Special Issue No. 11, 2013: To Rescue or not Rescue

Transcription

VSEBINA/CONTENT
UVODN A BESEDA/FOREWORD
Klaus Liebscher: Kako rešiti finančni in realni sektor / How to rescue the financial and the real sector
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U V O D N I K / E D I TO R I A L
Boštjan Jazbec: Zdrave banke za gospodarsko rast – ali nasprotno? / Which comes first: bank rescue or economic growth? 3
S I S T E M S K I V I D I K S A N A C I J E B A N Č N E G A S E K TO R J A
S Y S T E M I C A S P E C T O F B A N K I N G S E C TO R R E H A B I L I TAT I O N
Guido Ravoet: Ključne dileme bančne sanacije evropskega finančnega sistema
Key dilemmas of the bank rehabilitation in the European financial system
France Arhar in Matej Tomec: Prestrukturiranje sistemskih bank EMU v primerjavi s Slovenijo
Restructuring of systemic banks in EMU compared to Slovenia
Albrecht F. Michler and H. Jörg Thieme: Sanacija finančnega sektorja – primer nemških bank
Rehabilitation of Financial sector – The case of German banks
Otto Lucius: Sanacija finančnega sektorja – primer avstrijskih bank
Rehabilitation of Financial sector – The case of Austrian banks
Alan Dukes: Sanacija finančnega sektorja – primer irskih bank
Rehabilitation of Financial sector – The case of Irish banks
Antonio Carrascosa and Mario Delgado: Rehabilitacija finančnega sektorja – primer španskih bank
Rehabilitation of Financial sector – The case of Spanish banks
Ivan Ribnikar: Kapital in lastništvo bank z vidika bančne sanacije pri nas
Bank capital and ownership in light of bank rehabilitation in Slovenia
P R AV N O O KO L J E I N Z A KO N O DA J N I O K V I R I P R E S T RU K T U R I R A N JA P O DJ E T I J
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AND LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF COMPANY RESTRUCTURING
Andrej Simonič: Zakonodaja o sistemskem razdolževanju / Systemic deleveraging legislation
Mojca Trstenjak: Bančna zakonodaja in ukrepi za prestrukturiranje bank Banking legislation and bank rehabilitation measures
MAKROEKONOMSKI VIDIKI SANACIJE BANK IN PRESTRUKTURIRANJA PODJETIJ
MACRO-FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF BANK REHABILITATION AND COMPANY RESTRUCTURING
Holger Schmieding: Makroekonomski trendi in bančna kriza v EU / Macroeconomic trends and EU banking crisis
Marko Simoneti in Božo Jašovič: Razdolževanje bank v EU in Sloveniji / Bank deleveraging in EU and Slovenia Marjan Hafner in Urška Lušina: Zadolženost slovenske ekonomije in kreditna vrzel
Indebtedness of Slovenian economy and credit-to-GDP gap
Gonzalo Caprirolo: Makroekonomske posledice razdolževanja bank in podjetniškega sektorja
Macroeconomic implications of banks and corporate sector deleveraging
PRIMERI DOBRE PRAKSE/BEST PRACTICE C ASES AND LESSONS
Boštjan Kavčič in Andraž Kotolenko: Problematika zunajsodnih prodaj in težave bank v insolvenčnih postopkih
Insolvency proceedings – legal concerns and bank experience
Maja Koritnik in Peter Merc: Reševanje bank z zasebnimi sredstvi / Bail-in tool for bank resolution
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REMARKS
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Emil Lah: Slovenske banke med Scilo in Karibdo / Slovenian banks between rock and hard place
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S TAT I S T I Č N A P R I LO G A / S TAT I S T I C A L A P P E N D I X 120
Bančni
vestnik
REVIJA ZA DENARNIŠTVO IN BANČNIŠTVO
THE JOURNAL FOR MONEY AND BANKING
ISSN 0005-4631
Uredniški odbor: mag. Božo Jašovič (predsednik), mag. Janez Fabijan (namestnik predsednika), mag. Peter
Kupljen (mag. Kristijan Hvala), mag. Damijan Dolinar, Davorin Leskovar, univ. dipl. ekon., mag. Emil Lah,
dr. Damjan Kozamernik, dr. Mojmir Mrak, dr. Ivan Ribnikar (dr. Marko Košak), dr. Rasto Ovin (dr. Dušan
Zbašnik), dr. Marko Simoneti, Alenka Smerkolj, dipl. filolog, odgovorni urednik: mag. Emil Lah, strokovna
sodelavka: Azra Beganović, lektorica: Alenka Regally, AD in oblikovanje: Edi Berk/KROG, oblikovanje znaka
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FOREWORD
How to rescue the financial
and the real sector
Dear reader,
The current issue of “Bančni Vestnik“ focuses on bank rehabilitation and company restructuring. The foreword should
give a brief overview on how to rescue
the financial and the real sectors, by focusing on developments in Europe.
As of August 2007, notable turbulences
in the financial markets emerged, and,
due to the subprime crisis in the United
States, the risk aversion of banks increased. After the Lehman Brothers
Bankruptcy in 2008, a lot of financial
institutions got into serious difficulties. A
worldwide financial crisis evolved and
spilled-over to the real sector.
There were prompt reactions by the EU
policy makers and by policy makers on
national level in order to restore financial market stability. A lot of European
countries, including Austria, introduced
schemes to rescue banks by granting
State aid. In the context of the financial crisis, approximately twenty European countries introduced bank rescue
schemes. A wave of far-reaching restructuring of individual banks started.
The European Commission’s DirectorateGeneral for competition is responsible
for assessing and approving State aid for
banks. According to information from that
authority, approximately 1.6 trillion euros
of public means was granted in State aid
to banks in the EU between 1 October
2008 and the end of 2011. The amount
of guarantees (guarantees for banks‘ liabilities and other guarantees) granted
by EU governments was even three times
greater. In the meantime, a number of
States granted further State aid to banks.
Also the ECB reacted promptly. Inter alia,
it carried out the following measures:
The ECB granted liquidity to the interbank markets by a series of operations
as banks started to be reluctant to grant
interbank loans. The ECB substantially decreased interest rates and accepted additional assets as being eligible collateral
BV 11/2013
for providing liquidity to banks. In December 2011, the ECB agreed to carry out
two longer-term refinancing operations
(LTROs), each with duration of 36 months.
In the course of the financial crisis, a lot
of European banks had to be rescued
and/or far-reaching restructured, inter
alia banks in the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United
Kingdom. A number of European banks
were resolved. A key aspect in bank restructuring is that banks should have a
competitive and viable business model
that supports the real economy.
In order to give the first impression of
what has happened in the EU Member
States, there is Austria as an example.
Austria introduced a banking rescue
scheme in 2008, inter alia consisting of
the possibility to grant capital injections
(e.g. participation capital which is a kind
of preference shares capital without voting rights, which Austria injected to an
extent of 5.4 billion euros) and guarantees (60 billion euros originally; as at the
end of July 2013, approximately 8 billion
euros in guarantees was outstanding on
the basis of the two respective laws: the
interbank market support act and the financial market stability act).
Five Austrian banks have received public
support and started far-reaching restructuring programmes. Two banks had to be
nationalised. For one of these banks, a
wind-up institution was created in 2009.
Currently, there are considerations whether a wind-up institution should also be set
up for the second nationalised bank.
To stabilise the European financial sector
and to increase the bank resilience, a lot
of additional regulations were introduced
or will be introduced. For example, the
capital rules will be tightened (Basel III)
and a so called “banking union“ is under
consideration; with a centralised banking
supervision under the responsibility of the
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European Central Bank as well as a common deposit insurance scheme and a
common mechanism for bank resolution.
In the context of bank resolution, there is a
proposal from the European Commission
containing, among others, a bail-in component regarding banks which are under
resolution. According to the proposal, the
decision making structures of the “Single
Resolution Mechanism“ (European Commission, Single Resolution Board and the
national resolution authorities) shall decide on, respectively exercise, the write
down and conversion powers regarding
claims of inter alia certain investors and
shareholders.
As of 1 August 2013, there is already
a partial anticipation of the bail-in component, namely for the banks having a
capital shortfall and applying for public
capital support. According to the EU
State aid rules, these banks will have to
obtain contributions from shareholders
and subordinated debtholders before resorting to public recapitalisations or asset
protection measures.
Following the financial crisis, some European countries, especially in the periphery, got into severe economic troubles.
After a short recovery in 2010, the euro
area fell in a slow-down of its economic
performance and is still in a recession.
Only some countries, like Austria among
others, show meagre economic growth.
The real problems of these developments
lie in failures of the past in the fields of
fiscal and structural policies. The biggest
challenge is to reduce general debts and
to achieve balanced public budgets. In
addition, there is a need for better economic coordination, for a strict adherence to sustainable fiscal policies and
for improved surveillance mechanisms to
support solid economic growth and high
employment.
Klaus Liebscher,
Chairman of the Managing Board,
FIMBAG
BV 11/2012
UVODNA BESEDA
Kako rešiti finančni in
realni sektor
Spoštovani bralec,
Tema izdaje Bančnega vestnika, ki jo trenutno prebirate, je sanacija bank in prestrukturiranje gospodarskih družb. Uvodnik
ponuja kratek pregled načinov za reševanje
finančnega in realnega sektorja na podlagi
dogodkov, ki smo jim priča v Evropi.
V avgustu 2007 je zaradi krize drugorazrednih hipotekarnih kreditov v ZDA prišlo do
prvih resnih pretresov na finančnih trgih in
se je odpor do tveganj skokovito povečal.
Po propadu investicijske banke Lehman
Brothers leta 2008, se je veliko finančnih
institucij znašlo v resnih težavah. Svetovna
finančna kriza se je razširila in zajela tudi
realni sektor.
Institucije Evropske unije so se nemudoma
odzvale na te dogodke enako kot institucije
na nacionalni ravni s ciljem, da se ponovno
vzpostavi stabilnost finančnih trgov. Veliko število evropskih držav med katerimi je
bila tudi Avstrija, je sprejelo programe za
reševanje bank skozi podelitev državne pomoči. V okviru odziva na finančno krizo, je
približno dvajset evropskih držav vpeljalo
programe za reševanje bank. Sprožil se je
val daljnosežnega prestrukturiranja posameznih bank.
Generalni direktorat za konkurenco pri
Evropski Komisiji je pristojen za ocenjevanje in odobritev državne pomoči za banke.
Iz podatkov GD za konkurenco je razvidno,
da je bankam v Evropski uniji bilo odobreno približno 1600 milijard evrov sredstev
iz javnih virov kot državna pomoč v obdobju med 1. oktobrom 2008 in koncem leta
2011. Znesek jamstev vlad držav članic
Evropske unije (jamstva za obveznosti bank
in druge vrste garancij) je bil celo trikrat
višji.
Tudi Evropska centralna banka (ECB) se
je hitro odzvala. Med ostalim je izpeljala
naslednje ukrepe: ko so se banke vse težje
odločale za odobritev medbančnih posojil,
je Evropska centralna banka ponudila likvidnost medbančnim trgom skozi niz operacij
denarne politike. Evropska centralna banka
je bistveno znižala obrestne mere in sprejela dodatna sredstva kot zavarovanje, na
podlagi katerega so banke dobile likvidna
sredstva. V decembru 2011 se je ECB odločila za vpeljavo dveh operacij dolgoročnega refinanciranja (LTRO), pri čemer je vsaka
trajala 36 mesecev.
V času trajanja finančne krize je bilo potrebno reševati veliko evropskih bank in/ali so
banke potrebovale temeljito prestrukturiranje. Med temi bankami so se, med ostalim,
znašle banke v naslednjih državah: Avstrija, Belgija, Ciper, Danska, Finska, Francija,
Nemčija, Grčija, Madžarska, Irska, Italija,
Latvija, Nizozemska, Portugalska, Slovenija, Španija, Švedska in Združeno kraljestvo.
Marsikatera evropska banka je bila tudi rešena. Ključni aspekt prestrukturiranja bank
je, da naj bi banke imele konkurenčen in
vitalen poslovni model, ki nudi podporo realnemu gospodarstvu.
Z namenom, da na kratko orišemo kaj se je
dogajalo v državah članicah Evropske unije, lahko za primer vzamemo Avstrijo.
Avstrija je vpeljala shemo za reševanje
bank leta 2008, ki zajema, med ostalim,
možnost, da se bankam odobrijo injekcije svežega kapitala (npr. dokapitalizacije
bank v obliki ene vrste prednostnih delnic
brez glasovalnih pravic, ki jih je Avstrija
dokapitalizirala v višini 5,4 milijard evrov)
in jamstva (prvotno je bil določen znesek v
višini 60 milijard evrov, medtem ko je konec
julija 2013, bilo še približno 8 milijard v
jamstvih na voljo na podlagi dveh zakonov:
Zakon o podpori medbančnemu trgu in Zakon o finančni stabilnosti).
Pet avstrijskih bank je prejelo podporo iz
javnih virov in začelo s temeljitimi programi
za prestrukturiranje. Dve banki sta morali biti nacionalizirani. Za eno od teh bank
je leta 2009 bila ustanovljena posebna
institucija za likvidacijo. Trenutno se vodi
razprava o tem, ali naj se ustanovi tovrstna
institucija tudi za likvidacijo druge nacionalizirane banke.
Cela kopica dodatnih predpisov je bila že
vpeljana ali bo vpeljana z namenom, da se
stabilizira evropski finančni sektor in okrepi
prožnost bank. Kapitalska pravila, na primer, bodo poostrena (Basel III.) in na mizi
je predlog ustanovitve t.i. “bančne unije“;
centralizirani bančni nadzor bo v pristojnosti Evropske centralne banke, enako kot sku-
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pna shema za zavarovanje bančnih depozitov in skupni mehanizem za reševanje bank.
V okviru problematike reševanja bank, je
na mizi predlog Evropske komisije v katerem se, med ostalim, predlaga t.i. »bail-in
komponenta« za banke, ki so v postopku
reševanja. Skladno s tem predlogom, upravljavske strukture “Enotnega mehanizma za
reševanje bank“ (Evropska komisija, Enotni
svet za reševanje bank in nacionalni organi
za reševanje bank) so pristojne, da sprejmejo odločitve in spremljajo njihovo izvršitev v
zvezi z odpisi in imajo pristojnost, da odobrijo konverzijo terjatev, med ostalimi, nekaterih investitorjev in delničarjev.
Dne 1. avgusta 2013 je že začela veljati
delna preliminarna »bail-in komponenta«,
ki velja za banke z nezadostno višino kapitala in ki zaprosijo za kapitalske injekcije
z javnimi sredstvi. EU pravila o državni pomoči določajo, da bodo te banke morale
pridobiti prispevke od svojih delničarjev in
imetnikov podrejenih dolžniških kapitalskih
instrumentov preden zaprosijo za dokapitalizacijo s sredstvi davkoplačevalcev ali za
ukrepe zaščite premoženja.
Po finančni krizi so se nekatere evropske države zlasti s periferije Evropske unije znašle
v resnih gospodarskih težavah. Po kratkem
obdobju okrevanja leta 2010, je evroobmočje doletela upočasnitev gospodarske
dejavnosti in je še vedno v recesiji. Le posamezne države, kot je, na primer, Avstrija,
kažejo znake slabe gospodarske rasti.
Dejanski problemi v ozadju dogodkov, ki
smo jim bili priča, so spodrsljaji iz preteklih
let na področju fiskalnih in strukturnih politik.
Največji izziv je zmanjšanje proračunskega
primanjkljaja in vzpostavitev uravnovešenega državnega proračuna. Poleg tega je potrebno delovati usklajeno na gospodarskem
planu, strogo se držati trajnostne fiskalne
politike in izboljšati nadzorne mehanizme
s ciljem, da se ustvarijo pogoji za solidno
gospodarsko rast in visoko stopnjo zaposlenosti.
Klaus Liebscher,
Predsednik Upravnega odbora,
FIMBAG
BV 11/2013
UVODNIK/EDITORIAL
Zdrave banke za gospodarsko
rast – ali nasprotno?
Boštjan Jazbec*
S
lovenija je na pomembnih razpotjih, saj je od začetka
recesije naprej soočena s številnimi ekonomskimi in
družbenimi težavami ter šibko gospodarsko rastjo. Za
državo, gospodarstvo in družbo kot celoto je obrat nujen.
Osnovna naloga bank je posredniška vloga med varčevalci in investitorji. V krizi je ta naloga omejena zaradi
visokih stroškov pridobivanja virov, prevelike zadolženosti številnih podjetij in slabšanja kakovosti posojil.
Neučinkovitost posredniške funkcije bank se kaže tudi
v omejitvah izvajanja denarne politike oziroma v precej
višjih obrestnih merah za posojila podjetjem kot v povprečju evrskega območja.
Večina naših bank je trenutno v procesu celovitega
preverjanja stanja svojih bilanc in kapitalske osnove v
primeru dodatnih šokov v makroekonomskem okolju. Ta
proces je skladen z zahtevami evropskih institucij pri
dodeljevanju državne pomoči bankam. Namen tega procesa v Sloveniji je odstraniti slabe terjatve iz bančnih bilanc in zagotoviti kapitalske temelje za stabilen in učinkovit finančni sistem. To je nujen, ne pa tudi zadosten
pogoj za izhod iz krize in ponovno gospodarsko rast.
Gospodarska aktivnost bo odločilno vplivala na to, ali
bo ozdravitev bank zgolj začasna in ali bodo banke v prihodnje spet učinkovito opravljale posredniško funkcijo.
Temeljno vprašanje tega trenutka ni le, kako zagotoviti
stabilnost bank, temveč tudi, kako v prihodnje omogočiti
vzdržno gospodarsko rast. Dogajanje pred krizo je pokazalo, da le-ta v majhnem odprtem gospodarstvu dolgoročno ni mogoča le na podlagi velikih infrastrukturnih
projektov in domačega trošenja, še zlasti, če je slednje
podprto z izdatnim dolžniškim financiranjem iz tujine.
Rezultati takšne rasti gospodarstva so danes vidni v bilancah bank, podjetij in saldu javnih financ.
Uspešnost izhoda iz krize in preprečitev nastanka ponovne negativne povratne zanke med realnim in bančnim sektorjem bo pretežno pogojena s prestrukturiranjem bilanc podjetij in izboljšanjem strukture virov
financiranja. Po dokapitalizaciji bančnega sistema in ob
ustreznih pravnih rešitvah bi lahko banke bolj uporabljale instrument pretvorbe dela bančnih posojil v kapital
podjetij. To bi podjetjem z dobrimi poslovnimi načrti in
potencialom za rast omogočilo razbremenitev bilanc,
banke pa bi lahko pridobljene lastniške deleže, ko bo
njihova ekonomska vrednost višja, prodale po višji ceni.
Investicije v infrastrukturo morajo v naslednjih letih
* Dr. Boštjan Jazbec, guverner Banke Slovenije.
BV 11/2013
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prispevati k večanju produktivnosti zasebnega sektorja, njihovo financiranje pa ne sme obremenjevati javnih
financ. Zato bi se Slovenija morala bolj odpreti tujim
neposrednim investicijam z davčnimi olajšavami, stabilnim gospodarskim okoljem in krčenjem administrativnih ovir. Njena primerjalna prednost ne sme biti slabo
plačana in neizobražena delovna sila, ampak morajo
novo ustvarjena delovna mesta prinašati visoko dodano
vrednost. Tudi tako bomo preprečili trend izseljevanja
mlade in izobražene delovne sile.
Pretežni del naše gospodarske rasti mora izvirati iz
menjave s tujino. Izvozni del gospodarstva se je doslej
izkazal kot izjemno prilagodljiv, tako z vidika prilagajanja stroškov kot tudi iskanja poslovnih priložnosti
na novih trgih. Zato mu moramo z ukrepi ekonomske
politike omogočiti nadaljnjo rast. Zaradi pridobivanja
konkurenčnosti na tujih trgih je izvozni sektor prisiljen
v dodatno večanje stroškovne učinkovitost, ki ne sme
temeljiti na zmanjševanju spodbud zaposlenim za večanje produktivnosti. Namesto tega moramo postopoma
zmanjševati druge stroške dela, ki neposredno ne odsevajo prispevka posameznika k uspešnosti podjetja. Stroški gospodarstva se bodo morali posredno znižati tudi z
racionalizacijo in optimizacijo poslovanja v dejavnostih
z nižjo ravnijo konkurence.
Edini dejavnik, ki lahko na dolgi rok spodbudi gospodarsko rast, je večanje produktivnosti proizvodnih dejavnikov. Ukrepi, ki to zagotavljajo, delujejo počasi, zato bi jih
bilo treba začeti izvajati čim prej. Učinkovitost kapitala
je pogojena z uvajanjem novih tehnologij in spodbujanjem inovacijske dejavnosti. Podlaga za učinkovitost
delovne sile pa je kakovostno izobražena delovna sila.
Kriza je pokazala, da moramo v Sloveniji nujno spremeniti miselnost in namesto stremljenja za hitrim zaslužkom in varovanja ozkih interesnih skupin začeti
ustvarjati razmere za dolgoročno gospodarsko rast
in transparentno upravljanje države. Predvsem pa se
moramo zavedati, da država ne more poskrbeti za vse
in da je njena naloga predvsem, da prepreči razkrajanje socialne kohezije in poskrbi za kakovosten institucionalni okvir delovanja države in gospodarstva. Le
tako bo mogoče ustvariti družbo s stabilno in vzdržno
gospodarsko rastjo in čim večjo blaginjo njenih prebivalcev. Takrat se nam tudi ne bo več treba ukvarjati s
sanacijo bank.
SYSTEMIC ASPECT OF BANKING SECTOR REHABILITATION
UDK 336.71:061.1EU
Key dilemmas of the
bank rehabilitation in the
European financial system
KEY DILEMMAS OF THE
BANK REHABILITATION
IN THE EUROPEAN
FINANCIAL SYSTEM
There has been a
tremendous change the
European banking sector
has been undergoing.
One such key change
has been the increasing
regulation imposed
on the sector and its
consequences. This article
attempts to present those
challenges and solutions
(to be) implemented by
the banking sector in order
to succeed in an evolving
complex environment, and
contribute to the European
economy recovery.
JEL G01 G21 G28
U
Guido Ravoet*
ntil less than a decade ago, Europe’s banks have, arguably, been one of the most trusted institutions at the
heart of every community.
This has changed with the crisis which has brought
a range of new challenges for the banking sector: liquidity and
sovereign risks, ever-increasing policy interventions and protracted
low interest rates have distorted the market environment in which
both financial organisations and investors operate.
This year reveals a continued general trend of shrinkage and
disintegration of the European banking sector. The economic situation is less than favourable: different nations within the European
Union take different approaches to dealing with their challenges.
To generalise, the euro area banking sector is taking the strongest
hit (banking presence reduced in terms of numbers and financial
activity), while the non-euro area banks are faring better.1 Furthermore, financial stability is undermined. A paradigm shift in the
area of financial supervision is taking place, in order to solve the
fundamental trilemma of financial supervision.
All banks have been impacted by the crisis. Their current
decisions will determine their position in the global competition
and more specifically how they will be able to take advantage from
the recovery in mature markets as well as from the new regulatory
environment.
*
Guido Ravoet, Chief Executive, EBF Secretariat.
EBF, Facts and Figures, 2013.
1
4
BV 11/2013
It will take a long time, maybe 5
or even 10 years for the sector to
recover from the reputational blow
and the economic turmoil. European
banks’ figures on their Return on Equity (ROE) remain weak. For 2012,
EU 27 banks ROE median value is
only 3.4%2. Even where that metric
is still healthy, external factors such
as persistently low interest rates are
disrupting their business models. The
banking sector has acquired a highly negative reputation and customer
trust remains fragile. In spite of their
needs in terms of banking services,
customers are more and more looking for alternative financial services
providers (shadow banking)3.
Banking associations have played
a key role in helping solve the crisis.
They have stood as banks’ interlocutors with policy-makers, defending
and representing the interests of
their members in adverse circumstances. They have often taken
blows in the name of the sector,
have stood up in sometimes difficult
positions defending what seemed
in the eyes of regulators to be the
undefendable.
In the meantime, the main challenge
for banks has been to acknowledge
the poor state of their reputation –
with customers, investors, but also
other banks. Concretely, banks have
already made profound improvements in their risk management by
down-sizing and de-risking their
balance sheets. They are also developing numerous market solutions
as well as changing their attitude
and culture progressively, looking
towards more sustainable business
models. Banks are now aware that
incremental change is no longer a
sustainable response to the global
shift facing the industry. Several
banks have already launched repositioning strategies in order to adapt
to the new environment, but many
more need to follow suit.
BV 11/2013
****
Financial institutions, users of financial services, politicians and regulators – all have reacted to the crisis
in different ways, which has resulted
in a lack of mutual understanding
and counterproductive initiatives. In
order to tackle the dramatic decline
of trust in the banking industry
experiences among its customers4,
policy-makers are putting in place
tougher regulation. They conveyed
the same message as the media: the
banking industry is at the heart of
the crisis and should bear the cost
The euro
area banking
sector is
taking the
strongest hit.
of its misbehaviour. Further damage has been done to the industry
itself; bankers’ bonuses, benchmarks
manipulation... Once trust is broken,
it takes a long time to rebuild it …
In that context, banks are struggling
to strike the right balance between
profitability and funding the real
economy. Competition is indeed
fiercer than ever, and banks need
to maintain their position in the
market if they are to be profitable.
At the same time, they need to keep
playing their key role, which is that
of funding the economy, businesses
and households. The financial
sector provides a variety of functions which are essential to our
economies but is it understood well
enough?
5
Regulation, the political
solution
In the aftermath of the current
financial and economic crises, the
European banking sector has been
undergoing the regulatory ‘tsunami’.
In the run-up to the 2007-8 crisis,
some banks went too far in excessive
leveraging, resulting from shareholder-driven profit-seeking. As a consequence, banks, regardless of their
business model, are now faced with
tougher regulation on a vast array of
issues: from capital and liquidity requirements, to limitations to financial
leverage, to greater investor protection and increased transparency, to
governance and remuneration issues,
to reduction of over-the-counter
derivatives, to the way the sector is
structured, and more.
There has been a strong and understandable reaction from politicians
and regulators to the financial crisis.
But it is clear now that regulation
cannot solve everything.
At the EBF, we strongly believe that
the industry needs improved regulation, better response to the needs of
the wider economy, but certainly not
‘more and more of everything’5.
Regulatory reforms are aimed at
making financial institutions safer, ensuring stability of the financial system,
and relocating the cost of failures
from taxpayers to the creditors of
failing institutions. The ever-growing
list of initiatives is endless. It covers
not only tougher requirements for
individual banks but also macroprudential policies aimed at improving
financial stability and the resilience of
the financial sector as a whole.
1
EBF, Facts and Figures, 2013.
ECB
3
E&Y, Global Banking Outlook, 2013-2014.
4
According to E&Y, across Europe, 45% of
respondents said that the crisis has had a negative
impact on their trust in financial institutions
5
KPMG, The scope for better regulation
2
However, additional regulation
should not be considered as a
miracle solution; there are limits to
what regulation can achieve. It is
high time for regulators to step back
and evaluate the cumulative impact
of their multiple reform initiatives.
The consequences of the sweeping
reform compliance cause collateral
damages. Implementing those regulations increases banks’ costs, may
slow down innovation in financial
services and reduce ability for banks
to provide credit, trade finance and
risk management services. The current reform package also diminishes
returns to investors in financial institutions and also weighs on economic
growth. For instance, while banks are
deleveraging, economic growth in
Europe is weak (or even negative).
Negative short-term impact on economic growth may be a reasonable
price to pay to avoid future financial
crises. But evidence shows that the
waves of regulatory reforms are
now leading Europe and the global
financial system beyond the ‘tipping
point’ where the costs of ever more
regulation have begun to exceed the
benefits6.
The banking sector is far from being
reluctant to any regulatory development. Since last year, the European banking sector has embraced
wholeheartedly the Banking Union
project. It fully supports the initiatives
of a Single Supervisory Mechanism
and will contribute positively to the
initiatives on resolution and deposit
guarantees, the two outstanding
issues to complete the regulatory
overhaul. Besides, the European
Banking Federation has always
called for and worked to achieve a
European Single Market in financial
services. The Banking Union is the
first concrete project which will allow
for actual stability in the future, by facilitating convergence and establishing the basis for a level playing field
at European level. European banks
welcome the dialogue established in
order to build the Banking Union and
the increasing recognition of the importance of maintaining the capacity
of banks to finance the economy.
One may not forget however that
banking will always be about managing risk; this is the inherent nature
of the sector. Future failures will occur, there is little to do about some of
those. Nevertheless, the way failures
are addressed is decisive. While the
cumulative cost of regulation paid by
the wider economy may have been
seriously underestimated, no one can
shy away from their responsibility.
For 2012, EU
27 banks ROE
median value is
only 3.4%.
How to restore trust?
Although customers have been and
still are broadly satisfied with their
individual banking relationships, the
banking industry is now tarnished by
recent scandals. To help regulators
ease back and to restore trust and
confidence of all stakeholders, banks
have a strong motivation to demonstrate their efforts to conduct responsible and ethical banking.
The industry is shifting from a reactive to a proactive stance. Demonstrating the crucial role that banks
play as intermediaries for businesses
and investors will indeed facilitate
the process.
The range of measures (to be) taken
is far-reaching: change in culture and
behaviours, delivering much higher
standards of governance, better risk
management, improved customer
6
service, improved products and
services, better disclosure of asset
quality and risk; as well as corporate
social responsibility and financial
education programmes.
As banks adapt to the new environment, new challenges to the way
they operate are rising.
Firstly, it appears that most operating
models and structures are no longer
suitable. Restructuring of banks is
a reality; the EU banking sector is
shrinking. Some brands will disappear as consolidation intensifies
among smaller banks. In Europe,
many survivors will be much smaller
as deleveraging is expected to shrink
balance sheets by more than USD
2.5 trillion by December 20137.
Many banks that invested to expand
themselves at the international level
are now forced to give up their ambitions. European banks feel a real
pressure to focus on their core business in their home markets and have
already started restructuring. As
subsidiaries are sold and branches
closed, the ability to serve international customers will be at risk.
In the process of offering customers
more transparent, consistent and
comprehensive service, banks will
tend to restructure banking services
in order to both reduce costs and
significantly improve operating efficiency. This requires innovation and
technology. It will enable banks to
analyse client activity and provide
much more targeted services and
solutions. The promising mobile
banking trend will also respond to
the new needs consumers have.
Banks will need to anticipate shifts in
behaviour of their customers. Digital
banks have become first intermediaries between customers and the
financial world so communications
will be crucial. In that sense, pres-
6
7
KPMG, The scope for better regulation
E&Y, Global Banking Outlook, 2013-2014.
BV 11/2013
ence in social media is an essential
communication platform, particularly
with clients.
Despite their obvious benefit for consumers, those policies have a cost.
New regulations are already placing
considerable stress on banks’ data
and reporting platforms. In addition,
cybersecurity is also an ever-more
prominent issue, particularly with
outdated systems and data storage requirements that tend to grow
exponentially.
At the same time, customer behaviour is changing and expectations
are increasing. As competition
intensifies across Europe, customers
become less loyal to their bank and
as alternative providers enter the
market, only banks offered differentiated products or services will benefit
from that opportunity.
Consumer and investor
support is essential
Investors in financial institutions
and customers also need to play
their part in addressing the balance
between regulation and economic
growth. By implementing financial
education programmes and launching public relations campaigns,
banks have an opportunity to
explain how financial services are
important but also that there is a cost
attached to providing them.
In turn, the trade-off between risk
and returns also has to be acknowledged.
By better understanding banks’
business models and risks, both
consumers and investors will develop
a more realistic environment, in
particular in a world where failures
are more likely to result in the bailingin of creditors than a bailing-out by
taxpayers.
****
The banking sector acknowledges
that certain parts of the new regulaBV 11/2013
tory framework enhance the resilience of the industry. Nonetheless, it
has become clear that the important
role of banks needs to be preserved
by creating favourable conditions for
banking business. Should regulators fail to strike the right balance, it
will be to the detriment of Europe’s
economic recovery. Banks need an
effective and efficient supervisory
framework, but they also need to
have some room for manoeuvre.
Will banks be able to deal with this
changing landscape?8
Time has come to fully accept that
the environment has been entirely
European
banks feel a
real pressure to
focus on their
core business.
reshaped. Banks’ business, governance, culture and values therefore
need to change accordingly.
The ability of banks to rehabilitate in
the European and global financial
market depends on their aptitude to
demonstrate their own commitment
to a more constructive environment
by implementing significant cultural
and behavioural change. Taking
proactive measures regarding risk
management and disclosure are
essential. It will also be impacted by
their ability to constructively cooperate with regulators and supervisors in
order to implement better regulation.
It will also be crucial to communicate
effectively about the value of the
banking activities to the wider public.
Finally, developing strategic responses to competition and technological
opportunities are crucial factors to
7
be taken into consideration.
The European Banking Federation
has consistently been calling for
a true single market for financial
services, based on a single rule
book and a real level playing field
amongst European banks and at a
global level, to ensure the competitiveness of European banks in the
world. In order to build a sustainable
banking sector, aiming not to call on
taxpayers’ money to bail out banks,
a cumulative impact assessment to
analyse the actual consequences of
the new legislative framework and
national measures implemented by
individual Member States is required.
Banks are doing their best to draw
attention on the unintended consequences of the regulatory reactions
to the crisis, and offering practical
solutions. There is hope that the
structural reform proposals can be
amended in a way that reduces the
perverse effects on trade and the
economy as a whole, while preserving their effectiveness.
Many challenges remain, whether
in terms of shadow banking, integration, retail banking services and,
most of all, rebuilding a trusting
environment which will be the cornerstone for banks to play their full role
of financing the economy.
Finally, the regulators, the EU institutions, including the European Central
Bank, are taking steps to improve the
financing environment. These are to
be encouraged. Banks, for their part,
are ready to continue their role as
lenders, financial intermediaries and
advisers. They are, indeed, part of
the solution to the crisis.
REFERENCES:
EBF, Facts and Figures, 2013
E&Y, Global Banking Outlook, 2013-2014
KPMG, The scope for better regulation,
2013
8
Banks at crossroads, EBF 2013
UDK 336.71:338.124.4(497.4):061.1EU
Prestrukturiranje sistemskih
bank EMU v primerjavi s
Slovenijo
France Arhar in Matej Tomec*
RESTRUCTURING OF
SYSTEMIC BANKS IN EMU
COMPARED TO SLOVENIA
Restructuring activities
of most systemic banks
in the EMU area have
been carried out during
the crisis to a satisfactory
level. Both commercial
and investment banks are
faced with the challenges
of consolidation, which
is mainly based on the
reduction of risky activities
and interbank business,
the ability to obtain new
capital, deleveraging and
cost control. In the case of
the two largest Slovenian
banks, we can see a very
different picture, as the
restructuring of these
banks is in the early
stages. Persisting problems
of rising bad loans, poor
corporate governance,
problems in meeting
capital requirements and
reducing the amount of
credit available are still
present. Slovenian banks
need a quick and effective
consolidation, changes
in lending policy, and
especially privatisation.
JEL G01 G21
O
dvisnost gospodarstva od bančnega sektorja in njegova
velikost še poudarita nujnost hitrega in učinkovitega prestrukturiranja bank v času krize. Na agregatni ravni ni
moč zaslediti večjega obsega konsolidacije v času krize,
ki pa je vendarle bolj prisotna v sistemskih bankah, tudi
zaradi njihovega statusa. Različnost poslovnih modelov ter sposobnosti upravljanja s tveganji je med bankami precejšnja, vendar so se
v času krize tako investicijsko kot tudi komercialno usmerjene banke
soočile z velikimi težavami.
Uvod
Najpomembnejše aktivnosti prestrukturiranja sistemskih bank so
sanacija slabega portfelja, razdolževanje, povrnitev stabilnosti in
zaupanja ter donosnost, ki je v času krize upadla. V nasprotju z
večino sistemskih bank EMU sta največji slovenski banki šele začeli
aktivnosti prestrukturiranja. Problem slovenskih sistemskih bank
je izjemno slabo upravljanje s tveganji v predkriznih časih, prehitra
rast kreditiranja, slabo korporativno upravljanje in prevelik vpliv
države kot prevladujočega lastnika. Prav tako poteka konsolidacija bank prepočasi in premalo učinkovito, kar se kaže predvsem v
upadanju kreditne aktivnosti in negativnem vplivu na gospodarstvo.
V luči teh problemov smo izpostavili nekaj nujnih korakov. Treba
bi bilo spremeniti politiko kreditiranja, in sicer večje prakticiranje
fiksnih obrestnih mer (sedaj se uporabljajo večinoma gibljive obrestne mere), saj so zaradi fiksnih pasivnih obrestnih mer in nizkega
euribora obrestne mere negativne. Prav tako bi morali hitro ter
učinkovito konsolidirati slovenski bančni sistem. Eden ključnih
tovrstnih ukrepov je Družba za upravljanje slabih terjatev, ki mora
delovati transparentno, hitro in pošteno.
*
Dr. France Arhar, direktor Združenja bank Slovenije, in Matej Tomec, univ. dipl. ekon., doktorski študent , Ekonomskoposlovna fakulteta Maribor.
8
BV 11/2013
Po končani konsolidaciji je srednjeročno najpomembnejši korak prav
gotovo privatizacija največjih bank,
saj je to edina garancija, da se problemi s tako negativnim vplivom na
državni proračun in gospodarstvo ne
ponovijo tudi v prihodnje.
V prvem delu poglavja na kratko
predstavljamo bančni sistem EMU
ter značilnosti sistemsko pomembnih bank. V drugem poglavju pa
aktivnosti prestrukturiranja sistemskih
bank v primerjavi z dvema največjima slovenskima bankama. Zadnje
poglavje je namenjeno predstavitvi
nekaterih izzivov, s katerimi se bo
soočil slovenski bančni sektor in še
posebej večje banke v prihodnje.
Bančni sistem EMU
v času krize
Izjemna pomembnost bančnega
sektorja v EMU se kaže v njegovi
velikosti, ki je ob koncu leta 2012
obsegala 33 tisoč milijard €, kar je
345 % BDP EMU. Nizke obrestne
mere, številne kompleksne finančne
inovacije in visoka kreditna aktivnost so omogočile tako hitro rast
bančnega sektorja, predvsem v letih
pred nastankom finančne in gospodarske krize. Bančno financiranje
je najpomembnejši vir financiranja
v EMU, drugače kot npr. v ZDA,
kjer so finančni trgi bolj razviti in sta
sposobnost ter zmožnost realnega
sektorja širši. To velja predvsem za
številne večje korporacije, ki se lahko
po ugodnih obrestnih merah same
financirajo na trgu in niso toliko izpostavljene bančnemu financiranju ter
tveganjem, ki jih tovrstna odvisnost
prinaša.
Finančna in gospodarska kriza leta
2008 je razkrila številne pomanjkljivosti v bančnih modelih v času pred
krizo, ki sedaj ogrožajo stabilnost in
zaupanje v celoten bančni sistem.
Številne banke so rasle prehitro in
na napačnih temeljih. Liikanen et al.,
(2012) so izpostavili problem izraziBV 11/2013
Slika 1: Bilančna vsota držav EMU v % nacionalnega BDP v letu 2012
Vir: ECB podatki in IMF podatki
*Bilančna vsota v Luksemburgu znaša 2.180 % nacionalnega BDP.
