Letnik VII, Številka 3, 2009 - Fakulteta za upravo

Transcription

uprava
mednarodna znanstvena revija
za teorijo in prakso
Univerza v Ljubljani
Fakulteta za upravo
letnik VII, {tevilka 3, november 2009
ISSN 1581-7555
Uprava, letnik VII, 3/2009
1
Revija Uprava je znanstvena revija, ki združuje razli~ne discipline povezane z javno upravo. Obravnava
teoreti~na in prakti~na vpra{anja ter re{itve s podro~ja javne uprave, upo{tevajo~ upravne, pravne,
ekonomske, organizacijske in informacijske vidike delovanja in razvoja javne uprave.
izdajatelj / publisher
Fakulteta za upravo Univerze v Ljubljani
naslov uredni{tva / address
Fakulteta za Upravo Univerze v Ljubljani
Gosarjeva 5, SI-1000 Ljubljana
tel.: +386 (0)1 5805-500 faks: +386 (0)1 5805-521
e-po{ta: revija.uprava@fu.uni-lj.si
odgovorna urednica / editor
Stanka Setnikar-Cankar
uredni{ki odbor / editorial board
Sre~ko Devjak, Nevenka Hrovatin, Maja Klun, Rudi Kocjan~i~, Polona Kova~, Alenka Kuhelj, Rajko
Pirnat, Janez Stare, Metka Tekav~i~, Ljup~o Todorovski, Mirko Vintar
mednarodni uredni{ki odbor / international editorial board
Stephen BAILEY (Glasgow Caledonian University, Velika Britanija), Helena BLAŽI] (Ekonomski fakultet
Rijeka, Sveu~ili{te u Rijeci, Hrva{ka), Mirjana DRAKULI] (Fakultet organizacionih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Srbija), Jürgen HARBICH (München, Nem~ija), Gyorgy JENEI (Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem, Corvinus University of Budapest, Madžarska), Theo P.W.M. van der KROGT (EAPAA, European Association for
Public Administration Accreditation, Nizozemska), Kveta KUBATOVA (University of Economics Prague,
ê{ka Republika), Margaret LINEHAN (Cork Institute of Technology, Irska), Katarina OTT (Institut za javne
financije, Zagreb, Hrva{ka), Mirko PEJANOVI] (Fakultet politi~kih nauka Sarajevo, Univerzitet u Sarajevu,
BiH), Heinrich REINERMANN (Deutsche Hochschule für Verwaltungs-wissenschaft, Speyer, Nem~ija),
Walter SCHERRER (Economics Institute, University of Salzburg, Avstrija), Željko [EVI] (Glasgow Caledonian University, Velika Britanija), John TAYLOR (Glasgow Caledonian University, Velika Britanija), Neda VITEZI]
(Ekonomski fakultet Rijeka, Sveu~ili{te u Rijeci, Hrva{ka), Jacques ZILLER (Università di Pavia, Facoltà di Scienze Politiche, Italija)
tehni~no uredni{tvo / tehnical editor
Nata{a Svržnjak
oblikovanje
/ design
TM
studiobotas
fotografije / photography
arhiv fakultete, Matevž Paternoster
prelom / text design
Marjeta Pe~ari~
lektoriranje / editing
Katarina Puc
tisk / print
ûkGraf, tiskarna in trgovina d.o.o
ISSN
1581-7555
Revija izhaja {tirikrat letno. Cena posamezne {tevilke je 25,00 EUR. Letna naro~nina za pravne osebe
je 60,00 EUR, za posameznike 45,00 EUR, za {tudente 30,00 EUR, za tujino 80,00 EUR.
Znanstveno revijo Uprava je Javna agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost RS opredelila kot
znanstveno periodi~no publikacijo in jo v letu 2009 tudi sofinancira.
Revija Uprava je indeksirana v mednarodnih bazah:
- ECONLIT
- CSA-Worldwide Political Science Abstracts
- PAIS-International (Public Affairs Information Service)
- EGPA-PAZBABEL
2
vsebina
5
/ contents
Stanka Setnikar Cankar
Uvodnik
7
Wolfgang Drechsler
The rise and demise of the New Public
Management: Lessons and opportunities
for South East Europe
1.01 Original scientific article
29
Milo{ Sen~ur
Dvodomni sistem kot nasledek
procesa decentralizacije
1.02 Pregledni znanstveni ~lanek
45
Milo{ Sen~ur
The bicameral system as a successor
to decentralisation
1.02 Review article
61
Maja Zaman Groff, Marko Ho~evar
Public oversight of the audit profession –
Comparison of implemented practices in
the EU and the U.S.
1.02 Review article
81
Jaka Vadnjal
Assessment of establishment and operations under
market conditions for a public equity fund
1.02 Review article
103
Petra Do{enovi~ Bon~a, Maks Tajnikar
Model presoje poslovne uspe{nosti in
izkori{~enosti zmogljivosti v bolni{nicah
1.04 Strokovni ~lanek
131
Tatjana Tozjek
Nekateri vidiki varnosti, prožnosti
in varne prožnosti
1.04 Strokovni ~lanek
3
summaries
25
/ povzetki
Wolfgang Drechsler
Vzpon in propad novega javnega
menedžmenta: lekcije in priložnosti za
JV Evropo
1.01 Izvirni znanstveni ~lanek
77
Javni nadzor nad revidiranjem Primerjava sistemov, uvedenih v Evropski
uniji in v Združenih državah Amerike
99
Jaka Vadnjal
Presoja ustanovitve in delovanja
javnega sklada tveganega kapitala
pod tržnimi pogoji
127
Business process model as a tool to assess
business performance and capacity
utilization in hospitals
1.04 Professional article
144
Tatjana Tozjek
Some aspects of flexibility, security
and flexicurity
1.04 Professional article
4
Uvodnik
Spo{tovani.
Pred vami je nova {tevilka revije Uprava, ki jo boste lahko brali v novoletnem
~asu. Zato je priložnost za razmislek o dobrih željah in pri~akovanjih.
Slovenski javni upravi želim v prihodnjem letu preboj iz primeža uvedbe sistema pla~. O~itno je, da je uvedba novega pla~nega sistema sprožila plaz administriranja in iskanja bolj{ih možnosti za dolo~ene skupine zaposlenih. Ne dvomin, da
vidijo snovalci sistema predvsem njegove pozitivne strani. Zaposlene pa je novost
zatekla v zelo razli~nih stanjih. Nekatere skupine zaposlenih so bile ob uvedbi
novega sistema objektivno v slab{em položaju, kar jih bo spremljalo {e dalj ~asa.
Spremembe so mogo~e samo ob napredovanjih, finan~ne spodbude so za~asno
zamrznjene. Na podro~jih izobraževanja, raziskovanja, zdravstva, kulture, socialne
varnosti je sistem nagrajevanja nekonkuren~en z zasebnim sektorjem. V bolj{em
položaju so predvsem koncesionarji, ki prejemajo prora~unska sredstva za izvajanje
svoje dejavnosti, na podro~ju pla~ pa lahko delujejo kot zasebniki brez omejitev, s
katerimi se ubadajo njihovi konkurentje v javnem sektorju. Samo ugibamo lahko,
kak{en namen je vodil predlagatelje v uvedbo tega neenakopravnega položaja za
javne institucije.
Vsakodnevne zadrege s pla~nim sistemom obremenjujejo vse organizacije
javnega sektorja kot tudi ministrstvo in jim jemljejo energijo in ~as, ki bi ga morali
nameniti za snovanje programov sprememb in prilagajanj pogojem delovanja v
kriznih razmerah. Zato je druga želja namenjena snovalcem strategij in programov,
da kon~no predstavijo svoje jasne programe in cilje delovanja, dolo~ijo prioritetna
podro~ja delovanja za naslednje leto, jih uskladijo z možnostmi in pri~nejo z njihovim izvajanjem. Gospodarska kriza ne more biti izgovor za inercijo pri dolo~anju
dolgoro~nih nalog izbolj{anja delovanja javne uprave v Sloveniji.
Tretja želja je namenjena zaposlenim v javnem sektorju v Sloveniji. Kljub
omenjenim pomanjkljivostim sistema nagrajevanja ostaja varnost zaposlitve
pomemben element stabilnosti podro~ja. Vendar razli~ne raziskave kažejo, da se
nezadovoljstvo {iri tudi v javnem sektorju. Tukaj zaposleni i{~ejo razloge za to, da
se dolo~ene naloge, predvsem pa spremembe, ne morejo in ne želijo uvesti.
O~itno je za manj u~inkovito in manj strokovno delo najlažje iskati zunanje vzroke.
5
Tak pristop vodi v sistem, kjer ostajajo le tisti zaposleni, ki jih ni mogo~e pla~ati
tako malo, kot so oni sposobni malo narediti. Isto~asno pa ostajajo brez zaposlitve
mladi, ki ne morejo dobiti niti priložnosti, da pokažejo druga~en odnos do dela in
novo znanje.
Zato vsem iskalcem zaposlitve v javnem sektorju želim, da bi se zopet
vzpostavil sistem pripravni{tva in prakti~nega dela med izobraževanjem. Sodelovanje z bodo~im delodajalcem je najbolj{i na~in medsebojnega spoznavanja, ki
ima pozitivne u~inke za obe strani.
Odgovorna urednica
Red. prof. dr. Stanka Setnikar Cankar
6
Original scientific article
The rise and demise of the
New Public Management:
Lessons and opportunities for
South East Europe
UDK: 005:35(045)
Wolfgang Drechsler
Department of Public Administration, Tallinn University of Technology
drechsler@staff.ttu.ee
ABSTRACT
The essay traces the rise and demise of New Public Management (NPM)
during the last quarter of a century, as well as the emergence of a new public
administration phenomenon, tentatively called the Neo-Weberian State (NWS),
which is argued to be more suitable for coping with the current crisis and its
aftermath as well. The essay then focuses on the optimal public administration system for South East Europe, for which the experience of the new Member States of the European Union is used for lesson-drawing. Here, too, it is
argued that NPM is definitely not suited for the region, especially in current
conditions but also generally. The NWS, in spite of several problems including
those of context, remains the current concept of choice in the development of
public administration in Europe, and as such can also be utilized in various
ways in South East Europe.
Key words: New Public Management, Neo-Weberian State, South East
Europe, new EU Member States.
JEL: H83, D73, P20, L33, H11.
It is particularly interesting to see what shape the public administration
should take in South East Europe – specifically in the Western Balkan region,
which may be defined, functionally for the present purposes, as the countries
of former Yugoslavia, without Slovenia but including Albania. Public administration, after all, is the state in action, without which there is no state at all, and it
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Wolfgang Drechsler
The rise and demise of the New Public Management:
Lessons and opportunities for South East Europe
is one of the most vital paradigms of the modern world. It is especially relevant
to the countries of the region during the current phase, marked both by internal transition and consolidation and moves towards EU accession, if to varying
degrees, and made even more relevant by the current crisis and the reemergence of the state at the centre of development. Yet the ideal public administration structure is a moving target, as its form is not only contextspecific, but even the more abstract ideal is changing over time and currently
in a state of flux and re-assertion worldwide. This essay therefore attempts to
outline changes in the western concept of optimal public administration, i.e.
the general goal of public management reform, and then to draw some lessons from the transition experience of the new EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe, as arguably they experienced a similar experience
some time previously.
1. New public management and its demise
The most important reform movement over the last quarter of a century in
public administration has been New Public Management (NPM). NPM constitutes the transfer of business and market principles and management techniques from the private into the public sector, symbiotic with and based on a
neo-liberal understanding of state and economy. The goal, therefore, is a slimlined, minimal state in which any public activity is decreased and, if at all, exercised according to business principles of efficiency. It is popularly denoted by
concepts such as project management, flat hierarchies, customer orientation,
abolition of career civil service, depolitisation, total quality management, and
outsourcing. Transparency, citizen involvement, and decentralisation are not
part of the original core of NPM, both theoretically – because the NPM focus
on the apolitical rule of the expert makes them more difficult, and because
they do not necessarily contradict previous forms of public administration at all
– and empirically.
NPM comes from the Anglo-American sphere, and it was strongly pushed
by most international finance institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF.
It originates from the 1980s, a time characterised by the dominance of neoliberal governments and the perceived crisis of the welfare state and its financing, but it came to full fruition in the early 1990s. NPM was on the one hand a
8
Wolfgang Drechsler
powerful trend within public administration scholarship and practice – which
explains much of its power – and on the other, a genuine ideological concept.
As important and, though more rarely, as successful as several NPMinspired reforms of the public sector might have been and still may be, what
one notices first when looking at the public and private spheres is the difference, not the similarity. The state is characterised primarily by its monopoly on
power, force, and coercion on one side, and its focus on the public good, on
the other, while the business world legitimately focuses on profit maximisation. The use of business techniques within the public sphere therefore miscomprehends the most basic requirements of any state, particularly of a democracy, seeing them as a liability; yet regularity, transparency, and due process are simply much more important than low costs and speed.
For this reason economic and theoretical management insights in particular could only establish themselves once the dominance of the NPM has
passed, which as a genuine ideology was not even open to arguments stemming from its own leading method. NPM reforms created, for instance, quasimarkets within administrative organisations in order to generate market behaviour: yet, such behaviour can only develop in genuine and not in quasi (pseudo)
markets. (See König, 2001, pp. 6–7)
Another example is the problem of the performance-related pay concept
in relation to the demands of multitasking and motivation through identification
with the organisation. As has been demonstrated particularly well by George
Akerlof (Akerlof & Kranton, 2003), every organisation must have employees
who perform well (and cheaper) by identifying with the organisation, and that it
is therefore a key requirement of a good organisation to engender employee
identification with an organisation, therefore creating “motivational capital” (p.
29). Akerlof points out the problems denoted by the concept of “multitasking,” well investigated by Bruno Frey and his school (see Frey, 2007, pp.
209–212 for an excellent summary), with performance-related pay and monetary incentives only, which is a hallmark of NPM and perhaps the cornerstone
of its employment culture; he adds that overstrict supervision leads to less
quality and a declining output (Akerlof & Kranton, 2003, pp. 11, 22–26). As Frey
writes, “For no position – except perhaps the most simple assembly line work
– can all relevant aspects be defined and measured” (Frey, 2007, p. 209). Akerlof consciously validates his work by linking it to Weber’s concept that successful bureaucracies are based on the motto “an office is a vocation” with all
this implies (Akerlof & Kranton, 2003, p. 29). NPM therefore acts and looks like
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Wolfgang Drechsler
the application of business and management techniques to the public sector,
but not only in an inappropriate and simplistic, but also in an obsolete way.
But even by the standards of business efficiency, NPM cannot be said to
be successful from today’s perspective. For many years it has been clear that
there is no empirical evidence that NPM reforms have led to any productivity
increase or welfare maximisation (König, 1997, p. 214). The most that may be
claimed is that “several years of attempts and experiences of public management reforms in western Europe and other OECD countries give evidence of
relative failure rather than success” (van Mierlo, 1998, p. 401). Empirically, the
catchword promises have not been delivered – flat hierarchies are a matter of
appropriateness and depend in their suitability entirely on context; treating
citizens merely as customers takes away their participatory rights and duties
and thus harms the state; the abolition of career civil service will usually lead to
the erosion of administrative capacity; depolitisation – and thus dedemocratisation – leads to the return of the imperial bureaucrat (in its worst
sense, disguised as the entrepreneurial bureaucrat: same power, less responsibility); and outsourcing has proven to be excessively expensive and often
infringes on the state’s core competences, as well as on the most basic standards of equality. Quality management is not necessarily an NPM concept and
can just as easily be applied elsewhere and was actually always understood to
be part of a well-working PA; project management may frequently work, but as
a principle and in the long run, it is more expensive and less accountable than
the traditional approach.
In advanced public administration scholarship itself then, particularly – but
not only – in Europe, advocates of NPM are now heavily on the defensive, if
NPM is proposed as a world view (i.e. an ideology), rather than as one of several useful perspectives for public administration reform (i.e. part of the “tool
box”). What was an option fifteen years ago is simply not an option anymore
today. One could mark the following stages in public administration development:
10
•
around 1995, it was still possible to believe in NPM, although there
were first strong and substantial critiques;
•
around 2000, NPM was on the defensive, as empirical findings spoke
clearly against it as well;
•
around 2005, NPM was no longer considered a viable concept.
Wolfgang Drechsler
In other words, it has become quite rare in the last five to ten years, and
is becoming rarer still, to see articles in the very top journals, or essays and
keynote addresses by the very top public administration scholars – particularly
in Europe, but also in the United States – that are based on or implicitly assume the validity of NPM.
Yet, in many areas of scholarship and of the world, and particularly in policy, NPM is very much still alive and kicking (i.e. the farther one departs from
academia above all and from Europe or international and central government).
This is also true at the level of the EU and many Member States, where it
strikes a chord with the predominant world view or views (See Drechsler,
2009a).
Nevertheless, particularly at the local and regional levels, many communities have in recent years, and after careful deliberation, acted against NPM
reforms, even in traditional NPM strongholds (See Schäfer, 2008). The justifications for stopping NPM reforms given by the city of Dübendorf (Zurich) in
Switzerland provide a fair summary: “No improvements of efficiency, effectiveness or quality could be attributed to NPM reforms” (Noordhoek & Saner,
2005, p. 38). Shortly before the global economic crisis, the news that New
Zealand, the most famous trailblazer of NPM reforms, was buying back its
privatised railway system because privatisation had proved disastrous for economic development, investment, and innovation (a standard justification for
privatisation) is the most notable nail in the coffin for NPM (See
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/rail+buy+back+marks+new+sustainable+
era+transport for the official government announcement).
When the global financial meltdown hit in autumn 2008, it took the most
market-oriented circles a week at most to change full swing and demand that
the state come to the rescue. It also changed, for a while, public and political
attitudes towards bureaucracy in general, and the critique of NPM as formulated above seemed almost trivial. It seemed clear that the NPM phrases,
logic, and entire way of thinking was of the same mindset that had caused, or
at least triggered, the crisis to begin with: a naïve faith in simplified laissez-faire
economics and the predictably negative role of the state. However, when the
economy seemed to rebound in the summer of 2009, this was rapidly forgotten by many NPM advocates, so that at present while some countries and
public institutions have retracted and are heading in the direction that will be
outlined below, others believe that now is the time for NPM reforms. Yet this
is no longer under the mantle of “better service for less money” but merely
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Wolfgang Drechsler
in order to spend less (Peters, forthcoming). However, it is clear to most observers that now the time has come for alternatives to NPM.
2. The Neo-Weberian state
The counter-model to NPM, indeed its bête noire, is what is called Weberian public administration. This label is highly problematic, as NPM presents a
caricature of it and thus builds up a paper tiger. Apart from the caricature, for
Weber, the most efficient public administration was a set of offices in which
appointed civil servants operated under the principles of merit selection (impersonality), hierarchy, division of labour, exclusive employment, career advancement, the written form, and legality. This increase of rationality – his key
term – would increase the speed, scope, predictability, and cost-effectiveness
required for an advanced mass-industrial society (Weber, 1922, esp. pp. 124–
130).
It seems that fundamentally, with all its weaknesses, the Weberian model
is still the best around, and is certainly superior to the NPM; to paraphrase
Churchill, it is the worst form of public administration except all others. The
connection between Weberianism and economic growth seems, in any case,
very close (See Evans & Rauch, 1999).
Nevertheless, the optimal administrative structure of our times – whether
pre-crash, post-crash, or mid-crash – does not consist of a simple rehash of the
organisation principles of the mass production paradigm, whose weaknesses
are amply known from excessive legalism via genuine bureaucracy to genuine
antagonism to innovation and the economy. NPM also offers some managerialist elements and even larger principles which as such could be judged positively, as long as they do not form the basis of the system, and there must be
some adaptation to best match current circumstances with their different challenges, demands, and socio-intellectual context.
The most discussed model for the administrative paradigm to follow
NPM, i.e. post-NPM, is not therefore a return to the previous one, but according to the concept of Pollitt and Bouckaert proposed in 2004, the so-called
Neo-Weberian State (NWS), a fortuitous metaphor describing a model that coopts the positive elements of NPM, but on a Weberian foundation, so that
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Wolfgang Drechsler
both are, asymmetrically, deemed as superceded (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004,
pp. 96–102). One can briefly sum up the NWS as follows:
Table 1: The Neo-Weberian State (summary)
Neo-Weberian
Weberian
Shift from an internal focus on bureaucratic
rules to an external focus meeting citizens’
needs and wishes. The primary route to
achieving this is not applying market
mechanisms (although they may occasionally prove useful) but the creation of a
professional culture of quality and service.
Reaffirmation of the role of the state as
the main facilitator of solutions to the
new problems of globalisation, technological change, shifting demographics,
and environmental threat.
Supplementation (not replacement) of the
role of representative democracy with a
range of devices for consultation with, and
direct representation of citizens’ views.
Reaffirmation of the role of representative
democracy (central, regional, and local) as
the legitimating element within the state
apparatus.
In resource management within government, a modernisation of the relevant laws
to encourage greater focus on achieving
results rather than merely following procedure correctly. This is expressed partly in a
shift from ex ante to ex post controls,
without a complete abandonment of the
former.
Reaffirmation of administrative law –
suitably modernised – in preserving the
basic principles pertaining to the citizenstate relationship, including equality before the law, legal security, and the availability of specialized legal scrutiny of state
actions.
Professionalisation of public services, so
that the bureaucrat becomes not simply an
expert in the law relevant to his or her
sphere of activity, but also a professional
manager, focused on meeting the needs of
his or her citizens/users.
Preservation of the idea of a public service with a distinct status, culture, and
terms and conditions.
Source: Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004, pp. 99–100
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Wolfgang Drechsler
The NWS was intended as an empirical-analytical, not as a normative
model, and one of its creators, Pollitt, is quite self-critical about several of its
aspects, nor is this the only criticism around (See Pollitt et al., 2009, as well as
Dunn & Miller, 2007). And yet, the NWS is to date perhaps the best explanatory model of what is going on in Europe, and it does not throw good managerialist – and participatory – principles out when rejecting NPM as a whole. It is
still very much part of the research agenda, but in lieu of anything better, it
significantly helps our understanding of contemporary public administration.
In fact, the NWS is the perfect match for an innovation-based society, in
contrast to NPM. When dealing with innovation-based economics, the foundation of the Lisbon Agenda, the EU’s main development programme, there is an
immense push-pull function form what is, after all, a state-based socioeconomic development programme that asks for, draws upon, and requires
high-quality public administration to implement it (Drechsler, 2009a). Innovation
in the general interest, rather than that of an individual entrepreneur, is a question of successful innovation policy, and who should implement that, if not the
administration? Whatever the future leading technologies will be – nanotech,
biotech, convergence or something completely different – its setup will require
a particularly capable state actor and a science and technology policy implemented by a civil service that is denoted by long-term planning, high competence, and tolerance for mistakes: the opposite of NPM (Drechsler, 2008).
Innovation is a matter of state, as Claude Rochet puts it succinctly (2007).
It should further be emphasised for the current ICT paradigm that egovernance and NPM are not actually related, as is usually assumed because
they seem to share certain features. Almost none of the traditional Weberian
categories became obsolete through ICT (potentially, exclusive employment
does, which may be a problem for the nucleus of civil service), while some –
such as the written principle and division of labour – are actually enforced. In
the most prominent case of hierarchy, there are mixed dynamics, as it is
weakened by network models of organisation but strongly enforced via the
extreme control and coordination capabilities of ICT. Overall e-governance and
the NWS can reinforce each other, and in fact seem to do so (See Dunleavy et
al., 2005, 2006).
Finally, the NWS seems to be the best model available for public administration in times of crisis – or at least, during the current crisis. Whether one
likes the state or not (and it often comes down to just that), the return of the
state into the economy, on a scale unimaginable in mid-2008, means that our
14
Wolfgang Drechsler
system cannot function without a genuinely competent and motivated civil
service, and that cutting public expenditure at least in this realm is the worst
idea imaginable. The new big state is already there – and it is in the interest of
everyone, anywhere (excepting a few profiteers), that it is well-administered.
In fact, it may even be argued that the best hope for managing both the crisis
and later recovery well is the return of the mandarin, i.e. of a highly capable,
responsible, motivated, long-term focused senior civil service, among other
Neo-Weberian and indeed traditional Weberian institutions.
3. Lessons and opportunities for South East
Europe
But what does this all mean for South East Europe? In fact, the crisis itself
has not manifested itself in any specific manner in this region, so one must
consider any particular features of the region that would make the NPM and
NWS appropriate or inappropriate (and regarding the latter, there is certainly a
basic question regarding the applicability of Weberianism, old or new, to this
region) in themselves, or as a reservoir of good practices. This can be done by
looking at pre-crash experiences. For South East Europe, it would be necessary to look at the individual countries, their background, traditions, human and
other resources, and specific questions such as the state of neo-liberalism in
Serbia, the prevalent civil service payment systems in Macedonia, and the
legacy of the Venetian Republic’s administration in Montenegro. That is beyond the remit of this essay, if for no other reason than for that of space. Specifically in relation to the applicability of the NPM, however, a set of countries
that has recently undergone similar experiences and decisions exists: the new
EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe (a term that will also be applied to them during their accession period) – including Slovenia. Acknowledging any differences and specific features and with all the problems of lessondrawing as such (see Randma-Liiv, 2007, specifically about Central and Eastern
Europe) understood, one can still state that the debate on the use of NPM in
the new Member States is similar enough to that facing South East Europe
right now to be of use in gaining insight into what actions would be beneficial,
and what actions to avoid in the region, with lessons for the times of crisis and
beyond.
15
Wolfgang Drechsler
For one reason or another, serious comprehensive evaluations of the new
Member States’ experiences in public administration from an ex-post perspective still seem to be missing (an exception is the brilliant Randma-Liiv, 2009),
but one may already state generally that the main problem for new Member
States in this sphere was not structures, which are formally easy to replace,
but people, who are not. The main problem in the new Member States, in
other words, was the lack of well-qualified, motivated civil servants.
The problem is that good public administration, a high-quality civil service,
and a good understanding of the concept of state are interdependent: if one
element is bad, the other two will suffer as well (Drechsler, 2000, p. 5). Public
administration appears to require a special virtue – loaded though that word is
– on the part of its main protagonist, the civil servant, in order for the system
to function well or even at all. This virtue cannot be created artificially and is
highly dependent on tradition. How, then, can a good civil service be developed, if there is neither good tradition nor ethos, which was the situation generally faced by the new Member States? High civil service pay would be an
answer, but in most of the new Member States, the consensus was that this
cannot be afforded – or that the civil service is paid far too well anyway. Furthermore, as described above, performance-related pay, which seemed to be
the solution, does not work. Thus, one had to go back (but did not always do
so) to the old insight that the state must offer what the state can offer best:
the classic virtues of security, respect, stability, civility, and fulfilment – the
opposite of NPM measures. If the state does this, it will in turn become more
prestigious to work in the public administration. Ideally, this should lead to a
greater general faith in the state and the emergence of a decent concept of
state, which again will result in a higher civil service prestige – and so on, and
so forth.
What was generally true for public administrations in the new Member
States was that it was a nomenclature administration before the 1989/91 revolutions; where members of the cadre “were professional administrators, but
with politically and ideologically defined qualifications.” (König, 1997, p. 215)
That means that their experience was not necessarily valid, and their competence might have been low. In addition, many fields of administration – from
fiscal to municipal – were generally deficient. So, the question was not only, or
even primarily, one of downsizing, but rather one of building instead of reforming a functioning public administration system, which is invariably costly. And
16
Wolfgang Drechsler
indeed, there was no genuine downsizing at all, only the rhetoric of downsizing
(Drechsler, 2003).
In addition to the transition experience, the EU accession process was the
second key feature for all new Member States, as it is now for the South East
European region. The increase of administrative capacity, that is public administration reforms geared towards high quality, was primarily EU-driven in the
new Member States. It may well be that the administrative capacity of the
new Member States was highly deficient in according to EU requirements
right until accession, and that “the EU has been far from consistent in the signals it has sent to the candidate states” (Verheijen, 2000, p. 41). Yet the extent
to which the public administrations of the new Member States appeared successful – particularly regarding the (pre-crash) success in the case of Slovenia,
Hungary, and Estonia – was largely due to the EU accession process.
Even before EU accession became realistic, however, the self-chosen
public administration models for the new Member States were often Germany
and Sweden, and far less often the United States, and certainly not Britain
(Rose, 1993, pp. 113–144). Therefore, it was not surprising to see that “traditional continental career systems appear to be the main source of inspiration
for Central and Eastern European states. The German model is emerging, at
the current time, as a dominant influence in most states. … In general …,
there appears to be a clear tendency to return to the continental roots’ of pre1945” (Verheijen, 1999, pp. 330–331). Thus, often “the foundations were being laid to build an administrative elite shaping a Weberian-style bureaucracy
under the authority of elected politicians” (Cardona, 2000, p. 3), particularly in
Hungary and to some extent in Slovenia. (Unfortunately, it goes beyond the
scope of this essay to look at the specifically Austrian influence in South East
Europe today and over recent decades, but this would be an important path to
pursue in this context.)
After that which has been said about the power of the NPM creed during
the 1990s, and given the frequent role of neo-liberal governments in new
Member States around that time, this requires some explanation. First, while
public administration reform in the new Member States was promoted by various international organisations, what made the difference was that SIGMA,
the OECD unit advising Central and Eastern Europe states on administrative
reform (the most important agency dealing with the topic in the region, far
more ubiquitous than the World Bank), took a critical perspective towards NPM
from the beginning. Therefore, in spite of pressure from other organisations and
17
Wolfgang Drechsler
the understandable urge by consultants and by those people from the new
Member States engaged in reform who had learned about NPM in summer
schools and training seminars in the west and thus became its advocates, the
classical perspective could usually prevail (See Speer, 2001, pp. 85–86). Perhaps even more important was the explicit preference of the EU for a traditional public administration (Verheijen, 1999, p. 337), never mind its own engagement with NPM ideas and reforms, which also mostly came a decade
later (“Kinnock Reforms”) (See Drechsler, 2009a; Bauer, 2006). Both the very
direct demands and the accession trajectory towards a self-satisfied, well-paid,
traditional civil service of enormous proportions with all the advantages and
drawbacks would have made NPM reforms rather a waste of effort and
money.
However, in addition to these external reasons, there were internal reasons that meant NPM was particularly unsuitable for the new Member States,
which lay more in the transition experience than in the EU trajectory. As JJ
Hesse writes, “the introduction of business approaches in public administration, as advocated by NPM concepts, may well prove disastrous in systems
based on a continental European tradition in which either the preconditions
may not be in place or where they may be rejected due to their inherent logic”
(1998, p. 176). NPM is particularly bad if pushed upon transition and development countries because if it can make any sense, then it is only in an environment of a well-functioning democratic administrative tradition. After all, deregulating “the public service may not be viable before there is a set of values
that will permit government to operate in an accountable and non-corrupt
manner without the existence of formalized controls” (Peters, 2001, p. 167).
This was seen within the new Member States as well. A 2002 study
based on interviews with civil servants in several of these countries concluded
that NPM “is also known for its tendency to re-establish political control over
the civil service, which is exactly the opposite of what 100% of interviewees
of this study considered desirable for their countries. So, in at least one very
important aspect, i.e. the relations between civil service and government, the
NPM approach appears to be highly unsuitable, given the current needs” (King,
2002, p. 4). As the key democratic requirement of transparency is one of the
first victims of any form of NPM (Haque, 2001), “frequently NPM-defined effectiveness and efficiency bring about a decrease in accountability and responsibility, and in that way are undemocratic” (Debicki, 2003, p. 35). That, however, is
18
Wolfgang Drechsler
nowhere more problematic than in countries where the main order of the day
is to establish a democratic state, rather than to cut costs.
Therefore, the lesson from the new Member States to South East Europe
is clearly not to adopt NPM as a paradigm (rather than specific NPM tools). As
Guy Peters stated:
“Despite the appeal of ideas such as deregulation and flexibility, governments attempting to build both effective administration and democracy might
require much greater emphasis on formality, rules, and strong ethical standards. The values of efficiency and effectiveness are important but in the short
run not so crucial as creating probity and responsibility. Once a so-called Weberian administrative system is institutionalized, then it may make sense to
consider how best to move from that system towards a more “modern” system of public administration” (2001, p. 176; see also p. 164; Randma-Liiv,
2009).
And Klaus König has pointed out that a lesson that specifically East Germany can teach the other Central and Eastern European countries – and now
South East Europe – is to create the classical continental public administration
system first, which answers the specific problems of delegitimisation and
other typical problems (König, 2001, pp. 195–199):
“The application of contract management in Central and Eastern Europe
makes it very difficult to build up a modern functional system of public administration which contains basic qualities and ethical standards according to the
Western model; negotiating and executing the contracts leads to high transaction costs… (p. 197) Only when a well-educated public service with the basic
values of administrative ethics is in place and if a system of clear responsibilities prevails, so that measures for good public performance can be defined and
its costs are transparent, only then are the prerequisites created for the decision into which direction a reform process should go. … It may be more important, depending on the local situation, to create legal certainty via a fixed order
of responsibility, rather than to tap reserves of rationalization through simulated competition” (p. 198).
The first great opportunity offered by the lessons of the new Member
States for South East Europe is to avoid the NPM phase altogether, without
ignoring the important lessons from NPM and the powerful NPM tools. We
know now that NPM “clean-ups” cannot solve the problems of incompetence
and lack of democracy in a bureaucracy that are a hangover from the previous
19
Wolfgang Drechsler
regime, nor those of corruption – it cannot be done, however desirable that
may be. And this is clearly a pre-crash lesson.
The second opportunity lies in the concept of the NWS, and goes beyond
the experience of the new Member States, because the NWS was not yet in
place as a concept for most of their transition, only appearing towards the end
of that phase. Nonetheless, the NWS, as a viable and well-supported alternative that allows one not only to criticise NPM but to concretely present a quite
coherent, contemporary, modern model of what a public administration should
look like is something that was not available to the new Member States. This
is a fringe benefit that the comparatively late transition offers South East European countries, from which they can garner a serious advantage. This is all the
more so because the NWS, by its syncretistic nature, does combine the best
of both worlds, while leaving ample room for national specifics on the other.
And this is the case under the conditions of the current crisis as well, even
more so than before. This does not mean that the NWS should or even can be
adopted in its entirety in South East Europe, especially because it may well be
argued that the region never had an old Weberian tradition, but its insights can
certainly be helpful.
There will always be advisors, politicians, and stakeholders who will advocate NPM, whether because they think it is still the fashion, because of genuine ideology, or because they really see it as the best solution to the problems
at hand, and currently, because they think it saves money that must be saved.
So, there will always be throwbacks in the development of public administration in the region. Nevertheless, the general direction into which public administration in South East Europe should head is reasonably clear. As Aristotle says
in the Politika, “a state comes into existence for the purpose of ensuring survival, and it continues to exist for the purpose of the good life” (Arist., Pol. I
1252b). And as Marsilius of Padua comments upon this passage, the latter, the
good life, “is the perfect final cause of the state” (Defensor pacis I. iv.1.). A
good life in a good state in South East Europe, as diverse as the region may
historically, economically, and culturally be, yet consolidated and heading towards EU membership, geared towards peaceful and productive coexistence
in the globalized, competitive environment of the 21st century beyond the current crisis, is unthinkable without a high-quality, appropriate, well-working public administration and a responsible, responsive, competent and trustworthy
civil service, which is also crucial for weathering the effects of the crash as
they continue to unfold. The best model (to look at, not to copy) for such an
20
Wolfgang Drechsler
ideal currently appears to be the Neo-Weberian State (or something of its kind
or even beyond it); it is certainly not New Public Management.
4. Acknowledgments
This essay is based on the keynote address of the same title for the 2nd International Symposium on the Development of Public Administration in South
East Europe, University of Ljubljana and NISPAcee, Ljubljana, 19 June 2008; it
was updated in November 2009 in order to situate its argument within the
context of the current crisis. Sections 1 and 2 were based on several previous
publications, especially Drechsler, 2005b and, more recently, 2008 and 2009a;
section 3, on Drechsler, 2005a; thoughts on the crisis came from Drechsler,
2009c and especially from “The Neo-Weberian State: Public Administration
Paradigm for the Current Crisis?” a plenary paper delivered at the 7th Portuguese National Congress of Public Administration on “The State and Administration in the Answer to the Crisis”, Lisbon, 10 November 2009. I am grateful
to Mirko Vintar and Stanka Setnikar-Cankar for their kind invitation and hospitality and for the participants of the conference for their excellent feedback during the discussion session, to Tiina Randma-Liiv and Ingbert Edenhofer for
commenting on the essay version, and to the staff of the Portuguese National
Institute of Public Administration for discussing the crisis perspective. Support
from the Estonian Science Foundation (grant no. 7577) and the Estonian National Research Scheme (grant no. SF0140094s08) for the research upon
which this essay is based is gratefully acknowledged.
Wolfgang Drechsler is Professor and Chair of Governance at Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia, and co-director of its graduate Technology Governance program. He has
served as Ad¬visor to the President of Estonia, as Executive Secretary with the German Wissenschaftsrat during German Reunification, and as a Senior Legislative Analyst
in the United States Congress (APSA Congressional Fellow). He is a member of the
NISPAcee Steering Committee and, as the public management expert, of the Lisbon
Agenda Group.
21
Wolfgang Drechsler
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POVZETEK
VZPON IN PROPAD NOVEGA JAVNEGA
MENEDŽMENTA: LEKCIJE IN PRILOŽNOSTI ZA
JUGOVZHODNO EVROPO
V Jugovzhodni Evropi je {e posebno zanimivo pogledati, kak{no obliko naj bi privzela javna uprava. Javna uprava je konec koncev država v
delovanju, prvina, brez katere države sploh ni, poleg tega pa je tudi ena od
najvitalnej{ih paradigem dana{njega sveta. [e posebno je pomembna za
države regije, ki jo trenutno zaznamujejo – ~eprav razli~no – notranja tranzicija in konsolidacija ter proces pridruževanja Evropski uniji (EU), njen
pomen pa sta {e okrepili trenutna kriza in ponovna pojavitev države na
osrednjem prizori{~u razvoja. Idealna struktura javne uprave je gibljiva,
saj njena oblika ni specifi~na samo glede na okoli{~ine, temve~ se s
~asom spreminja tudi njen abstraktnej{i ideal, ki je trenutno povsod po
svetu negotov in se znova uveljavlja. V tem ~lanku želimo torej orisati
spremembe „zahodnega“ koncepta optimalne javne uprave, tj. splo{nega
cilja reforme javne uprave, nato pa pridobiti spoznanja iz tranzicijskih
izku{enj tistih novih držav ~lanic EU, ki so del Srednje in Vzhodne Evrope,
saj so najverjetneje {le skozi podobne procese.
