Volume 1 - Cheviot Futures

Cheviots Flood Impact Study
Dr Elizabeth Oughton
Dr David Passmore
Mr Luke Dilley
April 2009
Acknowledgements
This research has been commissioned by Cheviot Futures. It has been funded by
Northumberland National Park Authority, Scottish Borders Council, Northumberland
Strategic Partnership, Environment Agency, Natural England and North East Climate Change
Partnership. We wish to thank the members of Cheviot Futures and all of the people of
Northumberland and the Scottish Borders who took part in the interviews and told us about
their experiences of the floods of September 2008.
The responsibility for the contents of the report lies solely with the authors and does not
reflect the views of the funding agencies or Cheviot Futures.
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Volume 1
Overview
Introduction
Project aims
Methodology
Background to the Till catchment and the river environment
Physical impact and personal experience of the floods
Overview of the September flood geomorphology
Flood limits
Flood bank failure
Bank erosion and infrastructure damage
Changes of channel course
The September 2008 flood in context
Documented flood histories in the Breamish/Till
Geomorphological evidence for extreme flooding in the
British uplands
Summary
Personal stories, the week-end of September 4th-6th.
Economic effects of flooding
Farm and land based businesses
Non-farm businesses and private homes
The role of insurance
Social and community wellbeing: the effects of flooding
Analysis and lessons to be learned
Before the floods
During the floods and the immediate aftermath
Longer term effects and implications for management
Specific management issues
Relocation of key infrastructure
Reinstating floodplain and channel banks/current zones of
bank erosion
Permitting/enhancing overbank flood flows
Flood debris and channel maintenance
Implications for NSP Climate Change Strategy
Bibliography and sources consulted
Appendices
Appendix 1 Interview schedule
Appendix 2 Estimates of economic impact on farming and land based
industries
Volume 2 Technical Appendices (bound separately)
Flood geomorphology of the study reaches
Management options
Suggested river management techniques
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Figures
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Map of the River Till showing relief and location of sites
River Breamish at Ingram Mill, looking downstream
River Breamish between Beanley and Powburn
Active channel and bar morphology for River Breamish at Brandon derived
from historic and modern map records
Active channel and bar morphology for River Glen at Kirknewton derived
from historic and modern map records
Aerial photograph image of the Ingram-Ingram Mill reach (Breamish valley)
River Till at the confluence with Wooler Water
River Till at Thirlings (Milfield Basin)
Active channel at Weetwood shown on historic maps
LiDAR- derived transect (A-B) of the valley floor at Kirknewton showing EA
surveyed flood wrack marks.
September 2008 flood waters in the Milfield Basin (lower reaches of the
River Glen near Bridge End)
September 2008 flood waters in the River Glen valley at Glen Cottages
Kirknewton
Floodplain plantation at Thirlings (Milfield Basin) showing local flood
depths (wrack mark)
LiDAR-derived transect A-B of the valley floor of the River Till near
Woodbridge
Flood plain plantation at Thirlings (Milfield Basin) showing local flood
depths (wrack mark)
LiDAR-derived transects of the valley flor of the River Breamish near
Brandon
Flooding at Ingram Mill looking downstream
Flood scour and gravel deposition associated with overspill of the River
Glen near Kiknewton
View of floodbank breach and adjacent pre-1866 palaeochannel at
Woodbridge-Thirlings
Floodbank breach on meander bend downstream of Weetwood Bridge
Floodbank breach and associated scouring downstream of Weetwood
Bridge (River Till)
Site of floodbank breach, scouring and gravel deposition near Kirknewton
(River Glen)
Major bank erosion north bank of the Breamish downstream of Brandon
ford
Erosion of Brandon-Ingram road upstream of Brandon footbridge
Erosion of southern bridge abutment Ingram
Major bank erosion and destruction of southern footbridge span at
Brandon
Bank erosion threatening electricity pylon on south bank of Breamish at
Brandon ford
Floodbank breach and changed course of the River Glen at Kirknewton
River Breamish at Ingram-Ingram Mill showing flood limits, principal
overspill routeways, reinstated channel and bund
Bund established at Ingram visitor centre after the flood
Redesigned bund established in December 2008
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Cheviots Flood Impact Study
Overview
Introduction (section 1)
This project has been commissioned in response to the rapid and severe flooding in the
Cheviots over the weekend of September 6-7th 2008. It is focussed on the Breamish and Till
catchments in England and Bowmont Water in Scotland.
Study Aims (section 2)
The study aims to capture the impact of the floods on the local population and to provide a
record of the events. It examines:
 the physical impacts and extent of the flooding in the Till catchment
 the personal experiences and impressions of those caught up in the floods
 the socio-economic impacts on individuals and their livelihoods.
 provides a preliminary estimate of the economic impact of the flooding on the rural
community.
The study further aims to assess the existing mechanisms in place to deal with flood events,
to make recommendations for their improvement and to determine the ways in which
communities can adapt to the increasing threat of floods brought about by climate change.
The report has focused on the physical river channel movements in the Breamish and
presents recommendations for sustainable management.
The methodology and background to the Till catchment and the river environment are
provided in the full report (sections 3 and 4).
Physical impact of the floods (section 5)
The severity and extent of the September 2008 flooding reflects a combination of factors
including:
 the unusually high magnitude of the event, most likely equivalent to, or in excess of
the previously largest recorded event in 1948
 localised floodbank failure in the Till and Glen
 the floodplains in the Breamish and Till valleys are only 2-3m above the riverbed
and in the case of the Glen at Kirknewton, the surrounding land is lower than the
river bed.
Only in the Breamish valley between Ingram Mill and the A697 were floodwaters largely
confined to a relatively narrow floodplain corridor. In part this reflects the post-war history
of gravel extraction at Brandon Quarry. Several localities in the Breamish study reach
witnessed marked bank erosion (locally in the order of 20-30m):
 leading to local undermining of the Brandon-Ingram road
 damage to the southern bridge abutment at Ingram
 and failure of the southern footbridge abutment at Brandon.
i
Bank erosion in the study sites at Kirknewton, Weetwood and Thirlings appears to have been
highly localised and less severe. The rivers flooded and caused damage to farmland( fences,
crops, walls and deposition of sand, gravel and boulders). Overbank (where water
overtopped floodbanks) flows were characteristic of all the study sites and were associated
with near-flooding of property, destruction of fencing, localised flood scouring and
associated deposition of stone. In the Glen at Kirknewton, the river made a new channel
across the southern part of the valley floor. In the absence of remedial engineering this
would most likely have become the new course of the river.
It is important to emphasise, however, that the September event – while clearly of major
significance to those living and working in the valley – is by no means unusual when viewed
in the context of the longer-term development of the Breamish and Till valleys. Over the last
10,000 years, the rivers have moved over their floodplains and will still change in big floods,
especially the fast-flowing Breamish and Bowmont. The floodbanks have held in the rivers
and reduced their natural movement but are not high enough to hold back large flood
events, and they are in poor repair.
In the main report (volume 1) and Technical Appendices A-C (volume 2) we describe current
erosion management techniques and make recommendations for further work.
Flooding in rural areas
Rural communities are particularly vulnerable to flooding. As well as agriculture, rural areas
contain many small businesses and sole traders. Summer flooding is particularly damaging
when it affects standing crops, grazing animals, tourism and recreational businesses.
However, relatively low population density may mean that protection of rural areas is not
cost efficient. The report examines the particular aspects of rural vulnerability. Some
assessment of the scale and complexity of economic damages is presented. Many of these
are knock-on effects: for example, damage to equipment means impacts on crop plans for
the following year, there will be different impacts on tenants and land owners, and
insurance difficulties may arise in the future .
Personal experiences of the floods: on the day and the immediate aftermath (section 6)
The size and speed of the flood took the participants by surprise. No-one in the study had
registered for flood warnings (which are only currently available in a few areas such as
Wooler) although farmers and long term residents were aware of local signs. For most
people the severity of the floods became clear first when they awoke on the Saturday
morning. Several respondents commented that it was the noise of the water that woke
them. Farmers moved animals and machinery to safety where they could, but on Milfield
Plain, large numbers of animals on rented grazing land were lost. The severity of the
flooding meant that even animals that had been moved to higher ground were still affected
in some locations.
Infrastructure failed, bridges collapsed or became unsafe in some areas and in places roads
became impassable, for example around Chatton. Some households on the Glen and the
Breamish lost water and electricity services, as well as telephone lines. On parts of
Bowmont water and the River Glen there is no mobile phone coverage and householders
were left isolated. Local people helped holiday makers from cottages in the flood area to
leave but there was also a problem for some local residents who could not return to their
homes after work on Saturday. Some private householders moved out of the area when they
could, others, unable to leave, were only able to move personal valuables out of the reach of
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the floods. Similarly businesses moved stock and equipment where they were able and
sandbagged doors.
The floods occurred at the end of the holiday season and although there were some resident
visitors the timing and wet weather meant that there was low occupancy at caravan sites
and no recorded cancellation of business for hostels, camping or bunk houses. Holiday
makers in cottages were evacuated by foot in several places and returned for their cars later
in the week. Visitors and newcomers to the area had little idea of what they should do in this
emergency, nor who they should contact for advice.
Immediate help on the day was provided by neighbours, both in the form of advice and of a
more practical nature, for example use of bathrooms, or transport in four wheel drive
vehicles or tractors. Emergency powers were used by the Scottish Borders Council and by
the Highways Agency in England to restore infrastructure. Requests to Scottish Environment
Protection Agency (SEPA) and the Environment Agency (EA) on the week-end of the floods
did not help respondents and it was commented that EA was out of touch with what was
happening in the rural areas that week-end. There appeared to be no attempt by the
Environment Agency to provide information or advice during or immediately after the
floods. There also appeared to be no coordinated effort by ‘response partners’ to respond
to the floods in this area.
Economic Effects of the Flooding (section 7)
For farm and estate businesses: the economic effects of the floods can be defined in terms
of direct economic losses and those which are indirect and have longer term implications for
the management of the land.
Direct losses were incurred through the destruction of standing crops, harvested fodder and
loss of animals. On the Milfield Plain 800 sheep were drowned in addition to significant
numbers of cattle. Financial support for disposal of sheep carcases was made available from
ONE North East. Fencing was removed by the floods in many areas and good quality land
covered with debris and gravels. In England immediate financial help for replacement
fencing was made available through a grant of up to £2000 per farm business from the
Regional Development Agency ONE North East (ONE NE). In addition to fences, private roads
and bridges were destroyed or made unsafe and will require major expenditure to repair.
Fencing needed to be replaced quickly, in many cases requiring additional contractor costs
to the land manager. Repairs to farm machinery and equipment damaged in the floods incur
costs for repairs by specialist dealers. There are also severe (and largely uninsured) medium
term impacts from damaged machinery.
On the shooting estates and upland areas birds were lost in the floods and access limited by
infrastructure collapse leading to loss of income from shooting. In one example this
amounted to over £220,000 refunded for loss of shoots over five weeks, and there are
associated costs to the local community through loss of employment on these parties.
Estimates of direct costs as calculated in Appendix 2 to the report suggest losses of £2- 3
million to farming and shooting businesses.
The indirect costs and longer term implications have yet to be calculated in detail although
there are clear indications that these will be significant. The poor weather conditions
throughout the summer had already delayed the harvest and contributed to poor quality
grain. The floods exacerbated quality problems and contributed to very high drying costs.
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Fodder and feed prices will be forced up by the floods and reduce profits for livestock
farmers in the area. In addition grazing areas have been reduced in many cases and the
quality of grazing significantly affected by scouring and stone rubble left on fields.
The floods have longer term management implications for the land. Farmers reported that
they will need to re-plan to account for lost land resources and to consider alternatives.
Planting schedules need to be reorganised, there will be requirements for increased labour
use, re-planning of labour across the farm and contract hire. In some cases in the English
areas the Higher Level Stewardship scheme has been opened for land lost to flooding.
Decisions about uptake will depend on preparation and study of the alternatives and the
time frames involved. Both land owners and tenants commented that tenancy agreements
will need to be renegotiated in the light of the floods and longer term uses of land reassessed. Part of the management costs arise through the nuisance caused for example by
applying for grants and making insurance claims.
One of the direct costs arising from the flooding to tourist businesses is associated with loss
of income from rental and refunds for abandoned holiday rentals. Bad weather throughout
the summer had meant that income from tourism overnight businesses was already low.
The timing of the floods at the end of the season meant that there were no cancellations of
bookings. Caravan sites reported that many people had packed up and insurance has
covered losses of property. Visitor centres and attractions and local cafes did suffer, with
one visitor centre suffering extensive damage from flood water run-off. One food business
reported that they had benefited because people had to shop locally as they could not easily
leave the area. There was a major problem for small holders who suffered the same
problems as the larger farmers: loss of grazing, high feed and food prices, interruptions to
the farming cycle and so on but had far fewer resources to help them cope. Small holdings
are frequently associated with retirement or semi-retired households and loss of income for
these households is particularly significant.
The role of insurance
Three issues emerged over insurance and flooding:
 many of the losses on farms were not covered by insurance
 the difficulty of claiming
 concerns about obtaining insurance and level of future premiums.
Many farmers had uninsured losses; fences, walls, livestock and standing crops are not
regarded as insurable. There were however a number of problems that arose around
insurance claims on tenant farms. In most tenancy agreements it is the farmer that takes out