Številne
evropske banke
so rasle prehitro
in na napačnih
temeljih.
tega povečanja investicijskih aktivnosti, ki ni imelo podpore v depozitih
in je bilo izpostavljeno (pre)velikemu
tveganju (kompleksne finančne
inovacije) ter preveliki odvisnosti od
kratkoročnega financiranja na trgu
(predvsem medbančnega financiranja) in s tem povečanja bančne
integracije in sistemskega tveganja.
V času krize se je pokazalo, da banke z večjimi neobrestnimi prihodki
(prihodki iz investicijskega bančništva in tržnih aktivnosti) predstavljajo
večje sistemsko tveganje kot banke,
ki so bolj usmerjene v tradicionalno
bančništvo (Brunnermeier et al.,
2012). Investicijske banke so bile v
času krize prisiljene k obširnejšemu
prestrukturiranju in razdolževanju,
saj so bili investicijski portfelji v času
krize najhitreje in najmočneje na
udaru (npr. britanska Royal Bank
9
of Scotland). Kljub temu pa številni
primeri komercialno usmerjenih bank
prikazujejo, da so se tudi tovrstne
banke soočale z velikimi težavami,
predvsem v obliki naraščajočih slabih posojil (npr. italijanska UniCredit,
slovenska NLB).
Zaradi neustreznega upravljanja s
tveganji in slabših gospodarskih razmer v državah EMU (število stečajev
in prisilnih poravnav se je v času
krize zelo povečalo) so bile banke
primorane opraviti večje odpise in
slabitve, ki so negativno vplivali na
zaupanje in kapitalsko ustreznost. Izguba zaupanja je zmanjšala obseg
depozitov v bolj tveganih bankah in
povzročila zastoj v medbančnem financiranju, od katerega so bile banke preveč odvisne. Prevelika izpostavljenost medbančnemu tveganju
se je v času krize pokazala kot zelo
tvegana in predstavlja resno grožnjo
globalni finančni stabilnosti (Ahrend
in Goujard, 2012). Kljub splošnemu
nezaupanju na trgu so se pojavile
pomembne razlike pri dostopu do
medbančnega financiranja med bolj
stabilnimi (zdravimi) in manj stabilnimi bančnimi sistemi (Tintchev, 2013).
Posledica tega so bili nestandardni
ukrepi ECB, ki so povrnili likvidnost
na trgu ter preprečili hujše posledice.
Negotovost in slabšanje kapitalske
ustreznosti sta zmanjšali obseg
kreditne aktivnosti in povzročile t. i.
Slika 2: Tržna koncentracija v bančnem sistemu – bilančna vsota 3
največjih bank glede na nacionalno bilančno vsoto v letu 2012 (v %)
Vir: Bankscope in ECB podatki.
kreditni krč. Na eni strani se je zaradi prevelike zadolženosti realnega
sektorja zmanjšalo povpraševanje
po kreditiranju, na drugi strani pa so
bile banke zaradi ostrejših kapitalskih zahtev (s strani evropskega bančnega regulatorja) prisiljene zaostriti
pogoje kreditiranja ter tako zmanjšati
kreditno aktivnost (Valencia, 2008).
Pomanjkanje kapitala obstoječih
lastnikov in nizka donosnost kapitala
(ROE), ki se je v času krize izrazito
zmanjšala, sta bankam predstavljala velik izziv pri pridobitvi novega
kapitala. Kljub nizkim cenam delnic
(cena delnice se je npr. pri Société
Générale od leta 2007 znižala za
več kot 72 %) so investitorji oklevali
pri nakupu bančnih delnic, saj so
imeli številni alternativni vrednostni
papirji zagotovljene višje donose in
so bili predvsem varnejši (npr. države
obveznice).
Dobršen del bančnega sektorja je
bil tako odvisen od državne pomoči,
ki je od začetka krize do konca leta
2011 v EU znašala 1600 milijard €
(12,8 % BDP EU). Jamstva so znašala 1.085 milijard €, dokapitalizacije
322 milijard €, oslabljena sredstva
120 milijard € in likvidnostni ukrepi
89 milijard €. Države so finančnemu
sektorju pomagale tudi posredno,
in sicer v obliki državnih pomoči
realnemu sektorju. Tovrstna pomoč
je od začetka krize do konca leta
Slika 3: Bilančna vsota največjih bank v državah EMU glede na
nacionalni BDP v letu 2012 (v %)
Vir: Bankscope; IMF podatki.
10
2011 znašala 83 milijard € (Evropska komisija, 2012). Države so tako
pomagale podjetjem v gospodarstvu, katerih bankrot bi negativno
vplival na bilance bank v obliki novih
oslabitev in odpisov ter posledično
povzročil še večji pritisk na kapitalsko ustreznost (v ZDA npr. AIG, v
EMU npr. francoski Peugeot).
Posebna pozornost je (bila) namenjena sistemskim bankam, saj bi propad
le-teh lahko povzročil hujše negativne posledice za celoten nacionalni
finančni sistem. Sistemske banke
so najpogosteje opredeljene po
svoji bilančni vsoti, vendar spadajo
med takšne tudi banke, ki lahko
zaradi medsebojne povezanosti,
kompleksnosti in (ne)nadomestljivosti
finančne infrastrukture pomembno
vplivajo na celoten finančni sistem.
Med sistemsko pomembne banke bi
lahko uvrstili banke, ki so uvrščene v
kriterije nadzora ECB v prihajajoči
bančni uniji. Med sistemsko pomembne banke bi tako uvrstili banke,
katerih bilančna vsota presega 20 %
nacionalnega BDP, banke z več kot
30 milijardami € bilančne vsote oz.
vsaj tri največje banke v državi.
V primerjavi izbranih držav EMU
lahko vidimo precej različne stopnje
tržne koncentracije v bančnem sistemu. V državah, kjer imajo največje
tri banke zelo veliko stopnjo tržnega deleža, so z vidika nacionalne
sistemske pomembnosti tovrstne
banke še toliko bolj zavarovane pred
morebitnim propadom. V Sloveniji
in Nemčiji je v ospredju še velikost
največje banke v državi. Medtem
ko je razlika med največjo banko
in preostalima dvema v drugih
izbranih državah manjša (manj kot
enkrat večja), je v Nemčiji največja
banka Deutsche Bank po bilančni
vsoti kar 2,17-krat večja kot druga
največja nemška banka. V Sloveniji
je največja banka NLB 1,69-krat
večja kot druga največja banka
v državi. V nasprotju z največjo
slovensko banko Deutsche Bank
BV 11/2013
kljub tako veliki razliki ne predstavlja
problema, saj je banka v relativno
dobrem stanju zaradi obsežnih aktivnosti prestrukturiranja ter dobrega
gospodarskega okolja v Nemčiji. V
Sloveniji je situacija povsem drugačna, ker slabe gospodarske razmere,
slabo korporativno upravljanje in
nezmožnost prevladujočega lastnika
za hitro ter učinkovito konsolidacijo predstavljajo še posebno velik
problem. V prihodnje bo tudi zaradi
posebnosti in majhnosti slovenskega
gospodarstva treba zmanjšati razlike
med bankami, s tem normalizirati
bančni sektor in ga približati evropski strukturi. Ali z nadaljnjim krčenjem
največje banke ali s krepitvijo drugih
dveh bank (ali kakšne nove).
Sistemske banke uživajo zaradi svojega statusa določene konkurenčne
prednosti, predvsem v nižjih stroških
financiranja, saj veljajo za manj
tvegane, ker bodo (oz. so bile) v primeru težav deležne državne pomoči
(Demirgüc-Kunt in Huizinga, 2010).
V številnih državah se je v času krize
pojavil problem prevelikih bank za
reševanje, saj se tudi države soočajo
s težavami financiranja. Spirala med
bankami in državami je v zadnjih letih v EMU še posebej prisotna, zato
je treba sprejeti nadaljnje ukrepe, ki
naj bi rešili dano situacijo in preprečili nastanek podobnih problemov
v prihodnje. Eden izmed ključnih tovrstnih ukrepov je prihajajoča bančna
unija.
Aktivnosti prestrukturiranja
v času krize
Prestrukturiranje bančnega sektorja v
EMU je bilo od začetka krize do sedaj zelo omejeno. Nekatere države
so predstavile reforme za sanacijo in
prestrukturiranje svojega bančnega
sistema, vendar na agregatni ravni
do sedaj ni moč zaslediti večjega
napredka. Čeprav lahko zaznamo
zastoj rasti pri večini bank, se bilančna vsota bank v času krize ni bistveBV 11/2013
Slika 4: Delež posojil glede na bilančno vsoto v letu 2012 (v %)
Vir: Bankscope.
Državna pomoč
bankam je do
konca leta 2011
v EU znašala
1600 milijard
evrov.
no spremenila. Na obseg aktivnosti
prestrukturiranja vplivajo poslovni
modeli bank pred nastankom krize
ter zmožnost hitrega reagiranja na
spremenjeno gospodarsko okolje v
času krize. Hitrost prestrukturiranja
je močno odvisna od vpliva okolja, v
katerem banke poslujejo, ter finančne sposobnosti lastnikov za hitro ter
učinkovito prestrukturiranje. Po petih
letih finančne in gospodarske krize
številne banke še vedno niso zaključile procesa prestrukturiranja in razdolževanja v zadostnem obsegu, kar
je za obstoj, zdravo rast in uspešno
poslovanje nujno potrebno. Posledice so vidne v zastoju oz. zmanjšanju
kreditnih aktivnosti predvsem za
majhna in srednja podjetja.
Pri večjih sistemskih bankah lahko
zaznamo večje aktivnosti prestrukturiranja kot pri manjših bankah. To je
posledica številnih pritiskov, ki so jih
te banke deležne zaradi svojega sta11
tusa, tako s strani evropske komisije
(banke, ki so bile deležne državne
pomoči), evropskega bančnega
regulatorja EBA (z zviševanjem zahtevane kapitalske stopnje), držav, v
katerih poslujejo (da povečajo obseg
kreditiranja in pomagajo gospodarstvu) in nenazadnje tudi lastnikov, ki
zahtevajo večje donose. Na hitrost
prestrukturiranja so pomembno vplivali tudi ECB z likvidnostnimi ukrepi
ter državne pomoči, ki so bankam
omogočile daljše časovno obdobje
konsolidacije. Najpomembnejši cilj
prestrukturiranja bank je zmanjšati
obseg poslovanja z bolj tveganimi
finančnimi instrumenti in preveliko
odvisnost od medbančnega financiranja, ki se je v času krize izkazala
za zelo negotovo. Namen tega je
povrniti stabilnost in zaupanje v
bančni sistem ter zmanjšati tveganje
sistemske problematike.
Večina sistemskih bank spada v
kategorijo t. i. univerzalnih bank, saj
ponujajo zelo širok nabor bančnih
storitev. Kljub temu pa so poslovni modeli sistemskih bank precej
različni.
Pri investicijskih bankah, kot sta npr.
Deutsche Bank in Société Générale,
predstavljajo velik del poslovanja izvedeni finančni instrumenti ter druge
tržne aktivnosti. Investicijske aktivnosti bank so v predkriznem času
postale zanimivejše zaradi visokih
donosov in slabe regulacije na tem
Slika 5: Delež slabih posojil v bruto posojilih v letu 2012 (v %)
Vir: Bankscope.
področju. Številne finančne inovacije
so bankam omogočile ustvarjati nova
posojila ter tako pridobiti dodatno
likvidnost in sprostiti omejitve v kapitalskih zahtevah. Bančne bilance pogosto niso primerno ocenile tovrstnih
tveganj, saj so bile tržne vrednosti velikokrat precej nižje kot knjigovodske
vrednosti, po katerih banke vrednotijo sredstva. Aktivnosti prestrukturiranja bank so večinoma usmerjene v
zmanjševanje tovrstnega poslovanja,
ki se je izkazalo kot zelo tvegano in
je bankam povzročilo velike izgube.
Pri investicijskih bankah lahko v času
krize zaznamo izrazito zmanjšanje
deleža neobrestnih prihodkov v vseh
prihodkih (npr. Crédit Agricole za
46,7 %, Deutsche Bank za 25,3
%). Banke so neobrestne prihodke
večinoma nadomestile z obrestnimi
prihodki, z usmeritvijo v komercialno bančništvo, ki je ponavadi manj
tvegano od investicijskega.
Kljub večji negotovosti investicijskih
bank pa lahko v času krize zaznamo
primerljive težave tudi v komercialnih
bankah, torej bankah, katerih večji
del poslovanja temelji na zbiranju
depozitov in dajanju posojil. Številne
komercialne banke v EMU se soočajo z naraščajočim deležem slabih
terjatev, ki so posledica neustreznega upravljanja s tveganji in slabih
gospodarskih razmer, ki še dodatno
poslabšujejo posojilni portfelj.
Delež slabih posojil je še posebej zaskrbljujoč v dveh največjih
slovenskih bankah. Medtem ko se
je delež slabih posojil pri večini
bank v času krize povečal za nekaj
odstotnih točk, se je delež tovrstnih
posojil od leta 2007 v NKBM
povečal za 22,67 odstotne točke in
v NLB za 29,82 odstotne točke. Ti
dve banki lahko uvrstimo v skupino
Slika 6: Povprečen donos na kapital (ROE) v času krize (v %)
Vir: Bankscope.
12
bank z npr. grško največjo banko,
kjer je zaradi slabih gospodarskih
razmer delež slabih posojil izrazito
narasel in obsega okrog 30 % bruto
posojil. Tolikšen obseg slabih posojil
nam jasno prikaže izrazito slabo
upravljanje s tveganji v času pred
krizo. Delno lahko vzroke pripišemo
slabim gospodarskim razmeram,
vendar le-te niso toliko slabše, kot je
povprečje v EMU. Vzroke gre tako
iskati predvsem v pomanjkanju učinkovitega korporativnega upravljanja
bank in prevelikem vplivu države kot
pomembnega lastnika. Prav tako je
vzrok neučinkovita sanacija slabega
posojilnega portfelja, predvsem
zaradi prepočasnih in premajhnih
dokapitalizacij, ki bankama niso
omogočile ustreznih rešitev, saj so se
soočile s kapitalskimi omejitvami.
Evropski bančni regulator je v času
krize zvišal zahtevano kapitalsko
ustreznost za vse banke EMU z
namenom povečanja varnosti in stabilnosti. Pri sistemskih bankah je zahtevana kapitalska ustreznost še višja,
in sicer 9 % najkakovostnejšega
kapitala Core Tier 1. Čeprav je bilo
določeno relativno dolgo časovno
obdobje za dosego zahtevane stopnje, so številne banke te zahteve že
dosegle. Tako so večinoma ohranile
zaupanje komitentov, saj bi se lahko
v nasprotnem primeru soočile z
zmanjšanjem depozitov in obsegom
poslovanja. Kljub temu je pridobitev
svežega kapitala za marsikatero
banko predstavljala velik izziv (spomnimo na probleme banke UniCredit
pri 8 milijardah evrov visoki dokapitalizaciji v letih 2011/2012).
Slaba donosnost glede na tveganost
naložbe in pomanjkanje kapitala sta
poglavitna razloga, ki sta odvrnila
investitorje v nakup delnic bank. Obstoječi lastniki velikokrat niso bili sposobni oz. niso želeli dokapitalizirati
bank, saj je bila donosnost kapitala
prenizka. V predkriznih časih je ROE
dosegal 15, tudi nad 20 %, medtem
ko je bila povprečna donosnost v
BV 11/2013
času krize bistveno nižja.
Pri tovrstnih stopnjah donosnosti in
negotovosti v bančnem sistemu so
investitorji (predvsem institucionalni) raje posegali po bolj donosnih
in manj tveganih investicijah (npr.
obveznice korporacij in držav). Kljub
nizkim cenam delnic bank, ki so pri
večini bank upadle za več deset
odstotkov, so bili investitorji skeptični
do tovrstnih investicij. Tržna kapitalizacija je v času krize padla na zelo
nizke ravni, npr. pri UniCredit banki
za več kot 70 %, pri Crédit Agricole
za več kot 60 %. Pri nekaterih bankah lahko sicer že zaznamo pozitivno rast delnic, ki nakazuje, da so te
banke že v večjem obsegu prestrukturirale svoje portfelje ter tako spet
postale zanimivejše za investitorje.
Zaradi problemov pri pridobitvi
svežega kapitala v obliki dokapitalizacij so se banke bolj posluževale
t. i. instrumenta bail-in oz. pridobitve
kapitala s konvertibilnimi obveznicami. Značilnost konvertibilnih obveznic
je, da banka takoj dobi potreben
kapital (katerega kvaliteta zadostuje
kriterijem regulatorja), ki pa se konvertira v delnice po vnaprej določenih kriterijih. Največkrat uporabljeni
kriterij je zmanjšanje kapitalske stopnje pod določeno mejo. Investitorji
konvertibilnih obveznic v tem primeru
postanejo lastniki delnic, če pa pogoji za konverzijo niso izpolnjeni, pa
se konvertibilne obveznice štejejo kot
navadne obveznice (npr. obveznice
CoCo). Bail-in je v času krize pogosto uporabljen instrument pridobitve
svežega kapitala pri bankah in ima
pozitivne posledice, saj lahko ublaži
sistemska tveganja povezana z
nenadzorovanimi stečaji in zmanjša
pritisk razdolževanja (Zhou et al.,
2012).
Koncept bail-in bi bil lahko v prihodnje uporabljen ne samo pri
lastnikih obveznic, pač pa tudi pri
imetnikih depozitov nad vrednostjo
100.000 €. Tovrstna konverzija
je bila uporabljena na Cipru, kjer
BV 11/2013
Slika 7: Medbančno poslovanje v % bilančne vsote
Vir: Bankscope.
so imetnikom depozitov v lastniški
delež konvertirali tolikšno vrednost
depozitov, kolikor so potrebovali za
pokritje izgub. Če bodo v prihodnje
mogoče tovrstne konverzacije, je
treba vnaprej postaviti veliko bolj
jasna in pregledna pravila, da se bo
natančno vedelo, kakšni so pogoji
in kakšno je tveganje. Prav tako bi
bilo treba v tem primeru razmisliti
o večjem sodelovanju upnikov pri
nadzorovanju in upravljanju banke.
Ena izmed možnosti je zagotovljeno
mesto v nadzornem svetu banke, kjer
bi lahko upniki v določenem odstotku
tudi glasovali. Torej sprejeti bi bilo
treba zaveze za nominacijo upnikov
v nadzorni svet, saj bi bili ti sedaj
v veliko bolj tveganem položaju v
primeru težav banke.
Večji del aktivnosti prestrukturiranja
bank je bil prav tako usmerjen v
zmanjšanje medbančnih aktivnosti in
učinkovitejše obvladovanje stroškov.
Financiranje investicijskih in tudi
posojilnih aktivnosti bank je pretežno
temeljilo na kratkoročnem zadolževanju na trgu, predvsem na medbančnih trgih, ki pa so se v času krize
izkazali kot zelo negotovi. V kriznih
časih se je zaupanje izrazito zmanjšalo in predvsem manjše banke so
izgubile (ali je bil le-ta zelo omejen)
dostop do finančnih in medbančnih
trgov. Tako lahko pri večini bank
zaznamo zmanjšanje medbančnega
poslovanja v času krize.
Na zmanjšanje medbančnega
13
poslovanja je poleg negotovosti pomembno vplivala Evropska centralna
banka z nestandardnimi ukrepi, ki
jih je uporabila v času krize. Predvsem triletne operacije refinanciranja po zelo ugodni obrestni meri v
decembru leta 2011 in v februarju
leta 2012 so izrazito pripomogle k
zmanjšanju negotovosti in povečanju
likvidnosti v bančnem sistemu. Banke
v EMU so si v dveh tovrstnih operacijah od ECB izposodile več kot
1.000 milijard evrov. Medbančna
posojila so navadno krajše ročnosti,
ECB pa je z nestandardnim ukrepom
omogočila dolgoročna posojila, ki
so za banke bolj zanimiva, saj tudi
same pogosto dajejo posojila daljše
ročnosti kot za obdobje enega leta,
kolikor je bila ročnost posojil pri ECB
pred uvedbo nestandardnih ukrepov.
ECB je poleg odobritve daljših
posojil prav tako znižala kriterije
zavarovanj z vrednostnimi papirji.
Pred krizo je sprejemala le državne
obveznice, v času krize pa je poleg
državnih obveznic v zavarovanje
sprejemala tudi obveznice podjetij.
Tako je bistveno povečala sposobnost bank za najetje dolgoročnih
posojil. Prav tako se je s tem ukrepom zelo povečala odvisnost bank
EMU od financiranja pri ECB. Pri
tem se poraja vprašanje, kako ECB
vidi izhod iz te situacije. Zaradi
gospodarskih težav in še nedokončane konsolidacije dobršnega dela
bančnega sektorja EMU obstaja
velika verjetnost, da bo ECB z različnimi nestandardnimi ukrepi še naprej
posegala na bančni trg. Prihodnji
ukrepi ECB bodo znani najkasneje
konec leta 2014, ko zapade prva
tranša triletnih posojil.
Prihodnost bančnega sektorja je
usmerjena v bančno unijo, ki bo
predvidoma zaživela v začetku leta
2014. Bančna unija bo temeljila
na mehanizmu skupnega nadzora, evropski jamstveni shemi in na
mehanizmu za reševanje bank (sicer
pod strogimi pogoji). Učinkovitost
prestrukturiranja bančnega sektorja
v EMU ni zadostna, kar se kaže v
zmanjšanjem obsegu kreditiranja in
s številnimi težavami, s katerimi se
po petih letih krize soočajo mnoge
banke. Lahko predvidevamo, da bi
bili problemi bančnega sektorja manj
razsežni pod strožjim in enotnim
nadzorom. Prav tako bi bile banke
sposobne učinkoviteje pridobiti svež
kapital ter hitreje konsolidirati bilance. Čeprav je bančna unija projekt
prihodnosti, bo gotovo pripomogla
pri pridobitvi ponovnega zaupanja
na trgu že z ustanovitvijo prihodnje
leto in bo tako lahko del rešitve velike odvisnosti bank od financiranja
pri ECB.
Izzivi slovenskih
sistemskih bank
Primerjava dveh največjih bank v
Sloveniji z izbranimi sistemskimi
bankami v območju EMU nam
jasno pokaže razsežnost težav dveh
največjih slovenskih bank. Ne zgolj
to, da sta se banki soočili z večjimi
problemi kot večina preostalih bank,
tudi hitrost konsolidacije je potekala
počasneje in premalo učinkovito, kar
je razsežnost težav le še povečalo.
Del težav izhaja iz specifičnosti
slovenskega gospodarstva in bančnega poslovanja, saj je bil velik
del kreditiranja namenjen za nakup
nepremičnin in velikim podjetjem
(predvsem gradbenim podjetjem in
finančnim holdingom). Prihod finančne in gospodarske krize je poslabšal
poslovanje teh podjetij in povzročil
zastoj na nepremičninskem trgu, kar
pa je zelo močno prizadelo banke,
ki so bile izpostavljene tovrstnim
tveganjem. Izkazalo se je, da so bila
zavarovanja kreditov neprimerna
in da je bilo prisotno izrazito slabo
upravljanje s tveganji. Banke so
nase prevzemale prevelika tveganja,
pričakovale preveč optimistične scenarije in bile izpostavljene pritiskom
Evropska
bančna unija
bo predvidoma
zaživela
v začetku
prihodnjega leta.
ter vplivu politike.
Vse to se je pokazalo v močnem
poslabšanju posojilnega portfelja
v času krize, ki se je iz leta v leto z
odplačilom dobrih posojil in povečanim številom stečajev in prisilnih
poravnav še poslabševal. Na drugi
strani pa se je zmanjšalo kreditiranje in bankam so upadli obrestni
prihodki. Banke so zaradi oslabitev
in odpisov utrpele velike izgube iz
poslovanja, kar je vplivalo na kapitalsko ustreznost ter povečalo pritiske
po dokapitalizaciji.
Zaradi prevladujočega lastniškega
deleža države v obeh bankah je
dokapitalizacija potekala prepočasi
in ni bila izvedena v zadostnem
obsegu, kar je posledica pomanjkanja sredstev lastnikov ter političnih
napetosti in nepriljubljenosti tovrstnih
aktivnosti v javnosti. Banki tako nista
bili sposobni počistiti slabega dela
14
portfelja in hkrati zadostiti kapitalskim zahtevam EBA. Zato sta bili
prisiljeni v krčenje bilanc, predvsem
v obliki zmanjšanja obsega kreditiranja, kar pa je imelo negativne učinke
na gospodarsko rast. Slaba praksa
domačega lastništva v času pred
krizo in v času krize je jasen znak,
da je treba banke privatizirati.
Velik izziv slovenskim bankam v
prihodnje je prav tako sprememba
v politiki kreditiranja. Previsoke
obrestne mere v slovenskem bančnem prostoru, ki so približno 2
odstotni točki višje kot v povprečju
EU, vplivajo negativno na konkurenčnost našega gospodarstva. Del
problema je v slabših bonitetnih
ocenah bank, kar jim zvišuje stroške
virov, drugi del pa je prakticiranje
gibljive obrestne mere v Sloveniji. Pri
nizkih vrednostih euribora in visokih
fiksnih pasivnih obrestnih merah je
pri gibljivi obrestni meri (euribor plus
dodana marža) obrestna marža
lahko hitro negativna. Ta portfelj
prinaša pomemben minus, vsako
dodatno znižanje euribora pa bo
primanjkljaj še povečalo. Rešitev je v
večjem prakticiranju fiksne obrestne
mere, morda najprej za kratkoročne
posle, nato še za srednjeročne in
dolgoročne obrestne mere, saj bodo
v tem primeru obresti za posojila v
Sloveniji bolj primerljive evropskim.
Drug predlog je, da bi stranke v
pogodbo o dolgoročnih hipotekarnih
posojilih zapisale, da bosta pogodbenika po petih letih ocenila, kje sta
z obrestne mero glede na položaj
na trgu. Stranki lahko določita tudi
npr. meje koridorja, kjer nato pri
spremembah zunaj tega koridorja
določita za novo petletno obdobje
nekaj novega.
Zaradi zahtev evropskih institucij in
slabih rezultatov bank je sedaj pravi
trenutek, da se opravita konsolidacija in prestrukturiranje slovenskega
bančnega sektorja. V prvi vrsti je
treba zmanjšati tržni delež največje
banke in s tem sistemsko tveganje, ki
BV 11/2013
jo ta nevarnost prinaša. Prav tako je
treba konsolidirati slovenske banke,
predvsem največje tri. Pomemben
del konsolidacije bo opravljen s
pomočjo Družbe za upravljanje
slabih terjatev oz. t. i. slabe banke,
ki bo nase prevzela slabe terjatve
bank v zameno za državne obveznice in tako počistila slab portfelj
bank. Cena prenosa terjatev bo
predvidoma izvedena po realni,
torej tržni ceni, ki je velikokrat nižja
od knjigovodske vrednosti, zato
bodo banke po prenosu potrebovale
dodatni kapital. Po čiščenju portfelja
in dodatnem kapitalu in ob sočasni
konsolidaciji realnega sektorja bodo
banke spet zmožne kreditirati gospodarstvo ter tako potegniti Slovenijo
iz krize. Za manjše banke bo prav
tako nujno združevanje z namenom
znižati stroške in postati uspešnejši
ter konkurenčnejši.
Zadnji in verjetno najpomembnejši
korak prestrukturiranja je privatiza-
BV 11/2013
cija bank, saj se je izkazalo, da je
država kot prevladujoči lastnik dveh
največjih bank izrazito posegala v
upravljanje banke. Banke so zaradi
slabega korporativnega upravljanja
omogočile tolikšno zadolženost
realnega sektorja ter s slabim upravljanjem s tveganji povzročile velike
izgube v bančnem sistemu, katerega
sanacija finančno in moralno zelo
vpliva na državo kot celoto. Prodaja bank je edina garancija, da se
tovrstne težave v tolikšnem obsegu in
vplivu na državni proračun ne bodo
več ponovile. S privatizacijo največjih slovenskih bank bo omogočeno
učinkovito korporativno upravljanje
bank v prihodnje.
Brnnermeier, M. K., G. Dong in D. Palia
(2012) Banks’ Non-Interest Income and
Systemic Risk. Princeton University.
LITERATURA IN VIRI / REFERENCES:
Zhou, J., V. Rutledge, W. Bossu, M.
Dobler, N. Jassaud in M. Moore (2012)
From Bail-out to Bail-in: Mandatory
Debt Restructuring of Systemic Financial
Institutions. IMF Staff Discussion Note
12/03, Monetary and Capital Market
Department and Legal Department,
International Monetary Fund.
Ahrend, R. in A. Goujard (2012)
International Capital Mobility and
Financial Fragility – Part 1. Drivers of
Systemic Banking Crises: The Role of BankBalance-Sheet Contagion and Financial
Account Structure. OECD, Economics
Department Working Papers, No. 902,
OECD Publishing.
15
Demirgüc-Kunt, A. in H. Huizinga (2010)
Are Banks Too Big To Fail or Too Big To
Save? International Evidence From Equity
Prices and CDS Spreads. European Banking
Center Discussion Paper No. 2010-15.
EK (2012) Poročilo komisije – Dopolnitev
statističnega pregleda državnih pomoči za
leto 2012. Poročilo o državnih pomočeh, ki
so jih dodelile države članice EU. Evropska
Komisija, Bruselj.
Liikanen, E. et al. (2012) High-level Expert
Group on reforming the structure of the EU
banking sector. Final Report, Bruselj.
Tintchev, K. (2013) Connected to Whom?
International Interbank Borrowing During
the Global Crisis. IMF Working Paper
13/14, Monetary and Capital Markets
Department, International Monetary Fund.
Valencia, F. (2008) Banks’ Precautionary
Capital and Credit Crunches. IMF Working
Paper 08/248, Western Hemisphere
Department, International Monetary Fund.
UDK 336.71(430)
Rehabilitation of
Financial Sector – The case
of German banks
REHABILITATION OF
FINANCIAL SECTOR –
THE CASE OF GERMAN
BANKS
This paper investigates
the adjustment processes
of the German banking
sector and the government
support measures since
the outbreak of the
international financial
crisis in 2007 / 2008 and
its worsening through
the sovereign debt crisis
in the euro zone starting
in spring 2010. With
the help of government
interventions and the
previously introduced
adjustment processes, the
looming collapse of some
credit institutions and
overall risk of a systemic
crisis was prevented. But in
the long run, the increasing
competitive pressure
requires a reorientation
of many business models
and a further consolidation
in the German banking
sector to safeguard the
financial stability.
JEL G01 G18 G21 G28
I
Albrecht F. Michler and H. Jörg Thieme*
n the aftermath of the outbreak of the subprime crisis in the
United States in 2007 and the severe turmoil on the U.S. and
the international markets, the German banking system was
affected as well, because some commercial banks and especially the state-owned Landesbanken had significant positions of
toxic assets on their balance sheets or were directly involved in the
construction and financing of special purpose vehicles.
I. Introduction
The partly dramatic problems of individual banks were exacerbated by the sovereign debt crisis in some member states of the
euro zone (the GIPSY countries: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain
and Italy) since spring 2010. Finally, the economic stagnation
in the developed countries and important emerging markets has
slowed down the dynamic of the German economy at the end of
2008 and in 2009. The conditions for a sustainable recovery process of the German financial sector were very poor so far.
How have the affected banks reacted in the crisis? To which
extent were the individual commercial banks involved? Does sufficiently reliable empirical material exist about the potential and
actual losses from bad investment and credit lending decisions of
individual banks? Who had to compensate the realised losses and
who will compensate the potential future losses? Finally: Which
role do parliaments, governments and the European Central Bank
play in the management of the financial crisis? Which ad hoc measures were realised by the policy?
*
Albrecht F. Michler and H. Jörg Thieme, Heinrich-Heine-University of Duesseldorf.
16
BV 11/2013
et al. 2004). In addition, mortgage
banks and building and loan societies operate in all pillars, providing
mid- and long-term credits secured
against real estate (Table 1).
The privately-owned commercial
banks represent the largest segment by assets and are currently
composed of (a) four large banking
groups (Deutsche Bank AG, Commerzbank AG, Deutsche Postbank
AG and the foreign-owned UniCreditBank AG); (b) medium and smallsized banks; (c) and some branches
of foreign banks (IMF 2011:4). The
big banks are universal banks, operating retail and corporate banking
as well as investment banking. Some
banking groups have an international focus, other banks are more
regionally oriented or otherwise
specialised.
The public banking sector consists
of the Landesbanken as well as the
Sparkassen (savings banks). The
associated governance structure
entail that multiple levels of government are involved: in the case of the
Sparkassen the local governments
and in the case of the Landesbanken
the government of a German Federal
Are the reactions only a short-term
orientated regulation of processes to
gain time or is a long-term strategy
observable?
To answer these questions some
knowledge about the structure of the
German banking system is necessary
(II.). Then the problems of individual banks and banking groups are
marked briefly without an extensive
empirical analysis due to the limit
space (III.). In chapter IV the various
strategies and adjustment processes
in the German banking sector to
overcome the crisis are described
and critically analysed. Finally,
we give an outlook on the future
development of the German banking
sector (V.)
II. The structure of the
German banking system
The German banking system is
composed of three different pillars:
commercial banks, banks of the
public sector and credit cooperatives
which differ with respect to objectives and ownership (for a detailed
structural analysis, see IMF 2011
and the older analysis of Brunner
Land, regional Sparkassen associations or the national savings association (Brunner et al. 2004:3; Hüfner
2010:8-9). The public owners have
different interests: local governments
may wish that the savings banks
are engaged in public-policy or
(politically) motivated activities in the
community. If the local governments
have equity holdings in their Landesbank, they are more interested in
receiving high yields. On the other
hand, the Federal Land Government,
however, may be currently much less
interested in the profitability of its
Landesbank and more interested to
preserve its stability. In former times
the Landesbanken also were an
instrument of industrial and structural policy objectives. With these
publicly-owned banks unprofitable
enterprises were saved and new
corporate groups were founded.
Only the Landesbanken were
engaged in international business
and for some Landesbanken like the
former WestLB, investment banking
overseas was a major business of
their activities (for an overview see
IMF 2011:6). For a long time, the the
publicly-owned banks benefited from
Table 1: Structural data on German credit institutions
Category of banks
All categories of banks
Commercial banks
- Big banks 1
- Regional banks
- Branches of foreign banks
Landesbanken
Saving banks
Regional institutions of credit
cooperatives
Credit cooperatives
Mortgage banks
Special purpose banks
Memo item
Building and loan associations
Number of institutions
2006
2012
2,130
1,869
360
295
5
4
217
177
138
113
12
9
457
423
2
2
Number of branches in Germany
2006
2012
38,517
34,571
11,578
9,610
8,879
7,041
2,623
2,444
76
125
496
451
13,756
12,643
11
11
Number of employees
2006
2012
662,200
633,650
186,700
172,900
39,500
257,000
4,900
34,000
244,900
5,150
1,259
22
18
1,104
17
20
12,583
61
32
11,778
49
29
161,200
159,750
12,900
16,950
26
22
1,795
1,668
18,050
14,650
Source: Bundesbank (2007:19, 2012b:24, 2013:104).
1
Deutsche Bank AG, Dresdner Bank AG (until November 2009), Commerzbank AG, from January 1999.
BV 11/2013
17
government guarantees (Anstaltslast
and Gewährträgerhaftung) and the
more favourable refinancing options
on the capital markets. These government guarantees were terminated
in July 2005 to bring the German
system of government guarantees for
publicly-owned banks in line with the
state aid rules of the EC treaty. But
the grandfathering arrangements in
the period 2001-2005 remain valid
until 2015.
The cooperative banks (“Volksbanken”, “Raiffeisenbanken” and
“Spar- und Darlehenskassen“) are
owned by their members who are
usually their borrowers as well as
depositors. These banks usually operate on a regional scheme but are
not limited. The major objective is to
support their members, which represent more than half of the customers.
Each cooperative bank has its own
supervisory and executive board, but
to a large extent they operate under
a single brand. The cooperative
sector has its own mutual guarantee
scheme which maintains an institution
(rather than a deposit) insurance to
manage risk (Brunner et al. 2004:4).
The two regional banks (DZ Bank
AG and WGZ Bank AG) act as
central institutions for the cooperative banks and provide a range of
services for the primary banks.
Since the beginning of the financial
crisis, there has been a reduction in
the number of credit institutions, the
number of branches and of employees in the most categories of banks.
However, the shrinking of the banking sector may have been caused
not so much by the financial crisis,
but it may reflect a strong consolidation trend of the last two decades.
The number of banks has decreased
by 44 per cent since 1990. But in
contrast to other European countries
with a similar banking system, the
flexibility for cross-pillar restructuring
in Germany was low. The consolidation has taken place largely within
the same pillar and mostly in the
public and cooperative sector. In
many cases the consolidation was
the result of a stress situation and
not the result of a proactive business
strategy. Currently the German law
prohibits privately-owned banks to
take stakes in publicly-owned banks
that are created by law rather than
incorporated. As a result, the banking system exhibits a lower degree
of openness to private shareholders
compared to that in other EU countries. Between commercial banks we
see a few cases of consolidation (the
take-over of Dresdner Bank AG by
Commerzbank AG and the take-
Some
commercial
banks suffered
substantial
losses from
their investment
portfolios.
over of Deutsche Postbank AG by
Deutsche Bank AG) in part driven by
the financial crisis (IMF 2011:7).
According to indicators on the supply of banking services, the German banking system exhibits more
competition than banking systems
in some other European countries.
The number of credit institutions is
relatively larger than in other EU
countries. Also, the German system
is less concentrated; Germany has a
relative low Herfindahl concentration
index. The large number of banks
and employees mainly reflects the
high number of primary banks in
18
the public and cooperative sector.
But these two pillars operate largely
on the regional principle and the
competition within each pillar is
low. Most empirical studies find no
microeconomic evidence for a more
intense competition in Germany than
elsewhere. Like in other countries,
empirical studies find monopolistic
competition in the banking system
(Brunner et al. 2004:21-23; Hüfner
2010:15).
In contrast to this result, German
banks have on average shown
low profitability compared with the
banking system in other European
countries. Regardless of the measures
used, none of three banking pillars
compares favourably in performance
with other European comparators. Es
pecially for the larger banks the low
profitability has not been compensated for by lower risk, the performance
remains generally below average
(IMF 2011:14-18; Hüfner 2010:1315).
According to Bundesbank statistics (i
each September the monthly report
gives a detailed overview of the
performance) the average after-tax
return on equity (ROE) of the commercial banks was slightly above the
return of the primary banks in the
public and cooperative sector before
the financial crisis (sample period
1994 – 2007). As a result of the
crisis when the sample period is expanded to include 2008 and 2009
the performance of the commercial
banks was slightly below the ROE of
the primary banks. The profitability
of the Landesbanken is, however, on
average well below the performance
of the two other banking groups
(IMF 2011:14). The weak profitability of the banks is mainly attributable
to weak revenue generation and, less
importantly, relatively high operational costs, and relative cost efficiency
remains at levels comparable to
those of the EU peers. Nonetheless,
German banks – and particularly
BV 11/2013
Sparkassen – show higher than
average cost-to-income ratio, driven
by the higher operational costs still
faced, notwithstanding the ongoing
consolidation. Partly the relatively
low profitability of the German banking sector could reflect the fact that
profit maximisation is not the major
objective of the banks in the public
and cooperative sector. Another conclusion is a widespread underpricing
of risk and a lower proportion of
high-value-added activities owing to
a less innovative market environment
(Brunner et al. 2004:18).