Najpomembnej{e reformno gibanje zadnjega ~etrt stoletja v javni
upravi kot taki je novi javni menedžment (NJM), tj. prenos poslovnih in
tržnih na~el ter upravljavskih tehnik iz zasebnega v javni sektor, in sicer v
simbiozi z neoliberalnim pojmovanjem države in gospodarstva ter na njegovi podlagi. Glede na sodobno javnoupravno vedo je NJM zlasti – vendar ne samo – v Evropi trenutno mo~no v defenzivi, ~e ga razumemo kot
svetovni nazor (tj. ideologijo), ne pa kot eno od ve~ koristnih perspektiv za
reformo javne uprave (tj. „orodje“). Nenadni globalni finan~ni zlom jeseni
2008 je spremenil tudi javni in politi~ni odnos do birokracije na splo{no,
kritika NJM, kakor je izražena zgoraj, pa je bila videti skoraj trivialna – in
bilo je kot na dlani, da imajo fraze, logika in celoten na~in razmi{ljanja
NJM prav tisto miselno podstat, ki je sprva povzro~ila oziroma vsaj sprožila krizo, naivno vero v gospodarski liberalizem in predvidljivo negativno
vlogo države.
Protimodel NJM, pravzaprav njegov „grdi ra~ek“, je tako imenovana
Weberjanska javna uprava. Kaže, da je weberjanski model z vsemi slabostmi
vred v bistvu {e vedno najbolj{i, zagotovo pa je bolj{i od NJM – saj je, ~e
uporabimo Churchillove besede, najslab{a oblika javne uprave, razen
25
Wolfgang Drechsler
vseh drugih. Optimalna struktura uprave na{ega ~asa – ni pomembno, ali
pred zlomom, po njem ali med njim – pa vseeno ne pomeni preproste
predelave organizacijskih na~el paradigme množi~ne proizvodnje, katere
slabosti so dobro znane – od pretiranega legalizma prek pristne birokracije
do zagrizenega nasprotovanja inovaciji in gospodarstvu. Model upravne
paradigme, ki sledi NJM in o katerem je že nekaj let najve~ govora, tj.
post-NJM, zato ne pomeni vrnitve k prej{njemu, temve~ v skladu s Pollittovim in Bouckaertovim konceptom iz leta 2004 pomeni tako imenovano
neoweberjansko državo (NWD), metaforo za opis modela, ki sicer prevzema pozitivne prvine NJM, vendar na weberjanskem temelju, tako da sta
oba asimetri~no aufgehoben.
Zdi se, da je NWD najbolj{i model javne uprave, ki nam je na voljo v
kriznih ~asih – oziroma vsaj med sedanjo krizo. Najsi bo država ~loveku
v{e~ ali ne, njena vrnitev v gospodarstvo v obsegu, ki je bil {e sredi leta
2008 nepredstavljiv, pomeni, da na{ sistem ne more delovati brez resni~no usposobljene in motivirane državne uprave ter da je zmanj{evanje
javnih izdatkov na tem podro~ju najslab{a mogo~a zamisel.
Kaj pa vse to pomeni za Jugovzhodno Evropo? Kriza se v tej regiji
dejansko ne kaže ni~ druga~e kot drugje, tako da moramo v tem smislu
pogledati, kaj je posebnega v tej regiji, kar bi dolo~alo primernost ali
neprimernost NJM in NWD (in kar zadeva slednje, gre nedvomno za
osnovno vpra{anje o uporablnosti weberjanizma, starega ali novega, v tej
regiji) kot takih oziroma kot rezervoarjev dobrih praks – to pa lahko storimo z analiziranjem izku{enj iz ~asa pred zlomom. Prav pri vpra{anju uporabnosti NJM imamo vrsto držav, ki so nedavno dobile podobne izku{nje
in sprejele podobne odlo~itve, in sicer nove države ~lanice iz Srednje in
Vzhodne Evrope – med njimi tudi Slovenija. ê upo{tevamo vse razlike in
posebnosti, pa tudi težave pri jemanju lekcij, lahko re~emo, da je bila razprava o uporabi NJM v novih državah ~lanicah tako podobna razpravi, ki
jo ravno za~enja Jugovzhodna Evropa, da je lahko koristna pri ugotavljanju, kaj bi bilo v regiji dobro storiti in ~emu bi se bilo dobro izogniti – to pa
bi prineslo spoznanja za ~as krize in obdobje po njej.
Glavno spoznanje, ki ga nove države ~lanice lahko ponudijo Jugovzhodni Evropi, je nedvomno, naj ne sprejemajo NJM kot paradigme (razen
kot posami~na orodja NJM). Zdaj namre~ vemo, da s „~istkami“ NJM ni
mogo~e re{iti niti problemov preostanka nekompetentne in nedemokrati~ne birokracije iz prej{njih ~asov niti problemov korupcije – preprosto ni
26
Wolfgang Drechsler
mogo~e, ne glede na to, kako lepo bi to bilo. To pa je nedvomno že lekcija
iz ~asa pred zlomom.
Druga priložnost je koncept NWD, ta pa presega izku{nje novih držav
~lanic, saj v ~asu, ko so se spoprijemale z intenzivno tranzicijo – oziroma
zgolj v ~isto zadnjih letih NWD kot koncept {e ni obstajal. Kakor koli že,
NWD kot izvedljiva in dobro podprta alternativa, ki ~loveku omogo~a, ne
samo da kritizira NJM, temve~ da konkretno predstavi povsem razumljiv,
sodoben model tega, kako naj bi bila javna uprava videti, je nekaj, kar
odgovornim v novih državah ~lanicah ni bilo na voljo. Je posebna ugodnost razmeroma „pozne“ tranzicije, ki jo imajo države Jugovzhodne Evrope in od katere si lahko obetajo precej{njo korist.
Dobrega življenja v dobri državi Jugovzhodne Evrope (ne glede na
zgodovinsko, gospodarsko in kulturno raznolikost regije), ki je konsolidirana in se približuje ~lanstvu v EU, usmerjena v mirno in plodno sožitje v
globaliziranem, konkuren~nem okolju 21. stoletja po sedanji krizi, si ni
mogo~e zamisliti brez kakovostne, ustrezne, dobro delujo~e javne uprave
ter odgovorne, odzivne, kompetentne in zaupanja vredne državne uprave,
ki je klju~nega pomena tudi za premo{~anje {e aktualnih vplivov zloma.
Zdi se, da je trenutno najbolj{i model (po katerem bi se lahko zgledovali,
ne bi pa ga posnemali) za tak ideal NWD (oziroma nekaj podobnega ali
celo presegajo~ega); zagotovo pa to ni NJM.
27
28
Pregledni znanstveni ~lanek
Dvodomni sistem
kot nasledek procesa
decentralizacije
UDK: 342.25(045)
Milo{ Sen~ur
Univerza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za upravo
milos.sencur@fu.uni-lj.si
IZVLEÊK
Prispevek se posve~a vpra{anju teritorialnega principa v dvodomnem sistemu, ki se je kot prevladujo~i element pri oblikovanju drugega doma parlamenta obdržal do danes. S prikazom njegove vloge v primerjalno-pravni in
slovenski ureditvi pa pride do ugotovitve, da postaja teritorialni drugi dom
parlamenta vse bolj tudi nujni pogoj za unitarne države z razvito stopnjo
decentralizacije, zato je med njimi in federativnimi državami v tem pogledu
vedno manj razlik. Razlike glede vloge in položaja drugega doma so predvsem
posledica stopnje decentralizacije oziroma razvitosti lokalne samouprave,
svoje pa v~asih prispeva tudi oblika državne oblasti. S slabitvijo vloge parlamenta v razmerju z izvr{ilno oblastjo se namre~ zmanj{uje tudi vloga in položaj drugega doma. Kljub temu pa pomen dvodomnega odlo~anja v teoriji in
praksi ne pojenja.
Klju~ne besede: parlament, decentralizacija, dvodomni sistem.
JEL: K19
1. Uvod
Pomemben element pri odlo~itvi za oblikovanje dvodomnega predstavni{kega organa, zlasti z vidika dognanj in izku{enj primerjalno–pravne
ureditve in z vidika tradicije oziroma izku{enj konkretne države, naj bi bila oblika
državne ureditve, saj je vpra{anje teritorialnega predstavni{tva z njo v tesni
29
Milo{ Sen~ur
Dvodomni sistem kot nasledek procesa decentralizacije
zvezi. Za federativno urejene države je dvodomna ureditev parlamenta conditio
sine qua non že zaradi uresni~evanja federalnega na~ela, ki vklju~uje tudi ustrezno zastopanost teritorialnih enot v zveznem parlamentu. Vpra{anje pa je, v
kolik{ni meri notranja ~lenitev vpliva na vzpostavitev dvodomnega sistema po
teritorialnem principu v primeru unitarne države in kak{no vlogo ima tedaj drugi
dom. Ta naj bi vsekakor v obeh primerih predstavljal svojevrsten mehanizem
zavor in ravnovesij v delovanju (centralne) zakonodajne veje oblasti.
Za federativno urejene države in za unitarne države je zna~ilno, da oblast ni
nujno centralizirana, ampak je vrsta oblastnih nalog po na~elu vertikalne subsidiarnosti prenesenih v izvajanje ali celo upravljanje razli~nim oblikam teritorialne organiziranosti, razmerja med njimi in osrednjo oblastjo pa ob obstoju ustreznih okoli{~in temeljijo predvsem na sodelovanju in soodvisnosti. Prakti~no v
vsaki državi je poleg centralne ravni {e nižja raven, kjer gre za bolj ali manj razvito in razvejano lokalno samoupravo. Gre za oblike t. i. teritorialne decentralizacije.
Koliko ravni bo med centralno in lokalno ravnjo je odvisno od posamezne
1
države, predvsem od njene velikosti, zgodovinskih okoli{~in in vse bolj tudi od
2
zahtev, ki jih prina{a sodoben upravljavski proces. V zvezi z razli~nimi oblikami
in ravnmi teritorialne organiziranosti hkrati poteka tudi proces integracije, ki
posku{a te razli~ne elemente družbenega sistema na ustrezen na~in uokviriti.
Slednje pa že po naravi stvari nakazuje razli~ne dimenzije odnosov med centralno oblastjo in teritorialnimi enotami, zlasti vpra{anje medsebojnega vpliva.
2. Oblike teritorialne decentralizacije
Pri vpra{anju oblikovanja poddržavnih oblasti gre za nenehno iskanje ustreznega ravnotežja med decentralizacijo in centralizacijo in s tem za iskanje
novih organizacijskih oblik, tudi na teritorialni osnovi.
1 Brezov{ek meni, da obstoj mreže teritorialnih enot predstavlja nujnost v sodobni državi
(Brezov{ek, 1997, str. 188). Po podatkih DEXIE iz Pariza (publikacija EU sub-national governments: an overview) je v državah ~lanicah EU 92500 podržavnih skupnosti oz. oblasti (Vlaj,
2009).
2 Namre~, ~e gre le za eno stopnjo lokalne samouprave, potem prihaja do nasprotij in polarizacije v razmerjih med državo in lokalnimi skupnostmi. Po drugi strani pa ima tudi preve~
stopenj obi~ajno negativne posledice za upravljavski proces z vidika njegove u~inkovitosti.
30
Milo{ Sen~ur
Pomemben kriterij za decentralizacijske ukrepe strukturne, finan~ne in
druge narave naj bi bila predvsem težnja po razumnem odpravljanju morebitnih
teritorialnih pomanjkljivosti oziroma po zasledovanju enakovrednosti življenjskih
3
razmer prebivalcev na ravni {ir{e, državne skupnosti.
4
V praksi gre za razli~ne oblike in na~ine prenosa državnih nalog navzdol.
Pri tem gre bodisi za najmanj intenzivno stopnjo tega prenosa, za dekoncen5
tracijo ali upravno decentralizacijo, ko je predvsem zaradi funkcionalnih in organizacijskih potreb na strani centralne upravne organizacije in zaradi potreb
prebivalstva po dostopnosti upravnih storitev izvajanje oblastnih in drugih nalog
zaupano organom izven centralne lokacije, bodisi gre za decentralizacijo v
ožjem smislu, kjer ta prenos vklju~uje tudi pristojnost za oblikovanje politik in
deloma lasten nadzor nad izvajanjem nalog.
6
Ena od oblik in posledic procesa decentralizacije v sferi upravljanja z javnimi zadevami je lokalna samouprava. Lokalna samouprava ~rpa svojo mo~
7
neposredno iz ustave, obenem pa ustava dolo~a tudi meje njenega delovanja
in nadzora nad njo. Lokalna samouprava pomeni pomemben na~in družbene
8
9
(samo)regulacije, ki je hkrati nelo~ljivi del državne ureditve. Zaradi tega so
razmerja med lokalnimi skupnostmi in državo bistveni element samouprave. Pri
tem gre v skladu z na~elom vertikalne delitve oblasti za obojestranski nadzor v
razmerjih z državo in za možnosti zastopanja lokalnih skupnosti na centralni
ravni. Od slednjega bo namre~ odvisen obseg vpliva lokalnih skupnosti na urejanje njihovega položaja in odnosov z državno oblastjo.
3 Vzpostavitev ustreznega ravnotežja pri razdelitvi javnih prihodkov med osrednjo oblastjo
in teritorialnimi enotami za financiranje njihovih javnih potreb je tudi v na{i praksi vedno
problemati~no in težko re{ljivo vpra{anje. O pomembnosti ekonomskega vidika procesa
decentralizacije gl. ve~ v Bugari~, 1998, str. 121-130.
4 Za teritorialne oblike na slovenskem ozemlju zadnjih sto let je zna~ilno, da je upravljanje
javnih zadev potekalo na ve~ teritorialnih ravneh, kjer so se prepletale naloge samoupravnega in državnega zna~aja. Nazadnje je bil vzpostavljen enostopenjski komunalni sistem kot
poskus oblikovanja najbolj optimalne samoupravne in oblastne skupnosti z vidika iskanja
sorazmerja med frekvenco upravnih nalog ter {tevilom prebivalstva in velikostjo ozemlja.
5 Ta izraz je npr. izrecno uporabljen v 5. ~lenu italijanske ustave, ko je govora o službah,
podrejenih državi (gl. na spletni strani: http://www.senato.it/istituzione/29375/articolato.htm,
uporabljeno 2. 10. 2009).
6 V teoriji je v tem primeru govora o politi~ni decentralizaciji, ki naj bi bila najvi{ja stopnja
avtonomije (Porta, 2003, str. 207).
7 Prim. Osnutek ustave Republike Slovenije, Poro~evalec Skup{~ine Republike Slovenije, {t.
17/90, str. 20.
8 Tako imamo na istem obmo~ju dve oblasti, pri ~emer se mora tudi država podrejati lokalni
oblasti (npr. na podro~ju urejanja prostora).
9 Država daje npr. lokalnim skupnostim smernice na podro~ju urejanja prostora, ~eprav to
podro~je sodi v izvirni delokrog lokalne samouprave.
31
Milo{ Sen~ur
îm bolj je država decentralizirana (s politi~nega in ekonomskega vidika),
bolj bodo v ospredju vpra{anja glede razdelitve pristojnosti med njenim centrom in njenimi deli, prav tako pa tudi vpra{anje, kak{en vpliv naj imajo slednji
na oblikovanje centralnih organov in na njihove odlo~itve. S stopnjo decentralizacije raste tako tudi potreba po ustrezni povezanosti med sistemom kot celoto
in njegovimi deli, ki se pogosto uresni~uje v obliki dvodomne strukture centralnega organa oblasti.
Dvodomni sistem pa ni edina oblika delitve državne oblasti, enako tudi
na~elo horizontalne delitve oblasti ni edini vidik dvodomnosti. Politi~na oziroma
družbena mo~ namre~ ni porazdeljena le horizontalno, v smislu klasi~ne delitve
oblasti, ampak tudi vertikalno. Na~elo vertikalne delitve oblasti dobiva vse ve~ji
10
pomen, kajti pomemben delež oblasti naj bi pripadel lokalni samoupravi. Njeni
nosilci pa imajo glede na svoj samoupravni položaj hkrati pravico, da predstavijo
svoja stali{~a in sodelujejo pri re{evanju vseh tistih vpra{anj, ki se nana{ajo na
11
uresni~evanje lokalne samouprave.
3. Idejni temelji in praksa teritorialnega
predstavni{tva v primerjalni ureditvi
12
Najstarej{i, v dolo~enem smislu referen~ni drugi dom, je ameri{ki senat,
saj njegov nastanek datira v leto 1787. Za razliko od ve~ine drugih domov do
danes ni doživel nobenih pomembnej{ih sprememb z vidika enakopravnosti
razmerja s predstavni{kim domom kongresa. Senat je bil zasnovan kot predstavnik federalnih enot, vendar so kasneje (zlasti po uvedbi neposrednih volitev) nad interesi posameznih držav tudi v tem domu prevladali interesi
13
politi~nih strank.
10 Prim. Odlo~bo ustavnega sodi{~a Republike Slovenije, {t. U-I-176/04 (Uradni list RS, {t.
21/06).
11 Prim. Odlo~bo ustavnega sodi{~a Republike Slovenije, {t. U-I-24/07(Uradni list RS, {t.
101/07).
12 Po njem so se zgledovale {tevilne federacije. Delegati vseh avstralskih kolonij so npr. že
na konferenci leta 1890 v Melbournu sprejeli odlo~itev o bodo~i federativni ureditvi države,
katere centralni parlament bo dvodomen ({ir{e na spletni strani: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.
au/parlInfo/, uporabljeno 2. 10. 2009).
13 Grad et al., 2004, str. 143.
32
Milo{ Sen~ur
Ameri{kemu zgledu je sledila že {vicarska ustava iz leta 1848, ki je uvedla
14
dvodomni zvezni zakonodajni organ. Po sedanji ustavni ureditvi (ustava iz leta
1999) zvezno skup{~ino sestavljata zvezni zbor in kantonalni zbor. Mo~ in
svoboda {vicarskih kantonov, z izjemo kratkega obdobja obstoja unitarno urejene države, se je odrazila tudi v vlogi in položaju drugega doma. Ta je bil po
pristojnostih ves ~as popolnoma izena~en s prvim domom, kantonom pa je bilo
dopu{~eno, da sami dolo~ajo na~in njegovega oblikovanja.
15
Pomembnost
zgornjega doma je zmanj{ana v primerih, ko gre za obravnavo zadev na skupni
seji obeh domov, kjer pride do izraza {tevil~na prednost prvega doma. Njegovo
vlogo za{~itnika interesov kantonov zmanj{uje tudi referendum, saj je v tem
primeru zaupana ljudstvu. Poleg tega je za [vico v zadnjih desetletjih zna~ilna
16
centralizacija, ki vpliva na njeno preoblikovanje v skupino unitarnih držav.
Nem~ija je imela federativno ureditev že po ustavi iz leta 1871, vendar pa
je bila zakonodajna oblast pretežno v rokah centralne oblasti, ki je slabila vlogo
17
in položaj federalnih enot.
Kasneje so bile z Weimarsko ustavo zožene {e
pristojnosti drugega doma, zato prevladuje mnenje, da je bila Nem~ija tedaj
18
bliže decentralizirani unitarni državi. Po prihodu Hitlerja na oblast je bil drugi
19
dom skupaj z deželami leta 1934 ukinjen.
Po koncu druge svetovne vojne sta
imeli obe nem{ki državi dvodomni parlament, oba zgornja domova pa sta bila
20
predstavnika teritorialnih enot. Z združitvijo držav leta 1990 je bila uveljavljena
zahodnonem{ka ustava. Zvezni svet ima v razmerju s prvim domom podrejeno
21
22
vlogo. Na dolo~ene zakone ima pravico vložiti absolutni veto,
sicer pa le
14 Brli}, 1931, str. 467.
15 V preteklosti so v nekaj primerih predstavnike kantonov volile skup{~ine kantonov, danes
pa so voljeni neposredno. Po kantonalnih predpisih je tudi mandatna doba enotno urejena
(podatki so s spletne strani http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm, uporabljeno: 2. 10. 2009).
16 Trifunovska, 1991, str. 138. Po drugi strani pa je kot posledico decentralizacije zaznati
okrepljeno vertikalno povezovanje med kantoni in enotami lokalne samouprave (Zimmermann, 1993, str. 86).
17 Zvezno državo iz tistega obdobja so pogosto imenovali z izrazom psevdofederalizem
(Beyme, 2002, str. 307).
18 Grad et al., 2004, str. 91.
19 Prav tam.
20 Predstavnike drugega doma Vzhodne Nem~ije so volile skup{~ine teh enot, katerih sklepi
pa zanje niso bili zavezujo~i. Tam so bile dežele odpravljene leta 1952 in je bila država odtlej
unitarna (Grad et al., 2004., str. 108).
21 Zvezni svet po mnenju von Beyma ni drugi dom. Bolj mu pripisuje polparlamentarni
zna~aj, ki se kaže v tem, da se javnost ne zanima za njegovo delo, da ~lani glasujejo enotno
kot delegacija, da je nadzor nad vlado le posrednega zna~aja ipd. (Beyme, 2002, str. 310). Na
nekem drugem mestu pa avtor sklene, da se je zvezni svet v nasprotju s pri~akovanji tvorcev
ustave razvil v mo~an drugi dom (str. 316), kar je seveda bližje dejanskemu stanju (Russell,
2000, str. 216-218).
33
Milo{ Sen~ur
23
suspenzivni veto.
24
^lane zveznega sveta izvolijo deželne vlade izmed svojih
ter imajo imperativni mandat, kar pomeni, da sledijo navodilom dežel-
~lanov
25
nih vlad.
Ustava Avstrije iz leta 1920, po kateri je drugi dom odražal federativno
ureditev države, je bila dvakrat spremenjena (v letih 1925 in 1929), pri ~emer je
26
druga sprememba vpeljala v drugi dom tudi poklicne stanove. Ta sprememba
v strukturi drugega doma dobi radikalizirano nadgradnjo v novi ustavi iz leta
1934, ko drugi dom povsem izgubi vlogo predstavnika teritorialnih enot. Z ustavnim zakonom iz leta 1945 je bila ponovno uveljavljena prvotna ustava, zato
ima tudi drugi dom pristojnosti, podobne prvotni ustavni zasnovi. V okviru pristojnosti drugega doma je poleg pravice do zakonodajne iniciative in suspenzivnega veta omeniti {e pravico do soglasja na odlo~itve prvega doma v izrecno
27
dolo~enih primerih.
[panske avtonomne skupnosti nekateri primerjajo z nem{kimi deželami in
zaradi tega [panijo uvr{~ajo med visoko decentralizirane, skoraj federativne
28
države.
V {panskem senatu je ve~ina ~lanov drugega doma neposredno izvol-
jenih v okviru teritorialnih enot, del ~lanov pa izvolijo njihovi predstavni{ki organi. Nekateri menijo, da je {panski senat zaradi tega nenavaden drugi dom, ter
da neposredno izvoljeni ~lani senata nimajo naravnih povezav z lokalnimi
oblastmi, ~eprav so ve~inoma tudi ~lani skup{~in avtonomnih skupnosti.29
22 V po{tev pride predvsem pri spremembi ustave, zakonih z vplivom na državne finance,
ter tistih zakonih, ki vplivajo na deželno upravno jurisdikcijo ({ir{e na spletni strani:
http://www.bundestag.de, uporabljeno 2. 10. 2009).
23 Po 50. ~lenu nem{ke ustave imajo dežele pravico prek zveznega sveta sodelovati pri
zakonodaji zveze tudi v zadevah EU (gl. spletno stran: http://www.bundestag.de/gesetze/gg/,
24 Od tri do {est predstavnikov, pa~ glede na {tevilo prebivalcev v posamezni deželi. Mandatna doba ~lanov nem{kega drugega doma ni dolo~ena, ker jih imenujejo in odpokli~ejo
deželne vlade (podatki so s spletne strani: http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm, uporabljeno 2. 10. 2009).
25 Po mnenju teoretikov gre v primeru nem{kega zveznega sveta za unikaten in za najuspe{nej{i drugi dom glede teritorialnega zastopstva. V njem ni strankarskih skupin, ampak so
stali{~a njegovih ~lanov pogosto tista, ki vplivajo na strankarsko politiko. Drugi dom zagotavlja mehanizem kontrole nad zvezno zakonodajo, njegova potencialna mo~, da to zakonodajo
blokira, pa ustvarja sistem povezanosti in medsebojnega vpliva na relaciji zveza in dežele
(Russell, 2001b, str. 114 in 115).
26 Sprememba naj bi bila posledica zahtev politi~nih strank po pravi demokraciji (PolzerSrienz, 2000, str. 27).
27 Teorija je tak položaj drugega doma ozna~ila kot lažni dvodomni sistem, že sicer neznatno zastopanje interesov federalnih enot na zvezni ravni pa se s prevlado strankarskih interesov nad njimi le {e pove~uje (Koja, 1970, str. 259).
28 [midovnik, 1993, str. 203.
29 Russell, 2001b, str. 211.
34
Milo{ Sen~ur
Tudi v ve~ini {tevilnih ustavnih ureditev Francije je bilo teritorialno predstavni{tvo vedno pomemben element parlamenta. V obdobju tretje republike je
npr. senat predstavljal ob~ine kot najstarej{e in najbolj pomembne družbene
skupine, domova pa sta bila v zakonodajnem postopku na~eloma enako30
pravna.
Ustava ~etrte republike je znatno omejila pristojnosti drugega doma,
po ustavi pete republike iz leta 1958, ki velja {e danes, pa mora biti v parla31
mentu zagotovljeno predstavni{tvo teritorialnih enot.
Po mnenju teoretikov
gre pri vklju~evanju lokalnih interesov na državni ravni za podobno zastopanost,
kot je uveljavljena pri federativno in regionalno urejenih državah, kar daje lokalnim oblastem veliko možnosti za vplivanje na odlo~itve na vi{jih ravneh (senat
je dejansko svet francoskih ob~in).
32
Italijanski senat je po ustavi oblikovan na regionalni osnovi.
33
Zato bi
pri~akovali, da bo v ve~ji meri zastopnik interesov regij, vendar pa vpliv
politi~nih strank to vlogo senata in pomen regij v sistemu dvodomnosti
34
zmanj{uje.
Med predlogi za reformo ustavnega sistema v Italiji je tudi pred-
log, da bi imel senat manj{e {tevilo ~lanov, ki bi jih volili predstavniki ob~inskih,
pokrajinskih in regijskih svetov, splo{no zakonodajno pristojnost pa bi imel le
35
spodnji dom.
Kakor vidimo, je teritorialna osnova za oblikovanje drugega doma parla36
menta danes prevladujo~a in najbolj obi~ajna ter predstavlja zgled v moderni
37
državi. V federativnih državah so razlogi za dvodomno ureditev prakti~no enaki
30 Podobno urejen na~in volitev v senat je imela tudi [vedska, kjer so ~lane zgornjega doma
volili predstavni{ki organi provinc ter delegati tistih mest, ki niso bili zastopani v predstavni{kih organih provinc (Stefanovi}, 1931, str. 540).
31 Prim. 24. ~len ustave (http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp,
32 Meny, 1998, str. 117.
33 V italijanskem sistemu gre za {tiri ravni oblasti. Regije lahko same sprejemajo zakone na
razli~nih podro~jih, imajo pa tudi zakonodajno iniciativo (http://www.senato.it/istituzione/
29375/articolato.htm, uporabljeno 2. 10. 2009).
34 Predstavniki obeh zbornic se v poslanske skupine združujejo praviloma po strankarski
pripadnosti (Osnove, 1998, str. 70).
35 Klari}, 2005, str. 177 in 178.
36 Teritorialno predstavni{tvo je pravzaprav izvorna sestavina modernega dvodomnega
parlamenta, saj je tudi angle{ki model dvodomnega sistema sprva temeljil na teritorialnem
principu.
37 Npr. v Ukrajini je konec marca 2009 v parlamentarni postopek posredovan osnutek nove
ustave, kjer je predvidena uvedba dvodomnega parlamenta. Ukrajinski predsednik se je za
tak{en predlog odlo~il po zgledu drugih držav, ki imajo dvodomni sistem. Parlament bo
združeval predstavnike politi~nih sil v spodnjem domu, ki bodo voljeni neposredno po proporcionalnem sistemu, in predstavnike lokalnih skupnosti (zastopnike regij), ki bodo v zgornji
dom pri{li neposredno na podlagi ve~inskega volilnega sistema po na~elu paritete
(Ju{~enko, 2009, str. 5). Podobno v srbski ustavnopravni teoriji menijo, da naj bi se regionalizacija države odražala tudi v strukturi parlamenta, ~etudi enodomnega (Peji}, 2005, str. 80).
35
Milo{ Sen~ur
in govorijo o dvodomnosti kot nujni posledici oblike državne ureditve. Z redkimi
38
izjemami imajo vse federacije dvodomne parlamente,
drugi dom pa je v vlogi
39
predstavnika federalnih enot. Za unitarne države pa je struktura parlamenta
odvisna predvsem od stopnje decentralizacije države in razvitosti njene lokalne
samouprave. Povsod pa ima teritorialno zastopstvo razli~no pomembno težo.
Med državami z dvodomnim sistemom, kjer ima pomembno vlogo teritorialno predstavni{tvo, prihaja do pomembnih razlik glede vloge in položaja
drugega doma zaradi razli~nega zgodovinskega razvoja in družbenih sprememb
40
v posamezni državi, posebej sprememb na ekonomskem in politi~nem po41
dro~ju (npr. nastanek politi~nih strank in krepitev njihove vloge),
enakopravnosti med teritorialnimi enotami,
42
razlik z vidika
razli~nih možnosti teritorialnih
43
enot za udeležbo in vpliv pri odlo~anju na centralni ravni, procesov federali-
38 Npr. Saint Kitts & Nevis, Micronezija in Venezuela (Massicote, 2001, str. 152).
39 Dvodomna ureditev je marsikje zna~ilna tudi za federalne enote. V Avstraliji je npr. izjema
le Queensland, ki je drugi dom ukinil že leta 1922. Ve~ o tem gl. v Abolition of the Upper
House, Information on Parliament and Government in Queensland, str. 1-11 (spletna stran:
http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au./, uporabljeno 2. 10. 2009), kjer je zanimivo stali{~e, da je
enodomni parlament odklon od demokracije, dvodomni sistem pa potreba vsake vladavine.
To stali{~e je razumljivo, saj so avstralske federalne enote imele dvodomne parlamente po britanskem vzoru {e v ~asu statusa kolonij, ve~inoma iz istih razlogov, kot so zna~ilni za unitarne
države, tj., da pomenijo ustrezno zavoro in uravnoteženost znotraj zakonodajne oblasti.
40 Tipi~en primer je Francija, kjer je v dvestoletni zgodovini dvodomne strukture parlamenta
(v dolo~enem obdobju tudi ve~domne) njegov drugi dom doživljal {tevilne preobrazbe, tako
glede sestave, kakor tudi glede pristojnosti. Podobno je bilo tudi v nekdanji federativni Jugoslaviji, kjer so se družbene spremembe izrazito izražale v organizacijskih spremembah predstavni{kih teles na vseh ravneh oblasti.
41 Npr. ameri{ki senat je v vlogi predstavnika interesov lastni{kih struktur finan~ne, trgovske in veleposestni{ke narave pogosto sogla{al s predpisi, ki so krepili pristojnosti zveze na
ra~un državic, zato so danes razprave glede njegove vloge in potrebe po nadaljnjem obstoju
podobne kot pri unitarnih državah z dvodomnim sistemom (Hague et al., 2001, str. 275). Že
Laski je menil, da je bilo na~elo predstavni{tva teritorialnih enot v ameri{kem senatu izigrano z dejavnostjo strankarskega sistema, saj republikanci iz senata glasujejo enako kot republikanci iz predstavni{kega doma (Laski, 1934-35, str. 60).
42 Praviloma ima vsaka teritorialna enota v drugem domu zveznega parlamenta enako
{tevilo predstavnikov ne glede na njeno velikost in {tevilo prebivalstva (Peji}, 2005, str. 78).
Ker pa je vloga teritorialnega elementa danes prikrita s strankarsko politiko in strankarsko
zvestobo pri delovanju, je po mnenju teoretikov (Russell, 2003, str. 313) za ve~jo dinamiko
drugega doma bolj pomembno, da nobena politi~na stranka nima pretirane ve~ine v drugem
domu, kot pa to, da so vse teritorialne enote v njem paritetno zastopane.
43 V nekaterih federativno urejenih državah te možnosti niso uveljavljene le v okviru dejavnosti
drugega doma, ampak tudi na druge na~ine (npr. tako, da mora odlo~itve zveznega parlamenta
potrditi tudi dolo~eno {tevilo federalnih enot oziroma njihovih parlamentov, kot je to primer v
[vici, Kanadi in podobno v nekdanji SFR Jugoslaviji). Francoski enodomni parlament je po ustavi
iz leta 1793 moral sprejete zakone posredovati v mnenje vsem ob~inam v državi (~e je desetina
ob~in iz ve~ine departmajev nasprotovala zakonu, je parlament moral sklicati t. i. primarne
skup{~ine za dokon~en sprejem zakona). Na ta na~in so imele teritorialne skupnosti v Franciji
podobno vlogo, kakor jo imajo v dvodomnem sistemu. Po drugi strani pa so tudi primeri, kot npr.
v kanadskem parlamentu, ko ~lane senata imenuje zvezna izvr{ilna oblast in je zato vloga
drugega doma kot zastopnika federalnih enot vpra{ljiva.
36
Milo{ Sen~ur
44
zacije,
45
centralizacije in decentralizacije skozi razli~na obdobja, novih vzorcev
javnega upravljanja in podobno.
Po drugi strani pa je pri teh državah mogo~e najti {tevilne sti~ne to~ke, ki
med drugim koreninijo tudi v obliki njihove državne ureditve oziroma državne
oblasti. Velja prepri~anje, da ima drugi dom v predstavni{kih organih federativnih držav pomembnej{o vlogo od drugega doma v unitarni državi. Iz razlogov,
zaradi katerih je oblikovan, je to tudi upravi~ena domneva, vendar praksa tega
ne potrjuje v prepri~ljivi meri. O~itno je pri tem pomembna tudi oblika državne
46
47
oblasti, ki v dolo~eni meri vpliva na vlogo in položaj drugega doma.
Lahko bi rekli, da je tam, kjer parlament kot sistem izgublja na pomenu, ali
pa, kjer je lo~itev oblasti manj dosledno izvedena, tudi vloga drugega doma vse
48
manj{a. V zvezi s tem je posebna italijanska ureditev, ker gre za unitarno
državo in za parlamentarno republiko, a je senat kljub temu popolnoma enakopraven s predstavni{ko zbornico. Toda v italijanskem primeru gre za ve~
pomembnih okoli{~in, ki na neki na~in to posebnost pojasnjujejo. V Italiji ima
namre~ predsednik države, ~eprav je posredno izvoljen, bistveno ve~jo vlogo in
49
mo~nej{i položaj kot v drugih parlamentarnih ureditvah, vklju~no z na{o. Poleg
50
tega pa je v Italiji kljub unitarni ureditvi prisoten mo~an regionalni naboj,
ki se
zrcali tudi v pogostih zahtevah po federalizaciji države.
44 Belgija je bila dolgo ~asa unitarna in centralizirana država, vendar je od leta 1970 dalje
postopoma krenila po poti decentralizacije in federalizma, da bi leta 1993 tudi uradno postala
federativna država (Lijphart, 1999, str. 100). Belgija je primer, ki kaže, da so meje med federalnim in regionalnim zborom lahko tudi zabrisane (Ribi~i~, 2000, str. 56).
45 Gre za stalen proces prerazporejanja funkcij med centralno oblastjo in teritorialnimi
enotami v smeri krepitve ene ali drugih.
46 Za Kanado, Nem~ijo in Avstrijo je zna~ilna podrejena vloga drugega doma, ~eprav gre za
federativno urejene države, vendar pa imajo te države hkrati parlamentarno obliko oblasti
(delna izjema v skupini tovrstnih držav je npr. Avstralija, a ima tudi tam drugi dom manj{o
težo, ko gre za razmerje do vlade in za sprejemanje zakonov finan~ne narave).
47 V federativnih državah s skup{~inskim sistemom (npr. [vica in biv{e socialisti~ne države),
s predsedni{ko obliko oblasti (npr. ZDA) ali s prevladujo~imi elementi predsedni{ke oblike
oblasti (npr. Rusija) je npr. vloga drugega doma v parlamentu enakopravnej{a.
48 Danes se v prid dvodomnosti navaja, da so raznoliki interesi, zastopani v drugem domu,
manj pod vplivom vlade, kot pa v spodnjem domu (Russell, 2001a, str. 442).
49 Dalj{a mandatna doba predsednika države, pristojnost za oblikovanje vlade, imenovanje
najvi{jih državnih funkcionarjev, odobravanje osnutkov zakonov, ki jih vlada predloži v parlament, sklicevanje izrednih sej katerekoli zbornice parlamenta, pristojnost za njuno razpustitev, opravljanje nadzora nad izvajanjem zakonodajne funkcije v obliki odložilnega veta, vse
to so zna~ilnosti, ki govorijo o relativno mo~ni vlogi italijanskega predsednika države.
50 Dežele imajo zakonodajno pristojnost na dolo~enih podro~jih, imajo pravico do zakonodajne iniciative, lahko zahtevajo razpis razveljavitvenega ljudskega referenduma, poleg tega
je osrednja državna oblast v skladu z na~elom subsidiarnosti prepustila regionalnim oblastem, provincam in ob~inam cel niz upravnih nalog (Klari}, 2005, str. 174 in 175).
37
Milo{ Sen~ur
4. Teritorialno predstavni{tvo v razvoju slovenske
dvodomnosti
Slovenci se, podobno kot preostali evropski prostor, sre~ujemo z razli~no
strukturo in oblikami predstavni{kih organov že zelo dolgo in v razli~nih državnih tvorbah. Dvodomna struktura parlamenta je tudi v starej{i teoriji vedno
51
imela precej zagovornikov. Odlo~itve v praksi pa so seveda bile posledica
razmerja sil med razli~nimi družbenimi skupinami. Zlasti v nekdanji skupni
državi Jugoslaviji se je dinamika družbenih odnosov izrazito odražala v {tevilnih
spremembah strukture zveznega in republi{kih predstavni{kih organov.
52
Rde~a nit sprememb so bile tudi razprave o pomenu teritorialnega predstavni{tva v zakonodajnem organu.
