Economics - American Association of Wine Economists

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION
OF WINE ECONOMISTS
AAWE WORKING PAPER
No. 133
Economics
AN AGENCY-ORIENTED MODEL TO
EXPLAIN VINE-GROWING
SPECIALIZATION IN THE PROVINCE
OF BARCELONA IN THE MIDNINETEENTH CENTURY
Marc Badia-Miró and Enric Tello
February 2013
ISSN 2166-9112
www.wine-economics.org
An agency-oriented model to explain vine-growing specialization in the province of
Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain) in the mid-nineteenth century
MARC BADIA-MIRÓ* AND ENRIC TELLO**
*Departament d’Història i Institucions Econòmiques, Facultat d’Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona,
Av. Diagonal, 690, 08034, Barcelona, Espanya, e-mail: mbadia@ub.edu, (corresponding autor)
Xarxa de Referència en Economia i Polítiques Públiques
Centre d´Estudis ‘Antoni de Capmany’ d´Economia i Història Econòmica. Grup de Recerca Consolidat en
Història i Desenvolupament Econòmics (Indústria, Empresa i Sostenibilitat).
Departament d’Història i Institucions Econòmiques, Facultat d’Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona,
Av. Diagonal, 690, 08034, Barcelona, Espanya, e-mail: tello@ub.edu
Centre d´Estudis ‘Antoni de Capmany’ d´Economia i Història Econòmica. Grup de Recerca Consolidat en
Història i Desenvolupament Econòmics (Indústria, Empresa i Sostenibilitat).
**
Acknowledgements
Enric Tello has counted with the support given by the Spanish research projects HAR2009-13748C03 and HAR2012-38920-C02-02, and the Partnership Grant SSHRC 895-2011-1020 on Sustainable
Farm Systems: long-term socio-ecological metabolism in Western agriculture funded by the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada (2012-2017). Marc Badia-Miró acknowledges the support
of the Spanish research projects ECO2012-39169-C03-03 and XREPP. Both authors are members
of the Consolidated Research Group in Economic History and Development (Industry, Business
and Sustainability) at the Centre d’Estudis Antoni de Capmany (2009SGR153). We also thank the
help received from all members of these research teams, and especially to Ramon Garrabou,
Francesc Valls-Junyent, Xavier Cussó, Josep Colomé, Jordi Planas, Lluís Parcerisas, Ricard GarciaOrallo and Pere Pascual. We are also grateful for the criticisms and suggestions to earlier or partial
versions of this work made by James Foreman-Peck, Jean-Pascal Bassino, Pedro Lains, Joan
Ramon Rosés, Juan Carmona, Giovanni Federico, Cormac O’Grada and two other anonymous
reviewers. None of them are responsible for our own mistakes.
1
An agency-oriented model to explain vine-growing specialization in the province of
Barcelona (Catalonia, Spain) in the mid-nineteenth century
Resum
En aquest treball presentem un model sobre el procés d’especialització vitícola als municipis de la
provincial de Barcelona, a mitjans del s. XIX on s’explica com sorgeix una avantatge comparativa
fruit d’un procés que esdevindrà un dels punts de partida del procés d’industrialització a Catalunya.
Els resultats confirmen els papers jugats per l’impuls “Boserupiana” de la població en un context
d’intensificació de l’ús de la terra, i d’un impuls del mercat “Smithià” en un context d’expansió de la
demanda per part de les economies atlàntiques. També es posa de manifest la importància de les
dotacions agro-ecològiques i les condicions socio-institucionals relacionades amb la desigualtat de
l’ingrés. La difusió de la vinya dóna com a resultat una comunitat rural menys desigual fins al 1820,
tot i que aquesta desigualtat augmentarà a partir d’aquest moment.
JEL Codes: I39, N33, N53, Q56
Paraules clau: Especialització agrícola, vinya, impuls de la població, integració del mercat, idoneïtat
de la vinya, desigualtat rural, rati renda-salari, Catalunya.
Abstract
We present a model of vine-growing specialization in the municipalities of the province of
Barcelona in the mid-19th century that explains how a comparative advantage arose through a
process deemed to be one of the starting points for Catalan industrialization. The results confirm
the roles played by the ‘Boserupian’ population-push on land-use intensification and the ‘Smithian’
market-pull in a growing demand from the Atlantic economy. They also stress the conditioning
function of agro-ecological endowments and socio-institutional settings related to income
inequality. Vineyard planting gave rise to less unequal rural communities until 1820, but inequality
grew again afterwards.
Keywords: Agricultural specialization, vine-growing, population push, market integration,
grapevines suitability, rural inequality, rental-wage ratios, Catalonia
2
1. Introduction
This article presents and tests a model which explains vine-growing specialization in the province of
Barcelona, based on the stylized facts pointed out in many case studies published by rural
historians. It combines the theoretical insights of either Hecksher-Olhin or the New Economic
Geography approaches when considering comparative advantages, factor endowment and the
impact market openness to international markets had on the Catalan economy. According to the
existing historiography, the spread of vineyards started at the end of the 17th century and increased
until the Phylloxera Vastatrix plague at the end of the 19th century. In 1858 115,454 hectares were
planted with vines which accounted for 51 per cent of the farmland in the province of Barcelona,
and some 16,000 hectares more were added until the Phylloxera crisis in the 1880s (Badia-Miuró et
al., 2010). This process was triggered by the following driving forces: a) population growth; b)
market connection with an increasing demand for liquors and wines from a growing Atlantic
economy; and c) the planting of vineyards in mainly poor sloping lands landowners leased to small
grower-tenants with little or no land of their own by an emphyteutic contract called rabassa morta in
Catalan—as it expired when the vines planted died (Vilar, 1962; Giralt, 1965; Balcells, 1980;
Carmona and Simpson, 1999; Colomé, 2000; Garrabou et al., 2000; Garrabou et al., 2008; Garrabou
et al., 2009; Colomé et al., 2002; Badia-Miró et al., 2010).
This wine-exporting specialization brought about the most important change crop allocation
experienced in the Catalan rural society of that time. It had a deep effect on the composition and
evolution of foreign trade (Pan-Montojo, 1994; Carmona et al., 2001, Valls, 2001a; 2001b; 2003;
Pinilla and Ayuda, 2007). Furthermore, commercial profits accumulated by winemakers and traders
also contributed to finance the comparatively early industrialization of Catalonia (Sudrià and
Pascual, 1999; Marfany, 2010; 2012). A closer domestic market integration between rural and urban
places was also fostered by means of this vine-growing specialization (Valls, 2007). Thanks to the
opportunities which opened up for the poorest sections of the peasantry, a deeper domestic
demand for cheaper textiles manufactured by the nascent industry ensued (Sánchez and Nadal,
1998). This outcome of the Catalan viticulture stands out against other contemporary paths which
some Southern European regions followed, such as the French Languedoc, where vines or looms
became alternative ways of economic development (Johnson, 1995; Valls, 2004). Therefore,
explaining winegrowing specialization in Catalonia is a relevant economic historical issue.