insurance. The landlord may insure buildings but not contents and this had led to conflicts in
some cases, even litigation. Slow response of the insurers caused great anxiety for some
farms and related businesses. For non-farm businesses there were fewer complaints about
the insurance companies. A significant problem arising from insurance companies’ policies is
the replacement of like for like. If homes and businesses are to become more flood resilient
then they must be able to replace with more appropriate materials and design.
Non agricultural businesses and private households were less affected financially in that they
had higher levels of insurance but they will be faced with higher premiums in the future and
may not be able to obtain flood insurance at all. This has particularly serious implications for
small, rural businesses. Associated with this is the question of planning permission and
building in flood risk areas. In Scotland development is not allowed in flood risk areas; this is
not yet the case in England. Planning Authorities need to comply with Planning Policy
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Statement 25 which strongly opposes development in the flood plain. The Environment
Agency is a statutory consultee, and when they object there is now a clear requirement to
heed their concerns and an opportunity for the Minister to intervene. However, the value of
this strategy depends upon how flood risk is assessed, for example, surface water is not
covered by the assessment and yet in the Cheviots, both in Northumberland and the Scottish
Borders there was considerable damage done by run-off rather than by the river.
Several respondents commented that practical advice on flood claims would have been
useful. A major question arises around whether insurers will continue to provide cover to
households in flood areas.
Social and Community Wellbeing (section 8)
We found evidence of emotional and mental trauma caused by the flood and experience
elsewhere suggests that this may last for some time. A number of respondents reported that
they had sought medical help for feelings of stress and depression following the floods. One
of the causes of stress was anxiety over costs of repairs, the value of property and
renegotiation over existing contracts and agreements. In some cases the floods brought
communities together, in others it precipitated conflict and litigation.
There were widespread feelings of being undervalued as a rural and farming community.
People felt a lack of recognition that the land provides a livelihood and is a significant
contributor to the national economy. It was widely and strongly perceived that fish and the
natural environment took priority over people. It was also widely commented that the
response to the floods was concentrated on larger towns to the south, with very little
activity in the Till catchment.
Key findings (section 9)
The data revealed issues around vulnerability and risk, communication and the governance
and management of the rivers. Specific recommendations with respect to the period
immediately before the floods, during and immediately after the floods and in the months
following are discussed.
Community vulnerability depends upon the degree of risk to a hazard and the ability of that
community to cope with its effect. In addition to the natural hazards presented by flooding
and the socio-demographic factors influencing vulnerability. These further characteristics
that significantly affect vulnerability to floods in the Cheviots are tenancy and length of
residence in the area. Responses from some of the interviewees show that people were not
aware of the full implications of flooding for home, life and livelihood. Many people had
difficulty in understanding the ways in which risk is expressed taking 1/100 to mean that a
flood of this magnitude would not happen again for a hundred years.
To be effective flood warnings need to be disseminated quickly to those under threat.
However, there was no systematic dissemination activity to vulnerable individuals or
households in the Cheviots (flood warnings are currently unavailable to much of the Till
catchment). People need to be aware of the appropriate action to take in the event of a
flood warning or flood and there was a major difference between farmers, longer
established residents and businesses and others. However, we did not hear of any human
casualties: people were moved to safety from holiday cottages and caravans although
sometimes in dangerous circumstances. If the flooding had happened at night there would
have been a high risk to people attempting to escape or travel on remote roads.
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Resilience building and coping strategies need to take account of the low density and widely
dispersed population in rural areas. For example communities may be dependent on only
one road for access or have very limited mobile phone contact. Resilience building at the
community level may help in overcoming these limitations. For example, holding stores
securely in the village hall was proposed in one place. Several people noted that they
intended to improve the flood resilience of their homes through major structural work but
did not know what might be permitted by the environmental agencies. The resilience of
rural communities is the focus of the recently established Northumberland Flood Group, and
so improvements in this field can be expected.
Home based businesses are more common in rural areas and flooding may mean immediate
and direct loss of livelihood and the loss of productive assets for the future. There is a
pressure to insure small businesses but when these businesses lie in flood risk areas it may
become very expensive or even impossible to get insurance. We found evidence of
businesses planning to re-build or reorganise to better cope with flooding in the future but
the costs of these activities need to be weighed against insurance requirements and the
costs of flooding.
There were some complaints of poor communication during the flooding, people didn’t
know who to contact. There are cases where people were passed from one agency to
another or were given inaccurate information. In particular the EA and SEPA were
mentioned as being unhelpful. We did receive reports of good practice in Scotland where
the Borders Council provided a single point information service which people could contact
and which made available regular postings of updates. The service continued to November
and was praised as people felt that they had not been forgotten after the immediate
emergency. In both England and Scotland councils and emergency services acted promptly
and appropriately. The rapid response of ONE NE and Business Link with grants for fencing
and help with the disposal of dead stock was highly praised and a similar scheme would have
been welcomed in the Scottish Borders.
Problems of communication within and between agencies continued in the longer term.
Respondents frequently asked us where does authority lie in this situation and who has
priority? It was suggested to us that there was in-fighting between agencies. Two issues
arose from this uncertainty about the agencies involved: fear of sanctions through
inadvertent action; and a lack of confidence in the agencies which made people feel insecure
about their abilities. Several people commented that they found the EA heavy handed,
exhibited no sense of urgency and were not present on the ground so did not understand
what was happening. Despite all the negative comments it was generally recognised that the
environmental agencies have a very difficult job to do.
There is evidence of a democratic deficit and a clear need for much closer and earlier
engagement with local communities to guarantee that they are integrated into the planning,
implementation and monitoring of management alternatives for rivers and their immediate
surroundings.
River management
Detailed and specific plans for the Till catchment are discussed in the second volume of the
report the Technical Appendices A-C and are summarised in volume 1. These can be briefly
summarised under four headings: relocation of key infrastructure; reinstated floodplain and
channel banks in current zones of bank erosion; permitting or enhancing overbank flood
flows; and flood debris and channel maintenance. The appendices present the technical
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alternatives available for managing floods and building resilience, they do not take into
account the financial or institutional limitations that may apply.
Recommendations to Cheviot Futures (section 10)
A number of recommendations are made with respect to contributing to better planning for
floods and resilience building in the Cheviots:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
It is important to identify the most vulnerable members of the community taking
into account socio-demographic factors, temporary residence during holiday periods
as well as proximity to the river.
Local knowledge should be incorporated into systems of flood risk awareness and
‘on the ground knowledge’ be integrated into the system to complement top down
information. It is false to distinguish between expert and lay knowledge especially
since many of the local residents can draw on long and intimate acquaintance with
the local environment
It is incumbent on the EA to take an active role in dissemination. There is a need to
focus on ensuring that flood warnings are fast and reliable. This may mean using
very local networks of communication or developing novel techniques of
communication, for example, Bluetooth, texting and or email. The delivery and
dissemination of warnings needs to be locally very specific. The EA website indicates
for limited areas in the Till catchment that this type of service is available but it
wasn’t used and further research is needed to find out why.
There is a need to establish a clear plan that people are familiar with prior to the
flood telling them how to respond when they do receive a flood warning, for
example, where to go, who to contact, an emergency email or phone number, what
to take with them if they leave etc. Again, the EA provides information of this type
on its website but it is not taken up at the local level. Why? The paper version of the
Gloucestershire County Council Your Essential Flood Guide is a useful example.
People in the Ingram area need to be involved in the development of a management
plan and its implementation on the Breamish. The model offered by the ‘Making
Space for People’ project could be used.
The various organisations
(Northumberland County Council, Environment Agency, Natural England, National
Park) need to agree appropriate and sustainable river erosion management
techniques for different circumstances together with the local community.
The agencies involved in the protection and management of rural areas need to
have established a coordinated and transparent structure of flood management, in
particular it is important to identify clearly the lead agency.
This management structure and associated processes need to be clearly
communicated to the public with responses for requests for information channelled
through a single contact point.
There needs to be an obvious presence on the ground during the floods and in the
immediate aftermath to encourage confidence and trust.
Help lines must be accurate and reliable otherwise they can do more harm than
good.
In general it is important to ensure much closer earlier working relationships with
the local community to guarantee that they are integrated into the planning,
implementation and monitoring of land and river management.
There is, in general, a need to develop appropriate and more transparent structures
of governance for the planning, implementation and monitoring of management
alternatives.
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12.
13.
The goal of achieving sustainable and long-term management of the Breamish / Till
needs to take into consideration the likelihood of large-scale flooding and shifting of
their channels. Current climate change forecasts for the region suggest that an
approach that sets out to accommodate high-magnitude flooding is more in tune
with the Cheviot Futures vision. There is a need to adapt to and manage the impacts
as opposed to trying to prevent them.
While the scale and character of management options set out here will require due
consultation and costing, the Cheviot Futures initiative offers the opportunity to
ensure that any future works (including mitigation measures) are informed by
sustainable and sympathetic management and engineering practices.
viii
1. Introduction
On the 5th – 6th September 2008 Northumberland experienced an intense and prolonged
period of heavy rainfall associated with a slow-moving low pressure weather system that
tracked north-east across the UK. At Chillingham Barns weather station in the Till valley near
Chillingham, rainfall for the period 4-6th September totalled 158.3 mm, equivalent to 290%
of the September average for this location and has been provisionally estimated as
equivalent to a 1-in-200 year event
(http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/climate/uk/interesting/sep2008). This event followed several
weeks of above-average rainfall and resulted in rapid and exceptionally severe flooding in
east-flowing rivers draining the Cheviots; flooding in the Wansbeck and Coquet stands as the
largest on record, while inundation of extensive areas of the alluvial valley floor throughout
the Breamish / Till catchment was associated with localised flood bank breaching and
associated scour, bank erosion, damage to roads and bridges and severe disruption of
agricultural activities.
2. Project aims
This report has been commissioned by the North East Assembly in response to the severe
flooding on the week-end of 6th -7th. September 2008. The aim of the study is to (i) capture
the true impact of the floods on the local rural economy: on farmers, small business and the
lives of the small communities in this part of rural Northumberland and (ii) to learn from
these impacts so that the communities can adapt to the increasing threat of floods and to
identify opportunities presented by the changing climate. Initially planned for the English
part of the catchment the socio-economic aspect of the study was extended to include
Bowmont Water in Scotland.
A significant feature of the study was that it be carried out quickly in order to capture the
immediate feelings and thoughts of those affected by the flooding. The research activities
required by the brief are:
1. “Provide a record of the event and its associated impacts, capturing
photos, video and other media where possible.
2. Assemble local perspectives / case studies via interviews with both
people affected and responders
3. Map the extent of flooding experienced
4. Identify the physical impacts to the catchment via analysis of aerial
photography both before and after the event (data available from
NEA)
5. Collect and analyze information relating to the aftermath of the event
and recovery activity
6. Identify, where possible, the insured and uninsured losses incurred by
the rural economy in the affected area
7. Assess the mechanisms currently in place to deal with such events and
make recommendations in regard to gaps in provision and measures /
activities required to improve resilience
8. Assess recommendations in relation to the activities identified within
the Climate Proofing the Cheviot’s draft report
9. Gather local views, frustrations and aspirations that will help shape
what the wider project will physically deliver (and methods it will
avoid) and identify what, in the view of local people, will make the
1
wider Cheviots project truly successful. This will require extensive
consultation with affected farmers, land managers, relevant
businesses and communities.”
The project brief required that particular attention be paid to points 8 and 9 above, with this
in mind and in order to capture the local voices we have used quotations taken directly
from the interviews throughout the report
3. Methodology
The methodology has been chosen to bring together data on the physical, social and
economic effects of the floods.
The geomorphological context and impact of the September flood was assessed by a deskbased analysis supplemented by field visits to 4 case study reaches where flood impacts
were known to have been particularly marked (Fig. 1):
1. The Breamish valley between Bulby’s Wood (Ingram Farm) and the A697 crossing at
Powburn;
2. The Till valley at Weetwood
3. The Till valley between Thirlings and Woodbridge
4. The Glen valley at Kirknewton
Desk-based assessment was facilitated by development of a project GIS (ArcGIS) framework
that integrated a number of existing and newly-derived datasets:

LiDAR data flown by the Environment Agency in 2003 (Passmore and Waddington, in
press); this gave data points with 2m horizontal spacing and a vertical resolution of
±0.2m. These data were then rendered as digital elevation models (DEMs) in the GIS and
used as the basis for analysis of floodplain / terrace topography and geomorphology
(note that the LiDAR data is unfiltered and hence all topographic maps and transects
developed below include vegetation, buildings and infrastructure);

EA spot survey of September flood wrack marks;

Historic maps (Ordnance Survey County Series at scales of 1:10,560 and 1:10,000) and
modern Ordnance Survey map coverages;

Aerial photograph imagery derived from web-based sources (images captured and
georeferenced in ArcGIS).
Information on the recent historic and longer-term (Holocene) development of the alluvial
valley floor was also informed by published studies by Tipping (1994; 1998), Sear and Archer
(1988), Passmore et al (2002) and Passmore and Waddington (in press).
The socio-economic aspects of the flood were investigated through the secondary analysis
of the media, visit and meeting reports and letters. Primary data were collected through
face to face and telephone interviews with individuals affected by the floods.
2
Berwick upon Tweed
R. Twee
d
NORTH
SEA
Coldstream
Etal
Milfield
Bow
mon
t Wa
ter
S
E AN
S
C D
A ST
R
P O
M N
E E
N
T
Thirlings
study reach
Kirknewton
study reach
R. T
ill
Weetwood
R. Glen
g e Bu
rn
Kirknewton
Weetwood
study reach
R. T
ill
Colle
r
r Wate
Woole
Wooler
Bewick Bridge
Sourhope
C HEVIOT HILLS
Ingram - Powburn
study reach
Study area
Swindon Hill
R. Breamish
Powburn
Ingram
N
- Land over 100m
- Land over 200m
0
5
Figure 1: Map of the River Till showing relief and location of sites mentioned in text
10 km
Initially it was proposed to use focus groups as the most efficient way of eliciting this quality
of information within the proposed time frame. The Cheviot Futures team advised against
focus groups as a number had been carried out after the floods and it was felt that there
was a danger of ‘focus group fatigue’. We therefore replaced focus groups with semistructured interviews. This had the disadvantage of limiting the number of people that we
could talk to but did provide rich material and insights into the experience of the floods.
Maps, photographs and other physical artefacts were used to embed discussion around
personal experience. Contacts were selected initially from lists provided by the Cheviot
Futures team. These were comprised mainly of landowners and farmers and the initial
contacts were then used to identify other people who had been affected including other
small businesses and non-business households. In Scotland contact addresses were provided
by SEPA.
The interview schedule was designed to take a narrative approach asking people to talk
through the flood events and the period immediately following. Where necessary the
respondent is prompted by specific questions. The interviewer reframes the schedule
according to the particular circumstances of the person being interviewed. The interview
schedule is attached in Appendix 1
32 interviews were carried out:
3 land agents
13 farmers (2 with associated non-farm businesses)
6 individuals with institutional/political interests
5 non-business/part time households
5 non-farm businesses
1 journalist
The interviews were located around the four geomorphological study sites, Wooler and
Bowmont Water in Scotland. The respondents were guaranteed anonymity and all but ten of
the interviews were recorded, the remaining individuals preferring not to be recorded but
agreeing to notes being written of the meeting.
In addition to written materials photographs and video records have been analysed and used
to initiate discussion around the floods.
4. Background to the Till catchment and the river environment
The River Till is the second largest tributary of the Tweed with a catchment area of 650km2
and joins the Tweed at Tweedmill, 4km downstream of Coldstream and 20km above the
mouth of the river at Berwick (Fig. 1). Upper reaches of the Till (called the Breamish above
Bewick Bridge, Fig. 1) drain the rounded upland domes of the southern and southeast
Cheviot Hills which reach a maximum elevation of 815m. Towards the margins of the upland
massif the Breamish occupies a narrow and steep-sided valley with comparatively little
floodplain expanse, but at Ingram it emerges into a relatively wide valley floor that is flanked
by terraced deposits of glacial drift. Between Powburn and Hedgeley, 3 – 5km downvalley of
Ingram, the river channel, floodplain and adjacent sand and gravel terraces have been
extensively modified by modern aggregate extraction that continues to the present day.
Downstream of the quarry workings, the Breamish/Till meanders north and then east
through an alluvial valley floor up to 1km in width that is flanked by gently undulating glacial
4
and glaciofluvial drift and, to the east, the slopes of a Fell Sandstone escarpment that rise
steeply to 315m OD (Fig. 1).The River Till leaves its confined valley floor at Weetwood and
enters the low-relief (below 70m OD) Milfield Basin, the largest alluvial basin (c.15km2) in
North-East England (Fig. 1) and formerly the site of a large pro-glacial lake that developed
during de-glaciation of the region between c.15-13,000 years ago. Here the Till meanders
gently within prominent flood embankments across a broad expanse of alluvium between 34
– 36m OD (Fig. 1). In the central part of the basin the Till is joined by the tributary rivers Glen
and Wooler Water which drain the northern flanks of the Cheviot Hills. Below the confluence
with the Glen, and downvalley to Etal (Fig. 1), the Till becomes again confined to a valley
floor up to 1km wide that lies between upstanding Late Devensian terraces. Lower reaches
of the Till, between Etal and Tweedmill, occupy a deeply entrenched bedrock gorge with
little or no floodplain expanse.
River channel and floodplain environments in the Breamish / Till may be broadly classified
into two river types;
(i) ‘wandering’ gravel bed rivers – including the stretches of the Breamish (between Ingram
and Powburn) and the Glen (between Lanton and Kirknewton) (Fig. 1). These river settings
are located at the transition between steep, relatively confined upland valleys and the wider,
lower gradient valleys of the river’s middle courses. Here the rivers are flowing through
valley floors that are filled with extensive deposits of sand and gravel that were emplaced by
meltwater rivers during the end of the last glacial period (between 15-10,000 years ago).
Modern channels are relatively wide and shallow and frequently feature large gravel bars;
these bars may be associated with locally divided channel reaches and are frequently the
site of bank erosion (Figs. 2 and 3). Eroding channel banks reveal floodplain sediments to be
dominated by unconsolidated sands and gravels with a thin capping of sand and silt.
These types of river environment in the UK are typically associated with relatively high rates
of channel migration across the floodplain and switching between single and multiple
channel states, and are also apt to locally raise and lower their bed levels in response to the
movement of gravelly bedloads. Historic maps show that lateral shifts in the river course and
associated changes in gravel bar configurations have occurred in many parts of these
reaches over the period between c.1866 and the present day, with particularly marked
changes evident in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century (e.g. Figs. 4 and 5); in the
Breamish valley near Brandon, for example, nearly all the valley floor between the present
road and the southern valley side has been reworked or become vegetated since 1866 (Fig.
4). Furthermore, channel-like depressions on floodplain surfaces and cropmark images
visible on aerial photographs indicate that these valleys have experienced episodic shifts in
river channel course over much of the valley floor during the past 10,000 years (e.g. Fig. 6 see Appendix A for further details).
(ii) meandering rivers with fine gravel and sandy beds – characteristic of the River Till
between Bewick Bridge and Etal, and including the reaches at Weetwood and ThirlingsWoodbridge. These river settings have relatively low gradients and follow meandering,
single-channel courses that are typically confined by flood embankments constructed during
and after the mid-19th century (Fig. 7). Present channel banks are generally stable and
vegetated, but localised bank erosion (typically on the outside of meander bends) or
slumping reveals floodplain sediments to generally comprise 1-2m of sand, silt and clay
alluvium (Fig. 8). Recent historic changes in meandering channel courses are also evident on
historic maps but are generally restricted to localised meander migration (e.g. Fig. 9) or
meander cut-off. Over longer (post-glacial) timescales, however, meandering channel-like
5
Figure 2: River Breamish at Ingram Mill, looking downstream
Figure 3: River Breamish between Beanley and Powburn
1866
1899
1926
1957
Brandon
1979
modern (OS)
footbridge /
ford
200
100
0
200 Meters
±
Active gravel bars
Vegetated bars
gravel
workings
Figure 4: Active channel and bar morphology for River Breamish at Brandon derived from historic map records
(Ordnance Survey County Series) and modern Ordnance Survey data
Active gravel bars
Vegetated bars
1866
1899
1926
weir / gauging station
±
1957
modern (OS)
300
150
0
300 Meters
Figure 5: Active channel and bar morphology for River Glen at Kirknewton derived from historic map records
(Ordnance Survey County Series) and modern Ordnance Survey data
Figure 6: Aerial photograph image of the Ingram - Ingram Mill reach (Breamish valley) - note cropmark evidence of
palaeochannels to north of the river (image source: Google Earth / Multimap)
Figure7: River Till at the confluence with the Wooler Water(entering left)
Figure 8: River Till at Thirlings (Milfield Basin)
depressions and cropmark images on floodplain surfaces testify to occasional shifts in
channel course over extensive areas of the valley floor (Fig. 7 – see Appendix A for further
details).
Flooding in rural areas
Northumberland contains some of the areas of lowest population density in England. North
Northumberland is defined as ‘sparse rural’ and Wooler as ‘sparse town and fringe’. These
districts have at least 80% of the population in rural settlements and the main employment
in the area is in primary industries, wholesale and retail businesses and tourism. Several
studies have investigated the particular significance of floods to rural areas these have
included: Morris and Hess (2007) Posthumus and Morris (2007) Posthumus et al (2008) Pivot
et al (2002). Morris and Hess’ submission to the Pitt report outlines the characteristics of
rural communities that make them particularly vulnerable to flooding, these are:



rural communities are very diverse and apart from agriculture there may be many
sole traders and small firms
summer flooding causes much greater damage to crops, grazing livestock, tourism
and recreational activities
there are significant potential long term effects to rural communities, although
agriculture in flood plains may be relatively well adapted to exposure to flood risk, in
the future risks may increase because:
o protecting relatively sparsely inhabited rural space is not deemed cost
efficient compared to urban areas
o rural areas are sacrificed to flood storage to protect urban areas
o non agricultural activities in flood plains may be less resistant to flood risk
The role of rural land management has potential to affect flood generation through land use
and changes can reduce the speed of flow and serve for the storage of water. However this
raises questions as the extent to which multiple objectives of rural land management are
compatible? For example, at the present time rising food prices and increasing concern over
food security needs to be weighed against the use of nutrient rich flood plains for nature
conservation. Similarly there are questions about the implications for reward and
compensation for rural businesses and communities apart form farm businesses that may be
affected by flooding.
5. Physical impacts of the floods
The following sections document (i) an overview of the geomorphological impact of the
September 2008 floods in the context of the character of the river valley floor and the
documented history of river behaviour, and (ii) the personal experiences of the event. A
fuller account of the geomorphological assessment is set out in the technical Appendix A.
5.1. Overview of the September 2008 flood geomorphology
The severity and extent of the September 2008 flooding reflects a combination of factors
including (i) the unusually high magnitude of the event, most likely equivalent to, or in
excess of the previously largest recorded event in 1948, (ii) localised floodbank failure in the
Till and Glen and (iii) the low-relief topography of floodplains in the Breamish and Till valleys.
The following sections provide an overview of the September flood geomorphology in the
10
study reaches with a particular focus on flood limits, floodbank failures, bank erosion and
associated damage to infrastructure and changes in channel course.
5.1.1. Flood limits
The low-relief topography of floodplains and adjacent alluvial surfaces in the Breamish and
Till lies typically less than 2-3m above the present channel bed, and in the case of the Glen at
Kirknewton slopes away from the channel to elevations that are locally below the present
river bed (Fig. 10). High-magnitude floods that overtop or breach floodbanks (in combination
with locally-derived runoff from hillslopes and tributary streams) therefore have the capacity
to inundate extensive areas of the valley floor; the September 2008 flood was of sufficient
magnitude to inundate virtually the entire alluvial plain in many parts of the Till, especially in
the Milfield Basin (Fig. 11) and the valley of the River Glen (Fig. 12). In parts of the Milfield
Basin floodwaters locally reached depths of 2.5m across fields flanking the River Till (Figs. 13
and 14). Only in the Breamish valley between Bulby’s Wood and the A697 were floodwaters
largely confined to a relatively narrow floodplain corridor (Fig. 15). In this reach the present
Breamish occupies an active floodplain area that lies inset slightly below the elevation of
adjacent alluvial surfaces, especially downvalley of Ingram Mill (e.g. Fig. 16) where the postwar history of gravel extraction at Brandon Quarry has reduced the elevation of the channel
bed.
In the reaches examined in this study the majority of buildings established on the valley floor
were located on raised terrace surfaces at elevations sufficiently high to escape flooding;
notable exceptions include the low-lying structures at Ingram Mill (although here the
floodwaters fortunately failed to enter the main dwelling; Fig. 17) while houses at Glen
Cottages near Kirknewton narrowly escaped flooding due to a slightly elevated track and
kerb running along the northern side of the buildings (see Fig. 12). The configuration of
overbank flows was strongly influenced by topographic depressions on floodplain and
terrace surfaces that reflect former river channel courses (palaeochannels). These were
most evident during the rising and falling stages of the flood and were the localised focus of
flood scouring (especially where flows encountered obstacles such as fences and hedges)
and deposition of sand and gravel (Fig. 18). The configuration of palaeochannel depressions
also appears to have exerted a strong control over floodbank breaching and switching of
channel courses (see below).
5.1.2. Floodbank failure
Near or complete overtopping of 19th C. and later flood defences was widespread in the Till
catchment during the September 2008 event and in many locations triggered localised
failure and breaching of floodbanks. Floodbank failure was evident at all of the study reaches
and frequently occurred at the apex of abrupt river bends or where embankments crossed
topographic depressions reflecting the course of abandoned former channel courses (Figs.
19 and 20). Breaching on the River Till near Woodbridge (Fig. 19) and Weetwood (Fig. 20 and
21) and on the River Glen at Kirknewton (Fig. 22) was associated with marked scouring of the
floodplain surface at the breach site and redeposition of excavated sediment as extensive
spreads of sand and gravel immediately beyond the breach (Fig. 21 and 22; see also below).
5.1.3. Bank erosion and infrastructure damage
Exposed sand, silt and clay channel banks in the River Till appear to have witnessed only
localised and relatively limited bank erosion during the September 2008; by contrast, several
11
1866
1899
1925
1957
1981-87
present
Weetwood Hall
±
200
100
0
200 Meters
Figure 9: Active channel zone at Weetwood shown on historic maps (Ordnance Survey County Series)
71
70
69
68
67
66
m. OD
65
64
63
62
61
60
59
EA 12125 Floodlevel 361
56.80 m OD
58
floodbank
57
EA 12125 Floodlevel 355
54.18 m OD
track
56
55
54
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
metres
Figure 10: LiDAR-derived transect (A-B) of the valley floor at Kirknewton showing EA surveyed flood wrack marks
(see Appendix A for transect location)
Figure 11: September 2008 floodwaters in the Milfield Basin (lower reaches of the River Glen at
tileworks near Bridge End)
Figure 12: September 2008 floodwaters in the River Glen valley at Glen Cottages, Kirknewton
Wrack mark
Figure 13: Floodplain plantation at Thirlings (Milfield Basin) showing local flood depths (wrack mark)
of the September 2008 event
Thirlings-Woodbridge Transect A-B
A
EA12125FLOOD LEVEL 110
35.95 m OD
36.5
36
35.5
Zone of floodbank
breach / scour
35
m OD
34.5
pre-1866 channel
34
Area of flood sediment deposition
B
33.5
33
32.5
32
31.5
31
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
metres
Figure 14: LiDAR-derived transect A-B of the valley floor of the River Till near Woodbridge showing EA Flood
Level data, location of floodbank breach / scour and approximate extent of sand and gravel deposition
beyond the breach. For transect locations see Appendix A.
Figure 15: Floodplain plantation at Thirlings (Milfield Basin) showing local flood depths (wrack mark)
of the September 2008 event
Brandon Transect C-D
113
112
111
110
m OD
109
108
107
Post-1866 channel
and floodplain
106
105
EA12125 FLOOD LEVEL 294
101.79 m OD
104
Road
103
102
101
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
metres
Figure 16: LiDAR-derived transects of the valley floor of the River Breamish near Brandon showing
post-19th C channel and floodplain extent and EA flood level survey. For transect location see Appendix A.
Figure 17: Flooding at Ingram Mill (looking downstream)
Figure 18: Flood scour and gravel deposition associated with overspill of the River Glen
near Kirknewton
Figure 19: View of floodbank breach and adjacent pre-1866 palaeochannel at Woodbridge-Thirlings
(looking north-east with present channel to left)
Figure 20: Floodbank breach on meander bend downstream of Weetwood Bridge
Figure 21: Floodbank breach and associated scouring downstream of Weetwood Bridge (River Till)
Figure 22: Site of floodbank breach, scouring and gravel deposition near Kirknewton (River Glen)
localities in the Breamish study reach, and to a lesser extent in the Glen at Kirknewton,
experienced marked retreat of their less-cohesive sand and gravel banks. Bank erosion was
particularly widespread in the Breamish (locally exceeding 40-50 m, Fig. 23) and was
associated with undermining of the Brandon-Ingram road (Fig. 24), damage to the southern
bridge abutment at Ingram (Fig. 25) and failure of the southern footbridge abutment at
Brandon (Fig. 26). The most severe bank erosion in the Breamish occurred in a 1 km reach
centred on Brandon footbridge and ford where the present river occupies a confined
floodplain corridor which promotes relatively deep flood flows, and where the channel
banks tend to comprise thick (c.2-3 m) sequences of 19th and 20th C. alluvial sand and gravel
(Figs 23 and 26). Bank retreat in this part of the Breamish poses an ongoing threat not only
to the local road, ford and footbridge infrastructure, but also to the electricity pylon on the
south bank of the river which now lies only 15-20 m from the bank edge (Fig. 27).
5.1.4. Changes of channel course
The geomorphological impact of the September flood was sufficiently great so as to threaten
localised changes in the river course (‘avulsion’) in the Glen at Kirknewton (Fig. 28) and
possibly also the Breamish between Ingram Visitor Centre and Ingram Mill (Fig. 29). Overspill
in the Glen followed a major floodbank breach on the south side of the channel and was
promoted by the decline in floodplain elevations from north to south across the valley floor
(Fig. 10). Flows were focused in depressions on the floodplain surface reflecting former river
courses and re-entered the main channel some 900 m downvalley via a small wood southeast of Lanton (Fig. 28). The channel has since been reinstated in its pre-flood course in
order to enable the continued operation of the gauging station located downstream of the
floodbank breach. In the absence of remedial engineering the overspill routeway would
most likely have been consolidated as the new course of the Glen in this part of the valley. It
should also be noted that the village of Kirknewton has previously experienced major flood
overspill and gravel deposition during the largest of the 1948 events (see Archer, 1992), and
hence this part of the valley has been, and continues to be prone to channel avulsions during
high-magnitude floods.
Overspill of floodwaters in the Breamish valley on the southern side of the river between the
Visitor Centre and Ingram Mill (Fig. 29) may also have promoted a localised change in
channel course and configuration if left unmodified. Overspill at this location was probably
initiated by gravel deposition in the channel bed at the site of the Visitor Centre Car Park,
combined with breaching of the former gorse barrier on the left bank; floodwaters were
then able to traverse the low-lying 19th C and later floodplain deposits between the car park
and Ingram Mill (Fig. 29) before re-entering the main channel immediately downstream of
the Mill. Flood damage here included disrupted fences and bridges across the mill leat while
flood levels were sufficient to surround buildings associated with Ingram Mill (see also above,
Fig. 17). Shortly after the flood a short stretch of main channel immediately downstream of
the overspill site was reinstated in order to facilitate fish passage upstream; this work was
also combined with the formation of a low gravel bund intended to prevent further overspill
across the southern part floodplain towards Ingram Mill (Fig. 30). However, this proved
insufficient to prevent overspill in subsequent high-stage events during September and was
replaced with a redesigned bund in December (Fig. 31).
19
Figure 23: Site of major bank erosion during the September 2008 flood - north bank of the Breamish
downstream of Brandon ford
Figure 24: Erosion of Brandon-Ingram road upstream of Brandon footbridge during the
September 2008 flood
Figure 25: Erosion of southern bridge abutment at Ingram during the September 2008 flood
Figure 26: Site of major bank erosion and destruction of southern footbridge span at Brandon
during the September 2008 flood
Figure 27: Site of bank erosion threatening electricity pylon on south bank of the Breamish at Brandon ford.
Figure 28: Floodbank breach and changed course of the River Glen at Kirknewton (before reinstatement
of channel in pre-event course to left)
revised (Dec) bund
principal overspill routeways
during Sept. 2008 flood
Figure 29: River Breamish at Ingram - Ingram Mill showing flood limits, principal overspill routeways (south side of river), reinstated channel and bund.
Inset photographs show flood at high stage.
bank erosion
modified channel
approx Sept 2008 flood limit
Figure 30: Bund established at Ingram Visitor Centre in September 2008 shortly after the flood
Figure 31: Redesigned bund established in December 2008 (compare with Fig. 30 see also Fig. 29)
5.2. The September 2008 flood in context
5.2.1. Documented flood histories in the Breamish / Till
Settlement on the flood-prone alluvial valley floors of the Till catchment is limited by
comparison with other major Northumbrian rivers and carried only a relatively low profile in
19th C regional newspapers based in Berwick and Newcastle. Consequently, the early written
record of flooding in the catchment is typically derived from accounts of damage to mills,
bridges and agricultural land (Archer, 1992). These records allowed Archer (1992) to compile
evidence for a series of noteworthy events between 1763-1900, the majority of which were
documented during the last three decades of the 19th C. The event of the 2nd July, 1893 was
associated with a cloudburst event over the Cheviots and major flooding of the Breamish at
Ingram which destroyed two bridges (Archer, 1992; Clark, 2005); rainfall totals at Low
Bleakhope (8 km west of Ingram) have been estimated at between 200-229 mm while Clark
(2005) estimates a local rise in the river stage of the Breamish in the order of 4.5 m.
The Till catchment appears to have experienced comparatively few major floods during the
first four decades of the 20th C, but a succession of significant events in 1946, 1947, 1948
(two events) and 1949, now collectively known as the ‘Border Floods’, were amongst the
largest recorded in the region (Archer, 1992). Of particular note was the event of August
12th, 1948, which followed rainfall in the Cheviots in excess of 100 mm; flooding inundated
the Milfield Basin over some 6000 ha with stage levels at or near flood bank height and
forcing several breaches (Archer, 1992). A programme of flood bank improvements on the
Till (including parts of the Breamish) was undertaken between 1950-56 but these were
locally overtopped and breached by an event in August 1956. Subsequently, a cluster of 6
large floods between 1978-86 and a further event in March-April 1992 all inundated large
areas of agricultural land in the Till (Table 1; Archer, 1992).
5.2.2. Geomorphological evidence for extreme flooding in the British uplands
Recent analyses of the river gauging record for UK catchments have indicated that while
flood records for the past 30-50 years have yielded some evidence of an upward trend in the
number of high-flow days and in the 3-day annual flow maxima, there is no statistical
evidence of a longer-term flood trend spanning the past 80-120 years (Robson, 2002).
However, assessment of the longer-term trends in UK flooding – and attempts to predict
future flooding – are severely handicapped by the combination of relatively few gauging
stations in upland settings and their typically short instrumental flow records (Macklin and
Rumsby, 2007). Gauging stations in the Till catchment, for example, are limited to a site at
Kirknewton (River Glen, station 21032) and two sites in the lower reaches of the Till at Etal
(station 21031) and Heaton Mill (station 21806), with records extending back to 1962, 1955
and 2002 respectively. Furthermore, the station at Kirknewton is prone to uncertainties in
recording high flows due to floodwaters bypassing the cableway.
In the face of these limitations in the river gauging records, workers have turned to
geomorphologically-based analyses of high-magnitude flood deposits in an attempt to
extend our knowledge of the timing and character of 19th C and earlier flooding. Here we
note that a recent analysis of deposits in the British uplands by Macklin and Rumsby (2007)
has indicated that the past 200-300 years have witnessed significant changes in the
frequency and magnitude of major floods with a high incidence of such events in the mid18th and early 19th C. By contrast, and contrary to recent flood risk perception in many parts
of the UK, the past 50 years would appear to have seen a relative decrease in the frequency
25
and size of major floods, and these are possibly at their lowest level since the mid-18th C. It is
accepted, however, that it may be too early to determine whether the very recent largescale events are signalling a change in conditions (Macklin and Rumsby, 2007).
5.2.3. Summary
In summary it is important to emphasise that the September 2008 event – while clearly of
major significance to those living and working in the valley – is by no means unusual when
viewed in the context of the longer-term development of the Breamish and Till valleys.
Indeed, the combination of 19th and 20th C map evidence and sedimentary records of
channel and floodplain environments spanning the last 10,000 years indicates that the
channels in this valley are highly susceptible to periodic shifts in course in response to large
flood events. This is especially the case in the Breamish and Glen which are characterised by
laterally active and occasionally multiple channel systems. The presence of floodbanks has
acted to locally constrain many flood episodes since the 19th C, but in their current
configuration and state of repair can offer no guarantee of securing floodplains from
occasional very high magnitude events.
26
6 Personal experiences on the day and in the immediate aftermath
We saw the flood defence go- it was like a tidal wave, on Saturday morning we saw bales
and trees floating down. We packed our bags and then realised there was no where to go
because the road was closed. Two days later people got through in 4x4. (River Glen)
Long term residents, particularly farmers recognised that there was going to be a problem
and floods that week-end but the size and speed of the flood took everyone by surprise. The
flood waters rose rapidly through Friday night and Saturday morning so for many people it
was not until the morning that they were aware of the magnitude of the flooding.
At 6 a.m. on Saturday morning we heard the rubble and the water it woke us up. (Bowmont
Water)
No-one received a flood warning, but on the other hand many people commented that they
hadn’t signed up for flood warnings and thus didn’t expect one.
As the water spread infrastructure failed in some areas for example around Kirknewton the
electricity failed, water normally pumped from boreholes was lost as the electricity went,
telephone lines fell. In isolated areas where there is no mobile coverage and as roads
became impassable this effectively meant that individuals found themselves completely cut
off (Kirknewton and upstream from Kirk Yetholm).
Tarmac was lifted off the road – water got underneath it. (Bowmont Water)
The situation was exacerbated by sodden ground and runoff from hills and roads. The floods
also prevented those who had been at work or away at the week-end from returning to their
homes. Quite quickly cars were abandoned by the side of the road, for a while 4x4s were
able to move through the flood water, and then tractors but at Chatton it became too much
even for the tractors.
‘The road was closed Saturday lunchtime, by 3 p.m. you couldn’t get in with 4x4s. The Till was
rising at two feet per hour and Chatton was an island….We lost 2 fences, the road signs went,
the walls around the cricket pitch and 13 acres of standing wheat just disappeared. We lost
some sheep, they had been moved but then we couldn’t get to them. Sheep from other farms
were being washed on to our farm, they were stuck in the hedges. From the top of
Weetwood the whole valley was under water, you couldn’t see anything. I have never seen it
come up so quickly.’ (River Till)
People took what practical action that they could but then just had to sit it out. It became
dangerous to move, bridges were brought down quickly and roads became impassable. In
several cases people were helped out of their homes on foot and were only able to return
for their cars several days later.
Local knowledge and experience was very important in recognising that the rivers were
going to flood. Animals and farm machinery were moved although the speed and magnitude
of the flood meant that this wasn’t always successful. Animals in some cases were moved to
higher ground that would normally be safe but wasn’t in this instance. Similarly animals on
annual rented grazing on the Milfield plain were not removed in time which resulted in large
