More Money More Problems: NCAA Budgets

Political Science
More Money More Problems: NCAA Budgets and Scandals
Sponsoring Faculty Member: Dr. John Tures
Jalen Butler
Introduction
Collegiate athletics is one of the fastest growing industries in America,
and things do not seem to be slowing down. The host of HBO Real Sports,
Bryant Gumble, has one of the most candid quotes about the NCAA’s business
model. Gumbel says,” We have this multi-billion dollar collegiate sports industry; we have to figure out a way to fairly compensate those who are fueling
that industry.” He also states, “What a great business model, you make billions
and oh by the way you don’t have to pay the employees anything.” Gumbel
sent shock waves around the country because he is a much esteemed sports
anchor, and he took the contrarian perspective. The quote was aired on a 2011
Real Sports episode, but it is more relevant now than ever. This issue in collegiate athletics has always seemed to be a sport industry related issue, but now
it is becoming more and more political. The case being brought against the
NCAA by Ed O’Bannon, a former UCLA basketball star could prove to be ground
breaking in the collegiate athletic industry.
“Next week’s arguments in federal court will turn on a simple question
- are those rules a violation of federal law? The case was brought by
a former UCLA basketball star named Ed O’Bannon. A few years ago,
O’Bannon was working at a Toyota dealership near Las Vegas. One day
after work, he was hanging out at a friend’s house. His friend’s kid was
playing this college basketball video game. And O’Bannon says one of
the players in the video game looked really familiar” (Goldstein 2015).
The problem is this game was not out while O’Bannon was a collegiate athlete,
but after he a retired from a brief pro career. On the game, O’Bannon was on an
UCLA Legendary team that was composed of UCLA greats. It important to note
that none of the players on the game, even the current college players, were
named by their real names on the game. They were named by their position
(first name) and their number (last name), with almost exact likeness, height,
and weight. With that being said, it was very easy to distinguish who was the
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6’8, 225, bald headed, left handed player wearing the number 31 on the legendary UCLA team. O’Bannon would have never known that his likeness was
being used if his friend’s kids were not playing the popular NCAA March Madness video game. By the year 2013, all college football and basketball video
games were discontinued. Again, I do not know how much more volatile this
issue needs to become to be considered a “political issue.”
However, there has been an addition to the O’Bannon case, which was
filed in 2009, that could be even more ground breaking than O’Bannon’s issue.
The Northwestern football team has decided to fight for the ability to unionize.
It is only fitting for student athletes from one of the most prestigious institutions in the country to battle NCAA treatment.
“A National Labor Relations Board Regional Director recently found
that scholarship football players from Northwestern University are
“employees” under the National Labor Relations Act and ordered that
an election be conducted so that eligible football players can vote
whether to form a union. The authors of this article discuss the decision and its implications” (D’Aquila and Rudolph 2014, 37).
NCAA athletes, as a whole, have become dissatisfied with the lack of rights and
poor treatment they receive under the NCAA bylaws. Northwestern’s players
are just the first ones to take a notable stand.
“‘We’re one step closer to a world where college athletes are not stuck
with sports-related medical bills, do not lose their scholarships when
they are injured, are not subject to unnecessary brain trauma and
are given better opportunities to complete their degree,’ said former
Northwestern quarterback Kain Colter, who helped lead the effort
with the help of the United Steelworker” (ESPN 2014).
It is debatable whether college athletes deserve to be paid, but one thing for
sure is they deserve to be treated better.
Theory
In this paper, I hope to thoroughly discuss the institution that is collegiate athletics. The ground has been set for the corruption of the NCAA, but
there needs to be a scientific backing behind my claims.
“Science starts and ends with theories. Although the term theory is
used in a wide variety of ways, it could be defined as a set of empirical
generalizations about a topic. A theory consists of very general statements about how some phenomenon, such as a voting decision, eco219
nomic developments, or outbreaks of war, occurs” (Monroe 2000, 17).
Theories are the origin of the scientific process. As Monroe’s quote demonstrates, a theory plans to asses certain generalizations about a given topic. I
plan on presenting a theory that suggest as strong connection between the
profitability of collegiate athletics and corruption. It is important that I first
present the relevance of this information. With winning being the top priority
of NCAA athletic programs, it is more important than ever to recruit the best
prospects. NCAA coaches are normally only given a three to five year win to
show significant progress as a coach. With that being said, the high turnover
rate of college coaches invites corruption. To assess this situation properly I
must present his problem from the coach’s perspective. It is human nature to
want stability, but the coaching profession does not offer much stability. The
only way to ensure stability is to consistently win at a high-rate. This dilemma
brings forth a conflict of interest. Does a coach do what is best for their families
or conform to the presumed ethics of the coaching profession?