53
Plod tovrstnih razprav o iskanju us-
treznej{ih oblik za sodelovanje ob~in pri oblikovanju republi{ke politike oziroma
pri njihovem vplivanju na delo republi{ke skup{~ine in na doslednej{e uveljavljanje
na~ela dvodomnega odlo~anja, je bila na slovenskih tleh najprej uvedba zasedanja delegatov ob~in kot posvetovalnega telesa v republi{ki skup{~ini, kasneje
54
pa uvedba zbora ob~in kot enakopravnega zbora skup{~ine.
Struktura parlamenta je zaposlovala tudi snovalce nove slovenske us55
tave. To vpra{anje je bilo {e posebej povezano s strukturo bodo~e lokalne
samouprave. Glede temeljnih lokalnih skupnosti ni bilo posebnih razhajanj, pa~
pa so bila odprta vpra{anja glede oblikovanja {ir{ih lokalnih skupnosti in njihove
zastopanosti na državni ravni. Stali{~a v zvezi s tem so bila diametralno
nasprotna. Nekateri so menili, da pokrajin sploh ne potrebujemo, ker bi proces
regionalizacije hkrati pomenil težnjo po federalizaciji države, drugi pa, da brez
vzpostavitve druge ravni ne bo razvoja lokalne samouprave, kar bo imelo negativne posledice tudi glede uveljavljanja teritorialnih interesov pri dolo~anju
politike na državni ravni. Slednji so opozarjali, da bo ob velikem {tevilu majhnih
51 Vo{njak, 1920, str. 198-203 in Steska, 1920, str. 1-20. Vo{njak je menil, da naj bi bil zgornji
dom predstavnik vseh socialno-gospodarskih dejavnikov v državi, Steska pa je poudarjal, da
je sodelovanje teritorialnih avtonomnih zastopstev pri zakonodaji protiutež prenagljenim
odlo~itvam parlamenta.
52 Temeljit pregled tistega obdobja v Kristan, 1970, str. 184 in 185.
53 Sejni zapiski Skup{~ine SR Slovenije, {t. 38/68, Priloge, str. 472.
54 Že v razpravah o osnutku ustave je bilo poudarjeno, da mora v republi{ki skup{~ini priti
do izraza v vsej raznolikosti interes ob~in v vseh zadevah, ki so po svoji naravi take, da neposredno posegajo v interese ob~anov ter v položaj, vlogo in naloge ob~ine kot teritorialne
skupnosti (prim. v Sejni zapiski Skup{~ine SR Slovenije, 61. seja republi{kega zbora,18. 7.
1973, str. 115).
55 Prim. magnetogram razprave o teh vpra{anjih na 18. seji Komisije za ustavna vpra{anja
Skup{~ine Republike Slovenije z dne 12. 12. 1990.
38
Milo{ Sen~ur
in strokovno {ibkih ob~in in ob odsotnosti druge ravni lokalne samouprave
nastal v razmerju do centrov mo~i na državni ravni prehud razkorak.
56
V razli~nih fazah procesa nastajanja nove slovenske ustave se je kot alternativna re{itev v bodo~i strukturi parlamenta ves ~as pojavljal državni svet kot
zastopnik posebnih interesov (lokalnih, socialnih, poklicnih ipd.), ki pa nikoli ni
bil deležen ustrezne obravnave. Zaradi tega sta tudi njegova vloga in položaj
vse od uvedbe dalje precej nedore~ena. Zlasti to velja za zastopstvo teritorial57
nih interesov, ki imajo v državnem svetu absolutno ve~ino. Dilema tvorcev
ustave, kak{en drugi dom oblikovati, da bo ta ustrezal nalogam zastopstva teritorialnih enot in pozitivno vplival na zakonodajno dejavnost oziroma procese
družbenega upravljanja, je tako prisotna {e danes. Tudi zaradi nedosledno izvedenega na~ela delitve oblasti po vertikalni liniji.
Po ustavnih spremembah leta 2006 je dvostopenjska lokalna samouprava
postala obveznost. Vmesna stopnja med državo in ob~inami naj bi bile pokrajine
kot {ir{e samoupravne lokalne skupnosti. S tem naj bi tudi drugi dom slovenskega parlamenta dobil izrazitej{o vlogo (bodisi kot zbor pokrajin bodisi kot
58
strukturno reformiran državni svet ), seveda ob pogoju hkratnega premisleka o
ustreznosti zdaj{njih njegovih pristojnosti. Pri tem gre vedno za vrsto možnosti,
od oblikovanja mo~nega drugega doma, kar lahko privede celo do podrejenosti
prvega doma, do vzpostavitve tak{nega drugega doma, ki se v praksi izkaže kot
neu~inkovit in nepotreben. Re{itev je obi~ajno kompromis, ki pa je upravi~en le
v primeru, ~e zadosti vnaprej dolo~enim kriterijem (kot so npr. zagotovitev pristojnosti, ki bodo odlo~ilne v zakonodajnem postopku, ustrezen vpliv v razmerju
do izvr{ilne oblasti ipd.). Razvojno gledano naj bi zato re{itve glede bodo~e
vloge in položaja državnega sveta potekale primarno predvsem v naslednjih
dveh smereh:
•
v smeri spremembe razmerja med državnim svetom in državnim
zborom kot splo{nim predstavni{kim organom oziroma v smeri zagotavljanja ve~je konkuren~nosti državnega sveta z ustrezno redefinicijo
in modifikacijo njegovih pristojnosti in
56 Prim. v Ribi~i~, 2007, str. 331.
57 Pri tem je treba upo{tevati tudi dejstvo, da je bil državni svet zasnovan {e v ~asu obstoja
komunalnih ob~in, tako da gre za neke vrste anahronizem.
58 Najbolj zanimiva, {iroka in intenzivna razprava o možnostih preoblikovanja državnega
sveta v teritorialno predstavni{tvo oziroma predstavni{tvo bodo~ih pokrajin je v strokovni
javnosti potekala že leta 1998, kjer so bile predstavljene tako prednosti kot slabosti morebitnih sprememb (gl. npr. v Grad, 1998, str. 168-172 in Kristan, 1998, str. 173-174), {e bolj aktualna pa je postala po zadnjih ustavnih spremembah ({ir{e v Ribi~i~, 2007, str. 336-339).
39
Milo{ Sen~ur
•
v smeri spremembe njegove notranje strukturiranosti (delno ali v
celoti), pri ~emer je temeljna smer preobrazbe strukture državnega
sveta odvisna od bodo~e smeri nadaljnjega razvoja decentralizacije oziroma lokalne samouprave kot njene teritorialne oblike.
5. Sklepne misli
Oblikovanje drugega doma v ve~ini federativno urejenih držav z dvodomno
strukturo parlamenta temelji na teritorialnem principu. Ta vse bolj postaja nujni
pogoj tudi za unitarne države z razvito lokalno samoupravo, zato je med njimi in
federativnimi državami v tem pogledu vedno manj razlik. K postopnemu
izena~evanju prispeva tudi delovanje politi~nih strank, katerih interesi pogosto
preplavijo interese ostalih družbenih skupin.
Iz preteklih izku{enj in iz primerjalne ureditve lahko ~rpamo koristne
napotke za prihodnje odlo~itve. Nekatere dosedanje re{itve, tak primer je nedvomno ustavna opredelitev državnega sveta, so bile sprejete v veliki meri nepremi{ljeno, kar ima za posledico vedno mo~nej{i glavobol vsakokrat, ko je na
politi~nem jedilniku vpra{anje presoje sedanje in bodo~e vloge državnega sveta
ali celo njegove ukinitve.
Povezanost lokalne samouprave s centralno oblastjo in potreba po njunem
sodelovanju in usklajevanju tudi pri nas terja ustreznej{e institucionalne oblike.
V državnem svetu imamo posebno zastopstvo lokalnih interesov, kar pomeni,
da je lokalna samouprava eden od strukturnih dejavnikov parlamenta. Parlament naj bi poleg politi~nih interesov, katerih glavni nosilci so politi~ne stranke,
odražal tudi interese samoupravnih teritorialnih enot. Državni svet zato pomeni
vsaj možnost prepre~evanja popolnega monopola in samovolje splo{nega
predstavni{kega organa, ki lahko v nasprotnem primeru neovirano oblikuje
zakonodajo po lastni meri oziroma po meri politi~nih elit. Navedena možnost pa
je uresni~ljiva le v razmerah, ko ima drugi dom parlamenta {iroka pooblastila in
tak{ne pristojnosti, ki ga v veliki meri približujejo razmerju prirejenosti s prvim
domom. Gre predvsem za pomembno, v~asih tudi odlo~ilno vlogo v zakonodajnem postopku, v ustavno – revizijskem postopku, v zadevah finan~ne narave in
v razmerju do izvr{ilne veje oblasti. ê je eno glavnih orožij drugega doma
predvsem suspenzivni veto, s katerim zgolj za~asno odloži uveljavitev nekega
zakona, potem bo težko izpolnil pri~akovanja, pa naj gre za povsem pragmati~no
40
Milo{ Sen~ur
uveljavljanje interesov teritorialnih enot ali za uveljavljanje demokrati~nih standardov znotraj zakonodajne veje oblasti. V obeh primerih pride v sferi javnega
upravljanja do demokrati~nega deficita, le v druga~ni dimenziji tega upravljanja.
Mag. Milo{ Sen~ur, vi{ji predavatelj na Fakulteti za upravo Univerze v Ljubljani, je diplomiral in magistriral s podro~ja javne uprave na Pravni fakulteti v Ljubljani. Zadnjih dvajset
let deluje v javnem sektorju kot ~lan prvega slovenskega parlamenta, direktor ob~inske
uprave, na~elnik upravne enote, vrhovni državni revizor za lokalno samoupravo, univerzitetni u~itelj. Pri dosedanjem delu se je ukvarjal z raznimi vpra{anji, kot so premoženjskopravna razmerja med ob~inami, razmejitev pristojnosti med ob~ino in državo, volitve
zastopnikov lokalnih interesov v državnem svetu, vloga ob~in v zakonodajnem postopku,
razpolaganje s stvarnim premoženjem države in ob~in in podobno. Kot zunanji sodelavec
ministrstva, pristojnega za javno upravo, že ve~ let sodeluje v okviru programa obveznega usposabljanja za imenovanje v naziv.
Viri
•
Beyme, K. (2002). Politi~ni sistem Zvezne republike Nem~ije, Koper: Visoko{olsko sredi{~e.
•
Brezov{ek, M. (1997). Regionalna država med unitarizmom in federalizmom: teoreti~ni
modeli teritorialne organizacije oblasti. Teorija in praksa, let. 34, {t. 2/97, str. 183-196.
•
Brandt, N. (ur.). (1998). Osnove italijanskega ustavnega prava in Ustava Republike Italije.
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Brli}, I. (1931). O ustavu i ustavnoj povijesti {vicarske konfederacije, Zagreb.
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Bugari~, B. (1998). Ekonomski vidiki regionalizma. V: Ribi~i~, C. (ur.): Regionalizem v
Sloveniji. Zbornik, Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana, str. 121-130.
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Grad, F. (1998). Dvodomnost in zastopanost regionalnih interesov. V: Ribi~i~, C. (ur.):
Regionalizem v Sloveniji. Zbornik, Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana, str. 160-172.
41
Milo{ Sen~ur
42
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Grad, F., Kristan, I., Pereni~, A. (2004). Primerjalno ustavno pravo. Pravna fakulteta,
Ljubljana.
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Hague, R., Harrop, M. in Breslin, S. (2001). Komparativna vladavina i politika. Uvod.
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Ju{~enko, V. (2009). Ukrajina potrebuje ustavne spremembe. Delo, 30. april 2009.
•
Klari}, M. (2005). Lokalna samouprava u Italiji prema novom modelu, Zbornik radova
Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, let. 42.
•
Koja, F. (1970). Federalizam u Austriji. Arhiv za pravne i dru{tvene nauke, {t. 3-4/70.
•
Kristan, I. (1970). Dvodomni sistem v Jugoslaviji s posebnim poudarkom na razvoju zbora
narodov. Zbornik znanstvenih razprav, let. 34, Ljubljana, str. 179-209.
•
Kristan, I. (1998). Državni svet ali Zbor regij? V: Ribi~i~, C. (ur.): Regionalizem v Sloveniji.
Zbornik, Uradni list Republike Slovenije, Ljubljana, str. 173-185.
•
Laski, H. (1934-35). Politi~ka gramatika, zv. 1 in 2, Beograd.
•
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy, Government Forms and Performance in
Thirty-Six Countries. Yale University Press, New Haven in London.
•
Massicote, L. (2001). Legislative Unicameralism: A Global Survey and a Few Case Studies. V: Baldwin, N. D. J. in Shell, D. (ur.). Second Chambers, The Journal of Legislative
Studies. Vol. 7, Number 1, London.
•
Meny, Y. (1998). Francuski politi~ki sustav. Panliber, Osijek-Zagreb-Split.
•
Magnetogram 18. seje Komisije za ustavna vpra{anja Skup{~ine RS z dne 12. 12. 1990.
•
Odlo~ba ustavnega sodi{~a, {t. U-I-176/04 (Uradni list RS, {t. 21/06).
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Odlo~ba ustavnega sodi{~a, {t. U-I-24/07 (Uradni list RS, {t. 101/07).
•
Peji}, I. (2005). Dvodomi parlamenti u Evropi: analiza iskustava odabranih zemalja.
Evropsko zakonodavstvo, let. IV, {t. 14/05, Beograd, str. 75-80.
•
Polzer-Srienz, M. (2000). Razvoj ustavnega prava v Avstriji. V: Brandt, N. (ur.): Ustavni
sistem Republike Avstrije, Koper: Visoko{olsko sredi{~e.
•
Porta, D. D. (2003). Temelji politi~ne znanosti, Ljubljana: Založba Sophia.
•
Poro~evalec Skup{~ine Republike Slovenije, {t. 17/90.
•
Ribi~i~, C. (2000). Podoba parlamentarnega desetletja, Ljubljana: samozaložba.
Milo{ Sen~ur
•
Ribi~i~, C. (2007): Zastopanost pokrajin v slovenskem parlamentu, Javna uprava, let. 43,
{t. 2/07, str. 331-339.
•
Russell, M. (2000). Reforming the House of Lords, Lessons from Overseas, Oxford
University Press, New York.
•
Russell, M. (2001a). What are second chambers for?, Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 54, str.
442.
•
Russell, M. (2001b). The Territorial Role of Second Chambers. V: Baldwin, N. D. J. in
Shell, D. (ur.). Second Chambers. The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol. 7, Number 1,
London, str. 105-118.
•
Russell, M. (2003). Is the House of Lords Already Reformed?, Oxford: The Political
Quarterly Publishing Co, str. 311-318.
•
Siedentop, L. (2008). Zakaj so ustave pomembne. Uradni list RS, Revus, let. 1, {t. 1/08,
str. 110-123.
•
Stefanovi}, J. (1931). Dvodomni sistem u modernim ustavima, Mjese~nik, {t. 12/31, str.
534-540.
•
Steska, H. (1920). K vpra{anju organizacije na{e države, Slovenski pravnik, {t. 1-4/20, str.
1-20.
•
[midovnik, J. (1993). Regionalizem v Evropi in pri nas, Teorija in praksa, let. 30, {t. 34/93.
•
Trifunovska, S. (1991). Federalne države i medjunarodni ugovori, doktorska disertacija,
Novi sad.
•
Vlaj, S. (2009). Dileme pokrajinizacije Slovenije, predavanje 24. septembra 2009, Ljubljana: Ifimes-Mednarodni in{titut za bližnjevzhodne in balkanske {tudije.
•
Vo{njak, B. (1920). Jedan ili dva doma, Srpski književni glasnik, Nova serija, {t. 1/20, str.
198-203.
•
Zimmermann, W. (1993). Sistem lokalne samouprave v [vici, Javna uprava, let. 29, {t. 12/93, str. 81-88.
43
44
Review article
The bicameral system as a
successor to decentralisation
UDK: 342.25(045)
Milo{ Sen~ur
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Administration, Slovenia
milos.sencur@fu.uni-lj.si
ABSTRACT
The present paper focuses on the issue of territorial principle in a bicameral
system which has remained until today the prevailing element in the development of the second chamber of parliament. By presenting its role in the
Slovenian and comparable legal systems, the paper suggests that the territorial second chamber of parliament is ever more becoming an indispensable
condition also for unitary states with a high level of decentralisation, blurring
the distinction between unitary and federal states in such respect. The differences in the role and position of the second chamber are mainly related to the
level of decentralisation or development of the local government and, occasionally, to the form of state power. In fact, the weakening of the parliament's role in relation to the executive also diminishes the role and position
of the second chamber. Nevertheless, the significance of bicameral decisionmaking in theory and in practice remains unchanged.
Key words: parliament, decentralisation, bicameral system
JEL: K19
1. Introduction
An important element in the development of a bicameral representative
body − particularly in the light of the findings and experience from comparable
legal systems and the tradition or experience of the country concerned − is the
form of state organisation to which territorial representation is closely related.
In the countries governed by a federal system, a bicameral parliament is the
45
Milo{ Sen~ur
The bicameral system as a successor to decentralisation
conditio sine qua non for the implementation of the federal principle which also
implies proper representation of territorial units in the federal parliament. Thus,
what needs to be examined is to what extent internal subdivision affects the
establishment of the bicameral system based on the territorial principle in the
case of unitary states, and what is then the role of the second chamber. In
both cases, the latter should act as a specific mechanism of breaks and balances in the functioning of the (central) legislature.
A characteristic of both federal and unitary states is that power is not
necessarily centralised − based on the principle of vertical subsidiarity, numerous tasks are transferred into implementation or even management of various
forms of territorial organisation whose relations with the central government
are based, in the relevant circumstances, mainly on cooperation and interdependence. Practically any state has, in addition to the central level, also a lower
level of government represented by a more or less developed and diversified
local government. This is known as territorial decentralisation.
The number of levels between the central and local governments de1
pends on the individual country, mainly on its size, on historical developments, and increasingly often on the requirements brought about by the con2
temporary management process. As regards the various forms and levels of
territorial organisation, a process of integration is in place aimed at gathering
the various elements of the social system under a common framework, as
appropriate. This by itself points to varying dimensions of the relations between central government and territorial units, particularly their interactions.
2. Forms of territorial decentralisation
The shaping of sub-national authorities is a continuous search for the right
balance between decentralisation and centralisation, and thereby a search for
new forms of organisation, also on territorial basis. A significant criterion in the
1 Brezov{ek states that the existence of a network of territorial units is a prerequisite of the
modern state (Brezov{ek, 1997, p. 188). According to DEXIE, Paris (publication EU Subnational governments: an overview) EU Member States comprise 92,500 sub-national communities or authorities (Vlaj, 2009).
2 If there is only one level of local government, conflicts and polarity arise in the relations
between the state and the local communities. On the other hand, an excessive number of
levels normally presents negative consequences for the management process in terms of its
efficiency.
46
Milo{ Sen~ur
selection of decentralisation measures of structural, financial and other nature
should be, in particular, the tendency to reasonably eliminate any territorial
drawbacks or strive for the equality of living conditions of the population at the
3
level of a broader state community.
In practice, various forms and methods for a top-down transfer of state's
tasks exist. They refer either to the least intense level of transfer − i.e. decon4
5
centration or administrative decentralisation where the performance of authoritative and other tasks is entrusted with bodies outside the central location,
mainly owing to functional and organisational needs of the central administrative organisation and population's needs for access to administrative services −
or to decentralisation in a stricter sense where transfer also implies the right to
formulate policies and, partly, self-control over the implementation of the
6
tasks.
One of the forms and consequences of decentralisation in the management of public affairs is local government. The powers of local government are
7
provided by the constitution which also sets the boundaries of its operation
and control. Local government is an important method of societal
8
9
(self)regulation and at the same time an indivisible part of state organisation.
For such reason, the relations between local communities and the state are
considered an essential element of self-governance. Based on the principle of
vertical separation of power, this involves reciprocal control in the relations
with the state and the possibility of local community representation at the cen-
3 Establishing the right balance in the distribution of public revenue between central government and territorial units to finance their public needs is a problem and hardly resolvable
issue also in Slovenia. More about the significance of the economic aspect of decentralisation in Bugari~, 1998, p. 121-130.
4 Over the last one hundred years, a characteristic of the territorial units in Slovenia is that
the management of public affairs has been organised at several territorial levels where local
and state tasks intertwine. Eventually, a single-level public utility system was established as
an attempt to design the optimal self-governance and authority community in terms of
achieving balance between the frequency of administrative tasks and the number of population and size of the territory.
5 The term is, for example, explicitly used in Article 5 of the Italian constitution regulating
the services depending on the state (see: http://www.senato.it/istituzione/29375/
articolato.htm, accessed on 2 October 2009).
6 In such case, theory speaks of political decentralisation as the highest level of autonomy
(Porta, 2003, p. 207).
7 Cf. draft Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Poro~evalec - bulletin of the Assembly of
the Republic of Slovenia, No. 17/90, p. 20.
8 Thus, the same territory is managed by two governments, whereby also the state must
subject to the local government (e.g. in spatial planning).
9 For example, the state gives local communities guidelines for spatial planning although
such issue falls in the scope of work of the local government.
47
Milo{ Sen~ur
tral level. It is also the basis to determine the scope of influence of local communities on the regulation of their position and relations with the central
authority. The higher the level of decentralisation (in political and economic
terms), the more attention is devoted to issues relating to the separation of
power between the state's centre and its parts, and those relating to the impact the latter should have on the shaping of central bodies and the decisions
they make. The level of decentralisation is also directly proportional to the
need for adequate interconnection between the system and its parts, which
often results in the form of a bicameral structure of the central authority.
However, the bicameral system is not the only form of separation of state
powers, and the principle of horizontal separation of power is not the only aspect of bicameralism. In fact, political or social power is not distributed just
horizontally in the classical sense, but also vertically. The principle of the vertical separation of power is indeed gaining importance since a considerable
10
share of power should be held by the local government.
The holders of such
power have, given their self-governing position, at the same time the right to
present their views and participate in the resolution of issues relating to the
exercise of local government.
11
3. Conceptual bases and practices of territorial
representation in comparable countries
The oldest − and in a certain sense considered as reference − second
12
chamber is the United States Senate,
established as early as 1787. Contrary
to most other chambers the Senate has, to date, undergone no significant
changes in terms of equality with the Congress' House of Representatives.
Originally, the Senate had been designed as representative of the federal units
although here, too, the interests of political parties later (mainly following the
10 Cf. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia No. U-I-176/04 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No. 21/06).
11 Cf. Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia No. U-I-24/07 (Official
Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia No. 101/07).
12 A model to numerous federations. For example, at the Melbourne conference of 1890 the
delegates from all Australian colonies decided for a future federal organisation of the country with a bicameral central parliament (more at: http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/, accessed on 2 October 2009).
48
Milo{ Sen~ur
introduction of direct elections) prevailed over the interests of individual
13
states.
The U.S. model was followed by the Swiss constitution of 1848 introducing a
14
bicameral federal legislature. According to the existing constitutional system
(constitution of 1999), the Federal Assembly is composed by the National
Council and the Council of States. The power and freedom of the Swiss cantons has reflected in the role and position of the second chamber, except during the relatively short existence of a unitary state. In terms of powers, the
second chamber has been equal to the first and the cantons have been al15
lowed to autonomously define the manner in which it would be structured.
The importance of the upper chamber diminishes in the event of joint sessions
where the numerical advantage of the first chamber comes to the fore. Its role
as protector of the cantons' interests is further reduced in the event of a referendum where such role is entrusted to the people. Nevertheless, over the last
decades Switzerland has been characterised by centralisation affecting its
16
transformation into a group of unitary states.
Germany introduced a federal type of government with the constitution of
1871 although the legislative power was mainly in the hands of the central
17
authority, weakening the role and position of the federal units.
Later on, the
Weimar constitution restricted also the powers of the second chamber, and
the prevailing opinion today is that Germany was then close to a decentralised
18
unitary state.
Following the rise of Hitler to power, the second chamber and
19
the Länder were abolished in 1934. In the post-war period, both German states
had bicameral parliaments and both upper chambers were representatives of territo20
rial units. With the German reunification in 1990, the constitution of West Germany prevailed. The Federal Council (Bundesrat) is subordinate to the first cham13 Grad et al., 2004, p. 143.
14 Brli}, 1931, p. 467.
15 In the past the representatives of the states were occasionally elected by the states' assemblies; today, they are elected directly. The cantons' regulations also provide for a uniform duration of their term of office (data from: http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm, accessed on 2 October 2009).
16 Trifunovska, 1991, p. 138. On the other hand, there are signs of decentralisation resulting
in the enhanced vertical integration among the cantons and local government units
(Zimmermann, 1993, p. 86).
17 The then federal state was often named pseudo-federalism (Beyme, 2002, p. 307).
18 Grad et al., 2004, p. 91.
19 Ibid.
20 The representatives of the second chamber of East Germany were elected by the assemblies of these units, yet their decisions were not binding. The Länder were abolished in 1952
and the country became a unitary state (Grad et al., 2004, p. 108).
49
Milo{ Sen~ur
21
22
ber. It has the right to absolute veto on certain laws, and to suspensive veto on
23
all other legislation.
The members of the Federal Council are elected by the
state governments from among their members
24
and have an imperative term
meaning that they must follow the instructions of their state governments.
25
The 1920 constitution of Austria, pursuant to which the second chamber
reflected the federal organisation of the state, was amended twice (in 1925
and 1929), whereby the 1929 amendment expanded the second chamber to
26
also include professions.
Such change to the structure of the second cham-
ber was radically upgraded with the new constitution of 1934 when the second chamber completely lost its role of representative of territorial units. The
constitutional act of 1945 re-established the original constitution and returned
to the second chamber powers similar to those originally provided. In such
context, in addition to the right to legislative initiative and suspensive veto,
mention needs to be made of the right to consensus to the decisions of the
27
first chamber in specific cases.
The Spanish autonomous communities are sometimes compared with the
German Länder, ranking Spain among highly decentralised and almost federal
21 According to von Beyme, the Bundesrat is not a second chamber. It has a rather semiparliamentarian character shown by the fact that the public takes no interest in its work, that
its members vote unitarily as a delegation, that control over the government is indirect, etc.
(Beyme, 2002, p. 310). At some point the author concludes that the Bundesrat has – contrary
to the expectations of the authors of the constitution – developed into a strong second
chamber (p. 316), which is of course closer to the actual situation (Russell, 2000, p. 216-218).
22 This is useful mainly in the event of amendments to the constitution, laws affecting public finance, and those affecting the states’ administrative jurisdiction (more at:
http://www.bundestag.de, accessed on 2 October 2009).
23 Pursuant to Article 50 of the German constitution, the Länder participate through the
Bundesrat in the legislation and administration of the Federation and in matters concerning
the European Union (see: http://www.bundestag.de/gesetze/gg/, accessed on 2 October
2009).
24 From three to six representatives, depending on the number of inhabitants in the individual federal state. The term of office of the members of the Bundesrat is not fixed – they
are appointed and removed by the state governments (data retrieved from:
http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm, accessed on 2 October 2009).
25 According to theoreticians, the Bundesrat is a unique and most successful second chamber in terms of territorial representation. It has no party groups and the positions of its
members often influence the parties' policies. The second chamber provides a mechanism
of control over federal legislation, while its potential force to block such legislation creates a
system of interconnection and mutual influence between the federation and the states (Russell, 2001b, p. 114 and 115).
26 The amendment was a result of the requests for true democracy made by political parties
(Polzer-Srienz, 2000, p. 27).
27 Theory described such status of the second chamber as a false bicameral system, where
the already insignificant representation of federal units’ interests at the federal level is increasing with the predominance of party interests (Koja, 1970, p. 259).
50
Milo{ Sen~ur
28
countries. In the Spanish Senate, most members are directly elected within territorial units while other members are elected by their representative bodies. For
such reason the Senate is often regarded as an unusual second chamber where
directly elected members have no natural links with the local authorities although they are mostly also members of autonomous communities' legisla29
tures.
Likewise, most of the many constitutional systems of France considered
territorial representation to be an essential part of any parliament. During the
Third Republic, the Senate represented the communes as the oldest and most
important social groups, and the two chambers had, in principle, equal powers
30
in the legislative procedure.
The Fourth Republic significantly restricted the
powers of the second chamber, while the 1958 constitution of the Fifth Republic (still applicable today) provides that territorial units must be represented
31
in parliament.
According to theoreticians, the involvement of local interests at
the state level implies a similar representation as the one established in federally and regionally organised countries, giving the local authorities great possibilities to influence decisions at higher levels (the Senate is actually the council
32
of the French communes).
33
The Italian Senate is constitutionally shaped on a regional basis. It would
therefore be expected that it mainly acts as representative of the regions yet
such role of the Senate and the importance of the regions in the system of
34
bicameralism are diminished through the influence of political parties.
One of
the proposals to reform the constitutional system in Italy was for the Senate to
have less members elected by representatives of municipal, provincial and
regional councils, while general legislative power would be held exclusively by
35
the lower house.
28 [midovnik, 1993, p. 203.
29 Russell, 2001b, p. 211.
30 A similar system of election to Senate applied in Sweden where the members of the
upper house were elected by representative bodies of the provinces and the delegates of the
cities that were not represented in provincial representative bodies (Stefanovi}, 1931, p.
540).
31 Cf. Article 24 of the constitution (http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/
constitution.asp, accessed on 2 October 2009).
32 Meny, 1998, p. 117.
33 The Italian system recognises four levels of authority. The regions may autonomously
adopt laws related to several areas and also hold legislative initiative
(http://www.senato.it/istituzione/29375/articolato.htm, accessed on 2 October 2009).
34 As a rule, the representatives of both chambers gather in parliamentary groups by party
affiliation (Osnove, 1998, p. 70).
35 Klari}, 2005, p. 177 and 178.
51
Milo{ Sen~ur
As seen above, the prevailing and most common method for the devel36
opment of the second chamber of parliament today is regional basis , serving
37
as a model for the modern state.
In federal countries, the reasons for a bi-
cameral system are practically the same and consider bicameralism a necessary consequence of such type of state organisation. With some rare excep38
tions, all federations have bicameral parliaments,
the second chamber acting
39
as representative of the federal units. In unitary countries, the structure of
parliament mainly depends on the level of the country's decentralisation and
development of its local government. The importance of territorial representation varies.
In the countries governed by bicameral systems where territorial representation plays an important role, significant differences are observed in the
role and position of the second chamber owing to different historical develop40
ment and social changes in individual countries,
particularly in economics and
politics (e.g. creation of political parties and strengthening of their role),
41
36 Territorial representation is in fact the prime component of the modern bicameral parliament, and also the English model of bicameralism originally derived from the territorial
principle.
37 E.g. in late March 2009, Ukraine submitted into parliamentary procedure a new draft
constitution providing for the introduction of a bicameral parliament. The Ukrainian president chose such option based on the example of other countries with established bicameral
systems. The parliament would thus gather representatives of political forces in the lower
house, elected directly according to a proportional system, and representatives of local
communities (regions), entering the upper house directly based on a majority electoral system under the principle of parity (Ju{~enko, 2009, p. 5). Similarly, the Serbian constitutional
law theory states that regionalisation of the country would also reflect in the structure of
parliament, although unicameral (Peji}, 2005, p. 80).
38 E.g. Saint Kitts & Nevis, Micronesia and Venezuela (Massicote, 2001, p. 152).
39 The bicameral system is sometimes characteristic also of the federal units. Australia for
example only has one exception - Queensland, where the second chamber was abolished
already in 1922. More in Abolition of the Upper House, Information on Parliament and Government in Queensland, p. 1-11 (website: http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au./, accessed on 2
October 2009), stating that a unicameral parliament is a deviation from democracy while a
bicameral system is what every governance needs. Such statement is understandable since
bicameral parliaments based on the English model persisted in the Australian federal units
even in the time of the colonies status, mostly for the same reasons as those typical of unitary states, i.e. for serving as brake and balance of the legislature.
40 A typical example is France where in the 200 years of history of bicameral parliament (or
even multicameral in a certain period of time) its second chamber experienced several transformations both in terms of composition and powers. Quite similar was the situation in
former federal Yugoslavia where social changes explicitly reflected in the organisational
changes of representative bodies at all levels of power.
41 For example, the US Senate in its role of representative of the interests of the ownership
structures of financial, commercial and large estates nature has often supported regulations
strengthening the power of the federation on the account of the states; therefore, today's
discussions about its role and the need for its further existence are similar as in unitary
countries with bicameral systems (Hague et al., 2001, p. 275). Already Laski believed that the
52
Milo{ Sen~ur
42
distinctions in terms of equality of territorial units, varying possibilities of territorial units' participation in and influence on decision-making at the central
43
44
level, federalisation processes, centralisation and decentralisation over dif45
ferent periods, new patterns of public affairs management, etc.
On the other hand, these countries have numerous points in common
which are rooted, among other, in the form of their state organisation or state
authority. The prevailing conviction is that the second chamber in the legislatures of federal countries has a more important role than the second chamber
in unitary countries. This is, given the grounds for its existence, a justified supposition although not sufficiently confirmed by practice. Obviously, the form of
46
state organisation is important and to some extent affects the role and posi47
tion of the second chamber.
It may well be said that where the parliament as a system is losing importance or where the separation of power is less consistent, also the role of the
principle of representation of territorial units in the U.S. Senate was outwitted by the activity
of the party system since the republicans in the Senate and those in the House of Representatives always vote the same (Laski, 1934-35, p. 60).
42 As a rule, all territorial units in the second chamber of the federal parliament have the
same number of representatives irrespective of the unit's size and population (Peji}, 2005, p.
78). Yet since the role of the territorial element is in practice disguised by party politics and
party loyalty, theoreticians (Russell, 2003, p. 313) believe that it is more important for the
dynamics of the second chamber that no political party has excessive majority in the second
chamber than that all territorial units are represented therein on a parity basis.
43 In some federal countries, these possibilities are not available merely within the framework of activities of the second chamber but also in other ways (e.g. the decisions of the
federal parliament must be approved by a certain number of federal units or their parliaments, such as in Switzerland, Canada, and similarly in former Yugoslavia). Pursuant to the
constitution of 1793, the French unicameral parliament had to forward the adopted laws to
all communes in the country to obtain their opinion (if a tenth of the communes from most
departments opposed a law, the parliament had to convene what was known as primary
assemblies for the law to be finally adopted). Thus, the territorial communities of France had
a role similar to those in bicameral systems. On the other hand, there are cases such as the
Canadian parliament where members of the Senate are appointed by the federal government, thus questioning the role of the second chamber as representative of federal units.
44 Belgium was a unitary and centralised state for a long time, but since 1970 gradually
pursued decentralisation and federalism to officially become a federal country in 1993 (Lijphart, 1999, p. 100). Belgium is an example showing that the boundaries between federal in
regional assembly may also be blurred (Ribi~i~, 2000, p. 56).
45 This is a constant process of redistribution of tasks between the central government and
the territorial units in order to strengthen the one or the others.
46 Canada, Germany and Austria are characterised by a subordinate role of the second
chamber although these countries have a federal system, yet have at the same time a parliamentary form of power (a partial exception in this group of countries is Australia, but also
there the second chamber has a minor role when it comes to relations with the government
or adoption of finance-related laws ).
47 In federal countries with an assembly system (e.g., Switzerland and the former socialist
countries), with a presidential system (e.g. USA), or with prevailing elements of the presidential system (e.g. Russia), the role of the second chamber in parliament is more equal.
53
Milo{ Sen~ur
48
second chamber is diminishing. A specific example in such regard is the Italian system: Italy is a unitary country and a parliamentary republic, and nevertheless the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies are fully equal. Yet the Italian
case presents several important circumstances which somewhat explain this
peculiarity. For example, the president − although indirectly elected − has a
greater role and a stronger position than in other parliamentary systems, in49
cluding Slovenia.
Moreover, despite its unitary organisation, Italy features a
50
strong regional component
also reflected in the frequent requests for feder-
alisation.
4. Territorial representation in the development of
Slovenian bicameralism
Slovenians and the rest of Europe alike have been experiencing different
structures and forms of representative bodies over different periods of time
and through various systems of state organisation. The bicameral structure of
51
parliament found many advocates even in older theories. In practice, however, the decisions were the result of the distribution of power among various
social groups. Particularly in the case of former Yugoslavia, the dynamics of
social relations clearly reflected in numerous changes in the structure of the
52
federal and republic representative bodies. The fil rouge of such changes was
also a series of debates on the importance of territorial representation in the
48 An argument in favour of bicameralism is that the various interests represented in the
second chamber are less influenced by the government than in the lower house (Russell,
2001a, p. 442).
49 Longer term of office of the president, the right to form the government, the appointment
of senior state officials, the approval of draft laws submitted by the government to the parliament, convening extraordinary sessions of any parliamentary chamber, the right to dismiss them, supervision over the implementation of the legislative function in the form of
suspensive veto, are all characteristics testifying to the relatively strong role of the Italian
president.
50 The regions have legislative powers in certain areas, the right to legislative initiative,
they may request the calling of an abrogating popular referendum; in addition, based on the
subsidiarity principle, the central government transferred a series of administrative tasks
onto regional governments, provinces and municipalities (Klari}, 2005, p. 174 and 175).
51 Vo{njak, 1920, p. 198-203 in Steska, 1920, p. 1-20. Vo{njak believed that the upper house
should represent all socio-economic players in the country, while Steska argued that the
participation of territorial autonomous representations in legislation acted as counterbalance to overhasty decisions of the parliament.
52 For a thorough overview of this period see Kristan, 1970, p. 184 and 185.
54
Milo{ Sen~ur
53
legislature.
In Slovenia, the debates about finding the most suitable form of
municipal participation in the formulation of republic policies or municipal influence on the work of the republic assembly and on a more consistent implementation of the principle of bicameralism, first resulted in the introduction of
the meeting of municipal delegates as a consultative body of the republic assembly, and later on in the establishment of the Chamber of Municipalities as
54
an equal chamber of the Assembly.
The structure of parliament occupied also the thoughts of the authors of
55
the new Slovenian constitution,
particularly in relation to the structure of the
future local government. No particular disagreement was expressed in relation
to the basic local communities but questions were raised regarding the establishment of broader local communities and their representation at the state
level. The opinions thereon were diametrically opposed. Some people believed
regions to be unnecessary since the process of regionalisation would at the
same time imply a tendency toward the federalisation of the state, while others thought that without establishing the second level the local government
could not be developed, which would negatively affect also the promotion of
territorial interests in the formulation of state policies. The latter also cautioned
that a large number of small and technically weak municipalities and the absence of the second level of local government would lead to an excessive gap
56
in the relation toward the centres of power at the state level.