numbers of sheep and cattle being lost. Estimates of losses vary between 800 and 1000
27
animals. Immediate financial help for the disposal of carcasses was available through ONE
NE and managed through the County Council which helped to avoid a public health problem.
A number of people commented on the wildlife, badgers, foxes, hares and other animals
flushed out by the water and looking for higher ground.
Holiday makers were particularly vulnerable and local people helped them move out from
rented cottages, in some cases they returned home, in others being put up in temporary
accommodation locally. At Wooler caravan site people were evacuated from caravans close
to the water and touring caravans and tents were moved. This was the last week end of the
school summer holidays and the site was not very busy. In another case of a vulnerable small
business, they responded by moving stock onto higher shelves and sandbagged entrances.
Similarly, private individuals moved significant belongings, documents, computer disks,
photos etc., upstairs or onto higher shelves and the top of cupboards.
Saturday 5.30/6. We switched off the gas and electricity, moved the pets and left the house
to go to friends. (River Glen)
Several people noted that they had tried to cut trenches or divert the water from property
but that the floods rose too quickly for this to be an effective defence.
For relative newcomers to the area one of the problems was not knowing what should or
could happen during a flood and this included not knowing how to get information as
communications were cut.
We phoned the Parish Council, we have only been here two years and we didn’t know if there
was an emergency plan. (River Glen)
The County Council is mentioned frequently in the immediate aftermath of the flood as they
worked to make roads passable and, in places, to contain the river. This work was carried
out under Emergency powers and will be discussed in more detail below but it was seen very
positively by residents. In Scotland the Borders Council also responded very quickly and were
highly praised by local residents for work on roads and bridges. Similarly the utility
companies are praised for the very hard work that was done to replace services in the Glen
valley. In England many of the farmers took up the offer of £2000 from Business Link,
financed by ONE, to help with the immediate repairs of fences. This was particularly
important for managing grazing immediately after the flood. It was however commented
that even putting up temporary fencing invalidated any claim for the money which was
frustrating and held up work. Gates had also been washed away but did not qualify for
assistance. In Scotland there was no grant for fencing and it was commented that this would
have been a significant help. On the other hand the Scottish farmers that we visited felt that
they had benefitted from political intervention that had allowed them to do some clear –up
work on the river themselves and not to wait for SEPA.
Other immediate responses of help from the agencies were noted. For example, the EA
provided soak up mats to catch oil and contaminants and prevent them from entering the
river. The community police and fire and rescue services were praised for their work in the
Glen valley – mainly for just enquiring if people were OK and providing a hot drink. In
Scotland the local Borders Council and Police are praised for setting up an email service,
keeping in contact and providing access to social services, such as transport for hospital
appointments . This service continued:
28
The contact has been continued well into November – just to let us know that we haven’t
been forgotten. (Scottish Bowmont)
The response of farmers to the floods was in general one of – it happens we just need to get
on and deal with it. The small-holders, and residents who had moved into the area more
recently were however more traumatised were looking for an immediate response or help
and this will be discussed below.
7. Economic Effects of the Flooding1
The economic effects of the flooding differ between the farm and non-farm businesses and
households; and for the farms, between those who are landowners and those who are
tenants. Moreover at the time of the study repairs were still on going making costs difficult
to estimate. The timing of the floods was significant there were standing crops in the fields,
as harvesting of cereals had in any case been delayed by wet weather through the summer.
Wheat can survive flooding if the water drains off quickly but potatoes may damage and be
lost fairly rapidly. We heard surprised comments that farmers had managed to harvest both
wheat and potatoes after flooding which was attributed to fast draining sandy soils, however,
quality was severely compromised. There was straw still in fields waiting to be baled and
little oilseed rape had been sown. We heard several reports of how losses would have been
much greater if animals hadn’t been sold in the previous week.
For businesses dependent on tourism it was the last week end of the school holidays in
England and children had already returned to school in Scotland. However significant
differences between farm and non-farm businesses arise through what is insured and what
is not.
Many of the financial effects of the flooding will be felt in the longer term. Examples given to
us included: costs of keeping labour or machinery unused or under used, additional
contractor costs, particularly to replace fencing which had to be done immediately. The full
economic impacts will not be known for up to a year a more. Similarly the management
implications are difficult to cost as farmers need to change plans for the coming year
The main problems started when the water was gone – we still can’t plough and get the next
crop in. We had to change rotation for this year, but this may have been due to the wet
rather than the flooding. We have no flood barriers there was more of a problem where there
were barriers and then they broke. (River Till)
7.1 Farm and land based business costs2
Although we questioned farmers specifically we were unable to obtain meaningful estimates
of flood costs to farm businesses at the time at which we carried out the interviews. Some
farmers refused to specify costs because they had not yet been calculated. We were
1
The CRE small business survey was just beginning in September 2008 and it has been possible to
include a question asking business owners what the effects of floods have been. These data are not
yet available but will throw further light on the questions of economic losses to both farm and nonfarm businesses.
2
An estimate of the economic implications for farm and land based businesses has been calculated
using secondary data from the Farm Business Survey together with reported costs and is shown in
Appendix 2
29
provided with estimates for single items of expenditure, for example, to replace a bridge or
fencing but these were clearly estimates. We would be told for example, that fencing costs
£5 per metre to replace but then the farmer did not know exactly how much he needed to
replace. In some cases estimates were made but the respondent did not know who was
going to pay so it was not possible to attribute specific costs to the farm household. In other
cases we were provided with an estimate but without knowledge of the whole business it
was not possible to estimate the significance. For example, one land manager told us that
‘we could drop a million’, we don’t know though how significant this will be to the overall
profits of the business at the end of they year, or how these costs may be distributed
through the community. Many of the losses on farm were not insured, fences, walls,
livestock and standing crops are not regarded as insurable.
Many of the farmers that we spoke to were unable to estimate the losses directly
attributable to the flooding. In part this was because the weather had been bad all summer
and had reduced yields and quality of crops. The destruction of grazing has implications for
feeding throughout the winter exacerbated by the loss of hay and straw and widespread
damage to the land.
We lost 30 bales of hay because of the water. There was going to be a shortage of hay this
year due to the wet summer. We had been just about alright for hay – we were hoping to sell
some. We just have to accept it. (Bowmont Water)
In part economic losses were not available because farmers were not willing or able to work
out exactly how much the floods had cost.
There will be high feed and fodder costs in the coming year, no milling grade wheat coming
out of Northumberland – farmers will be feel effects in Feb/March 2009 and there is a
potential crisis in June. (Northumberland)
Land normally hired out for grazing was also lost, in many cases the quality of the land was
downgraded for good by scouring and deposition of rubble. Capping of soils will also cause
reduction of output, we were told, for up to a decade. Apart from the loss of quality land for
grazing there were also concerns expressed that animals on the flooded land would be more
likely to suffer disease problems. Selective re-introduction of the Higher Level Stewardship
Scheme for some English farmers offered a form of compensation but farmers felt that this
required careful consideration; it is for a limited term when food prices in general are rising
and there is concern over food security in the longer term. It was also noted that it was
necessary to look at the management of the whole farm rather than just the inundated
fields before a decision could be made on leaving fields for wetlands under the Scheme
which required modelling and would take time.
Apart from losses of land and destruction of buildings there were also associated machinery
costs.
Tractors are still in the repair shop, potatoes, hay crop and seed crops and autumn sowing in
the barn is all lost. Lots of machines have electronic controls e.g. tractors have a centralised
computer unit, its not reparable it will have to be replaced. (River Till)
Other tools and machines can be mended on the farm but they have to be stripped right
down cleaned and reassembled which is very time consuming. The flood will have
implications for the timing of farm activities and thus the choices about production:
30
Hopefully we can get early into the cycle next year, floods put you behind, there are extra
labour costs, the hire of a generator for the drier, extra month on your drying £1000 here
and £1000 there best not to work out what it actually did cost. Someone got a week old
sheep carcase in the combine [high costs in time and money to clear it out]. (River Till)
Farmers faced a great deal of additional work to clear trash and debris of fields and hedges.
The water was very dirty and carried a very heavy silt load:
A field of wheat up near Weetwood,… they got it cut but it was filthy you couldn’t see the
combine for dust. (River Till)
On upland areas the poor summer weather and floods led to severe reduction in game birds.
And the failure of infrastructure, bridges and farm roads made access to moors difficult. One
agent reported having to cancel shoots in October and November that incurred refunds of
approximately £220,000. Shoot cancellations also have knock-on effects through the local
economy for example through the employment of labour for beating and the preparation of
meals for shoot parties. The relatively very high replacement and building costs for bridges
and farm roads in upland areas are in contrast to the low revenue achieved from upland
farms.
One landowner put the cost of repairing forest roads on the estate at £60,000 and bridges
needed replacing that had been buried under thousands of tons of rock. At another site the
replacement of a bridge and ford was estimated at £12,000, with the costs having to be
borne by the business. In yet other sites bridge repairs were estimated at £20-25,000 per
bridge.
For tenant farmers the greater concerns were over how costs would be shared between
tenants, landlords and insurers.
31
There is no financial help from the [Estate] yet but they say they will give us a certain
percentage of the repair costs, but they don’t know how much they will receive yet. The
Estate is under no obligation to help us. (Bowmont Water)
A number of farmers and landowners commented on how the flood would mean
renegotiating rents, determining how costs should be split or allocated and who was
responsible for insurance. It thus put pressure on the relationship between the farm tenant
and land owner which was not always easy to reconcile.
We need to look at tenancy law to find out how to deal with the problem of the landlord not
doing anything. (River Till)
We walked the whole thing with tenants and Natural England, to decide how to repair
bridges, what river works were necessary. There will be grazing that will never go back. For
tenants this is act of God you lose it – but it is just a small percentage of the whole farm.
(River Till)
Although on another estate we were told:
The tenant has a legitimate claim for rent reduction because of the loss of good quality land.
(River Glen)
Many of the tenant farmers were dependent on landowners to carry out key repairs which
had financial implications if there was a time lag:
The estate took a long time to replace the bridge and that was annoying it took a month. The
loss of the bridge has really affected our management costs – there are many hidden costs
(Bowmont Water)
Many of the losses were not directly economic but through the amount of time and the
nuisance caused. Applying for grants making insurance applications, filling in forms etc.
interrupted normal patterns of work. Although some farmers in England made claims
directly to the Business Link fund (not available in Scotland) in other cases tenants claimed
through Estate HLS schemes and were reimbursed by the Estate. It was noted that the BL
fund was very welcome but that fencing costs approximately £5 per metre and that for some
individuals the grant contribution would be a relatively small proportion of the total costs.
For others it was very significant. There are indirect costs necessitated through re-planning
the management of the farm following the floods: planting schedules need to be
reorganised, loss of quality land has implications for livestock management, and there are
requirements for increased labour use, re-planning of labour use and contract hire. The
timing and timeliness of farming and other productive activities was severely disrupted by
the floods with subsequent financial loss yet to be computed.
In addition to the direct and indirect costs to the farmers and land owners there are further
costs multiplied through the rural economy: for example, there will be losses to contractors
through machinery hire, a reduction in casual labour use which will in turn have effects on
local businesses, garages, shops etc.3
3
See Appendix 2 for an illustration
32
7.2 Non-farm businesses and private homes
The bad weather throughout the summer meant that takings in tourism businesses and bed
and breakfast accommodation were low and no-one reported that the floods had caused a
particular drop in visitors. Many holiday makers left the area early, and a number of
respondents told us of visitors leaving holiday cottages, both in England and Scotland. Apart
from the immediate danger of the floods, loss of power meant that people could not stay.
Two respondents reported that visitors wanted their money back and that they were not
insured for this loss. One accommodation provider noted that there were fewer enquiries
following the flood but no-one had cancelled. The timing of the floods was important as the
school term was about to begin in England and had already started in Scotland and many
businesses would have expected a fall off in visitors. In some cases the floods directly
prevented access to cafés or stopped the business working altogether. However, not all
businesses were negatively affected, one food company commented that business picked up
because people couldn’t get out to do their usual shop.
Private homeowners did not on the whole report any economic loss associated with the
floods that were not insured. Smallholders did have problems though. Loss of grazing, either
for own use or to be rented, and the interruption of tupping had implications for the coming
agricultural year and for these very small businesses, often supplementing pensions the loss
of income was significant.
As in the case of farm businesses the allocation of responsibility for payments and repairs
caused holdups to some businesses that had significant implications for the livelihood of the
business owner.
Apart form the smallholders and cottage rentals non of the other businesses that we
contacted reported losses arising from the floods that were not covered by insurance. As in
the case of the farms they often noted difficulties in attributing costs directly to the flood.
For example, machinery that had to be taken apart and serviced annually in any case needed
to be stripped down after the floods. Although medium to long term effects on small
businesses can be quite severe some managed to start trading again relatively quickly.
7.3 The role of insurance
The Pitt Report (2008) argues for the importance of insurance against flood for small
businesses. The CRC (2007) has pointed out the need to develop more innovative insurance
policies for small businesses to overcome short and medium term disruptions in cash flow
and it has been recognised that as the number of hard engineering solutions to flooding are
reduced insurance will play a more important role (Priest et al, 2005).
Three issues emerged over insurance and flooding. The first was that many of the losses on
farms were not covered by insurance, secondly the length of time and ease of claim and
thirdly concerns about obtaining insurance and level of future premiums.
As we noted above many farmers had uninsured losses. Indeed in some cases due to the
location of farms and the likelihood of flooding to insure some assets against flooding
specifically would have been prohibitively expensive. There were however a number of
problems that arose around insurance claims on tenant farms. In most tenancy agreements
it is the farmer that takes out insurance. The landlord may insure building but not contents
and this had led to conflicts in some cases even litigation.
33
In practical terms the NFU insurance responded more quickly than non-farm insurers to farm
claims. Tardy response of the insurers and bickering over what they will pay for when people
need to get their businesses back up and running quickly caused great anxiety for some farm
related businesses. For non-farm businesses there were fewer complaints about the
insurance companies. For example, at Wooler Caravan Park the insurers came almost
immediately, agreed the claim and action necessary for the future and caused little
disruption to the business. One clear problem that will need to be sorted out with the
insurance industry is that of replacing like with like. If homes and businesses are to become
more flood resilient then they must be able to replace with more appropriate materials and
design. For example, the position of sockets on walls, the type of plaster etc. At the present
we heard from several respondents that buildings and contents had to be repaired to exactly
the same specification as prior to the floods: this does not constitute resilience building.
Businesses and private householders expressed concern over future premiums and whether
it would be worth insuring, or even whether it will be possible to insure some properties in
the future. One householder told us that his insurer had refused to renew because his land
had suffered flood erosion, he had found an alternative but at a considerably higher
premium. Associated with this is the question of planning permission and building in flood
risk areas. In Scotland development is not allowed in flood risk areas this is not yet the case
in England. However, the value of this strategy depends upon how flood risk is assessed, for
example, pluvial flow may not be covered by the assessment and yet in the Cheviots, both in
Northumberland and the Scottish Borders there was considerable damage done by run-off
rather than by the river.
Several respondents commented that practical advice on flood claims would have been
useful, for example taking digital photographs with date and time as the flooding took place.
A major question arises around whether insurers will continue to provide cover to
households in flood areas Treby et al (2006) investigate the potential role of insurance in
flood risk management and make suggestions of the ways in which insurers could reduce risk.
These strategies may however raise problems when businesses are based in rural areas and
when livelihoods are bound up with the land and landscape.
8. Social and Community Wellbeing - Effects of the Flooding
We have identified a number of distinct ways in which the flooding affected the mental and
physical wellbeing of individuals. Werrity et al (2007) argue that intangible flood impacts are
more severe than tangible, and that the trauma of being flooded is disproportionately felt by
the elderly, lower income households had those with lower social resilience. Tapsell and
Tunstall (2008) in a study over four and a half years show that complex health and social
impacts of floods may persist over time. Carroll et al. (2007) use the Carlisle floods to show
evidence of psychological health problems