“In a positive or direct relationship between two variables, as one variable rises, the other tends to rise; for example, ‘The more education one has the
greater one’s income.’” (Monroe 2000, 19). The hypothesis and variables should
help your theories become narrower and precise. I believe there is a positive
relationship between the profitability of collegiate athletics and the corruption
in collegiate athletics. With that being said, my independent variable is the
profitability of collegiate athletics and my dependent variable is the amount of
corruption in collegiate athletics. “Independent variables are those presumed
in the theory underlying the hypothesis to be the cause and dependent variables are the effects or consequences, (Monroe 2000, 20).” If my theory is a correct assumption, as the profitability of collegiate athletics increases, so should
the level on corruption in collegiate athletics. Before I proceed any further, I
must assess what each of my variables mean. Corruption, which is my dependent variable, in college athletics can take many forms, whether it is money or
academic scandals. When people primarily think of corruption in college athletics, they primarily think of college players receiving unpermitted monetary
benefits.
“Duke Coach Mike Krzyzewski made $9.7 million last year, according
to USA Today. The people running around in the middle of the court
- the players - are, of course, not getting paid. That’s because a long
time ago, a bunch of colleges got together and said scholarships are
fine, but paying athletes is against the rules” (Goldstein 2015).
This situation presented by Jacob Goldstein is another reason why corruption
has become so prevalent. It is tough to explain to a college athlete why they
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receive no compensation and their coach is a millionaire. There is another perspective that quote can be seen from. There are tons of coaches in the NCAA,
but very few are making the kind of money that Coach Krzyzewski commands.
“Cheating” can help a coach ascend to Coach K’s tax bracket. Profitability, my
independent variable, will be based on how much money the NCAA makes as a
whole. Also, I hope to find a way to determine how much more profitable winning is to an athletic program.
Hypothesis
“A hypothesis is simply an empirical statement derived from a theory.
The logic linking the two is that if a general theory is correct, then the
more specific hypothesis derived from it ought to be true. Moreover,
if the hypothesis is not confirmed by empirical observation, then our
confidence in the general theory has increased. However, if a hypothesis is not confirmed, we must question the validity of the theory from
which it was derived” (Monroe 2000, 18-19).
I hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between the profitability of
collegiate athletics and the corruption in collegiate athletics. There should be
a definitive difference between your independent and dependent variables.
“Although the distinction is sometimes difficult to make, in most hypotheses
it is apparent. The statement may include explicit language to that effect- for
example, ‘cause’, ‘leads to’, or ‘results in’, (Monroe 2000, 20).” If my hypothesis
is correct, the increased profitability of the NCAA should “lead to” more NCAA
scandals. I briefly discussed my two variables, profitability and corruption, earlier but now I will go more in depth. In order to understand profitability, I must
understand how the NCAA makes money. First, it is important to understand
that the NCAA is a non-profit organization.
“The NCAA’s designation as a nonprofit association is based on how
it uses money and not on how much revenue is generated. All but 4
percent of NCAA revenue is either returned directly to member conferences and institutions or used to support championships and programs that benefit student-athletes” (NCAA.org 2014).
The most important question to answer is where the NCAA gets its money
from.
“Most NCAA revenue (81 percent projected for 2012-13) comes from
media rights, mostly from a $10.8 billion, 14-year agreement with CBS
Sports and Turner Broadcasting for rights to the Division I Men’s Basketball Championship. Most of the remaining revenue comes from
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NCAA championships, primarily ticket sales” (NCAA.org 2014).
This is the first major point of my paper. The majority of the NCAA’s revenue
comes from the NCAA men’s basketball tournament TV contract. Regardless of
the industry, big money contracts and profits invite unethical behavior, hence
more NCAA scandals. This leads me into analyzing what these NCAA scandals
are.
“‘There are many pressures on schools when it comes to recruitment
because so much now hangs on winning, aside from just competing’
Eno said. Now there are so many financial issues tied up with the winning team. The stakes have risen to the point where some programs
are willing to go way out of bounds to increase their leverage to win
and fill the seats at football stadiums” (Goral 2004, 40).
Business author Tim Goral attempts to present how vital profits are to the NCAA
and college athletic model. It is easy to forget that NCAA athletic programs are
a business first! “At the heart of the problem is, of course, the fact that college
sports have become big business for many schools, a business built on a sports
economy that rivals that of Third World Countries” (Goral 2004, 42). How can
you have an industry that rivals Third World Countries, but you cannot pay your
workers?
“Many college athletes will one day move on to professional leagues,
bringing prestige to their schools. Legally, these college stars can’t be
paid for their services, but keeping them happy with other perks, says
critics, and is at the root of the growing wave of college sports scandals” (Goral 2004, 45).
This quote describes the scandal issue in a nutshell. Corruption, which is my
dependent variable, in college athletics can take many forms, whether it is
money or academic scandals.
Who Governs the Governing?