Over the various stages of drafting the new Slovenian constitution, the
National Council as representative of special interests (local, social, professional, etc.) has always been considered an alternative solution in the future
structure of parliament, but has not received adequate attention. For such reason, its role and position have been rather undefined ever since its establishment. This applies in particular to the representation of territorial interests
57
which have the absolute majority in the Council. Thus, the dilemma faced by
53 Session records of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia, No. 38/68, Appendices, p. 472.
54 Already the debates on the draft constitution stressed that in the republic assembly adequate attention should be given to the diversity of municipal interests in all matters which
directly affect the interests of the citizens and the position, role and tasks of the municipality
as territorial community (Cf. Session records of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic of
Slovenia, 61st session of the Chamber of the Republic, 18 July 1973, p. 115).
55 Cf. verbatim records of the debate at the 18th session of the Commission for Constitutional Affairs of the Slovenian Assembly of 12 December 1990.
56 Cf. Ribi~i~, 2007, p. 331.
57 This may be regarded as anachronism since the National Council was established already at the time of "municipal communes".
55
Milo{ Sen~ur
the authors of the constitution about which type of second chamber should be
chosen in order to satisfy the tasks of territorial representation and have a
positive influence on the legislative activity or social management processes,
is still very topical. Also owing to the inconsistent implementation of the principle of vertical separation of power.
The constitutional amendments of 2006 made the two-stage local government compulsory. The intermediate level between the state and the municipalities would be represented by the regions as broader self-governing local
communities. This would provide the second chamber of the Slovenian parliament with a more prominent role (either as chamber of the regions or a struc58
turally reformed National Council ), on condition of a simultaneous consideration of the suitability of its existing powers. Several possibilities are to be examined, from the creation of a strong second chamber, which might even lead
to subordination of the first chamber, to the establishment of a second chamber which would in practice qualify as inefficient and unnecessary. The right
solution is usually a compromise, which however is only justified if it meets
certain criteria (such as powers decisive for the legislative procedure, adequate
influence in the relation toward the executive, etc.).
In terms of development, the solutions regarding the future role and position of the National Council should be directed toward:
•
a change in the relation between the National Council and the National
Assembly as the general representative body, or improved competitiveness of the National Council with adequate redefinition and modification of its powers; and
•
a change in its internal structure (partly or entirely), whereby the transformation of the National Council's structure depends on the future
development of decentralisation or local government as the territorial
aspect thereof.
58 The most interesting, broad, and intense public debate on the possibilities to transform
the National Council into a territorial representation or representation of the future regions
was held as early as 1998 when both the advantages and disadvantages of possible modifications were presented (see e.g. Grad, 1998, p. 168-172 and Kristan, 1998, p. 173-174); the
debate became even more topical following the most recent constitutional amendments
(more in Ribi~i~, 2007, p. 336-339).
56
Milo{ Sen~ur
5. Conclusion
In most federal countries with bicameral parliaments, the second chamber
is established based on the territorial principle. The latter is ever more becoming an indispensable condition also for unitary states with well-developed local
government, slowly blurring the differences between them and the federal
countries. A contribution to gradual equalisation is made also by political parties whose interests often prevail over the interests of other social groups.
The past experience and the comparisons with other countries provide
useful guidelines for future decisions. Some of the existing solutions, an example thereof certainly being the constitutional definition of the National
Council, have largely been adopted without due consideration, which results in
increasing headache anytime the assessment of the existing and future role or
even abolishment of the National Council appears on the political menu.
The interconnection between local and central governments and the need
for their cooperation and coordination call for more adequate institutional forms
also in Slovenia. Local interests are represented in the National Council, which
means that local government is one of the structural elements of the parliament. In addition to political interests mainly pursued by political parties, the
parliament should reflect the interests of self-governing territorial units. The
National Council thus represents at least a possibility to prevent the absolute
monopoly and arbitrariness of the general representative body which may otherwise freely create legislation to fit its own interests or the interests of political elites. Such possibility is, however, only feasible where the second chamber has powers and competences broad enough to make it more equal to the
first chamber. This mainly refers to a significant and sometimes even decisive
role in the legislative process, in the process of constitutional review, in financial matters, and in the relation toward the executive. If one of the main weapons of the second chamber is suspensive veto whereby it only temporarily
suspends the entry into force of a law, then it will hardly meet the expectations − be it a pragmatic promotion of the interests of territorial units or the
implementation of democratic standards within the legislative branch. Both
cases result in a democratic deficit of public administration, which only differs
in terms of its dimension.
57
Milo{ Sen~ur
Milo{ Sen~ur, Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Administration of the University of Ljubljana,
obtained his Bachelor's and Master's Degrees in public administration at the Faculty of
Law of Ljubljana. For the last twenty years, he has been engaged in the public sector as
member of the first Slovenian parliament, director of municipal administration, head of
administrative unit, supreme state auditor for local government, university professor.
His hitherto work has been centred on issues such as property law relations among the
municipalities, distribution of powers between municipality and the state, elections of
representatives of local interests in the National Council, role of municipalities in the
legislative procedure, managing the physical assets of the state and municipalities, etc.
As an external associate of the ministry responsible for public administration, he has
been participating in the programme of compulsory training for appointment in grade for
several years.
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sistem Republike Avstrije, Koper: Higher Education Centre.
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43, No. 2/07, p. 331-339.
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•
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Review article
Public oversight of the audit
profession – Comparison
of implemented practices
in the EU and the U.S.
UDK: 33.025.13(4:73)(045)
Maja Zaman Groff
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics, Slovenia
maja.zaman@ef.uni-lj.si
Marko Ho~evar
University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics, Slovenia
marko.hocevar@ef.uni-lj.si
ABSTRACT
Following financial scandals at the turn of the century, the audit profession in the
European Union, the United States and elsewhere, has undergone profound legislative
and regulatory reforms, including the requirement for intense public oversight of the
profession. The article provides an overview of the development of external quality
assurance systems in the audit profession in the EU and the U.S. with emphasis on the
system of public oversight, implemented after the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 in the U.S. and the Statutory Audit Directive of 2006 in the EU. The aims of the
article are: 1) to explain different backgrounds of external quality assurance systems in
the EU and the U.S., 2) to describe implemented practices related to the public oversight system in the two regions and 3) to present the main findings of the existing
empirical research focusing on the impact of the newly established systems of public
oversight on the quality of audit services. Our literature research reveals that the evidence on the impact of the public oversight on the ultimate audit quality in the EU has
not yet been provided because the Member States have only finished the implementation of the Statutory Audit Directive requirements into national legislations by the year
2008. In the U.S., on the other hand, first empirical evidence has been presented, suggesting that the quality of auditing has improved after the passing of the Sarbanes
Oxley Act of 2002. So far evidence has been provided to support the proposition that
PCAOB opinions are associated with earnings quality of the audit firm’s clients, that
auditors have become more conservative and that the new inspectors (as opposed to
the former system of self-regulation) can hold the auditors to stricter standards by
taking concrete actions against felonious auditors and imposing costly penalties.
Key words: audit profession, public oversight, quality assurance systems in
EU and U.S., monitoring, peer review.
JEL: M48
61
Public oversight of the audit profession – Comparison
of implemented practices in the EU and the U.S.
1. Introduction
Following the milestones of economic development, specialized areas
of interest have developed within the accounting profession and a variety
of accounting-related professions have emerged. Development of different
accounting-related professions (e.g. financial and management accounting, tax
consulting and auditing) followed the need for specialized services, sought by
the state, public sector and business. Comparing different accounting-related
professions it is crucial to emphasize that the majority, such as financial and
management accounting, cost accounting and tax consulting have always been
driven by private interest. In its early history, the auditing profession was no
exception to this rule.
The period of the industrial revolution and high economic growth in
Europe (the period between years 1750 and 1850) was the period of transformation of successful entrepreneurs and small family businesses into large
industrial corporations. The period, following the industrial revolution and the
separation of owners from the management, especially the second half of the
19th century, was the period of increasing role of auditors and the rise of the
audit profession. At this time, auditors became important players in resolving
the agency problem between diverse interests of owners (principals) and their
appointed managers (agents). Auditors acted in the interest of owners to
whom they periodically reported on the completed audits. Consequently, auditing contributed to improved quality of information flows and played important
role in decreasing information asymmetry between principals and agents. As
auditors were not only expected to detect clerical errors and omissions in financial statements, but also to report on any evidence of management fraud,
they had to be independent of management.
With further development of financial markets the provision of an independent opinion on the financial statements to the general public became the
primary objective of an audit and the auditors were recognized to act in public
interest. The main audit objective gradually changed from the detection of
fraud to reporting on the actual financial condition of an entity. Audited financial
statements became crucial for functioning of capital markets because the auditing process reduced the information asymmetry between the management
and diverse groups of players on capital markets. Several researchers have
studied the relation between audit quality and its impact on financial state-
62
ments credibility. Alles, Kogan and Vasarhelyi (2004, p. 184) claimed that
assurance added value to communications between an auditee and its audience and that the degree to which audited financial statements added this
value was directly related to the credibility of the auditor. Similarly, Teoh and
Wong (1993, p. 365) provided evidence that companies increased the credibility of
their financial statements by appointing high-quality auditors. Hillary and Lennox (2005, p. 216) suggested that an audit firm’s average client preferred a
high-quality auditing since high-quality auditing helps to reduce information risk
and the cost of capital.
Today, among different accounting-related professions, only the audit profession is closely related to the public interest and is therefore most regulated.
Consequently, the requests for and standards of external quality assurance
systems for statutory audits have been included in national auditing regulations
already before the profound changes in the profession-related regulation, represented by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in the U.S. and the Directive
2006/43/EC (Statutory Audit Directive) in Europe.
Inclusion of quality assurance requests in national legislations of individual
states was crucial because although audit reports did refer to the use of auditing standards and declared auditor’s independence in the title of the report
itself (“independent auditor’s report”), there was no other assurance whether
the audit was truly carried out in conformity with the standards declared in the
report and whether the independence-related rules were respected, not to
mention an essential question, what provisions the independence-related rules
included. The need for external monitoring of audit profession originated from
request for appropriate quality of audit services, including the auditor’s independence.
External quality assurance system is the profession’s principal means of
demonstrating to the public, to regulators and other interested parties that
auditors are performing at a level that meets the established auditing standards as well as ethical rules. In addition, it encourages the profession to implement quality improvements in auditing methods. Surveys, related to effects
of quality assurance on quality of statutory audits (Recommendation on quality
assurance for the statutory audits in the European Union, 2000) demonstrate
that quality assurance is actually adding value in detecting and preventing
weaknesses in the audit process and that it results in improvements of auditing procedures and internal quality control systems of audit firms. Taking into
consideration that already in year 2000 statutory audits were mandatory in over
63
three million limited liability and joint stock companies across the EU under
the two accounting directives (at that time the 4th Directive on the Annual
accounts of certain types of companies and the 7th Directive on Consolidated
accounts of companies with limited liability), and that the 8th Directive at that
time did not contain specific guidance related to audit function and external
quality assurance, audit regimes and quality assurance systems differed significantly between different EU Member States as well as the U.S.
2. Quality assurance for the statutory audit in the
EU and the U.S. before the recent financial
scandals
Due to lack of any specific guidelines, a number of different external
quality assurance systems have developed in practice. Depending on the
status of persons in charge of carrying out the quality assurance, these can
generally be classified as variations of two principal types of systems: monitoring and peer review (Public Oversight of the Accounting Profession in Europe,
2007, p.12):
•
Monitoring refers to a situation where quality assurance reviews are
undertaken by staff employed by an independent review organization
(professional body or regulator).
•
Peer review refers to a situation where the review organization organizes and supervises the reviews undertaken by experienced and authorized practitioners of audit firms or statutory auditors (hence the
reference to “peer”), working on the contract basis.
Observing the divergent ways of external quality assurance development,
the European Commission issued its first recommendations on quality assurance in November 2000 (Recommendation on quality assurance for the statutory audit in the European Union – Minimum requirements, 2000). The goal of
these recommendations was to ensure that all statutory audits were covered
by equivalent quality assurance systems with sufficient public oversight. The
ultimate purpose of improved quality insurance in the audit profession was to
improve the reliability and comparability of financial information and to
64
restore confidence in the efficient functioning of the EU capital markets.
The Recommendation on quality assurance for the statutory audit was passed
as a result of the discussions within the EU Committee on Auditing, which is
composed of representatives from the Member States and the European audit
profession. The minimum requirements related to the implementation of quality assurance systems in the Member States still allowed certain flexibility:
both basic methodologies (monitoring and peer review) were acknowledged
when appropriate safeguards were applied. On the other hand, the ambition of
the recommendation was to change the existing situation where not all EU
statutory auditors were obliged to be covered by a quality assurance system
(before the recommendation was passed some Member States did not have a
system for quality assurance at all, whereas in other Member States coverage
existed only voluntarily). The ultimate goal of the recommendation was to improve the quality of auditing services throughout the EU by encouraging quality
assurance systems, which put forward specific requirements such as the frequency and the scope of the quality reviews and confidentiality. In particular,
the requirements for public oversight composed of a majority of nonpractitioners, publication of the results and the possibility of access to the review files by the competent authorities were the major contributions of the
recommendation to upgrade the existing quality assurance systems (Recommendation on quality assurance for the statutory audit in the European Union –
Minimum requirements, 2000).
In the U.S., the roots of the external quality assurance systems in the auditing profession can be traced to the early 1970’s, when the profession became self-regulated following several accounting scandals that involved fraudulent financial reporting and caused the public to question audit effectiveness.
After hearings at the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, the SEC Practice Section (SECPS) was established by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (AICPA) and any AICPA member firm that was engaged in
auditing financial statements of public companies was required to belong to
the SECPS and was required to undergo a peer review at least once every
three years (Lennox & Pittman, 2009, p.3). On the other hand, audit firms with
no public company clients were given an option to join voluntarily and these
firms were also subject to peer reviews (Hilary & Lennox, 2005, p.214). The
primary focus of the peer review process was on the overall quality of the audit firm and the reviewers documented their findings in “peer review opinions”
that were publicly available. In their reports, reviewers disclosed any systematic weakness found and issued an opinion that could be either “clean” (if
65
they found no significant weaknesses at the audit firm), “unmodified with
weaknesses” (if weaknesses were significant but not serious), “modified” (if
weaknesses were serious) or “adverse” (if weaknesses were very serious).
Hilary and Lennox (2005) provided first evidence on the credibility of AICPA
peer reviews. They carried out an extensive survey in which they studied
whether the opinions issued by the peer reviewers provided credible information to clients about audit firm quality. They investigated the credibility of peer
reviews by examining audit firm dismissals and appointments in the 12-month
period following issuance of peer review opinions and found that the reviewed
firms gained clients after receiving clean opinions and lost clients after receiving modified or adverse opinions. Their tests indicated that peer reviews were
perceived informative about the quality of the audit firms. Casterella, Jensen
and Knechel (2009, p.732) also found that there was a predictable link between
the number of weaknesses identified in a firm’s peer review report and the
likelihood of that audit firm having a malpractice claim filed against it. Similarly,
in their discussion of the changing role of audit committees in the corporate
governance process, Woodlock and Claypool (2001) pointed out several dimensions that should be considered at the audit committee meetings to improve its oversight and the confidence in the company’s financial statements.
In the context of the external auditor selection they suggest the audit committee members to review a copy of the external auditor’s latest peer review because “audit committees that review the peer review are in a better position
to determine whether the external auditor is suited for auditing the company’s
records” (Woodlock and Claypool, 2001, p. 30).
The debate between advocates and opponents of the implemented quality assurance system through the self-regulation was strident and it was becoming increasingly a political one. Among the advocates of the system,
Charles Kaiser, a former chair of the AICPA, stated that self-regulation provided
credibility, generated public trust and reduced unnecessary and costly governmental intervention (Hilary & Lennox, 2005, p. 214). On the other hand,
peer review has come under considerable criticism from many members of
the Congress, the media and others. The critics of self-regulation had argued
that peer reviews lacked credibility (Hilary & Lennox, 2005, p. 212) and the
prevailing cynical view of these reviews by their opponents was consolidated
in the following statement: “You scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours” (Lennox
& Pittman, 2009, p. 3). This and other critiques were mainly related to the general lack of independence among reviewers and reviewees (Anantharaman,
2007, p. 8). The generally perceived lack of independence was primarily
66
the consequence of possibility that the reviewee was allowed to choose the
audit firm to carry out the peer review.
Following the financial scandals at the turn of the century, the audit profession has lost the confidence of all groups of players on financial markets.
After long centuries of building the profession, it suddenly seemed to have
reached the point of “dead end”. Major players (governments, regulators, public agencies, investors and others) soon agreed that the profession that had
been designated to act in the interest of public, has shifted its course to begin
acting in the interest of profit. Unfortunately the consensus on the need for
immediate action, in the sense of profound changes in the profession-related
regulation, was reached too late to prevent the damage to financial markets
and profession itself. The ambition to restore public confidence in audit profession, improve reliability of publicly available financial information and stabilize
financial markets, led to profound legislative and regulatory reforms in the field
of the audit profession in Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere. These reforms
have redefined the roles of all players related to a public company’s financial
reporting process (management, internal and external auditors, boards of directors, supervisory boards and audit committees) and have highlighted the requirement for intense public oversight of the audit profession.
3. Development of public oversight of the audit
profession as the consequence of recent
financial scandals
The recent financial scandals, especially Enron and Worldcom, that
caused the fall of one of the big players in the auditing services market, Arthur
Andersen, have heavily undermined public confidence in the audit profession.
Alles, Kogan and Vasarhelyi (2004, p. 188) point out that the prevailing theory
behind corporate failure in the mind of the public was that “it is due to deliberate fraud between managers, aided and abetted by auditors, who, at best, are
incompetent and, at worst, corrupt and outright compliant”. Considering such
prevailing view of the audit report users it was clear that significant modifications, regarding the oversight of the audit profession, were indispensable. Restoring auditor credibility was one of the major ambitions of both, the Sarbanes
Oxley Act of 2002 in the U.S. and the Statutory Audit Directive (2006/43/EC)
67
in the EU. This issue was given a priority due to the importance of audited
financial statements in facilitating capital market transactions.
In the following two sections we present the characteristics of the newly
implemented public oversight systems in the EU and the U.S. Because there is
a high possibility that the new practices influence auditors’ incentives, we are
convinced that it is of major importance to study their impact on ultimate audit
quality. DeFond (2009, p. 1) points out that while auditor incentives, most
commonly associated with audit quality, are litigation and reputation concerns,
oversight mechanisms that are used to monitor the profession are also likely to
impact auditors’ incentives. Therefore, at the end of each section, we attempt
to provide any existing empirical evidence related to efficiency of the public
oversight systems on the quality of audit services provided by audit firms.
3.1 Public oversight of the audit profession in the EU
In the EU, criteria for the quality assurance system were put forward in
the Statutory Audit Directive in June 2006. With its principal scope to ensure
consistently high quality of auditing services in all EU Member States, the Directive introduced a requirement for all statutory auditors and audit firms to be
subject to a system of an independent quality assurance, organized independently from the reviewed statutory auditors and audit firms and subject to public
oversight on the basis of home country control. The requirements of the Directive called for profound changes of quality assurance arrangements in a number of European countries.
Although the new requirements related to the audit profession entailed
adjustments in national legislation of the Member States, the Directive still
allows for considerable differences regarding how external quality assurance
systems for statutory auditors and audit firms can be set up. In general, the
two types of quality assurance systems that have been introduced already
before the Statutory Audit Directive (monitoring and peer review), can be
found in Europe. In monitoring, quality assurance reviews are undertaken by
staff employed by a review organization. In peer review, the review organization organizes and supervises the reviews to be undertaken by experienced
and authorized practitioners of audit firms or statutory auditors. Despite these
differences, both systems of monitoring and peer review are considered to
comply with the Statutory Audit Directive. Under either of the existing two
systems, the newly established public oversight body may also attend the
68
reviews as part of its oversight work. Several EU countries have selected the
monitoring approach to exercise the oversight of the audit profession. Representatives of this group of countries are Great Britain, Ireland, Germany, Spain,
Cyprus and Slovenia. On the other hand, the peer review approach was chosen by Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Greece and Luxemburg. In
practice, also a combined approach can be found. Such approach refers to a
situation where oversight is primarily carried out by independent professionals,
employed at professional institutes, in co-operation with auditors-practitioners
working on a contractual basis. The primary advantage of this approach is that
contractual partners have valuable experience in auditing and knowledge regarding business operation in specific business areas. The combined approach
can be found in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Sweden, Austria and France
(Quality assurance arrangements across Europe, 2006).
In the Directive not only types of selected quality assurance systems but
also the system of their financing is subject to independent decision, taken by
the Member State. Consequently, considerable differences regarding the public oversight financing exist among different EU countries. In table 1 we present the financing arrangements of the public oversight system in four selected EU countries and Switzerland.
Table 1 reveals that significant differences exist among European countries regarding financing of the public oversight systems across Europe. Taking
into consideration the number of audit firms and the number of auditors, registered in different countries, it is still evident, that the total yearly available
funds vary significantly among selected countries. Also, while the majority of
countries have built the financing system of their public oversight on yearly
fees, collected from auditors and audit firms, in some countries the public
oversight system is financed exclusively from the state budget.
We believe that existing differences of established public oversight practices in different Member States raise a number of highly interesting questions. First, it can be assumed that the total amount of yearly available funds
affects the quality of the work performed by the public oversight body. But the
comparison of the funding systems and, particularly, the type of financing, also
reveals that in countries with smallest amounts of yearly funds they are financed through the state budget and are therefore highly independent from
auditors and audit firms.
69
Table 1: Comparison of financing arrangements of the public oversight
system in selected European countries
Finland
The Netherlands
Sweden
Switzerland
Slovenia
Number of
audit firms
74
485
111
3067
52
Number of
auditors
n.a.
1438
4108
6545
208
Public
oversight
body
Auditing Board
of the Central
Chamber of
Commerce
Authority for the
Financial Markets
(AFM) – Audit firm
supervision
department
Supervisory
Board of
Public
Accountants
Switzerland’s
Federal Audit
Oversight
Authority
Agency for
Public
Oversight of
the audit
profession
Type of
financing
Yearly fees
from audit
firms
Yearly fees from
audit firms
Yearly fees
from auditors
Yearly
amount
of fees
collected
700.000 EUR
(expected rise
to 1 mio EUR)
Must be approved
by the Ministry of
Finance regarding
planned activities
9
20
Number of
employees
Financed
Yearly fees from exclusively
audit firms and from budget
auditors
(180.000
EUR)
4,2 mio EUR
4,2 mio EUR
0
20
22
5
Source: Financing of public oversight bodies, 2009 (adopted)
As countries with higher budgets are mostly financed by the fees collected from auditors and/or audit firms, this raises the question of independence which is (in theory and practice) highly related with the audit quality. And
second, no evidence has so far been provided on influence of the type of the
quality assurance system selected (monitoring or peer review) on audit quality.
It is important to point out that within both systems special attention should be
paid to specific aspects of the quality assurance system. In the monitoring
system it is crucial to maintain high experience levels and professional competencies for reviewers. In the peer review system the emphasis is focused on
70
compliance with the independence-related standards. An interesting question
arising from the debate on the trade-off between expertise and independence
and its influence on the quality of work performed by the oversight body has
not yet been answered.
3.2 Public oversight of the audit profession in the U.S.
In the U.S., at the time of financial scandals, audit firms had been subject
to self-regulation under peer review for nearly 25 years. The financial reporting
failures renewed the on-going concerns about the effectiveness of selfregulation, the peer review program and the discussion whether monitoring
separate from the profession is essential for ensuring high-quality auditing
(Lennox, Pittman, 2009, p. 1). Empirical research, focusing on the period before the financial scandals, reveals mixed results regarding the efficiency of the
existing quality assurance system. On one hand, survey results supported the
high information value of peer reviews. The survey, carried out by Hilary and
Lennox (2005) provided evidence that peer-review reports were associated
with perceived audit quality. Their work was extended by Casterella, Jensen
and Knechel (2009), who tested if peer review opinions were also associated
with actual audit quality. Their research provides evidence that peer review
opinions were associated with actual audit quality in the sense of predicting
audit failure such as malpractice claims alleging auditor negligence, overworking staff and taking on risky clients (Casterella, Jensen & Knechel, 2009, p.
732). On the other hand, an important factor, adding to the debate whether the
self-regulation of the profession failed to protect investors against poor quality
audits, was the fact that Deloitte and Touche gave Arthur Andersen a favorable
opinion even after the Enron and other potential audit failures came to light.
Moreover, despite many publicly known cases of audit failure, none of the
major audit firms has ever received a negative peer review opinion (Alles, Kogan & Vasarhelyi, 2004, p. 185). Casterella, Jensen and Knechel (2009, p. 714)
indicate that the general observation (although at that time not yet systematically studied) was that most audit failures involved firms receiving clean (unmodified) peer-review reports. On basis of extent literature review they also
point out the evidence that peer-reviews report relatively few weaknesses,
that almost all peer-reviews result in unmodified reports, that most audit
failures involve peer-reviewed firms and that peer-review cannot be effective because of the general lack of independence between reviewers and
reviewees.
71
The system of oversight of the audit profession was profoundly changed
following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, when the system of self-regulation
through peer review process for the audit firms with SEC clients was replaced
by independent inspections, carried out by the newly created body, the Public
Company Accounting and Oversight Board (PCAOB). Under the new legislation, audit firms are required to undergo PCAOB inspection annually if they
audit at least 100 public companies and triennially if they have less than 100
clients among public companies (Anantharaman, 2007, p. 10). On the other
hand, audit firms with no SEC clients continue to be subject to peer reviews,
administered by the AICPA. One of the consequences of the Sarbanes Oxley
Act, regarding the establishment of the PCAOB was that 47 small audit firms
ceased auditing public clients during the period immediately following the passage of SOX. The survey of the factors behind their decision revealed that
concerns about the PCAOB inspections were the auditors’ primary reasons for
exiting the industry (DeFond, 2009).
4. Empirical evidence on the impact of the newly
established public oversight systems on quality
of audit services
In the U.S., an increasing number of researchers have been focusing their
empirical research on comparison between the self-regulation of the audit
profession and the new public oversight practices. Anantharaman (2007, p. 33)
found that firms that themselves review other firms consistently receive more
favorable opinions from peer reviewers than from PCAOB reviews and that
firms with peer reviewers who are less likely to be independent (such as
smaller, non-competing firms) and firms likely to be »peer review specialists«
also receive significantly more favorable opinions from peer review than from
the PCAOB. Gunny and Zhang (2006, p. 12) found that peer review opinions
were not associated with earnings quality of the audit firm’s clients whereas
they found evidence to support the proposition that PCAOB opinions were
associated with earnings quality of the audit firm’s clients. They confirmed that
audit firms that receive favorable PCAOB opinions have clients with higher
earnings quality. Moreover, DeFond (2009, p.2) concludes that the new inspectors can hold the auditors to stricter standards by imposing costly penalties:
72
“…unlike the peer reviewers the PCAOB inspectors are able to take actions
against felonious auditors which can result in large penalties. These actions
can include notifying the SEC of auditor transgressions, notifying the Justice
Department of possible criminal violations, and disciplinary proceedings by the
PCAOB itself”. Consequently, he argues that auditors might have incentives to
improve audit quality in anticipation of the inspections. Some evidence suggesting that the quality of auditing and the quality of financial reporting have
improved after the passing of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 has also been
presented by Cohen, Dey and Lys (2008), confirming that earnings management has been declining and by Lobo and Zhou (2006) pointing out that after
the passing of the SOX, auditors appear to be increasingly conservative.
In the EU, on the other hand, the Member States have only finished the
implementation of the Statutory Audit Directive requirements into national
legislations by the year 2008. In the U.S., at least 4 years have passed from
the reform (2002) to the publication of first contributions in high quality accounting journals such as Accounting Horizons (Lobo and Zhou, 2006), The
Accounting Review (Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008) and Journal of Accounting and
Economics (DeFond, 2009). In our opinion, the finding, that no empirical evidence has so far been provided on how the newly established systems of
public oversight in various EU Member States influence the ultimate quality of
audit services, can be mainly contributed to the fact that so far no comparable
sets of data have been available to allow for a high quality statistical analysis.
5. Conclusion
Following the financial scandals at the turn of the century, the audit profession has lost the confidence of all groups of players on financial markets.
The ambition to restore public confidence in audit profession, improve reliability of publicly available financial information and stabilize financial markets, led
to profound legislative and regulatory reforms in the field of the audit profession in Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere. These reforms included the requirement for intense public oversight of the audit profession. Preliminary
surveys, related to effects of quality assurance systems on quality of statutory audits demonstrated that quality assurance was actually adding value
in detecting and preventing weaknesses in the audit process and that it
73
resulted in improvements of auditing procedures and internal quality control
systems of audit firms.
In the article we explained different backgrounds of external quality assurance systems in the EU and the U.S., described implemented practices related
to the public oversight system in the two regions and presented the main findings of the existing empirical research focusing on the impact of the newly
established systems of public oversight on the quality of audit services provided by audit firms.
Studying the consequences of implementation of the new public oversight is a matter of high importance for two reasons. First, this issue is related
to a long-standing debate regarding the trade-off between expertise (represented by the oversight through monitoring and peer reviews by professional
organizations) on one hand and independence (represented by the more objective public oversight of the profession) on the other. Second, it is crucial to
know how the new quality assurance system affects the ultimate quality of the
audit services provided and how it signals actual audit quality.
Our research of published contributions of various researchers, focusing
their empirical studies on the impact of public oversight system on quality of
audit services provided by audit firms reveals that the evidence for the EU has
not yet been provided because the Member States have only finished the implementation of the Statutory Audit Directive requirements into national legislations by the year 2008. In the U.S., on the other hand, first empirical evidence has already been presented. Various researchers report empirical results
in support of the proposition that the quality of auditing has improved after the
passing of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. So far evidence has been provided
to confirm that earnings management has been declining, that auditors have
become more conservative and that the new PCAOB inspectors can hold the
auditors to stricter standards by taking concrete actions against felonious auditors and by imposing costly penalties.
74
Maja Zaman Groff, PhD, is Assistant Professor and a member of the Accounting and
Auditing Department at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics. Her areas of
research interest include auditing-related issues such as the role of auditing and audit
committees in corporate governance and quality assurance. She cooperates with a
Slovene audit firm and is involved in the corporate governance of various Slovene corporations as a member of audit committees. She has published a number of professional and scientific papers.
Marko Ho~evar, PhD, is Full Professor of Accounting and Auditing at the University of
Ljubljana, Faculty of Economics. He has acquired various experience working with industry and public sector including: serving as an independent expert in many business
and accounting cases, working with corporations and public organizations in designing
costing systems, developing and implementing planning and control systems. He has
written several textbooks and professional books and has published a number of professional and scientific papers.
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POVZETEK
JAVNI NADZOR NAD REVIDIRANJEM PRIMERJAVA SISTEMOV, UVEDENIH V EVROPSKI
UNIJI IN V ZDRUŽENIH DRŽAVAH AMERIKE
Vzporedno z glavnimi mejniki v zgodovini gospodarskega razvoja so
se v okviru ra~unovodske stroke razvijala specializirana podro~ja, na katerih se je oblikovalo ve~ z ra~unovodstvom povezanih poklicev. Razvoj
tak{nih poklicev (npr. finan~ni ra~unovodja, dav~ni svetovalec, revizor) je
sledil potrebam po specializiranih ra~unovodskih storitvah, po katerih sta
povpra{evala tako javni kot tudi gospodarski sektor. Ob primerjavi razli~nih, z ra~unovodstvom povezanih dejavnosti, je pomembno poudariti,
da ve~ino teh, kot so na primer finan~no (pa tudi stro{kovno ali poslovodno) ra~unovodstvo in dav~no svetovanje, že od samega za~etka usmerja
zasebni interes. V svoji zgodnji zgodovini je to pravilo veljalo tudi za poklic
revizorja. Danes je med vsemi ra~unovodskimi poklici le poklic revizorja
tesno povezan z javnim interesom in je zato med vsemi poklici tudi najbolj
zakonsko reguliran in nadziran. Glede na to, da se nadzor nad kakovostjo
izvajanja ra~unovodskih poklicev, ki jih usmerja zasebni interes, izvaja na
trgu prek ponudbe in povpra{evanja, je treba nadzor nad kakovostjo
opravljanja revizijske dejavnosti zakonsko regulirati, da bi zagotovili in
ohranili delovanje v javnem interesu.
Vklju~itev zahtev po vzpostavitvi primernega sistema obvladovanja
kakovosti revizijskega dela v zakonodajo je izredno pomembna za uresni~evanje javnega interesa na podro~ju revidiranja. êprav so se revizorji
v revizijskih poro~ilih že pred vklju~itvijo teh zahtev v zakonodajo sklicevali na uporabo revizijskih standardov in izrecno izjavljali svojo neodvisnost
že v samem naslovu revizorjevega poro~ila (»poro~ilo neodvisnega revizorja«), dejanskega zagotovila, da so bili revizijski standardi pri izvedbi
revizije resni~no upo{tevani in so bila upo{tevana vsa pravila, povezana z
neodvisnostjo revizorja, ni bilo. Potreba po zunanjem nadzoru nad revidiranjem tako izhaja iz zahteve po ustrezni kakovosti revizijskih storitev,
vklju~no z zagotavljanjem revizorjeve neodvisnosti.
Primerno zasnovan in dosledno izvajan sistem zunanjega obvladovanja kakovosti revizijskih storitev je najbolj u~inkovit na~in, s katerim revizor
svojim strankam, državi in javnosti dokazuje, da izvaja revizijske storitve
77
v skladu z zahtevami revizijskih standardov in eti~nih na~el. Poleg tega
tak{en sistem spodbuja uvajanje izbolj{av v revizijske postopke. Raziskave, ki se osredoto~ajo na prou~evanje u~inkov zunanjega obvladovanja
kakovosti zakonskih revizij v Evropski uniji, kažejo, da ustrezno zasnovani
in izvajani sistemi dejansko pripomorejo k odkrivanju in prepre~evanju
pomanjkljivosti v procesu revidiranja in se zrcalijo v ve~ji kakovosti opravljenih revizijskih storitev (Recommendation on quality assurance for the
statutory audits in the European Union, 2000). Upo{tevaje podatek, da je
bilo v Evropski uniji že v letu 2000 kar tri milijone družb z omejeno odgovornostjo in delni{kih družb zavezanih k obvezni reviziji letnih
ra~unovodskih izkazov v skladu z ra~unovodskima direktivama (s tedanjima ~etrto direktivo o letnih ra~unovodskih izkazih posameznih vrst družb
in sedmo direktivo o konsolidiranih ra~unovodskih izkazih) in da osma
(revizijska) direktiva v tem ~asu {e ni vsebovala posebnih navodil v zvezi s
sistemom obvladovanja kakovosti revizijskih storitev, so se v posameznih
državah oblikovali zelo razli~ni sistemi obvladovanja kakovosti revizijskega dela.
Nedavni finan~ni {kandali, predvsem Enron in Worldcom (ki sta povzro~ila padec enega izmed najve~jih akterjev na trgu revizijskih storitev,
revizijske družbe Arthur Andersen), so mo~no zamajali zaupanje javnosti v
revizijsko stroko. Alles, Kogan in Vasarhelyi (2004, str. 188) navajajo, da je
bilo prevladujo~e javno mnenje po izbruhu finan~nih {kandalov, da gre za
»…posledice namernih poslovodskih prevar ob pomo~i revizorjev, ki so v
najbolj{em primeru nesposobni, v najslab{em primeru pa podkupljeni«.
Upo{tevaje tak{en prevladujo~ pogled na kakovost revizijskih storitev v
o~eh uporabnikov revizijskih poro~il, so bile obsežne spremembe, povezane z nadzorom revizijske dejavnosti, nujne. Ponovna vzpostavitev zaupanja v revizijsko stroko, pove~anje verodostojnosti javno dostopnih
ra~unovodskih poro~il ter stabiliziranje finan~nih trgov so bili glavni cilji
zaostrene zakonodaje, tako Sarbanes - Oxleyevega zakona iz leta 2002 v
ZDA kot tudi Direktive 2006/43/ES o obveznih revizijah letnih in konsolidiranih ra~unovodskih izkazov družb iz leta 2006 v Evropski uniji.
^lanek opisuje razli~ne poti razvoja sistemov obvladovanja kakovosti
revidiranja v Evropski uniji in v Združenih državah Amerike ter sisteme, ki
so bili v EU in v ZDA uvedeni za potrebe izvajanja javnega nadzora nad
dejavnostjo revidiranja. Predstavljene so tudi glavne ugotovitve nekaterih
empiri~nih raziskav, ki se osredoto~ajo na prou~evanje vpliva novih
78
mehanizmov javnega nadzora nad revidiranjem revizijskih storitev, ki jih
izvajajo revizijske družbe.
Poznavanje posledic uvedbe novih sistemov javnega nadzora nad
revidiranjem je klju~nega pomena iz dveh razlogov. Prvi~, ker je to podro~je povezano z zelo aktualno razpravo o prednostih in slabostih razli~nih
vrst nadzora, ki so na eni strani povezane z visoko ravnjo strokovnega
znanja (obi~ajno se visoka strokovnost pripisuje sistemu medsebojnega
nadzora oz. sistemu »peer review«), na drugi strani pa z visoko ravnjo
neodvisnosti (le-ta je v najve~ji meri zagotovljena z neodvisnim nadzorom
oz. s sistemom »monitoring«). In drugi~, ker je pomembno spremljati,
kako novo uvedeni sistemi obvladovanja kakovosti vplivajo na kakovost
revizijskih storitev in kak{ne signale o dejanski kakovosti tak{en sistem
po{ilja uporabnikom revizijskih poro~il.
V Združenih državah Amerike vse ve~ raziskovalcev prou~uje razlike
med novo uvedenim sistemom javnega nadzora (ki ga v ZDA izvaja Odbor
za javni nadzor oz. Public Company Accounting and Oversight Board –
PCAOB) in nekdanjo samoregulacijo revizijske dejavnosti, ki se je izvajala
prek sistema medsebojnega nadzora (»peer review«).
Anantharaman (2007, str. 33) na primer ugotavlja, da revizijske družbe, ki se tudi same ukvarjajo z izvajanjem medsebojnega nadzora, redno
prejemajo bolj{a poro~ila o kakovosti od izvajalcev nadzora v sistemu
medsebojnega nadzora kot od PCAOB. Na podlagi izsledkov raziskave
avtor ugotavlja tudi, da revizijske družbe, ki izvajajo medsebojne preglede
in za katere je manj verjetno, da dosledno ustrezajo kriterijem neodvisnosti (gre predvsem za manj{e revizijske družbe) in tudi revizijske družbe, ki
so se v ve~ji meri specializirale za izvajanje medsebojnih pregledov, prav
tako pridobivajo bistveno bolj ugodna mnenja iz medsebojnih pregledov
kot od PCAOB.
