romanian
* Own adaptation from “Minorities in Bulgaria” published by the Center of Documentation and
Information on Minorities in Europe-Southeast Europe:
http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/CEDIME-Reports-Minorities-in-Bulgaria.html
and information from the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI):
http://www.ecmi.de/emap/download/Romania_Background.pdf
Bibliography
CLIMENT, V., Managing Multilingualism: An Insight into the European Union’s Language
Policy, Thesis presented by for the Degree of Master of Arts in Political Administrative
European Studies, 2003-2004. College of Europe, Bruges
CLIMENT, V., GIMENO, E.,, Linguistic Diversity in the European Union’s Institutional
Framework, Paper prepared for the European Culture Conference, University of Navarra,
Pamplona, 19-22 October 2005
DE CILLIA, R., “Erdäpfelsalat bleibt Erdäpfelsalat. Österreichisches Deutsch und EU-Beitritt”
in Muhr, R. et al. (ed.), Österreichisches Deutsch, Vienna: Hölder, 1995, pp. 121-131;
MORATINOS JOHNSTON, S., “Multilingualism and EU Enlargement” in Terminologie et
Traduction 2000, n.3
PUJADAS, B., The rules governing the languages of the European Union: which languages
and to what extent? A practical guide., Mercator, 2004 no. 17
STRUBELL, M., “Attitudes towards language: Weakening strong languages and strengthening
weak ones” in A.-F. Christidis (ed.) “Strong” and “weak” languages in the European
Union, Vol. 1: 151-172, Centre for the Greek Language, Thessaloniki (1999a)
Websites Consulted:
Centre of Documentation and Information on Minorities in Europe-Southeast
Europe:http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/bhr/english/index.html
Council of Europe:
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_Affairs/Local_and_regional_Democracy/Regional_or_Minority_
languages/
DG Education and Culture of the European Commission:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/education/policies/lang/languages/langmin/euromosaic/index_en.htm
l
European Centre for Minority Issues: http://www.ecmi.de
Languages and Europe: http://europa.eu.int/languages/en/document/59
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (Euromosaic II):
http://www.uoc.edu/euromosaic/web/homean/index1.html
144
A new neighbourhood policy?
Redefining the limits of political in Central and Eastern Europe in the EU
integration process
Ivan NACHEV
The concept of united Europe has various meanings. For some, it is a geographical
concept, and for others a political community (Kaplinski: 1993), based on trust, loyalty, and
shared values, on a move towards alliance, both economical and political.
The culture of Central and Eastern Europe’s countries is the fruit of a mutual
interlacement of three religious cultures and their influences – Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Islam,
and the political cultures of the Roma-Byzantine world, of West and East empires, the Ottoman
political system and, in many cases, of Slavic peoples’ political culture.
Balkans is the territory where more than then peoples are living, and whose history is
not directly linked to the history of Central and Eastern Europe’s peoples. Thus, the new
dimensions of neighbourhood and different visions of historical perspectives standing in front
of these countries could not do without the context of perspectives for developing a politics of
neighbourhood in both the new 2004 member states and Bulgaria and Romania.
The expansion of EU in the East demonstrated that for these societies there is more to
demand than negotiations between their political elites and those of Western European
countries, it demands the support of citizens who feel or want to feel themselves as Europeans.
It demands the overcome of differences in historical arrangements towards neighbouring
peoples. It also demands the overcome of nation-state’s rigid borders and passing towards the
unity of variety in cultural identities.
There are two general points of view on European integration – a positive and a
negative one.
The first is the positive, for it apprehends integration as a positive process in the course
of which main concepts, structures and values are redefined, and the final end to pursue is
delineated. Moreover, following the logics of “concentric circles”, states have to
consequentially go forward, pursuing those ends. Plus – integration as an end is not to be
protracted by the most slowly developing countries. It is in that sense that those we are willing
to include in concrete initiations – European economic and political spaces, European economic
and monetary union, that we can gradually develop such types of cooperation for which the
nation-state has never dreamt for.
The second and both negative and pessimistic one, in as much as it takes the processes
as the result of political elites’ unexplainable behavior, who thus way destroy much of the
positive that has been previously achieved by their predecessors, leading to the increase of
economic inequality, strengthening the dependence, undoing national cultures and the gradual
loss of national political autonomy. Really, in this way national identity is depersonalized and
the functions of national political and economic elites will gradually decrease, loosing the place
they have inhibited in defining the rules of “the game” on their own states’ territory. It is in this
way that “borders” will loose their meaning, and the perspectives for their washing away and
gradual disappearance are becoming more and more real.
The question of borders, in the context of European uniting and expansion in the East,
are comparatively underresearched. One of the reasons for this is that there is no sufficient
interest on behalf of Eurointegration’s administrations, and in part because of the circumstance
that, given the character of political processes, this issue is not presented in the agenda. On the
other hand, the survival of united Europe, as well as the survival of each political system within
it, lies in the debate of European identity (Habermas: 1975) and what exactly it means for the
people the wide and all-encompassing frame of the EU, for individuals and families, ethnic
communities, regions, and nations (Smith: 1992).
145
In XXI century’s first decade, such a new Europe is not confined to its western part
only, which, under the pressure of the cold war, developed a dense network of economic
contacts and cooperation, as well as institutions necessary for their political regulation. A
network, which surpassed all the known national and historical limits.
Today, Europe includes an unequal social aspect, at times inferiorly inimical and
dissatisfied Eastern Europe, which did not manage to achieve the degree of interaction by the
time of its dependence of the Soviet Union, yet in its approach to the West it achieved the
degree of political development that will allow it to rapidly and, I hope, fully participate in
values of European unity.
Today, this Europe includes more than 23 states or almost the whole European
continent with about 500 millions of citizens who belong to more than 30 nations and speak 60
languages and more. Such a Europe will represent the greatest in its essence political
conglomerate with no inferior borders and free movement of people. Thus, Europe will be the
greatest, in its purchasing capacity, general trade in the world.
However, this will be a Europe of differences and contrasts, of unresolved conflicts
and hardly reconciling identities. Could such a various Europe have a claim for a common
construction now, if the unity where there are no borders is not realized, in order for every
European to avoid being an outcast in whatever part of the continent?
Where is history left?
History is the teacher of life. It is also the main dividing line between peoples and
political elites. It is the general abyss between desire for cooperation and desire for saving the
differences. Evolution reveals that history is one of the human concepts of variety. In a long run
the establishment of cultural identity has been accomplished by juxtaposing it to another one.
The citizens of a country, the supporters of a political system considered “barbarians” those
who lived outside its borders or opposed its confinements. The rule was simple and clear –
repression was practiced upon all those groups who showed different attitude from that of the
official state or official doctrine.
One of the known examples in human history is the historical juxtaposition of Balkan
peoples. For ages they have shared one and the same territory, domination on one and the same
political system, they apprehend themselves as part of a “common” space, a “common” people.
And the very variety transforms them in part of a community having one destiny and one future.
The making of separate states and breaking with Ottoman empire, or the AustroHungarian one, if we move to West, created a peculiar tension and a competition in whose basis
there were more desire for opposing than belonging to a cultural sphere. After the decline of
socialist space where we all were experiencing the influence of ruling values and the necessity
of their continual recognition, all the Central and Eastern Europe peoples found ourselves in a
similar condition. Societies of unstable political cultures, political values, systems, and
economies. And all of them willing to turn back on historical juxtaposition and turn their look
towards European unity – a unity in diversity.
The way is clear, but complicate. It demands an end of the centuries-old opposition
and the making of a new political and economic space where there is no meaning what the
national political elites want, but what the EU citizens want.
Europe is a federation of countries, but also a federation of citizens.
The peculiarity of such federation consists in its rely on partially shared traditions and
past heritages, those of history such as Roman law, the political democracy of ancient Greece,
Judeo-Christian ethics, parliamentary institutions, the Renaissance humanism, rationalism and
empiricism, as well as romanticism and classicism. All these construct the type of “unity in
diversity” which is the official European cultural doctrine, which opposes a family of cultures
and states understood as overlapping elements in certain cases, yet not always.
146
On the concept of sovereignty
When, until recently, we accepted different concepts of the new political system and
doctrine that we were trying to build in our juxtaposed societies, we omitted in our mind that
these concepts are the fruit of the development of Anglo-Saxon political system, political
philosophy and practice, and the more we move towards unity the more they will change their
meaning and sound. And they will cease to mean this for us what they meant in the wake or the
midst of XX century.
The meaning and actual character of the issue of sovereignty as concept is defined by
our surrounding political and economic reality. Defined by the circumstance that, resulting from
our European cooperation and political and economic integration, new borders of political
process in the frames of this space are delineated.
It was until recently that sovereignty was the grounding principle for international law
and relations (Milanov: 2004). The fast development of integration processes after the fall of
communist regimes and the gradual transfer of functions to supra-national political institutions
set on the agenda the necessity of rethinking the concept of sovereignty. The supporters of
realism do not question the existence of nation-states as a basic, if not single element of world’s
territorial dividing and therefore of the existence of juxtaposing of these countries on this basis
of power and the equilibrium of powers. Thus, what is happening there, where national borders
fall grow weak, and national political elites are “forced” to consider in both their domestic and
foreign behavior the actions of neighbouring countries and their political elites.
Globalization and Europeization, in its sense of European political and economic
integration, are both the result of deep changes in international relations that prompted the
diminishment of state’s weight in favor of other actors on the international political domain.
State is no longer the central factor in political relations, and use is not the general tool of
overwhelming conflicts between states.
Hence, sovereignty is no longer the untouchable principle of international law (1) and
it is gradually linked to integration, and national political elites consider not only their own
interests but the ones of other countries following the process of integration.
For every political elite there is the question: is the sacrifice of sovereignty on the altar of
European integration justified or enough flexible solutions must be found, ones that will allow
its link to integration processes.
And is not the subsidiary principle this new approach that will allow us to save our
independence, at the expense of decentralization of political decisions and political practices.
Problems will be solved there, where they have arisen and where there are both political elite
and political institution burdened with their solution. In this way, the central role of national
governments will weaken and the relations between center and periphery of nation-state will
acquire new dimensions.
Regional politics represents a peculiar form of horizontal cooperation, where the
recently sovereign political subjects yield rights of local and supra-national institutions and
transfer their sovereignty to civic initiatives and interests.
What is going on with the nation-state?
Really, considering more broadly this problem, it is necessary to widen the question –
is the nation-state to survive in the age of European integration? If we start from conservative
political interpretations we will have to soothe the reader and say that nation-state is not only to
survive but, following the logics of “changing geometry” (Held: 1991) and Europe a la Carte,
the state will alone continue to determine its political behavior under the conditions of gradual
commitment of higher and low politics, national economies, as well as in the process of
establishing the four freedoms of movement, and more especially the freedom of migration in
the frames of a common European space.
In the age of globalization and European integration, nation-state acquires functions
that allow it to infect its own reasons of existence.
What is actually going on?
147
Nation-states and national economies are becoming inseparable part of the common
European political space called the EU, the move towards the acceptance of united European
currency – the Euro, and establish such freedoms of movement that much exceed their
capabilities of regulating these processes. Freedoms of movement of people, commodities,
capitals and goods put states in a situation of mobility where each one of the components
mentioned can settle there, where economic profit dictates. Practically, nation-state can not be
the economic and political manager and regulator of economic activity and the moving of labor
market on a proper territory, for they depend on the free will of participants in global, and in
particular the European, market and not on the will of local economic and political elites.
In practice, the elimination of borders between markets, the erasure of national
borders, the strengthening of trans-bordering cooperation, freedom of movement for people,
capitals and goods, these all are harshly constraining nation-state’s possibilities to form its
politics in an independent way.
The behavior of elites
Undoubtedly, the behavior of political and economic elites is dependent on the way
they think of integration processes. Years after years, parts of our societies went towards the
establishment of “European” in its kind and essence political system (Nachev: 2004). A system
of predictable political behavior, an applicable program for ruling, and clear international
contacts. A system of European and Atlantic integration and orientation. A system of modern
democratic society with a modern political thinking.
We went towards this or at least we thought so. Our societies organized, built and
structured a political system of representation that is based on the European idea of dividing the
political space in Left and Right.
In the process of transition political forces and elites formed, who continually searched
for their recognition with both Western political system and reality. In some aspects of these
processes, we never reached European political system. Neither the system that we set in
process of transition to democracy rationalized as “European”, nor the “actors” of this system
behave “in a European way”. We never built modern political elites. And not because a modern
political elite presupposes also a modern citizen, modern society that did not take place in some
countries, but also because the system of selecting political elites was displaced form the sphere
of “natural selection” to the sphere of “artificial” recognition of elites. The frequent changes of
political elites that were not based on competence and vision for the future but on political
affiliation was gradually brining about distrust in existing political elites, hence to the public
faces of power. In many countries the processes of integration can not be explained by the
elites, and their real essence failed to reach the mind of real people. The one that is to benefit
from advantages and disadvantages of free market, the one who can and must travel, produce,
sell commodities, offer goods and receive such in common European space.
Political elites in our countries will have to pay attention not to their own interests but
to the interests of their peoples and defending them in united Europe and defending commonEuropean values and economic and political interests.
In this sense, supra-national institutions will become the place where the national will
be leading, and the vision of various politics and possibilities for their realization will be
beyond the borders of the nation-state.
On the free movement of people
The integration of ten states from Central and Eastern Europe is already a fact. Very
soon Bulgaria and Romania will participate to them. The integration of Turkey and Macedonia
seems to be imaginary, yet negotiations with these countries already started.
And the problems of these states and their labor markets already started. National
governments years after years attempt at overwhelming unemployment, gender inequality and
unequal payments, to introduce principles of normal and effective functioning of the markets in
their countries and on this basis to create conditions for the normal existence of economies
148
which in turn to lead to increasing living standards of their peoples and to avoid mass
migrations in states with a well developed social model.
In this context, as also in the context of the full member nation-state, a range of
problems that have to be solved appears.
Free movement of people presupposes a gradual opening of nation-states’ labor
markets to the labor power of other member states. It is in this sense that national governments
will gradually loose their capabilities of regulating this process. And even though the sanitary
periods form two to seven years seemingly saves their capabilities of regulation, in practice the
opening of markets renders the regulation of such processes from the liberalization of labor
market relations a constant tendency. Free movement presupposes the gradual unification of
systems for recognizing diplomas and professional qualifications, which in turn presupposes the
gradual systematization of educational systems and their comparison not only in relation to
educational degrees but also in relation to educational practices.
This unification will lead to the coordination of systems of social security, which will
allow it for each EU citizen to do support of his or her health or unemployment insurance or
pension elsewhere in the EU and to transfer these payments at point of free movement in the
rest of the member states. In other words, the possibility of working in a member state, to move
in another, to settle in a third one and get retired will gradually drag out from national
governments those rights that allowed them for years to regulate with political decisions the
processes of free movement in the frames of national borders.
How are then economic and political elites to present and defend their visions for the
development of national economies, when along their borders, where until recently slowly
developing regions and subjects were positioned, where strategic production were missing,
today there are trans-bordering companies developing, offering commodities and goods that are
not influenced by the “rules” of national economies?
Of course, under such conditions, the power of national governments will be confined,
and very soon, conservative political and economic elites will oppose common-European ideas
of concentric circles. Whereas the possibilities of private and group interests of political elites
and economic outfits to influence integration processes exists, they will continue opposing the
European idea of building a stronger Union, for in this way they could save longer their power
to rule various processes and peoples’ destinies. However, the idea of free movement of people
has a different aim. And what is going on with the possibilities for voting? Nation-states will
continue to regulate these processes and set the same conditions for the citizens of the countries.
The incompatibility of these requirements with free market will question these rights too. Then,
borders will grow weak in this aspect also, and one of the greatest dreams of the supporters of
the federalist idea will become reality – what greater argument for applying sovereignty from
that of the European people to apply its right to choose and influence the processes of the
making of policies in the frames of the EU, where national interests will no longer be first, and
the interests of the common European space.
Instead of conclusion
Whatever our premises and expectations are, the problem of European identity, of
historical perspectives for overwhelming borders between nations and nation-states,
presupposes the clarification of those values which European countries’ population shared in
historical or actual plane. Very naturally, they can be found in the reigns of cultural geography
and territorial symbolism, in religion, in attitudes towards non-Europeans, political and law
traditions, cultural heritage and symbolism.
The idea of a common European home is applicable because of the fact there are no
serious geographical barriers to impede political contacts and economic movements. Soon,
political barriers will also be eliminated. For part of Europe, there is also the cultural role of
Mediterranean countries. Religious affiliation also represents a shared European experience in
as much as Christianity and Christian crusades have confirmed the perception and selfperception of Europeans. On the other hand, Christianity is inferiorly divided, and on the
149
continent people with another religion do live and will continue to live. Thus, religious variety
is part of European unity. Political traditions, cultural heritage and symbolism are the basis on
which experience and collective memories grows up, the ones that separates communities form
the continent from other communities and set the common points of Europe. Political borders
have no longer meaning, and the dividing line in history is not in the agenda.
In this situation, what is going on with the new borders of EU and were are the old
ones going? Where are they to be searched? Will European identity be confined to political
elites in Brussels and Strasburg or will it disperse in national political elites and then in
populations of the continent’s countries? The answer of this question requires researching the
link between the states of European integration and the forming of European identity, between
overwhelming old historical divisions and borders and the establishment of new ones.
It can turn out that the adherence to the European idea, apart from everything else, is in
the circumstance that European economic and political integration reveals to us new vital
chances and fields for applying our professional skills. This contributes for the making of
European identity not so much in terms of political elites who by virtue of circumstances must
remain national ones, though European-oriented, but among professionals, experts,
administrators, managers and all those people who see their future in united Europe. It is in this
way that borders will decline by themselves for the people who emotionally or by profession
and living experience are linked to the consequences off European integration. Also in relation
to those who cannot be dubbed neither its active bearers, nor actively aiming at making
European identity. Every society will face the challenges of multiculturalism and economical
and political restructuring of the European space resulting from the last two expansions – the
one from 2004 and the on-going 2007 one.