The academic literature describes flooding as being a serious threat to health and well being.
We were told of a number of examples where people’s health had been affected and mental
health problems had developed. One person reported having been to the doctor for antidepressants. There was the immediate fear and concern from seeing the river behave in this
way, the noise and roaring of the water was mentioned many times as being very frightening.
The perception of the river has changed for some people most obviously for those new to
the area or who had not lived here for long.
34
‘It was really frightening it has left an emotional scar; I have never seen a river get so violent
so quickly. I don’t think we will ever get over it. It has taken us a long while to feel safer.’
Another cause of stress was not the flooding itself but anxiety over payments for repairs,
renegotiation of existing agreements and responsibilities and longer term concerns that the
value of property had been greatly reduced. Although we did not receive any reports of
people become physically ill as a direct result of the flooding several homes did lack water
and sewage facilities.
There were positive effects that people identified, many respondents talked about the ways
people helped each other and that this has led to a strengthening of community
We felt kind of helpless, then local people kicked in, just checking up, I was so grateful the
number of people that were there just to talk to. Community were brilliant but we felt very
alone. (River Glen)
It threatened the way that people wanted to live to the extent it made them ill, we weren’t
flooded but very emotionally caught up… You have to depend on your neighbours, it has
brought the community together over other environmental issues (River Breamish)
There are however other significant examples of anger, blame and litigation
One quite widely spread response that we came across was of people feeling undervalued in
relation to others in more densely populated areas or the natural environment. The floods at
Morpeth and Rothbury over the same week-end had more media coverage and were
perceived as generating more sympathy. This was expressed as only Rothbury and Morpeth
counting – its us and them. We also encountered a frustration that people didn’t recognise
the value of farming and the countryside. The feeling was expressed that ‘nobody values
farming’, and this included the people, their property or farming livelihoods
The worst was seeing the land I don’t think people appreciate its our livelihood , people don’t
understand, I get upset to think about it. [She gets upset just talking about it again]
‘Farmers do a lot to protect the environment but nothing is done to protect the farmers from
the environment, their knowledge and activities are not valued’
In terms of the response after the flooding there is a widespread perception that human
needs are not regarded as highly as animals and plant life. This came up most frequently
with respect to the salmon although respondents did know that because the salmon were
spawning it was important to clear rivers. It wasn’t that they didn’t acknowledge the needs
of the fish but that they felt their needs were neglected.
EA and NE think more o f the river than the people. People want EA and NE to recognise that
all they want is to protect their property. EA and NE have a lot of power to stop people
protecting themselves (River Glen)
A further point made about the migratory fish was that the financial benefits from the
fishing were not necessarily gained where the floods had caused the most damage.
The work is done for the salmon but the financial benefits from salmon are not gained here.
(River Glen)
35
People are very low down the pecking order for EA and NE, they hide behind legislation,
snoop around but don’t talk to local people (River Glen)
The net effects were to leave people disaffected and feeling excluded.
36
9 Analysis and implications
You are not going to win the war with the river. You need to manage it so that water can
spread and not have so much power, for large landowners it is a small proportion of their
land. (River Till)
A number of issues arose in the analysis of the data concerning vulnerability and risk,
communication and the governance and management of the river. We will examine these in
relation to the situation prior to the floods, what happened during the floods and in the
immediate aftermath and the implications in the longer term and planning for the future.
9.1 Before the flood
The locals notice that direction of wind not good and its likely to flood (River Till)
Community vulnerability depends on the degree of risk when exposed to a hazard their
resistance and in their ability to cope with effects of hazardous events. Burningham et al
(2008) but vulnerability is not just a function of expected hazard severity. Individual sociodemographic factors e.g. age, disability, closeness to hazard source etc. are also significant
and vulnerability may be mitigated through local coping practices such as social and family
support networks. Two particular characteristics affecting vulnerability in the Cheviots are
tenancy and length of residence in the area.
The EA targets those at risk of flooding through awareness campaigns with the implicit
assumption that the provision of appropriate information and increased public awareness
will lead to behavioural change. There is however a considerable literature which questions
this model (See for example, Brown and Damery, 2002; Ryedale Flood Research Group 2008).
Flood risk awareness is awareness of living in an at-risk area, but being aware is not the
same as being fully cognisant of the implications of flooding. The responses from some of
the interviews show that people were not aware of the full implications of flooding for home,
life and livelihood. None of the people to whom we spoke claimed that they didn’t know
that there was a risk of flooding where they lived. It is though, not just knowledge of the risk
but the severity of the effects which is significant. The magnitude and speed of the
September floods took even long term residents by surprise. The 1948 floods were often
evoked as a standard of comparison and higher up the rivers the 2008 floods were perceived
as much more serious than those of 1948. Many people have difficulty in interpreting the
ways in which risk is expressed. They do not know what a 1/100 year flood means and there
is a danger of thinking that there will not be another flood like this for 100 years. Other
studies have shown that once people have experienced a severe flood they may well
assume that it means that it will not happen again for a long time.
No one that we spoke to was aware of any official flood warning system. Local knowledges
were however particularly important in recognising the threat of floods. We were given a
number of examples by farmers including: the direction of wind, the number of hours it had
been raining, plus some very specific site specific indicators e.g. when water reaches a
certain point on a boulder there is a need to act and move animals etc. To be effective flood
warnings need to be disseminated quickly to those under threat. There was no systematic
dissemination activity: some farmers did phone others lower down the valley as waters rose
but there was no organized dissemination of flood warnings to vulnerable individuals or
households. On Bowmont Water there was a flood warden out on the river during the
37
afternoon but he only became aware of the flood when it was actually happening. He was
able to close a dangerous bridge but again the speed of the flood took him and the residents
by surprise.
It is important that people are aware of the appropriate action to take in event of flood or
flood warning and it is here that major differences between resident farmers, longer
established businesses and others have emerged. Animals and machinery were moved
where possible, although in some cases not far enough out of danger and people were
moved to safety from holiday cottages and caravans. The speed of the floods meant that
animals on hired grazing on the Milfield plain could not be rescued in time and road closures
prevented people from moving within the area. However, almost everyone reached a point
where they just had to sit it out – there was nothing more to be done
Four lessons emerge from the experience of the situation prior to the September floods:
1. It is important to identify the most vulnerable members of the community taking
into account socio-demographic factors, temporary residence as well spatial
relation to the river. This may be particularly important in areas with large numbers
of visitors
2. It is false to distinguish between expert and lay knowledge. Local knowledge should
be incorporated into systems of flood risk awareness and ‘on the ground
knowledge’ be integrated into the system to complement information gathered
from above
3. There is a need to focus on ensuring that flood warnings are fast and reliable this
may mean using very local networks of communication or establishing novel
techniques of communication e.g. texting. The delivery and dissemination of
warnings needs to be locally very specific. The EA website indicates that this type of
service is available. There is therefore a need to find out why more people did not
use it.
4. Establish a clear plan that people are familiar with prior to the flood telling them
how to respond when they do receive a flood warning e.g. where to go, who to
contact, an emergency email or phone number, what to take with them if they leave.
Again, the EA provides information of this type on its website but it is not taken up
at the local level. Why?
This has raised awareness that there should be Parish emergency flood pack, we have now
signed up to flood line, but have little confidence. We have protected our photos not sure if
we would leave next time because we can’t protect our home.(River Glen)
9.2 During the floods and the immediate aftermath
The current fixes are temporary it will happen again (River Glen)
The main comment that we received was that people didn’t know who to talk to or where to
get information that they could trust. Enquiries were passed from one agency to another or
from one person to another within the same agency which left people feeling insecure and
angry. These comments applied particularly to EA and SEPA.
No-one told us what was going on. I emailed EA, NE – no replies, I was just passed around.
FWAG did respond to a call. Every agency had a different story
38
Good ideas didn’t work in practice. We were given conflicting advice on what to do and
where to go for help.
There were also some complaints about the accuracy of information: one person reported
talking to the EA and was told there was no danger when actually they were surrounded by
flood waters. Even if these occurrences are rare they are very undermining of the EA and it
will take more work to rebuild confidence. Similarly, in England, one person reported on a
system of free legal advice that was offered to those affected by floods the but company
involved knew nothing about it even when reference number was given – a situation which
further undermines confidence and exacerbates an already difficult situation.
We did receive reports of a good example of practice in Scotland where the Borders Council
provided a highly praised information service. Phone numbers and email contacts were
provided that people could use at any time and regular postings of updates on what was
happening were sent out through email. Although this type of service will not work where
there is no mobile phone coverage or telephone lines are down, as happened in parts of
Bowmont Water and the River Glen, there are substantial flood prone areas where this
would have helped. The Borders Council service continued into November and again was
praised as people felt that they had not been forgotten.
In both England and Scotland councils and emergency services acted promptly and
appropriately. For example in Scotland the council checked quickly on older people or those
with health risks. We were told that community police officers played this role in England,
offering hot drinks and a friendly word; and similarly the Fire and Rescue service ‘just called
in to check we were OK’.
The rapid response of ONE NE and Business Link with grants for fence replacement and help
with disposal of stock was highly praised and a similar grant would have been welcomed in
Scotland
The lessons that have emerged from hearing people’s experiences of the situation during the
floods and in the immediate aftermath are:
1. The agencies involved in the protection and management of rural areas need to
have established a clear and coordinated structure of flood management.
2. This management structure and the associated processes need to be clearly
communicated with responses for requests for information channelled through a
single contact point.
3. There needs to be a clear presence on the ground during the floods and in the
immediate aftermath
4. Help lines must be accurate and reliable otherwise they can do more harm than
good.
5. Requests for mobile phone masts, black spots in mobile coverage mean people are
very vulnerable to loss of landlines but this relatively easily fixed
9.3 The longer term and managing for the future
In a rural area it is not easy to pin point vulnerable people very easily. Low density of
population and the fact that people are more widely dispersed means that resilience
building and coping strategies must take into account these specific characteristics. For
39
example, many communities are reliant on a single form of communication with no mobile
or internet access. Similarly there may be only one road into an area which may become cutoff for several days. Local requests for resilience building at the community level included for
example: deciding that there is a need to develop an emergency action plan in the village
and a suggestion for the Parish council to hold stores etc for use in emergency
Several individuals noted that they were looking at ways to improve the flood resilience of
their homes and some of these required fairly major structural or engineering works. There
were however concerns that this might not be permitted by the ‘agencies’.
Rural residents, not just farmers, often live in or near their businesses. Flooding of homes
can mean an immediate and direct loss associated with the business but also the loss of
productive assets for the business future and may curtail their ability to make a living. This
raises some challenging questions for insurance of domestic property and businesses in rural
areas vulnerable to flooding. There is pressure to insure small businesses but it becomes
more expensive or not even possible to get insurance against floods in vulnerable areas. We
also found evidence of businesses planning to rebuild or re-organise in order to be able to
better cope with flooding in the future. For example at Heatherslaw there are plans to
station locomotives on higher ground. At Wooler caravan park caravans will be built on
higher blocks. The cost of these activities needs to be weighed against the insurance
requirements and the costs of flooding.
The problems of communication with and between agencies during the floods continued in
the longer term. This issue was brought up in both Scotland and England. Where there is
multi-agency regulation, for example, SEPA (Scotland), NE and EA (England), Tweed
Commissioners, NNPA, County Councils, where does authority lie? Who has priority? Two
issues in particular arose from this uncertainty. One was fear of sanctions through
inadvertent action, i.e. not knowing who you need to gain approval from.
Some farmers did try and ring SEPA and they were told that SEPA were not in the business of
advising farmers. However, there is a perception that this was because SEPA themselves are
unsure about what is permitted. SEPA are not willing to take responsibility for saying
yes.(Bowmont Water)
The council sorted out the river – they said to the workmen do what ever you need to keep
the water off the road. We were very glad they did that and didn’t leave it to the individual
farmers, because no-one wants to get on the wrong side of SEPA. (Bowmont Water)
The second issue is that apparent in-fighting between agencies reduces confidence and
increases insecurity. If people are unsure then they are more likely to disregard agencies’
advice and turn to more trusted sources such as friends and family.
Several people commented that they found EA heavy handed and unwilling to negotiate. It is
not clear whether this is because of their lack of understanding of the statutory role and
responsibilities of the EA and that they were therefore expecting too much or whether the
EA was dealing too abruptly with enquirers.
EA did nothing for 5 weeks and when I said I was going to go into river to clear my land
they said they would prosecute. EA have no working relationship, no give and take, they just
prosecute. (River Glen)
40
Several respondents told us that they felt that there was no sense of urgency on the part of
the agencies which lead to increasing frustration. This situation was exacerbated when there
was no agency presence on the ground.
From the research interviews there seem to be three ways of getting things done in relation
to the rivers in the longer term recovery period. The first is by working through agents or
landlords – but this was often the chosen option through unwillingness to get involved with
the environmental agencies. Land owners and their agents are seen as more powerful and
better able to negotiate with the agencies but need to know what tenants want. The tenant
sees the agent as protection – they take responsibility and so protect the tenant from losing
single farm payment (Scotland). The agents are seen to know the law and how to ‘play the
system’.
The second strategy was to try and deal directly with the environmental agencies but when
that didn’t work to take the argument to the media. The third, was to just get on and do
something yourself:
An old ford was being undercut by the river after the flooding. I just got in and fixed it I didn’t
want argy-bargy with the authorities…When you are an owner-occupier you can get on and
do it.
Alternatives two and three are not satisfactory and indicate a lack of willingness on the part
of the public to become involved with the environmental agencies making communication
in either direction much more difficult.
Despite all this negative comment it was recognised that the environmental agencies did
have a very difficult job:
Agencies will never come out well because some will always win and some will lose.(River
Till)
but that the timing of the interventions and public meetings wasn’t always appropriate:
The agencies had done some of their planning and this has reduced some of the damage credit due. The public meeting was too early, people were still too traumatised and so the
meeting was not as productive as it could have been.
And yet others note that they felt better once a public meeting had been held. I was also felt
that more preparation in advance would be more democratic. People would be able to
participate through their Council rather than feel that decisions were made and actions
taken without their participation but which would be paid for by their taxes.
There is a need to explore further changes in farming and land management practices to
increase resilience. In England the opportunity to apply for HLS was considered positively
but was not a decision to be taken quickly. One landowner talking with respect to a tenant
farmer said:
He can convert to HLS but how would it affect the farming operation as a whole – we have
asked for models, what will happen at different water levels? If valuable arable land is lost
then we will have to renegotiate the tenancy, if he loses some fields at high flood level but
gets HLS payment and the rest of land only floods temporarily and occasionally then that
41
might be OK. But there is no fall back situation for world shortage of food crazy to abandon
agriculture
Specific river and land management alternatives are discussed below. In order for the
chosen practices to be successful it will be necessary to:
1. Ensure much closer earlier engagement with the local community to guarantee that
they are integrated into the planning, implementation and monitoring of land and
river management.
2. Develop appropriate structures of governance for the planning, implementation and
monitoring of management alternatives.
3. maintain an obvious presence on the ground, a person whom people can identify as
being a contact and knowledgeable about the situation
9.4 Specific management issues
Evaluation of the September 2008 flood geomorphology and consideration of the longerterm context of river channel and floodplain development in the Till catchment has
highlighted a number of management issues and potential management options. These are
considered in detail in technical Appendices A and B, but may be briefly summarised as
follows:
9.4.1. Relocation of key infrastructure
While no doubt presenting the most costly – in the short-medium term – and challenging
option, relocating the Brandon-Ingram road to the northern side of the valley floor will
address a number of ongoing management issues that are at odds with the development of
a long-term and sustainable management framework, including;