The NCAA is the organization that runs majority of the collegiate athletic programs; the other organizations are the NAIA and NJCAA. This brings up
a political question that is relevant in almost every sector. Who regulates the
regulators? John Mack, who was the former chief executive of the investment
bank Morgan Stanley, has one of the most relevant quotes on the topic.
“‘We cannot control ourselves. You have to step in and control [Wall
Street].’ Those were the words of John Mack speaking in New York in
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November 2009 (to audible gasps). Congress obliged Mr. Mack by producing the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of July
2010” (Ferguson 2014, 59).
Mack understands in a business full of money hunger employees, it is very
tough to govern from within. How can you expect people who earn a living
through Wall Street to govern Wall Street ethically? It is human nature to act
upon what is in your best interest. The “business model” of the NCAA is very
similar to Wall Street. The NCAA student-athletes would be very similar to stock
holder in that fashion. The major difference is that I do not expect the NCAA to
admit that they cannot properly govern their institutions. The only way to get
the necessary change is to have the government govern the governing body
of every sector, as they have done with Wall Street. With the O’Bannon and
Northwestern cases pending, the NCAA will get some much needed government intervention sooner than later.
Profits go beyond Dollars
The benefits the institutions in the NCAA receive from athletics go far
beyond the monetary profits they receive.
“Of course, there are many colleges that use their athletes as core
marketers of the university. If not for college basketball players, think
about how much more money Gonzaga University would need to
spend on building name recognition to prospective students not located on the West Coast” (Edelman 2014).
Gonzaga University has become a basketball powerhouse that is relevant in
the national picture yearly. I am sure that people outside of the West Coast
are not familiar with that school aside from its basketball program. Another
example of this “free promotion” is Boise State University. Boise State is a yearly,
BCS bowl threat that is widely known for its blue turf. Again, how many people
are aware of Boise State University aside from its football team? There is a perspective I would like to take that puts this issue into prospective. Who are the
first alumnus you think of from North Carolina and Florida State University?
From my prospective, I would think of Michael Jordan (UNC) and Jameis Winston (FSU). Athletics are arguably the most talked about facet of an academic
institution.
“The year that Boston College quarterback Doug Flutie won the Heisman Trophy as the nation’s outstanding college football player, Boston College’s undergraduate admissions increased by 25 points and
its average SAT score of admitted freshmen skyrocketed by 110 points”
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(Edelman 2014).
Critics might argue that this is just a coincidence, but I am sure that there is
probably a similar increase at FSU during the Jameis Winston area. There is no
disputing that these institutions receive free promotion, it is just a matter of
where and how much free promotion they receive.
What is the NCAA?
Before examining the flaws in this system, it is important to know the
actual “purpose” of the NCAA.
“The National Collegiate Athletic Association is a membership-driven
organization dedicated to safeguarding the well-being of studentathletes and equipping them with the skills to succeed on the playing
field, in the classroom and throughout life” (NCAA.org 2015).
The NCAA is broken down in to three Divisions: Division 1, Division 2, and Division 3, with Division 1 being the largest, most talent-rich and profitable. Division 1 is the division of concern because it is the easily the most profitable and
visible. A common misconception about how the NCAA is how the governing
body works.
“Our governance structure consists of legislative bodies – made up of
volunteers from our member schools – that govern each division, as
well as a group of committees that set association-wide policy. These
committees manage topics affecting sports rules, championships,
health and safety, matters impacting women in athletics and opportunities for minorities” (NCAA.org 2015).
The NCAA does have officials that are not directly tied to NCAA institutions, but
the rules and legislature is decided on by a body of members of intuitions like
athletic directors and coaches. The highest body of the NCAA is the Executive
Committee.
“The Executive Committee is our highest governing body, bringing
together presidents and chancellors from each division to discuss issues important to the entire NCAA membership. All association-wide
governing bodies are charged with upholding and advancing the Association’s core values of fairness, safety and equal opportunity for all
student-athletes” (NCAA.org 2015).
This clearly describes the structure of the NCAA. “American universities have
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crafted an appealing image of ‘student-athletes.’ Kids go to school while playing sports on the side. They build character while representing their schools.
Everyone gains.” The NCAA and their member institutions want to give off the
image that they have the best interest of their students in mind, but it is obvious that this is not the case. The NCAA is a “non-profit” business!
Revenue
The revenue earned by the NCAA is the most debatable aspect of this
issue. Normally, the only college athletic programs which earn positive revenue
are football and men’s basketball. This is the point that critics of paying players
present. They question how you can pay player when only two sports earn
positive revenue. But it is important to note that positive revenue is only the
surface of this complex issue.
“At the Division I level, the NCAA operates much like any other professional sports league. The NCAA annually produces nearly $11 Billion
in revenue from the operation of college sports — more than the estimated league totals for the National Basketball Association and the
National Hockey League” (Edelman 2014).