Europe is either to unite and to overwhelm history is dividing role or to cognize
decline.
References
Adapting the institutions to make a success of enlargement (Commission opinion) (2000)
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities).
ANDERSON, M. et al. (eds.) (1995) Policing the European Union: Theory, Law and Practice
(Oxford and N.Y.: Oxford University Press).
BARNES, I. and BARNES P., (1999). The Enlarged European Union. (London: Longman).
BAYLIS, J. and S. SMITH (2001). The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to
International Relations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
HABERMAS, J. (1975). Legitimation Crisis. Beacon.
HELD, D. (ed) (1991) Political Theory Today (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press).
HENDERSON, K. (ed.) (1999) Back to Europe : Central and Eastern Europe and the
European Union (London : UCL Press).
HIX, S. (1999) The Political System of the European Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan).
KAPLINSKI, J. (1993). The Future of National Cultures in Europe. In The Future of the Nation
State in Europe. London.
MILANOV, M. (2004). Mondialisation et Souverainete. In La Mondialisation et Les Nouvelles
Limites du Politique. (Sofia: EON2000).
NACHEV, I. (2004). « Les Elites Bulgares: Face a L’Integration Europeenne at a la
Mondialisation », in La Mondialisation et Les Nouvelles Limites du Politique. (Sofia:
EON2000).
NUGENT, N. (1999) The Government and Politics of the European Union, 4th edn. (London:
Macmillan).
SMITH, A. (1992). “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, in International Affairs
Vol. 68, N 1, January 1992.
VIBERT, F. (2001) Europe simple, Europe strong: the future of European governance
(Cambridge: Polity).
150
Eastern European Borders
Mihai Răzvan UNGUREANU
The question of the ultimate frontier of the European construction has always been a
controversial issue. Where does Europe end? First it is the geography that sets a physical limit
to the European continent. But borders are imagined and can be invoked and used as frames in
the production of representations. Natural borders only exist if we want them to exist.
Throughout the history, mountains and rivers have divided, but also united people and nations.
Therefore, borders are more than simple lines of physical demarcation, and they can be
considered social constructions. They are lines of connection, in flux and negotiated. Moreover,
they have always been in movement, dynamic, changing all the time.
Regarding the limits of the European construction, as the European Commissioner Olli
Rehn1 underlined, geography only sets the frame, but fundamentally it is values that make the
borders of Europe, the most fundamental of which are liberty and solidarity, tolerance and
human rights, democracy and the rule of law. “The map of Europe is defined in the minds of
Europeans.”
The issue of EU external borders has attracted even more attention when the wave of
Eastern EU enlargement has become reality, particularly in terms of maintaining territorial
security and the ability to control flows in the context of threats stemming from transnational
crime, trafficking, and terrorism in a Europe increasingly characterised by mobility.
Furthermore, the new enlargement wave has brought into attention another large series of
migration forecasts.
The external borders of the EU have a double role: defined in national terms they are a
demarcation line, based on ethnicity, language and national culture; understood in supranational
term, they can still be interpreted as a frontier between two civilizations. The question that one
can easily raise is how to avoid the transformation of the eastern border of the EU into a
psychological new Iron Curtain.
In the context of the current wave of enlargement, in order to facilitate the promotion
of sustainable economic development and stability at the future European border, the EU
launched the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004. Through the ENP, the EU
redefines its own geopolitical interests and the relationship to the new neighbours by creating a
“ring of friends” at the European external borders.
ENP offers a new framework and new tools for promoting good governance and
economic development in the EU’s neighborhood, providing deeper political and economic
integration within the EU.
An important component of the neighborhood policy is co-operation at the enlarged
Union’s external borders. The Union of 25 acquired two new neighbours to the East, Belarus
and Ukraine, while a third one, Republic of Moldova, will be added, with Romania’s accession.
Russia’s border with the EU almost doubled in length. On the whole, the Union’s land border
with the countries covered by the ENP will pass from 1300 to 5100 kilometers.
By focussing efforts on a shared agenda, the ENP Action Plans deepen the relationship
with neighbours and promote greater mutual confidence. The Action Plans drafted under the
ENP offer each partner an ambitious package which includes joint actions and a gradual
participation in the so-called “four freedoms”, an essential ingredient of the EU.
The EU is financing cross-border co-operation on both sides of its borders. A wide
range of activities are supported: from interconnection of networks at the micro-scale of border
areas, economic co-operation, contacts between local authorities and NGO’s, to establishment
of border region partnerships. The region on the Eastern EU border needs to be connected to the
1
Olli Rehn, „Values Define Europe, not Borders”, Financial Times, 4 January 2005.
151
European infrastructure. Such an exercise would provide the link to the EU internal market of
the areas included in the ENP.
The Eastern ENP countries benefit from the TACIS programme, together with various
other forms of EC assistance. From 2007, as part of a general reform of the external assistance,
these programmes will be enhanced under a single new instrument - the European
Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which will integrate a wide range of core
policy objectives, including, development policy. It is important, therefore, that support
provided to neighbouring developing countries is coherent with the objectives and principles of
the Community development policy, as outlined in the Joint Statement on the European
Community Development Policy (10 November 2000) by the Council and the Commission (e.g.
while assistance to Ukraine can focus mainly on legislative and regulatory approximation,
assistance to Republic of Moldova will continue to have a significant component focussing on
poverty reduction and more traditional development objectives).
Once Romania becomes a full EU member on 1 January 2007, the RomanianMoldovan border will acquire a new relevancy and significance.
1. Moldova
We have already managed to assert ourselves as an important player in shaping all
major EU policies and undertakings towards Republic of Moldova. In view of Republic of
Moldova’s European aspirations, Romania has worked out a number of ways to provide
substantial support, including a framework for cross-border cooperation with EU financial
assistance, helping Moldovan authorities to harmonize their legislation, norms and standards to
those of the European Union, training Moldovan experts and sharing our experience, both
successes and failures, with our partners in Chisinau.
2005 was the year when our expertise on Republic of Moldova-related issues gained
full recognition within the Union. The EU has taken important steps towards finding a viable
and sustainable solution to the Transdnistrian conflict through the appointment of an EU
Special Representative for the Republic of Moldova in March 2005, the participation as
observer to the 5+2 negotiation format, the launching of the EU Border Assistance Mission
(BAM) in November 2005 (the ESDP monitoring mission at the Moldovan/Ukrainian border,
including the Transdnistrian segment).
The newly assumed pro-European orientation of the political elite in Chisinau has
generated a new geopolitical situation at the future EU’s Eastern border.
Now, there is stronger political and public support in Chisinau for an enhanced
relationship with the EU. European integration is one of the two major issues (the other being
the proper settlement of the situation in Transdnistria) where there is a consensus among the
political elite in Chisinau. The new orientation of the authorities in Chisinau draws considerable
support from both top-level officials and from the public approval for pro-European policies.
There are high expectations among the population of the Republic of Moldova for a rapid
change in their everyday life as a result of a closer relation with the Union, thus increasing the
pressure on the authorities to deliver a quick and tangible outcome from the pro-European
stand.
To cope with these expectations, EU has taken a series of steps in strengthening its
dialogue with Chisinau.
First and foremost, the Action Plan that entered into force on 22 February 2005 gives a
new quality to EU-Republic of Moldova relations. The implementation of its provisions is a
catalyst for Republic of Moldova’s transition to a modern European state. The Action Plan is a
first stage in Republic of Moldova’s road to European integration, leading to a new contractual
relation and a stable, secure and prosperous future for the Republic of Moldova as part of
Europe. The Republic of Moldova Action Plan is a key element to reinforce EU-Republic of
Moldova relations within the framework of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)
and to underpin political and economic reform in the country. Moreover, officials in Chisinau
have turned the ENP Action Plan into the cornerstone of its reform strategy.
152
Second, Brussels nomination of a Special Representative demonstrates the fact that
Republic of Moldova moved higher on the EU agenda today.
Third, launching the Border Assistance Mission on Moldovan-Ukrainian Border aims
directly at improving the overall security environment on the said border, particularly with
reference to its Transdnistrian sector. The mission will build the highly needed capacity for
border management, including customs, on the whole Moldovan - Ukrainian border, thus
helping to prevent trafficking people, smuggling of goods, proliferation of weapons and
customs fraud.
Finally, opening a Commission Delegation in Chisinau sends a clear signal of the
deepening of Brussels – Chisinau bilateral dialogue.The Action Plan priorities for 2006 set out a
comprehensive set of specific targets2 that includes political dialogue, and more precise
reforming electoral legislation, taking into account all the ODIHR and CoE recommendations;
strengthen independence of the judiciary and fundamental freedoms; active engagement in
negotiations for settlement of Transdnistria conflict and cooperation with border mission. In the
economic and trade field, the priorities are related to ensure macroeconomic stability, in
particular by fighting inflation and pursuing fiscal discipline and transparency in public finance,
early agreement with IMF on a new lending programme; improve the business climate,
transparency; reduce over-regulation.
Moreover, particular attention should be given to issues concerning justice, freedom
and security, amending legislation related to fight against crime and trafficking in persons,
adopting and implementing National Action Plan on migration, participating in regional and
cross-border cooperation on migration.
Establishing measures for gradual convergence towards the principles of the EU
internal electricity and gas markets and cooperation for regional energy market integration,
adopting and implementing a Road Safety Action Plan, cooperation in protection of the Danube
and Black Sea, could be significant examples of actions at sectorial level.
2. Ukraine
Moving northward to Kiev, one must acknowledge that the development of the ENP
has the potential to revitalise EU-Ukraine relations. Ukraine was the first of the New
Independent States to sign a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, in 1994, and
represents an important partner for the EU, given the shared interests in terms of economic and
political goals.
Ukraine and the EU agreed to enter into intensified political, security, economic and
cultural relations, including cross border co-operation and shared responsibility in conflict
prevention and conflict resolution, as described in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan.
Further strengthening the stability and effectiveness of institutions guaranteeing
democracy and the rule of law,, ensuring respect for the freedom of the media and freedom of
expression, enhancing co-operation in the common neighbourhood and regional security, in
particular working towards a viable solution to the Transdnistria conflict in Moldova, including
addressing border issues, are all priorities of the Action Plan. The Commission has been active
across a broader front. For example, progress has been made in a number of issues of benefit to
Ukraine (e.g. on Market Economy Status, visa facilitation and energy issues).
For 2006, the priorities included in the Action Plan are converging to the political
reform, trade and economic reform. Furthemore, in the political field, the main reform aspects
refer to: holding free and fair parliamentary elections (March 2006); taking steps to strengthen
independence of judicial system and fight against corruption; an active engagement in
negotiations for the settlement of the Transdnistrian conflict and cooperation with the border
mission.
2
Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Communication to the Commission “Implementing and promoting the
ENP”, 22 November 2005.
153
At this stage, trade and economic reform involves respectively the WTO accession; the
improvement of the business climate, including enforcing intellectual property rights; ensuring
macroeconomic stability in particular by fighting inflation and creating the conditions for
sustained economic growth. And finally, in others field of activity, important elements of the
Action Plan include the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding on
energy and nuclear safety issues; strengthening of the environment policy and cooperation,
including on climate change; cooperation in the protection of the Danube and Black Sea.
In 2006 the EU and ENP Eastern Europe countries will have to transform the borders
from a geographical barrier into a facilitator of economic, social and cultural exchange,
therefore responding to citizens' concerns for security, stability and prosperity. To quote the
European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, this
process will have to occur “not by imposing reforms, but by supporting and encouraging
reformers”3. Romania will continue to consistently contribute to this transformation, given is
commitment to the consolidation of the new democratic countries and to the spreading of
European values throughout the region.
3
Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: Helping Ourselves Through Helping
Our Neighbours”, Conference of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairmen of EU member and Candidate
States, London, 31 October 2005.
154
III. Focus
Livio MISSIR de LUSIGNAN
Reflexions sur l’Empire Ottoman et sur l’Europe de l’Avenir ou Turkey as
European Border ?
NOTE: Eurolimes will seek to be an initiative always open to reflection and
information, eliminating any barrier by bringing to the foreground hot issues troubling the
European continent as far as the borders are concerned. This initiative will be hosted in the
chapter entitled Focus in each issue. I would like to thank for this idea Professor Livio Missir de
Lusignan, a specialist in the Ottoman Empire (see the biography About the authors). He will
open the series of debates with a reflection upon the historical arguments for Turkey’s
integration to the European Union. For a year after the publishing of each issue, Eurolimes will
receive points of view referring to these topics on the address of the journal. These opinions
will be published in two successive issues in a special column of the Focus entitled Pros and
Cons.
155
Reflexions sur l’Empire Ottoman et sur l’Europe de l’Avenir ou Turky as
European Border ?
Livio MISSIR de LUSIGNAN
À la mémoire de Nicolas Jorga (1871-1940)
Latin d’Orient jure sanguinis,
Ce modeste hommage de son admirateur
Livio Missir de Lusignan,
Italien de Smyrne, Latin d’Orient
Jure sanguinis et ritus.
À l’Université de Navarre (Pampelune) il m’a été donné de rencontrer, en octobre
dernier, et dans le cadre du VIIIe Congrès international sur la Culture européenne, deux
professeurs d’une université roumains qui m’ont invité à collaborer à leur revue Eurolimes de
prochaine parution. C’est avec plaisir que j’ai accepté cette invitation et que je me permets par
les présentes Réflexions sur l’Empire ottoman et sur l’Europe de l’avenir de m’adresser à leurs
disciples ou tout simplement lecteurs.
Quoi de plus opportun, et de plus juste surtout, que d’évoquer, à cette occasion la
figure du grand historien et homme politique roumain Nicolas Jorga, dont nous avons
commémoré, non sans émotion, en 2005, le 65e anniversaire de la tragique disparition. Memoria
ejus in benedictione sit. En grec, dans la transcription traditionnelle latine, des Latins d’Orient
catholiques de Smyrne :“Eonia Mnimi tou” . On trouvera en annexe une liste de quelques rares
ouvrages de N. J. que j’ai la chance, et le bonheur, d’avoir dans ma bibliothèque privée.
Europe (c’est–à-dire, aujourd’hui, Union européenne) et Empire ottoman sont liés – à
mes yeux d’historien et de représentant d’un monde chrétien en contact avec les Turcs
musulmans depuis 1071 (bataille de Mantzikert) – par une expérience historique millénaire dont
une relecture s’impose tant à l’intérieur de l’Union européenne elle-même (cf. entre autres le
dernier Edgar Morin, Culture et barbarie européennes, Paris, Bayard, décembre 2005) qu’à
l’intérieur de la Turquie issue de l’Empire ottoman et représentant ne fut–ce que
géographiquement, c’est-à-dire territorialement, le premier berceau physique hittito-galatogreco-romain de tous ce qui se réclament de la culture et de la civilisation européenne.
Contrairement aux thèses dites nationalistes des XIXe et XXe siècles (notamment dans
les Balkans) – thèses motivées en grande partie par les besoins d’une cause dont les Turcs euxmêmes ont été finalement victimes à partir de la fin du XIXe et du début du XXe surtout –,
l’Empire ottoman a eu l’immense mérite (malgré toute la “barbarie” dont on l’a affublé depuis
le “prélèvement“ d’enfants chrétiens, d’origine – hélas-byzantine, si bien décrite par Le pont sur
la Drina d’Ivo Andrič et jusqu’aux différents martyres imposés au cours de son histoire) d’avoir
permis la préservation de presque toutes ses nations non-musulmanes chrétiennes que l’Église a
toujours appelées Nationes orientalium christianorum) et de la nation juive (soit les quatre
millet differents du millet musulman appelé scientifiquement (en droit canonique et en droit
international musulman) “Oumma”, en turc “dmmet”.
Or, les temps ont changé; de vieux empires européens se sont transformés en Étatsnations (ou “Etats-nation” au singulier afin de souligner, parfois, l’absorption de plusieurs
nations “minoritaires” en une seule Nation-État, ou“État-nation”); de nouveaux États-nation(s)
se sont ajoutés à de vieux Etats-nation européens dont, aussi, des États-nations ex-ottomans. Et
la transformation de l’Oumma elle-même n’a pas encore terminé son parcours historique.
Un nouvel équilibre du monde semble en jeu où pouvoirs et civilisations anciens et
nouveaux se cherchent, soucieux d’éviter, dans la mesure du possible, par de nouvelles
structures étatiques ou “paraétatiques”, des affrontements ouverts armés ou tant soit peu
pacifiques ! Le choix du meilleur paramètre unificateur n’est pas encore intervenu et on doute
156
qu’il puisse intervenir un jour prochain: le rapprochement religieux, l’abandon de la nation
étroite pour la nation continentale ou mondiale ou le réveil général d’une conscience humaine
rappelant l’éventuel inéluctable ?
Par quels moyens ? Les chrétiens entre eux semblent donner le bon exemple (Pape de
Rome et patriarche de Roumanie, entre autres; mais Sunnites et Chiites ou Ouigours et Chinois?
Latins ou Germains? Slaves ou Ouralo-altaïques? Américains, Africains ou Asiatiques? Valeurs
ou tactiques? Objectif ou action?
Commençons par notre continent, l’Europe, en nous imposant une discipline; en
perfectionnant le partage de pouvoirs étatiques suivant le modèle politico-économique introduit
en 1952 et en le précisant; en essayant de mieux nous connaître en langues, moeurs et visions
du monde qui rapprocheraient nos élites et les élites des différentes civilisations avec une
Turquie européenne, Byzance après Byzance, jusqu’a la laïcité.
Bruxelles, 4 janvier 2006
Quelques oeuvres de Nicolae Jorga présentes dans ma bibliothèque
1908 -1913 – Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches nach den Quellen dargestellt
5 vol.