III. Problems of the German
financial sector and the
government rescue measures
During the crisis, the direct exposures
to toxic assets as well as the turmoil
in the interbank markets put several
institutions into difficult. Particularly
some commercial banks and the
Landesbanken (LB) suffered substantial losses from their investment
portfolios. Due to their weak business model and the related weak
earnings, these banks had invested
heavily in structured products before
the crisis (Hüfner 2010:5, Table 1).
With the hope that they can realise
an additional yield pickup without a
change in their overall risk situation.
Without immediate government aid,
these banks would have collapsed
very quickly, whereas the primary
banks of the public and the cooperative sector showed relatively stable
profitability and had continuous
access to stable funding from retail
deposits.
The government rescue measures
can be divided into several phases
(IMF 2011:8; Hüfner 2010:5). Until
the fall of Lehman Brothers in autumn
2008, government involvement
comprised mostly stand-alone actions
for individual banks. Four banks (IKB
and the three Landesbanken WestLB,
BayernLB and SachsenLB) received
capital injections, credit lines and
asset-backed security loss guarantees. In a second period, a more
comprehensive support package was
followed the rescue of Hypo Real
Estate (HRE) at the end of September 2008. On 5 October 2008 the
Federal Government guaranteed all
private bank accounts and one week
later the government announced the
installation of the Financial Market
Stabilization Fund (SoFFin). This
institution can guarantee up to EUR
400 bn of bank financing and use
EUR 70 bn for recapitalisation and
asset purchases (the amount can
be increased by EUR 10bn on the
approval of the Budget Committee
of the parliament). Table 2 gives a
summary of all rescue packages until
mid-2013.
On the one hand the government
aid and guarantees have successfully stabilized the German banking
sector in the short term and have
merely prevents the collapse of the
institutes and reduces the overall risk
of a systemic crisis. But on the other
side the situation of the institutions
has not been sustainably improved
through the various public interventions. None of the mentioned banks
in Table 2 currently has a convincing business model for a long-run
orientation. The balance sheets of
troubled institutions will, however,
take time and continued efforts to be
cleaned up. Against this background
the overall costs that must be paid
by the taxpayer cannot be estimated
reliably at current time. In addition,
Table 2: Government rescue packages after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 09/2008
Government aid
EUR billions
Commerzbank
Hypo Real Estate 2
BayernLB
LBBW
IKB 3
HSH Nordbank 4
WestLB 1
Aareal Bank
Government
guarantees
EUR billions
total
repaid
total
18.2
9.8
10.0
5.0
8.4
3.0
3.0
0.5
13.1
0.0
0.9
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.2
5.0
124.0
19.8
12.7
10.0
10.0
5.0
4.0
State's holding
Balance sheet
in percent
EUR billions
at
before
after
present the crisis the crisis
0.0
0%
17%
0.0
0%
100%
4.8
50%
75%
12.7
59%
59%
0.0
38%
0%
10.0
55%
85%
5.0
49%
100%
0.0
0%
0%
6155
395
416
500
48
204
268
40
637
169
266
307
28
121
686
44
Resolu- Losses
tion
for the
agencies
tax
payers 7
EUR billions
136
137
27
16
44
82
-3.7
-19.1
-9.0
-3.8
-8.2
-1.0
-4.3
-0.1
Source: Wirtschaftswoche (2013:8).
1
main parts were carved out and sold; 2 including the loss compensation for the public bad bank FMS Wertmanagement; 3 costs
were borne by the public development bank KfW, which assumed the credit lines for ist former subsidiary IKB; 4 wants to repay the
state aid completely, 1 bio EUR of reserves were already formed; 5 without Dresdner Bank; 6 successor company Portigon; 7 profit
and loss for the German taxpayers.
BV 11/2013
19
it must be noted that the European
Commission approved the rescue
package only with conditions that
means that these banks have to adjust their business models including
cost-cutting, downsizing, refocusing,
and ownership change to ensure
long-term viability.
IV. General adjustments of
the banking system to the
financial crisis
Proactive adjustments of the banking
groups
In a first phase from mid-2007 to the
end of 2009, major German banks
with an international focus reduced
their leverage by reducing their balance sheets and increasing their capital. The breakdown of the interbank
markets was reflected in the balance
sheets of the major banks – that did
not offload toxic assets or liabilities
to resolution agencies – in falling
interbank claims and liabilities. The
claims on and liabilities to banks fell
by more than 35 per cent, which was
much more than the rate of contraction of total assets (13 per cent).
The institutions’ claims on nonbanks
shrank by the smaller margin of just
under 15 per cent. Domestic claims
fell by round about 5 per cent and
foreign claims by roughly 25 per
cent. On the other hand, the major
German banks increased equity by
over 26 per cent However, this was
mainly due to injections of government funds (Bundesbank 2012a:32).
The observable reduction in credit
lending was not the result of a credit
crunch. The credit constraint indicator of the Ifo Institute – based on ca.
4,000 responses of firms industry
and trade – for example showed
no dramatic increase during the
crisis years 2008 and 2009, and
the indicator decreases significantly
since the beginning of 2010. More
than anything, the reduction in credit
lending was the result of a weak
economic development caused
particularly by a strong fall in the net
exports. Moreover, lending by those
categories of banks which were
less affected by the global financial
crisis remained stable. The lending of
primary banks of the public and cooperative sector increased between
June 2007 and December 2009
(Bundesbank 2012a:33). The German banking system thus remained
fully functional at the peak of the
international financial crisis. For this
reason, some of the monetary policy
actions of the ECB in the last years to
support the economic recovery in the
euro zone were not mandatory from
a German point of view.
German banks concentrated their
deleveraging on assets denominated
in US dollar. This was a result of the
USD funding gap of the institutes
which had widened during the
crisis. For a time, the gap amounted
to more than USD 200 bn., which
reflected a dangerous currency
mismatch for German banks’ USDdenominated claims. Until the end of
2010, the institutions reduced their
USD-denominated activities and issued more USD debt securities. Since
autumn 2010, the gap of all German banks, including their foreign
branches and foreign subsidiaries,
has been below its pre-crisis level.
The German banking system has thus
become less susceptible to shocks in
the USD markets. Therefore, German
banks have been less affected by the
US money market funds’ reduction
of European exposures. The remaining demand for USD can now be
covered through the swap markets
(Bundesbank 2012a:33-34).
Since the collapse of Lehman Brothers holdings of asset-backed securities (ABS) have declined markedly
even at those institutions which have
not offloaded assets or liabilities to
banking resolution agencies. The
falling book value was mainly due
to maturities, repayments, redemp20
tions and amortisations. Following the large-scale impairment
charges recognised at the start of
the financial crisis, the remaining
write-downs amounted to EUR 4.8
bn (Bundesbank 2012a:34). Since
the beginning of 2010, nearly all
major banks have seen deterioration
in the average rating of their ABS
portfolios. In the case of five institutions, at least a fifth of their paper is
now rated as non-investment grade.
The legacy portfolios of crisis-prone
asset-backed securities continue to
stress the German banking system.
The European sovereign debt crisis
has been impacting on the financial
markets since spring 2010 with the
tremendous refunding problems
of Greece. It has triggered new
adjustments in the German financial
system, which so far have been accompanied by favourable domestic
conditions, with robust economic
activity and a good credit quality.
The sovereign debt crisis is having a
clear impact on the balance sheet
structure of the German banking
system. The banks’ balance sheets
reflect the increasing fragmentation
of the European banking system.
Although the balance sheets of the
major banks show a remarkable
increase in claims on banks between
the end of 2009 and 2012, this was
mostly inflated by a rise in balances
with central banks. After adjustment
for claims on the Bundesbank, the
corrected increase is significantly reduced (Bundesbank 2012a:35). The
adjustment to the debt crisis made by
the (major) banks is revealed by the
marked reduction in their exposures
to debtors from the GIPSY countries
between mid-2010 and 2012. This
reduces per se the danger of crossborder contagion effects. The debt
sustainability of government budgets
is now being seen in a much more
nuanced way than at the start of the
euro zone crisis.
Yet the German banking sector does
BV 11/2013
not currently appear to be following a general strategy of reducing
its international business model. The
foreign lending business of the banks
has fallen only moderately since the
start of the sovereign debt crisis. By
withdrawing to the domestic market,
German banks would lose the opportunities on foreign growth markets
and chances for diversification their
business.
The robust activity in the German
economy – which was and is the result of a high (international) competitiveness and a high ability of shock
absorption, due to the serious and at
the same time painful structural ad
justment processes within the 2000s
years – has proved to be a major
factor underpinning the profitability
of the banks. Even in the crisis year
2009 the gross write-downs of all
banks in Germany in domestic lending business showed only a marginal
increase. The volatile net trading income, under which the high losses in
2008 also arose, showed a steady
decline after picking up slightly for a
time in 2009. As proprietary trading
on the capital market proved to be
unsustainable in the crisis, a number of institutions have stopped or
reduced their prop trading activities
(Bundesbank 2012a:36).
The major banks have clearly
increased their tier 1 capital ratios.
These banks are thus responding
to the heightened demands of the
capital markets, the regulatory
requirements of the European Banking Authority (EBA) and new Basel
III capital rules, which have already
been partly anticipated. Between
March 2008 and September 2012,
the tier 1 capital of the major banks
increased from 8.3 per cent to 13.6
per cent of risk-weighted assets.
Since March 2008, the leverage
ratio – measured as the ratio of
total assets to tier 1 capital – of the
major banks has fallen from 43 to
32 (Bundesbank 2012a:37). The
BV 11/2013
average leverage ratio was lowered,
in particular, by conditions set by
the EU Commission to reduce total
assets in connection with reviewing
state aid. In 2012, the credit cooperatives and savings banks had a
distinctly lower tier 1 capital ratio
than the major banks. They additionally possess undisclosed reserves,
however. In mid-2012, their average
leverage ratios, at 16.6 and 14.9,
were well below the mean figure of
the other banks. The lower leverage of the cooperative and savings
banks is due to their business model,
which is geared to traditional lending
business. Despite the improvement,
The number
of banks has
decreased by
44 per cent
since 1990.
German banks’ leverage is still high
by comparison with other countries
(IMF 2011: 10).
The level of regulatory capital to
be held by the major banks has
declined since March 2008. This
was due, first of all, to a shortening
of the balance sheet. As exposures
to banks have been reduced and
the percentage of loans with a low
probability of default has increased,
the volume of risk-weighted assets
has contracted markedly, and hence
the required level of regulatory
capital has also declined. Since the
beginning of 2009, the average risk
weight of the exposures held by the
major banks has fallen. The nascent
economic upturn in Germany has
lowered the risk weight for exposures
21
to enterprises.
Robust domestic economic activity
has helped the German banking
system to cope with the strains from
the problem business areas. For
example, it is currently helping to
cushion the impact of the international shipping crisis. The market
risks reported by the German credit
institutions have undergone mixed
developments since the outbreak
of the financial crisis. The risk from
changes in credit spreads already
played a major role for some banks
prior to 2010. Since the onset of the
European sovereign debt crisis, it has
become considerably more important owing to the price fluctuations
of sovereign bonds. Interest rate risk,
on the other hand, has been largely
unchanged since beginning of the
last decade. It results from traditional
banking business, i.e. the granting of
long-term loans which are refinanced
by short-term customer deposits.
Large banks with an international
focus pass on much of their interest rate risk to insurers and other
financial intermediaries, for example
in the form of interest rate swaps. By
contrast, many savings banks and
credit cooperatives deliberately incur
this risk in order to generate income
from maturity transformation or to
avoid the cost of hedging.
In the middle of the past decade,
equity price risk posed a substantial
threat – especially to the larger, private commercial banks. Since then,
its importance has steadily declined;
like the risk from changes in volatility
and unmatched foreign exchange
positions, it is now, if anything, of
secondary importance.
Reactions of the other market side
At the peak of the financial crisis
many (private) bank clients in Germany rearrange their investments at
the expense of risky assets and in
favour of low-risk investments. The
development was reinforced by the
public announcement of the Federal
Government to guarantee all deposits in autumn 2008. Table 3 shows
remarkable changes in the level of
the deposits and borrowing from
domestic enterprises and households
as well as in the market shares of the
different banking groups. Particularly
notable is the rapidly increasing refinancing share of commercial banks
in the domestic sector (from 26.4 per
cent in 2006 to 33.6 per cent at the
end of 2012). Interesting in the first
phase of the crisis is also the increasing role of savings banks and credit
cooperatives for the sight deposits.
In contrast to the large commercial
banks and public Landesbanken
the primary banks of the public and
cooperative sector had virtually no
toxic assets on the balance sheets
and enjoyed the confidence of the
population. The increased liquidity
flows in favour of the small banks,
however, led to the problem, that the
development of the high-quality lending business could not keep step with
the business on their liabilities side.
The declining distortions on the
financial markets in the last years led
to a rebound in risk appetite and to
a reversal of the redeployment processes. The traditional breakdown of
the banking relations plays a larger
role again. The business account
of small and mid-size enterprises is
often held at the savings or cooperative banks because the lending process is less complicated and faster
in comparison with the procedure at
the major banks and their branches.
However, the personal accounts of
wealthy private customers are often
found in major or private banks. The
retail customers assume that these
banks have a better expertise in
private banking. As a result it can be
stated that although the level of deposits and borrowing from domestic
sources has risen significantly, the
structural adjustments also point to
increased competition between the
domestic banking groups for scarce
refinancing sources. The dependence
of German banks on the international capital markets has decreased
overall. Needless to say that this
development has been supported
by the international low-interest rate
setting.
V. Outlook
A number of structural developments
are posing a challenge to German
banks’ profitability over the midterm. These structural shifts raise
new issues concerning the balance
of banks’ business segments. Credit
institutions thus need to adapt their
business models promptly to the
changing environment.
First, competitive pressure will
increase in the domestic markets.
From our point of view, the current
low-interest rate environment could
further continue also within the next
years since the European sovereign
debt crisis and the potential risks
accompanying with that are not
removed over the mid-term. The required structural adjustments in many
member states of the euro area stand
only at the beginning and their systematic continuation is permanently
endangered. In connection with this,
neither the European Central Bank
nor the governments of the member
countries are really interested in
a higher interest rate level. There
is rather the danger of a policy of
“financial repression” with negative
real interest rates – produced by a
more or less moderate inflation and
by low long-term nominal interest
rates – which could reduce the real
sovereign debt durably.
In this scenario the pressure on
margins will increase further in the
German banking system because the
interest margins remain constant (this
is the most favourable case) or – this
is the most probable case – will
Table 3: Deposits and borrowing from domestic enterprises and households
Banking groups
All categories of banks
EUR billions
Commercial banks
share in percent
Saving banks
share in percent
Credit cooperatives
share in percent
Year
2006
2009
2012
2006
2009
2012
2006
2009
2012
2006
2009
2012
Total
2,394.6
2,829.7
3,090.2
26.4%
30.3%
33.6%
27.2%
25.4%
25.1%
17.7%
16.8%
17.3%
Sight
deposits
747.7
1,029.5
1,306.5
43.1%
42.1%
42.6%
29.0%
29.8%
28.8%
18.7%
19.5%
20.3%
including:
Time
Savings
deposits
deposits
962.8
586.5
1,102.6
594.9
1,072.5
617.6
21.6%
16.1%
26.1%
20.8%
31.4%
19.8%
7.3%
50.9%
5.6%
47.7%
4.6%
47.9%
8.7%
30.1%
7.5%
29.0%
6.4%
30.0%
Bank
savings bonds
97.5
103.2
93.6
8.1%
13.5%
22.1%
67.1%
62.9%
58.3%
23.0%
19.9%
18.2%
Source: Bundesbank (2013:68-71), Bundesbank online macroeconomic time series database and own calculations
22
BV 11/2013
decrease further. The opportunities
for an expansion of the non-interest
business are also restricted and
already have not realized any sustained increase in earnings within the
last few years.
Second, banks could be crowded
out as financial intermediaries and
thus lose some of their market share,
as a result of the trend towards
corporate funding via the capital
markets. This trend remains unchanged – despite the increasing defaults of SME bonds (bonds of small
and medium enterprises) in the last
months – as long as non-financial
corporations can issue their bonds to
the same or even more favourable
conditions than the major banks in
Germany. The large credit institutions
have to go more and more into the
financing of small and medium-sized
enterprises which cannot refinance
their business via the capital markets. But these market segments are
traditionally occupied by the savings
and cooperative banks. The competitive pressure will increase further by
the market entry of new competitors.
The low-interest rate environment
and the new regulatory framework
(the future rules of Solvency II) in the
insurance industry are the reasons
already today that insurers enter the
traditional segments of banks and
especially the markets of the savings
banks and credit unions. An example is the market for the financing of
private real estates. Finally foreign
banks will penetrate more and
more into the German markets with
the increasing financial integration
between the European retail markets.
The higher competitive pressure can
be seen already today in the regions
near the border.
Third, essential regulatory measures
will inevitably place a burden on
banks’ earnings, as did the contribution to the German restructuring fund
(bank levy), which was payable for
the first time in 2011, and the regulaBV 11/2013
tory surcharge on the costs of synthetic lending business. The changed
regulatory environment due to the
new rules of Basel III will tighten the
business conditions for all German
banks. The leverage ratio introduced
by Basel III might put additional
pressure, particularly on the business
model of the highly-leveraged institutions. Not only the new regulatory
capital framework but rather the
compliance with the new liquidity requirements can endanger especially
the traditional business of savings
banks and credit unions. The new
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
German banks
concentrated
their
deleveraging
on assets
denominated
in US dollar.
could restrict the opportunities of the
maturity transformation between the
two sides of their balance sheet. The
competitive advantages of the saving
banks and the credit unions over
the major banks – due to the strong
refinancing via the traditional deposit
business – would be partly removed.
Looking at the long-run adjustment
strategies – particularly for smaller
banks – the opportunities of the
credit institutions are restricted. For
the German savings banks and
credit unions neither specialisation
or niche strategy nor cost leadership
is possible. At first, the banks will
be able to encounter the increasing
23
competitive pressure with another
cost reduction. Besides the elimination of existing X inefficiencies in the
individual institutions, we will see another consolidation phase especially
in the cooperative sector but also
in the sector of the savings banks.
The number – particularly the credit
unions – will further drop considerably. This consolidation process is not
only the result of the difficult market
environment but also the result of the
increased regulation of the banking
sector which overburdens the smaller
credit institutions especially covering
the human and material resources.
The further (cross-pillar) consolidation among banks in the public and
the cooperative sector can help to
stimulate the economies of scale and
the economies of scope and therefore to improve the efficiency of the
cost structure, to reduce the cost-toincome ratio, and to strengthen the
business viability and stability in both
pillars of the banking system for the
next years.
The experiences with the financial crisis also have shown that the German
banking model has clear advantages
despite the lower profitability and the
apparently low efficiency in comparison with Europe. The smaller German banks with their low risk lending
activities and their strong deposit
banking business guaranteed the
credit supply in Germany also when
the financial crisis was at its peak,
because these banks were not really
influenced by the distortions on the
international capital and interbank
markets. The problems in the German banking sector were essentially
concentrated in some larger credit
institutions, in which particularly the
troubles in numerous Landesbanken
without a clear business model
is conspicuous. As a result, these
publicly-owned banks without an
acceptable business model should
gradually be liquidated or privatised
and the influence of the politics
should be reduced quickly. The involvement of private shareholders in
publicly-owned banks’ capital could
increase monitoring of the banks’ activity, with some more improvements.
Under this business environment
banks would face clearer incentives
to improve their efficiency, to achieve
a balanced risk-return profile, and
better disclosure and transparency
are promoted. The impact of political
motivated lending decisions would
be reduced without, for example,
basically questioning the social role
of savings banks.
The demand of some German
politicians and bankers to establish
a second national champion (for
example the Commerzbank AG)
beside the Deutsche Bank AG seems
not useful from our point of view. In
the international business Deutsche
Bank AG is subject to the competition
with other major banks with an international focus. The refinancing of
German large-scale enterprises via
the capital markets does not depend
on the nationality of the (investment)
banks. On the domestic markets the
competitive pressure will not increase
only for the small banks but also for
Deutsche Bank AG. From a regulatory point of view there is a risk that a
second global systemically important
bank (G-SIB) is created, a bank that
is too big to fail or to interconnected
to fail. To achieve a sustainable
financial stability, the number of systemically important banks should be
kept as small as possible to ensure
market entry and exit at any time.
References:
Brunner, A., Decressin, J., Hardy, D. and
B. Kudela (2004), Germany’s three-pillar
banking system. Cross-country perspectives
in Europe, IMF Occasional Paper No.
233, Washington, D.C.
Bundesbank (2007), The performance
of German credit institutions in 2006, in:
Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report
09/2012, 15-39
24
Bundesbank (2012a), The German
banking system five years into the financial
crisis, in: Financial Stability Review 2012,
Frankfurt/M, 31-40.
Bundesbank (2012b), The performance
of German credit institutions in 2011, in:
Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report
09/2012, 13-45.
Bundesbank (2013), Banking Statistics,
Statistical Supplement 1 to the Monthly
Report, August 2013.
Hau, H. and M. Thum (2009), Subprime
crisis and board (in-)competence: Private
vs public banks in Germany, in: Economic
Policy, Vol. 24/60, 701-752.
Hüfner, Felix (2010), The German banking
system: Lessons from the financial crisis,
OECD Economics Department Working
Papers No. 788, Paris.
Ianotta, G., G. Nocera and A. Sironi
(2007) Ownership structure, risk and
performance in the European banking
industry, in: Journal of Banking and
Finance, Vol. 31, 2127-2149.
IMF (2011), IMF Country Report 11/370,
Germany: Technical note on banking
sector structure, Washington, D.C.
Weil, L. (2009), Convergence in banking
efficiency across European countries, in:
Journal of International Financial Markets,
Vol. 19, 818-833.
Wirtschaftswoche (2013), No. 37,
09.09.2013, 8-9.
BV 11/2013
UDK 336.71(436)
Rehabilitation of
Financial Sector – The case
of Austrian Banks
REHABILITATION
OF FINANCIAL SECTOR –
THE CASE OF
AUSTRIAN BANKS
The financial crisis
unravelling in September
2008 led to unexpected
shocks in the financial
system and a deep
mistrust into banks and
banks distrusting each
other. Liquidity pools were
dry, the interbank market
non-existent. In this critical
situation the Austrian
Government together with
the competent authorities
took quick and decisive
measures to avert negative
consequences from
Austrian banks as much
as possible. This paper
discusses and evaluates
the specific measures
taken and tries to give an
outlook based on lessons
learnt.
JEL G01 G18 G21 G28
F
Otto Lucius*
inancial crisis and / or financial stability (or to be more
precise: the stability of the financial system) are buzzwords nowadays. This is true not only in economic
discussions, but also for the public, including politicians
and journalists. Why this? There are two simple reasons:
First, in our times the financial system is far more complex
than in the past. Times are gone when merchant banks with a capital ratio of 80 or 100 per cent were able to finance industrial development. And even when the so-called industrial revolution took
place those privately owned banks, like Rothschild, Sal. Oppenheim, just to name a few, had to turn into stock listed companies in
order to be able to finance huge industrial ventures, e.g. building of
railways lines and other infrastructure measures.
1. Introduction
The evolving industry itself quickly reached the limits of liquidity
and had to rely on external financing. This is why some 200 hundred
years ago capital markets gained such importance, now functioning
as financing source besides traditional credit supply by banks.
With the growing importance of capital markets not only financial instruments were at the heart of activities. It were derivatives
on financial instruments gaining ever more importance especially
over the last twenty years. Of course there were many reasons for
this; however, one factor facilitating the growth of derivatives was
freedom of capital movements and the resulting globalisation of
financial markets.
Prof. (FH) Mag. Otto Lucius, CFP, EFA, Managing Director Austrian Society for Bank Research (BWG).
*
BV 11/2013
25
Second, we experienced a financial
crisis five years ago. And unlike
other financial crises since the big
banking crisis in the thirties, this crisis
is not over yet. The shockwaves
were manifold and still to be felt in
everyday life. We have to keep in
mind that the financial crisis of 2008
quickly turned into a debt crisis of
sovereigns, this debt crisis still being
unresolved. And sovereigns are
heavily dependent on financing
through the financial system. There is
no quick solution with a guaranteed
happy end. This is why the debate
on a more resilient financial system is
not going to end soon.1
Therefore, it might be useful to start
with the unfolding of the financial crisis some years ago and to remember
some simple facts.
2. The unfolding of the
financial crisis2
The financial crisis of 2008 was
often compared to the banking crisis
of 1931 and the following Great
Depression. Fortunately that’s not
true. Of course we have experienced
several crises since the fifties. There
was, for example, the Asian crisis
of 1997. And we witnessed the dot.
com bubble bursting. And there were
some minor crashes along. However,
none of these crashes and crises
lasted for longer than one or two
years. To paraphrase a book title
by Reinhart and Rogoff: “This time is
different”. Is it really different?
Of course there is never monocausality in explanations for a crisis. And
there are many reasons for the last
crisis. Anyway, the trigger for the
crisis was rather simple and could
have been seen if someone would
have been willing to see.
In 2002/2003, the political will that
every American should have a home
of its own and the policy of low interest rates of the Fed coincided. In the
following years, the housing markets
in the U.S. experienced a huge
upswing. With everyone expecting
rising prices in real estate “forever”
US banks became rather negligent
in their lending practices on the one
hand and consumers became reckless about their ability to repay loans
in the future. This caused consumers
to invest more than they could afford
into housing mortgages. The Fed,
however, having followed a policy of
“cheap money” for some years was
forced to raise rates in 2006/2007.3
On the other hand, the booming
Overall Austria
registered
867 banks
at year-end
2008.
market of mortgage loans prompted
financial engineering in the form of
securitisation. As it often happens,
history is influenced by a person having a completely different intention.
This time it was a Chinese, David X.
Li, an actuary having worked with
Gaussian copula models in order
to solve the question for his then
employer, an insurance company, if
there were any correlation between
the death of an insured person and
an eventual death of the beneficiary.
Gaussian copula models proved to
be helpful in solving the problem of
correlated defaults. In the following
years, Mr. Li tried to apply this model
in finance and eventually published
a paper on default correlation.4
This paper was eagerly picked up
by the industry, especially rating
agencies, as they were now able
26
to price asset backed securities. If
the author remembers right, it was
Moody’s being the first to pick up
the paper and to implement it into its
tool Credit Metrics. Now the industry
thought to have a valid model to
price CDOs and alike. However the
application was met with scepticism. Besides some criticism by, for
example, Nassim Nicholas Talib,
the author of the Black Swan, it was
David Li himself stating as early as
2005 that the model was applied
the wrong way.5 But as the industry
had found a simple way to price not
only mortgage backed securities but
also derivative contracts based on
MBOs no one paid any attention to
lonesome critics. And by pricing and
rating those products they could be
distributed worldwide. This led to the
widespread belief that risk could be
distributed and the burden of default
would be shared. Now the financial
system was much more resilient! Was
it? 15 September 2008 proved the
contrary.
Early warning signs popped up in
2007. In June that year some hedge
funds of Bear Stearns couldn’t
refinance and had to be bailed out
by the bank. Almost exactly one year
before Lehman liquidity shortage of
British mortgage bank Northern Rock
caused a run by depositors on the
bank. These obvious signs of liquidity
problems weren’t read the correct
way.6 The warning signs continued:
1
For a comprehensive discussion on financial
stability see Andreas Dombret and Otto Lucius
(eds.) (2013), “Stability of the Financial System –
Illusion or Feasible Concept?”, Edward Elgar.
2
For a short yet concise summary of the financial
crisis and the consequences see also Dombret
(2013) pp. 4 - 8.
3
See historical data released by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, http://
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm
(accessed 8.9.2013).
4
Li, David X. (2000), “On Default Correlation: A
Copula Function Approach”, published in Journal of
Fixed Income, Vol. 9, Issue 4, pages 43–54.
5
Li (2008) in The Definitive Guide to CDOs, Ed.
by Gunter Meissner, p. 71.
BV 11/2013
In March 2008 the FED had to
rescue Bear Stearns by providing
a credit facility of some 29 billion
USD. Still the public had the feeling
that the situation was in no way
serious, because if a financial institution were in trouble the government
would step in. Borio (2009) called
this the “paradox of financial stability”.7 This means that the financial
system looks strongest exactly when
it is most vulnerable!
As the quality of real estate credit
portfolios steadily decreased it was
the two housing financing institutions Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
that ran into trouble. They had to
be taken over by the government,
in other words to be nationalised.
This happened one week before
Lehman went bankrupt. And it was
on 15. September 2008 that the
till now unthinkable happened:
Lehman Brothers went bankrupt. Not
enough: Merrill Lynch had to be
taken over by Bank of America, Wachovia had to be taken over partly
by Citigroup, and AIG, the largest
insurance group in the U.S., had to
be rescued.
During the first days after Lehman
nearly nothing happened. The
financial systems and its representatives were under shock. But out of a
sudden the shock switched into deep
mistrust. Liquid assets were withdrawn on a large scale as no one
trusted any other financial institution.
It might well be it were the next one
to fail. Immediate consequence was
a worldwide liquidity shortage to
an extent until then without prejudice. Money market funds had to
be closed and the whole financial
system was shortly before a deadly
collapse. Campa compared liquidity with water needed to cultivate
land. A shortage of liquidity leads to
problems as well as abundance of
liquidity (sic!) that could compromise
future growth by inflation.8
In this situation the U.S. Government
BV 11/2013
Graph 1: Number of Banks in Austria 2004 – 2012
Graph 2: Number of Branches in Austria 2004 - 2012
and Congress reacted quickly and
set up TARP, the Troubled Asset Relief Program with an amount of USD
700 billion. The reason for problems
of banks was twofold: Either they
lost money because Lehman was insolvent or they simply suffered under
severe liquidity shortage. With only
few exceptions, one of them being
Canada, one country after another
had to take action.
27
6
This is written in full awareness that it is always
easier to judge with the wisdom of knowing the past
– so to say providing ex post judgment. The author
is not going to blame anyone for not reading the
signs correctly. A very similar phenomenon can be
watched nowadays with supervisors: After having
designed one of the most complex rulebooks for
banking, Basel III, supervisors now realise that
not only the industry has to obey the rulebook but
the supervisors themselves have to monitor the
appropriate use of Basel III. In the light of the above
said it is quite amusing to read the paper of Andrew
Haldane and Vassileios Madouros “The dog and
the frisbee”, based on a speech of Haldane in
Jackson Hole in summer 2012.
7
C. Borio (2009), “Ten propositions about
liquidity crises”, BIS working paper, no. 293,
November.
8
José Manuel Campa (2013) „Stable Liquidity
and Funding Flows“ in Andreas Dombret and Otto
Lucius (eds.), Stability of the Financial System, E.
Elgar, p. 425.
3. The consequences for
Austria
The banking system in Austria is
compared to GDP not the biggest
one. Some say Austria is overbanked. In reality it is overbranched.
The number of independent banks is
steadily decreasing, this trend partly
set off by rising numbers of branches.
Overall Austria registered 867
banks at year-end 2008. Of these
551 belonged to Raiffeisen sector
and another 68 to Volksbanken
sector, both being credit unions.
Savings banks summed up to 55 and
commercial banks to 51. Details on
banks and branches over time and
sectors are shown in graphs 1 and
2. By end of the first half of 2011, the
balance-sheet total of Austrian banks
amounted to some 334 per cent of
GDP, which is number eleven in EU
ranking. In comparison Luxemburg is
leading with a balance-sheet total of
some 2,430 per cent of local GDP,
followed by Ireland with 799 per
cent of GDP and Malta with 796 per
cent of GDP. At the other end of the
scale is Lithuania with bank assets
totalling only 79 per cent of local
GDP.9
However, the “Top Ten” Austrian
banks account for roughly 50 to 60
per cent market share, be it in terms
of the balance-sheet total, credits or
deposits. On the other hand, one
has to admit that Austria is running
a smaller concentration risk in the
financial system compared to other
countries. Looking at the two large
banking groups in Austria, Erste
Group and RBI, both account for
roughly 100 per cent of GDP. Bank
Austria accounts for two thirds of
GDP, but theoretically a collapse
of Bank Austria would be an Italian
problem as Bank Austria is a subsidiary of UniCredit Group.10 If theory
could withstand a practice test,
remains to be seen – and will hopefully never be tested.
An old wisdom says: “There is nothing bad that doesn’t have its merits”.
The large number of relatively small
banks makes the banking system in
Austria rather resilient against shocks
like the one triggered by the crisis. It
was the large banks that were under
potential threat, or it was banks
badly managed.
Looking at large banks all of those
were potentially threatened by the
crisis. Furthermore, Austria had four
banks more or less heavily engaged
in CESEE. Any problem there could
The authorities
tried to convince
the largest
banks to
strengthen their
capital base.
have had a contagion effect. We will
deal with this under 5 below.
Nervousness spread after the
Lehman collapse. Before this nervousness could turn into panic, it was
a must to take counteractions. It is
worth noting that on a European
scale there was a strong political
will to take action. On 12. October
2008, the heads of states of the euro
area adopted the “Declaration on a
concerted European Action Plan of
the Euro Area Countries”.
4. Measures taken
It soon turned out that the worldwide
liquidity squeeze also affected banks
in Austria. The interbank market
was literally “dry”. Although the
vast majority of banks were funded
28
by deposits, the danger was that
depositors also lost confidence in the
banking system and would start withdrawing deposits on a large scale.
In other words, a bank run had to be
prevented.
In this potentially dangerous situation the Austrian Government after
thorough consultation with OeNB,
the Central Bank in Austria, took decisive action. On 8. October 2008,
Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer and
Vice Chancellor and Minister of
Finance Wilhelm Molterer informed
the public that all deposits of all
banks in Austria would be guaranteed to an unlimited extent by the
Austrian Government. This unlimited
guarantee would become effective
retroactively starting on 1 October
2008. This was the first in a long row
of measures that effectively helped to
keep confidence in the banking sector alive. Upon proposal of experts,
the government asked the Parliament
of Austria to enact a series of acts
and amendments to existing acts.11
The acts are incorporated in one legislative piece announced as BGBl I
No. 136/2008. Altogether financial
resources with a total of EUR 100
billion were provided.
The mentioned EUR 100 billion were
part of the so-called “banking rescue
package“ and had been distributed
as follows:
• EUR 50 billion for guarantees on
capital market issues of banks
and for the activities of Oesterreichische Clearingbank AG on the
basis of IBSG (see below 4.1.)
• EUR 10 billion was allocated for
liabilities in favour of Austrian
9
http://newsroom.sparkasse.at/osterreich-mit-765banken-auf-platz-zwei-in-eu/ (accessed 8.9.2013).
10
Numbers taken from Die Presse, 25. March
2013, http://diepresse.com/home/1380493/
Zypern-kann-ueberall-in-Europa-passieren (accessed
8.9.2013).
11
For a concise documentation of legal measures
to stabilise financial markets in Austria and other
European countries see Eder, Hörl and Winkler
(2008), “Stabilising the Financial Markets in
Europe”.
BV 11/2013
industrial companies.
• EUR 15 billion was allocated for
guarantees in order to stabilise
the Euro.
• EUR 10 billion was used to fund
necessary measures of deposit
protection.
• EUR 15 billion has been allocated for measures according to
FinStaG (see below 4.2.)
We will now have a closer look on
these acts and the measures taken.
4.1 The Federal Act on
Strengthening the Interbank
Market12 (Interbankmarktstärkungsgesetz – IBSG)
In order to strengthen the interbank
market and to facilitate liquidity
supply for Austrian banks, the Act
enabled the Ministry of Finance to
take over guarantees of up to EUR
75 billion. The act also provided the
basis to create a specialised institution called Oesterreichische Clearing
Bank AG OeCAG. This special bank
was founded by Austrian banks and
located at the premises of Oesterreichische Kontrollbank OeKB.
This bank became operational on
14 November 2008. The Republic provided for this special bank
guarantees of up to EUR 4 billion.
The European Commission agreed
also with this measure because funds
were provided without any discrimination, the interest rates were in line
with market rates and the funds were
limited in duration. All in all, the
OeCAG performed 310 web-based
auctions where deposits could be offered and loans within a time range
of 1 to 12 months could be asked
for. Allocations amounted to EUR
22.5 billion and USD 1.5 billion.
The liability of the Republic never
became active. The OeCAG paid to
the Republic altogether EUR 19.1.million in commitment fees.
This special measure was of utmost
importance as it prevented distorBV 11/2013
tions in the interbank market and
secured liquidity at all times. The
Act was in force until 31 December
2010. Thus the OeCAG closed its
operations in March 2011 and was
then dissolved.
The IBSG provided also for other
guarantees besides those for
OeCAG. Up to EUR 71 billion was
the amount approved for the liability
of the government for any obligations resulting of the issuance of
securities. The goal was to revitalise
medium-term refinancing of banks.
None of these guarantees has ever
become active.
Some Austrian
banks are highly
active in the
CESEE region.
4.2 Amendment of the Act on
the Austrian Investment and
Privatisation Agency
(ÖIAG-Gesetz 2000)
Before discussing the second part
of this legislative initiative (see 4.3.
below) it might be helpful to shed
some light on the creation of a special company designed to administer capital measures. The above
mentioned amendment enabled the
creation of a new company called
Finanzmarktbeteiligung Aktiengesellschaft des Bundes (FIMBAG),
a holding company for shares in
financial institutions (state owned as
a consequence of bank recapitalisation). FIMBAG has been established
as a subsidiary of Österrreichische Industrieholding AG (ÖIAG).
Intended to support the Republic of
29
Austria in all measures related to
FinStaG, the FIMBAG became operational on 11 November 2008. Its
legal foundation is rooted in para 3
section 5 of FinStaG. FIMBAG plays
an active role in managing financial
support for banks and/or representing the Republic as owner or partial
owner of some banks.
4.3. Financial Market Stabilisation Act (Finanzmarktstabilitätsgesetz – FinStaG)
This act together with IBSG (see
above 4.1.) was the core of the action plan the authorities had developed to fight consequences of the
financial crisis. The act empowered
the Minister of Finance to recapitalise individual banks and insurance
companies in order to safeguard
business activities in Austria, to secure macroeconomic balance and to
protect the Austrian economy.
The act allowed for the following
measures: taking up liability for the
payables of banks, e.g. by guarantees or collaterals, granting loans,
contributing equity and acquiring
participation. All of these measures
had to be provided against marketbased fees. If a bank wanted to call
recapitalisation measures under the
conditions of the FinStaG, it had to
allow the BMF to have discretionary power on certain aspects on
banking operations, including usage
of funds, salary schemes and the
way dividends were distributed. For
all measures taken under FinStaG a
total of EUR 15 billion was available.
Seen aside from the legal framework,
it is worth noting that in 2008 only
one bank was in need of rescue. This
was Kommunalkredit AG, a bank
specialised in financing communities
12
The English translation of the respective Austrian
act titles (except the one dealt with under 4.6.) has
been taken from Eder, Hörl and Winkler (2008),
“Stabilising the Financial Markets in Europe”.
and public entities. Due to a misled
very short term refinancing policy,
the bank came under pressure when
liquidity dried out. Furthermore, the
bank had a rather large derivatives
portfolio and was confronted with
margin calls further tightening the
liquidity squeeze. Kommunalkredit,
at that time the eight-biggest bank in
Austria and owned by ÖVAG with
50.78 per cent (Dexia holding 49
percent) had to be nationalised on
3. November 2008. The Republic bought 99.78 per cent for the
symbolic price of two euro. Later
on toxic assets of Kommunalkredit
were carved out and transferred to
the “bad bank”, a resolution bank
named KA Finanz AG.
