Development ethics - Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas

10th International Conference and 30th Anniversary of the
International Development Ethics Association
Development Ethics Contributions for a Socially Sustainable Future
University of Costa Rica
San José, Costa Rica, July 21-24, 2014
PAPERS
MONDAY 21 JULY
OPENING PLENARY
(CE)
Auditorio Ciencias Económicas
OPENING REMARKS.
Dr. Mario Solís and Dr. Eric Palmer
Rector of the University of Costa Rica.:
Dr. Henning Jensen
Discurso Dr. Henning Jensen Pennington, Rector UCR
Académicos prominenetes: David Crocker, académico de la Universidad de Maryland y
Luis Camacho, académico de la UCR; el Dr. Henry Mora, actual presidente de la
Asamblea Legislativa, conferencista principal de la mañana y la profesora Adela Cortina
conferencista principal de la tarde. Al Congreso asisten profesores de filosofía y de
ciencias sociales de muy diversos lugares: (Des Gasper, de Holanda, Nigel Dower de
Escocia, Jay Drydryk, de Ottawa, Canadá, Christine Koggel, de Bryn Mawr, Filladelfia,
USA, Francesca Gargallo, de México, Paul Thompson, profesro de Filosofía de la
Michigan State University (y quien es W.K. Kellogg Chair in Agricultural, Food and
Community Ethics), etc.
En la inauguración hablarán: Dr. Mario Solís, miembro del comité directivo de IDEA,
profesor e investigador de la Escuela de Filosofía y del INIF y organizador del Congreso.
Dr. Eric Palmer y Dra Sandra Boni, representantes de IDEA (vicepresidenta y tesorero).
Buenos días
Para la Universidad de Costa Rica es un placer y un honor, actuar como anfitriona de
este Décimo Congreso Internacional y Trigésimo Aniversario de la Asociación
Internacional de Ética del Desarrollo. Sin duda, se trata de un tema de especial
importancia y relevancia académica, cuya atención integral e interdisciplinaria debe
ser prioritaria en la identificación de los conflictos de valores sociales, políticos y
morales, propios de las diversas teorías del desarrollo, de su planificación y su práctica,
para contribuir al logro de las metas de desarrollo, social y ambientalmente
sostenibles.
Kjell Magne Bondevik, creador de la iniciativa de Ética y Desarrollo, con la necesidad de
dar una mayor preponderancia a la ética y a los valores entre los objetivos de política
pública en la esfera internacional, comentó que es necesario que el mundo deje de
estar regido por intereses económicos, por lo que los valores humanos y los principios
éticos se pueden convertir en una fuente de movilización política y contribuir al
cambio social; siendo para él, ambos un medio, porque están vinculados con la
elaboración de las políticas públicas, ya que presupone juicios de valor que deben ser
objeto de fiscalización y debate público. A su vez, en la concepción del mismo autor, se
debe evitar entender a la ética como beneficencia, ya que ella conduce a la exclusión
social.
La ciencia y la academia tienen el deber de propiciar la reflexión ética ante los retos no
resueltos de la sociedad, y estimular una investigación capaz de contribuir con el
desarrollo social. En los últimos años, hemos atestiguado el dinamismo y la innovación
en el ámbito de la ética, la transformación de su objeto de estudio y el
enriquecimiento de sus perspectivas y métodos de análisis. Esto es el resultado de la
confluencia y el diálogo entre diferentes disciplinas, lo cual ha hecho posible la
construcción de un conocimiento científico más complejo sobre los diferentes aspectos
de la ética del desarrollo.
La carta constitutiva de nuestra universidad es prolija en señalar las relaciones entre la
academia, el desarrollo y la ética. Es así como nuestro Estatuto Orgánico define el
deber superior de nuestra universidad como contribuir con el logro del bien común, a
la vez que establece el marco político dentro del cual ha de concretarse ese deber: la
justicia social, la equidad, el desarrollo integral, la libertad y la independencia de
nuestro pueblo.
El concepto de bien común ha experimentado múltiples transformaciones desde los
tiempos de Aristóteles, según hayan predominado visiones que lleven la impronta del
individualismo burgués, el comunitarismo, el liberalismo político, el liberalismo
bienestarista o, en las últimas décadas, la absolutización del mercado como
mecanismo superior de regulación de la vida social, en general.
Pero nuestro Estatuto Orgánico no entiende el bien común en términos abstractos,
sino que, por el contrario, de manera inmediata señala el marco dentro del cual debe
ser construido; o sea, en el contexto de la justicia, la equidad y la libertad. Quienes lo
redactaron, tomaron también la previsión de indicar las vías por las cuáles transitar
en la realización del bien común, entre las cuales se encuentran la búsqueda de la
verdad y la belleza, el respeto a las diferencias, la tolerancia, la conciencia creativa y
crítica, la ética, entre muchas otras.
En este contexto, el tema de la ética constituye uno de los ejes fundamentales de la
Universidad de Costa Rica, ya que promovemos y realizamos actividades académicas,
orientadas al conocimiento, investigación, promoción, defensa y práctica de la ética,
los valores y el desarrollo. Realizamos una investigación que responde al interés
público y a principios solidarios, relacionados con la dignidad y los derechos humanos,
que compromete nuestro quehacer con la justicia social, una mayor equidad y el
desarrollo integral de las personas.
Actualmente el gran desafío que tienen las instituciones académicas como la
Universidad e Costa Rica, es que no solo debemos proporcionar conocimientos, sino
también, que tenemos la responsabilidad de promover entre la comunidad
universitaria un profundo sentido de responsabilidad social, y un compromiso con el
bienestar de la sociedad. En este sentido, consideramos que la educación superior
como proceso educativo y de investigación, debe servir y fortalecer a la ciudadanía en
el ámbito local y global participando de forma activa, apoyando a grupos marginados
y contribuyendo a instaurar procesos democráticos.
Las investigaciones sobre el desarrollo, en general, y en América Latina, en particular,
se centran en un enfoque de los cambios macroeconómicos y estructurales de la
sociedad, así como en un análisis del papel que juegan las agendas de política
económica.
Entre los temas de esas agendas, se encuentra la economía de la pobreza, la cual ha
estado presente en el debate sobre el desarrollo latinoamericano desde principios del
siglo veinte. La Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, fundada en 1948,
pero portadora del actual nombre a partir de 1984, ha sido elemento clave en el
desarrollo de investigaciones sobre la pobreza, e investigaciones económicas en
general. La CEPAL ha hecho grandes contribuciones a la teoría del desarrollo, ha
impulsado análisis sobre los obstáculos estructurales al crecimiento interno, sobre la
naturaleza del sistema económico internacional, y ha avanzado la comprensión del
intercambio desigual en el comercio internacional.
Estos enfoques son muy importantes, pero no han estimulado otras formas de ver las
cosas que trasciendan la perspectiva estrictamente económica. Descubrir nuevas
perspectivas es de suma importancia para América Latina, ya que nuestro
subcontinente muestra las tasas de desigualdad más altas del mundo entre ricos y
pobres. Esta sola circunstancia hace perentoria la necesidad de pensar la relación
entre ética y desarrollo, pues nada puede ser más trascendente que la afirmación de
los derechos sociales y ciudadanos.
Ya décadas atrás, la teoría de la dependencia constituyó un sobresaliente aporte
latinoamericano a las ciencias económicas, políticas y sociales universales, cuyo
enfoque no era solo económico, sino a la vez histórico y político. En la misma línea,
existe ahora el desafío de pensar en cómo superar la pobreza y las desigualdades
dentro de políticas de inclusión y participación democráticas.
La década de los 80s es conocida como “la década perdida”. La discusión de entonces
se centró en el tema de la deuda externa, los programas de ajuste estructural y la
liberalización (desregulación) del mercado. No deja de tener un rasgo de cínica
exculpación que los otrora proponentes de los programas de ajuste estructural
sostengan que los países latinoamericanos fueron incapaces de superar sus acuciantes
problemas porque no supieron cumplir con las reformas de la agenda económica de
esos años.
Los fracasos de la “década perdida” tuvieron como consecuencia colateral la toma de
consciencia de los llamados “déficits sociales” y una necesidad de estudiar los temas
de la pobreza y la desigualdad desde otras perspectivas teóricas y metodológicas, pero
sobre todo desde un enfoque que puso al ser humano en el centro de todas las
reflexiones.
Todo esto evidencia que el congreso que hoy inauguramos sea especialmente
oportuno, puesto que es parte de la consolidación de una perspectiva humanista en la
política social que amplía la conceptualización teórica del desarrollo, pero sobre todo
cambia la perspectiva de la respuesta que la sociedad ha de tener ante sus desafíos. A
la vez, esta perspectiva focaliza los elementos propios de lo que debería convertirse en
un proyecto global de una humanidad reconciliada; no en términos de una difusa
utopía, sino como posibilidad real de inclusión y participación.
En 1984, la Universidad de Costa Rica fue la anfitriona de la primera conferencia
internacional de ética del desarrollo, organizada de manera conjunta por los doctores
David Crocker y Luis Camacho Naranjo. El tema de la conferencia fue, “La ética y el
desarrollo del tercer mundo”.
Uno de los logros más prominentes de dicho evento fue la creación de la Asociación
internacional para la Ética del Desarrollo (IDEA por sus siglas en inglés). Tanto la
conferencia como la fundación de IDEA, constituyeron eventos de gran relevancia
para el estudio de las implicaciones éticas de los programas y políticas públicas
de desarrollo, implementadas en el mundo.
No fue casualidad que todo esto sucediera en nuestro país, cuando precisamente
hace 30 años se estudiaba a Costa Rica como un caso ejemplar de alto desarrollo
humano, adquirido a pesar de ser un país de bajo ingreso; y esto particularmente en
virtud de sus instituciones sociales fuertes y efectivas. En ese tiempo, sin embargo,
la categoría de desarrollo humano y sus índices no habían sido concebidos con
claridad. Es relevante resaltar entonces que el debate internacional que tuvo lugar en
San José, en el marco de la conferencia del año 1984, contribuyera a la
conceptualización y operatividad de la idea de desarrollo humano y que sirviera para
estimular la crítica de diseños y prácticas de políticas de desarrollo en los foros más
relevantes del mundo de hoy.
La labor de IDEA durante los últimos treinta años ha sido el mantener el diálogo
intercultural, interdisciplinario e internacional, a través del cual se busca poner de
frente a intelectuales, organizaciones de base, y grupos de toma de decisión, con
el propósito de entender y promover una ética fundamentada y su aplicación en las
diversas alternativas y situaciones de desarrollo.
Los objetivos del Décimo Congreso Internacional y Trigésimo Aniversario de la
Asociación Internacional de Ética del Desarrollo (IDEA) están acordes con la historia de
IDEA y su visión sobre la ética del desarrollo y un desarrollo ético. Se usará este
espacio para discutir la importancia fundamental de la ética del desarrollo a la luz de
las demandas actuales de nuevos modelos de desarrollo que reconozcan que el
progreso debe de ser tanto social como ambientalmente sostenible. Aprovecharemos
este espacio para reconocer y celebrar las contribuciones de IDEA en el campo de la
ética del desarrollo en los últimos 30 años.
Para la Universidad de Costa Rica, y en especial para el Instituto de Investigaciones
Filosoficas, la Escuela de Filosofía y la la Maestría en Desarrollo Sostenible este evento
es una oportunidad excepcional para fortalecer los vínculos internacionales y
multidisciplinarios, intercambiar experiencias y conocimientos, como base para
consolidar nuestras líneas y proyectos de investigación en este campo, así como para
establecer nuevas opciones de trabajo.
Bienvenidos y bienvenidas a los investigadores internacionales que nos honran con su
presencia y en general a quienes con su participación enriquecen esta actividad.
Reciban mis mejores deseos para las actividades y diálogos de los próximos días.
Muchas gracias.
Presidential Address
The four tasks of development ethics at times of a changing climate
Presidential Address, IDEA 30th Year Anniversary Conference,
San Jose, Costa Rica 22 July 2014
Asuncion Lera St.Clair
Asun.lera.st.clair@dnvgl.com
Ladies and gentleman, colleagues, amigos de IDEA: Thirty years of organized thinking
around the theme of development ethics is quite a mark. Only few academic
organizations have such a long term life span. IDEA, although still a small group,
remains relevant and central for keeping the field of development ethics vibrant and
useful to society. I am sorry for not being able to join you but I hope the conference
brings to all of you the same kind of satisfaction I have experience in all IDEA
conferences. Inspiration, solidarity and companionship while contributing to the
conceptualization and thinking for a better world.
IDEA was born in this country and it is marvelous to gather here to celebrate this
anniversary. IDEA deserves this, and the credit goes to all those who created this
organization and who have worked during these three decades to maintain its
relevance and presence in academic and practical discussions about development. My
best regards to all of you. I have prepared some remarks that draw from my
involvement with the IPCC and the work I have done in the past decade on climate
change. Development ethics has never been so needed. I am aware few people see the
issue of climate change as urgent as I do, but it trust these remarks may help raising
such awareness.
Often, subthemes within an interdisciplinary area of work are fashions that come and
go. In development we have seen many, from participation, to empowerment,
corruption, environment, or governance. These are indeed important issues to focus in
our study of development processes and planning. But the core and sub-themes of
development ethics have never been so pressing, so urgent, so central, to guarantee
the safety and fairness of mankind. We live in a world that has achieved increased
living standards for many, that has doubled life expectancy in the past XXX years, and
that has achieved a level of technological advance unthinkable even just 30 years ago
and. At the same time inequalities today are simply brutal. The vast majority of the
wealth of the planet is in the hands of a few people, severe poverty and malnutrition,
marginalization and exploitation remain common for too large parts of the global
population. While sophisticated buildings rise to the skies all over the world, at the
bottom remain those who work without security, without access to goods and
services, unable to exercise their most basic human rights. Dispossession and abuse
affect too many children who grow up unable to tap into the opportunities offered by
progress, and in advanced economies the working poor are more and more common
amidst enormous wealth, and the middle classes are shrinking, insecure, and
increasingly indebted. This picture of brutal inequality and unfairness has been the
territory of much writing in development ethics, and in fact the motivation of our
founders, from Goulet to the work of Dave Crocker or Luis Camacho. But the progress
that has led to fantastic achievements and brutal inequalities has also leads to a more
silent crisis, a less visible (yet), unexpected, perhaps unintended (in the past), side
effect. Massive changes in the earth system that are already visible, are affecting the
livelihoods of those most vulnerable to any shock, and that we know will have
catastrophic consequences in the future for absolutely everyone. This is not, I argue,
an environmental problem, but a development issue. The biggest mistake I see is in the
pervasive treatment of climate change as an environmental problem or the territory of
the natural sciences. While the interdisciplinary alliances among natural scientists that
formed the field of earth system science, along with the use of new technologies and
computational capabilities have enables the “discovery” of substantive climate change
associated with CO2 in the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels, it is the task of
the social sciences to show how it is humans those who create the problems and those
who hold the key to its solution. This is true not only for climate change, but for all
global environmental change challenges. The changes to the earth system are thus the
result of particular models of development pursued by our ancestors, and very much in
particular, related to the specific view of development as modernization,
industrialization, and use of natural resources. As a problem caused by specific view on
what is progress, the result of human action and planning, climate change is, in my
opinion, one of the most fundamental issues for the field of development ethics in the
21st century. As I have argued in a recent commentary for the journal Nature Climate
Change
It is remarkable that we keep perceiving problems that are caused by humans,
that inflict harm on humans (and the life support systems on which they
depend) and that can only be solved by humans in terms of their biophysical
nature — as matters of molecules, shifts in atmospheric dynamics or ecosystem
interactions, imbalances in elemental cycles or merely as collapsing
environmental systems…. we should not assume that such framings will arouse
the passions of those less fascinated by science, less inclined to consider longterm consequences or consider complex systems, or those less aware of the
acute human dependence on stable, functioning natural systems (Hackmann,
Moser and St.Clair forthcoming 2014).
We need to bring to the debate on climate and what to do about it the passion and
humanity it deserves, and the thorough, detailed, and profound basic philosophical
thinking that being a human in the Anthropocene calls for.
We also need to truly use critical thinking from the humanities and the social sciences
to the really difficult questions, those that also affect us as elite academics. We talk
about sustainability, green growth, smart cities, building resilience and protecting the
environment, and indeed there is a central role of development ethics in thinking
through all those topics. But there is a lot less talk about the core issue: a still
dominant model of development as energy driven never ending growth, and ideas of
quality of life and wellbeing associated with consumption that are incompatible with
an equitable low carbon equitable future. Moreover, here we are facing a truly
commons problem. Solidary, equity, and collaborative work have never been so
pressing. Yet the dominant practical and ideological mindsets have fragmented,
personalized, and shattered societies and humans into self-interested maker players.
In a recent commentary Naomi Klein pointed to this somber reality when saying the
biggest problem with a global commons problem like climate change is that it comes at
the times when neo-liberalism rules the world and our minds (ref). As long as all the
solutions to climate remain focused on market mechanisms they will miss the
commons aspect and thus will be inefficient and insufficient. Last, while the most
catastrophic impacts are still avoidable, shifting to low carbon, equitable future is a
pathway full of dilemmas and tradeoffs. Not only are adaptation and mitigation actions
often in contradiction with protecting livelihoods (should we use land for biofuels or
for food production? Shall we use the forests as territory for indigenous populations or
for carbon sinks?) ; there are and undeniably there will be winner and losers. The
solution space away from catastrophic climate change is a territory for democratic
thinking and democratic deliberation. While science can provide knowledge for policy
and decision making, choices and decisions will have to be ethically analyzed, guided
through existing principles (human rights for example), in order to avoid a future
where mitigation is done at the expenses of the livelihoods of those marginalized, or a
future where the rich and powerful are adapted to a changed planet, or still worse, a
future where only the rich and powerful survive (and with them their future
generations).
From this perspective, the role of development ethics becomes central in diagnostic of
both the problems and also the solutions. Once we see climate change as totally
entangled with development and not as an environmental problem, these aspects of
the need for urgency and humanizing the challenges, the need to rethink wellbeing
and quality of life, the need to understand how to address a global commons issue;
and the need for parameters, signposts, principles and guidance for solving the
multiple tradeoffs and dilemmas in a fair, equitable and just way, gives content to four
fundamental tasks for development ethics in a changing climate.
The first task relates to unpacking the urgency posed by climate change by showing
how, from an ethical perspective, the impacts of climate change are extremely
dangerous risks, especially for those most vulnerable, and thus require immediate
attention. An issue very few people understand is that science can show why and how
the climate is changing and unveil the the risks of climate impacts but cannot
determine the dangers these pose to people and communities. The move from risk to
danger entails a valuation exercise. As such, development ethics traditional work on
defining what is responsible development and for whom becomes central.
The IPCC 5th Assessment Report shows a very dark picture of the risks today and the
dangers in a near future. The Report clearly establishes that climate change is already
happening, that the impacts are substantive and consequential, both in multiple
sectors and in terms of geographical distribution. And it shows emissions continue to
rise unabatedly. We are no longer talking about risks of sea level rise, increased
frequency and intensity in storms, more droughts and floods, changes in the onset of
seasons, less water availability, or threats to livelihoods as issues that would occur in a
distant future to future generations. All these issues are evident now, with the average
increase in temperatures at around 0.85 degrees Celsius and before we have seen the
impacts of the committed climate change, the changes that will come regardless of any
action because it is related to CO2 we are emitting in the atmosphere today.
Communities all over the world are witness to dramatic changes in their climate
conditions, affecting everything humans do. In Miami, to take an icon US city as an
example, sea level rise is already contaminating water supplies and the sewage system,
and floods are regularly increasing. No need to wait for a major hurricane. This is,
evidently, more common is low income communities.
As we look into the near future, especially if the world continues to do almost nothing
to mitigate and as preparing communities and infrastructure for adaptation is minimal
worldwide, the risks or a 4 degree world we are likely to see before the end of the 21 st
century are simply enormous and catastrophic. The IPCC Report shows there is high
confidence in major threats to water and food security, serious threats to coastal areas
(these are the areas of the world where the vast majority of the world population
lives); destruction of basic services such as electricity, emergency or health services in
large urban areas; deterioration of ecosystems and the goods and services these
provide; increased poverty and new poverty traps. Serious risks to health, changes in
the vectors of diseases, and spread of malaria and dengue to areas that have long
been free from those killer diseases. Increases in the intensity and frequency of
extreme weather events poses serious risks, for example, the report shows how in
many part of the planet working outdoors will not be possible as heat waves become
increasingly common. But when are those risks dangerous and for whom? A proper
understanding of these dangers requires valuation and social stratification. A key task
for development ethicists is to unpack the risks of climate change from the perspective
of the poor and marginalized, those who had not benefited from the development
models that have created the climate crisis and those whose carbon footprints are
smaller if not minimal. Development ethicists can also use their tools and resources to
unpack the injustices entailed by those dangers. ((An example of this work is by Jay
Drydyk and his application of work on displacement to climate related displacement))
Asking for whom is climate dangerous, why and when is therefore the first key task of
development ethics.
The second task relates to a better understanding of the components of well-being in
relation to development when the traditional understanding of what is or not good
development has fundamentally changed. If development in a changing climate has to
look completely different form the industrialized, modernist conception of the terms,
how does then well being and human development should look like? What is and what
is not a proper conception of quality of life and standard of living or what should be a
revised notion of human development and human security? It is of fundamental
importance to develop further thinking on what is a good life, on how equity, needs,
rights, or capabilities can or need to be reframed and revised in light of the fact that
we can no longer presume a never ending supply of natural resources or waste (in the
atmosphere or in the environment), and the need to truly set limits to consumption
and use of resources for the benefit of others and future generations. The current
debates on sustainable development or the Sustainable Development Goals do not go
far enough in truly thinking through what it means that the carbon budget in the
atmosphere is actually very small. The current draft of the SDGs proposals is , in the
words of Oliver the Shutter, until recently UN Special Rapporteur for the right to food,
“a blatant case of ineffectual use of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (ref,
BSRS Plenary talk). Regardless of technological progress, there is no doubt we must
adapt our conception of well being to a danger that is totally new and was never in the
minds of most theorists of well being (including Sen and many others). Tweaking on
the edges is simply not enough. Development ethics can provide much work in this
regard.
The third task for development ethics relates to questions on the global commons.
The UNFCCC clear states addressing climate change is a common but differentiated
responsibility, placing the burden of mitigation and action on advanced economies. At
the same time it is widely recognized climate change is a common problem: the actions
of some affect all. It is not possible to reduce emissions unless there is concerted and
collective action, and the problem of free riding is at the core of solutions to climate. In
addition of using the tools of development ethics to unpack the notion of
differentiated responsibilities, I would argue that we also must address climate change
as a development global commons, calling for redefining and understanding
development as global and thus giving the concept of “commons” a wider scope that
what is entailed under the UNFCCC principle. This refers both to the idea that all
actions have global consequences but also to the fact that development issues also
relate to advanced economies. Such “commonalizing” or globalizing development
itself has never happened. Development studies and most references on the theme
development still operate under the assumption some countries or regions are
developed more than others. In fact, the biggest weakness of the conception of
sustainable development is that it consist is understood to refer only to developing
countries. Climate change turns these assumptions upside down. We can no longer
assume advanced economies or “highly developed individuals or communities” that
are polluting the atmosphere leading to catastrophic harm are in fact developed in the
sense of being more advanced, better off, or ahead. In fact, climate change makes
mainstream development a blatant case of “maldevelopment”, using the terminology
of Denis Goulet. Development ethics can contribute to unpacking the multiple layers
and spheres of commonalites, which requires the treatment of many issues as global
public goods and global public bads. This means a major rethinking of the role for
solidarity, privatization of natural resources, provision of social protection at the global
and the local levels, and a multitude of other themes in relation to all countries and
places and not only the traditionally named developing countries. Solidarity within and
across borders acquires a new meaning. And future generations can no longer be seen
as remote, unrelated, and non-valued. Here lies the central challenge to the ideology
and culture of neoliberal economism, short termism, and the interactions between
inequalities in income and access to opportunities with the causes and solutions to
climate change. The logic and ethic of a neoliberal market is completely inadequate for
providing solutions. Given the economic costs of inaction are devastating, a proper
conceptualization using development ethics thinking can offer a very needed space for
debate about options. New thinking in coming from counterintuitive places, for
example the economics of no growth or the ideas espoused by John Fullerton ( a
former Wall Street banker) for a regenerative economy, or my own company which
has produced a vision for a safe and sustainable future that would benefit from a much
more informed ethical analysis.
The four task relates to the multiple tradeoffs and dilemmas in the processes leading
to a low carbon and equitable future. One important set of arguments presented in
the IPCC 5th Assessment Report are about the relations and interactions between
adaptation, mitigation and development. Finding a proper alignment among these
three issues requires the type of thinking and analysis that has marked development
ethics in its 30 years trajectory. Much of the currently in vogue concepts such as smart
cities, resilience, green growth, or smart agriculture offer a new territory for ethical
thinking. These are already central themes of this conference. I wish however to point
to a related set of issues. Not only it is central to see adaptation, mitigation and
development as interconnected seeking to create good synergies, but we also must be
attentive to the multiple tradeoffs and dilemmas they pose. Mitigation and adaptation
often have conflicting goals and may cause harm or have negative consequences,
especially for vulnerable and marginalized groups or regions. The literature assessed in
the IPCC report already shows multiple cases where actions to mitigate climate change
impacts have led to the dispossession of livelihoods, such for example in relation to
biofuels or REED programs. We have seen cases of deepening inequalities and a
reinforcement of existing power structures or gender divisions made worse in
attempts to promote top down adaptation plans (refs. refs.) . Land grabbing, already a
critical issue in particular for food security, is now commonplace. In the Andean,
Himalaya or Artic regions we see new struggles for resources made available by
melting glaciers. Conflict and displacement generated by climate impacts fueling
existing Climate change may end up meaning a new wave of colonialism. Even in a
politically consensual summary product such as the Summary for Policy Makers of
working group II Report we find clearly stated the risk to increased conflicts and new
poverty traps created by tradeoffs and dilemmas.
To conclude, I restate the critical role of development ethicists in engaging with
climate change research. I am aware the urgency and risks of climate change are not
so obvious to many, but I wish to emphasize that this is the most pressing challenge for
our generation. In particular, all of you who are at your early career can make
important contributions by exploring some of these or other issues I have not
addressed. There is still a window of opportunity to change trajectories, to reinvent
local and global strategies, to rethink what are or not those aspects of
maldevelopment that motivated the early thinkers of IDEA to create a new area of
interdisciplinary work.
I am sure there will be important discussion in the next days, thanks you for your
attention and once more apologies for not being able to travel to your beautiful
country.
1.1 Gender, sexuality, minorities
(CE)
Chair: Eric Palmer, Department of Philosophy, Allegheny College.
Room 340
Capability, dignity and sexuality: a philosophical case study.
David Hoekema
Professor of Philosophy
Calvin College, U.S.A
dhoekema@calvin.edu
Abstract: The capability approach has gained widespread favor in the field of
development ethics since it was put forward by theorists such as Amartya Sen and
Martha Nussbaum. In contrast to competing theories, it can encompass a broad range
of human goods, both concrete needs of subsistence and more abstract ideals of
autonomy and self-determination. Its philosophical appeal rests on a robust and
inclusive concept of human dignity. Western development policies should strive to
bring all people in the world to a reasonable level of health and sanitation, education,
and political and personal liberty, these theorists propose, because it is part of the
respect we owe them as men and women.
The capability approach aspires to offer a widely applicable – even universal -- moral
framework that can give due weight to cultural differences and social mores.
Development programs should not follow Western patterns of economic life or impose
Western modes of family life, as if there were only one sort of good life. Rather, they
should respect “local knowledge” and facilitate development that enhances rather
than replaces traditional ways of life. Development agencies that endorse this model,
in my observation and in the judgment of many, achieve greater success and avoid
many pitfalls of miscommunication, mistrust, and dependency.
Yet there are instances where the universal concept of human dignity and the
priorities of local cultures clash violently. The treatment of gay and lesbian residents
of East Africa is an instructive example. In this paper I will describe the enactment of a
2014 Ugandan law against homosexual activity, discuss the relationship of anti-gay
sentiment in East Africa to dominant religious teachings and conceptions of a good
human life, and explore whether the condemnation and isolation that this law has
elicited from Western observers is an adequate response.
In the enactment of anti-gay laws, I will argue, we see with special clarity both the
advantages and the limitations of a capability-based normative theory of development.
The prevailing Western view of this issue is simple: human dignity demands equal
treatment and legal protection for all regardless of race, religion, gender, and sexual
orientation. The countervailing view voiced by many Africans rejects claims for social
recognition of gays and lesbians as undermining essential moral values that underlie
African culture. A capabilities-based normative theory seems to endorse directly
opposed recommendations in this instance: all persons including GLBT persons
deserve equal treatment and social recognition, while at the same time all societies
including those intolerant of GLBT members have the right to articulate and implement
the moral values that they hold to be most important.
Is there another way to assess such laws and policies? I suggest that there may be.
Western development agencies must come to a better understanding of how
homosexuality is perceived and experienced in African societies, not assume that its
character is universal. And African political and religious leaders must come to
understand that the meaning and function of sexuality are changing, in ways that
cannot be adequately addressed by reaffirming traditional values. Exploring such
possibilities helps us understand both the contributions and the limitations of
development theory rooted in the exercise of a range of human capabilities.
Cosmopolitan global justice and minority rights.
Annamari Vitikainen
Postdoctoral Researcher in Political Philosophy
University of Tromsø, Norway
annamari.vitikainen@uit.no
Abstract: In recent years, political theorists and philosophers have turned their
attention increasingly towards issues of global justice and the questions of both the
appropriate principles of global justice as well as the feasibility of implementing these
principles in practice. Many theorists of global justice draw from cosmopolitan
sentiments and argue that the equal moral worth of human beings also create
obligations that extend beyond the domestic borders. According to some, the global
social, economic and/or institutional order creates a need to extend the domestic
principles of justice into the global arena, thus creating strong distributive duties of
global scale. In response to critique, promoters of cosmopolitan global justice have
developed approaches that can accommodate special obligations and (certain types of)
nationalistic sentiments while maintaining strong emphases on universal global
principles of justice.
While the debates on the scope of justice and the feasibility of implementing global
(egalitarian) principles of justice have been vivid, these debates have been surprisingly
silent about the questions of how the new global order, and the universalization of
domestic principles of justice into the global level affect different kinds of minorities,
including cultural and religious minorities, but also minorities within these minorities
and those who are often ‘doubly disadvantaged’ such as women and children.
Whereas it is relatively common to talk of the agents of justice and the obligations of
different kinds of groups or associations in implementing the principles of justice,
more work needs to be done, firstly, with respect to the incorporation of vulnerable
groups and group members into the discourses of justice, and secondly, with respect
to those special measures that may be needed in order for all (including minorities and
minorities within minorities) to be able to enjoy those rights, resources and
opportunities that global justice requires.
In this paper, I discuss some of the difficulties of transferring the traditional, liberal
democratic debates on minority rights to the global arena. I argue that, contrary to the
traditional debates, the minority rights debate on the global scale currently lacks the
framework within which these debates are situated. Within the traditional debates, it
has been relatively easy to establish, who the participants of the potential conflicts
are: the state, minority groups, group members, and members of the majority. In the
global context, however, both the defining of minority groups and the institutional
structures through which these groups should be accommodated become increasingly
difficult. The questions of who, and on what grounds, constitutes a minority, how the
basic rights, resources and opportunities are to be guaranteed, and who are the agents
of implementing the principles of justice, all need to be reconsidered in order to build
a theory that is genuinely inclusive also of those groups (and minorities within these
groups) that may not hold positions of power in either domestic or global contexts.
Removing Poverty by Removing Unfreedoms: Women’s Agency and Gender
Inequalities.
Christine Koggel
Professor of Philosophy
Carleton University, Canada
christine_koggel@carleton.ca
Abstract: Development ethicists of various sorts agree that poverty is not adequately
captured by an account of income levels alone and is best understood as having
multidimensional features. The capabilities approach, as articulated by Amartya Sen
and reflected in measures such as the annual Human Development Report, puts the
focus on what people are able to be and to do and not solely on measures such as
income levels or a country’s Gross Domestic Product. Sen understands poverty as a
deprivation of capabilities or, in his now preferred terminology, as sets of unfreedoms
that hinder possibilities for agency. In Development as Freedom, Sen pays particular
attention to unfreedoms suffered by women and makes the strong claim that “[t]he
extensive reach of women’s agency is one of the more neglected areas of development
studies, and most urgently in need of correction. Nothing, arguably, is as important
today in the political economy of development as an adequate recognition of political,
economic and social participation and leadership of women.” (1999, 109). For Sen,
women’s lack of agency limits what women can be and do. He argues that removing
women’s unfreedoms in areas of health care, education, work opportunities, and
political participation can enhance women’s agency.
Although I do not dispute these claims for what can enhance women’s agency, I want
to focus on a topic that is less explored in the mainstream literature; that of examining
the values and practices associated with caring for others and what this means for
accounts of women’s agency and the agency of those for whom they care. These
practices shape large parts of many women’s lives, but they do not have an easy fit
with what is recognized as the “political, economic and social participation and
leadership” of women. Care, whether of children, the elderly, or the disabled, tends to
be what women do but it is devalued in political, economic, and social spheres. To be
clear about the argument in this paper, I recognize and accept that removing
unfreedoms in areas such as work opportunities and political participation enhances
women’s agency, but want to argue that there is a broader range of questions to be
asked with respect to gender inequalities and women’s agency.
Introduction
Many theorists now agree that poverty is not adequately captured by an account of
income levels alone and is best understood as having multidimensional features. The
capabilities approach, as articulated by Amartya Sen and reflected in measures such as
the annual Human Development Report, puts the focus on what people are able to be
and to do and not solely on measures such as income levels or a country’s Gross
Domestic Product. Sen understands poverty as a deprivation of capabilities or, in his
recent and preferred terminology, as sets of unfreedoms that hinder possibilities for
agency. In Development as Freedom, Sen pays particular attention to unfreedoms
suffered by women and makes the strong claim that “[t]he extensive reach of women’s
agency is one of the more neglected areas of development studies, and most urgently
in need of correction. Nothing, arguably, is as important today in the political economy
of development as an adequate recognition of political, economic and social
participation and leadership of women. This is indeed a crucial aspect of ‘development
as freedom’” (1999, 109). For Sen, women’s lack of agency limits what women can be
and do. He argues that removing women’s unfreedoms in areas of health care,
education, work opportunities, and political participation can enhance women’s
agency.
Although I do not dispute these claims for what can enhance women’s agency, I want
to focus on a topic that is less explored in the mainstream literature; that of examining
the values and practices associated with caring for others and what this means for
both women’s agency and the agency of those for whom they care. These practices
shape large parts of many women’s lives, but they do not have an easy fit with what is
recognized as the “political, economic and social participation and leadership” of
women. Care, whether of children, the elderly, or the disabled, tends to be what
women do but it is devalued in political, economic, and social spheres. To be clear
about the argument in this paper, I will acknowledge and accept that removing
unfreedoms in areas such as work opportunities and political participation certainly
enhances women’s agency. But I will also question whether this is the only or best set
of policies for enhancing women’s agency. I do this by exploring areas or parts of many
women’s lives that are often assumed and implicit, made invisible, or left unexamined.
This exploration allows us to ask several sorts of questions that uncover additional
features of gender inequalities and make it possible to think of agency more broadly.
Does an assessment of gender inequalities in terms of ways to remove particular
political, economic, and social unfreedoms always fit well or easily with women’s lives
and experiences, ones that are often tied up with responsibilities for meeting the
needs of others? Does a focus on individual agency say too little about social values
such as care, trust, solidarity, and friendship and how these connect with possibilities
for enhancing the agency of both the self and others? Are these the sorts of values
that need an explicit analysis of and challenge to gender norms rather than policies
such as access to work outside the home that are generally taken to enhance
individual agency? How do entrenched gender norms that exist in relationships at all
levels from the personal to the global shape debates on structures and policies and
one’s ability to challenge or change these? Would explicit attention to policies that can
provide adequate care challenge our understanding of enhancing agency for women
engaged in these practices as well as for those for whom they care? Exploring answers
to these sorts of questions will reveal that the mainstream literature on poverty and
women’s agency, including that by Sen and powerful agencies such as the World Bank,
does not fully capture the lives and experiences of the great majority of women or the
full value of what many of them do and of what falls on them to do by way of
enhancing their own agency and that of others. The general strategy in this paper will
be to make the implicit explicit.
I begin the paper with a discussion of Sen’s version of the capabilities approach
because it provides a powerful challenge to the dominant view that poverty, and
development more generally, can be understood in terms of economic processes
alone. I argue that Sen’s account is important for highlighting poverty as
multidimensional and for making the interconnectedness of kinds of inequalities clear
and convincing. I will go on to argue, however, that his account fails to acknowledge
the full thrust of the following: (1) Possibilities for enhancing women’s agency cannot
be fully realized in and through a justice approach or standard neoliberal policies for
alleviating poverty or removing gender inequalities; and (2) Explicit attention to the full
effect of gender norms entrenched at familial, institutional, national, and global levels
can challenge and expand our understanding of agency itself and show that it should
be integrally connected with enhancing the agency of others. I support the first of
these critiques by discussing “Development as Freedom – And as What Else?” by Des
Gasper and Irene van Staveren. I defend the second critique by turning to Sarah Clark
Miller’s argument for expanding the very notion of agency to include rational,
emotional, and relational capacities, all of which point to what agency is or should be
for all human beings. I end the paper by examining the World Bank’s World
Development Report 2012, Gender Equality and Development to show that there is
much more to analyzing gender norms or understanding agency than is evident in Sen
or the World Bank report. While theorists may be cognizant of the detrimental
influences of gender norms on women’s agency, how this plays out in policies that
tend to be endorsed falls short of addressing the negative assumptions about practices
of caring for others as well as the positive aspects of these practices for enhancing
one’s agency and that of others.
Sen, the Capabilities Approach, and Women’s Agency
In general terms, the capabilities approach describes human beings, how they function
and what capabilities they have, as a base from which to examine and judge whether
individuals have the freedom to function in the ways that matter to them. Sen
provides examples of “capabilities like being able to avoid such deprivations as
starvation, undernourishment, escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as well
as the freedoms that are associated with being literate and numerate, enjoying
political participation and uncensored speech and so on. In this constitutive
perspective, development involves expansion of these and other basic freedoms.
Development, in this view, is the process of expanding human freedoms, and the
assessment of development has to be informed by this consideration” (1999, 36). Sen’s
account, thus, allows an examination into whether individuals in specific contexts and
under certain conditions have the freedom to function in ways that matter to
themselves (their subjective assessment of what matters to them) and to their wellbeing (an objective account of capabilities that allow one to live well).
For Sen, development as freedom gives a central role to agency; individuals ought to
be able to act for themselves and control the course of their own life. As against
previous accounts of development, Sen argues that people “need not be seen primarily
as passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs” and that they
should be treated as agents who “can effectively shape their own destiny and help
each other” (11). For Sen as well, there are two kinds of freedom relevant to an
account of agency. Enhancing agency can mean removing barriers and thus opening up
a broader range of options from which people can choose. What one chooses is then
up to the person’s subjective assessment of what matters to them. This aspect of
agency is captured by the notion of agency freedom. However, agency is also about
being able to make one’s life better—by accessing and making use of primary goods
such as health care, education, and work; using the abilities one has to make
substantive use of opportunities; and being free to participate in, deliberate about,
and have a say in the shaping of economic, social, and political institutions. This aspect
of agency is captured by the notion of well-being freedom. On the second aspect,
removing unfreedoms such as premature mortality, undernourishment, and ill health
as well as lack of access to education, work, and political participation can, then,
expand an individual’s capacity to pursue goals and objectives he or she values and has
“reason to value” (56, 63). What one values is both differentiated from and connected
with what one has “reason to value”. For Sen, the subjective elements of agency
freedom are integrally connected with the objective elements of well-being freedom.
This description of the richness and complexity of Sen’s account, one that involves the
multidimensionality, interconnectedness, and complementarity of both agency
freedom and well-being freedom will be important in assessing the critique of Sen’s
reliance on the concept of freedom in the section that follows.
Before we get to this, however, I need to fill in a few more details in Sen’s account of
agency freedom and well-being freedom. As suggested already, Sen rejects the idea
that the meaning of development or the goal of alleviating poverty can be captured by
merely describing market driven processes or by measuring income levels or economic
growth in and across countries. Data can show, for example, that the incomes of
African Americans are much lower than the white population in the U.S. but much
higher than those of people in China or Kerala. And yet this data does not reveal that
“African Americans have an absolutely lower chance of reaching mature ages than do
people of many third world societies, such as China, or Sri Lanka, or parts of India (with
different arrangements of health care, education, and community relations)” (6).
Measured by income alone, African Americans would seem to be doing well in
comparison to people in most parts of the world. But Sen argues that we need to
expand the informational base to take into account deprivations and various
unfreedoms that go beyond one’s capacity to buy the basic goods needed for survival.
An account of poverty in African American populations should be open to describing
the history, lives, and experiences that determine the range of unfreedoms that
disadvantage and shape the lives of African Americans. I will argue in the section that
follows that although Sen’s account permits this deeper investigation into the
multidimensional features of poverty, we need to broaden his account further to
explain multidimensional features of the lives of those likely to be disadvantaged and
less able to enhance agency freedoms or well-being freedoms because they care for
others.
The gist of Sen’s critique of standard theories of justice, such as those advocated by
utilitarians, libertarians, and John Rawls, is that they fail to capture the diversity of
human beings and the heterogeneity of contexts and conditions needed for an account
of what justice demands: “The respective roles of personal heterogeneities,
environmental diversities, variations in social climate, differences in relational
perspectives and distributions within the family have to receive the serious attention
they deserve for the making of public policy” (109). This means that there are no
simple descriptions of poverty or set prescriptions for alleviating it. Context and
conditions matter to the description and analysis. Moreover, debate and deliberation
are crucial to making public policy (2009, 392). In Sen’s view, judgments about what is
of value and about what policies will remove unfreedoms and enhance agency should
be made in and through democratic processes that emphasize the importance of the
exercise of public reasoning; that focus on implementing policies applicable to specific
contexts and conditions; and that can provide justifications for why some processes or
policies are better than others for addressing injustices or for achieving better or more
justice in specific contexts that manifest certain kinds of injustices. To return to the
African American case, the disenfranchisement and alienation of African Americans
from democratic processes of voting and participating in debates and in their
overrepresentation in prison populations and the ranks of the poor distort and have
deleterious effects on public policy. In this case, Sen’s account can explain that
deprivations can come about even when legal and formal barriers to voting and
participating are removed. These deprivations diminish both agency and well-being
freedoms.
In summary, Sen’s account can be said to be multidimensional in its account of
poverty; in its rejection of a too easy distinction between negative and positive
freedoms; in its account of the interconnectedness and complementarity of agency
and well-being freedoms; in its insistence that context matters to an account of
unfreedoms and to the analysis of policies that will work to remove them; and in its
defense of an inclusive and deliberative understanding of participation and of
democracy more generally. All this said in support of Sen’s account of the capabilities
approach, I want to argue that it falls short of being able to capture the full scope of
poverty as multidimensional—for particular people engaged in activities assumed in
and relegated to the private sphere and subject to norms that affect their ability to
enhance their agency and well-being freedoms. This is so because of Sen’s focus on
individuals and on the goal of enhancing their agency so that they can live lives they
value or have reason to value: “individual agency is, ultimately, central to addressing
these deprivations” (1999, xi). Sen’s individuals, I will argue, tend to be people who are
rational choosers, eager participants in market structures, and central actors in the
public and political spheres. Many women throughout the world who take on the
responsibilities of or are assumed to be responsible for caring for others tend not to be
market maximizers or political actors. Moreover, they are subject to norms that
stereotype who they are and what they can be and do. These two factors in turn make
it difficult to devise policies that address the importance of what they do (in enhancing
the agency of others) or to have them engage in these practices as legitimate ways for
them to enhance their own agency and well-being freedoms. Let me clarify that it is
not that Sen fails to recognize that entrenched gender norms act as barriers to women
being able to exercise agency and well-being freedoms. It is that Sen assumes and
attends to a particular kind of person, one who works outside the home and acts in the
political and public spheres, that, in the end, fails to capture the full range of
possibilities for enhancing agency and well-being freedoms.
In the sections that follow, I examine two sorts of criticisms of Sen that have
implications for accounts of poverty, women’s agency, and gender inequalities. The
general idea behind these criticisms can be captured by returning to an item on Sen’s
list of diversities and heterogeneities quoted earlier; that of unequal “distributions
within the family” that affect what women can be and do. It is certainly true that
inequalities in the family hinder possibilities for enhancing women’s agency and wellbeing freedoms. However, on this critique, using freedom as the fundamental and
overarching value and the way to diminish the impact of these inequalities will not be
enough. Alas, when it comes to promoting women’s agency and well-being freedoms,
Sen turns to the usual set of neoliberal strategies and policies: “empirical work in
recent years has brought out very clearly how the relative respect and regard for
women’s well-being is strongly influenced by such variables as women’s ability to earn
an independent income, to find employment outside the home, to have ownership
rights and to have literacy and be educated participants in decisions within and outside
the family. Indeed, even the survival disadvantage of women compared with men in
developing countries seems to go down sharply—and may even get eliminated—as
progress is made in these agency aspects” (1999, 191). The point is not that these
policies do not enhance women’s agency and well-being freedoms. Rather the
argument against Sen is two-pronged: 1) These strategies and policies will not be
sufficient for enhancing agency and well-being freedoms for women who take on
responsibilities of caring for others; and 2) Policies that explicitly promote and support
the values and practices of care can also succeed in enhancing women’s agency and
well-being freedoms and that of those for whom they care.
“Development as Freedom – and What Else?”: The Need to Specify Care
As discussed in the previous section, Sen defends freedom as the overarching value in
conceptualizing and evaluating development: “Expansion of freedom is viewed, in this
approach, both as the primary end and as the principal means of development” (xii).
This move from the language of capabilities in his earlier work to the language of
freedom has generated at least two sorts of criticism. Some critics charge that because
the concept of freedom comes with the “baggage” of dominant liberal understandings
of it as negative (freedom from interference by the state and others), it is susceptible
to misuse and misunderstanding. About this criticism, I would argue that it seems clear
to me that Sen is well aware of the dangers of turning to and embracing the overused
language of freedom and the baggage that comes with it. While it is risky to rely on a
concept that has these associations, Sen uses the concept of freedom strategically to
appropriate, reinterpret, and thereby challenge this prevalent understanding. As
argued in the previous section, Sen is clear that agency freedom (the negative freedom
to do what one chooses without barriers or interference from others) should be
viewed as integrally connected with well-being freedom (the positive freedom to avoid
deprivations and develop capabilities one has and has reason to value). Moreover, Sen
insists on under-specifying unfreedoms and refusing to prioritize kinds of freedoms
because he wants to leave room for interpretation, decision-making, and policy
implementation in specific contexts—in other words, to leave room for people to
exercise their political agency. Still, Sen is susceptible to a second criticism.
While Gasper and van Staveren credit Sen for delineating a complex account that
defends the importance of both negative and positive freedoms and rejects a sharp
distinction between them, they indict Sen for taking freedom as the overarching value
and failing to specify which capabilities or what values other than freedom matter to
the analysis of justice. While Gasper and van Staveren also defend positive freedoms
for women in the workplace and with respect to education, health care, and political
and social participation, they claim that Sen’s interest in removing gender inequalities
is better met with “greater use of the term ‘capability’ and less use of the term
‘freedom’” (138). They argue that the concept of freedom fails to capture the effect of
gender norms that shape practices and values traditionally associated with women:
“The claim that the woman is ‘free’ to participate reflects a focus only on the absence
of legal constraints and active prevention, based on a view that there are no other
ethically relevant constraints on a voluntaristic conception of agency” (139) and “this
implicitly idealizes Man as independent, already autonomous, rather than a social
being, someone socialized into the norms and values of a community, cared for by
parents, and having personal bonds as well as rights and duties towards society” (140,
their emphasis). Their critique may seem to offer little more than the standard one
against many liberal theorists: Sen falls into the trap of having the individualist,
autonomous, and independent self as a stand-in for all human beings. But I think there
is more than this to their critique. To show that this is so, I draw out what they mean
by the phrase “richly scripted actors” (149) and why they think that Sen’s account falls
short of capturing the full range of the diversity of human beings. Theirs is a move that
defends the need to specify that care is a unique and important value that should not
be subsumed under freedom. To better understand this move and what underlies their
notion of “richly scripted actors”, I take a second move of making use of Sarah Clark
Miller’s argument for expanding the notion of agency itself.
Gasper and van Staveren charge Sen with taking his main actor to be the sort of
individual whose identity and life plans are not shaped by the values and practices of
caring and of having responsibilities for meeting the needs of others. These values,
traditionally associated with women and significant in the lives of families and
communities, are not easily subsumed under Sen’s overarching value of freedom.
According to Gasper and van Staveren, “richly scripted actors” display diverse “psychic
states, capacities, and propensities” (150) and are not only or mainly “choosers who
reason” about their own lives (149). In their view, conceptualizing people exclusively as
rational choosers is not helpful for thinking about care as a value in and of itself, for
understanding the content of care as a value distinct from freedom, or for promoting
care as a value that defies subsumption under freedom. Sen’s unified language of
freedom overemphasizes values related to the self and neglects values related to being
in relationships with others (156). Finally, they argue that Sen’s “intense focus on
freedom may neglect evaluations of well-being in terms of social relations and
personal relationships, which are important sources of women’s well-being as well as
of women’s joint efforts to enhance others’ well-being” (145-6). Their point is not that
freedom can’t be made to cover or explain values and practices associated with care,
but that how freedom can do this needs to be specified, articulated, and defended.
Otherwise, assumptions will be made about how agents are best able to enhance
agency and well-being freedoms; that is, assumptions will be made that they can best
do this through “political, economic and social participation and leadership.”
As is clear in my summary of Sen’s account, agency and well-being freedoms are
multidimensional, interconnected, and complementary. His account can accommodate
the idea that one’s well-being can be tied up with caring for others and that this can
enhance one’s agency freedom. In other words, these need not be construed as
irrational choices. Thus, Sen cannot be said to ignore relational evaluations of wellbeing. Instead, the point is that in focusing on freedom as the single and overarching
value, Sen’s account fails to be explicit about how and why lives and identities
wrapped up in caring practices and in responsibilities for meeting the needs of others
(for parts of every individual’s life) often diminishes agency and well-being freedoms
for those who take on these responsibilities at the same time as it enhances agency
and well-being freedoms for those cared for who rely on care givers for enhancing
both their agency and well-being freedoms. This needs to be spelled out because
values and practices associated with care do not have an easy fit with projects of
enhancing one’s own freedom. Moreover, they tend to be invisible and part of the
assumed background against which theorists fall back on endorsing standard solutions
of having women work outside the home and be players in economic and political
structures. Their being invisible and assumed means that possibilities for
understanding the negative aspects of these values and practices or having their
positive aspects reflected in public policy are inhibited by women’s lack of voice and
participation in debates or policies that could result in real challenge and change to the
entrenched gender norms that sustain the very inequalities that Sen wants to
address—women’s lack of agency and well-being freedoms to work outside the home,
participate in debates, or be engaged in the making of public policy.
Of course, feminists who want to acknowledge the importance of care in many
women’s lives and to their identities and yet do not want to limit an account of
women’s agency to one that merely embraces these values, identities, and practices to
the exclusion of the self face a difficult task. Perhaps the solution will not be the
Gasper and van Staveren one of specifying care (and risking the devaluing of it).
Perhaps the problem of over- or under-valorizing care can be best handled if we focus
on how gender norms are shaped in and through relationships of power—in various
domains and at a variety of levels. Entrenched gender norms prescribe who should
take responsibility for meeting the needs of others. Care roles and practices are
necessary for the survival and the thriving of children, families, and communities, but
they usually impede political, social, or economic participation and activities. Thus,
both the standard moves of either questioning or assuming gender norms tend to keep
institutional structures of what counts as contributing to economic, social, or political
spheres in place. This makes it difficult to understand how these institutional
structures often work to diminish women’s agency (in both senses of agency freedom
and well-being freedom) and their ability to enhance the agency and well-being
freedoms of others. The Gasper and van Staveren strategy of specifying care and
valorizing the role it plays in women’s lives may not be the best way to tackle this
difficult set of issues. But there may be another way, one that questions the particular
kind of agent or the particular set of capacities and activities assumed by Sen and
mainstream theorists and policy makers interested in addressing gender inequalities.
The Need to Expand the Concept of Agency and Challenge Norms
While Sen’s multidimensional and interconnected account of freedom stands as a vital
contribution to the literature on poverty, it behooves us to capture both the richness
of the account as well as what may still be missing in it. Sen broadens the
informational base for assessing inequalities and thereby captures the many, varied,
and interconnected features of poverty; however, his account does not capture how
particular sorts of agents have lives shaped by norms and institutional structures that
often leave them powerless to remove, challenge, or change them. To understand how
caring for others tends to limit one’s agency means understanding how assumptions
about the value and practices of care shape institutions, structures, and world views so
that they are taken-for-granted and perceived as not needing to be challenged or
changed. These assumptions reach to the very notion of who an agent is understood to
be and what decisions and choices an agent makes or should make.
Elsewhere I have argued that by explicitly promoting freedoms such as being educated,
being able to work outside the home, owning property, and having access to health
care, Sen at least implies that women’s agency is best expanded when they reject the
work and values associated with caring for others (2003, 2009). One observation
would have us say that Sen is certainly right to suggest that when women refuse to
limit themselves to care work, they expand their agency and well-being freedoms.
Another observation would have us say that he is right to suggest that the best
strategy is for women to insist that they have the full range of options (agency
freedom) open to them and that they avail themselves of these options to improve
their lives (well-being freedom). However, both observations mean that Sen leaves an
unexamined assumption in place: the home is mainly a domain of unfreedoms for
women. Under these conditions of unfreedoms (that certainly persist for many women
around the world), it is not perceived as “rational” for women to “choose” to limit
their agency and well-being freedoms by having their life plans and goals wrapped up
in caring for others.
There is another point to be made about Sen’s account. It is true that he does not
ignore entirely the importance of social relations to agents: “Expanding the freedoms
that we have reason to value not only makes our lives richer and more unfettered, but
also allows us to be fuller social persons, exercising our own volitions and interacting
with—and influencing—the world in which we live” (14-5). We might say, instead, that
Sen assumes that lives that are very social in the sense that they are integrally
connected with promoting the agency and well-being of others do not fit the norm of
lives “we have reason to value.” Such an agent might be perceived as “influencing the
world in which we live”, but such an agent may be limiting, or at least be perceived as
limiting, rather than exercising their “own volitions.” Sen might be best understood,
then, as recognizing that care as it is currently perceived and practiced (devalued)
creates gender inequalities in homes and families, restricts opportunities, and limits
women’s economic, social and political freedoms. The point that needs to be made,
however, is that he says little or nothing to address or change the institutions and
structures that assume and embed norms that devalue caring practices—for various
women in multiple ways in different contexts. These are norms that tend to make it
incoherent to say that caring for others can be integral to enhancing agency and wellbeing freedoms for oneself or others.
A different approach would involve taking a closer look at the notion of agency
assumed by Sen and questioning institutions and structures built on norms that
interpret caring practices and responsibilities for meeting the needs of others as
hindrances to agency. This understanding of agency, a norm assumed in mainstream
moral and political theory, may itself need to be questioned. This is a move made by
Miller when she departs from standard accounts of agency in terms of a person’s
capacity to use reason to plan and control the course of one’s life and argues that
agency also needs to capture the emotional and relational features of human beings
who engage with others in moral decision making in ways that enhance agency and
well-being freedoms for oneself and others.
As embodied creatures with physical, psychological, and emotional needs, Miller
argues that agency can be compromised and result in harm to an agent when “people
cannot act as agents in their own lives. Their rational, autonomous, emotional, and
relational abilities are squandered. In short, the presence of unmet fundamental needs
can render humans unable to function in the most basic of ways” (2012, 26). This
differs from Gasper and van Staveren’s account of “richly scripted actors” because
Miller connects agential capacities to an account of fundamental needs that ought to
be met. Miller zeroes in on the significance of agency and the harm of compromised
agency as that which not only accounts for the moral significance of needs but can also
delineate which needs are fundamental. An objective and universal account of needs,
therefore, can show why they are morally significant and why they must be met “in
order to establish, maintain, or restore human agency” (37). On Miller’s account, then,
the duty to care sets obligations on any and all to respond to the needs of others in
ways that “establish, maintain, or restore human agency.” The argument is complex
but can be explained by unpacking her discussion of gender violence.
Miller discusses an area not covered in mainstream theory and policy; how gender
violence in the context of genocide makes it difficult for those responsible for meeting
needs to care for themselves let alone for those who depend on them. In defending an
“obligation to support persons’ abilities to meet others’ needs, that is, to ensure that
they can care” (2010, 148), Miller highlights the effects of gender violence with respect
to the breakdown of families and communities in Darfur and the devastating effect this
has on women’s ability to care for and meet the needs of others. She challenges
traditional accounts of responsibility that fail to pay attention to women’s agency and
their freedom to “engage in caring practice themselves, that is, to maintain, restore, or
strengthen their ability to care for others” (154). Her account of responsibility calls for
“respecting both local caretaking practices and understandings of need” (154) that can
enhance women’s agency and that of families and communities torn apart by war,
conflict, and violence. These contexts make it clear that devising strategies for
“empowering individuals and communities to be able to engage in caring practices
themselves” calls on individuals to understand the social and political causes of
violence as well as their own complicity (as citizens of rich countries) in creating needs
in distant places.
The example is, admittedly, far removed from where we began: with Sen’s account of
policies for enhancing women’s agency. This in itself may be revealing. There are a
number of points to make in connection with Miller’s expanded account of agency and
its application to gender violence in Darfur. It already moves us well beyond a focus on
agents as rational choosers; it allows an examination of complex issues and lives
affected in and through a global context; it ties obligations to an account of needs and
of responsibilities to meet needs so as to maintain, restore or strengthen agency in the
sense of one’s ability to care for oneself and for others. Miller examines the
interconnected and interrelated aspects of a set of concepts brought together to
illustrate that a proper account of need and its connection to the concepts of agency,
care, dignity, and obligation all point to the fundamental significance of human
interdependence. <1>
Agency can be harmed or enhanced in and through relationships in which we find
ourselves, are faced with choices, and make decisions about what to do. A critical
analysis of networks within which personal and public relationships exist can show why
care matters to individuals, families, and communities of “richly scripted actors,” ones
who are both choosers reasoning about their own lives and who are in relations with
those for whom they care. We need to understand not only how care in the home, in
one’s country, and in the global context are vital to agency and well-being, but also
why it is devalued in ways that make it difficult to grasp how the freedom to care for
others can promote agency and well-being freedoms for the self, families,
communities, and beyond. This will be particularly true for gender norms that are
assumed and entrenched in broader networks of relationships that determine who
engages in what activities and who has the power to dictate the meaning and value of
those activities. Gender norms also operate in Miller’s discussion of gender violence in
the Darfur region of the Sudan—and in multiple and complex ways: in perceptions of
women as sexual objects and in assumptions about dependents and needing to care
for them. But we need not imagine such a difficult case to summarize what is missing
in Sen’s account of what works to enhance women’s agency. Returning to the example
of poverty in African American communities will be useful to bring together and
illustrate these insights.
As mentioned earlier, Sen’s multidimensional account of poverty would take the
history and ongoing discrimination of African Americans to be relevant to the analysis
of data that show that African Americans have higher early mortality rates than many
people in so-called developing countries. Conceiving of agents as having rational,
emotional, and relational capacities can reveal multidimensional features in addition
to those Sen identifies in his examination of specific kinds of data. African Americans
are indeed overrepresented in the ranks of the poor and in prison populations, but we
also need to note the detrimental effect this has on families, on rates of single African
American mothers living in poverty, on their ability to care for themselves and families,
and on high levels of apathy and alienation from democratic processes. Moreover,
poverty is perpetuated and persists in a broader context of institutional structures that
force many African Americans to be in relation with those who control social welfare
programs, administer health care plans, determine reproductive and child care
policies, set workfare rules, deal with domestic or community violence, or decide who
has housing and where. These factors place a heavy emotional burden on individuals
and relationships and they create and perpetuate fundamental needs that “render
humans unable to function in the most basic of ways.” These relationships at the
public level determine how or even whether care is given and thereby shape lives as
well as possibilities for maintaining, restoring, or strengthening one’s ability to care for
oneself or others. The brief discussion of this example only touches the surface of
multidimensional aspects of gender inequalities that are revealed when we enrich the
range of human functions and practices beyond freedom as such and thereby expand
an account of agency. These are the sorts of gender inequalities that will not budge or
change easily in and through standard liberal options of removing laws that limit
opportunities for some or implementing positive measures that promote participation
in economic, social, and political spheres.
In the next and final section, I turn to the World Development Report 2012.
While the report at times diagnoses gender inequalities in insightful ways, as is the
case with Sen, it too falls back on endorsing the standard set of strategies of greater
access to jobs, education, and representation in political structures as ways to increase
women’s agency and well-being. To repeat, I do not dispute the importance or
effectiveness of these strategies. I do think, however, that an expanded notion of
agency that calls on the rational, emotional, and relational capacities of all agents can
help identify why policy makers should pay attention to contexts in which care
practices and one’s ability to care are diminished by economic, social, and political
factors.
Gender Inequalities and Women’s Agency: World Development Report 2012
The World Development Report, the annual flagship publication of the World Bank,
devotes its 2012 report to its first time examination of the theme Gender Equality and
Development. Let me begin the summary and analysis of this momentous report by
saying that the report is explicit about borrowing the notion of the centrality of
freedom to an account of development from Sen’s version of the capabilities
approach: “Following Amartya Sen, we see development as a process of expanding
freedoms equally for all people” (WDR 2012, 3). Chapter 1, “A Wave of Progress”
details the ways in which women’s lives have changed for the better with large and
fast gains in the second half of the 20th century. The report admits that progress has
been slow and limited for some women in some domains and then goes on to identify
four areas where gender gaps are most significant “and where growth alone cannot
solve the issues”: (1) Reducing excess female mortality and closing the education gaps
where they remain; (2) Improving access to economic opportunities for women; (3)
Increasing women’s voice and agency in the household and in society; and (4) Limiting
the reproduction of gender inequality across generations (WDR 2012, abstract). It
would seem that (1), (2), and part of (3) connect well with Sen’s approach and what he
advocates for enhancing women’s agency and well-being freedoms. I will focus on (3)
and (4) to explore whether the report does more than Sen in addressing the concerns
central to this paper.
The WDR 2012 recognizes the force and influence of gender norms with respect to
women’s lack of power and voice and how these persist across generations: “Perhaps
the ‘stickiest’ aspect of gender outcomes is the way patterns of gender inequality are
reproduced over time. Part of this persistence is rooted in slow-moving social norms
and how they affect what happens in the household. … Norms may be learned in the
household, but they are often reinforced by market signals and institutions, which are
gender biased in many aspects. For example, gender differences in the responsibility
for house and care work, as just discussed, are rooted in gender roles but
strengthened by discrimination in labor markets and by a lack of child-care services”
(WDR 2012, 21). The report also recognizes that effective solutions very much depend
on context specific factors of social and political structures, histories, traditions, and
practices: “Gender disparities persist for multiple reasons: there may be a single
institutional or policy ‘fix’ that is difficult and easily blocked; there may be multiple
reinforcing constraints in markets, formal institutions, and households that combine to
block progress; or they may be deeply rooted in gender roles or social norms that
evolve very slowly. Effective policy design requires a good understanding of which of
these situations prevails in a particular context, and of where and what the binding
constraints are” (WDR 2012, 37).
Finally, the report appears to acknowledge that there is more to addressing gender
inequalities than improving access to markets—at least in some contexts: “The
reproduction of specific gender inequalities across generations gives rise to ‘gender
inequality traps,’ which are likely to most affect the poor and excluded in society.
Women’s lack of political voice means that the market and institutional failures
feeding gender inequality are unlikely to be corrected. Income growth alone does little
to address the processes that underlie these persistent gaps” (WDR 2012, 32). While
the report shows promise in its recognition that gender norms generate inequalities, it
focuses on the unpaid work of caring for dependents as a factor that limits and shapes
access to paid work. It does not acknowledge or explain that unpaid reproductive and
caring work is work that is vital to the functioning of any economy. Nor does it explain
that market structures assume and accept the formal and informal rules and practices
that value male labor in the marketplace and devalue female labor that involves caring
practices and responsibilities for meeting the needs of others. Instead it takes
women’s work outside the home to have instrumental value in improving the
efficiencies of market structures and increasing economic growth. The report contains
two assumptions; both of which are problematic. First, perceiving women’s work
outside the home as contributing to economic growth sets the task as needing to
undermine gender norms that keep them in the home—and have them engage in
activities of meeting the needs of others. Second, getting them out of the home is
perceived as challenging gender norms that devalue caring for others at the same time
as it is assumed that this work will nevertheless get done.
Shahra Razavi explains in a review of the WDR 2012 that “if we see labour markets for
what they are: social institutions that operate on the basis of social norms and power
inequalities, then it is not too difficult to understand why patriarchal and racialized
strategies are deployed to create hierarchical structures that further the effective
control and exploitation of the workforce” (Razavi 2011, 5). This quote picks up on the
assumption that market mechanisms will enhance agency and well-being freedoms.
Razavi points out, however, that market structures also deploy and exploit gender,
race, and class so as to maximize profits and growth. I would add that patriarchal and
racialized strategies are not only deployed to control and exploit the workforce; they
are also deployed to reduce the effectiveness of strategies for enhancing agency and
well-being freedoms for those left in the home and dependent on others to meet their
needs. Again, the assumption and expectation is that women’s agency is enhanced
when they leave the home.
In Chapter 6, “Globalization’s impact on gender equality”, the report claims: “The new
forces associated with globalization—understood as the combination of economic
integration, technological diffusion, and greater access to information—have operated
through markets, formal institutions, and information institutions to lift some of the
constraints to greater gender equality” (WDR 2012, 254). It then goes on to praise the
ways in which information and communication technologies have opened up women’s
access to markets and economic opportunities; to acknowledge that gender inequality
“can diminish countries’ ability to compete internationally” and “hurt a country’s
international standing”; and to applaud the ways in which greater access to
information has created a “shift toward more egalitarian gender roles and norms” that
is in turn “reinforced by women’s economic empowerment” (WDR 2012, 255). The
report gives impressive details of when, where, and how gender inequalities have been
removed or alleviated through these features of globalization. These gains in gender
equality cannot be denied and my point, again, is not to criticize or reject these as
effective strategies. My quarrel is with the report’s recognition of the stickiness of
gender norms that persist across generations, on the one hand, and then the failure of
the report to question assumptions that economic, social, and political participation
will have the effect of removing the stickiness of gender norms. There is a sense in
which gender norms can be challenged in this way. But what is left are the needs
created in and through practices of care that are assumed to happen all the same. In
Miller’s terminology, the agency of individuals and communities to “maintain, restore,
or strengthen their ability to care for others” (154) is often hindered or diminished by
the needs that can be generated (rather than met) in and through the standard
neoliberal policies for alleviating poverty and enhancing women’s agency.
The report seems to come close to recognizing this failing when it acknowledges,
“Important challenges remain in working conditions for those outside formal
employment” only to have this followed by recommending strategies of including
social clauses, codes of conduct, and the ILO’s “decent work” approach (WDR 2012,
267). No mention is made of how sticky gender norms assume women’s necessary but
unpaid and devalued work of responsibilities for meeting the needs of others and that
this is often exploited rather than addressed through policies endorsing greater
participation in economic and political structures. The one place where the report
acknowledges that “gender differences in care responsibilities can prevent women
from seizing new agricultural and wage opportunities in the export sector,” it bemoans
women’s inability to find other female members in the household to take on these
“household duties” rather than call for the provision of childcare programs to better
meet the demands of the important work of caring for and meeting the needs of
others (WDR 2012, 269). As Razavi points out, “WDR 2012 counsels against provision
of ‘subsidies to new childcare programs’ if ‘fairly cheap alternatives already exist’
(WDR 2012, 297)—again there seems to be no concern for the quality of care that
these informal types of childcare tend to provide to children from low-income
households, nor any concern about the working conditions of the workers providing
the service” (Razawi 2011, 7, my emphasis). On my analysis, attending to the quality of
care as well as the ability to care for others will not happen without a re-evaluation
and revaluing of caring practices and responsibilities for meeting the needs of others.
Miller’s strategy of questioning the idea that agents are only or mainly rational
choosers is one way to highlight the importance of relational capacities that call on all
of us to respond to the needs of others.
Even in its acknowledgement of the “stickiness” of gender norms and the relation
between norms and a lack of power and voice the report fails to identify needs and
responsibilities to others in and through networks of relationships in which people’s
needs can be created, worsened, or undermined through oppressive relationships and
institutional structures and through the very policies designed to alleviate poverty and
meet people’s needs. A focus on the full range of who agents are and what they can do
and be challenges our understanding of agency and well-being freedoms by providing
a critical lens through which to understand how concepts, debates, theories, and
policies embed norms that are taken-for-granted and kept in place. Attending to the
importance of the values and practices of care and of responsibilities for meeting the
needs of others would have us reinterpret the data that show that women are more
likely than men to promote health care and education for and in families. Nicholas
Kristof, for example, writes: “A study found that if the wife has brought more
resources into the marriage—and thus has more spending money afterward—then her
children are healthier than those of families of equal wealth where the assets belong
to the man. What matters to the children’s well-being isn’t so much the level of the
family’s wealth as whether it is controlled by the mother or by the father” (194).
Instead of trying to fit this fact into beliefs and norms about agents and structures, I
would suggest that we view this as a strong argument for shaping theory that explicitly
values caring practices and for supporting policies that provide resources for
maintaining, restoring, or strengthening the ability of individuals and communities to
care for themselves and others. If we highlight responsibilities to others through an
approach that is oriented toward meeting the needs of particular others in
relationships of inequality that are sustained in and through current norms and
institutional structures, we come closer to knowing how to remove gender inequalities
and enhance women’s agency and that of those for whom they care.
Acknowledgements
It would not have been possible to formulate the arguments in this paper without the
critical feedback of participants at the “Poverty, Coercion, and Human Rights”
conference at Loyola University in Chicago in April 2012 and the patience and
generosity of Diana Meyers. Insights into how caring practices and responsibilities for
meeting the needs of others connect with enhancing agency came to life for me in
caring for my mother in her final weeks of battling cancer in fall 2012 and in the reevaluation of the place of work and family in my life.
Notes
<1> There is a vast and growing literature on relational theory from which Miller draws
and develops her account of agency, but also from which feminists have developed
accounts of justice and equality, for example, that challenge conceptions of these key
concepts in traditional liberal theory. Two recent collections show the range and reach
of this work: Downie and Llewellyn (2011) and Meynell, Campbell and Sherwin (2009).
The work of Iris Marion Young (2012) also makes use of relational insights in her
account of a social connection model from which she criticizes liberal conceptions of
justice and responsibility.
References
Downie, Jocelyn and Jennifer Llewellyn, eds. 2011. Being relational: Reflections on
relational theory and health law. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
Gasper, Des and Irene van Staveren. 2003. Development as freedom – and what else.
Feminist Economics, Special Issue on the Ideas and Work of Amartya Sen. Volume 9, no
2-3: 137-161.
Koggel, Christine M. 2002. Equality analysis in a global context: A relational approach.
In Feminist moral philosophy, ed. Samantha Brennan. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
Supplementary Volume, no. 28: 247-272.
Koggel, Christine M. 2003. Globalization and women’s paid work: Expanding freedom?
Feminist Economics, Special Issue on the Ideas and Work of Amartya Sen. Volume 9, no
2-3: 163-183.
Koggel, Christine M. 2009. Agency and empowerment: Embodied realities in a
globalized world. In Agency and embodiment , ed. Letitia Maynell, Sue Campbell and
Susan Sherwin. College Park: Penn State Press.
Koggel, Christine M. 2012. A relational approach to equality: New developments and
applications. In Being relational: Reflections on relational theory and health law, ed.
Jocelyn Downie and Jennifer Llewellyn. Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.
Kristof, Nicholas and Sheryl WuDunn. 2009. Half the sky: Turning oppression into
opportunity for women worldwide. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Maynell, Letitia, Sue Campbell and Susan Sherwin, eds. 2009. Agency and embodiment.
State College: Penn State Press.
Miller, Sarah Clark. 2010. Cosmopolitan Care. Ethics and Social Welfare 4 (2): 145-57.
Miller, Sarah Clark. 2012. The Ethics of Need: Agency, Dignity, and Obligation. New
York: Routledge.
Razavi, Shahra. 2011. World Development Report 2012: Gender equality and
development an opportunity both welcome and missed (an extended commentary).
United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.
Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as freedom. New York: Anchor Books.
Sen, Amartya. 2009. The idea of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
World Bank. 2011. World Development Report 2012: Gender equality and
development. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Young, Iris Marion (2012). Responsibility for Justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
1.2 Economics, ethics, technology
(CE)
Room: 341
Chair: Gabriela Arguedas, Department of Philosophy, Universidad de Costa Rica.
Antecedentes para una evaluación de las consecuencias éticas y sociales de la
Revolución Verde y la Revolución Biotecnológica.
Tzivia Margarita Huante Raya
Estudiante de la Maestría en Filosofía de la Cultura
Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, México
tzivia.huante@gmail.com
Abstract: En este trabajo se habla sobre la intensificación de la agricultura que
significó el cambio de la agricultura tradicional por una agricultura industrializada a
partir de la década de 1940, después del fin de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. Esta
agricultura industrializada significó el cambio de la rotación de cultivos a los
monocultivos, de los fertilizantes orgánicos a los fertilizantes químicos derivados del
petróleo, de las variedades de semillas altas por variedades enanas y de la agricultura
de temporal por la agricultura de riego. Posteriormente, como veremos, también
significó la introducción de variedades transgénicas (Shiva, 2003), (Thompson et. al
2008 ).
Aunque la intensificación de la agricultura inició en Estados Unidos, la intensificación
agrícola creada por este país fue adoptada por las países denominados de “primer
mundo” como Inglaterra, Canadá, Francia, Alemania y Australia, pero también en los
países denominados del “tercer mundo” como México, Costa Rica, Colombia, Perú y
otras naciones latinoamericanas, países de Asía como la India y Pakistán y de África
Etiopia y Kenia. El objetivo manifiesto de la intensificación de la agricultura fue
combatir hambre y la desnutrición (Shiva, 199, p. 38 – 39), (Altieri y Nicholls, 2000),
(Perkins y Jaminson; 2008). A partir del año 1960, la intensificación de la agricultura
fue llamada la ‘Revolución Verde’ (Shiva, 1991, p. 18).
A lo largo de este trabajo buscaré abordar las siguientes preguntas ¿Cómo inició esta
intensificación de la agricultura denominada Revolución Verde? ¿Cuáles fueron los
objetivos de su implementación? ¿Cuáles fueron las consecuencias éticas de este
cambio de sistemas de producción agrícola? ¿Quiénes se hicieron cargo de las
consecuencias ocasionadas por la tecnificación de la agricultura denominada
Revolución Verde ¿Cuál fue la respuesta a las consecuencias ocasionadas por la
Revolución Verde?
A su vez la Revolución Verde dio paso a la ingeniería genética con la invención de
nuevas variedades de cultivo modificadas genéticamente o transgénicas (Perkins y
Jaminson, 2008). Cabrá preguntarse si esta nueva revolución bio-tecnológica está
sentada sobre las mismas bases de la Revolución Verde, y si puede resolver los
problemas creados por la intensificación de la agricultura.
Racionalidad económica y ética ambiental.
Jorge Andrey Valenciano
Estudiante de la Maestría en Desarrollo Sostenible
Universidad de Costa Rica, Costa Rica
jorge.valenciano.salazar@una.cr
Abstract: La ética utilitarista se desarrolló fuertemente en Europa en el siglo XVIII y
XIX, y tuvo dentro de sus máximos exponentes a Jeremy Bentham y John Stuart Mill. La
felicidad, según Bentham, consiste en “maximizar el placer y minimizar el dolor”. Por
su parte, John Stuart Mill consideraba que lo importante del ser humano era tener una
“felicidad de calidad” en base a la educación y la cultura individuales pero también se
debía buscar la felicidad del colectivo social.
Estas ideas son desarrolladas en términos de la economía moderna por Adam Smith en
su libro Una investigación sobre la naturaleza y causas de la riqueza de las naciones
(Smith, 1776). Sin embargo, cabe destacar que solamente dos ideas son rescatadas por
los economistas posteriores a Smith, estas son: 1. El comportamiento egoísta del ser
humano en las acciones que realiza, fundamentalmente condensado en el siguiente
pasaje de Adam Smith; “No hemos de esperar que nuestra comida provenga de la
benevolencia del carnicero, ni del cervecero, ni del panadero, sino de su propio
interés. No apelamos a su humanitarismo, sino a su amor propio” 2. Que buscando el
interés propio (amor propio) en un sistema de mercado se maximiza la utilidad social,
fundamentalmente destacado en: “Cuando prefiere la actividad económica de su país
a la extranjera, únicamente considera su seguridad, y cuando dirige la primera de tal
forma que su producto represente el mayor valor posible, sólo piensa en su ganancia
propia; pero en este como en muchos otros casos, es conducido por una mano
invisible a promover un fin que no entraba en sus intenciones. Mas no implica mal
alguno para la sociedad que tal fin no entre a formar parte de sus propósitos, pues al
perseguir su propio interés, promueve el de la sociedad de una manera más efectiva
que si esto entrara en sus designios”.
Ahora bien, Smith estudió y analizó otras motivaciones en la ética de actuación de los
seres humanos. En su libro La teoría de los sentimientos morales”desarrolla cómo el
ser humano también puede actuar por simpatía, compromiso, valores, precaución,
altruismo; para Smith, el ser humano solamente actúa buscando su propio interés en
la mayoría de los contratos de mercado, lo que no significa que actúe de esa forma en
todas las situaciones de la vida diaria.
La riqueza filosófica del pensamiento utilitarista es formalizada por los economistas
marginalistas de finales del siglo XIX y principios el siglo XX en los siguientes puntos: 1.
El consumidor es un ser racional que siempre busca maximizar su utilidad; con un nivel
de ingreso dado escogerá la canasta de bienes que maximice su nivel de utilidad. 2. Si
escoge una canasta de bienes que no maximiza su utilidad será una escogencia
irracional. 3. Las empresas siempre buscan maximizar sus utilidades (en el mundo
actual) las ganancias monetarias. Por lo tanto, las empresas para tomar decisiones
racionales siempre buscaran maximizar sus ganancias y minimizar sus costos. 4. El
mercado es el mejor asignador de los recursos, ya que en un sistema de libre mercado
se maximiza la utilidad social.
Esta forma de pensamiento ha impregnado no solamente la académica mediante la
teoría económica, sino que muchas de las políticas públicas se han concentrado en
incentivar la producción de ganancias como única vía de maximizar el bienestar social.
Esta visión utilitarista, antropocéntrica del mundo está generando una crisis ambiental
y de valores en la humanidad actual.
Mi ponencia se propone mostrar y analizar cómo estas concepciones utilitaristas e
individualistas que se dan en las relaciones sociales humanas actuales tienen un
sustento teórico, por lo que se deben analizar y mostrar sus debilidades con el objetivo
de crear nuevas concepciones éticas en donde el centro (función objetivo) sea la
reproducción de la vida humana y el mantenimiento de la naturaleza y no la búsqueda
de ganancias y la utilidad individual que es la concepción que tiene la sociedad actual.
Celso Vargas
Profesor
Instituto Tecnológico de Costa Rica, Costa Rica.
celvargas8714@gmail.com
Ethical Rationale in Technology: re-reading Jean Ladriere
The Costa Rica Institute of Technology
Email: celvargas@itcr.ac.cr
Ethical Rationale in Technology: re-reading Jean Ladriere
In 1974 under the sponsor of UNESCO a colloquium on “Science, Ethics and Aesthetics”
took place. As a result, Jean Ladriere was commissioned to write a book on the subject.
The book “Les enjeux de la Rationalité” was published by UNESCO in 1977. It concerns
on the relationships between science, technology and culture. This publication is
important because it was one of the first book which discusses the impact of the
science and technology in ethics. Four main mechanisms of impact were devised: a)
extension of ethics domain; b) emergence of new ethical problems, c) suggestion of
new ethical values and d) new ways for determining norms (Ladriere, 1977,136).
During the last 40 years an important progress on the enrollment of ethics in science
and technology can be clearly appreciated.
After discussing a general perspective on technology and a brief summary of Ladrire´s
mechanisms, two main components of the enrollment of ethics in technology are
presented: a) a clarification of the concept of responsibility and b) safety systems.
1.
Brief Technological context
There exist different perspectives on technology. In this paper technology as a process
is adopted. But within this category different conceptions are also possible. One that
assess the way in which technology has penetrated and transformed cultures, societies
and the way of living or the progressive environmental impact due to the intensive use
of technology in all the spheres of human activities, and the strategies to deal with
these impacts. Closely related to it, the way in which technological activity is socially
organized can be studied, and the mechanisms by which technology is becoming
tightly related to science both as providing important and precise tools for advancing
scientific knowledge, and the use of scientific knowledge to develop new and more
sophisticated technological products.
Drawing an analogy of Lakatos (1970)
distinction between internal and external historiography, we may call the above
approach as an “external perspectives”, in the sense that it studies the way in which
technology production organizes and impacts society and environment.
Another approach of technology as process based on the internal intentionally of
technology is pursued in this paper. Some of the basic intentionally of technology can
be summarized as follow. i) Technology is a process that transforms an undesired
situation (or specific situations) into a desirable one. “Desirable” doesn´t indicate a
value judgment, but transforming a situation according to a previous purpose.
Undesired situations are called problems and desirable ones, objects. For example,
the construction of the pascaline calculator by Pascal responded to a specific intention:
to reduce his father´s manual process of counting. In this sense, the problem is to
make easier the process of counting, the product is a mechanical device or machine.
That is ii) technology is an intentionally driving process. Technological process is
closed under the situation analysis. In formal terms, T(P) = O. It takes a problem;
apply some transformation (T) to produce an object (as solution). Given that T is a
complex process (with several stages) it is expressed as Ṫ(P) = 0, to indicate that it is a
(partial) recursive process. Technological transformation process transforms the
problem into a design, the design into an implementation; this implementation needs
to be tested, and the final result is the object produced. Currently, what is considered
a technological object includes: machines, devices, parts, tools, software and
biotechnological products.
It is schematized in the following flow process. As observed, there are several
feedbacks in this process, that makes that the object produced transforms itself into a
new problem, the implementation feeds the design, and tests feed implementation
and design.
Technological process
iii) Design accumulation. This feature indicates that it conserves an important degree
of accumulation design. Those components that proved to work very well from a
structurally and functionally perspective of use tend to be conserved in the new
designs and production of objects. As pointed out by Edgerton (2006) innovation is
not the driven motif of technology production. Objects entirely new are very rare.
But what is observed is a tendency to produce them in a different way or using
different materials.
The following three features are related to the component of design.
iv) Technology as design centered process. What has been observed is the
importance of design in the current development of technology. Several reasons
support it. First, technology tends to be a very highly standardized activity. The better
way to meet these standards is taking them into account from the visualization of the
product to achieve. Second, technology production is strongly influenced by the
incorporation of scientific research results, mathematical developments, other
technological achievements and ethical concerns. Third, recently we have observed a
strong tendency toward considering the technology process as part of a technological
system, that is, to take into account that a specific technological product is a part of
the solution of a more complex problem. It is important to understand what the role
of this specific technological product in a more complex process. The way in which this
is achieved is by introducing standards to facilitate this visualization.
Given the importance of design, it is common to separate it into four main subsystems, as presented in the following scheme.
Design Structure scheme
Three sub-systems are particularly relevant to visualize the object: the definition
systems that includes among others, the problem transformed into requirements
(what the object will solve), structural specification (what the structure of the object),
functional specifications (how the object will work). The knowledge system includes:
technological alternatives, availability of scientific knowledge, mathematical and
scientific principles relevant to the application, computer tools and ethical concerns.
Verification system includes different tests that will be applied to the product during
the different stages of developments, including ethical tests to determine the
appropriateness of the object according to the ethical requirements previously
defined. Finally, decision making system is very important because specifies the
human resource involved, the stages in which to product will be developed, the way in
which recommendations will be decided, who decides when there exist different and
incompatible alternatives, and is also responsible for the integrity of the design.
In this context the introduction of ethics in technology will be discussed. But first it is
important to briefly review the work of Ladriere as one of pioneers in discussing the
impact of technology in ethics.
2.
Ladriere perspective on the impact of science and technology in ethics
As mentioned, Ladriere considers four ways in which science and technology impacted
positively ethics: a) an extension of ethics domain; b) the emergence of new ethical
problems, c) the suggestion of new ethical values and d) a new ways for determining
norms. Let us consider each in some detail.
a)
Extension of the ethics domain. The understanding, for example of a disease or
the discovery of a mechanism involved in spreading some pollutants in the
environment, has associated a change in the way in which this disease or pollution is
traditionally explained. With the introduction of scientific explanation, new values,
new criteria for decision making are introduced. The imperative of using verified
information is an important step to propose more appropriate solution to it. For
example, the introduction of email changed the traditional way of considering mails.
Regulations to assurance the integrity and privacy of the information, changed
drastically. Not only emerged new ways of organizing the information, but new ways
of using it. Associated with faster communication and transactions, new forms of
espionage emerged; new forms of sabotage, new forms of delinquency and
vulnerability. Society had responded in different ways to reduce the negative impacts
of this technology and, at the same time, increase the benefits. An important
refreshment of ethical themes was required prior to establish new regulations to
protect privacy, including a discrimination of the kind of information that should be
protected, institutions or organizations authorized to use it, and finally, that
information that is public
b)
Emergence of new ethical problems. For Ladriere, science and technology look
for different fundamental objectives of those of culture. While science and technology
orients to achieve universality, precision, rationality, standardization, tested
knowledge and intervention, cultures tend to provide sense to life, particularism; it is
the space for constructing personal identity, sense of belonging and a tendency to
conservadurism. Science and technology had invaded society in all aspects, including
cultures. New ethical problems that pose science and technology emerge from these
contrasting objectives. Two different categories of them emerge: internals and
externals. Both emerge due the special position of scientists and technologists.
Internal problems concern nature and structure and functioning of science and
technology, while externals relate to the social and ethical responsibility of scientists
and technologists. They are in between the two systems and they have to mediate
between them. Their mediation consists in determining and guaranteeing the
objectives of the society and those of scientific and technological research be
compatible and as closed as possible.
c)
Suggestion of new ethical values. Directly connected with this topic is the
following. The introduction of new scientific and technological results induces a very
creative process of proposing new ethical values to deal with the new conditions. For
example, after the introducing to email infrastructure, raised a number of questions
related to privacy issues. Several employees were fired accused of emailing private
information from their companies (see Rogerson, 2000). Passionate discussion took
place almost everywhere. This process concluded with some important decisions
differentiating between those scopes in which emails cannot be checked from those in
which it is important to do. In universities professors and students can exchange
emails freely. In cases of violation of personal integrity, this should be proven in court.