Gotha, F. A. Perthes AC (1908, 1909, 1910, 1911 et 1913)
Rel. toile ( dos et coins). De cette oeuvre le diplomate italien, mon ami et parent
(par les Aliotti) Ermanno Armao, de Smyrne, dit:
“E’ la terza in data delle grandi storie dell’Impero ottomano. Di minor mole delle
storia dell’ Hammer o, dello Zinkeisen l’opera dollo storico romeno è un lavoro più organico,
con minor lusso di particolari e di dettagli ma con maggior senso critico e più ampio sguardo
agli avvenimenti. Inoltre lo Jorga ha fatto uso di nuove fonti, ha fatto tesoro di dati e notizie
messe in luce in più di cinquant’ anni di studii e ricerche e nel 1° vol. tratta diffusamente dei
regni selgiucidi trascurati dai suoi predecessori. L’opera diffeta di una bibliografia e di un
indice generale di nomi di luoghi e di persone”.
1909 - Les Hongrois et la nationalité roumaine en 1909. Procès de presse et autres
persécutions. Vălenii-de-Munte, Impr. Neamul Românesc, 1909, 45 p., 10,5x16,5 cm.
1920 – Histoire des Roumains et de leur civilisation. Paris, H. Paulin, 1920, 289 p. Br. In fine
Tableau chronologie des princes ayant régné en Valachie, en Moldavie et dans les Principautes
Unies ainsi que Notes bibliographiques et Table des Matières XVIII p. Br.
D’après mes catalogues, une Breve storia dei Rumeni con speciale considerazione delle
relazioni conll’Italia a été publiée par Jorga à Bucharest en 1911 (8°, 176 p.); Une Storia dei
Romeni e della loro civiltà a été publiée en 1928 par Hoepli à Milan (16°, VII-447 p. III).
1921- Les Latins d’Orient – Conférences données en janvier 1921 au Collège de France, Paris,
1921, in-12°, 51 p.Br. C’est cette brochure qui m’a fait faire la distinction entre les deux types
de “Latins d’Orient” mentionnés dans la dédicace du présent article.
1921 et 1925 – Je n’ai pas pu acheter N. Jorga, Polonais et Roumains: relations politiques,
économiques et culturelles, Bucharest 1921 (in 8°, 95 p ill) ni Histoire des États balkaniques
jusqu’a 1924, Paris, Gamber, 1925, in 8°, Br., également cités dans mes catalogues de vente.
1928 - Essai de synthèse de l’histoire de l’humanité, Paris, Gamber, 1928, Br. Je n’ai que les
Tomes III “Époque moderne” et IV “Époque contemporaine” 8° gr. 528 et 496 p. resp.
1931- Je n’ai pas pu acheter Une ville romane devenue slave, Raguse, publiée par Jorga en 1931
(Bucarest, gr. 8°, br. 73 p) également citée dans l’un de mes catalogues.
1931- Deux conférences données en Belgique sur La Chanson Populaire Roumaine impr. Par
Sope à Bruxelles, 47 p.14. resp. à l’Universite de Bruxelles et à l’ Institut des Hautes-Études . à
Gand. À retenir une comparaison entre la Valachie et la Flandre (p. 46): Flandria tota continua
urba (encore en 2006).
1939 - Je trouve dans une autre de mes catalogues L’opera drammatica di N. J. par T.
Pignatelli, Roma, Cenacolo, 1939 in 16, p.150. Non acheté.
157
1945 - (3 ex.) Histoire du peuple français – Trad. franç. de P. Angelesco 412 p. Impr. à Genève.
1 portrait. Suivi d’un Essai bibliographique.
1971- Byzance après Byzance – Continuation de la vie byzantine, Bucarest, 1971, 312 p. III. –
Byzance ne serait–elle finie (comme je l’ai écrit) qu’en 1922 (incendie de Smyrne)?? Émouvant
ouvrage…
NOTE DE LA RÉDACTION DE LA REVUE:
La problématique soulevée par le Dr. Livio Missir de Lusignan est trop complexe et
même si son article peut paraître trop court pour répondre à toutes les questions qui se posent en
ce qui concerne le passé ottoman et la réalité “post-ottomane” actuelle, nous pensons que ses
“Réflexions” serviront à ouvrir, ou à nourrir, un débat allant bien au-delà de ce qu’on aurait pu
imaginer… Notre but est de présenter dans les pages d’Eurolimes des points de vue concernant
cette problématique.
À toutes fins utiles, et rien que pour la seule Turquie, dont les négociations d’adhésion
se sont ouvertes le 3 octobre dernier, voici – en langue anglaise- la “Déclaration d’ouverture de
l’Union européenne concernant la Conférence d’adhésion avec la Turquie”:
EU OPENING STATEMENT
FOR THE ACCESSION CONFERENCE WITH TURKEY
1.
2.
3.
4.
On behalf of the EU Member States, I am delighted to welcome here today the
distinguished representatives of Turkey to the Intergovernmental Conference opening the
accession negociations with your country.
There are already well established, close ties, between your country and the Union. We first
concluded contractual relations in 1963, when we signed our Association Agreement,
known as the Ankara Agreement. In 1995, we moved to the final stage of the Customs
Union, and in 1999 the Helsinki European Council declared Turkey a candidate state.
These represented important qualitative steps, both in political and economic terms. Today
is another important step in the evolution of this relationship.
The Association Agreement will continue to provide the framework for our relations during
the pre-accession period. By making progress toward extending the freedoms on which the
Community is based, notably by liberalising trade between you and the Community, and by
promoting economic and financial cooperation between us, it remains a key element of our
ever-closer relations.
Since Turkey applied for membership in April 1987, successive decisions of the
European Council have provided the strategy and the means to prepare the European
perspective of your country. This includes an Accession Partnership which is supported by
substantial pre-accession financial assistance.
We recall the European Council conclusions of 16/17 December 2004. We note that
the six pieces of legislation identified by the Commission and requested by the European
Council have entered into force and we expect that they will be fully implemented in
accordance with the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We also acknowledge the signature of the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara
Agreement. The position of the European Community and its Member States was set out in
their Declaration of 21 September 2005, in response to the Declaration by Turkey of 29
July 2005.
The European Council of 16/17 December 2004 requested the Council to agree on a
framework for our negociations. The negociating framework has been agreed by the
Council on the basis of a proposal by the Commission. It takes account of the experience of
the fifth enlargement process, and of the evolving acquis and has been prepared according
to own merits and the specific situation and characteristics of Turkey. It indicates clearly
the specific requirements of the process we are launching today.
158
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
The European Council also agreed that parallel to accession negociations, the Union will
engage with every candidate State in an intensive political and cultural dialogue involving
civil society. This dialogue will prove valuable in improving mutual understanding and
encouraging a debate on both sides on all aspects of our relationship.
The negociations which we launch today are based on Article 49 of the Treaty on European
Union. Let me recall that our negociations are taking place in an Intergovernmental
Conference with the participation of all Member States, as well as your country. As in all
IGCs, decisions will be taken on the basis of unanimity. It will be up to the Member States
to decide in due course whether conditions are right for the conclusion of the negociations.
We recall the need for Turkey to continue to work towards full and effective
implementation of the pre-accession strategy and reforms in particular as regards
strenghtening the independence and functioning of the judiciary, the exercise of
fundamental freedoms (association, expression and religion), cultural rights, the further
alignment of civil-military relations with European practice and the situation in the
Southeast of the country. This should ensure the irreversibility of the political reform
process. In conformity with Turkey’s commitment to peace and stability and to the
development of good neighbourly relations, including solutions to pending bilateral issues,
Turkey should actively promote regional cooperation. This should contribute to regional
stability.
Since the end of 1998, the Commission has made Regular Reports to the Council,
reviewing your progress in the light of the Copenhagen criteria, in particular the rate at
which you are adopting and implementing the acquis. Implementation of the Association
Partnership and progress in adopting the acquis are examined in the Association
Agreement bodies. As with any other candidate country, the monitoring of your
commitments will play a key role in informing the Council’s decisions on the conduct of
negociations with you.
The timely and effective implementation of the acquis as well as the need to bring your
administrative and judicial capacity up to the necessary level in order to achieve this are
prerequisites for membership. Therefore, convergence with the acquis which you have
already begun should now be intensified. You will also need to bear in mind developments
in the acquis since the date of the opening of negociations. The acquis includes the
objectives and principles on which the Union is founded, as set out in the Treaty on
European Union. It is a community of values, which every member must fully share.
The process will be rigorous and challenging. But we are confident in your determination
and commitment and will support you in your efforts. We are pleased to engage with you
today in this process.
159
Reviews and References
160
****, Ideias de Europa: Que fronteiras? (Coordinated by Maria Manuela Tavares
Ribeiro), Coimbra, Quarteto, 2004, 445p, ISBN 989-558-042-8
One of the most widely used concepts in contemporary political sciences is the border
as a separation line to mark political, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious individualities.
The border has been brought to the attention of the researchers at the time of nation-state
building and aimed almost exclusively at the issue of the political and state borders.
After the European construction, there has been a change in the concept of border,
while specialists in the field are convinced of the revolutionary mutations that have been going
on since May 2004 and will still be in the subsequent evolution of the borders. Nevertheless,
researchers are cautious regarding the statement that the integration and enlargement process of
the European Union are meant to establish borders for good.
All these up-to-date revolutionary issues for our time have aroused a series of
interrogative initiatives materialised in the framework of the Intensive Course/IP – Socrates
Programme at the Faculty of Letters at the University of Coimbra under the coordination of
Prof. Dr. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro; this initiative has already reached its third meeting.
The participation of a group of professors and researchers from all over Europe, as
well as from Latin America is a certain proof of the concerns in the field. The complexity of the
concept of border has generated a series of questions leading to more and more questions:
Which Europe? One Europe, or several Europes? Which is the geographic area? What are the
implications involved in the enlargement process? How do we build unity within diversity?
External borders, or internal borders?
Ideias de Europa: Que fronteiras (coordinated by Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro)
announces right from the title the proposal of finding out which will be the final borders of the
European Union. In this sense, the paper comprises the papers of the professors participating to
the Intensive Course organized at the University of Coimbra. The course aims at providing
answers to the Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, French, German, Romanian, Bulgaria, and Latin
American students, most of them Master students in European Studies.
The publication of the volume has given the opportunity to better know these ideas by
individuals within the universities all over the world, as well as by the public willing to be
informed and to penetrate the realities of the issue. Starting with the central idea of border, in
the economy of the volume there are certain approaches relating to the issue of cultural and
educational coalescence1, of culture and geopolitics2, culture and the social3, religion4. Most of
the volume approaches the issue of federalism5, external borders6 of the European Union and of
1
Procopis Papastratis, A New Frontiere or End of an era: The Bologna Process and transformation of the
University, in Ideias de Europa: que frontairas?, coord. Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, Coimbra, 2004,
p.165-177
2
Georges Contogeorgis, L`Europe culturelle et la geopolitique, in Ideias......, p.71-85 ; Maria da
Conceicao, Meireles Pereira, Ocidente – Imagens e Fronteiras da Europa e da Cultura Ocidental( 19381948), in Ideias…, p. 329-356
3
Mercedes Samaniego Boneu, Las fronteras socio-culturales de la Union Europea, in Ideias……., p.8798.
4
Manuel Clemente, Religião na Europa: uma fronteira aberta, in Ideias..., p.391-404
5
José Reis, Governação e Territórios na Europa: Hipóteses sobre um sub-federalismo europeu, in
Ideias..., p.13-27; Paul Alliés, Pouvoir et territoire: les nouvelles frontiéres d´un fédéralisme européen, in
Ideias....p.243-255
6
Mercedes Samaniego Boneu, Ideias de Europa: Que fronteiras, in Ideias..., p.407-413; Lúcio Cunha,
Europa: diversidade paisagística e fronteiras naturais em movimento, in Ideias...., p.29-34; Rui Cunha
Martins, Das fronteiras da Europa as fronteiras da ideia de Europa )o argumento paradigmatico e o
argumento integrador), in Ideia....., p.35-42; Carlos Reis, Fronteiras da ficção, espaços: a questão
europeia, in Ideia....., p55-70; António Martins da Silva, A Europa do futuro e o futuro de Portugal, in
Ideia....., p. 357-390
161
7
the regions . We also know the point of view on the identity and differences within the
European Union as seen by Latin America8 and the former Soviet Union area9. Cross-border
relations are also approached from the perspective of the Portuguese researchers in the Acores
Islands10.
Due to the topic approached, both researchers and professors have had an initiative to
rebuild the issues relating to the borders, and this initiative should be praised. However, the
papers provide much more; it is their personal opinions as moulded in the laboratory of
individual creation; they come to complete the restructuring endeavour and from this point of
view, the papers fit in the European scientific standards. Some of them belong to the European
Union, some others are expecting to join it, while others are from outside Europe. They all
show great interest in responding, or trying to respond, to the question in the title.
At the basis of the scientific initiative has been a solid bibliography completing the
already knowledge already acquired in the archives.
Ever since the establishment of the European Community, there have been several waves
of enlargement leading to new realities of the border. Within the pages of the volume, the
authors frequently debate the issue of deepening and enlarging, of federalism and population
movements11, from the perspective of the borders.
Will the European consciousness also be reflected as far as the borders are concerned?
Does EU citizenship12 involve joining the European consciousness? Beyond the borders, the
European consciousness has to be strengthened by finding new joint European values and
integrating solutions (the Bologna process).
Another issue debated is the reality EU has to face, that is, Europe’s immigrants. The
external borders, particularly the eastern one13 has been subject to researches that can be found
in the pages of this volume.
Which will be the eastern border of the European Union, provided that Romania joins the
EU in 200714? The border will be with the Republic of Moldova. We cannot ignore the presence
of an ethno-national delimitation between the two States founded not only in the connections
between the people, language, culture and, last but not least, history. Will Turkey, Ukraine, and
Moldova be accepted in the EU? And so, returning to the title of the volume: which will be the
borders of the European Union?
Although one cannot give a definite answer to this question, the end of the volume
suggests that over these borders there has always been a relation between the nations, and the
choice of Beethoven as a symbol15 (“Ode to Joy”, the last part of the 9th Symphony, has been
officially the anthem of the European Union since 1985) is a proof in this sense. We consider
that the multitude of issues raised by the borders will not be solved soon, but will make us all
responsible, citizens of the European Union, or of Europe, to find solutions.
7
Renauld de La Brosse, Espace médiatique européen et ” communauté de destins”: complémentarités ou
oppositions entre échelles continentale, nationale, régionale et locale? in Ideias...., p.283-296; Andrzej
Pankowicz, Evoluzione delle forme dell’autogestione territoriale nell’Europa Centrale, in Ideias....,
p.143-164
8
Estevão de Rezende Martins, Identidade e diferença: o processo de União Europeia visto desde a
América Latina, in Ideias....., p.223-241
9
Yuriy Pochta, The Ideas of postsoviet Russia abaut Europe, in Ideias....., p.267-282
10
Carlos Cordeiro, Os Açores e as relaçõis transatlanticas: olhares do outro, in Ideias....., p.297-328
11
Jean Pierre Colin, La nouvelle frontiere de l’immigration, in Ideias....., p.257-266
12
Rui Manuel Moura Ramos, A cidadania da União Europeia, in Ideias....., p.43-54
13
Stefan Bielanski, L´evoluzione del concetto della frontiera orientale dell´Europa nella storiografia
polacca, in Ideias.... , p.115-142; Nicole Pietri, La nouvelle frontiere extérieure orientale de l’Union
européenne, in Ideias..., p.99-113, Ines Katenhusen, Germany’s Politics toward European Integration
with special emphasis on the ‘Ostpolitik’, in Ideias....., p.209-222
14
Ioan Horga, La Roumanie et la question de ses frontieres dans le contexte de l’intégration á l’Union
Européene, in Ideias......, p.179-208
15
Sérgio Neto, A Europa sob o signo de Beethoven – algumas palavras em jeito de comentário, in
Ideias......, p.415-421
162
The reading of this book may offer lecturers responses to the issues the European society
is faced with and opens new research pathways.
Alina Stoica, e-mail: stoicaalina79@yahoo.com;
Ioan Sorin Cuc, e-mail: cucsorin@yahoo.com
****Transition to the Disappearance of Borders, Trimestriale di Sociologia
Internazionale, anno XV, nr. 1/Gennario 2006
The Institute of International Sociology in Gorizia (ISIG) has come to the foreground
during the past two decades in the field of researching the issue of the border through surveys
referring to the Balkan and Central Europe area. Continuing the series started in no. 2/2005 of
the ISIG Magazine dedicated to the issue of the governance of the cross-border cooperation,
the first issue of the year 2006 is focused on the research project called PILOT (Integrated Plan
for Cross-border Logistics) or, as shown by the subtitle of the magazine, A Plan for Managing
the Change from a Border Society and Economy to a Borderless Society and Economy.
PILOT is the result of the cross-disciplinary research addressed to economists,
sociologists, politicians, experts in logistics and vocational training. The project aims at
providing “a model of transition from border to no border followed here responds to certain
methodological requirements” (as Alberto Gasparini, the Director of the ISIG, puts it). In this
plan, one may notice the point of view of the regional political authority through Roberto
Casolini, Regional Minister, Department of Employment, Training, University and Research,
Autonomous Region of Friuli Venezia Giulia, who draws up a survey of “regional border
policies” in the context of the enlargement of the EU and of the change of certain areas from
border landscape to no border with complex consequences upon economy and social life.
A very consistent survey is dedicated to The European and Euroregional Context by
Zinoviv Broyde from the EcoResource Centre in Chernivtsi, Ukraine. It shows the European
point of view over the perspective of the borders from the new EU border upon the management
of cross-border through traffic. This rigorous survey sheds light on several effects of the
enlargement in 2004 and particularly on those that will operate in 2007 from the perspective of
setting up a genuine turntable of the European transportation that will be centred in the area
adjacent to the “geographical centre of Europe lying in the Rakhiv district in Ukraine”.