The NCAA is more profitable than the NBA and NHL, but they do not pay their
players. The University of Alabama is the perfect example of this issue. “Meanwhile the University of Alabama reported $143.3 million in athletic revenues
last year — more than the revenues of each of 30 NHL teams, and 25 of the 30
NBA teams.” With that being said, the University of Alabama is one of the most
profitable athletic organizations in the country but their players are not paid.
There are many “excuses” the NCAA uses for not paying athletes, for example
Title IX of the Patty T. Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act.
“The NCAA’s leaders have no shortage of excuses to defend their actions, and seek to maintain the status quo. The NCAA’s newest excuse
against improving the working conditions of college athletes is that
Title IX of the Patty T. Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act would
prevent any arrangement that would lead for greater net compensation for male student-athletes” (Edelman 2014).
This is not a relevant excuse if you assess NCAA athletic programs as regular
businesses. Yes, there might be an issue because most male and women sports
do not make a profit. In business, is there a command monetary standard for
stock owners in the same sector? No, profits are determined by how profitable
your business has become.
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Academic Scholarship vs Athletic Scholarship
There is a common misconception, in my opinion, that athletic scholarships
and academic scholarships are on the same level. As a former Division 3 basketball player, I understand this issue more than most. First, a student athlete will
miss a ton of class while playing a collegiate sport. “By contrast, the studentathletes who devote on average more than 40 hours per week to their sport
are not even provided with the full value of a college educational experience.”
A student athlete spends more to time playing their sport than people spend
at their full-time jobs, not to mention school work. But here is the difference
between a Division 3 and Division 1 basketball player. Division 3 athletics are
very lax, by comparison. For example, I have had the time to hold a part time
job, double major, and work an internship, while being a collegiate athlete. On
the other hand, Division 1 athletes have a very stringent schedule that is often
times predetermined. Also, Division 1 athletes are often times swayed into majors that limit you in the workplace.
“In theory, a college degree could act as a career back-up given the
paucity of professional opportunities, but the “student-athletes” most
likely to focus on sports are least likely to graduate, especially with a
useful degree after majoring in “eligibility,” as Duderstadt put it” (Edelman 2014).
The major difference between Division 1 and 3 basketball players is that D1
players receive full scholarships, while D3 players receive only academic aid.
Who would you say had the better academic experience? A person receiving a
Division 1 academic scholarship would have all the academic perks I received
plus extra free time. With an academic scholarship, a student could have a
quality internship and or a job, while working on an education. What income
could a Division 1 athlete receive, since players are not paid for play? The critics
want to suggest the value of education, but I question whether athletes will
receive the same education as their peers with academic scholarships.
“This year, the NCAA scheduled its Division I football championship on
a Monday night in early January, overlapping with Florida State football players’ first day of spring semester classes. Similarly, the NCAA
men’s basketball tournament will likely force at least some studentathletes to miss more than six days of spring classes” (Edelman 2014).
Are these athletes really receiving the same education as their peers?
New Slaves
It is common knowledge that the NCAA profits of the athletes, but it is impor226
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tant to exam to what extent. Former-LSU basketball coach Dale Brown has a
candid quote that puts this issue into perspective.
“Economist Andy Schwarz told Nocera that ‘Economically, a big chunk
of that money really does belong to the players.’ Former LSU basketball coach Dale Brown opined: ‘Look at the money we make off predominantly poor black kids. We’re the whoremasters.’ Schools claim
they can’t afford to pay students, but they could redistribute existing
revenue. Nocera suggested paying coaches less” (Bandow 2012).
Coach’s Brown basically presents the idea that NCAA has been “pimping” underprivileged athletes that they cannot “afford” to pay. It is important
to note that admitting an additional student, an athlete, does not really cost an
institution much money.
“There are other beneficiaries of ‘student-athletics.’ Argued sports
journalist Robert Lipsyte; ‘The true madness of March is the millions of
dollars—generated by the kids who touch the ball—that goes mostly
to the advertising hustlers, television suits, arena operators, concession hawkers, athletic gear manufacturers and retailers, university administrators, coaches and sports media noisemakers’” (Bandow 2012).
There are so many people profiting off of athletes, except the athlete.
And the NCAA does a great job of making sure it stays that way.
“Nevertheless, the NCAA works overtime to ensure that kids enjoy no
extra benefits, even, for instance, discounts for tattoos in exchange for
autographs. It doesn’t matter if “student-athletes” come from broken
and impoverished families, and have no money or educational future.
Need help supporting an impecunious mother or getting home for a
funeral? Fuggetabout it! Noted Nocera: ‘Any student athlete who accepts an unapproved, free hamburger from a coach, or even a fan, is in
violation of NCAA rules,’” (Edelman 2014).