Regardless of that case, no bank
was really in need of immediate
capital support at that time. However, the authorities OeNB and FMA
tried to convince the largest banks
to strengthen their capital base by
tapping the funds of FinStaG. One
of the first banks to do so was Erste
Group, calling for EUR 1.224 billion
in participation capital. (By the way,
Erste Group was also the first bank to
repay the full amount in 2013.) Then
other banks followed suit: RBI with
EUR 1.75 billion, BAWAG P.S.K.
with EUR 0.55 billion (of which 50
million already paid back by now)
and ÖVAG with the amount of EUR
1 billion. For an overview of the
initial capital measures see table 1.
Bank Austria never made a claim on
state aid.13
Hypo Alpe Adria (a special case)
and ÖVAG became subject to major
restructuring at a later stage. The
economic downturn in CESEE forced
ÖVAG not only to merge with its
Austrian daughter company Investkredit, but in later years to get rid
of all CESEE operations by selling
the respective banks to Sberbank.
Only the Romanian bank is still with
ÖVAG. The Republic meanwhile
became a shareholder of ÖVAG to
Table 1: Capital Measures
as per 31.12.2009
Participation
Capital:
BAWAG P.S.K.
Erste Group
Hypo Alpe-AdriaBank International
ÖVAG RBI Total
Shares:
Kommunalkredit
Austria and KF Total
in thousands
EUR
550.000
1.224.000
900.000
1.000.000
1.750.000
5.424.000
609.000
609.000
Table 2: Capital held by
FIMBAG as per 15.9.2013
Participation
Capital:
BAWAG P.S.K.
Hypo Alpe-AdriaBank International
ÖVAG RBI Total
Shares:
Kommunalkredit
Austria and KF Total
in thousands
EUR
500.000
275.111
300.000
1.750.000
2.825.111
609.000
4.4. Amendment of the Banking
Act (Bankwesengesetz)
609.000
the extent of 43 per cent of capital
stock.14 The involvement of FIMBAG
in capital measures at the end of
2012 can be seen in table 2.
Taken altogether we have to state
that the quick and decisive measures taken by the Republic and the
authorities prevented the worst case
scenario and helped the banking system to go through the shock waves of
the financial crisis rather smoothly.
As already stated, Hypo Alpe Adria
is a special case. The bank was
formerly owned by the Province
of Carinthia. It drove a course of
rapid expansion into the Alpe-Adria
region, especially Italy, Slovenia and
Croatia. It was sold to Bayerische
Landesbank in 2007. A very often
neglected fact is that the Carinthian government had accumulated
guarantees of roughly EUR 20 billion
30
in liabilities for the bank. When the
financial crisis broke out, the situation of Hypo Alpe Adria worsened.
And in late 2009, the then owner
Bayerische Landesbank was no more
able or willing to further support it.
A collapse of the bank would have
triggered the liabilities, far too much
to be borne by Carinthia. Taking
over these liabilities by the Republic
with consequences for public debt
had to be considered as a serious
danger for the standing of the Republic. Furthermore, Hypo Alpe Adria
had been a very active player in its
neighbouring countries. A collapse
of the bank would have had disastrous consequences for the region already shaken by the crisis. There was
international intervention to rescue
the bank. Thus there was no alternative for the Republic but to take over
Hypo Alpe Adria, which happened
on 14 December 2009.
The amendment of the Austrian
Banking Act became necessary
as one of the first measures to be
undertaken at the very beginning
of the financial crisis in order to
strengthen the trustworthiness of
the banking system by temporarily abolishing any restrictions on
deposit protection. For natural
persons as depositors there was no
restriction on deposit protection, for
SMEs a limit of EUR 50,000 was
introduced. From 1 January 2010
onwards the limit for deposit protection vis-à-vis natural persons was
limited to EUR 100,000 again. The
amendment also created the power
for the supervisor to demand
so-called capital add-ons in a simplified procedure.
13
FIMBAG Lagebericht Geschäftsjahr 2011.
FIMBAG Lagebericht Geschäftsjahr 2012.
14
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4.5. Amendment of the Stock
Exchange Act (Börsegesetz)
Due to the turmoil and the increased volatility in the capital markets one measure was to reduce
volatility at the Vienna Stock Exchange by prohibition of short selling at all, and to impose restrictions
on short selling on certain financial
instruments. The act empowered the
Financial Market Authority FMA in
Austria to issue regulations on short
selling. Indeed short selling was
never entirely forbidden, but a series of such regulations was put into
place concerning a prohibition of
uncovered short selling for shares
of certain companies, namely Erste
Group, RBI, UNIQA and VIG.
The validity of the last regulation
expired on 1 July 2013, as the EU
regulation No. 236/2012 entered
into force.
4.6. Economic Recovery Act 2008
(Konjunkturbelebungsgesetz
2008)
This act entered into force on 10
November 2008 and was intended to revive and stimulate the
Austrian economy. The steps taken
were the establishment of an SME
fund for projects with growth potential, benefiting from the SME initiative of the EIB, granting loans for
research and technology projects,
and lastly taking out loans from the
European development funds for
energy measures.
5. The Vienna Initiative
As already mentioned, some Austrian banks are highly active in the
CESEE region. This is mainly Bank
Austria, Erste Group and Raiffeisen
Bank International. ÖVAG, the head
institution of the Volksbank sector has
already retreated from this region
and sold its operations (except
BV 11/2013
Romania) to Sberbank. At the beginning of 2009 it was quite obvious
that the financial crisis would turn
into an economic crisis. At that time
some commentators and rating agencies feared a meltdown in the CESEE
countries. If this had happened Austrian banks operating there would
have been heavily affected.
However, at that time the threat of
adverse developments in the CESEE
and its negative consequences was
deemed purely theoretical. The countries in the Eastern and South-eastern
Europe came much better through
the crisis than expected. Anyway,
the constant debate about adverse
effects threatened to have real
negative consequences. Furthermore,
outsiders realised the danger of possible withdrawal of liquidity from the
countries in the CESEE region. This
in turn would have the potential to
trigger a crisis in this region. Therefore, the Austrian Ministry of Finance
started what then became known as
the “Vienna Initiative”.
This initiative, officially named
“Vienna Initiative/European Bank
Coordination Initiative (VI/EBCI)”,
was created in January 2009 as an
informal forum.15 It was launched by
the EBRD, the IMF and the Austrian
Ministry of Finance at the height of
the systemic financial crisis to provide
a framework for coordinating the crisis management and crisis resolution
of financial sector issues that were
highlighted by the economic downturn and involved large cross-border
bank groups systemically important
in the emerging Europe region.
Its aims were to prevent a large-scale
and uncoordinated withdrawal of
cross-border bank groups from the
region; further to ensure that parent
bank groups publicly commit to maintain their exposures and recapitalise
their subsidiaries, as part of the
overall balance-of-payments support
to countries where IMF/EC macroeconomic support programmes have
31
become necessary (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia, Romania
and Serbia). The initiative also aimed
to ensure that national support packages of cross-border bank groups
benefit their subsidiaries in emerging
Europe and avoid a home bias in
dealing with Europe’s banks. Next,
to agree on basic crisis management
and crisis resolution principles in
the region. Host country authorities
should be responsible for appropriate macroeconomic policies; liquidity
support in local currency irrespective
of bank ownership; and supporting
their deposit insurance schemes.
Parent bank groups – and the home
country authorities behind them –
should be responsible for providing
funding in foreign exchange and recapitalising subsidiaries. Finally, the
initiative aimed to strengthen crossborder regulatory cooperation and
information sharing in the context of
IMF/EC-supported programmes and
beyond.16
According to Nitsche, the Vienna
Initiative reached most of the goals
set – the initiative can be perceived
as a successful vehicle for publicprivate sector coordination in the
financial crisis. It also contributed to
shorten the perception lag of politicians with regard to the suddenly
increased macro-financial risks in the
fourth quarter of 2008 / beginning
of 2009. It helped stabilisation and
recovery in individual countries and
it helped to build up mutual trust
between the international banks,
home and host country authorities
and international financial institutions
(IFIs).17
Nitsche also mentioned some areas
where the VI failed: The attempt
to agree on a general framework
15
W. Nitsche (2010), “The Vienna Initiative /
European Bank Coordination Initiative: Assessment
and Outlook”, BMF-WP 4/2010.
16
EBRD, Vienna Initiative – moving to a new phase,
April 2012, p. 1.
17
See Nitsche (2010), p. 5.
was not successful. Although not
being a problem in the short term it
makes the platform very vulnerable.
And it was not possible to achieve
a common understanding on the
division of tasks and burden sharing in crisis management. However,
some elements for such an agreement emerged in the various country
meetings.18
A very concrete step in helping to
stabilise the CESEE region was the
IFI Initiative. EBRD, EIB and World
Bank joined forces in setting up a
two-year programme for 2009 –
2010 providing EUR 24.5 billion
committed for banking sectors and
bank lending to enterprises.19
6. Evaluation of measures
and outlook
This paper discussed the measures
taken in Austria. It is obvious that
only due to the quick and unanimous
decisions by the government major
negative consequences of the financial crisis 2008 could be prevented.
Confidence by depositors into banks
remained stable, and liquidity supply
in the interbank market could be supplied by OeCAG. The other newly
created institution FIMBAG is a success story in itself. That two banks in
Austria are still under pressure is only
in a secondary way consequence
of the financial crisis. It is by far due
to non-appropriate business models,
failure in risk management practices
and overly optimistic and hastily
expansion.
Are there lessons to be learned? Yes
indeed:
• First, if problems become visible
immediate and concerted action
is needed. Any delay in action
could make the situation even
worse. Trust is of utmost importance. And trust can only be
maintained by quick and trustworthy action.
• Second, if a bank needs capital
support but is in principle viable,
the Austrian way of providing
participation capital proved to
be successful. Can one imagine
a better investment today than
lending capital against 8 per cent
annual interest?
• However, the American experience has taught us that in case
restructuring is needed it might
be better for the government to
provide financial aid against
shares. These shares can be
sold with profit after successful
restructuring.
• Looking at the system as a
whole, liquidity is at its core. The
Austrian system of regular liquidity auction proved to be most
helpful.
Summarising we have to state the
following: In case of a crisis, do not
hesitate to act; instead, act immediately and instil confidence!
Stability of the Financial System, E. Elgar,
p. 425 sequ.
Dombret, Andreas (2013), “Five Years after
Lehman – Learning from the past, looking
to the future”, Speech at the 24th European
Business School Symposium, September,
Deutsche Bundesbank.
Dombret, Andreas and Otto Lucius (eds.)
(2013), “Stability of the Financial System
– Illusion or Feasible Concept?”, Edward
Elgar.
EBRD (2012), “Vienna Initiative – moving
to a new phase”, April, http://www.ebrd.
com/downloads/research/factsheets/viennainitiative.pdf.
Eder, Stefan, Hörl, Johannes and Winkler,
Andreas (2008), “Finanzmarktstärkung in
Europa – Stabilising the Financial Markets
in Europe”, NWV Verlag, Wien - Graz.
FIMBAG (2011, 2012), Lagebericht (for
the respective business year), http://www.
fmarktbet.at/cms/cms.php?pageName=19
Haldane, Andrew and Vasileios Madouros
“The dog and the Frisbee”, Bank of England, http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
publications/Documents/speeches/2012/
speech596.pdf.
IFI Initiative (2009), “EBRD, EIB and World
Bank Group join forces to support Central
and Eastern Europe”, http://vienna-initiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/
IFI-Initiative-EBRD-EIB-and-World-BankGroup-join-forces-to-support-Central-andEastern-Europe.pdf.
Li, David X. (2000), “On Default Correlation: A Copula Function Approach”,
published in Journal of Fixed Income, Vol.
9, Issue 4, pages 43–54.
Li, David X. (2008), “An Overview on
Copula Function Methods in Credit Portfolio Modelling”, in The Definitive Guide
to CDOs, Ed. by Gunter Meissner, p. 39
sequ.
Nitsche, Wolfgang (2010), “The Vienna
Initiative / European Bank Coordination
Initiative: Assessment and Outlook, BMFWP 4/2010.
ReferenceS:
Borio, Claudio (2009), “Ten propositions
about liquidity crises”, BIS working paper,
no. 293, November.
Campa Fernandez, José Manuel (2013)
„Stable Liquidity and Funding Flows“ in
Andreas Dombret and Otto Lucius (eds.),
32
18
Cf. Nitsche (2010), p. 5.
Factsheet on IFI Initiative http://vienna-initiative.
com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/IFI-InitiativeEBRD-EIB-and-World-Bank-Group-join-forces-tosupport-Central-and-Eastern-Europe.pdf (accessed
8. September 2013).
19
BV 11/2013
UDK 336.71(417)
Rehabilitation of
Financial Sector The case of Irish banks
REHABILITATION OF
FINANCIAL SECTOR - THE
CASE OF IRISH BANKS
This paper outlines the
factors that gave rise to the
Irish banking sector crisis
which led to the institution
of a comprehensive
guarantee scheme in
September 2008. It then
outlines the series of
direct support measures
and structural measures
implemented to deal
with the very substantial
impairments of the balance
sheets of the Irish banks.
It refers to the difficulties
arising from the lack of
a settled bank resolution
system in Ireland and in
the eurozone.
JEL G01 G18 G21 G28
O
n 30 September 2008, the Irish Minister for Finance
announced a state guarantee on all deposits and on a
range of debt instruments in Irish banks. Six banks announced that they would participate in the scheme.
Background
The announcement came after a period of increasing turbulence in financial markets dating back to mid-2007 and events in
the USA. Problems accumulated in rapid succession from then on.
The following are some selected examples of these problems.
• Sub-prime mortgages in the US proved to be extremely problematic, causing difficulties in other countries too.
• The US SEC began an investigation of CDO issuers in June
2007, causing widespread concerns about securitisation.
• In August 2007, the European Central Bank responded to
tensions in euro money markets and embarked on a series of
liquidity-provision measures.
• Problems began to emerge among mortgage lenders in the
UK, culminating in the nationalisation of Northern Rock in
February 2008.
• Bear Sterns suffered a massive drop in its liquid assets and
had to be bought by JP Morgan in March 2008.
• Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac joined the US problem list in
mid-July 2008.
• More problems emerged in the banking sectors in Sweden,
France, Germany and the Netherlands, all leading to government intervention of one form or another.
*
BV 11/2013
Alan Dukes*
Alan Dukes, Economist, Chairman of IBRC (formerly Anglo Irish Bank).
33
• On 15 August 2008, Lehman’s
filed for bankruptcy. Market
liquidity simply dried up.
• In response to the liquidity crisis,
the deposit protection level for
depositors in Irish banks was
raised on 20 September 2008
to €100,000 per depositor, per
institution.
• On 29 September 2008, the US
Treasury’s first bailout plan – the
$700bn TARP – was rejected
by Congress but passed on 3
October.
These and many other disruptive
market factors led to increasing
worries in Ireland about the liquidity
of the banking sector. These worries led, in turn, to the Government
decision on the bank guarantee. The
announcement was greeted with
surprise in Ireland. The face value of
liabilities guaranteed amounted to
over twice the value of Ireland’s GDP
(see Table 1 below).
While the Minister for Finance of
the day claimed that it would be
the “cheapest guarantee” in history
(because, he claimed, it would never
be called upon), many commentators
took the view that the state should
not be put at risk as a result of gross
mismanagement and imprudence on
the part of the boards and management of the banks. One bank in
particular - Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo)
– attracted special opprobrium. It
had for over a decade been a star
performer, showing a very rapid
rate of increase in its balance sheet
and high levels of profitability. When
concerns about the performance
of Irish banks in general began to
emerge in late 2007, Anglo was not
immune and its share price collapsed
in March 2008. By the time the
guarantee was announced, it was
clear that there were very serious
problems in Anglo. One view was
that it should be allowed to fail or be
liquidated. The government, however, took the view that “no bank could
be allowed to fail” because of the
risk of contagion. In his report (1),
the Governor of the Central Bank
observed (p. 131) that
“…..a default by a €100 billion
bank such as Anglo Irish Bank would
undoubtedly have put funding pressure on the other main Irish banks via
contagion, given the broad similarities in the type and geography of
their property-related lending, their
common implicit reliance on the
backing of the Irish State, and even
name confusion.”
The announcement of the guarantee
caused some unfavourable comment
in other EU Member States. The UK
Chancellor of the Exchequer was
concerned that the move would result
in a flow of bank deposits from the
UK to Ireland. Similar views were
expressed by the authorities of other
Member States and by the European
Commission. The Irish banks had
experienced substantial deposit outflows prior to the guarantee. Anglo
had been particularly hard hit. While
the level of deposits stabilised somewhat after the guarantee (except
for Anglo) there was no evidence
of any significant inflow of deposits
from other eurozone or EU Member
States in the months following the
guarantee.
Moreover, the UK and German
authorities had already intervened
in their banking sectors before the
Irish guarantee was announced and
the Irish action was followed in the
ensuing fifteen months by a series of
further interventions by the governments of the UK, France, Germany
and the Netherlands.
In addition, and in common with the
eurozone and most other European
states, Ireland did not have any
settled bank resolution rules, procedures or legislation. There was no
settled procedure for dealing with
the assets of a failed bank, even if
some of its liabilities were simply to
be repudiated.
The Genesis of the Problem
Table 1: Covered Banks: Liabilities Guaranteed by the
State as at 30 September 2008
€ billion
173.2 (47%)
124.2 (33%)
12.2 (3%)
49.1 (13%)
15.8 (4%)
0.7 (0%)
375.2
Customer Deposits
Senior Unsecured Debt
Dated Subordinated Debt
InterBank Deposits
Asset Covered Securities
Financial Instruments
Total
Source: Department of Finance, Dublin, adapted from (3).
34
In September 2008, the problem in
the Irish banking sector was perceived to be a liquidity problem.
Only a short time before that, the
banks had been subjected to a special study which concluded that they
were “well capitalised”, a conclusion
shared by the (then) Central Bank
and Financial Services Regulatory
Authority.
The banks had a large and growing
funding gap. At the end of 2002,
the excess of domestic lending to
residents over deposits amounted
to €26bn: by the end of 2008,
that gap had grown to €129bn. In
general, loan to deposit ratios had
increased over the years: Table 2
shows the change in one year from
2005 to 2006.
BV 11/2013
Table 2: Loan to Deposit Ratios for Selected Irish Financial
Institutions*, 2005 and 2006
Allied Irish Banks
Bank of Ireland
Anglo Irish Bank
Irish Nationwide Building Society
Irish Life and Permanent
Educational Building Society
2005
140%
210%
140%
135%
205%
140%
2006
145%
220%
135%
151%
250%
145%
* Loan to deposit ratio calculated at group level, including foreign loans and deposits.
Source: Annual Reports: adapted from (2) (R&W)
All data at December 2006, except Anglo Irish Bank data September 2006 and
Bank of Ireland data March 2007
In fact, lending activity in the banks
participating in the guarantee
scheme (the “covered institutions”)
had been expanding rapidly for
some years, as illustrated in Table 3.
Table 3: Compound Average
Annual Loan Growth
for Selected Irish Financial
Institutions, 2003 – 2006
Allied Irish Banks:
34%
Bank of Ireland:
28%
Anglo Irish Bank:
47%
Irish Nationwide Building Society: 40%
Irish Life and Permanent:
37%
Educational Building Society:
35%
Source: Annual Reports: adapted from (2)
Bank of Ireland data are for financial
year ending March in the following year
Anglo Irish Bank data are for the
financial year ending September
Aggregate domestic lending had
grown from €94bn. in 2002 to
€262bn. in 2008. Annual growth
rates were:
2003:
2004:
2005:
2006:
2007:
2008:
20%
28%
29%
28%
17%
5%
The total of outstanding loans and
advances from the covered institutions to customers grew from 1.2
BV 11/2013
times GDP in 2000 to 2.2 times GDP
in 2008.
Rapid growth in total lending,
increasing loan to deposit ratios and
substantial reliance on wholesale
interbank funding (much of it from
abroad) clearly gave rise to concerns about liquidity, particularly
in the light of tightening liquidity in
financial markets from late 2007 on.
Other dimensions of the problem
soon began to emerge.
Ireland experienced over a decade
of strong economic growth from the
mid-1990s. This growth fuelled a
massive property boom. Rising real
personal incomes boosted demand
for residential property, both among
intending owner-occupiers and
among those in the “buy to let”
market. A further impetus was added
by the emergence of a pattern of net
immigration from about 2000 on,
a phenomenon unknown in Ireland
since the mid-19th century. Rising personal incomes also fuelled demand
for retail centre development and
leisure facilities. A buoyant economy
which attracted substantial volumes
of foreign direct investment produced
vigorous demand for office, commercial and industrial construction. The
State engaged in a hugely-increased
infrastructure investment programme,
partly financed by public-private
partnerships, including the construction of motorways, schools, hospitals
35
and energy generation facilities
and the modernisation and upgrading of port facilities, railways and
railway rolling stock. The prices of
land scheduled for development
rose rapidly and even the “hope
value” of land not yet scheduled for
development increased. The boom
was further inflated by the operation
of a wide range of tax incentives for
construction and development which
began to be restricted only in 2007.
By and large, both the Irish public in
general and the political establishment have bought in to the proposition that “construction is good for the
economy”. As a result, it is estimated
that, by 2007, construction and
related activities accounted for about
13% of Irish GDP. In most of the
boom years, more residential units
were constructed in Ireland, with a
population of just over 4 million, than
in the whole of the UK, with a population fifteen times as great.
The property boom brought opportunities to the banks. Anglo was seen
to be the first to ride the wave. It enjoyed a long period of rapid growth
and high profitability based very
largely on clients in the construction
and property development sectors.
In time, the other banks followed suit
(BoI more slowly and less exuberantly than AIB). Anglo saw the need to
diversify. It built a substantial wealth
management operation which was,
however, closely linked to its construction and property development
clients and which invested heavily in
the property sector. It also “diversified” by engaging in the property
construction and development sectors in the UK and the USA.
The buoyant property and development market in Ireland attracted new
entrants, which took the view that
they had to compete aggressively
in order to gain market share. One
of the aggressive tactics used by
a new entrant was to offer 100%
mortgages to first-time house buyers.
That succeeded so well that previously-established lenders eventually
followed suit.
In 2000, the covered institutions
recorded after-tax profits of €2.5bn.,
or approximately 1.1% on their
assets. After a dip in 2001, profits
grew from 2002 to 2007, reaching €5.6bn. in that year, equivalent
to about 0.9% on assets. In 2008,
profits fell to €1.4bn., equivalent to
some 0.2% on assets.
The Nyberg Report (3), using data
from the Investment Property Databank, shows that real indexed commercial property values (combined
office, retail and manufacturing)
increased by 43% from 2000 to the
peak in 2007 and then declined
by 25% by the end of 2008. Real
indexed house prices (data from the
Department of the Environment and
from the Central Statistics Office)
rose by 48% between 2000 and the
peak in 2007 and then fell by 11%
by the end of 2008.
The Problem Crystallises
By the middle of 2007, the Irish
banking system had the following
notable characteristics.
• It was substantially dependent on
interbank wholesale funding to
underpin its operations.
• It was heavily exposed to lending
to an inflated property sector,
not only in Ireland but also in the
UK and in the USA (where the
sub-prime mortgage problem had
already erupted).
• Loan to value ratios on a very
large proportion of property-related lending were high.
• The banks were exposed to a
relatively small number of borrowers in the commercial property and development market.
Many of these borrowers had
loans from more than one of the
Irish banks and some also had loans from banks in other states. In
a number of cases, the “equity”
element in a financing proposal
was in fact supported by borrowing (sometimes from another
bank but in some cases under a
different group identity from the
same bank which financed the
main project).
In “normal” market conditions, these
were significant risk factors. In the
circumstances of the time, they were
extremely serious.
The credit squeeze which followed
the Lehman’s collapse meant that an
important source of bank funding
(interbank lending) effectively dried
up. It also meant that significant
numbers of the banks’ large clients in
the property and development sector
experienced their own funding difficulties, which in turn impaired their
ability to service their loans.
More was to come.
In March 2007, the Irish Index of
House Prices showed a decline for
the first time in five years. Effectively,
the house price bubble burst around
mid-2007. By the end of 2008,
house prices had fallen by 11%
from the 2007 peak. The commercial property market (office, retail
and manufacturing property and
development) soon followed. By the
end of 2008, commercial property
prices had fallen by 25% from the
2007 peak. The banks now found
themselves with large exposures to
loans secured on assets which were
rapidly losing value.
Looking back on the genesis of the
crisis in the Irish banking system, it is
clear that there were serious failings
in business models, business practices and risk assessment in the banks.
Equally, there were serious failings
in the regulatory sphere. Regulators
had access to all the information necessary to identify the shortcomings in
bank management, but failed to take
the action required to redress the situation. It has to be said, however, that
36
neither the Irish banks nor the Irish
regulators were alone in these failings: similar situations were common
in other countries. Space does not
permit a worthwhile analysis here:
that is to be found in the three reports
referenced below. It is, however, the
case that conclusions have been
drawn from the experience and that
regulatory practices have been very
substantially amended and regulatory resources increased.
The Policy Response
Liquidity, capitalisation,
personnel
The initial policy response, in the
form of the 30 September 2008
guarantee, was articulated in the
belief that the problem was one of
liquidity. The Irish authorities were
not alone in taking this view: liquidity
was demonstrably a pressing problem throughout the western economies. In August 2008, the European
Central Bank embarked on what was
to become a major (and frequently
controversial) expansion of its market
activities. Without this action, the
consequences, not only for the eurozone but for world financial markets,
would have been incalculable.
In Ireland, it quickly became clear
that there was more to the problem
than a crisis of liquidity.
The collapse of the property sector
had major economic and budgetary
implications. At its peak, the construction sector accounted for over
12% of total employment in the Irish
economy and of GDP. It was a major
contributor not only to income tax
revenue, but also to VAT and Stamp
Duty revenue, which between them
accounted for about 45% of total
tax revenue. The property sector
collapse had major implications for
fiscal policy. The government introduced an emergency early budget
on 13 October to begin to address
BV 11/2013
the situation. The implications of the
collapse, however, had not yet been
fully appreciated: the October 2008
budget included a forecast of tax
revenue which, in the event, proved
to be seriously over-optimistic. In
2009 and 2010, the government
was obliged to tighten fiscal policy,
with inevitably dampening effects on
the level of economic activity and
on incomes. These effects, in turn,
exacerbated a downward spiral in
the property and development sector. In its turn, this downward spiral
impacted on a substantial part of the
banking system’s asset base.
The parameters of the crisis rapidly
widened. In mid-December 2008,
the government announced that it
would allocate €10bn for the recapitalisation of the domestic banks.
This announcement was followed
a week later by the announcement
that the government would invest a
total of €5.5bn in preference shares
in three banks: €1.5bn in Anglo,
€2bn in AIB and €2bn in BoI. This
was a clear acknowledgement that
the problem was not simply one of
liquidity.
On 15 January 2009, the government announced the nationalisation of Anglo, citing as reasons the
weak funding of the bank and the
emerging evidence of unacceptable
practices following the resignation of
the Chairman after revelations about
the treatment of loans he held from
the bank. The Chairman’s resignation
was quickly followed by those of the
CEO and CFO. A new Board was
put in place on nationalisation.
A number of important personnel
changes in other institutions took
place or were announced during the
course of 2009.
• In January, the Minister for Finance announced the re-appointment
of the Governor of the Central
Bank. In early June, however, the
Governor announced his intenBV 11/2013
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
tion to retire with effect from 10
September.
In early January, the Chief Executive of the Financial Regulator
announced his retirement with
effect from 31 January.
In January, BoI announced the
retirement of its CEO with effect
from the summer of 2010.
In early February, the CEO and
two Directors of IL&P resigned in
the wake of revelations of a chain
of “balance sheet enhancement”
transfers amounting to €7 billion
between Anglo and IL&P in September 2008.
Also in early February, the Chairman of INBS resigned.
The CEO of INBS resigned at the
end of April.
At the end of April, AIB announced the resignations of the Chairman, the CEO and the Finance
Director.
In May, BoI announced the retirement of the Chairman with effect
from July 2010.
On 11 February, it was announced
that the state’s investment in AIB and
BoI would be increased to €7bn.
In the first quarter of 2009, the new
Board and management of Anglo
carried out an internal review of the
bank’s loss provisioning policies.
This concluded that the immediate
capitalisation need was €4bn., with
a substantial downside risk linked to
the continuing fall in property prices.
The outcome of the review was
reported to the Department (Ministry) of Finance on 15 April. This
conclusion was separately validated
both by an independent examination
commissioned by the bank and by
a further independent examination
commissioned by the Department of
Finance. The key factor identified by
these examinations was an acceleration of the rate of decline in property
prices in the last quarter of 2008,
with an even further acceleration in
37
the early months of 2009. (Most observers believe that property values
fell by between 50% and 60% from
the 2007 peak to the 2010/2011
trough. The objective evidence is
thin, both because of the lack of a
comprehensive tracking system in the
property sector and because there
was so little activity in the market
up to mid-2012). The government
injected €4bn into the bank on 9
June.
The result of Anglo’s review of its loss
provisioning policy suggested that
there had been serious deficiencies
in the loss provisioning policies of all
the banks, but the full import of these
deficiencies did not become apparent until some time later. It was clear,
however, that there were serious and,
up to early 2009, unrecognised
impairments on the balance sheets of
all the banks.
The quantum of provisions for impairment charges by the banks between
2000 and 2007 varied between
€1.5bn. and €1.8bn. As a percentage of loans, however, this went from
1.2% in 2000 to 1.3% in 2001 but
declined thereafter to about 0.4%
in 2006 and 0.5% 2007. In 2008,
the quantum increased to €5.8bn or
1.4% of loans.
Dealing with impaired
balance sheets
In early April 2009, the government
announced the outline of its plans to
deal with the problem of impairments
on the banks’ loan books. This took
the form of a National Asset Management Agency – NAMA – which
would take over the most impaired
bank assets, issuing bonds in return
and applying a discount to the value
of the assets acquired. Initially, it was
thought that NAMA might acquire
assets up to a value of €90 billion,
at a discount of about 30%. Legislation to set up NAMA was passed in
November 2009 and it commenced
operations in the following month.
NAMA operates through a holding
company – NAMA Investments Ltd.
– of which NAMA is a 49% shareholder, with 51% of the shares being
held by three private concerns. As a
result of this structure, NAMA debt
does not form part of the General
Government Debt for national accounts purposes.
Table 4 sets out a summary of loan
acquisitions by NAMA as at the end
of 2011.
Table 4: Summary of loan acquisitions
by NAMA as at end-2011: € billion
Loan balances transferred
Consideration paid
Discount
•
•
Table 5: NAMA portfolio
concentration by location
Dublin
Rest of Ireland
London
Rest of Britain
Northern Ireland
Rest of world
36%
18%
21%
12%
3%
10%
Source: NAMA
Table 6: NAMA portfolio
concentration by sector.
Development
Office
Retail
Hotel and leisure
Industrial
Residential
Land
Other
25%
19%
19%
8%
3%
12%
9%
5%
Source: NAMA
In total, NAMA has acquired loans
involving 772 debtor connections
with an average nominal value per
loan of €96mn.
Up to the end of 2012, NAMA
• disposed of €6.9 billion worth
of assets, equivalent to just over
Anglo
34.1
13.4
61%
BoI
9.9
5.6
43%
EBS
0.9
0.4
57%
INBS
8.7
3.4
61%
Total
74.0
31.8
57%
Source: NAMA
•
Tables 5 and 6 set out the geographic and regional concentration of the
loans acquired by NAMA.
AIB
20.4
9.0
56%
•
21% of the nominal consideration
for the assets it acquired,
completed sales transactions for
over 3,900 individual properties,
redeemed senior bonds and
made debt repayments to a total
of over €5bn since inception,
had generated cash flow of
€10.5bn since inception and
had a cash balance of over
€3.6bn.
Government action in
relation to the banks.
At the end of March 2010, the
Central Bank announced the conclusions of a PCAR it had carried out
on the banks. It concluded that AIB
had a capital requirement of €7.4bn
and that BoI had a requirement of
€2.7bn. These amounts were to
be raised through share issues and
asset sales. By the end of June, BoI
had completed a capital raising
programme amounting to €3.5bn.
In September, AIB sold its Polish interests to Santander for a capital gain
of €2.5bn. It nevertheless needed
a further government injection of
€3.7bn which was carried out in
December and which brought the
government’s shareholding to 93%.
At the end of March also, Anglo had
announced a loss of €12.7bn for
2009, the largest corporate loss in
Irish history, due to impairments on
its loan book. The government issued
a promissory note in the amount of
€8.3bn. It also issued a promissory
note of €2.6bn to INBS. Between
38
end-March and end-December, a
total of €25.3bn was issued to Anglo and €5.3bn to INBS in the form
of promissory notes. These notes, as
originally issued, carried an interest
payment of €3.06bn per annum
until 2023, reducing thereafter until
a final payment in 2031.
In September 2010, the government set out to clarify its plans for
the banking sector in the interests
of public information. The principal
conclusions were that:
• two “pillar banks” would be
retained: AIB and BoI, and
• Anglo would be wound down
over the ten-year period to 2020
at a total cost which was forecast to be between €29bn and
€34bn,
• Anglo’s deposits were transferred
to AIB.
By the end of 2010, the government
had committed a total of €46bn to
the recapitalisation and support of
the banking sector.
In November 2010, the government
agreed a bailout programme with
the “Troika” of the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF. This
included measures to support the
funding of the government’s actions
in relation to the banking sector.
Requests by the then government
and by its successor elected in 2011
to “bail in” senior bondholders in the
banks were rejected. A number of liability management exercises involving bail-in of subordinated bondholders were, however, carried out.
BV 11/2013
In mid-2011, it was decided to merge
INBS with Anglo and the merged
entity was re-branded as the Irish
Bank Reconstruction Corporation
Ltd. (IBRC). In February 2013, IBRC
was liquidated in order to replace
the outstanding promissory notes by
an alternative arrangement designed
to spread the associated government debt over a longer period and
reduce the fiscal pressure on the
government. The remaining assets
of IBRC will either be sold by the
Special Liquidators appointed by the
government or transferred to NAMA
at the end of the year.
Concluding overview
The absence of a settled bank resolution policy at both national and
eurozone level has been a major
difficulty. It was not until two years
after the bank guarantee of September 2008 that anything approaching
a clear strategy for the Irish banking
sector emerged. The actions taken in
relation to Anglo/IBRC required two
new pieces of dedicated legislation:
the Anglo Irish Bank Corporation
Act, 2009 and the Irish Bank Recon-
BV 11/2013
struction Corporation Act, 2013. The
two liquidity management exercises
carried out by Anglo in relation to
subordinated debt required specific
Statutory Instruments. Ireland still has
no bank resolution legislation. Legislation to reform the Central Bank of
Ireland and the regulatory regime for
banks was enacted in July 2010, to
take effect in October of that year.
It appears that the formulation of a
Single Resolution Mechanism at EU
level will take some time.
The two “pillar banks” – AIB and BoI
– have made progress in strengthening their balance sheets and in
securing (so far rather limited) access
to short-term funding markets. An Asset Quality Review is currently under
way as a prelude to a PCAR to be
carried out by the eurozone authorities during the course of 2014.
Arrangements for the PCAR have still
not been finalised by the eurozone
authorities and there is apprehension
in a number of Member States as to
what it might reveal.
Remediation of banking sector
problems is still very much a “work in
progress,” both in Ireland and in the
eurozone generally.
39
Abbreviations:
AIB:
Allied Irish Banks
Anglo: Anglo Irish Bank
BoI:
Bank of Ireland
EBS:
Educational Building Society
ECB:
European Central Bank
IL&P:
Irish Life and Permanent
IMF:
International Monetary Fund
INBS:
Irish Nationwide Building Society
NAMA:National Asset Management
Agency
PCAR:Prudential Capital Asset
Requirement
bn:
billion
mn:
million
References:
The Irish Banking Crisis: Regulatory and
Financial Stability Policy 2003-2008:
a Report to the Minister for Finance by
the Governor of the Central Bank (the
“Honohan Report”), 31 May 2010.
A Preliminary Report on the Sources of
Ireland’s Banking Crisis: Klaus Regling
and Max Watson (the “Regling-Watson
Report”), May 2010.
Misjudging Risk: Causes of the Systemic
Banking Crisis in Ireland: Report of the
Commission of Investigation into the
Banking Sector in Ireland (the “Nyberg
Report”), March 2011.
UDK 336.71(460)
Rehabilitation of Financial
Sector – The case of
Spanish banks
Antonio Carrascosa and Mario Delgado*
REHABILITATION OF
FINANCIAL SECTOR – THE
CASE OF SPANISH BANKS
The economic crisis in
Spain exposed significant
vulnerabilities in the
financial sector. Around
70% of the Spanish
banking sector has
proven to be healthy but
the remaining part have
needed public support. The
number of agents in the
sector has decreased from
50 in 2009 to 15 in 2013.
The capital needs detected
and not covered through
private means have been
addressed with public
money injections
(53.5 billion euros),
burden sharing exercises
and with the transfer
of real estate assets to
an Asset Management
Company. In order to
finance the public support
in 2012 Spain required
an EU financial assistance
for the weakest financial
institutions. The result –
most analysts agree- is a
much sounder and resilient
financial sector.
JEL G01 G18 G21 G28
O
ver the last few years, the Spanish financial sector has
gone through a substantial restructuring process. The
economic crisis derived from the international financial turmoil and from the bursting of the construction
bubble in Spain impacted across the economy, leading to surging
unemployment, deficit and public debt. It has also exposed significant vulnerabilities in the financial sector. Most analysts agree that
the financial sector is now considerably sounder than a few years
ago, but this has required substantial efforts both from the private
and the public sector.
1. Introduction
Several main aspects could be highlighted from the bank restructuring in Spain:
• The financial crisis in Spain has been systemic, but not all the
industry was equally affected. Around 70% of the banking sector – including 100% of commercial banks – has proven to be
healthy1 -and have not needed public financial support in the
form of capital or Cocos. The crisis was mostly focused on savings banks, and not even on all of them; certain saving banks
have coped well with it.
• The number of banks has decreased from 50 in 2009 to 15 in
2013 (not counting cooperatives, two minor saving banks and
foreign branches).
*Antonio Carrascosa, FROB, Director General, and Mario Delgado, FROB, Head of International Coordination.
September 2013.
1 Banco de Valencia and Banco Gallego needed support but they were controlled by Saving Banks.
40
BV 11/2013
• The FROB (“Fund for the Orderly
Resolution of the Banking Sector”
or “Fondo de Reestructuración
Ordenada Bancaria” in Spanish)
was set up in 2009 to channel the public financial support
to banks and was enhanced
in 2012 as Spanish resolution
authority, sharing responsibilities
with the Bank of Spain.
• Since 2009, 53.5 billion euros
of public money from budgetary sources has been injected
through capital instruments2 into
the banking sector (into 12 banks
which were former savings banks
or were controlled by savings
banks) and another 7.9 billion
has been injected from the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (“Fondo
de Garantía de Depósitos”; fully
financed with private contributions). Additionally, banks have
strengthened their capital position
through capital increases in the
market and through internal
generation of capital (using the
buffers accumulated in the boom
times, for example countercyclical
provisions).