Logistical development in the border area will also have impact upon the whole transit flow:
tourism, leisure, constructions, services, investments in these areas.
The first part of the project also includes points of view referring to the connections
between Friuli Venezia Giulia and Central Europe, the infrastructure in the region, as well as
the role of the partnership in such an initiative, such as the one of the Chamber of Commerce.
The second part of the project entitled Expectation, Strategies and Reality of the
Impact of Enlargement is focused on such issues as: perceptions, strategies and professionalism
of company owners and employers (a survey by Bruno Vici and Michalea Sterpini); critical
factors and intervention priorities; scenarios for the borer economy and employment (Moreno
Zago); the dimensions and structure of the haulage and logistics sectors; estimating the
employment impact of scenarios (Valerio Libralato); reassessment and strategies one year later
on the basis of the results of the initial data and the construction of the consequent scenarios.
The third part entitled Employment Policies, Training Initiative and Transport Policies
is focused on: employment projects, their implementation and inter-institutional interfaces
(Maria Emma Ramponi); present tensions and possible developments in local labour market
(Luigi Gaudin & Valeria Fili); a flexible skill-based training model (Gilberto Collinassi &
Massimiliano Iacono); the proximity service and employment incentives (Fabrizio Calabrese);
the Italian and the European Union transport policies (Jean François Daher).
Ioan Horga, e-mail: ihorga@uoradea.ro
163
Korine Amacher, Nicolas Levrat, Which will be the boundaries of Europe,
Bruylant Academia s.a, Belgique, 2005, ISBN: 2-87209-797-X
The paper Jusqu’où ira l’Europe brings to the attention of the historians and the public
twelve articles whose main focus is the issue of the future borders of Europe, as the title shows.
Coordinated by two renowned researchers of the prestigious European Institute in
Geneva, Korine Amacher and Nicolas Levrat, the paper represents the conclusion of a vast
research.
The group of twelve European intellectuals (geographers, historians, jurists,
philosophers, politologists) united in Geneva on the occasion of celebrating forty years since the
well-known Geneva research institute has been established expressed their point of view during
two days of debates. The book approaches topics such as: identity, European consciousness
regarding what Europe means nowadays, or is the integration process European by its “nature”?
It is already a well-known reality the fact that, since its establishment until present
day, the European Community has gone through several waves of enlargement. But,
considering the ever growing number of candidate countries, the issue of the enlargement has
acquired a great importance. By successively approaching the issues of thoroughness and
enlargement (both considered as having a major importance to the evolution of the Community
and implying each other), different authors remind amongst other consequences of these new
challenges of the integration process the inefficiency of the old legal framework and that a
reform of different institutions and Community bodies is desirable and unavoidable.
The result of such a complex process may be positive to the extent to which the
thoroughness of the research will bring to the foreground joint elements needed to shape a
European nation and hence a European identity. The European consciousness should be
consolidated by its appurtenance to European collective values that are not the European
institutions, but the concepts of freedom, democracy, human rights.
The dilemma occurring around the European identity is the issue of its historical
legitimacy, as well as the ratio with the national identity (the European identity does not
exclude national identity; it merely tries to make a discourse where both of them are perceived
as complementary and intrinsic to each other). The issue of building, or acknowledging, a
European identity and everything it stands for in defining Europe is still open and will probably
remain so for a long time.
Europe, a future project, or an inheritance? Asks Sandrine Kott. And she answers:
“The identity built on memory and history is nowadays a prism through which we consider
social and political realities”. Korine Amacher brought an example concerning the European
identity, the issue of Europe’s immigrants, often organised in groups, or even communities,
preserving or progressively building a strong nostalgia towards their country of origin, thus
reaching a “patriotism in exile” inevitably leading to a generous absence of the European
consciousness.
The fundamental request to outline the European nation is made through economic,
political, and institutional communication. The beginning of the European construction
integrated in the “Treaty of Rome” and the achievements carried out have the quality of
strengthening the explanations favouring this idea. But “we have to have an inside and an
outside. As long as Europe lives only outside in point, it cannot be Europe, it has to have a
spirit, an inside… the future civilisation will be made through man” (Christian de Bartillat).
More accurately, “to accept the European norms means to translate into life the conclusions of
the thinking of those belonging to your expanded family” (A. Dutu). Toutefois, au vu de la
diversité des “ingrédients” que l’on trouve dans la “corbeille historique de ce qui fait
aujourd’hui l’Europe (Sophie Bessis), l’identité européenne ne peut être que multiple, plurielle,
diversifiée, et peut-être, comme les frontières européennes, toujours a définir, ou a redéfinir
(Korine Amarcher). L’Europe serait ainsi un Graal moderne, dont l’intérêt réside dans la
quête, et non dans l’objet (Nicolas Levrat). Finally, L’Europe est un objet que l’on ne trouve
pas, mais que l’on cherche (Georges Nivat).
164
Once the European Council in Copenhagen (1993) recognized the legality of the
adhesion demarches of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe (PECO) to the enlargement
process, in 2002, once the application of Turkey to join the EU, new debates and questions have
been raised. The authors of the volume Jusqu’où ira l’Europe have not hesitated to express their
viewpoints: the process in development and the criteria imposed to the former communist
countries to collectively join the EU are operational for a Turkey that is about to become a
Member State? And if Turkey is European, isn’t Maghreb too? And the Near East? On the other
hand, what does it mean to be a European? In other words, has the integration project not been
born in Europe by accident?
As Olli Rehm, a member of the European Commission in charge with the enlargement,
put it, the map of Europe is defined in the mind of the Europeans. Geography sets the
framework, but the values are fundamentally the ones defining the borders of Europe. The
enlargement means the expansion of the area of European values, amongst which the most
important are freedom, solidarity, tolerance and human rights, democracy and the State.
According to the provisions of the treaties – which are the legal basis – the gates of the
European Union are open to “all European states respecting its values and engaging in
promoting them”. Does Turkey comply with these principles? What about Croatia?
The book is worth reading for various reasons, particularly because on the whole it
surprises by the open manner of approaching a series of sensitive issues to which the authors
provide clear-cut, unequivocal replies. At the same time, the topic of the book is attached to the
concerns of all the individuals interested in the reality we live in.
Alina Stoica, e-mail: stoicaalina79@yahoo.com
Gabriel Wackermann, Les frontières dans un monde en mouvement, Paris, Ellipses
Editions Marketing, 2003, 188 p, ISBN 2-7298-2543-6
The matter of frontiers represents today a subject of a great interest, being tackled and
discussed by specialists from many fields: Geography, History, Economy, Law, Political
Sciences and the list may go on. Globalization has fundamentally transformed the problem of
frontiers, and the rethinking of their role and characteristics for the contemporary world became
necessary.
The work of Professor Gabriel Wackermann – a specialist in frontier areas with an
outstanding theoretical and practical research in this field, especially in the European area – is
placed in this context of rethinking of the place and role of internal and external state frontiers.
The book analyses the theme of frontier and trans-frontier areas from a multidisciplinary point of view and marks their evolution through the ages; its starting point is man’s
permanent wish to excel his own economical, political, social or scientific limits due to the
impulse of the adventure, discovery and conquering spirit.
The book is built on four axes, used by the author in order to sketch, in precise detail,
the direction and the dynamic of the frontiers from all over the world and the present evolution
towards the trans-frontier areas. Thus he wants to sketch „the long road covered by humanity in
order to gradually, sinuously pass through the ages from a spirit of territorial aggression
towards a new vision of a harmonized world”.
The first part analyses the genesis and the historical affirmation of the frontiers and
refers to the ways through which the national frontiers of the states have been formed and,
consequently, the different frontier types (terrestrial, maritime, and ideological); it also refers to
the social, economical, political, juridical and cultural differences and discontinuities expressed
by these territorial separations. I took special notice of the concept of state „internal social
frontiers”, as Wackermann calls them, which create differences, inside of a nation, between the
rich and the poor, the powerful and the oppressed, often despite the official display of a socalled democratic system that is in fact monopolized by a small group of privileged people. I
think that only a few examples are enough to support the author’s idea: in USA, the ghettos
where people rejected by the “welfare society” live, mark risk zones and difficult
165
neighbourhoods, marginalized and avoided by the privileged. Also, other marked zones are
private, residential, well secured „closed quarters” where only people having a very high social
position are allowed; these zones first appeared in USA and then the concept was taken in Latin
America, to be widely used later on other continents too. The internal frontiers mark another
difference inside the same nation: the ethno-cultural, the identity difference. We can find such
examples all over the world: in South Africa, where the problem of Apartheid maintained many
ethnical frontiers; in Canada, where the linguistic assertion still represents the cause of several
controversies and separates the French area (Québec) from the Anglo-Saxon area; in Spain,
where political confrontations are always going on between the different zones which are selfgoverned, but want to maintain and declare their own identity; there are also terrorist attacks
taking place from the part of some ethnic groups.
The second axis of the book defines the characteristics of the frontier areas and makes
the passage towards the present reality, characterized by the development of the trans-frontier
entities.
The frontiers, together with the state and its internal self-governing regions they limit,
take part in the image of the state. Wackermann shows this by giving Québec as example; the
limits of Québec are broadly fixed by the winter which covers with snow 1,5 millions km2 for a
period of 6 months a year. This is why the city of Montreal is currently called winter city
(though this city is marked by the cold temperate – continental climate and it is not affected by
the famous Canadian winter).
Referring to the peoples’ representations related to the frontier area, the author states
that often the frontier exists only „in the mind” of those led to rightly or wrongly think in this
way even if the regions are not politically separated. The inhabitants of different regions tend to
be considered as one nation, sometimes aiming even to create an independent or self-governing
state: the inhabitants of the Breton, Basque, Corsican, Scottish regions...
The symbol, in its turn, has a big role in the definition of the frontier identity. The
„wall” symbol, the „fortification” symbol had world consequences. In the Ancient Rome, the
Palatin Mountain was the place where the bastions of the titanic imperial palace philosophically
represented the „frontier” with the rest of the Empire. In our times the Berlin Wall represented
the symbol of separation between two political worlds resulted after the Second World War:
capitalism and communism.
All these representations, projections, myths and symbols lead the author to conclude
that „frontiers belong, directly or indirectly, to the public language which transforms the
publicity of the national limits into myth”. Due to this myth, the political forces can more easily
obtain the national consensus and diminish protests.
The third part of the book presents arguments that explain the evolution of societies
towards the trans-frontier areas of the present. The author does not set aside any aspect which
stands at the origin of this change: from the new technologies and ideas to the globalization of
conflicts and the arrival of city agglomerations hard to administrate on the basis of the present
single-state model. In this context he underlines the decisive role played by the new
technologies which have completely changed the space and time relation and have reduced the
importance of frontiers. The economies based on knowledge strengthen the trans-frontier
partnerships on the principle of „small business, big markets, one world”. This huge
technological force is continuously gaining ground in front of the external, internal and mental
frontiers which already appear as belonging to another age. And the key domains of change in
the virtual undoing of communication frontiers are the financial, bank and exchange domains
with respect to the efficiency of change and evaluation technologies as well as the field of
illegal ventures, money laundry and financial criminality.
In order to succeed in transforming frontier areas under pressure into socio-spatial
relaxing trans-frontier areas, Wackermann proposes the „realpolitik” model which „implies
dialogue, understanding and the search for impartial solutions. It is based on tolerance,
pluralism, democracy, the resort to the Conventions of human rights, to the agreement actions”
and, very important, it does not reject the cultural diversity, but, on the contrary, sustains it.
166
The last axis of the book defines the present profile of the trans-frontier areas, thought
as inter-regions with indefinite limits. These areas may serve as basis for the implementation of
some profound institutional reforms, like replacing the hierarchical and pyramidal work concept
of the institutions of the European Union with a more active and efficient participation of the
regional and local collectivities in the European process of decision. Inside these areas, the
transnational cooperation would gain efficiency and flexibility. The author suggests the idea of
picturing the trans-frontier areas as experimental laboratories for the efficient reports between
societies and their territories, in the idea of trans-nationalization and to trans-continentalization.
For instance, the preservation of the environment and the search for a lasting development
require long term experiments based on coherent territorial ensembles, and thus the frontiers
represent an obstacle and distortion.
In the end, the different types of trans-frontier areas are briefly presented: euro-regions
(around the town centres near the state frontiers), euro-districts (on the basis of institutional,
administrative, socio-economical and cultural restrictions, impossible to obtain if they don’t
belong to a new „country”), the groups of states (European Union, NAFTA – North America
Free Trade Association, ASEAN – South-West Asia Nations Association, AUO – African Unity
Organization, Arabian Confederacy).
We may conclude that all these great or small world territorial structures can not
impose themselves in a lasting manner unless they allow the multicultural and multi-linguistic
expression of their members and accept the declaration of their basic values.
Being elaborated under the sign of the practical and scientific strictness, having a clear
and logical structure, a multidisciplinary approach and an interesting content that may be
understood by anyone, Gabriel Wackermann’s book succeeds in clarifying the context, the
necessity and the characteristics of the trans-frontier areas in this globalized and, as the author
states, „more and more unsure” world.
LuminiŃa Soproni, e-mail: lsoproni@uoradea.ro
Adrian Claudiu Popoviciu, e-mail: apopoviciu@uoradea.ro)
*****Cross-border Co-operation – Schengen Challenges (edited by Istvan SuliZakar), Debrecen, Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadoja, 2004, 280p,
ISBN 9634728723
The book is focused on four main topics, as follows: Internal and external borders of
the EU; Interethnic relations and migration; Regional development; Urban policy
The areas of interest of the surveys carried out are particularly two important
Euroregions in Central and Eastern Europe: Carpathian Euroregion and Bihor – Hajdu-Bihar
Euroregion, and the countries involved are Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, Poland and Slovakia.
The first topic shows the historical evolution of the European borders laying stress on
the key moments of history starting with the First World War, the Second World War, the Iron
Curtain, Yalta, Malta, as well as three great ideas focused on the European Union: United States
of Europe (Winston Churchill, Yurich, 1946), the United Europe (Robert Schuman, the
Schuman doctrine, 1950); last but not least the Europe of Nations, the Europe of Regions. The
presentation of the internal and external borders of the European Union, the advantages and
disadvantages of the borders (the visa issue), the future of Euroregions (that are on the territory
of the EU Member States and of non-member States), the Schengen acquis versus cross-border
cooperation, as well as the Security Policy. The regional issue is analysed through the need to
set up new regional levels in harmony with the NUTS system of the European Union; thus, the
Central and Eastern European area is analysed, as well as the role of the regionalism and
regionalisation, two important concepts in this equation.
The phenomenon of migration in Bihar (HU) is analysed through the different
development stages: the industrial revolution, the classical capitalism, the modern society, the
post-industrial one; different types of migration are shown: from trans-Atlantic migration to
village – city and city – village migration, or city – city migration. In the Bekes County, there is
167
the immigration of the Transylvanian inhabitants; their distribution and social mobility are also
shown.
Romanian – Hungarian interethnic relations have been formed especially after 1989;
up to that time, they were rather frail, and it was only after 1996 that there has been a radical
improvement in these relations, once the UDMR (Democratic Union of the Hungarians in
Romania) managed to join the Romanian Parliament and the government after the elections.
The development of the relations improved due to cultural, economic, tourist, and
environmental cooperation.
Another dimension of the relations is rendered by the border relations, tourist
shopping, and border traffic.
The relations between Hungary and Slovakia are materialised through twinned
localities, collaboration in different fields; there are researches focused on regional differences,
types of interethnic localities, target areas of collaboration and Euroregions in the area, human
potential, level of tolerance and human quality, the map of interethnic tolerance and the quality
of human resources, alternatives to the quantity and quality of additional human resources.
Hungarian – Ukrainian cooperation regarding economic areas is seen from two
perspectives: theoretical perspective - operational conditions, the legal elements and the
territorial features; ractical perspective - research of the special types and forms of cooperation
in areas of interest (analysis of development and investments in the area and investigation of the
border relations and cooperation).
The problems and difficulties of the integration of the Roma people in Komadi (HU)
are shown by characterising the population, considering the features, lifestyle, norms and
values, geographical location and interethnic relations existing in the area.
The topic of regional development is bent over the cross-border policy and the
importance of cross-border relations. Special attention is given to funding programmes of the
European Union mentioned and analysed for different regions where they have been applied, as
well as their results (Interreg IIIA, Interreg IIIB, Phare and interregional programmes in the
Carpathian Euroregion, micro-region level programmes).
The programmes have been presented and analysed from the perspective of the
priorities, measures, aims, objectives, SWOT analysis and assessment.
The chapter on urban policies shows the process of urbanisation in Hungary with an
essential alteration of the number of localities in Hungary in 1945 – 2004, the population, the
distribution of towns on the level of the counties and on the national level, as well as the change
of population of the towns.
An important place is taken by the international networks in the development of public
roads in Debrecen and Nyregyhaza, and their place in the European traffic network, the
development plans between the two towns in direct connection with the international spirit.
Local regional marketing has in view a clear-cut distinction between the two
dimensions and fields that are equally important in economy and geography. If the economy
considers the marketing services of enterprises, as well as a non-profit marketing, a social and
even political marketing, the geographic dimension analyses applied social geography and the
plans for local and regional development.
Within the regional marketing there are a series of slogans and symbols of a very good
format aimed at target groups on which they may exercise a strong and efficient impact.
The economic development of Debrecen is analysed through the conditions existing at
present from the point of view of transport conditions, industry, industrial parks, and so on.
In conclusion, the book edited by Prof. Dr. Istvan Suli-Zakar is a faithful reflection of
existing realities, providing a general view upon the concepts of border, policies, migration,
relations, marketing, urbanisation, as well as the manner in which they can be improved from
the perspective of the situation (local, regional and national) through the intervention of
different institutions, Community programmes, actors, alterations and developments that may
have as a result the harmonisation to the new requirements of the European Union.