Gunny in Zhang (2006, str. 12) poro~ata, da mnenja, ki izhajajo iz medsebojnih pregledov, niso povezana s kakovostjo izkazanega poslovnega
izida (»earnings quality«) pri naro~nikih revizijskih storitev revizijske družbe. Potrdila pa sta hipotezo, da je kakovost izkazanega poslovnega izida
pri strankah revizijske družbe povezana z mnenjem, ki ga izda PCAOB kot
organ javnega nadzora. Avtorja tako ugotavljata, da imajo revizijske družbe, ki prejemajo pozitivna mnenja PCAOB, stranke z vi{jo kakovostjo izkazanih poslovnih izidov.
DeFond (2009, str. 2) ugotavlja, da imajo novi in{pektorji kot izvajalci
javnega nadzora v primerjavi z nekdanjim sistemom samoregulacije v
79
rokah u~inkovitej{e mehanizme, na podlagi katerih lahko uveljavljajo strožje
standarde kakovosti, in sicer pravi, da "... za razliko od izvajalcev medsebojnega nadzora lahko in{pektorji PCAOB v primeru nekaterih pomembnej{ih
odkritih nepravilnostih sprožijo ukrepe, katerih posledice so visoke kazni
za revizijske družbe. Ti ukrepi vklju~ujejo prijavljanje nepravilnosti organu,
zadolženemu za nadzor borz in vrednostnic (Securities and Exchange
Commission – SEC), posredovanje izsledkov o morebitnih ugotovljenih
kriminalnih dejanjih Ministrstvu za pravosodje in disciplinske ukrepe, ki jih
izvaja neposredno PCAOB«. Avtor meni, da so zato revizijske družbe že v
fazi pri~akovanja javnega nadzora motivirane k izbolj{evanju kakovosti
revizijskih storitev.
Nekatere dodatne dokaze, ki kažejo, da se je po uvedbi Sarbanes –
Oxleyevega zakona kakovost revizijskih storitev, z njo pa tudi kakovost
ra~unovodskih poro~il družb, v katerih se izvaja revidiranje ra~unovodskih
izkazov, izbolj{ala, podajajo tudi Cohen, Dey in Lys (2008). Avtorji potrjujejo, da so po uvedbi zakona vse manj zaznani primeri prilagajanja poslovnega izida pri naro~nikih revizijskih storitev. Lobo in Zhou (2006) pa dodajata, da so po uvedbi zakona revizorji postali bolj konservativni.
Medtem, ko je bilo v Združenih državah Amerike objavljenih že nekaj
raziskav s tega podro~ja, pa rezultatov tovrstnih raziskav v Evropski uniji
{e ni. Državam ~lanicam EU je bila namre~ ob uvedbi Direktive 2006/43/ES
o obveznih revizijah letnih in konsolidiranih ra~unovodskih izkazov družb
dana možnost, da zahteve direktive vklju~ijo v svoje nacionalne zakonodaje v roku dveh let, to je do sredine leta 2008. V ZDA so minila vsaj {tiri leta
od uvedbe Sarbanes – Oxleyevega zakona leta 2002 do objave prvih
izsledkov raziskav v prvorazrednih revijah s podro~ja ra~unovodstva in
revizije, kot so npr. Accounting Horizons (Lobo and Zhou, 2006), The
Accounting Review (Cohen, Dey and Lys, 2008) in Journal of Accounting
and Economics (DeFond, 2009). Avtorja menita, da gre razloge za zaostanek na podro~ju prou~evanja posledic uvedbe novih sistemov javnega
nadzora nad revidiranjem na kakovostjo revizijskih storitev v Evropski
uniji pripisati predvsem dejstvu, da doslej {e ni bilo na voljo kakovostnih
primerljivih podatkov, ki bi lahko služili kot osnova za izvedbo kakovostne
statisti~ne analize.
80
Review article
Assessment of establishment
and operations under market
conditions for a public
equity fund
UDK: 338.246.027(045)
Jaka Vadnjal
Gea College, Visoka {ola za podjetni{tvo
jaka.vadnjal@gea-college.si
ABSTRACT
The government of Slovenia established a publicly funded venture capital
fund in order to provide start-up finance for small companies. The fund was
meant to fill in the market gap in early-stage equity finance supply. The fund is
co-financed from EU structural funds and has to comply with strict regulation
regarding possibility of market distortion from such measure. The objective of
the study is to give a straightforward answer whether the public fund will behave
within the equity market conditions or will impose an unloyal competition to the
existing privately financed funds. In accordance to this, an evaluation is given
advising that the public fund should not be regarded as a state-aid measure.
Key words: venture capital, SMEs, fund management company,
state aid, market conditions
JEL: G24
1. Introduction
In 2008 the Government of Slovenia established a risk capital investment
fund – Prva družba tveganega kapitala (thereinafter “PDTK”) which was the
first implication of the Law on venture capital companies (ZDTK) adopted in
2007. The objective of adopting the specialized law on venture capital was
81
Jaka Vadnjal
Assessment of establishment and operations under market
conditions for a public equity fund
mainly to set up a legal framework for establishment of new venture capital
firms, the purpose of the PDTK is to provide capital to SMEs which preferably
have core competencies in technology and are in their start-up phase. The
PDTK’s focus are SMEs in key technology sectors of the Slovenian economy.
The authorities hope that the measure will lower underlying financing risks and
increase confidence in further financing, notably private-equity financing, thus
to override the traditional finance gap evidenced in this sector (Chu & Hisrich,
2001). While financing eligible activities, the measure is intended to increase
the competitiveness and to strengthen the equity base of start-up SMEs (Baygan, 2003).
The activities that are to be financed with the capital provided by the
PDTK are moreover research or pre-competitive technological development of
new or improved products, processes or services. Eligible activities will be
tailored to a recognized market demand and should be distinguished by particular know-how, if possible capable of having intellectual property rights protected (Hellman & Puri, 2000). The mission of the PDTK is also to financially
catalyze and stimulate the knowledge flow from research institutions to mostly
SMEs, as an integrative element in the setup of support institutions, universities, research and technology parks, incubators and public agencies providing
to SMEs (Botazzi & Da Rin, 2002).
2. Objectives of the study
The PDTK and its investments are directly financed by public resources:
(1) from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), (2) co-financing
from the national budget of the Republic of Slovenia, and (3) from own resources of Slovenian Enterprise Fund (SEF), which is a public fund. The financing under the measure may improve the overall financial condition and enhance the market position of all stakeholders involved (Sunley et al., 2005). The
measure does not rule out the award of aid to firms engaged in economic sectors where intra-Community trade takes place. Thus, the fund and its operations could constitute aid within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC. The assessment of this measure could fall within the scope of the Community Guidelines
on State aid to promote risk capital investments in small and medium-sized
enterprises (thereinafter “the Guidelines”).
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Jaka Vadnjal
For the Guidelines to be applicable the following conditions must be met:
(1) the measure must be a scheme, targeting SMEs; (2) the measure must not
be intended to provide capital to an individual enterprise; (3) the measure must
exclude aid to enterprises in difficulty as defined in the Guidelines and, (4) the
Guidelines do not apply to aid for export-related activities, namely aid directly
linked to the quantities exported, to the establishment and operation of a distribution network or to other current expenditure linked to the export activity,
as well as aid contingent upon the use of domestic in preference to imported
goods. Thus, the planned measure falls in an unfavorable position of conflict
between real market driven forces and bureaucratic establishment of rules that
are set to defend market conditions (Lerner, 2002).
As defined within the scope of the Guidelines, financing for the setting-up
and operation should only be provided at market conditions. According to this,
there are certain issues which may be daubed whether they are eligible to be
treated as market conditions (Farag et al., 2004): (1) how the fund management company would be selected, (2) what would be appropriate fund management remuneration, (3) expected rates of returns for the investment and (4)
possibility for private sector co-investment. In accordance to this, the following
questions were defined to be addressed and answered in the research:
Q1. Is there a fund management company in Slovenia which may be
ready and competent to manage a publicly established risk capital fund according to the Guidelines and respecting ERDF rules?
Q2. What is the flat rate management fee, normally charged on comitted
capital by the fund management companies operating in Slovenia and what is
the market conditioned level of profit sharing fund for management remuneration?
Q3. What are the expected rates of return for risk and venture capital investments in the Slovenian market?
Q4. Is there any interest in private sector to invest in a publicly established fund or to co-invest alongside the fund’s investment on the level of an
individual company?
The present study should be therefore understood as more exploratory
rather than confirmatory, thus no propositions and/or hypotheses are proposed. Instead, just a set of research questions is put forward.
83
Jaka Vadnjal
3. Literature overview
While debt financing is the most important source of European enterprise
finance over the past decade, alternative instruments can become a significant
factor in providing flexibility and choices that better reflect the needs of enterprises throughout their development. Venture capital is likely to become the
most important option for specific knowledge based and growth oriented
types of SMEs.
The experience of venture capital in the USA shows that different forces
call for an increasing share in venture capital financing, either in the form of
(formal) venture capital funds, business angels or existing corporations through
their capital venturing. Experts used to stress the »equity capital culture«
when explaining the strength of venture capital in the USA and Great Britain
(Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003). However, according to some empirical evidence (Ernst & Young, 2006) it is not only a true entrepreneurial Anglo-Saxon
culture but government support for this type of capital with appropriate regulation and tax policy that is needed. The U.S. government supported innovative
SMEs through SBICs, tax-policy-preferred capital gains while, in 1978, pension
funds were allowed to invest in venture capital funds (Gompers & Lerner,
2002). Along with the »silent revolution« involving entrepreneurship and
changes in technology, this support has seen growth in the amount of traditional venture capital from around USD 5 billion in the mid-1990s to growth for
more than twenty times in ten years, with an even larger amount in informal
investments (Bygrave et al., 2003). Venture capital has also developed a viable
organizational structure of partnership management companies that are rewarded according to an investment’s success. Europe expressed its commitment to risk capital as a reflection of its concern over the high level of SMEs’
dependence on debt finance, as part of efforts to create an entrepreneurial
Europe (Cosh & Hughes, 2003). However, EU countries have trailed behind the
development of venture capital in the USA (Romain and Van Pottelsberghe,
2003) and the economic slump in 2001-2002 seriously aggravated the situation
in the venture capital market for both SMEs and VC funds (Kjaergaard & Nordstrom, 2004). Yet, it can be assumed that following economic recovery venture
capital will again become more important at least for certain types of SMEs or
enterprises in certain stages of their existence (Hermann et al., 2004). This is
very important since venture capital has backed those companies that have
really made technology breakthroughs. The study of VC-backed firms in Europe
84
Jaka Vadnjal
shows that venture capital was an essential ingredient of their creation, survival and growth, while 60% of these said they would not be in business today
without the funding and support of venture capitalists (Mayer et al., 2001).
Slovenian banks and other investors as the supply side of venture capital
started early in the entrepreneurship wave of 1990s, to become involved in
some types of venture capital investment (Glas et al., 2002). However, problems arise more from the demand side and the lack of ambitious entrepreneurial projects. In addition, the legal, administrative and tax environment is not
conducive to such investments. Because of the overall low development of
capital markets, one of the main obstacles seems to be the lack of exit possibilities which make the venture capital market liquid and thus attractive for
investors (Wright et al., 2005).
One of the sub-goals of the study is also to assess the market dynamics
of equity financing. Demand and supply of venture capital is defined by three
groups of factors (Schertler, 2003): (1) the level of entrepreneurial initiative of
individuals, (2) innovation potential of the economic environment, with the
resulting number of innovative ideas with ambition for entrepreneurial implementation and (3) institutional environment, making decisions on number and
terms of financing innovative ideas. Saertre (2001) states, that it is a typical
inductive research, where pattern builds on theoretical selection, being more
desired and appropriate in comparison to coincidental selection, which is basis
of deductive research. A »loose structured interview« is the most adequate
format of collecting data, recommended in literature (Miles and Huberman,
1994). It enables a sufficient quantity of information for a quality development
of theory and hypothesis (Andersen & Bollerslev, 1997), as well on the field of
financing with private equity, discussed in this research. However, it turns to
be a great research challenge to try to measure and evaluate a phenomenon
that hardly exists and to put efforts to predictions of further development.
Thus, confirmation of existence of equity gap at the market with really small
quantities appears to be problematic, which is consistent to some previous
research (Freshwater et al., 2001).
Nevertheless, one of the objectives is to obtain certain quantitative estimations from the study. Numerically it is a small pattern, which is a conscious
weakness of the study but is a direct consequence of researching a smallscale market. The paradigm that it is not appropriate to address quantitative
research questions with qualitative methods (Davidsson, 2005) was consciously by-passed for this occasion since no better research solution was
85
Jaka Vadnjal
available. As we have to deal with two theoretically different concepts, a preformulated content of the interview has been structured only for the part
where we want to collect quantity data in order to make a rough estimate on
the extent of demand and supply of equity capital.
4. Methodology
The methodology applied for this particular report generally consists of (1)
descriptive analyses of secondary sources, revealed in the literature and
sources section; (2) qualitative primary data and information analyses and; (3)
benchmarking with the similar public venture capital fund established in another country, which has passed the identical procedure of proving the
(non)compliancy with the EU state-aid measures. The primary data was compared and compiled from two collection processes. The first round took place
in May and June 2006 (Vadnjal et al., 2006) and the second round was overtaken in February 2007.
The methodology of data collection was a semi-structured interview, held
with several equity market players such as venture capital companies and fund
management companies operating in Slovenia while also several banks, insurance companies and some larger corporations were invited to participate in the
study (Megginson, 2004). The interviews were held with top representatives
of the companies, thus it can be proposed that their opinions represent competent, true and fair reflection of the current market situation (Meyer, 2007).
The Slovenian market is, as expected, specific for its limited scope, having low
level of specialization in the finance intermediaries sector (Bruton & Ahlstrom,
2003), which results in the fact that many industry players (apart from traditionally managed banks) are active in several financial sub-markets.
The participants in the study may be differentiated into three groups on
the basis on their market position being: (1) fund management companies, or
fund supplier institutions such as (2) financial holdings, banks, insurance companies etc., and (3) larger corporations. Several actors participating in the study
may be wearing different hats, being both, the fund management company
and financial company, or other combinations which may not be particularity
of Slovenia (Mason, 1999). On the other hand, expressed limitations of the
86
Jaka Vadnjal
market do not put many research opportunities to go into some more in-depth
quantitative research methodologies in order to get a more accurate evaluation
of several market parameters, such as expected return rates, management
fees, management remuneration (profit sharing option), etc. Another important
limitation of the study is that the data was collected in the times which were
still far away from the recession (before autumn 2008) which imposes the
possibility that the attitudes of the respondents might be quite different in the
light of the actual global economic crisis.
The following market actors in Slovenia participated in the study (some
names repeat for mentioned reasons of being involved in different activities):
•
As fund suppliers (16): NLB, Abanka, Banka Koper, Probanka, Po{tna
banka, Hranilnica Lon, Banka Celje, Reifeissen Krekova banka, NKBM
(as banks), Zavarovalnica Triglav, Adriatic Slovenica, Prva pokojninska
družba (as insurance companies), Poteza, KD Holding, Aktiva invest;
Individa (as financial companies);
•
As corporate investors (14): Ilirija, Mura, ETI, Blues, EMO orodjarna,
Alpina, Petrol, Danfoss Trata, AC Cosmos, Kovinoplastika Lož, Brest,
Litostroj; Krka, Gorenje;
•
As fund management companies (11): Horizone Venture Management, Poteza, NLB Funds, Sivent, KD Holding, Ilirika, Taxgroup, Aktiva
Invest, Perspektiva, Individa, RSG fund.
5. Key findings
Key findings relevant to the raised issues in the objectives of the study
are in the fields of (1) fund management where selection of the fund management company is considered and remuneration of the management company
is discussed; (2) expected rates of returns for the funds and, (3) public involvement in the PDTK’s investment activities.
87
Jaka Vadnjal
5.1 Fund management
There are two questions which were identified regarding the possible
consideration of the market conditions of the PDTK’s operations. According to
Guidelines, also the service providers within the investment process should be
expected to behave strictly under market conditions. For this particular reason,
selection procedures are examined together with service price (i.e. fund management remuneration).
5.1.1
Selection of the fund management company
The management company was not selected by a public tender procedure. From the comparative study of the other potential fund management
companies mentioned above it could be concluded that the fund management
company established by the government is the only company in Slovenia, having the human resource potential available, that has the expertise to manage
funds with ERDF co-financing in strict compliance with EC and domestic regulation. Moreover, the general opinion of the benchmarked management companies was that they would not be interested in the future to manage
schemes falling under “too demanding administrative and legal procedures”.
In the table 1, there is a summary of the interpreted answers to this research
question.
Table 1. Interest to manage a public fund
Q1: Do you have interest and competencies to manage a publicly established and financed
risk capital fund?
Yes
0
Maybe
1
No
Total
Not interested
Not competent
4
6
11
Source: Own research 2006-2008
The evaluation of the management capabilities available in the region was
also done. The companies focused on the region as they consider proximity to
be vital for managing funds of that size and scope, given the need for intensive
monitoring and supervision of the target enterprises. The evaluation pointed out
that there was no fund management company with a track record of managing
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Jaka Vadnjal
EU funds. Furthermore, the existing fund management companies (1) were
mostly established to manage internally created and raised funds, (2) there
was actually only a branch office for Slovenia, or (3) might be temporary out of
business for certain legal reasons. As far as competences were concerned, the
vast majority of respondents admitted not to have any experience with EU
funding prerequisites but they generally shared impression that a bulk of bureaucratic procedures had to be dealt with in such cases, thus implying requirements for additional and for the time being non-existing human resources
in order to manage such a fund.
5.1.2
Fund management remuneration
Remuneration of the managing company is normally expected to consist
of two components. Firstly, the managing company will receive 2.5% of the
committed capital annually as management fee, during the six-year investment
phase. Secondly, after the investment phase ends, the variable part of the
management fee will be calculated based on the capital invested less the
costs. The second phase is paid after the completion of the investment phase
on the level of each particular project (i.e. invested company). The costs are
located proportionally to committed capital into a particular investment. Three
investigated fund management companies expected the fees to be around 20
%, which is also EVCA’s (2009) recommendation. Other participants in the
study whether regarded this information as confidential or did not provide any
clear answer. Having in mind the limited availability of trustworthy research
data and information, it is confirmed that 20 % shares on profit by the management company is a market conditioned expected variable part of the fund
management remuneration. In the table 2, there is an analysis of participant’s
answers regarding the management fee, while in table 3 the views regarding
the profit-sharing fees are described.
Table 2. Management fee rate
Q2: What is the fee rate on the committed capital that you normal charge for similar fund
management assignments?
2.5 %
Around 2.5 %
Classified
information
No answer
Total
6
3
2
0
11
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Jaka Vadnjal
The remuneration principles, as presented, do reflect market rates, taking
into account the limitations of Slovenian market and its development phase,
which can be evaluated as early enough for many of study respondents to
express mere their expectations from possible future deals rather than actually
achieved and collected management fee rates. The other possibility is also that
the expressed 2.5 % fee rate is expressed through following EVCA’s (2009)
recommendations. The two respondents which did not want to reveal information regarding the management fee rate (1) were a foreign branch office of a
larger fund operating all over Europe and (2) a company which was established
on purpose to manage a particular fund.
Table 3. Management profit-sharing rate
Q3: What is profit-sharing fee rate that you normal charge for similar fund management
assignments?
20 %
Around 20 %
Classified
information
No answer
Total
2
2
1
6
11
5.2 Expected rate of returns
The evaluation of expected rate of returns on the level of an individual investment is a demanding assignment. The research among fund suppliers
(Vadnjal et al., 2006) may impose a speculation that possible fund suppliers
may not have a very clear picture on preferable or expected return rate. The
articulated rate can be summed up to be “at least 20 %” which is on the other
side often achieved even in the mutual funds industry in which majority of the
potential fund providers also operate. In the table 4, data on expected rates of
return are elaborated in detail. It can be observed that this opinion was provided by four study participants while others did not answer anything.
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Jaka Vadnjal
Table 4. Expected rate of return
Q4: What is your expected rate of return when investing into start-ups?
20 %
At least 20 %
Classified
information
No answer
Total
0
4
0
7
11
On the other hand, the research has been made in the times of positive
trends on Slovenian stock exchange markets which consequently make mutual
funds industry highly attractive for massive in-flows of cash. Therefore, the
expected return rates for more risky venture capital investments may be
higher. However, this might change rapidly in the case of downturn of the
stock exchange ratios. In this case, lower expected return rates for venture
and risk funds are expected. Since the data for this study were collected far
before the 2008-09 recession, it is correct to give a brief comment in the light
of the financial crisis. One can say that it has affected the venture capital industry like all other businesses. Fund-raising has become extremely hard and
investment managers are more cautious. As there have been hardly any activities in the 2009, it can be stated that the crisis would seriously affect the findings if the research would have been undertaken in some later stage of the
crisis.
5.3 Private sector investments
There were options of private sector direct or indirect investment involvement assessing: (1) direct investments from the private sector into the
fund managed by PDTK and (2) potential co-investments in the targeted SMEs.
The elaborated data on the potential interest to invest into the PDTK’s fund is
available in the table 5, while the alternative option to co-invest on the level of
individual company is explored in the table 6.
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Jaka Vadnjal
Table 5. Interest for investments into PDTK
Q5: Would you be interested to invest directly into PDTK’s fund?
Yes
Maybe
Not at all
Total
Financial inst.
0
2
14
16
Corporations
0
0
14
14
Total
0
0
28
30
Concerning the direct investment into the fund the study participants expressed high level of aversion regarding this investment option. The following
reasons for practically nil interest were expressed:
92
•
High risk, combined with low rates of return, as compared to other investment opportunities (management-buy-outs/buy-ins, private equity
placements etc.);
•
High monitoring and supervision costs which means high overhead
and sunk costs in comparison to the volume and quantity of the funds;
•
The limited investment opportunities because of the preferences for
geographical proximity of invested companies;
•
Relatively low management fees, due to the small average volume of
transactions;
•
Moderate level of experience and expertise regarding more risky investments and direct ownership involvement in the companies;
•
Funds prefer to keep the due diligence processes under their own
control;
•
They insist to keep management and supervision of investments
within their own management companies;
Jaka Vadnjal
•
Financial intermediaries which are active in several different capital
market segments prefer to remain flexible and not to lock their resources only into venture capital activities because of possible better
opportunities in other sub-markets (for instance mutual funds);
•
Some intermediaries (like banks and insurance companies) face serious legislative barriers and limitations which prevent them from getting involved into riskier financial investments.
Based on this evaluation, it can be stated that a clear market failure is present at the market segment on which the PDTK operates and that the PDTK
does not offer satisfactory investment or co-investment opportunities for private investors. Moreover, there is perceived almost no interest among private
investors to participate at the level of the PDTK. However, there is some interest for the involvement at the level of each transaction, alongside the PDTK
operations. Interestingly, in the same time period (2006-2008), two banks have
already decided to invest in privately established and managed venture capital
fund.
Several interviews were conducted also with larger companies that may
in the future provide some capital with a clear objective to foster development
of spin-off companies, which may increase the research and development
potential of the core business. However, this is the concept that has not
reached its maturity in Slovenia yet. Out of the 14 explored investment companies (listed above), none of them expressed any interest to invest into the
publicly established fund, nor considered any equity investments or coinvestments in new start-ups or spin-offs.
Table 6. Interest for co-investments on the individual company level
Q6: Would you be interested to co-invest with PDTK into individual company?
Yes
Maybe
Not at all
Total
Financial inst.
12
2
2
16
Corporations
2
2
10
14
Total
14
4
12
30
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Jaka Vadnjal
6. Conclusions and recommendations
At the time being there is no fund management company operating in
Slovenia, which would be evaluated to possess competencies and interest to
manage publicly funded risk capital fund. The government of Slovenia should
therefore proceed with the activities to provide its own venture fund management company PDTK with sufficient both financial and other necessary resources. It would be highly recommendable for PDTK to pull together a network of experts in order to provide expertise and assistance in the investment
decision-making processes. This pool of experts should not be limited to
Slovenian based specialists but should involve at least European if not global
business perspective. There is a need to underpin again that Slovenian risk and
venture capital market is far from the point of being regarded as developed
(only between 28 and 30 investments done so far, only two exits in twelve
years), thus making these estimations very robust and conditioned with only
limited quantity of data and information.
The market conditioned management fee rate is 2.5 % in Slovenia and the
profit sharing fee is 20 % of the profits realized. The PDTK should include the
business rates mentioned above in their business plan. Thus, speaking about
market conditioned internal rate of return on investment risk capital and venture capital investment is at least 20 %. Project proposals with projected returns below 20 % on year basis should be directed out of the PDTK’s pipeline
and further due diligence process.
There is no interest from private sector in Slovenia to invest in the PDTK’s
fund. On the other side, there is some interest in private sector to go into syndicated investments together with PDTK. PDTK should develop a sustainable
system to attract co-investment on the company level from the private sector.
However, there may always remain a certain degree of reluctance towards this
type of private-public investments because of the possible fear of government’s and politically motivated interventions with regard to the business.
The Community Guidelines on State aid to promote risk capital investments in SMEs enforce that financing for the start-up and operation should
only be provided at market conditions. Several issues which maybe impose
dilemmas whether they can be treated as market conditions were overviewed in this study: (1) selection of the fund management company;
(2) fund management remuneration; (3) expected rates of returns and
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Jaka Vadnjal
(4) private sector co-investment. The following recommendations may be put
forward:
•
As far as the selection of the fund is concerned, the supply of competent service provider which would also have experience with cofinancing arrangements through ERDF fund does not exist. Therefore,
the need for existence of a publicly owned management company
which fills in the gap is supported.
•
Regarding the management remuneration it can be stated that 2.5 %
management fee on the capital committed is the market conditioned
charge. There is less evidence to support 20 % profit sharing remuneration. However, these findings should be trusted to be accurate in
the given situation within the scope of the data and information available.
•
As far as expected rates of return are concerned, the evidence and
experience is Slovenia is poor and offers not much spare room for
possible elaboration. However, the bottom rate of 20 % is rate advised to the PDTK’s fund management and supervisors.
•
Lastly, the fund management can only thrive for private co-investment
on the level of individual company. By no means there is any evidence
on any potential interest from potential fund suppliers to invest in the
publicly established venture capital fund. On the other hand, there is a
certain interest in private sector to go for syndicate investment with
the PDTK. This interest is widely expressed by financial institutions
while it is less evident among corporations.
The possible implications of the paper are needed to be discussed with
caution. First, the doubt about methodological issue remains present with the
main dilemma: if more sophisticated techniques were used, would this increase the reliability of the results. It has been a repeated issue of researching
something that is hard to research because of small scope or due to the phenomena never researched so far (Da Rin et al., 2006). Thus, the more sophisticated methods would not diminish the doubtfulness of the results, probably
the most serious limitations of the study.
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Jaka Vadnjal
Dr. Jaka Vadnjal graduated from mechanical engineering, mastered from entrepreneurship and holds Ph. D., all from University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. He is senior lecturer at
GEA College of Entrepreneurship, where he also serves as director of the research
institute and president of the senate. He has been teaching at GEA College since 1996
and managed and participated in several research projects. He presented papers at
several conferences worldwide. He authored and co-authored eleven original scientific
articles published in journals. The papers and articles cover topics in family business
and venture capital. He is also co-author of four books on entrepreneurship also published outside Slovenia.
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venture investments in transitioning economies: a comparative analysis of eastern European and German markets. Venture Capital: An International Journal of Entrepreneurial
Finance 6 (4), 257-282.
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Freshwater, D., Barkley, D. L., Markley, D. M., Sass Rubin, J., & Shaffer, R. 2001. Non
traditional venture capital institutions: Filling a financial market gap. Columbia: Rural Policy Research Institute.
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Glas, M., Drnov{ek, M., & P{eni~ny, V. 2002. Is private equity capital really the solution?
V: Research in Entrepreneurship and Government Policy: Making the Connection. Vlerick
Leuven Gent Management School.
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Gompers, P., & Lerner, J. 2001. The venture capital revolution. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 15 (2), 145-168.
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Hellman, T., & Puri, M. 2000. The interaction between product market and financing
strategy: the role of venture capital. Review of Financial Studies 13 (4), 959-984.
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Hermann, H., Liebig, T., & Tödter. K. H. 2004. Studies of economic research centre no.
18/2004. Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bundesbank.
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Kjaergaard, R., & Nordstrom, B. J. 2004. Venture capital in Denmark. Copenhagen: Danish investment Fund (DIF).
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Klonowski, D. 2005. The evolution of the venture capital industry in transition economies: the case of Poland. Post-Communist Economies 17 (3), 331-348.
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Lerner, J. 2002. When bureaucrats meet entrepreneurs: the design of effective ‘public
venture capital’ programmes. The Economic Journal 112 (477), F73-F84.
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Mason, C. 1999. Editorial. Venture capital: rationale, aims and scope. Venture Capital 1
(1), 1-46.
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Megginson, W. L. 2004. Toward a global model of venture capital? Journal of applied
corporate finance 16 (1): 89-107.
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Mayer, C., Schoors, K., & Yafeh, Y. 2001. Sources of Funds and Investment Strategies
of Venture Capital Funds, Evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and UK. NBER Working
Paper 9645.
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Meyer, K. E. 2007. Foreign direct investment in the early years of economic transition: a
survey. Economics of Transition 3 (3), 301-320.
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Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. 1994. Qualitative data analysis: an expanded sourcebook. London: Sage.
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Romain, A., & van Pottelsberghe, B. 2003. The determinants of venture capital: a panel
data analysis of 16 OECD countries. Hitotshubashi University: Institute of Innovation Research, WP 03-25.
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Saetre, A. S. 2001. The demand side of the informal venture capital market: four Norwegian cases. Oslo: The Norwegian university of science and technology, Department
of industrial economics and technology management.
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Schertler, A. 2003. Driving forces of venture capital investments in Europe: A dynamic
panel data analysis. Kiel: Institute for world economics, working paper No. 03-27.
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Sunley, P., Klagge, B., Berndt, A., & Martin, R. 2005. Venture capital programs in the UK
and Germany: in what sense a regional problem? Regional Studies 39 (2), 255-273.
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Vadnjal, J., Berginc, J., Letonja, M., Penca, P., Slavni~, N., Pal~i~, I., & Kerec, M. 2006.
[tudija o obstoju vrzeli lastni{kega kapitala v Sloveniji. Piran: GEA College – Visoka {ola
za podjetni{tvo.
•
Wright, M., Pruthi, S., & Lockett, A. 2005. International venture capital research: from
cross-country comparisons to crossing borders. International Journal of Management
Reviews 7 (3), 135-165.
Jaka Vadnjal
POVZETEK
PRESOJA USTANOVITVE IN DELOVANJA
JAVNEGA SKLADA TVEGANEGA KAPITALA
POD TRŽNIMI POGOJI
1. Uvod
Slovenska vlada je leta 2008 ustanovila Prvo družbo tveganega kapitala (PDTK). Družba naj bi z javnim denarjem zapolnjevala tržno ni{o v lastni{kem financiranju malih in srednjih podjetij (MSP) in predvsem podjetni{kih zagonov. Družba je bila ustanovljena po Zakonu o družbah tveganega kapitala (ZDTK), ki ga je Slovenija sprejela 2007. PDTK naj bi se
usmerila predvsem v visokotehnolo{ka podjetja s potencialom doseganja
visoke dodane vrednosti in hitre rasti ter vstopa na mednarodne in globalne trge. PDTK ima za poslanstvo tudi spodbujanje trženja znanja, ki je
plod razvoja in raziskovanja v raziskovalnih institucijah, na univerzah, v
tehnolo{kih parkih in podjetni{kih inkubatorjih.
2. Namen {tudije
Na~rtovano je, da se bo PDTK financiral iz javnih virov in sicer delno iz
slovenskega nacionalnega prora~una in delno iz evropskih strukturnih
skladov. Kot tak mora delovati v skladu z evropsko regulativo in navodili
evropske skupnosti glede obravnavanja javno financiranih skladov tveganega kapitala v kontekstu državnih pomo~i. ê javno financirani sklad
lastni{kega financiranja dobi status javne pomo~i, lahko njegovo delovanje postane izjemno težavno in posledi~no manj u~inkovito. Zato se države,
ki organizirajo podobne finan~ne instrumente, sku{ajo izogniti statusu
državne pomo~i za svoje sklade. Seveda je to mogo~e le, ~e dokažejo, da
tudi javni skladi tveganega kapitala delujejo po tržnih zakonitostih in niso
nelojalna konkurenca zasebnim skladom. Kriteriji presoje, ali državni sklad
deluje po tržnih zakonitostih, ki jih sku{amo preveriti tudi v pri~ujo~i {tudiji, so predvsem: (1) kako bo izbrana družba, ki bo upravljala s skladom, (2)
kak{na bo ustrezna nagrada za upravljanje sklada, (3)kak{ni so pri~akovani
donosi na investirana sredstva in (4) možnosti soinvestiranja zasebnega
sektorja. V zvezi s tem so bila za {tudijo postavljena naslednja raziskovalna vpra{anja:
99
Jaka Vadnjal
Q1. Ali v Sloveniji obstaja upravljalska družba, ki bi bila sposobna
upravljati tak sklad v skladu z evropskimi pravili o državnih pomo~eh in
Evropskega sklada za regionalni razvoj?
Q2. Kak{na je fiksna provizija kot delež investiranega kapitala za
nagrade menedžmentu in kak{en je pri~akovani odstotek upravljalske družbe pri delitvi dobi~ka?
Q3. Kak{ni so pri~akovani donosi za javni sklad tveganega kapitala?
Q4. Ali v zasebnem finan~nem sektorju obstaja interes za soinvestiranje v javni sklad tveganega kapitala?
3. Pregled literature
Lastni{ko financiranje je v Evropi manj prisotno v podjetni{ki kulturi
kot na primer v ZDA (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003), vendar so poskusi
spodbujanja lastni{kega financiranja prisotni povsod v razvitej{ih in tudi
tranzicijskih gospodarstvih (Gompers & Lerner, 2002). êprav Evropa
glede lastni{kega financiranja {e zelo zaostaja za ZDA (Romain and Van
Pottelsberghe, 2003), prav v razvoju lastni{kega financiranja mnogi avtorji
vidijo prebujenje podjetni{ke Evrope (Cosh & Hughes, 2003). Seveda je
tvegani kapital primeren samo za natan~no dolo~en in relativno ozek
segment podjetij, ki so se s svojo inovativno podmeno odlo~ila za hitro
rast (Hermann et al., 2004; Mayer et al., 2001). V Sloveniji za~etki tveganega kapitala segajo v sredino devetdesetih let prej{njega stoletja (Glas
et al., 2002), vendar pravega razvoja doslej ni bilo, kar je pripisati predvsem majhnosti trga in posledi~no nizki likvidnosti kapitalskih trgov
(Wright et al., 2005).
4. Metodologija
Metodologija {tudije sestoji iz treh delov: (1) deskriptivne analize
sekundarnih virov, (2) kvalitativne analize primernih virov in (3) primerjave s podobnimi javnimi skladi tveganega kapitala v drugih deželah, ki so
se ravno tako ukvarjali z vpra{anji državnih pomo~i. Primarni podatki
so bili zbrani v dveh krogih (Vadnjal et al., 2006). Klju~na metodologija
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Jaka Vadnjal
zbiranja primarnih podatkov je bil pol-strukturirani intervju, h kateremu so
bile povabljene banke, zavarovalnice, družbe za upravljanje in tudi ve~ja
podjetja (Megginson, 2004). Intervjuvani so bili najvi{ji predstavniki teh
in{titucij, pristojni, da izražajo resni~ne namere dolo~ene družbe (Meyer,
2007). Pri tem se je kot omejitev pokazala nizka stopnja specializacije v
sektorju finan~nega posredni{tva (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003), kar se kaže v
tem, da mnogi igralci igrajo razli~ne vloge v finan~nih tokovih.
V raziskavi so sodelovale naslednje in{titucije (nekatera imena se
zaradi vpletenosti v razli~ne procese pojavljajo ve~ kot enkrat):
•
In{titucije, ki zagotavljajo sredstva (16): NLB, Abanka, Banka
Koper, Probanka, Po{tna banka, Hranilnica Lon, Banka Celje, Reifeissen Krekova banka, NKBM (kot banke), Zavarovalnica Triglav,
Adriatic Slovenica, Prva pokojninska družba (kot zavarovalnice),
Poteza, KD Holding, Aktiva invest; Individa (kot finan~ne družbe);
•
Korporacijski investitorji (14): Ilirija, Mura, ETI, Blues, EMO orodjarna, Alpina, Petrol, Danfoss Trata, AC Cosmos, Kovinoplastika
Lož, Brest, Litostroj; Krka, Gorenje;
•
Firme za upravljanje skladov (11): Horizone Venture Management,
Poteza, NLB Funds, Sivent, KD Holding, Ilirika, Taxgroup, Aktiva
Invest, Perspektiva, Individa, RSG sklad.
5. Klju~ne ugotovitve
Prvo raziskovalno vpra{anje se ukvarja z možnostjo, da se upravljalsko
družbo izbere z javnim razpisom. Med potencialnimi kandidati ni niti ena
upravljalska družba eksplicitno izrazila interesa za upravljanje z javnim
skladom tveganega kapitala. Velika ve~ina jih meni, da niso usposobljeni
za upravljanje takega sklada zaradi preve~ zahtevnih administrativnih postopkov v zvezi z državnimi pomo~mi in zahtevami strukturnih skladov.
Kljub temu se je ve~ina morebitnih upravljalskih družb strinjala z 2.5 %
upravljalsko provizijo, 20 % udeležbo na dobi~ku po kon~ani investiciji in
pri~akovanimi donosi 20 % na letni ravni.
Vpra{anje glede pri~akovanih donosov na investicijo je pokazalo, da je
med morebitnimi družbami za upravljanje le malo izku{enj in znanja, saj
jih velika ve~ina na vpra{anje sploh ni odgovorila. Zato so verjetno pri
izraženem mnenju o 20% pri~akovanih donosih sledili priporo~ilom EVCA.
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Jaka Vadnjal
Za soinvestiranje zasebnega sektorja v javni sklad prakti~no ni interesa. Med razlogi za tako prevladujo~e stali{~e najdemo visoko tveganje,
visoke stro{ke monitoringa in nadzora, zelo omejene možnosti financiranja zaradi omejenega geografskega prostora, relativno nizke upravljalske
provizije, malo izku{enj pri upravljanju tveganih investicij in željo po
samostojnem opravljanju skrbnih pregledov. Zaradi vsega na{tetega lahko trdimo, da na podro~ju upravljanja sklada tveganega kapitala obstaja
napaka trga, kar pomeni, da bo država morala nadaljevati z aktivnostmi
ustanavljanja in zagona lastne družbe za upravljanje.