Some partial versions of our model with successful results have already been published (Tello et al.,
2008; Garrabou et al., 2009). However, we are offering here what we consider to be the complete
and final version of it. In the first section we present the model and the stylized facts of the
available evidence. The second section enumerates the datasets that have allowed us to empirically
test the model, going deeper into the expected impact of each variable. In section three we check
the model against the datasets assembled. Section four discusses the results and conclusions.
3
2. A historical model to explain how a comparative advantage arose
At first sight, the theoretical background underlying this historical narrative could be considered to
be an applied version of the Heckscher–Ohlin model. According to it, vine-growing specialization
would have developed in those Catalan municipalities with more favourable factor endowment to
meet the increasing demand for wine. However, the existing literature not only points out that vines
tended to spread where land and labour endowments were most suitable. Historians have also tried
to explain how this comparative advantage arose throughout a specific historical process. Figure 1
describes the set of driving forces to be considered. Some of them can be regarded as naturally
given, such as agro-climatic endowment. Others depended on human agency, like migrations that
changed population densities or the readiness of many landless peasants to invest their labour force
to turn poor sloping land into terraced vineyards (Olarieta et al., 2008).
Figure 1 – About here
In other words, we are assuming an agency-oriented explanation of this historical process of landuse change (Lambin et al., 2000; Moran and Ostrom, 2005). Figure 1 highlights the ‘Boserupian’
pushing force of increasing population densities that triggered more intensive land uses in mainly
rural municipalities (Boserup, 1981; Netting, 1993; Hunt, 2000); and the market-pulling ‘Smithian’
force exerted by an overseas wine demand which induced a reallocation of land and labour towards
vine-growing. These population-pushing or market-pulling forces had different impacts on the local
land-use changes, depending on two other sets of conditioning factors, namely the specific agroclimatic endowments and the existence of a labour force ready to enter into tenancy contracts to
grow vines (Garrabou et al., 2008)
.
This agency-oriented model of land-use change combines what environmental historians (Cronon,
1991) as well as New Economic Geography (Krugman, 1993a; 1993b) call first-nature and secondnature variables. While agro-climatic endowments are first-nature factors, the dynamic interaction
between the other variables becomes a set of second-nature drivers—included time-distances to the
nearest seaport that we take as a proxy for the market-pulling force (Badia-Miró et al., 2010). What
eventually really matters is the combination between them. Except for the pulling market force of
demand, all variables had to move along a specific range of values, higher than a minimum but not
exceeding an upper level, so as to fit with the rest in a suitable economic factor endowment. Local
suitability to vine-growing was the outcome of a myriad of decisions taken by a lot of people
interacting in a given set of challenges and opportunities which in turn they transformed.
This agency-driven impulse set in motion self-reinforcing processes of vineyard planting, and some
additional loops could be established within them. Planting vines using the long-lasting leases of
rabassa morta could attract immigrants seeking new opportunities. This in turn might open a way of
access to land for poor landless peasants, while the increasing reliance on distant markets may affect
income distribution as well. The result would depend on the evolution of terms of trade and socio4
institutional responses. As long as a foreign demand for wine kept growing at a higher rate than the
local labour supply, we may expect that this market connection helped to reduce income inequality
in winegrowing areas (Lindert and Williamson, 2003; Williamson, 2006; 2011). Though, the actual
outcome would also depend on other social and political factors at stake.
This vine-growing specialization stopped when one or several key variables exceed certain
threshold values. For example, attaining population densities higher than the ones capable to be
sustained by a still mainly agrarian economy, or exhausting marginal lands available to plant
vineyards. As a result they faced a dilemma: Either demographic surpluses started to emigrate again
towards other places, or local economies started a structural change to more industrial activities
(Colomé et al., 2010, Colomé and Valls, 2012). It would be great to carry out this analysis along
several dates, in order to assess whether or not the relative weight of first-nature and second-nature
variables changed throughout this historical process. Nevertheless, the available datasets only allow
us to perform a cross-section analysis in the mid-19th century.
2.1. Specifying ‘Boserupian’ population push and ‘Smithian’ market pull
Our first dataset is taken from the Estadística Territorial of the province of Barcelona compiled in
1858 (Muro et al., 2011). This land-use figures have been benchmarked with other cadastral records
used in several case studies, and they enabled us to highlight the role that a large number of farm
plots held by poor smallholders, who had to give up on the idea of achieving self-sufficiency
through poly-culture, played in the spread of vineyards (Garrabou et al., 2000; 2001; 2010; Tello et
al., 2008). The spatial distribution of vineyards in the province of Barcelona in 1858 shows that
basically vine-growing municipalities were located either along the coast (around the seaports of
Mataró and Vilanova), or covered the flatter areas in the pre-littoral corridor (between the towns of
Vilafranca del Penedès, Igualada, Manresa and Terrassa). We also observe a higher presence of
vines in areas closer to Barcelona, and lower levels in the municipalities far from the coast—while
there was a first ring allocated for grains and vegetables around the city (Map 1).
Map 1 – About here
A further step was to identify those municipalities that showed a cluster with similar levels of vinegrowing specialization by using local I-Moran’s indices:
I i  zi  Wij z j
j
where Ii is the local I-Moran’s index, zi,t is the standardized value of the considered dataset in region
i, and Wi,j is the spatial weight matrix.1 The results are shown in Map 2:
1 In our case, we consider queen contiguity standardized by length border, so that we have weighed contact
values by the length of the common border among municipalities. This choice of the spatial weight matrix is
not neutral. If we compare the results obtained from different weight matrices (non-standardized or
standardized by number of neighbours) we could observe some dissimilarity, particularly among those
5
Map 2 – About here
As expected, local spatial autocorrelation appears to be significant in high-high relations in three
clusters of vine-growing specialization located in the south-west (the Penedès County, around the
town of Vilafranca and approaching the town of Vilanova), at the north-east side of the city of
Barcelona near the sea (the Maresme County, around the town of Mataró), and in some parts near
the centre of the province (Pla de Bages County, around the town of Manresa). A significant
autocorrelation cluster with low-low values appears at the northern parts, nearer to the prePyrenees mountains around the towns of Berga (Bergadà County) and Vic (Osona County). In the
rest of the province vineyards seem to be randomly distributed, i.e. they were intercropped with
grains, tree crops, woods and pastures in poly-cultural landscapes.