• In 2012 a comprehensive and
independent stress test exercise was conducted in order to
estimate the capital needs of the
banking sector. To ensure there
would be a sufficient backstop
for any level of capital needs, EU
financial assistance was requested in 2012 for the recapitalisation of the financial sector for a
maximum amount of 100 billion
euros (of which slightly more than
41 billion euros has been drawn
down).
• Management of the crisis has
been consistent with the guidelines of the FSB in terms of effective banking resolution. In order
to minimize public support, the
private sector has borne part of
the burden through the absorption of losses by shareholders
BV 11/2013
and holders of hybrid capital.
Senior debt and deposits have
not been affected by this burdensharing.
• The process has also involved the
creation of an Asset Management Company (SAREB, “Sociedad de Gestión de los Activos de
la Reestructuración Bancaria”)
for the orderly disposal of the
real estate-related assets of banks
in need of public capital.
• Entities receiving public funds
have undertaken restructuring or
resolution plans aimed at refocusing their businesses in retail activities in their region of origin.
• The restructuring process is now
close to being complete – the
main task remaining would be the
disinvestment of FROB’s participations in banks – but challenges
remain for the future of the banking sector, especially related to
its adaptation to the new environment (low interest rates in a
deleveraging scenario).
In this article we overview the steps of
the process and analyse the remaining challenges. We will focus on the
vulnerabilities in the Spanish financial
sector, without addressing other
dimensions of the Spanish economy
or, more broadly, the impact of the
international financial crisis.
2. Pre-crisis vulnerabilities
Traditionally, the Spanish Banking
Sector comprised three types of
credit entities: commercial banks,
savings banks (Cajas de ahorros)
and credit cooperatives. Prior to the
crisis, commercial banks and savings
banks had very similar market shares
accounting for more than 90% of
the sector, while Cooperatives had a
much smaller share.
During the years of expansion
several vulnerabilities built up in the
financial sector and, when the crisis
hit, important structural weaknesses
41
were exposed. They were concentrated mostly in the “Cajas de Ahorros”.
Most of the mounting vulnerabilities
were linked to the financing of the
housing bubble and can be summarised as follows.
1. Oversizing. In the pre-crisis years,
credit grew at very significant
rates (18% CAGR3 between
2002 and 2008). Growth during
that period was very credit intensive (because so is construction)
and the number of branches and
employees in the banking sector
increased significantly (the number of employees jumped from
243,743 in 2000 to 278,301
in 2008, while the number of
branches swelled from 39,391 in
2000 to 46,167 in 2008).
2. Balance sheets accumulated
assets linked to real estate which
became impaired when the bubble burst. The Spanish banking
sector was not an active dealer
or trader of the complex financial
products that were at the root of
the international financial crisis
but it did finance assets which
turned out to be problematic,
namely real estate assets. As
a consequence, doubts arose
about the quality of the balance
sheets of the financial sector,
with a clear impact on wholesale
financing availability.
3. Transparency and corporate
governance. Information disclosure was not complete for
agents to analyse how affected
by impaired assets of the banks
were, increasing uncertainty on
their situation. In addition, high
quality corporate governance
was not guaranteed in savings
banks, which were subject to
2
This figure does not include liquidity support,
guarantees to debt issuance, asset protection
schemes, public participation in SAREB (Spanish’s
Asset Management Company) or contributions from
the Spanish Deposit Guarantee Scheme.
3
Cumulative annual growth rate
political influence and to lack
of professional management in
some cases.
4. When recapitalisation needs
emerged, the savings banks were
faced with structural problems to
raise capital. The Cajas de Ahorros have a special ownership
structure with no shares capital
and thus, they rely mostly on retained earnings to increase their
capital or on preferred shares
– which, in general, were sold to
retail customers.
5. Finally, the legal framework revealed certain gaps and deficiencies, for example: the banking
resolution framework did not
have enough tools to allow swift
action and consumers of financial
products were not sufficiently
protected.
These deficiencies combined with
the macroeconomic downturn since
2008 led to a weakened banking
sector in need of a restructuring
and rationalisation. This process has
required significant efforts both from
the private and the public sector
including a request for financial assistance to the EU (for the financial
sector), the setting-up of an Asset
Management Company (SAREB),
the imposition of haircuts on privately
held shares and hybrid instruments,
public recapitalisation of certain entities and the strengthening of financial regulation. The result is a much
sounder and resilient financial sector.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that
although the financial crisis in Spain
was a systemic crisis, it did not affect
the entire industry in the same way.
Around 70% of the banking sector
did not need public capital support.
In fact, the most severe impact of
the crisis has been felt in the savings
banks sector, and not equally by all
Cajas. All the traditional banks and
several savings banks have been
able to cope with the crisis without
having to tap public capital.
3. Restructuring of the
Spanish banking system
The restructuring of the Spanish financial sector is very much under way,
but it has required significant efforts.
Here we review those efforts with a
special focus in the last few years.
3.1. Liquidity support
Like most of the developed countries
suffering from the crisis, the Spanish
government set up liquidity measures
to support their financial system
when the international crisis led to a
sharp deterioration of liquidity conditions in financial markets. In 2008,
a special fund was created in Spain
(FAAF, “Fondo para la Adquisición
de Activos Financieros” in Spanish, or “Fund for the Acquisition of
Financial Assets”) to inject liquidity
in banks in exchange of high quality
financial assets. Additionally, the
Treasury guarantees for debt issuance by banks were made available.
3.2. The FROB
In June 2009, the FROB was created
as a Fund to provide public financing
to banks in financial distress.
The establishment of the FROB follows the realisation that specific structures and legislation were needed to
address the problems that appeared
likely to materialize in the financial
sector. In this period, the first intervention of a Caja had been “Caja
Castilla la Mancha” in March 2009
– using resources of the Deposit
Guarantee Scheme – and it had
shown the deficiencies in the system
for dealing with these kind of issues
(for example, despite the injection of
public money, the control of decisions was not granted). The creation
of the FROB sought to overcome
those shortcomings.
In the first years of the process the
efforts were mainly addressed to try
to untangle the legal obstacles that,
especially regarding Saving Banks,
made it very difficult to recapitalize
them or to rationalize them through
mergers.
Originally, the capital injections by
the FROB came under the form of preferred shares, usually in the context
of a merger (most of the merging processes take place in this period). The
summary of the initial activity of the
FROB (2010) is presented in table 1.
Table 1: Phase one of FROB’S financing: consolidation
in the savings bank sector
1 CatalunyaCaixa
(Catalunya, Tarragona, Manresa)
2 Unnim
(Manlleu, Sabadell, Terrassa)
3 CEISS
(Caja España-Duero)
4 Nova CaixaGalicia
(Galicia, Caixanova)
5 BFA-Bankia
(Madrid, Bancaja, Laietana,
Insular, Ávila, Segovia y Rioja)
6 Banco Mare Nostrum
(Murica, Penedés, Sa Nostra, Granada)
7 Banca Cívica
(Navarra, Cajasol-Guadalajara,
General de Canarias, Burgos)
TOTAL
Date
March 2010
FROB aid (M€)
1,250
June 2010
380
March 2010
525
June 2010
1,162
June 2010
4,465
June 2010
915
December 2010
977
9,674
Source: FROB
42
BV 11/2013
In 2011, capital requirements were
increased up to 8-10% (depending on the financing structure of the
bank). In addition, FROB’s financing
took the form of ordinary shares,
which required Saving Banks to
change their nature into banks if
they were to receive FROB aid. As a
result, most savings banks transferred
their activities to commercial banks
which could then be recapitalised
more easily. In fact, nearly 100% of
savings banks have transferred their
banking activity to banks4, and not
only the savings banks, which have
needed public money but also the
healthy ones. Some of the new banks
derived from former Saving Banks
went listed, which qualified them for
the 8% capital requirement. In this
new form the financial support of the
FROB is presented in table 2.
Additionally, the Deposit Guarantee
Scheme provided support to other
Saving Banks to other Saving Banks
(CAM, Caja Castilla La Mancha and
Unnim) for around 7.8 billion euros
as a way to make the financial sector
itself to take on part of the burden of
the restructuring. The Deposit Guarantee Scheme also guaranteed some
of the “Asset Protection Schemes”
that were granted to facilitate the
sale of some of the institutions in
which the FROB had intervened.
Both in 2010 and 2011, the stress
tests were coordinated at the European level and the capital needs
detected and not covered privately,
were covered by the FROB (they are
included in table 1 and 2).
In August 2012, with the approval
of the Royal Decree Law 24/2012
(later approved as Law 9/2012), the
FROB took on extensive resolution
powers in close implementation of
the October 2011 FSB “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes
for Financial Institutions”. It thus
became the Spanish banking resolution authority, sharing responsibilities
with the Bank of Spain, and keeping
its holding company competences.
In this new format the FROB has
implemented new banks capitalizations which will be described in
paragraph 3.5.5.
Currently, the FROB is a 100% state
owned-company with a Governing
Committee chaired by the Deputy
Governor of the Bank of Spain and
comprising representatives from
the Bank of Spain, the Ministry of
Economy and Competitiveness, the
Ministry of Finance, a representative
from ICAC (“Instituto de Contabilidad y Auditoría de Cuentas” or the
Institute of Accounting and Accounts
Auditing) and (without voting rights)
a State Attorney, and a representative of the General Controller Department of the State Administration
(IGAE).
The Law 9/2012 enables the FROB
to act in the key stages of a bank
recovery and resolution. It allows for
an early intervention, for a restructuring in which public financial sup-
port is necessary in order to ensure
viability and for resolution as an
alternative to ordinary insolvency
procedures. The law also foresees
the possibility of setting up an “Asset
Management Company” and of
private sector involvement in the absorption of losses (“Burden sharing”).
The burden sharing foreseen affects
shares and hybrid instruments (that
is to say, no bail-in of senior debt or
deposits is foreseen).
In order to exercise its functions, the
FROB has at its disposal the ordinary mercantile faculties that every
shareholder has and it also counts
on significant administrative faculties
to facilitate its work, for example: it
can require the transmission of equity
instruments, hybrid capital or subordinated debt instruments and/or assets
and liabilities of the credit entity,
it can carry out capital increases/
reductions (even with exclusion of
preferential subscription rights) or it
can implement Subordinated Liabilities Exercises (burden sharing).
The FROB also has protocols for the
detection of possible illegal operations or with no economic or financial justification.
The FSB, in its first peer review of
the implementation of the key attributes, concluded that the level of
compliance of the Spanish regime
is very high. In any case, the Spanish regime will have to be adapted
when the forthcoming EU Directive
on Banking Recovery and Resolution
is approved.
Table 2: Phase two of FROB’S financing: improving solvency
1 CatalunyaBank
2 Unnim
(Manlleu, Sabadell, Terrassa)
3 Nova CaixaGalicia
4 Banco de Valencia
Date
FROB aid (M€)
September 2011
1,718
December 2011
568
September 2011
2,465
May 2012
998
TOTAL
As stated, a significant number of
mergers and acquisitions has taken
place since 2009 especially among
Cajas de Ahorros, leading to a huge
reduction in the number of agents
5,749
4
Only two minor Cajas maintain financial activity,
Caixa Pollença y Caixa Ontinyent.
Source: FROB
BV 11/2013
3.3. Rationalisation of
the banking sector
43
in the sector. The number of banks
has decreased from 50 in 2009 to
15 in 2013 (not counting cooperatives, two minor saving banks and
foreign branches). This number may
even decrease further in the near
term after the likely sales of some of
the FROB participated entities and
as a result of the likely integration of
Unicaja and CEISS. The number of
branches and employees has also
adjusted, dealing with the problem
of oversizing.
3.4. Cleaning up of
balance sheets
In early 2012, despite the restructuring and recapitalisation efforts,
significant doubts remained among
agents about the quality of balance
sheets, in relation to real estate
portfolios. Real estate assets linked
to loans to developers in the whole
Spanish banking system amounted to
323 billion euros by the end of June
2011, of which 175 billion euros was
considered problematic.
This was damaging for the whole
financial sector and it explained
banks’ difficulty to access wholesale
financial markets. That is why two
Royal Decree Laws (February and
May 2012) were passed aimed
at imposing on banks additional
clean-up measures through new
provisions and capital buffers for
real estate assets. The required
increase in provisions and capital
buffers amounted to around 80
billion euros, which would result in
a more realistic valuation of real
estate assets. The goal was to dispel
any doubts on the proper valuation
of the asset side.
3.5. EU financial assistance
As a result of these provisioning
efforts and of the deteriorating macroeconomic context capital needs
arose in some entities. In an effort
Table 3: Adjustment in number of branches and employees:
Number of employees (2000) 243.743
(2008) 278.301 (2012) 236.503
Number of branches
(2008) 46.167
(2000) 39.391
(2013; Q2) 36.407
Source: Bank of Spain
to ensure that, whatever the capital
needs were, there would be enough
public capital to deal with them, the
Spanish Government announced
in June 2012 that it would request
European financing for the recapitalization of its weakest financial
institutions for a maximum amount of
100 billion euros. The upper limit of
100 billion euros was set as a credible backstop, sufficient to cover the
system’s eventual capital needs in the
most stressed hypothetical scenarios.
This marked the first time that EU financial assistance was requested for
the support of a financial sector (up
to that point all EU financial supports
to euro countries –Greece, Portugal,
Ireland- had been macroeconomic
programs covering all financial
needs of the country and not only
those related to the financial sector).
A Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) was signed in July 2012
including horizontal conditionality in
the form of regulatory requirements
(such as the strengthening of the
banking resolution framework) and
individual conditionality in the form
of requirements for individual banks
in need of public support.
3.5.1. The stress test exercise
The 2012 recapitalisation process
began with a comprehensive stress
test. In order to ensure credibility
the stress tests were conducted by
two independent consultants (Oliver
Wyman and Roland Berger) and it
involved a Top-down and a Bottomup exercise (the latter conducted
by Oliver Wyman and including
on-the-ground portfolio reviews by
several external auditors). Addition44
ally, the stress tests were monitored
by international institutions: the
European Commission and the ECB,
since it was carried out in the context
of a European Financial Assistance.
It was also monitored by the IMF
which provided technical assistance
(but not financial resources).
The first stage of the Tests was the
Top-Down approach conducted by
Oliver Wyman and Roland Berger.
The objective was to offer an estimate
of the aggregate capital needs
for the Spanish banking system as
a whole under a baseline and a
stressed scenario. The time horizon of
the analysis was three years: 2012,
2013 and 2014 and the core Tier 1
threshold for the base scenario was
9% and 6% for the adverse scenario.
The exercise applied to 14 Spanish banking groups accounting for
almost 90% of the Spanish financial
system.
The aggregate capital needs detected were between 51 billion euros
and 62 billiuon euros.
The second stage was the bottomup exercise conducted by Oliver
Wyman and finalized in September.
The analysis performed included a
thorough review of the valuation and
accounting treatment of the assets
of Spanish banks, carried out by
four audit firms and six appraisal
companies – again, to reinforce the
credibility of the exercise. The capital
needs identified were around 55.8
billion euros (which was consistent
with the results of the first phase).
As a result of the exercise, the banks
analyzed were classified in 4 different groups:
• Group 0 included the banks with
no capital needs even under the
BV 11/2013
Table 4: Key assumptions in the baseline and stressed scenario of the Spanish Stress Test
GDP
Unemployment
Price evolution
Real estate prices
Interest rates
FX rates
Credit to other
resident sectors
Stocks
Real GDP
Nominal GDP
Unemployment Rate
Harmonised CPI
GDP deflator
Housing Prices
Land prices
Euribor, 3 months
Euribor, 12 months
Spanish debt, 10 years
Ex. rate/USD
Households
Non-Financial Firms
Madrid Stock
Exchange Index
2011
0.7%
2.1%
21.6%
3.1%
1.4%
-5.6%
-6.7%
1.5%
2.1%
5.6%
1.35
-1.7%
-4.1%
-9.7%
Base case
2012
2013
-1.7%
-0.3%
-0.7%
0.7%
23.8%
23.5%
1.8%
1.6%
1.0%
1.0%
-5.6%
-2.8%
-25.0%
-12.5%
0.9%
0.8%
1.6%
1.5%
6.4%
6.7%
1.34
1.33
-3.8%
-3.1%
-5.3%
-4.3%
-1.3%
-0.4%
2014
0.3%
1.2%
23.4%
1.4%
0.9%
-1.5%
5.0%
0.8%
1.5%
6.7%
1.30
-2.7%
-2.7%
0.0%
2012
-4.1%
-4.1%
25.0%
1.1%
0.0%
-19.9%
-50.0%
1.9%
2.6%
7.4%
1.34
-6.8%
-6.4%
-51.3%
Adverse case
2013
-2.1%
-2.8%
26.8%
0.0%
-0.7%
-4.5%
-16.0%
1.8%
2.5%
7.7%
1.33
-6.8%
-5.3%
-5.0%
2014
-0.3%
-0.2%
27.2%
0.3%
0.1%
-2.0%
-6.0%
1.8%
2.5%
7.7%
1.30
-4.0%
-4.0%
0.0%
Source: Bank of Spain
stressed macroeconomic scenario
(Santander, BBVA, CaixaBank,
Kutxabank, Banco Sabadell,
Bankinter and Unicaja). These
banks did not require additional
capital.
• Group 1 was comprised by
the banks, which were already
majority-owned by the FROB:
BFA-Bankia, Catalunya Banco,
NCG Banco and Banco de
Valencia, all of which needed
further capitalisations according to the exercise. This group
accounts for 18% of the sector
but for 86% of the entire capital
shortfall detected.
• Group 2 included the rest of the
banks with capital needs that
could not be satisfied trough the
market (Banco Mare Nostrum,
Liberbank, Caja3 and CEISS).
• Group 3 was composed of banks
with capital needs that could
be met through private means
(Banco Popular and Ibercaja)
The banks in groups 1, 2 and 3
should submit recapitalisation plans
in October 2012 for their approval
BV 11/2013
by the Banco de España and by the
European Commission. On the basis
of these plans, the need for State aid
was to be determined.
The Spanish Stress Tests have
become a benchmark because of
their focus on independence as a
means to ensure the credibility of the
results. The tests confirmed that the
core of the Spanish banking sector
was sound and that problems were
focused on a group of institutions
(limited, both in terms of quantity and
size). The capital needs detected
were well below the maximum
amount requested from Europe (100
billion euros).
3.5.2. Restructuring and
resolution plans
The MoU required all the banks in
need of public support to formulate
a restructuring or a resolution plan
(depending on whether the objective
was to restore viability or to orderly
liquidate the bank). Those plans
included the measures that the banks
were to undertake with a view to
45
avoid distortions to competition: focusing new production in retail and SME,
lending in their historical core region
(Real Estate Development and wholesale financing is forbidden), reducing
capacity (employees and branches),
divestment of non-core participations
and ensuring the re-balancing of balance sheets (limitations on total asset
growth, credit growth and a decrease
of the loan to deposits ratios were
imposed).
3.5.3 Transfer of assets
to the SAREB
A second requirement for the entities
that needed public support was the
transfer of their real estate-related
assets to an Asset Management
Company. To this effect the SAREB
was created in 2012 (SAREB stands
for “Management Company for
the Assets Stemming from the Bank
Restructuring” or “Sociedad de
Gestión de Activos de la Reestructuración Bancaria” in Spanish).
SAREB’s objective is to segregate
and manage the orderly disposal of
Table 5: Assets transferred to SAREB
Asset class
Land
RED
foreclosed Finished housing
assets
Unfinished developments
Finished
projects
Loans
to RE
Developers Urban land
Average haircut
79.5%
54.2%
63.2%
32.4%
53.6%
Gross
Net
Gross
Assets
Net
Gross
Total
Net
Loans
Group 1
54.520
28.313
24.358
8.397
78.878
36.710
Group 2
20.071
11.056
7.172
2.967
27.243
14.023
Total
74.591
39.369
31.530
11.364
106.121
50.733
Source: FROB
the assets related to the real estate
sector, for which it has a time-horizon
of 15 years.
According to the restructuring and/
or resolution plans, the assets to be
transferred to SAREB are those classified by the participating entities as
real estate (owned and not for use)
subject to an individual minimum
threshold (100,000 euros), loans to
real estate and development firms
that meet certain eligibility criteria
and above a minimum borrower
net book value exposure (250,000
euros) and controlled real estate
development equity investments.
Assets were transferred at a transfer
price composed of two elements,
the “Real Economic Value” (“REV”)
referred to in the MoU, calculated in
the Oliver Wyman bottom up stress
test exercise, using the base case
scenario and an additional haircut to
cover managing costs. The objective
was to ensure that transfer prices
were clearly conservative as one of
the keys for the success of SAREB
and therefore to facilitate the attraction of private capital.
Assets transferred to SAREB have
totalled 106.1 billion euros in book
value and the transfer price has been
50.6 billion euros, so the average discount has been around 53% (with different discounts depending on the type
of asset and the transferring bank).
To fund the transfer, SAREB has
issued securities (1-, 2- and 3-year
FRNs) which are guaranteed by the
Spanish Government and are therefore discountable at the Eurosystem.
SAREB’s capital (a combination of
pure equity and subordinated debt)
is 45% public (channelled through
the FROB) and 55% from private investors (who are most of the Spanish
Banks with no public funds and most
of the Insurance Companies).
SAREB’s
capital is 45%
public and 55%
from private
investors.
The creation of SAREB entails
significant managerial challenges,
since its time horizon is pre-fixed (15
years) and its social objective is to
dispose all of its assets. SAREB is
now completely operational. It has
already completed its first sales and
structured its first funds together with
private investors.
3.5.4. Burden sharing
The MoU required that part of the
costs of the restructuring process
would be borne by the private sector, in line with the FSB key attributes
on effective resolution regimes which
state that taxpayer involvement in
crisis management should be minimised.
In application of this principle,
shareholders and holders of hybrid
46
instruments (preferred shares and
subordinated debt) have suffered a
haircut in their holdings.
In the case of shareholders5, the entities were valued by three independent experts and in those where net
value was negative shareholders
were completely wiped out. This was
the case of CatalunyaCaixa, NovaCaixaGalicia, Banco de Valencia,
Bankia6, CEISS and Banco Gallego7.
The haircut to hybrid instruments was
a function of the present value of the
security (calculated by discounting its
expected future cash flows) and the
economic value of the company. Effective burden-sharing costs have depended on the characteristics (seniority, maturity…) of the instrument, the
economic value of the bank and the
final shareholder structure imposed
by State aid Decisions. After the
haircut, the security was transformed
into pure capital instruments (mostly
ordinary shares and in some cases
into Cocos; dated subordinated debt
could, in some cases, be transformed
into zero-coupon fixed-income instruments – senior debt or deposits –
with lower face value). Thus, many
of the holders of hybrid instruments
became shareholders.
5
The shareholders were, mainly, the original
Saving Banks that had transferred the activities to
the Banks. In the cases of listed banks (e.g. Bankia)
there were also other private shareholders.
6
In the case of Banco de Valencia and Bankia the
wiping out was close to 100% but not 100% due to
technical reasons, as they were quoted (the share
price was reduced to 1 cent).
7
Banco Gallego was controlled by
NovaCaixaGalicia and initially It was not dealt with
individually.
BV 11/2013
In the case of non-listed entities
(NovaCaixaGalicia and Catalunya
Caixa) the new shareholders could
not easily cash-in their shares so a
voluntary liquidity mechanism was
set up by the Government aimed at
retail investors, allowing the Deposit
Guarantee Scheme to acquire those
shares with a discount (fixed by an
independent expert based on liquidity parameters). More than 90% of
the addressees of this option (retail
shareholders formerly holders of hybrid instruments) have taken advantage of that possibility and sold their
shares. Consequently, the Deposit
Guarantee Scheme has become a
shareholder of those banks.
Many of the holders of hybrid instruments were retail investors. Since it
has become apparent that the sale
of those products had not been
transparent in all cases (there were
investors that acquired those securities without fully understanding their
nature) an arbitrage procedure has
been set up, with the participation of
an independent expert. The arbitrage process was chosen in order
to make the process more agile.
In it, holders of hybrid instruments
could prove that they had not been
properly informed or that they did
not fit the adequacy criteria for buying those instruments and earn the
reimbursement of their money.
Senior debt was not affected by the
burden sharing. According to the current draft of the forthcoming Banking
and Recovery Resolution Directive
bail-in of senior debt will be introduced in 2018.
3.5.5. Recapitalisation
Finally, capital needs were covered
by the FROB. The FROB injected
38.8 billion euros in nine banks.
These new injections come on top of
the ones realized in 2010 and 2011
already described.8
This amount is lower than the estiBV 11/2013
Table 6: Phase three of FROB’s financing: capital needs detected in
the Stress Tests
1 CatalunyaBank
2 CEISS
(Caja España-Duero)
3 Nova CaixaGalicia
4 BFA-Bankia
(Madrid, Bancaja, Laietana,
Insular, Ávila, Segovia y Rioja)
5 Banco Mare Nostrum
(Murica, Penedés, Sa Nostra,
Granada)
6 Banco de Valencia
7 Liberbank
(Grupo Cajastur, Caja
Extremadura, Caja Cantabria)
8 Caja3
(CAI, Caja Círculo, Caja Badajoz)
TOTAL
Date
Type
of Aid
FROB
aid (M€)
December 2012
Shares
9,084
March 2013
Cocos
604
December 2012
Shares
5,425
December 2012
Shares
17,959
December 2012
Shares
730
December 2012
December 2012
Shares
Cocos
4,500
124
December 2012
Cocos
407
38,833
Source: FROB
mated capital needs in the report by
Oliver Wyman. The differences stem
from several sources:
• Disposal of assets by entities.
• Raising of capital privately on the
markets.
• Burden sharing, which reduces
the capital needs through the direct absorption of losses by those
instruments and also through their
transformation into equity (in
more than 13 billion euros).
• Transfer to SAREB, which produces two effects on the transferring
banks. The first one is an increase
in losses, due to the discounts incorporated in the transfer prices.
This first effect increases capital
needs. However, due to the
disposal of those assets, RWA decrease and thus capital needed
decreases too. The total net effect
is a reduction in capital needs (in
more than 1 billion euros).
This 38.8 billion euros plus the 2.3
billion euros injected by the FROB in
SAREB makes up a total of 41.1 billion euros which is the total amount
47
disposed from the European credit
line (well below the agreed maximum of 100 billion euros).
3.10. Regulatory measures
In compliance with the MoU, a significant strengthening of the financial
regulatory environment has been
conducted. Some reforms can be
highlighted.
• The resolution framework has
been reinforced, as already
described, transforming the FROB
in a real resolution authority and
adopting many of the FSB guidelines on effective resolution.
• Corporate governance in savings
banks has been strengthened with
more stringent requirements of
professional management.
• Capital requirements were set at
9% of Core Tier 1 for all the entities (using EBA definition).
8
This Press Release by the Bank of Spain provides
a summary of all the capital injections and CoCos
provided by the FROB since 2009.
• Disclosure requirements have been
enhanced and harmonised for all
entities on areas such as restructured and refinanced loans, NPLs,
asset quality across asset classes
and sectorial concentration.
• The marketing of financial products has been revised, requiring
tougher tests to ensure the adequacy of the buyer of financial
products.
4. Challenges ahead
The restructuring process of the Spanish financial sector is significantly
advanced and the progress is recognised by external analysts; however
there are several challenges ahead.
• The FROB has already sold its
stakes in CAM, Banco de Valencia, Unnim and Banco Gallego
and it now has to proceed with
the sale of the remaining banks
in resolution (NovaCaixaGalicia
and CaixaCatalunya). In the
medium term, the FROB must
also sell its participation in BMN
and Bankia (banks in restructuring). As for the CoCos the FROB
currently holds, they should be
recovered through their ordinary
maturities.
• The macroeconomic context is
mentioned by some analysts as a
vulnerability of the financial sector. However, it should be noted
that economic performance is
being broadly better than what
was considered in the adverse
scenario of the Oliver Wyman
Stress Test (except for unemployment).
• In the context of the building-up
of the European Banking Union
an Asset Quality Review and the
Stress Test exercise are going to
be conducted. Spain is well prepared for that exercise after the
very detailed and thorough Stress
Test of 2012 and the subsequent
recapitalisations. It could be even
said that the Spanish experience
shows the importance of conducting demanding bank stress tests,
exhaustive and with the widest
possible scope, in order to ensure
their effectiveness.
• The latest recommendations from
the IMF and the European Commission also refer to:
1. The need to strengthen the
quality and quantity of capital, including through prudent
dividend policies. In this
regard, the Bank of Spain has
already issued a recommendation to limit cash dividends
to 25 % of profit.
2. Ensuring the cleaning up of
balance sheets, including
refinanced credits. As with the
previous issue, the Banks of
Spain has tightened the conditions for banks refinancing,
which will have to be treated
as substandard risks.
3. Overcoming credit supply
constraints. The final goal of
having a healthy financial sector is to provide sustainable
credit to the real economy.
The government is also implementing measures to support
credit in the short term such
as reinforcing ICO’s (“Instituto
de Crédito Oficial” or Official
Credit Institute) credit lines
and by promoting non-banking financing.
The main international observers
endorse these conclusions. The
European Commission highlighted in
30th September that: “The process
of restructuring of banks having
received State aid is well underway,
guided by the restructuring plans as
adopted by the European Commission. The foreseen burden-sharing
exercises with banks´ shareholders
and junior bond holders are virtually completed. Compliance with the
horizontal policy requirements in the
Memorandum of Understanding is
nearly complete, and, thereby, the
governance, regulatory and supervisory framework of the Spanish banking sector has been strengthened,
which translates into higher shock
resilience of the banking sector going forward.” In 30th September the
IMF said that “Nearly all measures
specified in the program have now
been implemented, as envisaged
under its front-loaded timetable. Of
note, capital-augmentation measures
arising from last year’s stress test
are now essentially complete, as is
SAREB’s organizational development.” It also adds that: “Actions
under the program since its inception
have bolstered the financial system’s
capital, liquidity, and efficiency.”
In sum, the banking sector is now
better placed to fulfill its mission: to
provide credit to the real economy
in sustainable terms. This is the final
objective underlying all the reforms
conducted.
6. Conclusion
The transformation experienced by
the Spanish financial sector has a
historic dimension and is now practically finished. The resulting financial
sector is structurally different from its
starting point. Financial entities are
sounder; the number of entities and
branches has reduced down to more
efficient levels and their corporate
structures are more suitable now to
sustainable value creation.
48
References:
FSB: Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes
for Financial Institutions (October 2011).
EU Directive the Recovery and Resolution of Credit
Institutions and Investment Firms
Spanish Law 9/2012 on Banks Restructuring and
Resolution
EU-Spanish “Memorandum of understanding on
financial-sector policy conditionality (july 2012)”
Banco de España website on the financial sector
restructuring
Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
information on the financial sector restructuring
BV 11/2013
UDK 336.71(497.4):347.7
Kapital in lastništvo bank z
vidika bančne sanacije pri nas
Ivan Ribnikar*
BANK CAPITAL AND
OWNERSHIP IN LIGHT OF
BANK REHABILITATION IN
SLOVENIA
Necessary rehabilitation
of banks in Slovenia that
includes the establishment
of a bad bank is in fact
the need to recapitalise
the banks in which the
government has an
important or a dominant
stake in their ownership
structure. The government
is reluctant to fulfil its
duty as the majority
shareholder of those
banks. The bad bank
seen as a priority is in
fact not necessary. It may
only increase the costs
of bank rehabilitation,
unless non-performing
loans, which are supposed
to be transferred to the
bad bank, are not really
worthless.
What we have now is
just the latest problem
with bank ownership in
Slovenia. Since the times
before the transition,
there have been problems
with bank ownership
and the paper gives a
short historical overview
of the situation. It seems
that the only viable bank
ownership is foreign
ownership in the sense that
Slovenian banks become
subsidiaries of foreign
banks.
JEL G21 G 28 G32
P
roblemi bank pri nas, ne samo sedanji, so problemi njihovega kapitala in za njim lastništva. Podobno sicer velja
tudi za nefinančna podjetja, vendar o njih samo najpotrebnejše. Ti problemi se vlečejo iz časov pred začetkom
tranzicije. Zato bomo pogledali najprej, kako je bilo s tem pred
začetkom tranzicije, zatem po začetku tranzicije in kako je danes.
Sanacija bank ima poleg svoje tehnične plati tudi vsebinsko. Zato
na koncu še o tem in o kapitalu in lastništvu bank v prihodnje.
1. Kapital podjetij in bank pri nas pred začetkom tranzicije
Kapital nefinančnih podjetij pri nas na začetku tranzicije, če z
njim začnemo, je nastal, kot je znano, z odpravo družbene lastnine
teh podjetij. Tako nastalega kapitala, del tega kapitala je prišel v
lastništvo države, je bilo relativno precej več kot v netranzicijskih
državah. Podjetja so namreč začela kot kapitalska podjetja z relativno majhno zadolženostjo. Zasluge za to ima permanentna prvobitna
akumulacija kapitala1 ali premoženja v podjetjih z družbeno lastnino, ki je bila očitno zelo učinkovita. Tako akumulirano premoženje
pri podjetjih se je preoblikovalo v (lastniški) kapital. Druga stran
ali zrcalna slika, vendar zelo pomanjšana, tega akumuliranega
kapitala v podjetjih se je kazala v premoženjskih bilancah bank kot
(kumulirana) nepokrita izguba.
Dr. Ivan Ribnikar, zaslužni profesor Ekonomske fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani.
S tako imenovano prvobitno akumulacijo kapitala je s krajo, nasiljem in tudi z umori, če je bilo potrebno, nastajal
prvi kapital. Zatem se je kapital večal zakonito z dobički podjetij. Ker je bila pri nas ves čas akumulacija kapitala,
večanje trajnih virov sredstev podjetij, nezakonita, pomeni, da smo imeli permanentno prvobitno akumulacijo kapitala in
družbeno nestabilnost, značilno za ta čas. Govorili so o permanentni revoluciji, vendar niso imeli v mislih te akumulacije
kapitala. *
1
BV 11/2013
49
Imenovala se je evfemistično »negativne tečajne razlike« in ne izguba.
Vendar je bilo teh izgub precej manj
kot pri podjetjih akumuliranega
premoženja. Del tega prenesenega
premoženja na podjetja, čeprav se
je prav tako dogajalo prek bank z
njihovimi posojili, ni puščal sledov v
premoženjskih bilancah bank. To so
bila posojila, ki so jih dobila podjetja
na osnovi bančnih vlog v domačem denarju. Premoženje bančnih
deponentov se je zaradi negativne
realne obrestne mere prenašalo z
bančnimi posojili na podjetja in tega
ni bilo videti v premoženjskih bilancah bank. Banke so bile že zaradi
tečajnih razlik vsaj skoraj insolventne.
Če pa k temu dodamo še potencialne izgube zaradi posojil, čeprav so
bila posojila na pol darila, so bile
insolventne. Imele so manj premoženja kot dolgov. Njihova neto aktiva
so bila negativna.
V začetku je bil lastniški kapital nefinančnih podjetij poceni. Lastništvo
je bilo zelo razpršeno, lastniki so
bili vsi državljani Slovenije. Nevedni
in nezainteresirani lastniki naj ne bi
vedeli, kaj lahko zahtevajo. Tako
je marsikdo mislil. Vendar moramo
vedeti, da so bili mnogi od teh
lastnikov nekdanji ali sedanji delavci
teh podjetij. Lastniki na primer niso
bili niti investicijski skladi iz eksotičnih držav niti menedžerji podjetij,
ki so jih kupili z velikimi bančnimi
posojili in jih odplačevali z dividendami prevzetih podjetij. Finančniki,
ki so poznali poslovne finance ali
»corporate finance«, ali so vsaj tako
mislili, in s tem optimalno kapitalsko
in finančno strukturo podjetja, niso
mogli kar tako prepričati podjetij, da
so premalo zadolženi. Vendar pa
verjetno to ne pomeni, da so bili v
podjetjih nevedneži. V podjetjih so
se kljub temu racionalno obnašali.
Dolžniški kapital je bil namreč precej
dražji od lastniškega in optimalna
kapitalska struktura podjetja je tista,
ki zagotavlja podjetju najcenejše
financiranje. Tako kljub razpršenemu
lastništvu in celo de facto diskreditiranemu delavskemu samoupravljanju
ni bilo nič narobe z racionalnostjo
na mikro ravni. Optimalna kapitalska
struktura verjetno ni kakšno določeno razmerje med dvema vrstama
kapitala, ki so ga enkrat za vselej in
za povsod izračunali in ga najdemo
v knjigah. To je preprosto tista struktura, ki zagotavlja podjetjem najcenejše financiranje.
Podjetja so imela dosti kapitala in
zaradi tega je bilo tudi dosti skomin,
kako se ga polastiti. Vzrok prilaščanja, kot ga poznamo, ni namreč ostal
samo pri skominah, je bil najprej že
Banke so bile
pred začetkom
tranzicije
insolventne.
v načinu odprave družbene lastnine nefinančnih podjetij. Razdelitvi
certifikatov ljudem je sledila tako
imenovana druga faza privatizacije,
kot se je reklo. Ta naj bi bila šele
prava. Kmalu se je začelo lastništvo
podjetij koncentrirati v rokah manjše
skupine podjetij in posameznikov.
Glavni val je seveda prišel precej
pozneje, in sicer po letu 2004, ko
ni bilo več tveganja spremembe vrednosti tolarja nasproti evru. Vendar
nas to pot ne zanima, kako so prišla
podjetja do današnjega stanja, ko
so preveč zadolžena.2 Zanimajo nas
banke in njihov kapital. Najprej pred
začetkom tranzicije ali neposredno
pred njenim začetkom.
Banke niso imele enakih problemov
s kapitalom, da bi ga bilo dosti ali
celo preveč in bi ta kapital postal cilj
50
pohlepnežev. Banke ga sicer imajo
na splošno mnogo manj kot nefinančna podjetja, vendar ne mislimo
na to. Imele so ga manj kot drugod
ali pa ga sploh niso imele. Imele
so negativna neto aktiva ali neto
premoženje.
Bile so drugačne, kar zadeva
kapital, ker pri njih ni bilo družbene
lastnine3 in s tem tudi zelo učinkovite
prvobitne akumulacije kapitala njim
v prid. Banke so sicer bile pri tej
permanentni prvobitni akumulaciji kapitala pomembne, vendar so bile na
drugi strani. Prek njih se je premoženje ali kapital akumuliralo v nefinančnih podjetjih. Deloma so bile banke
pri tem prenosu premoženja na
podjetja samo posredniki in deloma
so bile one tiste, ki so premoženje
izgubljale.
Ker banke niso bile v družbeni lasti,
so lahko imele trajno vložena sredstva svojih ustanoviteljev. Ta sredstva
so bila podobna kot delniški kapital
delničarjev. Če poiščemo podobno
institucijo drugod, so bile podobne
kapitalskim finančnim institucijam
z neomejeno odgovornostjo lastnikov. Ustanovitelji so odgovarjali
za obveznosti bank z vsem svojim
premoženjem. Zaradi tega tudi ni
bilo pomembno, koliko imajo banke
s strani svojih ustanoviteljev trajno
vloženih sredstev. Navadno je bilo
tega zelo malo.
Neomejena odgovornost sama po
sebi ni bila nekaj nenavadnega.