6. Zaklju~ki in priporo~ila
V Sloveniji trenutno ni upravljalske družbe, ki bi bila spodobna upravljati javno financirani sklad tveganega kapitala ob upo{tevanju zahtev
sheme državne pomo~i in zahtev evropskih strukturnih skladov. Tržno
pogojeno nagrado za upravljanje sredstev bi lahko opredelili kot 2.5 % na
investirana sredstva, pri ~emer upravljalske družbe pri~akujejo tudi 20 %
udeležbo na dobi~ku. Pri~akovani donosi na investirana sredstva se v
pogojih tveganega financiranja gibljejo od 20 % letno navzgor. Od zasebnega sektorja ni bilo zaznati interesa za soinvestiranje v javni sklad tveganega kapitala. Koristno bi torej bilo, da država nadaljuje z zagonom lastne
družbe za upravljanje, ki bo po eni strani delovala skladno s tržnimi pogoji
in po drugi strani zagotavljala kompetence pri izvajanju zahtev strukturnih
skladov in državnih pomo~i. Zaradi majhnosti obsega raziskave ostaja
odprta tudi metodolo{ka dilema o ustreznosti raziskovanja neraziskanega
(Da Rin et al., 2006), kar lahko komentiramo tudi s tem, da tudi bolj sofisticirane metode, kot jih uporabljamo v {tudiji, ne bi odpravile dvoma v
zanesljivost rezultatov in ugotovitev.
102
Strokovni ~lanek
Model presoje poslovne
uspe{nosti in izkori{~enosti
zmogljivosti v bolni{nicah
UDK: 005.336.1:614.21(045)
Petra Do{enovi~ Bon~a
Ekonomska fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani
petra.d.bonca@ef.uni-lj.si
Maks Tajnikar
Ekonomska fakulteta Univerze v Ljubljani
maks.tajnikar@ef.uni-lj.si
IZVLEÊK
Pri presoji poslovne uspe{nosti bolni{nic obi~ajno uporabljamo nabor kazalnikov in kazalcev, ki bodisi v obliki odnosov med kategorijami bodisi v obliki
absolutnih vrednosti izražajo poslovno uspe{nost. Tak{ne kazalnike in kazalce
poslovne uspe{nosti zelo pogosto dopolnjujemo s kazalniki u~inkovitosti, ki odražajo zlasti vidik izkori{~enosti ~love{kih in materialnih zmogljivosti in s tem vsaj
delno pojasnjujejo kazalnike poslovne uspe{nosti. V tej razpravi prikazujemo, da
je analiza poslovne uspe{nosti bolni{nic na podlagi standardnih kazalnikov in
kazalcev pomanjkljiva, in pojasnimo, da lahko presojo poslovne uspe{nosti in
u~inkovitosti v bolni{nicah izbolj{amo z uporabo procesnega modela.
Klju~ne besede: bolni{nica, presoja poslovne uspe{nosti, procesni model.
JEL : I19
1. Uvod
Pri analizi poslovne uspe{nosti bolni{nic obi~ajno uporabljamo nabor kazalnikov in kazalcev, ki bodisi v obliki odnosov med kategorijami bodisi v obliki
absolutnih vrednosti izražajo poslovno uspe{nost. Kazalnike poslovne
uspe{nosti zelo pogosto kombiniramo s kazalniki u~inkovitosti, saj domnevamo, da u~inkovitost vpliva na poslovno uspe{nost. Glede na to, da so cene
storitev v na{ih bolni{nicah dolo~ene administrativno in je v veliki meri dan tudi
103
Model presoje poslovne uspe{nosti in izkori{~enosti
obseg delovanja posameznih bolni{nic, je v resnici u~inkovitost klju~na za oblikovanje stro{kov in s tem tudi za poslovno uspe{nost. Vendar je uporaba
tak{nih kazalnikov in kazalcev sporna in pogosto ne daje resni~nega vpogleda v
poslovno uspe{nost bolni{nic, zlasti pa ne omogo~a pojasnjevanja razlogov za
dolo~eno poslovno uspe{nost in ne daje podlag za sprejemanje ustreznih
poslovnih potez za pove~anje poslovne uspe{nosti. Zato v tej razpravi prikazujemo, kako lahko analizo poslovne uspe{nosti v bolni{nicah izbolj{amo z uporabo procesnega modela in izra~unov izkori{~enosti zmogljivosti znotraj
posamezne bolni{nice.
2. Pomanjkljivosti standardnih kazalnikov in
kazalcev v analizi poslovne uspe{nosti bolni{nic
Relativne odnose med dolo~enimi kategorijami poslovanja obi~ajno imenujemo kazalniki, absolutne vrednosti kategorij pa kazalci. V zdravstvu lahko opredelimo obsežen nabor kazalnikov in kazalcev, s katerimi prikazujemo
u~inkovitost, tehni~ne in tehnolo{ke zna~ilnosti postopkov zdravljenja in
opreme, uspe{nost zdravljenja in uspe{nost poslovanja. Poslovna poro~ila
slovenskih bolni{nic naj bi obsegala sistematiziran spisek kazalnikov in kazalcev
njihove poslovne uspe{nosti in u~inkovitosti.
2.1 Standardni kazalniki in kazalci poslovne
uspe{nosti in u~inkovitosti bolni{nic
V bolni{nicah uspe{nost in u~inkovitost poslovanja ocenjujejo s pomo~jo
treh skupin kazalnikov in kazalcev. Prvo skupino v bolni{nicah imenujejo kazalniki poslovne u~inkovitosti, drugo kazalniki kakovosti in tretjo kazalniki klini~nih
poti. Kazalnike poslovne u~inkovitosti spremljajo vse bolni{nice po predpisani
enotni metodologiji, ki je opredeljena v 27. ~lenu in Prilogi IX Podro~nega
dogovora za bolni{nice za pogodbeno leto 2008 (2008a).
Kazalniki poslovne u~inkovitosti bolni{nic so izra~unani na podlagi kazalcev
o realiziranem fizi~nem obsegu dela bolni{nic po posameznih dejavnostih, na
podlagi podatkov o {tevilu zaposlenih po posameznih kvalifikacijskih profilih, na
podlagi podatkov o obsegu razpoložljivih materialnih zmogljivosti ter na podlagi
podatkov o prihodkih, ustvarjenih s pla~ili za opravljene storitve s strani zunanjih pla~nikov (Zavod za zdravstveno zavarovanje Slovenije, druge zavarovalnice,
104
bolniki s pla~ili iz žepa), in stro{kih za izvajanje dejavnosti posameznih enot
bolni{nice.
Kazalniki poslovne u~inkovitosti vklju~ujejo izbrane finan~ne kazalnike (na
primer kazalnik celotne gospodarnosti, delež amortizacije v celotnem prihodku,
delež porabljenih amortizacijskih sredstev, stopnja odpisanosti opreme, dnevi
vezave zalog materiala in koeficient pla~ilne sposobnosti), kazalnike spremljanja
u~inkovitosti izrabe ~love{kih in materialnih zmogljivosti ter nekatere druge
kazalnike (na primer delež stro{kov za informacijsko tehnologijo v celotnih prihodkih, delež stro{kov za izobraževanje v odhodkih in delež stro{kov energije v
celotnih prihodkih).
V okviru kazalnikov in kazalcev spremljanja u~inkovitosti izrabe ~love{kih
zmogljivosti bolni{nice spremljajo za posamezne dejavnosti {tevilo bolnikov in
obseg zdravstvenih storitev na zdravnika, na medicinsko sestro in na druge
~lane negovalnega osebja. Izkori{~enost materialnih zmogljivosti pa bolni{nice
lo~eno opazujejo za razpoložljivo opremo in razpoložljive prostore. Bolni{nice
tako spremljajo izkori{~enost dolo~enih aparatur (na primer RTG aparati,
ra~unalni{ka tomografija in magnetna resonanca), pri ~emer lo~eno spremljajo
uporabo aparatov za hospitalne in ambulantne bolnike, izkori{~enost operacijskih
dvoran in izkori{~enost intenzivnih enot. Izkori{~enost materialnih zmogljivosti
v obliki prostorov pa za posamezne dejavnosti spremljajo z vidika deleža prostorov, ki se uporabljajo za opravljanje dejavnosti, v celotnem razpoložljivem
prostoru posamezne dejavnosti ter z vidika njihove izkori{~enosti.
2.2 Omejitve standardnih kazalnikov in kazalcev
Vendar nabor kazalnikov in kazalcev, ki smo jih prikazali v poglavju 1.1, ni
uporaben sam po sebi, saj njihova vi{ina in velikost za dolo~eno obdobje ali v
dolo~enem trenutku omogo~a le malo analiti~nih sklepov. Take sklepe lahko
naredimo {ele tedaj, ko posamezne kazalnike in kazalce primerjamo med sabo.
Primerjamo jih lahko v ~asu in na tej podlagi sklepamo, ali se razmere izbolj{ujejo ali slab{ajo, primerjamo pa jih lahko tudi med bolni{nicami. Za take
primerjave moramo imeti podatke o drugih bolni{nicah, {e bolj{e pa je, ~e
imamo izbrano bolni{nico, ki lahko igra vlogo zgleda. Pa tudi ~e razpolagamo z
informacijami o vrednosti kazalcev in kazalnikov za ve~ obdobij in ve~ bolni{nic,
je osnovni problem ta, da poslovodstvo bolni{nic težko spremlja veliko {tevilo
razli~nih kazalnikov in kazalcev, obstaja pa tudi ve~ja verjetnost neustrezne
interpretacije njihove medsebojne povezanosti. Tako se za primerjavo med
105
enotami dolo~ene bolni{nice in med bolni{nicami uporabljajo druga~ne metode
primerjalne analize (na primer Ozcan, 2008, str. 3-13 ter Hollingsworth in Peacock, 2008, str. 28-42).
Da bi lahko s takimi primerjavami izvedli analiti~ne sklepe, ki bi izkazovali
resni~ne razmere, in zlasti da bi lahko na podlagi teh sklepov potegnili poslovne
poteze, ki bi pove~ale poslovno uspe{nost, moramo poznati medsebojno odvisnost posameznih kazalnikov in kazalcev. Pri tem pa naletimo na problem
heterogenosti poslovnih procesov med razli~nimi bolni{nicami in celo znotraj
njih, torej na primer med oddelki, klinikami ali enotami. Pove~anje dolo~enega
kazalnika v dolo~eni bolni{nico lahko vodi do izbolj{anja poslovne uspe{nosti, v
drugi pa jo znižuje. Absolutna raven nekega kazalnika ali kazalca v razli~nih
bolni{nicah, enotah ali oddelkih razli~no vpliva na poslovno uspe{nost. V praksi
vedno kaže dolo~en kazalnik ali kazalec pri medsebojnih primerjavah razlike v
u~inkovitosti in uspe{nosti poslovanja pa tudi razlike, ki izhajajo iz heterogenosti poslovnih procesov.
Ker na poslovno uspe{nost v bolni{nicah vpliva tudi pla~ilni sistem z vi{ino
cen za zdravstvene storitve in z obsegom podeljene dejavnosti znotraj zdravstvene mreže, ve~ina kazalcev in kazalnikov poslovne uspe{nosti ni ustrezna le
zaradi navedenih težav pri njihovi uporabi, pa~ pa je neuporabna tudi zaradi
vpliva pla~ilnega sistema na njihove denarne vrednosti. Upo{tevati je treba
zlasti spodbude, ki jih ustvarja pla~ilni sistem, oziroma vplive pla~ilnega sistema
na obna{anje in odlo~itve izvajalcev zdravstvenih storitev (Kornai, Eggleston,
2001, str. 84-85; Phelps, 2002, str. 376-429). Najpomembnej{i kazalniki
poslovne uspe{nosti so tako v neki bolni{nici odvisni od cen storitev, obsega
podeljene dejavnosti, pla~ilnega sistema, razpoložljive tehnologije in izbranih
tehnik ter od stro{kovne in tehni~ne u~inkovitosti. Zavedati se moramo, da je le
doseganje tehni~ne in stro{kovne u~inkovitosti v resnici v rokah poslovodstev v
bolni{nicah. Kazalniki uspe{nosti naj bi namre~ vklju~evali zgolj kategorije, ki so
pod vplivom vodstva, nediskrecijskih dejavnikov pa ne, saj v tem primeru dobimo neustrezno sliko poslovne uspe{nosti in u~inkovitosti v primerjavah med
razli~nimi bolni{nicami.
Da bi se izognili ve~ini omenjenih težav pri analizi poslovanja bolni{nic in
da bi znali razlikovati med razli~nimi dejavniki, ki vplivajo na poslovno uspe{nost
bolni{nic, si lahko pomagamo z analizo izkori{~enosti zmogljivosti in poslovne
uspe{nosti, ki temelji na uporabi prilagojenega procesnega modela bolni{nice.
Analiza poslovne uspe{nosti bolni{nic mora torej izhajati iz poteka poslovnih
procesov bolni{nice. Pomembno vlogo pri doseganju ve~je u~inkovitosti in
106
uspe{nosti so izbolj{avam pri izvajanju procesov pripisovali že za~etniki zgodnej{ih teorij o menedžmentu (npr. Taylorjev znanstveni menedžment), z razvojem sistemske teorije in s prispevki sodobnih teoretikov pa je postalo jasno, da
do maksimizacije u~inkovitosti posameznih oddelkov in funkcij v organizaciji
lahko pride tudi na ra~un u~inkovitosti in uspe{nosti organizacije kot celote.
Prav te vidike namre~ izpostavljajo sistemska teorija, ki organizacijo obravnava
kot kompleksen sistem, sestavljen iz medsebojno in z okoljem povezanih delov
z dolo~enimi lastnostmi, in prispevki sodobnih teoretikov, zlasti s formalizacijo
ideje o verigi vrednosti, ki presega meje oddelkov ali funkcij podjetja ali organizacije, kar je pomembno prispevalo k razvoju procesnega pogleda na organizacije (Harmon, 2007). Analizo izkori{~enosti zmogljivosti in poslovne
uspe{nosti, ki temelji na uporabi procesnega modela bolni{nice, lahko izvedemo v vsaki bolni{nici posebej, zanjo ni nujno, da imamo na voljo primerjalne
podatke iz drugih bolni{nic, posebej pomembno pa je, da omogo~a izoblikovanje
dolo~enih predlogov za prenovo procesov, ki bi pripeljali do ve~je u~inkovitosti
in uspe{nosti poslovanja v bolni{nici.
3. Procesni model in presoja poslovne uspe{nosti
in izkori{~enosti zmogljivosti v bolni{nicah
Procesni model, ki ga lahko uporabimo za analizo poslovne uspe{nosti,
mora slediti toku bolnikov, ko ti vstopajo v bolni{nico, prehajajo iz ene dejavnosti oziroma enote bolni{nice v drugo znotraj bolni{nice in izstopajo iz
bolni{nice. Pri tem zaposlujejo zmogljivosti iz razli~nih klinik, oddelkov in enot
znotraj in tudi zunaj bolni{nice, v kolikor bolni{nica za dolo~ene storitve napoti
bolnike k drugim zdravstvenim organizacijam, obremenjujejo razli~ne ~love{ke
in materialne zmogljivosti v bolni{nici, povzro~ajo stro{ke in ustvarjajo pravice
bolni{nice v okviru pla~ilnega sistema do prihodkov bolni{nice. Tokove bolnikov
med oddelki in enotami bolni{nice opredeljujejo procesi zdravstvene obravnave
bolnika. Ti procesi neposredno prispevajo k ustvarjanju vrednosti bolni{nic oziroma k doseganju ustreznega izida zdravstvene oskrbe, zato jih imenujemo tudi
temeljni poslovni procesi (Ould, 1995; Harmon, 2007; Lenz in Reichert, 2007).
Stro{ki pa v procesu zdravstvene obravnave nastajajo tudi zaradi podpornih
poslovnih procesov, zato je treba pri analizi poslovne uspe{nosti temeljnih
procesov upo{tevati tudi stro{ke, ki jih povzro~ajo podporni procesi.
107
3.1 Dva koraka pri presoji poslovne uspe{nosti in
izkori{~enosti zmogljivosti
Analiza poslovne uspe{nosti, ki upo{teva temeljne procese oziroma
tokove bolnikov v bolni{nici, obsega v grobem dve fazi. V prvi fazi oblikujemo
procesno sliko bolni{nice, ki kaže tokove bolnikov znotraj bolni{nice med
posameznimi oddelki in enotami, pa tudi tokove bolnikov med bolni{nico in
drugimi zdravstvenimi organizacijami. Cilj te faze ni le opredeliti procese in
njihovo medsebojno odvisnost, pa~ pa tudi kvantificirati aktivnosti, ki te~ejo
znotraj teh procesov. Na tej podlagi dobimo v drugi fazi dva bistvena rezultata
za analizo poslovanja. Prvi rezultat se navezuje na ugotovitev o izkori{~anju
~love{kih in materialnih zmogljivosti v posameznih procesih in dejavnostih,
drugi rezultat pa se nana{a na ugotovitev o uspe{nosti poslovanja po posameznih
procesih, in sicer z vidika organizacijskih enot, ki sodelujejo v teh procesih. Oba
rezultata sta lahko podlaga za preoblikovanje procesov, ki privede do ve~je
u~inkovitosti, pa tudi do znižanja stro{kov v bolni{nici. Zlasti analiza izkori{~enosti ~love{kih in materialnih zmogljivosti omogo~a tudi organizacijske
spremembe, ki vodijo do bolj izglajenega toka bolnikov skozi procese. Tak{na
analiza uspe{nosti poslovanja daje tudi odgovor na vpra{anje, v kolik{ni meri so
procesi, skozi katere te~e tok bolnikov, obremenjeni s stro{ki podpornih služb,
saj je opredelitev temeljnih procesov povezana tudi z opredelitvijo njihovih
podpornih procesov. Poleg tega pa primerjava tako opredeljene poslovne
uspe{nosti dolo~ene enote z izkori{~enostjo ~love{kih in materialnih
zmogljivosti te enote kaže tudi, v kolik{ni meri lahko vodstvo vpliva na poslovno
uspe{nost. ê dolo~ena enota kljub polni izkori{~enosti zmogljivosti in ustreznemu
izvajanju svojih temeljnih poslovnih procesov dosega nizko poslovno uspe{nost,
lahko ugotovimo, da je nizka poslovna uspe{nost posledica na primer neustreznega pla~ilnega sistema za opravljanje dejavnosti; to pa je nediskrecijski dejavnik, ki vpliva na uspe{nost opazovane enote, ~esar pri primerjavah poslovne
uspe{nosti tak{ne enote z drugimi enotami ne smemo zanemariti.
3.2 Procesni model
Pri oblikovanju procesnega modela bolni{nice je smiselno domnevati, da
so procesi povezani s tokovi bolnikov, tak{ni procesi zdravstvene obravnave pa
zahtevajo, da se bolniki gibljejo med posameznimi oddelki in enotami.
Posamezne bolni{nice so namre~ organizacijsko razdeljene na oddelke, ki izvajajo razli~ne zdravstvene dejavnosti. Klju~ni dejavnosti bolni{nic sta bolni{ni~na
108
dejavnost in specialisti~na ambulantna dejavnost. Posamezne oddelke
bolni{ni~ne in specialisti~ne ambulantne dejavnosti pa sestavlja ve~ enot, ki so
specializirane za izvajanje dolo~enih specialnosti zdravstvenih dejavnosti, torej
za dolo~en nabor zdravstvenih storitev. Da bi lahko oblikovali dovolj natan~en
procesni model oziroma dovolj natan~no strukturo procesov zdravstvene
obravnave, je smiselno opazovati tokove bolnikov med enotami na ~im nižji
ravni opazovanja. Natan~no zajemanje poteka procesov v bolni{nicah z namenom ugotavljanja uspe{nosti in u~inkovitosti je nujno zato, ker so tokovi
bolnikov oziroma procesi zdravstvene obravnave kompleksni, pri njihovi izvedbi
pa sodeluje veliko ljudi z razli~nih podro~ij in specialnosti. Poleg tega velja, da
tudi znotraj posameznih izvajalcev ti procesi niso omejeni na posamezne oddelke ali poslovne funkcije. Ti procesi se pogosto spreminjajo zaradi
tehnolo{kega napredka, razvoja novih metod zdravstvene obravnave ali novih
postopkov, ki so povezani z obravnavo posameznega bolnika. Ve~ine aktivnosti
posameznih procesov zdravstvene obravnave ne moremo v celoti avtomatizirati, {tevilne aktivnosti pa niso primerne niti za delno avtomatizacijo in je
njihovo izvajanje v celoti vezano na zdravstveno in drugo osebje. Med procesi
zdravstvene obravnave in znotraj njih poteka prenos velikega obsega in velikega {tevila razli~nih informacij, kakovost in obseg sodelovanja in usklajevanja
dela med osebjem in med osebjem in opremo, tako medicinsko opremo kot
sistemi za podporo odlo~anju, pa sta klju~na pri zagotavljanju kakovostne
zdravstvene oskrbe bolnikov ter pri obvladovanju stro{kov zdravstvene oskrbe
(Poulymenopoulou, Malamateniou in Vassilacopoulos, 2003; Anyanwu et al.,
2003).
Glede na to, da moramo procese opazovati z vidika toka bolnikov, so
posamezne enote bodisi za~etna bodisi kon~na to~ka teh procesov, v velikem
{tevilu primerov pa le mesto, na katero vstopa bolnik, a je zunaj med za~etno in
kon~no to~ko nekega procesa. V teh primerih bolnik za~asno izstopi iz
procesne poti in se ~ez ~as vrne na osnovno procesno pot. Pri tem je osnovni
tok bolnikov vezan na vstop bolnikov iz okolja v bolni{nico in izstop bolnikov iz
bolni{nice v okolje. Vstop bolnikov v bolni{nico lahko nastane na podlagi napotitve osebnega zdravnika, na podlagi napotitve drugih izvajalcev zdravstvenega
varstva pa tudi brez napotitve. êprav bi lahko v procesnem modelu bolni{nice
domnevali, da bolniki na~eloma vstopajo v bolni{nico skozi enote specialisti~ne
ambulantne dejavnosti (ambulante), so lahko take vstopne to~ke v procesnem
modelu tako ambulante kot enote bolni{ni~ne dejavnosti (bolni{ni~ne enote).
êprav bi lahko domnevali, da je osnovna to~ka izstopov bolnikov iz bolni{nice
109
enota, v kateri bolnik vstopi v bolni{nico, v procesnem modelu bolni{nice ni
smiselno omejiti izstopa bolnikov iz bolni{nice na vstopno to~ko.
Ker procesni model bolni{nice oblikujemo na podlagi tokov bolnikov in ker
ga uporabljamo z namenom ugotavljanja poslovne uspe{nosti, je smiselno v
procesnem modelu opazovati zgolj enote, ki sodelujejo pri zdravstveni obravnavi bolnikov in tako tudi ustvarjajo prihodke bolni{nice. S pomo~jo procesnega
modela tako ni smiselno opazovati uspe{nosti enot, ki izvajajo nezdravstvene
dejavnosti. Tak{ne enote izvajajo podporne procese temeljnih zdravstvenih
procesov, zato jih je treba ustrezno povezati s temeljnimi procesi. V bolni{nicah
lahko nezdravstvene dejavnosti razdelimo v dve skupini. V prvo sodi zdravstvena administracija, v drugo pa ostale podporne dejavnosti (npr.
ra~unovodstvo, vzdrževanje in ~i{~enje). Ti dve skupini moramo v procesnem
modelu obravnavati razli~no. Dejavnost zdravstvene administracije je namre~
neposredno povezana z zdravstvenimi dejavnostmi posameznih enot, zato je
treba zmogljivosti in stro{ke zdravstvene administracije opazovati v okviru
posameznih enot, ki opravljajo zdravstvene dejavnosti. Druge nezdravstvene
dejavnosti pa ne vstopajo v oblikovanje procesov, znotraj katerih se gibajo bolniki, zato jih ni smiselno upo{tevati pri ugotavljanju izkori{~anja ~love{kih in
materialnih zmogljivosti v bolni{nici. Treba pa je upo{tevati stro{ke, ki nastajajo
zaradi izvajanja tak{nih podpornih dejavnosti, in jih mora bolni{nica pokrivati z
ustvarjanjem dolo~enega presežka prihodkov nad odhodki posameznih enot, ki
izvajajo zdravstvene dejavnosti.
3.3 Elementi procesnega modela
Sestavni deli modela bolni{nice, ki jih prikazuje Slika 1, so:
1. enote, ki sestavljajo organizacijsko strukturo bolni{nice;
2. vstop bolnikov v posamezno opazovano enoto od zunaj, torej
vstop iz okolja bolni{nice;
3. vstop bolnikov v posamezno opazovano enoto iz drugih enot
bolni{nice, ki lahko nastanejo bodisi zaradi napotitve bolnika v
opazovano enoto na pregled ali napotitve bolnika v opazovano
enoto na nadaljnjo obravnavo;
4. razpoložljivi inputi v obliki tako ~love{kih kot materialnih
zmogljivosti, ki jih zaposluje opazovana enota, ki izvaja zdravstveno obravnavo oziroma zdravstvene storitve;
110
5. tehni~ni koli~niki za posamezno opazovano enoto v obliki normativov uporabe tako ~love{kih kot materialnih zmogljivosti, ki
omogo~ajo izra~un potrebnih inputov glede na enega bolnika, za
katerega opazovana enota izvaja zdravstveno obravnavo oziroma
zdravstvene storitve.
3.3.1
Matrika napotitev na pregled in matrika napotitev na
nadaljnjo obravnavo
ê opazujemo obremenjenost posamezne enote znotraj bolni{nice z bolniki, obseg te obremenjenosti ne dolo~a zgolj vstop bolnikov od zunaj v
bolni{nico, pa~ pa obseg obremenjenosti dolo~ajo tudi tokovi, ki se
vzpostavljajo med enotami znotraj bolni{nice. Posamezna enota je torej lahko
obremenjena z bolniki, ki vstopajo od zunaj v bolni{nico, z bolniki, ki prihajajo iz
druge enote v to enoto na pregled, in z bolniki, ki so napoteni iz druge enote,
ker so tam zaklju~ili zdravljenje in nadaljujejo obravnavo v tej enoti. S posnetkom kvantitativnih vidikov teh premikov bolnikov lahko oblikujemo dve matriki
procesov, ki kažeta tok bolnikov med posameznimi enotami v bolni{nici.
Prva matrika kaže tokove bolnikov v primeru, ko bolniki odhajajo iz
dolo~ene enote v drugo enoto na pregled in s tem obremenijo po obsegu dela
tak{no drugo enoto. Da bi lahko oblikovali tak{no matriko, moramo torej za
vsako enoto v bolni{nici ugotoviti, v katere druge enote ta enota napoti svoje
bolnike, opredeliti pa je treba tudi {tevilo tak{nih bolnikov. Poleg tega pa je za
ustrezno ugotavljanje poslovne uspe{nosti tak{ne enote treba ugotoviti tudi,
koliko bolnikov ta enota napoti na pregled k drugim zdravstvenim organizacijam, saj ima bolni{nica zaradi tak{nih napotitev stro{ke.
Druga matrika pa kaže kvantitativne vidike procesov, ki nastajajo z nadaljnjo
obravnavo bolnikov znotraj bolni{nice. Tudi v tem primeru je treba upo{tevati,
da lahko bolnik zaklju~i obravnavo znotraj katerekoli enote bolni{nice in nadaljuje
obravnavo v katerikoli drugi enoti bolni{nice. Pri matriki napotitev na nadaljnjo
obravnavo lahko upo{tevamo tudi, da lahko bolniki nadaljujejo obravnavo pri
drugih zdravstvenih organizacijah. Ker pa tak{ni bolniki ne obremenjujejo niti
~love{kih in materialnih zmogljivosti bolni{nice niti ne povzro~ajo stro{kov tej
bolni{nici, jih ni treba upo{tevati pri kvantifikaciji procesnega modela
bolni{nice, ki ga uporabljamo za oceno izkori{~enosti ~love{kih in materialnih
zmogljivosti ter poslovne uspe{nosti njenih enot.
111
Slika 1: Model bolni{nice
Enota 1
Enota 2
Enota 3
…
Enota X
Izstop bolnikov
ZMOGLJIVOSTI: ~love{ke in materialne
NORMATIV DELA PO BOLNIKU:
- osebje: zdravniki, medicinske sestre, zdravstveni
delavci in nezdravstveni delavci (zdravstvena
administracija)
- 4 najdražji aparati ali deli opreme
Izkori{~enost
zmogljivosti
CELOTNO [TEVILO BOLNIKOV
Z AÊTNO
Enota 2
Enota 3
…
Enota X
napotitve
v enoto 2
Enota 2
Enota 1
napotitve
v enoto 1
Enota 1
napotitve
iz
enote 2
napotitve
iz
enote 3
…
napotit ve
iz
enote X
Enota 1
Enota 2
Enota 3
…
Enota X
napotitve iz enote v enoto na nadaljnjo
obravnavo (zaklju~ek obravnave v za~etni enoti)
Enota X
napotitve
v enoto X
…
…
Enota 2
Enota 1
napotitve
v enoto 1
napotitve
iz
enote 1
napotitve
iz
enote 1
112
napotitve
iz
enote 2
napotitve
iz
enote 3
…
napotitve
iz
enote X
Vstop bolnikov od znotraj
Enota X
napotitve
v enoto X
…
…
napotitve iz enote v enoto na pregled
(za~asne napotitve v druge enote)
napotitve
v enoto 2
Uspe{nost
poslovanja
enot
Vstop bolnikov
od zunaj
ŠTEVILO BOLNIKOV
3.3.2
Kvantifikacija toka bolnikov
Bolni{nice podatkov o tokovih bolnikov med enotami, ki nastajajo bodisi
zaradi napotitev na pregled bodisi zaradi napotitev v nadaljnjo obravnavo, ne
poro~ajo v svojih letnih poro~ilih, prav tako pa jih v tak{ni obliki ne zahtevajo
pla~niki zdravstvenih storitev. Tako je mogo~e matriko napotitev na pregled in
matriko napotitev na nadaljnjo obravnavo oblikovati zgolj na podlagi internih
podatkov bolni{nic in razgovorov z zaposlenimi v posameznih enotah
bolni{nice.
Pri ugotavljanju celotnega {tevila bolnikov, ki obremenjujejo posamezno
enoto in vstopajo vanjo bodisi od zunaj bodisi iz drugih enot zaradi napotitev na
pregled ali na nadaljnjo obravnavo, pa ne moremo vseh enot bolni{nic obravnavati ne enak na~in, saj bolni{nice ne poro~ajo podatkov o bolnikih in
opravljenih storitvah na enak na~in za vse dejavnosti in posledi~no enote, ki te
dejavnosti izvajajo.
Glede na razpoložljivost podatkov o tokovih bolnikov lahko posamezne
enote razporedimo v pet skupin glede na to, ali se na ravni enote pojavlja izvirno financiran prihodek, ki nastane z zara~unavanjem storitev pla~niku zunaj
bolni{nice (prihodek je na primer za specialisti~ne ambulantne dejavnosti opredeljen s ceno in {tevilom to~k, za bolni{ni~ne dejavnosti pa s ceno in {tevilom
uteži za posamezno skupino primerljivih primerov), in glede na zajemanje {tevila bolnikov, ki kon~ajo obravnavo v posamezni enoti ({tevilo zaklju~enih
obravnav). Razpoložljivost podatkov o tokovih bolnikov je odvisna od mehanizmov pla~evanja zdravstvenih storitev, ki so uveljavljeni v Sloveniji. Za leto 2008
na primer so ti mehanizmi in na~ini spremljanja podatkov o {tevilu bolnikov in
opravljenih storitvah opredeljeni v Splo{nem dogovoru za pogodbeno leto 2008
(2008b), v Podro~nem dogovoru za bolni{nice za pogodbeno leto 2008 (2008c)
in v Navodilu o beleženju in obra~unavanju zdravstvenih storitev (2009).
V prvo skupino lahko uvrstimo enote, pri katerih ne moremo ugotoviti niti
prihodka niti {tevila zaklju~enih obravnav (na primer laboratorij). Zanje je
zna~ilno, da vanje ne vstopajo bolniki od zunaj, obravnave bolnikov znotraj
tak{nih enot pa nastajajo z napotitvijo bolnikov iz drugih enot bolni{nice, in
sicer tako iz ambulant kot iz bolni{ni~nih enot.
Za drugo skupino enot je zna~ilno, da pri njih nastaja prihodek, ~eprav v
bolni{nici ne ugotavljajo {tevila zaklju~enih obravnav (na primer fizioterapija za
potrebe ambulant). Prihodek v teh primerih nastaja s financiranjem obravnav
bolnikov, ki prihajajo v tak{no enoto iz ambulant bodisi na pregled bodisi na
nadaljnjo obravnavo. Za obravnavo bolnikov, ki so napoteni iz bolni{ni~nih enot,
113
pa tak{ne enote ne dobijo pla~ila od zunanjega pla~nika, saj je celotna obravnava tak{nih bolnikov financirana v okviru sistema pla~ila skupin primerljivih
primerov. Za enote druge skupine je zna~ilno tudi, da vanje ne vstopajo bolniki
od zunaj, saj bi bili sicer zabeleženi v okviru {tevila zaklju~enih obravnav.
Za tretjo skupino enot je zna~ilno, da pri njih ni mogo~e ugotoviti prihodka,
obstaja pa {tevilo zaklju~enih obravnav znotraj enote. V tem primeru {tevilo
zaklju~enih obravnav obsega tako zaklju~ene obravnave bolnikov, ki prihajajo od
zunaj, s ~imer ustvarja enota tržni prihodek, kot bolnike, ki prihajajo v enoto iz
te skupine iz ambulant na pregled. Ne zajema pa bolnikov, ki prihajajo iz
bolni{ni~nih enot na pregled v tak{no enoto, saj so ti zajeti že v okviru financiranja skupin primerljivih primerov, niti bolnikov, ki prihajajo iz ambulant in
bolni{ni~nih enot na nadaljnjo obravnavo, saj domnevamo, da v tak{nih enotah
ne te~e nadaljnja obravnava.
V ~etrti skupini, ki zajema bolni{ni~ne enote, za katere je zna~ilno, da lahko
ugotovimo tako prihodek kot {tevilo zaklju~enih obravnav ({tevilo odpu{~enih
bolnikov) na ravni enote, pa {tevilo zaklju~enih obravnav obsega poleg bolnikov,
ki vstopajo v bolni{nico od zunaj, tudi bolnike, ki vstopajo iz ambulant na nadaljnjo
obravnavo. V primerih, ko vstopajo v tak{no bolni{ni~no enoto na nadaljnjo
obravnavo bolniki iz ambulant znotraj bolni{nice, se namre~ v obravnavani
bolni{ni~ni enoti odpirajo novi primeri iz skupin primerljivih primerov. Tok bolnikov iz ambulant zgolj na pregled v bolni{ni~no enoto pa znotraj bolni{nice
zaradi narave bolni{ni~nih enot ne nastaja in zato tudi ni vklju~en v {tevilo zaklju~enih obravnav znotraj bolni{ni~nih enot. Vstop bolnikov v dolo~eno enoto
bolni{ni~ne dejavnosti iz drugih enot bolni{ni~ne dejavnosti na pregled (na
primer konziliarni pregledi) pa tudi ni zajet v {tevilu zaklju~enih obravnav, saj
mora bolni{nica stro{ek tak{nih storitev kriti s pla~ili za skupine primerljivih
primerov tistih enot, ki so napotile bolnika na pregled.
Za peto skupino enot, ki zajema ambulante, v kateri bolni{nica izkazuje
tako prihodek kot {tevilo zaklju~enih obravnav ({tevilo obiskov) znotraj enote, je
zna~ilno, da {tevilo zaklju~enih obravnav obsega poleg bolnikov, ki vstopajo v
enoto od zunaj, tudi bolnike, ki so napoteni iz drugih ambulant v analizirano
ambulanto zaradi pregleda ali nadaljnje obravnave, pa tudi bolnike, ki vstopajo iz
bolni{ni~nih enot v nadaljnjo obravnavo v analizirano ambulanto. Ne zajema pa
bolnikov, ki prihajajo iz bolni{ni~nih enot v posamezno ambulanto zgolj na pregled, saj so ti bolniki pla~ani v okviru sistema financiranja skupin primerljivih
primerov in niso posebej pla~ani v okviru dejavnosti analizirane ambulante.
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3.3.3
Celotno {tevilo bolnikov v dolo~eni enoti
Glede na opisano kompleksnost tokov bolnikov med enotami bolni{nice in
ugotavljanja {tevila bolnikov, ki jih obravnavajo v posamezni enoti, in glede na
cilj procesnega modela, moramo vpeljati v model klasifikacijo posameznih enot
v omenjenih pet skupin. Ker je {tevilo bolnikov, ki obremenjuje posamezno
enoto, se{tevek {tevila bolnikov, ki vstopajo od zunaj, in {tevila bolnikov, ki
vstopajo v enoto iz drugih enot na pregled ali nadaljnjo obravnavo, in ker v
bolni{nici ne spremljajo {tevila bolnikov, ki vstopajo od zunaj, pa~ pa {tevilo
zaklju~enih obravnav, moramo v modelu za vsako od petih skupin enot
izra~unati {tevilo bolnikov, ki vstopajo od zunaj iz {tevila zaklju~enih obravnav.
Tak{na korekcija je potrebna, saj z opredelitvijo procesov ugotovimo {tevilo
bolnikov, ki v enoto vstopa zaradi napotitve na pregled ali nadaljnjo obravnavo.
ê bi to {tevilo bolnikov zgolj pri{teli k {tevilu zaklju~enih obravnav, bi zaradi
dvojnega {tetja nekaterih skupin bolnikov v modelu izkazovali nerealne
obremenitve posameznih enot bolni{nice.
Z upo{tevanjem {tevila bolnikov, ki vstopajo v dolo~eno iz drugih enot
bolni{nice, in {tevila bolnikov, ki vstopajo od zunaj, kar smo izra~unali iz {tevila
zaklju~enih obravnav, lahko ugotovimo celotno {tevilo bolnikov, ki obremenjujejo posamezno enoto. To {tevilo kaže neto obremenitev posamezne enote z
bolniki, ki bodisi prihajajo v bolni{nico in enoto od zunaj in v enoto z napotitvami
znotraj bolni{nice na pregled ali v nadaljnjo obravnavo.