Grape vines had been grown in Catalonia for many centuries before they became the main cash
crop. They were traditionally planted as a temporary crop in small plots of woodland or scrub
previously slashed and burnt, until the vines became too old and the vineyard was left to be
reforested. Another crop pattern consisted of planting sparse rows of vines with strips of arable
land in between, which were alternatively sown with grains or left fallow. These vineyards had long
existed as a complementary side to the traditional agricultural system that produced wheat, wine
and olive oil in a poly-cultural landscape whose surpluses were mainly oriented to local markets.
Things started to change from the 17th century onwards, since population growth made it necessary
to adopt more intensive land-use patterns while the Dutch trade connected the Western
Mediterranean coast with the emerging Atlantic economy. This European or American demand for
spirits and wines started to pull a new commercial type of winegrowing in Catalonia (Vilar, 1962;
Fradera, 1987; Valls 2003). Moving beyond the city of Barcelona and its outskirts, population
densities increased from nearly 20 inhabitants per square kilometre in 1718 to more than 36 in
1787, and almost doubled again to 64 in 1857-1860. As a result, per capita land availability had
reduced from more than five hectares per inhabitant to only one and a half throughout 140 years.
In this context of market integration, the relationship between population growth and the change in
crop patterns appears to be less obvious than expected. Up to a point, higher population densities
fostered more intensive land uses, such as vine-growing, but further increases above a certain
threshold could put an end to vineyard planting—for example, due to the development of
industrious or industrial activities that would increase labour costs. An optimal population density
for viticulture seems to have been between 25 and 65 inhabitants per km2 (Badia-Miró et al. 2010),
a range that fits the upper threshold for a rain-fed agricultural economy established by Ester
Boserup (1981). Only an urban–industrial economy could host higher population densities, as was
the case in the industrializing districts of Barcelona, Mataró, Arenys de Mar, Terrassa, Sant Feliu de
Llobregat and Vilafranca del Penendès in 1857 (Table 1).
municipalities with high-low and low-high relations. The high-high and low-low relations were robust and
always appeared regardless of the matrix choice.
6
Table 1 – About here
Map 3 outlines that those municipalities with higher population densities, together with the capitals
of the districts, were clustered in coastal zones around Barcelona, and spread along the rivers
Llobregat (with an additional area that extended to the Penedès and Anoia counties) and the BesòsCongost (along the Vallès County). Moreover, these were precisely the areas where Catalan
industrialization began.
Map 3 – About here
Anyhow, it is not the population density at a given date that allows us to capture the push driving
force exerted by the ‘Boserupian population pressure’ on land-use intensification. But we believe it
to be the increase in population densities between some lower and upper thresholds preceding the
change in crop allocation. As we have already checked in earlier versions of the model (Tello et al.,
2008), what becomes significant is the growth population experienced along a period of time before
the levels of vine-growing specialization were laid down. Therefore, we use population increases
from 1787 to 1860 as the ‘Boserupian’ variable. Map 4 and
Map 5 show a rather random distribution of population growth rates, except in some municipalities
near the towns of Vilafranca del Penedès, Igualada and Terrassa.
Map 4 – About here
Map 5 – About here
How could these high population densities be fed? With average cereal yields at about 15-16
hectolitres per hectare grown in 44 per cent of farmland, local production of food grains could only
fulfil 39 per cent of the consumption needs circa 1860. To cover the other 61 per cent, the province
of Barcelona had to import one million hectolitres of wheat per year from Castile or other inland
regions of the Iberian Peninsula—since a ban on overseas imports of grain had been imposed in
1820 so as to create a Spanish home market (Map 6).
Map 6 – About here
A deeper market integration of the regional economy ensued after two centuries of an export-led
growth of Catalan viticulture. Therefore, market access became a key variable for the impact
exerted by this ‘Smithian’ pulling impulse in different municipalities. Our model assesses this pull
effect using travel costs to the seaports, as measured in time distances before the arrival of railways.
Map 7 shows the isochronal curves to the nearest harbour (Mataró, Vilanova or Barcelona) during
the first third of the 19th century.
Map 7 – About here
Before railroads, the location of every municipality had a deep impact on the economic access to
foreign markets. Practically all inland trade had to be carried through cart roads and bridle paths. By
7
comparing maps 1 and 7, the relationship between vine-growing locations and time distances to the
seaports becomes apparent.
2.2. Specifying agro-climatic endowment
Agro-climatic endowments acted as conditioning variables that mediated in the local responses to
population-push and market-pull. Slope of the land and the texture of soils, rainfall, frost risk, solar
radiation, together with altitude and average temperature determined the suitability of different
lands for a range of possible crops (Map 8).
Map 8 – About here
Agronomists also use specific agro-climatic indices constructed to obtain a proxy of land aptitude
for growing grapevines, such as the Huglin helio-thermic index or the Winkler and Amerine
Effective Thermal Integral (Tonietto and Carbonneau, 2004).2 Their values are seen on Map 9:
Map 9 – About here
A relationship between vineyard locations and agro-climatic endowments shows up when
comparing Map 1 with Maps 8 or 9. While municipal averages of temperature and solar radiation
seem to be positively correlated with higher percentages of vineyards in farmland, a negative sign is
expected when it comes to frost risk. On a less obvious way, average slope and water stress are also
expected to be positively correlated with vineyards since landowners had tended to allocate flatter
and moister soil to grow vegetables and cereals, and leased sloping and drier lands to small vinegrowing tenants. Similarly, we expected the Huglin and Winkler indices to show a positive and
significant impact on vine-growing specialization. However, as it will be explained, our results do
not confirm this assumption. The reasons seem to lie in the fact that in Catalonia growing vines was
not first choice of landowners, but only a second best for lands less suitable for growing grain.