alleviation of the threat of road undermining and flooding at several locations
between Ingram and Brandon;

permitting movement of the Breamish to the north of the current channel zone,
thereby facilitating protection of the low-lying Ingram Visitor Centre and Mill area;

permitting a greater range of river channel and floodplain habitats and biodiversity
on the valley floor, and

permitting potential development of overbank floodwater compartments (with
associated livestock refugia) in low-lying areas in the northern part of the valley floor,
thereby helping to buffer the impact of extreme floods in the highly sensitive
Brandon Quarry area
Re-opening of Brandon footbridge in its current location will require the extension of the
southern bridge span and appropriate measures to secure the southern abutment from bank
erosion. Consideration might also be given to relocating the footbridge as a single span
structure some 350m upstream of the current location - this would permit the southern
abutment to be located on a bedrock foundation adjacent to the valley side, secure from
river undercutting or lateral erosion (see Appendix A). Siting the northern abutment
42
adjacent to the present road would give a span of some 90-100m, approximately double the
present span.
9.4.2. Reinstated floodplain and channel banks / current zones of bank erosion
“HA has put in hard engineering, rock not native to the valley. Infrastructure threatened and
no thinking or acting ahead.”
Emergency river engineering conducted immediately after the September flood has served
to underpin bridge footings and road margins (e.g. Ingram Bridge south abutment; the road
upstream of Brandon footbridge), and has restored or reconfigured channels and channel
margins in order to permit fish passage (e.g. Ingram; Kirknewton), gauging station operations
(Kirknewton) and blocking off of breached floodbanks and potential avulsion points (e.g.
between Bulby’s Wood and Ingram Farm; Kirknewton). This has locally been associated with
deeply-founded emplacement of imported hard rock (rip-rap), but protection is localised
solely to the immediate zone of emplacement and is potentially vulnerable to erosion at
either end of the revetment. Furthermore, associated regrading of channel banks and
floodplain areas with unconsolidated gravel and crushed rock is unlikely to offer a
sustainable barrier to further erosion and reworking, even by moderate flooding. It is also
noted that such works are inappropriate in a SSSI context. The following measures should be
considered;

In affected areas where protection of infrastructure and(or) property is deemed
essential then consideration should be given to stabilising post-flood unconsolidated
works with appropriate (and where possible sympathetic) measures, especially through
promotion of re-profiled banks, soil development and planting (e.g. gorse, willow, etc).
Examples of acceptable and appropriate practice are set out in Appendix B;

Bank revetting measures detailed in Appendix B should also be considered as a more
acceptable alternative to hard rock emplacements for unprotected and eroding channel
margins in the vicinity of key infrastructure points and properties (e.g. Ingram Visitor
Centre, Brandon footbridge and electricity pylons);

For areas currently (or potentially) experiencing bank erosion that is threatening key
infrastructure or property, appropriate bank protection measures may need to be
supplemented by engineering upstream flow deflection, re-opening side channels
and(or) clearance of overbank flood routeways (see below).
9.4.3. Permitting / enhancing overbank flood flows
You are not going to win the war with the river. Manage it so water can spread and not have
so much power, for large landowners it is a small proportion of their land.
Has to be trade off between allowing water to spill and where it goes in peoples houses.
43
If valuable arable land is lost then we will have to renegotiate the tenancy, if he loses some
fields at high flood level but gets HLS payment and rest of land only floods temporarily and
occasionally then that might be OK.
EA protects on value and for EA ag has nil value, the Rivers Authority built flood banks so how
can EA just abandon them? – they should take them out or maintain them. You can maintain
yourself but only with their consent, SSSI can’t bring in new materials.

In some localities the blocking or restriction of overbank flows are promoting instabilities
or backing up of flood flows in the immediate vicinity; selective clearance or thinning of
vegetation and redesign of fencing and field boundaries is recommended in order to
improve flood routing and alleviate bank and infrastructure erosion problems

Consideration might also be given to a more pro-active attempt to permit and manage
overbank flooding in areas of the valley floor where temporary inundation may be
deemed acceptable (especially in largely pastoral areas, accepting that livestock
management will need careful consideration), or where floodplain wetland
environments are being encouraged (with concomitant benefits to wildlife, biodiversity,
etc). Here we note that many interviewees were recognising the potential benefits of
dissipating flood flows in a more managed fashion, especially if compensation or HLS
options were tabled. Such measures may be critical components of integrated schemes
to manage downstream impacts of extreme events.

Development of management frameworks for overbank flooding could be usefully
informed by surveys designed to identify areas where channel / floodplain / floodbank
configurations are potentially susceptible to breaching.

Management frameworks that seek to permit overbank flooding will also need to
consider the associated issue of protection of vulnerable property; the September 2008
event demonstrated, however, that relatively small scale and sympathetic features may
allow this to be achieved.

It is also noted that field drainage systems and ditch networks will need to be
appropriately managed, either to alleviate the risk of local hillslope and groundwater
flooding, or to actively promote floodplain ponding where desirable (see above).
Coordination of such activity is essential since drainage measures may have inadvertent
impacts on flooding.
9.4.4 Flood debris and channel maintenance
“Until 2003 we graded the river ourselves – done with permission and sensitively moved
gravel so that debris couldn’t block river, we have kept the river flowing. We can foresee
more flooding if you don’t let local people clear the river.”
 Localised obstruction of flows by sediment accumulation and – especially – wood and
plant debris is an inherent property of wandering gravel bed rivers such as the Breamish
44
and, by promoting channel migration and the development (and subsequent revegetation) of large gravel bars, is a key factor in generating a diverse and evolving
patchwork of channel and floodplain habitats. Accordingly, the desire of some
landowners and tenants to conduct localised and responsive channel maintenance is
liable to conflict with SSSI legislation, while also running the risk of fostering the
impression that such measures may prevent large scale flooding.
 However, there are cases where routine clearance of channel blockages – especially by
woody debris – may be desirable in order to alleviate backing-up of flood flows in areas
where property or infrastructure are threatened (see above). Such measures could be
usefully informed and managed by conducting routine geomorphological monitoring of
sensitive reaches. Consideration may also be given to thinning or coppicing of woods
located at the focus of bank erosion upstream of such blockage points in order to reduce
the potential for woody debris accumulation.
45
10 Preparing for the future – recommendations to Cheviot Futures
Public awareness of flood risk - general
1. It is important to identify the most vulnerable members of the community taking
into account socio-demographic factors, temporary residence during holiday periods
as well spatial relation to the river.
2. Local knowledge should be incorporated into systems of flood risk awareness and
‘on the ground knowledge’ be integrated into the system to complement
information gathered from above. It is false to distinguish between expert and lay
knowledge especially since many of the local residents can draw long and intimate
acquaintance with the local environment
3. It is incumbent on the EA to take an active role in dissemination. There is a need to
focus on ensuring that flood warnings are fast and reliable this may mean using very
local networks of communication or establishing novel techniques of communication
e.g. texting and or email. The delivery and dissemination of warnings needs to be
locally very specific. The EA website indicates that this type of service is available but
it wasn’t used and further research is needed to find out why.
4. There is a need to establish a clear plan that people are familiar with prior to the
flood telling them how to respond when they do receive a flood warning e.g. where
to go, who to contact, an emergency email or phone number, what to take with
them if they leave etc. Again, the EA provides information of this type on its website
but it is not taken up at the local level. Why? The paper version of the
Gloucestershire County Council Your Essential Flood Guide is a useful example.
Public awareness Ingram
5. People in the Ingram area need to be involved in the development of a management
plan and its implementation on the Breamish. The model offered by the ‘Making
Space for People’ project could be usefully engaged.
Communication
6. The agencies involved in the protection and management of rural areas need to
have established a coordinated and transparent structure of flood management, in
particular it is important to clearly identify the lead agency.
7. This management structure and associated processes need to be clearly
communicated to the public with responses for requests for information channelled
through a single contact point.
8. There needs to be a clear presence on the ground during the floods and in the
immediate aftermath to encourage confidence and trust.
9. Help lines must be accurate and reliable otherwise they can do more harm than
good.
10. In general it is important to ensure much closer earlier engagement with the local
community to guarantee that they are integrated into the planning, implementation
and monitoring of land and river management.
11. There is in general a need to develop appropriate and more transparent structures
of governance for the planning, implementation and monitoring of management
alternatives.
46
Sustainable management of river and floodplain environments
12. The goal of achieving sustainable and long-term management of valley floors in the
Breamish / Till is one that needs to be set against the long-term propensity of the rivers to
experience large-scale flooding and shifting of their channels. These trends are unlikely to be
ameliorated under current climate change forecasts for the region and hence an approach
that sets out to accommodate high-magnitude flooding is more in tune with the Cheviot
Futures vision than one that is predicated on prevention.
13. While the scale and character of management options set out here will require due
consultation and costing, the Cheviot Futures initiative offers the opportunity to ensure that
any future works (including mitigation measures) are informed by sustainable and
sympathetic management and engineering practices.
47
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52
Appendix 1 Interview schedule
The sub-headings under each question that is numbered are questions that we might want
to ask if the interviewees don’t bring up the topic in their ‘unfolding narrative’. The intention
is to identify what constrained or enabled people at different points through their
experience
Introduce study, discuss confidentiality and request recording
Could you tell me a little bit about the immediate run up to the flooding that you
experienced? (Remember to ask them to specify which day)
1. How did they become aware of the potential of flooding?