3.3.4
Normativi uporabe zmogljivosti dolo~ene
enote na bolnika
Za opredelitev povpra{evanja po ~love{kih in materialnih zmogljivostih v
bolni{nici je treba {tevilo bolnikov, ki izhaja iz njihovih tokov v bolni{nici,
spremeniti v povpra{evanje po posameznem tipu zmogljivosti. Za ta namen
opredelimo, koliko delovnih ur ali koliko strojnih ur potrebuje posamezni bolnik
v povpre~ju znotraj posamezne enote v delovnem procesu, v katerega je
vklju~en pri svojem zdravljenju. Zaradi tega je treba v procesni model
bolni{nice vklju~iti nabor normativov uporabe za vsak tip zmogljivosti in za
vsako enoto opazovanja v bolnikovem toku posebej. Normativi kažejo intenzivnost zaposlitve posameznega elementa zmogljivosti, pri ~emer je v primeru
bolni{nic smiselno, da upo{tevamo ~love{ke, prostorske in posteljne
zmogljivosti ter zmogljivost aparatov.
Zaposlenost ~love{kih zmogljivosti oziroma delovne sile lahko ugotavljamo
s ~asovnim obsegom dela, izmerjenega v urah, katerega posamezni kvalifikacijski
profil potro{i za obravnavo posameznega bolnika v celotnem ~asu, ki ga
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posamezni bolnik prebije v obravnavi znotraj posameznega oddelka. Pri velikosti prostorov oziroma povr{in, ki pripadajo posamezni enoti, moramo opredeliti potrebno velikost glede na zna~ilnosti dejavnosti, ki se v teh prostorih
izvajajo, in glede na {tevilo bolnikov, kar lahko za posamezno bolni{nico
ocenimo na podlagi preteklih podatkov, primerjave z drugimi bolni{nicami ali
glede na ekspertno mnenje. Pri ugotavljanju posteljnih zmogljivosti lahko izhajamo iz povpre~ne ležalne dobe, ki je zna~ilna za dolo~eno enoto bolni{nice. Pri
aparatih pa lahko izhajamo iz ~asovnih normativov, izraženih v urah, ki kažejo,
koliko ~asa posamezni bolnik v celotnem obdobju svoje obravnave znotraj ene
enote zaseda neki aparat.
Vsi navedeni normativi (normativi za delovno silo, prostor, posteljne
zmogljivosti in aparate) so v modelu konstantni in jih zato razumemo kot tehni~ne
normative.
4. Presoja izkori{~enosti zmogljivosti
Analiza izkori{~enosti ~love{kih in materialnih zmogljivosti je v bistvu
stranski proizvod na poti k analizi poslovne uspe{nosti bolni{nice. Ker pa je del
iste analize, seveda razkriva tudi pomembne dejavnike, ki vplivajo na njeno
poslovno uspe{nost. V bistvu je naturalni vidik poslovne uspe{nosti bolni{nice,
~eprav izkori{~enost zmogljivosti ne pomeni nujno tudi tehni~ne in stro{kovne
u~inkovitosti bolni{nice. Neka bolni{nica je namre~ lahko tehni~no
neu~inkovita, kar pomeni, da na enoto outputa uporablja prevelik obseg inputov
v primerjavi z u~inkovitimi bolni{nicami, a te inpute polno zaposluje. Za analizo
izkori{~enosti zmogljivosti po enotah bolni{nice potrebujemo povpra{evanje po
teh zmogljivostih, ki ga dobimo iz toka bolnikov in normativov uporabe
zmogljivosti na bolnika, in obseg zmogljivosti po enotah.
4.1 Potrebe po zmogljivostih v enotah
Pri delovni sili lahko povpra{evanje opredelimo na osnovi normativov, ki
kažejo obravnavo posameznega bolnika znotraj celotne obravnave v eni enoti v
urah, in {tevila bolnikov, ki jih obravnavajo v enem letu znotraj posamezne
enote. Glede na to, da smo pri normativih za delovno silo opredelili ~as, ki ga
posamezni zdravstveni delavec nameni obravnavi posameznega bolnika v
116
smislu dnevnega normativa, je treba pri izra~unavanju povpra{evanja po
~love{kih zmogljivostih znotraj posamezne enote upo{tevali tudi ležalno dobo
bolnikov v okviru enote. V primerih, ko statistika v bolni{nicah ne zajema teh
ležalnih dob (na primer za ambulante), pa je smiselno domnevati, da je dnevni
normativ ustrezen. Tak{no povpra{evanje je odvisno torej od {tevila bolnikov in
od normativov za obravnavo posameznega bolnika v ~asu, ki ga bolnik preživi
znotraj posamezne enote.
Tudi povpra{evanje po prostoru in po posteljah moramo opredeliti na osnovi {tevila bolnikov. Potreben prostor pa lahko dolo~imo z upo{tevanjem normativa potrebnega prostora na bolnika in {tevila bolnikov, ki vstopajo v
posamezno enoto. Povpra{evanje po posteljnih kapacitetah pa lahko opredelimo na podlagi {tevila bolnikov in povpre~ne ležalne dobe v posamezni enoti.
Tudi povpra{evanje po posameznih aparatih je povezano s {tevilom bolnikov, ki
vstopajo v posamezno enoto, z deležem teh bolnikov, ki so obravnavani s
pomo~jo posameznega aparata, in s ~asovnim normativom, izraženim v urah,
za obravnavo pacienta na tak{nem aparatu.
4.2 Razpoložljive zmogljivosti po enotah
Dejavnosti, ki se izvajajo v posameznih enotah, moramo opazovati tudi z
vidika zmogljivosti, ki jih posamezna enota uporablja pri izvajanju teh dejavnosti.
^love{ke zmogljivosti lahko opazujemo z vidika {tirih tipi~nih kvalifikacijskih
profilov, ki delujejo znotraj posamezne enote. Delovno silo bolni{nic lahko zajamemo v kategorijah zdravnikov, medicinskih sester, drugih zdravstvenih delavcev in nezdravstvenih delavcev. Pri vseh {tirih profilih je potrebno ugotoviti
{tevilo zaposlenih v posamezni kategoriji, pri tem pa zaradi medsebojne odvisnosti enot upo{tevati tudi dejstvo, da nekateri zaposleni delujejo v razli~nih
enotah.
Materialne zmogljivosti pa moramo opazovati z vidika povr{ine prostorov,
ki jih za svojo dejavnost uporablja posamezna enota, z vidika {tevila bolni{kih
postelj in {tevila razli~nih vrst aparatov, ki jih uporablja enota pri izvajanju svoje
dejavnosti. Glede na to, da v bolni{nicah uporabljajo veliko razli~nih aparatov in
opreme, se je z vidika ugotavljanja uspe{nosti smiselno omejiti zgolj na najdražje
tipe aparatov in tako omejiti nabor aparatov, za katere ugotavljamo stopnjo izkori{~enosti. Pri opredelitvi vrednosti aparatov je smiselno upo{tevati njihovo
nabavno vrednost in oblikovati klju~e za delitev stro{kov amortizacije ob predpostavki, da doba uporabe vseh klju~nih aparatov ne presega amortizacijske
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dobe. Na ta na~in se pri analizi poslovne uspe{nosti izognemo vplivu odpisanosti
aparatov in opreme na poslovni izid.
4.3 Ugotavljanje izkori{~enosti zmogljivosti enot
Odnos med ponudbo zmogljivosti in povpra{evanjem po zmogljivostih
kaže izkori{~enost ~love{kih in materialnih zmogljivosti znotraj posamezne
enote. Prednost uporabe procesnega modela pri ugotavljanju izkori{~enosti
zmogljivosti je opredelitev povpra{evanja, ki z upo{tevanjem tokov bolnikov
med enotami odraža dejansko obremenitev posamezne enote.
Pravilnost ocene izkori{~enosti v najve~ji meri izhaja iz ocene normativov
zaposlovanja posameznih zmogljivosti, ki merijo intenzivnost njihove uporabe.
ê je ocena normativov objektivna, lahko iz stopnje izkori{~enosti posamezne
zmogljivosti izvedemo tudi sklep o stopnji njene izkori{~enosti. V primeru nizke
stopnje izkori{~enosti, tedaj je nižja od 1, taka zmogljivost pomembno prispeva
k stro{kom, ~eprav z vidika bolni{ni~nih procesov ni v celoti potrebna. S tem
lahko identificiramo zmogljivosti, ki jih lahko odpustimo ali dezinvestiramo, ali
pa zanje najdemo zaposlitev v dejavnosti zunaj bolni{nice ali v diverzifikaciji
dejavnosti same bolni{nice. V primeru visoke stopnje izkori{~enosti
zmogljivosti, ko je stopnja vi{ja od 1, pa kaže na ozka grla, ki onemogo~ajo
doseganje ustreznega obsega dejavnosti v drugih enotah in gladek tok bolnikov
med enotami. S tem lahko ugotavljamo tudi izvore ~akalnih dob v bolni{nici. Pri
tem dobimo tudi informacijo, ali je mogo~e z ve~anjem intenzivnosti dela, ki se
kaže v normativih, dose~i ve~ji obseg dejavnosti brez zaposlovanja dodatnih
zmogljivosti. Rezultat tako omogo~a oceno intenzivnosti zaposlitve
posameznega elementa zmogljivosti v bolni{nici in ugotovitev morebitnih presežnih ali manjkajo~ih zmogljivosti. Vse to omogo~a argumentacijo klju~nih
poslovnih potez, kot so nakup nove opreme ali zaposlitev novih delavcev, ugotovitev presežne delovne sile in nepotrebne opreme, reorganizacijo bolni{nic za
bolj teko~ tok bolnikov, ko ne nastajajo ~akalne vrste, in ugotavljanje
zmogljivosti, ki povzro~ajo stro{ke, ne pa tudi prihodkov. Sploh ni drugega
na~ina ugotavljanja presežne delovne sile. Analiza normativov oziroma intenzivnosti dela posameznikov pa omogo~a tudi opredelitev ustreznega sistema nagrajevanja.
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5. Presoja poslovne uspe{nosti bolni{nice
Poslovno uspe{nost posameznih enot ugotavljamo z izkazi uspeha, katere
sestavljajo prihodki in odhodki, ki so neposredno povezani z dejavnostjo
posamezne enote. Do njih pridemo tako, da v procesni model in model za ugotavljanje izkori{~enosti zmogljivosti vpeljemo cene dejavnikov in storitev, ki jih
opravljajo v posamezni enoti.
5.1 Ugotavljanje odhodkov enot
Odhodkovni del izkazov uspeha posamezne enote bolni{nice sestavljajo
materialni stro{ki zdravil, stro{ki zdravstvenih storitev, stro{ki dela, odhodki
financiranja, izredni odhodki, amortizacija in drugi stro{ki.
Pri tem so klju~ni materialni stro{ki zdravil, ki so izra~unani iz povpre~nih
stro{kov zdravil oziroma stro{kov zdravil na bolnika v posamezni enoti, pomnoženimi s {tevilom bolnikov, ki so bili obravnavani v posamezni enoti. Na podoben na~in so izra~unani tudi stro{ki zdravstvenih storitev, ki so na~eloma
izra~unani v odnosu do {tevila bolnikov, ki jih napoti posamezna enota na
obravnavo k drugi zdravstveni organizaciji. Pri tem je osnovni izra~un stro{kov
zdravstvenih storitev preprost produkt povpre~ne vrednosti storitev na bolnika,
ki ga obravnavajo zunanji izvajalci, in {tevila tak{nih bolnikov.
Pri opredelitvi stro{kov dela posamezne enote je treba upo{tevati, da lahko
zaposleni delo opravljajo v razli~nih enotah. Stro{ke dela tako izra~unamo kot
produkt {tevila zaposlenih iz delovnih ur po posameznih kvalifikacijskih skupinah,
pri ~emer upo{tevamo samo delovne ure, ki jih zaposleni opravijo v analizirani
enoti, in dejanske stro{ke dela tak{nih zaposlenih, vendar samo za tisti del delovnih
ur, ki jih zaposleni opravijo v enoti. Na ta na~in smo v model stro{ke dela
vklju~ili v obliki variabilnih stro{kov.
Izredne odhodke in druge stro{ke, ki sestavljajo odhodke posamezne
enote, moramo razdeliti na enote z uporabo klju~ev. Izredne odhodke lahko
med enote delimo sorazmerno glede na materialne stro{ke zdravil, stro{ke
zdravstvenih storitev, stro{ke dela in odhodke financiranja. Pri razporeditvi
drugih stro{kov pa lahko sorazmernost opredelimo glede na materialne stro{ke
zdravil, stro{ke zdravstvenih storitev, stro{ke dela, odhodke financiranja in izredne odhodke.
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Stro{ke amortizacije na ravni enot izra~unamo na osnovi dejanskih amortizacijskih stopenj bolni{nice in neodpisane vrednosti zgradb, neodpisane
vrednosti opreme ter drugih opredmetenih osnovnih sredstev, pri ~emer
moramo neodpisano vrednost sredstev razporediti med enote. Neodpisano
vrednost zgradb lahko razdelimo med posamezne enote glede na povr{ino
prostora, s katerim enota razpolaga, v celotnem razpoložljivem prostoru
bolni{nice. Neodpisano vrednost opreme in drugih opredmetenih osnovnih
sredstev pa je smiselno razporediti na posamezno enoto glede na vrednost
izbranega nabora najdražjih tipov aparatov, ki jih uporablja posamezna enota. Na
ta na~in, kot smo pojasnili, zagotovimo, da razlike v stopnjah odpisanosti
opreme ne vplivajo na poslovni izid.
Med posamezne enote moramo razporediti tudi splo{ne stro{ke
bolni{nice, to so stro{ki podpornih procesov, med katere lahko uvrstimo
stro{ke dela uprave, službe vzdrževanja in drugih podpornih služb. Stro{ke dela
uprave lahko med posamezne enote razporedimo glede na {tevilo bolnikov in
{tevilo zaposlenih v posamezni enoti. Stro{ke dela služb vzdrževanja, ki zajemajo, na primer, stro{ke dela tehni~no-vzdrževalne službe in stro{ke dela
~istilnega servisa, lahko razporedimo glede na osnovna sredstva, s katerimi
razpolaga posamezna enota.
Prav tako moramo vsako posamezno enoto obremeniti z materialnimi
stro{ki in stro{ki storitev, ki niso materialni stro{ki zdravil in stro{ki zdravstvenih storitev. Nerazporejene materialne stro{ke lahko med enote razporedimo
glede na obseg osnovnih sredstev, nerazporejene stro{ke storitev pa glede na
{tevilo bolnikov, obravnavanih v posamezni enoti.
Tako ugotovljene režijske stro{ke, ki jih posamezna enota mora pokrivati iz
svojega pokritja in ki zajemajo stro{ke dela služb uprave, stro{ke dela služb
vzdrževanja ter nerazporejene materialne stro{ke in stro{ke storitev uporabimo
za ugotavljanje neto poslovnega rezultata posamezne enote znotraj analizirane
bolni{nice. Razliko med prihodki in odhodki, ki na ravni posamezne enote nastanejo neposredno zaradi opravljanja zdravstvenih dejavnosti, smo namre~
zmanj{ali za te režijske stro{ke in tako ugotovili neto poslovni rezultat
posamezne enote. S pomo~jo tako opredeljenega izkaza uspeha posamezne
enote lahko ugotovimo, v kak{ni meri posamezna enota prispeva k ustvarjanju
prihodka, v kak{ni meri prispeva k nastajanju odhodkov, pa tudi v kolik{ni meri
s svojim presežkom prihodkov nad odhodki lahko pokriva splo{ne oziroma režijske
stro{ke poslovanja bolni{nice.
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5.2 Ugotavljanje prihodkov enot
Z vidika ugotavljanja poslovne uspe{nosti posameznih enot je klju~no ugotavljanje prihodka posamezne enote. V analizi poslovne uspe{nosti lahko uporabimo tri na~ine ugotavljanja prihodkov enote. Prvi~, uporabimo lahko dejanske prihodke, ki jih pla~a zunanji pla~nik. Drugi~, dejanske prihodke pa lahko
tudi popravimo z upo{tevanjem vstopa bolnikov iz drugih enot, kar vklju~uje
interno zara~unavanje dolo~ene enote za opravljene storitve drugim enotam.
Tretji~, dejanske prihodke enot lahko popravimo z upo{tevanjem zara~unavanja
za opravljene storitve drugim enotam, pa tudi z upo{tevanjem, da analizirana
enota s svojimi bolniki obremenjuje druge enote in mora posledi~no dolo~en
del svojega prihodka prenesti na tak{ne druge enote. Izhodi{~ni prihodki iz
poslovanja, ki jih uporabljamo v analizi uspe{nosti enot, so dejanski prihodki, ki
jih posamezne enote dobijo s pla~ilom storitev od zunanjega pla~nika.
Drugi tip prihodkov iz poslovanja izra~unamo tako, da upo{tevamo tako
tiste bolnike, ki vstopajo iz okolice v bolni{nico in jih pla~uje zunanji pla~nik, kot
tiste bolnike, ki prihajajo iz ene enote v drugo enoto znotraj bolni{nice. Pri
izra~unu drugega tipa prihodkov iz poslovanja izhajamo iz izhodi{~nih prihodkov
iz poslovanja, torej dejansko realiziranih prihodkov. Drugi tip prihodkov iz
poslovanja sestavljajo prihodki, ki jih dobi enota z zara~unanjem storitev
pla~niku zunaj bolni{nice, in prihodki, ki bi jih enota dobila, ~e bi zara~unavala
svoje storitve tudi enotam znotraj bolni{nice, ~e storitev ne pla~a pla~nik zunaj
bolni{nice. Prihodki iz poslovanja, katere izra~unamo na ta na~in, bi morali biti
enaki ali ve~ji od prihodkov iz poslovanja, ki jih enote ustvarjajo s sistemom
financiranja s strani zunanjih pla~nikov njihovih storitev.
Prihodke iz poslovanja, ki upo{tevajo vstop iz drugih enot, izra~unamo kot
produkt celotnega {tevila obravnavanih bolnikov, torej celotnega {tevila bolnikov, ki obremenjujejo enoto, in povpre~nih prihodkov na bolnika, ki jih
bolni{nica doseže v posamezni enoti. Prihodek bolni{nica ustvarja z
zara~unavanjem opravljenih storitev zunanjemu pla~niku, pri ~emer je cena
storitev oziroma cena obra~unske enote, s katero se spremlja obseg storitev
(to~ka ali utež), za bolni{nico dana kategorija. Za izra~un prihodka na bolnika pa
je treba ustvarjene prihodke deliti s {tevilom bolnikov, ki jih financirajo zunanji
pla~niki. Kot smo pojasnili, tak{no {tevilo bolnikov odraža {tevilo zaklju~enih
obravnav.
Vendar je mogo~e prihodke na bolnika na opisani na~in ugotoviti zgolj za
~etrto in peto skupino enot iz drugega poglavja tega ~lanka, pri katerih se na
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ravni enote pojavljajo tako prihodki iz poslovanja kakor {tevilo zaklju~enih
obravnav. V drugi skupini enot, pri kateri ne beležijo {tevila zaklju~enih obravnav na enoti, izkazujejo pa prihodke iz poslovanja, moramo prihodke na bolnika
oziroma ceno obravnave posameznega bolnika izra~unati nekoliko druga~e, in
sicer v obliki koli~nika med prihodki iz poslovanja in celotnim {tevilom bolnikov, ki
jih obravnavajo znotraj tak{ne enote in ki lahko izvirajo zgolj iz napotitev na pregled
ali nadaljnjo obravnavo. Pri tretji in prvi skupini enot, ki ne beležijo prihodkov iz
poslovanja, pa kot ceno obravnave posameznega bolnika upo{tevamo lastno ceno
dejavnosti tak{ne enote v obliki razmerja med celotnimi odhodkov poslovanja
enoto in celotnega {tevila obravnavanih bolnikov.
ê bi med enotami znotraj bolni{nice obstajali tržni odnosi, bi morala enota, ki
je sprejela bolnika, zara~unati svojo storitev enoti, ki je poslala bolnika, ~e enota –
prejemnica dodatne obravnave bolnika take obravnave ni dobila pla~ane od zunanjega pla~nika. S tem bi nastali pri enoti, ki po{ilja bolnike, stro{ki, ki bi bili podobnega zna~aja, kot so stro{ki zunanjih zdravstvenih storitev za posamezno enoto, ti
stro{ki pa bi zmanj{evali poslovno uspe{nost enot, ki po{iljajo bolnike v druge
enote. Da bi ugotovili resni~no uspe{nost poslovanja v posamezni enoti, moramo
torej poleg stro{kov obravnave dejanskega {tevila bolnikov in prihodkov na podlagi
tega {tevila obravnavanih bolnikov, upo{tevati tudi stro{ke, ki bi nastali, ~e bi
morala enota za svoje bolnike, ki jih napoti v druge enote na pregled, pla~ati tem
enotam za opravljene storitve. ê upo{tevamo na opisani na~in tudi medsebojno
zara~unavanje storitev med enotami znotraj bolni{nice, kadar storitve v neki enoti,
ki nastanejo s po{iljanjem pacientov iz druge enote, niso pla~ane s sredstvi zunanjega pla~nika, dobimo poslovni rezultat posamezne enote, ki natan~no izraža
uspe{nost take enote tudi ob upo{tevanju medsebojne soodvisnosti. Prihodki v
tem primeru izražajo tudi prihodke, ki nastanejo zaradi tokov znotraj enot v
bolni{nici in so seveda lahko enaki ali ve~ji od prihodkov, ki jih posamezne enote
dobijo od zunanjega pla~nika za opravljene storitve, stro{ki pa v tem primeru obsegajo stro{ke obravnave dejanskega {tevila bolnikov, ki vstopajo v enoto, pa tudi
stro{ke, ki jih tak{na enota povzro~a s po{iljanjem bolnikov na pregled ali nadaljnjo
obravnavo v drugo enoto, ~e teh stro{kov ne pokrivajo zunanji pla~niki v drugi
enoti.
5.3 Ugotavljanje poslovne uspe{nosti
Trije poslovni rezultati v bolni{nici že sami po sebi nudijo veliko analiti~no
podlago. Govorijo namre~, v kolik{ni meri zunanji pla~nik v resnici pokrije
stro{ke neke enote, v kolik{ni meri bi se poslovni rezultat izbolj{al, ~e bi z
122
internim fakturiranjem dolo~ena enota svoje storitve, ki jih ne dobi pla~anih od
zunaj, zara~unavala drugim enotam, in kak{en bi bil poslovni rezultat, ~e bi
upo{tevali v celoti medsebojno fakturiranje storitev v bolni{nici. [ele zadnji
poslovni rezultat, ki ga sedaj v nobeni bolni{nici ra~unovodsko ne ugotavljajo, je
resni~na slika poslovne uspe{nosti posamezne enote.
Analiza prihodkovne in odhodkovne strani izkazov uspeha po enotah
odkriva tudi tiste elemente zlasti odhodkov enote, ki najbolj vplivajo na njeno
poslovno uspe{nost. S tem vidimo tudi, na ka{en na~in lahko uvedemo
stro{kovne prihranke. Ker ti lahko nastanejo bodisi s spreminjanjem cene dejavnikov bodisi s spreminjanjem zaposlenih zmogljivosti, lahko z analizo izkori{~anja zmogljivosti ugotovimo, ali je mogo~e s spreminjanjem zaposlenih
zmogljivosti znižati stro{ke in izbolj{ati poslovni rezultat. Prav tako je mogo~e
oceniti, ali bi lahko z zniževanjem cen dejavnikov (na primer nižanjem cen zdravil ali povpre~nih pla~ zaposlenih) pove~ali poslovno uspe{nost. Poslovne cilje
na podro~ju poslovne uspe{nosti lahko tako prevedemo v cilje na podro~ju
gospodarjenja z zmogljivostmi. Odpravljanje presežnih zmogljivosti pa lahko
prevedemo v rezultate v poslovni uspe{nosti. Izra~unamo lahko tudi, koliko
bolni{nico stane odpravljanje ~akalnih vrst. Posebni vidik uporabe tega modela
je tudi ocena ustreznosti pla~ilnega sistema. ê v bolni{nici ugotovijo, da ni
mogo~e pove~ati intenzivnosti in izkori{~anja zmogljivosti in da ni mogo~e
znižati cen dejavnikov, ob tem pa {e vedno dosegajo negativni poslovni rezultat, lahko sklepajo, da je financiranje bolni{ni~ne dejavnosti napa~no. Ker
analiza izkori{~enosti zmogljivosti temelji na koli~inskih normativih in ker se ti
neposredno izražajo v poslovnem uspehu, lahko vsaka bolni{nica presodi, v
koliki meri ji ustrezajo cene storitev, ki jih pla~uje zunanji pla~nik. Zato je
mogo~e z modelom preverjati tudi ustreznost dolo~itve cen obra~unskih enot
za opravljene storitve (na primer utež v primeru skupin primerljivih primerov,
to~ka ali bolni{ni~no oskrbni dan) v okviru pla~ilnega sistema pri nas.
6. Ugotovitve in priporo~ila
Prikazana analiza poslovne uspe{nosti v bolni{nicah z uporabo procesnega
modela omogo~a, da opredelimo notranje in zunanje vzroke poslovne
neuspe{nosti. Opredelimo lahko dva notranja vzroka. Prvi notranji vzrok
poslovne neuspe{nosti so neustrezni normativi, ki jih dosegajo zaposleni pri
izvajanju dejavnosti na ravni posameznih enot bolni{nice. Zaradi njih obravnava
123
bolnikov zahteva prevelik obseg ~love{kih in materialnih zmogljivosti in pretirano vklju~evanje drugih enot bolni{nice pri izvajanju dejavnosti dolo~ene
enote. Oboje tudi nepotrebno pove~uje stro{ke izvajanja dejavnosti posamezne
enote. Drugi notranji vzrok poslovne neuspe{nosti pa je neustrezna izkori{~enost razpoložljivih zmogljivosti. Ta nastane, ker so razpoložljive
zmogljivosti prevelike glede na obseg toka bolnikov, na normative za izvajanje
dejavnosti in na medsebojno odvisnost enot v bolni{nici. Presežne zmogljivosti
povzro~ajo nastajanje stro{kov, ki so nepotrebni z vidika obsega dejavnosti, ki
ga izvajajo v bolni{nicah. ê so za dolo~eno organizacijsko enoto ustrezni tako
normativi za opravljanje dejavnosti kot vklju~evanje drugih enot in v njej ne
nastajajo presežne zmogljivosti, poslovni uspeh enote pa je {e vedno negativen, je o~itno vzrok takega poslovnega neuspeha v neustreznih cenah
storitev, ki jih priznava zunanji pla~nik. Neustrezni pla~ilni sistem oziroma neustrezne cene, ki jih zunanji pla~nik priznava za zdravstvene storitve, je tako
zunanji vzrok poslovne neuspe{nosti.
Da bi vodstvo bolni{nic prikazani procesni model lahko uporabilo za
presojo poslovne uspe{nosti in opredelitev razlogov za nizko poslovno
uspe{nost na ravni posameznih enot, je treba v bolni{nici spremljanje podatkov
o obsegu opravljene dejavnosti in o nastalih stro{kih prilagoditi na na~in, da
bodo ustrezali potrebnim vhodnim podatkom prikazanega procesnega modela.
Tako je treba na ravni enot spremljati obseg opravljene dejavnosti, in sicer ne
zgolj na na~in, kot ga zahteva zunanji pla~nik zdravstvenih storitev, pa~ pa na
na~in, ki omogo~a opredelitev vrste vstopa bolnikov v posamezno organizacijsko enoto (vstop od zunaj ali vstop iz drugih enot). Tovrstni podatki namre~
omogo~ajo, da se na ravni posameznih organizacijskih enot opredelijo tako
dejanski prihodki, ki nastanejo s pla~ilom zunanjega pla~nika, kot transferni
prihodki, ki nastanejo z zara~unavanjem storitev med posameznimi enotami.
Natan~no spremljanje tokov bolnikov med enotami tako omogo~a tudi razporejanje nastalih stro{kov med organizacijske enote bolni{nice. Za ustrezno razporejanje nastalih stro{kov med organizacijske enote bolni{nice je treba na
ravni enot natan~no opredeliti tudi razpoložljive zmogljivosti. To je klju~no tudi
za izra~un njihove izkori{~enosti. Primerjava razpoložljivih zmogljivosti s
povpra{evanjem po zmogljivostih, ki je dolo~eno z normativi, ki jih dosegajo
zaposleni pri opravljanju dejavnosti, in s {tevilom obravnavnih bolnikov namre~
kaže doseženo stopnjo izkori{~enosti.
Klju~no za zaokrožitev opisanega procesnega modela pa je oblikovanje
normativov, ki bi jih morali dosegati zaposleni pri opravljanju dejavnosti in uporabi
124
materialnih zmogljivosti. Prav s spreminjanjem teh normativov lahko vodstvo
spremlja in regulira intenzivnost in produktivnost dela ter izkori{~enost
zmogljivosti ter s tem vpliva na poslovni izid enot in bolni{nice kot celote. Ti
normativi so lahko tudi podlaga za uveljavitev sistema evidentiranja dejanskega
dela, preko katerega lahko vodstvo spremlja obseg opravljenega dela
zaposlenih, odpravi velika nesorazmerja v obremenitvi med zaposlenimi, poleg
tega pa z normativi za opravljanje dejavnosti in s sistemom evidentiranja dela
stimulira zaposlene k u~inkovitemu delu, vpliva pa lahko tudi na strukturo
ponudbe bolni{nice.
Mag. Petra Do{enovi~ Bon~a je asistentka na Katedri za ekonomsko teorijo in politiko
na Ekonomski fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani. Njeni raziskovalni podro~ji sta ekonomika
zdravstva in ekonomika javnega sektorja. Sedanje raziskovalno delo vklju~uje
prou~evanje u~inkovitosti in uspe{nosti izvajalcev zdravstvenih storitev v Sloveniji in
prou~evanje inovacij kot dejavnika u~inkovitosti in uspe{nosti bolni{nic v Sloveniji. Trenutno je ~lanica Sosveta za zdravje Statisti~nega urada Republike Slovenije. Sodelovala
je pri razvoju magistrskega {tudija Management in ekonomika v zdravstvenem varstvu,
ki je nastal s pomo~jo sredstev EU in je prvi tovrstni program v Sloveniji. Objavila je
~lanke, v katerih analizira in prou~uje razli~ne vidike slovenskega zdravstvenega sistema
in reforme ter politike v tem sektorju. Sodeluje v svetovalnih projektih na podro~ju
zdravstva v Sloveniji.
Dr. Maks Tajnikar je redni profesor na Katedri za ekonomsko teorijo in politiko na Ekonomski fakulteti Univerze v Ljubljani. Bil je minister za malo gospodarstvo (1992-93) in
minister za gospodarstvo (1993-96) Republike Slovenije. V obdobju 2001-2007 je bil
dekan Ekonomske fakultete. Objavil je ve~ kot 230 strokovnih in znanstvenih ~lankov,
u~benike (Mikroekonomija, Upravljavska ekonomika, Tvegano poslovodenje, Postkeynesianska ekonomska teorija), je avtor 5 knjig in soavtor 5 knjig. Njegova raziskovalna
podro~ja so podjetni{tvo, ekonomika javnega sektorja in ekonomika zdravstva. Sodeloval je pri razvoju magistrskega {tudija Management in ekonomika v zdravstvenem varstvu,
ki je nastal s pomo~jo sredstev EU in je prvi tovrstni program v Sloveniji. Trenutno je tudi
vodja tega programa na Ekonomski fakulteti. Objavil je ~lanke, v katerih analizira in prou~uje
razli~ne vidike slovenskega zdravstvenega sistema in reforme ter politike v tem sektorju.
Sodeluje v svetovalnih projektih na podro~ju zdravstva v Sloveniji in je ~lan Sveta Klini~nega
centra Ljubljana.
125
Literatura in viri
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Hollingsworth, B., & Peacock, S. (2008). Efficiency measurement in health and health
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Kornai, J., & Eggleston, K. (2001). Welfare, Choice, and Solidarity in Transition. Cambridge:
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Ozcan, Y.A. (2008). Health care benchmarking and performance evaluation: an assessment using data envelopment analysis (DEA). New York: Springer, cop.
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Phelps, C.E. (2003). Health Economics. (3 ed.) Boston: Addison Wesley.
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workflow process requirements for an emergency medical service. Journal of Medical
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Zavod za zdravstveno zavarovanje Slovenije.
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(2008b). Splo{ni dogovor za pogodbeno leto 2008. Ljubljana: Zavod za zdravstveno zavarovanje Slovenije.
•
(2008c). Podro~ni dogovor za bolni{nice za pogodbeno leto 2008. Ljubljana: Zavod za
zdravstveno zavarovanje Slovenije.
rd
SUMMARY
BUSINESS PROCESS MODEL AS A TOOL
TO ASSESS BUSINESS PERFORMANCE AND
CAPACITY UTILIZATION IN HOSPITALS
Business performance analysis and assessment is usually performed
using various indicators of performance in both ratio form or as indicators
in absolute values. Such indicators of business performance are often
coupled with indicators of efficiency that reflect the levels of utilisation of
available resources. Efficiency indicators help explain indicators of performance. The paper demonstrates that business performance analysis
based on standard business performance indicators can be improved for
the case of hospitals if one views the hospitals as process organisations
when analysing their business performance and efficiency.
The paper thus demonstrates that the assessment of business performance of hospitals has to be based on a business process model of the
studied hospital. Such business processes have to reflect the flows of
patients from the point of their entry into a hospital to the point of their
exit from the hospital upon completion of their treatment. Patient flows
are determined by the treatment processes they undergo. During their
treatment the patients pass through hospital’s various organisational
units. The patient’s treatment process engages capacities of several units,
departments or clinics of a hospital and also capacities of other providers
of health care services in case a hospital refers a patient to a different
health care institution for additional services. Because the patient’s treatment process engages various human and material capacities of a hospital it also creates costs on the one hand and the right of a hospital to
claim payments from the insurers and create revenue in line with the implemented payment system for health care services. Treatment processes
that determine the flows of patients through the hospital’s organisational
units are the hospital’s core processes. This means that from all business
processes carried out by a hospital the treatment processes contribute
most significantly to the outcome of the patient’s care. The hospital’s
treatment processes are thus the hospital’s value-adding processes. There
are several other business processes a hospital carries out to support its
core treatment processes. Such support processes or enabling processes do
not contribute to creating additional value directly. However, they create
127
costs and have to be accounted for in business performance analysis and
allocated correctly to the performance of core treatment processes.
A business process model of a hospital that is used to analyse and assess its business performance consists of the following elements:
1. detailed list of hospital’s organisational units;
2. number of patients entering each analysed hospital’s organisational unit based on a referral from other health care organisations
or without a referral (entry as a first contact with a hospital)
3. number of patients entering each analysed organisational unit
based on a referral from other hospital’s organisational units
4. standards for delivery of care for each analysed organisational unit
that determine the needed quantity of human and material capacities per patient and therefore determine both the needed total
quantity of human and material capacities
5. total quantity of available human and material capacities of each
analysed organisational unit.
Business performance assessment of hospitals that is based on a
business process model of the studied hospitals entails two phases. In the
first phase we have to model the hospital’s business processes and develop a model of business processes that shows patient flows between
hospital’s organisational units and patient flows that link the hospital to
other health care organisations. The purpose of this first phase is to define the processes and determine their interdependence and also to quantify the activities that comprise the processes. Results of the first phase
can then be used in the second phase to obtain two results that provide
information about the hospital’s business performance. The first result
shows the capacity utilisation rates for both human and material capacities engaged during the delivery of hospital’s core processes. The second
result demonstrates the achieved business performance of core processes
aggregated at the level of individual organisational units.
Both results provide guidelines for business process change that contributes to increased efficiency and lower costs. Analysis of capacity utilisation rates can also be used to implement organisational changes that
enable smoother patient flows and reduce bottlenecks and excess capacities. Analysis of capacity utilisation rates is thus necessary to determine
employment needs and needs for new investments and also those excess
128
capacities that create costs but cannot contribute to outcomes of care and
hospital’s revenues.
Detailed allocation of incurred costs to hospital’s organisational units
that is based on patient flows or treatment processes enables the determination of business performance on the level of individual organisational units. Such an analysis enables us to determine which units create
losses and which are the ones that contribute to the creation of profits.
Such an analysis that is based on determining the links between core and
support processes also enables us to allocate the costs created by the support processes more accurately to the core processes and units that carry
them out. In addition, the analysis of business performance that is based on a
model of business processes enables us to develop several measures of performance. First, we can determine the performance that shows the relation
been the incurred costs and revenue created by payments from insurers and
other payers. Second, we can determine the performance taking into consideration the interdependence of various organisational units and both actual
revenues and revenues created by internally charging transfer prices.
Assessment of business performance based on a model of business
processes that links the analysis of business performance to the analysis of
capacity utilisation also enables us to determine the causes of poor or
good performance. Causes of poor performance can be internal or external. There are two main internal causes. The first internal cause is inappropriate standards for delivery of care for each analysed organisational
unit that determine the needed quantity of human and material capacities
per patient. The second internal cause is underutilised human and material capacities. The external cause of poor performance relates to the inappropriate payment system for health care services. If, for example, a
certain organisational unit fully utilises human and material capacities
and has appropriate standards for delivery of care, then we can attribute
poor performance to inadequate prices set for delivery of health care services. The prices and the payment system set for the provision of health
care services are a nondiscretionary factor that cannot be influenced by the
hospital’s management. The above discussion shows that the analysis of
business performance based on a model of business processes identifies the
causes of poor performance that can be influenced by the management, the
measures that need to be taken to tackle poor performance and those
causes that are external and represent a nondiscretionary factor of poor
business performance.
129
130
Strokovni ~lanek
Nekateri vidiki varnosti,
prožnosti in varne prožnosti
UDK: 331.5.021(045)
Tatjana Tozjek
Univerza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za upravo
tatjana.kozjek@fu.uni-lj.si
IZVLEÊK
Za pove~anje prožnosti organizacije izvajajo razli~ne ukrepe na podro~ju
~asovne razporeditve dela, obsega dela, stro{kov dela, notranje mobilnosti zaposlenih. Ti ukrepi imajo tako pozitivne kot negativne u~inke na zaposlene v organizacijah. V strokovni literaturi se za razmerje med prožnostjo na trgu dela in socialno varnostjo zaposlenih uporablja izraz varna prožnost. Države in organizacije
morajo pri uvajanju sprememb na podro~ju prožnosti in varnosti slediti vzoru
držav, ki so na tem podro~ju do sedaj naredile že veliko. Zagotoviti je potrebno
prožno zaposlovanje, ki bi omogo~alo hitro prilagajanje potrebam trga dela in s
tem konkuren~nost, uveljaviti je treba sistem socialne varnosti, ki bi prepre~eval,
da bi visoka mobilnost zaposlenih povzro~ala ob~utek negotovosti ter sprejeti
aktivno politiko zaposlovanja, ki mora temeljiti na usposabljanju in izobraževanju
kot temelju zaposljivosti. Pri uvedbi modela varne prožnosti pa morajo upo{tevati
potrebe in specifi~nosti njihovega trga dela, saj enostavno kopiranje modelov
uspe{nih držav ne prinese pozitivnih posledic.