2.3. Specifying inequality in agricultural wealth and income distribution
A source published in 1852, the Repartimiento Personal de la Riqueza Territorial, has allowed us to take
into account inequality in agricultural wealth and/or income distribution, seen as another
conditioning factor of the local impact of population push and market pull on winegrowing
specialization. This rather exceptional record lists the names of all owners of land, houses and
livestock who were subjected to the cadastral tax. The document adds up the evaluation of their
annual taxable incomes to obtain the corresponding tax burden of every municipality (Bravo
Given that vines stop vegetative activity below a temperature of ten degrees, and that above that level their
growth depends on available sunlight for photosynthesis, the Huglin index of helio-thermal aptitude is
obtained by the expression: IH = S[(Ta–10°)+(Tm–10°)]K/2, where Ta is the daily average temperature, Tm is
the maximum daily temperature during the active period of vegetation, and K is the length ratio of days
varying from 1.02 to 1.06 between 40 and 50 degrees latitude. The Active Thermal Integral (ATI) is calculated
by adding the daily mean temperatures above or equal to 10°C during the active period of vegetation between
March and October: ATI = STa, where Ta is the active temperature. The Effective Thermal Integral (ETI) of
the Winkler and Amerine index is the sum of effective daily mean temperatures, calculated from the monthly
average temperatures multiplied by days of each month during the growth season from April to October. So
that, ETI = STe, where the effective temperature (Te) is the active temperature (Ta) minus 10°C.
2
8
Murillo, 1852). Although several historians have used some information taken from these lists, this
is the first time that a large dataset is created and thoroughly analysed using the whole information
they contain. Our database includes more than 86,000 taxpayers in 295 municipalities out of the
311 existing at present in the province. They represented 12% of the total population, 24% all
males, and 41% of all male inhabitants older than 21, as recorded in the provincial census of 1857.
However, this rather exceptional information contains an important ambiguity: Are we calculating
inequalities of wealth or income? Wealth inequality is always greater than income inequality, as
people have to survive even with lower incomes while properties are accumulated over generations
only by those who earn higher ones (Van Zanden, 1995). As is fully explained in (Tello and BadiaMiró, 2011), the data provided refers only to the aggregate value of these properties locally owned
by each taxpayer in every municipality, according to the standardized procedures applied by the
cadastral officials—including the estimated incomes earned by grower tenants (Peña, 1852). Labour
people with no property or tenancy were excluded, while 84% of ratepayers were smallholders
having only a poor house with a family garden of their own. The implicit rent of the latter
amounted up to 2,000 Spanish reales, an income near the poverty line of that time (Cerdà, 1867).
Thus, our dataset becomes truncated and skewed as it is somewhere between wealth and income
distribution. In order to turn this dataset on personal real estate wealth into a clearer distribution of
agricultural incomes, we have added all non-owners male adults older than 21 before calculating
some of our inequality indices; and then, in order to correct the agricultural wages missed, a
minimum vital income of 1,500 reales a year has also been added to the earning valuation of
properties and tenancies held (Garrabou and Tello, 2002, Tello and Badia-Miró, 2011).3
Now we come to the main question: Which was the expected relationship between income
distribution and vine-growing specialization? Given that the long-lease rabassa contract established
that the tenancy lasted until the vines’ death, grower tenants used to bury strains in order to keep
them alive so as to turn their access to the land almost permanent. The duration of the contract,
and the rent share over the vintage, became the contested issues of a long social conflict that lasted
from the end of the 18th century until the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) (Balcells, 1980; Tello,
1997; Carmona and Simpson, 1999). Despite this long-lasting clash between landowners and
tenants, the spread of the rabassa tenancy system may be regarded as a praiseworthy achievement of
the poorest sections of Catalan rural society owing to their collective action. In fact, up to the first
decades of the 19th century vine-growing had led to a less unequal income distribution compared to
3
What credibility can we give to this source, given its tax purpose? From the private records of the
Marquis of Sentmenat we know that during the five years between 1850 and 1854 this landlord
earned in the municipalities of Sentmenat and Palau-solità-i-Plegamans an average yearly income of
12,047 and 15,983 reales respectively (Garrabou et al., 2001). The Distribution of Personal Wealth in Real
Estate Ownership of 1852 attributed to him a yearly cadastral income of 11,607 and 15,323 reales in
those places.
9
cereal-cropping or forestry municipalities (Garrabou and Tello, 2002; Tello and Badia-Miró, 2011).
Anyhow, was this achievement attained thanks to or in spite of the consequences market
integration and population growth brought about?
The answer is far from simple. Following a Heckscher-Ohlin approach, the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem states that an increase in relative prices of a commodity will lead to a rise in the return to
that factor which is used most intensively in producing it, and conversely, to a reduction in the
return to the other less abundant factor. By adopting this theoretical insight, economic historians
have shown that the First Globalization following the fall in maritime freight costs from 1870 to
the First World War entailed a rise in relative prices of agricultural goods in front of manufactures.
This in turn led to a greater inequality in land-abundant and labour-scarce countries that exported
primary commodities—as reflected in the rental-wage ratio increases in regions such as Latin
America or Eastern Europe. Conversely, labour-abundant and resource-scarce countries, such as
Japan and Western Europe, experienced a decrease in rental-wage ratios and a lesser inequality in
income distribution (O'Rourke and Williamson, 2001; Lindert and Williamson, 2003; Williamson,
2006; 2011).4
Between these contrasting outcomes, where can the case of Catalan viticulture be placed? First of
all, we consider the increase in market involvement which initially ran at a slow pace along the 18th
century and during the first half of the 19th century. Local populations could increase at a lower or
greater rate than the changes relative prices experienced, and be reinforced by migratory flows that
altered labour endowment at local level. Social unrest also increased along this period, a
phenomenon which led to institutional changes and political decisions that affected income
distribution.5 Looking at the available evidence, we face what seems a contradictory picture. On the
one hand, the Gini indices obtained with our dataset on agricultural wealth distribution in 1852
clearly point out a lower inequality level in vine-growing municipalities compared to the ones
mainly allocated to cereal cropping and forestry (Table 2).
Table 2 – About here
Per capita incomes were also lower in vine-growing municipalities than in the rest, thus we prompt
the following question: Was the lower wealth inequality level simply due to their relative poverty?6
4 According to (Williamson, 2006: 48), wage-rental ratios would have experienced in Spain a slower increase
than other non-protectionist European countries such as the United Kingdom, Denmark or Sweden from
1870 to 1914. See also (Prados de la Escosura, 2008).
(Santiago-Caballero, 2011) shows how inequality decreased in the cereal-growing inland Spanish province of
Guadalajara during the last third of 18th century due, as it seems, to a successful local land reform.
5
6 This fits the estimates made in the mid-18th century in France by François Quesnay, who attributed to vinegrowing peasant-owners the lowest non-wage agricultural income in his Tableau Économique (Milanovic, 2010).
Thanks to the revolution, French winegrowers became mainly property-holders: Exactly the same status that
rabassa tenants sought in Catalonia. Compared to them, the Catalan vine-growing tenants can only be
considered as would-be peasants. Nevertheless, their legal and economic status was stronger than other
tenants-at-will, or labour-tenants, that existed in several regions of Europe at the time, such as the statartorpare
in Sweden, husmennene in Norway, husmaendene in Denmark, or heuerlinge in North-western Germany (Morner,
1970; Schlumbohm, 1996).