Constantin Toca, e-mail: ctoca@uoradea.ro
168
**** Regards croisés sur l'Europe (coordonated by Michel Albert), Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 2005, 476p, ISBN: 213 054990 X;
Published under the auspices of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in Paris,
this work was intended to be dedicated to a Europe that was at the crossroads in 2004. The ten
new Member States had been subject to the greatest enlargement of the European Union. The
enlarged Europe was now faced with the challenges of this enlargement. Which were the costs?
How should the institution governing this Union look like? Had the European construction to be
continued through institutional reform and by setting up a legal framework? A Constitution for
Europe? Which were the limits? Could the enlargement go on? Which were the limits of this
Union? Could we speak about borders? Which were these borders? These are only a few
questions asked by the analysts and ordinary people. The volume coordinated by Michel Albert
has sought to answer these questions.
The paper starts with an Introduction made by Michel Albert. After a brief
presentation of the process of making up a United Europe, starting with the Rome Treaty (1957)
up to this enlargement, he tries to bring to the foreground the process of building Europe as seen
through the limits of this Union.
The population of the Union has grown by 70 million inhabitants, which means 25%
of the population of the 15 countries, but only 10% of their wealth. Should Western Europe fear
a possible immigration of a population coming from these countries? Which should be the
strategies of the Union at this very moment? Could a Constitution of all the Europeans solve the
problems of the Union? These are only a few questions to which the author tries to respond by
indicating the three important parts of the volume: I – Aperçus sur l’heritage (Views of the
Inheritance); II – La constructiona européenne et les limits de l’Union (The European
Construction and the Limits of the Union); III – Les enjeux du traité constitutionnel (Stakes of
the Constitutional Treaty).
The first part starts with an interesting paper by Jean Baechler, L’Europe n’a jamais
été un empire. In this paper, there is a brief mention of the different stages in the history of
Europe from Antiquity and Middle Ages to modern and contemporary epoch. The feudality of
the European kings and the concern of the European nations have drawn the author’s attention.
The idea of a universal monarchy, or the different projects for a federalisation of the European
states are harmoniously completed and argued through the texts of the European treaties
focused on the issue of the European balance and the construction of a long lasting peace
amongst the continent’s states in the past centuries. From the Napoleonian saga on the United
Europe to the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe has changed. Which were the consequences of this
European construction form a historical perspective?
L’Europe médiévale suggested by Jean Favier is another paper approaching the idea of
the inheritance of this Union, the Christian Europe that has been united so many times in front
of the Islam danger. A Catholic Europe, a Christian one, or ultimately an Islamic one, besides
the first two.
Marc Fumaroli has published in this volume the papers entitled L’Europe, république
des arts et lettres. Right from the beginning, the author hides his attachment to the American
model that was – as he said – built on university, scientific, and media development. In order to
be strong, Europe has to build its own cultural and unitary model. The republic of arts and
letters could thus become a unitary cultural model meant to give Europe the grandeur it used to
have.
Napoléon et l’Europe is a paper belonging to Jean Tulard. After a brief mention of the
successes and contribution of Napoleon to the Hexagon as it is now, the author tries to very
originally seize the essence of Napoleon’s Europe; but a Europe starting from Tilsit, hinting to
Napoleon’s treaty with the Russian tsar, much bigger than the present one. Does it have to be
considered as a model when certain sensitive aspects are approached? Isn’t Great Britain
European? Eventually, Europe has been neither the Europe of the Enlightenment, nor of
169
Napoleon’s bayonets; it has been the Europe of diplomats, of the Congress of Vienna…, of the
one in Paris.., of Berlin…, of Rome…, of Maastricht, and so on.
Relations franco-allemandes et construction européenne, proposed by Daniel CohnBendit, is a general presentation of the relations between the two peoples throughout the 20th
century, laying stress on the consolidation of these relations in the post-war period.
In the paper entitled De la construction européenne à la réforme des Nations Unies,
Robert Touleman makes a recent history of the events taking place after the terrorist attacks of
the Al-Qaida organisation. He speaks about ethics, law and democratic conditionings of the
European construction. The priority objective Europe has to ponder upon is – according to the
author – the promotion of a democratic model that it could export to the whole world. Starting
with this idea, he speaks of an external policy common to all Member States, or of the
conditions the Union should impose.
The second part starts with Raymond Barre’s paper on De Gaulle, l’Europe et
l’adaptation de la France au Marché commun 1959-1969. The author does not hesitate to
“advise” the Union as regards the new enlargement in 2004, the costs and strategies to be
followed, so that the new Member States better adapt to the new situation, and to facilitate a
better efficiency of the Community mechanisms.
Jacques Delors proposes a paper with an extremely attractive title: La construction
européenne, hier, aujourd’hui et demain. The conclusion is that the Community Europe cannot
have another solution but that of further enlargements, sooner or later. He even suggests a few
methods by approaching the Community issues after the American intervention in Iraq.
Le grand élargissement. Unité, diversité et singularité de l’Europe à 25, proposed by
Jean-Dominique Giuliani, tries to make a history of this enlargement of May 2004 starting with
the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The author tries to analyse the
features of the Europe of 25 in turn: unity, diversity, and uniqueness.
Les pays baltes et l’Europe, proposed by Sandra Kalniete, tries to find other
resemblances between the “European” states and the rest of Europe. The enlargement of the
borders towards east has reached not only unlimited possibilities of cooperation, bur also the
difficulties of action and implementation of the European law. Western Europe is now at a
crossroad, its borders used to be next to Russia. But isn’t Russia a European country? Couldn’t
Russia and other countries in the former USSR join the Union of the 25?
An interesting point of view concerning the European perception of the States in
Central Europe and the perception of “the 15” regarding this Europe is proposed by Bronislaw
Geremek in his paper, La vision européenne des pays de l’Europe centrale.
The delicate enlargement of Europe by the acceptance of Turkey in the Union is
debated in the article La question turque proposed by Thierry de Montbrial. The Europe of the
25, completed by the accession of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, could/would expand its
borders by the accession of Turkey, or Croatia (country that has stated its intention to start the
negotiations for adhesion).
The essence of this article may be found in the following equation: “Turkey is a
country close to Europe, an important country with genuine elites, but it is not a European
country”. The article also debates the possible candidacy of Byelorussia, Ukraine, and
Moldova; from this perspective, the adhesion criteria imposed by the Union should not be
diluted, as Thierry de Montbrial puts it.
From our point of view, the article of Alain Besaçon Les frontières de l’Europe d’un
point de vue historique is essential. The author makes a remarkable presentation of the
evolution of the European borders and approaches the different stages of “Europe” at different
historical epochs.
Les limites de l’Europe, a paper written by Jean-Claude Casanova, tries to define the
European area starting with different aspects (religious, demographic, cultural, economic,
political, and so on). When speaking about the “European nature”, the paper approaches the
widely debated question of Turkey’s joining the European Union.
170
The third part lays stress on the act of constitutional treaty, underlining the new
priorities of the enlarged Europe, and the issue of the “euro”, the relations with the United
States of America, the sovereignty of the European States, the federalist projects of the
continent; last but not least, the Community Constitution, as well as the place of religion in a
contemporary lay Europe.
Mircea Brie, e-mail: briedri@hotmail.com
John REX, Gurharpal SINGH, (Eds), Governance in Multicultural Societies,
Aldershot (UK), Ashgate, 2005, 249 p. ISBN 0-7546-3768-9
Cet ouvrage rassemble des contributions autour du thème des politiques publiques et
des dilemmes posés par celles-ci dans des sociétés à la diversité culturelle croissante. Il offre
une collection de communications théoriques et empiriques d’experts et de spécialistes de la
question de la gouvernance dans les sociétés multiculturelles. Ces différentes contributions
tentent de réconcilier peu ou prou la théorie sociale et politique et les études de cas.
Ce volume propose donc au lecteur une série d’essais contribuant à l’enrichissement de
la littérature sur le multiculturalisme et la politique publique tant dans les pays développés que
dans les sociétés en développement.
Les auteurs issus de quinze pays différents et reflétant différentes disciplines
s’interrogent sur la problématique fondamentale de la gouvernance dans les sociétés
multiculturelles.
L’ouvrage s’ouvre sur un débat théorique. Edward A.Tiryakian propose une lecture des
théories sociologiques en se demandant comment elles sont reliées aux thèmes idéologiques et
philosophiques. Il reprend les notions de multiculturel et de multiculturalisme qu’il décline :
comme nationalisme culturel, politique d’Etat et philosophie sociale. Ensuite, Steve Fenton
commente ces théories et esquisse la voie de leur discussion dans des contextes non européen et
non américain. John Rex plaide pour que le débat soit placé dans le contexte d’une discussion
de la citoyenneté selon T.H. Marshall alors que ce dernier ne prend pas en considération les
minorités ethniques.
Un débat similaire à celui des sociologistes a également lieu parmi les politologues et
les théoriciens politiques. Colin Tyler introduit les idées majeures qui animent le débat du
multiculturalisme dans les théories politiques. Il expose les quatre théories principales : 1) le
multiculturalisme libéral ; 2) l’anti- essentialisme et les politiques de reconnaissance ; 3) le
libéralisme politique de Rawls et 4) le multiculturalisme selon Bhikhu Parekh. Ce panorama
théorique aide le lecteur à s’orienter dans les débats sur la diversité culturelle qui ont pris place
entre les théoriciens. Il existe de nombreuses plages pour ce débat mais Tyler épingle les plus
pertinentes. Deux grandes questions sont discutées : la relation entre des entités sub-nationales
et une nation plus inclusive et celle de l’intégration des immigrés. Comme on peut le constater,
ces éclairages théoriques permettent de mieux comprendre les enjeux contemporains et les défis
de nos sociétés multiculturelles. Ce débat met en évidence des questions d’une actualité très
récente.
L’application de ces théories à l’étude de cas contemporains est l’objet de quatre
communications.
La première est conduite par Gurharpal Singh et traite du multiculturalisme dans la
ville ; l’auteur prend l’exemple de la ville multiculturelle de Leicester. Il explique comment, en
Grande Bretagne, le multiculturalisme comme politique publique a été influencé par
l’expérience des minorités ethniques dans les grandes villes. Il attire notre attention sur le
modèle de Leicester et propose une analyse en quatre points : les ressorts du développement du
multiculturalisme dans la ville ; les explications données pour comprendre le succès du modèle
de Leicester ; les enjeux actuels de la gestion de la diversité ; et enfin, une synthèse des leçons
de l’expérience de Leicester qui éclairent le débat sur la cohésion et le multiculturalisme en
Grande Bretagne.
171
La deuxième étude de cas porte sur les adaptations de la philosophie républicaine pour
traiter de la question des minorités en France. Catherine Withol de Wenden se demande si la
France se définit elle-même comme multiculturelle et si la notion de multiculturalisme s’adapte
au modèle français de citoyenneté dont elle définit les caractéristiques.
Ces deux premières contributions sont précieuses pour mettre en exergue les défis
actuels dans le contexte des événements des banlieues en France et des violences dans les
grandes cités européennes.
La troisième étude examine le cas de Frankfurt où il semble difficile d’intégrer des
institutions et des politiques multiculturelles dans le cadre d’un Etat providence bien établi.
Frank-Olaf Radke analyse l’intégration des notions d’inclusion et de médiation dans les
politiques au niveau local. Il analyse les différentes phases de mutation vers l’adoption du
Multiculturalisme dans le modèle de la ville allemande : des préconditions à la mise en
application. Il met également en exergue les paradoxes de cette politique. L’auteur analyse
également les réserves émises par ceux que cette politique vise. Il livre donc au lecteur une
analyse fort intéressante.
La quatrième étude de cas est développée par Hideki Tarumoto qui s’interroge sur le
multiculturalisme au Japon. Il met en relation les enjeux de l’immigration contemporaine avec
ceux de la première vague après la seconde guerre mondiale. Il esquisse les transformations du
modèle japonais : du mythe de l’homogénéité à une logique multiculturelle. Il montre
l’influence de la participation tardive du Japon aux instances internationales sur la logique de
son modèle d’intégration. Il examine les tenants et les aboutissants de la logique qui sous-tend
les différentes étapes de son amélioration.
D’autres problèmes émergent dans les pays post-communistes. David Carlton traite des
difficultés engendrées par la chute de l’Empire Austro-hongrois dans les Balkans. Il montre
l’impact de la politique wilsonienne de l’autodétermination et l’histoire des politiques
alternatives de changement de frontière et de déplacement de population. Ces problèmes furent
accrus dans l’ère post-Tito et renforcés par la question des religions. Galina Yemelianova
analyse les conflits ethniques dans l’ex-Union soviétique et décrit ceux-ci comme un problème
majeur de gouvernance. L’auteur démontre le rôle des groupes politiques et religieux.
D’autres communications encore s’articulent autour des problèmes rencontrés dans un
contexte non européen et dans des situations post-coloniales. John Rex ouvre cette section par
une discussion de la théorie de la société plurale notamment, selon Furnivall et Smith. Le cas de
la Malaisie est analysé par Steve Fenton. Simon Bekker et Anne Leidlé s’interrogent sur le
multiculturalisme comme une politique réalisable en Afrique du Sud. Les préconditions
constitutionnelles et les éléments fondamentaux qui ont fait le succès du multiculturalisme en
Afrique du Sud sont mis en évidence.
L’Asie du Sud présente un ensemble différent de problèmes liés à la coexistence de
l’Hindouisme, de l’Islam et de Sikhisme qui ont des significations tant politiques que
culturelles. Tous ces problèmes ont pris une dimension plus importante avec les partages de
l’Inde et la création d’Etats musulmans tels le Pakistan et Bangladesh.
Harihar Bhattacharyya analyse les différentes dimensions du multiculturalisme en Inde et
montre comment le débat des années 90 s’est structuré autour de deux tendances : un débat
académique autour de la notion même de multiculturalisme et une discussion sur le
multiculturalisme en tant que politique publique. Il débat de l’interaction entre
Multiculturalisme et Etat-Nation. Il prend ensuite l’angle du multiculturalisme en tant
qu’idéologie et politique et examine la position de Nehru sur cette question. Enfin, il termine
son essai en démontrant comment est appliqué le multiculturalisme dans une approche fédérale
et aborde la question de sa survie en analysant la création de trois nouveaux Etats dans ce
contexte.
Mohammad Waseem traite, quant à lui, du Pakistan où il existe une diversité
considérable qui a été gérée tant au niveau communal que politique. L’auteur nous propose une
approche historique minutieuse du processus de partition, de séparation entre l’Est et l’Ouest. Il
analyse les solutions adoptées pour pallier aux inégalités. Darshan Tatla analyse la situation des
172
Sikhs dans cette société multiculturelle. Il met en évidence le rôle de la diaspora. Chan Kwok
Bun traite de la diaspora chinoise au Canada et met en évidence un autre concept qui revêt une
grande importance à ses yeux : le cosmopolitanisme. Un dialogue entre les deux notions est
esquissé : multiculturalisme vs cosmopolitanisme
Les communications présentées ici montrent une diversité d’approche. Il n’existe pas
de notion ou de théorie unique du multiculturalisme. Il faut croiser les regards pour comprendre
quels en sont les ressorts. Le terme peut recouvrir une diversité de signification dans un monde
moderne, globalisé et de plus en plus complexe. La question de la gouvernance dans les sociétés
multiculturelles met en évidence la multiplicité des enjeux auxquels nous devons faire face au
quotidien mais elle met également en évidence les valeurs sur lesquelles se fondent nos
sociétés. Elle met en exergue nos modèles de société qui sont à réinventer et à adapter au monde
moderne et globalisé.
Fabienne Maron/ e-mail : maron@iiasiisa.be
*** EXLINEA (Lines of Exclusion as Arenas of Co-operation: Reconfiguring the
External Boundaries of Europe – Policies, Practices, Perceptions), Project in the 5th
Framework program, www.exlinea.org
The so called EXLINEA (Lines of Exclusion as Arenas of Co-operation:
Reconfiguring the External Boundaries of Europe – Policies, Practices, Perceptions) was funded
by the 5th Framework program of the European Union and universities, research institutions of
several European countries (Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Poland, Finland, Estonia,
Moldavia, Hungary and Russia) participated in it. In this project Hungary was represented by
the Debrecen Department of the Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, the regional coordinator was Béla Baranyi, the whole project was coordinated by
James Scott, the professor of the Free University of Berlin.
The creation of an “organised” European space that is cohesive, competitive, coherent
and sustainable is a political and social project of considerable dimension. It is no coincidence
that the European Union has embarked on policies that promote a sense of EU-identity and
citizenship; without a multilevel and boundary-transcending “connectedness” between cities,
regions, states and EU institutions, the concept of the EU as a space of meaning (and not a mere
economic organisation) will remain distant to the majority of its citizens. Importantly, as a locus
of governance and citizenship, regional scale has become central to the construction of a social
and democratic Europe. It is at the regional level where the manifold challenges posed by EU
enlargement, including institutional adaptation, conflict prevention, managing increasing
diversity of interests and heterogeneity and maintaining economic dynamism come together
with magnified intensity. As such, border regions appear to be key elements in facilitating the
European integration and enlargement process. They are seen as flexible vehicles for crossborder regional governance with which to mobilize collective action in addressing social,
economic and environmental issues. Within the wider context of European enlargement,
regional cross-border co-operation has been advanced as an opportunity for enhanced socialspatial development in peripheral areas of Central and Eastern Europe.