Flood warning?
Who did they check with (friends / family / agencies /
websites / radio?)/ did you go to check the river level?
Visual (e.g. water encroaching on their property?).
What actions did you take? What did you do?
What / who did / would have made a difference at this point?



2. What was the first evidence that the flooding was going to directly affect you,
and how did it effect you – what was the impact upon you – what happened?






What happened?
What was the extent / speed / nature of the flooding impact
upon you?
What did you do?
Did you contact anyone?
What / who / would have made a difference at this point?
How did it affect you emotionally?
3. From between the flood waters affecting you directly, to its subsidence what
happened (e.g. first 24/48hrs)




What did you do?
o Evacuate/stay?
o Who did you contact?
o Try and mitigate impact of flood waters?
Who turned up to help?
o Emergency services / friends / relatives /
neighbours?
What was the state of the infrastructure / vital services?
o Roads / rail / phones / electricity / water / heating /
food availability?
What did you want to do?
What did / would have made a difference at this point?
Who was responsible?

How did you react emotionally?


53
4. The water starts to subside; can you tell me a little bit about what happened?



What did you do?
Who helped / who didn’t?
What / who did / would have made a difference at this point?
5. How has this flood event impacted upon your livelihood?





Business, e.g. farm, or a small business? Work / employment?
Your investments, e.g. your house / farm machinery / stock etc.
What are the scale of these impacts
Were there any precautions that you took that has lessened the impact
of flood (e.g. insurance, flood plans?)
In your opinion what measures could have been taken by third parties to
limit the impacts that you are feeling now?
6. In terms of the future what do you think will happen?
 Employment / business / house / family?
 What will you do?
 What / who will / could make a difference?
 What do feel now about the whole experience? What in your opinion
are the things that could really / did really make a difference in respect
to situation you find yourself in.
7. Are there any additional comments that you would like to make about
experience of the floods?
your
Thanks
54
Appendix 2 – Economic Impacts on Farming of the Till river floods September 2008
The Economic analysis is based on published Defra Farm Income figures for the 2007/08
crop year (Table A.2.1). These data are indexed up (using Defra price indices for
Agricultural Outputs and Inputs) to arrive at a predicted set of outputs and inputs for the
2008/09 crop year (Table A.2.2). Using data provided on the extent of the flooding and
flood coefficients (reasonable assumptions) reductions in outputs and increases input
costs (and net effects on Farm Business Income [FBI]) are calculated for the 2008 crop
year (Table A.2.3). Using the same baseline data provided and 2009 flood coefficients
(reasonable assumptions) changes in outputs and inputs (and net effects on Farm
Business Income [FBI]) are calculated for the 2009 crop year (Table A.2.4).
Baseline data:
3350ha of farmland within 16 parishes was hit by the floods. 14 of these are in the
Berwick District. Using Defra census data for Berwick District the likely spread of the
farm population is as follows:
Cereal and Cropping Farms
Lowland Grazing Farms
LFA Grazing Farms
Mixed Lowland Farms
Total
47
18
18
19
102
Defra census data (and having discounted Spare time farms of <5ha) suggests that the
flooded area would be equivalent to 10 full farms across this farm type distribution.
Economic data published (http://www.farmbusinesssurvey.co.uk/) by Rural Business
Research (http://www.ncl.ac.uk/afrd/business/FarmBusinessSurvey.htm) for the
combined GORs of North East and Yorkshire Humber is used to predict likely outputs,
inputs and Farm Business Income figures for the area with and without flooding for the
2008 and 2009 crop years.
Further calculations will estimate outputs foregone and other costs incurred for shooting
enterprises affected and costs to rural infrastructure.
55
Figure A1
List of Parishes affected by the 2008 Flooding
Qui ckTi me™ and a
TIFF (Uncompresse d) d eco mpressor
are ne eded to see thi s pi cture.
Parish Key
20
21
Eglingham
Glanton
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Branxton
Carham
Chatton
Chillingham
Cornhill-on-Tweed
Doddington
Ewart
Ford
Ilderton
Ingram
11
12
13
14
15
16
Kirknewton
Lilburn
Milfield
Norham
Roddam
Wooler
56
Table A.2.1 - Output and Input Costs North East & Yorkshire & Humber - Per Farm - 2007
2007-08 index
Agricultural output
Crop output (excl subs)[60%cereals]
Livestock output (excl. subs)
Other Agricultural output
Output from Agri-environment activities etc.
Output from diversification out of agriculture
Output from Single Payment Scheme
Farm Business Output
FBI (excl. profit/loss on sale of assets)
141,949
70,693
64,168
1023
6,065
9,373
25,222
0.86
1.18
1.09
1.00
1.00
1.00
Variable costs
Crop specific costs[40% fert]
Livestock specific costs
purchased feed & fodder
home grown feed & fodder
veterinary fees & medicines
other livestock costs
Contract costs
Casual labour
Miscellaneous variable costs
Fixed costs
Regular labour
Machinery costs
General farming costs
Land and property costs
Miscellaneous fixed costs
182,609
41,846
Table A.2.2 - Estimate Output and Input Costs North East & Yorkshire & Humber - Per Farm - 2008
Estimates of the position in 2008 - no flood effect
2007 data revalued by Agricultural Output and Input indices
flood coeff
08crop 09crop
Agricultural output
144,240
Variable costs
Crop output (excl subs)[60%cereals]
60,796
0.25
0.25
Crop specific costs[40% fert]
Livestock output (excl. subs)
75,718
0.90
0.90
Livestock specific costs
Other Agricultural output
1,115
0.90
0.90
purchased feed & fodder
Output from Agri-environment activities etc.
6,611
1.00
1.00
home grown feed & fodder
Output from diversification out of agriculture
9,373
0.50
0.50
veterinary fees & medicines
Output from Single Payment Scheme
25,222
1.00
1.00
other livestock costs
Contract costs
Casual labour
Miscellaneous variable costs
Fixed costs
Regular labour
Machinery costs
General farming costs
Land and property costs
Miscellaneous fixed costs
Farm Business Output
FBI (excl. profit/loss on sale of assets)
185,446
24,427
2007-08 index
64,047
22,239
32,657
18,931
4,359
2,580
6,787
6,487
2,073
591
76,716
12,069
25,039
19,129
17,093
3,386
1.68
1.07
1.07
0.97
0.97
1.21
1.12
1.20
1.12
1.07
1.03
1.07
1.20
140,763
flood coeff
08crop 09crop
82,187
37,362
33,927
20,162
4,642
2,513
6,611
7,869
2,321
708
78,832
13,515
25,039
19,129
17,093
4,056
1.00
1.10
1.10
1.00
1.00
1.20
1.20
1.20
1.00
0.70
1.10
1.30
1.00
1.00
1.30
1.20
1.20
1.00
1.00
1.20
1.20
1.20
1.00
1.00
1.20
1.20
1.20
1.00
161,019
57
Table A.2.3 - Estimate Output and Input Costs North East & Yorkshire & Humber - Per Farm - 2008 crop year
Estimates of the position in 2008 - with flood damage
2007 data revalued by Agricultural Output and Input indices
change due
change due
to floods
to floods
Agricultural output
90,960
-53280
Variable costs
87,618
5431
Crop output (excl subs)[60%cereals]
15,199
-45597
Crop specific costs[40% fert]
37,362
0
Livestock output (excl. subs)
68,146
-7572
Livestock specific costs
37,320
3393
Other Agricultural output
1,004
-112
purchased feed & fodder
22,178
2016
Output from Agri-environment activities etc.
6,611
0
home grown feed & fodder
4,642
0
Output from diversification out of agriculture
4,687
-4687
veterinary fees & medicines
2,513
0
Output from Single Payment Scheme
25,222
0
other livestock costs
7,933
1322
Contract costs
9,442
1574
Casual labour
2,786
464
Miscellaneous variable costs
708
0
Fixed costs
91,084
12252
Regular labour
13,515
0
Machinery costs
30,047
5008
General farming costs
22,955
3826
Land and property costs
20,512
3419
Miscellaneous fixed costs
4,056
0
Farm Business Output
FBI (excl. profit/loss on sale of assets)
No farms
Lost Output due to floods 2008 crop
Reduction in FBI due to floods 2008 crop
127,479
-51,223
-57967
-75650
178,702
17683
10
-579668 Increased costs due to floods 2008
-756498
176829
Table A.2.4 - Estimate Output and Input Costs North East & Yorkshire & Humber - Per Farm - 2009 crop year
Estimates of the position in 2009 - with flood damage
2007 data revalued by Agricultural Output and Input indices
Agricultural output
Crop output (excl subs)[60%cereals]
Livestock output (excl. subs)
Other Agricultural output
Output from Agri-environment activities etc.
Output from diversification out of agriculture
Output from Single Payment Scheme
Farm Business Output
FBI (excl. profit/loss on sale of assets)
No farms
Lost Output due to floods 2009
Reduction in FBI due to floods 2009
90,960
15,199
68,146
1,004
6,611
4,687
25,222
-53280
-45597
-7572
-112
0
-4687
0
127,479
-40,015
-57967
-64441
Variable costs
Crop specific costs[40% fert]
Livestock specific costs
purchased feed & fodder
home grown feed & fodder
veterinary fees & medicines
other livestock costs
Contract costs
Casual labour
Miscellaneous variable costs
Fixed costs
Regular labour
Machinery costs
General farming costs
Land and property costs
Miscellaneous fixed costs
76,409
26,153
37,320
26,210
4,642
2,513
8,594
9,442
2,786
708
91,084
13,515
30,047
22,955
20,512
4,056
-11208
-11208
0
4032
0
0
661
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
167,494
-11208
10
-579668 Increased costs due to floods 2009
-644413
-112085
58
Figure A.3 Millfield Plain Flood Damage: Cost Estimate Template.
Use/facility Affected
Effect
Upland grazings
Infrastructure Costs
COST (£)
Extent of effect
Quantity
Cost/unit (£)
Total Cost
lost shooting days person-day
20
13000
260000
Fences destroyed
Km
20
4000
80000
number
5
20000
100000
km
5
50000
250000
km
5
20000
100000
Unit
Bridges
destroyed
Public Road
damage
Private Road
damage
Other costs
Total costs £
Casual Labour Local Business
Loss
suppliers' loss
24000
40000
324000
530000
COMMENTS
5 weeks shooting @ 4days/wk. 100 brace days @ 130/brace, 30 beaters @£40/day
Summary:
Losses to Farm output for the 2008 crop year are estimated to be £579000 with an
increase in costs of £177000 resulting in a net Farm Business Income (FBI) reduction of
£756000 (Table A.2.3).
Direct losses to livestock are estimated to be approx 800 sheep and 20 cattle (NFU
private communication) which at £100/head and £1000/head as guideline estimates put
direct livestock losses at £100000.
Losses to Farm output for the 2009 crop year are estimated to be £579000 with an
increase in costs of £112000 resulting in a net Farm Business Income (FBI) reduction of
£644000 (Table A.2.4).
Direct losses to shooting days (TableA.3) estimate a total loss of £260000 of revenue and
of a further £64000 of loss to the local economy in terms of casual labour and hospitality.
Further estimates as to the costs of repairing damaged infrastructure are also indicated
above in Table A.3 – the total of which on these estimates would be £530000.
Total losses to farming are of the order of £1.5m with at least a further £0.5m in
damaged infrastructure. There are of course multiple knock on effects on the local
economy of these loses to agriculture but they have not been quantified in this study.
Losses to shooting and the associated local economy some £0.6m.
59