For example, Georgia star running back Todd Gurley was suspended
for profiting off of his own likeness. He was punished for signing his own autograph. Gurley did nothing that was detrimental to the NCAA or the University of Georgia, but he received a severe punishment for his actions. Does the
NCAA really have the athletes’ best interests at heart or do they only seek to
control them?
College Athletics or Farm Systems?
It has come to a point where it is tough to distinguish the difference
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between a college athletic programs and minor league farm teams.
“Pro teams also like the existing system. Universities act as a quasifarm system, discovering talent, training players, and highlighting
performance for free. In contrast to baseball and hockey, professional
basketball and football franchises enjoy the help of others to turn
immature, self-interested, and undeveloped teenagers into effective
team players” (Bandow 2012).
The Kentucky men’s basketball program is the perfect example of this
problem in action. The NBA has rules in place that prevents high school seniors
from entering the draft until players are one year removed from High School.
With that being said, Kentucky coach, John Calipari, has mainstreamed the
“one and done concept”. He gets talented freshman every year that only plan
on playing college basketball for one year before heading pro. After the end of
the 2014-2015 season, Coach Calipari had three freshman, three sophomores,
and a junior leave college early for the NBA draft. There is also another route
players have explored. Since you only have to be one year removed from high
school basketball, players have been going overseas to earn money before
eventually heading to the NBA.
“Yes, players get scholarships, though the latter is not an expenditure for the university. The marginal education, for the most athletic
students most interested in a pro career, college sports is indentured
servitude, forcing them to work for an education they don’t want. A
university education is not a benefit but an opportunity cost, a fouryear loss of paid playing time” (Bandow 2012).
It is very interesting to look at a college degree as an “opportunity cost”
for these future professional athletes. Most of these athletes could care less
about a college degree, and their “rigorous” course load tells the story. Some
of these athletes have been known to load up with PE and activity course, and
they normally do not attend class after the season is over. I must note that
there is a clause at some colleges that allow professional athletes to come back
to school finish their degree. As time passes, the more college athletic programs are beginning to look like farm systems.
NCAA Revenue and Scandals
The variables used have already been discussed, but this section of
the paper will breakdown the exact numbers. The research design is very clear,
use the exact numbers then look for a correlation. When discussing the profitability, the independent variable, of the NCAA, the data being used is the yearly
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revenue for FBS and FCS athletic programs. The numbers span back from 2004
until 2012.
Median Total Revenue 2004-2012 (via NCAA.org) http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/2012RevExp.pdf
Next, the NCAA has listed the total number of NCAA violations from the years
spanning 2004 to 2012. The information was received via the NCAA website,
but I charted this information by year including the college and violation type.
NCAA Violations Chart 2004-2012 (via NCAA.org)
https://web1.ncaa.org/LSDBi/exec/miSearch
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Year
School
Scandal Type
2012
University of Tennessee (Knoxville)
Eastern Michigan University
Texas Southern University
University of Central Florida
Pepperdine University
University of South Carolina
(Columbia)
Baylor University
Recruiting Violations
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2012
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
2011
University of North Carolina
(Chapel Hill)
Radford University
University of Nebraska (Lincoln)
Ohio State University
University of Oklahoma
University of Cincinnati
Boise State University
University of Tennessee (Knoxville)
Louisiana State University
Georgia Institute of Technology
West Virginia University
East Carolina University
2011
2011
2010
2010
Samford University
Arkansas State University
University of California, Berkeley
University of Connecticut
Texas Tech University
Arizona State University
University of Michigan
2010
Princeton University
2010
University of Tennessee (Chattanooga)
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NCAA Practice Violations
Impermissible Participation
Recruiting Violations
Eligibility Violations
Impermissible Participation
Recruiting Violations and Failure to
Monitor
Academic Fraud and Impermissible Benefits
Extra Benefits
Extra Benefits
Extra Benefits
Extra Benefits
Recruiting Violations
Impermissible Benefits
False Information and Recruiting
Violations
Impermissible Benefits
Various NCAA Violations
NCAA Practice Violations
Academic Fraud and Impermissible Benefits
Financial Aid Violations
Eligibility Violations
Recruiting Violations
Recruiting Violations
Recruiting Violations
Recruiting Violations
Unethical Conduct and Failure to
Monitor
Impermissible Educational Expenses
Recruiting Violations
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2010
2010
Morehead State University
University of Arizona
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
2010
Ball State University
University of San Francisco