The basic aim of this project, EXLINEA “Lines of Exclusion as Arenas of Cooperation: Reconfiguring the External Boundaries of Europe – Policies, Practices, Perceptions”,
was to examine capacities for “region-building” (that is, the development of co-operative
structures and practices) across national borders in Central and Eastern Europe in anticipation
of EU enlargement. As the EU takes on new members and its external boundaries gradually
shift, socio-economic and political transformations are taking place “at the border”. These
transformations signify new regional development opportunities but often also problems and
tensions. In some cases, the imposition of visa restrictions on non-EU citizens could pose new
obstacles to co-operation, conjuring fears of an emerging “fortress Europe” that divides the
continent. At the present and future external borders of the EU it will be necessary to find
173
mechanisms that mediate between external pressures and local concerns and transcend socioeconomic, political and systemic asymmetries
The research aims of this project thus corresponded with several of the goals
underlying the Key Action “Improving the Socio-Economic Knowledge Base” of the Fifth
Framework Programme. Most importantly, the project investigated issues of innovative regional
governance, European integration and citizenship within the context of the political and socioeconomic challenges of enlargement. In so doing it addressed most directly research task 3 of
the Call Specific (of July 2001), but also related to research task in that governance for socioeconomic development is at issue. Furthermore, EXLINEA addressed three research challenges
enumerated in the Call Specific:
multi-level governance
conflict prevention, early warning and management
socio-economic changes linked to the enlargement process.
Cross-border co-operation is seen as instrumental in promoting European integration
and facilitating the process of enlargement. The European Union (as well as several member
states) has been actively supportive of cross-border co-operation initiatives in order to foster
good neighbourliness and cultural understanding, enhance economic networking, encourage
regional and local participation in policy-making, and promote a sense of “Europeanness”.
As the EU’s boundaries shift geographically, it will be necessary to investigate the
extent to which meaningful forms of conflict prevention, problem-solving and other forms of
collective action are emerging in Central and Eastern European border regions. In what ways
can cross-border regionalisation in these countries contribute to European multilevel
governance? Future enlargement presents a major political, economic and social challenge for
the European Union. It will also have far-reaching effects on the acceding countries (and their
regions) who, while striving to adopt the acquis communautaire, must deal with fundamental
societal transformations and rapid structural change. In border regions diverse socio-economic
conditions and practices increasingly confront each other, opening prospects for trade and cooperation but, at the same time, often encouraging undesirable and illegal activities and even
resulting in misunderstanding and conflict. Furthermore, gradual enlargement eastward will
result in new external borders with the former Soviet Union and other states and thus new
possible tensions.
EXLINEA aimed on the one hand to inform scientific debate over the political
significance of cross-border regionalism within the context of European integration and
enlargement. In doing so the project contributed to a new conceptualization of borderlands as
spaces created by social interactions, institutions and rules operating at different spatial levels.
On the other hand, it seeked to enrich policy debate by critically discussing the experiences and
lessons learned since 1990 in areas located on the EU’s external borders.
At the centre of this project thus lied an innovative “institutionalist” approach to the
analysis of cross-border co-operation and region-building. We departed from the assumption
that transboundary interaction is conditioned by political opportunity structures operating at
least three different levels (the supranational, the national and the local) that coalesce
regionally. Political opportunity structures affect regionalisation processes by giving rise to
specific regimes or “set(s) of rules and institutions, formal and informal, that aim at and succeed
in regularising neighbourhood (regional) behaviour”. At the ground level of regional crossborder co-operation this translates into a dual process of formal institutionalisation
(characterised by more-or-less formal organisations and co-operation initiatives) and informal
integration (as associated with processes of social interaction and the participation of civil
society).
Empirical work was based on the analysis of policies, political discourses, concrete cooperation practices, and perceptions of borders and cross-border co-operation as they have 1)
configured specific governance contexts and 2) conditioned and re-conditioned cross-border
regionalisation patterns. Significantly, the evolution of policies, practices and perceptions (P-PP) was addressed at three different spatial levels: the supranational, the national and the
174
subnational (local and regional). This allowed us, at the level of regional case studies, to
describe and explain the emergence of specific cross-border co-operation “regimes”. In short,
this research encompasses not only the assessment of the constraints and potentials of crossborder co-operation at former lines of exclusion at the “outer edges” of the European Union, but
also the analysis of the role and the interests and intentions of the relevant actors in developing
cross-border co-operation practices. Six case studies served to illustrate the conflicting
challenges EU’s border policies face as enlargement proceeds. Special attention was focused on
selected subareas of the Estonian-Russian, Finnish-Russian, Polish-Ukrainian, HungarianUkrainian-Romanian, Moldavian-Romanian and Nortnern Greek border regions (see map). The
final conference of the project was held in Brussels, on December 8, 2005, where the empirical
and theoretical results of the research in the Hungarian-Romanian and the Hungarian-Ukrainian
border regions were presented by the researchers of the Hungarian team. The further results of
the EXLINEA project will be published by the ASHGATE Publishing in the near future.
Finally, EXLINEA pursues objectives that were explicitly “product-oriented”.
Recognising the importance of circulating knowledge of cross-border co-operation practices
and experiences, dissemination was a central activity accompanying all phases of the project.
Dissemination activities included a project website, a newsletter, scientific articles, policy
papers, seminars and the production of material for university-level courses. The dissemination
activities were communicated to the Commission on a regular basis. Workshops and a final
conference conveyed policy relevant information whereas project results were made available
to the wider scientific community through articles, papers presented at international conferences
and a book. (Béla Baranyi, e-mail: baranyib@rkk.hu)
****Discussion Papers Special Issue, Hungarian – Romanian and Hungarian –
Ukrainian Border Regions as Areas of Co-operation along the External Borders of
Europe, Edited by Béla Barany, Centre for Regional Studies of Hungarian
Academy of Sciences, Series editor: Zoltàn Gal, Pécs, 2005, ISSN - 0238-2008
This paper was conceived by the Debrecen Department of the „Alföld” (Great Plain)
Institute of the Centre for Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under the
EU 5th Framework Programme „Exlinea” (lines of Exclusion as Arenas of Co-operation:
Reconfiguring the External Boundaries of Europe – Policies, Practices, Perceptions).
As one may notice right from the title, it is a Discussion Notebook, or a book suggesting
a dialogue between Hungary, Romania and Ukraine upon the issues approached, that is,
Hungarian – Romanian and Hungarian – Ukrainian border regions as areas of cooperation along
the external border of the European Union (EU). Considering the accession of Hungary as a full
member of the European Union (May 2004), its southern and eastern borders have become
external borders of the European Union.
Right from the beginning, one may notice as a positive fact Hungary’s institutional
endeavour to create the tools needed for the investigation of the new issue. Thus, a Centre for
Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences has been established. Within this
Centre, there is the Great Plain Institute in Debrecen that has worked in the framework of the
EXLINEA programme of the EU. We think that the Hungarian institutional endeavours should
be considered as an example for the Romanian authorities at least from certain points of view.
This paper – which should be considered as a first of its kind – is structured as follows:
after a preface (J. SCOTT) underlining the idea that it has been published at the right time, after
the enlargement of the European Union (in 2004) and before the future enlargement that is
drawing near, so under the circumstances of some major geo-political changes of Central and
Eastern Europe. This is followed by the introduction (signed by Bela BARANYI). The volume
is divided into four main chapters: I. Background study of the Hungarian-Romanian ant the
Hungarian-Ukrainian border regions; II. Hungarian-Romanian and the Hungarian-Ukrainian
cross-border co-operation; III. Results of Empirical Work in the Hungarian-Romanian and the
Hungarian-Ukrainian Border Region; IV. Annexes.
175
The authors make references to the size of the border in the first chapter. This chapter
is mostly concerned with the Romanian – Hungarian border area, while the second with the
Hungarian – Ukrainian border area. Thus, the historical, legal, political, economic and social
dimensions of the borders with Romania and Ukraine have been identified. After debating upon
the border between Hungary and Transylvania in the Middle Ages in the subchapter entitled
Historical Dimension (pp 12-15), the authors ignore the fact that it reflects the ethnic principle
by respecting the rights of the majority that had been approached before as a productive
appendix, although it was manifest on the level of the fight for equal rights with other ethnies. It
is important to say that, given the historical background in point of development of the two
peoples throughout the centuries, no border may be traced in such a manner to avoid comprising
ethnic minorities from the neighbouring countries. This is mainly an eastern European feature.
There is an error from a historical point of view when speaking of a population of 3.5 million
inhabitants in Transylvania in 1918 out of which, according to the authors, 1.7 million – which
is 50% – were Hungarians. This is probably intended to substantiate the statements regarding
the disrespect of the ethnic principle when the border was established. Unfortunately, this
interpretation is not productive. In 2006, when we all look to a joint European future, such
interpretations should disappear from the discourse of the historians. The need to cooperate in a
genuine European spirit compels us to such an attitude.
At the same time, we have to correct the statement according to which the
determination of the borders had only painful effects. The population in Transylvania, most of
them Romanians, lived a moment of extreme enthusiasm on December 1, 1918, when they
decided to join the rest of the country, Romania. We need to make this clear to avoid a
misunderstanding, that is, that the whole population from Transylvania suffered because of the
Treaty signed in Trianon, which would be an error. As a matter of fact, it was only after the
union that the Romanians could enjoy all democratic rights in point of political and national
life, just like the Hungarian population that had remained in the Romanian kingdom. It is also
debatable the issue of the so-called economic break after which the population in Transylvania
suffered. Although it is true that a certain economic unity was destroyed, it is as true that the
Romanians in Transylvania became more actively involved from an economic point of view, as
they benefited from a legislation that was no longer limiting them, since they had completely
different possibilities for economic development. At the same time, the Romanian state was
strengthened economically after the union of Transylvania and Romania, a natural and desired
phenomenon, at least as far as the Romanians were concerned. The old arguments are reiterated
in the subchapter concerning the legal aspect. After the Second World War, cross-border
relations have been reactivated in time; the authors stress the role of the agreements concluded
on a state level (The Romanian – Hungarian Treaty of 1997, p 17) that determined the basic
framework for cooperation, with special stress on the importance of Euroregions, particularly
the small ones that are more efficient than the large ones, according to the authors. The
difficulties arouse from the fact that the regional development system had been developing in
both countries (p 21).
We have to notice that, starting with the analysis of the economic aspect, comparative
tables are more and more frequently used for the two countries (the evolution of the GDP and of
certain economic sectors on a national level, as well as of the great regions in Eastern Hungary
and Western Romania). We may see the differences in the evolution of Hungary and Romania
from the available data. The border with Ukraine is approached by the same token.
The second chapter debates the cross-border cooperation on the level of the regions
(NUTS 2), of the county (NUTS 3), and micro-regional (NUTS 4) that only exist in Hungary
for the time being, as the ones on the level of the municipalities and other types or institutional
relations, such as the University of Debrecen with similar institutions in Romania and Ukraine.
An interesting subchapter is dedicated to the border region and the cross-border relations as
seen by the inhabitants on both sides of the border. The investigation has been carried out
starting with some questionnaires filled in by 600 inhabitants on the Romanian side (Borş,
Săcuieni, Urziceni, Cenad, Grănceri) and 600 inhabitants on the Hungarian side of the border,
176
and 509 and 566 on the Hungarian and Ukrainian sides respectively (p 79). The following
aspects were aimed at: the opinions of the population in the border region concerning the border
and the neighbouring country, the border region with the neighbouring country (the
development of these relations, of the relationships amongst the citizens in the border area), the
issue of joining the European Union, the role of the Euroregions alongside the eastern borders
of Hungary.
Finally, the third chapter of the book is concerned with the results of the analysis of the
questionnaire in the border region in the first subchapter, so that the second one renders the
perception upon the border and cross-border cooperation under several aspects, including
personal relationships (p 159), that play a vital role. The answers given to the questionnaires are
important and the survey is opportune. Nevertheless, we think it would have been much more
appropriate to be expanded to the localities with a population mainly made up of Romanians in
the border area. It is necessary to examine the business economic relations, as well as other
types of relations with the Hungarian ethnics in Romania’s border area, to expand it to the
Romanian population in Bihor, considering that the general impression would be that the survey
has been carried out amongst the Hungarians on both sides of the border. The narrowness of
the stripe chosen for the survey and the low number of interviewed people (600 on the
Romanian side of the border) lower the relevance of the survey, particularly if we consider the
small-sized Euroregion of Bihor – Hajdu-Bihar that is the most active one. There is no problem
relating to the linguistic aspect, as there are several Hungarian speakers in Bihor.
However, besides the lacks mentioned above, these Discussion Papers have the quality
of opening a new road by using a method that can be taken over by others, just like our
Hungarian colleagues – who have taken over the western model, the one of creating and
developing these Euroregions. Therefore, we consider that the volume is worth reading.
Antonio Faur, e-mail: antoniofaur@yahoo.com
****, Borders and border regionalism in the transforming Central Europe, Edited
by István Süli-Zakar, Debrecen, Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadója,
2003, 386 p
The study of borders, border regions and cross-border co-operations and the
exploration of potential co-operation forms has been one of the most important research topics
of the Department of Social Geography and Regional Development Planning at the University
of Debrecen since the early nineties. The members of the Department take an active part in the
work of various national and international organisations dealing with cross-border issues. The
Department annually organises its international conferences and workshops on the various
aspects of cross-border co-operations as a result of which it publishes the latest research
outcomes in its series on cross-border problems. The presentations of the participants of the
conferences and workshops are published in two languages: every second year, all papers are
translated into English with a Hungarian abstract and vice versa. This allows access to the
international forums and thus the Department has gained renown all over Europe. The editor of
the volumes is Prof. Dr. István Süli-Zakar, university professor, Head of the Department of
Social Geography and Regional Development Planning. The research grouped directed by Prof.
Dr. Süli-Zakar covers all aspects of borders, border regions and cross-border co-operations.
In the autumn of 2002, the selected aspect concentrated on the possible effects of the
enlargement of the European Union. The number of papers included in the volume entitled
Borders and border regionalism in the transforming Central Europe reached 32 with a great
variety of research areas. The participants arrived from all over Europe, representing a segment
of the international relations of the Department. Thus, besides the neighbouring countries,
Germany and Finland were also represented. The language of the book is Hungarian with
English abstracts at the end of each paper. The studies were grouped around three topics.
Six of the participants concentrated on the general aspects of Borders and border
regions. This basically provided kind of an introduction and theoretical background for the
177
studies focusing on more specific fields. The first study focuses on one of the hottest issue of
the accession for Hungary, the question of the Schengen borders. The paper deals with the
impact of the Schengen Treaty on the relationship between state and individuals. The example
of the German-Danish border is used to provide a short preview on the possible developments
in the Hungarian border regions. This study creates the milieu for the rest of the section – and
thus the book itself – since the aspects of the re-interpretation of the borders and cross-border
co-operations in Central Europe, the euroregional developments in the Hungarian border
regions, the limiting function of the (Schengen) borders for the industrial investors, the situation
of gateways in the transforming European space and the effects on the regional development
systems together form a basis for all other aspects of the co-operations in a “Europe struggling
within her internal and external borders”.
Seventeen of the studies focused on a special geographic area within the Central
European space, namely the northeastern part of Hungary. The EU accession of Hungary had
the greatest impact on the eastern – and especially the northeastern – borders of Hungary. While
the Hungarian-Slovakian border became one of the so-called internal borders of the European
Union – although the Schengen Agreement has not yet entered into force along the new internal
borders –, the situation and future of the Romanian and Ukrainian borders were still in doubts.
This meant that all experts agreed that although the Hungarian-Romanian border should soon
become an internal border within the European Union – with the expected accession of
Romania in 2007 – but the Hungarian-Ukrainian border was to remain an external border for a –
much – longer period. This issue made our researchers to concentrate their attention on those
aspects of the relevant borders that might be affected by the new “division of Europe”.
The studies in the part entitled Borders in North-Eastern Hungary, the Schengen issue
is made specific to Northeast Hungary. The regional development issues are approached from
the point of view of Hajdú-Bihar county, the role of the gateway cities in the Eastern transfer
zone are discussed, the future of the interregional relations of the Northern Great Plain and
Southern Great Plain regions are addressed together with several issues affecting Hajdú-Bihar,
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and Heves counties. The great variety of
issues introduced by the authors is well demonstrated by the fact that such region-specific
elements are also discussed here which have high relevance for not only the state but the
individuals as well. The aspects of migration, social acceptance and adaptation of the
intellectual migrants, participation of foreign workers on the labour markets in the “East Ends”,
the organisation of exhibitions and fairs, or the exportation and marketing of wine all form an
important part in the way of thinking and living in this special part of the transforming Central
Europe.
The book is closed by nine studies that concentrate on the interpretation and future of
the Schengen borders in the Carpathian basin. These studies take back the readers into a wider
European space through the question of identities and identity consciousness along the FinnishRussian or the Hungarian-Romanian borders. Some of the authors also turn to a rather sensitive
point of the enlargement processes – partly affected by the Schengen issues as well –, namely
the future of the economic integration and within it more especially, the question of the
agriculture and industry. The last section of the book suggests that one of the biggest fears of
the enlarged European Union is the high number of border related illegal activities and criminal
actions along the new external borders of the integration.
The book is published a in black and white form, and the altogether 386 pages include
several tables, figures and maps which provide important and precious data and information on
the various aspects of borders, border regions and border regionalism.
Klára Czimre, e-mail: czimrekl@delfin.klte.hu
178
Alexandru Niculescu, Individualitatea limbii române între limbile romanice 4.
Elemente de istorie culturală (L'individualité de la langue roumaine 4. Éléments
d'histoire culturelle), Clusium, 2004, 304 p, ISBN 973-555-396-1
Pas mal de fois, lorsqu’on fait tardivement la connaissance de quelqu’un, on se
demande comment cela avait été possible. Voilà ce que je viens de ressentir, récemment, après
avoir connu Mr le professeur Alexandru Niculescu et lu quelques uns de ses livres. J’ai dû
arriver à Paris pour le connaître ! Le plus récent de ses livres est L’individualité de la langue
roumaine 4. Éléments d’histoire culturelle, un ouvrage sur la langue roumaine qui dépasse la
sphère étroite des recherches linguistiques, s’intégrant, par son sujet, c’est-à-dire l’espace de
formation de la langue roumaine, dans le thème généreux et moderne des frontières
linguistiques. L’extension de la latinité orientale, l’espace de formation de la langue roumaine,
les influences exerçées au long des siècles sur la latinité orientale, voilà quelques uns des
thèmes auxquels l’auteur nous propose à réfléchir. Les sujets abordés, l’esprit critique de
l’auteur en font un modèle du genre. Même si je ne suis pas tout à fait d’accord avec ses
affirmations, cela ne m’empêche pourtant à remarquer la force de son écriture, la finesse de ses
observations et le remarquable esprit critique qui nous fait défaut le dernier temps.