In the case of companies, each one has to define a regulatory framework that protects
what the company considers important (Kaner, 2001). In this case new values emerge
related to privacy and its contexts
d)
New ways for determining norms. Science and technology have created a new
order over nature that gives more independency to professional to make decisions,
not based on traditions, but in what is desirable, reasonable and convenient. Thus
science and technology are an important source of ethical creativity and
independence. The creation of new norms appropriate to the context makes ethics
more rich and complex, and ruled by rational criteria. The role assigned to science
and technology makes this activity a mean to gain in autonomy and to strengthen
responsibility. As it provides more knowledge and tools for intervention, professionals
have more freedom to decide how to act and more responsibility.
3.
Autonomy and safety systems: two ethical dimensions embedded in technology
These two dimensions of ethics are introduced as examples in which it is observed the
ethical rationale in technology. Both aspects are tightly related, one feedbacks the
other, but conceptually can be separated. Autonomy expresses a set of attributes,
conditions and what we may call “preparedness state” that are manifest in the criteria
used for decision making and in acts of individuals. Safety systems consist of set of
requirements and procedures that should be observed in the evaluation to prevent
negative impacts associated with the introduction of technology in society and in
environment. Let introduce each of them, to proceed to discuss some of their
relationships.
A.
Autonomy. There are five main attributes that characterize autonomy:
freedom, responsibility, formation, information and non-coercion. We may call the
first four attributes “internal” in the sense that configure a cognitive state that we may
associate with an autonomous agent. While the fifth is an external attribute that
expresses the requirement for the decision making in the sense that it should be as
independent as possible from external pressures. The optimum autonomous state is
that in which these attributes are maximally optimized. We call this “preparedness
state”. By simplification we may talk about a scale of autonomy according to the
degree in which some conditions are met. Two kind of conditions are relevant: social
conditions related to the satisfaction of basic needs and human security (UNDP, 1994),
and cognitive conditions associated with the capability of abstracting from concrete
situations to more general conditions (Gadamer, 1977, 38). Autonomy is an endless
human goal.
“Freedom” is defined as the amplification of the space of decision making. As the
overcome of the determinants that limits the availability of alternatives to decide,
intervene, propose and create. Science and technology play an important role in this
amplification process.
“Responsibility” is defined as the process of creating capacity to analyze, prevent,
reduce and respond for the consequences of the decision made or for omissions. As
Ramírez (2004) pointed out, responsibility is expressed in three different and
complementary ways: i) As retrospective responsibility, the capability to respond for
our acts and omissions and to be criticized accordingly. This manifestation of
responsibility expresses as guilty; ii) As prospective responsibility, as our capability to
understand and to prevent possible consequences of a decision or intervention. In
technology this is the most important way in which responsibility expresses, iii) as
extended responsibility, as understanding our obligations with the planet and with
other forms of life, including, the understanding that human beings are part of a bigger
life order.
“Formation”. Designates the process by mean of which cognitive and applicative skills
are developed so individuals are capable of situating particular situations in a larger
context, understanding particularities of situation and at the same time visualizing this
situation as sharing elements with other situations. Formation emphasizes the process
of abstraction, differentiation and integration of elements obtained from different
situations. For example, understanding that a particular technological process can
contribute to strengthen or weak some global trends, that can exclude social groups in
condition of vulnerability. Many computer software are programed using object
oriented programming that implicitly excludes blind persons, for example. Formation,
then, relates with this process of situating a solution in a more universal context.
“Information”. Is a complex concept but it has an intuitive use in our daily life enough
for our discussion. In this paper, it is mention two particular aspects: a) its role in
increasing the capability to better understanding, to discriminate and to make more
appropriate decisions. We may paraphrase Kant by saying that “formation without
information is empty, information without formation is blind”. And, b) availability of
information is a social requirement to potentiate the human capacities.
As can be seen, these four components are fundamental to autonomy and are closely
related. Freedom conveys more responsibility; more formation implies more freedom
and a better exercise of responsibility. Information increases responsibility by favoring
decision making. Responsibility implies more formation, more freedom and more
information. All these components pose special challenge to society aimed at
guarantying the conditions that make possible a more rich and autonomous society.
In science and technology, autonomy is getting a very important role. Science and
technology are important sources of regulation particularly in that aspects in which
ethical and societal issues are involved. In responsibility, an important contribution
from science and technology in prospective and in extended responsibility is observed.
In what remains, it will be introduced a particular aspect in which prospective and
extended responsibility is manifested: safety systems.
B.
Safety systems. A safety system is a sextuple SS = < ES F, DP, RA. RM, RC>,
where F stands for factors, DP for default principles, RA for risk assessment, RM for
risk management, RC for risk communication and ES for Ethical and Societal Issues. F
and ES are very important. F has different elements depending of the context. But all
have in common the factor of uncertainty. In technological applications related to
biodiversity or ecosystems, variability and complexity are important factors. Variability
cannot be reduced neither eliminated, and then it is important to be prepared for
expecting unpredicted events. In specific population statistical measures are used to
determine if the occurrence of these events are statistically meaningful. Complexity is
also closely related to variability, but it concerns the system o process in which
technology is or will be settled. It is usual to operationalize complexity as “non-linear
behavior of a system or process”. Complexity can be linearized. Several procedures
can be used to do it. For example, marking a specific species and determinate the
interactions of other species with this one. Finally, uncertainties can be reduced and
minimized using different procedures. But the main goal of safety systems is to be as
precise as possible in prediction.
DP (default principles) plays an important role in safety systems. It permits to define a
method to approach a specific problem, including, a technological intervention. One of
them the precautionary principle, according to which in case of doubt on the
consequences of an intervention, postpone it until better knowledge be available to
claim that negative consequences are minimal or don´t occur at all. Other important
default principle is that of segregation. From a safety perspective a complex
phenomenon must be analyzed in terms of its parts, in terms of safety factors. In other
words, in safety it is assumed that it is possible to linearize, but taking into account
that some systems or processes are nonlinear.
RA, risk assessment is one of the scientific dimensions of technology of the most
interest. It consists in determining those risks associated with a specific intervention,
in assessing its impact. Generally speaking, a risk is the probability of occurrence of an
event considered as harm. But it is needed also the determinate the impact of events.
Not all risks have the same impact. Then a risk is a function of its probability BY its
impact. The task of the science is determining with precision these risks and its
impact. Given a technological introduction, scientific goal consists in claiming that
impacts of this technology is closed under one set of events and its impact (closure
property).
RM, risk management consists in determining the way in which to reduce, mitigate and
eliminate a possible harm. To do it is necessary to take into account: economic aspects
related to the costs of implementing the solution. Sometimes it is reasonable some
level of tolerance, for example in biological effects of ionization radiation it is
established a dose limit to public. The same is true for other technological application
such as the chloride limit in drinkable water. But in addition to it other scientific and
technological considerations are relevant. For example, if there are new materials
with specific properties available so that impact of the technology can be reduced or,
scientific knowledge for improving technological solutions. The main principle in risk
management is to deal with risks as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA principle).
There are three main strategies for dealing with risks. As mentioned by Sven Ove
Hansson (2011): “Simple safety principles, often expressible as rules of thumbs, have
a central role in safety engineering. Three of the most important of these are inherent
safety, safety factors, and multiple barriers.”
Inherent safety happens in those
contexts in which is possible to replace an existent technology by a new one with
proved safety standards that drastically reduce or eliminate previously identified risks.
Safety factors as defined by Sven Ove Hansson (2011) consists in “… numerical factors
employed or used as part of the design process for our houses, tools, etc., in order to
ensure that our constructions are stronger than the bare minimum expected to be
required for their functions”. Finally, multiple barriers consist in physical barriers,
independent one from the other, that are used to reduce or eliminate identified risks.
For example, in nuclear power plants three different physical barriers are used to
prevent any release of nuclear material for kernel to the atmosphere. In nuclear
power plants other risk standards are used to assure security in the working of these
plants. Not only these three strategies are used constantly, but it is implemented a
probabilistic risk assessment in which a map of impacts and probable event chains is
established, and a limit on the number of abnormal events.
RC, risk communication is an important component of the requirements for
commercializing products. Information related, for example, with side effects
associated with medicines is a normalized mean to inform consumers and end-users
on the possible effects. Currently, all big projects under implementation need to have
a strategy for communicating on possible events and the means to reduce or eliminate
their impact.
ES, Ethical and Societal aspects are one of the most important dimensions of the safety
system as applied to technology. Analyzing what is considered as harm, it is found that
it derives from determining what is valuable and, therefore, that needs to be
protected. Generally speaking, valuable themes are classified in four main dimensions:
economic dimension, social, environmental and institutional dimensions.
These
dimensions can be arranged as a Cartesian space aimed at achieving optimization,
reduction and elimination of harms; it is showed in the following scheme.
Ethical Dimensional Scheme
Each of these has many themes that are object of protection. However in practice,
only some aspects of two or other dimensions are relevant for a technological
development. For example, in the case of genetically modified organism (GMO), are
relevant themes related with economics, health and environment. Let exemplified it.
FAO has listed the following as relevant: “inoculum density; resistance of the
pathogen to environmental conditions (humidity, temperature, cultural practices and
chemical application); means of dissemination: water, air, soil or vectors; presence of
susceptible hosts; spatial relationship between susceptible hosts and pathogens;
virulence of the pathogen.” (FAO, 2011: Module 3, p. 9).
The second example derives from the perspective of National Academy of Engineering
(NAE), and related to the risks and benefits of human subjects participating in
research. In this case the following themes were identified and classified: Physical:
“injury, illness, pain, suffering, or discomfort”, Psychological: “negative perception of
self, emotional suffering (e.g., anxiety or shame), or aberrations in thought or
behavior”, Social: “the negative effects on one's interactions or relationships with
others”, Economic harms: “the imposition, direct or indirect, of financial costs on
participants” and legal: “such as arrest, conviction, incarceration, or lawsuits. Such
harms could occur, for example, in studies of possession or use of illicit drugs, sexual
abuse, or workplace theft” (NAE, 2014).
These examples show how ethical issues are very relevant in technology and also how
complex is to approach them. Because of this, it is usual to see that ethical approach
are parceled and not connected with other approaches. One important challenge is to
pass from specific cases to a more general approach to ethics in technology. There are
some efforts in this direction that will be analyzed in a further paper.
References
Andow, David A. and Hilbeck Angelika (2004) “Science-based Risk Assessment for
Nontarget Effects of Transgenic Crops”. Bioscience, Vol.4, No.7, July 2004.
Edgerton, David (2006) The Shock of the Old. Technology and Global history since
1900. Profile Books Ltd, USA
FAO (2011) Biosafety Resource Book. Rome
FAO (2009) Biosafety of Genetically Modified Organisms: Basic concepts, methods and
issues. Rome
Gadamer, Hans-Georg ( 1977) Verdad y Método. Ediciones Sígueme, Spain
Kaner, Cem (2001) Business
Ethics
and
Electronic
http://www.kaner.com/pdfs/EthicsEmail.pdf Accessed August, 15th, 2014
Mail.
Ladriere, Jean (1977) El Reto de la Racionalidad. Ediciones Sígueme, Spain
Lakatos, Imre (1970) “History of Science and its rational reconstructions” PSA:
Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Vol.
1970, pp. 91-136
National Academy of Engineering (2014) "Chapter 4: Assessing Risks and Potential
Benefits and Evaluating Vulnerability (Research Involving Human Participants V1)"
Online Ethics Center for Engineering 6/14/2006 National Academy of Engineering
Accessed:
Sunday,
August
31,
2014
www.onlineethics.org/Topics/RespResearch/ResResources/nbacindex/nbachindex/hch
apter4.aspx
Ramírez, Edgar Roy (2004) “Mecanismos de Evasión de la Responsabilidad y otras
reflexiones”. In Alfaro, Mario and Ramirez, Roy editors (2004) Ética, Ciencia y
Tecnología. Editorial Tecnológica de Costa Rica.
Rogerson, Simon (2000) “Email Ethics”. IMIS Journal, Volume 10
UNDP, (1994) Human Development Report. United Nations, USA.
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.p
df
Hansson, Sven Ove (2011) Risk. Entry: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/risk/
1.3 Development, a philosophical approach
(CE)
Room 342
Chair: Alejandra Boni, Departamento de Proyectos de Ingeniería, Universidad
Politécnica de Valencia.
La fundamentación de la ética del desarrollo en la obra de Denis Goulet.
Montserrat Culebro Juárez
Candidata a Doctora en filosofía
Universidad de Salamanca, España
mculebro@usal.es
Abstract: En esta comunicación se abordaran las características más importantes de la
ética del desarrollo de Denis Goulet. De manera que permitan comprender su
pensamiento. Me centraré en la vida buena y en la fundamentación de este proyecto
ético.
Palabras clave: Denis Goulet, ética, desarrollo.
Key words: Denis Goulet, ethics, development.
Introduccion
Esta presentación tiene el propósito de exponer, brevemente, algunas de las
preguntas y los problemas planteados por la reflexión filosófica de Denis Goulet.
Considerado como pionero de la ética del desarrollo, este autor llevó a cabo una
prolija producción teórica en torno a temas como la participación, la tecnología y la
ayuda al desarrollo. Su pensamiento fue significativo para la reflexión filosófica en
cuestiones de desarrollo y pobreza durante el siglo XX, en concreto a partir de 1965
cuando publica su primer libro Ética del desarrollo, época que coincide con el auge por
la preocupación del desarrollo a nivel internacional debido al proceso de
descolonización en los continentes de África y Asia y con el Primer Decenio para el
Desarrollo (1961-1970) auspiciados por la Organización de las Naciones Unidas. Por tal
motivo, es importante concederle interés a su obra para este siglo XXI.
La vida buena, los fundamentos óptimos de la vida en sociedad y la actitud propia
hacia la naturaleza y los ambientes artificiales constituyen los tres temas principales de
la ética del desarrollo, de acuerdo con Goulet. Su proyecto ético se caracteriza por ser
una ética de la virtud, teleológica, austera que tiene en cuenta el medio ambiente. A
estas características se añade el concepto de la realización humana que entiende a
partir de los objetivos del desarrollo: sostenimiento de la vida, la libertad y la estima. El
desarrollo puede contribuir al florecimiento humano a través de la realización de estos
objetivos, a forjar el aspecto espiritual del ser humano más que el material.
2. La vida buena
El primer punto relevante, en mi opinión, del pensamiento de Goulet es la pregunta
por la vida buena y, en concreto, por la relación entre la plenitud del bien y la
abundancia de bienes. Por tanto, la cuestión por dilucidar es la concepción del bien
ligada a la idea del desarrollo. Entendido éste como un proceso de cambio que se lleva
a cabo cuando se tienen opciones para elegir. Esa idea de bien radica, en la propuesta
de Goulet, en la propia posibilidad de elegir, de manera libre y no determinada. El bien
ya no consiste, como sí lo fue en la antigüedad o en la Edad Media, en un concepto
unitario. La elección en el desarrollo la llevará a cabo cada persona, cada grupo y cada
nación. Dicha elección consiste entre permanecer estancados y subdesarrollados o
“acoger todos los males que se derivan de los modelos ordinarios de la modernidad y
el desarrollo” (Goulet, 1999, 184). Goulet consideró que la elección ha sido cruel, ha
implicado costos sociales y culturales para los pueblos del Tercer Mundo, en
consecuencia se requiere la liberación de determinismos y de condiciones que impiden
la libertad de tomar de decisiones genuinas relacionadas con la calidad de vida de las
personas. Aquí es donde adquiere importancia la participación, pues hace posible la
realización de esa concepción del bien, en el sentido en que cada persona o ser
humano forme parte del proceso de toma de decisiones para elegir los medios con los
cuales se producirán los cambios necesarios para desarrollar una comunidad o un país
del que se es miembro o ciudadano. Pero también porque teniendo una concepción
del bien, basada en la elección, se tiene la posibilidad de realizar un modo de vida o de
vivir un tipo de vida que cada persona valora como la mejor o más adecuada (Sen). Por
tanto, la participación permite controlar los eventos que pueden afectar nuestras
elecciones y nuestras propias vidas.
3. Los fundamentos de la ética del desarrollo en la propuesta de Goulet
Otro de los temas por abordar es el problema de la fundamentación. Cabe distinguir
dos aspectos en este ámbito. Primero, la ética del desarrollo, en Goulet, posee un
fundamento ontológico basado en una naturaleza humana. En este proyecto ético se
encuentra la consideración de un ser humano vulnerable y solidario. La vulnerabilidad
muestra la finitud de la vida y el sufrimiento terrenal de los seres humanos. Asimismo,
da cuenta de la imperfección humana bajo esta consideración Goulet sostiene que el
ser humano para ser perfecto requiere salir de sí mismo, necesita de los otros y
necesitas cosas para revertir su imperfección. La vulnerabilidad, en el caso del
desarrollo, es producto de cuestiones estructurales. El ser humano queda inerme
frente a fuerzas económicas, sociales y culturales que terminan socavando la estima, la
libertad y la dignidad humana. La vulnerabilidad no sólo la atribuye a los seres
humanos en lo individual, sino que las comunidades también son consideradas
vulnerables. Los vulnerables no son sólo los subdesarrollados, sino también los
desarrollados. Asumir la vulnerabilidad humana constituye un paso para establecer
relaciones de reciprocidad entre los seres humanos y las naciones.
El segundo aspecto es la fundamentación epistémica. La fenomenología es el método
elegido por Goulet para elaborar la ética del desarrollo, pero no el único. El mundo de
la vida propuesto por la fenomenología es recuperado por Goulet: por el mundo vital
de los pueblos o comunidades y sus tradiciones. Así, pretendió revertir la excesiva
neutralidad, objetividad y rigurosidad metodológica en que han incurrido los
científicos sociales occidentales y que ha desembocado en un etnocentrismo. Esto fue
consecuencia de que las ciencias sociales y los científicos sociales no tomaron los
valores como variables de sus investigaciones, lo cual produjo que la ética y las ciencias
sociales quedaran disociadas. Así, propuso una metodología total para el estudio de los
valores utilizada por los científicos sociales, no centrada exclusivamente en la técnica
cuantitativa.
La dialéctica es el otro método utilizado por Goulet. El desarrollo, para Goulet, se lleva
a cabo, sino por la contradicción, al menos por la oposición. Es así que en su
pensamiento están planteados los opuestos. Al analizar el desarrollo, lo hará frente a
su opuesto, el subdesarrollo. Por eso, propone el concepto de desarrollo auténtico
frente al de anti-desarrollo. Así, el primero implica madurez, progreso hacia la
perfección, justicia, mayor conciencia y mayor felicidad. El segundo produce
consecuencias negativas para la identidad cultural debido al alto nivel de vida y a la
eficacia.
Otro de los pilares en la fundamentación de la ética del desarrollo es la racionalidad
existencial. Es un tipo de racionalidad que no posee una base científica, sino una
sensible. Esta racionalidad posee un núcleo duro en el que se encuentran los valores
que determinan la identidad cultural de las personas como miembros de un grupo o
comunidad. Este núcleo no puede ser alterado o cambiado, pues se alteraría la
identidad grupal y los valores que permiten mantener cohesionado al grupo.
A partir de la racionalidad, Goulet formula una teoría de las racionalidades que
conduciría a una visión holista del mundo y no reduccionista propia de etnocentristas y
aislacionismos políticos. Goulet no postuló una racionalidad individualista abstracta y
desconectada sino una racionalidad moderna vinculada a una idea de saber universal y
racional, pero atenta a lo concreto y existencial.
4. Otras características en el pensamiento de Goulet
El ser humano aparece como un ser finito que, sin embargo, aspira a la trascendencia.
La trascendencia es definida por Goulet como “la creación de una alternativa a lo que
[el ser humano] tiene que ser en virtud de lo que ya ha sido” (1985, 242). Este
concepto implica que la vida humana es algo más que la sola existencia, que la simple
supervivencia. La vida también consiste en la búsqueda de sentido e identidad de los
seres humanos que viven en sociedad. Estas necesidades perfeccionan al ser humano y
permiten que tenga una vida más significativa, con sentido. Actualizan, asimismo, las
potencialidades del ser humano.
Goulet concibe al ser ser humano en lo individual y como un ser social, es decir, como
miembro de una comunidad. Esa comunidad le permite perfeccionarse es por ello que
él mismo caracteriza a su proyecto moral como una ética del ser más del hombre y no
del tener más. A este carácter social del ser humano, se añade la característica de un
ser solidario, en franca oposición a posturas que conciben al ser humano como egoísta.
La solidaridad posee esta misma fundamentación, ya que se basa en una humanidad
común.
Finalmente, Goulet posee una concepción de la historia dialéctica, humanista y
espiritual. La religión aporta, para el autor, significado a la existencia y al destino
humano, el cual no se reduce a las cuestiones materiales. La historia humana y las
actividades humanas no constituyen fines absolutos porque son medios para preparar
la redención, donde se explica la verdadera trascendencia humana. El desarrollo, como
actividad humana, preparará un mundo más justo. Para este ético del desarrollo, Dios
creó a los seres humanos como forjadores de su propia historia con total libertad
inherente a su destino individual y colectivo.
Goulet pone en vigencia la categoría de finalidad en la ética del desarrollo. Bajo el
esquema fines-medios, los medios para el desarrollo como pueden ser la tecnología o
la cooperación al desarrollo se subordinan a fines como los objetivos del desarrollo:
estima, libertad y sostenimiento de la vida, pero estos fines a su vez se subordinan a
un fin último. La característica teleológica de este proyecto ético consiste en una
estructura teleológica de corte cristiano. El fin último para cualquier medio, de toda
acción y elección humanas. No hay excusa para dejar de actuar frente a los problemas
que enfrenta la humanidad, la religión y el cristianismo para él poseen un componente
de compromiso con las tareas temporales de esta vida. Los cristianos se comprometen
con el desarrollo
Para concluir, es importante subrayar que parte del carácter universal de la ética del
desarrollo de Goulet se debe a que tiene como telón de fondo una teleología cristiana.
En Ética del desarrollo de 1965 expone su humanismo cristiano. Para la Ética del
desarrollo 1996 continua sosteniendo la idea de trascendencia, pero ya no se refiere
en concreto al cristianismo sino a la religión y a las religiones en general
Bibliografía
Goulet, D. (1996). A New Discipline: Development Ethics. Otawa: IDRC.
(1974). A New Moral Order: Studies in Development Ethics and Liberation Theology.
New York: Orbis Books, 1974.
(1971). “An ethical model for the study of values”. Harvard Educational Review, 41,
205–227.
(1979). “Can values shape the third world technology policy?”. Journal of International
Affairs 33 (1), 89-109.
(2006). Development Ethics at Work: Explorations -- 1960-2002. London ; New York:
Routlege.
(1980). “Development experts: the one-eyed giants”. World Development, 8, 481–489.
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(1968). “Development for what?”. Comparative Political Studies, 1, 295–312.
(1992). “Development indicators: a research problem, a policy problema”. The Journal
of Socio-Economics, 21, 245–260. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/1053-5357(92)90012-V.
(1965). Ética del desarrollo. Barcelona: Editorial Estela.
(1999). Ética del desarrollo: guía teórica y práctica. Madrid: IEPALA.
(2005). “Global Governance, Dam Conflicts, and Participation”. Human Rights
Quarterly 27, (3), 881-907. doi:10.1353/hrq.2005.0036.
——— (1981). “In defense of cultural rights: technology, tradition and conflicting
models of rationality”. Human Rights Quarterly, 3 (4), 1-18.
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(1992). "International Ethics and Human Rights". Alternatives: Global, Local, Political
17, (2), 231-46.
(1989). Incentives for Development: The Key to Equity. New York: New Horizons Press.
(1992). “La cultura y los valores tradicionales en el desarrollo”, Revista de Filosofía de
la Universidad de Costa Rica, XXX, 27–36.
(1983). México: Development Strategies for the Future, Notre Dame ; London:
University of Notre Dame Press.
(1989). “Tareas y métodos en la ética del desarrollo”. Revista de Filosofía de la
Universidad de Costa Rica, XXVII (66), 293–306.
(1985). The cruel choice: a new concept in the theory of development. Lanham:
University Press of America.
(1986). “Three rationalities in development decision-making”. World Development, 14,
301–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(86)90061-6.
The Philosophical Life Examined: The Contributions and Limitations of
Philosophers at work in Development Ethics.
Lori Keleher
Professor of philosophy
New Mexico State University, U.S.A
lorikeleher@gmail.com
Abstract: John Dewey said “philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for
dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by
philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men” (1917). Peter Singer challenges
philosophers not only to relate philosophy to public and personal affairs in arguments,
but to take their own conclusions seriously by acting in accordance with them in action
in order to establish a way of life in which theory and practice are “if not yet in
harmony, are at least coming together” (1972). David Crocker calls us to “go beyond
Singer” to forge “a vision about what our course and development ethics might be –
less concerned with foundational issues and more committed than was Singer’s
applied philosophy to an ethics that was interdisciplinary, institutionally and
empirically informed, and policy-relevant” (2008).
In this essay I seek to get clear on what role philosophers qua philosophers can,
should, and should not play in the field of human development. After a critical analysis
of the literature on the role of philosophers in development I argue 1) that there are
some tasks best suited to philosophers, for example, conceptual analysis, framing and
re-framing of questions, generating and interpreting philosophical theories (e.g.,
theories of justice); 2) that some tasks that are acceptable, but not necessary for
philosophers, for example, engaging in field work can inform philosophical work, but is
not a necessary experience for a philosopher; and finally 3) that there are important
limits to the contributions philosophers qua philosophers can make to development,
for example, the measurement and collection of important empirical data is a task best
left to others, although philosophy (e.g., feminist epistemology and philosophy of
science) can helpfully inform collection and measurement methodology. After arguing
for the place of philosophers within the field of human development, I then briefly
argue for the place of human development issues within philosophy. In other words, I
argue that engaging development ethics is a legitimate practice for philosophers
working in university philosophy departments.
I believe this essay engages suitable theme for the 30 th anniversary conference of IDEA
in which we reflect on the role and scope of development ethics past, present, and
future.
Openness to Closed Conceptual Structures: Accounting For Epistemic
Injustice.
Shelbi Meissner
Student of Philosophy
Michigan State University, U.S.A
shelbimeissner@gmail.com
Abstract: Within her account of epistemic injustice, Miranda Fricker distinguishes two
particular types of culpable epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical
injustice. Fricker attributes any other instance of epistemic disadvantage to cases of
epistemic bad luck. Kristie Dotson warns against Fricker’s closed conceptual structure
of epistemic injustice and disadvantage. Dotson argues Fricker’s conception of
epistemic injustice and disadvantage is a foreclosed theory, and that Fricker fails to
account for other instances of epistemic injustice, in particular, contributory injustice.
Because epistemic injustice is difficult to detect, and because epistemic injustice is
often perpetuated when it is left undetected, Dotson calls for an open conceptual
structure of epistemic injustice. Dotson believes an open conceptual structure will
minimize the likelihood of perpetuating undetected epistemic injustice. I will argue
three things: 1) Dotson correctly locates a missing type of epistemic injustice in
Fricker’s account, 2) Dotson has underestimated the dangers of an open conceptual
structure of epistemic injustice insofar as it is applied to development ethics, and 3)
building off the work of development ethicist Serene Khader, I suggest an account of
epistemic injustice that is theoretically open and practically closed is the ideal
conceptual structure, as long as we are concerned about epistemic injustice in
development ethics.
In section one, I will begin with an outline of Fricker’s understanding of epistemic
injustice, and the two types of epistemic injustice she identifies. I will also provide
Fricker’s account of epistemic bad luck. In section two, I will explain Dotson’s
understanding of contributory injustice, and the argument she provides for its status
as a manifestation of epistemic injustice that is not included in Fricker’s view. I will
then explain Dotson’s motivations for an open conceptual structure of epistemic
injustice. In section three, I will attempt to put Khader’s work on adaptive preferences
in conversation with Fricker and Dotson. Finally, from the combination of epistemic
injustice and Khader’s work on inappropriately adaptive preference (IAP) intervention,
I will provide my own understanding of open conceptual structures and the dangers I
believe reside in such an approach when addressing the obligations of development
practitioners in the field. I ultimately will show that if we fail to allow openness in our
conceptual structure of epistemic injustice, then we run the risk of perpetuating
unrecognized forms of epistemic injustice, as Dotson suggests. However, if we allow
openness in our conceptual structure of epistemic injustice, then we risk practitioners
manipulating the schema for their own ends, as Khader warns against. I submit that an
account of epistemic injustice that is theoretically open and practically closed remedies
this concern.
1.4 Poverty and development aid.
(CE)
Room 343
Chair: Ronnie Hawkins: Department of Philosophy, University of Florida
Global Poverty and the Promise of International Development.
Ndidi Nwaneri
Ph.D. student of Social and Political Philosophy
Loyola University, U.S.A
nnwaneri@luc.edu
Abstract: In this paper, I highlight a contradiction within the underlying
presuppositions of the practice of international development (ID). Next, I argue for a
change in the ideological basis of our commitments to the reduction of global poverty.
I conclude with a call for a change in the fundamental ideology that drives the
reduction of global poverty.
The practice (although not necessarily the theory) of ID seems to presuppose the
possibility meeting the basic needs of majority of the global poor, while maintaining
both the consumption patterns, as well as the proportion of global resources
consumed by the global rich. I illustrate the contradictory nature of this presupposition
by showing that the current structure of the global economic and financial system
cannot accommodate the strategies that are required to reduce the levels of absolute
poverty.
Addressing global poverty within the current economic and financial system would
entail either a drastic reduction of the volume of consumption of the global rich,
astronomical increases in global production, or both. Since global resources are not
infinite, global production cannot continue to increase infinitely. This means in the first
place, that it is not possible to maintain current rates of global consumption.
Even assuming unlimited increases in global resources and production, the structure of
the global distribution pattern between the rich and the poor precludes the reduction
of absolute poverty. This is because the economic and financial system is structured
such that the more resources you have, the more you can get, and the less you have,
the less you can access. Given such a system, it is not surprising that the global rich
consume an unsustainably high (and increasing) proportion of global production. I
argue that ID practice presumes the possibility of reducing global poverty within this
contradiction.
I also argue that a genuine commitment to drastically reducing the numbers of the
global poor requires a fundamental change in how we conceive of ourselves, and how
we relate to resources and the environment. It will also entail changes in how we act in
the world, the role we allow artifacts play in our self-constitution, as well as our
relationship to the physical environment. Without a fundamental change in these
relationships, not only will we not be able to resolve the aforementioned
contradiction, but more importantly, we will not be able to attain the goal of
minimizing the number of people who have to live a less than human life of abject
poverty.
I conclude that without such ideological changes, professional ID notwithstanding, we
will continue to fall short of the goal of global poverty alleviation.
Who is Violating the Rights of the World’s Poor?
Richard Galvin and John R. Harris
Richard Galvin
Professor of Philosophy
Texas Christian University, U.S.A
r.galvin@tcu.edu
John R. Harris
Professor of Philosophy
Texas Christian University, U.S.A
j.r.harris@tcu.edu
Presenter: John R. Harris
Abstract: Thomas Pogge argues that we are violating the rights of the world’s poor.
According to Pogge, most citizens of the world’s developed countries are responsible
for their government’s role in contributing to institutional structures that are
implicated in human rights violations. We, the citizens of these countries, are
implicated because the attitudes of citizens matter, yet we have failed to insist that
our governments cease to contribute to the institutional structures that contribute to
global poverty. Thus, those of us who live in developed countries are guilty of violating
a negative right to noninterference held by those who find themselves victimized by
severe poverty.
In this paper we will neither challenge the claim that persistent, absolute poverty is a
serious rights violation, nor will we argue that citizens of developed countries ought to
do much more to alleviate the suffering associated with severe poverty--we grant as
much. Rather, in this paper, we argue that Pogge is mistaken merely about the nature
of the obligation that most citizens have to those who suffer from extreme poverty.
Our concern with Pogge’s argument is that he overstates the role most of us play in
the production and maintenance of those institutional structures that contribute to
global poverty. Take the United States, a country that has done much to contribute to
the maintenance of those institutional structures that contribute to global poverty.
What is contentious about Pogge’s thesis is not whether the United States’
government has played this role, but who is to blame. Empirically speaking there is
strong evidence that most citizens in the United States have little to no impact on the
policies or policymakers. Rather, the evidence suggests that policymakers decisions
are disproportionately affected by the interests and desires of the wealthiest citizens.
Even if this is incorrect, and all or most US citizens are implicated, we argue that
responsibility will not and should not be distributed equally. Thus, blame should be
focused on the wealthy and political elites who have most directly contributed to the
unjust policies.
Finally, we consider a possible response on Pogge’s behalf. Perhaps, even if we are not
all individually responsible, we can all be held collectively responsible. Of course, what
this means is itself contentious and deserves analysis. Ultimately we argue that either
Pogge must insist that we all share blame equally or that blame may be distributed
unevenly throughout the collective. If Pogge adopts the former position, then he
offers an implausible account of our moral situation. If he adopts the latter, then we
should apportion blame according to the degree that one contributed to the collective
actions. Again we will find that many of us make trivial contributions to these unjust
institutions, and as a result we have proportionately weak obligations to lend
assistance to the world’s poor.
TUESDAY 22 JULY
9:00 to 10:10
Plenary sesión Chair: Jimmy Washburn
Económicas (CE)
2.1 Health and development
(CE)
Auditorio Ciencias
Room 40
Chair: Christine Koggel , Department of Philosophy, Carleton University
Essential Medicines, Intellectual Property and Neglected Diseases: A Proposal
for Reform.
James Crombie
Professor of Philosophy
l'Université Sainte-Anne, Nova Scotia, Canada.
james.crombie@usainteanne.ca
Abstract: Health problems are a major inhibiting factor for harmonious, sustainable
development. This paper describes structural injustices and asymmetry in access to
treatments and medicine in the developing and developed worlds attributing them
largely to the current system of financing research through income generated by
patents applied to medicines under the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPs Agreement). The "flexibilities" introduced by the Doha
Declaration of 2001 and the General Council Decision of 2003 (compulsory licenses and
parallel exporting) have not significantly improved the situation. Proposals for
alternative systems include suggestions by a WHO Consultative Expert Working Group
presented in 2012, as well as one modeled on the Canadian Public Lending Right
Program for compensating authors of works lent out by public libraries. Patentsupported pricing can be considered to be a form of "tax" (Stiglitz 2007) equal to the
difference between the patent- supported price and the marginal cost of production.
The benefits promised in exchange for payment of this "tax" have not however been
forthcoming. Innovation has on the contrary actually slowed down in the period since
1994, particularly in the areas of essential medicines and the 17 officially recognized
neglected tropical diseases or NTDs. The production of certain essential medications
has even been discontinued - as in the case of the "resurrection drug" eflornithine
used in the treatment of comatose patients suffering from African trypanosomiasis.
Lack of progress is noted in combatting Chagas Disease, affecting productivity and
lifespan for 8 million or more individuals in the Americas, with a loss of 426
thousand disability- adjusted life years. Meanwhile, the major part of the resources
derived from patent-supported pricing of medicines is directed, not towards genuine
research and innovation, but to advertising and promotional campaigns of various
sorts, to the production of "me- too" drugs, to the "evergreening" of patents and to
the reconfiguration of chronic risk factors such as osteoporosis and
hypercholesterolemia - which are of concern to affluent first-world populations - in
what has been termed "disease mongering". The current system is also conducive to
the "sequestering" of important data on drug trials (cf. Healy 2012; Goldacre 2012) by
having them treated as "proprietary". The currently dominant system of patentprotection and regulation of medicines is thus not providing appropriate incentives for
the development of effective remedies for debilitating diseases affecting large
numbers of low-income individuals in developing countries - in addition to making
slow progress in providing existing remedies to populations in need. The WHO
Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and Development (WHO-CEWG 2012)
proposes a number of innovative solutions, including that the governing body of WHO
should put in place a "binding instrument" whereby member countries would pay a
certain percentage of their GNP into a fund responsible for research on important
diseases."Patent pools" could be set up and other innovative measures taken. And,
while we are waiting for these changes to go through, emergency measures should be
taken to supply specific mediations at cost (Stiglitz 2007) in developing countries faced
with major public health problems.
Introduction
The general health of a population is a key component of the well-being and the
capacity for the continued sustainable development of both the more developed and
the less developed nations. Health has in fact been defined by at least one author
(Whitbeck 1981: 35) as identical with the psychophysiological capacity to act with a
view to accomplishing one's goals and realizing one's aspirations. These goals and
aspirations may be individual or they may be shared and collective. Health care, on the
other hand, can be seen as those measures taken to maintain health or to restore it
when it is compromised by disease, trauma or disability. An important part of the
evolution of health care over the past century and a half has been the development
and widespread use of important pharmaceuticals such as anaesthetics, insulin,
antibiotics and certain vaccines. It is certainly difficult to imagine the world as it existed
prior to the discovery of penicillin and other effective antibiotics (although we may
soon be compelled to by the development of antimicrobial resistance, but that is
another story). The general legal and economic regime under which pharmaceuticals
are developed and made available to the population which can benefit from them is
thus of extreme interest, particularly in view of the fact that this regime has recently
undergone some radical transformations in the context of what is called globalization,
including a very serious effort, under the auspices of the World Trade Organization, to
establish a universal regime of intellectual property including patents for
pharmaceuticals. The optimality of the system being put in place has been the object
of serious concerns on a number of matters, including the high price of patented
pharmaceuticals (which puts some newer essential medicines out of the reach of the
very individuals and communities which most need them), asymmetries observed in
the use, availability and development of what are termed "essential medicines" for
the more developed and less developed regions of the world1 and, paradoxically, a
slowing down of innovation and a general lack of research on priority health problems
including what are termed the neglected tropical diseases or NTDs and which
constitute major obstacles to the development of less developed nations. The current
system of incentives for medical and pharmaceutical innovation is clearly not meeting
obvious needs and needs fixing.2
The present paper concurs with the
recommendation of the World Health Organization Consultative Expert Working Group
on Research and Development (WHO-CWEG 2012) in 2012 to the effect that the
funding and overall coordination of health research - particularly in the area
ofneglected tropical diseases3 - could be conducted under the umbrella of the
World Health Organization and that these activities could be funded through an
"instrument" of international law which, under the Constitution of that organization,
could be made binding on all of its member states. (This recommendation - of which
more infra - is currently in abeyance but is deserving of reconsideration.) This
recommendation could leave the present system of patents intact. This paper
suggests, however, that the patent system is itself perhaps ill-adapted to the area of
essential medicines and that intellectual property for health-related products should
be vested in a public body, the most appropriate of which seems to be, once again, the
World Health Organization. The developers and inventors of truly valuable
pharmaceutical and other health-related innovations could, in this context, be
rewarded and incentivized under a system partly modeled on the Canadian Public
Lending Right Program which provides payments to the authors of works on loan in
Canadian publiclibraries.
The HIV/AIDS pandemic, antiretrovirals and the TRIPs Agreement
The impetus to produce the current study was initially provided by reflection on what
at first blush seemed like a relatively simple, although serious, problem, namely the
lack of access in the developing world to effective antiretroviral medications in
response to the devastating HIV/AIDS pandemic. The most obvious factor in this lack of
access to appropriate medication was, and still is, of course price: a year's supply (for a
single patient) of the first successful antiretroviral medication4 to arrive on the market,
initially sold for ten or twenty times the entire average annual income of most
individuals and families living in the countries most affected, putting the treatment
completely out of reach of precisely the people most affected by the crisis (and out of
reach of their governments as well). The high purchase price of these medications
had, and still has, little relation to the actual immediate (i.e. marginal) cost of
producing them - and pharmaceutical laboratories located in India and elsewhere
quickly offered to produce copies of them at a greatly reduced price of two or three
hundred US dollars for a year's supply.
In 2003, it was observed that "only 5% of the world's people with HIV/AIDS in
developing countries who [needed] anti-retroviral treatment ... [actually had] access to
it" (Elliott et al., 2003). More recently, concerning the situation as it existed ten years
later, UNAIDS has reported on a situation which has improved (somewhat) but is still
scandalously stark, indicating that "the HIV treatment coverage in low- and middleincome countries represented only 34% (32-37%) of the 28.6 million people eligible in
2013" (UNAIDS 2013, 6). For "eligible" we can here read "in need oftreatment". In
other words, two out of three human beings in the "majority world" with HIV/AIDS are
deprived of the treatment they need. Depriving only two individuals out of three
requiring treatment is admittedly better than nineteen out of twenty. But we are still
speaking of, in round figures, twenty million people unnecessarily condemned to losing
many years of productive existence. These statistics represent a devastating situation
affecting the economic and social viability of many less developed countries, especially
when we reflect that, in this particular pandemic, the age segment from 15 to 30 years
of age is disproportionately affected and that this age segment is made up of precisely
the individuals most needed (during the coming decades) to produce goods like basic
food and shelter and to provide services of all kinds, including security, education,
research and health care. This age group also includes the largest number of new
parents, so that as a result of the non- availability of antiretrovirals, large numbers of
young children are left behind as orphans or inadequately cared for as their parents
sicken and die prematurely.5
While there exists, at the time of writing, no actual effective cure or vaccine for
VIH/AIDS, it should be emphasized that with continued access to appropriate
antiretroviral medication and other supports (such as medical advice, proper nutrition
and community acceptance) an individual can maintain a normal, productive life. But
this can occur only if the individual - or the individual's country of residence - is
wealthy enough to purchase the required medication in its patented form - or if his or
her country has (like Brazil) has found a way around - or thumbed its nose at - the
restrictions imposed by the TRIPs Agreement in order to provide cost-effective
treatment to its citizens.
TRIPs, compulsory licenses and parallel exports
The TRIPs Agreement of 1994 - or to give it its full name - the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hence the acronym TRIPs, or ADPIC in
Spanish and French)6 - is one of the fundamental treaties administered by the the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and which by 2016 is scheduled to become binding
on even the least developed members of that organization, which includes almost all
the countries of the planet. The TRIPs Agreement requires that each member state of
the WTO shall insure through national legislation the universal protection of
intellectual property rights, including - and this is our present concern - patents on
pharmaceuticals. Under pressure from governments and pressure groups reacting to
the above- mentioned situation - whereby 95% of the world's people with HIV/AIDS in
developing countries were not receiving the needed medication, largely because of
patent-protected price levels - theWTO, via the Doha Declaration of 2001 and the
General Council Decision of 2003, clarified and somewhat modified the "flexibilities"
allowed for under the TRIPs Agreement. These flexibilities allow the governments of
member countries to deal with public health emergencies through what are called
compulsory licences and parallel imports. Under a compulsory licence, the patentholder can be legally forced to agree - while however receiving compensation deemed
to be reasonable - to the production of a generic copy of its patented product by a
third party. This third party can be, for example, a suitably equipped local
pharmaceutical laboratory. The possibility of parallel imports theoretically applies in
the case of countries which (like Rwanda or Lesotho, but unlike Brazil, India and South
Africa, for example) do not have their own, locally-based pharmaceutical industries.
The system of "flexibilities" has however not worked very well in practice, partly
because of bureaucratic restrictions lobbied for by patent-holders who worry that
cheaply priced products destined for poorer countries might find their way back into
the protected markets in richer countries and partly because of pressure to maintain a
narrow interpretation for what counts as a "public health emergency".
Canada's Access to Medicines Regime (CAMR), for example, created under a law
passed in the Canadian Parliament in 2004 and regulations proclaimed in 2005 allows
Canadian pharmaceutical companies to produce, under compulsory licenses, copies of
patented medications for export to developing countries which require them for public
health needs. First the good news, announced in the Magazine of the World
Intellectual Property Organization:
In September [2007], Canada became the first country to use the
waiver from the TRIPS Agreement provisions to issue a compulsory
license authorizing a company to make a generic version of a
patented drug for export. The Canadian government authorized
Apotex to export 260,000 packs of Apo-Triavar enough to treat
21,000 AIDS patients for a year to be delivered to Rwanda. (WIPO
2007)
Also in the "good news" department is the statement that "Apotex announced that the
drug would initially cost US$0.405 per tablet, compared to US$20 per tablet for the
brand-name equivalent, and would drop in price further once production of the active
pharmaceutical ingredients increased" (ibid.). The bad news, however, is that the
number and nature of bureaucratic hoops7 which need to be jumped through in order
for the required contracts to be signed and the required compulsory licenses issued
are such that, in 2012, the Canadian HIV/AIDS Network reported:
Since CAMR was passed almost six years ago, it has only been used
once after years of work by non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and one generic company for a single shipment of a single AIDS drug
to a single developing country. In its current form, CAMR is unlikely
to be used again due to the procedural requirements it places on
developing countries and generic pharmaceutical manufacturers.
(Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network 2012: 1)
South Africa's Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property (DNPIP) of 2013
"acknowledges the need to modify existing legislation and regulations to address the
difficulties in using both compulsory licensing and parallel importation measures, as
neither provision has been successfully used to date on a pharmaceutical product"
(MSF 2014). We may legitimately conclude that the parallel exports scheme, using
compulsory licenses, has not had a brilliant success heretofore as a means of avoiding
the side-effects of the supposedly beneficial system of patent-supported prices in the
richer countries (of which more later). This is hardly surprising in view of the long list of
requirements which must by met by any member of the WTO which attempts to
institute an arrangement like Canada's CAMR. Under article 31 of the TRIPs
Agreement, for example,
a WTO Member government cannot subject whole classes of
pharmaceuticals - such as "essential medicines" - to a pre-established
compulsory licensing scheme. It must, instead, adopt a case-by-case
approach and shape the compulsory license to meet the purpose for
which each license was authorized (Reichman 2009).
There must also have taken place negotiations with the patent-holder and the issuance
of the compulsory license must be subject to review by a higher authority - and to
being voided should the circumstances justifying its issuance have changed (cf. ibid.).
And so on. One cannot help but feel that there was a great deal of reluctance in
conceding the possibility of compulsory licenses in the first place. Presumably, this is
because there is unwillingness to compromise the supposed benefits of patentsupported pricing. We will next examine what these benefits may be.
In defence of pharmaceutical patents be defended: four premises to evaluate
Defenders of the particular intellectual property regime which is being globalized
through the TRIPs Agreement generally argue - in spite of the difficulties just
mentioned (and others) - that the system produces or has the potential to produce
overall benefits when compared with alternatives. Defenders of the TRIPs Agreement
regime will claim that - while the compulsory license and parallel exporting provisions
of the TRIPs Agreement currently provide optimal solutions to the solvable problems
concerning health care emergencies in the less developed countries and elsewhere that defence of this regime is the best way to insure the progress of science, medicine
and human well- being in general. The defenders of the TRIPs Agreement regime thus
rely implicitly and sometimes
explicitly on premises like the following: (1) without the current intellectual
property regime, the problem of the lack of universal availability of Zidovudine
(AZT) - due to its extremely high price while under patent - would have been
replaced by the problem of the total and permanent non- availability of
antiretroviral treatments. In a more generalized form, this premise states that,
(2) as a result of the rewards insured by patent-protected monopolies, there is
a maximization of benefits from innovation in the area of pharmaceuticals and
health-care generally, that (3) most of the excess revenue generated by high
prices on patented products is re-invested in research and and that (4) these
benefits flow to rich and poor alike. Critics of the intellectual property regime
enshrined in the TRIPs Agreement, on the other hand, seriously question the
truth of all four of these claims.
Premise (1), to the effect that there would be no pharmaceutical innovation at all in
the absence of patent-supported pricing, is contradicted by the history of many
important pharmaceutical advances in periods where patent-supported pricing was
not a factor - as we shall see in more detail further on. Premise (2), to the effect that
patent-supported pricing results in a maximization of benefits from innovation in the
area of pharmaceuticals and health-care, is dis-confirmed by the generally observed
slow-down in pharmaceutical innovation since the institution of the protections
enshrined by the TRIPs Agreement of 1994. More on this point later. Premise (3), as we
shall also see, is also patently false, since pharmaceutical companies demonstrably
spend more on promotion, advertising and lobbying than on research. (In the absence
of detailed accounting of research expenditures, it is also reasonable to suppose that
many of the vaunted "research" activities supported by many companies could equally
well be budgeted for under "promotion".8) Premise (4), to the effect that in spite of
the hardships imposed on poorer nations by patent-supported pricing the end result is
of equal benefit to rich and poor alike, is contradicted by the existence of the 10/90
gap in terms of which only 10% of health research is devoted to the health problems of
90% of the world's population.9
A later estimation has it that only 5% of health
research is devoted to the health problems of 93% of the world's population.10
Premise (4) is also contradicted by the lack of interest on the part of major
pharmaceutical companies in neglected tropical diseases, to which we now turn.
Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTDs)
Independently of the amounts actually invested in research (of which more will be said
anon), the system of patent-protection for pharmaceuticals which, under the TRIPs
Agreement, is being extended to the entire world, has not as yet been very successful
in producing innovative solutions for a series of important diseases and health
problems which are not of much concern to populations in the richer and more highly
developed countries and which, unlike AIDS and Avian Flu for example, are not
headline-catching epidemics or pandemics and not very likely to spread to New York,
Tokyo or Berlin. These diseases, which have come to be known as Neglected Tropical
Diseases, or NTDs, are largely endemic and/or often chronic in nature - and as a result
do not catch flashy headlines in the way that emerging epidemics and pandemics can.
In view of their often endemic and chronic nature, their status as public health
emergencies question can also be questioned by negotiators when discussing the
"flexibilities" provided for under the TRIPs Agreement. (Some negotiators would prefer
to limit compulsory licenses and parallel exports to crises provoked by emerging
pandemics like the ones associated with HIV/AIDS, SARS and Avian Influenza.) These
neglected diseases nonetheless constitute serious impediments to the well-being and
harmonious economic development of populations in a large areas of the planet.
The World Health Organization has officially designated 17 diseases as NDTs (cf.
WHO2014b). A partial list includes diseases such as malaria, dengue, leishmaniasis,
chikungunya, African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) and American
trypanosomiasis (Chagas disease). These diseases receive a disproportionately 11 low
level of attention from the international medical, scientific and pharmaceutical
communities. The tentative explanation for this lack of interest is that the intellectual
property regime which is currently being globalized provides little incentive to find
innovative solutions to the health problems and health-care needs of populations
which, at this point in history, happen to be disproportionately poor - to which one can
add that a major part of the historical explanation why these populations are
disproportionately poor is precisely because of the burden of disease with which they
have to cope - and because the current system for financing the necessary research
and insuring innovation in these areas has not been successful for these diseases and
for these populations. (This is particularly flagrant in cases where production of the
only cheap and effective remedies has actually been discontinued by major
multinationals because it did not seem that these medications were bringing in enough
revenue. The case of the discontinuance of the production ofeflornithine is discussed
further on.)
Essential medicines, what they are and their importance for development
The crisis over the pricing and availability of antiretroviral medications in the context
of the VIH/AIDS pandemic has also had the merit of renewing debate and analysis on
the topic of essential medicines. Essential medicines can be defined ostentively by
their presence on the latest version of the list of essential medicines maintained by the
World Health Organization, currently in its 18th edition (April 2013, amended in
October).12 As for the necessary and sufficient conditions which must be satisfied for a
medicine to be on the list, there exists an evolving set of procedures for adding
medications to the list - and for deleting them. A fairly elaborate definition in words
(which has since been modified somewhat) was proposed by the WHO Expert
Committee on the Selection and Use of Essential Medicines as it existed in 2002 in its
report published the following year:
Essential medicines are those that satisfy the priority health care
needs of the population. They are selected with due regard to public
health relevance, evidence on efficacy and safety, and comparative
cost effectiveness. Essential medicines are intended to be available
within the context of functioning health systems at all times in
adequate amounts, in the appropriate dosage forms, with assured
quality and adequate information, and at a price the individual and
the community can afford. The implementation of the concept of
essential medicines is intended to be flexible and adaptable to many
different situations; exactly which medicines are regarded as
essential remains a national responsibility. (WHO Expert Committee
2003: 22)
We take particular note of the words "at a price the individual and the community can
afford". The latest list (WHO 2013) contains items like acetylsalicylic acid, ibuprofen
and paracetamol (i.e., acetaminophen, for North Americans), labelled as antimigraine
medicines, as well as, further on, the well-known zidovudine (AZT) and a number of
other antiretroviral medications including combinations like lamivudine + nevirapine +
stavudine (WHO 2013: 17) and five medications against two important NTDs, African
and American trypanosomiasis (WHO 2013: 21). Among these five we find eflornithine,
particularly useful in the treatment of the gambiense form of African trypanosomiasis
or sleeping sickness, and which is the central pivot of what we will call the "Eflornithine
Affair".
The "Eflornithine Affair" (or the premature death of the "resurrection drug")
What we may call the "Eflornithine Affair" illustrates paradigmatically the extent to
which the pharmaceutical needs of the less developed countries simply do not have a
place in the priorities of the multinational pharmaceutical corporations. In his recent
book, La Vérité sur les médicaments, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen writes:
In the 1990s, all hopes of eliminating the recrudescence of sleeping
sickness fastened on a new medicine, eflornithine, which had initially
been developed for the treatment of certain cancers. Administered
to patients in terminal coma, its effect was so rapid and dramatic
that the term "resurrection drug" was used by some observers.
However, the production of eflornithine was brutally discontinued in
1995 by the pharmaceutical group Hoechst Marion Roussel which
held the patent the reason given being that the medication was not
generating sufficient profits. The association Médecins sans
frontières [Doctors Without Borders] (MSF) tried - as part of an
extensive campaign in favour of access to essential medicines - to
convince Hoechst to recommence production of eflornithine - but in
vain. At the end of the 1990s, the remaining stocks of eflornithine
were about to be exhausted and the situation on the ground had
become critical. (Borch-Jacobsen 2014: 72, translation)
It was only when a new "lifestyle" medication, Vaniqa®, approved by the FDA in the
United States in 2000 and in Europe the following year - as a treatment for the
problem of excess facial hair in women! turned out to have eflornithine as its main
active agreement, that MSF "turned up the heat" again, so to speak, with the following
result:
In order to avoid a public relations disaster, [Bristol-Myers Squibb
(BMS)] and Aventis (who in the meantime had acquired Hoechst)
signed an agreement with the WHO in 2001 by which they
committed themselves to cover world's needs in eflornithine and to
subsidize research on sleeping sickness to the tune of 5 million
dollars per annum. This was in the context an insignificant amount,
since the annual cash flow for BMS that year was 20.5 billion dollars
and for Aventis it was 6.7 billion. But the public image of the brand
had been saved. [...] (ibid : 72)
In other words, without the business opportunity created by the aversion for facial hair
among women in the richer countries, an important medicine against African
trypanosomiasis would have been lost. Borch-Jacobsen (2014: 73) quotes a
spokesperson for Bristol-Myers Squibb who, in all naïveté is reported13 to have
confessed: "Before Vaniqa® came along, there was not the slightest reason to produce
eflornithine. Now that reason exists." For a a more detailed account of what we have
called the Eflornithine Affair, see the relevant page on the site of the World Health
Organization (WHO (nd [ca 2001]) and Donald G. McNeil Jr.'s treatment of this
particular case in his New York Times report on the subject (McNeil 2000) - the subtitle
of which is "Drug Makers and 3rd World: Study in Neglect".
Lessons to be drawn from the Eflornithine Affair
But what, we may ask, is the appropriate reaction to this exemplary tale? The
temptation is to yield to feelings of moral outrage at the immoral conduct of the
managements of Hoechst, BMS and Aventis - who deprived victims of sleeping sickness
of a lifesaving and irreplaceable remedy - and to reflect that persons in their positions
should receive a better education in the area of ethics. This is perhaps not the most
fruitful approach - given that, as executives of a corporation owned by its
shareholders, they have an obligation to insure the profitability of the shareholders'
investment. They may, as human beings, as citizens, as parents, as signatories to
various types of contract, etc., have other obligations but, to the extent that they are
employees of the company's shareholders, the duty of the executives of a corporation
does not extend to saving the lives of individuals who, in Africa or elsewhere, have the
misfortune to fall seriously ill. If the management of a corporation deliberately
maintains a money-losing operation - including the production of a beneficial drug like
eflornithinethe shareholders have legitimate grounds for complaint against them.
The problem is therefore not the lack of proper ethical training for executives of
pharmaceutical giants but rather the question of whether it is appropriate for
pharmaceutical companies to be the owners of patents for drugs like eflornithine or,
for that matter, of the patent for any essential medicine. (Spinoza, in his political
philosophy, observed that a political system is irrational to the extent that it requires in
order to function properly an abnormal level of sainthood among those exercising
power.) It is interesting to note that when Hoechst Marion Roussel realized that the
privileges attached to being the patent-holders with respect to eflornithine had
become a public-relations liability, "this company granted WHO the production rights
for eflornithine in order that a third party manufacturer could be found" (WHO (nd [ca
2001]). Finding a manufacturer for an essential medicine currently out of production is
- fairly obviously it would seem - part of the moral obligations of the patent-holder of
such a medicine. Only certain "production rights" associated with the patent were
however transferred to WHO which, in partnership with Médecins sans frontières,
succeeded in identifying "some eight pharmaceutical companies [...] as potential
manufacturers" (ibid.). In the end, however, before this arrangement could be gone
ahead with, BMS and Aventis decided to act more generously. It is, however, surely
not entirely happenstance that the arrangements for the production of eflornithine
should at least start to fall into place in this way - as a way of resolving both the public
relations problem of the patent holders and the treatment availability crisis for victims
of the disease. The suggestion is that it is a fitting and rational arrangement for
whatever patents may be associated with important essential medicines for these
patents to vest with the World Health Organization, which in turn can be responsible
for issuing calls for tenders or other appropriate measures with a view to having the
medications actually produced and distributed. A similar process is used, within nation
states, for the construction and maintenanceof roads. The government decides, on the
basis of public interest, whether and where a road should be constructed and issues
calls for tenders from various private contractors able to do the work. In the absence
of insufficient political will to entrust this mandate to the World Health Organization, a
fall-back solution would be for patents in essential medicines to vest in the Health
Ministry of each national government.
In cases like that of eflornithine, where there is an overlap between the use of a
molecule as an essential medicine (in this case to treat sleeping sickness) and its use in
the context of a "lifestyle" pharmaceutical (in this case for reducing growth of facial
hair, considered as unattractive), the producers of the "lifestyle" pharmaceutical
should perhaps be required to pay some kind of royalty or fee towards the use of the
molecule as an essential medicine. This is, de facto, what seems to have spontaneously
occurred between the manufacturers of the facial hair inhibitor Vaniqa® and the World
Health Organization, more precisely the latter's TDR program, to which BMS and
Aventis have voluntarily supplied pharmaceuticals (eflornithine) and money. The fact
that such an arrangement has seemed rational and fair in an individual case provides
reason to think that a general formula couldbe inspired by this example.
Another important but neglected tropical disease: Chagas Disease
Given that the venue of the conference for which this paper was prepared is located in
Central America, it is perhaps fitting to say here a few words about Chagas Disease named in honour of the Brazilian clinician and scientist Carlos Chagas who, in 1909,
first accurately described this disease and identified the protozoan parasite which is its
cause, along with the insect which is the disease's main vector. The name Carlos
Chagas chose for the parasite he had discovered was trypanosoma cruzi in honour of
Carlos Chagas' mentor, the great Brazilian epidemiologist Oswaldo Cruz. This parasite
is less well known than its African relatives, trypanosoma brucei gambiense and
trypanosoma brucei rhodesiense, which cause African trypanosomiasis or sleeping
sickness - which we have just mentioned in relation to the Eflornithine Affair. Another
name for Chagas Disease is American trypanosomiasis.
Chagas Disease is relatively little known, especially in the "first" world, despite the fact
that by a conservative estimate 7 to 8 million people in the Americas suffer from it and
12 or 13 thousand individuals die from it annually (WHO 2014c). A news report
published on the occasion of an international conference held in April 2013 in
Cochabamba, Bolivia, on the subject of this disease placed the number of victims at 10
million, "of which less than 1% receive medical treatment" (ElCaribe / AP 2013,
translation). The disease lowers the productivity and shortens the lives of many people
- by 426 thousand disability-adjusted life years (DALYs)14 in the Americas in 2004
(WHO 2008: 60) for a total of 430 DALYs worldwide. In the final stages, the parasite,
which eventually accumulates in the heart of the victim, may cause unexpected heart
attacks. This disease primarily victimizes the extremely poor and as a result it is
sometimes called the disease of the poor, la enfermedad de los pobres (Gutiérrez
2013). For this reason we may also presume that the number of victims is in all
likelihood much higher than that just indicated. Not so long ago, the most current
guess was that 19 million persons in the Americas suffered from this disease.
According to the Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative, Chagas Disease is "endemic in
21 countries across Latin America and kills more people in the region each year than
any other parasite-born disease, including malaria" (DNDi 2014). DNDi adds that "in
total, 100 million people are at risk worldwide" (ibid.). The DNDi also reports (citing
WHO documentation) that "in Brazil alone, losses of over US$ 1.3 billion in wages and
industrial productivity were due to workers with Chagas disease" and that "Chagas
disease is a leading cause of infectious cardiomyopathy worldwide"(ibid.).
The protozoan parasite which causes of Chagas Disease is present in the feces of a
blood- sucking triatomine insect known in Central America as the chinche picuda - or,
more appropriately, as the chinche asesina - and in English as the "kissing bug". In
Argentina, these insects are called vinchucas, in Brazil they are called barbeiros. They
may also be called pitos or chipos, and receive other names as well. They typically
come out from behind picture frames or from other hiding places at night and feed on
the blood of sleeping humans. Strangely, while African victims of sleeping sickness are
typically infected by the bite of the tse-tse fly, human victims of American
trypanosomiasis are not infected as a result of the actual bite of the carrier but by its
feces, deposited at the moment of feeding. The parasite is subsequently transferred to
the wound or to the eyes and mouth by scratching. Human to human contamination is
also possible in various ways. As the result of migratory movements of population, the
disease has spread to the United States, Canada, Spain and other non-tropical
countries.
The World Health Organization informs us that, for Chagas Disease, "there is not any
available vaccine" (WHO 2014c, italics added), although a web search will turn up news
reports to the effect that several vaccines have been developed recently.15 The
"neglected" characteristic of Chagas Disease is perhaps illustrated by an enigmatic
sentence encountered in an older version of the English-language Wikipedia article on
Chagas Disease to the effect that "a reasonably effective vaccine was developed in
Ribeirão Preto [where the University of São Paulo has a School ofMedicine] in the
1970s, using cellular and subcellular fractions of the parasite, but it was found
economically unfeasible" (retrieved16 2006-09-07 14:08:04). This older version of the
English- language Wikipedia article is still reflected (as of 2014-06-21) in the
corresponding French-language article (Wikipedia 2014) but no reference to an antiChagas vaccine developed in the 1970s at the Ribeirão Preto Medical School currently
occurs in the corresponding Spanish-, Portuguese- and English-language articles as
they existed on 2014-06-21.
The as yet un-met treatment needs indicated by the Drugs for Neglected Diseases
Initiative include "improved treatment options [...] for all stages of Chagas infection: A
paediatric strength which is affordable, age-adapted, safe, and efficacious would cure
patients early on in the disease [and] a new drug for chronic disease that is safe,
efficacious, and adapted to the field, and ideally would work in both stages of the
disease" (DNDi 2014). The current medications on the World Health Organization's list
of essential medicines for the disease have alarming levels of toxicity for the patient
and are not satisfactorily effective in treating the later phase(s) of the disease.
"Doctors and nurses in the field are forced to care for patients with
treatments that are largely archaic, toxic, ineffective; some are
unaffordable and some are nonexistent," said Sophie Delaunay,
executive director of the US section of the humanitarian medical
group Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF; Doctors Without Borders), as
she described the challenges of neglected tropical diseases.
(Voelker2009: 1755)
A telling statistic
The WHO Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and Development
(established in 2010) reports that between 1975 and 2000, only 16 out of 1393 new
medicines were for "tropical diseases" and tuberculosis. Between 2000 and 2009, 26
relevant new products are identified, 10 of which "were for AIDS and 11 for malaria"
(WHO-CEWG 2012: 35; Cohen et al. 2010).
Patenting Drugs: An Option or a Necessity?
"Patenting drugs," in the words of David Healy, "and thereby restricting access to them
either physically or by virtue of the increased price that comes with monopoly, was for
centuries regarded as incompatible with a vocation to alleviate disease" (Healy 2012,
27). The idea of subjecting pharmaceuticals to patent law is controversial at best - as
illustrated by the fact, reported by Healy, that in 1844 the French National Assembly
reversed an earlier law enacted in 1791 and "removed medicines from the domain of
patentable products" (ibid.) only to reverse its position again "in 1960 when France,
the country which had been most opposed to patenting medicines, switched to
product patents, followed in 1967 by Germany, the country that had developed more
pharmaceuticals than all other countries combined" (Healy 2012: 29). In
"Pharmaceutical Patent Law in-the-Making", Maurice Cassier writes:
After the first patent laws on inventions were enacted in the late
eighteenth century, parliaments, governments, institutions, and
medical professions endeavored to limit or suspend the extension of
monopolies on remedies, in the interests of public health. In 1844 the
French parliament, against the government's advice, prohibited
patents on medicines for a century. In this respect it followed the line
of the Académie de Médecine, which at the time was fiercely
opposed to monopolies on medicinal remedies. After 1944, when
pharmaceutical processes could again be patented in France, the
government instituted a "special license" justified in the name of
public health. [...] Despite the early internationalization of patent
rights, via the Paris Convention of 1883, many other states also
excluded medicines from patenting. This was the case for instance in
West Germany, until 1968, and Japan, until 1975. The developing
countries of interest to us here, Brazil and India, likewise opted for
the nonpatentability of pharmaceutical products, respectively, in
1945 and 1970. In 1994 a new phase of globalization of intellectual
property (IP) was, however, initiated with WTO trade regulations that
extended 20-year patents on medicines to all member countries
(May, 2000). Two years later the Brazilian parliament passed a law
recognizing pharmaceutical patents, even though the WTO
international standard did not come into force until a decade later.
India, on the other hand, stalled until March 2005.
In the late 1990s, the globalization of medicine patents triggered an
upsurge of actions by governments and civil society calling for the
regulation of the scope of these patents. They endeavored to use
every form of flexibility in the WTO agreements and national laws in
order to strike a balance between IP and access to new treatments.
[...]
These struggles through the law (petitioning patent offices, lawsuits)
and over the law (public campaigns) have proliferated since the early
2000s, especially in Brazil and India. In Brazil, struggles to obtain
compulsory licenses have intensified since
2001, under the impulse of the HIV/AIDS program, MSF Brazil, AIDS
patient organizations, and public and private generics manufacturers
engaged in reverse engineering of patented antiretrovirals (ARVs).
Legal opposition to patents provided for by Brazilian patent law and
Indian law has multiplied since 2006 and led to several refusals of
patents on ARVs and on a particularly expensive cancer medicine,
Glivec, owned by Novartis. [...] The court ruled in 2007 that a state
had the right to define the bounds of patentability, in the public
interest. (Cassier 2013: 6889-6925)
A patent, we remind the reader, is a monopoly granted by a government to the patentholder for the manufacture, sale and import of a product for a limited period of time.
Patents are normally granted for an invention which can be shown to be something
novel - and to have usefulness above and beyond what already exists. The moral and
political justification for limiting the right of all to imitate good ideas, as we have
already mentioned, is the belief that this is a good way to stimulate innovation and to
improve human existence (identified above as Premise (2)). It is perhaps paradoxical
that defenders of the neoliberal version of globalization - and who in general believe in
the benefits of liberalizing commerce - and who also in general consider that
government intervention is an evil - should be among the strongest proponents of the
system embodied by the TRIPs Agreement - which is an attempt to restrict the flow of
knowledge and which requires a good deal of government intervention in order to
enforce it (cf. Stiglitz 2007: 117). The difference between the higher price charged for
on-patent medicines, as compared to what the price of the corresponding generics
would be in the absence of a patent can, according to Stiglitz, be thought of as being
equivalent to a tax imposed on the users of the product, in exchange for the supposed
advantages of the uniform, one-size-fits-all universal patent system which the sponsors
of the TRIPs Agreement regime are putting into place.
The TRIPs Agreement attempts to impose "on the entire world the dominant
intellectual property regime in the United States and Europe" (Stiglitz ibid.). This
particular system, in the opinion of Joseph Stiglitz, is "not in the interests of developing
countries", in addition to being "not good for the United States and the EU" (ibid.).
Stiglitz furthermore argues that no one single intellectual property regime can be
suitable, simultaneously, "for the least-developed, the middle- income and the
advanced industrialized countries" (Stiglitz 2007: 119).
Historically, it is worth mentioning that many major pharmaceutical advances,
including the development of penicillin and the anti-polio Salk vaccine occurred
without the benefit of patents - and the patent on the production of insulin was held in
trust for the public by the University of Toronto, in spite of attempts by a major
pharmaceutical company to "get around" it (cf. Healy 2012: 28).
It is also worth mentioning that patents are only one element of a complex system
which has evolved in recent history to provide a framework for the development and
use of pharmaceuticals. In addition to restrictions imposed by the process which an
inventor must go through in order to obtain a patent, a new medication must, as a
condition of being offered for sale, also be approved (for a specified use or for
specified uses) by the government agency responsible for insuring the efficacy and
safety of medications.17 But, even once approved, the medication has still not been
acquired or used by a human being, since many medications are "on prescription only"
- which at least in principle requires that a qualified health care professional shall (on
the basis of previous training and continuing access to the medical literature) have
decided that the prescribed medication is appropriate for the particular problem of the
particular patient to whom it is prescribed. Young doctors and others may be surprised
to learn just how recent the "on-prescription-only" provisions of the law are. In the
United States, for example, they were instituted as late as 1962 by the Kefauver Harris
Amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. On top of these controls,
there are also more-or-less voluntary guidelines for the treatment of various
conditions which are laid down by non-governmental bodies of experts, the following
of which gives a certain level of protection against the ever-present danger of lawsuits
for malpractice. A number of authors (including Healy 2012) have argued that this
entire system is seriously defective for a number of different reasons, not all of which
can detain us here. We will however mention here one of the elements criticized by
Healy, namely the modification of American law - under the the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980
- which encourages university-connected scientists to patent discoveries made while
on salary at their universities. This, according to Healy, has had a corrupting effect on
both science and clinical practice. Healy writes:
[C]linicians and scientists have seemed keener on making patent
applications themselves and setting up start-up companies than in
advancing medical knowledge or healthcare. [...] Molecules are only
interesting insofar as they can be used to capture market niches.
Medicine may look the same as it has always done to onlookers; the
marketers know it's not. (Healy 2012: 34).
The conclusion being argued for here is that the dominant intellectual property regime
including patents for medicines is not the only possible one - and may in fact not even
be the best one (from various points of view). This being noted, it is time to look at the
standard arguments for the TRIPs Agreement intellectual property regime in the
context of therapeutic pharmaceuticals and from the point of view of asymmetries of
health care between the more developed and the less developed world.
Is the TRIPs Agreement regime necessary (or even favourable) to the
continued progress of medical science?
We have already suggested at the beginning of this study that defenders of the TRIPs
Agreement regime (which we will begin calling the TAR) that patent protection for
pharmaceuticals insures (1) that innovations like AZT and other antiretrovirals will be
produced and (2) that, as a result of the rewards insured by patent-protected
monopolies, there is a maximization of benefits from innovation in the area of
pharmaceuticals and health-care generally. This is indeed what is asserted by a folder
entitled Striking a Balance: Patents and Access to Drugs and Health Care published by
the World Intellectual Property Organization ca 2002 and which denounces six
"myths", including the following:
Myth: "The patent system is especially unfair to developing countries,
which face difficult social and economic circumstances and should be
exempt from international intellectual property requirements,
especially in the case of patent protection for certain drugs." (WIPO
ca 2002)
The refutation of this "myth" as provided by WIPO begins with the following:
A robust patent system providing for adequate patent protection is
an indispensable incentive to creative and inventive work [...]. An
adequate patent system can also help countries develop and
strengthen their own research infrastructures [...]. An adequate
patent system also provides a proper balance between the public
interest and the interest of the inventor. (ibid.)
Unfortunately for the convincingness of this refutation, it can be observed that, since
the adoption of the TAR protections in 1994, the pace of innovation has not picked up,
but rather it has slowed down, contrary to the promise (Angell 2004, Healy 2012,
WHO-CEWG 2012, Goldacre 2012, etc.). In addition, it should be pointed out that the
holders of patents who insist on high prices and who are being rewarded are, in
general, not the inventors of the products in question. The actual invention of many of
the patented molecules was achieved by researchers in government-funded research
organizations such as universities - the patent being afterwards transferred to a
pharmaceutical company. One of the defects of the TAR is perhaps, precisely, that the
actual inventors of useful therapies are not sufficiently rewarded. The argument is not
whether useful innovation should or not be rewarded, the argument is whether the
TAR is a satisfactory way of achieving this end (among others).
Returning however to the half-dozen "myths" denounced by the same WIPO folder, we
note the following:
Myth: "International treaties concerning patent protection interfere with the
basic human right to life-saving drugs."
It is hard to avoid the reflection that this is a hard "myth" to debunk when patent
protection has in reality meant prohibitively high prices for essential medicines
urgently needed by large numbers of people with low incomes - and when the defence
of patent-holders' rights takes the concrete form of attempts to limit and to obstruct
the use of the "flexibilities" provided for by the TAR through compulsory licenses and
parallel exporting. The TAR would seem, moreover, to be an aggravating factor - as
opposed to a mitigating one - in the case of the "Eflornithine Affair" discussed earlier,
in which maximizing revenue for the patent-holder was not compatible with
maximizing health-care benefits for those who suffer from sleeping sickness. It thus
seems hard to avoid the conclusion that the actual details of the international treaties
concerning intellectual property currently in place do indeed "interfere with the basic
human right to life-saving drugs" by instituting a structure in which the incentive can
be in favour of the discontinuance of the production of a literally life-saving drug and
where the only disincentive to just "sitting" on an exclusive patent to an indispensable
medicine is the danger of a negative public relations campaign being launched by a
troublesome NGO. Furthermore, with respect to the first "myth" examined above, it is
particularly notable that, in the interval since the signing of the TRIPs Agreement in
1994, the "creative and inventive work" fostered by the TAR has not resulted in new,
better treatments for sleeping sickness but instead has threatened to interrupt access
to an older one.
It is interesting to note that the authors of the WIPO folder argue that the TAR cannot
be said to interfere with the basic human right to life-saving drugs because the both
the latter right and the right to enjoy one's rights as a creator of intellectual property
are enshrined in the same Universsal Declaration of Human Rights, the assumption
being, presumably, that there can therefore exist no contradiction or tension between
them. The refutation reads as follows:
Both the right of any individual to enjoy the material and moral
benefits as a creator of intellectual property, and the right of all
human beings to a standard of living that affords adequate health
and medical care, are set forth in the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 25 and 27). They are not
contradictory but should be seen as complimentary [ sic ] because
the former rights afford the enjoyment of the latter rights through
progress and innovation in science. International intellectual
property treaties, including those relating to patents, fully comply
with the Declaration. (WIPO ca 2002).
The last sentence, "International intellectual property treaties, including those relating
to patents, fully comply with the Declaration" is perhaps less than obviously true. The
second-to-last sentence - which suggests, once again, that "progress and innovation in
science" are optimally obtained under the TAR- is, as already remarked above, on
shaky ground since, as already remarked, considerable progress and innovation in
medical science have taken place without the benefit of the type of patent- protection
provided by the TAR. It has also been remarked that, after 20 years of the TAR, the
pace of progress and innovation in medicine has slowed, not quickened. More
precisely, if there have been "many new drugs", the type of innovation they represent
has been of "little benefit" - as is illustrated by the following slide from a presentation
by by Jörg Schaaber at the "Selling Sickness" conference held in Washington in 2013.
Schaaber's source is the publication Prescrire.
According to the analysis represented by this pie-chart - the methodology for which is
not analysed here - out of 984 newly approved drugs over a period of nine years, only
2% actually constituted a "real advance". The context for this lack of achievement is a
half century-long period during which the current intellectual property regime has
dominated Europe and the United States and two decades at the beginning of which,
with the adoption of the TRIPs Agreement, this system was globalized. Are we really
working under the best possible system?
How much of patent-generated income is really used for research and getting drugs
approved?
If the results of research funded by patent-supported pricing are not as impressively
innovative as we have been led to believe, what now can we say about the not-always
implicit suggestion that most of the extra money brought in by patent-supported
pricing is spent on research and on getting new products approved by the requisite
regulatory agencies? What we can say is that (1) the amounts actually spent have been
exaggerated and that (2) pharmaceutical companies spend much more on advertising
and promotional activities than they do on actual research.
A number of years ago, for example, it was a commonplace to advance the figure of
approximately 802 million US dollars (in 2000 dollars) as the average cost incurred by a
pharmaceutical company for each new drug brought to market. This figure has been
analyzed and deconstructed by Marcia Angell,18 who points out first of all that while
the pharmaceutical industry (through PhRMA reports) gives overall figures for "R&D",
the individual companies do not reveal "what each company spends, and for what
purposes, on the development of each drug" (Angell 2004:565). Furthermore, much of
what is represented as being spent on R&D, Angell adds, "may really be marketing
which counts as R&D because it looks better to have a large R&D budget than to have
a large marketing budget" (ibid.). So-called "Phase IV studies", for example, amount to
paying doctors to try a new drug which will already have been approved and which will
already be on the market. Referring to calculations made by a consumer advocacy
group Public Citizen, Angell notes that the average cost, after taxes, using PhMRA's
own total for research divided by the total number of drugs approved, was closer to
$100 million after taxes and "a far cry from the vaunted $802 million" (Angell 2004:
590). Turning to where the figure of $802 million might have come from, Angell
informs us that it originates in an analysis done by a group of economists under Joseph
DiMasi of Tufts University and that this analysis divided total research expenditure not
by the total number of pharmaceuticals approved but by the total number of "new
molecular entities" (NMEs) or (to use the older term) "self-originated new chemical
entities" (NCEs) - which were much less numerous. Removing the fictional
"opportunity costs" and tax deductions, the $802 million per NME shrinks, by Angell's
calculations, to $266 million, but if the divisor is the total number of approvals
obtained, Angell puts the real average, as just noted, at less than $100 million per drug
approval.
But is all of this $100 million being used to support what we would really want to call
"research"? Coming back to the lack of any detailed breakdown which would tell us
exactly what this money was spent on, the critic is entitled to speculate that medical
ghostwriting is in all likelihood a sizable item in the research budget. (The examination
of this worrisome phenomenon goes beyond the purview of the present paper,
however.) Observers are also entitled to grumble about the general "dodginess" (if we
may use that word) of the "research" which goes into preparing and conducting the
clinical trials undertaken by drug companies (according to Goldacre 2012; BorchJacobsen 2014; Healy 2012, among others). Another component of so-called
"research" may be the "awarenesscampaigns" targeting a new disease for which a new
medication is about to be released.
Disease Mongering
The subject of "awareness campaigns" brings us to the phenomenon called "disease
mongering" by which new diseases or "risk factors" are invented or by which older
diseases and risk factors (like obesity) are re-configured and re-defined to include
more people. Under the current intellectual property regime, coupled with current
arrangements for the evaluation and approval of pharmaceutical products for being
prescribed by physicians, pharmaceutical companies have a greater financial interest in
developing medications to be taken over a long period of time than they have in
developing products which provide - after a few weeks of treatment - a definitive
"cure" for a short- term health problem, like a nasty infection, restoring the patient to
health and thus to a state where medication is no longer required, which is the best
possible outcome for the patient and the worst possible outcome for the marketer of
pharmaceuticals. Perhaps not coincidentally, the development of new, improved
antibiotics has slowed to a trickle, in spite of the need created by the increasing
development of resistance to the existing stock of antimicrobials by many dangerous
bacteria. Chronic "risk factors" such as osteoporosis and hypercholesterolemia,
however, are of a nature that, once diagnosed, patients may expect to be advised to
take an anti-hypercholesterolemia, anti-osteoporosis or anti-something medication for
the rest of their lives - as well as additional medications which become necessary to
treat the side-effects of the medications they are already taking. These physiological
conditions like osteoporosis and hypercholesterolemia, as well as psychic afflictions
like anxiety, depression, bipolarity and attention deficit disorders, also have the
advantage of being of concern to affluent first-world populations which benefit from
levels of income and participation in public and private health insurance schemes
which enable them to purchase the medications which they have been led to believe
are necessary because of something which is more or less permanently "wrong" with
them. This is a market which, from a commercial point of view, is much more
interesting than that provided by low-income populations and individuals suffering, for
example, from a disease which can be cured by eliminating the parasite which causes
it. The demand for such a product is, from a commercial point of view, selfeliminating and not, in a perverse sense, "sustainable"!
Such, then, is the structure of incentives to innovate currently provided by the present
configuration of the dominant intellectual property + drug approval regime we are
living with. It does not seem to provide strong encouragement for the development of
safe alleviative treatments, or better yet for reliable diagnostics, absolute cures and
preventive vaccines for Chagas disease, dengue, malaria, chikungunya, sleeping
sickness, etc. Cynics may even quip that there is a financial danger - a negative
incentive - associated with the development of such important medicines. Question:
What is this "danger"? Answer: The producer of such a product would come under
immediate pressure to provide it, at cost, to the low-income populations which are the
main victims of these scourges.
Use of patent-generated income for advertising and promotional purposes
We have already alluded to the fact that pharmaceutical companies spend far more on
advertising and promotion than on research. Marcia Angell writes:
In 2002, when the ten U.S. drug companies in the Fortune 500 list
had combined worldwide sales of about $217 billion and spent just
over 14 percent of that on R & D (about $31 billion), they had a profit
margin of 17 percent ($36 billion). Thus, profits were substantially
more than R & D costs. Even more startling is the fact that they spent
a walloping 31 percent of sales (about $67 billion) on marketing and
administration. (Angell 2004: 677).
In other words, the amount which pharmaceutical companies spend on marketing and
administration is more than double the amount they say they spend on research (some
of the latter being, as we have seen, in all likelihood more appropriately classified as
promotion).
It is also well known that for every four or five doctors in the United States, there is at
least one well-dressed, well-paid, charming and persuasive drug company
representative who will come to visit regularly to distribute company literature, free
samples of medicines and other gifts. We may well ask: Are AIDS patients in Africa
paying their salaries?
Advertising is perhaps an unavoidable phenomenon in the contemporary world. It can
also be argued that advertising is a source of information. But, by its very nature and
by its very purpose, advertising, considered as a source of information, is at the same
time a source of mis-information- as Goldacre (2012) has pointed out. By paying high
patent-supported prices for medicine, the purchasers are thus in a sense paying to be
mis-informed. A large proportion of what purchasers of medicines marketed at patentsupported prices pay for their medication therefore goes to paying to be misinformed or to have misinformation supplied to one's physician. The proportion of patentgenerated income devoted to providing misinformation is estimated at easily the
double of the proportion of patent-generated income that is to devoted to having
innovative research done. Under a different system, much of the resources now
devoted to advertising and promotion could bedevoted to providing information and
education in a way that is more objective and less dominated by flagrant conflict of
interest.
Use and misuse of patent-generated income for lobbying
Another of the disadvantages of the intellectual property regime for medicines which
is being applied under the TRIPs Agreement is how the resources generated by patentsupported pricing give pharmaceutical corporations both the wherewithall and the
motivation to block beneficial initives, like the institution of a global fund for R&D on
essential medicines under the auspices of the World Health Organization. If there is no
particular incentive for the pharmaceutical industry to develop products which
promise, at the outset, to be unprofitable, why should we not create an alternative
structure to do so? Since such a structure already exists, the question is more
relevantly why should we not begin to put this structure to use? In La Vérité sur les
médicaments, Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen writes:
Created in 1948 under the aegis of the United Nations, the World
Health Organization has the constitutional powers necessary to
remedy this situation. Article 19 of the WHO Constitution stipulates
that the World Health Assembly has the authority to adopt
international conventions by a two-thirds majority of its member
states. In April
2012, after seven years of reflection, a WHO Consultative Expert
Working Group recommended [cf. WHO-CEWG (2012)] the creation
of world pharmaceutical R&D organisation financed by the member
states at the rate of 0.01% of their respective GNPs. Such an
organization, founded not on the principle of intellectual property
but on that of a universal right to health would provide sustainable
financial support for the development of essential medicines at
affordable prices for the concerned populations. (Borch-Jacobsen
2014: 75)
Borch-Jacobsen continues:
This did not please the International Federation of Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers & Associations (IFPMA) which, three years earlier, was
able to have advance access to a "confidential" draft of the report
the WHO experts had communicated to it in order to receive the
IFPMA's comments. In a two page statement sent "behind the back"
of the Expert Working Group, the IFPMA formulated its own
recommendations - which were very negative with regard to all
proposals attacking the present system of intellectual property.
Revealed by Wikileaks, this "attempted sabotage" of the work of the
Expert Working Group was denounced in a strongly voiced editorial
published in the medical journal The Lancet: "The drug industry
should no longer be allowed to hold the poor people of the world to
ransom" [The Lancet 's editorial team 2010:2].
But the IFPMA need not have been concerned. The text of the
working paper had hardly been submitted to the World Health
Assembly when the proposal of a compulsory world convention was
immediately blocked by the opposition of the United States, Japan
and the countries of the European Union (including France). These
countries, which are the richest countries of the planet (and,
incidentally, the countries where the largest pharmaceutical
industries are located), are opposed to the principle of a compulsory
tax and would prefer a "voluntary" contribution. Nils Daulaire, the
representative of the Obama administration declared, in the clearest
of terms: "At this time, we do not favor the establishment of an
intergovernmental working group to further develop the ... proposals
[.] [...] We would not support any proposal that would put in place a
new financing mechanism that could be characterized as a globally
collected tax" [quoted Carter 201219].
Further study of the proposal has been definitely postponed. (Borch-Jacobsen 2014:
75-76) Reflecting on the same incident, a recent article speaks of "thwarted attempts
to develop an R&D convention [which] have spurred [a] call for fresh debate on the
viability of the very foundations of the current global health system" (Kiddell-Munro et
al. 2013: abstract) but identify the problem as being attributable to a "state-centric
global health system" where "ultimately decisions are made by powerful states
wielding their political and economic power" (Kiddell-Munro et al. 2013: 5). Our
diagnosis is that there is yet another level of power hidden behind the "powerful
states" - and that patent-generated income, instead of being channelled into needed
research, contributes to the lobbying-power of the pharmaceutical industry which, in
turn, is used to influence national governments of the more powerful states to act
not only against the interest of the populations of less powerful states but also against
the interest of their own populations. Fortunately, there is still enough vitality in the
democratic institutions of most of the powerful states in question to allow us to hope
that, to the extent that the electorate can be made aware of what is happening, the
situation can be changed.
"Me-too" drugs and the "Evergreening" of patents
Another disadvantage of the current intellectual property regime is that it encourages
a considerable waste of time and resources in the production of "me-too" drugs and in
the "evergreening" of patents.
In the case of "me-too" drugs, the incentive is provided by the spectacle of a rival
pharmaceutical company which has developed - and patented - a product which has
proved to be extremely lucrative. The objective becomes to produce a product
sufficiently similar to the one which is enjoying proven success on the market but
which is at the same time sufficiently different, in some way, to merit a patent. This is
what w might term minimal innovation: just different enough, but not too different.