University of Southern California
University of Texas, Pan American
Indiana University- Purdue
University at (Indianapolis)
University of Nevada, Reno
University of Central Florida
Georgia Southern University
2009
2009
2009
College of the Holy Cross
University of Richmond
Georgetown University
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
University of Memphis
Southeast Missouri State University
University of New Hampshire
University of Alabama
University of South Alabama
Northeastern University
Florida State University
2009
2009
2009
2009
2009
Abilene Christian University
Eastern Washington University
University of Albany
Coastal Carolina University
Alabama State University
2009
Indiana University (Bloomington)
University of New Mexico
Texas Southern University
2010
2010
2008
2008
2008
Southeast Missouri State University
Impermissible Benefits
Impermissible Benefits and Failure
to Monitor
Practice Violations
Impermissible Financial Aid
Recruiting Violations
Recruiting Violations
Eligibility Violations
Extra Benefits
Recruiting Violations
Unethical Conduct and Failure to
Monitor
Recruiting Violations
Recruiting Violations
Extra Benefits and Failure to Monitor
Recruiting Violations
Extra Benefits
Recruiting Violations
Impermissible Benefits
Impermissible Financial Aid
Recruiting Violations
Academic Fraud and Impermissible Benefits
Failure to Monitor
Practice Violations
Recruiting Violations
Financial Aid Violations
Recruiting Violations and Extra
Benefits
Failure to Adhere to Penlties
Extra Benefits
Impermissible Benefits and Financial Aid Violations
Recruiting Violations
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2008
2008
Middle Tennessee State University
Florida International University
Brigham Young University
2008
Long Beach State University
2008
2008
Texas Christian University
Prairie View A&M
2007
2007
University of Arkansas (Fayetteville)
Ball State University
2007
Purdue University
2007
University of Oklahoma
2007
University of Colorado (Boulder)
Temple University
West Virginia University
2008
2007
2007
2007
2007
University of Louisiana at Lafayette
McNeese State University
2006
2006
University of Iowa
University of Kansas
2006
2006
Northern Illinois University
Alcorn State University
2006
2006
2006
2006
2006
University of Oklahoma
Bradley University
Savannah State University
St. John's University (New
York)
California State University,
Fresno
Ohio State University
2006
2006
Florida A&M University
Weber State University
2006
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Eligibility Violations
Financial Aid Violations and Lack of
Institutional Control
Extra Benefits and Failure to Monitor
Impermissible Benefits and Failure
to Monitor
Recruiting Violations
Extra Benefits and Lack of Institutional Control
Recruiting Violations and Failure to
Monitor
Extra Financial Aid and Extra Benefits
Academic Fraud and Unethical Behavior
Extra Benefits and Failure to Monitor
Practice Violations
Eligibility Violations
Recruiting Violations and Unethical Conduct
Eligibility Violations and Failure to
Monitor
Academic Fraud and Impermissible Benefits
Admissions Fraud
Impermissible Benefits and Academic Fraud
Extra Benefits
Practice Violations and Lack of Institutional Control
Recruiting Violations
Extra Benefits
Lack of Compliance
Impermissible Benefits
Recruiting Violations
Academic Fraud, Extra benefits,
and Recruiting Violations
Eligibility Violations
Eligibility Violations and Failure to
Monitor
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2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
2005
Georgia Institute of Technology
University of South Carolina
(Columbia)
Arizona State University
University of Illinois-Champaign
University of Memphis
2005
Texas Christian University
Florida International University
Baylor University
2005
Nicholls State University
2005
2005
Stony Brook University
Texas State University
2004
University of Missouri, Columbia
Mississippi State University
University of Washington
2004
2004
2004
2004
University of Louisiana at
Monroe
Stetson University
2004
University of Georgia
2004
Villanova University
2004
University of Oregon
2004
2004
Auburn University
Gardner-Webb University
2004
St. Bonaventure University
Extra Benefits and Failure to Monitor
Impermissible Benefits and Unethical Conduct
Impermissible Benefits and Financial Aid Violations
Extra Benefits
Eligibility Violations and Failure to
Monitor
Extra Benefits and Academic Fraud
Practice Violations and Failure to
Monitor
Impermissible Benefits and Unethical Conduct
Extra Benefits and Unethical Conduct
Violations of NCAA Bylaws
Impermissible Financial Aid and
Failure to Monitor
Recruiting Violations and Extra
Benefits
Recruiting Violations
Recruiting Violations and Gambling
Violations of NCAA Regulations
and Unethical Conduct
Recruiting Violations and Extra
Benefits
Recruiting Violations, Extra Benefits, and Academic Fraud
Recruiting Violations and Extra
Benefits
Eligibility Violations and Failure to
Monitor
Recruiting Violations
Recruiting Violations, Extra Benefits, and Unethical Conduct
Extra Benefits and Lack of Institutional Control
233
There are a few things that need to be addressed to further understand the data I chose, and to understand NCAA’s revenue. First, you might
wonder why basketball and football are the only college sports mentioned
heavily in this NCAA paper. The reason is that basketball and football are the
only sports that make a profit. What does this mean? This means all of the other
NCAA sports cost an athletic department money, instead of making money.
The focus on the first chart is on the revenue discrepancies between the sports.