Klju~ne besede: varna prožnost, strategija, model, socialna varnost, trg
dela, zaposlovanje
JEL: H0
1. Uvod
Organizacije morajo ostati prožne, da lahko reagirajo na nepri~akovane
spremembe na podro~ju povpra{evanja, se prilagajati novim tehnologijam,
zaposleni morajo biti kar se da u~inkoviti ter pripravljeni na vseživljenjsko
u~enje in drugo. Organizacije zato želijo prožnej{o delovno-pravno zakonodajo,
ki bi jim dopu{~ala prilagajanje {tevila zaposlenih, zaposleni pa želijo kar se da
131
Tatjana Kozjek
Nekateri vidiki varnosti, prožnosti in varne prožnosti
visoko socialno varnost. Dejstvo je, da previsoka varnost povzro~i togost trga
dela in s tem ovira prilagajanje zaposlenosti razmeram v gospodarstvu, zato
morajo države in organizacije iskati prav{nje razmerje med prožnostjo in varnostjo.
Za razmerje med prožnostjo na trgu dela in socialno varnostjo zaposlenih
se uporablja izraz varna prožnost. Pojem je razmeroma nov, enotna uveljavljena
definicija {e ne obstaja, temve~ se v razpravah pojavljajo razli~ne opredelitve
posameznih avtorjev.
V prispevku so navedene nekatere opredelitve prožnosti, varnosti ter
varne prožnosti. Prikazane so zna~ilnosti modelov varne prožnosti Danske,
Nizozemske, [vedske in Avstrije ter podani nekateri predlogi za uvedbo modela
varne prožnosti v Sloveniji.
2. Opredelitev prožnosti
Tros in Wilthagen (2004, str. 171) ter ILO (2004, str. 14) navajajo {tiri osnovne elemente prožnosti:
•
zunanja numeri~na prožnost, ki ozna~uje sposobnost organizacije, da
prilagaja raven potrebnega produkcijskega faktorja dela spremembam
na trgu blaga z zmanj{anjem ali pove~anjem {tevila zaposlenih;
•
notranja numeri~na prožnost, ki ozna~uje sposobnost organizacije, da
prilagaja obseg in ~asovno razporeditev dela ({tevilo delovnih ur in
delovni ~as) brez zmanj{anja ali pove~anja {tevila zaposlenih;
•
funkcionalna prožnost, ki daje delodajalcu možnost razporejanja
zaposlenih na razli~na delovna mesta (notranja mobilnost zaposlenih);
•
prožnost pla~ in stro{kov dela, ki se znotraj organizacije pojavlja kot
problem nagrajevanja dela oziroma povezanosti pla~ z rezultati.
V literaturi je poznan tudi pojem prožnost trga dela. Standing (1986, str.
59) je prožnost trga dela opredelil kot hitrost in obseg prilagajanja:
132
•
cen spremembam ponudbe in povpra{evanja;
•
koli~in spremembam cen, pla~ in dohodkov;
•
kakovosti spremembam strukture povpra{evanja po delovni sili.
Tatjana Kozjek
Kajzerjeva (2005, str. 12) navaja, da se v strokovnih razpravah pojem omejuje zgolj na prožnost pla~ in stro{kov dela, zanemarja pa se vpra{anje prilagajanja koli~in spremembam na strani ponudbe in povpra{evanja. Prožnost trga
dela naj bi omogo~ala hitrej{e prilagajanje gospodarstva spremembam in zagotavljala bolj u~inkovito razporeditev produkcijskega faktorja dela, ~eprav prožnost ni sinonim za u~inkovitost delovanja trga dela. Pravi tudi, da se je v
Sloveniji do sedaj v ospredje postavljala predvsem numeri~na prožnost oziroma
se je prožnost razumela zgolj kot lažje odpu{~anje delavcev.
Najbolj pogosta interpretacija prožnosti trga dela, ki jo opredeljujejo razli~ni
avtorji (npr. Lazear, 1990, str. 699, Siebert, 1997, str. 37), pa je povezana z
regulacijo trga dela in institucijami trga dela, ki se sinteti~no izraža z indeksom
varovanja zaposlitve (angl. Employment Protection Legislation Index); ta
omogo~a primerjavo ureditev na podro~ju delovnih razmerij. V poro~ilu OECD
(2004, str. 72) je navedeno, da je indeks raz~lenjen na tri vsebinsko dopolnjujo~e se elemente:
•
regulacije, ki se nana{ajo na pogoje trajnih pogodb o zaposlitvi v
primeru individualnih odpu{~anj;
•
dopolnilne pogoje v primeru obsežnej{ih odpu{~anj;
•
regulacije glede možnosti zaposlovanja za dolo~en ~as (pogoji zaposlitvenih pogodb za dolo~en ~as).
Ignjatovi} (2002, str. 45) navaja, da trg dela ni prožen v primerih, ~e:
•
so nadomestila za brezposelne previsoka ali jih brezposelni prejemajo
predolgo;
•
zakonodaja preve~ obremenjuje delodajalce pri zaposlovanju in
odpu{~anju delavcev;
•
je dovoljeno tedensko {tevilo delovnih ur preve~ strogo omejeno;
•
je nadurno delo preve~ nagrajeno;
•
imajo delavska predstavni{tva velik pomen in varujejo delavce pred
konkurenco;
•
pla~e niso prožne.
133
Tatjana Kozjek
3. Opredelitev varnosti
Wilthagen, Tros in van Lieshout (2004, str. 114) so opredelili 4 tipe varnosti:
1. varnost službe – delovnega mesta - je verjetnost, da bo zaposleni
zadržal službo pri nekem delodajalcu. Ta vrsta varnosti je zagotovljena z varnostjo zaposlenih pred odpu{~anjem in pred ve~jimi
spremembami delovnih pogojev. Je glavni predmet zakonodaje varnosti zaposlenosti.
2. Varnost zaposlitve je verjetnost zadržanja v zaposlitvi – ne nujno pri istem delodajalcu. Pomeni dosegljivost nove zaposlitve za odpu{~ene in
brezposelne, ki ustrezajo njihovim kvalifikacijam in preteklim delovnim
razmeram. Zaposljivost iskalcev je mogo~e pove~ati z vseživljenjskim
usposabljanjem, ki ga lahko ponudijo tako delodajalci kot aktivne
politike zaposlovanja.
3. Dohodkovna (socialna) varnost je dohodkovna varnost v primeru prenehanja pla~anega dela.
4. Kombinacijska varnost je gotovost, s katero je mogo~e usklajevati
pla~ano delo z drugimi družbenimi odgovornostmi. Slednja ne more
biti prikazana z drugimi vrstami varnosti.
Mednarodna organizacija dela (ILO, 2004, str. 14) je v okviru Programa socialno ekonomske varnosti opredelila pojem ekonomske varnosti. Ekonomska
varnost je sestavljena iz osnovne socialne varnosti, ki je opredeljena z
dostopom do infrastrukture za osnovne potrebe zdravja, izobrazbe, stanovanja,
informacij in socialne varnosti ter varnosti, ki je povezana z delom.
Pojem varnosti na trgu dela podobno kot prožnost trga dela zajema ve~
vidikov. Osnovna varnost pomeni omejevanje vplivov negotovosti in tveganj, s
katerimi se ljudje dnevno soo~ajo, z zagotavljanjem socialnega okolja, v
katerem lahko pripadajo dolo~eni skupnosti, imajo možnost opravljati izbrani
poklic ter razvijejo svoje zmožnosti z dostojnim delom (ILO, 2004, str. 15).
134
Tatjana Kozjek
4. Opredelitev varne prožnosti
Koncept varne prožnosti temelji na ideji, da si dimenziji prožnosti in varnosti nista nasprotujo~i, ampak sta vzajemno podporni v kontekstu globalizacije, s katero se soo~ajo vse ekonomije (Tros, Wilthagen, 2004, str. 169).
Wilthagen in Tros (2004, str. 166) varno prožnost opredelita kot politi~no
strategijo, ki hkrati na eni strani spodbuja prožnost trga dela ter prožnost v organizaciji dela in delovnih razmerjih ter pove~a varnost zaposlitve in socialno
varnost na drugi strani, predvsem za {ibkej{e skupine znotraj in izven trga dela.
Ta definicija nakazuje, da se strategije in politike varne prožnosti razvijajo na
koordiniran in nameren na~in, na primer skozi pogajanja med socialnimi partnerji ali med individualnimi delodajalci in zaposlenimi na razli~nih ravneh. Tak
na~in ne izklju~uje vloge tržnih sil, finan~nih vspodbud, fiskalnih ukrepov, javnozasebnih partnerstev ali popolnoma zasebnih organov in agencij.
Avtorja pa varne prožnosti nista videla le kot politike in strategije trga dela,
ampak tudi kot dolo~eno stanje na trgu dela. V tem primeru sta definirala varno
prožnost kot tipi~no obliko varnosti in kot tipi~no obliko prožnosti. V tem smislu
pravita, da je varna prožnost stopnja zaposlitvene, dohodkovne varnosti, ki
omogo~a kariero delavcev z relativno skromno pozicijo na trgu dela ter aktivnost in socialno vklju~enost. Trdita tudi, da je varna prožnost stopnja numeri~ne
prožnosti in pla~ne prožnosti, ki omogo~a trgu dela in posamezni organizaciji
hitro in ustrezno prilagoditev spremenjenim pogojem, z namenom ohranitve
konkuren~nosti in produktivnosti (Wilthagen, Tros, 2004, str. 167).
Tangian (2004, str. 11) je to opredelitev varne prožnosti, zaradi neprimernosti za merjenje, zožil na socialno varnost in zaposlovanje atipi~nih zaposlitev,
ki niso trajne zaposlitve za polni delovni ~as.
Van Velzen in Wilthagen (2004, str. 4) sta ugotovila, da se lahko strategije
varne prožnosti razlikujejo pri vsaj treh dimenzijah:
•
glede na raven spodbujanja strategije varne prožnosti (nacionalna,
regionalna, lokalna, industrijska, raven organizacije);
•
glede akterjev, ki so vklju~eni v strategije varne prožnosti (država, regionalni
ali lokalni vladni predstavniki, socialni partnerji, organizacija ali zaposleni);
•
glede oblike uveljavitve oziroma normativne oblike strategij varne
prožnosti (zakon, kolektivna pogodba, socialni sporazum, individualna pogodba, politike razvoja ~love{kih virov).
135
Tatjana Kozjek
5. Modeli varne prožnosti po svetu
Reforme vpeljane v ve~ državah, kot so na primer Danska, Nizozemska,
[vedska in Avstrija, katerih primeri so prikazani v nadaljevanju, so v zadnjih
dveh desetletjih kljub razli~nim ekonomskim pogojem zmanj{ale brezposelnost
in stimulirale rast produktivnosti. Ne glede na to, da so imele razli~ne za~etne
položaje in so sledile razli~nim potem, jim je skupna u~inkovita kombinacija
fiskalne prilagoditve ter reforme trga dela in trga proizvodov.
V nadaljevanju so prikazani {tirje primeri uspe{ne uvedbe modela varne
prožnosti v praksi.
Za vzor~ni primer varne prožnosti se je uveljavil danski model. Danska ima
u~inkovito kombinacijo prožnosti (velika zaposlitvena mobilnost kot posledica
relativno nizke stopnje varnosti zaposlitve), socialne varnosti (radodaren sistem
zavarovanja za brezposelnost) in aktivne politike trga dela (Lang, 2006, str. 3).
Madsen (2002, str. 51) navaja, da danski zlati trikotnik trga dela sestavljajo trije
segmenti:
•
visoka eksterna numeri~na prožnost (prožno zaposlovanje, ki omogo~a
delodajalcem hitro prilagajanje potrebam trga dela in s tem konkuren~nost);
•
visoka raven dohodkovne varnosti (sistem socialne varnosti, ki prepre~uje, da bi visoka mobilnost zaposlenih pri le-teh povzro~ala
ob~utek negotovosti ali marginalizacijo);
•
visoka raven zaposlitvene varnosti (aktivna politika zaposlovanja, ki
temelji na usposabljanju in izobraževanju kot temelju zaposljivosti).
Na sliki 1 je prikazan tako imenovani zlati trikotnik varne prožnosti danskega trga dela.
Pu{~ici, ki povezujeta prožni trg dela in sistem zavarovanja za brezposelnost ponazarjata, da veliko {tevilo delavcev vsako leto prizadene brezposelnost,
toda ve~ina se jih vrne na delo po kratkem obdobju brezposelnosti. Tistim, ki se
ne vrnejo hitro v zaposlitev, pomagajo z aktivnimi programi (mi{ljena je aktivna
politika zaposlovanja) na trgu dela. Argument, ki podpira koncept zlatega trikotnika je, da je uspeh danskega zaposlitvenega sistema rezultat edinstvene kombinacije prožnosti (merjeno z visoko stopnjo mobilnosti služb), socialne varnosti
(radodarni sistem socialne pomo~i in nadomestil za brezposelnost) in aktivnih
136
Tatjana Kozjek
programov trga dela, ki podpirajo trajajo~o
(Bradgaard, Madsen, Larsen, 2005, str. 3).
transformacijo
ekonomije
Slika 1: Zlati trikotnik danskega trga dela
Veliko novih
delovnih mest
Prožni trg
dela
Pravica in dolžnost
aktivacije:”learnfare”
Visoka
nadomestila
Sistem
varovanja za
brezposelnost
Aktivna
politika
zaposlovanja
Vir: Madsen, 2002, str. 51
Drugi primer uspe{ne uvedbe modela varne prožnosti je Nizozemska.
Zna~ilnost Nizozemske je, da se pogodbe o za~asnem delu lahko sklepajo najve~
za obdobje dveh let, pogodbe za dolo~en ~as pa za obdobje treh. Delodajalec
lahko sklene pogodbo za dolo~en ~as le trikrat zaporedoma, naslednja pogodba
pa mora biti sklenjena za nedolo~en ~as. Pri tem so možna odstopanja glede na
veljavno kolektivno pogodbo in dogovor (Van Oorshot, 2001, str. 9). V obdobju
recesije lahko delodajalec delavce odpusti, dokler se razmere v organizaciji ne
izbolj{ajo, delodajalec pa ima možnost, da delavca na ~akanju za~asno pokli~e
na delo. Za te primere je dolo~en minimalni prihodek in minimalno {tevilo ur, ki
jih mora delodajalec pla~ati delavcu. Denarna nadomestila so zagotovljena tudi
za tiste, ki so pripravljeni sprejeti nižje pla~ano delovno mesto. Uzakonili so tudi
izena~enje pravic zaposlenih z atipi~nimi oblikami pogodb s pravicami redno
zaposlenih (Clasen et al., 2001, str. 161, 162).
137
Tatjana Kozjek
Skupna zna~ilnost uspe{ne uvedbe modela varne prožnosti Nizozemske in
Danske je velika vloga socialnih partnerjev in pripravljenost na popu{~anje tako
na strani delodajalcev kot delojemalcev.
Tudi [vedska si je pri uvedbi modela varne prožnosti za vzor vzela Dansko.
Na [vedskem ve~ina kolektivnih pogajanj poteka na lokalni in ne na državni
ravni. Pla~e in delovni pogoji so predpisani v kolektivnih pogodbah in Zakonu o
varovanju zaposlitve. Pomemben del tega dolo~a, da delodajalec ne more
prosto izbirati, koga odpusti v ~asu zaposlitve. Zakon namre~ navaja, da je v
~asu zmanj{evanja {tevila zaposlenih treba najprej odpustiti zaposlene, ki so
dobili zaposlitev zadnji. Obstajajo pa nekatere izjeme, ki so bile uvedene predvsem zaradi prilagodljivosti zakona in veljajo za mala in srednje velika podjetja.
Vloga socialnih partnerjev pri pogodbenih dogovorih je velika. Pobude k varni
prožnosti dajejo organizacije delodajalcev in sindikati skupaj, v okviru razli~nih
sporazumov v zvezi z zniževanjem {tevila zaposlenih ter finan~nih spodbud.
Sporazumi v zvezi z zniževanjem {tevila zaposlenih so dogovorjeni v okviru
kolektivnih pogodb. Cilj teh sporazumov je izpolniti tako zahteve delodajalcev
kot potrebe presežnih delavcev. Obstaja osem upokojitvenih programov, kar
zajema 50% delovne sile.
Na [vedskem obstajata dva velika sklada: Fundacija za varovanje zaposlitve in Varnostni svet zaposlenih. Fundacija za varovanje zaposlitve pomaga
presežnim delavcem pri iskanju nove zaposlitve. Ustanovljena je bila z Zakonom o varovanju zaposlitve za zaposlene v javnem sektorju. Zakon o varovanju
zaposlitve pokriva zaposlene, katerih pogoji zaposlitve so urejeni s kolektivnimi
pogodbami med {vedsko vlado za delodajalce na strani vlade in strankami na
strani zaposlenih. Sporazum vklju~uje zaposlene, ki imajo pravico do odpravnine in imajo vsaj eno leto delovnih izku{enj na položaju. Z nekaterimi izjemami so upravi~eni do odpravnine, ki ustreza znesku, ki skupaj s koristmi iz
zavarovanja za primer brezposelnosti omogo~a do 80 odstotkov pla~e v prvih
200 dneh in 70 odstotkov v naslednjih 100 dneh za zaposlene z dohodki nad
zgornjo mejo zavarovanja za primer brezposelnosti. Varnostni svet zaposlenih
pa je združenje v lasti Konfederacije {vedskih podjetij in Sveta za pogajanje in
sodelovanje. ^lani so obi~ajno vodstveni delavci v zasebnem sektorju. Varnostni svet zaposlenih pomaga presežnim delavcem pri iskanju nove zaposlitve
in zagotavlja odpravnino in finan~no podporo za usposabljanje posameznikov,
starej{ih od 40 in z najmanj pet let izku{enj na položaju. Ti programi podpirajo
tudi zaposlene, ki želijo ustanoviti lastna podjetja (Thorsen, Brunk, 2009, str. 1).
138
Tatjana Kozjek
V Avstriji so uvedli sklade, ki so orodje za vzpostavitev potencialne
delovne sile na prožen in smiseln na~in in s tem podpirajo strukturne spremembe. Finan~no so podprti predvsem iz evropskih virov, posebej iz Evropskega socialnega sklada. Brezposelni dobijo priložnost za delo, medtem ko
dobivajo socialno varnost v obliki nadomestil za brezposelnost, povezanih z
izobraževanjem, nadaljnjim izobraževanjem ali usposabljanjem na delu. Posebnost teh skladov so njihova dolgoro~na naravnanost in njihovi posledi~no
vzdržni u~inki na zaposlovanje. Spodbujajo ve~jo poklicno, pla~no in geografsko
mobilnost, kot ukrep, ki meri na ravnotežje med prožnostjo in socialno varnostjo. V smernicah sklada avstrijskega zavoda za zaposlovanje so zapisali
naslednje:
•
vklju~evanje organizacij, ki i{~ejo zaposlene, v usposabljanje brezposelnih glede na obstoje~e potrebe;
•
premo{~anje vrzeli med zahtevanimi in obstoje~imi kvalifikacijami
brezposelnih;
•
podpiranje strukturnih sprememb;
•
izbolj{evanje možnosti za zaposlovanje žensk (European Communities,
2008, str. 30–35).
6. Predlogi za oblikovanje modela varne
prožnosti v Sloveniji
Domadenikova in ostali (2005, str. 1–4) navajajo, da so problemi, ki v
Sloveniji slabo vplivajo na varno prožnost, predvsem dokaj visoki stro{ki
zaposlovanja in odpu{~anja (odpravnine, socialni prispevki, davek na izpla~ane
pla~e, odpovedni roki, …), prezgodnje upokojevanje, premalo efektivnega dela
(vpliv bolni{kega staleža, malic, praznikov, nadur, dopustov,…) ter prevelika
vloga sindikatov.
Kresalova (2007, str. 492–494) pravi, da bi morala Slovenija ~im prej pristopiti k temeljni analizi stanja in k oblikovanju celovitega modela varne prožnosti
glede na slovenske specifi~ne zna~ilnosti ter cilje urejanja podro~ja dela, pri
~emer bi bilo smiselno omejevati pretiran obseg tako imenovanih prožnih oblik
zaposlovanja ({e posebej za dolo~en ~as) oziroma tudi pri tem spodbujati enako
zastopanost žensk in mo{kih v teh oblikah zaposlitve. V ve~ji meri je treba
139
Tatjana Kozjek
spodbujati predvsem funkcionalno prožnost v povezavi z zagotavljanjem varnosti za delavce, kar naj bi na srednji in dolgi rok spodbudno u~inkovalo na produktivnost in inovativnost delavcev ter s tem tudi konkuren~nost gospodarstva.
Prizadevati si je treba za pravno ureditev, ki bo spodbujala usklajen ekonomsko–socialni razvoj, uravnoteženo spodbujala prav{njo povezavo prožnosti in
varnosti, prepre~evala segmentacijo trga dela in dela na ~rno ter upo{tevala
tudi na~ela nediskriminatornega zaposlovanja. Pri tem je treba upo{tevati temeljna na~ela varne prožnosti, oblikovana na ravni Evropske skupnosti.
V temeljnih na~elih Evropske skupnosti je navedeno, da mora varna prožnost:
140
•
vklju~evati prožne in zanesljive pogodbene ureditve (s stali{~a delodajalcev in delojemalcev ter vklju~enih in izklju~enih), celostne strategije
vseživljenjskega u~enja, u~inkovite aktivne politike trga dela in
sodobne sisteme socialne varnosti;
•
temeljiti na ravnovesju med pravicami in odgovornostmi za delodajalce, delojemalce, iskalce zaposlitve in javne organe; prilagoditi jo je
treba posebnim okoli{~inam, razmeram na trgih dela in industrijskim
razmeram držav ~lanic;
•
zmanj{ati razliko med vklju~enimi in izklju~enimi delojemalci na trgu
dela, kar pomeni, da morajo biti vklju~eni delojemalci pripravljeni na
prehajanje z enega na drugo delovno mesto, med tem procesom pa
morajo biti za{~iteni; izklju~eni delojemalci, vklju~no z brezposelnimi,
pa potrebujejo lahek dostop do trga dela in odsko~no desko, ki jim bo
omogo~ala napredovanje do stabilnih pogodbenih ureditev:
•
spodbujati notranjo in zunanjo varno prožnost (znotraj organizacij in med
organizacijami) in pri tem spodbujati tako mobilnost navzgor kot tudi mobilnost med obdobji brezposelnosti ali neaktivnosti in zaposlitvijo;
•
podpirati enakost spolov s spodbujanjem enakega dostopa do kakovostnih delovnih mest za ženske in mo{ke, z zagotavljanjem možnosti v zvezi
z usklajevanjem dela in družinskega življenja ter enakih možnosti za migrante, mlade, invalide in starej{e delojemalce;
•
zahtevati ozra~je zaupanja in dialoga med javnimi organi in socialnimi partnerji, kjer bodo vsi pripravljeni prevzeti odgovornost za spremembe – prizadevati si morajo za pravi~no razdelitev stro{kov in koristi, zlasti med organizacijami, posamezniki in javnimi prora~uni ter namenjati posebno pozornost posebnemu položaju malih in srednjih organizacij (European
Commission, 2007, str. 10).
Tatjana Kozjek
7. Zaklju~ek
V ~asu recesije je pomen prav{nje povezave med prožnostjo in varnostjo
{e bolj v ospredju, saj lahko prevelika prožnost pripelje do velikih socialnih
sprememb, prevelika varnost pa povzro~i togost trga dela in s tem ovira prilagajanje zaposlenosti razmeram v gospodarstvu.
Države in organizacije morajo zato slediti vzoru držav, ki so na tem podro~ju do sedaj naredile že veliko (kot sta na primer Danska in Nizozemska) ter
zagotoviti prožno zaposlovanje, ki bi omogo~alo hitro prilagajanje potrebam trga
dela in s tem konkuren~nost; uveljaviti je treba sistem socialne varnosti, ki bi
prepre~eval, da bi visoka mobilnost zaposlenih povzro~ala ob~utek negotovosti
ali marginalizacijo, ter sprejeti aktivno politiko zaposlovanja, ki mora temeljiti na
usposabljanju in izobraževanju kot temelju zaposljivosti.
Pri uvedbi koncepta varne prožnosti morajo države upo{tevati potrebe in
specifi~nosti trga dela ter ureditev prilagoditi družbenemu, socialnemu, gospodarskemu, zgodovinskemu, kulturnemu kontekstu in potrebam, saj enostavno
kopiranje konceptov uspe{nih držav (kot sta na primer Danska in Nizozemska),
prav zaradi že omenjenih razlogov ne more prinesti pozitivnih rezultatov.
Mag. Tatjana Kozjek je od leta 2004 zaposlena na Fakulteti za upravo Univerze v
Ljubljani kot asistentka za podro~je organizacije javnega sektorja. Raziskuje podro~je
organizacije javnega sektorja in upravljanja s ~love{kimi viri, sodeluje pri pripravi in
izvedbi vaj ter seminarjev za javne uslužbence.
141
Tatjana Kozjek
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•
Standing, G. (1986). Labour Flexibility: Cause or Cure for Unemployment? Public Lectures (25), Genova: International Institute for Labour Studies.
•
Tangian, A. (2004). Defining the flexicurity index in application to European countries.
Diskussionpapier. WSI in der Hans Boeckler Stiftung (122), Duesseldorf.
•
Yvonne Thorsén, Y., Brunk, T. (2009). Sweden: Flexicurity and industrial relations. Retrieved 11. 11. 2009 from Sweden: Flexicurity and industrial relations. Oxford Research.
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/studies/TN0803038s/se0803039q.htm.
•
Tros, F., Wilthagen, T. (2004). The Concept of »Flexicurity«: a new approach to regulating employment and labour markets in Flexicurity. Conceptual Issues and Political Implementation in Europe. European Review of labour research 10(2), 166–186.
•
Van Oorschot, W. (2001). Activation and flexicurity policies in the Netherlands. Work
welfare and citizenship. Tilburg: Tilburg University, Department of sociology.
•
Van Velzen, M., Wilthagen, T. (2004). The road towards adaptability, flexibility and security. Discussion paper. Tilburg University, Tilburg.
•
Wilthagen, T., Tros, F., Van Lieshort, H. (2004). Towards »Flexicurity«? Balancing Flexibility and Security in EU Member States. European Journal of Social Security 6(2), 113–
136.
143
Tatjana Kozjek
SUMMARY
SOME ASPECTS OF FLEXIBILITY,
SECURITY AND FLEXICURITY
In recent years, numerous events have increased the competitiveness
and pace of structural change in many countries. Organizations must remain flexible in order to react to unexpected changes in demand, they
must adapt to new technologies. The employees are required to be productive and prepared for lifelong learning. Organizations, therefore, want
a more flexible labour legislation that would allow them to adapt the
number of employees, and employees on the other side want to have as
high social security contributions as possible. The fact is that if security is
too high it causes rigidity of the labour market and thus hinders adjustment of employment conditions in the economy. Therefore countries and
organizations are obliged to seek a correlation between flexibility and
security.
The paper describes some of the definitions of flexibility, security and
the correlation between flexibility and security of the so-called flexicurity.
Presented are some strategies of the countries that have successfully introduced the concept of flexicurity.
Wilthagen and Tros (2004, pp. 166) define flexicurity as a flexible political strategy, which on the one hand promotes labor market flexibility,
flexibility in work organization and labor relations and increased job
security and social security on the other hand, particularly for the vulnerable groups on and outside the labor market. This definition suggests
that strategies and policies of flexicurity develop on a safe, coordinated
and deliberate way, for example, through negotiations between social
partners or between individual employers and employees at various
levels. This method does not exclude the role of market forces, financial
incentives, fiscal measures, public-private partnerships or private organizations and agencies.
The Danish flexicurity model has been established in the nineties and
it has the effective combination of flexibility (high job mobility as a result
of a relatively low level of job security), social security (generous system
of unemployment insurance) and active labour market policies (Lang,
2006, pp. 3).
Countries and organizations should follow the countries that in this
area have been successful (such as Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands).
144
Tatjana Kozjek
They should provide flexible employment, allowing rapid adjustment of
labour market needs and competitiveness; promote social security system, preventing a feeling of insecurity and marginalization because of the
high mobility of staff, and take an active employment strategy, based
on training and education as the cornerstones of employability.
When adopting the concept of flexicurity the countries must consider
the needs and specificities of their labour market. Simply copying the
concepts of successful countries (such as Denmark, Sweden and the
Netherlands), especially because of the specificity of individual labour
markets, values and needs, will not bring positive outcomes.
.
145
146
Navodila avtorjem
V reviji Uprava objavljamo izvirne ~lanke, ki obravnavajo teoreti~na in prakti~na
vpra{anja razvoja in delovanja javne uprave.
Znanstvene ~lanke objavljamo v slovenskem in v angle{kem jeziku, izjemoma v
nem{kem ali francoskem jeziku. Druge ~lanke objavljamo v slovenskem, nem{kem ali
francoskem jeziku, z dalj{im povzetkom v angle{kem jeziku.
Uredni{ki postopek
Uredni{tvo lahko {e pred recenzijo zavrne objavo ~lanka, ~e njegova vsebina ne
ustreza najavljeni temi, ~e je bil podoben ~lanek v reviji že objavljen, ali ~e ~lanek ne
ustreza kriterijem za objavo v reviji. O tem uredni{tvo pisno obvesti avtorja.
Pred sprejemom ~lanka v recenzijo mora avtor podpisati Izjavo o avtorstvu, s
katero avtor prenese materialne avtorske pravice na izdajatelja revije in dovoli objavo
~lanka na spletu.
^lanek naj bo lektoriran, v uredni{tvu se opravlja samo korektura. Izjemoma se po
dogovoru z avtorjem besedilo tudi lektorira.
Vsi ~lanki se recenzirajo in razvrstijo po tipologiji COBISS (1.01 Izvirni znanstveni
~lanek; 1.02 Pregledni znanstveni ~lanek; 1.04 Strokovni ~lanek; 1.08 Objavljeni
znanstveni prispevek na konferenci). Med recenziranjem avtorji in recenzenti niso
imenovani. ^lanki pod 1.01, 1.02 morajo za objavo prejeti dve pozitivni recenziji.
Po sprejemu ~lanka pod 1.01, 1.02 v objavo se avtorje, ki so poslali ~lanek v slovenskem jeziku, obvesti, naj po{ljejo {e prevod ~lanka v angle{ki jezik.
Oblikovanje ~lanka
Naslovu prispevka naj sledi: polno ime avtorja/avtorjev, naziv institucije/institucij in
elektronski naslov/naslovi. ^lanek mora vsebovati {e:
− izvle~ek, ki naj v 8 do 10 vrsticah opi{e vsebino prispevka in dosežene
rezultate raziskave;
− klju~ne besede: 1-5 klju~nih besed;
− JEL kodo iz klasifikacije po Journal of Economic Literature - JEL
(http://www.aeaweb.org/journal/jel_class_system.html);
− ~lanek pod 1.04, ki bo objavljen v slovenskem, nem{kem ali francoskem
jeziku, naj vsebuje tudi povzetek v angle{kem jeziku v obsegu 3 strani.
(v povzetku prevedite naslov in klju~ne besede ter predstavite vsebino
~lanka (opredelitev problema in ugotovitve));
− kratek življenjepis avtorja/avtorjev (do 8 vrstic).
^lanek naj bo napisan v urejevalniku besedil Word (*.doc, *.docx) v enojnem razmiku, brez posebnih ali poudarjenih ~rk. Ne uporabljajte zamika pri odstavkih. Razdelki
od Uvoda do Sklepnih ugotovitev naj bodo naslovljeni in o{tevil~eni z arabskimi {tevilkami.
Slike in tabele, ki jih omenjate v ~lanku, vklju~ite v besedilo. Opremite jih z naslovom in o{tevil~ite z arabskimi {tevilkami. ê v ~lanku uporabljate slike ali tabele drugih
avtorjev, navedite sklic pod sliko, tabelo ali kot sprotno opombo. Ena~be o{tevil~ite v
oklepajih desno od ena~be.
^lanek naj obsega najve~ 30.000 znakov.
147
V besedilu se sklicujte na navedeno literaturo na na~in: (Novak, 1999, str. 456).
Na koncu ~lanka navedite literaturo po abecednem redu avtorjev in vire, po
naslednjem vzorcu:
^lanek v reviji:
• Gilber, G., & Pierre, P. (1996). Incentives and optimal size of local
jurisdictions. European Economic Review (40), 19–41.
Knjiga:
• Katzenbach, J., & Smith, D. (1993). The wisdom of teams.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Knjiga z urednikom:
• Keene, E. (Ed.). (1988). Natural Language. Cambridge: University of
Cambridge Press.
Prispevek na konferenci:
• Bugari~, B. (2002). Od hierarhi~ne k participativni (odprti) javni upravi. IX. dnevi
slovenske uprave. Portorož (pp. 23-29). Ljubljana: Visoka upravna {ola.
Internetni vir:
• Tax Administration of the Republic of Slovenia. (n.d.). Retrieved 8. 5., 2007,
from Tax Administration of the Republic of Slovenia: http://www.durs.gov.si/
Uradna publikacija, poro~ilo:
• (2001). World Development Indicators. Washington: World Bank.
Disertacija:
• Richmond, J. (2005). Customer expectations in the world of electronic banking:
a case study of the Bank of Britain. Ph. D. . Chelmsford: Anglia Ruskin
University.
Kadar ima publikacija ve~ kot {tiri avtorje, navedite samo prvega avtorja, npr. Novak et al. ê navajate dve deli ali ve~ del istega avtorja, letnico ozna~ite, npr. 2005a,
2005b…
Priporo~amo, da uporabite samodejni zapis literature, ki ga omogo~a Word 2007
(zapis APA).
Ko je ~lanek dokon~no urejen in pripravljen za tisk, ga prejme avtor v dokon~ni
pregled in potrditev.
^lanek imenujte po priimku prvega avtorja (Novak.doc) in ga po{ljite po elektronski
po{ti na naslov:
revija.uprava@fu.uni-lj.si.
En izvod ~lanka, natisnjenega na papirju, po{ljite na naslov:
Fakulteta za upravo,
Uredni{tvo revije Uprava,
Gosarjeva ulica 5, 1000 Ljubljana.
148
Instructions for Authors
The Uprava (Administration) journal publishes articles dealing with theoretical and
practical issues relating to the development and function of public administration.
Academic texts are published in Slovene and English, and exceptionally in German
and French. Other articles are published in Slovene, German or French, with an extended summary in English.
Editorial policy
The editorial board may decide not to publish an article even before peer review, if
its content does not match the stated themes, if a similar article has already been published in the journal, or if the article does not meet the criteria for publication in the
review. The editorial board will inform authors of such a decision in writing.
Before an article is accepted for peer review, the author must sign a Statement of
Authorship, transferring material copyright to the journal's publisher and consenting to
the article's publication online.
The article should already be edited, and the editorial board only takes responsibility for proof-reading. Exceptionally it may also edit a text in agreement with the author.
All articles are peer-reviewed and classified (1.01 Original scientific article; 1.02
Review article; 1.04 Professional article; 1.08 Published scientific conference contribution). The author and reviewer are not named during the peer review process.
Articles classified as 1.01 and 1.02 must have two positive peer reviews in order
to be published.
After acceptance of an article 1.01, 1.02 for publication, authors submitting an article in Slovene are asked to provide a translation into English.
Article formatting
The article's title should be followed by: the full name of the author/authors; the
name of the institution/institutions and email address(es). The article 1.04 must also
include:
−
−
−
−
−
an abstract describing the content of the contribution and research results
achieved in 8 to 10 lines;
keywords: 1-5 keywords;
a JEL code (Journal of Economic Literature) –
(http://www.aeaweb.org/journal/jel_class_system.html);
if published in Slovene, German or French, the article must also have a summary in English, 3 pages in length (the summary should translate the title and
keywards and present the content of the article (define the argument and findings));
a short CV of the author/authors to the article (up to 8 lines).
An article must be supplied in the MS Word (*.doc, *.docx) with single spacing,
without special or highlighted characters. Do not indent paragraphs. Sections from the
introduction to the conclusion should be titled and numbered with Arabic numerals.
Figures and tables mentioned in the article should be included in the text. They
should be titled and numbered with Arabic numerals. If the figures or tables of other
authors are used in the article, give the reference below the figure or table or as a footnote. Equations should be numbered in brackets to the right of the equation.
Articles should not exceed 30 000 characters.
149
References in the text to cited literature should be made as follows: (Novak,
1999, p. 456).
State the literature in alphabetical order of author and source at the end of the
article, as follows:
Article from a journal:
• Gilber, G., & Pierre, P. (1996). Incentives and optimal size of local jurisdictions.
European Economic Review (40), 19–41.
Book:
• Katzenbach, J., & Smith, D. (1993). The wisdom of teams. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard Business School Press.
Book with editor:
• Keene, E. (Ed.). (1988). Natural Language. Cambridge: University of
Cambridge Press.
Conference contribution:
• Bugarič, B. (2002). Od hierarhi~ne k participativni (odprti) javni upravi. IX.
dnevi slovenske uprave. Portorož (pp. 23-29). Ljubljana: Visoka upravna {ola.
Internet source:
• Tax Administration of the Republic of Slovenia. (n.d.). Retrieved 8. 5., 2007,
from Tax Administration of the Republic of Slovenia: http://www.durs.gov.si/
Official publication, report:
• (2001). World Development Indicators. Washington: World Bank.
Dissertation:
• Richmond, J. (2005). Customer expectations in the world of electronic banking:
a case study of the Bank of Britain. Ph. D. . Chelmsford: Anglia Ruskin
University.
If a publication has more than four authors, state only the first author, e.g. Novak
et al. If citing two works or more by the same author, indicate the year, e.g. 2005a,
2005b, etc. We recommend the use of the automatic literature citation, which is supported by Word 2007 (APA citation).
When the article has been finally edited and prepared for printing, it is sent to the
author for final check and confirmation.
The article filename should use the first author's surname (Smith.doc) and be sent
by email to the following address: revija.uprava@fu.uni-lj.si.
One printed, paper copy of the article should be sent to the following address:
Fakulteta za upravo,
Uredni{tvo revije Uprava,
Gosarjeva ulica 5, 1000 Ljubljana.
150

Letnik VII, Številka 3, 2009 - Fakulteta za upravo

Transcription

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