10
To answer this question, we calculated the Theil index of an estimated agricultural income
distribution including all adult males, and obtained the corresponding Extraction Ratios (ER)
compared to a maximum Inequality Possibility Frontier (IPF) related to per capita income
(Milanovic et al., 2011). The results confirm that not only agrarian income inequality was lower in
vine-growing municipalities but extraction ratio as well.
Nevertheless, when looking at the long-term trends showed by rental-wage ratios from 1826 to
1893 it becomes apparent that land rents captured almost all gains taken from the two waves of
increase in the relative prices of wine. Agricultural wages did not, so income inequality must have
tended to increase in Catalan vine-growing areas along the 19th century. Conversely, in cerealgrowing areas the long-term trend showed a reduction in rental-wage ratios that must have entailed
a lowering of rural inequality (Figure 2).
Figure 2 – About here
The only way to reconcile the evidence given in Table 2 and Figure 2 is to establish a clear
distinction between levels and trends. The long-lasting spread of vineyards from the mid-17th century
to the beginning of the 19th century through rabassa leases seems to have reduced wealth and
income inequality in winegrowing places, at least compared to grain-growing or forestry
municipalities. As a result, circa 1850 vine-growing municipalities had lesser inequality levels than
the rest. Anyhow, from 1825 onwards inequality started to rise again in vine-growing municipalities
whereas in grain-growing areas it diminished. This contrast between levels and trends may help us
to unravel a difficult conundrum. How can social unrest in vine-growing municipalities be
explained, knowing that agricultural income was more evenly distributed in them than in any other
area in the Barcelona province in the mid-19th century?
Perhaps inequality in winegrowing areas was lower precisely because of the collective action Catalan
rabassa tenants exerted, prompting their empowerment (Tello and Badia-Miró, 2011).7 On the other
hand, Figure 2 clearly shows that landowners took almost all the gains in relative prices along the
two main booms Catalan viticulture went trough, i.e. the Odium mildew in the 1840s, and the
Phylloxera plague from 1875 to 1885 (Colomé et al., Forthcoming). Throughout the wine crisis
Catalonia underwent after the Napoleonic wars in the 1820s, in the 1860s, and after 1885, the
decrease in land rents was also lower than the diminishing trend in relative prices of wine—so that
landowners succeeded in downloading the crisis on the rest of the population. Certainly, as
sharecroppers Catalan vine-grower tenants could also take some gains from favourable trends in
relative prices. However, most of them were smallholders lacking enough access to land to earn a
This relates to the connections between inequality as such, and the perception of it. As Alexis de
Tocqueville wrote in Democracy in America in 1835, ‘When inequality of conditions is the common law of society, the most
marked inequalities do not strike the eye; when everything is nearly on the same level, the slightest are marked enough to hurt it.
Hence the desire of equality always becomes more insatiable in proportion as equality is more complete’ (reference taken from
(Stiglitz, 2012). Besides that, people in the lowest social strata also need to rely on some resources in order to
struggle to improve their condition. Therefore, empowerment becomes more likely in societies with
intermediate rather than extreme levels of inequality.
7
11
living, and had to search for additional incomes as daily labourers hired by wealthier landowners. As
a result, income inequality must have tended to rise in winegrowing areas whereas it must have
tended to fall in grain-growing municipalities—where land rents remained fairly stable while
agricultural wages, which were lower there, tended to converge with coastal ones (Garrabou, Tello
2002). This fits quite well to explain the reasons underlying the strong social and political
polarization found within many Catalan rural communities which relied on viticulture during the
second half of the 19th century, and along the first third of the 20th century as well (Planas and
Valls, 2011).
How do these contrasting results relate to the assumptions made by the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem? As we are dealing with a highly labour-intensive cash crop, we should expect that the
expansion of viticulture entailed a reduction in inequality through a diminishing trend in rentalwage ratios—always under a ceteris paribus assumption. Although we found evidence of lesser levels
of wealth inequality in winegrowing municipalities in the mid-19th century, the historical series of
rental-wage ratios seem to contradict the expected diminishing trend in vine-growing areas from
1825 onwards. Therefore, we formulate a hypothesis with many nuances. On the one hand, the
bold collective action from vine-growing rabassa tenants would have harnessed the underlying
economic trends in their favour set up in line with Stolper-Samuelson assumptions, provided that
these would have not been counteracted by the social power well-off landowners exerted and the
public policies implemented at the time (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Milanovic, 2005; 2011).
This was probably the case while this regional economy remained commercially open until 1820,
but from that date on it was counteracted to a great extent.
The strong protectionist trade policy implemented in Spain after 1820 highlights the social and
political forces at stake. After the emancipation of the Latin American colonies, foreign imports of
grain were simply banned in order to substitute them with cereals coming from inland Spain. It was
not until the democratic revolution of 1868 that this ban was replaced with a moderate tariff which
established an effective protection of about 10% over the wholesale wheat price in Barcelona.
Following the restoration of the monarchy in 1874, the combined effect of higher tariffs and the
devaluation of the Spanish currency increased this effective protection to nearly 20%. Then, in 1891
onwards tariffs were subsequently raised to 30% and more. At the end of the 19th century effective
protection reached 50% of the Catalan wheat price (Pascual, 1990: 138-141). This helps us to
understand why most wealthy landowners kept their estates poly-cultural and allocated the better
lands to cereal crops.
This complex social and political fabric can also explain why it is not so easy to find a simple spatial
pattern in the impact of vine-growing specialization in the evolution of rural inequality in Catalonia.
As (Williamson, 2006: 58) pointed out, it is even likely that a reverse causality was established
between commodity prices and factor endowment—so that a favourable evolution of relative prices
fostered rabassa leases and attracted more immigrants, thus increasing cheap labour supply and
making land-labour relations endogenous at a local level. The whole picture appears to be
12
sometimes rather blurred. Counter what we found in other variables, income inequality does not
show spatial autocorrelation—which means that it was randomly distributed in space in the midnineteenth century (Map 10).