Dandanes je še vedno v Evropi in
2
Pri vzrokih moramo začeti z načinom odprave
družbene lastnine in končati s finančno in
ekonomsko krizo. Vmes je vmešavanje politike
v vodenje podjetij, to je obnašanje države,
in poskus vodstev podjetij obraniti se tega
vmešavanja na način, da so poskusila postati
večinski lastnik. Dosegljivost poceni denarja je
kazala, da bo to mogoče. Bila je tudi grabežljivost,
vendar grabežljivost sama ne bi bila zadosti, saj
kapitalizem temelji na grabežljivosti. Ne sicer
neomejeni, ampak omejevani. Tako je vsaj v
današnjih normalnih državah.
3
V bankah ni bilo samoupravljanja in s tem
družbene lastnine, ker delo v bankah ni bilo
produktivno. Ni ustvarjalo vrednosti. Seveda v
skladu z marksizmom, kar pa seveda ni imelo
nobene zveze z Marxom.
BV 11/2013
ZDA kar nekaj finančnih institucij z
neomejeno odgovornostjo lastnikov.
Poleg tega je neomejena odgovornost, vsaj tako je videti, še vedno ali
ponovno aktualna. Zaradi propada
mnogih zasebnih bank se razmišlja
in piše o kapitalu in se v zvezi s
tem ponovno omenja neomejena
odgovornost lastnikov.4 Če bi pri tej
krizi propadle banke v državni lasti,
bi bil odgovor preprost. Edina prava
rešitev je privatizacija. Tako pa ni
preprostega odgovora.5 Sicer pa si v
začetku razvoja bančništvo ni moglo
zamisliti, da ne bi bilo neomejene
odgovornosti. Kdo bi zaupal denar
komu, če ne odgovarja neomejeno
z vsem svojim premoženjem. Da bi
ta neomejena odgovornost ne bila
samo papirna, so bili lahko delničarji
samo bogati.
Neomejena odgovornosti pri naših
bankah se je pred začetkom tranzicije jemala kot nekaj čudaškega in
nepomembnega, ker naj bi se zaradi
stalnega razvrednotevanja bančnih
posojil zaradi inflacije le malokrat
zgodilo, da bi podjetja ne mogla
servisirati svojih bančnih dolgov in bi
se posojila bank spremenila v slaba.
Vendar se je izkazalo, da neomejena odgovornost bank ni bila nekaj
nenavadnega, ampak pomembnega. To se je pokazalo pred začetkom
tranzicije, ko so se banke spremenile
v delniške družbe. Če bi bilo po zakonu, bi namreč morali lastniki, ali de
facto lastniki, s svojim premoženjem
pokriti kumulirane izgube bank in jih
ustrezno rekapitalizirati. Šele tako bi
ustvarili pogoje za njihovo spremembo v delniške družbe. Banke so se,
kot vemo, brez tega spremenile v
delniške družbe in država je bila tista, ki jih je pozneje sanirala. Zaradi
tega je bilo lahko v podjetjih toliko
več kapitala, ko so se preoblikovala
v delniške družbe, in s tem premoženja za razdelitev ter potešitev skomin
grabežljivih.
BV 11/2013
2. Podjetja in banke
po začetku tranzicije
in sanacija bank
Omenili smo že, kar je sicer tudi
znano, da gospodarski sistem z
družbeno lastnino (in delavskim
samoupravljanjem) ne bi mogel delovati, če ne bi banke omogočale, da
pri podjetjih nastajajo na desni strani
njihove premoženjske bilance postavke, če povemo tehnicistično, ki niso
dolgovi. To pomeni postavke, kot
so sicer pri podjetjih trajno vložena
sredstva, to je lastniški kapital. To se
ni moglo dogajati normalno s trajno
vloženim denarjem ali premoženjem
posameznikov in institucij. Ustavno
je bilo namreč prepovedano, da
bi imel kdorkoli v podjetju trajno
vložena sredstva. Ker pa so takšna
sredstva bila, pomeni, da so nastala
na neustaven način. Lahko sicer
rečemo, samo na pol neustavno, ker
ta sredstva niso pripadala nobeni
fizični ali pravni osebi, kot na primer
pri bankah ustanoviteljem, ampak
so pripadala »družbi« in od tod
družbena lastnina. Našel se je izhod
iz zagate.
Zaradi permanentne prvobitne
akumulacije kapitala pri nefinančnih
podjetjih prek bank so bile banke
pred začetkom tranzicije insolventne. Treba jih je bilo sanirati. Če so
ostale insolventne po začetku njihove
sanacije tudi potem, ko je država
pokrila izgube, imenovane »tečajne
razlike«, in takšne so bile v začetku
tri in zatem dve banki, so šle v tako
imenovano individualno sanacijo.
Drugačno obravnavanje »negativnih
tečajnih razlik« od drugega dela
izgub bank je posledica tega, da so
»negativne tečajne razlike« nastajale
v bankah, ker so morale sprejemati
vloge v tujem denarju, medtem ko
niso smele dajati posojil v tujem denarju. Zaradi zmanjševanja vrednosti
bančnih posojil v dinarjih nasproti
bančnim vlogam v tujem denarju, pri
katerih tega ni bilo, je nastajala pri
51
bankah izguba. Lahko rečemo, da je
bila ta izguba bankam vsiljena s strani oblasti in bilo je prav ali vsaj manj
narobe, da to pokrije država, čeprav
se je tudi s temi bančnimi posojili
prenašalo premoženje na posojilojemalce. Lahko bi na primer tudi za ta
del izgub poklicali lastnike bank, da
te izgube pokrijejo, saj so, kot je bilo
rečeno, neomejeno odgovarjali za
obveznosti bank.
Država je pri sanaciji bank s svojimi
obveznicami pokrila izgube bank,
tudi potencialne zaradi njihovih
slabih posojil. V zameno za slaba
posojila so banke dobile državne
obveznice. S tem je prešlo lastništvo
teh bank v celoti v roke države.
Tehnično je to šlo prek institucije, ki
je bila dejansko »slaba banka«. Ker
je bila ta banka samo za državni
banki, država je bila njuna edina
lastnica, je bila ta slaba banka
podobna slabi banki, ki jo ustanovi,
kot je edino smotrno in brez problemov, posamezna banka. Ni bilo na
primer pomembno, kako se vrednotijo slaba posojila, ki so se prenesla
na slabo banko. Vendar pa je bilo
pri tej sanaciji pomembno, da so se
slaba bančna posojila prenesla po
nominalni vrednosti. Tako je lahko
namreč država pokrila (potencialne)
izgube bank sorazmerno velikosti
teh izgub. Vendar to ni bilo zadosti.
Če bi namreč banki dobili od države
prek slabe banke samo toliko, ne bi
bili več insolventni, kar bi sicer bilo
pomembno, vendar bi kljub temu
dobili premalo. Bankam je bilo na-
4
Nihče seveda ne predlaga neomejene
odgovornosti, vendar se omenja (Goodhart,
2010), objavljajo se razprave o britanskih bankah
v devetnajstem stoletju, kako se je postopoma
zmanjševal delež lastniškega kapitala (Turner,
2009).
5
Večina meni, da se mora pri bankah delež
lastniškega kapitala povečati (Miles in drugi,
2011; Haldane 2012 in 2012a, Lanchester, 2013,
Turner, 2013) in da se mora določiti relativno visok
»leverage ratio« in opustiti ali vsaj ne zaupati toliko
»risk weighted assets«, ko gre za določitev velikosti
potrebnega kapitala. Izkazalo se je namreč, da
ne smemo preveč zaupati v »risk weighted assets«.
So pa tudi nasprotna mnenja (DeAngelo in Stulz,
2013).
mreč treba dati še nekaj več papirjev
države, da bi bilo vsaj nekaj neto
premoženja bank in s tem njihovega
kapitala.
Namen slabe banke, ki jo praviloma
ustanovi sama banka, ni priti do daril
od koga razen seveda od svojih
lastnikov. Slaba banka naj bi bila
finančna institucija, ki je sposobna
reševati probleme podjetij, ki ne morejo servisirati svojih bančnih dolgov.
In slaba banka iz začetka devetdesetih let je bila podobna slabi banki,
ki jo ustanovi posamezna banka. Ker
je lastnik takšne slabe banke dobra
banka, lahko poljubno pomaga slabi
banki. Na primer pokriva njene izgube, ki so zaradi njenih slabih terjatev
pričakovane. Pri nas je bila lastnica,
ali vsaj de facto lastnica obeh bank
država, in ne banke, in zato je
država lahko pokrivala zgube slabe
banke, ki so bile dejansko izgube
njenih bank, ki sta se očistili slabih
posojil. To je bilo seveda smotrno
s strani države, saj bi bili stroški
propada teh bank zagotovo večji
kot stroški sanacije, to je pokrivanja
izgub in rekapitalizacije bank. Takrat
seveda ni bilo zunanjih omejitev za
to. Bila pa je tudi kakšna banka, ki
ni potrebovala državne pomoči,
vendar kljub temu ni bilo kakšne posebne diskriminacije. Lastništvo dveh
bank je bilo v celoti državno.
Tehnično je bilo tako, če ostanemo
še pri slabi banki, da so se slaba
posojila prenesla na slabo banko po
njihovi nominalni vrednosti. Z razliko
med nominalno in dejansko vrednostjo prenesenih slabih posojil je država subvencionirala svoji banki, to je
pokrila izgube zaradi slabih bančnih
posojil. Tega seveda ne bi bilo, če
se slaba posojila ne bi prenašala po
njihovi nominalni, ampak po dejanski
vrednosti. Banka se namreč sanira
samo tako, da dobi od koga dodatni
kapital, če ga ima premalo, banka
je na primer solventna, če kdo še pokrije kumulirane izgube, če je banka
insolventna.
Ker pa je z ustanovitvijo slabe banke, kot smo jo poznali, in sicer agencijo za sanacijo bank in hranilnic, šlo
za dva posla, prenos slabih terjatev
in pokritje izgub bank ter njuno rekapitalizacijo, se je menda ustvarilo
mnenje, da je slaba banka tudi sedaj
potrebna zato, da dobijo banke darila (pokritje izgub) in dodatni kapital.
Od tod verjetno pričakovanja, da bo
slaba banka napravila banke dobre
in da bodo lahko potem te na veliko
dajale posojila.
Slaba banka, ki
se pripravlja, je
nekaj drugega
kot slaba banka
na začetku
tranzicije.
3. Podjetja, banke in slaba
banka dandanes
Že nekaj časa se pri bankah povečuje obseg slabih posojil, ki izčrpavajo
bančni kapital. Zaradi tega se morajo banke rekapitalizirati. Videli smo
sicer, da se s slabo banko ne more
povečati bančni kapital, če niso
takšne razmere, kot so bile pri nas v
začetku devetdesetih let. Vendar pa
se dandanes kljub temu, da gre za
bančni kapital, javnosti zavajajoče
oznanja kot najpomembnejše, kdaj
se bodo slaba posojila prenesla na
slabo banko. Ali pa se ne pove, za
kaj gre. Zato je videti, da je od tega
odvisna rekapitalizacija bank. Ni
jasno, ali se misli, da se s prenosom
slabih posojil banka že rekapitalizira
ali pa lahko rekapitalizacija sledi
52
šele prenosu slabih posojil.
Vztrajanje na časovnem zaporedju,
in sicer najprej prenos slabih posojil
na slabo banko in s tem ali za tem
rekapitalizacija, lahko pomeni, da so
slaba posojila kužna in ne pomenijo
samo ustreznega zmanjšanja kapitala, ampak negativno delujejo tudi na
druge naložbe bank in zato morajo
čim prej iz bilance bank.
Slaba banka, ki se pripravlja, je
nekaj drugega kot slaba banka
na začetku tranzicije. Ni niti slaba
banka posamezne banke niti bank,
ki imajo istega lastnika. Država
bo gotovo za njo, vendar so v treh
bankah še drugi lastniki. To seveda
precej zaplete prenos slabih posojil. Še posebej pomembno je, da
slaba banka in prek nje država ne
bosta nikomur nič podarili. Banke so
namreč pri sanaciji iz devetdesetih
let dobile za na slabo banko po
nominalni vednosti prenesena slaba
posojila državne obveznice, ki so
bile denominirane v nemških markah
in so prinašale bankam obresti po
osemodstotni letni obrestni meri. Zdaj
bodo seveda obveznice, najbolje bi
bilo, kot bomo videli, da jih sploh ne
bi bilo, v domači valuti in ne morda
v kakšni zelo močni tuji valuti, ki bi
stalno pridobivala vrednost glede na
evro. Tudi z obrestmi za te obveznice
bo drugače. Tudi prek obresti, ki naj
bi jih slaba banka plačevala bankam, ne sme država subvencionirati
bank. Zaradi tega bo slaba banka
smela dati bankam v zameno za slaba posojila samo pretočne obveznice (»pass-through bonds«)6. Vendar
upamo, da je to samo hipotetično, to
je, kako bi bilo, če bi bilo narobe in
ne bi bila prenesena na slabo banka
resnično samo ničvredna posojila.
Slaba banka se je pojavila pred
nekaj časa, čeprav se jasnovidci
hvalijo, da so jo predlagali že pred
6
Nekaj besed o tej obveznici je mogoče najti v
kratkem besedilu iz leta 1996 (Ribnikar, 1966).
BV 11/2013
leti, zaradi problemov s kapitalom
treh bank, kjer je država večinska ali
pomembna lastnica. Zaradi zunanjih
okoliščin in tudi razmer v teh bankah
bi jih morala država ponovno rekapitalizirati, kar ni tako nenavadno za
lastnika, čeprav je lahko formalno
zapleteno, ker je država lastnica in
smo v EU. V obtok je prišla slaba
banka. Vendar pa, ko gre za slaba
bančna posojila, je edino prav, če
vsaka banka, ki ima dosti takšnih
posojil, ustanovi svojo slabo banko,
če posebni oddelek banke, ki bi se
ukvarjal samo s slabimi posojili, ne bi
bil zadosti. Bodisi da gre za posebni
oddelek v banki ali za slabo banko,
ki jo ustanovi banka, je njen namen
zagotoviti boljše gospodarjenje s
tem izdvojenim premoženjem banke.
Postaviti podjetja na noge, če je
mogoče, in jih prodati, če so banke
(in država) njegove pomembne
lastnice. To je tudi lahko edini smisel
tudi slabe banke, ki se načrtuje in
nestrpno pričakuje. V posebnem
oddelku, ki ga ustanovijo posamezne banke, ali pa v slabi banki, če je
oddelek premalo, je pomembno, da
so v njem ljudje z bančnimi izkušnjami in izkušnjami reševanja podjetij
različnih dejavnosti, ki se na to bolje
spoznajo kot drugi bankirji ali kot
bankirji nasploh.
4. Problemi kapitala pri nas
Problemi kapitala bank, ki so dejansko problemi njihovega lastništva, se
vlečejo že od začetka tranzicije. Še
posebej so postali pereči v zadnjem
času, ko je lastnik, mislimo seveda
na državo, namesto rekapitalizacije
»svojih« ali »skoraj svojih« bank
odkril, verjetno s pomočjo Bruslja,
slabo banko. Kakor koli obračamo,
je problem nezadostnost kapitala.
Ker pa je pri nas očitno to problem
lastništva bank, nas zanima, kako je
s tem lastništvom. Problemi lastništva
in kapitala so tudi pri nefinančnih
podjetjih in drugih finančnih instituciBV 11/2013
jah, vendar jih puščamo ob strani.
Za tranzicijske države se v začetku
postavlja zasebno lastništvo nasproti
še vedno državnemu. Pri nas verjetno
ne moremo postavljati državnega lastništva podjetij nasproti zasebnemu.
Ne morda zaradi tega, ker pri nas
pred začetkom tranzicije ni bilo državne lastnine, nastala je šele z odpravo družbene lastnine in s sanacijo
bank. Pri nas namreč navadno pomeni privatizacija, in to ne samo bank,
ampak tudi nefinančnih podjetij, ne
Problemi
kapitala
naših bank
so dejansko
problemi
njihovega
lastništva.
samo prodaje tujcem, ampak precej
več in/ali nekaj drugega. Pomeni
namreč navadno prevzem banke ali
podjetja s strani kakšne tuje banke
ali tujega podjetja, kar se navadno
označuje kot strateško partnerstvo,
čeprav ni nikakršnega partnerstva.
To velja še posebej za banke. Če
kdo govori o privatizaciji bank na
primer v Nemčiji, to ne pomeni, da
bodo tujci prevzeli banke. V Nemčiji
je namreč več kot dovolj domačih
potencialnih bančnih lastnikov, in sicer različnih finančnih institucij. Med
njimi bodo seveda tudi tuje finančne
institucije, vendar to ni nič posebnega. Lahko so tudi pretežno ali celo
samo tuje, vendar je pomembno, ali
ostaja banka samostojna in da ne
postane hči druge banke.
Čeprav verjetno nima v Nemčiji
53
skoraj nihče nič proti privatizaciji, je
gotovo drugače, ko gre za to, da
bi tuja podjetja prevzela nemška in
jih spremenila v svoje hčere. Zato
gre med nami in tujci, ko se govori
in piše o privatizaciji, za »double
talking«. Za kaj gre, tega ne vedo niti
tisti, ki pri nas neprenehoma govorijo, naj se čim prej vse privatizira, niti
tujci. Ne vedo, da nam pravijo, da
moramo banke in podjetja čim prej
prepustiti tujim bankam in podjetjem,
da jih prevzamejo in spremenijo
v svoje podružnice ali hčerinska
podjetja.
Vendar vse to ni argument za to, da
se država ne umakne iz lastništva
bank in nefinančnih podjetij, če se
ona ne more spremeniti. Žal ni videti,
da bi naša država postala podobna
drugim, kjer lastništvo države ni nič
nenavadnega. Vendar nam posebnost, kaj pomeni pri nas privatizacija,
morda razloži, zakaj toliko obotavljanja pri privatizaciji. Privatizacija je,
kot smo videli, pri nas nekaj drugega
kot v večjih evropskih državah. In
glede na državo, kakšno imamo,
se moramo zato osvoboditi iluzij,
kakšna podjetja in kakšno gospodarstvo bomo imeli.
Ker nas zanimajo banke, še nekaj
besed o kapitalu in lastništvu bank.
V nasprotju z nefinančnimi podjetji,
pri katerih je lahko lastnik kdor koli,
za banke ni dobro, da je lastništvo
razpršeno in da se skupina, ki ima
odločilni lastniški nadzor v banki, pogosto spreminja. Pogosto spreminjanje večinskega lastništva, kar je lahko
pri razpršenem delničarstvu, pomeni
namreč za banko nestabilnost. Zato
je v tej zvezi najpomembnejše, da so
večinski lastniki finančne institucije.
Pri finančnih institucijah je skoraj
vse njihovo premoženje finančno in
delnice bank v njihovem portfelju so
nekaj običajnega. Tega ne moremo
reči za nefinančna podjetja. Zanje
je praviloma finančno premoženje
samo nekaj začasnega. Pri njih ne
moremo pričakovati, da bodo ostali
lastniki na dolgi rok. S tem imamo
tudi mi kar nekaj izkušenj.
Če pogledamo pri nas finančne
institucije po številu in velikosti kot
potencialne lastnice bank, vidimo,
da takšno lastništvo bank ni mogoče.
Koketiranje s pokojninskimi skladi je
na primer bila neumnost, čeprav je
bil to eden od argumentov za njihovo ustanovitev. Vsak sklad, in zato
tudi pokojninski, mora razpršiti svoje
premoženje in v takšnem skladu ne
bi moglo biti več kot nekaj delnic
kakšne naše večje banke. Kakor koli
obračamo, ne moremo najti ustreznih
potencialnih lastnikov bank. Poleg
države ostane samo tujina. Navadno je seveda alternativa državi
kot lastnici bank, in tudi nefinančnih
podjetij, to, da banke, tudi nefinančna podjetja, izgubijo samostojnost
in postanejo hčere tujih bank ali tujih
(nefinančnih) podjetij.
Če država ne more biti lastnica bank
ali to ni dobro, ker je slab lastnik, kar
je pri nas splošno sprejeta resnica,
kar pa seveda ne velja za državo na
splošno, je edina rešitev privatizacija
v tistem smislu, kot je pri nas edino
mogoča. Dopustiti moramo, da banke postanejo na splošno hčere tujih
bank. Tako izgubijo svojo samostojnost. Verjetno je ekonomska samostojnost, seveda omejena, podobno
pomembna kot politična, vendar pa
v zvezi s politično samostojnostjo
nihče ne govori omalovažujoče, da
gre za izmišljeni nacionalni interes.
Država očitno že nekaj časa kaže,
da ne želi biti lastnica bank, če
ostanemo samo pri njih. Ne želi na
primer rekapitalizirati bank. Slaba
banka, ki naj bi bila odkritje, lahko
privede samo do tega, da če ne
bodo prenesena nanjo samo resnično ničvredna posojila, bodo stroški
sanacije bank mnogo večji in tako
vse skupaj še bolj grozno. Rekapitalizacija se šteje, ne glede na Bruselj,
za pomoč, za nekaj, kar bodo spet
plačali davkoplačevalci in podobno.
Država bo morala prepustiti banke,
da jih prevzamejo tuje banke in jih
spremenijo v svoje hčere. In videti je,
če pomislimo na slabo banko, da to
želi napraviti hitro, čeprav v škodo
državljanov in ne samo davkoplačevalcev. Sanacija bank in slaba
banka sta namreč tako zamišljeni,
vsaj kot je videti, da bo vsakomur
neizpodbitno dokazano, da se to
mora zgoditi. To so, upajmo, čeprav
je tega upanja verjetno malo, samo
želje.
Država se mora sicer v celoti umakniti iz bank, če ne želi imeti večinskega
lastniškega deleža. Manjši delež,
na primer 25 odstotkov in še ena
delnica, kar naj bi bila strateška odločitev, je neumnost. S kakršnim koli
deležem, ki je manjši od nekaj nad
50 odstotkov, ne more preprečiti,
da banka ne bi izgubila samostojnosti. Sprijazniti se bomo morali, da
ekonomska samostojnost ne bo samo
deloma omejena, kot je nujno v
današnjem svetu, ampak da bo zelo
omejena, kot tudi dandanes ni ravno
nujno. Videti je, da je pri nas zaradi
države, kakršno imamo, to nujno.
***
Banke, ki so v večinskem lastništvu države, so zaradi finančne in ekonomske krize ter še česa drugega, kar
nas ne zanima, v težavah in država
jih noče rekapitalizirati.7 Ponuja
slabo banko, na katero naj bi bila
prenesena slaba bančna posojila teh
bank. Že ves čas se vse vrti okrog te
banke in vrednotenja slabih posojil.
Videti je, da država želi prenesti na
slabo banko slaba posojila po vrednosti, ki seveda ne bo nominalna,
kot je bila nekoč, in prav je tako, vendar tudi ne bo dejanska, ampak bo
nič ali vsaj blizu tega. Stroški bi bili
v tem primeru s slabo banko manjši,
to je, ne bi bilo nepotrebnih dodatnih
stroškov, vendar tega država ne
more napraviti. Ni edina lastnica treh
bank, saj bi to bila kraja in seveda
nasprotje sanacije bank. Poleg tega,
54
kar je verjetno pomembnejše, bi po
tem prenosu imele banke še manj
kapitala, ker bi se s prenosom tako
vrednotenih slabih posojil prenesel
na slabo banko tudi del njihovega
premoženja. Zaradi tega bi bilo
treba za rekapitalizacijo bank še več
kapitala, vendar pa tega kapitala
očitno država ne bi mogla zagotoviti. Zato bi bila nujna hitra privatizacija teh bank.
Premoženje, vzeto bankam, ko bi se
slaba posojila nasilno kot ničvredna
prenesla na slabo banko, čeprav
posojila ne bi bila takšna, bi postalo
premoženje slabe banke. Ko bi se
podjetja, ki so dolžniki pri prenesenih slabih posojilih, prodajala, bi
slaba banka dosegala zanje ugodno
ceno. Prek prodajne cene podjetij
bi namreč unovčila vsaj delno tudi
premoženje, ki je bilo prek slabih
posojil kot ničvredno preneseno
nanjo. Zaradi ugodnih cen bi bilo
treba podjetja kar se da hitro prodati. Zasluga za privatizacijo in dober
izkupiček bi šla upravi slabe banke
in seveda njeni zamisli.
Ker pa je vse to hipotetično, nasilnosti si pri vrednotenju slabih posojil
slaba banka kljub morebitni podpori
Bruslja verjetno ne bi mogla privoščiti, ni mogoče videti racionalnega
razloga za slabo banko. Če država
in verjetno Bruselj, kljub temu, da ni
racionalnega razloga zanjo, želita
ostati pri slabi banki, to očitno želi
uprava te banke, saj se kregajo za
mesto v njej. Zato je edini način,
da se zaradi prenosa slabih posojil
nanjo ne bodo povečali stroški za
državo, ta, da se prenesejo na slabo
banko samo resnično ničvredna
posojila. Pričakovana vrednost teh
7
Ker država ne more rekapitalizirati bank s svojimi
obveznicami, to je s stvarnim vložkom, in to ni samo
naša iznajdba, ampak menda tudi Bruslja, mora
za potreben denar iti na trg. To bo ali bi podražilo
rekapitalizacijo bank s strani države, če pustimo ob
strani, kaj vse se šteje kot državna pomoč. Tudi to je
tako lepo narejeno, da bo privatizacija nujna in je
igra s slabo banko in z vrednotenjem slabih posojil
morda sploh nepotrebna.
BV 11/2013
posojil mora biti nič. Prenos kakršnih
koli drugih posojil, ki niso ničvredna
in slaba banka plača zanje toliko,
kolikor so vredna, se za ta znesek
po nepotrebnem, namreč samo za
to, da se spremeni lokacija slabih
posojil, povečajo stroški sanacije, če
ostanemo pri besedi sanacija.
Če bodo prenesena tudi druga
posojila, ki niso dejansko ničvredna,
po njihovi dejanski vrednosti, bo to
pomenilo, da državi, in s tem davkoplačevalcem, o katerih toliko govori,
stroški niso pomembni. Ne pride
verjetno v poštev, kot je bilo že rečeno, da se prenašajo posojila, ki niso
ničvredna, kot da bi bila takšna, in
da zato banke zanje ne dobijo nič.
Zato je edino racionalno v iracionalnosti, da se na slabo banko, na katero stavijo ne samo država, ampak
tudi gospodarstvo in strokovnjaki,
prenesejo samo resnično ničvredna
bančna posojila.Tako država ne bi
imela nobenih dodatnih stroško, ne
bi izdala nobenih obveznic, ali ne
bi jamčila za nobene obveznice, ki
BV 11/2013
bi jih bankam dala slaba banka. Za
državo bi bili stroški sanacije bank
samo stroški rekapitalizacije bank, če
seveda rekapitalizacijo imenujemo
strošek.8
Pri tem puščamo ob strani sicer za
mnoge zelo pomembne verjetno
kolateralne koristi od slabe banke,
na primer možnost odkriti, kdo je
dajal posojila, ki so zdaj slaba.
Verjetno tudi posojila, ki so bila ob
odobritvi dobra. Tako ne bi šlo samo
za zapravljanje denarja, kar se ne
sme kar tako dopustiti, ampak tudi
za blamažo Slovenije, kako se namreč odkriva morebitno fravdulentno
obnašanje bankirjev.
LITERATURA IN VIRI/REFERENCES:
DeAngelo, H. & R. M. Stulz, 2013, »Why
high leverage is optimal for banks«, NBER
Working Paper 19139, 20 str.
Goohart, C., 2010, »How should we
regulate bank capital and financial
products? What role for 'living wills'?,
objavljeno v: R. Adair Turner in drugi, »The
Future of Finance«,LSE, str. 165 – 186.
Haldane, A., 2012, The doom loop«,
55
London Review of Books, 23. Februar, 8 str.
Haldane, A., 2012, »The dog and the
frisbee«, Razprava na 36. Simpoziju
Federal Reserve Bank of Cansas City »The
changing policy landscape«, Jackson Hole,
Wyoming, 31, avgusta, 36 str.
Lanchester, J., 2013, »Let's consider banks:
can we tame the banks«, London Review of
Books, 8. Julij, 15 str.
Miles, D., J. Yang & G. Marcheggiano,
2011, »Optimal bank capital«, Bank of
England, Discussion Paper No. 31, 52 str.
Ribnikar, I., 2009, »Listinjenje«, Bančni
vestnik, št. 1-2, str. 48-51.
Turner, J. D., 2009, » 'The last acre
and sixpence': view on bankliability
management in nineteenth century Britain«,
Financial History Review, str. 111- 127.
Turner, A., 2013, »Debt, Money and
Mephistopheles: how we get out of this
mess?«, Cass usiness School, str. 43.
8
Strošek za državo in s tem za državljane in ne
samo za davkoplačevalce, kot neprestano slišimo in
beremo, je namreč strošek za tiste, ki neto dobivajo
od države, je v izgubi »njenih« bank, če ostanemo
pri bankah.Gre samo za izgubo, ki je posledica
nevestnega ali celo fravdulentnega obnašanja
uprav in nadzornih svetov bank. Običajna izguba
ni nekaj kriminalnega. Kot pravi P. Samuelson,
kapitalizem ne temelji na dobičku, ampak temelji
na dobičku in izgubi. Rekapitalizacija bank, ki je
morda enaka izgubi bank v lastništvu države, ni
strošek ampak naložba države. Če morda Bruselj
in tudi strokovna javnost doma mislita drugače, ne
spremeni dejstva, da je rekapitalizacija bank kot
vsaka druga naložba in se o njej odloča podobno.
Strošek za državo je namreč z izgubo že bil
narejen.
L E GA L E N V I R O N M E N T A N D L E G I S L AT I V E F R A M E WO R K O F C O M PA N Y R E S T R U C T U R I N G
UDK 338.124.4:336.71
Zakonodaja o sistemskem
razdolževanju
Andrej Simonič*
SYSTEMIC DELEVERAGING
LEGISLATION
As Slovenia is facing
a severe financial and
banking crisis, and a
severe downturn in the
corporate sector, it is of
great importance that we
introduce new rules to
facilitate the survival of
businesses, banks, jobs
and people. The main goal
of the new act on systemic
deleveraging of companies
is to make it easier for
creditors and debtors
to reach out-of-court
settlements and quicker
debt-to-equity conversions,
which would lead to
rescue and restructuring of
businesses. The new rules
should allow creditors to
step in the process sooner,
thus contributing to the
company’s survival more
efficiently than they can
now in the compulsory
settlement proceedings,
which are run and
controlled by irresponsible
owners. Compulsory
settlements often occur too
late and the creditors get
too little out of them. New
out-of-court settlements
of debt-to-equity swaps
would be faster, controlled
by creditors and would
only be possible if the
benefits for the creditors
were larger in comparison
with bankruptcy
proceedings.
Z
akon o finančnem poslovanju podjetij in postopkih zaradi
insolventnosti in prisilnem prenehanju (ZFPPIPP) – poenostavljeno obstoječa insolvenčna zakonodaja – se uporablja od 1. oktobra 2008. Z rezultati uporabe ne moremo
biti zadovoljni.
1. Stečajna zakonodaja ne daje dobrih rezultatov
Stroški stečaja so med najvišjimi na svetu, hitrost postopka pa
je med najpočasnejšimi na svetu. Obstoječa zakonodaja ne omogoča
ohranjanja zdravih jeder v stečaju. Gre za čisto razprodajo premoženja. Zaradi dolgotrajnosti postopkov je premoženje v postopkih
prodaje v ekonomskem pogledu neaktivno. Dolžnik ga ne more
uporabljati, kupec pa ne kupiti ne ekonomsko aktivirati.
Tudi postopki prisilne poravnave so se izkazali kot večinoma
neuspešni. Večina podjetij kljub zaključku prisilne poravnave ostane
prezadolžena. Količnik med dolgom in EBITDA ostaja mnogo previsok. Če k temu dodamo še splošno poslabšanje ekonomskih razmer
v državi, dolžniki iz potrjene prisilne poravnave kmalu vnovič zaidejo v insolventnost. V ekonomskem pogledu torej rezultat prisilne
poravnave ni dosti drugačen od stečaja. V obeh primerih dolžnik
že na srednji rok preneha poslovati, pred tem pa posluje na robu
likvidnosti, ni razvoja in počasi umira.
JEL G01 G31 G33
* Andrej Simonič, univ. dipl. iur.
56
BV 11/2013
2. Razlogi za slabe rezultate
Poglavitni problem v Sloveniji je
nerešeno konceptualno vprašanje,
kaj pomeni prisilna poravnava na
podlagi izkazane insolvence. Po teoriji naj bi se v insolvenčnih postopkih,
kot posledici insolvence , dogajala
»generalna izvršba« za poplačilo
vseh upnikov. In če je restrukturiranje
boljši način poplačila le-teh, lahko
upniki pristanejo nanj, drugače gre
za razprodajo premoženja dolžnika
in njegovo ukinitev kot poslovnega
subjekta . V obeh poznanih načinih
izvedbe insolvenčnega postopka,
kot enoten postopek (npr. Nemčija)
ali dva ločena postopka (npr. ZDA),
imetniki udeležb (lastniki) postanejo
razred upnikov, restrukturiranje in
ohranjanje delujočih podjemov je
mogoče v obeh primerih. Slovenski
ZFPPIPP vzpostavlja dva med seboj
ločena postopka. Prvič, prisilno
poravnavo, ki jo v celoti obvladujejo
stari lastniki in uprava, ki jo ti imenujejo. In drugič, stečajni postopek,
ki ne omogoča ohranitve delovanja
podjetja. Obe poti sta neustrezni.
Poleg previsokih stroškov v stečaju
praviloma ne ostane nič za poplačilo
navadnih upnikov, to je zlasti delavcev in dobaviteljev. S prodajo premoženja se praviloma poplačajo zgolj
zavarovani upniki, pa še ti ne nujno
v celoti. Zaradi nastanka sistemske
nelikvidnosti so cene dosežene v
stečajnih prodajah nizke. Zakon ne
omogoča razdelitve neprodajljivega
premoženja med upnike.
Neustrezno je zastavljena tudi prisilna poravnava. Načrt finančnega
prestrukturiranja v prisilni poravnavi
pripravijo uprava in stari lastniki,
kar zbuja nezaupanje upnikov. V
obstoječi ureditvi prisilne poravnave
ni upoštevano načelo absolutne
prioritete. V predlogu finančnega
prestrukturiranja ni mogoče oblikovati razredov in tako upoštevati
različen pravni in ekonomski položaj
različnih skupin upnikov. Na primer,
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prisilna poravnava posega v pravice
malih dobaviteljev, ki bi jih bilo, gleda na ekonomske okoliščine, edino
smiselno v celoti poplačati, pa zakon
tega ne omogoča. Mali in veliki dobavitelji, banke, ki posojajo obratni
kapital, in banke, ki dajejo investicijska posojila, so enako obravnavani,
kar je popolna deformacija. Stari
lastniki, ki bi morali prvi vse izgubiti,
ohranjajo svoje deleže. O potrditvi
prisilne poravnave glasujejo navadni
upniki, ki v primeru stečaja sploh ne
Obe poti,
prisilna
poravnava
in stečajni
postopek,
sta trenutno
neustrezni.
bi bili poplačani, zavarovani upniki,
ki bi morali biti najmanj prizadeti,
pa sploh ne glasujejo. Posledica
opisane deformirane situacije je tudi
deformiran tipičen rezultat prisilne
poravnave. Prevladujoča rešitev je
maksimalen reprogram dolga in
čim manj konverzije dolga v kapital.
Posledično s potrditvijo prisilne poravnave dolžnik ni niti finančno niti
poslovno prestrukturiran.
3. Dodaten vpliv finančne
krize na vodenje
insolvenčnih postopkov
Po začetku svetovne finančne krize
je že leta 2010 postalo očitno, da
je poglaviten vir ekonomske krize v
Sloveniji prezadolženost nefinančnega sektorja. Posojilni bum pomeni
krizo tudi v bankah. Nelikvidnost
57
se je najprej pojavila pri najbolj
izpostavljenih dolžnikih, potem pa
je po sistemu domin hitro prerasla v
sistemsko nelikvidnost.
Glede na položaj v slovenskem
gospodarstvu je tako v tem trenutku
skoraj nemogoče izvesti finančno
prestrukturiranje s hkratno dokapitalizacijo. Tako se ponuja rešitev:
konverzija dolga v kapital. V tem
okviru lahko pričakujemo, da bodo
banke takšnemu dolžniku zagotovile
posojila za obratni kapital, s tem da
bo zaradi razdolžitve potreba po
bančnem financiranju obratnega kapitala manjša. Investicijska vlaganja
pa se bodo odložila na čas po izvedenem poslovnem prestrukturiranju.
Poslovno prestrukturiranje pa bodo
morali izvesti novi lastniki, za kar bo
potrebno več časa od časa za samo
konverzijo.
4. Način reševanja
obstoječih razmer
Uporabiti je treba splošno načelo:
pravila o sistemski razdolžitvi omogočijo sklepanje krovnega sporazuma tako, da se omogoči rešitev, ki je
enaka, kot bi bil pogodbeni dogovor
med strankami v svetu popolnih
informacij in z ničelnimi transakcijskimi stroški.
Upnikom se v okviru maksimalne možne pogodbene svobode omogoči
sklepanje krovnih sporazumov na
način, da se izvede uspešno finančno prestrukturiranje dolžnikov, ob
predpostavki, da vsi upniki dobijo v
primeru sklenitve krovnega sporazuma večjo vrednost, kot bi jo dobili
v primeru razprodaje premoženja
v stečajnem postopku. S sklenitvijo
krovnega sporazuma si upniki med
seboj v skladu z dogovorom razdelijo pozitivno razliko vrednosti
delujočega podjetja v razmerju do
likvidacijske mase. Če ni tako, krovni
sporazum ne bo sklenjen in začel se
bo stečaj.
Zgoraj opisana dodana vrednost
za upnike se bo realizirala zgolj
pod pogojem, da bo razdolženo
podjetje sposobno dolgoročno
pozitivno poslovati v boju s konkurenco. Navedeno pa pomeni, da bo
treba doseči vzdržno razmerje med
dolgom in EBITDA, ki se bo moralo
gibati nekje blizu količnika 3. Novi
predpis seveda takšnega razmerja
ne more omogočiti neposredno.
Lahko pa sklepanje razumnih dogovorov omogoči tako, da odpravi
deformacije obstoječega ZFPPIPP,
to pa je zlasti pravilno upoštevanje
načel absolutne prioritete in razrešitev vprašanja posega v pravice
zavarovanih upnikov. Le tako bo
vsem pogajalcem omogočeno
jasno in enoznačno razumevanje
postopka razdolžitve in primerjava
le-tega z alternativno možnostjo, to
je s stečajem. Tako sklenjeni krovni
sporazumi bodo logični in ekonomsko vzdržni.
5. Koncept zakona o
sistemski razdolžitvi
(v nadaljevanju ZSR)
Praksa kaže, da se upniki vključitvi
v formalne postopke po ZFPPIPP
izogibajo. Dolžniki in banke sklepajo
sporazume o moratoriju ter se pogajajo o sklenitvi krovnega sporazuma.
Do končne sklenitve tega pa pogosto
ne pride zato, ker ni mogoče doseči
100-odstotnega soglasja vseh upnikov. V takšnem primeru bi seveda
moral biti upnik, ki ne želi skleniti
sporazuma, 100-odstotno poplačan
v skladu s pogodbo, kar pa je nesprejemljivo za preostale upnike.