Well-known examples include attempts to imitate the first antiretroviral drug AZT, but
also the production of SSRIs20 similar to Prozac (fluoexitine) - or imitations of the
statin Lipitor, reputed to be the best-selling drug of all time,21 a paradigm case of the
"blockbuster", successfully promoted for its power to lower measurable cholesterol in
the blood. Lipitor is now off-patent, but there are currently a half-dozen newer,
patented statins on the market which are doing very well, at least from the point of
view of sales. It is perhaps doubtful whether humanity needs yet another statin
medication - whereas humanity certainly does need better prevention and treatment
for sleeping sickness and Chagas disease (for example). In view of the 10/90 or 5/93
gap in health research, we may justifiably feel that the principal of triage adopted in
hospital emergency rooms is not being followed by the operation of the current
structures under which health research is financed by patent- supported prices.
This impression is reinforced by consideration of the "evergreening" of ntpatents and
approvals for medications. "Evergreening" is achieved by applying for a new patent for
an existing medication in virtue of a change in dosage or format or in view of an
application to have a new use for the drug officially approved. As a parallel tactic,
production and promotion of the now off-patent or soon to be off-patent form of the
product can be reduced or discontinued.22 ("Sorry, that's not currently available, but
we do have the new, improved version!") The NGO Médecins sans frontières or
Doctors Without Borders has recently denounced a covert campaign on the part of
the pharmaceutical lobby to block attempts by the South African government to
change its laws in order to prevent re-patenting of existing treatments for frivolous
reasons:
Documents leaked on 17 January [2014] [...] reveal plans for a covert,
large-scale public relations campaign with a US$600,000 (R6 million)
budget, financed largely by the US-based pharmaceutical lobby. The
goal of the proposed strategy is to disrupt the country's long-awaited
plans to bring into force public health safeguards absent in its patent
system. These changes would, among other initiatives, ensure that
companies cannot unfairly extend monopolies by simply changing a
formulation or combining two medicines into a single tablet, and
registering a new patent for this obvious change. This practice of
patent 'evergreening' unfairly blocks generic competition and keeps
drug prices high, limiting patients’ ability to access the life-saving
medicines they need. (MSF 2014)
As MSF explains, the situation is perhaps more urgent in South Africa than in other
countries:
Because South Africa blindly hands out patents without examining
their quality -granting more patents on medicines than even the U.S.
and Europe - the country often cannot access generics available in
other countries. Multiple patents on medicines in South Africa lead to
some of the longest delays in the developing world for the
introduction of generic competition. In some cases, such as for
cancer medicine imatinib, South Africa pays up to 35 times more for
originator products than other countries pay where robust generic
competition is available. (Ibid.)
The existence of a US$600,000 covert public relations campaign financed by the
pharmaceutical lobby - it should be mentioned in passing - is also another example of
the misuse of the surplus income created by patent-supported pricing of medications.
Conclusion: Some Recommendations
The intellectual property regime and the drug-approval mechanisms currently
dominant in the world clearly need to be carefully reviewed and remodelled. There are
many identifiable dysfunctionalities, the most flagrant of which is possibly the
dyssymmetries in research and delivery of treatment and prevention programs
between the more developed and the less developed worlds.
Independently of any radical structural changes - remembering that two out of three
persons afflicted with HIV/AIDS in the developing world still do not have access to
treatment - one place to begin could be to follow Joseph Stiglitz's suggestion that "the
advanced industrial countries [could] simply [...] provide the drugs, or at least subsidize
them - in effect paying the 'tax,' the difference between [patent-supported] price and
marginal cost" (Stiglitz 2007: 120). (We have already mentioned that Stiglitz considers
that the difference between the patent-supported price and actual costs of production
and distribution to be a form of "tax" which we pay in exchange for the supposed
advantages of the current intellectual property regime.) Thus it is that, according to
Stiglitz, "one of the simplest ways for the developed countries to help developing
countries is to 'waive' the tax, allowing them to use the intellectual property for their
own citizens, so that their citizens can obtainthe drugs at cost" (ibid.). As part of this
idea, "universities should insist that, as a part of their licensing agreements with drug
manufacturers, drugs be provided to developing countries at a deeply discounted
price" (ibid.). A model for this kind of effort could be provided by how the United
States and other countries mobilized for the Second World War - temporarily
forgetting internal dissensions and in-fighting in order to concentrate on measures
objectively needed to face a pressing emergency. When the dikes have given way, the
first priority is send boats down the flooded streets to pick up those who are in
immediate danger of drowning or in need of assistance, independently of who the
boats available may actually belong to. The work of redesigning the system of dikes
and rebuilding them - or of relocating the population which has just been flooded out or of compensating the owners of the boats which were requisitioned - belongs to a
second line of priorities. Given the extraordinary number of lives and - even more
importantly! - of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) at stake when so many people
with HIV/AIDS are left untreated, it is morally and economically unacceptable not to
take urgent action.
Given that whatever action is actually undertaken with a view to resolving the world's
health problems from a development perspective will be associated with costs - as for
example to pay for the system of compensation for authors of beneficial
pharmaceutical innovations - Stiglitz's proposal to "waive the tax" constituted by the
patent-supported price differential between generics and on- patent drugs is
complementary to the World Health Organization's Consultative Expert Working Group
on Research and Development proposal to institute a different, more appropriate form
of "tax" in order to finance and coordinate research in important areas of health
(WHO-CEWG 2012). The CEWG considers a number of possibilities - including
something akin to the famous Tobin Tax on financial transactions.
In the light of cases like the Eflornithine Affair dealt with above and others similar, and
for other reasons, we may conclude that the current intellectual property regime is
not, in its present form, providing the correct incentives. Part of the solution might be
to decree (in each nation state and worldwide) that medicines on the list of Essential
Medicines are simply not subject to being protected by patent - or that they are to be
placed in some kind of patent pool. Wasteful redundancy due to "me-too" drugs and
"evergreening" should be avoided in the processes whereby patent applications are
evaluated and products are evaluated - either for inclusion on the list of Essential
Medicines - or even, in general, for approval for sale as pharmaceuticals in the first
place. (Also, withdrawal of approval should become more frequent, and less subject to
conflict of interest.) Authorization to produce and distribute products listed as
Essential Medicines could be granted on the basis of calls for tenders and adjudication
by an agency of WHO constituted for the purpose. The relevant WHO agency could be
in the position of signing contracts to insure that certain kinds of research be
undertaken, in the position of actually purchasing drugs from the lowest bidder - or in
a position analogous to that of a government which allows a private company to build
a bridge at its own expense in exchange for the right to charge tolls for a number of
years.
Another interesting model for reconciling the need to recognize and remunerate the
producers of intellectual property with the need to provide access to the the property
in question is provided in the case of the Public Lending Right Program administered by
the Canada Council for the Arts which allows the authors of books and other works
which are present in Canadian public libraries and therefore lent out (essentially free
of charge) to members of the public to receive payments as a function of the (roughly)
estimated use which shall have been made of their works during the preceding year.
Authors must submit an application, indicating the works of which they are the author,
and receive an annual payment as a function of the estimated use of those works
during the year (cf. Canada Council 2014a). The Canada Council for the Arts is what
might be called a "crown corporation" or a "government-owned enterprise". On its
website, the Canada Council explains that it "was created by an Act of Parliament in
1957 [...] to foster and promote the study and enjoyment of, and the production of
works in, the arts, and operate at 'arm’s length' or independently of government"
(Canada Council 2014b).
In the case of patented medicines provided at a price below the patent-supported one
- in the case, for example, of "essential medicines" supplied to developing countries - a
similar system could be used to compensate the inventors and developers of these
products as a function of their actual usefulness and level of use in basic health care,
including for neglected diseases. In a more perfectly globalized world, the same system
could apply to essential medicines and basic health care in all countries, independently
of their level of development. If Canadian authors can be compensated as a function of
the estimated number of times their works have been read by the users of public
libraries, the developers of useful molecules and the inventors of new, effective
treatments could, in theory, be compensated in terms of the number of disabilityadjusted life years (DALYs) their creation has contributed to saving. The compensation
for the anti-sleeping sickness use of the "resurrection drug" enflornithine would thus contrary to what happens under the present system - be higher (not lower, as it is
under the present system) than for the use of the same molecule in combatting
feminine hirsuteness. The actual manufacturers of useful medicines should of course
receive at least the cost of production plus a reasonable level of profit in exchange for
producing valuable medicines. The wastefulness and confusion created by "me-too"
drugs and the "evergreening" of existing patents could hopefully be diminished by
refusal to reward the authors of products which do not actually constitute an
improvement over existing products. The reduction of asymmetries in health-care
between the more developed and less developed world would also, by reducing
assymmetries in loss of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs), reduce differences in
productivity, to the benefit, one would hope, of all.
[End notes and references on following pages.]
1.
This has been termed the 10/90 Gap in terms of which only 10% of health
research is devoted to the health problems of 90% of the world's population. The
World Health Organization Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and
Development, attributes this statistic to the Global Forum for Heath Research (GFHR)
in 1998 and mentions that the Commission on Health Research and Development
(CHRD) proposes a revised calculation which "would suggest a 5/93 gap" (WHO-CEWG
2012: 90), i.e. considerably wider than 10/90.
2.
We are faced with what the World Health Organization Consultative Expert
Working Group on Research and Development has repeatedly termed a "market
failure" (WHO-CEWG 2012: 8, 17, 24, 25, 33, 83). Joseph Stiglitz, on the other hand,
speaks not of a market failure, but of a market distorted by the imposition (through
government intervention to support the system of patents) of a price differential
(often rather huge) between marginal cost of production and the patent-supported
price, which, in view of the necessary government intervention involved, is thus the
equivalent of a "tax". Stiglitz argues that, in exchange for the payment of this "tax", the
consumers of health-care products are not receiving the expected returns. Cf. infra and
Stiglitz 2007: 117.
3.
The term "neglected diseases" is, for now, sufficiently precise for our purposes.
But our concern can be more accurately expressed in the terms used by the 2012 WHO
Working Group:
[O]ur mandate - [which is to develop] "proposals for new and innovative sources of
funding to stimulate research and development related to Type II and Type III diseases
and the specific research and development needs of developing countries in relation to
Type I diseases" - is much wider than "neglected" diseases or the scope covered by GFinder. (WHO-CEWG 2012:83)
The definitions of diseases of Type I, Type II, and Type III are as follows:
Type I diseases are incident in both rich and poor countries, with large numbers of
vulnerable populations in each. Type II diseases are incident in both rich and poor
countries, but with a substantial proportion of the cases in poor countries. Type III
diseases are those that are overwhelmingly or exclusively incident in developing
countries. (WHO-CEWG 2012: 18n2) Strictly speaking, the "neglected tropical diseases"
are the 17 diseases officially recognized as such by the World Health Organization. Cf.
WHO (2014b). It is also to be noted that HIV/AIDS is a Type II rather than a Type III
disease.
4. Zidovudine, also known as AZT.
5.
In the Abuja Declaration of 2001, the Heads of State and Government of the
Organisation of African Unity declared: "We recognise that the epidemic of HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Other Related Infectious Diseases constitute not only a major health
crisis, but also an exceptional threat to Africa's development, social cohesion, political
stability, food security as well as the greatest global threat to the survival and life
expectancy of African peoples. These diseases, which are themselves exacerbated by
poverty and conflict situations in our Continent, also entail a devastating economic
burden, through the loss of human capital, reduced productivity and the diversion of
human and financial resources to care and treatment." (OAU 2001: 3, sect. 13)
6. ADPIC: In Spanish: Acuerdo sobre los Aspectos de los Derechos de Propiedad
Intelectual relacionados con el Comercio. In French: Aspects des droits de propriété
intellectuelle qui touchent au commerce.
7. See Governement of Canada (2007).
8. Cf. infra for a discussion of Marcia Angell's analysis (2004) of this matter.
9. See note 1, above.
10. See note 1, above.
11. The proportionality here is with regard to the populations affected. Unlike what
are called "orphan diseases", NTDs affect large populations.
12. In 1975, "the World Health Assembly by resolution WHA28.66 requested
the Director-General to advise Member States on 'the selection and procurement, at
reasonable cost, of essential drugs of established quality corresponding to their
national health needs' " (WHO Expert Committee 2003: 20). The first meeting of the
WHO Expert Committee on the Selection of Essential Drugs (as it was called until 2002)
was held in 1977 and proposed one of the early definitions of "essential drugs" (as
they were then called).
13.
Reported, but where, exactly? There is a small problem concerning the source
of this quotation. Borch-Jacobsen (2014: 73) attributes it to an article by Tina Barnes,
"The scandal of poor people's diseases", The New York Times, 29 March 2006. The
author of the present study was unable to find this article via Eureka.cc and resorted to
a search engine on the world wide web. An article with the title "The Scandal of ‘Poor
People’s Diseases’" and indicated as having been published in the New York Times on
the appropriate date is referred to in a blog signed by Ann Spencer at
http://sb721blog.blogspot.com/2007/12/unite-for- children-unite-for-aids.html (dated
2007-12-13, accessed 2014-06-20). But the name of the author is here given as
"Rosenberg, Tina" not "Barnes, Tina". A search on Eureka.cc turns up an article dated
2006-03-30 (the next day) in the New York Times by Tina Rosenberg but entitled
"Mexico City in the City" - which, from its content, could have been written by a person
interested in the problem of poor people's diseases. Tina Rosenberg is identified by
Wikipedia as the author of three books and as "an editorial writer for The New York
Times who frequently writes for The New York Times Magazine" (article Tina
Rosenberg accessed
2014-06-20). A further search turns up a reference dated April 11, 2006, published on
the site of the Pesticide Action Network, to an opinion piece entitled "The Scandal of
'Poor People's Diseases'" published in "Times Select, March 29" and attributed to "New
York
Times
editor
Tina
Rosenberg"
(see
www.panna.org/legacy/panups/panup_20060411.dv.html, accessed 2014-06-20). This
reference is accompanied by a link to a criticism by Sonia Shah which appeared in The
Nation on April 17, 2006 of the position taken by Rosenberg concerning the u s e o f
DDT against malaria and which can be read at
www.thenation.com/article/dont-blame-environmentalists-malaria (accessed 201406-20). The Shah article contains what purports to be a link to the Rosenberg at
http://select.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/opinion/29talkingpoints.html?_r=0).
An
attempt to access this URL on 2014-06-20 produced only a blank page, however.
14.
For a definition - accompanied by an explanation - of the concept of DisabilityAdjusted Life Year (DALY), see WHO 2014c.
15.
One of these discoveries is reported as having been made by Igor C. Almeida
and Alexandre F. Marques who are, respectively a professor and a post-doctoral
research fellow at the University of Texas (cf. Washington-Valdez 2012). Another
promising development (a therapeutic vaccine) is attributed to Ivone Carvalho (cf. Cyro
/ Agência Brasil 2014).
16.
As retrieved and displayed by those responsible for the site Right
Diagnosis™ at www.rightdiagnosis.com/c/chagas_disease/wiki.htm (accessed 201406-21).
17.
The patent is obtained from the national Patent Office. The approval for the
marketing of a pharmaceutical product or therapeutic device is obtained, in the United
States, from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or, in the European Union, from
the European Medicines Agency (EMA). In Canada, the same function is assumed by
the Therapeutic Products Directorate of Health Canada's Health Products and Food
Branch. Health Canada is a Ministry or Department of the Canadian federal
government. One of the frequent criticisms of the current system (formulated, for
example, by David Healy) is that, in Europe, the United States and Canada, the decision
to withdraw the approval for a product which turns out to have unexpected sideeffects after being allowed on the market, is made by the same agency which
approved the drug in the first place - placing the agency in a position of conflict of
interest (in that a decision to remove a drug from the list of approved drugs involves at
least an implicit criticism of the quality of the decision to place it on the list in the first
place).
18.
Former editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine and currently a
Senior Lecturer in the Department of Global Health and Social Medicine at the Harvard
Medical S c h o o l . S e e h e r p a g e o n t h e H a r v a r d w e b s i t
e
a t http://ghsm.hms.harvard.edu/people/faculty/marcia-angell (accessed 201406-22)
19.
The correct date of Zach Carter's report (Carter 2012) in the Huffingdon Post
seems to be the 25th and not the 5th of May, contrary to the reference in BorchJacobsen (2014: 76, note 20). The second sentence of the Nils Daulaire's statement is
not provided in the version of Carter's report (Carter 2012) which could be accessed on
2014-06-23 but is confirmed by being identified as the position taken by the United
States in Kiddell-Munro et al. (2013: 3) with a reference to the same report by Carter,
in its form as "retrieved February 13, 2013" (Kiddell-Munro et al. : 6).
20.
SSRI: Selective seratonin reuptake inhibitor. These products were
marketed as anti- depressants, on the hypothesis that insufficiency of serotonin
was a causal factor in depression.
21.
According to a press report by Associated Press and Crain's New York Business
available
at
www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20111228/HEALTH_CARE/111229902/lipitorbecomes-worlds-top-selling-drug# (accessed 2014-07-13).
22.
A classical case of evergreening a patent - Schering-Plough's replacement of its
soon-to-be- off-patent Claritin by Clarinex - is described in Angell (2004: 1050-1060).
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Poor Methodology?: RCTs in Development and Medicine
Fred Gifford
Professor of Philosophy
Michigan State University, U.S.A
gifford@msu.edu
Poor Methodology?: RCTs in Development and Medicine
Abstract
Controversy abounds concerning the effectiveness of development interventions and
programs – whether these be bed nets, Millennium Villages or aid in general. It has
been urged that, in order to justify expense and ground difficult allocation decisions,
we should carry out carefully designed randomized controlled trials (RCTs), modeled
after the successful methodology concerning clinical interventions in medicine. But not
all are equally enthusiastic about the “RCT movement” afoot in the “development
world”, and this has spurred debate. There are methodological worries, such as that
the results will not generalize, that there will be a skewing of what questions are
studied, and that mistakes will be made by naïve or insufficiently careful researchers.
And there are ethical worries arising from the fact that RCTs often involve intentionally
treating half of the human subjects in a suboptimal way in order to gain useful
information from the fact that they end up less well-off after the trial, raising concerns
about harm and exploitation
The question of the appropriateness of RCTs, and the broader question of the difficulty
of gaining reliable knowledge, are deeply important for development work, with
application across the field. The purpose of this paper is to address this debate, in part
by making comparisons of the development context with the medical context, where
methodological, ethical and social issues have been discussed in detail.
Important tasks include (1) a clarification of the status of RCTs in medicine, and (2) a
consideration of what relevant differences there might be between the two contexts.
In reviewing the status of RCTs in medicine, I pay special attention to the social and
institutional contexts into which research evaluation is embedded. This involves
understanding the roles of evidence-based medicine, practice guidelines, consensus
conferences, and the FDA
Features which may be importantly different between the two contexts include the
number of complex social variables at play, the role of frequency dependence in
relation to the need to scale up, the degree and kinds of social or political forces to
deal with, the lack of special obligations had by health care professionals, and what is
at stake in accepting the results of a trial. There is much to be thought through
concerning how these differences may affect the assessment of research method. The
above insights about the social context of medical trials also provide materials for a
more fruitful discussion of the debate concerning means of gaining reliable knowledge
for development practice.
Introduction
Controversy abounds concerning the effectiveness of development interventions and
programs –from bed nets, school lunch programs, agricultural or legal advice, cash
transfers and Millennium Villages to aid in general. It has been urged – for instance by
Banerjee and Duflo, authors of Poor Economics1, and co-founders of the Jameel Poverty
Action Lab (J-PAL) at MIT – that, in order to justify expense and ground difficult
allocation decisions, we should carry out carefully designed randomized controlled
trials (RCTs), modeled after the successful methodology concerning clinical
interventions in medicine.
Randomized assignment of subjects to experimental and control groups addresses the
selection bias which plagues other sorts of studies, and more generally, helps control
for a whole range of potentially confounding factors. This added rigor helps to
convince donors and other funders (such as government ministries) of the worth of
tested interventions.
Amongst the findings recently generated from the new development RCTs are the
following: Giving parents a small bag of lentils as an incentive increases vaccination
rates. Small fees for bed-nets are a substantial disincentive to uptake, but those given
nets for free are willing to buy nets later. Both conditional and unconditional cash
transfers (à la the practice of the NGO GiveDirectly) are effective in decreasing both
poverty and psychological stress. And they do not – as feared – result in recipients
wasting the money on “temptation goods”; nor are they shown to have untoward
effects on others in the community (like rising prices).
Study results like these provide important information for making decisions about
development interventions. Note that some of these results are at least somewhat
surprising, challenging received wisdom. Another feature of these examples is that
1
Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight
Global Poverty. New York: Public Affairs, 2011.
they address concrete questions such as which of several possible methods to use to
motivate a certain behavior – not big questions like “Does aid work?” In the view of
Banerjee and Duflo, this is an advantage, as it helps focus our attention on addressing
problems where real answers can be obtained.
But not all are equally enthusiastic about the “RCT movement” afoot in the
“development world”, and this has spurred debate – in periodicals, journals, and in the
blogosphere -- about their appropriateness. There are two types of concerns:
Methodological worries include the claim that the results will not generalize, that
there will be a skewing of what questions are studied, and that mistakes will be made
by naïve or insufficiently careful researchers. Added to these are ethical worries,
arising from the fact that randomizing often involves intentionally treating half of the
human subjects in a suboptimal way in order to gain useful information from the fact
that they end up less well-off after the trial, raising concerns about harm and
exploitation.
The purpose of this paper is to address this debate, in part by reflecting on the
comparison of the development context with the medical context, and to suggest the
need for further thought on these matters.
Several factors complicate the attempt to even characterize this debate: Social and
psychological dimensions of this include a certain amount of hype and gripe, worries
about turf, fads and bandwagons, along with the throwing around of terms like
“randomistas” and “faith-based” initiatives. And on the methodological side, anyway,
the situation is frustratingly complex, with much ambiguity about what the thesis is or
ought to be. For instance, the strong thesis that we should rely exclusively on RCTs in
all circumstances is implausibly strong, and no one really holds it (though bits of
rhetoric suggest it); the weak thesis that we should consider them a bit more than we
have in the past is toothlessly weak. The thesis that we should use them just when
they are the right method to use is of course correct but also empty until we specify
just when that is.
And surely there is wisdom in the methodological advice that denies that there is some
one correct method; study design depends on the situation, including the question
that is important to ask. Sometimes an RCT will be best, and sometimes it will be
inappropriate, and this cannot be resolved in the abstract. There are lots of kinds of
questions and studies, lots of alternative methods, and in lieu of an established and
comprehensive theory here, perhaps we need to let researchers go forward and make
their own judgments about specific projects.
In any case, there is a wide variety of issues here, and we provide here only a selective
sketch. The purpose is not to resolve the debate but to begin to map it out, and
especially to urge systematic thinking about the fruitfulness of the comparison
between the medical and development realms. Still, it is hoped that at least some
valuable things can be said at a general level, providing us with background from which
we can think about more specific issues.
In what follows, I begin by describing some of the critiques of RCTs in the development
context, and noting some responses. I then describe the RCT situation in medicine,
and in this context I highlight the importance of broader social/institutional
dimensions into which RCTs are embeded. I then turn to the task of considering what
differences there may be between the medical and development contexts, drawing
out just a couple for discussion. As most of the discussion to that point will have
concerned the methodological side of things, I turn at the end to briefly outline some
ideas concerning the ethical worries.
Some Critiques and Responses
To give a sense of the debates, here is a short list of the methodological
critiques of RCTs in development contexts:
The inability to generalize from the results of an RCT (external validity)
This can be a matter of trying to generalize from one (e.g., geographical or
environmental) context to another, or from a small pilot to a scaled-up
situation (it’s often pointed out that there are “frequency-dependent” effects
that make this not work), or from places that allowed you to do a trial to places
that didn’t. Thus even if RCTs may have better internal validity, so that one is
very confident regarding the conclusion about what is going on in this sample,
one will not have confidence that the results are more generally applicable.
The fact that important confounders can remain:
For instance, people who know that they are being randomized, or even just
monitored, may change their behavior (for example, the Hawthorne effect).
The arbitrary narrowing of question choice:
There is a worry that it will encourage researchers to ask only a narrow set of
questions, ones that happen to fit this tool.
The tendency to careless use of the method:
Angus Deaton2 describes the poor use of the methodology of instrumental
variables (this is in the quasi-experiments, which randomistas recommend as
second-best). This practice is tied to something else – the implicit belief that
one will be able to carry out this method without making judgments or
assumptions about theory or mechanism. Researchers are easily misled into
thinking that they have valid results, or into believing that this is a fool-proof
statistical method that allows them to forgo thinking about theory and
mechanism.
RCTs being more expensive per study
We won’t attempt a systematic analysis of the legitimacy of each of these
critiques, so as to resolve the issue, but note the following responses.
Concerning generalizability to new environments, it can be responded that we can
redo trials in the new context (for instance, when we change our focus to what
happens in a different country). (Of course, a counter response is that in practice
scientists are not adequately rewarded for replication studies, so this doesn’t tend to
occur.) It will also be said that the alternative has problems as well: one cannot
2
Deaton, Angus, “Instruments, randomization, and learning about development”,
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 48, pp. 424-455 (2010)
assume that a large, heterogeneous sample will be just like a particular group or
individual one is interested in.
Concerning generalizability with respect to scale-up: one point to consider is whether
researchers will really be fooled in this way, or whether perhaps such cases will be
sufficiently obvious and relatively limited: For instance, if the intervention group ends
up with better employment, but this is not likely to generalize to a situation where the
relatively few government jobs are already taken, this is likely to be readily understood
by the researchers beforehand.Concerning Deaton’s claim that people won’t carry out
the method correctly, the obvious response is to try harder go avoid this, by making
sure that people are properly trained, and by attempting to avoid perverse incentives.
(We’ll come back to this.)
In sum, there are indeed some serious issues here that ultimately need to be
addressed, ones that can surely wreck havoc in some contents. But the matter is
complicated, in that the RCT appears to have genuine benefits, and when there are
problems, it’s not always obvious that the alternatives are better. These different
considerations will need to be weighed against each other.
Ethical worries. Now, briefly, the central ethical challenge is that RCTs intentionally
withhold a plausibly beneficial intervention, in order to gain useful information from
the fact that certain individuals end up less well-off after the trial. A full ethical
analysis of the situation would require consideration of several complex issues
(utilitarian trade-offs, exploitation, equipoise, the ignoring of results not yet
“statistically significant”, consent, “community consent”, “community participation”,
and different moral standards for poorer countries), issues discussed at length in either
bioethics or philosophy of medicine. Here I’ll just mention a couple responses that
have come up in the development context:
One response is to point out that “no one will be worse off than otherwise”; some
people or communities will be picked out as not receiving some benefit, but they will
be in exactly the same situation as if the study had not been done at all. A related (and
actually derivative) response can be called the “Not If But When” rationale -- all groups
get the treatment; it’s just that group 1 gets it this year, and group 2 gets it (beginning)
the next year, etc.
These are reasonable initial suggestions for how to decrease the moral tension or for
alleviating the moral downside to these trials. But they are certainly not watertight. I
do believe that they need to be examined more carefully, and that this needs to be
integrated with a consideration of the above list of issues. (Note that these are things
that have analogues in the discussions of RCTs in medicine.) I’ll come back to this
briefly at the end.
RCTs in Medicine
So, if the basic idea is that we should do RCTs like they do in medicine, one thing we
need to do is to examine the case of RCTs in medicine. What has been their role? How
are they viewed? Have they been successful?
Now, before I look in more detail at these questions, I want to look briefly at a very
broad level: If we ask whether RCTs have been “successful” in medicine, the question
arises of what we mean by this and what the evidence for it is. After all, it’s not on the
basis of RCTs. Clearly, if we are thinking that RCTs are the method to use because
medicine is so wonderfully effective (inferring this from a comparison of health in 1900
and 2000), then we are not being careful about the possibility of confounding
variables. Much of the improvement of health 1900-2000 was due to public health,
not medicine. And much of the improvement of medical care in that period was not
due to RCTs, but to better basic science and an influx of research funding generally.
What we’d like to know is how much RCTs contributed to that. I do think that it is
plausible that it has been quite beneficial, but we must understand that it’s a
complicated matter to assess this, and I won't pretend to take on that task here. So, in
the following discussion of RCTs within medicine, note that we aren’t reviewing
empirical evidence of efficacy, but doing something more like tracking professional
judgments.
The two main points I want to make here about the role of RCTs in medicine are these:
(1) that the considered pro-RCT view in medicine is a more nuanced one, and (2) that if
we really want to know what’s going on in medicine, RCTs are only one part of a larger
picture, one which includes various social/institutional features.
Nuance. First, it’s true RCTs hold a status for many in medicine as a sort of “gold
standard”. Such statements are made all the time. But the situation is more nuanced.
One way to illustrate this is with the practice of “systematic reviews”, where studies
from the literature are screened and their data combined to articulate the best
findings on a given question. (This is part of “evidence-based medicine”, to be
discussed in a moment.)
The rules for carrying out systematic reviews often describe what’s called a “hierarchy
of evidence”. RCTs (actually, meta-analyses of RCTs) are at the top, counting as the
best evidence. There has been a tendency to make hard line statements or
assumptions: any RCT is better than any non-RCT, or even: if you have RCTs, there is no
need to even consider information farther down the list. But that tendency is now
rejected in all serious discussions of the matter; the other types of information in the
hierarchy should be neither trumped nor ignored. There has been much written about
how other methods are also valuable; interestingly, this is often combined with ethical
critiques of RCTs. (Analogously, there has been controversy as well about the
necessary of using placebo controls.3)
There are also more theoretical critiques actually challenging whether randomization is
necessary (or that beneficial) in the first place, emphasizing that RCTs do not provide
an algorithm but instead require judgment. Some of the arguments are technical – I’ll
just mention one here: the fact that randomization does not actually guarantee
balance in the causal factors for a given trial. (Every once in a while you get 20 heads
in a row.)4
3
Rothman, K.J. and Michels, K.B., The continuing unethical use of placebo controls”,
New England Journal of Medicine, 1994; 331(6): 394-8.
4
Worrall, John, "Why There's No Cause to Randomize." British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science. S58, no. 3 (2007): 451-488. Teira, David, “Frequentist Vs. Bayesian Clinical Trials”,
in Fred Gifford, ed., Philosophy of Medicine (Handbook of Philosophy of Science).
Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2011 (255-297)
This debate about randomization is connected to a broad policy issue: whether trials
should be designed and evaluated in a Bayesian instead of the usual frequentist
statistical framework, where the latter is the entrenched position. I return to this
below.
Beyond RCTs. But beyond this nuance to the pro-RCT view in medicine, there is a more
significant lesson to be learned from the medicine case. It is true that RCTs have been
discovered and developed as a very fruitful tool for improving medicine’s knowledge
base. But it's also true that RCTs are really one piece in a broader ecology of methods
and social practices. And we need to look at this broader realm of practice if we want
to make good judgments about what the situation is in medicine that might be
emulated in some other domain.
One sizable part of this – but not all of it – is associated with the broad movement
called “evidence-based medicine” (EBM), which includes a set of practices at several
levels:
(1) The generation of trials (with careful methodology, and with trial registries
to try to respond to publication bias)
(2) The collating of information from trials (the systematic reviews described
above, the Cochrane Collaboration5)
(3) Practice guidelines sometimes generated from this
There has been controversy and resistance here, especially due to
worries of entanglement with clinical autonomy and decisions about
insurance coverage. Just how practice guidelines should be worded,
and how they should be used, is in fact complicated.
(4) Skills at the user end (the practice and skill of critical appraisal, reading the
literature to make clinical decisions)
(5) Training (concerning all of these processes)
And then there are features independent of EBM (and which had largely already come
into play prior to the EBM movement), functioning as other socially sanctioned
gatekeepers or influencers.
(a) Journals (and granting agencies): peer review and criteria for publication
(b) IRB review of research protocols
(c) Rules of responsible conduct of research (and associated training)
(d) Consensus conferences, another social mechanism for vetting evidence
(e) The FDA process
For our purposes, the most important example of an institutional structure that plays a
role in vetting evidence and constructing our medical knowledge base is this last one -the drug approval mechanism involving the regulations and practices of the FDA: the
set of criteria applied and the expert panel created that interprets and judges the
adequacy of the information presented to it. This is a gatekeeper role in that if the
evidence isn’t sufficient to convince the FDA, then the drug doesn’t get approved. This
5
http://www.cochrane.org/
also has an impact on the general role of RCTs in medicine, in part through the
expectations it sets up.
Now, the practices such as these enumerated on the above lists – in part specific
policies, and in part cultural practice -- are part of what explains the operation and the
success of the medical enterprise, and they are also things that we can try to modify so
as to further advance its goals. For instance, article selection at journals (as peer
review) helps maintain quality, but the problems concerning “publication bias” show
us that this selection process needs to be tweaked if we are truly going to improve our
medical knowledge base and practice. More generally, there are other levers for
improving our knowledge base than by increasing the number of RCTs we do, and how
the RCTs play their role (and whether they are appropriate) will depend on some of
these other features.
Consider again Angus Deaton’s critique concerning the inappropriate use of
instrumental variables in quasi-experimentation: the claim is that people who are not
as methodologically astute or careful as they should be carry out a practice that
doesn't take seriously the importance of theory (relying on it and constructing it), and
that this leads to misleading or useless results. Of course, there are some other
solutions to the problem that don’t involve rejecting RCTs: for example, we can train
people not to make that mistake, and, at a deeper level, if the problem is that there is
so much pressure to do RCTs that it pushes people against their better judgment, then
that aspect of the scientific social enterprise should be changed.
Of course this solution is not straightforward, and we are led to some difficult tensions
here, which I will raise but not resolve. I can assert that if people are properly trained
and motivated so that they don't fall for the mistakes such as trying to proceed
without theory and mechanism, then everything will be all right. But then someone
like Deaton could say, well, but this is the real world, and psychological weakness,
methodological naïveté and the distorted incentives within the scientific enterprise will
conspire to mess things up, so it’s safer not to condone the RCT project in the first
place.
As another example from the broader debate: It’s said that we can redo RCTs in
different (e.g., geographical) contexts to respond to the generalizability problem. But
in practice scientists are not adequately rewarded for replication studies. So, do we
say that we should try to change that, or understand that it is part of the unchangeable
background of the scientific enterprise? It does seem a virtue to be realistic, but
should we really say, as was once said of the poor, “The ‘distorted incentives of
academia’ will always be with us”?
I will not resolve this here. Surely we need to take seriously both what is actually likely
to happen and what we could possibly change. But my main point here is that these
matters of the social/institutional context must be grappled with in addressing the
question of the value of RCTs.
Each of these things – the nuanced endorsement and the insights about the broader
context, will be important to have in mind as we think about the use of RCTs in
development contexts. And the issue of the broader social/institutional context is
especially important as we explore the matter of similarities and differences between
the medical and development realms. As an example, the controversy and resistance
mentioned above concerning practice guidelines in medicine would be a fruitful matter
to examine as we look for insights about how to proceed in the development context.
Analogies and Disanalogies
So with that as some background framework about RCTs in medicine, let us go on to
the topic of how differences between the medical and development contexts may play
a role in our thinking about these matters.
There are obvious analogies: Many think that they know what works, but there is
disagreement, and our development interventions very often do not work. And
presumably the broad case for RCTs in development holds that the development
situation is relevantly similar. But some who are skeptical of RCTs in development may
want to point out ways in which the development context is different, so that the
appropriateness of RCTs in medicine wouldn’t immediately show their appropriateness
in the development context.
Perhaps there are aspects of the development context that systematically make RCTs
inappropriate there. These might make it harder or impractical to carry out RCTs
(though it’s worth noting that sometimes it may be easier). There may be differences
concerning what we need to know, what biases we need to guard against, as well as
what social/institutional features exist. RCTs might be less necessary (than in
medicine) because there are other effective ways to gain the same information. These
are all possibilities that should be considered if we are relying on the analogy. Here I
just list a few potential differences.
First, for some broad categories, one could point to:
(i) Differences in the number of complex social variables at play
This could exacerbate the generalizability problem, though it could also
mean that the alternatives are more problematic as well, and that it is
more important to have effective methods of control. It also results in
our not being able to “blind” subjects, as easily or at all.
(ii) Differences in the outcome measurements
For example: well-being and capabilities instead of health or medical
measures
A more specific one would be
(iii) The need to scale up (so intensifying the external validity worry)
Focusing on the ethical issues brings to mind some others:
(iv) Differences in “seriousness” of the outcomes
For instance: life/death/health vs. other
(v) Differences with respect to our obligations concerning subjects’ welfare
The medical case involves health care professionals with significant
(rolerelated) obligations to treat, whereas this is not so in the development
context.
(vi) Lack of need to do sequential trials.
Sequential trials are more likely to force the ethical issue, given the
presence of interim data. It may be easier (than in drug trials) to avoid
this by doing all the interventions at once.
(vii) Difference in the background status in developing countries where
people otherwise do not have these innovations available (such that
subjects really will be “no worse off” than outside the trial)
Now, a broad exploration of the medicine/development comparison would examine
each of these and more. What I want to do here is focus on the following feature.
(viii) Differences in the structure of the decision-situation
(the nature of the decision to be made and thus what’s at stake)
Related to this is a factor that impacts this decision-situation:
(ix) Differences in involvement of a formal institution
(the FDA’s decision about “approval”)
The Decision-Situation:
Contexts can differ with respect to “what’s at stake” -- what the consequences are
once the decision is made. By this I mean not just how serious the benefits and harms
to individuals are ((iv) above), but how extensive and irreversible, given the policies in
place. (This can include how important is it to avoid false positives and false
negatives.)
When a drug is approved, it goes on the market. Marketing and other forces then take
over. Of course, it’s possible that it will later be discovered to have bad side-effects
and have its approval withdrawn. But in fact this isn’t likely. Instead, approval will
impact future practice in a way that’s hard to undo.
Recall from the earlier discussion that there is controversy concerning the FDA’s
practice grounded in randomization, and that there is a serious argument that drug
assessment can and should be guided instead by a Bayesian framework, and that this
could be done without randomization. What’s interesting for us here is the following.
It’s possible to accept the theoretical argument that randomization can be dispensed
with, and yet still endorse a drug assessment policy requiring randomization. This is
because controlling for selection variables as randomization does will help ensure
impartiality, and thus can help to allay people’s fears that aspects of the studies might
be tampered with, say, by drug companies.6 This is important in this context, with so
much at stake concerning the public safety and welfare, and at the same time the fact
that drug companies can have so much power and will to manipulate.
On this view, RCTs are required in medicine because of this specific activity of drug
approval – with a high-stakes assessment, and within an environment in which
powerful drug companies can have an influence on various aspects of the process.
So, what of the development context? On the face of it, things will be different there,
and perhaps this particular rationale – and hence the case for RCTs -- won’t be so
strong there. But it’s complicated. For it does seem plausible that this pragmatic
argument (concerning impartiality) could be significant in the development context as
well. There are, of course, interested parties to worry about, and there may be political
6
David Teira (2011): “Frequentist Vs. Bayesian Clinical Trials”, in Fred Gifford, ed.,
Philosophy of Medicine (Handbook of Philosophy of Science). Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2011
(255-297)
matters at stake. Still, such parties do not have the power of the drug companies, and
further there doesn’t seem to be the same presumption that the decision will not be
overturned in the future; this suggests a significant difference between the medicine
and development decision-situations. But it will be important to look at lines of
thought like this in greater detail to be confident about this assessment. In any case,
whether or not we use this line of thought to downplay the importance of RCTs in the
development context, I do think this is an important locus for exploring similarities and
differences between the medical and development contexts.
Relatedly, the significance of this special institutional structure, the FDA, in the medical
case raises another question about the development case. Should there be some
official, international, organization to be the keeper, vetter and synthesizer – if not
regulator -- of our development knowledge base? Does the World Bank do this now,
and adequately? Would we want them to? Will systematic reviews in this literature
have adequate standing and respect or support? Further questions of this sort will
need to be explored.
More broadly, if we want to ask questions about the quality, adequacy, utility and
fairness of our “development knowledge base”, we need ultimately to address
social/institutional matters like these. And as with the “impartiality” issue just
discussed, this is a mode of comparison between medicine and development worth
exploring more carefully.
Return to ethical considerations:
I close by returning briefly to a discussion of the moral concerns about RCTs in
development. I suggested earlier that the “no worse off than otherwise” rationale
(NWOTO) – where those in the study are said be no worse off than if the study had not
been done -- does have some prima facie merit, but that we need to consider this
much more carefully. Similarly for the “Not If But When” rationale (NIBW), where all
groups get the treatment, but some may wait for a year before starting. One reason to
insist that there are serious ethical issues to work out comes from the rather glib way
in which these responses are sometimes made. (“Randomisation is no big deal” was a
mantra in one article.)7
Consider the following concerning the NWOTO idea: this is the rationale that
presumably underlies the “short-course AZT for lowering maternal-fetal HIV
transmission” trial in the 1990’s in Africa and elsewhere that generated considerable
moral controversy. Whatever one thinks of this case, it wouldn’t be an appropriate
description to say that it was “no big deal”.
One might argue that the AZT trial is simply more morally problematic in other ways
that would not apply to at least typical development-interventions. For instance, it
might be pointed out that that case was medical; it involved health care professionals.
(I earlier raised the question of whether that might make any moral difference, and
why, but we didn't argue for any conclusion about that; it still needs to be considered.)
Also, those in the control group were directly interacted with; they were given placebo
7
Howard White, “Tips on selling randomised controlled trials”,
http://www.3ieimpact.org/en/announcements/2013/03/26/tips-selling-randomisedcontrolled-trials/, accessed Aug. 20, 2014.
pills. (Of course, one implication of this is that presumably some of them were
benefitted as a result of the placebo effect!) These matters would be part of the
serious ethical discussion that will have to take place concerning RCTs in development.
Another reason to pay more attention is the following: Consider the NIBW case: Is it
really morally acceptable to have some groups wait a year, or two? Is the assumption
that they are just as well off in the end? This would seem to depend on the details.
On the face of it, when the intervention is in fact effective and important, those groups
who get the intervention a year or two later are less well-off overall. Take as the
example school-age children having the opportunity to go to school or have that
schooling be effective. If they receive two years less of schooling, they can be
significantly less well-off, then and later.
Of course, it can be argued that this “phase-in” in the RCT is the same as the “phasein” that would occur in a real program (if we just began to implement the program
rather than studying it), and hence the subjects of the study are “no worse off than
otherwise”. Of course, this then puts pressure on us to justify the NWOTO rationale.
Further, suppose for the moment that we are satisfied that the NWOTO (or NIBW)
rationale “really works” (really does constitute a justification) in a given instance – for
example, where people really are not worse off than otherwise. Without some careful
guidance, there is a worry that we will easily fall into saying of cases that are roughly in
this ballpark that “well, it seems they are likely to not really be any worse off than
otherwise”. One needs to be careful in thinking through what counts as this, and there
needs to be some accountability and critical ethical discussion about this; it is not
enough simply to have a generic justification available.
Finally, I want to emphasize a way in which we need to step back and consider things
more broadly. We need to ask and reflect on how this decision will be perceived by
the target population. As we proceed with these sorts of studies, we will need to
examine rationales like NWOTO both from the point of view of whether it seems to be
a sound moral argument in the abstract and also from the point of view of whether it
will be perceived as such by those affected by the study. This is one reason why the
discussion of the ethics of RCTs will need to integrate the further list of factors
mentioned earlier. One crucial component to add to the analysis will be consent, and
when that proves sufficiently impractical, a genuine participation on the part of the
communities being studied -- “community consent”, “community participation”, and
the legitimacy of different moral standards for poorer countries. And addressing this
broader set of issues will take some further thinking.
So I submit that this brief discussion makes the case that there is a need to examine
more carefully the ethical issues concerning RCTs in development. This broader
discussion that will need to occur will also be aided by a more systematic exploration
of the comparison between the medical and development contexts, as well as by a
further exploration of the social and institutional contexts into which research
evaluation is embedded.
Capabilities and Care Ethics: The Role of Care and Counter Narratives in
Ethics and Development
Jennifer Caseldine-Bracht
Doctoral candidate in the department of philosophy
Michigan State University, U.S.A
caseldin@msu.edu
Abstract: In this work, I argue that the role of care is not featured prominently enough
in some of the human rights and development literature. The sustained care of people
day in and day out is an essential part of human life. It is a necessary requirement for
human flourishing. Yet the concept of care has not always been carefully examined in
so far as it relates to human development. If we focus on the concept of care with as
much intensity as we analyze concepts of justice, truth and rights then we might see
the world through a different lens. This would be a world where care earns its rightful
place in the human rights literature.
The ways care has been devalued in both global and domestic politics has been well
documented. Care givers are often forced into poverty when they provide care to
family members for an extended period of time, for example. Ideal humans are
reasonable, independent and autonomous, according to the cultural master narrative.
If we peer too closely at care ethics we see that this ideal is impossible to obtain.
Humans are also emotional, interdependent and needy. Care often responds to this
part of the human experience. Since the neediness of human beings is an
uncomfortable truth, it is understandable that people tend not to want to focus on
care. However, by avoiding thinking about care we end up with impoverished theories
of development and human rights.
It is easy to see why many people want to devalue care but a thorough investigation
reveals the important role care has in all of our lives. How can we incorporate an ethics
of care into our political conceptions of capabilities and human development? I will
examine Joan Tronto’s concept of care as a political conception. Further, Nussbaum’s
capabilities list addresses this issue. She includes the right of affiliation:
Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other
human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction… [1]
Oppressive master narratives construct stories in ways that unfairly represents
marginalized groups. Counter stories are a means to resist those master narratives that
oppress people. A counter story is told in a way “…to make visible the morally relevant
details that the master narrative suppresses.”[2] The role of narrative is crucial to the
development of a culture of care. Jane Addams, Martha Nussbaum and Hilde
Lindemann’s work highlight different ways in which approaches to development can
be helped or hindered through varied types of narratives. In this paper, I will
demonstrate the way good counter narratives can help us develop a more accurate
understanding of the role care has in our lives. Finally, I will explain how this approach
will lead us to think about human development and capabilities in a way which takes
into account complex, relational and deeply valuable human experiences.
[1] Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities
Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000. 79.
[2] Lindemann, Hilde. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2001.
7.
Introduction
I will argue that the role of care is not featured prominently enough in much of the
human rights literature. The sustained care of people day in and day out is an essential
part of human life. It is a necessary requirement for human flourishing. Yet the concept
of care has not been carefully examined in so far as it relates to human rights. If we
focus on the concept of care with as much intensity as we analyze concepts of justice,
truth and rights then we will see the world through a different lens. This will be a world
where care earns its rightful place in the human rights literature.
Ideal humans are reasonable, independent and autonomous, according to the cultural
master narrative. If we peer too closely at care ethics we see that this ideal is
impossible to obtain. Humans are also emotional, interdependent and needy. Care
often responds to this part of the human experience. Since the neediness of human
beings is an uncomfortable truth, it is understandable that people tend not to want to
focus on care. However, by avoiding thinking about care we end up with an
impoverished theory of human rights.
Fortunately, there are ways of challenging oppressive cultural master narratives. We
can introduce counter narratives. In this chapter, I will demonstrate the way good
counter narratives can help us develop a more accurate understanding of the role of
care in our lives. Finally, I will explain what makes a good counter narrative and how
this approach will lead us to think about human rights in a way which takes into
account complex, deeply rich human experiences. The role of narrative is crucial to the
development of a culture of care. Narratives are designed for a multitude of purposes.
Jane Addams, Martha Nussbaum and Hilde Lindemann’s work highlight different ways
in which the capabilities approach can be helped or hindered through varied types of
stories. I will explore which types of narratives are helpful to a capabilities approach to
human rights which is adequately and properly informed by care.
Nussbaum on Compassion, Sympathy, Empathy and Sympathetic Knowledge
In Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions, Nussbaum defines
empathy as “an imaginative reconstruction of another person’s experience, without
any particular evaluation of that experience.” For Nussbaum, the concept of sympathy
is closer to that of compassion. She writes, “If there is any difference between
“Sympathy” and “compassion” in contemporary usage, it is perhaps that “compassion”
seems more intense and suggests a greater degree of suffering, both on the part of the
afflicted person and on the part of the person having the emotion.”8 In order to
properly evaluate another’s experience, according to Nussbaum, we need proper
compassion. That is, it can’t be parochial or partial in the sense that our emotions
cloud our judgments. Rather, by using reason and normative frameworks (such as the
8
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. 301-302.
capabilities approach) combined with a compassionate understanding of the
particulars of a situation we can act more justly. Nussbaum goes on to claim that there
is a role for compassion in public life. She asserts that laws and institutions shape our
sense of even our most intimate relationships. Our public understanding, according to
Nussbaum, of who should be taken care of and who should do the caring is developed
and maintained through these laws and institutions.9
While Nussbaum argues that just institutions are important she also acknowledges
they can’t do all the heavy lifting for civil society. Rather, there are many instances
when we need to develop a compassionate citizenry in order to address issues of elder
care, love, death, separation and so on. For Nussbaum, “Compassion requires the
judgment that there are serious bad things that happen through no fault of their
own.”10 She focuses much of her attention on victims, agents, blame, forgiveness,
criminal justice and how to get our judgments right. When thinking about how to get
our judgments right, she advocates her capabilities list. She argues that we need to
recognize our own capacity for evil11, avoid relying on lopsided narratives where we
tend to over-identify with people most like us and avoid feeling disgust for people that
commit violent criminal acts. If we can do this, then we can develop correct judgments
and appropriate compassion. Nussbaum believes narratives, art and poetry can help us
become more just and compassionate citizens.
Nussbaum on Institutions, Capabilities and Compassion
For Nussbaum, institutions and laws play a prominent role in shaping our
compassion. Literature, art and poetry help us to develop a deeper appreciation of the
human experience, for example they may lead us to a better understanding of human
fragility. Furthermore, if narratives, music, art and poetry are chosen wisely then they
can help us stretch our moral imagination. In Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for
Justice, Nussbaum points out that law is necessary to guard against “bad civil
passions”. She argues “…law often precedes and guides the creation of decent
sentiments.”12 She claims that through court decisions such as Brown vs. Board of
Education, where it was determined that separate public schools for black and white
children would be illegal, that emotions and moral sentiments slowly began to change.
While guards and weapons were necessary to make sure desegregation occurred, this
force ended up creating a space wherein hearts and minds slowly started to change,
though there is still a long way to go.13 In Upheavals of Thought, Nussbaum provides
another example of the role of institutions in shaping compassionate emotion. She
9
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001.423
10
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001.405.
11
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. 452.
12
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice.
Cambridge: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2013. 315.
13
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice.
Cambridge: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2013. 315-316.
provides an example of a child with Down Syndrome. Nussbaum argues that laws
requiring “mainstreaming” of people with this particular genetic disorder into public
classrooms helped to change the hearts of students. Through integration, students
learned about this particular student and developed compassion for him. She argues
that our laws and institutions are “dramatically reshaping our eudemonistic
judgments” regarding the treatment of people with such genetic disorders. The
student with Down syndrome said value should be measured by the love and
compassion we have. Nussbaum writes, “But that compassion, as he knows, is not
spontaneous; it is shaped by social and legal structures.”14 It is not clear from the
anecdote that the young man actually drew this particular conclusion which aligns
nicely with her own position, but her argument is that institutions are responsible for
creating conditions where compassion is more likely to develop.
As seen in most of Nussbaum’s work, she argues this can be successfully linked to the
capabilities approach. A just nation embraces the list of capabilities she offers, they
invite citizens through art, education, memorials and so forth (some of her examples
are Millennium Park and the Vietnam Veterans Memorial) to cultivate compassion and
respect for democracy and diversity through these projects. She writes
Any good society has definite ideas of what is good and bad: for example,
that racism is bad and equal respect is good…As for public artworks,
monuments and parks, it’s not even possible for them to be emotionally
neutral: they have to be organized in one way rather than another…this,
however, is not an objectionable type of paternalism, because it does not
remove critique or choice.15
Of course, this may be a circular problem. Nussbaum argues that democratic nation
states should have the primary duty to protect capabilities. For Nussbaum, capabilities
are justified primarily but not completely by an Aristotelian/Marxist philosophy.16 She
promotes capabilities and encourages democratic nation states and their institutions
to keep them in mind when designing laws, policies and institutions. She argues that
relying on these institutions instead of more informal approaches is morally
appropriate because these institutions are supported by democratic citizens. 17
Elsewhere, she argues that these nation states should cultivate feelings of proper
compassion to make citizens more amendable to endorsing the capabilities
approach.18 However, if the strength of democratic nation states lies in the fact that
they reflect the will of the people, then it may be a little bit tricky to argue that the job
14
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. 422.
15
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice.
Cambridge: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2013. 389-390.
16
Nussbaum, Martha. "Women's Capabilities and Social Justice." Journal of Human
Development 1.2 (2000): 219-47.
17
Nussbaum, Martha. Creating Capabilities (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2011) 114-117.
18
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
Chapter 8: Compassion and Public Life. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. 401-454.
of the government is to push its citizens in a certain direction. It is also not clear that if
a government truly reflected the will of the people that it would want to nudge people
in a different direction. However, it is also seems reasonable to argue that government
has a responsibility to ensure the rights of all its citizens, so decisions such as Brown vs.
the Board of Education are sometimes justified. Regarding the relationship between
compassion and social institutions, Nussbaum writes
The relationship between compassion and social institutions is and should
be a two-way street: compassionate individuals construct institutions that
embody what they imagine; and institutions, in turn, influence the
development of compassion in individuals.19
Still, it is clear that she believes nation state institutions should play a large role in
shaping the compassion of its citizens.
Jane Addams, Democracy and Sympathetic Understanding
Jane Addams believed there was a role for institutions to protect human rights, too.
Addams worked tirelessly with others in her community to promote child labor laws,
sanitation laws, immigration laws, women’s right to vote and more.20 However, she
takes a grass roots approach to developing more compassionate citizens. As I will
demonstrate later in this paper, in a story about the Pullman strikes she provides a
counter narrative that challenges attempts by benevolent leaders to do good for the
people instead of doing good with them. For Addams, democracy is more social than
institutional. She believes democracy is a model of ethics. While her work is
compatible with Nussbaum’s and she certainly fought for institutional reform too, her
work focuses more on the relational aspect of human life. Addams agrees with John
Dewey that “a democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of
associated living, of conjoint communicated experience.” 21 This focus is not, as
Nussbaum says, because we can’t create perfectly just institutions. Rather, it is
because Addams and Dewey see that institutional rules and safeguards are necessary
in as far as we don’t have a sympathetic understanding of one another’s lives,
challenges, hopes and dreams. Addams argues that action based on sympathetic
knowledge is the foundation of a moral life. Sympathetic knowledge is a symbiotic
relationship between standpoint epistemology and ethics. She has written, “We
continually forget that the sphere of morals is the sphere of action, that speculation in
regard to morality is but observation and must remain in the sphere of intellectual
19
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. 405.
20
Please see Twenty Years at Hull House (page 75 and 185-188), Addams, Jane. A New
Conscience and an Ancient Evil. Urbana: University of Illinois, 2002 (87-89), Addams
Jane. “Why Women Should Vote,” Ladies Home Journal, January 1910 (21-22).
21
Dewey, John. Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education.
New York: Macmillan, 1916. 101.
comment…until we…are obliged to act upon our theory.”22 It is a key component of
competent citizenship and is necessary for the development of a strong democracy.
According to Addams, our ethics and our epistemology are intertwined and democracy
flourishes when we develop a sympathetic understanding of one another’s lives. This
involves seriously taking the time to listen to one another and invoking the principle of
charity when interpreting one another’s actions. She writes, “We know instinctively
that if we grow contemptuous of our fellows, and consciously limit our intercourse to
certain kinds of people to whom we have previously decided to respect, we not only
tremendously circumscribe our range of life but also limit the scope of our ethics.”23
Regarding a search for truth, Addams believes that we can only discover it when we
adopt a thoughtful, open and democratic approach to the world around us. We learn
to become good democratic citizens through experience, understanding diverse
viewpoints, understanding that care is particular rather than general, the importance
of challenging conventional narratives and the way abstract moral principles are
traditionally applied. We understand that our fate is tied to other views, too. She
embraced the same type of objective standpoint feminist epistemology that Sandra
Harding has famously developed. According to Harding,
Feminist standpoint proposes starting research from the daily lives of
women (or others who didn’t design the dominant frameworks) for three
reasons: first, to understand women’s lives through concepts and terms
that come from those lives. Sociologist Dorothy Smith says the term
“housework” would never be coined by people who do it–it clearly comes
from the lives of people who work outside the home, for whom the
household is not a place of work. Secondly, to “study up”: to critically
analyze the dominant institutions, their cultures and practices through the
lens of people who receive few benefits from those institutions. Third is to
understand how the assumptions and practices of those institutions–such
as the Pentagon, the Department of Education, the State Department, Wall
Street–shape the daily lives of women, and how does what women do
shape those institutions?24
Harding argues that many times the dominant views do not always encompass the
views of marginalized people. The views can be expressed by those that are
marginalized but it can also be appreciated by those that are in a more privileged
position. She points out that Hegel, though he was not a slave, advocated that the
master/slave relationship could be better understood if examined from the
22
Addams, Jane. Democracy and Social Ethics, (Urbana and Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 2002) p. 119.
23
Addams, Jane. Democracy and Social Ethics, (Urbana and Chicago: University of
Illinois Press, 2002) page 8.
24
Flores, Nina."Beyond the “Secularism Tic” – An Interview with Feminist Philosopher
Sandra Harding." Ms Magazine Blog. Web. 19 Sept. 2013.
perspective of the slave. 25 This coincides with Addams argument that through
sympathetic understanding and listening we can find a system that is more just and
progressive; that transcends one designed only from the perspective of a dominant
group.
Moral Motivations: The Promise and Perils of Narratives
The Perils of Oppressive Master Narratives
Nussbaum has argued that narratives are a necessary tool for understanding
the intricate layers of particular personal experiences and ideas that make us fully
human. Addams would agree with Nussbaum about the importance of narratives. She
used classic narratives to present her points poignantly and with an emotional impact
usually not felt through reciting abstract principles and theories. However, she
believed selecting the appropriate narrative is learned through experience. For
instance, Addams had grown up learning the narrative of the middle and upper class
people of America. This narrative included people pulling themselves up by their
bootstraps, a moral obligation to try to avoid accepting charity from others,
thriftiness, and a dedication to hard work. She dutifully accepted this narrative and
tried to convince others to turn their lives around by following the instructions
contained within it. Through tragic experience, she learned of the shortcomings
contained in this narrative. Addams had known a shipping clerk that had been out of
work for a long time. He had come by the Hull-House several times to get help for his
family. She heard of some work on a drainage canal and told him that he really should
try to get that work (or any work) before he bothered to come to a charity asking for
help. The man mentioned that he was an indoor worker and that the cold winters were
too hard on him. Addams stood by her instructions. Instead of asking the Hull-House
for help, he worked for two days digging on the canal. He caught pneumonia and died
a week later. It was through this painful experience that Addams realized she needed
to gain knowledge about the specifics of people’s lives before she could work with
them to address the problems they were trying to overcome. 26 The narrative she
shares with others has drastically changed from the previous master narrative she
passed along to others because of this experience. Addams eventually argued that
abstract moral rules applied can do more harm than good. There is no shortcut to
seriously listening to one another and developing a sympathetic understanding of the
particular, concrete situation.
The Promise of Counter Narratives
Nussbaum argues that philosophers need to spend more time writing about
themes in literature. Philosophical concepts are not enough to get at complex truths
about love. She argues that writing moral narratives involves finding the appropriate
link between conception and expression. Certain aspects of the human experience
25
Harding, Sandra. Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is “Strong Objectivity”?
Feminist Theory: A Philosophical Anthology. Ann E. Cudd and Robin O. Andreasen
(Eds.) Malden:Blackwell, 2005) 224.
26
Addams, Jane Twenty Years at Hull-House, Ed. Victoria Bissell Brown. (Boston:
Bedford/St. Martin’s,1999) p.109.
simply cannot adequately be understood through abstract principles, concepts and
rules. Sometimes our ordinary language doesn’t have the capacity to uncover and
express important truths, either. It takes a “narrative artist” to capture some sort of
the truths that are part of the human condition.27 However, it is not clear that this
approach will have widespread appeal. In Damaged Identities: Narrative Repair, Hilde
Lindemann argues that some of the examples Nussbaum chooses may be too
challenging for even the well-educated readers. Lindemann’s point is that Nussbaum
seems to assume that most of us have a high level of narrative competence, when this
may simply not be the case.28 What is to be done if this is not the case? Nussbaum
argues that if we select the right narratives then we will develop the rationally
justifiable compassion that is important for a just society. Regarding capabilities,
development and global justice, Nussbaum believes novels such as Joyce’s Ulysses
provides a roadmap to thinking about such things. Nussbaum writes that it may be to
claim too much to state Ulysses contains a political theory. Yet it does have a political
point of view. She writes
This stance combines scientific rationalism with a nonreductive concern for
“the soul,” for human emotion and aspiration; a concern for kindness with
a passionate defense of sexual liberty (protection of the “law of
copyright”); compassion for human suffering with an intense dislike of
religious parochialism and obscurantism and of their relative, militant
nationalism.29
She believes the complexity of life, love and political theories can sometimes only be
uncovered through this type of narrative art. This is good as far as it goes. But how
many people are going to uncover these types of sophisticated truths through this type
of literature? As Lindemann has convincingly argued, this approach raises some other
questions. There is an epistemological question which is raised; how do we know
whether or not we are choosing the correct reading material? Nussbaum’s work does
not address this question. Furthermore, it may be difficult for some people to find the
time and resources to deeply immerse themselves in such narrative art. Finally,
Lindemann points out that there is usually an important gap between fiction and real
life moral dilemmas. We often have much more knowledge of the motivations, desires,
conflicts and so forth of fictional characters than we do of our colleagues, fellow
citizens and fellow human beings with unfamiliar customs in locations far away from
us. There is not always a way to take what we have learned from reading novels and
apply it neatly to the moral dilemmas we face in our own lives. Instead, Lindemann
believes a focus on counter-narratives will avoid some of the perils she highlighted in
Nussbaum’s approach to narrative art and moral progress. Counter narratives are
instructive for several reasons. First, people can create their own counter narratives
regardless of social status. They don’t need some special literary skills in order to fully
27
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature.
New York: Oxford UP, 1990. 5.
28
Lindemann, Hilde. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2001.
44.
29
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. 708.
comprehend the messages contained within the narrative. Finally, there is the problem
of linking fiction with the problems of her actual life. While counter narratives may be
sparked from reading, they need not be. This provides expansive possibilities for
challenging oppressive master narratives without all of the obstacles which might arise
with Nussbaum’s account.30
Jane Addams already brilliantly incorporated both the theories of Nussbaum and
Lindemann into her work. Addams often developed counter stories to challenge
mainstream narratives. Marilyn Fischer demonstrates how Addams’s interpretation of
a devil baby story provides a powerful counter narrative. At the Hull House, a story was
being told about a devil baby. According to this story, a baby had been born with
cloven hooves. She could speak the moment she was born; she had a tail and so on.
Many curious people heard this story and rushed to the Hull House demanding to see
this baby. Gawkers and spectators were intrigued by this story. Some older, immigrant
women had been excitedly talking about it for some time. Outsiders wanted to learn
more about this baby. Of course, on the face of it, these older, marginalized women
may have seemed to be crazy or liars. However, Addams offers a counter narrative.
The women telling these stories had very little social power and many of them had
often been horribly abused. They were seldom listened to or consulted for advice.
When men came to inquire about the devil baby, these women used the opportunity
to teach moral lessons, to communicate their own pain or sometimes to maintain
some family discipline. Addams came to understand the spirit of these stories and the
truths that were uncovered by sympathetically listening and actively trying to
understand the meaning behind them. As Fischer points out, Addams accurately
portrayed these women as artists and knowledge makers without romanticizing their
methods or ‘feminist consciousness’.31
Addams uses her experience with these women, combined with sympathetic
interpretation to demonstrate how there can be a deeper, truer counter narrative that
we may be blind to if we have bought into the web of beliefs promoted by powerful
people in our own cultures. Addams also relies on classic stories appreciated by the
mainstream culture in order to challenge master narratives that were current in her
time and place. For example, in A Modern Lear, she sets up the dilemma of a group of
workers going on strike against their employer with the following observation
During the discussions which followed the Pullman strike, the defenders of the
situation were broadly divided between the people pleading for individual
benevolence and those insisting upon social righteousness; between those who
held that the philanthropy of the president of the Pullman company had been
most ungratefully received and those who maintained that the situation was
30
Lindemann, Hilde. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2001.
41-46 and 64-68.
31
“Trojan Women and Devil Baby Tales: Addams on Domestic Violence,” pp. 81-105
in Maurice Hamington ed., Feminist Interpretations of Jane Addams. (University Park:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010).
the inevitable outcome of the social consciousness developing among working
people.32
She lays this event out as a conflict between an individualistic capitalist with
benevolent intentions versus the collective will of the workers. Furthermore, she uses
the story of King Lear to bring an imaginative literary element to this problem of
misguided benevolence. She works to show how there is a larger lesson to be learned
in our understanding of the Pullman strikes. Addams claims that Pullman was doing
what he thought was best, he seemed to have a benevolent good will towards those
that worked for him. He believed he was doing a great deal more for his employees
than many employers of the time. Why did the workers turn against him? Addams
relates this to the story of King Lear, a literary figure who also found his benevolent
intensions rejected. In both cases, a benevolent leader tried to do good ‘for’ others
instead of doing good ‘with’ them. Both Lear and Pullman knew they were extremely
powerful individuals and they felt confident that their superior position made it
possible for them to successfully direct the lives of those that were considered lower in
the social (or familial) hierarchy. They thought they knew better what these people
wanted than these people knew for themselves. Hence, both King Lear and Pullman
meant well but their stories point to the same tragic flaw. They became too confident
of their own personal conception of what is good and they ceased to inquire what
other’s want, or to look at the ethics of the larger social group. Once they went down
that path, their most benevolent intentions turned into action had disastrous results.
In the Pullman case, his incompetent understanding of care-as-paternalistic endeavors
inadvertently led to a path where democracy was compromised. When oppressed
workers are not given a voice, then this is a direct threat to the spirit of democracy.
The story of King Lear is an example of a respectable narrative which is accepted by the
culture yet challenges a master narrative in Chicago politics at the time. Namely, that
those with money and power know better than those at the margins of society. This
counter narrative challenges the oppressive master narrative endorsing paternalistic
policies.
These types of stories are counter narratives which will expand our range of
sympathetic knowledge. For Addams, we don’t have a duty to care. Rather we have a
duty to expand our range of experiences beyond our traditional understandings of the
human experience, which is often limited by oppressive master narratives. Addams
often worked with people that were in a different socio-economic class from her. She
paid attention to people that at first glance may have seemed different from her, she
sympathized with them and expected to learn from these conversations and
experiences. She then was able to construct compelling counter narratives that
challenged mainstream values.
Lindemann asks us to use experiences from our own personal lives in order to create
counter narratives, too. By linking our own lives to those with similar experiences, we
32
Jane Addams, "A Modern Lear," in Satellite Cities: A Study of Industrial Suburbs, ed.
Graham Romeyn Taylor (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1915), 69. Accessed
online at: http://publications.newberry.org/pullman/items/show/87.
can shift our web of beliefs that connect with a master narrative to a new, more
accurate narrative. According to Lindemann, master narratives do not have to be
oppressive. However, counter stories are a means to resist those master narratives
that do oppress people. A counter story is told in a way “…to make visible the morally
relevant details that the master narrative suppresses.”33 For instance, Lindemann
writes her own counter narrative to challenge the master narrative of doctors and
nurses and provides a powerful example of how some identities are damaged through
these master narratives. But she also suggests that counter narratives can repair our
identities. For instance, she tells the story of a nurse named Virginia Martin. This nurse
had internalized her job from the doctors' perspectives. She believed her job was not
as serious or important as a doctor’s job. She also dismissed behavior that discounted
her ethical viewpoints and her side of the story as simply docs being docs. However, as
she joined a committee of nurses and they talked, she began to start to challenge
these enculturated beliefs. She heard stories from other nurses who were indignant of
being treated like children, who resented the ways in which they were sometimes
exploited. Virginia Martin started to feel indignant for them in a way she was unable to
feel for herself. By linking her experiences to those of other women with similar
experiences but with different interpretations of events, she began to develop her own
counter narrative over time.34 These counter narratives help us form identities which
are important to us.
Our stories also help other people form their own identities outside of the master
narratives. For instance, in Virginia Martin’s case the doctors saw the nurses as mother
figures. Lindemann writes
When…the physicians at Virginia Martin’s hospital think about the nurses
at all, the picture in their minds, seemingly so normal and ordinary that it
crowds out other possible representations, is that of the loving mother
who tends to the bodily and emotional needs of the sick. The image is
latent rather than manifest, not even fully acknowledged even by the
doctors themselves, but its latent quality is what gives it much of its
power.35
Lindemann goes on to point out that these nurses do not think of themselves as
mothers nor do they think of their patients as children. The point of counter stories are
to expose oppressive structures found in the master narratives and replace them with
more liberating, fuller and accurate stories. This applies to many of Addams’s stories,
too. Lindemann recognizes that in order for these stories to be successful they have to
get at the root of the problem, they should be widely circulated, “culturally digestible”
33
Lindemann, Hilde. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2001.
7..
34
Lindemann, Hilde. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2001.
1-10.
35
Lindemann, Hilde. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2001.
146-147.
and both sides of the power equation should be able to relate to them. 36 While some
portions of Addams’s examples and stories seem outdated today, she was working to
make them “culturally digestible” for the time and place in which she existed.
While Lindemann does not identify with care ethics, her work on repairing damaged
identities by thinking about the role of narrative in ethics provides a powerful
methodology for incorporating compassion and care in local, national and global
politics. A large part of the work that is still needed to be done in global justice will
involve shining a light on what is often unseen. By making these latent images of care
workers manifest, by appropriately challenging various narratives such as pulling
oneself up by one's bootstraps, of a work ethics that does not consider what sort of
capabilities are necessary to do the required work in a society, by providing counter
narratives to demonstrate examples of the “privileged irresponsibility” introduced in
Joan Tronto’s work, we can create a space where care is more adequately and
appropriately featured in both our global and domestic political landscapes.
Global Justice, Capabilities and Care Ethics
Care ethics demands effort, experience, knowledge, imagination, and
empathy for the totality of the moral context to be effectively understood.
The result is not exoneration of personal responsibility but a richer
understanding of the human condition whereby we are all actors and acted
upon.37
In the field of global justice, Thomas Pogge has made an enormous contribution. He
has provided compelling statistics and reasons to demonstrate that global institutional
policies need to be reformed. Pogge has provided powerful counter stories, too. For
example, he challenges the “purely domestic poverty thesis” 38 by arguing that some
people still maintain that when societies are not thriving, then it is the fault of local
politics, philosophies, religious views and so forth. But this overlooks the role of
colonization, global trade, trade policies and even genocide. Pogge provides a
compelling counter narrative to challenge this master story. He demonstrates how
Western nation states are creating unjust global institutions which primarily benefit
the powerful. He argues, providing case studies, that it is evident that these global
institutional arrangements are causing severe deprivation in poorer regions of the
world. 39 However, as Fiona Robinson has correctly pointed out, Pogge’s approach to
global ethics is rights-based and ignores the rich relational nature of human life. He
tells some compelling counter stories but he doesn’t tell a broad enough range of
them. According to Robinson, his account is “procedural, individualistic, universalistic 36
Lindemann, Hilde. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2001.
150-188.
37
Hamington, Maurice. Introduction. Feminist Interpretations of Jane Addams.
University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP, 2010. 15.
38
Pogge, Thomas. Politics as Usual: What Lies behind the Pro-poor Rhetoric.
Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010. 32.
39
Pogge, Thomas. Politics as Usual: What Lies behind the Pro-poor Rhetoric.
Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010. 32.
it focuses on the procedures for arriving at a theory of justice which privileges
individuals as autonomous, and seeks to extend this principle to all individuals in the
world.”40 She argues that this approach is fatally flawed, in part, because it is not
possible to simply add women and stir.41 I do not believe that Pogge’s approach is
fatally flawed. However, Robinson is surely correct that it does not go far enough. He
has not successfully made the case that an institutional negative rights model is the
best way of achieving global justice.42 Additionally, he has not included issues of care
into his theory, and until he does it is woefully incomplete. A case can be made that
the popular neo-liberal model of global trade, policy and so forth is an oppressive
master narrative. While Pogge challenges an extremely important part of this
narrative, he leaves part of the oppressive structure (the invisibility of care work) fully
intact. As Lindemann has noted, “Oppressive master narratives commonly construct
the identities of certain classes of people from the perspective of an arrogant eye,
dismissing and degrading anything about the members of the class that does not bear
directly on their value to the dominant group."43 This is a clue to how so many issues
related to care have been overlooked with the solely individualistic approach to global
justice. I am not arguing against individual rights but rather that this is a truncated
approach to thinking about complex, deeply rich human experiences. This approach
averts some important issues, which simply can’t be avoided when thinking about
global justice.
Counter Narratives and Global Justice: Making the Invisible Visible
For example, an area of trade that prima facie appears gender neutral, but is
really gender biased, is the informal economy. It is virtually ignored in world trade
policy. According to the 2009 World Survey on the Role of Women in Development,
the informal trade sector needs to be addressed. Often, women working in the
informal economy lack the income to gain from tariff exemptions, are uninformed
about taxation policies, and are unaware that they have any labor rights. Additionally,
they are not protected by standard safety regulations nor are they eligible for social
security. Furthermore, they are generally excluded from the decision making process.
They do not participate in the development of trade, investment, or labor policies.
Those participating in the informal economy, which includes a high percentage of
women, are often working informally because of a variety of reasons, though I will only
briefly focus on two issues here: 1) Stereotypical attitudes towards traditional notions
of ‘women’s’ work (housework, child care, and other unpaid and undervalued work)
often confine women to the informal sector of the economy. 2) Certain trade
agreements, such as NAFTA, lead to retrenchments and radical changes in production,
which lead to more women becoming part of the informal economy. Women are often
the last hired and the first fired, which thrusts them back into the informal economy.
40
Robinson, Fiona. "Care, Gender and Global Social Justice: Rethinking ‘ethical
Globalization’." Journal of Global Ethics 2.1 (2006). 11.
41
Robinson, Fiona. "Care, Gender and Global Social Justice: Rethinking ‘ethical
Globalization’." Journal of Global Ethics 2.1 (2006): 5-25.
42
Please review chapter one in Pogge, Thomas Politics as Usual: What Lies behind the
Pro-poor Rhetoric. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010 for his practical argument advancing a
libertarian model for global justice.
43
Lindemann, Hilde. Damaged Identities, Narrative Repair. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2001.
173.
Often times, men are seen as the bread winner, which is an excuse to let women go
first. “This (the informal economy) has become the last resort not only for the
increasing number of retrenched workers, but also for factories through
subcontracting to the informal sector in order to cut labor costs.” 44 As more and more
women are becoming members of the informal sector due to unfair trade agreements,
they become increasingly marginalized and invisible. Those most negatively impacted
by these policies are the poor and marginalized women. Since the poor and
marginalized groups of people are the ones most affected by the world trade policies,
their stories need to be told. If we adopt Harding’s objective feminist standpoint
theory, which focuses on the relationship between women’s daily lives and the
institutions which govern their lives, then we will see that a focus on care and an ethics
of care must be included in any human rights ethics.
I chose to focus on stereotypical attitudes of care work and the way that some trade
agreements render many women virtually invisible because these stereotypical
attitudes about women are often grounded in oppressive master cultural narratives.
These entrenched problems are a reflection of both domestic and global institutions,
policies and systems that do not value care. As Tronto has pointed out, they may not
value it because they may not see it. People tend not to see that which frightens them
or makes them feel less than human in their current cultural master narrative. In much
of the traditional western philosophical literature, these ideal humans are not in need
of care. By peering too closely into the ethics of care, that false philosophical ideal is
shown to be impossible to obtain. For those that are successful by society’s standards,
focusing on care can raise some troubling questions about their own moral right to
great wealth and the importance of the work their care givers do.
Tronto argues
Care work is devalued; care is also devalued conceptually through a
connection with privacy, with emotion, and with the needy. Since our
society treats public accomplishment, rationality, and autonomy as worthy
qualities, care is devalued insofar as it embodies their opposites.45
It is easy to see why many people want to devalue care but a thorough investigation
reveals the important role care has in all of our lives. How can we incorporate an ethics
of care into our political conceptions of capabilities and human development?
Nussbaum’s capabilities list addresses this issue. She includes the right of affiliation:
Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern
for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to
44
Randriamaro, Zo. Bridge. Rep. N.p., Dec. 2005. Web. 11 Sept. 2013.
Tronto, Joan C. Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethic of Care. New
York: Routledge, 1993.117.
45
be able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for
that situation; to have the capability for both justice and friendship.46
The ways care has been devalued in both global and domestic politics has been well
documented. Care givers are often forced into poverty when they provide care to
family members for an extended period of time, for example.47 Robin West argues
that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is the best argument for a liberal welfare state.
West proposes a right of caregivers “to give care to dependents without incurring the
risk of severe impoverishment or subordination.”48 While this is an important right
and, as both West and Nussbaum point out, the language of rights has some rhetorical
benefits, there still needs to be a foundation which makes people appreciate the
significance of this right. Yet, as we know, rights that aren’t internalized by the
majority of people are often unenforced. This does not mean that unenforced rights
are not necessary, merely that they are not sufficient for actualizing the capabilities of
people to live free from these threats. There are plenty of examples of unenforced
rights in the United States, too. For instance, American women are supposed to be
considered for jobs based on their qualifications, yet studies shows that applications
with typically female first names are more likely to be rejected. Women with exactly
the same qualifications as men are often viewed as inferior candidates.49 Legally,
women are supposed to be paid the same as men for comparable work. Yet, women
earn on average about three quarters of what men do for equal work. 50 Legally,
women have reproductive rights including abortion. Yet, in rural areas, 97% of the
counties have no abortion provider.51 This demonstrates that an ethics of care, an
ethics of responsibility, and an understanding of power structures and groups are
necessary for the creation of a space wherein there is the opportunity for more of
these capabilities to be actualized. An ethics of care can be encouraged through a
capabilities approach and a counter narrative methodology. For example, Addams
mentions that a master narrative among charity workers is that saloons are places of
horror. However, when charity workers express their beliefs about saloons their
warnings often do not ring true. Instead, many clients remember the kindness they
received at saloons. They recall the drinks that they were given until they got back on
their feet, the warm room and kind words. They are reminded of the care that was
exhibited in the saloon that was not always exhibited by the charity worker. Addams
46
Nussbaum, Martha Craven. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities
Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000. 79.
47
See Love’s Labor (1999) by Eva Kittay, Joan Tronto’s work Moral Boundaries,
Robinson, Fiona. Globalizing Care: Ethics, Feminist Theory, and International
Relations for some examples.
48
West, Robin. "Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW."
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/267Georgetown Law, 2001. Web. 10
Sept. 2013.
49
Eagly, Alice Hendrickson, and Linda L. Carli. Through the Labyrinth: The Truth
about How Women Become Leaders. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2008.
50
Eagly, Alice Hendrickson, and Linda L. Carli. Through the Labyrinth: The Truth
about How Women Become Leaders. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2008.
51
"Women in County without Abortion Provider (%)." Health Care Report Card. N.p.,
n.d. Web. 10 Sept. 2013.
challenges the traditional charity worker’s understanding of situations by providing
these types of counter narratives, which focus on the importance of care in people’s
lives.52
Addams also would recognize Nussbaum’s point that care needs to be political, though
she might balk at the claim that an ethics of care is developed through institutions.
Addams wrote
Doubtless we all fled something distasteful in the juxtaposition of the two
words "organized" and "charity." The idea of organizing an emotion is in
itself repelling, even to those of us who feel most solely the need of more
order in altruistic effort and see the end to be desired.53
Our emotions often motivate us to organize, not the other way around, according to
Addams. So while a capabilities approach to human development is helpful, we want
to keep in mind the importance of experience and sympathetic understanding in
developing our political conceptions of care and capabilities.
Capabilities, Care Ethics: A Right to Care and Beyond
“In the unceasing ebb and flow of justice and oppression we must all dig
channels as best we may, that at the propitious moment somewhat of the
swelling tide may be conducted to the barren places of life.”54
Jane Addams argued that justice, rights and care are all part of a democratic society.
While she did not argue for a strict duty to care, she did believe that once we gained a
fair amount of sympathetic knowledge about a situation, then we ought to act. She
worked in her community as an individual citizen to promote human rights and issues
of economic justice, while also recognizing the extreme importance of collective
action. Addams conjunction of moral psychology (sympathy) and epistemology
(understanding) can also serve as a key component in both an ethics of care, as well as
an ethics of justice. Though Addams did not use the same terminology, her concept of
sympathetic understanding is grounded in an ethics of care. As Carol Nackenoff has
pointed out, Addams’s concern that the democratic process includes all voices can be
helpful when thinking about democracy from a care ethics perspective. Nackenoff
writes
Feminist arguments for an ethic of care and at least some strains in the
recent civic engagement debate in the United States share the premise
that meaningful democratic politics requires transcending notions of the
52 Addams, Jane. "The Subtle Problems of Charity." The Atlantic. . Web. Accessed 19
Sept. 2013.
53 Addams, Jane. "The Subtle Problems of Charity." The Atlantic. . Web. Accessed 19
Sept. 2013.
54
Addams, Jane. Twenty Years at Hull-House: With Autobiographical Notes. New
York: Signet Classic, 1999. 40.
autonomous individual whose self-interest is an adequate expression of
citizenship.55
Addams’s approach is consistent with contemporary care ethics, which tends to
emphasize the importance of personal relationships, compassion, love and sympathy.
She demonstrates how caring social relations are necessary for engaged citizens to
build a strong and agile democracy. While Addams’s philosophy is relational and
promotes engaging in one’s own community, it is also about challenging institutional
injustice. A duty to care is too abstract for Jane Addams. The capabilities approach,
while often abstract, also acknowledges the importance of care to a proper human life.
This means both a stronger ethics of care, as well as respect for those that do the
caring, in addition to the recommendations made by Thomas Pogge. It often requires a
creative combination of individuals, organizations and nation states to create a more
just world. It will take the same type of creativity to create a more caring world.
Addams approach to political projects is consistent with some of Iris Young’s work in
Responsibility for Justice, too. Young points out that it is often inappropriate and
ineffective to blame others. In cases of structural injustices, it is easy to oversimplify
the complexity of the various processes, institutions, policies and so forth which
contribute to serious problems. Many people tend to become defensive when they are
blamed for things that they may only be partially or indirectly responsible for and a
blame game begins. In public discourse, this often results in different sides pointing at
each other and this approach often distracts us from taking positive action to solve the
complex problems which arise in this increasingly interrelated and globalized world. 56
Addams did not focus on blame, either. For instance, in The Spirit of Youth and the City
Streets, Addams considers the reasons so many children get into trouble with the law.
Some of these reasons include: relief from boredom, wanting to fit in with other
children, a quest for adventure, an escape from the bleakness of their own lives and so
forth. She writes
Out of my twenty years' experience at Hull-House I can recall all sorts of
pilferings, petty larcenies, and even burglaries, due to that never ceasing
effort on the part of boys to procure theater tickets. I can also recall
indirect efforts towards the same end which are most pitiful.57
Addams’s is not arguing that what these children are doing is morally justified. Rather,
she is trying to better understand the motivations underlying their actions instead of
simply dismissing their actions as inappropriate or immoral. It is through caring and
55
Nackenhoff, Carol.“New Politics for New Selves: Jane Addams’s Legacy for
Democratic Citizenship in the 21st Century,” pp. 119-142 in Marilyn Fischer, Carol
Nackenoff, and Wendy Chmielewski, eds., Jane Addams and the Practice of
Democracy: Women’s Experiences Shaping Theory. (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 2009).
56
Young, Iris. Responsibility for Justice. (Oxford University Press, 2010).pp. 116-117.
57
Jane Addams. The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets. New York: Macmillan (1930):
51. Accessed online at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/16221/16221-h/16221-h.htm.
sympathetic knowledge that we gain an understanding of what sort of policies and
institutions we need in order to actualize capabilities.
Conclusion
Through compassion beyond parochialism as advocated by Nussbaum and by
the counter stories advocated by Lindemann and demonstrated by Addams, we can
develop a framework for the possibility of care earning its rightful place in
development ethics. Through accessible narratives we can make the case for the
importance of care in human rights and capabilities. Care plays an important role in all
of our lives and ought not to be made invisible by our political processes and
institutions, both domestic and global. We need to address the fear and disgust
sometimes surrounding the idea of care through powerful counter stories. Resistance
to an ethics of care may be partially based on a fear of thinking about those on the
frontline giving care. These issues must be addressed. Addams writes about the
dangers of human beings turning away from topics that produce negative visceral
reactions. While she doesn’t focus particularly on care in this example, it is clear that
her thoughts would be helpful to this issue. Regarding prostitution and the white sex
slave business, Addams points out that the idea of “commercialized vice” is something
many men and women don’t seriously contemplate. It puts them “into a state of
indignant revolt.” Addams argues that people may use these feelings to justify not
thinking about it. These feelings cause some to justify a willful ignorance to
uncomfortable topics. However, it is vital that we go beyond discomfort and address
uncomfortable issues. Addams writes:
Some of the writers who are performing this valiant service are related to
those great artists who in every age enter into a long struggle with existing
social conditions, until after many years they change the outlook upon life
for at least a handful of their contemporaries. Their readers find
themselves no longer mere bewildered spectators of a given social wrong,
but have become conscious of their own hypocrisy in regard to it, and they
realize that a veritable horror, simply because it was hidden, had come to
seem to them inevitable and almost normal.58
She encourages writers to write about these issues, to provide counter narratives, and
to provide those stories which address issues of social justice. Regarding her retelling
of King Lear, she is reminding people of the importance of standpoint epistemology. It
is helpful to pay careful attention to marginalized points of view in order to avoid
paternalism, or other undesirable –isms. By sympathetically listening to the old
women’s tales of a devil baby, she provides a counter narrative that demonstrates the
wisdom and human dignity of the story tellers. Her counter narratives force us to
consider morally relevant features of a situation which we might otherwise prefer to
ignore. Addams’s counter narrative reveals the oppressive structures that rendered
the story teller’s lives virtually invisible.59 Through sympathetic understanding and
political activism we can create a symbiotic activism through which care earns its
58
Addams, Jane. A New Conscience and an Ancient Evil. Urbana: University of Illinois,
2002. 7-8.
59
Addams, Jane. The Long Road of Woman's Memory,. New York: Macmillan, 1916.
rightful place as a centerpiece in a conversation about capabilities and global justice.
Through this symbiotic activism, it will become evident that the institutional negative
duty approach of Pogge (wherein he argues that those in the West have violated the
negative rights of others through their institutions and hence must work collectively to
reshape or dismantle these institutions) and Miller’s basic needs approach are
insufficient to address the scope of issues involved in a baseline understanding of
global justice.
2.2 Justice and war.
(CE)
Roo m 42
Chair: Nigel Dower, Department of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen
Globalization, horizontal inequalities, and civil war
Sarah Peters
Ph.D. student, Department of Political Science
University of Notre Dame, U.S.A
sarahpeters298@gmail.com
Abstract: In this paper, I examine the impact of international economic exchange on
the propensity for civil war. My argument is that rising horizontal inequality
engendered by economic globalization, combined with political exclusion of identity
groups, can produce high levels of internal violence. I test my argument using
qualitative comparative analysis (QCA).