Map 10 – About here
3. Running the model
In order to test statistically the determinants of vine-growing specialization the following model has
been used:
VDSup j  1   2 ·AGRCL j   3·MKAC j   4 ·INEQ j   5·AGPOB j ,t 1   j
(1)
Where VDSupj is the percentage proportion of cropland allocated to vineyards, AGRCLj are a set
of agro-climatic variables which could affect vineyard specialization (slope, rainfall, altitude, soil
quality, frost risk and agro-climatic suitability indices for growing grapevines), MKACj captures the
‘Smithian-pull’ effect through market access (either domestic or foreign) as assessed by time
distances to the seaport of Barcelona.8 INEQj captures income inequality considering Theil indices
of income inequality for adult male population as a whole, corrected with a subsistence wage
income for all working-age men. To improve the robustness of the estimation we tried using
Inequality Extraction Ratio, Theil index with no corrections and Gini index, but no better results
were obtained. To capture the ‘Boserupian-push’ we consider AGPOBj,t-1, i.e., the population rate
growth for each municipality between 1787 until 1860.9
Finally, a few dummy variables were considered: CPJ for those municipalities which were capital
districts, and DMES70a for those with population densities greater than 70 inhab./km2. Both cases
allow us to assess the impact of more urban and diversified economies on vine-growing
specialization, and a negative sign ought to be expected. We have also considered DM_King to
search for a possible positive effect of municipalities having the King as manor, instead of having a
member of the nobility or the Church before the manorial system was abolished in 1836—provided
that this could entail a more flexible institutional framework. However, no robust results were
obtained in all estimates.
Table 3 – About here
Population growth rates between 1787 and 1860 were significant and with the expected sign, so
that municipalities with higher rates of population increase before 1860 had higher shares of
When a one-time benchmark is considered the choice for a market access variable is not as relevant as when
using a time series analysis. Innovation in transport facilities has a deeper impact in the latter case (Badia-Miró
et al., 2010).
8
We have also considered population densities to capture ‘Boserupian’ effects, but no better results were
obtained. Coefficients were significant but with a negative sign. This suggests that in the mid-19th century the
range of population density suitable for growing vineyards had already been attained or even surpassed in
most areas of the province of Barcelona with appropriate agro-ecological endowments. Further population
increases above that upper threshold entailed a negative impact in winegrowing.
9
13
farmland allocated to vineyards. This confirms the ‘Boserupian-push effect’ which favours more
labour-intensive crops. The significance of dummy variables related to capital districts or having
population densities higher than 70 inhab./km2 may suggest the existence of an upper threshold of
some 65 inhab./km2, or one and a half hectares per inhabitant, a figure above which the population
push ceased to foster winegrowing. The market access pull, as measured with time-distances to
Barcelona, is always significant and negative except when spatial autocorrelation is considered. This
highlights the ‘Smithian-pulling force’ of foreign market access for wine and liquor exports
combined with the ‘Boserupian-push effect’.
The joint impact of these drivers on local land-use changes depended upon other sets of
conditioning factors: Agro-ecological suitability, and income inequality. No surprises appear when
using agro-climatic variables. Rainfall levels are significant and negative, indicating vines were
planted in drier lands while moister ones were reserved to grain and vegetables. The same happens
with altitude. Frost risk is significant and positive. Slope is also significant and negative, and the
square of the slope has a negative sign showing that it has a decreasing positive impact. All these
results confirm that vineyards were planted as a second-best choice in poorer and sloping lands
which were less suitable for grain—but not as much as in forestlands and pastures. We have also
repeated the estimates considering the municipal helio-thermal values taken with the Huglin index
and the Winkler and Amerine ETI, which are expected to capture the better locations for planting
grapevines. Coefficients are not significant, thus reinforcing again that vineyard locations can not be
simply explained as a resource allocation owing to agro-climatic endowments given. Therefore,
what seems relevant is the interaction between the whole set of variables that put in motion an
agency-driven process that created a comparative advantage from the available resources.
An important leap forward of our model is to have included inequality as a relevant variable for the
first time, and it appears to be significant and negative. That is, those municipalities with higher
levels of income inequality tended to have lower vine-growing levels. Conversely, the ones with
more even income distribution had higher proportions of vineyards in their farmland in the mid19th century. To test the robustness of this result we have also considered income inequality values
only for the cadastral valuation of the taxpayers’ properties, and extraction ratios. In all cases the
result was the same, showing significant coefficients and the expected sign.10
This meaningful result is not merely an outcome of the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism applied to a
labour-intensive cash-crop. Due to the social power agrarian elites held, and the public policies
implemented in their favour, the evolution rental-wage ratios experienced in Catalan winegrowing
areas from 1820 onwards was exactly the opposite to the one expected according to a ceteris paribus
10 We have also analysed the weight that each term of the equation has in the final outcome. The result
reveals that geographical variables such as altitude, rainfall or slope have a slightly greater impact than the
others. Among the agency-oriented variables, inequality and market access stand out over the impact of
population push.
14
assumption required by this theorem. Thus, we have to stress the roles played by the protectionist
Spanish trade policy, and by the Catalan rabassa-sharecroppers who fiercely fought against their
landowners to stay in the land, reduce the rent share or even become whole owners of the
vineyards. They did not achieve this last aim—except when the Catalan Tenancy Act was passed in
1934, which Franco’s dictatorship abolished in 1939. But they were successful to some extent with
the former attempt.
Finally, we have also run some regressions to correct possible spatial autocorrelation problems. As
expected, spatial autocorrelation only appears in the impact of time-distances to Barcelona and for
average municipal rainfall. All other variables maintain significant coefficients with the expected
sign, reinforcing the robustness of the results obtained.
4. Concluding remarks
After having successfully included income inequality as a variable, we consider this to be the final
and complete version of our model which explains agricultural vine-growing specialization degree
attained in the province of Barcelona in the mid-19th century. It has not been conceived as simply a
replication of Hecksher-Ohlin or any other static economic model requiring a ceteris paribus
assumption, but as a historical dynamic explanation of how a comparative advantage was actually
created through an agency-driven process. From this standpoint, the interaction between context
and agency becomes crucial. People acted according to the range of opportunities and resources
that were available in their context. However, their agency also changed this context and opened
new opportunities or altered to a point the prevailing factor endowment.
By gathering large datasets available from many sources, not yet fully exploited, we have
successfully tested a thorough explanation of this historical process of winegrowing specialization,
deemed to be a starting point for industrialization and modern economic growth in Catalonia. Our
results confirm the prime role played by the ‘Smithian’ market-pulling force combined with the
‘Boserupian’ population-pushing effect, the two main drivers of land-use change. At the same time
they stress the conditioning function the prevailing agro-ecological endowment had, as well as
socio-institutional settings that gave rise to different levels of income or wealth inequality. What
stands out most is the fact that vineyard specialization can not be explained as a simple marketdriven resource reallocation, undertaken only according to a given set of agro-climatic features. The
active development of second-nature factors is as important as the first-nature endowments set in
advance (Cronon, 1991; Krugman, 1993b).