ZSR bi tako uredil način, kot se zdaj
dogaja v praksi. To je, da bi omogočil sklenitev moratorija in krovnega
sporazuma z večino glasov in ne
s stoodstotnim soglasjem. Zaradi
pravila o preglasovanju je potrebna sodna potrditev predhodno že
sklenjenega oziroma izglasovanega
krovnega sporazuma.
6. Dileme ZSR
• Načelo absolutne prioritete
Načelo absolutne prioritete v principu pomeni, da mora biti zagotovljena prednost poplačila zavarovanih
terjatev pred navadnimi terjatvami
in pred podrejenimi terjatvami in na
koncu pred terjatvami družbenikov.
Ob upoštevanju absolutne prioritete
mora krovni sporazum zagotavljati
ugodnejše poplačilo vseh upnikov od
poplačila v primeru stečaja. V zvezi
Praksa kaže,
da se upniki
formalnim
zakonodajnim
postopkom
izogibajo.
s podrobnejšo izvedbo pa so odprta
številna strokovna vprašanja.
V vrstnem redu od najbolj prednostnih upnikov proti manj prednostnim
upnikom imamo naslednje vrste
upnikov:
1.Zavarovani upniki (finančna in
nefinančna zavarovanja)
2.Navadni upnik DURS (davki in
prispevki)
3.Navadni upniki delavci
4.Navadni upniki veliki dobavitelji
5.Navadni upniki mali dobavitelji
6.Navadni finančni upniki
7.Podrejeni upniki (obveznice CoCo)
8.Lastniki
Zgoraj so navedene le nekatere
najpogostnejše skupine upnikov.
V primeru stečaja se takšni upniki
poplačajo po še kar jasnem vrstnem
redu prioritet, kot jih določa ZFPPIPP.
V idealiziranem primeru se iz enotne
58
mase denarja pridobljene s prodajo
dolžnikovega premoženja poplačajo
najprej zavarovani upniki, nato se
poplačajo stroški stečaja in šele s
preostankom se poplačajo navadni
upniki, med njimi delno prednostno
delavci.
V primeru finančnega prestrukturiranja in s tem nadaljevanja poslovanja dolžnika pa stvar ni več tako
enostavna. Vir za poplačilo ni več
denar iz likvidacijske mase, ampak
pozitiven denarni tok finančno
saniranega podjetja in/ali vrednost
podjetja pri »debt zo equity swap-u«. Gledano znotraj prvega leta
je višina prostega denarnega toka
praviloma nižja od likvidacijske vrednosti, ob upoštevanju diskontirane
vrednosti bodočega denarnega toka
pa je vrednost podjetja seveda večja
od likvidacijske vrednosti. Upnike je
v skladu z načeli prioritete možno
izplačati le v ustrezno določenem
časovnem obdobju. Pri tem pa je
z vidika zagotovitve uspešnega
sprejetja finančnega prestrukturiranja
ter nadaljnjega poslovanja podjetja
treba nekatere upnike poplačati celo
100-odstotno v skladu s pogodbami,
kar je več, kot bi jim šlo v skladu z
načelom prioritete. Praviloma so
tako prednostno poplačani mali
dobavitelji in delavci. Vprašanje je,
kje so v tem primeru terjatve države
iz naslova davkov in prispevkov.
Na tem mestu pa ne gre več le za
strokovno vprašanje, temveč tudi
za politično. Mogoča je rešitev, da
krovni sporazum posega le v pravice
finančnih upnikov in se nefinančni
upniki 100-odstotno poplačajo, kar
pa je velik poseg v načelo prioritete.
Obravnavano načelo absolutne
prioritete je mnogo pomembnejše,
kot se zdi na prvi pogled. Bistvo
načela je, da ne posega v obstoječa pogodbena razmerja. Pri tem
gre za pogodbena razmerja, ki
so nastala v času, ko je bil dolžnik
solventno podjetje. Takšna pogodbena razmerja so se izvrševala in
BV 11/2013
ob zapadlosti tekoče poplačevala.
Lastniki so si izplačevali dividende.
Navedena obligacijska in korporacijska razmerja pa so v sebi vsebovala
pravila o tveganjih. Ravno ta pravila
o tveganjih se po nastopu insolventnosti spremenijo v pravila absolutne
prioritete. Pri tem je pomembno, da v
času sklepanja pogodb pogodbene
stranke zaupajo, da bodo v primeru
nastanka insolventnosti tveganja, kot
so vgrajena v pogodbe, realizirana
skladno z načeli prioritete. Takšno
zaupanje pomembno znižuje stroške
financiranja delujočih podjetij in tako
povečuje konkurenčnost nacionalne
ekonomije. In nasprotno, dvom v
spoštovanje načela absolutne prioritete v okviru delujočega podjetja
povzroča deformacije, ki se kažejo
v neobičajnih načinih financiranja.
V slovenskih razmerah je to v praksi
pomenilo, da so v nasprotju z
evropsko prakso skoraj vse banke,
kot finančni kreditodajalci, zahtevale
zavarovanje s hipoteko na nepremičnini, ker jim je edino to zagotavljalo
jasno določeno prioriteto oziroma
zavarovanje pred tveganji.
Ob pripravi nove insolvenčne
zakonodaje je nujno treba pripraviti
jasen, razumljiv in razumen sistem
absolutnih prioritet, ki bo utemeljen
na spoštovanju pogodbenih določil
ter ustrezno modificiran glede na
ekonomsko nujnost zagotovitve
nadaljnjega poslovanja finančno
prestrukturiranega dolžnika. Glede
obojega navedenega pa bo treba
najti tudi ustrezno politično soglasje,
kajti zainteresirane institucije predstavljajo različne skupine upnikov (npr.
finančni in nefinančni upniki), zato
so njihovi interesi nasprotni. Pri tem
je pomembno, da potrebno politično
soglasje ne bo preveč deformiralo
sistema. Vsaj delavci in mali dobavitelji bi se morali zavedati, da so
v pogledu prioritet v najslabšem
položaju, vendar pa je ravno njihov
interes glede nadaljnjega poslovanja
dolžnika in s tem možnosti novih poBV 11/2013
slov s finančno saniranim dolžnikom
močnejši od interesa po čim večjem
poplačilu iz naslova starih poslov,
vendar z dvomom nadaljnjega poslovanja dolžnika.
• Poseg v pravice zavarovanih
upnikov.
Slovenska posebnost je, da so
praviloma vsi finančni upniki hkrati
tudi zavarovani upniki. Zlasti zaradi
sistemske nelikvidnosti ob nastopu
insolventnosti likvidacijska masa ne
zadošča niti za poplačilo zavarovanih upnikov. To pomeni, da je v številnih primerih za potrebe vzdržnega
načrta finančnega prestrukturiranja
Zagotovljena
mora biti
prednost
poplačila
zavarovanih
terjatev pred
drugimi
terjatvami.
dolžnika treba najti razumen način,
kako poseči v pravice zavarovanih
upnikov. Pri tem bo treba razlikovati
med upniki s finančnimi zavarovanji
in upniki z nefinančnimi zavarovanji.
Osnutek ZSR zaenkrat predvideva le
obveznost glasovanja zavarovanih
upnikov v posebnem razredu, pri
čemer je odločitev v takšnem razredu
sprejeta s 75-odstotno večino nominalne vrednosti terjatev. Vsebina
takšne odločitve pa še ni jasna. Ena
od možnosti je, da se oblikuje poseben pool zavarovanj in določi delež
posameznega zavarovanega upnika
59
v tem poolu.
• Cenilci in upravitelj
Vsi primerljivi postopki zunajsodnih
prestrukturiranj v drugih državah
predvidevajo posebno vlogo administratorja. Osnutek ZSR namenja
funkcijo administratorja stečajnim
upraviteljem, imenovanim na podlagi
določb ZFPPIPP. Vprašanje je, ali
je to najboljša rešitev, zlasti ker je v
postopku finančnega prestrukturiranja potreben finančni svetovalec, kar
upravitelj ni. Osnutek ZSR dopušča
to vprašanje pogodbeni svobodi
upnikov in dolžnika.
Osnutek ZSR prav tako ne predvideva obveznega imenovanja cenilca. V
okviru pogodbene svobode si lahko
ustreznega izvedenca najame vsak
upnik za potrebe lastnega odločanja
o načinu glasovanja glede potrditve
krovnega sporazuma ali pa tudi dolžnik, da si zagotovi verodostojnost
predlogov. Tudi zahtevana vsebina
krovnega sporazuma je v osnutku
ZSR navedena le na ravni načel,
konkretizacija pa je prepuščena
pogodbeni svobodi. Vprašanje je, če
vse navedeno zadošča za odločanje sodišča glede sodne potrditve
krovnega sporazuma. Menim, da
bi bilo treba glede navedenega
vprašanja zunaj določb zakona
pripraviti posebne smernice oziroma
uzance, ki bi jih pri pripravi krovnega sporazuma upoštevali pogajalci
in potem tudi upravitelj pri pripravi
mnenja. Tako izdelan krovni sporazum in priloženo mnenje upravitelja
bi morala zadoščati za učinkovito
sodno odločanje o potrditvi krovnega sporazuma. Predpostavka za
izdelavo smernic bi moral biti jasen
odgovor na vprašanje podrobnosti
glede izvajanja načela absolutne
prioritete in načina posega v pravice
zavarovanih upnikov.
• Sodna potrditev
Osnutek ZSR predvideva potrditev
predhodno sklenjenega krovnega
sporazuma s strani sodišča. Posto-
pek sodne potrditve je smiselno
podoben načinu odločanja sodišča
v postopkih o predlogu za začasno
odredbo. Navedeno pomeni, da
sodišče vloženi predlog za potrditev
javno objavi s pozivom upnikom, da
v osemdnevnem roku vložijo odgovor na predlog. V okviru trditvenih
podlag iz predloga za potrditev in
morebitnega odgovora na predlog
sodišče po načelu verjetnosti krovni
sporazum potrdi in ta začne s pravnomočnostjo veljati glede izvedbe
finančnega prestrukturiranja. Vsak
upnik, ki je vložil odgovor, lahko
naknadno vloži tožbo, s katero
zahteva, da krovni sporazum nanj
nima pravnega učinka. V pravdi, ki
sledi vloženi tožbi, odloča sodišče o
spornih vprašanjih po načelu gotovosti, kar lahko vključuje tudi izvajanje
dokazov z izvedenci.
• Razmerje do ZFPPIPP
Osnutek ZSR uvaja hiter in enostaven
postopek finančnega prestrukturiranja dolžnika ob bistvenem načelu,
da večina lahko preglasuje manjšino
in potem sprejeta odločitev velja tudi
za tistega upnika, ki je glasoval proti.
Pri tem je seveda treba upoštevati načelo poštenega in enakega
obravnavanja upnikov in načelo,
da vsi dobijo več, kot pa bi dobili v
stečaju. Če takšnega dogovora ni
mogoče doseči, lahko vsak upnik
ali dolžnik zahteva uvedbo insolvenčnega postopka na podlagi
določb ZFPPIPP. Zato osnutek ZSR ne
nadomešča določb ZFPPIPP, ampak
ponuja dodatno, bolj fleksibilno,
hitrejšo pot do normalno delujočega
podjetja. Glede na to hkrati s sprejemanjem osnutka ZSR ni nujno treba
novelirati še ZFPPIPP. Če pa bi do
novele ZFPPIPP v tej fazi kljub temu
prišlo, potem bi bilo edino smiselno
v ZFPPIPP vnesti naslednje bistvene
spremembe:
◦◦ Razmisliti o uvedbi enotnega
sistema. To pomeni, da se v
primeru predloga za začetek
prisilne poravnave ali v primeru
predloga za stečaj začne isti
insolvenčni postopek z vsemi
pravnimi posledicami, z edino
razliko, da v primeru predloga
za prisilno poravnavo dolžnik
nadaljuje poslovanje.
◦◦ Korporacijske pravice lastnikov
se po reorganizaciji ohranijo v
višini, ki predstavlja realni preostanek vrednosti podjetja pred
reorganizacijo. Če se ugotovi,
da ta obstaja, lahko nekdanji
lastniki, kot podrejeni upniki,
pridobijo/ohranijo proporcionalno ustrezen delež v osnovnem
kapitalu dolžnika.
◦◦ Če je predlagana prisilna poravnava, upravitelj lahko pooblasti
staro upravo za nadaljnje delo
pod njegovim nadzorom.
◦◦ V postopku prisilne poravnave
je treba uvesti načelo absolutne
prioritete.
◦◦ Načrt finančnega prestrukturiranja pripravi upravitelj, pri tem mu
stara uprava lahko pomaga.
7. Pričakovani rezultati
sprejetja ZSR
Osnutek ZSR ponuja orodje za razdolžitev gospodarstva, njegova uporaba pa je zlasti odvisna od načina
izvedbe sanacije bank. Če bodo
banke to orodje uporabljale, lahko
pričakujemo hitro finančno prestrukturiranje slovenskega gospodarstva.
Posledično bo sproščeni denarni tok
pri dolžniku zmanjšal potrebe po
bančnem financiranju obratnega
kapitala. Šele tako bo postavljen
temelj za kasnejšo poslovno sanacijo
slovenskega gospodarstva, ki je prvi
pogoj za nove investicije in rast ter
na koncu za izstop bank iz lastništva
podjetij, v katerega bodo vstopile,
ne da bi si to zares želele.
60
8. Posledica ZSR za
bančni sistem
Predlagana razdolžitev gospodarstva je nujno povezana z vprašanjem
sanacije bank. Zaenkrat je predvidena sanacija bank po načelu bail
out. Zelo poenostavljeno to pomeni,
da bodo banke v zameno za slabo
aktivo prejele obveznice Republike
Slovenije, ki jih bodo nato pri ECB
zastavile za evre. Predvidevam, da
bo ECB za likvidnostne potrebe bank
odkupovala obveznice Republike
Slovenije izdane zaradi sanacije
bank le v primeru, če bo verjela v
solventnost izdajatelja obveznic, v
to pa bo verjela le, če proračun ne
bo več v prevelikem primanjkljaju
oziroma bo mogoče potreben celo
presežek. Povsem možno je, da se
poenostavljeno opisani model ne bo
izšel.
V nasprotnem primeru se lahko zgodi prestrukturiranje bank po načelu
bail in, kar pa pomeni bolj ali manj
kontroliran stečaj bank z obsežnim
hair cut-om. Če se to zgodi, se bodo
tudi na ravni bank odprla ključna
vprašanja absolutne prioritete, ki
zaenkrat niso ustrezno razrešena
v sistemu bančništva. S tem v zvezi
je že v pripravi novela zakona o
bančništvu, ki ureja položaj podrejenih terjatev do bank za primer
sanacije banke. Takšen razplet v
bankah pa bi nedvomno povzročil
nov val stečajev v realnem sektorju
in pravočasna ter smiselna ureditev
sistemske razdolžitve bi postala še
bolj pomembna.
Zakon o finančnem poslovanju podjetij in
postopkih zaradi insolventnosti in prisilnem
prenehanju, Uradni list RS, 31. 12. 2007.
Osnutek Zakona o sistemski razdolžitvi,
delovna gradiva.
BV 11/2013
UDK 336.71:346.62(497.4)
Bančna zakonodaja in ukrepi
za prestrukturiranje bank
Mojca Trstenjak*
BANKING LEGISLATION
AND BANK
REHABILITATION
MEASURES
In the last year, the
Banking act has been
enhanced in order to
introduce more efficient
supervisory tools, tailored
to meet the requirements
for efficient restructuring
of credit institutions as
an alternative to regular
winding down procedures,
such as insolvency or
administrative liquidation.
The financial stability has
been put forward as a
prevailing principle of
bank’s supervision and,
if threatened, triggers
the use of extraordinary
supervisory tools (such
as special administration,
purchase and assumption
transactions, selling
bank’s shares, increase
of bank’s capital, bail-in
of equity and qualified
liabilities), to implement
bank restructuring
measures and to achieve
the long term viability
of the bank or allow for
orderly wind-down of nonviable institution. When
designing the supervisory
toolbox to comply with
the restructuring purposes,
the state aid rules have
been taken into account
in order to establish a
framework that will allow
a state participation in the
restructuring process in
compliance with state aid
rules.
JEL G18 G21 G28
BV 11/2013
D
anes govorimo o prestrukturiranju bank oziroma bančnega sistema v kontekstu bančne in širše gospodarske
krize, ki je sooblikovala vzroke za nastanek težav v
bankah in je po drugi strani tudi pomemben dejavnik pri
oblikovanju rešitev in ukrepov prestrukturiranja, ki bodo v danih
razmerah zagotovili ponovno vzpostavitev uspešnega poslovanja
bank in posredno tudi delovanje celotnega bančnega sistema v svoji
osnovni funkciji – podpori gospodarstvu.
1. Pomen prestrukturiranja bank
Poenostavljeno lahko povzamemo, da prestrukturiranje bank
vključuje ukrepe (notranje) reorganizacije poslovanja in prilagoditve poslovnega modela glede na spremenjene razmere na trgu. Za
učinkovito prestrukturiranje banke je vsekakor nujno pravočasno
prepoznavanje težav in načrtovanje ustreznih ukrepov za njihovo
odpravljanje, glede na pravne in dejanske možnosti, ki so na voljo.
Uspešno reševanje nastalih težav v okviru prestrukturiranja banke
nikakor ni odvisno od osamljenih dejavnikov, ampak od prepletenosti in součinkovanja različnih zunanjih in notranjih dejavnikov.
Po eni strani gre za fleksibilnost in odzivnost notranje poslovne in
upravljalske (vključno z lastniško) strukture, po drugi strani je reševanje teh težav odvisno tudi od splošnega gospodarskega položaja.
* Mojca Trstenjak, univ. dipl. prav., zaposlena v Banki Slovenije kot specialist pravni svetovalec banke. Stališča, izražena
v tem članku, ne predstavljajo stališč institucije, v kateri je avtorica zaposlena.
61
Uspešno reševanje težav je odvisno tudi od usklajenosti področnih
predpisov s cilji prestrukturiranja
(npr. splošna insolvenčna zakonodaja, prevzemna zakonodaja pa tudi
uveljavljanje teh predpisov, zlasti
glede finančne discipline in poslovne
etike), pa tudi od učinkovitosti delovanja državnih institucij in nadzornih
organov pri izvajanju teh predpisov,
če navedemo le nekaj od pomembnejših dejavnikov.
Ko zaradi težav v bankah nastajajo motnje v delovanju bančnega
sistema kot celote, je usklajenost
navedenih dejavnikov še toliko
pomembnejša. Vzpostavitev učinkovitega okvira za prestrukturiranje bank
je v tem primeru nujna za zagotavljanje pravilnega delovanja bančnega
sistema kot celote in za zagotavljanje
stabilnosti finančnega sistema. Zaradi učinkov finančne krize in pomanjkanja potrebnih finančnih sredstev
splošni pravni okvir, ki določa okvire
in pogoje (instrumentarij) za prestrukturiranje gospodarskih subjektov,
ob predpostavkah delujočega trga
(kot so bile podane pred nastankom
krize), ne ustreza več potrebam in
ciljem (učinkovitega) prestrukturiranja
bank. Zaradi sistemskih razsežnosti
prestrukturiranja bank se posamični
(zasebni) interesi oziroma cilji umikajo javnemu interesu s ciljem zagotavljanja stabilnosti finančnega sistema.
V zadnjih letih so številne države, ki
so se soočale s podobnimi (sistemskimi) težavami v delovanju bančnega
oziroma finančnega sistema, sprejele
ukrepe, ki posredno ali neposredno
usmerjajo oziroma vzpodbujajo
procese prestrukturiranja bank ter
sooblikujejo novo podobo bančnega
sistema v državi. Ukrepi za doseganje tega cilja so bili različni, odvisni
od konkretnih vzrokov za nastanek
krize, od družbenopolitičnega in
pravnega okvira, širšega gospodarskega okolja in nenazadnje tudi od
uveljavljenih nadzorniških praks. Tudi
v Sloveniji je prodrlo spoznanje, da
je prestrukturiranje bank v okviru
sanacije bančnega sistema proces,
ki presega okvire neposrednega
nadzora nad bankami in notranjega
prestrukturiranja poslovnega modela.
Spremembe prevzemne zakonodaje,
spremembe postopkov unovčevanja
zavarovanj na nepremičninah (notarska prodaja), napovedana reforma
insolvenčne zakonodaje s poudarkom na prestrukturiranju dolžnikov,
aktivne politike države na področju
prestrukturiranja gospodarstva in
državne pomoči gospodarstvu ter
nenazadnje tudi uveljavitev okvira za
sanacijo bank so dejavniki, ki bodo
v prihodnjem obdobju odločilno
Viri financiranja
so v finančni
krizi omejeni.
vplivali na proces prestrukturiranja
bank v Sloveniji.
V tem prispevku se omejujemo na
predstavitev ukrepov, ki jih v zvezi
s prestrukturiranjem bank v okviru
nadzora in sanacije bank na podlagi
zakona o bančništvu izreka Banka
Slovenije. Pri tem je že uvodoma nujno pojasnilo, da so ukrepi nadzora
kot (prisilni) instrument za prestrukturiranje banke utemeljeni šele, ko
ciljev prestrukturiranja ni mogoče
zagotoviti z drugimi (zasebnimi,
prostovoljnimi) rešitvami, hkrati pa
je prestrukturiranje banke oziroma
razrešitev njenih težav nujna za ohranjanje stabilnosti banke in zavarovanje deponentov oziroma v končni
posledici za ohranitev stabilnosti
bančnega oziroma (širšega) finančnega sistema.
62
2. Prestrukturiranje bank
kot cilj nadzora
Banka Slovenije je v zadnjem letu
s spremembami zakonodaje na
področju nadzora in sanacije bank
pridobila pomembne nove pristojnosti, ki omogočajo oziroma zahtevajo
njeno aktivno vlogo pri načrtovanju
in izvajanju ukrepov prestrukturiranja
v posameznih bankah.
Z novelo zakona o bančništvu, ki je
bila sprejeta decembra 2012
(ZBan-1J),1 je bil izveden prvi del
reforme na področju nadzora nad
bankami, s katero se zagotavljanje
stabilnosti finančnega sistema jasno
opredeli kot eden od najpomembnejših ciljev nadzora, pristojnosti
Banke Slovenije pri izvajanju nadzora pa se razširijo z novimi ukrepi in
pooblastili pri načrtovanju in izvajanju prestrukturiranja banke tako, da
se ohranja stabilnosti finančnega sistema. Drugi del reforme na področju
ukrepov nadzora bo novela ZBan-1L,2 ki bo z jasno opredelitvijo ciljev
izrednih ukrepov še dodatno utrdila
razumevanje izrednih ukrepov v
vlogi prestrukturiranja banke zaradi
ohranjanja stabilnosti finančnega
sistema. V predlogu novele ZBan-1L
se namreč kot cilj izrednih ukrepov
izrecno opredeljuje reorganizacija
banke, tako da se z ukrepi prestrukturiranja (reorganizacije) bodisi
ponovno vzpostavijo pogoji za dolgoročno uspešno poslovanje banke
bodisi da se izvedejo postopki za
urejeno (postopno, nadzorovano)
prenehanje banke, ki vključuje delno
ali popolno prenehanje poslovanja.3
Izredni ukrepi se tako uveljavljajo
1
Uradni list RS, št. 105/2012.
Predlog zakona o spremembah in dopolnitvah
zakona o bančništvu je Vlada RS potrdila na seji
dne 10. 10. 2013.
3
V zvezi s tem je pomembno sporočilo predloga
novele, da je postopno prenehanje banke utemeljeno predvsem takrat, ko je zaradi nemotenega
delovanja sistema nujno, da se ohranjajo določene
dejavnosti banke v težavah in se v okviru prestrukturiranja prenesejo na druge izvajalce bodisi
postopoma ukinjajo, brez pomembnejših učinkov na
delovanje sistema kot celote.
2
BV 11/2013
kot alternativa oziroma dopolnitev rednih postopkov prenehanja
banke (prisilna poravnava oziroma
stečaj), ki se uporabijo z namenom,
da se odvrnejo negativni učinki
prenehanja banke. Pri tem pa je v
vsakem posameznem primeru treba
presoditi, ali je uporaba tega okvira
upravičena glede na učinke, ki bi jih
redno prenehanje banke oziroma
stečaj banke lahko povzročila glede
na vsakokratne zunanje ter notranje
dejavnike stabilnosti finančnega
sistema.
Prestrukturiranje banke na način,
da se ohrani ali ponovno vzpostavi
dolgoročno uspešno poslovanje
banke, je predvsem odgovornost
banke, njenega menedžmenta in
lastnikov. Če ukrepi za vzpostavitev
uspešnega poslovanja banke zaradi
notranjih ali zunanjih dejavnikov
niso uspešni in banka posledično
ne zagotavlja več pogojev za
ohranitev dovoljenja za opravljanje
bančnih storitev, bi bilo treba zoper
banko uvesti ustrezne postopke
za prenehanje banke – odvzem
dovoljenja za opravljanje bančnih
storitev ter prisilna likvidacija oziroma stečaj banke. Stečaj banke kot
oblika prenehanja v finančni krizi
zaradi učinkov na druge subjekte
finančnega trga in na širše gospodarstvo nikakor ni ustrezna oblika
prenehanja banke.4 Ukrepi nadzora
za prestrukturiranje bank se tako
uveljavljajo z namenom, da se
odvrnejo morebitni negativni učinki
uvedbe stečaja banke tako, da se
zagotovi ohranitev ključnih funkcij in
dejavnosti banke, ohranja zaupanje
uporabnikov in posledično ohranja
stabilnost finančnega sistema.5
Stabilnost finančnega sistema
in merila, po katerih se ocenjuje
njegova ogroženost, so opredeljena
v zakonu o bančništvu,6 s tem pa
je zakon zagotavljanje stabilnosti
finančnega sistema z ukrepi nadzora
jasno opredelil kot osrednje načelo
izvajanja nadzora nad bankami.
BV 11/2013
Kot je poudarjeno že uvodoma, je
vloga Banke Slovenije v procesu
prestrukturiranja oziroma stopnja
omejevanja upravičenj obstoječih
lastnikov pri upravljanju in prestrukturiranju banke s prisilnimi ukrepi nadzora odvisna tako od stopnje tveganj
v banki7 kot tudi od sposobnosti in
pripravljenosti lastnikov, da zagotovijo pogoje za učinkovito prestrukturiranje banke.8 Praviloma je slednje
vedno povezano z vprašanjem
finančnih zmožnosti lastnikov, da
banki zagotovijo potrebna sredstva
za povečanje osnovnega kapitala,
saj so viri financiranja v finančni
krizi omejeni, naraščajoče težave
pa zahtevajo takojšnje ukrepanje z
vplačilom dodatnega kapitala, da se
zagotovi zahtevana kapitalska ustreznost in prepreči propad banke.
Z novelo ZBan-1J so se določile
konkretne pristojnosti Banke Sloveni-
je pri izvajanju ukrepov za prestrukturiranje banke, vključno z izrecno
določenimi pristojnostmi, da upravi
banki izda konkretna navodila glede
oblikovanja predloga skupščinskih
sklepov v zvezi s povečanjem osnovnega kapitala banke. Zakon zaradi
lažjega sprejemanja odločitev, ki so
potrebne za povečanje osnovnega
kapitala, določa veljavnost odločitev, ki so sicer sprejete na nižjo
večino, kot bi bila zahtevana po
splošnih prepisih, odpravljena pa so
tudi nekatera druga varovala, ki so
sicer uveljavljena zaradi varovanja
manjšinskih delničarjev (glede sklica
skupščine od izpodbijanja skupščinskih sklepov). S tem zakon v primeru
prestrukturiranja banke omejuje
pravice delničarjev, ki niso sposobni
ali pripravljeni podpreti procesov
prestrukturiranja banke pri odločanju
o ukrepih prestrukturiranja (povečanje osnovnega kapitala), pri čemer
so te omejitve utemeljene z dejstvom,
da z dosedanjimi ukrepi delničarji
oziroma banka ni uspela odpraviti
nastalih težav in izvesti ukrepov za
prestrukturiranje banke. Kot pomembna vzpodbuda procesom prestrukturiranja s povečanjem osnovnega
kapitala banke so v zakonu določene tudi oprostitve glede obvezne
prevzemne ponudbe, če bi posamezni investitor zaradi sodelovanja
pri povečanju osnovnega kapitala,
kadar je povečanje posledica zahtev
Banke Slovenije, pridobil delež nad
prevzemnim pragom, kot ga določa
4
Odvzem dovoljenja banki bi namreč pomenil
takojšnjo izključitev banke iz vseh pomembnih
finančnih infrastruktur (kreditne linije, plačilni in
poravnalni sistemi, ...), zaradi česar banka dejansko
ne bi bila več sposobna servisirati uporabnikov,
posledično pa bi se njeno premoženje znatno
razvrednotilo ter pripeljalo do insolventnosti
banke. Učinki insolventnosti banke na druge
finančne subjekte (zaradi prepletenosti poslovanja,
obveznosti izplačila zajamčenih vlog) oziroma na
širše gospodarstvo (zaradi ustavitve poslovanja,
zamrznitve nezajamčenih vlog) bi torej v vseh
negativnih razsežnostih nastopili takoj. O tem vidiku
tudi Mathias Dewatripont and Xavier Freixas v »The
Crisis Aftermath: New Regulatory Paradigms«.
5
Temeljna načela učinkovitega mehanizma
reševanja podrobneje obravnava Financial Stability
Board v dokumentu »Key Attributes of Effective
Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions«.
6
Glej 254. člen zakona. Določba je bila
uveljavljena z novelo ZBan-1J.
7
V prvem odstavku 253.a člena ZBan-1 je
kot eden od razlogov, ki mora biti izpolnjen za
izdajo izrednega ukrepa, ugotovljeno povečano
tveganje v banki. Takšno tveganje je glede na drugi
odstavek istega člena podano zlasti v primeru, če
banka ne izpolnjuje ali v naslednji šestih mesecih
verjetno ne bo zagotavljala minimalnega kapitala
ali ustreznega likvidnostnega položaja in so ali
verjetno bodo s tem podani pogoji za odvzem
dovoljenja za opravljanje bančnih storitev.
8
Kot drugi razlog za izdajo izrednega ukrepa, ki
mora biti izpolnjen hkrati s pogojem povečanega
tveganja, je tudi dejstvo, da banka z drugimi
ukrepi ni uspela odpraviti tveganj in torej ni izvedla
potrebnih ukrepov za prestrukturiranje banke.
Stabilnost finančnega sistema je dobrina v javnem interesu, ki se varuje
(tudi) z ukrepi nadzora, ki jih s ciljem
prestrukturiranja banke lahko izreče
Banka Slovenije in tako prevzame
upravljanje banke.
Ogrožanje stabilnosti finančnega
sistema se za namene izrednih
ukrepov torej presoja za katero koli
banko, glede na konkretne okoliščine
povezane z banko ter okoljem, v
katerem deluje.
3. Ukrepi nadzora za
prestrukturiranje bank
63
zakon o prevzemih.
Navedeni ukrepi so v zakonu urejeni
kot dodatni ukrepi nadzora, ki jih
Banka Slovenije izreče banki zaradi
ugotovljenih kršitev glede obvladovanja tveganj. Ob upoštevanju načela
sorazmernosti ukrepov nadzora, ki
s svojimi učinki posegajo v položaj
delničarjev, je poseg upravičen
zlasti, če stopnja tveganja v banki
ogroža stabilno poslovanje banke.
Z dodatnimi ukrepi nadzora lahko
Banka Slovenije daje nadaljnja navodila upravi banke glede načrtovanja
ukrepov prestrukturiranja, pri čemer
je poglavitni cilj takšnega usmerjanja, da banka čim bolj učinkovito
zmanjša tveganja in zagotovi pogoje
za varno in zanesljivo poslovanje
(za zavarovanje vlagateljev).
V primeru, ko niti z dodatnimi ukrepi
ni mogoče odpraviti tveganja in
izpeljati ukrepov za prestrukturiranje
banke, se v primeru povečanega
tveganja, ko banka ne izpolnjuje
več minimalnih pogojev za ohranitev
dovoljenja za opravljanje bančnih
storitev, banki lahko izrečejo izredni
ukrepi, kjer upravljanje banke prevzame Banka Slovenije.9 Z novelo
ZBan-1J je reforma ukrepov nadzora
v pomembnem delu temeljila prav na
preoblikovanju in dopolnitvi izrednih
ukrepov, tako da ti ukrepi Banki
Slovenije omogočajo, da odvrne
negativne učinke propada (stečaja)
banke in kot skrajni ukrep prevzame
upravljanje banke z namenom, da
izvede potrebne ukrepe za ohranitev
stabilnosti finančnega sistema.
ZBan-1J je tako uredil štiri izredne
ukrepe: (1) imenovanje izredne
uprave, (2) prodajo delnic banke
obstoječih delničarjev novemu investitorju, (3) povečanje osnovnega
kapitala banke z vložkom novega
investitorja in (4) prenos premoženja banke na prevzemno družbo. Z
novelo ZBan-1L pa bo uveljavljen
še dodaten izredni ukrep, in sicer
(5) ukrep prenehanja in konverzije
kvalificiranih obveznosti.
Ko so izpolnjeni pogoji za uporabo izrednih ukrepov, je odločitev
o izdaji posameznega ukrepa
oziroma o kombinaciji različnih
ukrepov predmet presoje Banke
Slovenije, ki bo morala za dosego
ciljev prestrukturiranja upoštevati
tako notranje dejavnike (vzroke za
nastanek povečanega tveganja v
banki) kot tudi zunanje dejavnike,
ki vplivajo na uspešno izvedbo prestrukturiranja (ponovno vzpostavitev
poslovanja banke oziroma postopno prenehanje banke).
Že pri opredelitvi ciljev prestrukturiranja kot tudi pri izbiri določenih
Izredna uprava
lahko predlaga
ukrepe za
postopno
prenehanje
banke.
ukrepov mora biti odločitev utemeljena z analizo ekonomske upravičenosti, ki potrjuje bodisi ugotovitev,
da bo banka z določenimi ukrepi
prestrukturiranja sposobna zagotoviti dolgoročno uspešno (dobičkonosno) poslovanje, bodisi ugotovitev, da tega cilja v razumnem času
ni mogoče doseči. Ob tem je za
odločitev pomembna tudi pripravljenost morebitnih investitorjev
oziroma prevzemnikov, da se pod
določenimi pogoji vključijo v proces
prestrukturiranja – bodisi država
prek mehanizmov državnih pomoči
bodisi zasebni investitorji, ki vstopijo
v banko s svežim kapitalom oziroma
prevzamejo del poslovanja banke.
Zakon sicer določa okvire za uporabo posameznih izrednih ukrepov,
64
vendar pa hkrati določa široko diskrecijo Banke Slovenije, da izdela
načrt prestrukturiranja z izrednimi
ukrepi tako, da bodo ukrepi kar
najbolj zagotavljali uresničitev ciljev
prestrukturiranja in bodo prilagojeni
konkretnim okoliščinam, ki bodo
vplivale na uspešnost celotnega
procesa.
V zvezi z ukrepom imenovanja
izredne uprave v banki bo novela
ZBan-1L predvsem jasneje opredelila vlogo izredne uprave pri
načrtovanju in pri izvajanju prestrukturiranja banke. Predlog novele tako
izrecno določa, da izredna uprava
pripravi oceno glede možnosti,
da se v banki v razumnem roku
vzpostavijo razmere za uspešno
poslovanje in predlaga ustrezne
ukrepe prestrukturiranja, vključno s
predlogom in oceno učinkov drugih
izrednih ukrepov, npr. prenehanja in
konverzije kvalificiranih obveznosti,
prenosa premoženja in obveznosti
banke, povečanja osnovnega kapitala banke in prodaje delnic banke.
Če izredna uprava oceni, da ukrepi
za vzpostavitev dolgoročno uspešnega poslovanja v banki ne bodo
uspešni ali jih ne bo mogoče izvesti
v razumnem roku, predlaga ukrepe
za postopno prenehanje banke,
vključno z ukrepi za postopno
unovčitev premoženja banke in poplačilo upnikov banke. Podlaga za
delo izredne uprave je torej načrt
reorganizacije, ki ga potrdi Banka
Slovenije glede na cilje prestrukturiranja v konkretnem primeru.
Pomembna novost v zakonu je vsekakor ukrep prenosa premoženja in
obveznosti banke na prevzemnika.
Predmet prenosa je lahko katero
koli premoženje oziroma obveznosti banke, razen kvalificiranih
obveznosti, ki predstavljajo osnovni
9
Na podlagi 255.a člena ZBan-1 z vročitvijo
odločbe o izrednih ukrepih prenehajo pooblastila
in pristojnosti skupščini in nadzornemu svetu banke,
pristojnosti skupščine in nadzornega sveta banke
izvaja Banka Slovenije.
BV 11/2013
kapital banke, in obveznosti banke
do upnikov iz naslova kapitalskih
instrumentov in drugih podrejenih
obveznosti banke. S tem ukrepom
se lahko na prevzemnika prenesejo bodisi določene perspektivne
skupine premoženja in obveznosti,
ki so vezane na opravljanje določene dejavnosti banke, bodisi se iz
banke izloči problematično premoženje oziroma obveznosti tako, da
se banka razbremeni tveganj in se
(ob drugih dejavnikih) zagotovijo
razmere za ponovno uspešno poslovanje. Prenos premoženja banke v
okviru izrednega ukrepa se opravi
odplačno tako, da prevzemnik zagotovi ustrezno nadomestilo bodisi
v denarju, z vrednostnimi papirji
prevzemnika ali s prevzemom obveznosti banke v sorazmerni višini
glede na prevzeto premoženje. Ker
se z ukrepom prenosa premoženja
in obveznosti (avtoritativno) neizogibno posega tudi v pogodbena
razmerja banke s tretjimi osebami
(tako upniki kot dolžniki), določa
zakon tudi učinke takšnega prenosa
za tretje osebe. Ker je namen ukrepa, da premoženje, ki se prenaša,
tudi po prenosu opravlja svojo
funkcijo in tako ohranja vrednost
za prevzemnika, zakon za namene
takšnega prenosa poenostavlja
nekatera (splošna) pravila pogodbenega prava v zvezi s prenosom
premoženja oziroma obveznosti in
hkrati omejuje pravice tretjih oseb,
da bi zaradi prenosa premoženja
na prevzemnika lahko odpovedale
že sklenjene pogodbe oziroma uveljavljale morebitne kršitve pogodbe
v razmerju do banke.
Prevzemnik premoženja na podlagi
izrednega ukrepa je lahko kateri
koli subjekt, ki nastopa na trgu in
lahko v skladu s predpisi opravlja
dejavnost, s katero je povezano
premoženje. Premoženje oziroma
obveznosti so glede na ureditev v
ZBan-1 lahko z izrednim ukrepom
prenesene tudi na (državno) slabo
BV 11/2013
banko oziroma posebno namensko družbo, ki jo ustanovi banka
z izločitvijo neperspektivnega ali
problematičnega premoženja banke. Pri tem zakon ne ureja izrecno
niti prenosa na slabo banko niti na
posebno namensko družbo, ampak
se ta vprašanja z vidika možnih
učinkov na javne finance rešujejo v
okviru zakona o ukrepih za zagotavljanje stabilnosti bank.
Kot pomembno novost med izrednimi ukrepi je v zvezi s prestrukturiranjem banke vsekakor treba omeniti
tudi ukrep prenehanja in konverzije
kvalificiranih obveznosti (bail-in), ki
se bo uveljavil z novelo ZBan-1L.