First, I show that rising international economic dependence (on trade and foreign
direct and portfolio investment) may lead to increased economic inequality in a
particular country. The most economically and politically powerful groups will be in the
best position to reap benefits of international trade and investment, and there is no
guarantee that gains from trade will be divided equally among groups in society.
Furthermore, as countries increase their participation in the world economy, wages
rise more in more developed and competitive sectors than in less competitive sectors.
Financial openness increases the likelihood of financial crises, wherein the poor suffer
most because of recession, reduced tax base, and cuts to social spending. The need to
attract foreign investment puts pressure on governments to reduce worker wages and
benefits, as well as public employment and spending.
But economic inequality alone is not enough to lead to civil war. Recent literature
suggests that inequality along class lines does not raise the probability of civil war, but
with horizontal inequality, or an unequal economic distribution along ethnic or
religious lines, the likelihood of internal violence increases significantly. Frances
Stewart has argued that “ a degree of similarity of circumstance” (Stewart 2000, p.
247) is not enough on its own to mobilize a rebel group. Certain other conditions must
be present. A political leader can mobilize a group when it has both “cultural”
distinction as well as material power differences from other groups. “Differences in
actual underlying conditions with respect to political control and economics are
important for the development of group identity and mobilization. Without such
inequalities, group identification is likely to be weak and remain a cultural rather than
political or conflict-creating phenomenon” (Stewart 2000, p. 247). As Ted Gurr (1993)
has argued, it is relative, not absolute, socioeconomic positions that are more often
underlying causes of conflict. If a whole society is impoverished, there is no motivating
factor for group organization.
Countries with pre-existing ethnic disparities in income distribution are likely to see
rising horizontal inequality as a result of increasing participation in the global
economy. Disadvantaged identity groups will have incentives to mobilize around their
grievances. However, groups that have inclusion in the political process (unlikely in
autocratic regimes, but democracy does not automatically mean inclusion) can redress
their grievances through peaceful means. But political exclusion can lead groups to
take up violent means against the government, resulting in rebellion, insurgency, or
civil war. Thus free trade and other economic components of globalization, often
touted as benevolent forces for both peace and development, could actually lead to
both violence among and persistent underdevelopment of poor and marginalized
ethnic groups under some circumstances.
Anger in Search of Justice: Reflections on the Gezi Revolt in Turkey
Ahmet Öncü and Gürcan Koçan
Ahmet Öncü
School of Management, Sabancı University,
aoncu@sabanciuniv.edu
Gürcan Koçan
Department of Humanities & Social Sciences, Istanbul Technical University,
kocan@itu.edu.tr
Presenter : Gürcan Koçan
Abstract: In this paper we focus on the underlying motivation behind the participation
of individuals in what came to be known as the Gezi Revolt. For us, the Gezi Revolt was
the expression of anger in response to a perceived social injustice. Those who
participated in the uprising aimed not only to enforce political change but also gain
dignity in their lives through struggle and moral expression. Gezi represents weaving
together moral, cognitive, and emotional responses. Anger and fury were the two
particular emotions that have provided a sense of urgency among a large section of
people across the land and led to the building of a community or network of
individuals and groups through which sharing of stories and expressing feelings turned
into practices of moral progress. We discuss how the participants of “the Gezi
Community” achieved to put aside their before identities and hold back their
unpleasant and dividing emotions to one another so that they could come together
around a common cause as merely individuals.
Mobilization research provides us with plausible motives as to why people may
participate in collective action. Among these, mean-end, group affiliation and belief
systems appear to be broadly recognized as the most common reasons for movement
participation. The mean-end explanation treats the participants as thickly rational
individuals, and thereby focuses exclusively on the actors’ strategies and tactics in their
attempts to bring change in their socio-political environment. The group affiliation
explanation rests on the notions of identity and belongingness, and hence moves away
from the thick rationality assumption. This sort of explanation examines the influence
of sociological and socio-psychological factors on individuals’ decisions to join
mobilizations. It therefore emphasizes the importance of collective conscience or
group consciousness as part of the ontology of human agency. In doing so, it calls into
question the assumption of thick rationality associated with the view of actors as
atomized individuals interested solely in costs and benefits i.e., consequences of their
actions in an utilitarian manner. The belief system explanation focuses on individuals’
search for values with which they would separate and select morally correct action
from a set of all viable ones. Here neither the utilitarian calculations nor the feelings
of adherence to group norms are seen as explanatory factors regarding the movement
participation. But rather doing “the right thing,” so to speak, is prioritized in
accounting for the reasons as to why individuals choose to join a particular
mobilization. In other words, movement participation was taken as an evidence for
individuals’ expression how they feel morally about happenings in their social and
political environment. Although all of those three explanations are equally important
for examining a given mobilization, it is important to note that only the last one –
namely, the belief systems explanation- focuses precisely on emotions and hence
individually grounded morality and ethics. Our narration of the Gezi revolt which
emphasizes the moral outrage as the fundamental motive behind many individuals’
participation in the uprising therefore draws more from the last one than the others
Religion And Development: Prosperity Gospel And The Vision Of Infinite
Growth Among Evangelical-Pentecostals In Kenya.
Yonatan N. Gez
PhD Candidate in Anthropology and Sociology of Development and a research
assistant,
The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies.
University of Geneva,
gezyonatan@gmail.com
Abstract: The neo-Pentecostal Christian wave has been exploding in Latin America and
sub-Saharan Africa since the 1970s-1980s. The movement has been enjoying a strong
backwind from American evangelicalism, with its emphasis on the importance of
salvation and becoming ‘Born Again.’ But alongside spiritual teachings and evangelical
emphasis, the Evangelical-Pentecostal movement has also been a carrier of a particular
conservative perspective on social, political, and economic affairs.
Kenya, in this respect, is an interesting case, for it has been subject to strong influence
by Western missionaries both in the past and at present. As John Lonsdale estimates,
“[i]n the 1990s Kenya had 1,300 of them [i.e. evangelical missionaries], an astounding
figure, twice as many as other African country, and a second missionization none
would have foretold in 1963 (Lonsdale, 2002: 184).” This “second missionization,”
accompanied by strong partnership with American churches overseas, invites
particular outlooks which have penetrated Kenyan national consciousness. Thus for
instance, in international relations, these induce unquestioning support for the United
States and a Christian Zionist message often divorced from events on the ground
(Séraphin, 2003).
Central to the Evangelical-Pentecostal vision is the emphasis on financial contributions
and abundance under the title of the ‘prosperity gospel.’ Following the stand put forth
by Weber’s famous argument linking Protestantism with the spirit of capitalism, many
scholars suggest that Pentecostal churches positively encourage people’s agency and
are “a positive resource for modern economic development” (Berger, 2009: 71;
Maxwell, 1998; 2000; Martin, 2002; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000). This proposition is
contested, however, with one significant detractor having suggested as far back as
1991 that “the gospel of prosperity […] dissuades adherents from evaluating the
present economic order, merely persuading them to try to be amongst those who
benefit from it” (Gifford, 1991: 66). Just as problematic, the prosperity approach tends
to emphasize that, in order to reap God’s blessings, one must show his/her trust in
God by ‘planting a seed’ and making generous contributions to the church and to men
of God. As Linda van de Kamp (2011) shows in her study of Pentecostal women in
Maputo, such donations may have devastating effects on the urban poor. In Kenya too,
stories and rumors about the dark side of the prosperity gospel abound.
In this paper, I will propose an analysis and critique of the prosperity gospel, as
imported and promoted in Kenya. I will suggest that such teachings reflect a neoliberal
stance, which justifies unreflective economic success as an ideal pursuit. From a
development perspective, the prosperity gospel’s image of constant growth is clearly
unsustainable. Indeed, Kenyans who subscribe to the prosperity gospel dream of
owning large vehicles and fancy houses, and tend not to reflect on the environmental
impact caused by achieving their dreams. From an ethical standpoint as well, while the
Born Again identity is presented as a total transformation of the self, partially
manifesting in ethical reorientation (e.g. marital fidelity, interpersonal honesty), I
would suggest that the prosperity gospel is in tension with a genuine pursuit of an
ethical life.
This paper will build on my research in Kenya, where I have been studying Christianity
as a development anthropologist since 2010, and will be supported by findings from a
small research project conducted among members of a Pentecostal congregation in
Kisumu, western Kenya, between May-July 2014.
2.3 Development, fairtrade and human rights.
(CE)
Room 43
Chair: Lori Keleher, Department of Philosophy, New Mexico State University
El derecho a tener derechos: hacia una conformación ciudadana desde la
alteridad.
Claudia Morales
Becaria posdoctoral del Centro de Investigaciones sobre América Latina y el
Caribe de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
Universidad Nacional Autónoma, México
moralesclabi@gmail.com
Abstract: La ciudadanía desde Latinoamérica es una construcción inacabada,
históricamente no ha podido consolidarse como un modelo ético de expresión pública.
Además se suman nuevas realidades culturales, políticas y económicas que en esta
región exigen pensar en una ciudadanía distinta con identidades y características
propias a la idea tradicional del ciudadano occidental que se circunscribe en la nación
Estado.
En el caso de los latinoamericanos que residen en Estados Unidos han podido vivenciar
la condición de p
de no tener papeles para trabajar, habitar y beneficiarse de esa comunidad política. En
este sentido la reivindicación que hacen algunos movimientos de inmigrantes recobran
la crítica arendtiana sobre el «derecho a tener derechos», pues la pérdida de los
derechos civiles es equivalente a la pérdida de los derechos humanos e inclusive a la
pérdida de un lugar en la Humanidad.
El problema a los que se enfrentan las Naciones-Estados es la delimitación anacrónica
de la territorialidad, que hoy se ve trastocada por las tecnologías, la
internacionalización de la comunicación y los impactos de movimientos que
encuentran razones comunes, en este sentido habrá que orientarse hacia la
construcción de ciudadanías evitando distinciones entre las mismas, es decir
ciudadanos de primera y de segunda, así como marginalidad y en una condición de
inferioridad en aquellos que quedan fuera de la estructura nacional, porque el reclamo
se basa en considerar derechos colectivos más derechos individuales, lo que requiere
mayor reflexión y análisis.
El presente trabajo de investigación pretende estudiar la ciudadanía desde la ética, al
ciudadano como fenómeno humano, en el que se considere la inclusión de derechos,
la reflexión sobre identidades comunes y construidas de manera artificial a partir de la
condición de inmigrantes o parias en los procesos de globalización. Esto se realizará
desde un enfoque fenomenológico tomado del pensamiento Hannah Arendt y su
reflexión sobre «el derecho a tener derechos», la condición de paria, apátrida o
parvenu. Así como de los estudios de Seyla Benhabib basados en la «itineración
democrática» y «política jurisgenerativa» son mediados por las normas universales y
la voluntad de la mayoría democrática y no son actos de repetición simple.
En particular se considera el Movimiento “Justicia del Barrio”, que surgió como una
lucha por el reconocimiento de derechos de inmigrantes latinoamericanos, hoy se
plantea como una lucha para liberar y reconocer otros sectores sociales además de los
inmigrantes como mujeres, lesbianas, la gente de color (latinoamericanos,
africanoamericanos, asiáticos e indígenas), homosexuales y de la comunidad
transgénero, que se ven afectados no sólo por la falta de ciudadanía, sino por las
políticas neoliberales que han impactado el mundo occidental y han dejado polarizada
a la sociedad . La acción política de esta organización responde a un carácter y
formación de ciudadanía que ha tenido como génesis la defensa y dignidad de los
vecinos por mantener su vivienda. Ha sido una movilización que hasta este momento
no ha logrado el reconocimiento jurídico de ciudadano, pero si ha construido una
identidad en torno a la vida fáctica y la imagen que se ha creado por el entorno en el
que viven. En una reflexión ética desde los movimientos de migrantes y de los sin
papeles.
What makes FairTrade fair?
Nigel Dower
Honorary Senior Lecturer in Philosophy,
University of Aberdeen, Scotland
n.dower@abdn.ac.uk
Abstract: I shall approach this question via another question: what ethical reasons do
consumers have for buying FairTrade bananas, coffee, tea etc.? At one level it a
humanitarian concern for supporting farmers and enabling them to have a sufficient
price on a secure basis for their products (we might call it ‘humane trade’). But at
another it is about promoting greater justice in the world and reducing injustice,
including understanding this as reducing one’s own dependence on unfair or unjust
practices. What is unjust about typical production of such foods? At one level it is
about a farmer’s rights being either violated or undermined: the unequal power
relations undermines genuinely free contracts of employment or exchange, and leaves
him/her with insufficient money to meet the subsistence rights of him/herself and
his/her family.
What may lie behind a simple act of buying FairTrade bananas may be a whole theory
of global justice, whatever that theory is. Even a relatively libertarian or non-radical
theory of global justice can recognise that if farmer’s or other workers’ rights are
undermined because of lack of freedom, then there is an issue of unfairness. But a
more radical account of global justice will go beyond the specific rights of the worker
involved and either present a general assessment of global economic power relations
as being unjust, or develop in a more Rawlsian way an account of global distribution of
goods/resources by which measure the world falls seriously short of meeting global
social justice.
But whichever theory one favours, exploring this is important for two reasons. First, it
takes all but the least reflective of consumers into a recognition that what they do is
not just about forward-looking charity/benevolence/aid but about their more
complicated relationships to global economic relations of which they are a part.
Second, once we think about Fair Trade in this way, we should quickly be drawn into
recognising that fair trade in the range of commodities that are currently conspicuous
is merely the tip of the iceberg of a much wider range of globally traded goods that
have negative impacts on people and planet: doing our best by FairTrade merely
reduces but does not get rid of our dependence on ethically troubling global impacts.
Both these reasons illustrate how for individuals in richer countries a key challenge of
development ethics is how they behave as consumers.
What makes Fairtrade fair?
Benevolence, Charity, Goodwill
If not…
What?
UNFAIR TRADE!
–
= supporting global justice
= reducing dependence on global injustice
End of Story?
–
Economic
environmental /carbon
–
–
Reduce dependence?
etc. …etc.
–
-
–
-
–
Conclusion:
First, it takes all but the least reflective of consumers into a recognition that what they
do is not just about forward-looking charity/benevolence/aid but about their
more complicated relationships to global economic relations of which they are a
part.
Second, doing our best by FairTrade merely reduces but does not get rid of our
dependence on ethically troubling global impacts.
Both these reasons illustrate how for individuals in richer countries a key challenge of
development ethics is how they behave as consumers.
The Taste of Freedom: Capabilities, Human Rights, and the Concept of
Suffering
Matthew Richard Regan
PhD student (International Development concentration)
University of Maryland, USA
mrgregan@umd.edu
Abstract: As the concerns of international development scholars and practitioners
have increasingly moved away from a reliance on a specific group of economic
indicators and towards a more multi-faceted understanding of human well-being, the
connection between the aims of the development community and the international
human rights movement have increasingly overlapped. Martha Nussbaum, for
example, identifies the Capability Approach (CA) to development as “closely allied with
the international human rights movement.” And yet, despite this self-declared affinity
and general overlap in programmatic concern, the exact nature of the theoretical
connection remains opaque. Clearly, both have a concern for establishing a basic
framework of “core” human functionings upon which a “good life” can be built, but the
means by which this core framework is divined—be it through a legal apparatus, as
endorsed by the human rights approach, a philosophical understanding of “the good”,
as prescribed by Nussbaum, or a deliberative process, as endorsed by Amartya Sen and
David Crocker—remains much less apparent. This paper will examine one possible
means of bridging the gap between the human rights and CA, placing the concepts of
“core capabilities” and “human rights” on a single ethical foundation of human
suffering—one that combines Sen and Crocker’s concept of agency, Philip Pettit’s
understanding of “freedom as non-domination”, and the insights Buddhist ethics
(especially as interpreted by Damien Keown). In doing so, it will attempt to provide a
framework by which capabilities and rights can be evaluated on a relatively universal
scale, while at the same time, avoiding the apotheosis of particular lists of “universal
human rights” and “central capabilities” that often serve as tempting targets of critics
of both enumerated human rights and Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities
orientation. By grounding human rights in a broadly-defined understanding of
suffering, I hope to show that human rights and democratic aspirations can be rooted
in a way that both provides the general, universal central premises needed for a firm
grounding across societies, but also allows for a wide variety of individual and cultural
values, as well as providing sufficient room for deliberative institutions in which social
groups can collectively shape their own aims and expectations.
Just as the great ocean has but one taste, the taste of
salt, so too does this teaching have but one taste, the
taste of freedom.
—Gotama Buddha, Uposatha Sutta (Udana 5:5)
Freedoms are not only the primary ends of development,
they are also among its principle means.
—Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom
Introduction: Blurring the Boundaries of “Development”
For much of the last century, the theory and practice of international development has
been dominated by a perspective that equates the growth and availability of certain
material goods, usually measured in terms of income, as the primary end of
development—what David Crocker calls the “‘crude’ commodities approach.”60 On the
surface, there is a certain eloquent logic to this approach: Poverty is odious for the
poor because they do not have the material means to get what they want. Therefore,
if we want to improve the lives of the poor, we should strive to improve the conditions
that make it possible for them to improve their potential for material well-being. But if
we delve a little deeper into the logic of this approach’s central argument, we
encounter a problem of logical consistency: The commodity-based approach to
development “transforms mere means into ends.” 61 If the ultimate goal of
development is to improve the lot of the poor, no matter how important material
goods are in improving that life (and they certainly are very important), material goods
remain only a means to a greater end, in this case, an improved quality of life for those
previously impoverished.
Consider food, for example. Food is certainly a material good, and as one of the basic
needs of all biological organisms, there is no disputing that a deprivation of the
necessary amount of food is a horrible thing, but it does not necessarily follow that
food is a good in and of itself. If we are severely allergic to peanuts and wheat gluten,
for example, a peanut butter sandwich bring us harm rather than benefit, and even if
we had no dietary restrictions, there is a limited amount of food one can physically
ingest within any given period of time. No matter how hungry we are, once we are full
there is simply no more benefit we can derive from eating additional food, and if we
continue to insist upon eating (or even worse, if we are forcibly made to do so), we run
an ever increasing risk of encountering some bodily harm. Furthermore, food is only
useful within a certain temporal range.62 No matter how delicious the orange we ate
six months ago may have been at the time, if we had locked it away in our desk drawer
and saved it for today, it is unlikely to be anything but repulsive.
Food, therefore, is only valuable because it satisfies our hunger, provides our physical
bodies with chemical energy, and if we are lucky, meets our psychological desire for
good-tasting nourishment—it is only valuable as the means to a set of interrelated
ends. The “means as ends” critique of the “crude” commodities approach asserts that
the same can be said of all materially-based approaches. No matter if our focus is on
food, monetary income, shelter, or even access to education or healthcare, as long as
we view these things as the ends of “good development” rather than, as Amartya Sen
60
David A. Crocker, Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 113.
61
Ibid.
62
Even the venerable Twinkie, despite a common belief in its immortality, it destined to spoilage. See:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A46062-2005Apr12.html.
suggests, “integrated into a broader and fuller picture of success and deprivation,” 63
we will be susceptible to the same critique.
But if we reach this conclusion, we suddenly find ourselves at a loss. Clearly, we can no
longer rest on materially-based explanations of development. It is not longer sufficient
to say a country is developing once it has reached x threshold of GDP per capita or has
ensured that y percent of the population can read or the infection rate of some easilytreatable childhood disease has fallen below z. Instead, we must rest our
understanding of the ends of development on some new source, something that is
related to the material means through which development was traditionally
understood, and yet not synonymous with them.
To do so, development theorists have turned their attention towards various abstract
conceptions of what development should aim to ultimately produce, and by doing so
have become increasingly involved in the larger political and philosophical debates
about the meaning of concepts like justice, human flourishing, and “the good life.” Yet,
herein lies the problem. While moving from a means-based focus to an ends-based
one allows us to avoid the “commodity fetishism” that has plagued wealth-based
approaches to development, such a move also requires us to take a firm stand on what
exactly the ends of development should be. And in doing so, we ultimately open
ourselves up to new range of questions and criticisms—the most pertinent being:
where does development end? To all the questions of material well-being that have
occupied the minds of development theorists and practitioners for decades, must we
now add the addition questions of political freedom and human rights?
The first attempts to link these three domains have already been made. Halperin,
Siegel, and Weinsten, 64 for example, make a strong empirical case for including
democracy as a key component of (and necessary aid to) good development. Similarly,
Peter Uvin makes an argument for the necessity of a “[human] rights-based approach
to development.”65 If the ends of “good development” truly are human flourishing, or
some other broad-reaching concept, then both democracy and human rights are
certainly applicable, but considering that both these domains already have substantial
literatures and histories of their own, development theorists must be careful to both
gain the necessary insights these domains have to offer but remain sufficiently
independent to avoid becoming entirely subsumed into one or the other. A
conversation between the domains of democracy, development, and human rights has
much to offer, but before proclaiming that boundaries between these domains utterly
demolished, it is necessary to take a step back and ask an even more basic question:
What do we mean by human flourishing (or justice or “the good life”) to begin with?
And how can we answer such a question without the risk of imposing a view that
others might not share?
While there are numerous approaches we can take to navigate the interrelationship
between development, democracy, and human rights, the scope of the paper is not
63
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: Anchor Books, 1999), 20.
Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein, The Democracy Advantage: How
Democracies Promote Prosperity (New York: Routledge, 2010).
65
Peter Uvin, Human Rights and Development (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc., 2004).
64
sufficient to treat all of them with the amount of attention they deserve. 66 Instead, I
will focus on the specific promise of the capability approach (CA),67 as formulated by
Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. In doing so, I hope to shed light on two important
dilemmas that advocates of the capability approach must face, and how the insights of
Buddhist ethics and Philip Pettit’s concept of “freedom as non-domination”68 can help
move us towards an equitable solution of both.
The Capability Approach: Two Dilemmas
Martha Nussbaum provides the following as a provisional definition of the
capability approach:
[It is]…an approach to comparative quality-of-life assessment and
to theorizing about basic social justice… [that] holds that the key
question to ask… is, “What is each person able to do and to be?”
In other words, the approach takes each person as an end, asking
not just about the total or average well-being [within a society]
but about the opportunities available to each person.69
Thus, unlike the commodity-based approaches discussed in the introduction, the
capability approach would assess development in terms of the various activities70
(functionings, in capability approach terms) that one could undertake in a given
situation. These functionings, in turn, are part of a larger set of capabilities, activities
one could engage in if one so desired.71 As Sen puts it, “While the combination of a
person’s functionings reflects her actual achievements, the capability set represents
the freedom to achieve: the alternative functioning combinations from which this
person could choose.”72
For Sen, this capability/functioning dichotomy is further enlivened by the concept of
agency. In Sen’s formulation of the capability approach, the capability/functioning
dichotomy is directly related to well-being; any given person’s actual well-being
corresponds to her functionings and her potential states of well-being correspond with
66
For an overviewed and capability approach-based critique of some of the major ones, see chapter 4 of
Crocker’s Ethics of Global Development.
67
While Martha Nussbaum prefers the term “capabilities approach” and Des Gasper suggest that the
broadest term, encompassing Sen, Nussbaum, and related theorists, should be “capability orientation”, I
will use the “capability approach” as a single, all-inclusive term for the approaches of Sen, Nussbaum,
and other allied thinkers.
68
Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997).
69
Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, MA:
The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2011), 18. Emphasis in the original.
70
These activities include both physical activities (bodily and verbal actions) and states of being (mental
actions).
71
Those who detect within this conception a hint of Aristotle’s distinction between potentiality (δύναμις)
and actuality (ἐνέργεια) will be happy to learn that both Sen and Nussbaum acknowledge Aristotle as one
of the intellectual antecedents of their approach.
72
Sen, 75. Emphasis in the original.
her capability set. But acting in the interests of one’s own well-being does not exhaust
the possibility of one’s choices, potentialities, and actions. Whether I wear a red tie or
a blue tie to my presentation, for example, does not necessarily affect my well-being in
the gross sense, as no matter which tie I wear, I will be equally clothed and
undoubtedly well-dressed. To express this second notion, Sen uses the concept of the
individual as an agent, in the sense “as someone who acts and brings about change,
and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives,
whether or not we assess them in terms of some external criteria as well.” 73 Like
capability/functioning, agency can also be expressed in two dimensions, as either
potential (agency freedom) or actual (agency achievement).74 Nussbaum, however, is
more skeptical of the concept of agency, and instead “rejects Sen’s normative duality
of agency and well-being in favor of an integrated and complex norm of human wellbeing composed of both functioning and capabilities.”75
For purposes of this paper, however, I would like to evoke a middle ground between
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s positions on agency. Sen’s conception of well-being is an
evaluative one, grounded in examining the “substantive freedoms… [one has available]
to choose a life that one has reason to value”76 Thus, in order to be able to fully
express agency, in which one is able to make choices about what one values in the
world, one must first be secured some modicum of well-being. Well-being can be seen
as the field upon which the game of agency is played—if the field is in disrepair, there
can be no game, and if we are to play a good game, we must focus at least some of our
attention to cleaning it up. When we reflect upon the development-centered context
in which Sen originally formulated these ideas, the reason for this distinction become
apparent. Sen, rightfully so, believes it inappropriate for those in development to
dictate what “a life that one has reason to value” should be—this is more
appropriately decided by individual reflection and community deliberation. What
development should focus on is the freedom one has to make such choices.
Nussbaum’s task, on the other hand, is primarily a philosophical one, and thus, does
not need the hard distinction between well-being and agency. Her focus is to make a
more substantial attempt to answer the question, which while inappropriate for the
development practitioner is appropriate for the philosopher, “what is a life one has
reason to value?” It is not then, that Nussbaum objects to implications of agency,
namely that one should have some substantive control over the choices they wish to
make, but rather, that her understanding of well-being is expansive enough to include
it within well-being itself. Nussbaum may not talk about agency in such terms, but
once one looks at her list of central capabilities, especially “practical reason”,
“affiliation”, and “control over one’s environment”,77 you cannot help but hear the
echo of agency in the background.
If the difference between Nussbaum and Sen is more formal than essential, we can
approach the distinction between well-being and agency in a more pragmatic way.
73
Ibid., 19.
I don’t have space in this paper to examine the various means and modes of agency (direct vs. indirect,
for example), but for a general discussion, including a discussion of Nussbaum’s rejection of agency, see
Crocker, 150-163.
75
Ibid., 161.
76
Sen, 75.
77
Nussbaum, 33-34.
74
Instead of focusing on Sen’s reasons for dividing life into well-being and agency and
Nussbaum’s reasons for rejecting this division, for the moment, we can table the
debate and focus on the implications of the broader position they both hold: that all
human activities can be categorized as either potentialities (freedoms) or actualities
(achievements) and that choosing between one potentiality and another requires
some degree of valuation and volitional action. At the moment, we will not ask what
this valuation entails, but merely acknowledge the fact that it exists.
By now, the close affinity between the CA, human rights, and democracy should be
apparent. Nussbaum identifies her version of the approach as “a species of the human
rights approach”78 and Sen is a strong advocate for the benefits of both human rights
and democracy, especially in his more recent work.79 From the human rights side,
ethicist Grace Kao also notes the compatibility of CA and the human rights paradigm,
although she cautions that “these conceptual frameworks are ultimately not reducible
to one another, which is why [the advocates of the CA] urge us to retain the use of
both.”80 In general, the CA contributes to human rights by asking “what functionings
and capabilities should one have to live a life in which can exercise substantive control
over ones choices and values?” and to democracy by asking the related question “what
functioning and capabilities should one have in order to make substantive choices
about how one lives in accordance with one’s values?” And yet, even though these are
framed in as value-neutral terms as possible, one cannot help but notice that even
these broadly formed questions are laden with normative judgments. By simply taking
the position that human rights and democracy are goals towards which one should
aim, is the CA merely recreating the issues that critiques of these two domains are
quick to point out? Despite all their praise of choice and freedom, are adherents of the
CA really limiting the universe of possibilities one could choose? These questions are
the root of two dilemmas advocates of the capability approach must face: the dilemma
of absolutism vs. relativism and the dilemma of enumeration vs. deliberation.
Absolutism vs. Relativism
It is not a coincidence that each of these two dilemmas reflects are related problem
within the two domains we have identified as highly-compatible with the CA. The
absolutism vs. relativism dilemma is closely affiliated with the challenge of
ethnocentrism, a charge that is often lobbed against proponents of greater concern for
human rights, especially outside of the so-called “Western” world. Likewise, the
problem of enumeration vs. deliberation is related to internal debates within
democracy theory, wherein the question of “how deeply should democracy go?” is of
paramount concern.
78
Ibid., 62.
See, among numerous other examples, part IV of Sen, The Idea of Justice (Cambridge, MA: The
Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2009), 321-415.
80
Grace Y. Kao, Grounding Human Rights in a Pluralist World (Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press, 2011), 109.
79
The dilemma of absolutism vs. relativism can be summed up as follows: because all
ideas have their origins in a particular historical and cultural context, it is inappropriate
for these views to be uncritically applied to other peoples and places, where contexts
might be vastly different. In the field of human rights, this is often presented as a
challenge to the true universality of rights, as these rights “emanate from Western
political, cultural, or religious views…”81 While some, like Uvin, view this critique
primarily as a “political ploy”82 used to deflect criticism, especially when states are
accused of gross rights violations, there is more than just political cynicism behind this
critique, even if more often than not they are deployed in a cynical manner.
Uvin identifies six possible responses to the challenge of ethnocentrism: the legalist,
the soft relativist, the affirmativist, the empiricist, the philosophical, and the
incrementalist.83
Of these six, however, only the last three are of particular importance to formulating a
response based in the capability approach. The first three, the legalist, soft relativist,
and affirmativist paths, all treat human rights as a body of legal duties rather then
deeper commitments directed towards the end of human flourishing. The legalist path
posits that as long as countries have agreed to uphold a right, it doesn’t matter where
these rights original derive from—the rules of mahjong apply to me whether or not I
am of Chinese descent, what matters is whether or not I have decided to play the
game. The soft relativist, on the other hand, suggests “that the human rights edifice
allows space for culturally and socially sensitive variations in implementation.”84 Thus,
even though the ultimate sources of human rights may be Eurocentric, they can be
applied and implemented in such a way that they are non-intrusive to other cultural
contexts. The affirmativist, meanwhile, takes an even stronger position: upholding
human rights is the correct position to take, and the question of their historical and
cultural origins is irrelevant. If they’re right, they’re right.
The remaining three approaches, however, treat human rights within a broader
context, focusing more on the content and implications of these rights, rather than
their particular existence as legal guarantees. The first of these, the empiricist path, is
practiced notably by Sen himself. Sen has devoted sections of his two most influential
books, Development as Freedom85 and The Idea of Justice86 to demonstrating that
human rights and democratic ideals are not exclusively Western, but rather, have
precedents and antecedents throughout numerous contemporary and historical
cultures. Similarly, the philosophical path reflects the approach of Martha Nussbaum
and her list of central capabilities, which she takes pains to defend against similar
claims of ethnocentrism and cultural imperialism, using a mix of philosophical and
empiricist arguments.87 Uvin identifies both Sen and Nussbaum as practitioners of this
path as the CA ultimately seeks “to specify universally valid conceptions of what
81
Uvin, 17.
Ibid.
83
Ibid., 17-38
84
Ibid., 22.
85
Sen, Democracy as Freedom, 227-248.
86
Sen, The Idea of Justice, 329-335.
87
Nussbaum, 101-112.
82
human beings, qua human, deserve.”88 Finally, the incrementalist approach recognizes
human rights as a process, rather than a singular event, and seeks to build upon
success and agreements where resistance is low and continued applied effort where
resistance is high. While there is no formal connection here with the CA, it is related,
as one of the key features of the CA is to recognize which freedoms and achievements
exist and which are lacking. This, of course, does not prevent gross abuses from being
committed, and is met with skepticism by Uvin who views it as “too willing to overlook
issues of principle in the name of incremental change,” 89 but in the messy and
uncertain world of political reality, it does present opportunities for promise and
positive change in places that would otherwise seem hopeless.
But even if the CA has a meaningful response to the challenge of ethnocentrism within
the specific domains of democracy and human rights, it still must meet with the larger
problem of absolutism vs. relativism. Of the two, Nussbaum takes the stronger stance,
as her list of ten central capabilities cannot be anything but absolute—they are
advertised as the central capabilities that are essential components to proper human
flourishing. Sen, with his advocacy of public deliberation and social choice, is a little
more reticent to commit to anything as absolute as an absolute, but there remains the
sense within his work, especially in terms of well-being, that there are some general
universals that should be very broadly applied. His connection between famines and
poor governance,90 for example, along with his advocacy of democracy and human
rights, would seem to indicate that some form of democratic, deliberative mechanism,
as well as a well-established human rights regime is essential for well-being freedom
and achievement in the very least. Thus, it appears Sen is making some tacit
assumptions about what a good life would be, even if he is uncomfortable to specify
anything except the broadest sense of what it is. Given the importance of choice and
cultural diversity in the works of both Nussbaum and Sen, however, it is important to
plumb the depths of this universal conception of the good life while still preserving
enough space for the wide relative differences we see between the various cultures of
the world, as well as individuals within these cultures. While this weak absolutism
might trouble some, especially those committed to a strong version of cultural
relativism, it might be calming to reflect upon the insights of anthropologist Melford
Spiro’s critique of strong cultural relativism:
Since, as a species, we are the product of biological (including
behavioral) evolution, it is not necessary to subscribe to the
program of sociobiology to acknowledge… that as a result of
selective evolutionary pressures, our hominid ancestors acquired
a set of species-specific biological characteristics, many of which
are socially and culturally relevant.91
88
Uvin, 27.
Ibid., 31.
90
Sen, Development as Freedom, 160-188.
91
Melford Spiro, Anthropological Other or Burmese Brother? Studies in Cultural Analysis (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992), 16.
89
Whether we should play our absolutist cards close to our vest as Sen or openly as
Nussbaum, the tension between proclaiming human universals and respecting cultural
diversity remains one of the most important issues facing the CA today.
Enumeration vs. deliberation
As we have discussed above, the capability approach is weakly absolutist. There is
some set of capabilities and functionings that are essential for us to live the life we
choose to live, but beyond this basic core, there remains a broad space for cultural and
individual diversity. In this sense, we can also identify the CA as teleological, given that
it ultimately aims towards a single end: human flourishing in the broadest sense of the
concept.92 But in the approaches of Sen and Nussbaum, we see two very different
approaches to defining this end, something to which we have already alluded to
above.
Nussbaum presents a very clear picture of the end towards which the capability
approach should aspire: the adoption and implementation of her list of ten central
capabilities. If all these capabilities were equally available to all, we would truly be
living in the state of human flourishing towards which the capability approach aims.
Sen, on the other hand, provides little beyond vague notions of what this good life
would look like, and through his division of agency and well-being, provides
opportunities for both domains to evolve and be refined in the face of public
deliberation. It is very telling that, even for the seemingly straightforward domain of
well-being, Sen admits that “there are indeed no royal roads to evaluation… there are
distinct merits in each of these well-established strategies [of evaluation], but… each
also suffers from significant limitation.”93
The problem here is twofold. If, following Nussbaum, we commit ourselves to a
specific list of central capabilities, those without which the aim of human flourishing
cannot be achieved, we find ourselves open to the sort of “point of view” critiques we
have already examined in relation to the first dilemma, as well as the means and ends
critique with which we confronted the “crude” commodities approach in the
beginning. By insisting upon an enumerated list, Nussbaum takes a concrete position,
one which is either correct or incorrect.
Sen, on the other hand, has the exact opposite problem. By relying upon public
deliberation to decide which capabilities we should value, Sen is able to avoid the
pitfalls of Nussbaum’s list, but opens himself up to a variety of new ones. As Frank
Hendriks notes in relation to deliberation democracy as a method of political decision
making, “the average citizen has no need for endless nights of democratic participation
and deliberation, most certainly not if the decision-making process is as protracted and
time-consuming as it is in participatory democracy.” 94 How much further would this
critique apply if the question at hand was not a matter of some immediate community
92
Again, given the Aristotelian heritage of the CA, this is not entirely a surprise.
Sen, Development as Freedom, 85.
94
Frank Hendriks, Vital Democracy: A Theory of Democracy in Action, translated by R. Stuve (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010), 126.
93
concern, but rather, the much more abstract and contentious, “which capabilities and
functionings should we value in order to secure human flourishing?” To complicate
matters even further, if we assume that there are universal (or even near-universal)
capabilities that all (or most) human should share in order to achieve the end of
human flourish, how could a truly participatory body ever be constructed? We would
either need to develop some kind of system of representation (which would tarnish
the notion of a truly deliberative consultation) or start building a very large assembly
hall.
Thus, even though we can be fairly certain that both Sen’s and Nussbaum’s
formulations of the capability approach are teleologically-oriented toward some
understanding of human flourishing, both the boundaries of the universal applicability
of these ends and the method by which they are ultimately decided upon remains
unsettled.
Enter Buddhist Ethics
In an attempt to provide a possible solution to these dilemmas, I would like to make a
case for Buddhist ethics as a means of bridging the gap between both (1) the
teleological, universal ends of the capability approach and providing sufficient space
for human diversity and (2) the security of Nussbaum’s enumerated list and the
freedom of Sen’s preference for deliberation. Before beginning, however, I would like
to stress that this is a philosophical argument, not a religious one. Although the
teachings of the sage Gotama 95 certainly became the central core of the world
religious tradition we know as Buddhism, if we root our approach in the basic
philosophical methods found within Buddhist texts, we will find a wealth of reflection
on moral philosophy that does not require any kind of religious commitment to accept.
As Buddhist scholar Damien Keown notes, “In the face of the complexity of Buddhist
metaphysics it is easy to lose sight of the fact that Buddhism is a response to what is
fundamentally an ethical problem—the perennial problem of the best kind of life for
man to lead.”96 Keown identifies the approach of Buddhist ethics as one that is
objectivist, naturalist, and teleological, 97 factors which make it similar to both
Aristotelian ethics and the wider ethical orientation of the CA. Even if the values of
capabilities are determined by recourse to deliberation, once we have determined
such values, we can judge the rightness or wrongness of actions on the objective basis
of whether they promote or deter the development of valuable capabilities. Likewise,
the value of capabilities is rooted in functional naturalism, rather than some
philosophical abstraction (capability x is valuable because it promotes human
flourishing, not simply because capability x is intrinsically valuable). The teleological
aspects of the CA have been treated in depth in the previous section.
Furthermore, just as Aristotle’s pagan philosophy was able to be adapted and
Christianized into Thomism, I believe that Buddhist ethics, with minimal alterations,
95
To avoid religious connotations, I will refer to the founder of Buddhist ethics not by his religious title
“the Buddha” (literally, the “awakened one”) but rather, but his family name, Gotama. This follows the
contemporary tradition found in the Pali canon in which both his supporters and detractors refer to him as
“the Sage Gotama” (Samana Gotama in Pali).
96
Damien V. Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 1.
97
Ibid., 232.
can be adapted into a secular, pluralistic ethics. Unlike other religious ethics, Buddhist
ethics does not require one to believe that Gotama was anything other than a human
being. In fact, one does not even necessarily need to believe to the standard Buddhist
assertion that Gotama achieved some kind of super-normal, metaphysically-relevant
awakening. We need only hold Gotama to the same standard as Aristotle or Kant or
J.S. Mill—a human being with something particularly insightful to say about moral
philosophy.
At the core of Buddhist ethics is a central concern with suffering and its cessation, so
much so in fact, that Gotama proclaimed, “both formerly and now what I teach is
[exclusively] suffering and the cessation of suffering.”98 The Buddhist treatment of
suffering, however, is different from that of an rudimentary utilitarian concern for
physical pleasure and pain, but rather, is based upon a systematic understanding of
how suffering arise not just from sense stimuli, but rather, an intractable cycle of cause
and effect as explained in its cardinal insight: the Four Noble Truths. As the central
tenant of Buddhist philosophy, there are of course numerous and lengthy expositions
on the Four Noble Truths and their implications,99 but for our purposes, we can
simplify them into four short propositions:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Suffering100 is omnipresent in the phenomenal world.
Suffering exists because it has a cause.
Because suffering arises due to a cause, it is possible to diminish suffering.
There is a means to diminish suffering.101
Not surprisingly, Buddhist ethics have developed a particular attention to suffering,
both that which occurs within oneself and that which occurs in others, and as such,
uses the arising of suffering as the primary means of ethical valuation. Actions are
considered ethically supportable (kusala in Pali) or reproachable (akusala) only in
respect as to whether or not it leads to positive outcomes (i.e. the easing of
suffering).102 With this in mind, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama distills the central concept
of Buddhist ethics as: “It is necessary to help others, not only in our prayers, but in our
98
Alagaddupama Sutta, Majjhima Nikaya 22, translated by Bhikkhu Ñanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi in The
Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya (Boston, MA:
Wisdom Publications, 1995), 234.
99
Particularly good ones can be found in Thich Nhat Hanh, The Heart of the Buddha’s Teachings:
Transforming Suffering into Peace, Joy, and Liberation (New York: Broadway Books, 1998); Walpola
Rahula, What The Buddha Taught (New York: Grove Press, 1974); Geshe Tashi Tsering, The Four Noble
Truths: The Foundations of Buddhist Thought, Volume 1 (Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2005); and
Ajahn Sucitto, Turning the Wheel of Truth: Commentary on the Buddha’s First Teaching (Boston, MA:
Shambhala Publications, Inc., 2010).
100
In Pali, dukkha. This word is more broad than the English word “suffering” and equally means “stress”
and “dissatisfaction.”
101
In the complete Buddhist analysis, the fourth Noble Truth is the Eightfold Path—right view, right
thought, right action, right speech, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, and right
concentration. For our purposes, however, all we need to consider is that there is a means by which the
grip of suffering can be loosened.
102
Keown, 116-122.
daily lives. If we find we cannot help others, the least we can do is to desist from
harming them.”103
At this point, however, it is important to note that the Buddhist concepts of suffering
and happiness are not solely rooted in base sensation. While Gotama, of course,
recognized sensation as one source of suffering and happiness, he also noted other,
more objective forms of suffering:
…birth is suffering, aging is suffering, illness is suffering, death is
suffering; union with what is displeasing is suffering; separation
from what is pleasing is suffering; not to get what one wants is
suffering; in brief, [the whole of human existence is subject to]
suffering.104
Whereas the suffering based in sensation is ultimately rooted in our one phenomenal
experience, by broadening suffering to “union with what is displeasing,” “separation
from what is pleasing,” and not getting what one wants, we are able to develop a
sense of objective suffering outside the immediate experience of the subject. Instead
of being bound to what we immediately feel, we can extend the experience of
suffering to wanting a pleasant feeling to last longer, wanting an unpleasant situation
to end quickly, or being disappointed when a fleeting joy passes.
Happiness, then, in a broad sense, is rooted in attaining those things we want, and
suffering in our inability to do so. On the diagnostic level, it doesn’t matter whether or
not these craving are rooted in positive or negative ethical motivations—whether or
not the object of our craving is praiseworthy or blameworthy, we suffering when we
do not receive those things we value, or conversely, when we do receive those things
which we do not value. In this simplistic form of valuation, where suffering is caused by
being close to those things we dislike and far from those we like, could easily be
applied to the functioning/capability dichotomy.
In the figure below, I have attempted to sketch out what such an application would
look like. Consider the two boxes to be the set of possible capabilities and actual
functionings of a given person. Within her capability set are a number of capabilities
which she values (represented by smiley faces) and those which she does not (the
frowny faces). For each of these capabilities, she has both freedoms (the ability to
bring them into her functionings set, represented by the arrows lines) and
achievements (capabilities she has brought into her actual functionings, represented
by the solid arrows). But things are not as simple as this. There are also abilities she
has to block undesirable capabilities from manifesting and impediments that prevent
her from doing so. On the left hand side of the picture, I have depicted the four
103
Tenzin Gyatso (the 14th Dalai Lama), “A Talk to Western Buddhists,” in The Dalai Lama: A Policy of
Kindness, compiled and edited by Sidney Piburn (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1990), 87.
104
Dhammacakkapavatanna Sutta, Samyutta Nikaya 56:11, translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi in The
Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya (Boston, MA: Wisdom
Publications, 2000), 1844.
arrangements in which she could be considered happy: she either (a) is enjoying a
valuable functioning, (b) is enjoying a valuable capability, (c) is enjoying the ability to
prevent a undesirable functioning, or (d) is enjoying the ability to prevent an
undesirably capability. On the right hand side, however, she is subjected to the variety
of ways she can suffer: she is (e) enduring an undesirable functioning, (f) enduring an
undesirable capability, (g) impeded from enjoying a valuable functioning, or (h)
impeded from enjoying a valuable capability. In reality, of course, these pure states
would not exist, and the individual would be experience the typical mix of happiness
and suffering that typifies human existence.
It is important to note here that the individual valuations depicted here are based in
nothing more than the individual’s tastes and preferences. Up until this point, there is
very little difference between this Buddhist analysis and a sophisticated utilitarian one,
but here is where we make a crucial departure: Even if the lucky person on the right
hand of the diagram were to get all the things she were after—actually enjoying
desirable functionings and capabilities and effectively avoid undesirable ones—she
would not be happy indefinitely because such satisfaction is impermanent. According
to Gotama, all feelings of pleasure and pain, as well as a third neutral feeling that has
no English equivalent (adukkhamasukha), “are impermanent, conditioned,
dependently arisen, subject to destruction, subject to vanishing, subject to fading
away, subject to cessation.” 105 Once they do so, they transform into producers of
suffering themselves, because as soon as they fade away, or we simply become bored
of them, they no longer provide the sustenance they once did—thus his identification
of craving as the root of suffering.
105
Anicca Sutta, Samyutta Nikaya 36:9, translated in Bodhi, 1269.
HAPPINESS
SUFFERING
CAPABILITIES
CAPABILITIES
      
a.
b.
c. d.

      
e.
f.
g. h.


ABILITY


FUNCTIONINGS

IMPEDIMENT


FUNCTIONINGS
Figure 1. Happiness and Suffering in Capabilities and Functionings
Unlike utilitarianism, then, Buddhist ethics does not rest on the assertion that those
actions which produce suffering are bad and happiness are good, but rather, goes
deeper to posit an end towards which ethical action must be directed, namely, the
further elimination of suffering in the future. As Keown states, “Buddhist ethics can
only be characterized as utilitarian if it is accepted that ethics has no ultimate value, no
intrinsic relation to enlightenment [i.e. the full and complete ending of suffering], and
serves only as temporary insulation from suffering within which intellectual goods can
be pursued.”106
Luckily, however, I do not believe we need to subscribe to the lofty Buddhist goal of
the end of all suffering if we are looking for an end worthy of the human flourishing
required by the CA. Instead of the strongly absolutist end of the elimination of all
suffering, I believe the weakly absolutist end of the continued minimization of suffering
can serve our purposes. While, in the Buddhist sense, we might still be subjected to
the suffering inherent in the impermanent nature of phenomena, we can at least work
towards weakening those kinds of suffering that are in our power to combat—
malnutrition, disease, political oppression, etc.
106
Keown, 184.
We could have equally placed continued maximization of happiness as our end of
human flourishing, but there are several reasons why I think this concept is more
problematic than the minimization of suffering. Although on the surface, especially as
presented in the diagram above, suffering and happiness seem to be binary
opposites—logically, maximizing one should minimize the other—there are several
conceptual and pragmatic reasons why a suffering-based approach is preferable.
Firstly, it seems that suffering is less susceptible to the problem of adaptive
preferences. In this scenario, through habituation, situations that would generally
produce dissatisfaction are accepted as normal and even preferable. Nussbaum,
observes that the preferences of women who have habituated to the idea that
“education is not for women” will not “easily change [their preferences] on account of
new information about the benefits and pleasures of education. Some will, but not
those who have deeply internalized the idea that a proper woman does not go in for
schooling.”107 In this case, we cannot say the woman is unhappy if her preference is
being upheld (i.e. not going to school), but if we analyze her in terms of a capability
that she may find valuable (if not for the habituation that such a capability is not for
her) being made unavailable to her, we could conclude that she is suffering.
Conceptually, it is much easier to imagine someone who is suffering being habituated
into thinking they are not, than someone who isn’t suffering being habituated into
thinking they are.
Secondly, are more importantly, the alleviation of suffering provides a norm which is
both progressive and pragmatic—even if suffering x cannot be immediately lessened,
there is still value in working to lessen it in the future, while at the same time, our goal
of lessening suffering provides us with a clear list of priorities without resorting to the
sort of “all-or-nothing” thinking that a goal of maximizing satisfaction can provide. As
Kahneman and Krueger note, “we suspect that many policymakers are more
comfortable with the idea of minimizing a specific concept of misery than maximizing a
nebulous concept of happiness.”108 If our goal, for example, is providing adequate food
for all those who are hungry, a single malnourished child makes us failures, but if our
going is to lessen the grip of hungry as much as we can, every person we help brings us
closer to our goal. There is also an echo here of Sen’s early work on social choice
theory,109 where he posits that even if, as Arrow’s theorem dictates, we cannot use
majoritarian methods to achieve a reliable single consensus, we can, by using value
restriction, get “all members [to] agree that one alternative in the collective is either
not best, not worst, or not middling.”110
Moving from Theory to Practice
So far, our new equation of human flourishing with the minimization of suffering
seems to have a lot of promise. By moving away from the immediate, phenomenal
107
Nussbaum, 84.
Daniel Kahneman and Alan B. Krueger, “Developments in the Measurement of Subjective WellBeing” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 1 (Winter 2006), 22.
109
Sen, “A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decision,” Econometrica 34 (1966), 491-499.
110
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions, 2nd edition (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2010), 84.
108
experience of suffering as a sensation, we've been able to define suffering as both the
existence of inaccessibility capabilities and functionings that we value and the
persistence of capabilities and functionings that we do not. In doing, we've provided a
norm of human flourish that seems to satisfy the demands of both the absolutism vs.
relativism dilemma and the enumeration vs. deliberation dilemma. By providing a
single, broad, universal value in which we can root human flourishing, focusing on
human flourishing as the minimization of suffering gives us a weak absolute which we
can be fairly confident is a true universal and yet is also considerably robust against the
critique of ethnocentrism. To successfully claim the norm of minimizing suffering is an
ethnocentrically-derived value, one would need to successfully argue that certain
human populations are not subject to the same general condition of suffering as
everyone else. Remember, we are not considered about which capabilities and
functionings an individual chooses as valuable at this level of analysis, merely that they
are suffering when they are unable to achieve the ones they want and are forced to
sustain ones they do not. A successful counterexample, than, would be a group of
people who suffer when they get what they want and are happy when they don't.
Likewise, the minimization of suffering provides a way out of the enumeration vs.
deliberation dilemma which by providing a single norm against which our deliberations
can be framed. If we wished, we could even use this norm to defend lists, such as
Nussbaum's or the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Clearly, these lists are derived
from historical and cultural contexts, one which we might not be able to comfortably
apply to the whole of humanity, but if we can find their propositions to be consistent
with the norm of human flourishing as the minimization of suffering, we can
nonetheless support their assertions. Similarly, if we are of a more deliberative bent,
we can use the minimization of suffering as an important tool to frame out discussion.
If, for example, we began from first principles, we would not only need to discern what
capabilities and functionings we should value, but first and foremost, what the criteria
and first principles of valuation should be. By using the minimization of suffering as the
universal norm of human flourishing, we can table the more difficult philosophical
debate (remember that we are not interested in ultimate answers here, just broadly
agreeable and generally applicable ones that should be acceptable to a wide variety of
worldviews) and instead, focus on the more immediate problems of what actions we
can take to reduce the suffering of ourselves and others.
Once we begin to put this principle into operation, however, we will immediately
encounter a problem: as we work to minimize suffering, our efforts might actually
produce more suffering! Take, for example, the very worth cause of eliminating child
labor. Clearly, child labor produces copious amounts of suffering. Even if working
conditions are reasonable and the working children are not in immediate physical
danger, by working instead of received education, these children are having all the
positive capabilities that could be available to them—future career skills, social
mobility, potential for greater income, social interaction with peers; and even the
possibility that some children might actually enjoy learning. To wipe out child labor,
however, we will need to institute things that, at least on the surface, generate
suffering: we will need to pass anti-child labor legislation, we will need to enforce
those laws and possibly even but serious offenders in jail, and we will need to deprive
families of the income child labor generates. In the calculus of most reasonable people,
these are small prices to pay for the elimination of a perceived greater evil, but if we
are strictly using suffering as our barometer as to whether or not an action should be
undertaken, could we not make the case the solution produces more suffering than
the problem?
Luckily, Philip Pettit's work on political liberty offers us a way out. According to Pettit,
the central premise of the republican tradition is “a belief freedom as nondomination.”111 According to Pettit, one is dominated when one’s choices are subject
to the arbitrary will of another. Thus, a slave with a permissive master is still unfree,
even though they might have a greater amount of day-to-day choice than a freeman
with a particularly miserable life. As a slave, the freedom he enjoys is entirely
dependent upon the will of his master—if his permissive master has a sudden charge
of heart and becomes cruel, all the freedom he enjoys would be immediately
dissolved. The miserable freeman, on the other, remains free to make his own choices,
even though his outcomes are less than ideal.
The key contribution of Pettit’s work, at least for our purposes, is that arbitrary
interference (domination) is less desirable than non-arbitrary interference. Pettit uses
the example of law enforcement officials, who certainly interfere in the lives of others,
but “since they operate on the basis of coercive law [rather than their own whims],
...their interference is non-arbitrary.”112 Thus, Pettit allows us to conceive of certain
kinds of interference—which we could equally equate with suffering from a
capabilities and functions point of view—that are more permissible than simple
arbitrary interference. It is a trade-off, of course, as there is still genuine interference,
but without this proviso, it is doubtful that other, more dominating forms of
interference could be defended against.
Returning to our problem of child labor, now armed with Pettit's concept for freedom
as non-domination, we can conclude that the suffering created by efforts to eradicate
child labor are permissible because they are non-arbitrary. If we decide that child labor
provides an intolerable amount of suffering in the lives of children, by subjecting them
to actual harm and preventing them from having a full range of choices in the future,
than we can equally decide that the suffering created by means to outlaw it are
unfortunate but necessary conditions for the minimization of suffering in the grand
scheme. This imposed suffering only affects those who are perpetuating child labor (if
you are not supporting child labor, as long as the laws are being applied justly, how
could you run afoul of child labor laws?), and as child labor becomes less prevalent, we
could even submit that the suffering of those dependent upon would ultimately less as
they adjusted to new means of labor and income.
Thus, it is perhaps fitting to re-formulate our norm of human flourishing to be not
simply the minimization of suffering, but rather, the minimization of arbitrary
suffering. And, following Pettit's assertion that non-arbitrary interference is that which
is incurred in order to secure against arbitrary inference, we can further say that nonarbitrary suffering is that incurred in the struggle to prevent grosser, more arbitrary
forms of suffering. Thus, we are able to justify our efforts to secure human rights,
111
112
Pettit, 31.
Ibid., 65.
political voice, and good development, even if there are real consequences that might
increase the suffering of those dependent upon these injustices.
Of course, there remains much work to do. If we are truly to move from a theory of
human flourishing—one that includes not only basic material needs, but also human
rights and political voice—to a norm that can be operationalized, we will need not only
the philosophical underpinnings outlined here, but also the real-world tools required
to bring them into practice. There still, for example, remains the hard work of design
tools to measure capabilities that are not only philosophical sound but
methodologically robust. But I do believe the concept of human flourish as the
minimization of arbitrary suffering can help us towards a reframing of the hard
problems of development and human rights, from the question of military intervention
in cases of gross rights violations to the ever-growing problem of climate change.
Whether or not this contribution will be small or large, however, depends entirely on
our ability to find practical tools that reflect not only what we can measure, but also
what we should.
Bibliography
Bodhi, Bhikkhu (translator). The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A New
Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya. Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2000.
Crocker, David A. Ethics of Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative
Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Halperin, Morton H., Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein. The Democracy
Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity. New York: Routledge, 2010.
Hendriks, Frank. Vital Democracy: A Theory of Democracy in Action. Translated by R.
Stuve. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Kahneman, Daniel and Alan B. Krueger. “Developments in the Measurement of
Subjective Well-Being.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20, no. 1 (Winter
2006). Pgs. 3-24.
Kao, Grace Y. Grounding Human Rights in a Pluralist World. Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 2011.
Keown, Damien V. “Are There Human Rights in Buddhism?” in Buddhism and Human
Rights. Edited by Damien V. Keown, Charles S. Prebish, and Wayne R. Husted.
Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998. Pgs. 15-41.
—————. The Nature of Buddhist Ethics. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
Keown, Damien V., Charles S. Prebish, and Wayne R. Husted. Buddhism and Human
Rights. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1998.
Nussbaum, Martha C. Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach.
Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2011.
Pettit, Philip. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1997.
Rahula, Walpola. What The Buddha Taught. New York: Grove Press, 1974.
Sen, Amartya. “A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decision,” Econometrica 34 (1966).
Pgs. 491-499.
—————. Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books, 1999.
—————. The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard
University, 2009.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions, 2nd
edition. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2010.
Spiro, Melford. Anthropological Other or Burmese Brother? Studies in Cultural
Analysis. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992
Sucitto, Ajahn. Turning the Wheel of Truth: Commentary on the Buddha’s First
Teaching. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications, Inc., 2010.
Tashi Tsering, Geshe. The Four Noble Truths: The Foundations of Buddhist Thought,
Volume 1. Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2005.
Tenzin Gyatso (the 14th Dalai Lama). The Dalai Lama: A Policy of Kindness. Compiled
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Thich Nhat Hanh. The Heart of the Buddha’s Teachings: Transforming Suffering into
Peace, Joy, and Liberation. New York: Broadway Books, 1998.
Uvin, Peter. Human Rights and Development. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc.,
2004.
3.1 Philosophy, ethics and development
(CE)
Room 340
Chair: Jay Drydyk, Department of Philosophy, Carleton University
From Insularity to Responsibility: Emmanuel Levinas on Development Ethics
Abi Doukhan
Assistant Professor of Philosophy
Queens College, CUNY, USA
doukhana@yahoo.com
From Insularity to Responsability:
A Levinasian Contribution to Development Ethics
Introduction
A few years ago, I taught a class on practical ethics that included a section on
“poverty”. I remember asking the students whether they felt that they were
responsible for the poverty of southern nations and feeling somewhat disconcerted by
their answer that they did not feel any of that poverty was their problem. Inasmuch as
they felt that they had not caused any of that poverty, they did not feel that it was any
of their concern. This is of course, a perfectly logical and legitimate answer, and yet I
felt like something was missing from that answer. I could not feel satisfied by that
answer. This class period started me wondering whether there is not something deeply
amiss with our way of looking on to the plight of others as though it was not part of us,
as though it was not in a way affecting us. As though we are here and they are there
and we are not somehow all connected. It started me wondering if it is not this loss of
connection that has gone wrong in western societies and which is at the origin of our
intrinsic callousness and indifference to the “other”.
I am of course not the first one to wonder like this. Philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, in
the wake of the Holocaust, emitted such a critique of the western individualistic and
autonomous psyche and situated in these very characteristics the seeds of the
genocide113. It is only a disconnected self, one which has become profoundly detached
and indifferent the plight of others which can look on the mass injustices committed
against those “others” without flinching, as did most people during the nazi
occupation. Such a self reassures itself that, inasmuch as it is not the cause of the
injustice, it does not need to intervene. What happens to the other does not in any
way imply or affect it. Such a self did not, however, arise out of nowhere. It is centuries
of philosophical thought which has led the western psyche to this understanding of
itself as distinct from its surroundings, as detached and separate from its “other”. And
it is these centuries of philosophical thinking which has, according to Levinas, led to
the rampant irresponsibility displayed by our contemporaries. Hence the somewhat
calloused, yet perfectly rational, answer given to me by my students.
The purpose of this paper will be to further develop the Levinasian critique of the
western sense of self in an attempt to arrive at a redefinition of the self no more as
individualistic and autonomous, but as connected and responsible. It is such a self that
113
He is not the only one to have done so. Horkheimer and Adorno, in their
groundbreaking book, The Dialectic of Reason, have also emitted the same hypothesis.
needs to be rediscovered and disclosed to the western intellectual landscape if any
genuine concern is to arise out of the western nations for the suffering others around
them. And it is such a self that we must awaken to if any genuine aid, beyond the
token and symbolic aid that western nations are currently giving, is to be distributed.
As Ehrenfelt put it in his candid conversation about sustainable development, we need
a “new paradigm”, a “new story”114 if we are to seriously tackle the problems in
development that lay ahead of us. Such a new paradigm will necessarily entail that we
re-examine, as Ehrenfeld does in the last chapters of his book, “what it means to be
human”115. But before we can get to this re-examination of our humanity, centuries of
philosophical thought and habit must be overcome. And it is to this that we must first
turn.
I.The Cartesian Self as Separate
Western individualism plunges its roots in the modernist philosophy of the
Enlightnement era. Cartesian philosophy is one of its precursors and it is in Descartes’
works that the whole program of western individualism plunges its roots. Whereas
before Descartes, the self found itself either connected to God, to society or to nature,
with Descartes, the self, for the first time, arises and constitutes itself without a single
reference to an other. One might even say that the self constitutes itself, in Cartesian
philosophy, against the other, against the realm of appearances within which the self
finds itself at the moment of the Cartesian doubt. Indeed, the radicalness of the
Cartesian doubt lies precisely in this: That the other of the self, i.e. the world that
surrounds it, even its own body, is struck with doubt. What if it were all an illusion?
What if it were not really real!?
The Cartesian way out of this conundrum is no less radical: Turning to itself the self
asks as to what might be a single certainty in this terrifying realm of illusions and the
answer is: Itself. Descartes expresses it as follows: I am sure of only one thing that I am
doubting, and therefore that I am.116 The self thus arises as the only certainty, i.e. as
the only true reality, in a sea of illusions. Thus, in Cartesian philosophy, we have the
awakening of the self to itself as alone, as distinct, and as separate from a world cast as
illusory. The Cartesian self thus precedes the world in immaculate separateness and, as
we can see in the remaining chapters of the Metaphysical Meditations, must then
begin the difficult task of constituting the world, the others within it, and, eventually,
God himself.
The self thus constitutes itself in Cartesian philosophy, as a substance different from
that of the world around it. It is different, separate, and superior to the world. It is of
no surprise that, as a result, Cartesian philosophy would come to struggle with the
nature of the connection between the self and the world, even to its own body.117 If
the self is constituted as distinct from the world, and as of an altogether different
114
Ehrenfelt, Flourishing, 16.
Ibid, 81.
116
Descartes, Metaphysical Meditations.
117
Cf. Metaphysical Meditations.
115
substance, how does it come to know the world, how does it come to connect with the
world in a genuine way and not as a mere product of its own perception. Indeed, if it is
as Descartes says, that the self constitutes the world, what is to say that the world is
indeed as the self says it is, what is to say that it coincides with our perception of it.
This problem of the connection between mind and matter would thus become one of
the main problems that modern philosophy would come to inherit from Descartes.
Such a problem, however, only arises from a conception of the self as distinct and
separate from the world.
The Cartesian position gives thus rise to a number of epistemological problems. But
the limits of the Cartesian philosophy go beyond mere problems of perception and
cognition; there are also deep ethical problems with the Cartesian premise of the
autonomy and separateness of the self. Indeed, if the self is separate from the world
around it, then what is the world to the self that it might care for it! If the self
constitutes itself autonomously from the world, then to what degree does it need the
world, or have anything to do with the world. If the glory of the self is in itself, in its
own rational capacities to think and to doubt, then why does it need its other? Finally,
if the self is primordially defined as solitary and autonomous, how then might it relate
to others other than artificially or coercively? This is precisely Ehrenfeld’s critique of
the Cartesian solitary self. Such a self finds itself incapable of genuine morality: If “as
individuals, we are always presumed to act out of self-interest…acts that are done for
the benefit of others, such as heroism and altruism, are seen as mere manifestations
of a certain kind of self-interest in this model, thereby discounting their moral
nature”.118 The Cartesian premise of the solitary and autonomous self thus strikes at
the very foundations of ethics—that there is a bond, a connection, albeit invisible and
subtle, between the self and the others around it.
II. The phenomenological turn: moving away from the separate self
It is these insufficiencies of Cartesian philosophy and of its extrapolation in modern
philosophy (Kant, Leibniz, etc) that a new movement called phenomenology would
respond to in an attempt to arrive at a completely redefinition of the self. Although
phenomenology has tried to solve mostly the epistemological problems of the
connection between mind and matter, its repercussions on ethics are important. It is
these repercussions that will be highlighted in Levinas’ philosophy. But before we
enter the discussion on Levinas, a detour through the phenomenological thought
which grounds the Levinasian ethics is necessary.
The main contribution of phenomenology lies in its redefining of the self no more as
distinct and superior to the world, but as always in connection with it. According to
Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement, consciousness is always
consciousness of something.119 For Husserl, this “of” is not the “of” of perception, or of
cognition, but rather it is an “of” of connection. The self is not just perceiving the
world, it is in contact with the world, it is connected to the world and it is precisely this
118
119
Ehrenfeld, Flourishing, 29-30.
Husserl, Cartesian Meditations.
connection which constitutes it intrinsically!! Far are we from the Cartesian definition
of the self as a substance distinct from the world around it. We now have a definition
of the self as connection. This is what makes a self a self: That it is constantly in a state
of connection with exteriority, with its other. The other is then an intrinsic part of the
self. There is no self without the other. The repercussions of this idea on ethics are
immense! But no less are the repercussions on the mind-matter problem.
Inasmuch as the self has found itself redefined as intrinsically connected to the world,
the latter does no more appear as a substance foreign and distinct from the self, nor as
a product of the self’s perceptive faculties. On the contrary, the world is now taken as
it is, as the pole of an encounter, rather than the object of a perception.120 In this
context, there can be no question of the world being illusory or mere perception. The
world is no more the way the self constitutes it, but, rather, is received as it gives itself
to the self. This is only possible in the context of an encounter. Indeed, one might go as
far as to say that the world will necessarily appear as an illusion only for a self which
defines itself, as does the Cartesian self, as the origin of the world. To redefine the self
as capable of encounter, however, is by the same token, to give back to the world its
credibility as an other to be encountered and received by the self!
Phenomenology thus does a massive service to philosophy, as well as redefines the
self, no more as merely rational—as Descartes had defined it—but as relational. What
makes the self a self is not its intellectual capacities to doubt or to think about the
world on its own terms, but rather the capacity it has to relate and connect with the
world around it.121 Again, one cannot overemphasize the repercussions on ethics of
such a redefinition of the self, or, rather, rediscovery of the self’s intrinsic relational
character. It is to this that we now turn.
III. The Levinasian Self as Responsible
Following in the footsteps of the phenomenological redefinition of the self as
relational, Levinas will explore the repercussions of this discovery for the realm of
ethics. Like phenomenology, Levinas is dissatisfied with the western concept of the self
as distinct and separate from the world. His motivations, however, are ethical and not
epistemological. Indeed, inasmuch as the self defines itself narrowly as rational, and
finds all of its glory therein, what place is there, for such a self, for ethics and for a
concern for the other. This is precisely where, according to Levinas, western thought
has gone wrong: In defining the self as rational and as autonomous, the west has
neutralized the very foundations of ethics. Such a self will always ask: “Why does the
120
Martin Buber would come to describe our relationship with the world as taking the
structure of an encounter—which stems from exteriority, from the other and awakens
the self to its reality--rather than as an experience—which originates from the self, and
as such, ever vulnerable to the possibility of being a mere construction of the self (cf. I
and Thou).
121
Such a redefinition of the self as relational rather than rational had also been
attempted by philosophers such as Kierkegaard, Rosenzweig, and later by Levinas,
Buber and Marcel.
other concern me? What is Hecuba to me? Am I my brother’s keeper?” Levinas goes
on to add that “These questions have meaning only if one has already supposed that
the ego is concerned only with itself, is only a concern for itself”. 122 Such a self has no
concern nor need for its other. And as such, it will always remain indifferent to the
plight of that other which does not concern it.
This is, however, according to Levinas, a profoundly misunderstanding of the self’s true
nature. To limit the intrinsic characteristics of the self to its rationality is to reduce the
self to a machine. A machine too is rational. How then is the self more than a machine?
According to Levinas, what makes the self more than a machine, and as such, defines
its intrinsic humanity, is its capacity to relate to the other. Following in Husserl’s
redescovery of the self as an essential encounter with the world around, Levinas offers
the more precise definition of the self as encounter with the human other. This
intrinsic bond between the self and the others around it is what constitutes the self as
a human self, according to Levinas.
Radicalizing the Husserlian understanding of the self as always consciousness of
something, Levinas will come to define the self as conscience, that is to say, as
intrinsically responsible for other human beings. But whereas the consciousness of the
world in the Husserlian sense implies a constitutive role on the part of the self, wholly
different is the encounter with a human other. The human other will resist all designs
and will turn and transform the self which encounters it. Levinas describes this other
as follows: “The face resists possession, resists my powers … [rather it] appeals to
me”.123 As such, the encounter with the other constitutes a profoundly different
experience from the mere encounter with the world. While the encounter with the
world can take place without there being any effect on the self, the encounter with a
human other must always, if it is to have taken place, have a transformative impact on
the self. The encounter with the human other is always an encounter which somehow
limits and transforms the self, it always has an impact on the self, it always somehow
affects it. Any encounter short of this constitutes a mechanized, machine-like
encounter which completely misses the other as other.
It is moreover precisely such an encounter which, according to Levinas, defines the
self’s humanity. One might thus deduce that what makes us human is our capacity to
be resisted, affected, impacted and transformed by an other. And it is this very
capacity which defines, for Levinas, our ethical character: It is a “sensibility,
vulnerability, maternity, and materiality, which describe responsibility for others”. 124
Only a being which can be affected, limited and transformed is capable of ethics, i.e. of
profoundly and genuinely engaging with an other. Any encounter short of this borders
on indifference and can be likened to a mechanized approach to reality. Our humanity
thus rests upon our capacity to be bound to the other, to be genuinely connected to
the other; it rests no more on our rationality but on our relationality! This is what
makes us truly human, and, as such, ethical!
122
Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 117.
Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 194-197.
124
Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 106.
123
We are not far here, incidentally, from the African concept of the self as relational. In
his comments on the African concept of Ubuntu, Desmond Tutu shows that it implies a
subversion of the Cartesian “I think therefore I am”, into “I am because I belong”,
because I am connected, bound to others.125 For the African psyche, my humanity is
constituted by and through my connections with the others around me: “I need other
human beings in order to be human. The completely self-sufficient human being is
subhuman. I can be me only if you are fully you”.126 Leopold Senghor, in his unflinching
critique of the western psyche, makes a similar point. Comparing the western attitude
towards the outside world as that of a “bird of prey”, he then goes on to contrast it to
that of the African who “does not begin by distinguishing himself from the object, the
tree or stone, the man or animal or social event. He does not keep it at a distance…he
discovers the Other. He is moved to his bowels, going out in a centrigual movement
from the subject to the object on the waves sent out from the Other”.127 As such, the
African psyche finds itself constituted by the other and through that other. It awakens
at the contact of that other and vibrates continuously with it. The African self is thus,
as the Levinasian transformed self, profoundly relational.
IV. Conclusions for Development Ethics
But we now must come back to the crux of the matter. We must come back to my
students’ indifference, to our indifference as western individuals and nations to the
plight of the southern countries. What might a philosophy like Levinas’ teach us?
Awaken us to? How does Levinas’ concept of the subject speak to the very pressing
problems of poverty and aid. Perhaps what one might gain from Levinas is a renewed
sense of our interconnectivity. We might realize that, inasmuch as our humanity is
defined by our bond to others, that the stance so commonly adopted of indifference
might be less than human. That in a way, our indifference disserves not only the poor
but ourselves; that we have, in many ways, lost a sense of our own humanity and have
allowed ourselves to be defined in a mechanized, functionalized way as rational
machines, impermeable, immovable, unimpacted by the others around us! Perhaps we
might again see our full human potential as a self to be defined no more in terms of
what we have as intrinsic attributes of rationality, intelligence, masterfulness, but
rather in who we are, or perhaps more precisely who we choose to be in the face of
the suffering other. Perhaps we might regain a sense that our full potential as a human
self will only be reached when we have rediscovered our capacity to relate and to
connect with the others around us, that, as the concept of Ubuntu teaches us, our
humanity depends on their having achieved humanity, that our happiness depends on
their well-being and that our dignity as humans depends on theirs. Perhaps we might
understand this as nations as well. That in a way, our aid and contributions to the
south might help us rediscover the hidden, yet undisclosed and untapped treasure of
our own humanity, of our own spirituality that decades of materialistic and
individualistic philosophy have succeeded in stifling. Perhaps we might realize with
Ehrenfeld that while “making ourselves materially rich, we are making ourselves
125
Desmond Tutu, God is Not a Christian, 22.
Ibid. 22.
127
Leopold Senghor, Prose and Poetry, 30-31.
126
existentially and psychologically poor”.128 Perhaps this is the solution to the nihilism
and rampant materialism that is beginning to define the western nations. Perhaps this
is the beginning of a new dawn for the west.
John Dewey’s Philosophy of Education and Development Ethics
Marta Gluchmanová and Vasil Gluchman
Marta Gluchmanová
Lecturer at the Department of Humanities, Technical University in Košice
(Slovakia).
Technical University of Kosice, Slovakia
marta.gluchmanova@tuke.sk
Vasil Gluchman
Professor and UNESCO Chair in Bioethics
Institute of Ethics and Bioethics, University of Presov, Slovakia
gluchmv0@unipo.sk
Abstract: Development ethics predominantly studies ethical and moral issues
regarding the economic and social development of society; it focuses on the problems
of social and global justice, food safety, poverty, need, social inequality, epidemics,
diseases, etc. The goal is to find ways of solving the above problems on national,
international and global levels. The most important role in the solution process is
played by renowned international organisations, such as the UN, FAO, WHO, etc., who
deal with searching for solutions to pressing problems worldwide.
What is, however, frequently overlooked, or underestimated, is the role of education
in the process of prevention of and solution to economic and social problems,
especially on the national level. The most developed countries usually implement a
high quality system of education, broad accessibility to education, a high number of
people with a university degree in proportion to the total number of inhabitants, etc.
On the one hand, there is an emphasis on the accessibility and quality of technological
education as a driving force in the economic development of the country. A highly
significant role in the process of society’s social development is, however, also played
by education in humanities and social science, which has a positive influence primarily
on the formation of democratic society, as the development of critical thinking enables
people to better understand world events, to overcome prejudice, and it can also be of
128
Ehrenfeld, Flourishing, 31.
help in reaching a better understanding of other people and building empathy towards
the suffering and pain of others (Nussbaum). Generally speaking, education not only
contributes to economic development but also brings considerable social benefits for
society and the globalised world in the form of educated and cultivated citizens,
socially responsible and living, for the most part, a healthy lifestyle (Barnett).
A basis for the realisation of the above intentions can be found in Dewey’s model of
education as a means for the moral and social development of an individual and
society. In this model, a key role is played by the experience of students and great
emphasis is placed on the formation of an active approach to the acquisition of
knowledge (including freedom of thought) and its application to the life of an
individual and society. The aim should be seen in common good as a result of
implementing experience and acquired knowledge in the process of education and
their application in real life (including the ability to predict consequences of one’s
behaviour and actions on the level of an individual as well as society). Schooling, in his
understanding, should not be a means of social control; on the contrary, it should be a
driving force for the participation in the life of community, or, society. What Dewey
had in mind was not just gaining a lot of knowledge and information on the part of
pupils and students, but, most of all, developing their motives, moral powers, and
adapting and finding their place in social life. He perceived the individual as a result of
the process of social development and, consequently, freedom, in his understanding,
was an ability to produce social change. In his opinion, any new, plausible model of
education had to correspond to the development of society and its new forms of social
and moral life, the dominant features being the ability of an individual to react to
changing situations, search for creative solutions, and fight against rigidity and
prejudices.
Dewey’s model of education, on the one hand, creates conditions for the
implementation of development ethics in education and makes it possible to spread
the above ideas faster and better to the consciousness of individuals and society. On
the other hand, however, development ethics overlaps with Dewey’s model of
education in the effort for an equal moral value of all human beings, with the emphasis
on equal right to education and an effort to achieve fairer society and welfare for all.
Upstream of Ethics: Examining the Social Ontology of Development
Ronnie Hawkins
Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy (retired)
University of Central Florida, USA
2ronniehawkins@gmail.com
Abstract: Ontology is that branch of philosophy that addresses existence: what kinds
of things exist, and in what manner. It is only relatively recently, however, that
contemporary western philosophy has begun overcoming its individualistic bias to pay
attention to our nature as highly social beings, and with that enlargement of
perspective has come the recognition that much of we take for granted as reality
“exists” only in a social way; this constitutes our social ontology. There are the things
that exist independently of our human beliefs, desires and expectations--physical
objects, living organisms, functioning ecosystems—and then there are the “things”
that exist only by human agreement—money, nation-states, interest rates, debt—
things that seem to be as solid as rocks and trees and human beings, simply because
we all accept them and reinforce the belief in each other that they really exist.
Understanding the crucial ontological difference between the two, and the difference
it makes—that we can change those things we constructed within our shared belief
systems, even abolish them, but when we try to alter the reality of living organisms
and ecosystems, we do it only at our peril—can help us make better choices as we
confront the future.
Denis Goulet’s Development Ethics (1995) exhibits a greater breadth and depth than
many works in the field, including both individual and social levels in its analysis and
considering issues that many would consider to be ontological rather than strictly
“ethical.” Whereas some ethicists simply debate whether or not less industrialized
countries “have the right to develop,” assuming the given ontology, Goulet
interrogates what “development” means, pointing out that these societies need not
follow a single, linear trajectory, such as that pursued by the United States. In these
respects, his work presents itself as open to dialogue with the emerging field of social
ontology. Goulet’s recognition of three species-wide human goals--“optimum lifesustenance, esteem, and freedom (p. 41)—allow for considering what John Searle calls
the ontologically objective as what sustains our biological lives, the ontologically
subjective under the heading labeled “esteem,” and our vast range of possible choices
for reconstructing our social reality as a manifestation of our human freedom. When
Goulet ascribes “the frenetic desire of some societies to achieve development”
(presumably according to the industrial model) to a need to attain “esteem” in their
own and others’ eyes (p. 43), he is identifying the predominant (but often unremarked)
role of the social in our inability, at the species level, to deal adequately with global
threats to our survival such as climate change, of which accelerating consumerism is a
prominent driver. For example, how much do people pursue a plethora of material
goods out of biological need, how much out of individual “greed” or allegiance to a
capitalist ideology, and how much simply in order to “keep up with the Joneses,” both
at the level of individuals competing with their neighbors and at the level of nations
competing with neighboring countries? I suspect the latter may be of primary
importance, and understanding that social forces are pushing us to keep reinforcing
the same old social constructions instead of creating now ones, and that we have the
freedom to rechannel them, could go a long way in helping us change our ontology of
“development” for the better. Costa Rica, as a “developing” country, has done very
well in emphasizing basic education, primary health care for all, excellent public
transportation, and so on, but it faces challenges in the years ahead regarding how
much more it will seek esteem by emulating high-consuming societies, as well as how
much of its ontologically objective “resources” it will sacrifice to the seduction of easy
“credit” and “debt” in an economic system that is itself entirely ontologically
subjective.
Upstream of Ethics: Examining the Social Ontology of Development
Ontology is that branch of philosophy that addresses existence: what kinds of things
exist, and in what manner. It is only relatively recently, however, that contemporary
western philosophy has begun overcoming its individualistic bias to pay attention to
our nature as highly social beings, and with that enlargement of perspective has come
the recognition that much of what we take for granted as reality “exists” only in a
social way; this constitutes our social ontology. There are the things that exist
independently of our human beliefs, desires and expectations--physical objects, living
organisms, functioning ecosystems—and then there are the “things” that exist only by
human agreement—money, nation-states, interest rates, debt—things that seem to be
as solid as rocks and trees and human beings, simply because we all accept them and
reinforce the belief in each other that they really exist. Understanding the crucial
ontological difference between the two, and the difference it makes—that we can
change those things we have constructed within our shared belief systems, even
abolish them, but when we try to alter the reality of living organisms and ecosystems,
we do it only at our peril—can help us make better choices as we confront the future
John Searle is a pioneering figure in social ontology, his The Construction of Social
Reality (1995) outlining how it is that we can get from the things studied by physics
and biology to the “things” that are studied by politics and economics, a puzzle that he
has termed “the metaphysical burden of social reality” (Searle 1995, 1). The link, of
course, is our human groupishness, a biological characteristic, combined with our
ability to create and share meaningful symbols. Like a number of other social animals,
we exhibit collective intentionality, the ability to cooperate as members of a group to
carry out an action or share an attitude; a soccer team displays collective intentionality
when it moves the ball down the field, as does a pack of hyenas when they bring down
an antelope. In addition, we humans, along with some of the great apes and a few
other animals, have the ability to impose a function upon an object; an orangutan and
a human may use a stick as a lever, for example, and a human can also impute a
symbolic meaning to one, as when a scepter is seen to signify royalty. One of Searle’s
favorite examples of the construction of an aspect of our social reality is money: the
strips of paper bearing variously colored ink markings have few physical uses in and of
themselves, short of raw material for origami or starting fires, but when we collectively
agree to impute an amount of “value” to them, giving a certain sort of status to them
that they would not have intrinsically, they become able to function in a powerful way
within human society. And with the seemingly endless potential for repeating of this
imposition of shared symbolic status and thereby function on virtually any starting
material (including the various sounds and markings of human speech and writing), we
have been able to build up “institutions” of remarkable complexity. Once you have
money, for example, you can, by following what Searle calls “constitutive rules,” create
entirely new forms of behavior having to do with borrowing and lending, the setting up
of a banking industry, the development of a stock exchange, and on and on. 129
129
Searle’s general formulation of how this works is through the iteration of “X counts
as Y in context C,” such that paper strip X counts as money, Y, in context C, coming off
a government printing press, an amount of money X’ counts as loan payment Y’ in
context C’, your bank’s friendly lending office, and so on.
Searle, as a philosopher of mind and language, presents quite a sophisticated analysis
of how all this comes about, but what’s important for our discussion here is the fact
that our social ontology, what we normally take for granted as “the way things are,”
generally lies “upstream” of ethics; it is the context within which we make our ethical
decisions—assuming things are the way they are, “we should do A and not B.” Since it
is not just a matter of my subjective opinion that a certain piece of paper is a fivedollar bill, for example, but rather the collective agreement (if rarely considered
consciously) of the vast majority of members of my society that maintains its existence
as a five-dollar bill, it seems to be what it is independently of my volition; my ethical
concerns are most likely going to be limited to debating whether or not I should hand
it back to the man from whose wallet I saw it fall rather than considering what kind of
a strange “thing” this strip of cellulose is and whether or not I want to accept its
having a “value” of a couple of hamburgers and an order of fries. Coming to terms with
the fact that large chunks of “the way things are” are socially constructed, not aspects
of our biological “given,” and therefore also open to ethical assessment and reasoned
choice, will be a matter of attaining this awareness collectively, on the level of our
social units; nevertheless, whether or not we yet have achieved this sort of awareness,
the fact remains that such “things” as five-dollar bills, and the abstract superstructures
we have created based on them, have a form of existence that is (as Searle terms it)
ontologically subjective, in contrast with the ontologically objective objects and
relationships that exist independently of our human beliefs, desires and expectations.
Most people do not seem to be actively aware of this most important ontological
distinction, however. An article from my file that struck me some time ago as an
example illustrative of the lack of explicit acknowledgment this distinction, and also of
another aspect of the ontological subjectivity of contemporary economics, is “Can
Sustainable Management Save Tropical Forests?” by Richard Rice, Raymond Gullison,
and John Reed (Scientific American, 1997). The authors, having dedicated their careers
to the conservation of biological diversity and finding the ongoing devastation of
tropical forests “a constant source of distress,” came together initially to develop ways
of harvesting mahogany in an ecologically sustainable manner, in hopes of convincing
timber companies to adopt the practice. Studying the timbering practices in Bolivia,
however, they concluded that companies had no economic incentive to delay or
restrict harvests so as to allow regeneration, since the economically “most rational
approach” was to cut down all the mahogany they could right away, following that to
cut all the rest of the trees yielding any “positive net return” sequentially, and to invest
the monetary proceeds, since at that time interests rates were averaging 17 per cent
per year. The article includes a number of color photographs of plants and animals
harbored in tropical forests—the real, living beings whose lives are in question—but its
main focus seems to be on a graph plotting the amount of U.S. dollars “returned” over
time given different choices of forestry, with the sustainable “delayed harvest” yielding
only a doubling of the price to be obtained by letting what was initially $1000 worth of
trees grow in size over 15 years (5% “rate of return”), whereas the “investments” of
that same amount all at once in the purely abstract monetary scheme at “interest
rates” in the double digits climb skyward on sharply exponential J-curves.
(illustration from Rice, Gullison and Reid, Scientific American April 1997, p. 44)
Well, of course, you might say—it’s obvious from this what the “rational” course of
action should be, it’s as the authors say, cut it all down and invest the profits at the
highest rate of return—wouldn’t most people think so? And the fact that what is being
measured on the y-axis is quite different in kind from the sorts of things ecologists
typically measure and present graphically, such as the numbers and sizes of trees in
the forest, or even board feet of lumber, is something that is likely to escape notice
entirely. But I would like to draw attention to this difference, which is really quite
stark, ontologically speaking; one sort of thing—trees, lumber--has material existence,
and indeed the former has life as well. The other sort of “thing”—the one that is
presented graphically here--is entirely abstract; an amount of “U.S. dollars” is in fact
nothing but a quantification over symbols, although, with our current organization of
social reality, “possessing” a certain quantified amount of such symbols will allow you
to get other people to do certain things for you, given that they would like to have
some of “them” for themselves. In themselves, these symbols cannot be eaten, nor do
they metabolize; their physical instantiation, in fact, is likely to be in the form of a
pattern of electric charges in a computer bank, with an accompanying pattern of
neuronal firings in the head of whatever human primate is apprehending them. The
difference between what is being depicted in the photos of forest organisms and what
is being depicted in this graph is not simply a difference between apples and oranges—
it is a difference between apples and ideas. As long as we humans collectively perceive
them as real “things,” these quantities of dollars may seem to be quite substantial, and
as long as everyone accepts their conventional symbolic status, the larger economic
system—the one in which real goods and services are exchanged among real people—
will continue to “function.” But in what way was it functioning, at the time of the
writing of this “scientific” paper, and in what way is it functioning currently? It was and
is functioning in such a way that tropical forests, as well as other manifestations of the
Earth’s biodiversity, are continuing to be destroyed.