The data validates the idea that football and basketball are the most valuable
college sports. The next chart shows the differences in profitability between
men, women, and coed sports. An argument against “pay for play” has been
that women athletic team need to get paid as well. The data shows that no
women’s athletic is even profitable. Both charts show the data from the final
year of my study, 2012.
NCAA FBS Generate Revenues and Expenses by Sport 2012 (via NCAA.org)
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/2012RevExp.pdf
NCAA Summary of Revenues and Expenses 2012 (via NCAA.org)
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/2012RevExp.pdf
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Jalen Butler
Test Results
The first piece of data that I researched was the number of NCAA violations. There were a total of 106 Division 1 NCAA violations, between the years
2004 and 2012. The chart below shows the yearly breakdown of NCAA violations. And the corresponding table below it shows analyzes the data from the
NCAA violations chart.
235
Statistics
Number of NCAA Violations
Valid
9
N
Missing
0
Mean
11.78
Std. Deviation
2.438
Sum
106
The average number of NCAA violations per year was 11.78.
The next piece of data that was assessed is the data comparing the
profitability of the FBS and FBS divisions of the NCAA. The chart below shows
a breakdown of the yearly revenue earnings from FBS and FCS. And the corresponding table below it shows analyzes the data from the revenue chart.
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Jalen Butler
Valid
N
Missing
Mean
Std. Deviation
Sum
Statistics
Median Total
Median Total
Revenue FBS $ Revenue FCS $
9
9
0
0
41978222.22
11279111.11
9362973.870
2135061.559
377804000
101512000
The average yearly revenue for the FBS and FCS divisions are
$41,978,222.22 (FBS) and $11,279,111.11 (FCS) respectively. Also, the FBS
made a total of $377,804,000 during that time period, while the FCS division
made $101,512,000.
The test results showed a finding contrary to those that I expected.
Anybody who knows anything about the collegiate athletics industry would
suggest that there is some relationship between the profitability of the NCAA
and the amount of NCAA (scandals) violations committed yearly. I hypothesized that there would be would be a positive relationship between these two
variables. I predicted that as the NCAA became more profitable, there would
be an increase in the amount of NCAA violations. The chart below compares
the yearly totals of my two variables. And the table below that shows the analysis of my variables.
237
2012
NCAA Violations vs Total Revenue
Number of Median Total Revenue Median Total Revenue
Violations
(FBS) in $
(FCS) in $
10
55,976,000
13,761,000
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
14
14
16
9
9
12
11
11
Year
52,715,000
48,298,000
45,698,000
41,088,000
37,566,000
35,400,000
32,849,000
28,214,000
13,425,000
13,189,000
12,111,000
12,080,000
10,527,000
9,642,000
9,007,000
7,770,000
Correlations
Number Of Median ToMeViolations tal Revenue dian Total
FBS $
Revenue
FCS $
Pearson Correlation
1
.327
.291
Number Of
Sig. (2-tailed)
.390
.448
Violations
N
9
9
9
Pearson Correlation
.327
1
.971**
Median Total
Sig. (2-tailed)
.390
.000
Revenue FBS $
N
9
9
9
1
Pearson Correlation
.291
.971**
Median Total
Sig. (2-tailed)
.448
.000
Revenue FCS $ N
9
9
9
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
To understand this table correctly, there must be a clear understanding of how the Pearson Correlation works. “Pearson’s r assumes that there are
two interval variables. Its range is from -1 to +1. It is a measure of association,
that is, of the strength of the relationship. Essentially, it measures how closely
the case points cluster around the regression line” (Monroe 2000, 144). My variables have a Pearson’s r of .327 for FBS budgets and scandals, and .291 for FCS
budgets and scandals, but both correlations have an insignificant positive relationship.
First, it is important to mention that the both sides of the NCAA, FBS
and FCS, are seeing a yearly increase in revenue. So, there is a positive relationship between the increases in both of these divisions. With that being said, as
the FBS increases in revenue, the FCS should see an increase in revenue as well.
On the other hand, there is no verifiable trend for the NCAA violations. The
number of NCAA violations was its lowest during the middle years of 2008 and
2009. The most noteworthy piece of information comes from the year 2008
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Jalen Butler
to 2009. This is the year of the largest increase of FBS revenue totals. On top of
that, this is also the year with the highest jump of NCAA violations. Although
this seems like valuable information, as a whole there is not enough information to conclude that there is a significant relationship between these variables. Even though there is a positive relationship between my two variables,
their relationship is not significant enough.