Le livre est divisé en cinq chapitres : I. Structures linguistiques, II. Structures
culturelles, III. Culture et religion, IV. “Parentage”, “nation” et notre langue, V. Annexe. Je
remarque le fait que Mr le professeur Niculescu attaque des problèmes fondamentaux de
l’histoire et culture roumaine : la formation de la langue roumaine ; l’extension de la latinité
orientale, les apports des Slaves, des Bulgares et, plus tard, des Hongrois, des Turques et des
Tartars. Une première question qu’on met en discussion est celle des apports des Slaves, de la
mesure dans laquelle ils ont influencé le processus de la formation de la langue roumaine. Ce
problème est, logiquement, lié à la question si la langue roumaine était déjà formée ou non à
l’arrivée des Slaves au nord du Danube. Le professeur pense que la langue roumaine n’était
point formée à ce moment-là et il en donne de nombreuses preuves, surtout d’ordre linguistique.
Quant à nous, on considère ses conclusions courageuses, prouvées parfois par les dernières
recherches historiques et archéologiques qui parlent de plus en plus clairement d’une symbiose
roumaine-slave. Peut-être n’est-il pas inutile d’admettre le fait que certains historiens roumains
de la période d’entre les deux guerres mondiales (Nicolae Iorga, Silviu Dragomir et P. P.
Panaitescu, par exemple) ont mis en évidence quelques-uns de ces aspects, mettant ainsi les
bases d’une recherche critique et honnête de l’histoire roumaine en relation avec les peuples
voisins. L’instauration du régime communiste en Roumanie et ses influences idéologiques,
culminant avec la théorie imposée de considérer les Roumains comme des descendants des
Slaves, ont mené à une involution des recherches sur ce segment fondamental. Les années
suivantes, les historiens ont été très prudents au sujet de cette symbiose, vu la situation des
années ‘50. L’ouvrage de Mr le professeur Niculescu constitue une preuve de plus sur la
nécessité des recherches interdisciplinaires, dans ce cas, entre l’histoire et la linguistique, dans
l’investigation de la période du debut de Moyen Âge.
La théorie selon laquelle la langue roumaine s’est formée aussi en relation avec la
langue slave avait été mise en circulation antérieurement. Plus intéressantes sont les études
suivantes pleines de suggestions innovatoires : Multiculturalisme, altérité, histoire ; Les Pays
Roumains – la Valachie ; Entre latinité et spécificité roumaine ; “Parentage”, considérations
philosophiques ; “Nation” et langue. Malheureusement, on pense que le livre souffre à cause
du grand nombre de thèmes et des diverses manières dont ils sont abordés. Personnellement,
j’aurais renoncé à quelques études, bien écrites mais ayant un niveau d’articles, afin de sauver
le tout. Les études de grande force risquent de perdre de leurs effets lorsqu’elles sont suivies par
autre thèmes, rédigés selon d’autres méthodes.
Sorin Sipos, e-mail: : ssipos@uoradea.ro
179
Alexandru Ilies, România. Euroregiuni, Oradea, Editura UniversităŃii din Oradea,
2004, 218 p, ISBN 973-613-569-1
The fall of communism in the Eastern European block has brought about changes in
the economic, political, or administrative, fields of a country. An ensemble of European
structures successfully implemented in the western part of the old continent has also appeared in
Romania. One of the European concepts that has been heard more and more often – and with
which we are trying to become familiar – is that of “Euroregion”, a product of the international
life dynamics in the past few decades. The paper of Prof. Dr. Alexandru Ilies – Romania.
Euroregions proves to be a genuine survey meant to inform the reader on the aspects, forms and
structures of cross-border cooperation that Romania has been implementing – “Romania
belongs to a region where, throughout the half century ending with the fall of the communist
system, important changes on a political, economic, and social levels with regional and global
implications of a great diversity have come up”.
Meant for both specialists in the field and to those who wish to understand the
Euroregional structures, the book represents excellent guidelines made up of 14 chapters. The
first chapters are meant to define the “Euroregion” and all its aspects. Thus, after a brief
historical approach of the notion in Europe, we are shown the content, aim, and objectives of
Euroregions, tracing the features and variety in point of structure from the point of view of its
legal aspects; the author underlines that the Euroregion is a volunteer association set up for a
joint interest of the parties involved respecting the legislations on a national, or international,
level. We find out that in Western Europe cross-border cooperation in its Euroregional forms of
practice started as early as the 6th decade of the 20th century, as a model considered with certain
reserve by the communist countries at the epoch. Nevertheless, the past 15 years have
contributed to understanding, accepting, and implementing this European model in the former
socialist block. According to the author, Europe currently has more than a hundred Euroregions
for economic development and cross-border cooperation; these structures have become efficient
through the cooperation of local, or regional, governments, through economic trades of the
parties involved, through favouring cultural and scientific exchange together with the free
circulation of individuals, through different means of collaboration in the field of
communication, and so on.
The main content of the paper is revealed in the subsequent 11 chapters, each
representing one of the 11 Euroregions in Romania: “Carpatica”; “Dunăre – Criş – Tisa –
Mureş”; “Dunărea de Jos”; “Prutul Superior”; “Dunărea de Sud”; “Giurgiu Ruse”; “Siret – Prut
– Nistru”; “Dunărea 21”; “Bihor – Hajdu – Bihar”; “Danubius”; “Dunăre – Dobrogea”. Six
structures out of theses are involved in a bilateral cooperation, whereas five are characterized of
a trilateral cooperation. In the case of the Euroregion “Carpatica”, the participation made up of
five state structures made up of Romania, Ukraine, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland, promotes
this area as “one with the highest Euroregional structures of the kind working so far on the level
of Europe”, as the author points out. Consequently, we may notice the obvious trend of the
neighbouring regions to come together in structures leading to an efficient use of the space in all
aspects.
Thus, each chapter is dedicated to one of these structures. The historical and
organisational aspects are presented, along with the main political, economic, and geographic
features. Following this pattern, the author makes up a map of the area, and of these
Euroregions; it is a manifold map meant to show the particularities of each structure, its
potential and which would be the premises favouring sustainable development.
We have to mention the fact that the volume comprises a series of statistics, graphs,
and pictures meant to facilitate the reader’s insight, or on the contrary, to provide an image as
clear as possible of Romania on a Euroregional level. The final remark of the author is that
“there are the favourable premises to strengthen cultural and economic exchange, particularly in
the cross-border area with Romanian participation. An important role is the harmonization of
180
the associated countries”. The book comprises a vast bibliography for those willing to find out
more and provides a series of links to web sites in the field, besides the surveys.
The conclusion is evident – Euroregions represent a necessary step for the European
integration, and the book Romania. Euroregions is a necessary lecture for those willing to
understand certain aspects of the European Union mechanisms.
Raul Gutin, e-mail: raul_gutin@yahoo.com
Klára Czimre, Euroregional development at EU adhere moment - especially the
Hungarian euroregions, Studia Geographica, nr.15, Debrecen 2005, 223 p, ISBN
963 472 938 X
The author, Klára Czimre it is professor at the University of Debrecen (Hungary), at he
Human Geography and Territorial Development Faculty . She is preoccupied on this theme for
several years, gathering a vast knowledge on this itinerary, fact proved by the bibliography she
used for this research work, where almost 247 works are works published abroad. An other
positive aspect of this work it is represented by the fact that the big majority of information and
material used are the latest news in this field. So as the theme of the book, that it is as new as
possible and it is a novelty as well in theory as in practice. European geography it is
preoccupied even from the 50this on border and frontier study, and are even more preoccupied
on this, now, as looking the EU enlarge.
The EU enlargement brings some other themes to be studied as: outskirt regions,
frontier zones, neighbour regions, euroregions, these role and links, determination of
geographic position role in cross border co-operations, the functionality of Hungarian
euroregions , as well as their relations with EU
This work has 6 chapters, logically structured, written in a correct scientific language,
written at the mo ment requirement, has 104 figures, 27 tables, 46 maps and 47 diagrams. The
work also has a annex with 8 tables, 2 maps and a question set that was draw up by the author
and used in the precursory study to draw up the book and as help in field work.
The first two chapters Purposes and methods and Evaluation and comparison of
specialty studies on borders and border zones. Here the author presents shortly the purposes
,the manners and the methods used. Then comes the confrontation of the former appeared works
on Borders an frontiers. This confrontation it is realized as well as from the sight of the
geography as well as from history, economic, and sociology. So, the author, mixes these fields
with still, just like she mixed the bibliography used for these chapters.
Also in these chapters may be seen new ideas an personal methods of the author.
The third chapter The present politics on borders and border regions, The EU and the
euroregions. Here are presented the present specialty opinions, borders and border region
politics.
The fourth, fifth, and sixth chapters (4-Euroregional co-operations between EU and
central Europe, 5- Euroregions near Hungarian borders, 6-Hungarian euroregions role and
place in EU ), these represents the most important part of this work. Here are presented the
euroregions: definitions, types, roles and co-operation possibilities. Throughout these chapters
the text it is very finely mixed with figures, maps and tables, so it is easier to understand even
for those who are not specialists.
The sixth chapter it is the works summary, here being presented the conclusions, and
all these are also presented in english to (written by the author herself whose specialization it is
english-geography). All these are in the seventh chapter.
Ambrus L. Attila, e-mail: attilaambrus@freemail.hu
181
Institute for Euroregional Studies (IERS) -- European Excellence Centre
“Jean Monnet” www.iser.rdsor.ro
IERS is a project initiated by the University of Oradea and is made up of four “Jean
Monnet” structures: Chair Jean Monnet in Community Law (Prof. Dr. Ovidiu Tinca), Chair
Jean Monnet in Euroregional Studies (Prof. Dr. Ioan Horga), Module Jean Monnet in European
Integration Economics (Prof. Dr. Anca Dodesccu), Module Jean Monnet in Trade and
Competition Policies (Prof. Dr. Mihai Berinde).
IERS has been established in partnership with the University of Debrecen: the
Department for Social Geography and Regional Development Planning (Prof. Dr. Suli-Zakar
Istvan), the Module Jean Monnet in Community Law (Prof. Dr. Varnay Erno), the Faculty of
Economics (Prof. Dr. Kormos Janos).
The IERS project has been carried out in partnership with the following institutions:
the Bihor County Council, the Board of the Bihor – Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion, the Chamber of
Commerce and Industry Oradea, the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture Satu
Mare, the Regional Development Agency of Northern Transylvania, the SAPARD Agency
North-West, the Regional Office for the Romanian – Hungarian Cross-border Cooperation
Oradea, the Carpathian Foundation Oradea, the Euroregiohaz Debrecen, the Association of the
Romanian – Hungarian Border Communes, the Forum Foundation Oradea.
The Institute for Euroregional Studies aims at being an interface to disseminate
European information in the neighbouring area as represented by the new eastern borders of the
EU. Likewise, IERS will act as a central pivot in the development of scientific research and the
promotion of human resources in the area on the European market of research and human
resources development to train specialists in the cross-border field and of the European
neighbourhood area policies for the borders with Ukraine, Moldova, and Serbia and
Montenegro, where Romania and Hungary are required to be actively involved. IERS aims at
becoming a high standard centre for regional and cross-border expertise of the national and
European institutions.
The structure of the Institute for Euroregional Studies is as follows:
a) School for Euroregional Studies made up of:
BA in International Relations and European Studies (3 years)
MA in Euroregional Studies and Cross-border Relations (2 years)
Inter-university MA in Community Law (2 years)
Interuniversity MA in European Economic Integration
Doctoral School in Euroregional Studies in partnership with the University of
Debrecen in the fields mentioned above
b) International Centre for Euroregional Research (CICERO) that will develop the
expertise in the field of Borders, Cross-border Cooperation and the Regionalism with
the following directions: foundations of the history and regional and cross-border
demography, geographical and administrative foundations: the Euroregions –
expressions of subsidiarity, economic cooperation in the Euroregional area, the
borderless Europe, new identitary forms.
The results of these surveys and research will be made public through conferences and
seminars organised twice a year, as well as through the biannual Eurolimes journal. The
editorial staff will be made up of scientific personalities particularly from Romania and
Hungary, from the EU Member States, from Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, the USA, and Canada
and through participation to national and European project tenders.
The official opening of the IERS took place on January 19 – 20, 2006 at the University
of Oradea with the participation of specialists from the Universities of Oradea and Debrecen, as
well as important personalities from Oradea. The presentation of the Institute for Euroregional
Studies made by Prof. Dr. Ioan Horga and Prof. Dr. Suli-Zakar Istvan as Co-Directors of the
182
IERS, was followed by the official opening of the IERS, with the messages of the Rectors of the
two Universities: Prof. Dr. Teodor Traian Maghiar, Rector of the University of Oradea, and
Nagy Janos, Rector of the University of Debrecen, of other officials, such as: Traian Abrudan,
Deputy Prefect of the Bihor County, Ioan Micula, President of the Chamber of Commerce and
Industry of the Bihor County, Mihai Groza, Deputy Mayor of the Municipality of Oradea.
The debates were focused on the idea of encouraging collaboration between professors
and students from the two universities. Proposals have been made for doctoral and BA level
studies in partnership, and for a joint Romanian – Hungarian and Hungarian – Romanian Legal
Dictionary and a Romanian – Hungarian Guidelines in Community Law.
This was followed by a debate on: How Can the IERS Become a Renowned
Euroregional Actor? It was moderated by Anca Dodescu, Dean of the Faculty of Economics at
the University of Oradea, and Kormos Janos, Dean of the Faculty of Economics at the
University of Debrecen. Valuable contribution has been made by: Livia Banu, Director of the
Regional Office for Cross-border Cooperation Romania – Hungary, Lucia Pantea, Directorate
for European Integration within the Bihor County Council, Oradea Branch, Sorin Radu,
Director of the BRIPS – North-West, Lorena Stoica, Director of the Carpatica Foundation,
Romania Branch Office, Szabo Bela, Dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Debrecen.
The debates were focused on the issues related to the development of human resources in the
field of cross-border cooperation, the collaboration in planning the activities and the funds in
the fields of European funding and practical training of the students in the spirit of the attributes
needed for cross-border development.
The opening festivity of the Institute was attended by representatives of the media
from Oradea, which proves that the event aroused the interest of the journalists due to its
involvement in the future development of the Bihor – Hajdu-Bihar Euroregion, in the crossborder cooperation in general, and on the higher standard of professional training of the future
specialists in international relations.
The opening was followed by a seminar entitled Challenges and Perspectives in the
Regional and Euroregional Issues in the New Europe. The papers were delivered by
professors from Oradea and Debrecen, members of the IERS, when topics referring to regions,
Euroregions and borders in the new Europe were approached, as well as legal and economic
aspects of the Euroregional development; the borderless Europe, or the Europe with different
borders; actors and mechanisms of European integration through regional policies; the
traditional and current perspective of the border; regional policies of the European Union
between desiderata and expectancies.
In the conclusions of the seminar, it was established that the second IERS seminar
should be organised in Debrecen on June 8 – 9, 2006. The topic of the seminar will be Regional
Development in the Romanian – Hungarian Cross-border Area.
183
About the autors
184
Robert Bideleux is a Political Sciences Professor at the Universitatea of Wales, Swansea, UK.
Since 1991, he has been working in the Department of Political Sciences and International
Relations. He is the Director of the Russian and Eastern Studies Centre. Publications:
Communism and Development, London and New York, Methuen, 1985; (with Richard Taylor),
European Integration and Disintegration East and West, Routledge, London and New York,
1996; (with Jan Jeffries), A History of Eastern Europe: Crisis and Change, Routledge, London,
1998; “Xenophobia and religious racial ethnic cleansing” in Europe. Frontiers, cultures,
histories
Florence, 2005. E-mail : r.j.bideleux@swansea.ac.uk
Vicent Climent-Ferrando (1978), Language Policy Advisor (Barcelona, Spain), M.A in
European Studies. College of Europe, Bruges. Fields of insterest: multilingualism, EU
Language Policy, EU Regional Policy, EU Social Policy, Justice and Home Affairs,
Enlargement. Publications: Linguistic Diversity in the European Union’s Institutional
Framework, Editor for the European Commission’s database SCADPLUS, etc.
Gerard Delanty is a Professor of Sociology, University of Liverpool, UK and has written on
various issues in social theory and general sociology. He is editor of the European Journal of
Social Theory and author of ten books and editor of five, including Inventing Europe
(Macmillan 1995); Social Science (1997; new edition 2005); Social Theory in a Changing
World (Polity Press 1998); Modernity and Postmodernity (Sage 2000); Citizenship in a Global
Age (Open University Press 2000); Challenging Knowledge: The University in the Knowledge
Society (Open University Press 2001); (with Patrick O’ Mahony) Nationalism and Social
Theory (Sage 2002); Community (Routledge 2003); (edited) Adorno: Modern Masters 4 vols
(Sage 2004); (edited with Piet Strydom) Philosophies of Social Science (Open University Press
2003); (with Chris Rumford) Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of
Europeanization (Routledge 2005); and has edited the Handbook of Contemporary European
Social Theory (Routledge 2005) and (with Krishan Kumar) The Handbook of Nations and
Nationalism (Sage 2006). http://www.liv.ac.uk/sspsw/staff/biogs/delanty.htm. Address:
Department of Sociology, University of Liverpool, Eleanor Rathbone Building, Bedford Street
South, Liverpool L69 7ZA, UK. E-mail: delanty@liverpool.ac.uk
Richard T. Griffiths (1948) is Professor of Economic and Social History at Leiden University.