Moreover, another ontological observation that can be made using this illustration as
an example is the apparent power of compound interest to “create something out of
nothing.” Consider, for a moment, what it is that is signified by NPP, or net primary
production, an ecologist’s term for the total amount of available biomass created by
green plants, trapping the energy of the sun through photosynthesis over the course of
a year; this (though it has to be estimated theoretically) is a quantity of something that
is ontologically objective; its concrete manifestations are tangibly real, and in fact are
what keep us animals alive and functioning. Now consider, in contrast, what is
“produced” by the calculation of compound interest. Nothing in the real, ontologically
objective world has been created by means of this simple mathematical operation! It
may be that, once it has been performed on a given set of symbols, human beings
become enabled to carry out certain operations in the physical world, given the
meanings other humans will attribute to the now-numerically enhanced symbol set,
but these operations may or may not themselves produce anything of actual value to
living beings; indeed, these operations may harm them. Likewise, the total sum of such
symbols “produced” in a given year by a given national grouping of humans is
represented by its GDP—but what does that amount to, ontologically speaking, in
comparison with what would be measured as the corresponding bioregion’s NPP? The
above graph deceptively conveys the “production” of something, indicated by an
increasing area under the curve as interest rates increase, but that “something” is
entirely ontologically subjective. Should we humans cease to exist, or cease believing
in that “something,” it will vanish without a trace.
The field of development ethics is well positioned to look “upstream” of issues that are
narrowly ethical and examine the ontology of issues such as these, since much of
“development” is currently determined without full awareness of the important
ontological distinction I am drawing attention to here. The narrowly ethical approach
seems to make a general assumption that nations which are not yet fully
“industrialized” will necessarily follow down this developmental path unless restricted,
often taking little heed of what doing so will entail for the ontologically objective
world, and indeed much of the ethical discussion centered around climate change
seems simply to focus on “whether or not,” or to what extent, these countries could
be said to have “a right to develop.” The work of Denis Goulet is noteworthy in
refusing to fall into this dualistic trap, however, as well as in explicitly recognizing the
importance of the social as well as the individual level of analysis. Goulet recognizes
three fundamental goals that he maintains are pursued by all human beings, though in
societally as well as individually different ways: “optimum life-sustenance, esteem, and
freedom” (1995, 41), and I would like to use this aspect of his theoretical framework in
discussing the ontology of development a little further.
First of all, for our life-sustenance, we need food, fresh water, fiber, and (given our
present social ontology) such things as fossil fuels, metals, the phosphorus required for
large-scale agriculture and the like, all of which are ontologically objective; they exist
independently of our belief systems, and wishing for, expecting, or “demanding” such
things will not make them appear at our command. Such “resources,” or
biogeophysical “goods and services,” moreover, are now understood to be embedded
within the larger Earth System, which supports their availability through systemic
processes such as nutrient cycling, soil formation, the trapping of solar energy through
photosynthesis, and the regulation of the climate system by carbon storage in
ecosystems and in the world’s oceans. There is now a growing recognition that our
collective human activities have been bringing about large changes in the Earth
System, with grave consequences likely not only for the planet’s nonhuman biota but
for our own livelihood as well. Some scientists maintain that we have entered a new
epoch in planetary history, christening it the Anthropocene (Crutzen, 2002). A growing
worry is that, if we continue on in the same trajectory, we are threatening to shift the
Earth System out of its relative Holocene stability and into another state altogether, a
state that may have some markedly different parameters that are unlikely to be
hospitable to our form of life (Rockstrom et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2011; Barnosky et
al., 2012):
(Illustration from Steffen et al., Ambio (2011) 40: 739-761, p. 755)
“Human population growth and per-capita consumption rate underlie all of the other
present drivers of global change,” according to Barnosky et al. (2012, 4); the Earth’s
human population has roughly quadrupled during the last century, tripling just since
the “Great Acceleration” of almost everything that occurred after World War II, and
our per capita material consumption has grown “many times faster” (Steffen et al.,
2011, 743). Such are the ontologically objective aspects of our current situation, on the
long-term, large-scale view. One set of scientists contributing to the “Earth Systems”
literature has linked these facts to the ontologically subjective aspects of our reality in
this way:
“It is plausible that current development paradigms and patterns, if continued, would
tip the integrated human-earth system into a radically different basin of attraction. . . .
Profound change in society is likely to be required for persistence in the Holocene
stability domain. Alas, resilience of behavioral patterns in society is notoriously large
and a serious impediment for preventing loss of Earth System resilience.” (Folke et al.,
2010, emphasis added)
The resilience of a system has been defined as the capacity of that system to maintain
itself upon exposure to a certain amount of disturbance “so as to still retain essentially
the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks” (Walker et al. 2004: 4, as cited in
Folke et al. 2010, 1). It is crucially important, in terms of life-sustenance, that our
current Earth System exhibit enough resilience to maintain its present state in the face
of anthropogenic changes already unleashed. Our “current development paradigms”
and the behavioral patterns that support and are supported by them, however—the
impetus of which is toward ever more “growth” in both human numbers and per
capita consumption--are serving to push the planetary system toward a different
“basin of attraction,” and unfortunately they, along with their supporting institutional
structures, built up according to the linguistic/symbolic operations that Searle
describes, are a resilient part of our social ontology. If we are to avert environmental
disaster, we will need to effect “profound change in society,” and hence a much better
understanding the social ontology of development will be needed to help us maintain
(and improve) social functioning while reversing this thrust.
Time does not permit me to examine our process of constructing social reality in any
detail here, but I would like to raise an issue or two regarding it that might prove to be
“take home” considerations from this talk. For one thing, it might be valuable to
interrogate the role played by what Goulet refers to as the human value or goal of
“esteem” as it relates to humanity’s overall trajectory, especially as displayed since
“the great Acceleration” of the 1950s and 60s, when the ability to compare oneself
and one’s society with others became facilitated by electronic communications media.
As a biological species, we humans evolved from small groupings of social primates
that needed to cooperate within their groups in order to compete with other
groupings for the “resources” of the environments they lived in; in addition, there has
always been within-group competition for status within social hierarchies of the sort
many other primate species tend to form, with individuals requiring a certain degree of
status in order to enjoy a modicum of well-being within the group. Goulet observes,
“[t]he universal human need for esteem explains . . . the frenetic desire of some
societies to achieve development . . . [They] seek development in order to receive
some of the esteem so prodigally dispensed to nations already developed . . .” (1995,
43). Of course both individuals and groups want to obtain the materials needed for
basic life sustenance, including provisions for such fundamentals as health care and
education. Individuals and groups that seek much more than that in material terms are
sometimes said to be motivated by “greed,” and I would not deny the fairly
widespread existence of this vice. But to what extent might the striving for more,
more, more be the result, not so much of an intrinsic desire for an excess of “the good
things of life,” but of a desire simply to outcompete and attain a higher status—and
supposedly thereby greater “esteem”—than one’s neighbors, on both an individual
and a societal level? How much, in other words, does the motivation of the rich man to
install a swimming pool or purchase a sports car derive from the pure pleasure he
expects to get from swimming or driving, and how much is it inspired by his urge to
keep up with—and surpass—the Joneses? Even more salient to the global situation,
how much does the motivation of national leaders to “develop” their countries and
thereby “increase the GDP” derive from a drive toward greater status and power, for
their nation-states and for themselves as individuals? Attention to some of the social
dynamics, which are usually externalized when the focus is on individual pleasureseeking, might give some new insights into the forces keeping us on our present path.
One of the insidious attractions of the monetization of economics, in fact, may be the
exquisite precision with which it enables us to quantify just how much higher in status
a person or a society might be than another—a moot point if we are all to suffer the
demise of our biosphere as a result of the competition for such status.
Goulet’s third identified human value or goal is freedom, and a better understanding of
our social ontology might lead to a new appreciation of the extent to which we can
manifest that value, as individuals, as societies, and as a species. Jean-Paul Sartre
famously maintained that we are each, as human individuals, absolutely free to choose
our actions and even our attitudes and emotions within our given situations (the
prisoner free to choose how he or she will orient to enclosure within prison walls), and
many philosophers who have felt that he must be wrong about this seem to have had
difficulty expressing exactly why. I would submit that both Sartre and his critics have
failed to “see,” or clearly articulate, the social forces that can for some be perceived as
equally impenetrable as stone but that can also, once collective intentionality is
directed toward making necessary alterations in them, become malleable, or at least
open to redirection. We humans are physically (including technologically) capable of
exercising a great deal of choice over both our reproductive behavior and our material
consumption (including the consumption of resources by the entirely wasteful
activities of militarism); it is our social resonance with earlier patterns of behavior,
individuals mutually reinforcing existing attitudes and beliefs, that keeps our particular
form of social reality in place. The greater our collective awareness of how the
ontologically subjective is maintained, the more readily we can shift our own “social
state” before our current social inertia shifts the planetary state.
To weave together several different areas of contemporary thinking, those who
address changes to our “Earth Systems” talk in terms not only of resilience but of the
adaptability and transformability of “complex social-ecological systems (SESs)” (Folke
et al., 2010). Adaptability allows the system to adjust to disturbances without changing
its basic trajectory, while transformability “is the capacity to create new stability
domains for development, a new stability landscape, and cross thresholds into a new
development trajectory” (ibid, 6). We are now being urged to “explore options for the
deliberate transformation of systems that threaten Earth System resilience” (ibid, 7).
Our current, virtually species-wide expectation for continually “growing” families and
social groupings is one aspect of social reality that can change and in some places
seems to be changing. Our merciless intergroup competition for “economic growth”
must surely also be targeted for change, and in this case I believe the “ontological
challenge” of becoming able to see that the economic realm is the result of continuing
active social construction over which we can exercise collective choice, once posed,
can act as a kind of conceptual lever to raise collective awareness in preparation for
meaningful change.
In the concluding remarks to his 2010 book, John Searle notes that
“It is, for example, a mistake to treat money and other such instruments as if they
were natural phenomena, like the phenomena studied in physics, chemistry, and
biology. The recent economic crisis makes it clear that they are products of massive
fantasy. As long as everyone shares the fantasy and has confidence in it, the system
will work just fine [barring, that is, a collision with the ontologically objective system
that supports it]. But when some of the fantasies cease to be believable, as happened
with the subprime mortgage instruments, then the whole system begins to unravel.”
(Searle 2010, 201, italics and insertion added)
Denis Goulet’s observations can be added to this conversation:
“It is only because of their greater ability to influence events that developed societies
have been able to impose a disjointed economy characterized by domination and
structural vulnerability on societies which, although poor and perhaps even
economically stagnant, formerly enjoyed considerable social cohesion and some form
of harmony with nature’s cosmic forces. Similarly, it is only because of their greater
power that rich industrial countries can portray “development” itself to the Third
World as necessary, if not as desirable.” (Goulet 1995, 48)
Just exactly how supraindividual “power” comes into being through social construction
is another issue that unfortunately cannot be examined here (although Searle presents
an interesting analysis of it). “A disjointed economy characterized by domination and
structural vulnerability,” however, seems a fitting way of describing not only the
institutional structures that have been imposed by industrial culture as it has
metastasized around the world but also the state of the economies in the supposedly
“rich” countries today. It is becoming apparent that hierarchically organized
social/economic structures which rely on “infinite growth” to promote the illusion that
sooner or later “a rising tide will lift all boats” are ultimately unsustainable, due to the
social as well as the ecological problems that they create. In the same passage Goulet
notes that “Development, as generally practiced, implies one particular image of the
good life” (ibid), an image that is not necessarily conducive to human happiness,
societal functionality, or even individual health, all things considered (e.g., in light of
the newly declared, increasingly worldwide “obesity crisis”).
Putting these insights together, we—a growing number of citizens of this planet--can
see that the “development” paradigm that has been “sold” to us over the last several
decades is full of serious flaws, and not at all worthy of being taken as the guiding light
forward into a prosperous future for us all. Searle’s pointing out that there is nothing
inevitable about the current economic system, nothing “solid” underlying it as there is
in the phenomena studied by biology and chemistry, opens the door to our human
freedom. He even puts his finger on a key pressure point for triggering change in our
institutional reality. “Since its creation is really just words, words, words,” he asks,
“how do we manage to get away with it?” His “short answer” is that “we get away with
it to the extent that we can get other people to accept it.” This answer just pushes the
question back into why people accept the “institutional facts” as given, however, and
his answer to this, beyond the general intuition that they must be in everyone’s
interests, is as follows:
“[O]ne feature that runs through a large number of cases is that in accepting the
institutional facts, people do not typically understand what is going on. They do not
think of private property, . . . or human rights, or governments as human creations.
They tend to think of them as part of the natural order of things, to be taken for
granted in the same way they take for granted the weather or the force of gravity.”
(Searle 2010, 106-107, emphasis added)
I would draw attention to the fluidity of meaning of the words “we” and “they” in the
above passages. What sort of general increase in the overall level of awareness would
it take to change the “they” who do not understand what is really going on into the
“we” in the first sentence of this paragraph, we who need to, and are coming to, know
what’s going on? In his discussion of the value of freedom, Goulet maintains that
“most individuals wish to have only that degree of freedom which they need to engage
in spheres of activity for which they feel competent,” spheres comprising “a very
circumscribed orbit,” to step outside of which “is to flirt with unmanageable anxiety”
(1995, 45); in a similar vein, Folke et al. observe that “getting beyond the state of
denial” with respect to the need for transformational change “is not easy and often
requires a shock or at least a perceived crisis” (2010, 5). I would say that bridging the
gap between the understanding that our culturally embedded constructs and their
supporting institutions both MUST and CAN change, and what may still be, for many, a
tenacious certainty that the global economic system, with its massive burden of “debt”
and its vacuum-cleaner suction tugging at the fabric of Life, IS simply another feature
of reality like gravity and the weather to be accepted out of necessity, is the urgent
challenge before all who are aware of the social ontology of “development.”
Kenneth Boulding writes that the behavior of people, individually and in their social
groupings, “depends on the image” they have of the world and their own place in it.
Feedback from our expanding sphere of knowledge should lead to changes in this
image, but there is resistance to changing the image that a society holds, and it may
take strong, repeated messages to penetrate it; when the resistance is penetrated,
however, “the effect is a realignment or reorganization of the whole knowledge
structure” (Boulding 1956). “Primitive men,” he maintains—using what is today an
ethnically insensitive term, unless it is understood as applying not to indigenous
cultures so much as to most contemporary economists—“imagined themselves to be
living on a virtually illimitable plane,” holding something he terms “the image of the
frontier”--whereas people who know what’s going on have updated their image to
envision a “spherical earth and a closed sphere of human activity” (Boulding 1966, in
Daly 1980, 253). What would be the dimensions of future human “development” if our
collective, global image of reality were realigned in this way? Denis Goulet suggests
how all such proposed development should be scrutinized:
“[T]he ancient goals of protecting life, of nurturing esteem, and of freeing oneself as
much as possible must now become the criteria against which development itself is to
be judged. It is not these goals which must be judged by development.” (Goulet 1995,
48)
Humanity can continue to develop toward these three goals indefinitely. But while the
number of ontologically subjective, entirely abstract “objects” like dollars can
theoretically grow to infinity, humanity cannot continue to “grow” in numbers or in
consumption indefinitely while inhabiting a finite globe. Nor should it aspire to.
Costa Rica can be considered in light of some of the points made in this discussion. As
a “developing” country, it has done very well over recent decades in building a national
infrastructure to supply electricity, water, transportation, and telecommunications,
and in creating social systems to provide basic education, primary health care and
social services for the great majority of its population. Despite undergoing a short-lived
civil war in 1948 and some severe “structural adjustment” following the economic
crisis of the early 1980s, Costa Rica has managed to uphold its longstanding tradition of
democratic institutions and “keep the peace” without requiring the presence of a
standing army. “[I]t is the only country in Latin America to have enjoyed uninterrupted
political democracy over the past fifty years, a time when even bastions of democracy
like Chile and Uruguay suffered bloody military coups and long dictatorships that
replaced civil liberties with state terror” (Palmer and Molina 2004, 1). Ecologically,
Costa Rica has officially protected around one-quarter of its remaining natural lands,
the highest percentage of any country in the world. On the other hand, it is also noted
to have “long held the world record in forest clearing—7 percent of total forested area
was cleared every year since the 1960s” (Locher 1997, 284):
(Illustration from Locher, “Migration and the Costa Rican Environment Since 1900,”
1997, p. 285)
The conversion of forested land to coffee and banana plantations for export
agriculture dates back to the early twentieth century, and the cumulative effects of
intensive pesticide use have resulted in the poisoning of some of Costa Rica’s most
fertile soils, including an estimated five to seven thousand hectares surrounding the
Terraba River that has been “effectively sterilized for most agricultural purposes” due
to a copper-based fungicide applied by the United Fruit Company (Marquardt 2002,
309). Much of the previous (and ongoing) deforestation has been driven by continuing
migration of the landless poor into “the frontier,” however, by governmental policies
recognizing occupation and granting ownership on the basis of the “improvement”
made by cutting trees, a process that has often resulted, not in sustainable agricultural
settlements, but in a traveling wave of deforestation ultimately terminating in the soil
compaction, erosion and fertility loss of lands that end up as cattle ranches (Locher
1997). As Boulding noted regarding the illusion its image conveys, Uli Locher points out
that “the frontier is by definition not sustainable”; unlike even the current plantation
agro-industry, exploiting the forested frontier “resembles a short-lived mining
operation in that its resources (wood and topsoil) will inevitably become exhausted
over time” (ibid, 286, 290, emphasis added).
As seen by Locher, “Costa Rica has become a model of the process deplored by world
systems analysts,” with “the combination of foreign investment, soft state regulation,
and free migration” resulting in short-term advantages but longer-term costs for the
environment, the rural population, and eventually the country as a whole (ibid, 291).
However, given the thinking of some of the “Earth Systems” scientists (as well as
bioregionalists and other environmental philosophers) regarding an appropriate size
and scale for the basic social-ecological unit, the advantage may lie on the side of
smaller countries like Costa Rica rather than larger ones like the United States, if they
change “the image” they pursue. “Transformational change at smaller scales enables
resilience at larger scales,” write Folke et al. (2010, abstract), with “smaller, more
manageable SESs [social-ecological systems]”--if ecological resilience is fostered within
them--likely to “contribute to Earth System resilience.” “An effective architecture of a
governance system for planetary stewardship is likely to be polycentric and multi-level
rather than centralized and hierarchical,” theorize Steffen et al. (2011, 757); what this
might mean for nation-state behemoths whose economies are currently built up by
“maximizing GDP” around the increasing concentration of centralized military power is
left unexplored, but the trajectory supporting such flagrantly wasteful and
unsustainable SESs is clearly one to be reversed.
Costa Rica is not so big as to be democratically unwieldy, and its population growth
rate has been decreasing steadily over the past decade. Its subdivision into provinces,
cantons and districts allows for governance structures tailored appropriately to each
bioregion. Most ecological systems are sufficiently intact to be resilient as long as they
are not used as bargaining chips in the games humans play with money. If attention
can be directed toward the importance of a human population’s ability to support
itself on the land area that it inhabits—a highly desirable situation, given the
ontological subjectivity, and increasing untenability, of the global economic system
and hence the undesirability of material dependence upon it—then what was
historically a nation of relatively autonomous small farmers may wisely choose to
derive its “esteem” from things like performance on the soccer field rather than in
mindless competition for growth in abstractions like the GDP.
References
Barnosky, Anthony D., et al. 2012. “Approaching a State Shift in Earth’s Biosphere.”
Nature 486: 52-58.
Boulding, Kenneth E. 1956. The Image. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan.
1966. “The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth.” From Resources for the
Future, Inc., Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press. In Herman Daly, ed., Economics, Ecology, Ethics: Essays Toward a
Steady-State Economy. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1980, pgs. 253266.
Crutzen, Paul J. 2002. “Geology of Mankind: The Anthropocene.” Nature 415: 23.
Folke, Carl, et al. 2010. “Resilience Thinking: Integrating Resilience, Adaptability and
Transformability.” Ecology and Society 15(4): 20 [online].
Goulet, Denis. 1995. Development Ethics: A Guide to Theory and Practice. New York:
The Apex Press.
Locher, Uli. 1997. “Migration and the Costa Rican Environment Since 1900.” From
Anne Pebley and Luis Rosero-Bixby, eds., Demographic Diversity and Change in the
Central American Isthmus. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. In Palmer, Steven, and Ivan
Molina, eds., The Costa Rica Reader: History, Culture, Politics, 2004, pgs. 284-292.
Marquardt, Steve. 2002. “Pesticides and Parakeets in the Banana Industry.” Latin
American Research Review 37.2. In Palmer, Steven, and Ivan Molina, eds., The Costa
Rica Reader: History, Culture, Politics, 2004, pgs. 298-309.
Palmer, Steven, and Ivan Molina, eds. 2004. The Costa Rica Reader: History, Culture,
Politics.
Rice, Richard E., Raymond E. Gullison, and John W. Reid. “Can Sustainable
Management Save Tropical Forests?” Scientific American, April 1997, pgs. 44-49.
Rockstrom, Johan, et al. 2009. “A Safe Operating Space for Humanity.” Nature 461:
472-475.
Searle, John R. 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press.
. 2010. Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Steffen, Will, et al. 2011. “The Anthropocene: From Global Change to Planetary
Stewardship.” Ambio 40: 739-761.
Walker, B. H., et al. 2004. “Resilience, Adaptability, and Transformability in SocialEcological
Systems.
Ecology
and
Society
9(2):
5
[online]
URL:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol9/iss2/art5.
3.2 Ecotourism and social Justice in Costa Rica
(CE)
Room 341
Chair: Fred Gifford, Department of Philosophy, Michigan State University
Up Against the Wall: Ecotourism, Development, and Social Justice in Costa
Rica.
Yvonne A. Braun
Professor, Departments of Women’s and Gender Studies and International
Studies
University of Oregon, U.S.A
ybraun@uoregon.edu.
Michael C. Dreiling
Professor in the Department of Sociology
University of Oregon, U.S.A
dreiling@uoregon.edu
Matthew Eddy
Professor in the Department of Sociology
Minot State University, U.S.A
matthew.eddy@minotstateu.edu
David M. Dominguez,
Department of Sociology,selling
University of Oregon
Introduction
Nearly one-quarter of Costa Rica’s export earnings derive from an expanding tourist
sector, one that is increasingly diversified in a mix of tourist niches. Ecotourism is the
fastest growing of these niches, and its promises are featured in a range of sites and
practices, including the brochures of the largest multinational hospitality and hotel
corporations who promote a vision of sustainability that relies on expanding
consumption of “environmental” amenities through profit driven global corporations.
The marketing of eco-tourism appeals to a sentiment among some higher income
tourists to lighten their ecological footprint while vacationing in the tropics. While a
considerable literature identifies the ecological costs associated with the corporateconsumer model of ecotourism, less attention addresses the impacts on the social
fabric and lived experiences of communities that sustain these eco-resorts. Our
approach introduces a lens of social justice to raise questions about the often separate
dimensions of social equity and sustainable development that are typically implied in
the term ecotourism.
Our study briefly explores the historical evolution of tourist development in Costa Rica,
specifically large-scale coastal development, as a means for national development.
Amid pressures to attract foreign direct investment in a neoliberal era, Costa Rica has
struggled to maintain its modern approach to developmentalism that includes a strong
sense of social welfare, environmental protection, and public goods, including a high
standard for coastal preservation and public access to coastlines. The imperative to
attract FDI and foreign exchange reserves converged with Costa Rica’s conservation
agenda to promote investment in ecotourism, generating a robust tourist economy
including the kind of large-scale tourism development - a corporate owned eco-reserve
resort - we explore in the Guanacaste region.
We argue Costa Rica’s simultaneous protection of coastlines and public access and the
promotion of large-scale private investment by global real estate and hospitality
industries exposes contradictory ethical paradigms of developmentalism, one rooted in
the principle of inclusion and the other in exclusion. The physical manifestation of the
intersection of these two agendas is the wall of the resort on the public beach. We
highlight these contradictions in two events – one ordinary, the other extraordinary –
that happened at the same location – where the wall of the private eco-reserve meets
the public beach – in order to raise questions about development, ethics, and
inclusion.
Literature Review
Stem et al. (2003, 323) suggest ecotourism is capable of delivering a wide range of
social and economic benefits. Locally, ecotourism can provide benefits in the form of
employment opportunities, improved infrastructure to local community, and increased
business and revenue for local stores “while also maintaining ecological resource
integrity through low-impact non-consumptive resource use.” In addition to these
benefits, ecotourism can also indirectly facilitate participation in local markets and
other businesses. Ecotourism can also financially support protected areas through
revenue generated from park entrance fees (Koens, Dieperink, and Miranda 2009;
Stem et al. 2003) as well as build environmental awareness (Horton 2009).
However, high rates of “leakage” prevent a large portion of revenue generated from
ecotourism to reach local communities (Simpson 2009; Stem et al. 2003). In addition,
the influx of tourists can lead to a disintegration of cultural and social ties within
families and the community (Duffy 2002; Koens, Dieperink, and Miranda 2009; Stem et
al. 2003). Successful ecotourism can also negatively impact the local environment with
increases in solid waste, disturbances to natural habitats, and trail erosion (Stem, et al.
2003) as well as sewage issues (Koens, Dieperink, and Miranda 2009). Increases in
tourists can also impact the wildlife within ecotourism sites (Duffy 2002). In addition,
Horton (2009) challenges the assertion that ecotourism can possibly provide economic
benefits to local communities while promoting environmental conservation. Instead,
Horton (2009, 104) suggests ecotourism reproduces “preexisting patterns of
stratification,” perpetuating “historical economic inequalities and further
disempower[ing] local peoples.” Duffy contends negative impacts such as these can
lead to an overall decline in the quality of the tourist experience.
Despite many of the structural issues associated with ecotourism, the idea of it as a
development strategy has generated tremendous excitement throughout Latin
America over the last two decades (Roberts and Thanos 2003). Costa Rica has become
the poster child for ecotourism and sustainable development in Latin America (Honey
2008). This can be attributed to what many consider as a highly successful experience
of increased tourism to Costa Rica since the late 1980s. The strategy was so successful,
in fact, that ecotourism is now the greatest source of foreign capital in Costa Rica,
surpassing traditional exports like coffee in 1990 and bananas in 1993 (Honey 2008;
Iveniuk 2006; Minca and Linda 2000). But when success is measured in terms of
economic exchange, relationships of environmental and social exploitation are often
de-emphasized or simply overlooked.
Defining Ecotourism
There has been considerable debate as to how to properly define “ecotourism” (Duffy
2002; Gould and Lewis 2009; Honey 1999; Simpson 2009). Gould and Lewis (2009)
argue the term “ecotourism” is a contested label based on how the definitional
requirements are operationalized. Hector Lascurian, one of the earliest ecotourism
experts, argued ecotourism is not simply a niche market in the global economy but
rather a set of principles engaged in by the tourists themselves. In this sense, lowimpact travel to San Francisco would transform tourists into environmentalists based
on their responsible interaction with the environment (Honey 2003).
Simpson (2009) argues, however, that the term changed from its original definition to
more contemporary versions. Honey (1999) proposed a seven-point framework
outlining the necessary conditions for ecotourism, which went further to include a
cultural component. Simpson (2009) also raises questions of sustainability about an
ecotourism initiative if the conditions that Honey proposes cannot be met. Today, The
International Ecotourism Society (TIES) broadly defines ecotourism as “responsible
travel to natural areas that conserves the environment and sustains the well-being of
the local people” (Koens, Dieperink and Miranda 2009, 1225), or what we call
sustainable development and social equity.
Ecotourism is framed as a form of low-impact travel, greener and more sustainable
than other forms of mass tourism (Weaver 2001). For Weaver, ecotourism is really a
variant of mass tourism. While the label of ecotourism places “this form of tourism in
an ideological niche” with an identity that stands in “conscious opposition to mass
tourism,” the similarities between the two are really quite close. Weaver (2001, 107)
identifies the characteristics of mass tourism as “large-scale, externally controlled, high
leakage, and concentrated in high-density tourist [areas]” and claims ecotourism can
be traced within this same frame. He conceptualizes ecotourism along a spectrum
from “soft” to “hard” with most ecotourism being “soft.” He argues “hard” ecotourism
is extremely rare and involves “small number[s] of environmentally aware participants
who embark on relatively long specialized trips” with expectations of few, if any,
amenities or services. He argues these ecotourists actively engage with the natural
environment in a form of “enhancement sustainability,” meaning they intend to
improve the condition of the environment through volunteer work. “Soft” ecotourism,
on the other hand, involves larger numbers of ecotourists who take short trips as part
of larger, multi-purpose trips. These ecotourists expect services and amenities and rely
on interpretation (from guides) as an engagement process with the environment. This
is a more passive approach, what Weaver calls “steady-state sustainability,” meaning
“leaving an area in the same condition as when they arrived” (2001, 106).
Weaver concludes most ecotourism is engaged in a “soft” manner and often looks very
similar, if not identical, to mass tourism. Honey (2008, 32), despite her overwhelming
support of the industry, echoes this sentiment, asserting “real ecotourism is indeed
rare and usually imperfect.” Duffy (2002, 46) suggests most ecotourists replicate the
same problems they are supposed to replace, concluding, “just like mass tourists,
[ecotourists] are motivated by self-indulgence; for them, their travel acts as a marker
of social position, which separates them from conventional tourists.” Weaver (2001,
110) suggests a sort of symbiotic relationship exists between “soft” ecotourism and
mass tourism in that each benefits from the other, as “mass tourism indirectly
supports protected areas, through the revenues generated from mass tourists’
engaging in soft ecotourism.”
In addition to leaving a small ecological footprint on the destination, an integral part of
ecotourism is respecting the local population’s customs and practices and benefitting
local communities, what we call social equity. The notion of high-value ecotourism,
versus high-volume, suggests that scale can matter (CREST 2014). High-volume is
similar to mass tourism in its orientation towards facilitating a large number of tourist
experiences, with little emphasis on engagement or connection with local communities
and people. High-value, by contrast, is marked by activities or experiences that engage
tourists with local people or communities in ways that facilitate engagement or
learning, and allow local communities to accrue the benefits of tourist development.
For our purposes, we view tourism as encompassing a range of practices, some of
which might be understood as constituting conventional, consumer-based, highvolume, high-value, and/or eco-friendly tourism. As the above review makes clear,
there is no one defining threshold for “ecotourism,” yet the term clearly is meant to
signal attention to the consequences for the environment, broadly conceived, and to
the well-being of local people. We suggest that it is this latter point – dimensions of
social equity and justice – that are likely to be least prioritized across all the forms of
tourist development. Further, as the appeal of being “green” grows for both tourists
and tourist companies, the range of activities and types of development considered
ecotourism also grows. As multinational corporations increasingly market luxury, allinclusive large-scale chain resorts as ecofriendly, what some might call greenwashing,
ecotourism blurs with mass tourism in ways that raise questions about the role of local
communities in tourist development, and particularly ecotourism, and who benefits.
Communities and Ecotourism
The literature on local communities generally reflects the conclusion that local
involvement in decision-making is a necessary component for “successful” ecotourism
initiatives, with the needs and interests of local communities being addressed (Van
Tassell and Daniel 2006). However, Roberts and Thanos (2003, 83) contend “local
people continue to feel excluded from key decisions regarding protected areas in
Central America” and “are often among the last to be consulted about new protection
initiatives” in particular. Indeed, Honey (2008, 98) notes that tens of millions of
indigenous peoples have been forcibly expelled from their lands in the process of
making protected zones, effectively creating “conservation refugees”. She contends
these people “are largely invisible [and] often live in squalid conditions around
protected areas.” This practice devalues the input and lives of indigenous communities
that, in fact, may have maintained the forests as a component of their subsistence and
survival for generations. Particularly when protected zones are also sites of tourist
development designed for generating revenue, power and inequality – globally and
locally – may shape these dynamics and practices in contradictory ways.
Even where local communities may play a small role in the decision-making, Honey
(2008) argues most indigenous peoples maintain a “comparative disadvantage” when
dealing with national governments and international capital and large ecotourism
companies too often package “local people as smiling and welcoming faces for
international visitors,” ultimately serving the interests of local and global elites (Duffy
2002, 103). Due to the power and influence of foreign investment, indigenous and
non-elite local peoples are largely absent in early stages of decision-making related to
tourist or ecotourist development, and over time their labor value is extracted as they
are virtually transformed from “dignified loggers and fisherman … into busboys”
(Homero Aridjis, as quoted in Roberts and Thanos, 86).
For many of these reasons, Campbell (1999) argues that more inclusive participation
and decision-making of communities only addresses part of the challenges of building
successful, socially just ecotourism. She suggests governmental oversight and
regulation is also required if real benefits are going to be absorbed into local
communities investing in ecotourism. This suggests that any benefits to the local
community stemming from ecotourism (alternative tourism) will be limited, at best, “in
the absence of formalized planning and intervention.”
As private investment interests fund most tourist and ecotourist development, and as
these increasingly are large-scale and foreign owned, national and regional
governments are challenged to oversee and ensure that local communities are
benefiting from these activities. In order to make ecotourism a more sustainable
development strategy, Honey (2008), echoing Campbell (1999), argues regulations are
imperative to enable local communities to get footing before transnational giants
come in and eliminate existing local enterprises. The commitments of governments,
and elites more generally, to this approach is further complicated by the increased
pressures on less developed countries to generate foreign direct investment and
foreign exchange, and to comply with the terms of trade prioritized by dominant elites
under neoliberal globalization. We now turn to Costa Rica, to explore how this small
Central American country has grappled with the challenges of tourism as a national
development strategy and to consider some of the ethical questions about
development that our case reveals.
Costa Rica: Background and Development Ideals
Costa Rica is often described as a nation having the “happiest people on Earth,” who
enjoy a longer life expectancy than many people in developed countries, and are
lauded for progressive environmental protections and labor practices – all while having
no national military since 1948. In fact, the choice to demilitarize was justified for the
potential benefits that would result from investing in social goods rather than in
militarization. While by no means perfect, how a middle-income country like Costa
Rica achieves such high levels of social and environmental wellbeing offers a powerful
narrative for engaging critical development studies. At the same time, Costa Rica’s
challenges reveal important dimensions of the struggle to develop ethically – to
prioritize the social, economic, and environmental wellbeing of people – in an era
dominated by neoliberal globalization. We first present a brief history of Costa Rica’s
social welfare approach to development and then move on to discuss our case,
ecotourism in Guanacaste, highlighting how exploring ecotourism in Costa Rica
illuminates the ethical tensions of tourism as a strategy for economic, environmental,
and social development.
A review of Costa Rica’s modern history suggests there are longstanding tensions
about national economic and social development and its levels of engagement with
external powers (such as the United States and multinational corporations). Post WWII
events particularly created increased pressures on less developed countries to “open”
to foreign direct investment and expand export markets as a means towards
modernization and economic development. This also created opportunities for new
leaders in Costa Rican politics to emerge, leaders who spoke passionately about
prioritizing the wellbeing of Costa Rican people over the economic interests of
foreigners. The leading figure of modern Costa Rican politics, Jose Figueres, argued in
an essay in New Leader (1953), “Foreign ownership of a large segment of a country’s
economy or territory constitutes ‘economic occupation.’ This is no wild fancy. I know. I
am a citizen of a ‘banana republic.’”
Such positions, often reductionistically labeled “nationalism,” were then, and remain
now, extremely controversial in the eyes of U.S. elites, in particular. During the Cold
War, in Costa Rica and the rest of the developing world, it was often unclear what U.S.
elites feared more, Communism or forms of “nationalism” or democratic socialism
which might hurt U.S. corporate investments abroad (Longley 1997; Klein 2007, 570).
In this sense, Costa Rican exceptionalism today includes its track record in maintaining
many public agencies and nationalized industries (at least partially resisting or forcing
compromises with the neoliberal privatization agendas of domestic and foreign elites)
without jeopardizing its close ties with the U.S. In short, Costa Rica has been one of the
slowest nations in Latin America to privatize its public sectors and to liberalize its
economy (Chamberlain 2007, Clark 2011).
As President, Figueres challenged power relations between foreign powers and his
government, perhaps best illustrated in his re-negotiation of a United Fruit Company
(UFCO) contract to better benefit Costa Rican workers and Costa Rica. This unusual
feat in Latin America was only made possible by an extremely deft balancing act of
accommodation and resistance to U.S. hegemony, mixed with impeccable anticommunist credentials, a history of democratic stability and cordial relations with the
U.S. (Longley 1997). During the period of UFCO contract re-negotiations Figueres
argued, “We did not try to kill the goose which lays the golden eggs, rather we say to it
that she laid them here in our nest” (Figueres-Ferrer 131). More broadly, Figueres’
leadership represented two important attributes of modern Costa Rican governance:
first, it was a pushing back against the development agenda of Western elites, who
tended to neglect and reproduce structures of dominance while blaming culture – in
this case Costa Rican culture – for poverty and underdevelopment (see Longley 1997,
167-168). Second, it signaled the rise of a particular developmentalist approach in
Costa Rica that would engage and accommodate powerful global interests to a point,
but would simultaneously chart a path to domestically invest in building a strong social
democratic state, including dissolving the military to do so.
Since the 1940s, Costa Rica has embraced a social welfare state model and adopted
incremental reforms over the years which, compared to other nations in the region,
have prioritized the well-being of the poor and the middle class, while protecting the
environment as a public good. Early in his political career, Costa Rican President Oscar
Arias exemplified this approach as he said, “Development cannot be neutral. We are
committed to the poor.”
In many ways, these efforts have been successful: in policy, all Costa Ricans have rights
to universal education and healthcare, resulting in the lowest infant mortality rate and
highest average life expectancy (78.5 years) in Latin America, and indeed, a life
expectancy greater than some developed countries such as the U.S. Further, according
to Gallup’s World Poll, Costa Ricans remain among the happiest people on earth, even
greater than Denmark or Sweden. Remarkably they achieve this with a quarter of the
resources and income of their Scandinavian counterparts. Over one-quarter of the
country is protected in national parks and about 80% of their energy comes from the
renewable resource of hydroelectricity (Kane 2014). A remarkably high percentage of
food exports are fair trade and organic certified. While not without problems, the
social safety net policies and programs generally have enabled greater access to
education and healthcare and created the foundation for a stable social democracy
with progressive environmental and labor policies.
And yet, the hegemony of neoliberal globalization has not left contemporary Costa
Rica untouched. Leaders, such as Arias, have grappled with balancing national social
development efforts amidst external pressures to increasingly liberalize the economy
and state institutions.
“The country's post World War II development model -- emphasizing food selfsufficiency, financial and technical support to small and medium-size farmers, importsubstitution industries and trade with other Central American countries -- led to a
steady rise in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and a relatively equitable distribution
of income. However, an overreliance on the export of coffee yielded an economic crisis
when coffee and other commodity prices fell and oil prices rose in the 1970s” (HansenKuhn 1993).
At the time, Hansen-Kuhn notes that Costa Rica had one of the highest levels of debt
per capita in the world, with debt-service payments to commercial banks taking up
60% of export earnings (1993). This forced a crisis for the government who was
committed to its system of social and civil services with limited and declining revenues.
After suspending debt payments and losing access to commercial loans, Costa Rica
became the first country in Central America to undergo a period of structural
adjustments beginning in the early 1980s.
Adjustments throughout the 1980s involved the implementation of typical austerity
measures and the promotion of tourism and non-traditional agricultural and industrial
exports through subsidies and reduced duties and taxes. These generally reduced
governmental revenue, putting increased pressure on existing social services and
programs, while opening up Costa Rica’s economy for increased foreign investment
and intervention. This early effect of the debt crisis removed Costa Rica’s social
democratic elite from development decisions and began to place greater development
authority in transnational market and financial institutions. This was also exemplified
in the small but significant debt for nature swaps in which Costa Rica was an early
participant.
Under the strong influence of large international banks, as well as the effects of
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) under the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Bank, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the debt crisis
entrenched an export oriented development agenda that included tourism as a key
alternative to generate export earnings outside of agriculture and coffee. Together,
the early initiatives to preserve the tropical biodiversity in Costa Rica, alongside the
efforts to diversify export earnings though tourism, set Costa Rica’s path to become
both an innovator and a pawn in the global ecotourism market in the decades that
follow.
The Tourism Sector
During this period of export-oriented structural adjustment, tourism became a
prioritized avenue in which to generate revenue through foreign direct investment and
foreign exchange. Foreign tourism began to grow rapidly in 1985 and by 1999 Costa
Rica had one million visitors annually. Just 5 years later, in 2004, almost 1.5 million
tourists generated $1.3 billion in revenue, or 7% of gross domestic product (GDP)
(Molina and Palmer 2007, 159). Costa Rica hosted over 2.3 million international visitors
in 2012, outpacing most of its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors (World Bank).
A recent survey of 23,000 international travelers from 26 countries ranked Costa Rica
as the #1 most recommended travel destination in the world (Dyer 2014).
At the same time, neoliberal policies, exacerbating inequality around the world, have
made high-end tourism very lucrative. In fact, revenues for luxury hotels (charging an
average of $405 a night for a room) grew 70% worldwide between 2001 and 2005
(Klein 2007, 496). These trends set the stage for the type of investments many
multinational corporations have sought in Costa Rica.
Tourism as a strategy for development involved creating a business friendly
environment in which to increase foreign direct investment into the sector. Costa
Rica’s peaceful, relatively stable society offered a comparative advantage regionally in
which to foster the growth of both foreign visitors and investment. As former
President Oscar Arias said during the 1980s, “peace is essential. If you want to increase
investment, both national as well as foreign, without peace no one is going to invest. If
you want to bring tourism, who is going to come to a country where there is a civil
war?” (Richards 1988) In early 2014, Costa Rica ranked #1 in a Regional Security Index
as the safest country for foreign travelers as well as the safest country for business
investments in all of Latin America (FTI 2014).
The efforts to build a robust tourist sector dovetailed with new and prior initiatives to
preserve the unique biodiversity and beauty of Costa Rica (as in the debt-for-nature
swaps). Amidst rising concerns about deforestation and pressures to grow the
economy in the 1980s and 1990s, Costa Rica developed a national park system and
created coastline protections that could both preserve public environmental goods
and access, and generate tourist revenue. Rather than see tourism and
environmentalism as conflicting endeavors, Costa Rica embraced the development of a
niche market of ecotourism that had the potential to link tourism and economic
development with the country’s existing strengths - stability, environmental beauty
and ideals, and comfort – while maintaining its inclusive ideals and practices in regards
to public goods.
Ecotourism mushroomed as tourists – mostly from higher income countries – sought
to lighten their ecological footprint while vacationing and as national policies
encouraged more eco-friendly development and practices (including green
certification systems and preservation codes). As we discuss above, ecotourism is a
concept used to describe a wide range of practices and philosophies in Costa Rica. In
general, ecotourism suggests some attention to the prevention of or minimization of
the effects of consumer-based tourism on the environment. Critics argue that what
counts as ecotourism – as opposed to conventional tourism – has widened over time
as more hospitality industry stakeholders seek to be associated with a green image
that has market appeal but little substance, while tourists desire the image of being
green without sacrificing any comforts.
Over time, as tourism generally grew, it became an integral part of Costa Rica’s
economic development strategy. The foreign exchange and investment that it brought
created more pressure to increasingly expand the sector in the 2000s, challenging
other, longstanding priorities such as maintaining inclusive public access to coastlines
and pushing back on unfair trade relationships. The controversial effects of these
pressures can be seen at the national and regional levels. For example, after winning
re-election in 2006, Arias strongly pushed for the Central American Free Trade Act
(CAFTA), helping to ensure its passage in a bitterly divisive national referendum
campaign in 2007. Similarly, tax breaks and exceptions for multinational corporations
building tourist infrastructure in the Guanacaste region – despite tax laws and policies
that protect public goods – have reduced revenues to fund the social welfare programs
at the heart of Costa Rican developmentalism. This occurs at the very time when the
effects of neoliberal globalization locally – such as the decrease in real wages
accompanied by rising costs – create greater need for these social services.
Recent happenings have eroded the inclusive intentions of tourist development as a
national development strategy for Costa Rica. Developments in Guanacaste
particularly reveal the contradictions of contemporary consumer-corporate tourism
more generally.
Development in Guanacaste, Costa Rica
Guanacaste Province, one of six in Costa Rica, is located in the northwest, Pacific
region and contains some of the most beautiful and desirable coastlines in the country.
The weather in Guanacaste is generally drier, with more average days of sun per year
than any other region. Tourism as a national development strategy finds form in
Guanacaste as the region is heavily marketed as a sun and sand style vacation place in
the tropics.
As tourism to Costa Rica has increased over the last two decades, Guanacaste has
shifted from a ranch and agricultural economy to one highly developed for
international tourism, particularly its coastal zone. In particular, “coastal tourism in
recent years has grown largely on the model of the all-inclusive resort,” evidenced by
the over 100 four and five-star all-inclusive branded resorts (The Center for
Responsible Travel [CREST] 2014, 8). The Center for Responsible Travel suggests that
this particular form of recent tourist development in Guanacaste is significant as
“resort tourism is heavily dependent on the North American market for investors,
developers, and consumers” (CREST 2010, 53).
All-inclusive branded resorts tend to be large-scale and high-volume with a focus on
providing luxury accommodations and services, including spa treatments, on-site golf
courses, and gourmet meals and alcohol, and are very expensive. These target higher
income foreign tourists, as most local people cannot afford all-inclusive resorts.
Indeed, rising costs have made Guanacaste inaccessible for most Costa Rican tourists
(CREST 2014, 76).
These developments are not without controversy, as reflected in an interview with
Mariano Figueres, one of Jose Figueres’ sons and Director of Intelligence Services
under President Luis Solis. Figueres locates these specific kinds of development as
resulting from imbalanced trade arrangements and globalization (Eddy and Dreiling
2012):
“And now globalization and the free trade agreement bombard us with 5 star hotels.
From multinational companies, where Costa Ricans cannot add any value at all at the
beaches or at the mountains. They come in with all-included packages, so the locals
can’t see any benefit of all, and on top of that, these hotel chains come in and do
whatever they want, they have no measure in corrupting whoever they have to
corrupt, buying whoever they have to buy, to get the permissions to destroy our
nature, which makes future tourism absolutely unsustainable. Our tourism shouldn’t
be 5 star hotels.”
Figueres, and critics like him, see these changes as an enormous threat to the Costa
Rican middle class that has both reflected and constituted the foundation of the
country’s economic and social development. To their point, despite the widely
repeated national sense of Costa Rica as a middle class society, inequality has been on
the rise for many years. In 2011, 22% of Costa Ricans lived in poverty and 6.3% of
households lived in “extreme poverty,” with trends in Guanacaste closely resembling
these national trends (CREST 2014, 9). While poverty has generally decreased
nationally over the last decade, “the gap between rich and poor in Costa Rica is the
highest it has been in more than two decades” with the country ranking 100 out of 126
countries on the UNDP’s Income Inequality Index, suggesting it is one of the most
unequal countries in the world (CREST 2014, 8). Moreover, recent findings reveal that
Guanacaste Province “….has the highest level of unemployment in the country, thus
raising further doubts that large, all-inclusive branded resorts are generating
sustainable livelihoods” (CREST 2014, 8).
Indeed, as tourist development has skyrocketed, issues of social equity and
sustainability have largely been sidelined. Two events in the summer of 2012 brought
some of these contradictions of recent tourist development to the fore, as two of the
authors visited the Guanacaste region, staying in the small fishing town of Brasilito.
These two events – one ordinary, the other extraordinary – pushed us to consider the
social dynamics of a large-scale eco-tourist real estate and vacation development on
surrounding communities, many of whom serve this major eco-resort with their labor,
merchandise, or services.
Brasilito is a small fishing town that sits between two major, albeit different, tourist
developments at Playa Conchal and Playa Flamingo. South of Brasilito is a large-scale,
corporate eco-reserve development that includes an all-inclusive, five-star hotel and
golf course, along with real estate properties within the reserve that lies proximate to
Playa Conchal. North of Brasilito is Playa Flamingo, where a series of higher end tourist
hotels largely cater to North American tourists (interview with Luis). The curve of the
coastline and its rock cliffs separate Playa Brasilito from Playa Flamingo, such that
neither are in view of each other or easily accessible by foot or ATV. This adds to a
sense of Playa Flamingo being “over there,” or out of reach from Brasilito.
In contrast, Playa Conchal is approximately one mile south of Brasilito and easily
accessible via stretches of dirt and sand. The corporate owned eco-reserve, Reserva
Conchal, and eco-resort hotel, specifically, jut up against this beach, making their site
as proximate to the coastline as possible. Costa Rican laws protecting coastlines have
prevented developments such as these from building right on the beach, in part to
preserve their environmental integrity and to protect inclusive public access. That
being said, the resort has built a concrete wall along its perimeter to the beach, with a
guarded entry point to the reserve and beach. The eco-resort clearly benefits from
providing their high-end tourists privileged access to the beach, considered one of the
most beautiful in Costa Rica.
Tourists step out of the reserve onto the white sand beach, met with a sign warning
them that they are now out of the eco-reserve and all interactions with local vendors
are at their own risk:
Please be advised that the local vendors located on the public beach in front of our
resort are not associated in any way to Reserva Conchal. We cannot guarantee or
assure you on the legality, authenticity, genuineness or honesty of any of these
merchants and any and all interactions with them are at your sole risk. Bear in mind
that several of these merchants misrepresent themselves as resort agents and they, in
general terms, lack insurance coverage, legal representation, and/or proper
government permits for their activities.
The simultaneous protection of coastlines and public access and the promotion of
large-scale private investment by global real estate and hospitality industries exposes
contradictory ethical paradigms, one rooted in the principle of inclusion and the other
in exclusion. The physical manifestation of the intersection of these two agendas is the
wall of the resort on the public beach. We highlight these contradictions in two events
– one ordinary, the other extraordinary – that happened at the same location – where
the wall of the private eco-reserve meets the public beach – in order to raise questions
about development, ethics, and inclusion.
The first event is an exploration of the daily movement of people and money from the
local town of Brasilito to the eco-resort. Each day dozens of ATVs, horses, and people
on foot pulling wagons, carrying jewelry, food, massage tables, and other goods,
migrate over one mile along the public beach to the walls of the eco-resort. Mid-way,
select entrepreneurs broker encounters between tourists and a variety of sellers of
services, tours, and goods.
The eco-resort becomes a major focal point of economic activity, even if the sellers’
presence is only tolerated at the margins of the physical boundary of the resort. The
people from the village selling goods must migrate to this wall, but not beyond it, with
the hopes of an economic exchange. As most economic activity associated with the
tourists at this resort occurs within its walls, not in the neighboring community of
Brasilito, brokers try to draw out and negotiate economic interactions at the edge of
the resort as tourists cross onto the public beach. In this way, ordinary people try to
gain access to monies and opportunities associated with economic development
projects, such as the resort, that are built in ways to exclude them.
In the second event, the 7.6 earthquake that shook Costa Rica in August 2012 also
exposed a rift between public and private spaces on the pristine coastline. In the
context of this natural disaster, dozens of local merchants – who, as noted above,
routinely trek over a mile on the public beach to access the private beach entrance to
the eco-resort to sell their wares and services – were shaken violently by the temblor.
One informant reported wondering, amidst the panic, would the resort guards let him
and others cross the wall into the resort to gain shelter? Ultimately, this incident
reveals how the private development of public resources creates lived contradictions
and borders that create and reinforce social exclusions (even in times of crisis). The
private development of an exclusive eco-resort, while creating a market for private
wares and services on a public beach, also walls in the high-income tourists from the
social lives of those who live in the community.
The all-inclusive resort is premised on being the exclusive seller of services, similar to a
“cruise ship” model (CREST 2014) whereby all products are packaged, managed, and
sold within the tourist site in order to control the tourist experience and, of course, to
capture the resulting profits. Creating skepticism and fear about what lies outside the
resort – such as the warning sign at the gated entry to the beach – further entrenches
notions of exclusivity and difference in order to promote economic benefits for
corporate owners. These notions tragically spill over, however, into other dimensions
of social experience as evidenced by the earthquake incident. Amidst a crisis, even a
basic need such as shelter becomes reserved for those eligible through their economic
relation to the resort as purchaser or provider of resort services.
Conclusion
Tourism, proposed as a path towards greater economic development nationally, may
actually contribute to contradictory conditions locally. In briefly juxtaposing a
corporate branded eco-reserve and eco-tourist complex with the proximate smallscale, local Costa Rican coastal village, we seek to clarify their intertwined, yet
divergent, experiences in the wake of contemporary strategies for regional socio-
economic development in Guanacaste and Costa Rica more generally. Amid pressures
to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in a neoliberal era, Costa Rica has struggled
to maintain a high standard for coastal preservation and public access to coastlines.
The imperative to attract FDI and foreign exchange reserves converged with Costa
Rica’s conservation agenda to promote investment in ecotourism as a national
development strategy, generating, among other kinds of tourism, the kind of largescale tourism development in these communities.
Multinational corporations, seeking exclusive access to pristine beaches or biodiverse
tropics to build lucrative foreign markets, take advantage of opportunities to develop
and expand within developing countries. As promoting green practices and protecting
environmental resources are integrated into Costa Rica’s national development plans
and prove profitable, industry elite seek to align with ecotourism. Despite the success
of ecotourism more generally, or perhaps because of it, within this context
multinational corporations can “greenwash” their tourist development activities with
sophisticated marketing strategies, blurring the differences between ecotourism and
mass tourism.
State facilitated tourist development simultaneously initiates a process of reorganizing
resources in these coastal areas despite policies and laws that serve to protect
inclusive access to coastlines and beaches. When tourist development centers around
the high-volume, all-inclusive resort, it further ends up entrenching the reorganization
of land and resources in the area toward the interests of capital and foreign elite, as it
privileges the use of these spaces and resources to provide expensive, exclusive luxury
vacations for foreign tourists over other local, inclusive uses.
Eco-tourism is marketed as sustainable or different from the mainstream tourist
model, and in some ways, there can be real and important differences. But, as the
literature shows, there is enormous variation as to what constitutes sustainable
practices or even ecotourism, and the distribution of the burdens and benefits of
ecotourist development, like much of sustainable development, has not been
equitable. While the real profits of tourist development – eco-friendly or otherwise –
are accumulated by corporate developers, the real access to the benefits of
development (in contrast to the benefits of beach access) is mediated by private
investments that draw exclusionary boundaries, both real and symbolic, as
demonstrated in our two events at the resort wall in Guanacaste. Conservation laws
and principles of public access around coastal beaches, so central to Costa Rican
developmentalism, offered a certain social democratic promise. Yet these protections
belie the contradictions within strategies of green economic development, such as
high-volume ecotourism, that allow both Costa Rican and foreign industry elite to
exploit that promise by failing to prioritize questions of privilege, access, and equity.
Indeed, as described by a recent CREST (2014) study, another more sustainable model
of development co-exists on the fringes of this zone. The Nosara and Sámara coastal
communities have
“…managed to chart a different course, based on smaller scale, experiential tourism.
This is high value – rather than high volume – tourism, which strives to hire and
purchase locally, create authentic links to the local destination and surrounding natural
and cultural attractions, and ensure that tourism dollars stay in and benefit the host
community” (CREST 2014, 8).
Mariano Figueres echoes this vision of more sustainable and equitable tourist
development as rooted in the community and traditions of Costa Rica (Eddy and
Dreiling 2012):
“It should be the little Costa Rican lodge, the Costa Rican family, the co-operativa,
cooperative, you know, and the towns around that adding value and selling services
and showing the real country.”
As Honey (2008) notes, national and regional authorities in Guanacaste have the
opportunity to make good on this promise through regulations that structure tourist
development more ethically by limiting the interests of foreign capital and prioritizing
social equity locally. Such state facilitated tourism development could address the
needs of and provide benefits to local communities, making good on the promise of
ecotourist development as part of the national social democratic tradition of Costa
Rican developmentalism.
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doi:
Vulnerable due to hope: Aspiration paradox as a cross-cultural concern.
Eric Palmer
Professor, Department of Philosophy
Allegheny College.
epalmer@allegheny.edu
Vulnerable due to hope: aspiration paradox as a cross-cultural concern
Abstract: Vulnerability concerns sensitivity to shock, or the inability of an individual to
rally in the face of setbacks. It pertains, in its most familiar use, to health, to healthrelated emergencies (such as epidemics) and to health-related social and
environmental conditions (such as famines and climate change). This presentation
considers economic vulnerability, exploring the risk of deprivation of necessary
resources due to a complex and rarely discussed vulnerability that arises from hope.
Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological account of French petit-bourgeois aspiration in The Social
Structures of the Economy has recently inspired Wendy Olsen to introduce the term
“aspiration paradox” to characterize cases wherein “a borrower's status aspirations
may contribute to a situation in which their borrowings exceed their capacity to repay,”
leaving the individual much the worse, due to an aspiration to betterment.
The overextended homebuyer, the family that takes vacations on credit, and the
entrepreneur who strives, fails, and falls back into worse circumstances are three
examples of failed aspiration noted in Bourdieu’s observations of the French middle
class. Olsen extends Bourdieu’s discussion to a detailed case study among poor women
of rural India, displaying the significant hazards that accompany “cow loans,” which are
loans for livestock that may or may not lead to improvement in women’s self-esteem,
status, financial position and financial stability. For this presentation I add two of my
own cases to the survey of aspirational vulnerability: vulnerability that attends
microcredit lending generally, most notably in India, and vulnerability in the context of
payday loans and credit cards, particularly in USA. If such financial opportunities were
not made available to these people – if some were denied loans due to a careful
assessment of their vulnerability – would they be better off? We should seriously
consider that they might be.
Addressing the paradox of aspiration for just social planning and for just development
may require us, first, to distinguish factors within an analysis of aspiration. The
antecedent attractions of aspiration are distinguishable from the advantages that
come as a result of aspiration, and we may also consider the risks (the vulnerability)
that attend the latter. To accompany this analysis, second, we must consider
separately the place of individual self-determination within just social arrangements, in
cases in which self-determination leads to poor outcomes. Familiar philosophical
discussions of adaptive preference touch on related concerns regarding the relation of
individuals’ agency to other aspects of their flourishing.
I will hazard the straightforwardly paternalistic suggestion that limiting access to
lending to those who are vulnerable to their aspirations can be a just policy. Because
aspiration paradox is a cross-cultural phenomenon, and because lending frequently
involves asymmetries in mathematical education between borrowers and lenders, I
hope to elude at least some of the charges of colonialism that have gained a stronger
purchase on adaptive preference arguments.
0. Introduction
My focus is vulnerability, which concerns “individual susceptibility,” 130 insecurity,
sensitivity to shock, or the inability of an individual to rally in the face of setbacks. It
pertains, in its most familiar use, to health, to health-related emergencies (such as
epidemics) and to health-related social and environmental conditions (such as famines
130
“Individual susceptibility is diversity in responsiveness among individuals to occupational and
environmental exposures. It makes it difficult to determine actual risks, particularly at the low levels to
which most people are exposed. The individual susceptibility is largely deter- mined by genetic factors,
which are very complex in nature. For example the toxicity of a number environmental and workplace
chemicals is determined by a complicated balance of its toxicity and metabolic biotransformation. These
processes are largely influenced by individual genetic factors, which are crucial in indi- vidual
susceptibility. So, effects of exposure to a certain chemical are related to its toxic effects, intensity of
exposure and individual susceptibility.” Encyclopedia of public health, Springer, 2008.
and climate change). I take its opposite to be resilience: a concept that may differ from
robustness, or stability.
Vulnerability is a much-used term in health care and in social studies of development.
But it is only lightly used in philosophy; its use is nevertheless on the rise. It was
perhaps introduced into late 20th century development ethics by Denis Goulet, within
part of an interesting and radical theory of human development, but I think its rise is
more clearly traced to broader philosophical currents in ethics. It has found its way
into current discussion through the ethic of care; and in Judith Butler’s term
“precarity,” which might be taken as a synonym of vulnerability. Today, alas, I don’t
have the time available to visit these theorists much further: this presentation won’t
be a thick accounting of vulnerability.
My broadest reason for focusing upon vulnerability – a claim that I also won’t
articulate further today – is that consideration of the concept might promote different
intuitions that the terms used more frequently in egalitarian and Kantian ethical theory
cannot. I suggest that vulnerability is a particular, ethically salient marker of what
Thomas Nagel calls “the distinction between persons”: it characterizes a feature of
differences between persons (or, of persons in transient states...) that we would wish
to take account of, one that is distinct from equality of persons and respect of persons.
We need to take account of what people need, and this is different from treating them
equally. Vulnerability presents one important aspect of need that requires attention in
ethics.
Arguing such a claim would exceed the short time available; so I will zero in on a
particular, unusual variety of vulnerability that might be illustrative; one that I think
has surprising and far-reaching relevance for ethical discussion – linking it to the vexed
concept of adaptive preference, for example. The species of vulnerability I will
highlight is the vulnerability that accompanies hope for improvement; the variety of
this species will be economic. I will explore the risk of deprivation of necessary
resources; a deprivation that arises due to hope. We hazard burdens and risks to
produce better lives in the long run; but risks may not ultimately pay off, and may not
turn out well for us. Aspirations may set us back. Wendy Olsen, a development
sociologist, introduced the neat term “aspiration paradox” to characterize such cases.
In her words, “a borrower's status aspirations may contribute to a situation in which
their borrowings exceed their capacity to repay,” leaving the individual much the
worse, due to an aspiration to betterment.
Passing from sociology to ethics and policy, this leads to the question: should sensible
people be encouraged, or even allowed, to hazard all the risks, and so the
vulnerability, that they think prudent? (I expect that many of you can already see, with
that question, the link to discussions of adaptive preference.)
1. Aspiration paradox
In “Aspiration Paradox in Indian Microfinance,” Wendy Olsen explores women’s selfhelp groups in Andhra Pradesh, India, and she particularly focuses upon the efforts by
many rural women to purchase and keep a $200 cow, through installment lending. 131 A
standard lending support for this venture, called a “cow loan,” has become readily
available in some villages through the efforts of nonprofits and government. These
loans can and regularly do lead the families of the women, already low in income, to
significant financial loss. The cow itself, which may not survive the loan period, at best
generates a stream of income at about the same level as the cost of keeping that same
cow during the nearly two year period of repayment for a cow loan. If the risk is
surpassed and the cow survives, it is likely to be ‘budget neutral’ during the repayment
period, and a good value thereafter. But of course financial value should not be
considered the only relevant value, in this case: it is clear that the process of gaining
and paying back such loans produces self-esteem and community esteem, and the cow
loan scheme is seen as of great value for personal development and social
improvement for women in society.
But there is more to consider on the economic and social fronts. For the woman raising
the cow, roughly ten days per month that might have been spent earning cash through
labor is occupied in tending the cow. In some areas, local overgrazing and increased
water demand for cattle also leads to environmental degradation for the greater
community. The group interactions and self-education that accompany and support
these cow loans within the womens’ Self Help Group organizations that distribute the
loans are considerable, well-documented rewards that women discover. We and they
may hope that this will also provide improvement in women’s status over the
generations. But, Olsen argues, frantic re-borrowing to pay the demanding loans and
increased suffering for the woman and her family frequently accompany these
rewards.
Olson has not completed sufficient survey work that might lead her to conclude that
her “suspicion of a problem” with the loans is in fact a serious problem: family finances
are difficult to study so carefully, and she did not document failures to repay loans. Is
the increase in vulnerability worth it? In Sen’s language, does the institution of cow
loans serve for “expanding the freedoms we have reason to value,” or is it a
paradoxical aspiration, one that is desirable, yet all too likely to produce more bad
than good? I am not about to make the mistake of suggesting that it is, or that it is not;
that the aspiration to a cow loan is or is not really problematic, overall. I am not highly
familiar with the case, and I am not an expert in measuring capabilities and
environmental impacts. I am too familiar with the thorny issue of colonial attitudes,
and I am too much the skeptic to be tempted to reach an answer, myself. But I suggest
that this is an example that helps us to consider the possibility that reasonable people
can aspire to what isn’t good for them. And, I think I have a good idea of an important
root of the problem, if there is a problem.
2. The landscape of lending
131
Wendy Olsen, “Aspiration Paradox in Indian Micro-Finance: A Difficulty and an Opportunity for
Debate,” University of Manchester Brooks World Poverty Institute, BWPI Working Paper 42, 2008 2-5.
http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/resources/Working-Papers/bwpi-wp-4208.pdf. And see Jamie Morgan
& Wendy Olsen, “Aspiration Problems for the Indian Rural Poor: Research on self-help groups and
micro-finance,” Capital and Class 35(2) 2011, 189-212.
I think I see a similar problem, a possible paradoxical choice for improvement, in the
uptake of microcredit by the poor, when lending conditions are not advantageous.
Another such case is the rise of for-profit microfinance in India, in which the lending
conditions are tuned by market forces, and tuned less in favor of the borrower than in
the past, so that the lender might endeavor to do well financially as well as socially.
And lending in USA through the mechanism of payday loans presents similar concerns.
The recent history of the uptake of mortgages in the US markets is also similar. In each
of these lending cases that I will not discuss in detail here, more clearly than in the
case of cow loans, many people are very likely to get what they bargained for, but not
what they expected. And this is because they did not really know what to expect:
instead, they got less than expected, and their vulnerability is realized as a dramatic
decrease in living standards.
Do people understand what they aspire to, in finance? I will switch away from Olson’s
example, now, to consider one closer to my home: U.S. perceptions of wealth, and
American understanding of the finance of mortgages. Thomas Diprete has studied the
results of a 2005 Gallup poll of United States opinion.132 The survey straightforwardly
indicates that over 50% of Americans age 18-29 believe that they will, at some point in
their lives “be rich.” Diprete teases out what they mean by ‘rich’: he expects that they
hold it corresponds very roughly to a household income of about $120,000 per annum,
which represented about the top 10% of income at that time, as it does now. While it
is possible to fit 50% of people into that bracket for a brief portion of their lives, so
that people ‘take turns’ at being rich, I think it’s reasonable to say both that that is not
how it works – there is not so very much mobility in the U.S. system, I could show you
this -- and taking turns is not what the young adults intended to suggest, anyway: they
aspired, and expected, to become rich, and probably, to stay there. Many other
surveys point to a complexly structured, but very robust, mistaken belief in
opportunity for young and old.
Those are aspirations; consider also the results of our aspirations. Recent experiences
with credit in the housing market of the United States strongly suggest that a great
proportion of the population whose finances indicate middle class status show limited
ability at successfully managing financial risk under the lending conditions that prevail
there. Careful surveys show that they do not understand what “compound interest”
actually entails, for example. And a good proportion of households are quite
vulnerable to the demands imposed by emergencies: One credible survey indicates
that half of all American adults would agree that they definitely or probably could not
come up with $2,000 to meet an emergency within the space of a month. 133 This is the
precarious space in which even the middle classes live, in one of the wealthiest of
nations, facing financial tides that they cannot predict, with an optimism that isn’t
borne out by the evidence. And, by the way, they also don’t realize their ignorance:
132
Thomas Diprete, “Is This a Great Country? Upward Mobility and the Chance for Riches in
Contemporary America,” Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 25 2007 89-95.
133
Annamaria Lusardi, Peter Tufano. “Debt Literacy, Financial Experiences, and Overindebtedness,”
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 14808 (March 2009). Available at:
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14808. Annamaria Lusardi, Daniel Schneider and Peter Tufano,
“Financially Fragile Households: Evidence and Implications,” National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. 17072 (March 2011). Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w17072.
when asked to rate their confidence regarding their grasp of finance, they will express
high confidence, and they will estimate that they are clearer about it than their
neighbors, generally – so, not only do they not know, they don’t know that they don’t
know.
3. Adaptive preference
At this point, perhaps my voice sounds rather paternalistic as an American, or neocolonial, as a development ethicist. I may be taken to be suggesting that I, armed with
the work of economists, understand these people’s situations better than they
themselves do. I haven’t quite argued that. But their own choices, when seen in the
aggregate of populations of people like them, are likely to harm them, or constrain
flourishing. I am suggesting I can see something about them that they themselves
can’t. I am arguing that they cannot pass the tests that I see as relevant for
appropriate, or rational, choice. And I would argue that it is not necessary for me to
make those reasons their own reasons as well, for a concern like mine to be promoted
legitimately in public policy. I would make claims on behalf of expertise that could
infringe upon individual freedom.
The terrain I am entering here has clear resemblance to that in which we find the
development ethicist who argues that some widely and firmly held subjective
preferences and aspirations are not worth having. Martha Nussbaum directly
challenges the individual’s preferences: she writes, “embraced as a normative position,
subjective welfarism makes it impossible to conduct a radical critique of unjust
conditions.” (Women and Human Development, 117) She argues for tempering
individual choice with a re-assertion of regard for development in social policy. In one
example, she notes that women in impoverished circumstances who have the charge
of their children’s care may have to choose concerning which of two children to send
to school, or to educate the furthest. In many societies, the women will routinely
choose sons over daughters. Nussbaum proposed an explanation for this, and in 1999
she laid it down to women “internaliz[ing] their second-class status and not striv[ing]
for what is out of reach.” They have adapted their preferences to unjust
circumstances, she argues, and they are re-imposing those circumstances on their
daughters. And so, she finds, “we have good reasons…to support public investment in
female literacy, even in the absence of young girls’ demand for such programs.”
(Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice 1999, 151)
Put too crudely: the women know what they want, but Nussbaum knows what they
need; or at least, an element of what they need, for development and justice.
Otherwise, women’s own preferences may “internalize” and perpetuate the conditions
of their own oppression. Critics, such as Alison Jaggar and Uma Narayan, have replied
that Nussbaum produces a reconfigured colonial perspective, perpetuating the
tendency to see poor women as unthinking victims of patriarchal cultures.
Does my discussion hazard similar dangers? Certainly. But with respect to most of the
cases that I have noted, I think the charge of colonialism can be effectively deflected,
by steering away from psychological explanation of preferences, and towards the
details vis a vis justice for the social situation. So, on to my closing deflection.
Vulnerability, like dependence and care, is very much constructed within a social
context. Some vulnerabilities are rather robust across widely varied social contexts –
for a simple example, babies will die when not attended to, for whatever social
reasons there are that lead to them being neglected. Other vulnerabilities, by contrast,
are very sensitive to such context: Babies will be fed perhaps too little clean milk in
some circumstances, but they won’t as frequently die from drinking polluted water, if
their parents aren’t encouraged by authority figures in lab coats to buy nutritious baby
formula.
Some troubling aspects of financial decision are also robust across varied contexts.
Perhaps the tendency of U.S. residents to see theirs as a land of opportunity is
evidence of one such case. But much that is troubling about financial decision in the
cases I have reviewed here is very sensitive to context. These choices are built into a
particular social context of contracting individuals, some of whom know the business
of finance far more thoroughly than others. The landscape of lending, for all these
cases, with the possible exception of the cow loans, is inhabited by wolves and sheep.
It’s not that the sheep don’t know what’s good for them; they simply aren’t sufficiently
aware of the presence of wolves, and they can’t be expected to be aware, either.
These sheep, as I have characterized them, are not fools: the poor of the globe are
adept at maintaining complex financial arrangements, and their finances have never
been simple. To manage their businesses, save money for various purposes along
varied time scales, and to ensure funds for emergency, they themselves have devised a
broad variety of strategies across the globe that economists have noted. Lending
circles and lottery groups have been found to be indigenous economic systems that
have long worked for the people’s benefit.134 But human psychological bias, naïveté,
and exploitation are also features that can be found in the landscape of lending. Those
who are naïve in particular financial practices are at a disadvantage. If the practices are
carefully designed to capture their attention but only partially to address their needs,
then those who have dedicated their time and education to designing such attractive
lending offers are at an advantage.
How do I avoid charges of paternalism, then, if I will not straightforwardly deny that
people may not know what is good for them? First, where practical, avoid the trap of
psychological theorizing, avoiding the psychological explanation that enmires
Nussbaum’s justification. Much is gained by providing the ethical justification for
criticism of people’s choices simply by relying on other ethical materials that are
readily at hand.
In this case, a relational vulnerability that results from a differential in education – for
example, in finance specialists attempting to sell unfamiliar products to those less
educated – this is not a case in which ignorance is the most ethically salient
134
See Daryl Collins, Jonathan Morduch, Studart Rutherford and Orlanda Ruthven, Portfolios of the
Poor (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton, 2009); Abhijit K. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Poor Economics (New
York: Public Affairs, 2011).
characteristic. Rather, this is a case of exploitation. Restricting access to borrowing
may be appropriately justified within a society due to paternalistic concerns (we don’t
want people getting in over their heads). But the ethical justification for restriction in
these cases – perhaps with the exception of the cow loans – is based not on
paternalism, but rather, on duties to protect against exploitation. Nussbaum also is on
her firmest ground, I think, when she most clearly separates the psychological
explanation for dubious choices from the ethical ground for the justification of
criticism of that behavior.
The criticism in this case, then, is of the ethics of the lender and the permissiveness of
the social order, which allows exploitation to take place. I need not know what the
borrower needs, I need only know that the lender is setting people up for a fall. The
ethical criticism is not of their choice, actually, it is of the lender, and of a society that
does not provide opportunities to borrow or save that do not so seriously increase
vulnerability.
Mal-designed opportunities yield vulnerability; other opportunities may yield freedom.
Borrowers go to loan sharks and see their debt double once a month, when no better
option is available. They go to American payday lenders and see their debt double
every 4 months, when no better option is available. For some of these cases, we need
not broach the subject of paternalism in policy choices that deny poor opportunities to
the poor, if people instead have access to more appropriate options, both suited to
their understanding and absent exploitation.
But exploitation is not the root concern for all such cases: the cow loans continue to
trouble me.
Development ethics: how can it be generative?. The need to analyse and
learn from capitalism
Des Gasper
Professor, International Institute of Social Studies
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands
gasper@iss.nl
Mohsen Yazdanpanah
Professor, International Institute of Social Studies
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Netherlands
Abstract: Capitalism’s conception and format for social progress are dominant to this
day. GDP growth remains as the quintessential criterion of development even though a
myriad of warnings, alternatives and theories have been presented to enrich the
concept of development and detach it from narrow economism, including under the
banners of Human Development and the Capability Approach. So, hitherto, the way
deemed essential to change forms of living and remove poverty and facilitate
capabilities has been as a trickle-down from profit-led capital accumulation. In
reaction, development ethics continues to warn about the dangerous consequences:
human suffering, poverty, inequity, displacement, environmental damage, and dangers
of being meaning-poor within material affluence. This paper aims to highlight limits of
existing development ethics, related to the lack of a narrative generative approach to
development, unlike what is offered by capitalism.
From a narrative standpoint, the primary concept of development is a systemic
societal change in the form of living—a transformative journey involving a system of
mobilizing and directing human energies and not only inanimate energy; as illuminated
by Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests. The concept cannot be reduced to
freedom, justice, and cultural norms alone. The adjective ‘generative’ indicates a
concern with the forces driving sustained sequences of action and production as the
way of transformation in form of living. This differs from reference merely to resource
allocation in production. This systematic reordering is defined in a narrative which
shows how development begins from a startpoint and expands stepwise into other
stages. It will be argued further though, that a narrative approach to development
gravitates around a central concept of good. Following Hirschman’s account of the
emergence of capitalism, we try to conceptualize the elements of capitalism which
enable it to act as the predominant practical approach to development: 1. a way of
accumulation that seems to induce unending desire for growth, 2. flexible hierarchy
between people, and 3. turning contradictions into motion.
A set of interrelated issues which contribute to the common neglect of a generative
narrative approach will be discussed, including the stance of ‘separation’, which
considers people as the recipient of development’s outcomes without explaining the
creative counter-side; and some practical, methodological, and ontological problems in
theory building, including the difficulty of theorizing ‘impersonal interdependency’
within social systems, which is central for understanding the power of capitalism. This
last issue requires exploration of in particular the nature of capitalist-credit-money and
why development ethics seems weak in scrutinizing, affecting, or re-designing
‘impersonal interdependency’ – questions which will be taken up in a sister paper.
Keywords: Development ethics, Capitalism, Development narrative, Social reality,
Capability approach, Impersonal-interdependency, Money
Introduction
Capitalism’s concrete way of social progress persists overwhelmingly strongly to this
day. GDP growth, also, remains as the quintessential criterion of being developed even
though a myriad of warnings, alternative notions and theories have been presented to
enrich the concept of development and detach it from narrow economism, including
under the banner of Human Development and its attendant Capability Approach. So,
hitherto, the essential way to change forms of living and remove poverty and facilitate
capabilities has been considered to be from trickle-down effect after intensive
sustained capital accumulation. In reaction, development ethics continues to warn
about consequences: human suffering and poverty for many, inequity, displacement,
environmental damage, and dangers of being meaning-poor within material affluence.
A big body of studies shows that well-being is weakly connected with income,
especially above middle income levels, but this fact does not seem to influence
behaviour. Concerning lessons from and limits of development ethics, this paper aims
to highlight little considered aspects that concern the lack of a generative approach to
development in the face of capitalism.
Gasper (2004a) formulates three core activities or ‘stages’ of activity in development
ethics as: sensitization, systematization, and adaptation/application. It seems that
development ethics has been more successful in the first stage than the second and
more successful in the second than in the third. Development ethics needs to consider
further its relation to capitalist development, and how a new approach can operate in
the space where capitalism operates. For this purpose, it is striking to scrutinize again
the very nature of mainstream capitalist development which enables it to be
dominant.
To find the crux of capitalism’s ability we are required to rethink the concept of
development. The concept of development has been conceptualized in many ways,
whether positive or evaluative and whether historical or ahistorical (Gasper 2004a,
Ch.2). Intense debates have centered on whether value criteria are relative or
universal. Some convergence has been achieved on the concept of development as
provision of the ‘preconditions for whatever form of better life decision-makers
perceive …’ (Gasper 2004a: 36). Various such viewpoints have presented new insight
which inform our evaluative interpretation of development. But does any of them
provide a notion of development as practically effective as capitalism does? Note that
we emphasize the term ‘effective’ rather than ‘reasonable’, ‘legitimate’, ‘democratic’,
‘just’, ‘free’, or so on.135 For these viewpoints remain restrictive rather than generative.
They can constrain capitalism and moderate its effects, or provide a hybridization
when some virtues survive alongside homo economicus, but not replace its pivotal role
in organizing our life.
Development should be understood also as a generative narrative concept and a
dynamic system of energy. These lenses add an explanatory frame for development.
Hitherto, only capitalism has provided this generative ground fully, while other
evaluative approaches have typically contributed as setting restrictions. 136 A
conception of development should show how creative forces are shaped within the
system, and so cannot be reduced to ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, ‘democracy’, or ‘cultural
norms’. Evaluative criteria must consider which generative kind is more legitimate,
free, or just. In other words, today we in reality talk about freedom in capitalism,
democracy in capitalism, or justice in capitalism. We need to understand how each
generative formation like capitalism essentially affects not only the workability of each
evaluative criterion in practice, but also the possible future of social general attitudes
toward life and different realizations of a good life.
Currently, the most plausible widespread frameworks in development studies
emphasize the values of agency and non-paternalism; and there has long been critique
of standard economics for its narrow focus on utility maximization, by arguing that real
135
This points to a quasi-pragmatist position even if it may somehow disagree with the
exact philosophical base of pragmatism..
136
The capability approach tries to appeal to the same root forces of freedom, agency
and reason, while using more deliberation and more fellow-feeling. But it has been
limited in several important ways.
behavior reflects multiple partly incommensurable values—including ethical values. At
the same time, consumption and consumerism have enormously increased while basic
needs of huge groups are unfulfilled. If people do not merely behave in accord with
self-interest, and if studies show that there is no meaningful correlation between
income, wealth and well-being, why is behavior so centred on interests and
consumption ?
So the paper mentions a number of issues in terms of which the direction of attention
of the Capability Approach—as one of the most plausible frameworks—should be
examined. This discussion, at the same time, aims to demonstrate the elements of
capitalism which reflect its underlying narrative: the central role of a concept of good
that we identify as interest not utility, plus three conditions that a generative narrative
must fulfil. A critical question arises: why do development ethics discussions focus so
much on critique of ‘utility and welfare economics’ rather than on ‘interests and
capitalism’s social reality’? While critiques of welfare economics concentrate on its
assumption of utility maximization, the problem lies elsewhere: the social reality of
capitalism that establishes the idea of ‘interests’, objectively through social relations,
not from subjective preferences in market operations as welfare economics assumes.
Hirschman’s account of capitalism helps us to grasp how ‘interests’ become objectively
a base for new order, power structure, and an Interest-Governed world. We also refer
to Schumpeter and Simmel to present some of the other crucial issues that ultimately
construct elements of a narrative. At the end of Part One, we clarify the three
requirements of a narrative generative approach.
In Part Two, some issues related to the neglect of narrative generative approaches will
be considered: ‘separation’, development ontology, and impersonal-interdependency.
Analysis of ‘impersonal-interdependency’ demands attention to in particular the
institution of money, to unveil how this invisible aspect of social reality affects a range
of important issues in development studies such as agency, justice, consumerism and
participation. That will be the subject of a sister paper, and is only pointed to in the
final parts of this paper, together with some concluding remarks, and the open
question of how the three requirements of a narrative generative approach might be
satisfied within development ethics.
Part One - Capitalism as a narrative
Rethinking the Capability Approach: what matters most? Welfare economics or
Capitalism? Utility or Interests?
One of the most attractive and plausible frameworks for development (ethics), the
Capability Approach, arose in association with critique of economics representations of
rational utility maximization behavior. Sen found that these representations depict
‘rational fools’—persons ‘who are unable to distinguish between perfectly
distinguishable question[s] about one’s own welfare, one’s motivation’ (1985:3)—and
give a grotesquely narrow picture of human behavior and motivations. A person may
behave plausibly and rationally in a way other than the pursuit of self-interest and
being happy as the consequence of an action; ‘a person’s motivation behind choice
may or may not coincide with the pursuit of self-interest’ (1985:3). For constructing a
more adequate evaluative framework, Sen suggested that we consider the
functionings which can be achieved by the users of commodities rather than the
commodities in themselves; he puts the person at the centre of well-being inquiry
instead of the commodity. Further, he detaches and highlights the valuing faculty in
human beings, not equating it, for example, to a mental state like happiness. He has
built an attractive general perspective for development, as the expansion of
capabilities which people have reason to value. The freedom-oriented picture of
development, a value-imbued idea without restriction to any specific or exclusive value
theory, and the respectful view about human agency, are attractive features of the
approach.
It is not this paper’s contention that the Capability Approach (CA) has not been
insightful. Our critique arises from the function attributed to this approach: a
framework theory for development in terms of a powerful claim for freedom. Besides
suggesting weaknesses of the approach, we will try to conceptualize more clearly what
properties an approach needs in order to be adequately generative.
Sen’s starting point, the critique of mainstream economics, is relevant to why his
approach does not account wholly for the phenomena of development. Sen aims at
understanding individual behavior, within a social body which has been developed by
processes of change—development. His approach is not as atomistic as modern
economics is, but modern economics has acquired a remarkable power. Despite its
atomistic foundation and its inability to account for many phenomena, modern
economics provides an ideological—and practical—discourse that influences and
legitimates different classes of people to act in accord with narrow self-interest. It
generates action, to an extent probably far beyond what the capability approach can
do. This power of standard economics comes from its service to the objective idea of
‘interests’.
From Sen’s standpoint, the key problem to be solved was in the foundation of welfare
economics, a branch of economics that emerged in the 20th century aiming at
increasing social welfare by using microeconomics ideas to evaluate policy options. It
seeks to assess the well-being achieved via consumption, using the principle that the
consumer knows best and acts accordingly. Indeed welfare economics provides some
measurements to choose between projects that government could do, different
policies for environmental issues and public goods, or options in education, healthcare,
pensions, and insurance, for example. On this ground the capability approach (CA)
could have a contribution by providing enriched criteria of evaluation. But this line—
using criteria to evaluate well-being and then making the social choice accordingly—is
a less important role of economics to influence practice than what happens through
articulating a foundational discourse which forms a specific social reality involving
different stakeholders, from government to university students and ordinary people.
Let us reformulate the problem: how many of the vices and virtues of present-day
social life are the consequence of economism, the foundational discourse, and not only
of the detailed theorems and choice criteria of welfare economics? If the answer is
many, then our concerns for ethical development should aim at economism and not
only at welfare economics. In company with capitalism, economism has established a
process of development as organic change in the form of living. The process of change
in the system of commodities is far more important than their stationary character.
Welfare economics emerged long after this phenomenon of comprehensive change
began, yet the present-day issues of development are strongly connected to this
historical path.
By emphasizing the notion of functioning rather than the mental state due to
consumption, Sen distances himself from the consumer-mode focus which welfare
economics has. But perhaps because of the ground he concentrates on—welfare
economics—he presents a quasi-consumer-perspective on individual behavior. It is
true that CA insists on agency and considers how far the individual is an effective
agent. But when Sen sets forth the capability set as the set of effective opportunities in
which the individual can realize his functioning, the system of potentially available
commodities is given (Sen 1985:8). The very process in which commodities are
produced is absent, yet it involves influential conditions that affect agency and wellbeing. The system of commodities reflects a history and a social-institutional system.
The freedom that is proclaimed in the approach remains embedded in the capitalistmode of society. In that frame, the CA is mainly restrictive rather than generative, even
when it aims to devise positive freedom, new capability. It sets criteria for good or
acceptable development under capitalism, rather than generating also an alternative.
The strong assumption that lies behind the approach, perhaps with roots in pragmatic
philosophy, is that emptying a theory of development from any specific conception of
good conduces to a high degree of freedom and agency in practice. This provision is
questionable, as Michael Sandel (2012: 202) evidently argues:
Such deliberation [about the meaning and purpose of goods] touch,
unavoidably, on competing conceptions of good life. This is terrain on
which we sometimes fear to tread. For fear of disagreement, we hesitate
to bring our moral and spiritual convictions into the public square. But
shrinking from these questions does not leave them undecided. It is simply
means that markets will decide them for us.
The capability approach (outside the naive versions, formulated only in terms of
facilitating want-fulfilment) is meant to encourage such deliberation between various
conceptions, by avoiding imposing a pre-set conception. But advocating agency
without any conception or proposal of relevant functionings could lead to
unintentional conspiring with the capitalist way of development.
Still, alternative generative proposals for development need to draw on the lessons
implied in the generative power of capitalism. A generative approach considers: 1) the
form of living or functionings, as its organic output rather only as input; 2) the relations
that led systematically to such an output; 3) a narrative that traces how the outcome
was/would be achieved.
Features of capitalist social reality: the entrepreneur in a world of ‘interests’ –
organizing a strong hierarchy in a new social relation
Development should be understood as systemic change in the form of living. Form of
living includes the material shell of life, typically understood as the economic aspect of
life regarding production and resource allocation. This economic/material aspect
should not be read as ‘neutral’, or free from moral attitude, or a purely
‘scientific’/‘engineering’ matter. Economism—in spite of what is suggested by much
modern economics where everyone is ultimately a utility-maximizer consumer—
narrates a story which considers man as doer in relation to other men, who cannot be
reduced to merely a consumer. We should note immediately that this story is not a
general one to apply for all people and all patterns of action. It prioritizes the
entrepreneur-capitalist, man pictured as a dynamic potent agent—here named MAN,
in contrast to man as the consumer.137
To appreciate how capitalism drives change in form of living, Schumpeter is instructive:
Capitalism, then, is by nature a form or method of economic change and
not only never is but never can be stationary. And this evolutionary
character of the capitalist process is not merely due to the fact that
economic life goes on in a social and natural environment which changes
and by its change alters the data of economic action; this fact is important
and these changes (wars, revolutions and so on) often condition industrial
change, but they are not its prime movers. Nor is this evolutionary
character due to a quasi-automatic increase in population and capital or to
the vagaries of monetary systems of which exactly the same thing holds
true. The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in
motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of
production or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of
industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates. (Schumpeter 2010
[1942]: 82, emphasis added)
Though stressing new consumer goods could be interpreted as propounding the
primacy of consumption, Schumpeter’s writings show that he sees the entrepreneur as
the prime mover in evolutionary process under capitalism. In his prediction of the
downfall of capitalism, he argues that an important reason is the fading of the
entrepreneur personality:
137
We borrow the terminology of ‘MAN and man’ from Myrdal, though he used it in a
somewhat different way. As Dykema explained: ‘Who or what stands outside of the
faulty environment, able to rescue it? Myrdal does not hold to any natural law
view - he has condemned such as fostering a laissez- faire bias. It is man that
shapes the institutions that shape man. But rather than facing a problem of
circularity here, it seems that we may be speaking of MAN and man. The
common man is caught up in the environmental web, but MAN, epitomized by
Western, Enlightenment, social scientist MAN, is the agent that stands outside of
the underdevelopment environment and can thus function as its savior. It is
MAN that can shape the environment which in turn will shape man’ (Dykema
1986: 153).