Conclusion
First, there was an insignificant positive relationship between my
variables. I hypothesized that there would be a positive relationship between
the profitability of the NCAA and the number of NCAA violations (scandals)
committed. Anybody with any knowledge about the “big business” of college
athletics would have suggested a similar hypothesize. Critics of my argument
might believe that this disproves my claims, but this is far from the truth. First,
the data that I analyzed was incomplete. The NCAA website does not show their
revenue data beyond the year 2004; as a result, I could only analyze data from
2004 to 2012. The NCAA scandal data went back as far as the 1950s, but this
is irrelevant without the corresponding revenue data. The NCAA understands
that people, like myself, would want to use this data to criticize their “business
model,” so it is easy to see why the website’s data is minimal. The NCAA does
have their own “research” section where they analyze commonly asked questions. But it does not take a rocket scientist to see that this data is manipulated.
The NCAA uses the “research” section to paint themselves as the good guys in
these issues. They also show data that presents the idea that their institution
is in good standing. As the USA Today’s research shows, the NCAA does have a
fast growing problem.
“The review finds that 53 of the 120 universities in the NCAA’s top
competitive level, the Bowl Subdivision, were found by the Division
I Committee on Infractions to have committed major rules violations
from 2001 to 2010. That number appears to have held largely constant
from the previous two decades, but the 2000s show that the number
of colleges that committed serious violations of the association’s academic rules nearly doubled, to 15 from eight in the 1990s” (Lederman
2011).
USA Today reported that the NCAA’s number of serious violations of
the association’s academic rules has nearly doubled from the 1990s to the
2000s. This does not mention the dozens of other NCAA violations that are
prominent. The NCAA has a ton of issues that will make headway soon, especially after O’Bannon case.
Again, let’s not forget that the NCAA is a “non-profit” organization. The
239
biggest loser in this deal is the student-athletes. I would agree with Niall Ferguson link of corruption of the NCAA to life on the Serengeti.
“There, our institutions recall the wildlife if the Serengeti, the ‘endless
plains’ of northern Tanzania and Southern Kenya. Some of us are wildebeest, grazing as we move in the herd. Other of us (rather fewer)
are predators. I am afraid there are some scavengers and parasites,
too. Likewise, in civil society, we form our groups and bands rather in
the way that chimpanzees and baboons do. Like the clubs we humans
used to be so fond of joining, a baboon troop has its rules and hierarchies” (Ferguson 2014, 16-17).
As Ferguson suggest, there are institutions in our society that could
be compared to life on the Serengeti. The elites, the NCAA, could be seen as
the predators that prey on “weaker” animals, the student-athletes. “The elites”
are in a position of influence that dictates life for the student-athletes. There
are many people who make money off the NCAA’s student athletes; those who
make such money off players are the scavengers and parasites. With that being said, America cannot make the proper steps to improve the structure of the
NCAA without holding those in control accountable. But my last statement
might change, because as the Northwestern players and Ed O’Bannon show,
the “grazing wildebeest” will not be taken advantage of any longer without a
fight.
240
Works Cited
Doug Bandow (2012) “End College Sports Indentured Servitude: Pay
“Student Athletes””. Sports Forbes. http://www.forbes.com/sites/
dougbandow/2012/02/21/end-college-sports-indentured-servitudepay-student-athletes/ (Accessed May 2015)
Barbara J. D’Aquila and Margaret Rudolph (2014). “NLRB Director Finds
Scholarship Athletes are Employees.” Employee Relations Law
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ESPN 2014 “NU players cast secret ballots”. ESPN.com. http://espn.go.com/
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cats-players-vote-whether-form-first-union-college-athletes
(Accessed May 2015)
Mark Edelman (2014) “21 Reasons Why Student-Athletes Are Employees
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forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/01/30/21-reasons-why-stu
dent-athletes-are-employees-and-should-be-allowed-to-unionize/
(Accessed May 2015)
Mark Edelman (2014) “How NCAA Greed Has Led To A Student-Athlete
Uprising”. Sports Forbes. http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedel
man/2014/02/11/how-ncaa-greed-has-led-to-a-student-athlete-up
rising/ (Accessed May 2015)
Niall Ferguson (2013). The Great Degeneration: How Institutions Decay and
Economies Die. New York, NY: Penguin Publishing
Jacob Goldstein (2015). Does NCAA Ban On Paying Student Athletes Violate
Federal Law?. Morning Edition (NPR), http://eds.a.ebscohost.com/
eds/detail/detail?sid=bb9a9218 (Accessed May 2015)
Tim Goral (2004). At All COSTS. University Business, 7(5), 40-51. http://
eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/detail/detail?sid=5c5223a9-d57a-48f6ac75-e355a8267b64%40sessionmgr115&vid=0&hid=117&bdata=Jn
NpdGU9Z (Accessed 2015)
Doug Lederman (2011) “Revenues and Expenses 2004-2012”. USAToday.
com. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2011-02-07ncaa-infractions_N.htm (Accessed May 2015
Alan Monroe (2000). Essentials of Political Science Research. Boulder, Colorado:
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ernance (Accessed May 2015)
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2015)
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