As the rest of these variables had already been tested in previous versions of the model (Garrabou
et al., 2009), the most important novelty found is that land-use profiles of inequality in agricultural
income distribution matter a great deal. In Catalonia, vineyard spread led to a less unequal rural
society until the mid-19th century. However, these lower inequality levels in winegrowing
municipalities went later hand in hand with a rise in rental-wage ratios that showed a persistent
15
trend to increase inequality again—a result which contradicts the expected situation in a labourintensive cash-crop according to the Stolper-Samuleson theorem under a ceteris paribus assumption.
This helps us to explain the strong polarization and ceaseless social unrest that existed in
winegrowing Catalan municipalities from the mid-19th century until the Spanish Civil War (19361939).
We may conclude that by transforming a previous landscape of brushwood and forest, or of cereal
crops grown in unsuitable poor land, into vineyards these rabassa sharecroppers not only opened a
gateway for themselves within Catalan villages and towns. They also gained a place in society and a
share of its income. By increasing population numbers and deepening the home market, this helped
to turn Catalonia eventually into a late-modern industrious society and an early-contemporary
industrial economy. Some legacies of this historical path remain nowadays. Ironically, the most
tasteful and appreciated Catalan wines still come from these poor sloping lands formerly terraced
by rabassers-tenants, while flatter lands with higher helio-thermic indices produce more abundant
vintages of low quality grape juice only suitable for making sparkling cava.
Acknowledgements
Enric Tello has counted with the support given by the Spanish research projects HAR2009-13748C03 and HAR2012-38920-C02-02, and the Partnership Grant SSHRC 895-2011-1020 on Sustainable
Farm Systems: long-term socio-ecological metabolism in Western agriculture funded by the Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada (2012-2017). Marc Badia-Miró acknowledges the support
of the Spanish research projects ECO2012-39169-C03-03 and XREPP. Both authors are members
of the Consolidated Research Group in Economic History and Development (Industry, Business
and Sustainability) at the Centre d’Estudis Antoni de Capmany (2009SGR153). We also thank the
help received from all members of these research teams, and especially to Ramon Garrabou,
Francesc Valls-Junyent, Xavier Cussó, Josep Colomé, Jordi Planas, Lluís Parcerisas, Ricard GarciaOrallo and Pere Pascual. We are also grateful for the criticisms and suggestions to earlier or partial
versions of this work made by James Foreman-Peck, Jean-Pascal Bassino, Pedro Lains, Joan
Ramon Rosés, Juan Carmona, Giovanni Federico, Cormac O’Grada and two other anonymous
reviewers. None of them are responsible for our own mistakes.
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21
Figures, tables and Maps
Figure 1 - Pushing or pulling drivers and conditioning factors of Catalan vine-growing specialization developed
until 1860
Push driving force:
A. Increasing rural
population
density
(by population growth
and immigration)
Conditional factors that modulated
the local impact of driving forces
pushing and pulling towards vinegrowing specialization:
1. Agro-ecological land
endowments
2. Inequality in land
ownership and tenure, or
rural income distribution
% of vineyards in farmland
Source: Our own, based in (Garrabou et al., 2009; Badia-Miró et al., 2010).
22
Pull driving force:
B. Increasing demand
for brandy and wine
exports
(by integration to
international markets)
y municipality iin 1858
Map 1 - Proportion of cropland allllocated to vineeyards in every
Source: Our own, from
m the Estadística T
Territorial (Muro et al., 2011).
Map 2 – Univariate
U
Locaal Moran for th
he vineyard speecialization
23
Source: Our own making from the same data of Map 1 considering
SpaceStat at a p-value=0.05. Red values indicate high-high relations,
blue values are low-low relations, light reds are high-low relations
and light blue are low-high relations.
Table 1. Population increase and population densities in the districts of the province of Barcelona (1718-1857)
1718
Districts
Inhabitants
Inhabitants
/km2
1787
ha
/inhabitant
Inhabitants
Inhabitants
/km2
1857
ha
/inhabitant
Inhabitants
Inhabitants
/km2
ha
/inhabitant
yearly
growth
rates
1718 1858
yearly
growth
rates
1787 1858
Barcelona
Arenys
Berga
Granollers
Igualada
Manresa
Mataró
Sant Feliu
Terrassa
Vic
Vilafranca
TOTALS
36,781
14,599
12,121
16,819
12,354
16,586
16,639
8,110
9,937
21,740
11,721
177,407
234.4
36.6
10
27.7
12.5
14.7
92.2
17.1
17.3
20.1
17.6
23.7
0.43
2.73
10.03
3.61
8.02
6.8
1.08
5.84
5.79
4.98
5.67
4.23
125,745
30,070
19,299
22,819
25,714
25,692
29,986
24,207
20,552
40,954
28,837
393,875
801.4
75.3
15.9
37.5
26
22.8
166.2
51.1
35.7
37.8
43.4
52.5
0.12
1.33
6.3
2.66
3.85
4.39
0.6
1.96
2.8
2.64
2.31
1.9
247,942
37,063
39,632
38,521
54,934
53,057
43,164
39,588
52,737
59,618
48,079
714,335
1,580.30
92.9
32.6
63.4
55.5
47
239.3
83.5
91.7
55.1
72.3
95.3
0.06
1.08
3.07
1.58
1.8
2.13
0.42
1.2
1.09
1.82
1.38
1.05
1.4%
0.7%
0.8%
0.6%
1.1%
0.8%
0.7%
1.1%
1.2%
0.7%
1.0%
1.0%
1.0%
0.3%
1.0%
0.7%
1.1%
1.0%
0.5%
0.7%
1.3%
0.5%
0.7%
0.8%
Outside
Barcelona
District
140,626
19.2
5.2
268,130
36.6
2.73
466,393
63.7
1.57
0.9%
0.8%
census
taken
from
Centre
Sources: Our own, based on
(http://www.ced.uab.es/index.php).
population
24
d’Estudis
Demogràfics
Map 3. Pop
pulation densitties and main ttransport netwo
works in the pro
ovince of Barceelona in 1860
Source::
Our
own,
from
m
tha
Centre
C
d’Esstudis
Dem
mogràfics
(http:///www.ced.uab.ees/index.php). W
We thank Barccelona Regionall for facilitatingg digital
informaation on the roaad and rail netwoorks in 1860.
25
Map 4. Aveerage annual po
population grow
wth rates from 1787 to 1860
Source: Our own, with poppulation data of the 1787 and
d 1860 census
he Centre d’Estu
tudis Demogràfiics (http://www
w.ced.uab.es/).
taken from th
Dark purple shows higher grrowth rates.