We have seen that the function of entrepreneurs is to reform or
revolutionize the pattern of production by exploiting an invention or, more
generally, an untried technological possibility for producing a new
commodity or producing an old one in a new way, by opening up a new
source of supply of materials or a new outlet for products, by reorganizing
an industry and so on. … To act with confidence […] beyond the range of
familiar beacons and to overcome that resistance requires aptitudes that
are present in only a small fraction of the population and that define the
entrepreneurial type as well as the entrepreneurial function. This social
function is already losing importance and is bound to lose it at an
accelerating rate in the future even if the economic process itself of which
entrepreneurship was the prime mover went on unabated. (2010[1942]:
132)
Thus the heroic personality of the powerful man, the entrepreneur, is the main
constituent of the narrative of economism, whether or not we agree with
Schumpeter’s prognostication. To explore further the historical roots of capitalism,
including the character of powerful man, the entrepreneur, we turn to The Passions
and the Interests where Hirschman shows how modern capitalism ‘arose right in the
center of the "power structure" and the "establishment"’ (1977: 129).
Weber had been criticized for his account of the spirit of capitalism. Hirschman’s
account of that spirit brings new insight which is central to our attempt to rethink the
ontology of development. According to critics of Weber, what he called the spirit of
capitalism was already common among merchants in Europe in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries (Hirschman 1977: 9). Weber is not completely mistaken, but indeed
his account cannot retrace the sequential pieces of the genesis of capitalism, how an
old social structure metamorphosed into a new one—an Interest-Governed World. We
need to find the place to connect the two sides of this huge transition: 1-the
combination of feudalism, aristocracy, and monarchy, and 2-capitalism, as Hirschman
explains:
A vast literature has contrasted the aristocratic, heroic ideal of the Feudal
Age and the Renaissance with the bourgeois mentality and the Protestant
Ethic of a later era. The decline of one ethic and the rise of another have
been exhaustively surveyed and have been presented as precisely such: as
two distinct historical processes, each of which had as its protagonist a
different social class, the declining aristocracy on the one hand, and the
rising bourgeoisie on the other. Historians have of course found it
attractive to present the story as a pageant in the course of which a young
challenger takes on the aging champion. But this conception has appealed
equally, if not more, to those searching for scientific knowledge of society
and its so-called laws of motion. While the Marxian and Weberian analyses
disagree on the relative importance of economic and noneconomic
factors, they both view the rise of capitalism and of its "spirit'' as an
assault on preexisting systems of ideas and of socioeconomic relations. A
group of historians has recently questioned the class character of the
French Revolution. In dealing here with the history of ideas I do not aspire
to be quite so iconoclastic; but, in a similar vein, I shall present some
evidence that the new arose out of the old to a greater extent than has
generally been appreciated. To portray a lengthy ideological change or
transition as an endogenous process is of course more complex than to
depict it as the rise of an independently conceived, insurgent ideology
concurrent with the decline of a hitherto dominant ethic. A portrayal of
this sort involves the identification of a sequence of concatenated ideas
and propositions whose final outcome is necessarily hidden from the
proponents of the individual links, at least in the early stages of the
process; for they would have shuddered—and revised their thinking—had
they realized where their ideas would ultimately lead (Hirschman, 1977,
p.4).
Neither the pure principles of market forces—for example from the standpoint of
neoclassical economics—nor what can be found in a plausible normative criterion of
development like CA can tell us enough of how the current system of change,
development, is established. The idea of social progress came with a new paradigm,
Interest-Governed World, which, at the same time, was subject to the engineering of
social progress.
…the idea of engineering social progress by cleverly setting up one passion
to fight another became a fairly common intellectual pastime in the course
of the eighteenth century. It is indeed expressed by a host of writers,
minor as well as major, in general or applied form. (Hirschman 1977, p.26).
The chain of steps of transition, in Hirschman’s account, was led by intentional
decision making138 to establish the conditions that embody capitalism as an organic
entity, though the outcome was unpredictable by early pioneers. The thinking behind
the transition was a remarkable mixture of, first, a model which seems to encompass
everything in a mechanical behavior—like the ‘invisible hand’—and, second, an
intentional act to articulate the social order towards a specific direction. The first
episode of the story begins with the new function of the idea of glory when ‘the
possibility that one vice may check another’ was supported limitedly by St. Augustine
and then ‘was broadened far beyond his teachings’ and became the early version of
the idea of invisible hand, ‘a force that makes men pursuing their private passions
conspire unknowingly toward the public good’ (p.10). While the contents
metamorphosed, the central nature of the juxtaposition—intentional acts plus
mechanical model—has remained unchanged. After the idea of glory, ‘in an
astonishing transformation’ ‘all the heroic virtues were shown to be forms of mere
self-preservation by Hobbes, of self-love by La Rochefoucauld, of vanity and of frantic
escape from real self-knowledge by Pascal’ (p.11).
This took place in a complex story that should be ‘traced to a new turn in the theory of
the state’. A new theory of individual behavior had been articulated, led by
Machiavelli, aimed at instructing the prince (Hirschman 1977:12-13). The important
lesson was: the moral philosopher must ‘provide guidance to the real world in which
138
To explore other viewpoint on the up-down process of capitalism’s origin, see Stretton (1969) that describes how
capitalism was established thanks to monopoly, tariffs, and war.
the prince must operate’; then, the new theory grew from being a tool for the prince
into being the new approach to human nature as supposedly ‘it really is’. The main
reason to consider man as ‘he really is’ was the problem of inability of moral
philosophy and religion to restrain ‘the destructive passions of men’. The new theory
could promise ‘repressing and harnessing the passions’ (p.14-15), using the principle of
the countervailing passions. It led to a new meaning of ‘interests’, as a new paradigm
for operationalizing the already accepted strategy—‘pitting passion against passion’
(p.31). Love of gain was represented as the calm passion and, at the same time, as the
strong one able to countervail all others. Associated with gradual change in the
meaning given to ‘interests’, the concentration turned from the ruler to the groups,
when they seek to advance their interests within their interaction with the state in
England or France (p.35-44).
Eventually, as the final episode, the transition received its most influential
presentation in The Wealth of Nations. Hirschman warned that:
[T]he expansion of commerce and industry in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries has been viewed here as being welcomed and
promoted not by some marginal social groups, nor by an insurgent
ideology, but by a current of opinion that arose right in the center of the
"power structure" and the "establishment" of the time (p.129).
Smith in contrast highlighted ‘desire of better condition’ as the basic prompting force.
While in ethics he was trying to set forth a richer concept of human nature, that is
induced to act by a range of sentiments of which avarice was only one, he ultimately
took ‘interest’/interests as the referencing locus for all of the other passions. Indeed,
…it is precisely in The Theory of Moral Sentiments that he paves the way for
collapsing these other passions into the drive for the "augmentation of
fortune." Interestingly enough, he does so in the guise of doing the
opposite; for he goes out of his way to stress the noneconomic and non
consumptionist motives that are behind the struggle for economic advance.
(Hirschman, p.108).
Capitalism arose under this transitional structure. What should be learned from that
history is that we should extend our perspective beyond abstracted principles
presented by modern economics like market competition, rational utility
maximization, or seeing market forces as intrinsic independent laws in themselves.
Likewise, reducing capitalism to the commodity form, plus the habitat for the
commodity (markets), plus private property is not adequate (Gasper 2009). Similarly
even when the conception of capitalism becomes a bit richer, as in McCloskey: ‘merely
private property and free labor without central planning, regulated by the rule of law
and by an ethical consensus’ (McCloskey 2006: 14). Fundamental components missing
in those conceptions are the prerogative of capital to retain surplus (so that ‘free labor’
means free of any claim to a share of the surplus), and the associated notion of the
heroic entrepreneur.
Representations such as McCloskey’s are not adequate to the reality of capitalism.
They are derived conceptual products of capitalism. They fail to grasp the import of,
first, the stepwise conceptual innovation before realization in practice; for example,
how the meaning of interest transformed to come to mean love of gain, and, second,
the nature of institutional facts and their dependence on collective intentionality (see
Searle 1995: 23-29). These representations are each a social construction of reality
which was born in the struggle, in the first place, to mediate relational hierarchy. They
are a new discourse of concepts to structure collective intentionality. It is arguable that
capitalism reproduced the previous collective intentionality—i.e., it needed the earlier
one to get started—but transformed it through its dynamism which can be seen also as
the revolutionary form. That is, the dynamic aspect of capitalism allowed it to do so,
but nonetheless was rooted in earlier patterns of intentional managing.
The two most important examples are money and enterprise and corresponding
institutional objects like equity, derivatives, bonds and so on, by which, on the one
hand, this dynamism provides and expands circular flows of subjective attitudes, and,
on the other hand, simultaneously expands their realization in an epistemologically
objective dimension—the social reality of capitalism. It happens while modern
economics tell us that money valuation is the outcome of interplay of subjective
preferences (Ingham 2004: 66) and the corporation is the combined entity of capital
and labor with the aim of profit maximization. But the peculiar nature of money as a
social relation is a precondition for these sorts of subjective attitudes.
Before examining the institution of money and how it fundamentally evolved as a core
element of capitalism, one needs to go further with the structured conceptualization
of capitalism, which is the task of this paper. A sister paper explores credit-money and
collective intentionality.
Gravitating around Good, the central role and objective position of the Interests in
capitalism
One of the main macro functions of capitalism’s economic and social reality is to
organise societal cooperation. With respect to the high degree of cooperation achieved
in the era of capitalism, what is the role of good? If good is objectively conceived as
the ‘end at which action must aim’ (Blackburn 2005: 154), could such an objective
understanding have a role in social cooperation in capitalism? ‘Liberal political
societies are characteristically committed to denying any place for a determinate
conception of the human good in their public discourse, let alone allowing that their
common life should be grounded in such a conception’ (MacIntyre 1984: 13). Yet in
fact a unified or shared conception of objective good plays a major role in the
institutional order of capitalism. This topic leads to a research agenda about the valueinbuilt nature of institutions. As a probable result, when we look at, for example, the
institutions of money or enterprise, they are not sets of neutral rules, but are products
of the evolutionary core dynamism of capitalism.
In clarification of the role of interests, let us return to Sen. According to Sen (and many
others), people actually behave in a mixed pattern of self-interest and moral
sentiments. This is the real fact that economics must consider (Sen 1996: 1, 13). He
insists that the problem has occurred after the influence of Robbins (2007 [1932]),
when the engineering direction in economics detached itself from ethics, while earlier
these two aspects existed comfortably together. A brilliant instance is Adam Smith
himself. Sen objects to the presentations of Smith—Sen names them Smithian—to
‘make him the guru of self-interest’ (p.23-24). He admires modern economics, that
‘often have been very fruitful’, but it can be better by adding the reality of ethical
behavior into its explanations.
Sen draws an incomplete picture of the relationship between reality—how people
actually behave—, modern economics, and classical economics. In his picture two
substantial questions remained unanswered: 1- is there any evidence that shows
behavior according to the stereotype of ‘economic man’ was an increasing emerging
fact before modern economics—for example before Robbins? 2- does the co-existence
of self-interest and self-less behavior means that these two types of behaviors play the
same role in institutional cooperation? With respect to the former question, we can
refer to, for example, Simmel (1978 [1907]) who shows how before modern economics
general behavior in society had gradually been approaching closer to the economic
man. This implies a challenge to Sen’s attempt to prove the innocence of classical
economics. Further, at least one reason why Smithians think the way they do could be
the effect of a prevailing disciplinary discourse that enforces economists to think as
such—even though they ‘might be personally allowed a moderate dose of friendliness’
(1996: 1). The existence of such a prevailing discourse and its effect on the behavior of
economists shows we need to explore how it can affect other people’s behavior too. In
this sense, what Smith really said is less important than how Smith has been
understood; for example, how the invisible-hand metaphor has moulded both
specialists’ and ordinary people’s vision.
In fact, Sen’s distinction between an ‘engineering’ and an ‘ethical’ approach in
economics can be misleading. What he named the ‘engineering’ approach is not
merely technically-oriented and free from animating spirit, and this spirit does not
totally differ from that established by classical economics, which enthroned ‘the
interests’ as central in the explanation of social and economic behaviour. Modern
economics plays the role of specifying the conditions of an Interest-Governed World,
by giving theoretical justification for money making through a sequential and cyclical
logic of: rationality (identification of rationality with maximization of self-interest) →
gain (money making) → subjective well-being (utility maximization). 139 Modern
economics tries to provide justification for what has been already determined and
established—gain, accumulation, money making. Even if it fails in its (rational fool)
conception of rationality and its conception of well-being (utility, as a tautology
imputed whatsoever outcome eventuates; Gasper 2004b), yet it can advance thanks to
role in providing a narrative for capitalism.
The declared harmony, through cooperation via interests-guided behaviour, can be
understood better by Simmel’s remarks. The psychological attitude, as the animating
aspect of this order, goes beyond the explicit conventional bases of modern
139
Vital is that the cycle involves ‘gain’. Arguably, modern economics accomodates a justification for
what has already been determined and established—gain or interests. This is why modern economics is
(politically) successful despite its false assumptions – it provides a narrative of justification. The
justification it proposes is : human beings are rational, rationality commands utility maximization, and
more gain gives a higher budget constraint and purportedly results in more utility.
economics, but is implicit because modern economics takes interest/interests as the
main reference of everything. Note that ‘interests’ has come to subsume many things,
including desire for meaningful patterning of existence, and pride in the pure fact of
possession, rather than only pleasure or utility through active consumption. According
to Simmel:
It must always be emphasized that the contrast between egoism and
altruism in no way fully embraces the motivations for our actions. In fact
we have an objective interest in whether certain events or things are
realized or not, and this is so regardless of the consequences for the human
subject. It is important to us that a harmony, an order based on ideas, and a
significance – which does not have to fit the usual schemes of ethics or
aesthetics – prevail in the world. We feel ourselves obliged to co-operate in
this without always asking whether it gives pleasure or will be of advantage
to any person, that is, whether it is of interest to oneself or to another. … I
will leave every psychological and epistemological interpretation of this
impersonal motivation undecided here. It is, in any case, a psychological
fact which only enters into a variety of combinations with the sequence of
purposes of a personal nature. The collector who shuts away his valuables
from everyone else and who does not even enjoy them himself, yet
watches most jealously over them, colours his egoism with an admixture of
supra-subjective valuation. Generally speaking, it is the function of
possessions to be enjoyed and we may contrast this not only with those
objects that one enjoys without wanting to own them, like the stars, but
also those whose value is independent of all subjective enjoyment like the
beauty, order and significance of the universe, whose value persists
independent of human response. In the case of such possessive people,
there exists an intermediate or mixed phenomenon: possession is certainly
necessary, yet it does not extend to its regular subjective consequences but
is experienced as a worthwhile and valuable goal without them. Here it is
not the quality of the object that is the genuine bearer of value; rather,
however much quality is indispensable and determines the measure of the
value, the true motivation is the fact of its being possessed, the form of the
relationship in which the subject stands to the object. The real value, at
which the teleological sequence comes to an end, lies in this form – which
is realizable only in a specific content: it lies in this ownership by the subject
which exists as an objective fact (Simmel 1978 [1907]: 257-258).
In this sense, money comes to be the only good which cannot decay:
However, money takes on an exceptional position in this respect. On the
one hand, it pushes to its limit any incommensurability between the wish
and its object. Any endeavor that has been focused on money only finds in
it something completely indeterminate, something that cannot satisfy a
reasonable demand and to which we have no specific relation because it
has no substance. If our wish does not extend beyond money towards a
concrete goal, then a deadly disappointment must follow. Such a
disappointment will always be experienced where monetary wealth, which
has been passionately desired and considered an unquestionable
happiness, reveals what it really is after it has been acquired: money is
merely a means, whose elevation to an ultimate purpose cannot survive
after it has been acquired. Whereas here the greatest discrepancy between
wish and fulfilment exists, the exact reverse takes place if the psychological
character of money as a final purpose has become permanently solidified
and greed, too, has become a chronic condition. In this case, where the
desired object is supposed to grant nothing but its possession, and where
this limitation of desire is not only a passing self-deception, every
disappointment is dropped. All objects that we want to possess are
expected to achieve something for us once we own them. The often tragic,
often humorous incommensurability between wish and fulfilment is due to
the inadequate anticipation of this achievement of which I have just
spoken. But money is not expected to achieve anything for the greedy
person over and above its mere ownership. We know more about money
than about any other object because there is nothing to be known about
money and so it cannot hide anything from us. It is a thing absolutely
lacking in qualities and therefore cannot, as can even the most pitiful
object, conceal within itself any surprises or disappointments. Whoever
really and definitely only wants money is absolutely safe from such
experiences (Simmel 1978 [1907]: 262).
And as result, it approaches close to the notion of God:
In reality, money in its psychological form, as the absolute means and thus
as the unifying point of innumerable sequences of purposes, possesses a
significant relationship to the notion of God – a relationship that only
psychology, which has the privilege of being unable to commit blasphemy,
may disclose. The essence of the notion of God is that all diversities and
contradictions in the world achieve a unity in him, that he is – according to
a beautiful formulation of Nicolas de Cusa – the coincidentia oppositorum .
Out of this idea, that in him all estrangements and all irreconcilables of
existence find their unity and equalization, there arises the peace, the
security, the all-embracing wealth of feeling that reverberate with the
notion of God which we hold (Simmel 1978[1907]: 254).
Simmel describes a modern world of huge impersonal systems, held together to a large
extent, even though certainly not totally, through a mechanics of money and interestseeking. To compare with other school of thoughts, for example with principles of
deontology and kinds of virtue ethics that provide vital principles for cooperative
behavior, one cannot find such a role of a conception of good. In deontology, a set of
normative obligations like dignity and equality must be respected and it can be proven
that an economy cannot be sustained or effective without such principles. To
compensate for weaknesses of deontology, ‘the good in virtue ethics involves having
both good motivations and good reasons. Together they produce moral goods, like
justice, generosity, liberality, or kindness, which derive meaning from their application
in particular contexts.’ (van Staveren 2007: 27). In this view, the balance between selfinterest and altruism is justified as a virtue of being between excess and deficiency.
Despite the praiseworthy and also indispensable aspects of both these ethical
perspectives, they are not able to touch the pivotal role of self-interested action in
behavior especially in modern societies. It is essential to recognize and intelligently
accommodate the kind of impersonal-interdependency that is central in today’s life,
even if in a different way from the one that contemporary capitalism provides.
Regarding impersonal-interdependency, including in regard to the nature of money
and the operation of the enterprise, the role of deontology is (only) to constrain what
already has been made: in other words, to operate in restrictive mode. Likewise, virtue
ethics could not be generative in this regard. Although it goes beyond mere assertion
of duty and obligation, by involving emotion and skills in practice, it does not
sufficiently address the nature of institutions and of collective intentionality. It adheres
to the vision that concentrates on the agent as virtuous when he promotes his internal
good through practice and processes of trial and error (van Staveren 2007). In
MacIntyre’s version, this vision should result in a narrative unity which takes its
content from tradition and rejects universal-impersonal principles of liberal ethics.
Whatever the contributions and insights in this ethical approach, it tells us nothing for
example about how institutional arrangements in money production could be achieved
generatively from the agents’ practice, though it yet could impose something
restrictively in practice.
How do interests play an axial role? Football as an institution can be used as a brief
illustration. Firstly, football as an institution has no existence apart from its
constitutive rules, like offside and goal. Secondly, the rules are achieved through
collective intentionality. Football includes large body of organizations, with different
participants who cooperate with each other: player, referee, coach, technician,
accountant, reporter, photographer, servant, etc., but each of the different
stakeholders’ different purpose of activity contributes ultimately to the objective
purpose of win. In addition, a set of ethical principles is required to facilitate or
operate the system; such as fair play, equality, friendship, based in deontology or even
virtue ethics. But the strong object of attention and purpose of action, to be winner,
could not be derived from these ethical points.
Considering the central role of ‘win’ in football helps us to understand how selfinterest lies at the heart of an Interest-Governed World, a world in which other
purposes of acts also exist but in a subsidiary role at the institutional level for
cooperative behavior. Interests are the main source of the energetic acts from which a
change in the form of living is driven. Interests have become represented by money
and related entities—‘transferable monetized claims over resources’ (Gasper 2009).
Every status in life need to be sustained and enhanced in material form, like learning,
biking, eating, and so on. The social institution of production to accommodate change
in the form of living is run by a system of rules designed in accord with the role of
interests like ‘win’. So the interests govern the institutional cooperation; even, for
example, in a school that includes much selfless behavior, by a variety of chains this
activity depends on the lust for interest-advancement elsewhere in the system by
capitalist man / MAN.
Though capitalism is sometimes associated with subjectivism, as the most prominent
discourse in its normative philosophy, paradoxically its intuitional structure gravitates
around an objective concept of good, at which actions aim. Based on the central
concept of good as the focal center for cooperation, capitalism presents itself as the
only alternative that provides the necessary systematic change in the form of living.
Any alternative to capitalism must show that it can provide a feasible and desirable
change in form of living; that it presents a realistic and generative combination of
ethics, action, emotion and the management of impersonal-interdependency.
Religions, traditions and ethical strands of thought are the major sources of ideological
reproduction and of alternative narrations. But this pre-capitalist legacy must be
converted into a narration that could fulfil requirements of today’s world, the world of
global scale institutions and impersonal-interdependency. To shed a light on what
aspects should be satisfied by any alternative generative approach, we now try to
reformulate what has been said in terms of a set of features that reflects an
understanding of capitalism as generative narrative.
Three conditions that capitalism as a generative narrative approach satisfies
The idea of meta-narrative includes sociological perspectives like Marxism that offer a
general ideology for society.140 On the other hand, in humanities and related social
studies narrative theory represents a method in qualitative research studies. What we
wish to borrow from narratology is neither a general framework like Marxism nor a
qualitative method for research but something in between: a way of investigating the
‘characters’ (the purported agents, categories and forces that are appealed to) and
component ‘stories’ (the notions of interconnection, causality, sequence, etc.) that are
used in systems of interpreting the world. These ‘arrange a stream of events into a
trajectory of themes, motives and plot lines’ (Jahn 2005), in which the state
experienced in each situation is the cause of the next one and is also the effect of the
previous action.
In this case, investigating the grand narrative of capitalism, we identify a narrative of
MAN and man regarding capitalism’s inner dynamism. It involves a cycle, as for
example Bremond formulates for story narratology in which ‘the cycle starts from a
state of deficiency or a satisfactory state’ that will be disrupted, and ‘ends usually with
the establishment of a satisfactory state’ (Bremond 1970: 251, cited by Jahn 2005).
4.
As an example in development studies, Haddad (2008) compares some important recent statements in development
studies. He concludes that none of them offered an alternative to the dominant Anglo American metanarrative.
According to him, ‘we need other metanarratives that can compete, be reconciled and amalgamated with the Anglo
American metanarrative’.
This circular pattern of Bremond would fit well with the circular course of actions in
the inner dynamism of capitalism, with the specific feature that in capitalism the
experienced state ends in deficiency which feeds an unending cycle. The following
elements are what form sequence and causality of the inner dynamism of capitalism:
a) An objectively identifiable path of maximization
b) A strong hierarchy that can be flexible, subject to remaining consistent with the
two other conditions
c) Turning contradictions into motion.
An objectively identifiable path of maximization. What was presented from Hirschman
on the idea of ‘interests’ and from Simmel on the concept of money can be
reformulated here, in relation to the first feature that a generative narrative should
have. Simmel portrays money as that which becomes end rather than means, because
of its existence as ‘supra-subjective valuation’. ‘Money can become, psychologically, an
absolute value, because it does not have to fear being dissolved into something
relative, a prospect that makes it impossible for many substantial values to maintain
the claim to be absolute’ (Simmel 1978: 256). Above the subjective consequences of
action, money is the only thing, in the new capitalist order, that could locate value
outside of the subject. In effect, it is the main accumulatable entity able to satisfy the
striving for being maximized. It remains uncorrupted [except by theft, fraud and
inflation], but accumulatable and retractable—facets not found in utility phenomena.
The possibility of unending accumulation supports its claim to be absolute. What goes
for money goes for ‘interests’; they reflect almost the same thing.
The concept of good in capitalism thus takes its content from a supra-subjective
source. This allows, first, a sensible path of maximization—the measure of good can be
accumulated and retraceable--, and second, because the objective can be shared by
parties it allows cooperation and collective intentionality. Without collective
intentionality of the purpose it is not possible to organise acts in collective behavior
and, for example, compete with each other.
A strong hierarchy that can be flexible, consistent with the two other conditions. With
the new role of the interests come hierarchical social relations, involving the structural
dichotomy between ‘MAN’ and ‘man’. Hierarchy arises out of, first, the lust for power,
and second, the reality of different faculty and advantages between people, some of
them due to the heritage of history and others from personality. Lust for power might
be morally controlled, but the advantages and weaknesses bequeathed by history
perpetuate the ubiquity of structural hierarchy. For the emergence of capitalism, the
instructive lesson of Hirschman’s account is that it ‘arose right in the center of the
"power structure" and the pre-existing "establishment"’.
The origins are to be found in the concern with statecraft. The passions that
most need bridling belong to the powerful, who are in a position to do
harm on a huge scale and were believed to be particularly well endowed
with passions in comparison to the lesser orders. As a result, the most
interesting applications of the [Passions-v.-Interests] thesis show how the
willfulness, the disastrous lust for glory, and, in general, the passionate
excesses of the powerful are curbed by the interests—their own and those
of their subjects. (Hirschman: 1977: 70).
The new way re-channeled the previous lust for power in another direction. This is
what, in conjunction with various vital institutional innovations and other
circumstances, initiated revolutionary socio-economic change. MAN and MAN
cooperated in order to achieve mastery of man. Gasper (2009), commenting on
Nietzsche’s views, remarks: ‘Man, real Man, strove for mastery, even world mastery’.
MAN
Conditional morality
MAN
Conditional morality
man
man
Conditional morality
The morality between characters mediates the course of action of each character. Socalled self-regulation is not intrinsic to markets, but is the reflection of the conditional
morality between MAN and man, with the same collective intentionality and the then
shared purpose of gain. The conditional morality between MAN and MAN, the
masters, is staged usually in the real world by competition between capitalist
leaderships in banks, foundations, corporations, etc. The relations between man and
man are submerged by consumerism. MAN-man relations are master-subordinate
relations. These characterizations are matters of degree; and a person may have two
characters in some degree and at the same time but in different fora, as a master or a
consumer. But the contrast between the two types of character is crucial for
constructing the relational narrative between stakeholders.
The conditional morality represents the predominance of Man-Man relations over
Man-Commodity relations. Modern economics relegates everything to the latter type
of relation, which matches a social reality which gives the former type of relation a
secondary role. In contrast, Man-Man relations have been noted by Marx, Simmel,
Schumpeter and Hirschman as a primary role. ‘The prerogative of capital’ to retain the
surplus is one product of this reality regarding relations, and underlies today’s
intuitional essence of the corporation. The same goes for capitalist-credit money, a
more complicated case which we shall discuss later together with the associated
theme of impersonal-interdependency.
Turning contradictions into motion. The final constituent of the narrative is the
possibility of turning contradictions into motion, the miracle of capitalism’s ability to
provide sustained systematic change in the form of living. Whereas competing lust for
power in feudal or monarchical structures leads to bloody wars, within capitalism, as
Hirschman indicates, the new role of interests means that competition between
rivals—MAN and MAN—pushes the system forward for further stages of change in the
form of living.
Taking the three elements together, one sees how the system is dynamic and why
each element support others, to give a system for change in the form of living together
with a simple accessible narrative. Each generative approach that wishes to offer an
alternative to capitalism should have these sorts of elements. We will deal with this
challenge for development ethics briefly in the next part.
Part Two - Problems in theory building that underpin the neglect of a generative
narrative approach
A restrictive approach, one that sets criteria to judge and restrict the operations of
capitalism, can suffer from a hidden gap: a separation. It usually assumes implicitly an
unspecific institutional system which must become responsible for development.
First, this sort of approach can separate part of society out from development which it
can purportedly view from the outside and decide about. It defines the main agenda of
development as to serve inside-people, to make opportunities and well-being for
them. ‘Well-being’ is considered as the result of development; development must
enhance people’s well-being and quality of life. This direction still views people as the
recipient of development. And there are other outside-people who can provide these
conditions. Treating development as freedom can become an illustration of this
separation. Freedom in any possible normative variant—negative, positive, agency,
process, opportunity, freedom from want, from fantasy, from addiction, etc.—may
become treated as requiring the external counterpart entity in order to achieve it or to
remove inhibiting factors.
Second, political authority itself cannot be the main system by which the system of
production is organized ethically and institutionally; it only provides some general
conditions. Capitalism is the main system, worldwide, yet restrictive ethicists often do
not address its basic forms of operation. Various ethicists attempt to affect policies,
and try to influence international organizations and governments to change their
views; for example, to turn from neoliberal policies to others (St. Clair 2007). But often
their advocacy, against neoliberalism and in favour of some alternative, seems to miss
the biggest point, if it continues to implicitly accept the general narrative of capitalism.
Consider a famous example from the Capability Approach (CA): a bicycle provides the
capability ‘to be able to move around’, which development should provide. But how is
the bicycle itself produced? Does the CA have ideas different from trickle-down
regarding the expansion of new capabilities by production? And does the CA yet
extend to seriously consider the far more influential example of the petroleum-fuelled
motor vehicle and the societal systems that grew up around it ? (See e.g. Urry 2011).
Often development theories build general conceptual frames which are useful as an
interpretative tool to explain an object of study, and then continue to policy
recommendation; for example, in the capability approach, needs theory, or existential
ethics in development. But development theories need to give deep attention to
objective social realities of development in itself, especially when the systems of social
moulding evolve in major ways—as we shall explore later in this project in relation to
the institution of money. If the prime concept of development is systematic change in
the forms of living, then development studies must engage with the distinctive nature
of capitalism: ‘development’ is a phenomenon brought into existence by capitalism.
Understanding capitalism requires identifying capitalism’s narrative(s); and
fundamentally changing capitalism can only probably be through a post-capitalist
narrative.
The workable way to conceptualize a value-imbued concept like freedom is to consider
it in the context of a narrative and then to envisage the alternative processes and
outcomes that a different narrative may suggest. Currently, our conceptualization
about freedom is strongly tacitly influenced by capitalist social realities, which impose
many things that lie beyond individual awareness, even in fora of democratic
deliberation. This elision of attention to key features of social reality in theory building
for development allows reinforcement of capitalist development. Yazdanpanh’s later
work will look at the institution of money, capitalist credit money, which raises a range
of vitally important issues connected with people’s ‘collective intentionality’ and
unawareness, impersonal interdependency, resource mobilization and distribution of
benefits. We need to examine too the collaboration of social science to help constitute
this specific nature of money, and the moral climate that permits and indeed
ensconces pursuit of money itself as the end.
Karl Polanyi’s illustration of the Gold Standard helps unveil the power of impersonalinterdependency. Polanyi argued how three simple rules of the Gold Standard
system—all of them in favor of the international free market and market selfregulation—contributed fundamentally to a set of flows of resources, exploitation of
overseas populations, dramatic declines in wages and farm income, increase in
unemployment, a sharp rise in failures of businesses and banks, and ultimately to the
emergence of fascism and war (Polanyi 2001 [1944]: xxx). Similarly, to see how the
sphere of individual reasoning links to the power of impersonal social interdependency
we need to interface micro value concepts—like capability—with narrative.
The standard way of trying to link social science and/or ethics theory to practice is
‘policy’. Studies, by their methods and the system of values they choose and apply,
evaluate and design policy options in order to guide choice and action. In other words,
policy is the ultimate target. But this procedure can involve a misdirection, if it masks
and ignores the influence of foundational assumptions about the very nature of
development as a system of energy in a social reality and as a narrative. Obviously
there are no policy commands to be a homo economicus, but there are ranges of
policies that indirectly affect people’s attitude towards homo economicus. Even the
prioritization of measurable criteria—closely tied to the objective idea of interests—
has an influence, since it de facto downgrades many values that are non-monetizable
or not thing-oriented (Gasper 2008). Awareness that a socio-economic-political system
contains much more than ‘policy’ helps us understand the power of capitalism as a
(relatively) consistent dynamic system in which (most) elements behave in harmony,
reinforcing each other and downgrading the alternatives.
The capitalist narrative of development has a powerful inner dynamism to get more
expansion and to include more human beings, territory, countries, etc. It can convert
other issues such as needs or poverty to become subordinate incorporated values
within its own narrative about what is valuable and historically necessary. This we can
call imposing value from the inner dynamism of a system. The Asian tigers as the most
attractive new developed countries are examples of such an internal power of
capitalism to evolve and maintain predominance as ideology. That the governance
practices of the Asian tigers have sometimes been remote from the ideology
presented by capitalism’s global ideologues only reinforces our point about the
flexibility and force of the master-narrative. In this narrative, the function of policy is
to remove institutional obstacles to the expansion of capitalism, and to prime the
capitalist engine directly or indirectly, in order to allow trickle-down from more
accumulation for already accumulated capital.
Alternative narratives which yet tacitly assume homo economicus and capitalist
accumulation, and implicitly only seek to somehow regulate and qualify capitalist
development, have difficulty in competing with an entrenched narrative that places
homo economicus at its heart. In the absence of an alternative narrative generative
approach for development studies and development ethics, a preoccupation with
detailed case studies could cause unintentional sliding into the river of capitalism’s
expansion. Such case studies should consider analysis, case investigation and theory
building for development as also a matter of constructing a narrative, rather than only
as a matter of explaining, evaluating or prescribing.
Development ethics should recognize this challenge and define and work on new
agendas involving these methodological issues.
(a) Turning attention also towards values that are imposed by the inner dynamism of a
system that steers development. Exploring value inquiry from a narrative standpoint is
complex and needs methodological innovation (or drawing on methodological tools
developed elsewhere but not yet familiar in development ethics work). More
generally, value inquiry should go further to investigate how the nature of a system
affects our attitudes and re-forms traditions. These issues were outlined by Goulet, for
example, especially in his work of the 1960s and 70s.
(b) Thinking further about the concept of agency within social reality. To what extent
can agency of a class of people be placed above social reality; to what extent can social
reality itself be human being’s intended product? Furthermore, how agency can be
understood as a process?
(c) What is the role of development theory? Compare two sequences:
Evaluating→ policy analysis and policy design→ application
Idea/Ideology → collective belief, representation, intentionality → creating facts
(behavioral and institutional).
While development studies has largely limited itself to the former sequence, capitalism
benefits from the latter sequence as well as the former. Welfare economics defined
itself in the former mould; however, it serves also the latter format, in harmony with
the idea of interests. How can theory building for development use the latter mould?
How far does a human rights approach yet occupy such a mould?
(d) Considering how problems like poverty can be resolved in a way other than via a
trickle-down effect. To do so, we need to reduce our mental dependency on the
categories of capitalism. Separation of ontologically subjective and objective
dimensions could help here. For example, technology and physical resources are an
objective matter, but money is a subjective one, even though we perceive it as an
objective world in the same way as the natural world.
(e) Central to understanding the grand narrative and the power of capitalism is
examination of impersonal-interdependency. In terms of impersonal-interdependency,
understanding the institution and role of money is essential. Nowadays, money works
as a social relation of mobilizing resources and transferring wealth from new
developing areas to richer ones. Forming alternative frames and concepts and defining
different concrete scenarios relies on the narrative we hold. Interactive thinking,
combining and alternating between narrative horizons and concrete issues, can open a
wide range of alternatives and relevant topics to study.
Impersonal-interdependency comes as a product of the structuring of social reality
which enables human beings to be coordinated by the institution of money. From his
long study of the nature of money, Geoffrey Ingham concludes that Marx and
Durkheim failed to propose an alternative to impersonal-interdependency in the face
of capitalism: ‘Modern society required a moral basis that was appropriate for its
complex “organic” structure in which individuals would be aware that their
independence and individuality is based on their mutual interdependence’ (Ingham
2013:144). We will argue, in a sister paper, building on and extending Ingham’s
account of the nature of money and using aspects of Searle’s conceptualization of
social reality, that money connects ethics with institutions in an invisible way that has
been usually neglected.
To anticipate, we will suggest that impersonal-interdependency connects strongly with
the primary concept of development—systemic change in the form of living—as well
as the other significant issues such as agency, responsibility, distribution of benefits,
and so on. Moreover, the imposition of invisible values in myriad ways can be
investigated through its elucidation. A series of questions and issues will become
raised for attention, notably that capitalist credit-money expands societal capacity, but
by mobilizing the resources of the public for the benefit especially of the powerful
private capitalist class. How would it be possible to instead activate this social capacity
in favor of broader public benefit? The same pattern and question apply in relation to
financial markets operating on a world scale, not only within nations. The nature of
capitalist-credit money brings an unending impulsion to expand itself, and it
accordingly mobilizes human and natural resources toward the privileged monetary
headquarters and sustains consumerism there. Relevant development ethics needs to
transcend ‘separation’, and to seek to grasp the mechanisms and narrative of
capitalism more adequately; and then proceed to propose counter-narratives, and
visions of how to design for fulfilment of basic needs of deprived people while
harnessing the capacity of money in social organization.
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3.3 Global development: obstacles and challenges
(CE)
Room 342
Chair: Jimmy Washburn, Department of Philosophy, University of Costa Rica.
PANEL: Global development: obstacles and challenges.
Presenters: 1. Mladjo Ivanovic, PhD student Department of Philosophy
2. Anna Malavisi, PhD student Department of Philosophy
3. Monica List, PhD student Department of Philosophy
Michigan State University, U.S.A
Ivanoviv@msu.edu, Malavisi@msu.edu list@msu.edu
Abstract: Panel proposal: Obstacles and Challenges to Global Development
In this panel we offer a critical analysis of some of the obstacles that arise within the
discourse and practice of global development. We focus on three areas: symbolic
challenges; epistemic injustice and a conceptual analysis of the term sustainability, a
term bandied around among development theoreticians and practitioners that like
many other concepts can be misinterpreted and distorted. We argue that a better
understanding of these obstacles can offer an insight into how best to address these
obstacles and challenges. Without this period of critical reflexivity, we become pawns
of a global system destined for failure.
Presenter No.1: The Blind leading the Deaf: Symbolic challenges to Development
practices
The proliferation of development discourse in Western societies during the 1980s and
1990s ranks as one of the more astonishing developments of an often tragically
astonishing century. Since most discussions of the moral and legal aspects of
development emphasize the structural arrangements and policies that regulate
conduct of international institutions, one may raise the question of the subject who is
doing the negotiating and in which ways development norms and practices are framed
and represented to her. The problem, then, is not only to offer a radical alternative to
various political discourses of (mal) development through reorganization of
institutional forces, but also to disclose ways how public sentiment is formed and the
ways in which certain social forces nurture support of political subjects for interests
that these forces want to advance, regardless of their ethical value and integrity. In
order to articulate a moral evaluation of contemporary development practices this
paper considers how certain ‘well-intentioned’ contemporary political projects result
from the very configurations and effects of power that they seek to subdue.
Theoreticians often interpret development through the analysis of successful historical
events. Limiting the discussion of development in this way avoids its complexity, and
minimizes the role played by economic, political, and cultural institutions. To avoid this
deficiency, this paper treats development as a relational process embedded in the
structures and regulative powers of international law, political management, work of
media, and global economy. By disclosing ways in which embedded political and
economic interests shape development practices, my final aim is to pose a profound
challenge to contemporary development discourse by revealing its questionable moral
foundations.
In order to achieve this goal, I critically reflect on ways in which contemporary
development discourse focuses on the spatial and structural features of power in
humanitarian management ignoring the symbolic dimensions involved. This failure to
acknowledge how interpretative and symbolic representations of development
projects affect public sentiment overlooks the subjective aspects of these contexts,
and may distort concrete weight that ethics has for development practices. An ongoing
politicization of development and the subsequent complicity of NGO workers with
economic powers remind us of the deeper problem plaguing development ethics,
namely the various processes by which we make sense of such political and economic
projects. How do we make sense of, or even reconcile, the connection between
development and political violence? How do objectified accounts of statistics
concerning human deprivation mobilize our understanding, make us grieve, or even
cause us to forget and remain indifferent? Finally, what moral obligations does the
knowledge of such horrifying conditions arouse, and what are the invoked questions of
responsibility? In some cases, state efforts to control the visual and discursive
dimensions of public opinion blur the line between bearing witness and ongoing
political manipulation. The ways media politicize and internalize humanitarian and
development choices put in question our grasp of the moral challenges that plague the
intersection of international humanitarianism, development practices and the political
choices that lead to these crises. If we want to understand how morally culpable the
political present is, we need a critical investigation into the formation of public
imagination, and how such imagination affects lives of others.
Presenter No.2: Epistemic injustice in global development
There are millions of children, women and men who do not have access to clean
running water, an adequate supply of food, electricity, education and the fulfillment of
other human rights. This can be considered as a moral failing on the part of individuals
and institutions. Global development is comprised of a system of ideas, policies,
institutions and individuals which at first glance is supposedly concerned with the
amelioration of the living conditions of those populations living in disadvantaged
situations. However, this in fact is not necessarily true. A fundamental problem in
development is the suppression of knowledge or what Boaventura de Sousa Santos
calls, “a form of epistemicide.” I argue that understanding epistemic injustice is crucial
for rethinking the theory and practice of global development. From my own analysis
which also draws on my experience as a development professional for many years in
Latin America, one of the fundamental problems of development theory and practice
is grounded in the limitations in the theoretical discussions of knowledge, and how this
knowledge is then applied in the practice. Understanding epistemic injustice can alter
the way we think about global development, and will thus guide us in how gross
injustices such as extreme poverty can and should be addressed. I begin by discussing
the importance of knowledge as a virtue in and of itself.
Second, I introduce the notion of epistemic injustice and analyse how the theory and
practice of global development is epistemically unjust. To help build this analysis I
draw on the work of feminist epistemologists and other theorists such as Boaventura
de Sousa Santos. Santos introduces the term cognitive justice and claims that
cognitive justice is an essential component of global justice. Cognitive justice for
Santos can be likened to epistemic justice in many ways. So beginning with Miranda
Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, I will work through the work of feminist
epistemologists such as Anderson, Medina, Dotson and others, but also of Santos, to
construct and articulate more fully a concept of epistemic injustice. I argue that there
is a synergy between Santos’ cognitive justice and epistemic justice as put forward by
feminist and social epistemologists, and that a more robust account of
cognitive/epistemic injustice is found through this synergistic relationship. I finish by
offering some thoughts on what needs to happen to achieve epistemic justice in global
development.
Presenter No. 3. The concept of sustainability: the search for consensus and
objectivity
Countless variants and offshoots of the concept of sustainability have emerged since
the publication of Our Common Future (WCED, 1987). Among these variants, the
concept of social sustainability is perhaps one of the broadest, creating deliberate
connections between populations’ ability to meet their needs and their ability to
maintain the resource base that fulfills those needs. However, beyond this basic
definition, there is little agreement on what social sustainability entails, or what it
should look like in practice. Conceptual and taxonomical analyses of social
sustainability often focus on the basic elements, norms, or conditions that must be
present in order for sustainability to be possible or successful. These analyses also
often point out that the “conceptual chaos” that has become endemic to discussions
of sustainability compromises the term’s utility (Vallance et al, 2011), and therefore
the ability to progress from theoretical discussions to practical applications of social
sustainability.
A common element in discussions of social sustainability is the need to find a generally
accepted concept or definition. Terms such as “bridging of differences”, and
“consensus building” are frequently found in the literature. While a common approach
to building consensus is the use of participatory approaches that aim to include the
voices of multiple stakeholders, the search for unified concepts and shared goals
undeniably relies on the acceptance of a form of objective knowledge, understood as
neutral and value-free. In this sense, both sustainability and development rely on a
scientific, objective understanding of both the subjects and objects of their practices.
These practices assume that the needs, resources, and capabilities of individuals and
communities, and their environments can be accurately quantified, monitored, and
measured in order to determine the best strategy for maintaining a certain quality of
life for present and future generations. I point out at least one way in which this is
problematic. Establishing an objective baseline and goals for social sustainability
necessarily requires the homogenization of individuals and their needs. This often
results in a stereotypical “we”, or what Chandra Mohanty (1984) calls “the
Essentialized Third World Woman”, who can never truly participate in the process of
defining sustainability, because her views are already part of the hypothesis.
The solution, however, is not to resort to relativism, for this would inevitably lead to
further conceptual divides and paralysis. As Donna Haraway (1988) points out,
“relativism and totalization are both god tricks, promising vision from nowhere and
everywhere equally and fully”. I argue that feminist concepts of objectivity, such as
Sandra Harding’s strong objectivity, and Haraway’s situated knowledges may provide
the sustainability movement with a way to incorporate multiple local knowledges
while avoiding both relativism and totalization. I also contend that using these views
to examine social sustainability and sustainable development may help make visible
the connections between the concepts and methods of these practices, emphasizing
and critically examining the role that objectivity plays in establishing academic and
political agendas.
3.4 Ética del desarrollo en América Latina
(CE)
Room 343
Chair: Hannia Franceschi, Escuela de Trabajo Social, San Ramón, Universidad de Costa
Rica.
Una aproximación estético-ambiental al problema ético de la naturaleza en
América Latina.
Angelina Paredes Castellanos
Doctorante en Filosofía
Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, México.
angelinacastell@gmail.com
Abstract: Uno de los grandes desafíos para América Latina es lograr articular y superar
la “imagen estética errónea”, que pesa sobre los cuerpos y la “naturaleza
latinoamericana”. El reconocimiento de la conexión íntima entre “la naturaleza y los
cuerpos” revela, que la interpretación que hagamos sobre una repercutirá en los otros.
Proponemos preguntarnos primeramente ¿cuál ha sido la idea o concepción que se
tiene de la naturaleza en América Latina? En segundo lugar, proponemos preguntarnos
¿Cuál ha sido la idea o concepción acerca de los cuerpos latinoamericanos?
Cuestiones, que proponen una revisión histórica acompañada de una consideración
estética, con tal de pensar en un futuro ecológicamente sustentable a nivel de un
desarrollo social y humano para nuestra región. En plena época de relaciones
internacionales donde cada vez más personas del mundo nos interrelacionamos y
necesitamos unas de otras, me parece importante advertir que la ética se tiene que
apoyar con la estética ambiental para un diálogo entre las culturas, donde las “visiones
estereotipadas” de unas con/sobre las otras sean revalorizadas. Hoy, en el campo de la
filosofía latinoamericana tenemos más conceptos clave para pensar nuestra realidad:
piénsese en las filosofías del cuerpo, en las filosofías de la naturaleza, en las nuevas
éticas antihumano-céntricas: “animal, vegetal”, en las eco-filosofías feministas
latinoamericanas, en los movimiento sociales, entre más propuestas teóricas y
prácticas, todo ello, apunta a pensar en el respeto, reconocimiento y dignidad de
nuestros “ambientes: naturales y corporales”.
Pensar a la “naturaleza
latinoamericana” como un gran Cuerpo, aspecto sugerido por la revisión de la
propuesta filosófica de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, así como formular las varias
interpretaciones culturales de la naturaleza no solo a nivel epistemológico sino
también a nivel estético, por parte del filósofo alemán Hans-Georg Gadamer, nos
parecen sugerencias filosóficas clave para vislumbrar un análisis crítico pero también
propositivo en torno a una estética dignificante de nuestra región. Hoy la imagen de la
naturaleza como cosa o máquina empieza a cambiar (lamentablemente no por la
mayoría) desde que algunos autores en todo el mundo, se han pronunciado por una
noción no objetiva del ambiente. En su lugar, promueven otras concepciones del
entorno natural, respetando ciclos; estudian a la Tierra asumida desde su vitalidad y
belleza, desde una consideración de convivencia respetuosa. Tal proceso puede ser
también un aspecto clave para cambiar la visión de muchas situaciones sociales en la
realidad latinoamericana, sobre todo, lo que concierne a los “cuerpos” concebidos
como cosas o mercancías. Trabajar en los prejuicios, imágenes, ideas o concepciones
estéticas sobre la “naturaleza-corporal” de nuestra región puede aportar en una ética
preocupada por el futuro, supervivencia y desarrollo ecológico y humano en nuestra
región. Puede ser una reflexión estético-ambiental, que intente mejorar el diálogo
entre culturas y, no la explotación o la dominación, que a su vez conllevan a la
discriminación o a la sumisión. Por todo esto, la ética ambiental pero también la
estética ambiental tienen un papel decisivo para reflexionar sobre la circunstancia de
la naturaleza en América Latina.
Introducción
Ética del Desarrollo Humano sostenible en América Latina: logros y desafíosUno del
desafíos más importantes para América Latina es cambiar una imagen, una idea o una
interpretación problemática que involucra a ambos: a la naturaleza y al cuerpo
humano desde la objetivación. Imagen que incluye, a su vez aspectos, históricos,
culturales, económicos, sociales y estéticos construidos por largo tiempo, que
ameritan un necesario e imprescindible análisis crítico desde la filosofía
(hermenéutica) ambiental.
En primer lugar, es muy importante pensar en conjunto: a la naturaleza y al cuerpo
porque sin este "paisaje total" es imposible considerar porqué la interpretación del
primer concepto impacta al segundo, es decir, porque la objetivación de la naturaleza
(por la mentalidad moderna) implica también la objetivación del cuerpo o de los
cuerpos. Rasgo principal de la cultura Occidental negadora del cuerpo y de la
naturaleza.
Por ello, hay que tener en cuenta el concepto occidental de “naturaleza” estudiado por
lo que podemos denominar la filosofía eco-hermenéutica; (Grün, 2007) ahí podemos
ver expuesta, analizada y criticada la manera en que la naturaleza desde la filosofía
moderna, en la que se basa la hegemonía de la mentalidad occidental, se ha entendido
como una cosa, diferente y opuesta al ser humano, especialmente desde que la
modernidad, definió a la naturaleza como un objeto a disposición del hombre. Se trata
de una naturaleza como una gran máquina perfecta, una cosa para dominar.
Concepción objetiva, que a su vez, ha impactado al propio concepto de Cuerpo, pues al
mismo, se le ha definido como una máquina, un objeto o como algo olvidado en la
definición misma del hombre.
Ahora, bien, el concepto de “cuerpo” es un asunto que muchas veces no se menciona
en la mayoría de los análisis ambientales, pues mantienen un concepto central e
idealista de “naturaleza”, es decir, un concepto, que tiende a in-visibilizar la dimensión
corporal, por la que el mismo hombre es Cuerpo y también naturaleza. Por la que
también el mismo ser humano puede ser “ambiente”. Se trata de pensar en un
concepto amplio de “naturaleza”; donde una conciencia corporal para el horizonte
hermenéutico-ambiental incluya lo humano en tanto cuerpo. La reflexión de lo
humano en la reflexión ambiental es un aspecto muy importante. (Foladori, 2006). El
hombre en tanto cuerpo es “paisaje ambiental”.
Desde las reflexiones del filósofo francés Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “el cuerpo” es parte
de la naturaleza. Nunca el cuerpo humano es una cosa diferente de la naturaleza. El
cuerpo nos recuerda nuestra conexión intrínseca con la naturaleza, siempre presente.
Somos naturaleza porque somos cuerpo. (Ramírez, 2010).
El filósofo francés nos recuerda al cuerpo como naturaleza. Primero, hace “visible” una
cuestión ocultada por la cultura hegemónica occidental: la dimensión sensible y
perceptiva en la que el cuerpo es un fenómeno primordial en nuestra relación con la
naturaleza; sin el cual es imposible las otras dimensiones de la existencia. Por el
cuerpo: sentimos y después pensamos. Siento, luego pienso es la frase que nos
recuerda precisamente la dimensión primordial de nuestro cuerpo.
Aunque tales afirmaciones remiten a un debate acerca de la preeminencia
epistemológica y ontológica del cuerpo ante las especulaciones de la filosofía moderna
de la autoconciencia, nosotros queremos ver, este recuerdo o visibilización del cuerpo,
desde una dimensión hermenéutica-ambiental, primero: porque la interpretación del
cuerpo como objetivado responde a una visión de la naturaleza como objeto, en
conjunto. Y segundo, porque la suposición de la objetivación del cuerpo como
naturaleza hace que sea fundamental problematizar la dimensión humana para los
discursos ambientales.
La interpretación del cuerpo tiene una relación estrecha con la interpretación de la
naturaleza, al menos en la historia de Occidente, pues ambos han sido vistos como
objetos, a la disposición del ser humano o sin un valor más allá que el instrumental. En
cambio, desde la filosofía, podemos volver a pensarlos en una relación ontológica.
En la mentalidad moderna, la naturaleza y el cuerpo reciben la misma interpretación
cosificante. Esta reflexión no es menor si la pensamos: por ejemplo,
1. Para ampliar el horizonte ecológico, muchas veces centrado y reducido a “lo
ambiental” sin considerar ningún rasgo humano: en este caso: el cuerpo.
2. Para la cuestión de la sustentabilidad ambiental. Al reflexionar desde una
filosofía del cuerpo se debe a su vez a reflexionar sobre lo humano. “Yo en
tanto cuerpo soy parte del paisaje ambiental”.
3. Si la pensamos para una propuesta ético-ambiental de la “naturaleza” que
involucre el respecto y el reconocimiento de los cuerpos.
4. Si pensamos esta propuesta ético-ambiental para el contexto Latinoamericano.
Por ejemplo, comprender esta interpretación occidental de la naturaleza es muy
importante para Latinoamérica, porque en primer instancia, la idea que tenían los
conquistadores cuando llegaron a este nuevo continente era ya la de una “naturaleza”
(incluido el cuerpo) como objeto para el dominio. En su horizonte hermenéutico de
comprensión de la realidad los recién llegados al Nuevo Mundo, pensaban al hombre
fuera de la naturaleza, la consideraban algo lejano, en oposición a sí mismos y a su
entera disposición. (Gudynas, 2010). Una “naturaleza” separada de lo humano y bajo
el dominio era una visión, que a poco a poco se iría instalando en la historia de la
región; expandiéndose luego como parte de la mentalidad moderna de la cultura
occidental.
La imagen de la naturaleza en América Latina concebida en su inicio desde la
dominación, se ha construido sobre la base de un imaginario entorno a una
"naturaleza exótica" y unos "cuerpos exóticos" de suyo rechazado al ser extraños o
diferentes. (Le Breton, 2002). Bajo los prejuicios de su propia cultura epocal, “el
foráneo conquistador” interpretó al cuerpo y la naturaleza del nuevo continente desde
la devaluación (Gudynas, 2010). El cuerpo desnudo del nativo y también su “entorno
natural” considerado salvaje, fueron objetos de explotación, desde “prejuicios
negativos”, basados en la invisibilidad del de lo corporal y lo natural de una cultura
considerada superior.
El fuerte impacto estético frente a aquél "cuerpo desnudo del nativo" y la imagen del
encuentro con una "naturaleza salvaje", fue en su momento, una total incomprensión
proveniente del choque de dos cosmovisiones de dos civilizaciones que hoy
comprendemos con más claridad. Una “cultura foránea”, que había dejado de
pensarse como parte de la naturaleza y, otra, “nativa” u “originaria”, que se pensaba
precisamente como perteneciente al Universo. (Morales, 2010) Una cultura dominante
que rechazaba al Cuerpo y a la naturaleza y, una cultura que aceptaba su propio
cuerpo y a la Naturaleza.
La devaluación del Otro en la que se basó la dominación del nativo del Nuevo Mundo,
no fue sólo es una cuestión de “conquista epistemológica” sino que fue una
devaluación de índole estético-cultural Estéticamente, el afán de dominación de la
naturaleza y el cuerpo bajo el calificativo peyorativo de exóticos: extraños y diferentes,
condicionó los prejuicios de dominación favorecedores sobre toda una región.
La devaluación estética del Otro: del cuerpo del Otro, con sus particulares
características y; de su ambiente, igualmente, considerado como diferente fue la base
para discriminación posterior. El concepto exótico aparte de dar cuenta de un
“encuentro incomprensible” entre un sujeto y otro, abre el terreno de lo que
efectivamente se ha referido por exótico: el cuerpo y el paisaje, considerados como
diferentes e “inferiores”, categorías propias de la tragedia de la extrañeza del mundo
del hombre moderno.
La cuestión es que incluso ahora el punto de vista occidental sobre la naturaleza que
impacta al cuerpo no parece finalizar. Occidente ha mantenido una mentalidad
dicotómica (ambiente y cuerpo) hasta en sus disciplinas mas actuales, afectando
negativamente con esta imagen hegemónica del mundo, no sólo a la cuestión
ecológica sino también la cuestión social-humana. De ahí que, la reivindicación de lo
ambiental deba incluir la reivindicación de lo corporal inclusive para un discurso
preocupado por la sustentabilidad.
Para América Latina, no es nueva la vinculación íntima entre el cuerpo y la naturaleza.
En el pasado y en algunas cosmovisiones de ciertos grupos de la región, las
interpretaciones de la naturaleza están tradicionalmente vinculadas a una visión más
cercana, fraterna o hasta sagrada de la misma. El cuerpo es parte de la naturaleza:
ambos “naturaleza y cuerpo” son considerados desde la sacralidad y no están
separados. (Morales, 2010) El cuerpo es considerado un templo sagrado y la
naturaleza en mayor medida.
No sólo en su consideración tradicional también en propuestas actuales de filósofos
latinoamericanos encontramos un re-planteamiento en torno a la crisis ambiental,
pero que de suyo tratan su significado más profundo: la pérdida del cuerpo y de la
Tierra. Noguera por ejemplo, está planteando otra forma alternativa de comprender
al cuerpo como parte de la Tierra. Ante el pensamiento moderno que ha eliminado de
la mente de los seres humanos la conexión ontológica del ser humano con la
naturaleza, el Geo-pensamiento latinoamericano propone una recuperación de la
“diversidad de formas” frente a la única visión predominante, en que la Tierra
constituye al cuerpo. (Noguera de Echeverri, 2011) Se ha de pensar en el hombre de la
Tierra en contraparte a la idea de la Tierra del hombre para evitar reducir la naturaleza
a una mercancía y, al mismo cuerpo, a un recurso para la venta o la explotación. De
esta forma el olvido o la pérdida del cuerpo nace de pensar geo-filosóficamente una
relación ontológica.
Considero que tanto el pensamiento tradicional como el filosófico contemporáneo
latinoamericanos sobre el tema ambiental tienen un aporte en la visibilización del
cuerpo para el debate ambiental. De tal modo que incluir “lo humano” en los discursos
del medio ambiente se realice a través de la dimensión corporal. Se trata de
“visibilizar” el cuerpo, un rasgo humano para una preocupación ecológica.
Con esto, no se trata de caer en neo-antropocentrismos, sino en advertir el riesgo o
peligro de seguir con una in-visibilización “corporal” para el tema ambiental. Dejar de
lado, el tema del cuerpo desde el horizonte ambiental, acaba en una incomprensión de
lo que involucra el concepto “Tierra”. Como sabemos los peligros son caer o no querer
ver una serie de injusticas; donde el caso Latinoamericano es un caso especial.
Nos referimos a fenómenos, donde los habitantes de un lugar son desalojados,
amenazados o hasta devaluados en sus costumbres por sus tierras. Entre más
aspectos, donde lamentablemente se pone en evidencia la continua “negación del
cuerpo”. Ahora en América Latina nos enfrentamos: al tráfico de órganos, la trata, el
turismo sexual infantil donde el cuerpo es visto como un recurso, un objeto para la
comercialización, exactamente como en la misma imagen negadora de la naturaleza,
cuando se la reduce a la categoría de “recursos naturales”, “canasta de materias
primas”, “objeto para la venta”, o “paisaje exótico”. Actualmente, “el cuerpo
latinoamericano” in-visibilizado, ante los embates de la gran demanda de recursos
corre el peligro de ser considerado como un “recurso corporal” para la explotación
ambiental, parte la “canasta de recursos naturales”. Los “prejuicios culturales” de la
mentalidad moderna radican en la forma despectiva, en que la naturaleza o los
cuerpos, han sido vistos como “cosas” para el dominio; con nefastas consecuencias no
sólo ecológicas sino sociales. El “cuerpo latinoamericano” ha que ha sido in-visibilizado
de los análisis preocupados por el medio ambiente debe incluirlo.
La preocupación ecológica contemporánea, tiende a concentrase en la sustentabilidad
del medio natural sin pensar en la: “sustentabilidad humana”. Todavía falta mucho
para incluir el referente humano-corporal.
No sólo para la filosofía sino para otras ramas del conocimiento interesadas en temas
ambientales en América Latina, es muy importante considerar la imagen del cuerpo y
de la naturaleza con un paisaje en conjunto, sin esto aspecto, la ética para un
desarrollo ético social y ambiental sustentable, que buscamos no será posible…
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desarrollo educativo en el caso ecuatoriano.
Meysis Carmenati González
Investigadora-docente
Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales y Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar,
Ecuador.
meysisc@gmail.com
Abstract: En los años recientes el mundo ha visto con especial atención los cambios
producidos en ciertos países del sur latinoamericano. Hemos sido testigos de la ola del
Socialismo del Siglo XXI en Venezuela (1999); el Socialismo comunitario y las políticas
del Suma Qamana, en el Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia (2005); y las políticas del
Sumak Kawsay o Buen Vivir, de la Revolución Ciudadana en el Ecuador (2007). En los
albores del nuevo siglo estos procesos irrumpieron al modo de una alternativa que,
desde distintas posturas y matices, elaboran principios de transformación y
descolonización de las sociedades. Se crearon espacios de articulación, se reactivaron
plataformas institucionales que permanecían marginadas o reproducían una cultura de
desclasamiento y acceso restringido. Fundamentalmente se desarrollaron políticas
desde el distanciamiento y rechazo al neoliberalismo en tanto el cambio civilizatorio
debía responder a una historia marcada por el sello de la dependencia. Entre las
transformaciones más radicales se puede identificar el impacto de la reforma
educativa en las universidades ecuatorianas y su vinculación con el paradigma del
Buen Vivir.
Si tuviéramos que definir en pocas palabras el potencial de esta reforma, diríamos que
se trata de analizar la producción teórica universitaria, teniendo en cuenta su objeto
social educativo y su vinculación a un contexto histórico. Desde una concepción de
desarrollo educativo ético se reflexiona sobre las necesidades de formación frente a los
procesos de cambio que operan en la región latinoamericana. Por supuesto, desde un
posicionamiento crítico, capaz de analizar no solo lo fenoménico, se impone una
reflexión sobre aquellos condicionamientos estructurales que actúan como sujetos de
la inercia o del cambio. En cuanto una universidad funciona y existe como institución
pública, está obligada a redefinirse desde principios normativos éticos que expliciten
su objeto social hacia el exterior y articulen sus dinámicas al interior. Se trata de la
incorporación, sistemática y rigurosa, de situaciones de aprendizaje ético y formación
ciudadana. No obstante, ello no puede limitarse a una cuestión meramente curricular
o a un conjunto de disposiciones y normativas legales: implica la formulación de
propuestas en política académica-docente y en vinculación a la comunidad; en pocas
palabras, se precisa un cambio en las culturas docente y laboral del profesorado. En el
caso ecuatoriano, el proceso de transformación ha reunido diferentes perspectivas
que van desde la inclusión de la interculturalidad como principio del
constitucionalismo transformador hasta la canonización de modelos pedagógicos
específicos, estrechamente vinculados con el paradigma de la complejidad. La
articulación de todos estos principios dentro de un proceso de democracia radical
expone un número importante de contradicciones y revela la complejidad de la
transformación sustantiva de las sociedades latinoamericanas en un proyecto que pasa
por ser incluyente y plurinacional. Sucede que esta articulación no puede ser un
proyecto coyuntural, sino que debe asumirse como un fundamento programático.
Porque, ¿desde qué instituciones se hacen, explícita o implícitamente, políticas que
influyen en el desarrollo social de un país? ¿Qué posibilidad poseen las instituciones
académicas para encarar la enorme transformación que supone asumirse como
productores directos no sólo de conocimientos, sino también de prácticas con impacto
directo sobre la sociedad? En esos espacios de acción, que es necesario enfatizar, se
producen ideas y visiones que pueden re-articular la economía, la cultura, la política,
los modos de vida de los ecuatorianos. En este sentido, particular atención merece la
observación acerca del carácter condicionado de la actividad docente y, sobre todo, de
los impactos producidos por sus resultados. Es necesario entender la comunidad
científica como un actor social, inmerso en una lucha constante de hegemonías
políticas. Actualmente, los mayores desafíos de las universidades de Latinoamérica se
concentran en la necesidad de consolidar una identidad propia, frente a la desbandada
neoliberal imperante. Entre las potencialidades de tal apropiación crítica se destaca la
posibilidad de construir nuevos paradigmas y “puntos de mira”, a partir de una
realidad social y política muy compleja y en pleno proceso de transformación, como la
que viven hoy muchos pueblos latinoamericanos.
¿Quién define lo qué es desarrollo? Un estudio de las motivaciones, los
valores y la agencia de las mujeres en resistencia contra el proyecto minero
Conga en Perú.
Sarai Fariñas Ausina
Investigadora del Grupo de Estudios en Desarrollo, Cooperación y Ética.
Universitat Politècnica de València; España
saraifarinas@gmail.com
Alejandra Boni Aristizábal
Investigadora asociada del Instituto INGENIO y Coordinadora del Programa de
Doctorado en Desarrollo Local y Cooperación Internacional en la UPV.
Universitat Politècnica de València, España
aboni@ingenio.upv.es
Jordi Peris Blanes
Profesor Titular de Universidad del Departamento de Proyectos de la
Universidad Politécnica de Valencia.
Universitat Politècnica de València. España
jperisb@dpi.upv.es
Presentadora: Alejandra Boni Aristizábal
Abstract: En el Perú, las reformas neoliberales del libre mercado han integrado de
manera frenética al país en los mercados globales y los flujos extranjeros de
inversiones directas. En este contexto, el sector minero ha tomado las riendas el
protagonismo de un cambio decisivo para Perú, afectando las trayectorias de
desarrollo del país.
En el marco de este énfasis en los proyectos extractivistas, el proyecto Conga de
Yanacocha, ubicado en la región de Cajamarca en el Norte de Perú, pretende la
explotación de dos depósitos de pórfidos de cobre con contenidos de oro. Según el
Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (Knight Piessold, 2011), el plano general del Proyecto
Conga y sus elementos mas importantes, ocuparan un área aproximadamente de
2,000 ha.
El proyecto ha estado latente durante aproximadamente 7 años (2003-2009) hasta
2010 donde se realiza una exposición del proyecto. Después de este episodio se
producen varios reclamos de comunidades y en Septiembre de 2011, se desencadena
el primer levantamiento de la población civil de la comunidad de Agua Blanca, que
percibe cambios en el sabor y olor del agua; asimismo, se comprueba que la empresa
está haciendo perforaciones diamantinas en las zonas cercanas de captación de agua.
En Noviembre de 2011, las poblaciones cercanas y las provincias afectadas apoyan el
levantamiento y estalla el inicio del conflicto que dirige la atención al presidente
Humala, al que se le pide que cumpla su compromiso de campaña relativo al cese de
actividad minera en Conga. Desde entonces y hasta el momento, la población civil se
ha organizado para hacer frente al proyecto, generando redes de resistencia que han
frenado -o al menos ralentizado- el inicio de las perforaciones en la zona de impacto
del proyecto. En Cajamarca, muchas mujeres han salido por primera vez a la calle para
manifestar su posición de rechazo a un proyecto impuesto, siendo piezas clave en la
lucha contra Conga.
En esta investigación se analizan las motivaciones y valores de las mujeres en
resistencia en el conflicto Conga; para ello se han empleado elementos que nos
proporciona el enfoque de capacidades para el desarrollo humano, y en concreto la
noción de agencia, junto con aportaciones de Bourdieu y de las teorías ecofeministas.
Las evidencias recogidas nos permiten afirmar que el papel de las mujeres en la lucha
está mediado por los roles de género. Su presencia en las marchas queda relegada a
roles de cuidado, a la sensibilización y a tareas reproductivas como la preparación de la
olla común que es el sustento principal de las marchas; sin embargo no toman posición
en los puestos de decisión. Los valores que despliegan se sientan sobre la base de sus
experiencias cotidianas, ya que a todas ellas les une el hecho de que los problemas
ecológicos y sociales pasan por el eje central de sus vidas: su sustento. La movilización
parte pues desde unos valores que se ligan a sus vivencias. Asimismo, las mujeres se
posicionan de una manera frente a la noción de desarrollo -centrada en la creación de
riqueza- impulsada por el gobierno; frente a este planteamiento, las mujeres ensalzan
en su discurso valores asociados a un desarrollo que ubique en su eje a la persona
como fin último. Por ello, la defensa del agua cobra un protagonismo especial al existir
un vínculo inequívoco entre la tarea socialmente asignada a la mujer como gestora y
proveedora del agua y los valores y motivos que le llevan a el ejercicio de la agencia.
Por último, se ha observado que las mujeres ejercen una agencia con consciencia de
responsabilidad hacia los demás y la colectividad como un organismo entero (Ballet et
al., 2007), también como parte de una construcción social que ha modulado las
preocupaciones de las mujeres hacia los demás. Su agencia es ejercida en base a una
visión que va más allá de la consecución de sus propios objetivos personales. El tipo de
agencia que ejercen es por tanto, una agencia fuerte. La construcción de su papel de
agentes, como diría Bourdieu (1987) no opera en un vacío social, sino que está
sometida a coacciones estructurales.
En el Perú, las reformas neoliberales del libre mercado han integrado de manera
frenética al país en los mercados globales y los flujos extranjeros de inversiones
directas. En este contexto, el sector minero ha tomado las riendas el protagonismo de
un cambio decisivo para Perú, afectando las trayectorias de desarrollo del país.
Gran parte del debate sobre las políticas extractivas se ha centrado en el modelo de
desarrollo que estas actividades implican (Urteaga, P. 2011; Preciado, R 2011; Lopez,
E. 2011; Bury, J. 2010; Shiva, V. 1988;) . En el caso de la minería de extracción de oro,
este debate toma posición al encuadrar un desarrollo económico proveniente de la
venta de un metal que en el mercado tiene un precio estable y que es un activo
monetario, además de una materia prima.
La minería en general tiene una relación inseparable con el recurso hídrico y, como
apunta Balvín (2004:2), los conflictos generados por la actividad minera con las
comunidades campesinas, indígenas y originarias se presentan por los siguientes
factores: 1) Por el uso de fuentes de agua utilizadas para fines agropecuarios y que
son derivadas a fines mineros; 2) Por la contaminación de las fuentes de agua; 3) Por la
gestión del agua en la cuenca. En la minería, los circuitos subterráneos de agua y las
fuentes de alimentación hídrica, son transformados al remover la tierra para abrir las
zanjas y sacar el mineral o depositar los relaves141 que afectan a la calidad de los suelos
y del agua subterránea.
141
Los relaves son deshechos tóxicos subproductos de procesos mineros que contienen altas
concentraciones de químicos.
El proyecto Conga de Yanacocha -consorcio de Newmont Mining Corporation (51,35%),
Compañía de Minas Buenaventura (44,65%) y del Banco Mundial-IFC (5%)- pretende la
explotación de dos depósitos de pórfidos de cobre con contenidos de oro que se
ubican al este del arrea donde Yanacocha realiza actualmente sus operaciones. Se
tiene prevista la extracción de 1,085 Mt de material (mineral, roca de desmonte y
mineral de baja ley); equivalente a 504 Mt de mineral proyectado sobre 19 años de
minado (Torres y Castillo, 2012). Según el Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (Knight
Piessold, 2011), el plano general del Proyecto Conga y sus elementos más importantes,
ocuparan un área aproximadamente de 2,000 ha.
En la zona de influencia del proyecto Conga, se han inventariado 682 manantiales, 102
captaciones de agua para consumo humano, 100 ha. de bofedales, 18 canales de riego
y 6 lagunas.
Mapa 1: Zona afectada por el proyecto Conga
Fuente: Torres y Castillo, 2012
Durante aproximadamente 7 años (2003-2009) el proyecto Conga se mantiene en un
estado latente de exploraciones. La empresa minera Yanacocha inicia la compra de
terrenos al campesinado a precios muy bajos, aprovechando la situación económica de
las poblaciones rurales. En marzo de 2010 se realiza una exposición del proyecto y una
ronda de preguntas, la mayoría de ellas centradas en la preocupación acerca de la
contaminación y de la pérdida de cantidad de agua.
Después de este episodio se producen varios reclamos de comunidades distintas y en
Septiembre de 2011, se desencadena el primer levantamiento de la población civil de
la comunidad de Agua Blanca que percibe cambios en el sabor y olor del agua, y se
comprueba que la empresa está haciendo perforaciones diamantinas en las zonas
cercanas de captación de agua. En Noviembre de 2011, las poblaciones cercanas y las
provincias comprometidas apoyan el levantamiento y estalla el inicio del conflicto que
dirige la atención al presidente Humala, al que se le pide que cumpla su compromiso
de campaña relativo al cese de actividad minera en Conga. Desde entonces y hasta el
momento, la población civil se ha organizado para hacer frente al proyecto, generando
redes de resistencia que han frenado -o al menos ralentizado- el inicio de las
perforaciones en la zona de impacto del proyecto.
En Cajamarca, muchas mujeres han salido por primera vez a la calle para manifestar su
posición de rechazo a un proyecto impuesto, siendo piezas clave en la lucha contra
Conga. En Cajamarca, por ejemplo, la marcha de mujeres embarazadas contra el
proyecto Conga en Junio de 2012 supuso un acto simbólico que tuvo una fuerte
repercusión en los medios. La marcha de mujeres, también en Junio de 2012, agrupó a
mujeres de las rondas campesinas, religiosas, mujeres de areas rurales y urbanas, en
un acto de defensa del territorio que supuso la participación de 20.000 mujeres como
participantes de la manifestación pacífica.
Con estos antecedentes, y teniendo en cuenta la contribución de las mujeres como
agentes sociales en el conflicto, esta investigación pretende profundizar en tres temas
clave: 1) Cuál es el rol de las mujeres en el conflicto Conga, 2) Cuáles son las
motivaciones y valores para ejercer su papel de agentes sociales y cómo estas
motivaciones están moduladas por la estructura social 3) Qué tipo de agencia ejercen
las mujeres.
Para ello, el texto se organizará partiendo de diferentes elementos de análisis que
abarcarán la noción de agencia, tal y como se entiende desde el Enfoque de las
Capacidades, perspectivas ecofeministas del Sur y la ecología política feminista, que
nos permitirán llevar la discusión a cómo las preferencias de las mujeres están
condicionadas por una estructura social que las modula. En el apartado metodología,
expondremos brevemente tanto las técnicas empleadas como la selección de
informantes para dar respuesta a las preguntas de investigación. La discusión estará
fundamentada en base a las evidencias que se obtengan y se recogerán en el apartado
de conclusiones, donde resumiremos los elementos clave de la investigación.
2. ELEMENTOS DE ANÁLISIS
El Enfoque de las Capacidades surge en el contexto del planteamiento del Desarrollo
Humano como nuevo paradigma. Defiende que el desarrollo no termina en el aumento
de la producción económica nacional, y que por eso su estimación mediante la renta
disponible es insuficiente. (Cejudo, 2007) Aparece, con la aportación de Amartya Sen,
como un enfoque alternativo a la economía del bienestar y a enfoques utilitarios que
utilizan la satisfacción personal como la referencia final. Siguiendo el pensamiento de
Muñiz (2008), podríamos afirmar que el Desarrollo Humano se refiere a la expansión
de las oportunidades de las personas. Pero, ¿para hacer qué? Sen (1999) podría
responder: “para llevar las vidas que tiene razón de valorar”. Esto implícitamente
asume que las personas tienen cierta capacidad para reflexionar y escoger entre
diferentes estilos de vida. El Enfoque de las Capacidades Humanas otorga un papel
fundamental a la capacidad de tomar decisiones en los asuntos que afectan a la vida
de las personas. Es por esta razón que consideramos que este marco resulta idóneo
para analizar los procesos de construcción de agencia que llevan a las mujeres a
ocupar el espacio público y a reclamar su derecho a llevar la vida que tienen razones
para valorar.
Sen (1985, p. 206) defiende una definición de agencia como "lo que una persona es
libre de hacer y lograr para la consecución de objetivos o valores, cualesquiera que él o
ella considere importantes". En consecuencia, "las personas que disfrutan de altos
niveles de la agencia están comprometidas en las acciones que son congruentes con
sus valores "(Alkire, 2007). Esto, para Sen, se convierte en un aspecto fundamental en
la materialización efectiva de las capacidades y del Desarrollo Humano. La agencia es
“esencial para ver al público no sólo como el paciente cuyo bienestar llama la atención,
sino también como el agente cuyas acciones pueden transformar la sociedad" (Drèze y
Sen, 1989).
Desde el marco del Enfoque de las Capacidades, algunos autores apuntan a que
cuando se trata de aproximarse al papel de la agencia del individuo como colaborador
en la vida económica, política y acciones sociales (Sen, 1999: 19), tenemos que
ensalzar la importancia de la acción colectiva en el cambio social y asumir que "la
agencia individual sólo puede formar parte del medio de desarrollo cuando tiene en
cuenta explícitamente la forma en que esta agencia individual está conectada con los
otros "(De Herdt y Bastiansen, 2008: 344).
En relación a eso, Ballet et al. (2007) proponen ampliar el concepto de agencia de Sen
y considerar la responsabilidad como una característica constitutiva de la persona en el
mismo nivel que la libertad. Esto tiene importantes consecuencias, ya que genera una
distinción entre la agencia débil y agencia fuerte. “Mientras que la agencia débil se
refiere exclusivamente al desarrollo de los objetivos y las capacidades individuales, la
agencia de fuerte incluiría el ejercicio de la responsabilidad hacia los demás y la
sociedad como un organismo entero” (Ballet et al., 2007: 187). La agencia deviene
agencia fuerte cuando tiene por objeto ampliar la libertad de los otros dentro de una
red de interacciones sociales donde el compromiso y la responsabilidad son
protagonistas.
Sin embargo, bajo nuestra perspectiva, esta noción de agencia queda limitada para dar
sentido a los procesos de cambio social y entendemos que en este estudio, cabe añadir
una perspectiva sociológica para poder abordar la discusión bajo un enfoque más
amplio.
Uno de los puntos más interesantes a abordar, y al que el enfoque de capacidades no
responde de manera clara es la reflexión alrededor de la agencia y la estructura.
Autores como Giddens (1984) consideran agencia y estructura como inherentes y
recíprocamente constitutivas, de forma que la estructura no es un agregado de fuerzas
abstractas sino que se reproduce, materializa y modifica precisamente a través de las
acciones específicas de los actores, a los que a su vez modula y restringe.
Teniendo en cuenta que el poder estructural está, en parte, fondeado y atravesado por
nuestros imaginarios, creencias y supuestos, la reflexión crítica de lo que sucede en tu
entorno y la toma de conciencia de ser agente, resulta muy pertinente en el marco de
la acción. En este senitdo, Healey (2006) apunta que "la gente tendría el potencial de
desafiar el poder si pudiera lograr la comprensión suficiente para reflexionar sobre sus
condiciones de existencia y ver su opresión estructurada como lo que realmente es"
(Healey, 2006: 46). En la misma línea, Wright Mills (1959) afirma que “lo que los
hombres necesitan es una cualidad mental que les ayude a usar la información y a
desarrollar la razón para conseguir recapitulaciones lúcidas de lo que ocurre en el
mundo y de lo que quizás está ocurriendo dentro de ellos” (Wright Mills, 1959: 25).
Es interesante la visión de Kabeer (1999) acerca de la agencia, cuando apunta a que
ésta es algo más que una acción observable, sino que también abarca el significado, la
motivación y el propósito que los individuos aportan a su actividad, su sentido de
agencia. Esta puede tomar forma de negociación, de subversión o de resistencia, pero
también puede llegar a observarse como algo mas intangible. En muchas ocasiones la
mujer ha desplegado dentro del ámbito doméstico un amplio surtido de ejercicios de
negociación que han ido modificando las normas estructurales, han sido procesos
lentos, casi invisibles, que han cambiado el devenir social, y sin embargo no son
ampliamente estudiados en ciencias sociales por el hecho de pertenecer al ámbito de
lo privado y por contribuir más sutilmente al cambio.
La contribución del Ecofeminismo del Sur y de la ecología política feminista es
especialmente relevante para arrojar luz sobre el significado que las mujeres le
otorgan a la naturaleza y a la defensa de la tierra cuando al ejercer su agencia.
El ecofeminismo del sur se diferencia de otros tipos de ecofeminismos por el hecho de
que no ha surgido de una investigación académica sobre ecología y feminismo, sino del
encuentro con mujeres que han sufrido graves problemas ecológicos, que afectan la
salud y el sostenimiento de sus familias (Albareda, S. 2011). Existe, según Puleo (2005),
un misticismo que es un retorno, en clave feminista, del panteísmo o reconocimiento
del carácter sagrado de la Naturaleza y, por tanto, de la necesidad de respetarla, al
tiempo que se constituye en orgullosa afirmación de una identidad colectiva
largamente despreciada. Bajo este enfoque, las cualidades que se atribuyen a la
feminidad, como la proximidad a la vida, el cuidado y la dependencia de unas personas
de las otras y de la naturaleza, son vistas como actitudes positivas para superar la crisis
ambiental.
Bajo esta corriente, autoras como Vandana Shiva identifican los actuales modelos
desarrollistas como modelos patriarcales que, del mismo modo que someten a la
naturaleza, también someten a la mujer bajo principios de inequidad e injusticia (Shiva,
1988). Se afirma que no sólo el ‘desarrollo’ es una fuente de violencia hacia la mujer y
a la naturaleza, sino que “el conocimiento científico, en el cual se basa el actual
modelo de desarrollo, es en si una fuente de violencia” (Shiva, 1988: 46). La
destrucción de la naturaleza y la subyugación de la mujer son características del
denominado ‘progreso’.
No obstante, aunque a partir de las entrevistas, se ha vislumbrado que esta corriente
teórica abarcaría una gran parte de los discursos de las mujeres participantes en el
conflicto, se hace imprescindible dialogar con otras corrientes como la Ecología Política
Feminista, que permite establecer una discusión en torno a las motivaciones que
llevan a las mujeres a ejercer su papel de agentes sociales. Según esta perspectiva, se
intenta comprender e interpretar la experiencia local en el contexto de los procesos
globales del cambio ambiental y económico, prestando atención al complejo contexto
en el cual el género interactúa con la clase, la raza, la cultura y la identidad nacional
para conformar nuestra experiencia de "el ambiente" y nuestros intereses en el mismo
(Rocheleau et al., 2004).
Hay tres temas fundamentales que se abarcan desde la ecología política feminista
(Rocheleau et al., 2004): el primero es el conocimiento dependiente del género como
aparece en una "ciencia de la subsistencia" emergente que incluye la creación,
mantenimiento y protección de ambientes sanos en el hogar, el trabajo y los
ecosistemas regionales. En segundo lugar, se consideran los derechos y las
responsabilidades ambientales dependientes del género, incluyendo la propiedad,
recursos, espacio y todas las variaciones de los derechos legales y consuetudinarios
que se "estructuran con base en el género". El tercer tema es el de la política
ambiental y el activismo de base estructurados con base en el género. Y aquí cabe
añadir que, si bien es verdad que en las últimas décadas las mujeres se han colocado
en la base de los grupos de base emergentes en la acción política a favor del cambio
(Merchant, 1992; Seager, 1993; Hynes, 1992), han ocupado posiciones en la lucha que
son el espejo de los roles de género que han venido desarrollando en los espacios
privados.
Las mujeres de todo el mundo, expuestas a diversos sistemas políticos y económicos,
se ven involucradas hasta cierto punto en las actividades comerciales (Berry, 1989;
Jackson, 1985, 1993), pero también son responsables de proporcionar o administrar
las necesidades fundamentales de la vida cotidiana (alimentos, agua, combustible,
ropa) y de cuidar la salud, la limpieza y a los niños y niñas en el nivel doméstico,
cuando no también en el nivel de la comunidad (Moser, 1989). Estas responsabilidades
creadas socialmente colocan a las mujeres en una posición que se opone a los riesgos
de la salud, la vida y los recursos de subsistencia vital.
Es crucial preguntarse qué relación hay entre las preferencias de las personas -en este
caso de las mujeres- y una estructura social que moldea los roles asignados y los
convierte en sociales poniendo en duda, por lo tanto, la “naturalidad” de sus
elecciones. En esta línea, Bourdieu (1987) señala que la construcción no opera en un
vacío social, sino que está sometida a coacciones estructurales y que las estructuras
cognitivas están socialmente estructuradas porque tienen una génesis social. Nos
encontramos, en este punto, con uno de los conceptos claves del marco teórico de
Bourdieu: la noción de habitus. Es la forma en que las estructuras sociales se graban en
nuestra mente y nuestro cuerpo, las estructuras sociales de nuestra subjetividad. El
habitus, con la apariencia propia de lo innato, es fruto de la incorporación de una
estructura social en forma de esquemas de percepción y valoración (disposiciones) que
toman la apariencia de lo natural.
3. METODOLOGÍA DEL ESTUDIO
La recogida de datos de campo se lleva a cabo en dos fases. La primera entre Julio y
Septiembre de 2012 y la segunda entre Agosto y Octubre de 2013. El escenario
geográfico donde se desarrolla el trabajo tiene dos núcleos principales: Cajamarca y
Celendín. La elección de éstos depende fundamentalmente de la proximidad del
proyecto y de la implicación de las mujeres en la lucha contra Conga.
Se optó por una metodología cualitativa que ayudara a desgranar las preguntas
planteadas. Mediante la comprensión del discurso de los sujetos sociales, podemos
llegar muy fácilmente a las motivaciones y valores que mueven a la mujer para ejercer
su función de agente social.
Se realizaron un total de diez entrevistas semiestructuradas, tres entrevistas grupales y
una historia de vida. Además de un análisis documental de información -recogida en
periódicos y documentos de organizaciones medioambientales- y un diario de campo a
partir de la observación participante.
Los criterios para que el discurso abarcara un abanico de informantes lo más amplio
posible han sido los siguientes: 1) Diversidad de ámbitos. Para ello se ha optado por
recoger información desde el ámbito experto, pasando por el comunitario y el político.