He has worked extensively on the history of European integration, a topic which, as well as the
sharing of sovereignty, involves the reduction or elimination of frontier barriers and borders
among nations. More recently he has become interested in the nature of borders themselves, in
particular the real impact on the control of irregular migration. Whilst pontificating on this very
topic in Russia, he was asked, "What happens when a border moves and you become a
foreigner in your own country?". It is this question that was responsible for this latest phase in
border research. E-mail: R.T.Griffiths@let.leidenuniv.nl
Ioan Horga (1956) is a History and International Relations Professor at the University of
Oradea. He is currently concerned with European integration issues, laying stress on the issue of
the borders, of cross-border cooperation, of the media and religion contribution to shaping a
European awareness. He is the holder of the Chair “Jean Monnet” in Euroregional Studies and a
Co-Director of the Institute for Euroregional Studies – “Jean Monnet” European Centre of
Excellence Oradea – Debrecen. He is an editor of the Eurolimes and a member of the Siena
Network (www.unisi.it). He is author or co-author of the following works: Constuctie
Europeana. Traditie, Relaitate si Perspectiva, Oradea, 1998; The Role of Mass Media and of
the New Information and Communication Technologies in the Democratisation Process of
Central and Eastern European Societies (in collaboration with Renaud de la Brosse), Brussels,
2002; The Contribution of Mass Media to the Enlargement of the European Union (in
collaboration with Ariane Landuyt and Renaud de la Brosse), Brussels, 2003; International and
185
European Security versus the Explosion of Global Media (in collaboration with Maria Manuela
Tavares Ribeiro and Renaud de la Brosse), Brussels, 2004; Mass-Media and the Good
Gouvernance after the Enlargement of EU, (in collaboration with Fabien Maron and Renaud de
la Brosse), Bruxelles, 2005; Teoria Relatiilor Internationale, Oradea, 2006. E-mail:
ihorga@uoradea.ro
Livio Missir de Lusignan (1931), est historien de l’Empire ottoman, notamment de la Nation
Latine d’Orient. En tant que fonctionnaire européen, a participé aux négociations d’adhésion de
la Grèce, a dirigé l’action culturelle européenne et présidé le Centre d’information Robert
Schuman de la Commission. Chargé du cours dans plusieurs universités d’Europe et
d’Amérique. Spécialiste du droit des minorités, des relations Église-État et de l’Islam.
Conférencier et linguiste. Membre de la SEC (Société Européenne de la Culture), Venise.
Membre de la SIHMED (Société internationale des historiens de la Méditerranée), Pérouse.
Membre du Collegio araldico (consultant), Rome. M. Missir de Lusignan est notamment
l’auteur de deux volumes parus en 2004, à Istambul chez l’éd. ISIS (Kuneralp), sous les titres
respectifs de Vie latine de l’Empire ottoman et Familles latines de l’Empire ottoman. Dans ces
livres M. Missir de Lusignan cite, i.a., Mikhail Sturdza dans son fameux livre Dictionnaire des
Grandes familles de Constantinople, de Grèce et d’Albanie (Paris, 1983).Œuvres: Églises et
État en Turquie et au Proche-Orient, essai, Dembla, Bruxelles, 1973; Una fonte ignorata della
storia ottomana: la genealogia delle famiglie latine d’Oriente e in particolare dragomannali,
essai, Napoli, 1974,dans Atti del I Convegno internazionale di studi sulla Turchia preottomana
e ottomana; Rome et les Églises d’Orient vues par un Latin d’Orient, essai, La Pensée
universelle, Paris, 1976; Introduction à l’histoire de la latinité ottomane, essai, F. Steiner
Verlag, Wiesbaden, 1977; Introduction au droit civil ecclésiastique turc, essai, Steiner,
Erlangen, 1977;L’Europe avant l’Europe (Voyages belges en Orient-XIXe s.),essai, L. de
Meyer, Bruxelles, 1979; Le statut international d’une famille de Smyrne depuis Mahmoud Ier,
essai, Dembla, Bruxelles, 1981, introduction à l’histoire de la nationalité ottomane; La chiesa
latina in Oriente, essai, Collegio Araldico, Rome, 1984;L’environnement sacral chez les Latins
d’Orient en Islam actuel, essai, Chez l’auteur, Bruxelles, 1986; La condition humaine chez les
Latins d’Orient en 1986, essai, R.S.P.I., Florence, 1986; La condition humaine chez les Latins
d’Orient en 1991, 1991; La tolérance et les nations ottomanes, 1992; L’Europe:un exil
mythique chez les Orientaux (notamment latins), 1998; La dimension du ciel chez les Latins
d’Orient, 1999; La tradition chez les Latins d’Orient, 2000; La femme chez les Latins d’Orient
(ill.), 2001; L’autre, l’étranger chez les Latins d’Orient, 2002.
Ivan Nachev (1968) He graduates from the Philosophical Faculty of the Sofia University. Then
he starts a career in the Political department of the New Bulgarian University in Sofia. Since
1997, he has been lecturer in European Political Theory. In the course of his academic career,
Ivan Nachev boasts significant academic achievements in the field of European Integration
Theory. He has published in Bulgarian, French and English languages. In addition to his
academic career, Ivan Nachev has taken active part in expert meetings, publishing projects,
seminars, working groups etc. in Bulgaria, as a European Union candidate country. He has a
specialisation in Centre for the Study of European Governance in the School of Politics at the
Nottingham University, UK. Ivan Nachev is a member of the Bulgarian Political Science
Association and Bulgarian Association of Political Marketing and Communication. Now he is a
MA Program in European Integration Director in New Bulgarian University, Sofia. E-mail:
ivannachevbg@abv.bg
Jean Nouzille, ancien élève de l'Ecole spéciale militaire interarmes de Saint-Cyr-Coëtquidan et
de l'Enseignement militaire supérieur scientifique et technique, officier de carriere, participant
notamment aux guerres d'Indochine et d'Algérie, docteur d'Etat es lettres, diplômé de l'Institut
des Hautes Etudes Européennes, spécialiste d'Europe centrale et sud-orientale, professeur a
l'école spéciale militaire de Saint-Cyr et chargé de cours a l'Université des Sciences humaines et
186
au Centre d'études germaniques de Strasbourg, président du Comité européen d'histoire et de
stratégie balkaniques.
Chris G. Quispel (1947) is an associate professor of social history at Leiden University. He has
worked mainly in the field of the history of racism, ethnicity and migration. He specialises in
the history of relationship between blacks and whites in the United States. He has published
several books and many articles in English and Dutch. At present he is taking up historical
border studies as a new field of interest.
Maria Marczewska-Rytko is Professor of Political Science and Religious Studies at the
Faculty of Political Science, UMCS in Lublin, Poland. Her academic work involves problems
of contemporary social and religious thought and political movements. She is the author of four
books in Polish Populism. Problems of Theory and Political Practice in Latin America, Lublin
1992; Populism. Theory and Political Practice, Lublin 1995; Non-Christian Religions in
Poland, Lublin 1997; Direct Democracy in Theory and Political Practice, Lublin 2001; editor
of two books in Polish Poland Between West and East in the Process of European Integration,
Lublin 2001; Poland in the International System in the Process of European Integration,
Puławy 2001, one in English Religion in a Changing Europe. Between Pluralism and
Fundamentalism. Selected Problems, Lublin 2003 and coeditor of one of five volumes of
Political Science Encyclopaedia, Kraków 2000. She is the member of the board of Polish
Political Science Association, member of RINAX - Response and Intervention Network Against
Xenophobia
and
Standing
Group
“Extremism
and
Democracy”.
E-mail:
m_marczewska@yahoo.com
Sorin-DomiŃian Sipos (1969) is Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of History – Geography at the
University of Oradea, where he teaches Middle History of Romania, the History of
Transylvania, History of Minorities. He published as author, or in collaboration, the following
five books: Silviu Dragomir–istoric, 2002 and Antoine-Françoise Le Clerc, Memoriu
topografic şi statistic asupra Basarabiei, Valahiei şi Moldovei, provincii ale Turciei Europene,
2004, in collaboration with Ioan-Aurel Pop, as well as 70 surveys and articles in magazines in
Romania and abroad. He is deputy editor-in-chief of the magazine Muntii Apuseni and editorial
secretary of the Eurolimes journal. E-mail: ssipos@uoradea.ro.
Istvan Süli-Zakar (1945) is a Professor at the Debrecen University. He is President of the
Council of Scientific Student Association (Lajos Kossuth University); President of the Nature
Sciences Section of the OTDK (National Scientific Student Conference); Member of leaders of
the MTA DAB (Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Academic Committee of Debrecen); Member
of the Regional Scientific Committee of the MTA (Hungarian Academy of Sciences); Member
of the Regional Council of the Carpathian Euroregion; Member of Central European
Organisation of UNS Habitat. He is author of Egy hátrányos helyzető térség fejlesz-tésének
társadalom földrajzi és szociológiai problémái (Social and sociological problems of the
development of a backward region), Encsi Polgármesteri Hivatal, KLTE, Encs-Debrecen, 1991;
K. Czimre. (Eds.): Carpathian Euroregion. Borders in the Region – Cross-border Cooperation, Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadója, Debrecen, 2002; Borders and
Cross-border Co-operations in the Central European Transformation Countries, Debreceni
Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadója, Debrecen; 2002; Határok és határmentiség az átalakuló
Közép-Európában, Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, Debrecen, 2003; Crossborder Co-operations – Schengen Challenges, Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó Debrecen, 2004. Email: sulizi@tigris.unideb.hu
Thomas Tanase, médiéviste, agrégé d’histoire et diplômé de l’Institut d’études Politiques de
Paris est chargé de cours à l’université de Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. Il prépare actuellement
187
une thèse sous la direction de Michel Balard intitulée Les Franciscains, les Mongols et
l’ouverture de l’Asie aux Occidentaux (XIIIe-XVe siècle). E-mail: thtanase@club-internet.fr
Esther Gimeno Ugalde (1979), Lecturer at the University of Vienna, M.A. in European
Studies. University of Vienna, Austria; PhD candidate on Sociolinguistics (Language and
national identity). Field on interest: multilingualism, EU Language Policy, Language and
National Identity, Sociolinguistics. Numerous articles on EU-affairs for the newspaper “Diari
de Tarragona” and the online magazine “EuropaDigital”, Linguistic Diversity in the European
Union’s Institutional Framework, etc. E-mail: esther.gimeno.ugalde@univie.ac.at
Mihai Razvan Ungureanu was appointed Minister of Romanian Foreign Affairs on December,
2004. Prior to this appointment, he was deputy coordinator for the South-East European
Cooperation Initiative (SECI), Vienna; he served as State Secretary with the MFA (1998-2001)
and Director General - Regional envoy of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe (20012003). In 1993 he became M.Phil.of St.Cross College, University of Oxford, and in 2004
Dr.Phil. Faculty of History, "Al .I.Cuza" University of Iasi. He delivered courses at several
higher education institutions, as well as published over 50 scientific articles and had over 60
contributions to newspapers in the country and abroad.
188
The Official Opening of the Institute for Euroregional Studies – “Jean Monnet”
European Centre of Excellence as Shown in the Romanian and Hungarian Media
(19-20 january 2006)
Proiect academic European:
Institutul de Studii Euroregionale la Universitatea din Oradea
În prezenŃa a zeci de cadre didactice universitare de la Universitatea din Debrecen si
Universitatea din Oradea, a oficialităŃilor locale şi centrale, ieri, in Aula Magna a
UniversităŃii a avut loc festivitatea de deschidere oficială a Institutului pentru Studii
Euroregionale (ISER) Centru European de ExcelenŃă „Jean Monnet” Oradea – Debrecen.
Din prezentarea facută participanŃilor de către Ioan Horga, directorul Departamentului
de Integrare Europeană din cadrul UniversităŃii din Oradea, dar şi unul dintre cei doi directori ai
Institutului pentru Studii Eurogerionale, a reieşit că noua instituŃie academică va fi gestionată de
un
consiliu
de
conducere format din 17
membri, dintre care 9
sunt din Oradea şi 8 de
la Universitatea din
Debrecen.
Proiectul
pentru
înfiinŃarea
acestui
institut
a
demarat la 1 octombrie
2005 şi va continua şi în
anii următori, fiind
finanŃat în proporŃie de
75%
de
Comisia
Profesorii orădeni vor să fie europeni
Europeană şi 25% de
Universitatea
din
Oradea. „Proiectul este structurat pe doi piloni principali: un pilon de formare la nivel de
masteranzi si doctoranzi şi un altul de cercetare pe cinci domenii de studiu”, a spus
prof.univ.Ioan Horga.
În cuvântul său, Teodor-Traian Maghiar, rectorul UniversităŃii din Oradea, a spus
despre construirea acestui institut că înfiinŃarea lui s-a datorat faptului că în cadrul instituŃiei
orădene există un corp profesoral bine pregătit profesional, dar şi eforturilor comune depuse de
cele două universităŃi, din Oradea şi Debrecen.
O scurtă prezentare a UniversităŃii din Debrecen, cât si a principalelor direcŃii de
cooperare dintre cele două universităŃi au fost făcute de Nagy János, rectorul respectivei
instituŃii academice din Ungaria şi cel de al doilea partener al Institutului pentru Studii
Euroregionale.
Cuvântări de salut si felicitări pentru eforturile şi energiile consumate pentru
înfiinŃarea institutului au fost adresate şi de Traian Abrudan, subprefectul judeŃului Bihor, Mihai
Groza, viceprimar al municipiului Oradea, şi Ioan Micula, preşedintele Camerei de ComerŃ şi
Industrie a JudeŃului Bihor.
Dezbateri pe diverse teme euroregionale
După deschiderea festivă, participanŃii au trecut efectiv la dezbateri pe diferite teme
stabilite de organizatori. Una dintre temele acestor dezbateri a fost cum poate deveni ISER un
actor euroregional recunoscut, la care moderatori au fost Anca Dobrescu, decan al FacultăŃii de
ŞtiinŃe Economice din Oradea, şi Kormos János, decanul FacultăŃii de ŞtiinŃe Economice a
UniversităŃii din Debrecen.
189
În cursul după-amiezii de ieri au mai avut loc alte dezbateri pe teme ca: „Provocări şi
perspective în problematica regională şi euroregională în noua Europă”, „Aspecte legislative şi
economice ale dezvoltării euroregionale”, „Europa fără frontiere sau Europa cu alte frontiere?”.
Lucrările seminarului vor continua şi astăzi, când vor fi dezbătute alte teme interesante
care privesc în mod special perspectiva integrării Ńării noastre in Uniunea Europeană şi politicile
regionale ale UE între deziderate şi aşteptări.
Adrian Nicolau- Realitatea Bihoreana/20 january 2006
190
A tudományos élet híreibıl
Euroregionális Tanulmányok Intézete Nagyváradon
A Nagyváradi Egyetemen felavatták az Euroregionális Tanulmányok Intézetetét (ERTI),
Európa legújabb „Jean Monnet” kutatóközpontját
A Nagyváradi Egyetem Aula Magna terme zsufolásig megtelt az új európai kutatóközpont
avatási ünnepségén. Az egyetemi tanárok és diákok mellett a megnyitón jelen voltak a Bihari
Tanfelügyelıség vezetıi, kamarai képviselık, vállalkozók és a helyi közigazgatási szervek
képviselıi is. A kutatóközpont létrehozását az Európai Bizottság támogatta a „Jean Monnet”
Alapítvány segítségével. Nagyváradon az egyetemen négy „Jean Monnet” szervezetet
finanszíroznak, s ez az egyetlen romániai egyetem mely ilyen nagy támogatottságot ért el. Az
ERTI a Nagyváradi Egyetem és a Debreceni Egyetem összefogásával jött létre. A projekthez
további intézmények is csatlakoztak: Bihar Megye Tanácsa, Nagyvárad Városi Tanácsa, Bihar
– Hajdu-Bihar Eurorégió Irányító Tanácsa, a SAPARD Ügynökség, a Debreceni Eurorégióház
Alapítvány. Az alapítók remélik, hogy az ERTI meghatározó kutatási központ lesz Románia
nyugati határainál – elsısorban az EU keleti szomszédsági övezetében – és jelentıs mértékben
szolgálja a határon átnyúló kapcsolatok fejlesztését. A most megkötött szerzıdés, és támogatás
három évre szól, a költségeket egyrészt az Európai Bizottság „Jean Monnet” Alapítványa (75%)
és a Nagyváradi Egyetem (25%) biztosítja.
„A programnak két pillére van: az
oktatás és a kutatás. Az ERTI
elsısorban romániai szakembereket fog
képezni egyrészt a határon átnyúló
kapcsolatok, másrészt az európai
szomszédsági
politika
területén
(Ukrajna,
Moldávia,
Szerbia,
Montenegro,
stb.).
A
kutatások
elsısorban a Hajdú-Bihar – Bihar
Eurorégió, illetve a Kárpátok Eurorégió
területére irányulnak. A kutatóintézet
önálló szakmai folyóiratot is indít
EUROLIMES
néven,
melynek
tematikus tanulmányai a határokra, a
határmenti együttmőködésre és a
regionalizmusra
vonatkoznak.
Ma
mindössze egyetlen hasonló projekt
mőködik Európában: Nemetország,
Luxemburg és Franciaország határán” –
Az új kutatóintézetet az ERTI igazgatója Prof. Dr. Ioan Horga
(jobbról) és Prof. Dr. Süli-Zakar István társigazgató (balról)
jelentette ki Ioan Horga egyetemi tanár,
mutatta be az érdeklıdıknek
az ERTI igazgatója. „Az Euroregionális
Tanulmányok Intézetének következı
konferenciáját 2006. június 5–10. között a Debreceni Egyetemen rendezzük” – tette hozzá SüliZakar István tanszékvezetı egyetemi tanár az intézet társigazgatója.
Az ERTI tevékenységérıl információk szerezhetık a www.iser.rdsor.ro vagy
www.uoradea.ig.ro/iser weblapokon.