Maap 5. LISA map
ap for average annual
a
populattion growth rattes to detect sp
patial autocorreelation (1787-18860)
Source: Our own making coonsidering SpacceStat at a p-vallue=0.05. Red
v
are low-low relations,
values indicaate high-high reelations, blue values
light reds are high-low relatioons and light blu
ue are low-high relations.
26
M 6. Shortagee in cereal food
Map
d production to
o meet local co
onsumption in tthe
mun
nicipalities of thhe province off Barcelona (18559-67)
Source: Our own, from
m the dataset coompiled with th
he Estadístiques de la producció i consum de
o Catalonia, Foons de la
cereals alls partits judicials de la província dde Barcelona (Naational Library of
Junta dee Comerç, lot CX
XXVI, boxes 1663 and 164).
27
Map 7. Time distancees to the nearesst seaport using
ng existing cartt roads and brid
idle paths
in the provinnce of Barcelon
na in 1824-1838
m two itineraries published beforre the first Cataalan railway was set up in
Source: Our own, from
nonymous, 18388), checked with
h other sources (Bertrán Soler, 1847) or
1848 (Frrigola, 1824; An
authors (Vilar, 1962; Fo
ont, 1999; Pascuual, 1999; Herran
nz-Loncán, 2007
7; 2008).
28
Map 8. Som
me agro-ecolog
gical endowmen
ents to grow vin
nes or grains in
n the province oof Barcelona
Slopes
Water stress
Index of aggrological suitaability of soils
Number of
o months withh frost risk
Sourcee: Our own, madde with GIS with current agro-cclimatic data in the province of Barcelona.
29
Table 2. Land-use profiles of inequality in agricultural wealth or income distribution in the municipalities of the
province of Barcelona in 1852-1858
Gini indices of the
cadastral valuation
of property
Prevailing land uses
average
Extraction Ratios expressed as % of the
actual Theil indices of agricultural income
distribution, compared to the maximum
Inequality Possibility Frontier (IPF)
median
68.2
69.8
24.9
all municipalities with land-use data in 1858
64.7
65.2
22.0
mainly winegrowing municipalities
69.1
69.9
25.2
mainly cereal cropping
70.1
72.0
25.0
mainly allocated to forestry uses of land
Source: our own, calculated from the Repartimiento Personal de la Riqueza Territorial of 1852 (Library of the University of
Barcelona, reference 146-1-II/13), the population census of 1857 (taken from the Centre d’Estudis Demogràfics,
http://www.ced.uab.es/), and the Estadística Territorial compiled in 1858 (Muro et al., 2011). Theil indices, Extraction
Ratios and the IPF have been calculated for the whole adult male population older than 21, and adding a minimum vital
income of 1,500 Spanish reales a year (Tello and Badia-Miró, 2011).
Figure 2. Evolution of rental-wage ratios in coastal winegrowing counties (Vallès), or in inland cereal cropping
ones (Segarra and Urgell), compared to the relative prices of wine in Catalonia (1826-1893, all data in elevenyear moving averages with the reference year in the middle)*
200
180
index 1845‐1849 = 100
160
140
r/w litoral (winegrowing in the Vallès County)
120
100
relative prices of wine in terms of wheat in Catalonia
80
60
r/w inland (cereal cropping in the Segarra County)
40
r/w inland (cereal cropping in the Urgell County)
20
1891
1888
1885
1882
1879
1876
1873
1870
1867
1864
1861
1858
1855
1852
1849
1846
1843
1840
1837
1834
1831
1828
1825
0
Source: our own, calculated from the land rents of the Marquis of Sentmenat (Garrabou et al., 2011) and the Torelló
family (Pascual, 2000), the series of agricultural wages from (Garrabou and Tello 2002), and the relative prices of wine
from (Colomé et al., Forthcoming).
30
Map 10. Income inequ
uality in the muunicipalities off the province of
o Barcelona, aaccording
to the Gini indices
in
of the ccadastral valuattion of property
ty in 1852-1858
Sourcce: Our own, frrom the sourcees referred in Table
T
2. Greeneer municipalitiees have
higherr levels and yello
ower lesser levells of income ineequality.
Table 3. Explaaining vine-gro
owing specializ
ization in the province
pr
of Barccelona in the m
mid-19th century
ry
***
0.9921
0.107 ***
0.764 0.042 ****
***
10.5522
1.806 ***
7.347 1.440 ****
OLS - Onlyy
OLS Spatiall LAG Vineyard
Only Vin eyard
0.809 0.065 ***
0.084 0.0051 *
0.594 0.0053 ***
6.015 1.640 ***
3.797 1.1150 ***
0.008 0.002 ****
0.006 0.003 **
-0.001 0.000 ****
-0.010 0.003 ****
-0.001 0.000 ***
-0.007 0.004 *
-3.032 0.653 ****
-3.571 0.776 ***
TOBIT (1)
const
1.100
0
0.110
Rho
AGP
POB_1787_1860
9.771
1
1.716
DEN1860
-2.93E-04 1.36E
E-04
PLV
0.006
0
0.003
PEND
PEND^2
-0.001
0
0.000
ALT
-0.009
0
0.004
DISTBCN
THE
EIL1NOR_CONT
THEL
L1NORM_POBMA
A
-4.746
0
0.815
ER5T1
-0.166
0
0.077
CPJ
DM_KING
-0.137
0
0.036
DMES70a
292
N
L
Log-likelihood
-24.8922
Adj usted R-squared
Sch
hwarz criterion
106.551
Akkaike criterion
69.7833
H
Hannan-Quinn
84.5111
T
TOBIT
(2)
**
**
***
**
-2.58E--04 1.43E-04 *
0.0010
0.003 **
-0.0001
-0.0007
0.000 ***
0.004 *
0.2247
0.065 ***
***
**
OLS
-0.124 0.065 *
-0.091 0.027 ****
***
292
-37.646
120.706
91.292
103.074
292
56.717
0.583
-68.020
-97.434
-85.652
-0.059 0.032 *
-0.074 0.034 **
229
44.364
0.350
-45.258
-72.728
-61.646
0.037 0.0006 ***
-0.001 0.0000 ***
0.000 0.0000 ***
-1.156 0.5537 **
229
94.5447
0.6399
-175.0994
Note: t-ratios are in cuursive; ***1, **55, or *10% statiistical confidencce interval. OLS, ordinary least squares. OLS – Spatial
ng spatial lags to correct spatial autocorrelation
a
Lag, orrdinary least squuares considerin
biases.
31