2) Diversidad de posicionamientos respecto a la actividad minera. 3) Grado de
Implicación en la lucha. Cuando hablamos de la de implicación en la lucha nos estamos
refiriendo a los diferentes niveles en los que las mujeres participan en ella.
En el siguiente esquema podemos observar con detalle la información respecto a los
posicionamientos, técnicas y ámbitos de recogida de información.
Figura 1: Ámbitos, posicionamientos y técnicas de recogida de información
Fuente: elaboración propia
4. AGENCIA, MOTIVACIONES Y VALORES DE LAS MUJERES EN EL CONFLICTO MINERO
CONGA
A lo largo de este apartado se discute sobre la base de las evidencias disponibles cual
es el papel de la mujer en el conflicto Conga como agente social, explorando cuáles
son las motivaciones y los valores que la llevan a ejercer un tipo de agencia u otro en
función de las constricciones estructurales.
Hemos dividido el apartado en tres espacios que responden a la lógica del discurso de
las entrevistadas, y por tanto a las evidencias obtenidas.
4.1 El papel de las mujeres en el conflicto está mediado por los roles de género
tradicionales.
En este sentido, las voces recogidas a través de los discursos, coinciden en señalar que
las tareas logísticas ejercidas por las mujeres han sido la base del sustento de la lucha.
Entre estas labores, como vemos en los fragmentos rescatados de las entrevistas,
ocupan un lugar central aquellas que tradicionalmente se han asignado a los roles
femeninos. Las ollas comunes, como sustento alimentario imprescindible en el éxito de
las largas marchas y paros, han sido organizadas tanto por hombres como por mujeres,
aunque ellos se ocupaban de tareas asignadas tradicionalmente a los hombres -como
la búsqueda de leña-, y ellas se han encargado de la cocción de los insumos para
transformarlos en alimentos. La siguiente cita da voz a una de las mujeres de la
Plataforma Interinstritucional Celendina (PIC) - que alberga a varias organizaciones a
nivel local- apoyando esta afirmación a través de su discurso.
“(…) se movían (las mujeres) desde horas muy tempranas, venían,
participaban en las ollas comunes, siempre activas, siempre
colaboradoras, siempre esperando ideas: “¿qué es lo que debemos hacer?
¿qué estrategias de lucha?” (EL)
Como vemos, aunque su participación ha sido clave, en la cita anterior se reproduce la
idea de que, al menos un sector de la población femenina de base se manifestaba
activo, pero, por otro lado, estas mismas mujeres mostraban una actitud de espera
frente a las decisiones que se iban a tomar.
Las mujeres, en varias ocasiones han sido el escudo, poniendo sus propios cuerpos en
los momentos de alta tensión durante las marchas, reproduciendo una vez más el rol
de cuidadoras.
“Entonces, hemos trabajado para que nuestros líderes en Celendín han
reconocido que el trabajo de la mujer es muy importante. En la hora más
fuerte, más decisiva de esta lucha, han tomado la batuta, pues, las
mujeres, ¿no? En el enfrentamiento que hemos tenido en Guazmin, han
sido las mujeres las que han sido arrastradas, las que han sido apaleadas,
jaloneadas de sus pelos, ¿no? Ellas .... han formado la barrera mientras
los hombres de allá tomaban aire para salir adelante” (EGL)
Las marchas de las mujeres hacia las lagunas en señal de protesta y como gesto
de protección hacia el recurso hídrico, ha sido una constante durante los meses
de protesta, a pesar –como se relata en la siguiente cita- de la responsabilidad
del cuidado de los hijos e hijas, que les es asignada como rol tradicional, como
señalan Rocheleau et al. , (2004).
“Mira, verdaderamente se notaba mucho la presencia de las mujeres.
Nosotras íbamos un día, o pasábamos para ir a la marcha del agua, pero
de las comunidades, las mujeres cargaban a sus hijos o de la mano los
llevaban, pero participación total, y se quedaban semanas, semanas. A los
8 días se turnaban, se iban otras y regresaban a su casa, así se
organizaban ellas” (EGR)
Por otro lado, hay que destacar el protagonismo de las mujeres en su papel de
sensibilización. En este caso, es interesante sacar a la luz el rol de las mujeres de base
como agentes dentro de la iglesia para sensibilizar al resto de mujeres en el área rural.
Una de las entrevistadas que participó como facilitadora en los talleres que se
organizaban desde la parroquia, nos ilustra de qué manera se empieza a trabajar la
emancipación de las mujeres para que salgan a la calle a protestar para alcanzar
aquello que valoran en sus vidas (Sen, 1985). Como vemos en la cita, el reclamo para la
asistencia a los talleres y la aprobación por parte de los maridos, viene a través de
tareas asignadas socialmente al trabajo femenino, como es la costura.
“(…) Es por eso que al ver tanta cobardía de las mujeres en el área rural a
salir para lucha contra la mina, es por eso que con la hermana
empezamos con un taller en el propio Chocay y luego lo sacamos al área
rural porque las mujeres eran bien oprimidas, los maridos bien machistas:
“no sales, no te vas, no hablas, no sabes”, pero con nuestros grupos que
formamos en el campo; por ejemplo, tenemos mujeres que no saben leer,
no saben escribir, pero aprenden a coser; en un principio le hablaban así
(apoya su cabeza sobre la mesa y se tapa la cara), se tapaban así para
hablar, pero ahora esas señoras ya están más despiertas, ya su
autoestima bastante arriba, ya salen.” (EMB)
Tomando la cita de arriba, el ejercicio de agencia es doble, tanto el que realizan las
mujeres a nivel de sensibilización para catalizar esta agencia, como el de las que
reciben el contenido de dichos talleres y posteriormente ponen en práctica.
Recordemos que Kabeer (1999) apunta a este tipo de agencia cuando habla de las
negociaciones sutiles que ocurren en la vida privada entre mujeres y hombres para no
subestimar la práctica de agencia que suelen ejercer éstas.
Por último, es interesante rescatar el discurso que reproduce una de las lideresas,
representante de la Marcha Mundial de Mujeres, que confirma, como apuntan
Rocheleau et al. (2004) el activismo de base dependiente del género: la presencia de la
mujer en tareas logísticas, en la capacitación y en sensibilización. Sin embargo, apunta
a una invisibilización de la mujer en los espacios de toma de decisiones, que son
copados exclusivamente por los hombres.
“(…) porque hemos hecho dos…hasta tres talleres, ¿no Mirtha? Reuniones
en distintos momentos como Marcha Mundial juntando a las compañeras
de Tambo Grande que también estuvieron en lucha en Piura. A las
compañeras de Cajamarca, en lucha. A las compañeras de Lambayeque
que también están enfrentada contra lo mismo: el extractivismo y la
actividad minera, ¿no? Entonces, lo que se puede recoger es que las
compañeras participan en la capacitación, en la sensibilización, en todas
las tareas logísticas y en todas las movilizaciones. Sin embargo, no están
en los espacios de toma de decisiones, donde el espacio es estrictamente
masculino.”(EGL)
4.2 Las motivaciones y los valores se alinean con una perspectiva del Desarrollo
Humano y de vinculación con las tareas socialmente asignadas al rol femenino.
Como apunta Muñiz (2008), bajo la visión del Enfoque de las Capacidades, las personas
ejercen su autonomía cuando sus acciones están basadas en su propio juicio, tomando
en cuenta los contextos en los cuales interactúan. Obedeciendo a esta lógica, en la
discusión de este apartado pretendemos indagar en las motivaciones y valores que
llevan a las mujeres a ejercer la agencia social en el conflicto Conga. El quid está en
comprender que efectivamente, en este caso de estudio, la agencia ejercida por las
mujeres responde a la necesidad de ampliar las opciones reales de aquello que tienen
motivos para valorar.
A lo largo de la recogida de información en campo, se iban perfilando, a raíz de las
entrevistas, una serie de valores compartidos por las mujeres que participaban del
conflicto Conga. A todas ellas las unía el hecho de que, como apunta Albareda (2011)
han sufrido graves problemas ecológicos, que afectan la salud y el sostenimiento de
sus familias (Albareda, S. 2011). No se parte de una elaboración teórica desde la
academia sino de las propias vivencias. El sentido de la movilización parte desde se
vivencia como un relato circular en el que parten de su experiencia para ligarla con la
política macro y volver de nuevo a su experiencia. Los valores por tanto están
asentados sobre su cotidianeidad y la manera en que la viven. Una de las lideresas nos
ofrece un discurso en la entrevista grupal en el que se resume esta idea.
“Las mujeres siguen allí! Saben de todo esto pero es un convencimiento
que les nace de adentro, de su espíritu, de lo que han vivido. No han
recibido quinientos talleres de capacitación, no han recibido un
doctorado, una maestría, pero es un convencimiento que a todos los que
escuchan nos arrastra.” (EGL)
Hemos destacado dos ejes alrededor de los cuales se aglutinan los discursos centrados
en los valores que mueven a las mujeres para el ejercicio de la agencia: el eje de los
valores asociados al concepto de Desarrollo Humano y el eje del valor del agua como
principal motor de la lucha.
Desarrollo Humano
Teniendo en cuenta que el discurso que se promueve - tanto desde la empresa minera
Yanacocha como desde el Gobierno central- para legitimar la aprobación del proyecto,
es que la mina aurífera proporcionará desarrollo basado en el crecimiento económico,
las mujeres se posicionan frente a esta noción desarrollista apostando por un
desarrollo que contemple el bienestar de las personas como fin último (Sen, 1985)
“En este sentido, nosotros tenemos como le digo, les digo..que no..el
desarrollo que empieza, empieza por la persona. No es comprarse un
televisor, no es comprarse una camioneta, este. Los capitalistas piensan la
persona ha surgido cuando tiene una casa muy linda, un estadio muy
bonito, una camioneta de repente, este, lujos momentáneos. Pero que,
como personas, no hay. Hay desnutrición, hay gente que vive en extrema
pobreza. Estamos considerados como la tercera provincia en desnutrición
crónica, entonces, ¿de que desarrollo hablamos? El desarrollo tiene que
empezar primero por nosotros como personas. Luego vendrán estadios,
mercados, todo eso, pero cuando nosotros tengamos ya una vida...este,
vivir en un ambiente donde nos de condiciones para vivir como personas,
no como cualquier cosa…” (EGL)
Esta evidencia concuerda con la noción de Desarrollo Humano porque cuestiona que el
desarrollo dependa fundamentalmente de la expansión del capital físico y se resalta la
importancia del capital humano. En definitiva se sustituye una visión del desarrollo
centrado en la producción de bienes por otra centrada en la ampliación de las
capacidades de las personas, en el sentido de Sen (1999).
Una de las lideresas que forma parte de la FEMUCARINAP142, nos orienta también en
esta visión de desarrollo contrapuesta a la noción desarrollista que se promueven
desde la minería a gran escala.
“(…) Que gracias a la minería es el desarrollo del Perú. Y le decíamos, no...
peor, está empobreciendo. La minería si antes existía pero era equitativa,
no era tan lucrativa y burocrática como ahora. Nos está matando la
minería. Es la salud, es la soberanía alimentaria, la tierra y el agua lo que
nosotros luchamos y nuestras semillas para el futuro. (EGL)”
Cuestionan además la noción desarrollista entendiendo que el progreso que ofrece el
discurso minero genera destrucción en vez de riqueza y exponen que su lucha va
vinculada a que el desarrollo no sea sinónimo de decadencia. Apuestan por el respeto
hacia lo que las personas valoran y hacia las actividades que están mas en armonía con
la cosmovisión y la tradición de sus pueblos.
“Con dinero no se sale de la pobreza, nosotros queremos acá una igualdad
social, oportunidad para todos, que se creen fuentes de trabajo, que se
apoye a otro tipo de actividades; Celendín toda la vida ha sido un pueblo
netamente agrícola, un pueblo ganadero; entonces que se fortalezcan
esas actividades, no se las cambie de la noche a la mañana; entonces eso
es lo que queremos. (…) no contamos con recursos económicos, pero sí
somos gente con principios, con valores, que estamos decididos, estamos
exponiéndonos y vamos a seguir hasta el final, hasta conseguir nuestro
objetivo” (EL)
La defensa del agua como principal motor de la lucha
Atendiendo al planteamiento de Shiva (1988), podemos reconocer en los discursos
reproducidos en las entrevistas que la mujer es la primera que detecta la escasez y el
cambio en la calidad del agua porque son ellas quienes trabajan cotidianamente en la
producción de medios de subsistencia vinculados al trabajo de cuidados. Las
motivaciones por tanto están ligadas a esta condición, es decir, que el lazo que las
mujeres rurales sienten con la naturaleza se origina por sus responsabilidades de
género en la economía familiar (Agarwal, 1996) . Una de las entrevistadas, que trabaja
como productora y distribuidora de productos agrícolas lo relata de la siguiente
manera.
“(…) la gente se comenzó a preocupar por las cosas que estaban pasando
y por resistir, porque también habían niños que estaban cayendo
enfermos por ejemplo en Conochuco, ya estaban botando sangre por la
nariz, aja, y entonces... el agua ya se estaba contaminando, la gente aquí
sufría mareo, teníamos asepsia ¿? y entonces empezamos este a salir,
142
Federación de Mujeres Campesinas Rurales Indígenas del Perú.
nos organizamos, entre comerciantes, comenzamos a hacer nuestros
carteles y comenzamos a apoyar la lucha, si, así es. (EMB2)
La lucha por defender los medios de subsistencia de los que dependen estas mujeres,
unido a la tarea socialmente asignada de recogida y uso del agua en el ámbito
reproductivo se entiende también como un valor agregado para ejercer su agencia.
Como apuntaría Bourdieu (1987), la construcción no opera en un vacío social, sino que
está sometida a coacciones estructurales y que las estructuras cognitivas están
socialmente estructuradas porque tienen una génesis social.
“Por Conga no van a sufrir no solamente nosotros, van a sufrir todos los niños.
La mayor parte, la minería este, lo que más influye su salud son a los niños y a
los mayores de edad, los que más les afecta a su salud. Entonces nosotros
teníamos que, por esa misma razón nosotros teníamos que salir, este; ahora
vamos a salir hasta el final.” (EMB2)
“Porque estamos en la casa con eso (…) El hombre sale a trabajar y..”
(EGC)
Se perciben, por otro lado, motivos ligados al vínculo que sienten las mujeres con la
tierra, un reconocimiento, como dice Puleo (2005) del carácter sagrado de la
Naturaleza y, por tanto, de la necesidad de respetarla.
“No vamos a permitir que vengan y destrocen nuestras lagunas, nuestra
agua es sagrada, estas lagunas son sagradas, y si vamos a dar la vida la
vamos a dar”. (EMB2)
“Ven al cerro como la persona, a veces como la persona viva, que le da
agua, que le da leña, que le da agua sobre todo y leña y encima en buenas
partes pueden sembrar, a la vez lo consideran importante porque ha sido
la zona de entierro de los antiguos, los antiguos les llaman ellas” (EMA)
En definitiva las mujeres están ejerciendo su agencia atendiendo al concepto que
Alkire (2007) identifica, al comprometerse en acciones que son congruentes con sus
valores.
Es imprescindible vincular en este punto la dualidad agencia/estructura para destacar
los valores bajo los cuales ejercen su papel en el conflicto. Como apunta Bourdieu
(1987) “el habitus, con la apariencia propia de lo innato, es fruto de la incorporación
de una estructura social en forma de esquemas de percepción y valoración
(disposiciones) que toman la apariencia de lo natural”. En este sentido, las
responsabilidades que sienten las mujeres con el agua tiene un origen social, que
moldea la manera de percibir como intrínsecamente importante el cuidado de un
recurso que utilizan diariamente en sus tareas socialmente asignadas.
4.3 La agencia se construye desde un sentir de responsabilidad hacia la colectividad.
En este apartado se discute qué tipo de agencia ejercen las mujeres en el conflicto
Conga. Para ello, usamos los referentes del marco teórico que se refieren a la
diferencia entre una agencia débil, que apunta exclusivamente al desarrollo de los
objetivos y las capacidades individuales y una agencia fuerte, que incluiría el ejercicio
de responsabilidad hacia los demás y la sociedad como un organismo entero. (Ballet et
al., 2007).
A lo largo de la discusión en los apartados anteriores, hemos observado que entre los
valores que llevaban a las mujeres a salir a la calle para demandar una ampliación de
las oportunidades reales para llevar la vida que tenían razones para valorar, se repiten
aquellos que tienen que ver con el cuidado hacia los demás. La preocupación por la
salud de los hijos aparece constantemente en el discurso, haciendo visible una vez más
que las responsabilidades de género, construidas socialmente e incorporadas a través
de la estructura social (Bourdieu, 1987) moldean el tipo de agencia que ejercen.
“Bueno, yo soy madre, y como madre de familia, pues valoro la vida de
mis hijos, ¿no? Entonces yo tenía que ver eso, este, por la vida de mis
hijos, por la vida de nosotros y por la vida de otros niños también que hay.
Si Conga va, Por Conga no van a sufrir no solamente nosotros, van a sufrir
todos los niños. La mayor parte, la minería este, lo que más influye su
salud son a los niños y a los mayores de edad, los que más les afecta a su
salud. Entonces nosotros teníamos que, por esa misma razón nosotros
teníamos que salir, este… ahora vamos a salir hasta el final” (EMB2)
Desde la perspectiva de la agencia fuerte se ubican las bases para elaborar estrategias
de desarrollo humano local cuyo objetivo es la consecución de logros de desarrollo
humano colectivo. Y en este sentido, las organizaciones de mujeres que surgen en un
contexto local tienen en su punto de mira un alcance que va mas allá de sus propios
objetivos personales para centrarse en ampliar las capacidades en un sentido
colectivo.
“Ahora con la minería toma mas sentido (la presencia en la lucha). Las
rondas femeninas se adaptan a los tiempos. Salen a la calle para defender
los derechos de todos, de todas” (EMB)
En el discurso individual de las mujeres en las entrevistas aparecen evidencias de que
el ejercicio de su agencia tiene sentido porque abarca la concepción de salud y
seguridad para un colectivo y para el medio natural en el que viven.
“Para nuestros niños, nuestros jóvenes y las mamás que somos...
necesitamos más salud y seguridad... para eso lo que luchamos” (EGL)
Existe, por tanto una consciencia de que su papel es importante para conseguir logros
a nivel colectivo, y así lo relata una de las lideresas que forma parte de la PIC.
“ (…) todos debemos estar involucrados, todos debemos estar unidos
porque la fuerza, esa unión, esa buena organización que tenga un pueblo
va a hacer que cambie esta situación” (EMB)
Por último, destacar que estas motivaciones surgen en el seno de una reflexión acerca
de la realidad. Esta idea se dibuja en la retórica de una de las lideresas comunitarias
del pueblo de Celendín cuando habla de la participación activa en la lucha y de la
presencia en las calles. Como apunta Wright Mills (1999), son capaces de situarse a si
mismas en el escenario social, en la historia y observarse como un actores que, por el
hecho de vivir de una determinada manera contribuyen a dar forma a esa sociedad.
“(…) porque nos estábamos midiendo con el poder más fuerte. Teníamos
el poder económico sobre nosotros y nosotros teníamos pues la
organización de cuatro gatos contra este poder enorme. Entonces, nos
sentíamos cobardes en algunos momentos de poder convocar al pueblo
para protestar. Pero el treinta de noviembre nos dimos con la gran
sorpresa que no éramos cuatros gatos. Éramos todo el pueblo, ¿no?”(EGL)
Otro fragmento interesante que podemos extraer de la entrevista grupal a mujeres de
base nos hace comprender que, en la línea de lo que apuntan Dreze y Sen (2002),
estas mujeres han conquistado el poder de cuestionar y reexaminar las normas y los
valores dominantes y son capaces de conectar un hecho social local con un sistema
internacional de valores e intereses, y vincularlo a su potencial de acción como agente
de cambio. En el siguiente relato, además, vemos cómo la mujer relaciona el discurso
con su práctica para hacer entender a su familia que la lucha es para el beneficio de la
comunidad y del país entero.
“Entendemos como que estas empresas transnacionales dejan de lado
todo derecho de las personas para hacer prevalecer sus intereses. Y
realmente, los presidentes, los gobernantes son como títeres de estas
empresas porque nosotros nos damos cuenta que esto no es un problema
solamente de Celendín. Es un problema nacional, local, departamental e
internacional (…) Entonces nos damos cuenta, por ejemplo, que el 48% del
territorio nacional peruano está concesionado. Yo tuve la necesidad de
conocer in situ las lagunas ¿no? Llevé a toda mi familia, para que supieran
por lo que estábamos luchando, por nuestros hijos, por todos, para el país
entero” (EGC)
5. CONCLUSIONES
El interés de esta investigación se ha centrado en indagar en el rol de las mujeres en el
conflicto Conga, aproximarnos a cuáles son las motivaciones y valores para ejercer su
papel de agentes sociales y a evidenciar cómo estas motivaciones están moduladas por
la estructura social.
El Enfoque de las Capacidades ofrece los elementos conceptuales y teóricos necesarios
para analizar la agencia en relación a la ampliación de las opciones de vida en un
contexto de opresión de libertades. Sin embargo, durante la recopilación de
información nos hemos encontrado con nuevos elementos que han implicado la
necesidad de ampliar el análisis e incluir nuevas visones de la agencia. En este sentido,
al tratar de entender cuáles eran las motivaciones de las mujeres para ejercer su
agencia y ampliar las opciones según los valores que ellas consideraban importantes
en sus vidas, nos hemos visto con la obligación de comprenderlos e interpretarlos.
El discurso recogido nos ofrece un primer soporte sobre el que poder afirmar que el
papel de las mujeres en la lucha está mediado por los roles de género. Su presencia en
las marchas queda relegada a roles de cuidado, a la sensibilización y a tareas
reproductivas como la preparación de la olla común que es el sustento principal de las
marchas; sin embargo no toman posición en los puestos de decisión.
Los valores que despliegan se sientan sobre la base de sus experiencias cotidianas, ya
que a todas ellas les une el hecho de que los problemas ecológicos y sociales pasan por
el eje central de sus vidas: su sustento. La movilización parte pues desde unos valores
que se ligan a sus vivencias.
Se posicionan de una manera frente a la noción de desarrollo -centrada en la creación
de riqueza- impulsada por el gobierno; frente a este planteamiento, las mujeres
ensalzan en su discurso valores asociados a un desarrollo que ubique en su eje a la
persona como fin último. La defensa del agua cobra un protagonismo especial al existir
un vínculo inequívoco entre la tarea socialmente asignada a la mujer como gestora y
proveedora del agua y los valores y motivos que le llevan a el ejercicio de la agencia.
Por último, y en relación al último punto en el que hemos pretendido adentrarnos, se
ha observado que las mujeres ejercen una agencia con consciencia de responsabilidad
hacia los demás y la colectividad como un organismo entero (Ballet et al., 2007),
también como parte de una construcción social que ha modulado las preocupaciones
de las mujeres hacia los demás. Su agencia es ejercida en base a una visión que va mas
allá de la consecución de sus propios objetivos personales. El tipo de agencia que
ejercen es por tanto, una agencia fuerte. La construcción de su papel de agentes, como
diría Bourdieu (1987) no opera en un vacío social, sino que está sometida a coacciones
estructurales.
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WEDNESDAY 23 July
2:00 to 3:30
(CE)
Plenary Session
Chair: Gabriela Arguedas
Auditorio
Ética y estética feministas para una epistemología no racista del desarrollo.
Dra. Francesca Gargallo
Revisemos qué oportunidad tienen en la transformación del mundo las revoluciones
culturales.
Agnes Heller fue una filósofa húngara famosa por haber dado un lugar epistémico a la
vida cotidiana, definiéndola como heterogéna y jerárquica, portadora de distintos
contenidos y significaciones.143 Para esta filósofa los movimientos culturales tienen la
capacidad de transformar la sociedad. Sostenía que después de la Segunda Guerra
Mundial así lo hicieron en Europa el existencialismo, la generación alienada y el post
estructuralismo; los tres acompañados constantemente por el feminismo, entendido
por ella –que no era feminista- como uno de los móviles de una revolución social en
profundidad.144
Aunque Heller se aboca en su reflexión a estudiar cómo estos tres movimientos, en
Europa, dieron por fin al traste con la cultura de clases que se perfiló con la revolución
industrial, con sus divisiones estancas entre aristocracia, burguesía y sectores
populares, es interesante para nosotras retomar aquí su idea de que las sociedades
pueden transformarse a través de revoluciones que ocurren por movimientos
culturales; eso es, por el despertar de emociones, de experiencia estéticas. De hecho,
“los intelectuales independientes, y en particular los artistas, fueron los primeros
grupos disidentes” de la división clasista de la cultura europea, según nos revela
Heller.145
Si tres corrientes de pensamiento que giraron a percepciones del sentir social ante la
realidad pudieron dar origen a movimientos que actuaron en el cambio de las
relaciones entre las personas, con el estado y con la cultura, es porque trastocaron la
idea de conocimiento.
En Nuestra América, desde 1973, cuando se expresó el Movimiento Quintín Lame, del
pueblo Nasa, y aún más desde 1994 con el levantamiento zapatista de los pueblos
mayas de Chiapas, las proposiciones universales que sostenían la epistemología
occidental –ciencia, libertad, cultura, desarrollo, entre otras- ya no nos significan nada
más que imposiciones ideológicas. La connotación pluralista del saber y de las formas
de acceder a él, se nos han evidenciado desde una historia negada, no escrita,
silenciada adrede, que retomaba su lugar a los ojos del mundo mediante actos
políticos, que eran al mismo tiempo movimientos de reivindicación cultural. Las
naciones nasa y mayas situaron las culturas americanas en la relación que tienen entre
sí y dejaron de preocuparse por la historia como categoría del devenir necesario para
vincularla a la memoria, a lo colectivo, lo personal, lo vivido y lo negado.
Al igual que todos los pueblos, el nasa y los mayas están conformados por mujeres,
hombres y una pequeña minoría de personas intersexuales. Como la mayoría absoluta
143
Muchos de sus estudios se enfocaron a la comprensión de la vida cotidiana. Cfr. Agnes Heller,
Historia y vida cotidiana: aportación a la sociología socialista, Grijalbo, México, 1972; Sociología de la
Vida Cotidiana, Ediciones Península, Barcelona, 1977; La revolución de la vida cotidiana, Ediciones
Península, Barcelona, 1982, entre otros.
144
Agnes Heller, “Los movimientos culturales como vehículos de cambio”, en Nueva Sociedad, n.96,
Caracas, julio-agosto de 1988, pp. 39-49
145
Ibidem, p. 40
de los pueblos, tienen sus propios sistemas de género.146 Éstos son regímenes sociales
que se derivan de técnicas de ubicación de las personas con genitales femeninos y
masculinos en una relación laboral dual no siempre equitativa que, para reproducirse,
incluye saberes excluyentes, rituales religiosos ligados a cosmogonías sexuadas,
lugares sociales, acceso a la riqueza y a la tierra diferenciados, sexualidades,
emotividades, a la vez que no les niega a ninguno de los dos una participación en el ser
mismo de la colectividad. Equitativo o no, todo sistema de género implica la existencia
de sujetos construidos a través de la educación formal e informal como femeninos y
como masculinos para que la sociedad se mantenga viva y, en lo posible, se expanda.
Los sistemas de género construyen a las mujeres y a los hombres, a la vez que
organizan su vida cotidiana en función de su existencia. Son la estructura básica de la
mayoría de las sociedades del mundo, no importa si su sistema es matrilinear o
patrilinear, si es matrifocal o patrifocal, si incorporan un tercer género que mezcle
características de los dos principales, donde existe un sistema de género le coexiste
una división sexual del trabajo y una legalidad que la garantiza. Igualmente, concurren
una estética y una moral que lo normalizan y una episteme –religiosa o no- que lo
naturaliza.
Si el pueblo Nasa, en el diseño de un sistema educativo propio, prevé que los ancianos
lleven en sus recorridos a las niñas junto con los niños y que se reconozcan los saberes
de las ancianas, los pueblos mayas del gobierno autónomo zapatista asumen que las
mujeres han de estar en la Junta de Buen Gobierno y en todos los cargos de gobierno
en un número equivalente a los hombres: 50% y 50%.
Decimos que no hay un libro donde nos guiemos cómo hacer la autonomía en
nuestro gobierno, no hay un libro que nos dirija, vamos aprendiendo con el
trabajo. Lo que nos cuesta como compañeras es aprender a hablar, a decidir, a
opinar y a proponer cosas nuevas para que nos lleven a un camino nuevo. Pero
no estamos sin la participación de las compañeras, en las distintas áreas de
trabajo en nuestra zona, así como en los distintos niveles de gobierno y en otras
áreas como salud y educación, de por sí están participando compañeras. Ya
146
Los sistemas de género no son universales ni es universal la inferiorización social de las
mujeres en todos los pueblos. Aún más, es probable que no sea universal ni siquiera la
diferenciación social de las personas según su sexo. Hay una tendencia a creer que los pueblos
tupí-guaraníes no dan importancia a la diferencia sexual de las personas. Personalmente creo
que el tupí es un sistema de género más igualitario que otro, entre otras cosas porque asume que
el modelo de ser humano es el del cuerpo femenino, cuya vida está marcada por más tiempos
que los de la vida y la muerte. Entre los tupí no es necesario “demostrar” que se puede ser como
una persona de otro sexo, porque las acciones sociales no están marcadas por una superioridad o
una inferioridad de las mujeres o de los hombres y ambos pueden hacer todas las cosas que son
consideradas humanas por su cosmovisión. En otras culturas actuales de Asia y África también
hay pueblos que no dan una gran importancia, ni mucho menos una escala de valores, a la
diferencia sexual. ¿Se mantiene en ese caso la existencia de un sistema de género? Según la
arqueóloga Marija Gimbutas, en la Antigua Europa, entre el 6.500 y el 3500 a.C., tampoco
existían diferenciaciones excluyentes de los trabajos por sexo; aunque prefiere subrayar el
carácter no violento de esa cultura, deja intuir que la no discriminación sexual estaba en la base
de su pacifismo: The Goddesses and Gods of Old Europe: Myths and Cult Images, New and
Updated Edition, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1982, 304 pp. También puede verse:
The living Godess, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2001, 286 pp.
tenemos compañeras en todas las áreas, aunque no al 100%, pero tenemos
compañeras en todas las diferentes áreas.147
La supresión de exclusiones en el ámbito público ha sido para las mujeres nasa y mayas
zapatistas el camino tomado para superar la discriminación de género y, por ende, el
sistema de género mismo, pues éste descansa invariablemente en la sumisión de uno
de los grupos sexuales. Es un camino ligado a la participación y a la construcción de
identidades alternativas a la de la sujetivación individual de la cultura de origen
europeo. Para las nasas y para las mayas zapatistas el sujeto de su principal
identificación es el colectivo de pertenencia. Para ellas desempeñarse en colectivo es
la forma de llegar a la liberación de su persona, pues participar de la toma de
decisiones que conciernen al conjunto les resulta indispensable para reconocerse
como personas importantes, productoras y reproductoras, del sistema que les da
autonomía y libertad.
Según Lorena Cabnal, integrante de la Asociación de Mujeres Indígenas de Santa María
de Xalapán (AMISMAXAJ) de Guatemala, las mujeres que se liberan en comunidad
además tienen una profunda conexión con la defensa del territorio. Sostiene que,
“para las mujeres indígenas, la defensa del territorio tierra es la propia defensa del
territorio cuerpo”. Eso es, existe un vínculo entre la participación de las mujeres en la
lucha contra las transnacionales que amenazan sus tierras comunales, y la lucha por la
dignidad e inviolabilidad del cuerpo de las mujeres como personas que conforman un
colectivo y tienen por eso mismo derecho a su autonomía sexual y su libertad de
movimiento, afectividad, asociación y expresión. La historia del racismo de estado en
Guatemala ha implicado a la vez el genocidio y el despojo de los pueblos xinka y mayas
– que, como ya dijimos, siempre están conformados por hombres y mujeres- y la
violencia específica contra los cuerpos y las vidas de las mujeres.
Según Cabnal, “hay mucho luto, duelo, temor y terror instalados sobre nuestros
cuerpos, justamente por lo que ha implicado la violencia sexual durante la guerra”.148
En estas condiciones, poner el cuerpo en primera línea en la defensa de la tierra
colectiva implica confrontar el acoso y la violencia por parte de los agentes locales de
las transnacionales, de los órganos represivos del estado, así como de los propios
compañeros que, en 500 años de colonización, han transformado las preferencias
sociales por los hombres de su cultura ancestral en un brutal sistema de misoginia
institucionalizada e incuestionable, mediante un proceso que la propia Lorena Cabnal
llama “entronque de patriarcados”.149
Entronque de patriarcados es una categoría elaborada por el feminismo comunitario,
en diferentes contextos, pero en diálogo, entre las feministas aymaras de Bolivia y
xinkas de Guatemala. Por lo que entiendo, implica la existencia histórica de un
patriarcado originario ancestral, la penetración colonial con la consecuente imposición
del sistema de género dominante entre los colonizadores, y el entronque o enlace de
147
Participación de las mujeres en el gobierno autónomo. Cuaderno de texto de primer grado del curso
de “La Libertad según l@s Zapatistas”, s.p.i. y s.f., pero probablemente Chiapas, 2013, p.7
148
PBI Abriendo Espacios para la Paz, Entrevista a Lorena Cabnal, mayo de 2013 http://www.pbiee.org/fileadmin/user_files/groups/spain/1305Entrevista_a_Lorena_Cabnal_completa.pdf
149
Lorena Cabnal, “Acercamiento a la construcción de la propuesta de pensamiento epistémico de las
mujeres indígenas feministas comunitarias de Abya Yala”, en Feminismos diversos: el feminismo
comunitario,
ACSUR,
Las
Segovias,
2010,
http://porunavidavivible.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/feminismos-comunitario-lorena-cabnal.pdf
los dos patriarcados para dar origen a una nueva forma estructural de androfilia
misógina, recrudecida por la división racista que se establece entre los descendientes
de los pueblos conquistados y los descendientes de los conquistadores. Este sistema
de dominación implica una hegemonía discursiva del poder que se reproduce siempre
en tres niveles contemporáneos unos a otros: el racismo, el sexismo y el colonialismo
que llegan a nuestros días y buscan mantenerse y reproducirse.
El sexismo y el racismo son dos sistemas sociales agresivos que buscan explotar grupos
específicos de personas identificadas por alguna connotación corporal, sea ésta la
portación de genitales o de ciertos rasgos fenotípicos como el color de la piel o el tipo
de pelo, mediante un proceso de construcción de su inferioridad “natural” y su no
participación en la cultura. En el México rural todavía he escuchado la expresión
“gente de razón” para hacer referencia a las personas no indígenas. Así de las mujeres
es común encontrar, aún en estudios científicos, afirmaciones semejantes a que son
más viscerales, naturales, intuitivas, emotivas, empáticas, mientras los hombres son
racionales.150 Estas afirmaciones obviamente históricas e ideológicas, sostienen sin
embargo que son objetivas porque científicas, haciendo hincapié en que la ciencia es
universal, invariable y exacta. Cuestionarla es prueba de ignorancia.
Ahora bien, desde el siglo XVIII, se observa una hegemonía de la racionalidad sobre
otras formas de evaluación (teológicas, emotivas, espirituales, poéticas, estéticas) de la
comprensión del mundo y de las relaciones sociales e interpersonales. Una
racionalidad que acompaña el descubrimiento de la utilidad de las ciencias duras para
el avance de la civilización, entendida como industrialización y tecnologización de la
producción, y la alta valoración de lo útil en la filosofía de la educación.
Ahora bien, si el sistema educativo logra construir un consenso acerca de viejos
prejuicios coloniales según los cuales los pueblos indígenas no son pueblos de razón y
las mujeres son más emotivas que racionales, la ciencia demostrará su certeza
universal. A la vez, si la ciencia enfocada a la utilidad del avance tecnológico de la
producción afirma como verdadera una de sus conclusiones, el sistema educativo
hegemónico la convertirá en un paradigma incuestionable. El binomio cienciaeducación descansa, por lo tanto, en una racionalidad utilitarista. A la vez, esta
racionalidad dará pié a una ética utilitarista, la que sostiene la moralidad de lo que
garantiza la continuidad del sistema. Y la continuidad permitirá la elaboración positiva
de emociones calmadas, no agresivas, relativas a lo que se pretende agradable y bello,
identificado con lo racional, lo educado y la racialización del privilegio para lo blanco.
Este tipo de epistemología ética y estética, desde el siglo XIX dirige la política y la
economía hacia el racismo y el sexismo. Mujeres pobres, rurales, analfabetas y
racializadas, sobre las indígenas y las negras recaen todas las consecuencias de la
150
Los ejemplos son innumerables, y provienen de la medicina, la psicología y la biología, así como de
las humanidades y la teología. Todavía en febrero de 2013 la catedrática española de Bioquímica y
Biología Molecular Natalia López-Moratalla produjo un vídeo sobre el funcionamiento del “cerebro
enamorado”, para aseverar que en “la mujer” domina una empatía emocional, mientras que “el hombre”
es más racional y con mayores estímulos eróticos. Como todo el video, la certificación científica de la
diferencia en el apetito sexual de mujeres y hombres se sostiene en prejuicios y se convierte en un
justificante último de las agresiones sexuales de los hombres. El vídeo ¿Cómo funciona un cerebro
enamorado?, de la Universidad de Navarra, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6itm-rjzH5U) habla de
“vínculos amorosos”, “personas amadas”, “satisfacción”, “bases biológicas del enamoramiento
universales”, pero ni siquiera hace referencia a la posibilidad del enamoramiento entre dos mujeres o dos
hombres o entre dos personas que no se identifican ni como hombres ni como mujeres (intersexuales,
transexuales, transgéneros)
discriminación: se desconocen sus saberes, se les niega el acceso a la riqueza, se
mantienen impunes las agresiones físicas y sexuales que sufren, se duda de su
religiosidad, se objeta su moralidad y se impugna su belleza.
Desde la afirmación de la utilidad del progreso, es decir del repudio de la herencia del
pasado para avanzar hacia un futuro racional, las naciones colonialistas y sus escuelas
construyeron una perversa sinonimía entre mundo urbano cosmopolita y civilización,
dando a entender que el modelo de las clases ilustradas blancas, al que podían acceder
sólo los hombres, era el portador de una evolución más que útil, indispensable.
En nombre del progreso y su orden civilizatorio se justificaron agresiones territoriales,
genocidios, explotaciones laborales, intolerancia hacia las expresiones espirituales
desconocidas, imposiciones de modelos nucleares de familia y la más estricta
heteronormatividad. El progreso debía servir para la acumulación material, lo que se le
oponía era atrasado, salvaje, inmoral y feo.
En América Latina, que mayoritariamente había logrado su independencia política de
las metrópolis europeas en las primeras dos décadas del siglo, el progreso se concibió
como una fantasía, la de “hacer de su América un mundo a la altura del llamado
mundo occidental”, según lo describe Leopoldo Zea.151 Las élites locales se encargaron
de la imitación de las formas europeas, sin reparar en la explotación de los recursos
humanos y materiales. El progreso llegaba de la mano del orden y éste necesitaba de
iluminadas dictaduras como las de Porfirio Díaz y el Dr. Francia, genocidios para la
sustitución de las poblaciones indígenas por migrantes de origen europeo, minería y
obra infraestructurales dañinas para el medioambiente. También llegaba de la mano
de los descubrimientos en el campo de la bacteriología, por los cuales la higienización
forzada de la gente subrayaba la racionalidad de quienes obedecían las reglas
sanitarias y la irracionalidad de las mujeres que preferían amamantar a sus hijas/os, de
los obreros que vivían en condiciones de hacinamiento y de los pueblos que daban
poca importancia al baño diario (especialmente los nómadas de los desiertos que eran
muy rebeldes a los trabajos forzados).
La idea de progreso reafirmaba las discriminaciones coloniales. Su racionalidad se
pretendía científica, por ende universal. Quien estaba fuera del progreso no tenía
derecho a la historia porque no tenía futuro.
En el siglo XIX, las primeras feministas no se dieron cuenta del peligro que entrañaba la
noción de progreso. Si bien fueron antiesclavistas en Estados Unidos y nacionalistas
antimperialistas en México, Centro y Suramérica, también se identificaron inicialmente
con el liberalismo europeo. Después, las feministas socialistas y anarquistas en pocas
ocasiones llegaron a estrechar vínculos con las mujeres y los hombres de los pueblos
de agricultores no urbanos. El progreso como ideología implicó la construcción de
sectores estancos e incomunicados en América y el grupo socio-racial que regía la
dirección económica identificó el progreso de sus negocios con el futuro de la nación.
Al hacerlo, fortaleció el sistema racista que construye el lugar simbólico, económico y
estético de las personas, según los privilegios y visibilidad que otorga a las blancas y las
desventajas y olvidos que impone a los individuos y colectivos mestizos, indígenas y
negros.
151
Leopoldo Zea, El pensamiento latinoamericano, Ariel, Barcelona, 1976, p.73
La revolución mexicana puso fin al proyecto del progreso económico de las minorías
blancas e introdujo los derechos económicos colectivos –a la vivienda, al trabajo, a la
educación y a la salud- de las mayorías mestizas. El movimiento por los derechos civiles
en Estados Unidos, acabó con la identificación de lo bello con lo blanco y de la justicia
con la normatividad. No obstante, ninguno de los dos movimientos logró desbancar de
la educación, de la construcción misma de la teoría de quiénes y cómo conocemos, la
idea de que hay personas cuya racionalidad es menor o nula, personas incapaces de
moralidad, afeadas por su condición de raza y clase, seres que son “otros”.
Se necesitaba la libertad de elegir las propias formas de vida, el respeto a las
alternativas históricas de los pueblos, el reconocimiento de la economía de las
mujeres, pero la episteme de origen colonial no permitía explorar siquiera el trabajo
como misión o como cooperación, la producción según parámetros de equilibrio local
entre crecimiento y moderación en el uso de los recursos, el acceso a saberes
producidos desde parámetros y en espacios no escolarizados, las relaciones afectivas
no determinadas por el orden familiar reproductivo, imaginarios de permanencia y no
de cambio de los modelos de vida. La dependencia ideológica de origen colonial se
mantuvo en la idea de “desarrollo” que apareció al finalizar la segunda guerra mundial
y se impuso en el mundo capitalista como crecimiento económico y en la propuesta
socialista, como crecimiento con equidad, un bienestar con cierta autonomía
cultural.152
El cambio social y los métodos de conocimiento siguieron los derroteros del
universalismo de la racionalidad excluyente europea. La pobreza de la mayoría de la
población impedía a los gobiernos diseñar proyectos de cambio de la estructura
socioeconómica para la realización de su potencial humano; por lo tanto, se visualizó el
desarrollo como un constante proceso de cambio para la realización de las mejoras en
las condiciones de vida, a partir de estrategias consideradas iguales y buenas para
todos los pueblos.
El poder de los hombres y de los grupos urbanos blancos, las relaciones de clase, la
discriminación de las mujeres, la propiedad y el uso colectivo o privado de la tierra, las
dependencias del mercado a nivel internacional y de patrones de educación
centralizados a nivel interno, las ideologías, los valores, las identidades tradicionales,
las relaciones con la sacralidad del territorio, fueron desechados como variantes para
pensar un bienestar de todos los pueblos y sectores. Desde gobiernos de élites, se
optó por un mecánico camino predeterminado del desarrollo, autoritario y, por
supuesto, irrealizable, pero que se intentó imponer reprimiendo toda protesta e
intento autónomo.
Como bien dice Heller, fueron necesarias revoluciones culturales profundas en la vida
cotidiana, para llegar a aceptar la crisis ecológica, la agricultura de subsistencia, la
autoproducción y el intercambio, la cooperación que son propias de las propuestas de
generaciones de sobrevivientes de la represión contra la izquierda, contra el
terrorismo y contra la delincuencia organizada que, década tras década, ha matado un
número indeterminado de jóvenes y aumentado la marginación de los pueblos
indígenas. Los límites del desarrollo percibidos por artistas, feministas y activistas de
152
Cfr. David Crocker, “La naturaleza y la práctica de una ética del desarrollo”, en Revista de Filosofía
de
la
Universidad
de
Costa
Rica,
n.63-64,
San
José,
1988,
pp.
49-56
http://inif.ucr.ac.cr/recursos/docs/Revista%20de%20Filosof%C3%ADa%20UCR/Vol.%20XXVI/No.%20
63-64/La%20Naturaleza%20y%20la%20Practica%20de%20una%20Etica%20del%20Desarrollo.pdf
los derechos humanos habían con anterioridad sido evidenciados por las mujeres y
hombres de diversos pueblos cuando levantaron la voz para definir ese espacio de
espiritualidad inmanente que es su territorio y se compone de la tierra, el aire, el agua,
los recursos biológicos y minerales en equilibrio.
En este clima, desde las últimas décadas del siglo XX se han multiplicado los
movimientos de los pueblos originarios que luchan contra la minería al cielo abierto, la
construcción de represas y los cultivos transgénicos de la agricultura industrial, en
nombre de la protección de un territorio que las mujeres identifican con el propio
cuerpo colectivo y, por ende, igualan con el espacio de las emociones. Defenderse es
construir sin necesidad de crecer atropellando árboles y fuentes de agua, a la vez que
pelear por la defensa del territorio tierra con los hombres les permite confrontarlos
para que acaten sus decisiones con respecto a su territorio cuerpo.
Según Dorotea Gómez Grijalva, antropóloga feminista maya quich’é, el propio cuerpo
es un territorio político, histórico y no biológico, y conocerlo es un acto de
descolonización del conocimiento. “Asumo que ha sido nombrado y construido a partir
de ideologías, discursos e ideas que han justificado su opresión, su explotación, su
sometimiento, su enajenación y su devaluación”, dice al afirmar su decisión de repensarse y construir una historia propia, espiritual, racional y emocional.153
Enlaza el feminismo con una iniciativa ética que se contrapone al consumo, el
lesbianismo con una revisión de la historia de las relaciones entre mujeres y hombres
en todos los pueblos, la defensa de la cultura de pertenencia con una voluntad de
transformaciones de la patrilinearidad del apellido y de la propiedad colectiva y
familiar. A la hostilidad racista, excluyente y discriminadora, que experimentó al llegar
a vivir a la ciudad capital contrapone la seguridad de la ignorancia de las élites,
volteando la episteme occidental con una afirmación irónica:
En cuanto a mi adscripción étnica, por muchas razones utilizo el término Maya
en vez de indígena para auto identificarme como descendiente de los pueblos
mayas. Entre las razones más relevantes, puedo citar las siguientes: a) es una
decisión político-personal para contrarrestar la idea prevaleciente en el
imaginario social guatemalteco, de que los mayas ya no existimos o que en todos
casos nuestros antepasados se fueron a Marte; b) para reafirmar mi conciencia
política respecto a los derechos étnicos frente al Estado y la sociedad
guatemalteca.154
La ironía en este texto es un acto estético, incomoda y divierte, impide que la
afirmación pase inadvertida. De ninguna manera es una escapatoria para la
contundencia del recuento histórico de los 36 años de guerra genocida, de 1960 a
1996, cuando el racismo estructural y el cierre de los espacios políticos impulsaron
formas de resistencia y re-creación aun mientras, o más bien porque, el ejército
guatemalteco exterminaba 626 comunidades mayas, asesinando 200 000 personas y
enviando 900 000 más al exilio exterior y un millón al desplazamiento interno.
153
Dorotea Gómez Grijalva, Mi cuerpo es un territorio político, Brecha lésbica, 2012, p. 6,
http://brechalesbica.files.wordpress.com/2010/11/mi-cuerpo-es-un-territorio-polc3adtico77777-doroteagc3b3mez-grijalva.pdf
154
Ibidem, p. 5
El cuerpo de la memoria territorial, el territorio de la autodeterminación política de
una lesbiana maya, habla de condiciones de vida a mejorar en el respeto de una
ecología propia.
Si el desarrollo puede ser una práctica de funcionamiento social y no sólo una
estrategia dirigida a un cambio, se convierte en un movimiento de pluralización del
universo cultural, como los que analiza en Europa Agnes Heller. ¿Puede desbaratar el
sistema racista originado por la invasión de América al principio de la Modernidad así
como los movimientos europeos deshicieron los restos de la cultura de clases que se
originó en la Revolución Industrial?
Un movimiento feminista situado en la ola de defensas de los territorios y las
autonomías indígenas puede bloquear el engranaje del entronque de patriarcados,
entendido también como maquinaria de construcción de identidades subordinadas.
Entonces, tal y como lo pretende la Ley Revolucionaria de Mujeres de l@s zapatistas,
las mujeres “sin importar su raza, credo, color o filiación política” tendrán “derecho a
participar en la lucha revolucionaria en el lugar y grado que su voluntad y capacidad
determinen”.155
4:15 to 5:40
(CE)
Plenary Session
Chair: Luis Camacho
Auditorio
Development Ethics in a New Key
David A. Crocker*156
Keywords: development ethics, political economy, agency, empowerment, inequality,
democracy, corruption, transitional justice
Introduction
The Journal of Global Ethics “Tenth Anniversary Forum: The Future of Global Ethics”157
coincides with the year in which the International Development Ethics Association
(IDEA) held its Tenth International Conference and celebrated its 30th Anniversary on
July 21-23, 2014. These IDEA events, like its founding in 1984, took place at the
University of Costa Rica. The Journal’s Anniversary Forum has provided an occasion for
155
Artículo primero de la Ley Revolucionaria de Mujeres, de diciembre de 1993, citado en Participación
de las Mujeres en el Gobierno Autónomo, Op. Cit., p. 66
*Email: dcrocker@umd.edu
Notes
157
Journal of Global Ethics, 10, 1 (April 2014).
global ethics (GE) to take stock of the past, present, and future of global ethics.
Accordingly, the Journal’s editors have solicited reflections on “the future directions of
the fields of global ethics, global justice, and development ethics.” 158 Happily, the
Costa Rican conference featured sessions in which leading development ethicists—
Sandra Boni, Luis Camacho, Adela Cortina, Jay Drydyk, Nigel Dower, Des Gasper, and
Christine Koggel—reflected critically and constructively on the current challenges and
future prospects of their discipline or multidisciplinary field. Socrates’s famous oneliner “the unexamined life is not worth living” applies to institutions, such as journals,
associations, and disciplines, as well as to individuals: “the unexamined institution is
not worth supporting.”
The present paper, based on my plenary presentation in the 2014 IDEA conference, is
my effort to build on the ideas of my colleagues and try my own hand at where
development ethics (DE) should be heading. Entitled—with a nod to philosopher
Suzanne Langer (Langer 1942)—“Development Ethics in a New Key,” my remarks
addressed the way in which DE in a new key should build on and transpose DE to meet
our emerging challenges. In this paper’s first section, I briefly discuss the Journal’s
Global Ethics Form and various ways DE has been related to global ethics. In the
second section, I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of DE in the old key. The third
section briefly summarizes recent efforts to expand and reorchestrate DE. In a fourth
section I identify and elaborate five (additional) topics for DE in a new key. A final
section concludes.
Global Ethics and Development Ethics
As the initial contributions to the Tenth Anniversary Forum make clear global ethics
(GE) and DE have been and continue to be conceived in various ways. I resist the
temptation in this essay to set forth what I take to be the best definition of the two
fields and their relations. On three different approaches, however, there is or should
be some link between DE and GE. First, DE can be defined as the “ethics of global
development”—ethical reflection on the ends, means, and processes of beneficial
social change (and maintenance) at the local, national, regional, and global levels (and
their relations). Second, some define GE as the search for one universal ethic to guide
relations among people all over the globe and then to be applied to sub-fields, such as
development, business, trade, the environment, and conflict. Finally, Adela Cortina
exemplifies a third approach in which DE is—like bioethics, business ethics, and
environmental ethics—an interdisciplinary field that has “reached the global level”
(Cortina 2014, 31) and stands to gain from interaction with other sorts of applied
ethics.
Regardless of which of these three (or other) conceptions of DE and GE one adopts, I
believe that we should avoid two views: (1) only global institutions and the relations
among states matter; national (and local) development is causally and normatively
insignificant; (2) only national (or local) development matters and global institutions
and relations among states are causally and normatively irrelevant. The first
unacceptable position is similar to what Thomas Pogge describes and rejects as
158
“Introduction: The Future of Global Ethics Forum,” Journal of Global Ethics, 10, 1
(2014), 7.
“explanatory nationalism,” which “makes us look at poverty and oppression as
problems whose root cause and possible solutions are domestic” (Pogge 2002, 141;
see also Pepper 2014, 69, n.17). The second, equally one-sided, position might be
called “explanatory and normative globalism” in which local and national problems are
ultimately due to global factors (and the rich democracies responsible for them). 159
Once we reject the false dichotomy that only global or only national (and local) factors
count, we are open to seeing that the subnational, national, regional, and global
factors are causally and normatively important with different weights and in different
ways in different contexts. GE tends to start with the universal and global and ask how
they affect the national (and local) for good and ill. DE tends to start with the local and
national and then considers ways in which the former affects and is affected by the
global—especially with respect to the issues of poverty and powerlessness. Wherever
one starts, DE and GE can and should often converge.
Development Ethics in Old Key
The Costa Rican development experience, at least since the IDEA’s founding in 1984,
shaped DE both positively and negatively. Costa Rican, Kenyan, and British
development ethicists found in the Costa Rica of the mid-1980s a county that was
democratic, ethnically homogenous, and peace-loving. Since 1900 there had been only
a brief authoritarian interlude (1917-19) and a 44-day civil war (1948). Representative
democracy reigned: regular democratic elections took place as did peaceful transfers
of power. Except for tiny minorities of African descendants and indigenous
communities along the Atlantic Coast, the “Ticos” were relatively homogenous. With
roots 19th century reforms, education was universal, cost-free, and mandatory
through age 16. A European-style social democracy substantially reduced poverty. The
burgeoning system of national parks was attracting eco-tourists from around the
world. Costa Ricans tended to resolve disagreements with civil discussion and amiable
deliberation rather than verbal and physical attacks, let alone civil war. A free press
and vigorous civil society as well as separation of powers kept corruption under
control. All in all, the Costa Ricans were proud of their Tico-style development model
and achievements. Denis Goulet, the pioneer of DE and the keynote speaker at IDEA’s
first international conference in Costa Rica in 1987, had challenged development
ethicists with a basic task: “keep hope alive.” Given Costa Rica’s history, achievements,
and aspirations -- especially in contrast with its conflicted and impoverished neighbors
-- it became all too easy to believe that if Costa Rica could “develop” as a result of their
goals, market means, and democratic institutions, then, with the right sort of
normative vision, other poor and developing countries could do so as well.
Appreciating Costa Rica’s development successes, together with our Costa Rican
colleagues we built on Denis Goulet’s practice of a DE that was inter-disciplinary and
combined academic approaches with concerns for development policy and practice.
The University of Costa Rica’s philosophy faculty continued an earlier tradition of
public engagement; philosophers, such as Luis Camacho and E. Roy Ramirez, among
others, offered courses on Costa Rican development challenges and wrote articles in
159
For arguments against Pogge’s view, see (Crocker 2008, 49-51) and (Drydyk 2014,
19).
national press on current events. Our 1987 IDEA conference included many academics
besides philosophers and many development and environmental practitioners, such as
Daniel Janzen, who established the Santa Rosa Dry Tropical Forest Preserve, and Joe
Stuckey, a founder of the Monteverde Quaker Development Community. Believing
that there were limits to what could be taught and learned in an academic conference,
in the middle of the conference week, participants made site visits to various
development projects. Although empirical research, policy analysis and proposals, and
implementation were important, the first generation of IDEA ethicists tended to
subordinate these components to the articulation and defense of a normative
foundation.
We development ethicists, however, now clearly realize and gradually have come to
see, that the Costa Rican experience both could not easily be replicated elsewhere
and, more importantly, provided an inadequate lens to grasp the development
challenges in most countries throughout the world. Instead of Costa Rica’s internal
peace, most poor or developing countries were riven by insecurity and internal
conflicts, such as drug and sex trafficking, military and police repression, and—not
infrequently—civil war. Instead of Costa Rica’s ethnic and religious homogeneity and
ideological harmony, many “developing” and so-called “developed” countries
exhibited deep cultural divides and discriminatory practices. Other countries had little
of Costa Rica’s social democratic safety net, and consequently had deep and worsening
poverty and inequality. Governance in most developing countries was either thinly
democratic or amounted to a more or less repressive guardianship, whether of the
right or the left. Corruption in both high and low places was rampant and
unchallenged. Influenced by the provocative arguments of global ethicist Thomas
Pogge, it became increasingly clear to IDEA ethicists that it was not (only) internal
problems that caused these many and linked problems but (also) regional and global
structures, such as the Cold War and the international economic institutions. Finally,
we began to realize that DE, if it were to make a difference in the development world
as well as the academic world, would have to be less occupied with normative visions
and more concerned with both political economy and with ethical reflection on
strategy and tactics—what Goulet had presciently called an ethics of “the means of the
means.” What was needed was DE in a new key.160
It should also be said that the more that I worked on Costa Rica in the late-80’s and early90’s, the more I recognized that even in that period Costa Rica itself fell far short of our original
idyllic picture of Costa Rica and shared—albeit, less dramatically—many of the negative
features that had become all too visible in its near neighbors and other poor and failed countries.
Although it had no army, in the 80s its US supported guardia rural and guardia civil employed
strong arm tactics that unnerved Costa Ricans. With anti-communist zeal and aiming to make
Costa Rica a showcase of free-market capitalism, US President Ronald Reagan had funded—in
exchange for a secret airbase in Northern Costa Rica to launch support for Nicaragua’s
contras—much of Costa Rica’s development success. Many Costa Rican critics bemoaned
Costa Rican dependency on the US and the way that Costa Ricans were falling through large
holes in the country’s safety net. With a crush of “eco tourists,” Costa Rica’s protected areas
began to deteriorate. Costa Rica’s vaunted democracy became distressingly a matter of topdown technocratic administration and citizen parades at election time. Social critics declared the
160
Development Ethics: Expanding the Focus
In the last two decades, IDEA development ethicists and their dialogue partners
expanded the scope of DE and moved more squarely into non-developmental aspects
of GE. What remained intact from IDEA’s founding was the commitment to ethical
reflection on the ends, means, and processes of good social change, usually conceived
as poverty alleviation, equal opportunity, and social harmony. What changed was a
new and sustained critique of the many and deep obstacles to these goals, and a new
emphasis on finding ethical and effective ways to overcome practices inimical to
ethical goals.
Nigel Dower investigated the ways in which violence and war, on the one hand, and
unsustainable consumption, on the other, impede good development. He expanded
development goals to include environmental sustainability, global citizenship and
peaceful relations within and between nations (Dower 2003, 2005, 2009).
Asunción St. Clair, Des Gasper, and Victoria Portocarrero challenged DE to take up the
issue of climate change; they recognized the ways in which maldevelopment
contributes to climate change and they argued that solutions to climate change
require a multidisciplinary approach to which DE could and should contribute (Gasper,
Portocarrero, St. Clair 2013). St. Clair and Desmond McNeill and St. Clair criticized the
ways in which leading international organizations, such as the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the United Nations all too frequently appropriate
critical and progressive ethical concepts and sanitize them to support the status quo
(McNeill and St. Clair 2009).
Des Gasper, on his own and with others, compellingly argued that development
ethicists must recognize and seek to reduce personal and institutional insecurity—
especially vulnerabilities that result from crime and armed conflict—as a part of
comprehensive development (Gasper 2005, 2007; Koehler, Gasper, Jolly, Simane
2012). Peter Penz, Jay Drydyk, and Pablo Bose showed how nationally executed and
internationally-funded attempts at big development projects, such as dams, displace
poor and powerless people and called for potential victims to participate in planning
and for actual victims to be compensated (Penz, Drydyk, and Bose 2011). Adela Cortina
argued that bad governance, in which public officials maltreat citizens and fail to
protect citizen agency and well-being, must be replaced with democratic governments
in which citizens are protagonists for and participants in self-government (Cortina
1997, 2014).
Sometimes alone, often in dialogue with a multidisciplinary team, these development
ethicists and many others are contributing to DE in a new key. What I would like to do
traditional democratic model to be “agotado” (worn out) and agreed that a new development
model was needed. But opinion makers acrimoniously disagreed as to whether this alternative
should be a revival of social democracy, free market liberalism (“neo-liberalism”), or something
very different. For my analysis and evaluation of this Costa Rican debate, see (Crocker 1989,
1990).
in the remainder of this programmatic essay is not only provide a label for this new
work but also put forward some topics that we development ethicists—at least this
one—have either ignored or insufficiently emphasized.
Development Ethics’ New Key
What are the topics that DE in a new key should emphasize and link? Although other
development ethicists will have somewhat different lists, here is mine: (1) inequality of
power, (2) agency and empowerment, (3) democracy and development, (4) corruption,
and (5) transitional justice.
(1) Inequality of Power and its “price” for (good) development, from the local to the
global, has become a hot topic throughout the world. Stiglitz (2012, 2013, 2014),
Piketty (2013), and Krugman (2014) are only three names associated with arguments
that some form of inequality is both the cause and consequence of not only
maldevelopment, but also bad governance. 161 Given their ethical commitments,
development ethicists must draw on the best work in political economy if they are to
deal ethically with human deprivation and transformation. Political economists ask
how and why power of various kinds is distributed within a social unit. How much
inequality of economic, political and social power exists? What are the causes and
relations of these inequalities and their consequences for good development at any
level? What are the most effective and durable ways to reduce multiple inequalities?
Complementing these empirical questions, the development ethicist asks: What, if
anything, is wrong with various types of inequality? What, if anything, should be done
about inequalities and who or what should do it? With respect to governance, for
example, the ethicist assesses what Michael Johnston describes as “political
contention over questions of who is to govern whom, by what right, through what
means, and within what limits” (Johnston 2014, 2).
It is important, of course, to ask “Inequality of what?” and to consider not only income
and wealth inequalities, but also horizontal inequalities (among religious or ethnic
groups), inequalities of freedoms that people have reason to value, and inequality of
agency, including political agency. And for most development ethicists, economic
growth is not the end of development but at best a means. But even if we define
inequality by income and/or wealth and development by economic growth,
“inequality,” as Krugman puts it is a “drag.” And political economist and New York
Times op ed columnist Krugman does not shy away from the ethical and policy
implications of the new egalitarianism:
Doesn’t taxing the rich and helping the poor reduce the incentive to make
money? Well, yes, but incentives aren’t the only thing that matters for
161
For an accessible summary, see (Doyle and Stiglitz, 2014). Stiglitz more technically
addresses the nature, causes, and consequences of various kinds of inequality in (Stiglitz
2012, 2013). See (Piketty, 2013) and Krugman (2014). For an evidence that “extractive”
elites are a main cause of nation failure, and that economic and political “inclusiveness”
is the basic solution, see also (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).
economic growth. Opportunity is also crucial. And extreme inequality deprives
many people of the opportunity to fulfill their potential.
Think about it. Do talented children in low-income American families have the
same chance to make use of their talent—to get the right education, to pursue
the right career path — as those born higher up the ladder? Of course not.
Moreover, this isn’t just unfair, it’s expensive. Extreme inequality means a
waste of human resources (Krugman 2014b).
Just as political economists and opinion columnists do not refrain from making ethical
judgments and policy prescriptions, so development ethicists should draw on the most
credible work and controversies in political economy. Amartya Sen, an economistphilosopher who takes economic and political causes and consequences seriously, has
made his normative and policy work with Jean Dreze on India increasingly compelling
by progressively deepening the analysis of India’s power imbalances and the “grip of
inequality” (Dreze and Sen, 2013, 199). What is called for is not pure values or pure
facts, but an multidisciplinary approach in which values provide a way of seeing and
evaluating the facts while facts, their causes and effects, enable us to understand and
explain that which is, has been, is likely to be, and might be—if agents act
appropriately (Crocker 2008; see Gasper 2012). Without an anchoring in political
economy, DE risks an inadequate grasp of constraints on and opportunities for
ethically justified policies and actions.
(2) Agency and empowerment have become important ideals in ethical reflection on
development, but DE in a new key should distinguish them by understanding agency as
necessary but insufficient for what we should mean by empowerment (Drydyk 2013).
Development ethicists are indebted to Sen for his 1985 distinction between agency
and well-being (Sen 1985; see Crocker and Robeyns 2009). Development actors and
institutions should respect, support, and restore both of these aspects of human
existence, but agency and well-being, although causally linked, are different. A person
or group is an agent to the extent the person or group decides and acts on purpose
and for a deliberated purpose, without external or internal compulsion, and makes a
difference in the world. In that case a person or group is self-determining, the author
of its own life instead of the object of another’s coercion or the victim of the force of
circumstance (Crocker 2008, 153-63; Crocker and Robeyns 2009). A person’s life goes
well when that person’s “beings and doings” are ones that this person has reason to
value and either realizes in life or has the freedom so realize. Being nourished, healthy,
secure, and happy are examples of well-being achievement; having real opportunities
or freedoms for such “beings and doings” are examples of well-being freedoms. To
exercise agency freedom (and have agency achievements), an agent requires at least
minimal well-being; and by exercising agency an agent may increase his or her well
being.
So far so good. It has, however, become increasingly apparent that agents not only can
exercise their agency in ways that reduce and even end their own well-being but also
in ways that harm or terminate the well-being of others. One way to understand the
ideal of empowerment, then, is that empowered individuals and groups are agents
who have the agency-power to work for their own well-being and that of others and
do so by contesting and overcoming power inequities that limit their agency and wellbeing (Drydyk 2013). A woman is not empowered if she is merely free to be employed
outside the home, for the powers that be may subject her to jobs—if they exist at all—
marked by harassment, discrimination, and decreased well-being (Koggel 2013).
Women are empowered to the extent that individually and collectively they struggle
against and (sometimes, at least) overcome the powers arrayed against their agency
and well-being (Koggel 2013). It follows that DE in the new key must concern itself not
only with promoting agency but also with morally permissible protagonismo that
challenges, contests, and seeks to overcome societal obstacles to a better life (Drydyk
2013). Political economy as sketched above delineates and exposes those obstacles,
especially those related to various inequalities.
(3) Development and democracy should be integrated in the theory and practice of the
DE in the new key. Many development ethicists and practitioners have argued—
persuasively, I believe—that citizens affected by local development projects should
have a role in decision making in all phases of those projects. These phases include
identification of need, deliberation about ends and means, monitoring, and evaluation.
People have a right to exercise their agency and help determine and modify the
policies under which they live. To do so gives participants a sense that they are
respected agents and that they “own” their projects. One consequence is that local
democracy—especially when it is inclusive and provides opportunity for the voices of
the marginalized to be heard—reduces the danger of elite capture and contributes to a
development project’s durability. Important examples include participatory budgeting
in municipalities in Brazil and throughout Latin America as well as other channels and
venue for citizens to exercise empowered agency (Baiocchi et al 2011; Cameron et al
2011; Goldfrank 2012, Vasquez Durán, 2014).
Local democracy, however, is not enough. Increasingly development scholars,
advocates, and practitioners are recognizing that local democracy must be supported
by and support national (and regional) democracy. For even the most innovative local
democratic institutions can be “managed,” undermined, or captured by powerful
economic, ethnic, political, or religious elites. Democracy on all levels requires
equitable development: and human-centered, durable development requires a broad
and deep democracy that makes a difference.
At least three factors, which development ethicist must expose and criticize, impede
the desired integration of development and democracy. First, since World War II
development assistance has repeatedly succumbed to “the temptation of the
technical” and eschewed governance issues and, in a broad sense, politics (Carothers
and de Gramont 2013). Defining development as value-free economic growth, many
development experts conceived of internal development efforts or development aid
from developed countries as “objective” and technical, far removed from cold war and
political acrimony. Yet we now know that the technical aid, such as credit unions or
anti-malaria bed nets, can shore up repressive regime. Food aid for starving people, for
example, can increase hunger when it deflates prices farmers receive for their crops or
causes recipient nations to fail to attack the causes of famine. Recipient countries
become dependent on outsiders, and development projects fail for lack of citizen
ownership. Elites can capture politically “neutral” aid and strengthen their dominance
through patronage systems and corruption. When development aid is exclusively
economic assistance, it ignores “the broader aspirations of citizens beyond economic
success, such as popular desires for political dignity and empowerment” (Carothers
and de Gramont 2013, 5). The result, apparent in North Africa, is a failure of
development aid to address political tensions, which subsequently explode.
A second obstacle to integrating democracy and development is the tendency of many
international financial instituions and national governments to address the above
problems with the neutral-sounding solution of “(good) governance” instead of some
form of inclusive and deep democracy. But such governance, based on rule of law and
electoral competition, is compatible with “managed democracy” or “competitive
authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2010). Indeed the most serious current rival to an
integration of development and democracy, is a new form of “benevolent”
authoritarianism in which elections—even ones reasonably free and fair—are held but
are devices by which an elite holds onto power. One reason Chinese development
assistance is on the march throughout the “developing” world, is that Chinese
“developers”—promising to leave local authoritarianism or deficient democracy
intact—provide infrastructure in exchange for access to resources and other benefits.
Examples are China’s building of Costa Rica’s shiny new national soccer stadium and
China’s agreement to fund and control a Nicaraguan alternative to the Panama Canal.
The authoritarian temptation is great. One way to challenge it is to appeal to Acemoglu
and Robinson’s evidence that nations fail in the mid- and long-run because economic
and political exclusiveness (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Another way is for
development ethicists to expand the notion of democracy so as to include social
movements and democratic militants that are working for a level playing field. Rather
than democracy being identified solely with a “one-off ritual that happens on the
election day,” “democracy is a year-round job” (Kiai and Vize 2014) in which citizens,
especially marginalized individuals and groups, use or create many channels and
venues through which they can govern. (Deveaux 2003, Kosko 2013) One implication is
that democratic and democratizing societies should delink citizenship from any ethnic
identity or religious affiliation and affirm a “rainbow polity,” an ethic of pluralism
(Kymlicka 2007; Kosko 2013; Muasher 2014). One objection to this sort of liberal and
democratic pluralism is that citizens will be unable to be loyal to and identify with a
polity unless it is rooted in a (single) ethnicity or religion. For an argument to the
contrary, see Anna Stiltz, Liberal Loyalty: Freedom, Obligation, and the State (Stiltz
2011).
(4) DE in a new key also should more explicitly and robustly tackle the issue of
corruption. Development ethicists initially shied away from this issue. Why? Because
the first thing—and, sometimes, the only thing—that sparked an interviewer’s interest
in our “field” was our “solution” to X’s corruption (where X is a person, governmental
or nongovernmental institution). Wanting to avoid self-righteous finger-waving and a
fixation on personal character instead of addressing ethically deficient institutions and
political policies, development ethicists tried (usually unsuccessfully) to dodge the
question and change the topic. And it is interesting to note that the term “corruption”
does not appear in the indices of major works in DE (Goulet 1971, 1989); Nussbaum
2001, 2011; Gasper 2004; Dower 2007; Crocker 2008; Penz, Drydyk, and Bose 2011;
Deneulin 2014).
It is important to note that was not development ethicists were not alone in failing to
address corruption. It was not until the World Bank began to tackle the issue. Why so
late? Corruption obviously touched on governance and political issues, and the Bank
up to the 1990’s viewed its mission as being purely economic or technical and in no
way infringing on a country’s internal affairs. The Bank came to realize, however, that
corruption impeded the attainment of the Bank’s goal of economic growth for
developing countries.
In 2002 the IDEA “owl of Minerva” (Hegel’s image of the philosopher) finally began to
take up the corruption issue when this DE association held its Sixth International
Conference in Honduras on the theme “Poverty, Corruption and Human Rights: Ethics
of Citizenship and Public Service.” Penz, Drydyk, and Bose (2011) proposed “integrity”
as one of the eight values that characterizes worthwhile development (in contrast to
maldevelopment). In her contribution to the Future of Global Ethics Forum, Cortina
called attention to international business ethics as a source for addressing corruption
and applauded the UN’s Global Compact and its principle that all enterprises, including
civic and labor organizations, should act “against all forms of corruption, including
extortion and bribery” (Cortina 2014).
Finally, in May 15, 2014 I gave a public address entitled “Ética Pública, Corrupción, y
Gobiernos Regionales” [Public Ethics, Corruption, and Regional Governments] at the
Universidad Antonio Ruiz de Montoya in Lima, Peru. The occasion was a shocking case
of homicide and likely systematic corruption: César Álvarez, the governor of Peru’s
resource-rich Department of Áncash, allegedly had engineered the murder of a
political rival, who had three years earlier been almost fatally wounded in an attempt
on his life. Preliminary investigations and media attention showed that the murder was
likely “the tip of the iceberg” (López 2014). The day of my lecture, the governor was
charged with many counts of criminality and corruption. Evidence mounted that
Áncash’s basic institutions – the judiciary, the local press, private contractors, the
Department’s policy and representatives to the national Parliament – were deeply
mired in a systematic web of corrupt practices. The Áncash affair, a clear and
distressing case of corruption in the classic sense of “abuse of public role for private
benefit,” shocked the nation (Cotler 2014). On May 30, Governor Álvarez and fortynine of his “associates” were sent to jail (“preventive custody”) for 18 months pending
judicial proceedings.
Corruption can and should be central to “new key” DE, which I have argued, builds on
the best work in political economy. Arguably, maldevelopment both causes and is
caused by corruption. Addressing corruption requires theoretical work, policy analysis,
ethical evaluation, and practical engagement. Theoretical work includes conceptual,
historical, and empirical argumentation with respect to the nature, types, causes,
tenacity, and consequences of both governmental and nongovernmental corruption. A
new DE includes assessment of the moral merit, effectiveness, and durability of
different sorts of strategies for attacking and reducing corruption. Ethical evaluation
emphasizes what is morally wrong with corruption as well as the moral quality (of lack
thereof) of various anti-corruption strategies. (Some anti-corruption agencies are
themselves corrupt or increase rather than reduce corruption. Most basically, what do
citizens have a right to expect of the state with respect to the issue of corruption
(Johnston 2014)? Policy work requires identifying ways to improve anti-corruption
laws, incentives, and institutions. What role can and should personal integrity, moral
commitment (fuerza moral), and civic education play in combatting corruption?
A very promising way into the corruption issue is for development ethicist to engage
the work of political scientist Michael Johnston. Particularly important among his many
publications on corruption are Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and
Democracy (2005) and Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep
Democratization (2014). Johnston argues that the fundamental cause of corruption of
all kinds is some sort of power imbalance. Yet he also claims the power constellations
and corruption types vary significantly and that strategies to combat corruption must
vary accordingly. What works in one corruption type may fail to work in another type
and may even result in more corruption. What all effective and ethically justified anticorruption strategies have in common is what he calls “deep democratization” —not
building democracy in an electoral or constitutional sense, but rather enabling and
encouraging citizens to check abuses of wealth and power through political advocacy
of their own interests (Johnston 2014, xiii). Each country beset by corruption can and
should address the problem democratically through nationwide public discussion, an
independent and critical press, democratically enacted regulation, and a mobilized
citizenry motivated to defend its interests and exercise its empowered agency.i
Although the Áncash episode has not yet run its course, the initial response of the
Peruvian civil society and government has been encouraging. Professor Fernando
Villarán, who organized the May 15 anti-corruption lecture-panel at Universidad
Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, comments in recent communication:
I am sending you the news of the day. César Álvarez, the regional president of
Áncash, has been sent to jail for 18 months (although this has happened, there
is still the possibility that he will go free on bail). This is very good news for it
indicates the political will of this government (the Ministries of Justice and the
Interior), which has supported a team of anti-corruption prosecutors that has
put together a case and presented it to the judiciary. I am convinced that our
event in the university has contributed to this outcome, which, although still
partial, sends a very powerful signal to whole country and to all those who are
corrupt (Villarán 2014).
(5) Finally, the cultures of “impunity,” which are among the causes and consequences
of corruption, alert us to a final component of DE in a new key—the importance of
transitional justice for good development. Before a country can move forward, it must
often reckon with past wrongs, such as genocide, systematic violation of human rights,
and other forms of social injustice. Among the means that nations have employed are
“forgive and forget,” truth and reconciliation commissions, historical accounts,
reparations, apologies, trial and punishment, museums, and artistic contributions.
A nation emerging from a difficult past must decide not only how and why it should
reckon with that past but how it should balance past-looking efforts with futureoriented policies and institutions (Crocker 1999, 2002; De Greiff and Duthie 2009).
Finding the right balance is crucial. Too much or the wrong kind of attention to the
past can undermine efforts for a better future. Future dreams may turn into
nightmares if the past is neglected. Past injustices may endure into the present and
block or undermine efforts at good and democratic development (Spinner-Halev
2012). The best ways forward will include efforts to understand and transform the
causes of past wrongs, especially when these cause persist in the present.
Each of our first four components of new-key DE converges on the theme of
transitional justice and development. Inequalities of various kinds, especially
inequalities of economic and political power, are often among the principle causes of
past injustices; overcoming power imbalances is frequently indispensable in righting
past wrongs and removing their causes. Individual and communal agency can be used
either to commit wrongs or—through citizen empowerment—to defend against and to
reckon appropriately with them. National and global citizens, among them
development ethicists, can and should exercise their empowered agency to resist
passivity, overcome those powers that maintain an unfair playing field, and find new
ways to keep hope alive. Authoritarian societies, such as South Africa under apartheid,
terrorist movements, such ISIS, as well as insufficiently democratic societies, such as
the USA, frequently violate the human rights of minorities (or majorities). And
reckoning with a society’s past wrongs can and should be part of transitions to a more
inclusive and deeper democracy (Crocker 1999, 2002, 2008). Corruption with its
culture of impunity is one of the past and enduring wrongs that transitional justice
must combat. Moreover, current corrupt acts undermine any transition to a more just
and democratic society (Freedom House 2014).
Conclusion
The five interrelated topics that I have discussed only make more prominent issues
that have been implicit, secondary, or recently emergent in DE. Current events —from
Syria and Iraq to Ferguson, Missouri—make it increasingly clear that good
development from the local to the global is both complex and urgent. With a new
emphasis on attacking the evils of inequality, authoritarianism, and corruption and a
new commitment to advancing citizen empowerment, inclusive democracy, and
transitional justice, DE in a new key can continue to “keep hope alive” and contribute
to human progress.
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the many IDEA colleagues who have contributed over the years
to my evolving views on the nature and mission of development ethics. All of us
are deeply indebted to our Costa Rican colleagues—especially Luis Camacho
and Mario Solis—for hosting IDEA’s splendid Tenth International Conference
and 30th Anniversary. For their helpful comments on this paper, I thank Edna
Crocker, Larry Crocker, Eric Palmer, Matthew Regan, Marie Claire Vasquez
Durán, and Engda Wubneh.
Notes on contributor
Dr. David A. Crocker is Senior Research Scholar and Director of the School of Public
Policy’s Specialization in International Development at the University of Maryland.
Coming to UMD from Colorado State University in 1993, he specializes in international
development ethics, sociopolitical philosophy, transitional justice, democracy, and
democratization. He was a visiting professor at the University of Munich, was twice a
Fulbright Scholar at the University of Costa Rica, held the UNESCO Chair in
Development at the University of Valencia (Spain), and taught at the National
Autonomous University of Honduras and the University of Chile. He was a founder and
first president of the International Development Ethics Association and is a Fellow of
the Human Development and Capability Association. His publications include Ethics of
Global Development: Agency, Capability, and Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge
2008) and “Democratic Leadership, Citizenship, and Social Justice” (Palgrave 2012).
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THURSDAY 24 JULY, TRIP TO SAN RAMÓN
9:00 to 10:20
Franceschi
Plenary Session
Chair: Hannia
La universidad y el desarrollo humano con miras a las transformaciones
globales.
Dr. Alejandra Boni
¿Cuál es la misión de la Universidad? ¿Qué sentido tienen estas instituciones en su
entorno local? ¿Y si miramos hacia lo global, hacia los desafíos globales que se nos
señalaban al inicio de esta 10ª Conferencia: un mundo que ha doblado la esperanza de
vida para muchas personas, pero con una desigualdades exageradas, con altos índices
de pobreza, marginación, explotación, amenazas a los ecosistemas..?
Para estas preguntas existen diferentes respuestas. El Banco Mundial afirma que “la
educación terciaria es necesaria para crear, divulgar y aplicar el conocimiento de una
manera eficaz, y para construir capacidad tanto técnica como profesional” (2003:19).
Otra visión es la del Preámbulo de la Carta Magna de las Universidades (creada en
1988 y firmada por cientos de universidades de todo el mundo)162 que afirma que “la
universidad debe asegurar a las futuras generaciones la educación y la formación
necesarias que contribuyan al respeto de los grandes equilibrios del entorno natural y
de la vida” (1988:1).
En trabajos anteriores (Boni y Gasper, 2011, 2012 y Boni y Walker, 2013) hemos
empleado la diferenciación acuñada por una asociación de educadores en el campo del
desarrollo (DEA/UT, 1999) que distingue entre visiones “reduccionistas” de la
educación orientadas primeramente hacia la competitividad y la eficiencia y otras
visiones mas “amplias”.
Los reduccionismos provienen de una visión estrecha de las actividades, los productos
y los objetivos de la universidad, así como de lo que significa la sociedad del
conocimiento. La visión estrecha estaría fundamentada en el rol económico que ha de
jugar la universidad, formando a individuos especializados que se integren en la
sociedad para atender la demanda de objetivos económicos, y realizando una
investigación de primera fila que lleve a adquirir una ventaja competitiva sectorial o
nacional. Ejemplos de esta aproximación reduccionista los encontramos en el Consejo
de la Unión Europea (2007), la OCDE (2007) o el citado Banco Mundial (2003).
La visión amplia incorporaría otros valores (la adaptabilidad, la reflexividad, la
colaboración) en la formación de los egresados, entendiendo que el objetivo de la
educación superior es contribuir a un desarrollo duradero como ciudadanos globales
responsables. Asimismo, se reconoce la función social de la educación superior,
facilitadora de partenariados múltiples para facilitar la distribución del conocimiento.
Esta visión está presente en documentos elaborados en plataformas que agrupan a
diferentes universidades como son Declaración Mundial sobre la Educación Superior
en el siglo XXI: Visión y Acción163, firmada en 1988, o la mencionada Declaración de
Tailloires de 2005 164, o la red de la GUNI (Global University Network for Innovation)
que agrupa a 208 instituciones de 78 países (incluyendo a las Cátedras UNESCO,
162
La Carta Magna está disponible en castellano en http://www.magna-
charta.org/pdf/mc_pdf/mc_spanish.pdf fecha de consulta 20 de agosto de 2013).
163 El texto de la Declaración puede ser consultado en
http://www.unesco.org/education/educprog/wche/declaration_spa.htm#declaracion (fecha de
consulta 20 de agosto de 2013).
164
Disponible en http://www.tufts.edu/talloiresnetwork/?pid=17 (fecha de consulta 10 de agosto de
2010).
Universidades, centros de investigación y redes) dedicadas a la innovación y el
compromiso social de la educación superior.165
En esta conferencia queremos profundizar en la visión amplia de la universidad a partir
de los elementos del desarrollo humano. Al igual que ha sucedido en otros ámbitos del
desarrollo, este enfoque ha demostrado tener un gran potencial inspirador de políticas
y prácticas (Dreze y Sen, 1989; Gasper, 2008; Frediani et al, 2014).
Comenzaremos apuntando algunas características centrales de la idea de desarrollo
humano; seguidamente, abordaremos tres temas relevantes en el debate de la
universidad confrontando la perspectiva del desarrollo humano con la perspectiva más
dominante actualmente en la educación superior. El primer ambito es la definición del
currículum universitario, y ahí dialogaremos entre el enfoque por competencias y el
enfoque de las capacidades para el desarrollo humano; el segundo es la visión de la
calidad de la universidad y ahí abordaremos una propuesta de calidad integral y
holística inspirada en el desarrollo humano frente a la visión de la calidad más
extendida hoy en día basada en estándares externos y propuesta desde las élites
académicas. Por último, analizaremos la generación de conocimiento en la universidad
contraponiendo una visión disciplinar a una visión inter o trans-disciplinar de la
generación de conocimiento que dialoga con diferentes epistemologías y reconoce la
importancia del conocimiento que se genera fuera de la academia.
Elementos centrales del desarrollo humano
Des Gasper (2013) nos habla de las diversas acepciones que tiene el término desarrollo
humano; puede ser entendido, desde el ámbito de la biología o la psicología, como
etapas y procesos de desarrollo de los seres humanos a nivel individual. También
puede ser concebido como sinónimo de evolución de las especies, aunque esto es un
término menos común. En tercer lugar y a raíz del primer significado, el término puede
referirse al “desarrollo de recursos humanos” (DRH), que se utiliza de manera habitual
en la gestión organizativa y la planificación económica en materia de capacitación y
educación. En cuarto lugar, el significado aportado por “el enfoque de desarrollo
humano” del PNUD y del HDCA, se refiere a un enfoque humano en el desarrollo socioeconómico, a la humanización de los procesos de cambio social y económico en lo
local, en las naciones y en el mundo (Haq, 1999; Gasper, 2009a; PNUD, 2010). Este
cuarto significado está estrechamente vinculado a los términos derechos humanos y
seguridad humana, que reflejan de manera similar los intentos de humanizar
conceptos básicos del mundo moderno (Jolly et al. 2009; Weiss et al. 2005).
¿Qué aporta el “enfoque de desarrollo humano”? Al estudiar los procesos y resultados
del cambio económico y social, enfatiza (Boni y Gasper, 2011; 2012):
1. Una pluralidad de valores, no sólo los que tienen utilidad económica, como
defienden y promueven los mercados.
165
Más información en http://www.guninetwork.org/about-guni/about-guni#sthash.V0gk5pN9.dpuf
2. Una preocupación y solidaridad hacia todos los seres humanos,
independientemente del lugar en el que vivan, e incluye particularmente a
todos aquellos que se ven afectados por nuestras acciones; y
3. La normalidad y el carácter central de las interconexiones y las
interdependencias.
En primer lugar, la naturaleza humana es algo más que aquellas cosas que podemos
valorar con dinero, y las variables monetarias no son medidas éticamente fiables para
aquello a lo que pueden dar valor y de hecho valoran las personas. En segundo lugar,
nuestro ámbito de preocupación debería ir más allá de las fronteras nacionales; las
personas deben responsabilizarse de cómo sus vidas afectan las de otras personas,
independientemente de dónde se encuentren (Gasper, 2013)
Esto está relacionado con el tercer aspecto, que es menos obvio; los cálculos
económicos tienden a medir los aspectos sociales y ambientales otorgándoles un valor
monetario; sin embargo, el daño a los ecosistemas, el daño a la confianza y al respeto
mutuo, el daño a la salud física y mental y a la dignidad no pueden ser tratados como
parte del mismo cálculo monetario empresarial utilizado para las mercancías (Gasper,
2013).
Las interconexiones sobrepasen la capacidad de cualquier individuo o individuos u
organizaciones o naciones para tener plena conciencia y dominio de ésta, teniendo
más bien que abordarla con medios que permitan utilizar el conocimiento de cada
individuo. La ignorancia de este principio explica por qué en algunas ocasiones las
personas más inteligentes cometen los peores errores frente a problemas complejos,
problemas que sobrepasan las capacidades de cualquier individuo.
La interconexión es (o debería ser) el fundamento de la Universidad: un lugar en el que
todo (o una gran parte) se estudia en un mismo lugar, abierto a personas de todas
partes, pues todo está interconectado y una multiplicidad de perspectivas es tanto
inevitable como necesaria.
El currículo universitario: capacidades vs competencias
Bawden observa que las actividades de enseñanza, investigación y servicios externos
que se llevan a cabo en las universidades, así como los ingresos y beneficios de las
universidades, solo deben considerarse como medios intermedios hacia los objetivos
superiores de desarrollo humano y social (Bawden, 2008). ¿Y qué significa esto para la
orientación de las actividades docentes de las universidades?
Diferentes autores y autoras que trabajan en el ámbito del DH han dado respuesta a
este interrogante. Por ejemplo, una de sus autoras más influyentes, Martha
Nussbaum, ha abordado la discusión sobre la educación superior proponiendo tres
capacidades para cultivar la ciudadanía democrática (Nussbaum, 1997; 2006): en
primer lugar, la capacidad para el examen crítico o el pensamiento crítico, que permite
comprobar si lo que se lee o dice es consistente en su razonamiento y preciso en su
juicio. En segundo lugar, está la habilidad cosmopolita, que se centra en entender las
diferencias entre los grupos y las naciones y los intereses comunes de los seres
humanos que hacen que el entendimiento sea esencial si lo que se quiere es resolver
los problemas comunes. Y, por último, la imaginación narrativa que significa la
habilidad para ponerse en los zapatos de personas diferentes, ser un lector inteligente
de las historias de los demás y poder entender sus emociones y deseos.
Otra autora, Melanie Walker (2006) ha ampliado estas tres capacidades a una lista de
ocho; entre ellas se encuentran: la razón práctica, la resiliencia, el conocimiento y la
imaginación, la disposición al aprendizaje y la capacidad para tener relaciones sociales.
Como la misma autora argumenta, se trata sólo de una propuesta para la discusión
pero creemos que puede ser interesante para repensar el currículo educativo y pensar
la educación no como mera transmisión de conocimientos sino también como una
oportunidad para potenciar un tipo de ciudadanía activa y crítica que pueda
convertirse en “agente” de cambio. No hablamos, por tanto, de cualquier cambio, sino
de un cambio orientado a una sociedad basada en esos valores.
En un trabajo reciente (Boni et al, 2014) hemos empleado esta propuesta para analizar
si una actividad de extensión social que impulsa la Universidad Politécnica de Valencia
(UPV) está promoviendo o no las capacidades de los y las estudiantes. La iniciativa se
denomina Meridies y es un programa a través del cual estudiantes de diferentes
ingenierías de la UPV realizan una estancia entre 3 y 6 meses en una organización de
desarrollo radicada, normalmente, en América Latina. Es el tipo de programas que
entraría en lo que en España se conoce como cooperación al desarrollo universitaria y
en Costa Rica como extensión social o compromiso social universitario.
El uso de la lista de Walker nos ha permitido evidenciar que casi todas las capacidades
que allí se proponen habían sido potenciadas durante la estancia Meridies de los y las
estudiantes.
En relación con la capacidad de razón práctica, por ejemplo:
Quería aprender, y evolucionar, progresar, también ver qué puntos prácticos
tenía mi carrera, porque yo había estudiado pero no había trabajado nada
relacionado con el medio ambiente (…) Era poner en práctica lo que había
estudiado y al mismo tiempo también aprender claro.
O en relación con la resiliencia educacional:
Descubrí que es factible trabajar en el extranjero, se puede hacer, no es tan
diferente a hacerlo aquí, descubrí que tengo capacidad para buscarme la vida,
(…) tengo más confianza de enfrentarme a un trabajo diferente, tengo más
confianza a la hora de incluirme en un grupo de trabajo, creo que es un aporte
de autoestima (…) esa valentía para tomar esa decisión a corto o medio plazo
pues, si no hubiera salido fuera posiblemente no me lo plantearía
O el aprendizaje de la importancia de las relaciones sociales y de la diversidad:
Ellos tenían una forma de trabajar súper tranquila, y yo les metía presión, y
también ellos un día me dijeron, mira, así no funcionamos. (…) Me preguntaron
que de dónde era, cómo se llamaban mis padres, qué habían estudiado, qué
había estudiado yo, cómo se llamaban mis hermanas (…) Después, ellos ya me
conocían, había una especie de confianza mutua, y eso permitía sacar adelante
muchos trabajos, (…) me dijeron, los trabajos tienen que salir, pero un trabajo
no sale si no conoces al de al lado y sabes lo que quiere, y yo pensé, ajá!
Hemos estado hablando hasta el momento de un currículo universitario orientado a la
potenciación de capacidades, no de competencias ni de resultados de aprendizaje que
son los términos más empleados en los objetivos curriculares actuales, al menos en
Europa. Para el debate sobre la visión y misión de la universidad, es interesante
diferenciar ambos conceptos y reflexionar de dónde provienen.
Por un lado, las capacidades nacen en el seno del pensamiento sobre desarrollo
humano y se definen por Amartya Sen (1999:87) como las libertades sustantivas (que
podemos traducir aquí por libertades reales u oportunidades reales) para llevar el tipo
de vida que las personas valoran. Los funcionamientos son las actividades que las
personas realizan y que son valoradas por ellas. El enfoque remarca mucho la
importancia de la valoración por parte de las personas, tanto refiriéndose a las
capacidades como a los funcionamientos. Explicándolo de una manera sencilla: una
persona puede tener muchas monedas (capacidades) pero gasta parte en una cosa que
valora (funcionamiento) y otras no las gasta (no se transforman en funcionamiento y
siguen siendo capacidades). Es importante entender la idea de capacidades como
libertades u oportunidades reales. No pueden ser deseos, sino ha de ser algo que
puede ser puesto en práctica. Incluyen tanto cosas materiales (la capacidad sería estar
alimentada y el funcionamiento sería comer), como estados de las personas (la
capacidad sería tener convicciones políticas y el funcionamiento iniciar una huelga de
hambre). Sen nos recuerda que lo más importante es que las personas tengan las
libertades u oportunidades valiosas (capacidades) para llevar el tipo de vidas que
desean llevar, hacer lo que quieren hacer y ser la persona que quieren ser. Una vez
ellas tengan efectivamente estas oportunidades sustantivas, ellas pueden elegir poner
en práctica aquellas opciones que valoran más.
Por otro lado, como nos recuerda Koldo Unceta (2013), la noción de competencias
surge en 1973, cuando David McClelland, Profesor de la Escuela de Negocios de
Harvard planteó (en un artículo que alcanzó gran difusión) que los expedientes
académicos y los test de inteligencia no eran capaces por si solos de predecir con
fiabilidad la adecuada adaptación de los estudiantes a los problemas de la vida
cotidiana, y en consecuencia el éxito profesional. Esto le condujo a buscar otras
variables, a las que llamó “competencias”, que permitieran una mejor predicción del
rendimiento laboral. Durante estas investigaciones encontró que, para predecir con
una mayor eficacia el rendimiento, era necesario estudiar directamente a las personas
en el trabajo.
Las competencias, continúa Unceta (2013), tienen dos características esenciales: su
evaluabilidad y la resolución de problemas en contextos específicos. En primer lugar,
las competencias deben ser identificables y evaluables. Esto acaba generando dos
tipos de dinámicas: en unos casos se traduce en la desconsideración en la práctica de
todo aquello que no es evaluable. Como no se puede evaluar, se deja de lado. En otros
casos se opta por la simulación y la apariencia. Para ello se arbitran indicadores
concretos y supuestos mecanismos de evaluación lo que se lleva a cabo sólo para
rellenar el formulario y poder pasar a la siguiente casilla. La realidad, en todo caso, es
que aquellos aspectos que podrían tener más interés en una definición amplia de la
noción de competencias, se dejan de lado porque no cumplen con un requisito básico
del concepto: ser evaluables. El segundo aspecto es que las competencias se refieren a
la resolución de problemas en contextos específicos. Se es competente para algo en
concreto.
Si pensamos en lo que el enfoque de capacidades nos propone, todos aquellos
aspectos de la vida que no tengan relación directa con la resolución de problemas
específicos en el lugar de trabajo dejarían de tener sentido. Qué pensar de las
emociones, de la reflexividad y el pensamiento crítico que precisamente nos preparan
para tomar las decisiones de manera más razonada, autónoma y auténtica; qué decir
de la capacidad de ser agente de cambio, que lo que quiere es precisamente
transformar la realidad injusta; o qué pensar de problemas como los desafíos
ambientales y sociales a los que hacíamos referencia al comienzo de esta conferencia y
que no pueden ser abordados con una mirada estrecha y reduccionista (Lozano et al,
2012).
Nos encontramos pues ante la paradoja de una enseñanza que pretende orientarse a
actuar mejor en situaciones concretas y para enfrentar problemas específicos, a la vez
que se apoya una visión estandarizada de la calidad y una descontextualización
creciente de la Universidad respecto de su entorno humano y cultural (Unceta, 2013).
La calidad de la universidad desde la perspectiva del desarrollo humano
Ante esta visión de la calidad, el desarrollo humano es un enfoque lo suficientemente
rico para ofrecer una visión de la calidad diferente, mucho más integral, contextual y
respetuosa de la diversidad. Veamos, primeramente, algunos de las características del
debate actual sobre la universidad.
Más allá de la reciente “obsesión” por los rankings como indicadores de la calidad
universitaria, la preocupación por la calidad de la universidad y su gestión han estado
en la agenda de las políticas universitarias desde los años 80 (Vroeijenstijn, 2000).
Debido al incremento de las demandas sociales a la educación superior, la necesidad
de nuevas habilidades demandadas en el contexto de la globalización (habilidades para
gestionar, para explorar, para negociar, habilidades éticas, etc.) y el proceso de
internacionalización y diversificación de la educación superior, ha crecido un interés
creciente en la calidad de los recursos, de los procesos y de los resultados de la
universidad. Asimismo, han aumentado las demandas para que la universidad rinda
cuentas; la autonomía y la auto-regulación de la universidad están siendo limitadas por
nuevos instrumentos de control externo, incluyendo la acreditación, las auditorías y las
evaluaciones de programas y disciplinas (Aas et al, 2009).
En este contexto, la calidad de la educación superior ha sido cuestionada. Se han
hecho diferentes esfuerzos para definir indicadores simples y medibles. Al mismo
tiempo, se han destacado los efectos negativos de confiar en esos indicadores para el
control de las universidades. No existe, por tanto, un consenso sobre lo que significa
una universidad de calidad. Bikas Sanyal y Michaela Martin (2007: 5) han identificado
diez diferentes definiciones de calidad en la universidad: “que proporciona excelencia,
que es excepcional, que proporciona una buena relación calidad-precio, que se ajusta a
las especificaciones, que hace las cosas bien a la primera, que satisface las necesidades
de los clientes, que no tiene defectos, que ofrece un valor añadido; que presenta
adecuación del objetivo y que presenta adecuación para el objetivo”. Podemos
afirmar, junto con De Ketele (2008) que la calidad es un concepto difícil de definir
debido a su carácter multidimensional y relativo. En el mismo sentido, Sanyal y Martin
(2007) sugieren que debido a que la calidad significa diferentes cosas para diferentes
actores y es difícil reconciliar los intereses de todos, la definición de la calidad es un
proceso político en sí mismo.
Otras voces autorizadas que han reflexionado sobre la calidad de la universidad son
Hans Van Ginkel y Marco Antonio Rodrigues Dias (2007). Estos autores destacan que
en el debate sobre la calidad el tema de fondo es quién dice lo que es calidad. Aquí
existe una tensión entre posturas que intentan homogeneizar unos estándares
internacionales y otras que defienden la relevancia de los contextos locales. El primero
de los enfoques, defendido por la OCDE y la OMC, apuntan los autores, no toma en
cuenta la diversidad, los contextos y las necesidades locales, descontextualizando la
universidad e imponiendo criterios a los países del Sur que, en lugar de socios activos,
son considerados meros receptores. Frente a esta visión, existe otra, defendida en la
Conferencia Mundial de Educación Superior de 1998 donde la calidad es definida de la
siguiente manera: «“[...] la calidad de la enseñanza superior es un concepto
pluridimensional, que debería comprender todas sus funciones y actividades:
enseñanza y programas académicos, investigación y becas, personal, estudiantes,
edificios, instalaciones, equipamiento y servicios a la comunidad y al mundo
universitario. Una autoevaluación interna y un examen externo realizados con
transparencia por expertos independientes, en lo posible especializados en lo
internacional, son esenciales para la mejora de la calidad. Deberían crearse instancias
nacionales independientes y definirse normas comparativas de calidad, reconocidas en
el plano internacional. Con miras a tener en cuenta la diversidad y evitar la
uniformidad, debería prestarse la atención debida a las particularidades de los
contextos institucional, nacional y regional. Los protagonistas deben ser parte integral
del proceso de evaluación institucional” 166 . Es una lástima que en la siguiente
Conferencia Mundial sobre Educación Superior, celebrada en París en julio de 2009, no
se insistiera en esta línea avanzada en 1998, ya que las referencias a la calidad que se
hacen no son muy explícitas, limitándose a subrayar que es necesaria una educación
superior de calidad.
166
Artículo 11.a de la Declaración Mundial sobre la Educación Superior en el siglo XXI: Visión y acción,
UNESCO, París, 1998.
En esta definición encontramos ideas interesantes que guardan relación con la
propuesta del DH (Boni y Gasper, 2011;2012). En primer lugar la pluridimensionalidad.
No se trataría de reducir la calidad a unos pocos indicadores de éxito (al estilo de los
rankings) sino abarcar diferentes aspectos de la vida actividad universitaria:
enseñanza, investigación, instalaciones, servicios a la comunidad, etc.
En segundo lugar la diversidad. Al igual que, al referirnos al DH hablábamos de la
diversidad entre todo el género humano, aquí nos hemos de referir a la importancia de
los contextos institucionales, locales y regionales para definir criterios de calidad,
donde, y ahí entraría el tercer criterio, la participación de los protagonistas en la
definición de dichos criterios sería uno de los elementos centrales. Y ¿quiénes son los
protagonistas? Si pensamos que la universidad ha de atender a los desafíos de toda la
sociedad, los protagonistas son todos los ciudadanos que, inventando o poniendo en
práctica mecanismos ya inventados, deberían participar en mayor medida en la
definición de las políticas y las actividades universitarias. Como destacan Van Ginkel y
Dias (2007), para saber lo que es calidad, todos los actores universitarios han de
participar para definir lo que la sociedad espera de las instituciones de educación
superior. El DH puede contribuir a no olvidar los valores esenciales en estos procesos
que requieren mecanismos reales de participación, trasparencia y rendición de cuentas
en sentido amplio, para asegurar que las decisiones democráticamente adoptadas se
llevan a cabo.
Por ello, nos atrevemos a sugerir una propuesta multidimensional para pensar en la
calidad de la universidad basada en los valores del desarrollo humano.
Nuestra propuesta considera las distintas actividades que se realizan en la universidad
(docencia, investigación, el compromiso social, la gobernanza interna de la universidad
y las políticas universitarias así como el entorno físico de la institución) y las analiza a la
luz de los valores del DH: bienestar, participación y capacitación, equidad y diversidad
y sostenibilidad. Esta selección de valores está basada en el reciente trabajo de Peter
Penz, Jay Drydyk y Pablo Bose (2010) que identifican seis valores fundamentales que
han sido la base de los debates sobre el DH durante los últimos cincuenta años: 1) el
bienestar y la seguridad del ser humano; 2) la equidad; 3) la participación y el
empoderamiento; 4) los derechos humanos; 5) la libertad cultural, y 6) la
sostenibilidad medioambiental. El único de esta serie de valores que no hemos incluido
son los derechos humanos, ya que se trata de un valor que se solapa substancialmente
con el resto: muchos de los aspectos que se agruparían bajo este concepto están
incluidos, por ejemplo, en los valores de equidad y diversidad.
En la figura 1 presentamos los resultados de la matriz. No hay que entenderla como
una propuesta cerrada, sino inspiradora de una visión diferente de la calidad. A los que
trabajan en el campo del desarrollo humano y las capacidades, les amplía la mira de las
potencialidades del enfoque que, habitualmente, se ha centrado en el ámbito del
currículum. A los que han mirado la universidad desde el ángulo de la participación y la
transformación social, les ofrece un marco normativo más amplio desde el que
repensar la universidad. Y a los decisores políticos universitarios les brinda unos
criterios distintos, y mucho más amplios, sobre cómo interpretar la calidad de la
universidad.
Actividades
universitarias
Docencia
Investigación
Compromiso social
Gobernanza/políticas
universitarias
Entorno
universitario
Acceso público a
las instalaciones
universitarias
(bibliotecas,
edificios
universitarios)
Una buena política de
salarios y promoción
para el personal
académico y
administrativo
Lugares para
relajarse
(dentro y fuera
de los edificios)
Valores DH
Bienestar (incluye
autonomía,
pensamiento crítico,
reflexividad,
emociones,
sentimientos,
espiritualidad,
autoestima,
iniciativa,
creatividad, forma
física, etc.)
Participación y
empoderamiento
(incluye la agencia y
la transformación
social)
Metodologías
basadas en el
pensamiento crítico
Investigación
orientada a temas
relacionados con el
bienestar humano,
Prácticas reflexivas
desde una
perspectiva global y
Planes de estudios
abiertos (permitir que local
los estudiantes creen Nuevas
sus propias áreas de
oportunidades para la
conocimiento, etc.)
investigación en
Centros para el
aprendizaje de
adultos
materia de becas y
programas
Participación en el
diseño de los planes
de estudios de los
grados y de los cursos
(por parte del
profesorado y el
Creación compartida
del conocimiento
Decisión compartida
en los temas de
Redes de la
comunidad
académica o civil
Compromiso del
estudiantado
Programas de
bienestar
Una buena política de
becas para
estudiantes de grado
y de posgrado
Participación en la
definición de la misión
de la universidad, los
planes estratégicos,
las elecciones y los
equipos de gobierno
Instalaciones
deportivas
Espacios
tranquilos para
la reflexión
Suficiente luz y
aire en los
edificios,
espacios
abiertos
Vida asociativa
dentro de la
universidad,
particularmente
en los ámbitos
estudiantado), y en
las evaluaciones de
curso (por parte de
los estudiantes)
Metodologías de
aprendizaje
participativo
Relación de los
contenidos con la
realidad
investigación
Campos die
investigación
relevantes para el
cambio social
Investigación
participativa
Elaboración
participativa de los
presupuestos para las
prioridades en
investigación
(trabajo
voluntario,
proyectos de
colaboración)
Compromiso del
profesorado
(colaboración de
los centros de
investigación con
la sociedad; el
personal adopta el
compromiso social
como parte de su
trabajo)
Actos de
compromiso
público
Equidad (justicia
social) y diversidad
(aprendizaje entre
diferentes culturas e
identidades)
Presencia de
elementos culturales
y multiculturales en
los planes de estudios
Educación en valores
Cursos virtuales y a
tiempo parcial
Beneficios de la
investigación para la
sociedad
Diferencias
contextuales y
culturales de los
temas de
investigación
que incluyen actores
internos y externos.
Promoción de
políticas que premien
el compromiso social
social y político
Espacio abierto
en las aulas
para favorecer
la movilidad
Debate público
Tiempo reservado
para actividades
sociales y culturales
Incentivos a los
estudiantes y al
personal universitario
por su compromiso
con la comunidad
Transferencia de
tecnología
Políticas equitativas
de contratación
Contribuciones a la
economía local y a
la cohesión social
(ocupación
generada dentro
de sectores
excluidos
Acceso equitativo a la
universidad para las
minorías y los grupos
excluidos o de rentas
bajas (ayudas
económicas, etc.)
Acceso general
a los servicios
universitarios
Fondos para temas de socialmente;
investigación poco
actividades
lucrativos
económicas;
servicios de
asesoramiento
empresarial)
Premios
Actividades
universitarias
dirigidas a apoyar
las culturas y las
lenguas locales
Actividades
organizadas para
entidades
comunitarias
Sostenibilidad
(temas globales,
perspectivas
holísticas,
perspectivas a largo
plazo,
interdisciplinariedad)
Temas globales en los
planes de estudios
(ética, desarrollo
sostenible, estudios
sobre la paz)
Redes Norte-Sur
Investigación
interdisciplinaria
Temas de
investigación
Enfoque
interdisciplinario en la relevantes para
cuestiones globales
docencia
Contactos
internacionales
Programas
internacionales de
cooperación
Oportunidades
para que el
personal
Representación de los
grupos de exclusión
Atención a las
lenguas locales
Asignación
presupuestaria para
actividades de DH
Acceso para
estudiantado con
discapacidades o con
hijos, y para
estudiantes
embarazadas
Mecanismos de
rendición de cuentas
Responsabilidad social
corporativa en las
inversiones de la
universidad y otras
prácticas
Políticas
medioambientales
Programas de
Respetuoso con
el medio
ambiente
Espacios verdes
Redes y programas
Norte-Sur
universitario y el
estudiantado
lleven a cabo
actividades en el
extranjero
cooperación
internacional para el
desarrollo
La generación de conocimiento desde la universidad
Entramos ya en el último de los temas que queremos abordar en esta conferencia: qué
tipo de conocimiento es el más adecuado para promover los objetivos del desarrollo
humano y cómo ha de ser generado. Ya vimos como uno de los elementos centrales del
desarrollo humano nos remite a la idea de las interconexiones e interdependencias y, por
ello, parece difícil que el análisis de los problemas complejos a los que nos enfrentamos y
la propuesta de soluciones pueda ser realizada dentro de los límites disciplinares que
caracterizan la universidad de hoy en día.
Como plantea Des Gasper (2013):
Cada disciplina omite un gran número de tipos de información y de perspectivas y procesa
la información limitada con la que cuenta de una manera determinada y sistemática, pero
limitada […] A menudo necesitamos una visión más amplia del mundo, al resultar éste
demasiado complejo e interconectado como para ser captado de manera adecuada por
disciplinas individuales; para estudiar de manera efectiva las particularidades de casos,
situaciones e historias concretas necesitamos múltiples lentes y puntos de vista. Tal y como
queda resumido por Ling: “la amplitud es una característica esencial de la profundidad”
(Ling, 2011: 41-2).
Sin embargo, el sistema universitario actual no facilita esta perspectiva. Como destaca
Domínguez (2012: 9) citando el informe de 1982 del CERI (Centro de Investigación
Educativa e Innovación de la OCDE) “las comunidades tienen problemas. Las universidades
departamentos”. Esta manera de entender el conocimiento compartimentado, según De
Sousa (2005), provoca que sean los y las investigadoras quienes determinan los problemas
científicos que se han de resolver, definen las soluciones y establecen las metodologías y
los ritmos de investigación. Asimismo, genera un “conocimiento homogéneo y
organizativamente jerárquico en la medida en que los agentes que participan en su
producción comparten los mismos objetivos de producción del conocimiento, tienen la
misma formación, la misma cultura científica y lo hacen según jerarquías organizacionales
bien definidas” (De Sousa, 2005: 44). Por tanto, las comunidades científicas funcionan no
sólo como unidades de conocimiento, sino también como unidades de cultura que
configuran la identidad de los y las acadécmicas (Gasper, 2013).
Surge, por tanto, la importancia de una perspectiva inter e incluso transdisciplinar que
supere las fronteras disciplinares que nos impiden hacer frente a los problemas complejos
de nuestro tiempo. No se trata de la mera superposición de disciplinas, sino de la
búsqueda de nuevos marcos, perspectivas, metáforas, de un trabajo en red, y de actitudes
esenciales como la curiosidad, el respeto mutuo y la seguridad psicológica (Gasper, 2013).
La segunda cuestión que queríamos destacar es la importancia de la co-producción de
conocimiento. Muy a menudo, la universidad genera un conocimiento auto-referenciado,
282
en el marco de las tradiciones disciplinarias a las que hacíamos referencia anteriormente y
dónde no se evalúa la utilidad social del mismo sino el cumplimiento de unos estándares
científicos determinados en el seno de las comunidades disciplinares.
Sin embargo, si se quiere producir un conocimiento útil a la sociedad y alineado con los
valores que propone el desarrollo humano es importante que sea generado a partir del
reconocimiento del otro y de los otros, de sus necesidades y sus aspiraciones así como del
reconocimiento de la forma en la cual otros interpretan la realidad y su significado (Saint
Clair, 2013). Y en esa co-producción del conocimiento es especialmente importante dar
voz a las comunidades y personas que sufren las consecuencias de un modelo de
desarrollo injusto e insostenible (Boni et al, 2013).
Boaventura de Sousa Santos va más allá y propone tomar distancia en relación a la
tradición crítica eurocéntrica y reconocer formas alternativas de conocimiento e
interconectar con ellas en términos de igualdad, lo que denomina “Justicia cognitiva”
(2010: 43). Esto no implica ignorar la riqueza de la tradición europea y desacreditar el
conocimiento científico, sino utilizarlo para sustentar alternativas viables en pro de la
justicia social y construirlo a partir de lo que el mismo autor denomina la Ecología de
Saberes (2009); se trata de una contraepistemología que persigue crear un pensamiento
propositivo y pluralista, en el que todos los saberes son igual de válidos ya que se
entrecruzan e intervienen en la realidad, no la representan (Soury, 2014). Esto requiere un
trabajo de traducción cultural, entre cosmovisiones diversas desde una perspectiva
horizontal y de auténtico diálogo.
¿Es posible que la universidad sea un sitio adecuado para este tipo de construcción de
conocimiento? Nosotros creemos que sí y coincidimos con la perspectiva de Delanty
(2008) que sostiene que la universidad ocupa un lugar privilegiado para conectar diversos
discursos sociales y que debe convertirse en un centro cosmopolita de la cultura pública
global que aúne diferentes tipos de conocimiento y culturas. Pero para esto, es necesario
que no prevalezcan los intereses de los mercados y de los poderes públicos y que sea un
lugar donde prevalezca la reflexión creativa y la propuesta de alternativas en pro de la
justicia social.
Quizás se esté muy lejos de esto en la universidad de hoy en día y sea muy difícil
transformar la institución universitaria en su totalidad, pero es innegable que, como
destaca Lambert (2010), la universidad puede darnos la “posibilidad del lugar” para
practicar un tipo de docencia e investigación y una manera de tomar decisiones que nos
acerque al desarrollo humano.
Creemos que es importante que los valores del DH penetren en la universidad. De la
misma manera que lo que sucedió en los años 90 cuando el DH se popularizó entre la
comunidad del desarrollo, creemos que ahora es el momento de que este enfoque
283
permee las actividades de la universidad. Si no, los enormes desafíos a los que nos
enfrentamos, no podrán ser resueltos de una manera social y ambientalmente
responsable.
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“Living Well Rather Than Living Better”: Biocentric Equality and Human
Development Approaches to the "Good Life"
Johannes M. Waldmueller
johannes.waldmuller@graduateinstitute.ch
Dr. des. Development Studies
The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva
(IHEID)
Research Associate of www.kompreno.org
Introduction
The aim of this paper is to discuss a novel approach to human development and human
rights by putting into question the prevalent paradigm and prefix for both, namely
'human'. To be clear from the outset, to critically question the 'human' in human
development and human rights is by no means to depreciate the primary importance of
287
humans for humans, in particular the trans-cultural value of human dignity1 (see also
Lebech 2004; Dupré 2009; Kohen 2013), however much it might be differently expressed
in different cultural contexts. Rather, it is about asking for a more adequate ontological
conception of humans – a sort of seemingly paradoxical undertaking in philosophical
anthropology beyond the human2 – and their situatedness within nature in order to
contribute to better designed programs, policies and other solutions in the name of both,
human rights and development, on the ground.
My hypothesis here, derived from ethnographically following the national implementation
of human rights indicators (HRI) in Ecuador between 2010 and 2013,3 is that liberal
conceptions of individuals as they are theorized in the West, i.e. putting moments of
subjectification ahead of any cultural and natural embedding and thus emphasizing
individual choices (cf. Cowan 2009), do not suffice to implement adequate assessments of
human dignity, as in the case of human rights indicators. While it is nowadays common
standard to regard both spheres 'culture' and 'nature' as socially and culturally
constructed – both are differently framed and delineated to each other in varying contexts
–, scholarly accounts of nature rights (derechos de la naturaleza), as they are enshrined in
the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008,4 for example, are still marginalized.5 Likewise, UN
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), nor major conceptions of capabilities and
functionings, as set out in the broad work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, tend to
take systemic, metabolic or holistic relationships between human individuals, groups
(necessarily differentiating according to 'peoples' and 'minorities' and their distinctive
1
“The critical role of the idea of human dignity in ethical thinking about human
rights, and the importance of viewing human rights as having legitimacy and validity
within the ethical domain (rather than as simply being the 'products' of legal and
institutional arrangements are also important themes.”, write Vizard et al. (2011:2) in their
introduction to the their edited volume of the Journal of Human Development and
Capabilities.
2
"Philosophical anthropology is thus, literally, the systematic study of man
conducted within philosophy or by the reflective methods characteristic of philosophy; it
might in particular be thought of as being concerned with questions of the status of man in
the universe, or the purpose or meaning of human life, and indeed, with the issues of
whether there is any such meaning and of whether man can be made the object of
systematic study” (Encyclopedia Britannica 1993:550). Eduardo Kohen (2013), an
Ecuadorian anthropologist working in the Amazon, has recently provided the international
scientific community, with a rich and detailed study of human-nature relations that go
beyond traditional accounts. He, however, had neither development nor policy-making in
his scope of research.
3
Doctoral research for my PhD in Development Studies (IHEID, Geneva) conducted
in (mostly) Ecuador, Switzerland, Costa Rica and Mexico between 2009 and 2014 (thesis
forthcoming in June 2014).
4
Constitución de la República de Ecuador, 2008, Art. 71-74.
5
For a notable exemption, see Acosta and Martínez (2009; 2011).
288
rights), 6 and their environments into account: humans as such always remain their
primary focus. In this sense, applied liberal political philosophy and subsequent
approaches to development, remain largely anthropocentric. Anthropocentrism means
exactly this, the prevalent focus of (social, political and economic) theories, programs,
projects, and policies on humans (and therein mostly targeting identifiable individuals or
specific groups). Such a view is clearly expressed in speaking of 'resources', instead of
'nature' or the 'environment', for example, thus highlighting the usefulness of nature for
humans – and rarely vice versa. Such a view attributes merely instrumental value to
nature.
In ethical theory and increasingly also in policy-related practice, anthropocentrism needs
to be distinguished from biocentric vantage points. These attribute intrinsic value to life as
such, including nature and humans in a more holistic conception:7 there, life itself – i.e.
moments of interaction between humans and nature, metabolisms and ecosystems,
including natural periods of arising and passing of all what is living being – is put at the
first place of any consideration. Development, in this sense, should not (only) be geared
toward human well-being, but to human-nature well-being in constant interaction.
Consequentially, a national or regional economy should be ordered and governed
according, and being subject, to such understanding. Little has been advanced at the
international level in this respect with regard to policy-making, programming and
development in general. Yet there are some exceptions, of which particularly one serves
as the initial point for this paper: during the first nationwide implementation of HRI in
Ecuador in the context of the governmental doctrine of Buen Vivir/Sumak Kawsay,8
6
See Jordan (2008) for a general introduction on this crucial differentiation. SchulteTenckhoff (2012) has discussed the gradual blurring of peoples' rights with (cultural)
minority rights at large. This bears important implications with regard to sustainability,
access to resources and climate change (see Lavorel 2012), in particular – but not only – for
indigenous people.
7
An early and significant account of biocentric ethics was developed by Paul Taylor
(1986). Four basic tenants in his theory are: (1) human beings are members of Earth’s
community (the same as all other species); (2) all species are part of a system of
interdependence; (3) all living things pursue their own good in their own ways; (4) humans
are not inherently superior to other living things.
8
Buen Vivir (inaccurately translated from Qichua 'sumak kawsay' – 'being well
together') is the official societal, economic, political and philosophical raison d'être of the
Ecuadorian state; it is expressed in the Constitution of 2008 and spelled out in quinquennial
Planes Nacionales para el Buen Vivir (PNBV, the former national development plans),
elaborated by the highest planning authority in the country. Development has been
subordinated to achieve and preserve this goal. Beyond the governmental understanding,
there exists a high number of divergent definitions, drawing on different sources (Acosta
and Martínez 2009; Cortez 2010 Acosta 2012; Walsh 2010; Thomson 2011; Attawalpa
2012; Radcliffe 2012; Deneulin 2012; Vanhulst and Beling 2013; Altmann 2013). In a
generic sense Buen Vivir provides 'platforms for transformation' (Gudynas 2011), involving
289
concerned planners became aware of the requirement to assess inter alia nature's rights,
and hence human-nature metabolisms, in order to adequately assess human rights
progress.
One reason for the marginalized concern with biocentric accounts to life might be
their superficial contradiction with the very concept of mainstream 'development' (here
understood as utilitarian economic growth) but also with human rights, owed to the
emphasis on life's natural transitoriness, as opposed to the culturally construed promise
of infinite growth and human progress. Another reason can perhaps be found in the
required shifts of reflecting on the various levels of interaction between individuals and
collectives – something little applied in the case of human development theories, where
given states and governments9 frequently tend to be taken for granted (sometimes even
confounded with 'cultures'), regardless their colonial origin and still prevalent postcolonial mechanisms of exclusions of large parts of societies.10 Same can be said about the
field of human rights, whose international protection system at the level of the UN OHCHR
is mandated and financed by governments to primarily work with governments. In
addition, there are particular difficulties with regard to conceptualizing individual and
group rights for historical and political reasons. For reasons of space and scope, such
historical and discursive considerations shall not be part of this paper.
Instead, and generally oscillating between empirical accounts and reflecting on concepts,
this paper starts by briefly discussing the relationship between human rights and human
the following: “In its most general sense, buen vivir denotes organizes, and constructs a
system of knowledge and living based on the communion of humans and nature and on the
spatial-temporal-harmonious totality of existence. That is, on the necessary interrelation of
beings, knowledges, logics, and rationalities of though, action, existence, and living. This
notion is part and parcel of the cosmovision, cosmology, or philosophy of the indigenous
peoples of Abya Yala.” (Walsh 2010:18).
9
A remark on the use of 'government' and 'state' in this paper seems necessary: in
Latin America, and Andean states in particular, 'government' does not mean a sort of
unitary institutional and political system, commonly subscribed to a particular agenda for
an elected period of time – it only does through a Western perspective. Instead, ministries,
state agencies, ombudsman institutions, etc. appear to constantly oscillate between conflicts
and approval around common competition, power and resource struggles, moments of
following own agendas according to personal preferences, and, in general, this difference
between 'government' and 'state' plays out very heterogeneously. Likewise, it is often the
case that such conflicts arise at all three different levels of governance – national, regional
and local – and in between them, even within the same governing party. For this reason it is
suggested to keep in mind that the way 'government' or 'state' is used in the following refers
mainly to the inner circles around the presidency and its confidants, which might include
some (supra-)ministries, agencies and other state-funded institutions at a given moment of
time, but in no case all state institutions together.
10
For Latin America, see, e.g., Lander (1998); Quijano and Ennis (2000); Walsh
(2004); Gotkowitz (2011).
290
development, highlighting the importance of mutual interconnectedness at the
theoretical and practical level. The next chapter introduces the HRI project in Ecuador and
provides a descriptive account of the experiences there in recent years, which eventually
made necessary to re-think human rights by embracing a more biocentric perspective on
development planning and assessment. The final parts of this paper are dedicated to
rethinking the existent HRI methodology, by drawing on the experience from Ecuador. It is
argued that human development and human rights could be enriched by conceptually
linking HRI to capabilities and functionings, taken from human development theories. But
in order to be effective, also capabilities and functionings need further refinement with
regard to human collectives as well as human-nature relations. Introducing nature's
capabilities and functioning within the scope of a refined HRI assessment methodology, is
thus the overall purpose of this work, at least relevant for countries with high natural
diversity and thus human exposure to hazard.
Human Development and Human Rights
William Birdsall (2014) has recently provided us with a coherent overview of the common
(and less mutual) trajectories of human development and human rights, presenting the
discussions around the contested 'right to development' (Centre for Development and
Human Rights 2004; Beetham 2006) as a cement between the two sides dealing with
development at the global level. Similar to other commentators (Uvin 2004; Alston 2005;
Fukuda-Parr 2008; Vizard, Fukuda-Parr, and Elson 2011; de Béco 2014), he identifies
important gaps, inherent divisions between human development (or 'capability approach',
CA) and human rights proponents and movements: “This divide arises because the two
approaches operate in different development realms: human rights in the experiential
realm of power politics; the CA in the philosophical realm of public policy. Human rights
are practice seeking to be put into theory while the CA is theory seeking to be put into
practice.” (Birdsdall 2014: 2). Others argue that human rights are a field dominated by
lawyers and legal experts, while development and policy-making is largely left to social
scientists, including economists (de Béco 2014). While the former would be rather
concerned with norms, principles and a correct application of them, the latter
“concentrate on capacity building and try to improve resilience.” (ibid.: 52). Accordingly,
the latter tend to have adversarial ties to governments, whereas “the former privilege
partnerships with them, as they consider those governments weak rather than wicked”
(ibid.). However, proponents of the CA have been keen to highlight the need to strengthen
a mutual relationship between human rights and human development, having Sen as its
forerunners, for whom freedom is both and end in itself and a means for development (cf.
Sen 1999:xii). For Sen, due to his philosophical and economic formation, human rights are
a means to enhance freedom, and eventually to contribute to 'development as capability
expansion' (which precisely is the title of another publication: Sen 1999b). Accordingly,
Sen has come up with a classification of freedoms and functionings according to human
rights (e.g., 2000; 2005).
291
The shift from economic measurements, typically based on the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), to capabilities in order to assess the quality of individual lives, has
influenced a high number of scholars from various disciplines. Martha Nussbaum has
provided us with a well-reflected list of central capabilities (Nussbaum 2006), and
continued to develop her own approach to the CA (Nussbaum 2011a). Particularly in her
earlier and recent work, she has discussed the relationship between human development
and human rights (Nussbaum 1997:7-9; 2011b; 2003:40–50), also emphasizing the mutual
usefulness of both approaches. Both, Sen and Nussbaum, differentiate between
capabilities (which for Nussbaum are “fundamental entitlements” to be included as
objects of collective action at both the national and international level; Nussbaum
2004:13) and functionings to make the CA operable in development work, planning and
assessment. (1) Capabilities are capacities and abilities, taken together, to lead the kind of
life someone values. They can and should be assessed by individuals as well as by
development planners. (2) Functionings – individual “beings and doings” (Qizilbash
2008:55) – encompass “[...] the full range of activities – including productive, reproductive, caring, expressive and deliberative kinds of functioning that human beings
may achieve and the subjective 'end states' (that is, the happiness or sense of well-being
that are the final outcome of those functionings).” (Dean 2009:2).
This inherently individualistic conception has been criticized by Gore who argued that:
“goodness or badness of social arrangements or states of affairs is evaluated on the basis
of what is good or bad for individual well-being and freedom and [because it] also reduced
to the good of those individuals.” (Gore 1997:242; see also Deneulin 2008:109). While
Deneulin has consequentially, and perhaps in response, introduced the concept and
notion of 'structures of living together'11 (2008) to enrich the CA, this basic differentiation
between capabilities and functionings remains being uphold and has recently been
applied to collective capabilities as well (Solava 2006; 2013). As collective capabilities are
understood specific structures of group affiliation, expressing shared responsiveness and
responsibility, that need to be taken into account in the sense of collective action and
group formation among the poor and can contribute to human development and
capability enhancement. Such notions of collective capabilities have, again in turn, been
criticized, e.g., by Alkire (Comim, Qizilbash, and Alkire 2008) who, in the words of Solava,
argued that “for evaluative purposes the focus of the capability approach should remain
the individual. She criticizes the notion of collective capabilities as it assumes that 'every
member of the group/collectivity who enjoyed those capabilities valued them' (Alkire
2008:39) and explains that 'a claim that a structure or group ‘provided a collective
11
“Stuctures of living together [e.g., values, beauty, culture, etc. that belong to a
historical community] are thus not only to be assessed because they are good for
individuals, but also according to whether they promote the collective structures which help
individuals to flourish.” (ibid.).
292
capability’ may overlook some significant dis-benefits or heterogeneities' (ibid.:40).”
(Solava 2013:6).
However, the discussion within the CA has not yet endorsed the legal-philosophical
debates related to the fundamental ontological question of collectives (see footnote 6) as
such: whether they would be 'peoples', 'minorities' or 'groups'. The CA could potentially
profit from such engagement, since the right to self-determination, attributed to peoples
(who remain largely undefined) is commonly regarded as the premise for all human
rights.12
The Human Development Report 2000, entitled 'Human Rights and Human Development'
also focused on the relationship, without specifying collectives further. It argued that
human rights would focus on the existence of duties and entitlements in human
development, development in turn would bear a perspective of change and progress to
human rights (UNDP 2000:19–24). In this respect, an important conceptual distinction
between 'rights' and 'needs' was formulated by Branco (2009) who has argued that needs,
in order to be needs and as opposed to rights, would necessarily presuppose only partial
fulfillment – thus accepting inequality to some extent – while rights, in order to be rights,
would be immediate entitlements, valid for everyone without restriction.
Hence, despite a stark imbalance of funding to the UNHCHR and UNDP from the overall
United Nations budget allocations,13 an important discussion at the level of the United
Nations also concerns the ultimate goal of human aspirations. Should human rights be
considered as an end, and no longer as a means, to achieve development? Or should
human rights be regarded as means to achieve human development? Accordingly, both
spheres have developed their own methodology of assessment and sets of indicators – for
human development the Human Development Index (HDI), inspiring the MDGs – and
human rights the human rights indicators, elaborated by the UN OHCHR 14 and the
12
The peoples' right to self-determination is spelled out in Article 1 of both the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
13
According to http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ABOUTUS/Pages/FundingBudget.aspx
[last retrieve:12/04/2014], the UN OHCHR receives only about three per cent of the overall
UN budget, despite major increases of funds since 2005 (for 2012-2013 biennium budget, a
total of US$ 168.5 million). This allocation amounts to one third of the UN OHCHR
overall budget, two thirds stemming from voluntary contributions of member states and
further donations.
14
The three UN OHCHR standard publications on HRI are: UN OHCHR (2006;
2008; 2012) – the most recent providing the most encompassing introduction and
methodology). In addition, the Mexican UNHCHR office, the first worldwide to actually
implement HRI projects, has published several detailed reports and guides, providing
accounts of the implementation of various HRI in the country, which can be found online:
http://www.hchr.org.mx/ [last retrieve: 07.04.2014]. The specific report for Latin America,
providing a summery of all region-wide projects in the field has been published recently:
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Organization of American States (see IACHR 2008). Despite differences in conception –
“MDGs focusing on well-being and poverty through mainly aiming at economic, social and
cultural goals, human rights provide entitlements to equality and dignity” (de Béco 2014,
64) – all three indicator systems have in common to focus on states and to be applied
through governments. Not surprisingly, voices can increasingly be encountered who argue
for blending MDG with HRI (see de Béco 2014; Dorsey et al. 2010). In addition, there is a
diagnosed “need to go beyond legal monitoring by evaluating the de jure and the de facto
position of individuals and groups […] central to the normative framework developed by
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This emphasis […] reflects a
paradigm shift in legal thinking that puts weight on the evaluation of the results achieved
as well as the evaluation of the conduct of states in the evaluation of international
obligations. The need to evaluate state conduct in the context of outcomes (or results)
constitutes an important extension in the evidential base for evaluating human rights and
makes analytical space for the use of socio-economic indicators, as well as legal and policy
measures, as an informational base for examining the compliance of states with their
international human rights obligations.” (Vizard et al. 2011:8).
Besides the focus on individuals, and the state as well as international actors (perhaps
most clearly expressed in ul Haq 1995) to bring development about, there is more that
links both sides together: both human rights and human development have been criticized
for their liberal, 'Westernocentric' standpoint. “Capability is at one level a neo-Aristotelian
concept. It is an idea that, potentially, captures the notion of eudaimonic wellbeing and
the 'good life' that is to be found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and the Eudemian
Ethics [...]. It is a concept that transcends a narrow hedonic and utilitarian calculus in order
to embrace the essential 'virtues' that, morally, define humanity. Yet capability remains a
post-Enlightenment liberal concept. It is an idea within the tradition of Roosevelt's (1944)
four freedoms speech in which - amongst other things - he asserted that 'a necessitous
man is not a free man'. (Dean 2009:3). Such critique alluding to a flawed application of
essentially Western conceptions of the good life in the entire world, resemble the critique
of human rights, which would (1) neglect their close endorsement of the capitalist right to
property (see Tully 2007), (2) misrepresent the human in human rights due to historical
bias (see Mignolo 2013) and (3) seek to universalize a distinct canon of values instead of
upholding openness to a variety of different values (Mignolo 2011; Latour 2004).
UN ACNUDH (2013). Further essential texts, revealing something about the evolution
within the debate, starting with Barsh (1993), who elaborated something as the basic scope
of how to measure human rights, are (from a plurality of disciplines and for various
purposes): Fröberg (2005); Andersen and Sano (2006); Malhotra and Fasel (2005);
McInerney-Lankford and Sano (2010); Merry (2013a); Hines (2005); Welling (2008);
Rosga and Satterthwaite (2009); de Béco (2014).
294
Moreover, and despite certainly gained merits thanks to the focus on human dimensions
in policy-making, both human development and human rights miss out a crucial dimension
of being, which essentially makes impossible to speak of 'assessing the quality of life'
without: nature.15 While inter-generational justice with regard to sustainability has been
introduced to the debate within the CA (see Watene 2013), and sustainability was devoted
an entire edition of the Journal of Human Development and Capabilities (Lessmann and
Rauschmayer 2013a; 2013b), the linkages between human development, human rights
and nature remain generally little explored and superficial. Yet, individual capabilities, and
even more functionings, depend largely on the factual and representational (assessed)
natural endowment and environment one lives in. Also for a state to meet its human
rights obligations, considering 'it's' natural endowment and environment, is key to design
adequate policies.16 The next chapter provides an account of the implementation of HRI in
Ecuador, showing to which extent this unaddressed linkage can play out in practice with
regard to state planning.
Human Rights Indicators in Ecuador: the Case of SIIDERECHOS
Throughout the 1990s, Ecuador witnessed a devastating breakdown of the state and
private sector, including financial structures. In retrospective, neoliberal policies, largescale privatizations and an extremely weak and unstable government are often blamed as
preconditions for this breakdown (see Ayala Mora 1989; Lauderbaugh 2012). One of the
effects of this crucial period in Ecuador was the establishment of various social policies
and progress measurement projects, deeply anchored in the belief of increased
transparency and better governance through 'objective' knowledge generation.
Accordingly, an important institutional project to be established around the year 2000 was
perhaps SIISE (Sistema Integral de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador)17 which is nowadays
15
It is intriguing to see that the crucial link between 'nature' (and be it as 'resources')
and human development as well as human rights is not even mentioned once in the edited
volume on the relation of the two spheres of the Journal of Human Development and
Capabilities (2011).
16
In this respect, Vizard et al. (2011:16) mention at least the 'need for clarification of
key international standards', such as 'progressive realization', the 'maximum of available
resources' and the concept of the 'minimum core', which are recognized in human rights
literature and also codified in according treaties and covenants.
17
On attempt to access SIISE data, the following positivist introduction is presented:
“Hoy en día, existe en el mundo un interés creciente entre gobiernos, comunidades de
desarrollo y medios académicos, sobre la medición del progreso social, además del
económico. Como resultado ha surgido una amplia actividad para elaborar medidas
cuantitativas de las condiciones de vida de la población - los llamados 'indicadores sociales'
- que permitan trazar los avances de los países más allá de las ciafras económicas
agregadas. El objetivo principal del SIISE es asegurar que el país cuente con un mecanismo
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administered by the powerful Ministerio Coordinador de Desarrollo Social.18 Given the
more recent historical experience, it is not entirely by chance that Ecuador was one of the
first countries where a pilot project on human rights measurement was conducted by the
Center for Economic and Social Rights on the right to health (CERS 1999) and neither a
surprise that the government nowadays seeks to implement – and it is the first worldwide
to do so – a national strategy to human rights indicators (see UNHCHR 2012, 113), called
SIIDERECHOS, together with the local UNHCHR office and foreign experts.
Generally, every foreign researcher coming to Ecuador will be intrigued by the widespread
availability of statistical data which seem to be displayed everywhere in private and public
media, including Correa's own weekly TV show. One of my interlocutors even stated that
one encounters in Ecuador an 'obsession with quantitative data', typically believed to
represent 'factual', instead of 'arbitrarily usable' and thus malleable, knowledge. What we
have to take as point of departure, is that 'governance by means of numbers', and in
particular indicators, has been mushrooming in the past decade – also at a global level
(see Hansen 2012; Merry 2011; Rosga and Satterthwaite 2009). When it comes to
numbers and figures, Merry (2011:88), for example, tells us that the need for indicators
arose with the increased need for accountability, of “results-based” or “evidence-driven”
programs and projects. Hence, according to Merry, indicators in particular represent “a
slippage between the political and the technical. The slippage occurs in the way issues and
problems are defined, in the identity and role of experts, in the relative power of the
people engaged in producing and using indicators, and in the power and clout of the
sponsoring organization.”
However, SIIDERECHOS follows the constitutional provisions requiring the State to
plan the development of the country – the 'state conduct' in UN parlance – in a way to
ensure the realization of the rights and principles enshrined in it (for this approach called
“neoconstitucionalismo”, see Ávila Santamaría [2011]). The Constitution of 2008 has been
celebrated as one of the most progressive existent on this planet to date. Citing the
Constitution, the most recent Plan Nacional para el Buen Vivir states:
“Con el nuevo constitucionalismo, el Ecuador pasa a ser un 'Estado
constitucional de derechos y justicia', superando la noción tradicional,
presente en la Carta Magna de 1998, en la que se catalogaba al Estado como
'social de derecho'. Este cambio no es solamente semántico, sino que tiene
profundas implicaciones en el rol del Estado, en la concepción y el ejercicio de
que promueva la elaboración, difusión y uso de estas medidas.” Taken from:
http://www.siise.gob.ec/siiseweb/ [last retrieve: 04.03.2014].
18
The constitution from 2008 prescribes a few coordinating ministries to be
superordinate to the common sectoral ministries.
296
los derechos humanos y de la naturaleza, y en la planificación nacional.” 19
(Senplades 2013:81).
“Los derechos humanos, otrora vistos como un obstáculo para el ejercicio del
poder publico, pasan a convertirse en la razón de ser del Estado, el motivo de
su existencia: 'El mas alto deber del Estado consiste en respetar y hacer
respetar los derechos garantizados en la Constitución' (art. 11.9). '[Los
derechos] serán de directa e inmediata aplicación por y ante cualquier
servidora o servidor publico, administrativo o judicial, de oficio o a petición de
parte […]. Para el ejercicio de los derechos y las garantías constitucionales no
se exigirán condiciones o requisitos que no estén establecidos en la
Constitución o la ley” (art. 11.3).'”20 (SENPLADES 2013:81).
Due to the heavy emphasis on consolidated state planning and investment to bring about
Buen Vivir (see SENPLADES 2009; 2013) – i.e. inter alia understood as the gradual
realization and constant monitoring of all human rights, including a few additional rights –
SIIDERECHOS was embraced by various actors at the national Ministry of Justice, Human
Rights and Religious Affairs in order to promote an already existent methodology, namely
HRI, vis-a-vis the national planning authority, SENPLADES. This planning authority has been
intending to develop a novel system of Buen Vivir indicators for the purpose of advancing
accountability and policy monitoring, linked to public investment. Since it was based on
modified accounts of human development – highlighting the expansions of potentials,
choices and freedoms (thus, e.g., investing in traffic infrastructure) – it lacked a proper
novel account of human rights improvement and even more of additional rights of nature
as well as 'Buen Vivir rights', as they are guaranteed as immediately claimable in the
Constitution. They encompass the following rights, of which only some are internationally
codified (particularly the 'right to water' since 2010): “derecho al agua, a la tierra, la
soberania alimentaria, a los recursos naturales, a la biodiversidad, a los bosques y a los
19
All translations from Spanish to English are mine: “With the new constitutionalism,
Ecuador becomes a 'constitutional state of rights and justice', overcoming the traditional
notion, present in the Constitution of 1998, in which the State was characterized as 'social
state of law'. This change is not only semantic, but it has profound implications for the
state's role in the conception and realization of human rights and of nature and for national
planning.” (ibid.).
20
“Human rights, once viewed as an obstacle to the exercise of public power, went on
to become the raison d'être of the state, the reason for its existence: 'The highest duty of the
State is to respect and uphold the rights guaranteed in the Constitution "(art. 11.9).' [These
rights] will be of direct and immediate application and to any servant or public,
administrative or judicial server, ex officio or upon request [...]. 'For the exercise of
constitutional rights and guarantees no conditions or requirements that are not specified in
the Constitution or the law '(art. 11.3) can be demanded.'” (ibid.).
297
saberes tradicionales” (de Sousa Santos 2010, 150).21 The assessment of human rights,
however, requires different sorts of data-gathering and information processing: “Human
development indicators do not provide information on the extent to which a state is
complying with its obligations” (Fukuda-Parr 2011:79). In addition, traditional social
indicators lack disaggregation of data by various subgroups, regions and characteristics
(age, sex, dis-/abled, ethnicity, etc.), which is considered as prime advantage of HRI (cf. de
Béco 2014). This, in turn, would be a complementary addition to individual assessments.
In fact, the Ecuadorian political focus is much influenced by a systemic or metabolic
rationale between humans and nature: the long-term government's plan, to change the
economy substantially by using natural resources to build up a knowledge-based economy
focusing on high tech production, stands out as paradigmatic example. For this reason, the
PNBV 2009-2013, for example, draws references to human development approaches and
even cites its main proponents, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbuam occasionally (see
SENPLADES 2009, 28; 38). It's passage 3.2.5. (“Hacia una relación armónica con la
naturaleza”) lays out how human development and natural resources are understood in
an 'ecosystematic and intergenerational' way at the level of main public policy-making. It
is worth quoting it almost completely:
“La responsabilidad ética con las actuales y futuras generaciones y con el resto
de especies es un principio fundamental para prefigurar un nuevo esquema de
desarrollo humano. Éste necesita reconocer la dependencia de la economía
respecto de la naturaleza; admitir que la economía forma parte de un sistema
mayor, el ecosistema, soporte de la vida como proveedor de recursos y
funciones ambientales, y sumidero de deshechos. La economía no puede verse
únicamente como un circuito cerrado entre productores de mercancías y
consumidores, siendo el mercado su mecanismo de coordinación a través de
los precios. En realidad, la economía constituye un sistema abierto que
necesita el ingreso de energía y materiales, como insumos del proceso
productivo que, al ser procesados generan un flujo de residuos: el calor
disipado o energía degradada y los residuos materiales, que en ese estado
retornan a la naturaleza, pero no pueden reciclarse completamente. [...].
Asimismo, además de la recreación con hermosos paisajes, la naturaleza
21
Others include here: the rights to water, food, environment, health, communication
and information, culture and science, education, habitat and housing, work and social
security; these are divided in two sub-chapters, (1) 'inclusion and fairness', encompassing:
physical culture and leisure, social communication, knowledges (translated from the
Spanish plural 'saberes'), risk management, dwelling and human mobility, human security
and transport, as well as (2) 'biodiversity and natural resources', including nature and
environment, biodiversity, natural heritage and ecosytems, land, biosphere, urban ecology
and alternative energies (cf. Cortez 2010, 1; see also León 2008).
298
proporciona un conjunto de servicios fundamentales para la vida: la
temperatura, la lluvia, la composición atmosférica, etc., que constituyen
condiciones insustituibles y cuya preservación tiene un valor infinito. No se
trata de mantener incólume el patrimonio natural, porque esto es imposible
por el uso de energía y materiales que realizan las distintas sociedades, así
como por la capacidad de asimilación de los ecosistemas, sino de resguardarlo
a un nivel adecuado. Las políticas públicas tradicionalmente han intentando
enfatizar con poco éxito la equidad intrageneracional, enfocándose en los más
pobres. No obstante, suele omitirse la equidad intergeneracional; se ignoran
las preferencias de las próximas generaciones (o incluso las preferencias de la
generación actual en unos cuantos años). No se entiende que el no pago de la
‘deuda ambiental’ ahora puede implicar la imposibilidad de pago de la ‘deuda
social’ del mañana. Promover el desarrollo sostenible significa consolidar el
progreso tecnológico hacia el incremento de la eficiencia, entendida como la
generación de un nivel de producción determinado, con el menor uso posible
de recursos naturales.” (ibid., 38-39.).22
Such statements make clear that relational accounts, focusing on the numerous
relationships between humans and nature, are key to developing better policies
with regard to state planning, fulfillment of human rights obligations, but also to
22
“Ethical responsibility toward current and future generations and other species is
fundamental to envision a new scheme for human development. It requires to recognize the
dependence of the economy on nature; to admit that the economy is part of a larger system,
the ecosystem, supporter of life as a provider of resources and environmental functions, as
well as waste sump. The economy can not only be seen as a closed circuit between
commodity producers and consumers, having markets as its coordination mechanism
through prices. In fact, the economy is an open system that requires the input of energy and
materials as inputs to the production process which, once processed, generate outflow of
waste: the dissipated heat, degraded energy and waste materials, which in that state return
to nature, but can not be entirely recycled [...]. Likewise, and in addition to recreation
thanks to beautiful scenery, nature provides a set of core services for life. Temperature,
rainfall, atmospheric composition, etc., which are irreplaceable conditions and whose
preservation is of infinite value. It is not about keeping nature save and intact, because this
is impossible for the use of energy and materials that different societies generat as well as
for the assimilative capacity of ecosystems, but to protect it at an appropriate level. Public
policies have traditionally been trying to emphasize intra-generational equity with little
success, by focusing on the poorest. However, often less regarded is inter-generational
equity; preferences of future generations (or even the preferences of the current generation
in a few years) are ignored. It is little understood that non-payment of 'environmental debts'
now can make it impossible to pay the 'social debts' of tomorrow. Promoting sustainable
development means consolidating technological progress toward increasing efficiency,
defined as the generation of production at a determined level, with minimal use of natural
resources.” (ibid.).
299
achieve sustainability in its full sense. In Ecuador, human rights indicators have
increasingly become considered as central to respect, protect and fulfill such a role
of the state – SIIDERECHOS has eventually been officially endorsed, recognized and
financially endowed by SENPLADES in mid-2012 (with a budget of USD 15mio over a
period of five years, including various sub-projects).
Much information gathered and compiled for the SIDERECHOS project will be taken
from SIISE and INEC (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos); the latter
conducted the last census in 2010, using far-reaching methodology for datagathering and analysis. However, still much is needed to convince public authorities
of the necessity (1) to change existent systems of data collection, (2) to collaborate
continuously in data exchange across institutions (including state and non-state
actors), and (3) to train them in a new and holistic perspective, linking development
efforts to human rights monitoring and ecological perspectives.
SIIDERECHOS consists of a concerted approach to reinforce a human rights focus in
statistical accounts of the country at all three administrative levels: national, regional and
local. The idea is to generate distinct human rights-related information in a constantly
ongoing way. These results should be made publicly available in an online database to be
used by civil society and state institutions to effectively claim and implement policyrelevant human rights remedies. In this sense, human rights become inextricably
entangled with development. In Ecuador, the project has been conceptually lead by the
local UNHCHR office, in close collaborating with UNHCHR experts at its headquarters in
Geneva as well as the regional UNHCHR HRI expert (based in Mexico). The UNHCHR seeks
to forge alliances between like-minded Ecuadorian public officials at different ministries
and data-processing institutions. In summer 2013, a revised project proposal for
SIDERECHOS was accepted by the supra-planning authority SENPLADES in order to
establish a web-database where citizens and officials can inform themselves about
structural, process and outcome-related frameworks with regard to human rights, largely
following the UNHCHR methodology to HRI. However, this process has not been frictionfree.
Between 2010 and 2013, a series of high level meetings took place, aiming at
'mainstreaming' the idea and methodology of human rights indicators. The regional
UNHCHR consultant for Latin America, working in Mexico, supervised the Ecuadorian
project and delivered technical and expert input, based on the gained experience with
indicator's elaboration from, mainly, Mexico City. Soon it became clear that the proposed
UNHCHR methodology would not satisfy the needs Ecuadorian representatives, engaged
in the project, perceived. According to some, the problem has been that the constitution
of Ecuador appears to be 'more advanced with regard to rights' than the international
human rights framework itself. As a nationwide project, then, SIDERECHOS should monitor
and measure any (non-)progress with regard to the national/constitutional rights
framework (embedded within the international framework) in order to be “useful for any
300
public authority”. 23 Technical experts engaged in conceptualizing the proposed
methodology were quick in arguing for the simple use of already existent data into the
new system – as well as for assessing structural and process indicators for all assessed
rights together, instead of a single rights basis. Institutional and personal considerations,
regarding the spatial, temporal and financial location of SIDERECHOS, accompanied this
attempt to take governmental 'ownership' of an international methodology. Significantly,
national NGOs and human rights institutions were almost entirely excluded from all of
these consultations and meetings, whereas private law firms were consulted and even
contracted to elaborate a precursor of the 'structural inventory' of human rights
obligations.
However, also academic circles and independent NGOs got eventually wind of the
attempts to measure human rights. Some people concerned, including myself, around the
Programa Andino de Derechos Humanos (PADH), based at the internationally financed
Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar in Quito, started discussing alternative forms of human
rights indicators. An initializing moment was perhaps marked by the public and repeated
attacks of President Rafael Correa against the human rights report 2011, annually
elaborated by the PADH (2011, 2012). These reports are known for their outspoken
analysis, especially with regard to persecutions of human rights defenders by the
government (see e.g CEDHU, Acción Ecológica, and INREDH 2011). In spring 2012, Correa
accused the editors of the report of having used 'invalid sources and data' in an
'unscholarly' manner in his weekly TV show ('Enlace sabatina'). The data in question
stemmed from various NGOs, aligned with the indigenous and ecologist movement, with
long-standing track-record and personal as well as professionals ties to the editors.24
While Correa insisted on putting in place an international commission to verify the
information specified in the report under the threat to curb Ecuadorian expenditures to
the university, this event shows the inherent political nature of 'valid' and 'invalid' data.
How could one reliably assess the situation of human rights in a country where
information, which has not been approved by the government, is deemed illegitimate,
'invalid' and 'unscholarly'? By invoking the notion of 'scientificalness' a double effect was
achieved: first, what is not scientific is ascribed to the civil society, in particular, in its
marginalized forms (such as indigenous representatives). Second, the label of being
'scientific' was solely attributed to the government and it's issued data.
This is a common perception in the region, as the head of statistics at the Inter-American
Institute of Human Rights (IAIHR), linked to the Inter-American Commission of Human
23
This is stated in the draft version by the Ministerio de la Justicia for the budget and
project plan of SIDERECHOS, submitted to the UNHCHR consultant for revision. I was
able to obtain a copy of this unpublicized document.
24
The website of PADH provides an overview of this case, including statements by
people responsible for the human rights report as well as by the director of UASB:
http://www.uasb.edu.ec/padh.php [last retrieve: 07.04.2014].
301
Rights, confirmed: one could not measure the progress of governments on the basis of
NGO reports, because they would be “inconstant” and hardly “rigorous”. “The problem is
that some of them do publish good reports, but they elaborate them in one year and in
the next one they won't. There is an issue of expertise and funding.”25 As a consequence,
the IAIHR does not collaborate with NGOs at all. Human rights, in this sense, remain an
exclusive concern of governments in Latin America – and ultimately cannot be claimed or
appropriated by someone else.
It is precisely this view which is in question, when invoking a “decolonial option” (Mignolo
2011) for human rights, as it has been the case with SIDERECHOS. In general, human rights
are frequently perceived as instruments of neo-colonial dominion which would require
Ecuadorian 'ownership' and a re-formulation and re-institutionalization in the Global
South. The public management and development logics of the UNHCHR indicators'
methodology, however much locally embraced thanks to their ability to deliver quick
results, was also put into question by a few public officials. They seemed to have been
influenced by more critical comments on human rights, accusing them to be purely
'anthropocentric', market-liberal and individualistic. With them, an alternative approach
to human rights as thought of at PADH, entered fertile grounds. A 'biocentric' version of
human rights measurement should not start with the human individual – something alien
to the claims of Buen Vivir – but with its encompassing environment.
HRI Towards Biocentric Human-Nature Rights?
Similar to the logics-in-use of UNDP's human development approach, Millennium
Development Goals and other forms of utilitarian socio-economic input-output equations,
human rights indicators prescribe a distinct sort of how to bring about 'development'.
They embody a specific assumption of how to bring about social change toward justice in
the name of rights – ordered in structural, process and outcome clusters – thereby
emphasizing the agency of governments to initiate and monitor this change. Nature,
commons, collectives and all sorts of resources are merely subsumed to this assumed
process of change, subsequent to consciously made choices by humans. If only correctly
deployed, the desired outcomes will result – there is no agency ascribed to natural
resources themselves. This is all the more interesting for a country, considered as being a
'megadiverse hotspot of fauna and flora'; a tourist-friendly classification that comes with
important limitations: Ecuador is constantly threatened by erupting volcanoes, melt-down
of glaciers, floods and exposed to the El Niño/La Niña phenomena. In addition,
exploitation and exportation of natural resources (crude oil), agricultural and fishery
products are the primary means of the national economy (see Dávalos 2013; Moore and
Velasquez 2012). Given this paramount dependence from nature and its 'choices', the
accusation of anthropocentrism in state planning cannot easily be dismissed.
25
Interview in San José (Instituto Inter-Americano de Derechos Humanos), July 2012.
302
A relational, reciprocal and complimentary (stipulated as the basic values of Buen Vivir)
perspective of human rights instead, cannot neglect the dialectics of structure-agency of
any human condition, neither the plurality of ontologies we seem to be confronted with
(see Blaser 2013), in particular in a supposed 'intercultural' and 'plurinational' context, as
it characterizes the recognized constitution of the country (interculturalidad and
plurinationalidad are the two pillars of Buen Vivir). The notion of 'biocentrism' expresses
the attempt to shift the focus of attention from human lives to life as such – thus to life in
all its plurality and multitude. It resembles, but goes beyond, accounts of “Deep Ecology”
(Næss 1973; 1984). Biocentrism does so, by focusing on the relations between such
relational structures of interdependency of humans from natural conditions, on the one
hand, and human agency, on the other hand; and not primarily on particular outcomes as
demanded by traditional development programs. A biocentric account attempts rather at
assessing qualities, instead of quantities, such as reciprocity, complementarity or
correspondence – between individuals and collectives as well as ecosystems, economy
and – what could be called – political and natural capabilities.
From this perspective, structural indicators of common human rights indicator
methodologies become topographical ones: rivers, mountains, sacred places (huacas in
the Andes), islands, beaches, bays, etc. What would be direct nature's rights, and what are
the obligations of people necessary to maintain a river, a chain of mountains, stretch of
beaches or mangroves intact while being able to live well altogether? How can we frame
these rights in a way to preserve this area for all future generations, while at the same
time permitting to use a certain land in a sustainable way? To which extend would
individual and collective capabilities of humans be affected by such framing? Can we
eventually speak of capabilities of, for instance, a chain of volcanoes, in terms of
predictability of eruptions? Would an effected eruption be countable as functioning of a
volcano
Any such topographical area requires legal protection, foremost as in rights of nature
itself, but also delineation to each other. The common classification into 'zones' –
expressing various degrees of human-nature interaction, and successfully applied, e.g, in
perma-culture methods – could serve as a basis to signal specific areas without delineating
them sharply. Marking the borders to other regions requires to take into account all what
lives, works, plays – in short: constitutes and is engaged – within a certain territory as well
as crossing to other areas. Here, the notion of 'process indicators' takes on a different
meaning, a relational one, which takes metabolic forms of human-nature-interaction into
account. Who, how and to which extend, is dependent on a given topographical area? To
which extent would such an area, including humans and non-humans, be dependent from
neighboring ones? How and to which extend, in turn, is such an area dependent on legal
protection? In the context of Latin America, not only human rights are to be included, but
for instance also property, intellectual and collective rights, sensitively weighted one
against each other. Again, capabilities, understood as potentials (e.g., potential threads
and preventive measures) could be used to conceptualize such needs and required
303
fulfillment of legal obligations. The evualuative and classificatory concept of functionings,
in turn, could be used to assess the interplay between obligations and freedoms, as
initially pondered by Sen (Sen 2004:338–342; 2009:367 and 372–376). In principle, the
existing HRI framework, focusing on existent legal and policy-related structures, process as
policy-targets and achieved outcomes, provides a well-developed methodology to include
rights 'as goals', as in the description of outcomes.
In order to answer such sensitive balancing, a re-fined approach to capabilities and
functionings was also discussed around SIIDERECHOS: each right, corresponding to legal
national and international obligations,26 could be broken down into actual instances of
real manifestations (functionings) and potentials and abilities (capabilities). But in a crucial
step, and in order to be purposeful for both existent circumstances in the country and
state planning, these re-categorizations should not only be made for humans, but also for
rivers, national parks, mountains, arable lands, yet potentially even for endangered plants,
animals, etc. What, again, are the capabilities of a specific volcano and its surroundings?
To which extend will they effect the lives of people settling within this area? What will this
imply both at the individual and collective level?
In such an account and shifted focus, the assessment of human-nature rights is relocated
from a linear-causal and purely individual focus to a dynamic and systemic understanding
of interaction between humans and their environment. A more biocentric take on overall
assessments of life quality means to take life itself, including life's inherent cycles of
change (arising and passing), at the center of consideration. In consequence, it becomes
also graspable that every capability at the individual level would require collective
frameworks, constant efforts, institutions and, importantly, official recognition (cf.
Honneth 1995; Heins 2008; Schweiger 2013) in order to be successfully turned into
functionings. At the level of monitoring and assessment, it is clearly not sufficient to only
assess individual opportunities and capacities (neither what a state could do to enhance
them), if thorough and constant monitoring is envisioned. What is needed is to assess also
the responsiveness and resilience of those collective achievements, e.g., of those legal
institutions, typically accompanying more or less individual life paths, including the given
legal institutional system in a country as such.27
Human-Nature Rights and Capabilities
SIIDERECHOS has not been fully implemented yet; it remains a project to be constantly
discussed, contested and refined over time. So far, it mainly follows the UNHCHR
26
Ecuador is one of the few countries which have signed (and ratified almost all) all
international human rights covenants and treaties.
27
What would be valid human rights claims, if there were no system in place to
respect, protect and eventually fulfill them? Accordingly, HRI would have to measure the
corresponding individual and collective capabilities and functioning for every single right
and their complementarity.
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methodology, but seeks to be based on Ecuadorian legal frameworks: in this respect,
rights to be measured are taken from the Ecuadorian Constitution and not (only) from
international human rights treaties, covenants, declarations and special procedures. The
important conundrums regarding group rights (derechos collectivos) and nature rights
have been put off to later stages, given their inherent complexities which would perhaps
scratch more than the surface of a post-colonial state. But on a more academic-reflexive
level, the following questions appear: how have rights of nature been 'invented', why in
Ecuador? Where do they stem from? Consequentially, what could be gained from such a
biocentric perspective and how does it play out in reality? Lastly, to which extent could
the CA profit from such a new dimension, and what are major differences? This chapter
attempts to answer some of these questions.
Crucially, and according to the perspective of biocentrism, rights of nature ethically
attempt to draw attention, and legally to indeed pose, limitations to processes of
development (2009b; 2011). By remembering us of the necessity to take life circles –
arising and passing – at the core of planning and assessment procedures, it is not longer
possible to conceptualize development as steady growth, accumulation or enhancement
of freedoms only. Instead, one has to ethically agree, politically to implement and legally
to institutionalize thresholds, limits, and according restrictions, for example between the
use of natural resources to fulfill obligations emanating from the ICESCR and maintaining
biodiversity. Such more systemic views re-distribute and attribute new responsibilities,
obligations to specific actors and eventually create different modes of subjectification
through changed patterns of production and, ideally, consumption. Nature rights aim at
upvaluing preservation of natural environments, of respecting existing biodiversity by
keeping it as much as possible intact, and at obliging to reestablish what has been
destroyed.28 Such a view becomes possible, if one accepts that 'nature' – as inextricably
and essentially linked to the vision of Buen Vivir, which depends on land and correct, i.e.
sustainable, use of land – is alive, a living being, to which all individuals are connected to.
The Constitution of Ecuador thus stipulates: “Nature or Pacha Mama, where life
reproduces and realizes itself, has the right to be respected integrally with regard to
existence, maintaining and regeneration of its life cycles, structures, functions and
evolutionary processes.”29 (own translation; Ávila Santamaría 2011b:205). In this sense of
28
In Ecuador, derechos de la naturaleza encompass the following constitutional
guarantees, which are indivisible and inalienable, and at the same overall level of judicial
hierarchy, from all other guarantees and norms with regard to human rights and Buen Vivir:
(1) derecho de la naturaleza a que se respete integralmente su existencia; (2) derecho de la
naturaleza a la restauración; (3) derecho de las personas, comunidades, pueblos y
nacionalidades a beneficiarse del ambiente y las riquezas naturales. (cf. Constitución 2008,
Art. 71).
29
Nina Pacari, indigenous judge at the Constitutional Court of Ecuador, provides the
following explanation of the link between life, being and humans: “Según la cosmovision
indígena, todos los seres de la naturaleza están investidos de energía que es el SAMAI y, en
305
mutual respect, one can speak of a requirement to limit the desire to achieve individual
(and collective) capabilities and functionings (or to perceive one's capabilities differently):
“La Tierra nos necesita para que no la agotemos ni la destrocemos, es decir demanda un
'no hacer', un respecto de nuestra parte. De igual modo, nos necesita para lo que
hagamos sea respetuoso con sus ciclos de regeneración, o sea, demanda un hacer
racional, una actitud conservacionista y hasta ecologista.”30 (ibid.:191-192).
However, it is not entirely necessary that one adopts an ecologist, environmentalist or
even anti-humanist standpoint in defense of the Earth. Neither is seemingly 'rational'
resource-efficiency, however much required for achieving the clearly anthropocentric
concept of 'sustainability', the exclusive way forward. As the Argentinean judge Zaffaroni
(2011) has demonstrated, rights of non-human beings have been discussed and
implemented for long time already; likewise has it been long discussed to assign, e.g.,
capabilities to non-human beings (Nussbaum 1997; 2006). Moreover, there is a
longstanding debate about the legal standing of trees (and forests) which in fact has
inspired Alberto Acosta, the former Ecuadorian energy and mining minister who also
acted as the president of the Asamblea Nacional Constituyente in 2007, to propose
derechos de la naturaleza to be included in the Constitution which was elaborated by this
broad civil consulting Asamblea.
In particular the life-long work and engagement of the US-legal scholar Christopher Stone
(1972; 2010) should be mentioned here.31 Early on, he developed his proposal for trees to
have legal standing, similar to other non-human entities, such as companies, and thus
should have rights, which in addition could be quite easily be implemented. Later on, he
extended his approach to the climate – as bearers of rights – and discussed this in the
context of sustainability debates. In chapter II of his book from 2010, Stone discusses the
various positions regarding normative and legal constraints under the paradigm of
sustainability (2010:117-124). And while he seems to favor the argument that constant
consecuencia, son seres que tienen vida: una piedra, un rio (agua), la montaña, el sol, las
plantas, en fin, todos los seres tienen vida y ellos también disfrutan de una familia, de
alegrías y tristezas al igual que el ser humano. […] en el mundo de los pueblos indígenas –
La Tierra – no es sino allpa-mama que, según la traducción literal, significa madre-tierra.
¿Por qué esto de allpa-mama? Primero, hay una identidad de género: es mujer. Segundo, es
lo más grande y sagrado, es la generadora de vida y producción; sin ella, caemos en la nada,
simplemente somos la nada o no somos nadie, como dicen nuestros abuelos.” (Pacari
2009:33–34).
30
“The Earth needs us to not deplete or destroy it, i.e. demands a respect to 'not do'
from us. Similarly, we need to be respectful of what we do with its cycles of regeneration,
i.e. demands 'to do' rationally, in a conservationist attitude or even environmentalist one.”
(ibid.).
31
Acosta himself mentioned this book as one of his main sources of inspiration,
beyond Buen Vivir in its more traditional, indigenous conceptions. Personal interview in
Quito (FLACSO), 07.02.2012
306
transformation of natural resources into other forms of capital has been constituting what
is called development of humankind, he still argues for “preservationism” (ibid.) as a sort
of 'best option' we could take, faced with trade offs between human well-being at present
and assumptions of the future: “Preservationism calls upon us to perpetuate the
continued existence and appreciation of many of those things that are constitutive of
human identification and flourishing. They are among the 'keepsakes' that connect each
generation to, and constructs of us all, a true family of Humankind.” (ibid.:124). In order to
do so, he suggests the implementation of specific nature's rights as well as a system of
“Global Guardianship” (see ibid.:106; to be housed, e.g., at the United Nations) and a
“Global Commons Trust Fund” (ibid.: 125). Specifically trained persons at the regional,
national and international level could act as guardians of nature, to claim their rights, and
thus embody and reclaim important restrictions of individual and collective human
capabilities to aspired functionings. Those guardians and bodies would do so in lieu of
nature's capabilities and functionings (which, basically, are to maintain its life cycles and
ecosystems, including evolutionary changes).
An important caveat and problem with regard to the CA is that nature, as opposed to
basic assumptions in the CA, has no preferences, no choices to make; at least they seem
hardly visible or graspable for humans. Stone argues therefore for a sort of legal
pragmatism in corresponding court cases, where already now lawyers, e.g., in cases of
property-decisions concerning future generations would have to decide in good faith and
according to assumed preferences (ibid.:Afterword). Still, assessing capabilities and
functinings of humans is generally viewed as some target-performance comparison, based
on an empiricst understanding of reality. Applying similar concepts to nature at whatever
scope (small-scale local, regional, national parks, etc.) would requite to think capabilities
as potentials of ecosystems, less than preferences, including, e.g., resilience to external
influences. Functionings, in any case, could only be assess with human criteria and must
be measured against agreed standards of maintaining biodiversity or restoring it. This
involves public deliberation at various levels.
Similarly, the legal system nowadays in place in Ecuador, envisages to appeal arbitral
verdict from the Constitutional Court in case of conflicting legal provisions regarding
human (and nature) rights. Such standoff is in fact constantly the case, because of the
state's legal obligation to immediately fulfill and realize human rights and Buen Vivir, if
necessary, by continuously exploiting natural resources, while at the same time being
obliged to meet its obligations for preserving and restoring the environment.32 This makes
32
The case of Yasuní-ITT perhaps demonstrates this problem at best: following the
path-breaking proposal to leave crude oil in the soil if the international community would
pay Ecuador compensation of up to two thirds of the loss of revenues through exporting
this oil, the government decided to stop the project in mid-2013 under reference to its
duties: “no podemos ser mentigos asentados en un saco de oro” ('we cannot be beggars
residing on a bag of gold'). See also (Rival 2010; 2012; Burbano et al. 2011). This decision
307
clear that also biocentrism remains first of all a cultural, human-made, conception; at
best, it can serve as political tool and strategy (similar to the CA in its beginnings) and thus
has mainly instrumental value. As human beings, it seems, we can always only deal with
human values (including sustainability) through human modes of interaction. But would
this necessarily imply that extending concepts of capabilities and functionings to nature
would be an anthropocentric act? If, for example, 'vulnerability' – a common term in
human rights parlance – could be measured in potentials, capacities and abilities of both,
humans and non-humans? Including, and this would be the novel twist, constant
evaluations (through modified human-nature rights indicators) of those human practices
that would pose damaging limitations to the 'normal flourishing of life cycles'. While at the
same time re-distributing responsibilities, e.g. to guardians, to restrict precisely such
practices in order to enhance capabilities and real-life functionings of both humans and
nature?
Conclusion
This paper has argued for a refined approach to the existent gap between human
development and human rights, by questioning the 'human' anthropocentrism of both
framworks. It contrasts these certainly cultural paradigms and practices, which are
primarily concerned with human protection and fulfillment, with a different paradigm,
namely biocentrism. Such a perspective emerged as being required through the
implementation of human rights indicators (HRI) in Ecuador during the years 2009 until
2013 (and ongoing). These indicators follow largely the international, and
anthropocentric, methodology developed by the UNHCHR (2012). However, given
Ecuador's comprising and specific framework of law-in-books (which includes rights of
nature at an equal level as human rights), it became possible to shift away from mere
anthropocentric human rights assessment and to reflect on a more dynamic and holistic
understanding of rights linked to development. Development, however, is also in Ecuador
nowadays primarily understood as human development – and leaves broadly out the
question of how to ethically tackle trade-off obligations to nature preservation and
restoration, on the one hand, and to enhance capabilities and freedoms further, on the
other hand. As key to rethinking this assumed impasse the paper identifies the missing
consideration of restrictions and limitations in the CA, while being more common in
human rights (specifically, in so-called 'negative rights' that should prevent the state from
taking certain actions and instead to uphold basic civil and political freedoms). But
thinking about restrictions of development, posed by nature rights, is also something alien
to the HRI methodology so far, which thus only insufficiently captures the situation of
human lives (and rights) in Ecuador (as elsewhere). Extending capabilities and
functionings, modified as potentials and real instantiations, to nature could point to a way
forward for redesigning public assessments, such as HRI. Adopting a strategic perspective
however was countered by civil society protest until President Correa showed potential
acceptance on conducting a public referendum in 2014.
308
of biocentrism and hence taking life cycles including life's inherent passages from arising
to passing (limitations) into account, seems a necessary and an important contribution to
also rethinking the CA/human development approach.
A final remark should be added to another underlying thread of this paper: both human
rights indicators as well as rights of nature, in the way they are conceptualized in Ecuador,
attribute a powerful role to the state (the government). It is the state to bear
responsibility for monitoring it's human rights progress, and likewise, the protection and
preservation of nature. This is a crucially flawed conception, since governments may have
distinct political goals as demonstrated in the case of HRI and data validity. Another
problem is that the question of group rights, in particular peoples' rights, is put off to the
future in projects such as SIIDERECHOS. However, various peoples have a distinctly closer
relationship to their immediate environment, as it is also acknowledged in the group
rights spelled out in the Ecuadorian Constitution.33 These, however, are (similar to many
countries in Latin America) merely framed as minority rights and their culturalist spirit of
preserving distinct cultural traits and lands. The internationally recognized group right to
self-determination as peoples, even against vital state interests, is still missing.
Implementing it thoroughly, i.e. legally guaranteeing enhanced capability sets for selfdetermination, including sub-terrestrial grounds, could bear a substantial step forward to
establish political and legal systems of guardianship at the local level.
Bibliography
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Constitution, Art. 56-60.
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3:00 to 4:30 Conversation with students and professors of the Maestría en Desarrollo
sostenible.
Dr. Henry O. Vargas Benavides – Subdirector, Sede de Occidente
De parte de la Universidad de Costa Rica, Sede de Occidente, les damos la más cordial
bienvenida y a la vez les deseamos el máximo provecho en la continuación de actividades
de la Décima Conferencia Internacional, en el marco del Treinta Aniversario de la
Asociación Internacional de Desarrollo sobre la Ética.
Un agradecimiento especial a la Maestría de Desarrollo Sostenible de la Sede de
Occidente de la Universidad de Costa Rica, por organizar parte de este encuentro el día de
hoy y el de mañana, así como a sus profesores. Les damos la bienvenida a los invitados
nacionales e internacionales a esta Conferencia, a los estudiantes y profesores que nos
acompañan.
En la lengua indígena bribri la palabra Duwàlök designa al rey de los animales. Es el
personaje que cuida a todos y cada uno de los animales de su cosmovisión, personajes
que a la vez son sagrados y portadores de diferentes habilidades o poderes, como el
venado, quetzal, tepezcuintle, saíno, chancho de monte, culebra, águila, ratón, lagarto,
danta, entre otros. Además es el personaje que resguarda todas las semillas de las plantas.
Cuando un cazador busca alimentos para llevar a su casa, le piden, en primera instancia,
permiso a Duwàlök para poderlos cazar. Incluso si este rey se les aparecía y les preguntaba
a los cazadores acerca de lo que buscaban, él les conseguía porciones abundantes que
requerían para poder volver y alimentar con tranquilidad a sus familias. También disponía
de sirvientes que le ayudaban a los cazadores a suplir sus necesidades.
319
Con su bastón de mando y desde su hamaca, este chamán o rey castigaba también a las
personas que herían a otros animales y los dejaban huir, junto con sus criados curaba los
animalitos y los regresaba al bosque. Algunos cazadores llegaron a sus aposentos, guiados
por sus sirvientes y el Rey les regañaba cuando dejaban presas heridas; les enseñó
igualmente cómo debían cazar y sólo capturar lo necesario. Los preparó en el oficio de
sukia y al tiempo los dejaba regresar a sus hogares. Los que desobedecían sus órdenes
morían en pocas horas y los que no, se convertían en grandes chamanes o doctores.
En la cosmovisión bribri también se encuentra el Dueño del Monte, es el que gobierna
todas las montañas, ríos, árboles, en fin, la casa de los animales. Parte de estas historias
fueron contadas por el indígena Rosendo Jackson del clan SweköLwak y Rito Steward,
ambos indígenas de Talamanca.
El concepto filosófico del indígena bribri, sintetizado en este mito, nos obliga a
preguntarnos ¿si estamos tomando lo necesario de nuestro recursos naturales o
humanos? ¿tan solo lo que necesitamos? Nos obliga a revisar tendencias globales sobre la
explotación acelerada y consumista que estamos provocando ¿Cuántos animales o
víctimas heridas dejamos a nuestro alrededor y luego las sanamos? ¿Pedimos permiso tan
solo para tomar lo que nos corresponde y dejarle su parte a los demás?
Bienvenidos a la Reserva Biológica Alberto Manuel Brenes (que visitarán al final de la
tarde), y que está a punto de extenderse de 7800 hectáreas a más de ocho mil hectáreas,
la cual está custodiada por el SINAC y la Universidad de Costa Rica, y que este año celebra
39 años de su fundación, primero como Reserva Forestal y luego como Zona Protectora.
La Sede de Occidente, junto con diversos institutos, centros y universidades, públicos y
privados, nacionales e internacionales, ha producido abundantes investigaciones y ha
pedido permiso al Rey de los animales y al Dueño del Monte para desarrollar actividades
en pro de la conservación, la sostenibilidad y el desarrollo ético, ejemplo de presentes y
futuras generaciones. Esperamos que sus profesores y educadores continúen enseñando a
las nuevas generaciones sobre un desarrollo sostenible, como lo hizo el Rey de los
animales.
Bienvenidos a una tierra de trapiches, ganaderos y agricultores. Pero también bienvenidos
a la tierra de intelectuales, poetas y artistas que pululan por sus calles; bienvenidos a la
tierra que vio nacer la regionalización de la educación superior; bienvenidos a la cuna de
movimientos políticos y hechos que han marcado la soberanía nacional. Bienvenidos a
degustar de la aguadulce y el café, de los gallos, las sopas y casados en Bajo la Paz de San
Ramón.
Les deseamos éxitos en esta continuación del encuentro y la vez tomemos lo necesario y
demos el máximo de nuestros aportes para un mejor equilibrio y sustentabilidad con
nuestra naturaleza, nuestro planeta y los que nos rodean.
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