Bail-in je kot instrument za uporabo
zasebnih sredstev pri prestrukturiranju in sanaciji bank že uveljavljen v
nekaterih državah EU – države so
za uveljavitev teh mehanizmov že
spremenile svojo nacionalno zakonodajo, predvsem zaradi potrebe,
da se v okviru ukrepov sanacije
bank z državno pomočjo zmanjšajo
zahteve po dodatnem kapitalu za
potrebe pokrivanja izgub z dokapitalizacijo bank in tako razbremenijo
javne finance.
Pomen ukrepa prenehanja in
konverzije kvalificiranih obveznosti
v zvezi z reševanjem bank je v zadnjih letih sprožil številne razprave
v EU, v katerih so bile poudarjene
tako prednosti kot slabosti ukrepa z
vidika učinkov na položaj upnikov
kot tudi na delovanje finančnih trgov
(zaradi zmanjšanega zanimanja
investitorjev, da bi sredstva nalagali v instrumente, ki bi lahko bili v
procesu reševanja banke predmet
prenehanja oziroma konverzije).
Ugotovimo lahko, da so bili v ome-
njenih razpravah očitno uspešnejši
zagovorniki uporabe tega ukrepa,
saj je prenehanje oziroma konverzija predvidena kot eden od ukrepov
za reševanje bank tudi v predlogu
direktive,10 ki naj bi bila sprejeta
konec tega leta.
Podpora uporabi ukrepa prenehanja in konverzije se je uveljavljala
tudi v praksi nekaterih držav članic,
ki so torej že pred sprejetjem direktive v svojih nacionalnih zakonodajah uredile tudi ukrepe prisilnega
prenehanja oziroma konverzije
določenih obveznosti banke do
upnikov z namenom, da se stroški
reševanja banke vsaj delno razporedijo na zasebne investitorje in se
tako razbremeni proračun.
V zadnjem obdobju se je v okviru
reševanja bank ukrep prenehanja in
konverzije že uveljavil kot učinkovit ukrep, ki nadomešča oziroma
dopolnjuje druge (javne) vire
financiranja reševanja bank. Kot
posledico tega dejstva je evropska komisija temu novemu trendu
prilagodila tudi pravila, po katerih
se presoja dopustnost državnih
pomoči za sanacijo bank.11 Tako je
evropska komisija kot obvezen element državne pomoči določila, da
morajo delničarji banke in investitorji, ki so vlagali sredstva v tvegane
instrumente banke, maksimalno
prispevati k pokrivanju izgub banke
in k pokrivanju stroškov za ponovno
vzpostavitev kapitalske ustreznosti
banke. Prenehanje oziroma konverzija kvalificiranih obveznosti v
delnice banke je torej nujna, preden
se uporabijo javna sredstva za
sanacijo bank, da bi se državna
pomoč za sanacijo posamezne
10
Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council establishing a
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit
institutions and investment firms and amending
Council Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC,
Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/
EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and 2011/35/
EC and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 - General
approach (Brussels, 15 July 2013, 2012/0150
(COD)) (http://register.consilium.europa.eu)
11
Sporočilo Komisije o uporabi pravil o državni
pomoči za podporne ukrepe v korist bank v okviru
finančne krize od 1. avgusta 2013 dalje (Uradni list
EU C 216, 30. 7. 2013, str. 0001–0015). Sporočilo
glede presoje državnih pomoči za sanacijo bank, ki
je veljalo pred 31. 7. 2013, ni eksplicitno določalo
zahteve glede uporabe bail-in v zvezi z državno
pomočjo bankam, ampak le splošno zahtevo, da se
»bremena reševanja ustrezno porazdelijo tudi na
lastnike in upnike«.
65
banke lahko štela kot dopustna. Pri
tem je komisija določila, da mora
prenehanje oziroma konverzija
vključevati najmanj osnovni kapital
banke ter tiste obveznosti banke do
upnikov, ki bi jih v primeru prenehanja (z upoštevanjem prednostnega
vrstnega reda poplačila, kot ga
določa insolvenčna zakonodaja)
banka poplačala šele po popolnem
poplačilu navadnih terjatev upnikov.
Breme reševanja banke torej najprej
trpijo delničarji banke, nato pa po
vrstnem redu tisti upniki banke, ki bi
v primeru prenehanja banke lahko
uveljavljali poplačilo svojih podrejenih terjatev do banke. Obseg
prenehanja oziroma konverzije je
v vsakem posameznem primeru
odvisen od obsega izgub v banki in
od višine dodatnega kapitala, ki ga
potrebuje banka za zagotavljanje
kapitalske ustreznosti.
Pristojnost evropske komisije, da
določa zahteve glede državne
pomoči, je utemeljena neposredno
na pogodbi o delovanju EU, saj
presoja državnih pomoči sodi v
okvir ukrepov na področju varstva
konkurence.12 Ukrepi in pristojnosti
komisije v zvezi s tem so opredeljeni
neposredno v pogodbi o EU, zato
tudi določanje smernic in zahtev glede pogojev za državne pomoči sodi
v okvir avtonomnih pristojnosti komisije, upravičenost njenih zahtev pa
se lahko izpodbija pred Sodiščem
EU v okviru posameznih postopkov v
zvezi z dodelitvijo državne pomoči.
Z uveljavitvijo novele ZBan-1L bo
Banka Slovenije v okviru načrtovanja
prestrukturiranja banke lahko uporabila tudi ukrep prenehanja in konverzije kvalificiranih obveznosti. Kot kvalificirane obveznosti se v predlogu
novele določajo poleg osnovnega
kapitala tudi tiste obveznosti banke,
ki bi se v primeru stečaja banke poplačale z vrstnim redom podrejenih
terjatev, torej šele po poplačilu vseh
navadnih terjatev upnikov.13 Ukrep
prenehanja in konverzije je tako v
predlogu novele omejen le na točno
določene kategorije obveznosti, zato
tega ukrepa ni mogoče uporabiti za
prenehanje ali konverzijo drugih (navadnih) obveznosti banke – depozitov in obveznosti banke iz naslova
izdanih (navadnih) obveznic ali
drugih finančnih instrumentov banke,
ki nimajo lastnosti podrejenih instrumentov (v primeru stečaja banke),
tako ni mogoče odpisati ali konvertirati v okviru izrednega ukrepa.
Predlog novele določa, da učinki
prenehanja oziroma konverzije za
banko in za upnike kvalificiranih
Breme reševanja
banke bodo
odslej najprej
prevzeli
delničarji banke.
obveznosti banke nastopijo z izdajo
odločbe o izrednem ukrepu. Izredni
ukrep je glede učinkov, ki jih ustvarja
za položaj upnikov kvalificiranih
obveznosti banke, primerljiv z učinki
prisilne poravnave, kot jo sicer določa splošna insolvenčna zakonodaja
in ki je bila pred novelo ZBan-1L v
primeru bank izrecno izključena.
Tudi sicer se ukrep prenehanja
oziroma konverzije izreče z upoštevanje osnovnih načel insolvenčnih
12
Poročilo komisije je izdano na podlagi 107. člena
Pogodbe o delovanju Evropske unije.
13
V novem tretjem odstavku 253.člena zakona
predlog novele ZBan-1L določa kvalificirane
obveznosti banke, ki so:
1. osnovni kapital banke (obveznosti prvega reda),
2. obveznosti do imetnikov hibridnih finančnih
instrumentov iz 4. točke prvega odstavka 133.
člena tega zakona (obveznosti drugega reda),
3. obveznosti do imetnikov finančnih instrumentov,
ki se po 134. členu tega zakona upoštevajo pri
66
postopkov, zlasti načelo, da noben
upnik kvalificirane obveznosti zaradi
prenehanja ali konverzije ne sme
utrpeti večjih izgub, kot bi jih utrpel v
primeru prenehanja banke.14 Ob tem
je ponovno treba izpostaviti dejstvo,
da so izredni ukrepi in s tem povezano prestrukturiranje dopustni le,
če se z njimi prepreči propad banke
(tj. odvrnejo razlogi za odvzem
dovoljenja banki in s tem prepreči
stečaj banke, ki bi sicer sledil kot
edina realna posledica odvzema).
V zvezi z ukrepom prenehanja in
konverzije bo tako ključna predvsem
ocena pričakovanih učinkov stečaja
banke na položaj upnikov kvalificiranih obveznosti – torej ocena višine
poplačila teh obveznosti v primeru
stečaja banke, ki bo hkrati tudi podlaga za prenehanje teh obveznosti in
podlaga za določanje vrednosti pri
konverziji teh obveznosti v delnice
banke (tj. vrednost stvarnih vložkov
pri povečanju osnovnega kapitala
banke)15.
Ukrep prenehanja in konverzije se
bo glede na nova pravila evropske
komisije o državnih pomočeh v
primeru sanacije bank predvidoma
vedno uporabil v primerih, ko bo
za prestrukturiranje banke potrebna
državna pomoč. Vendar novela
ZBan-1L uporabe tega ukrepa ne
omejuje le na primere državnih
pomoči, ampak omogoča uporabo
tudi v drugih primerih, kjer ni predvidena uporaba javnih sredstev (tj. za
namene urejenega prenehanja brez
sredstev državne pomoči).
izračunu dodatnega kapitala banke, razen če so
te obveznosti že zajete v 1. ali 2. točki (obveznosti
tretjega reda),
4. obveznosti, ki niso zajete v 1., 2. ali 3. točki, in
bi se v primeru stečajnega postopka nad banko
poplačale po poplačilu navadnih terjatev do banke
(obveznosti četrtega reda).
14
Glej peti odstavek 261.a člena predloga novele
ZBan-1L.
15
V zvezi s tem glej 261.b in 261.d člena predloga
novele ZBan-1L.
BV 11/2013
4. Sklep
Izredni ukrepi, kot jih ureja zakon
o bančništvu, so sicer oblikovani z
namenom, da bi omogočili hitro in
učinkovito prestrukturiranje bank, ki
je potrebno za pravilno delovanje
bančnega sistem kot celote. Vendar
pa izredni ukrepi po drugi strani
pomenijo skrajni poseg oziroma ukinitev pravic lastnikov in upnikov, ki so
v primeru izrednih ukrepov izključeni
iz procesa odločanja in načrtovanja
ukrepov prestrukturiranja.
Ob tem se je treba zavedati tudi
dejstva, da bo okvir reševanja, kot
ga določa zakon o bančništvu z dodatnimi in izrednimi ukrepi nadzora
za prestrukturiranje banke, glede
osnovnih rešitev glede prestrukturiranja in sanacije bank v relativno
kratkem času s sprejetjem in implementacijo direktive o vzpostavitvi
skupnega okvir za prestrukturiranje
in sanacijo bank uveljavljen v vseh
državah članicah EU. Danes torej
ni več vprašanje, ali bo tak okvir,
BV 11/2013
vključno s prenehanjem (write down)
in konverzijo obveznosti banke kot
ukrepom prestrukturiranja bank, na
ravni EU uveljavljen ali ne, ampak
se postavlja predvsem vprašanje,
kako v okviru posamezne nacionalne
zakonodaje opredeliti pogoje za
uporabo teh ukrepov, da bo poseg v
pravice delničarjev in upnikov sorazmeren. Zakon o bančništvu in zlasti
izredni ukrepi, kot so zasnovani v
zakonu, vključno s predlogom novele
ZBan-1L, bodo morali ta preizkus
sorazmernosti prestati prej, kot bo to
primer v drugih državah ob sprejemanju omenjene direktive. S sprejetjem omenjene direktive pa čaka
slovenskega zakonodajalca še tretji
del reforme ukrepov nadzora, ko bo
ukrepe prestrukturiranja in sanacije
moral v celoti prilagoditi zahtevam iz
direktive.
Predlog zakona o spremembah in
dopolnitvah Zakona o bančništvu (ZBan1J), Poročevalec DZ z dne 30.11.2013.
Mathias Dewatripont and Xavier Freixas:
The Crisis Aftermath: New Regulatory
Paradigms, Centre for Economic Policy
Research (CEPR) 2012, London (www.
voxeu.org)
Zakon o bančništvu, Uradni list RS, št.
99/10 - uradno prečiščeno besedilo, 9/11
- ZPlaSS-B, 35/11, 59/11, 85/11, 48/12,
105/12, 56/13 in 63/13 - ZS-K (ZBan-1)
67
Predlog zakona o spremembah in
dopolnitvah Zakona o bančništvu (ZBan1L), Vlada RS, (EVA 3013-1611-0146)
(www. http://www.dz-rs.si/).
Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council establishing
a framework for the recovery and resolution
of credit institutions and investment
firms and amending Council Directives
77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives
2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/
EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC and
2011/35/EC and Regulation (EU) No
1093/2010 - General approach (Brussels,
15 July 2013, 2012/0150 (COD)) (http://
register.consilium.europa.eu).
Sporočilo Komisije o uporabi pravil o
državni pomoči za podporne ukrepe v
korist bank v okviru finančne krize od 1.
avgusta 2013 dalje (Uradni list EU C 216,
30. 7. 2013, str. 0001–0015)
Key Attributes of Effective Resolution
Regimes for Financial Institutions”, oktober
2011, Financial Stability Board (www.
financialstabilityboard.org)
Dirk Schoenmaker, Banking Supervision
and Resolution: The European Dimension,
January 2012, DSF Policy Paper, No. 19
(www.dsf.nl)
UDK 336.71:061.1EU
Macroeconomic trends and
EU banking crisis
Holger Schmieding*
MACROECONOMIC
TRENDS AND EU
BANKING CRISIS
The eurozone crisis
has exposed serious
banking problems in
some eurozone member
countries. After a long
period of trial and
error, the eurozone has
managed to contain
the systemic risks which
these national problems
pose to the eurozone as
a whole. Since the ECB
stepped forward as the
de facto lender of last
resort for reform-oriented
governments in July 2012,
tensions have receded.
The toxic link between
banks and sovereigns
has been weakened. As a
result, sorting out banking
problems is largely a task
for the national sovereigns.
The faster and the more
decisively they do so, the
better for these countries.
Rapid progress towards a
full banking union would
be helpful for the euro
countries hit by the crisis.
But the available evidence
shows that a full banking
union is not essential for
the crisis to go away.
JEL G01 G21 G28
T
he eurozone crisis has exposed serious banking problems
in some eurozone member countries including Ireland,
Spain, Italy and Slovenia. For a while, some countries
even fell victim to a vicious circle. Doubts about the ability
of the national sovereign to backstop its major banks raised the
funding costs for banks to such an extent that the resulting credit
crunch exacerbated the recession and the fiscal problems of the
sovereign.
KEY CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we take a fundamental look at the euro crisis
and the toxic link between sovereigns and banks.
Our major conclusion is that, after a long period of trial and
error, the eurozone has managed to contain the systemic risks to
the eurozone as a whole. Between them, the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) and the European Central Bank (ECB) now have
the means and the instruments for two key tasks: (1) they can back
up the national sovereigns to such an extent that these sovereigns
can deal with their banking problems if they choose to do so. (2)
The ESM and ECB can contain the risk of contagion from small
crisis countries to bigger less problematic members and to the
eurozone as a whole.
As a result, sorting out banking problems fast and decisively is
largely a task for the national sovereign.
*
Holger Schmieding, Chief Economist, Berenberg.
68
BV 11/2013
A lack of courage to deal with
national banking problems poses a
serious risk to the respective country
but less so to the eurozone as a
whole.
An immediate and full banking union
with common rules, a common supervisor, a joint resolution regime and
common deposit insurance would be
useful. But it is not essential. National
sovereigns themselves can take all
the decisive steps to defuse their
national banking problems, even if
some of them may request European
support to speed up the process.
I. TOUGH LOVE:
THE NATURE OF
THE EURO CRISIS
Crises are handmaidens of change.
Some 30 years ago, Margaret
Thatcher slayed an inflation dragon
and crushed the power of irresponsible trade unions in Britain, turning
the then “sick man of Europe” into
a modern service economy. Twenty
years ago, Sweden and Denmark
transformed soft socialism into a
welfare system that works. Ten years
ago, Germany cut social benefits
and loosened labour market rules by
enough to turn Europe’s worst-performing economy into the continent’s
new growth engine. Two years
ago, the three small Baltic countries
emerged from a dramatic post-bubble crisis in better shape than they
had been before.
In all these cases, the initial results of
tough reforms were record unemployment, social unrest and howls of
protests from many economists. In all
cases, history proved the hard-nosed
reformers right, as it did in the even
more traumatic transformation of
post-communist Europe in the 1990s.
Over the last three years, the countries of the eurozone have struck a
grand bargain. The strong support
the weak and the weak accept the
tough conditions attached to such
BV 11/2013
help. They need to make their fiscal
positions sustainable by reining in
their current budget deficits and by
raising their long-term growth potential through structural reforms.
In the eurozone, support from the
strong to the weak takes the form of
highly conditional credits. “Tough
love” is the rule of the game.1 As a
result, there is much less risk of moral
hazard in the mutual support systems
between eurozone countries than the
usual transfer systems within nation
states. In the eurozone, the donors
can and do set the terms at which
they grant support to the recipients.
Put simply: Germany (as a donor)
Eurozone has
managed to
contain the
systemic risks to
the eurozone as
a whole.
can be much tougher on Spain (as a
recipient) than it ever could be on its
own destitute regions such as Bremen
and the Saar. Whereas Spaniards
do not vote in the national election of
the donor country (Germany), the citizens of Germany’s problem regions
vote in the elections to the German
parliament.
On static criteria of an optimum
currency area, the lack of major automatic and unconditional transfers
between member countries counts
against the eurozone. But on the
more important dynamic criterion
as to whether the institutional setting
provides the right incentives, this
counts as an advantage: those who
need to be protected against market
turmoil have to make their economies
69
more dynamic and hence less likely
to require aid in the future.
No easy escape routes
The euro denies its members the
easy escape routes: they can no
longer devalue or inflate their way
out of trouble. Instead, they have to
take the hard route of fundamental
reforms. Inflation or devaluation does
not solve any structural problems.
These macroeconomic gimmicks
merely postpone the day of reckoning. The common currency forces its
weaker members to choose between
the chaos that would ensue from a
euro exit and the painful reforms
needed to improve their lot for good.
The big call for the economic future
in Europe is whether this tough love
approach will work. In our view, it
probably will. In the OECD’s league
table for actual structural economic
reforms2, Greece takes the top spot
of all OECD members for 2011
and 2012, followed by Ireland,
Estonia, Portugal and Spain. All four
countries that had received external
assistance by the end-2012 cut-off
date for the analysis are among the
five top reformers.
Confusing dreams with reality
In analysing the euro crisis, many observers make a simple mistake: they
confuse their dreams of what would
be a perfect world with reality.
The world does not have to be
perfect in order to work. For example, Germany would be much better
off if it had a simple flat tax and a
deregulated labour market. But in
real life, a complex tax system and
an overregulated labour market have
1
See Holger Schmieding, Tough Love: the true
nature of the euro crisis, Berenberg, 20 August
2012.
2
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development, Economic Policy Reforms 2013:
Going for Growth, Paris 2013,
not prevented Germany from turning
itself into the economic powerhouse
of Europe.
The same holds for the eurozone
crisis. Many observers believe that
the region needs a full political
union, a full fiscal union, an immediate banking union, a full German/
ECB guarantee for sovereign debt or
the realisation of some other pipedream to get out of its crisis. Some of
the arguments such observers make
are not wrong. Yes, some kinds of
financial tensions could be contained
by a full-scale mutualisation of public
debt or other variants of fiscal or
even political union. And yes, an
immediate banking union or any other way to end the credit crunch for
small and medium-sized enterprises
in parts of the euro periphery in one
fell swoop could be quite helpful.
But discussing what may or may not
be desirable is very different from
analysing what is strictly necessary
for the euro crisis to fade.
The bare essentials
Stripping it to the bare essentials, the
eurozone needs four ingredients for
its crisis to fade. All four are in place.
1. A reliable mechanism to contain contagion. The problems of
small countries must not endanger the region as a whole. Since
the ECB president Mario Draghi’s
announcement of 26 July 2012
that the second most powerful
economic institution in the world,
the ECB, would not commit
suicide but would instead do all it
takes to preserve the euro and its
own existence, this ingredient is in
place. The eurozone now has a
lender of last resort.
2. The right incentives so that places like Greece fix their underlying
problems. With the tough love approach pursued by Germany and
the ECB, this ingredient is there
as well: Europe helps places like
Greece or Ireland with serious
amounts of money if the recipients
meet harsh reform conditions.3
Despite occasional hiccups, the
reform process is well entrenched
and well advanced.4
3. The political will to stick to the
grand bargain: the strong help
the weak while the weak accept
the strings attached. All German
mainstream political parties back
chancellor Merkel’s euro policies.
At the periphery, the will to do
what it takes to stay part of the
euro family has survived numerous challenges including elections and changes in government
in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy
and Spain.
4. Some growth in key export
markets. To export their way out
of their domestic adjustment recession, the euro periphery needs
some increase in global demand
and in core European domestic
demand. So far, external demand
remains suitably resilient. For
the euro periphery, good news
from Germany, the US, the UK,
China and Switzerland more than
offsets the wobbles in a number
of emerging markets.
Of course, past performance is no
guarantee for the future. But it does
hold lessons. Euro-sceptics underestimate the capacity of the eurozone
to contain and overcome its crisis at
their own peril.
II. BANKING CRISIS –
THE FUNDAMENTAL VIEW
Banks are a vital part of any modern
economy. They intermediate between savers and investors and
transmit the monetary policy of the
central bank to the real economy,
that is, to households and companies. Banks and capital markets
pool resources and risks. They thus
help to change the risk profile of
70
an economy: funds deposited by
risk-averse savers can finance the
promising projects of risk-taking
entrepreneurs. Banks and financial
markets have a network function like
no other sector of the economy. No
sector of an advanced economy can
function without financial services. A
serious problem in the car industry is
bad news for the car industry and all
its stakeholders. A serious banking
problem can paralyse an entire
economy.
One of the most robust lessons of
financial history is that serious banking problems need to be tackled fast
and decisively to limit the damage.
Among the many examples from
which that lesson can be drawn are
those of Sweden (1992-1993),5
the post-Lehman US (2009-2010)
and, as part of the euro crisis, even
Ireland (2010-2012). One of the
reasons why the US is now rebounding faster from the Great Financial
Crisis of the last five years and why
Ireland enjoys a more promising
economic outlook and lower bond
yields than other countries on the
euro periphery is that they dealt rather energetically with their banking
problems. Countries which let their
banking issues fester, including
Spain, Cyprus and Slovenia, are
finding it harder to escape recession.
Nonetheless, we have not included
comprehensive bank rehabilitation in
the crisis countries and a eurozone
banking union among the bare
essentials needed to let the eurozone crisis fade further. Why is that
so? The answer is simple: the pace
of progress on sorting out banking
problems is crucial for individual
3
We explain this approach in detail in Tough Love:
the true nature of the euro crisis, Berenberg, 20
August 2012.
4
See for example our Euro Plus Monitor, Spring
2013 Update, Berenberg and Lisbon Council, 7
March 2013.
5
See for instance Ingves and Lind (2009), also
Kanaya nd Woo on the case of Japan in the 1990s.
BV 11/2013
countries. If they act fast and forcefully, their adjustment recessions
will be brief and their subsequent
recoveries will be rapid; if they fail
to do so, the recessions will be longer and deeper and the recoveries
will initially be shallower. But this is
largely a problem for those individual countries themselves. It is less of
a systemic issue for the eurozone
as a whole. Slovenia’s progress on
banking issues, or the lack of it, has
been shaping its own economic fate.
But it is of limited importance for the
eurozone as a whole.
The roots of the problem
The pervasive banking problems in
some eurozone member countries
have three different roots.
1. In Ireland and Spain, credit-fuelled real estate booms turned
into bust after 2007, as they did
in the US and the UK. In Slovenia, undisciplined lending practices by some institutions also
stored up trouble for the future.
2. In Greece and Cyprus, the de
facto default of Greece on its
sovereign bonds wiped out the
capital of almost all major banks,
triggering a need to recapitalise these banks largely at the
expense of eurozone taxpayers.
3. Across the eurozone periphery, the deep double-dip recession caused (i) by the post-Lehman global financial collapse,
(ii) by severe austerity and (iii)
by the collapse of economic
confidence from mid-2011 to
mid-2012 amid widespread anxiety about a perceived risk of the
eurozone break-up led to a surge
in non-performing loans. As a result, even Italy is now struggling
with a credit-crunch for smalland medium-sized enterprises
although Italy did not suffer from
a real estate boom-bust cycle.
BV 11/2013
The vicious circle
The eurozone crisis added a special
complication to banking issues. In
countries with their own national
currency, the national central banks
and the national sovereigns are the
usual backstops for troubled banking systems. But eurozone members
no longer have a central bank that
could intervene at its own discretion.
More importantly, the eurozone crisis
started with worries about public
debt. This limits the ability of national
governments to support their banking
systems. Transferring debt from the
balance sheets of banks to that of
the eurozone crisis. Once markets
started to worry about individual
countries, driving up the funding cost
for sovereigns and banks alike, these
countries seemed to be sucked ever
deeper into the malaise. And seeing
a major slide in asset prices in small
countries with big problems such as
Greece, investors turned away from
bigger countries such as Spain and
Italy as well, just to be safe side.
When the de facto default of Greece
on its public debt, announced in July
2011, confirmed some of the worst
fears of investors about Greece, contagion spread like wildfire to Spain
and Italy.
Containing the contagion risks
The eurozone
crisis started
with worries
about public
debt.
the national sovereign adds to the
debt mountain. The result has been
a toxic link between banks and their
sovereign. In a vicious circle, concerns about sovereign debt erode
the value of the sovereign bonds
which banks hold as assets while
the short-term pain of austerity hurts
bank earnings. The perceived need
for the sovereign to support banks, in
turn, fuel worries about an ever-rising
debt burden, making it more difficult
for the sovereign to fund itself while
further depressing the value of the
bonds held by banks.
This vicious circle, or the mere risk
that there might be such a vicious
circle, has been at the heart of
71
After some dithering, the eurozone
has successfully reacted to those
problems. By setting up the temporary and then the permanent
rescue shields (European Financial
Stability Facility EFSF and European
Stabilisation Mechanism ESM), the
parliaments of the eurozone members willed sufficient funds to back
up all small euro crisis countries up
to and including Spain. The ECB
announcement of 26 July 2012 to
do all it takes to preserve the euro,
and to buy sovereign bonds of
reform countries if need be as long
as those countries abide by the terms
of an EFSF/ESM programme, de
facto added the funds to keep Italy
out of harm’s way as well. The ECB
stepped forward as the eurozone’s
lender of last resort.
The ECB promise had two major effects. Firstly, it virtually put an end to
contagion risks within the eurozone.
If one country were to hit the wall,
perhaps by hypothetically losing
access to bailout funds because it
has refused to meet the conditions,
the ECB could credibly protect all
other countries against the fallout
from such an incident. Secondly, the
bailout funds can lend the national
sovereigns the money needed to
recapitalise banks, de facto weakening the toxic link between national
sovereigns and the banks under their
jurisdiction.
The mechanisms to contain contagion risks and to support the weaker
sovereigns have a major consequence for the analysis of banking
problems within the eurozone. They
have reduced the risks that banking
problems in one country can spread
to other countries and the eurozone
as a whole. If a country cannot raise
funds to recapitalise banks on its
own, it can ask the ESM for help,
as Spain has done. If trouble in one
country were to endanger other
countries or if markets were to worry
that the ESM would not have the
means to support a large eurozone
member country, the ECB could
activate its OMT programme. As a
result, banking problems have turned
largely into issues to be dealt with
on the national level, possibly with
European support. A full eurozone
banking union, while useful, is not
required to protect the eurozone as a
whole from the potential fallout from
banking problems on the national
level.
Put differently: instead of waiting for
a solution within the framework of
a future eurozone banking union,
countries such as Spain and Slovenia ought to address their banking
problems at home. The faster and
more decisively they do so, the better
for these countries.
Accepting the strings attached
The eurozone has the instruments to
contain contagion risks and to help
countries that have lost - or are at risk
of losing - access to funding markets. Of course, any outside support
comes with strings attached. The
ECB has explicitly tied its programme
for potential “Outright Monetary
Transactions“ (OMT) to the ESM
conditionality. Countries that ask
for help expose themselves to troika
supervision and tough conditionality.
Politically, that can be very painful.
Seen just from the standpoint of ending the crisis in individual countries
fast, this conditionality is a severe
handicap. Avoiding such conditionality for the sovereign, for instance by
asking the ESM to directly recapitalise banks without dealing with
and through the national sovereign,
would be much more convenient for
national governments. No wonder
than most of the weak euro mem-
Countries such
as Spain and
Slovenia ought
to address
their banking
problems at
home.
bers are very much in favour of that.
The tough conditionality attached
to European support is one of the
key reasons why crisis countries are
not cleaning up their bank balance
sheets as fast and thoroughly as they
should.
But seen from the vantage point of
other countries and the region as a
whole, the calculus is very different.
Lending support without conditions
would incur a moral hazard problem. Countries might be encouraged
to continue with ultimately unsustainable policies if the risks of such
policies can be partly shifted onto
foreign taxpayers. Also, by allowing a direct bank recapitalisation
or through other ways of virtually
72
unconditional support, the donor
countries would lose the useful leverage to promote pro-growth structural reforms in the crisis countries.
While avoiding such painful reforms
may feel good near-term, it would
mean to let slip an opportunity to
strengthen the fundamental health of
countries.
As a result of the tough conditionality attached to actually accessing
support funds, euro crisis countries
have to strike their own balance
between chance of faster resolution
and hence a faster return to economic growth and the risk of a loss
of sovereignty. It may not be a bad
thing that countries are forced into a
national public discourse about such
a choice.
Tackling banking problems:
better to be bold
The gradual fading of tensions in the
eurozone since August 2012 has
opened up a chance for countries
with troubled banking sectors. In an
environment of improving sentiment,
markets may be ready to allow
countries a little more leeway than
they had before. Markets are starting
to look at opportunities for growth
instead of just focussing on the risks
inherent in high levels of public debt.
If countries choose to forcefully
tackle their banking problems, using
national funds to recapitalise or wind
down problem banks if need be,
such resolve may impress markets. In
other words, chances are that, with a
credible programme, countries may
be able to raise the required funds
on the capital markets, especially if
the programmes bear the stamp of
approval of the EU Commission and
eurozone finance ministers. Amid
improving sentiment, countries such
as Spain and Slovenia may avoid
having to ask for a (full) ESM support programme if markets see that
they are heading in the right direcBV 11/2013
tion. The chance that bold action can
improve future growth prospects can
outweigh the need to borrow more
near-term to clean up bank balance
sheets.
Whether or not such an attempt
would really be successful remains
unclear. It crucially depends on still
fickle market sentiment. But it is worth
a try. If raising the required funds on
the market turned out to be too difficult, the country could still apply for
European help. With a credible programme to resolve its banking issues,
it would already have met much of
the likely conditions that would be
attached to such official support.
III. BANKING UNION –
USEFUL BUT NOT ESSENTIAL
A full banking union for the eurozone
could help to ease tensions further
and allow the euro crisis countries
to return to satisfactory growth fast.
It would break the link between
banks and the national sovereign.
It could spread the costs of winding
down problem banks and strengthen
confidence in the banking systems
of problem countries. For example,
capital adequacy tests run by the European Central Banks could be much
more credible than the previous
stress tests that were heavily influenced by national regulators who
are often seen as biased. A stamp
of approval from the ECB could
improve access of banks to funding
markets and strengthen the confidence of depositors in that bank.
But while rapid progress towards a
full banking union would be helpful
for euro crisis countries, the available
evidence shows that it is not essential
for the crisis to fade. Financial tensions in the eurozone have already
subsided significantly since the ECB
announced its readiness to do what it
takes to preserve the euro and hence
its own existence. Right after the ECB
unveiled its programme for potential
BV 11/2013
“Outright Monetary Transactions”
in August 2012, leading economic
indicators started to turn up in the
periphery as well as in core Europe.
Monetary policy usually works with
a lag of some three quarters. Exactly
on cue, the eurozone economy
returned to modest growth in the second quarter of 2013, three quarters
after the decisive shift in ECB policy.
The leading indicators available at
the time of writing project further
gradual gains in momentum. Whereas the periphery is still lagging behind the core, the leading indicators
suggest that most peripheral countries will leave recession in the third
quarter. In Portugal and Greece,
GDP started to expand again in the
second quarter already according to
provisional data.
The economic recovery has started
despite a serious credit crunch for
small and medium-sized enterprises in some peripheral eurozone
countries such as Spain and Italy.
In the eurozone as a whole, loans
to non-financial corporations fell by
3.7% year-on-year in July 2013.
But how can economies expand
when credit to companies is contracting? Doesn’t the eurozone have to
fix its major financial problems first
before the economic outlook can
brighten for good? The answer is
simple: in the eurozone, bank credit
to companies is a lagging indicator
of the business cycle. Turning points
in bank credit tend to follow turning
points in the real economy with a
variable lag of around two quarters.
Companies only ask for a credit, and
banks only grant a new credit, when
the economy is already clearly on
the way up. Banks do not finance the
first phase of an economic turnaround.
Unlike bank credit to companies,
money supply is a leading indicator
of the economic cycle. That holds
at least for the eurozone where
monetary policy is largely transmitted through the banking system to
the real economy. As Chart 1 shows,
major turning points in real M1 money supply tend to lead the eurozone
business cycle by roughly three
quarters. Real M1 consists of the
liquid balances (cash and overnight
deposits) of households and non-financial companies adjusted for the
increase in consumer prices. In times
of crisis, companies and households
try to raise their liquid balances. Central banks make that easy through an
Chart 1: Money supply and GDP growth in the eurozone
Yoy changes in %, M1 deflated by consumer prices, advanced by three quarters. Source: ECB, Eurostat, Berenberg calculations.
14
6
12
5
10
4
8
3
6
2
4
1
2
0
0
-1
-2
-2
-4
-6
Jan 92
Eurozone real M1,3q fwd, lhs
Jan 95
Jan 98
73
Jan 01
-3
GDP, rhs
Jan 04
Jan 07
Jan 10
Jan 13
-4
appropriately accommodative monetary policy. When households and
companies have raised their reserves
– and when their worst fears fail to
materialise – they eventually end up
with more liquidity than they want to
hold in the long run. They gradually
start to spend some of these liquid
balances.
Put differently, companies in the
eurozone tend to finance the first
phase of an economic recovery out
of liquid balances which they have
accumulated during the crisis. Bank
credit only kicks in when the upswing
is well on its way.
Of course, companies will eventually
need bank credits to put an economic recovery on a sound footing. This
may well be happening soon. Chart
2 shows that financing cost for some
of the worst-hit companies in the eurozone, the small and medium-sized
companies in Italy and Spain, have
started to fall modestly from very
elevated levels in late 2012. We
expect this trend to continue as
overall financial tensions recede
further and – after some quarters of
economic growth – banks become
less hesitant to grant new credits.
However, the turnaround in bank
credit to corporates will probably be
later and shallower than in previous
economic upturns as banks continue
to prioritise balance sheet repair
over the expansion of their businesses. Until the European Central Bank
has concluded its forthcoming asset
quality review, probably in early
Chart 2: Financing cost for small and medium-sized enterprises
Loans to non-financial corporations, up to € 1mn, maturity 1-5 years, new
business, annualised agreed rate (AAR), in %. Source: ECB
SME financing costs
7
6
Germany
Spain
Italy
5
4
3
Jan 2003
Jan 2005
Jan 2007
2014, many banks may be especially reluctant to take on new risks.
The banking problems in the eurozone, including the lack of a full
banking union with a joint supervisor,
a joint resolution mechanism and a
joint deposit guarantee fund, are likely to restrain the unfolding economic
upswing. We expect the economic
upturn to remain slightly below trend
in the eurozone until these issues are
resolved. But we do not expect the
banking problems to prevent the economic upswing in the first place. The
more individual countries manage to
repair their banking systems on their
own initiative, the faster they may lift
their GDP growth to their trend rate
or beyond.
74
Jan 2009
Jan 2011
Jan 2013
REFERENCES:
Holger Schmieding and Christian Schulz,
Euro Plus Monitor, Spring 2013 Update,
Berenberg and Lisbon Council, 7 March
2013.
Holger Schmieding, Tough Love: the true
nature of the euro crisis, Berenberg, 20
August 2012.
Stefan Ingves and Göran Lund, Is the
Swedish Model for Dealing with a Banking
Crisis still Valid?, in: Lessons Learned from
Previous Banking Crises: Sweden, Japan,
Spain, and Mexico, Group of Thirty,
Occasional Paper No. 79, Washington,
DC, 2009.
Akihiro Kanaya and David Woo, The
Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s:
Sources and Lessons, International
Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper,
Washington, DC, January 2000.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development, Economic Policy
Reforms 2013: Going for Growth, Paris
2013.
BV 11/2013
UDK 336.71:338.124.4(497.4):061.1EU
Razdolževanje bank
v EU in Sloveniji
Marko Simoneti in Božo Jašovič*
BANK DELEVERAGING IN
EU AND SLOVENIA
The purpose of this
paper is to analyze the
possibilities for "good"
deleveraging of banking
and corporate sector in
Slovenia. Many banks
that are dependent on
wholesale funding are
facing strategic decision
to change their business
plans. Quintessential
ingredient of these
changes is de-leveraging
and less dependence on
unstable financing due
to uncertainties which
arise from time to time
in financial markets. The
process of deleveraging
can be implemented either
through recapitalisation
or retrenchment of assets.
The latter can contribute
to contraction of credits
to non-financial sectors
and ensuing contraction
of economic activity. The
negative feedback loop
thus feeds back through
the worsening economic
activity on banks’ balance
sheets. The Slovenian
enterprise sector is among
most dependent on bank
financing; therefore, the
process of deleveraging
is likely to have negative
consequences on supply
of credit to the economy.
Due to a high level of
non-performing loans,
the deleveraging process
should go hand in hand
with cleaning up banks’
balance sheets and
enterprise restructuring.
JEL G01 G21
BV 11/2013
G
lobalno bančno razdolževanje (de-leveraging, de-risking)
je posledica nevzdržnega procesa kreditiranja v obdobju
pred finančno krizo. V tem obdobju so ogromne količine
kapitalskih tokov v obliki kreditov dobesedno »zalile«
nekatere nacionalne ekonomije. Zaradi obilice razpoložljivih sredstev so bili tudi kreditni standardi bank temu primerno sproščeni, ta
sredstva pa so pogosto končala v tveganih finančnih instrumentih,
manj donosnih ali celo nasedlih investicijah gradbenega sektorja in
kreditih zadolženim podjetjem in posameznikom, ki bi v normalnih
okoliščinah težko dobili kredit na podlagi slabe bonitete. V bilancah
finančnih (bančnih) institucij se je močno povečala zadolženost, kapital lastnikov pa je bil neznaten in s tem tudi varnost upnikov bank.
1. Uvod
Banke niso uspele zbrati dovolj depozitov za take obsege kreditiranja, zato so zadolžitev povečale z najemanjem grosističnih virov
na mednarodnih finančnih trgih. Posledica takega ravnanja je bila,
da je postal finančni sistem zelo kompleksen in medsebojno prepleten. Z izbruhom finančne krize se je najprej začel sesuvati ta del
trga in banke so bile prisiljene v nasprotni proces – razdolžitev, ki
naj bi bančne bilance tolikanj razgradil, da bodo postale dolgoročno
vzdržne in stabilne. Proces razdolževanja ni samo posledica razmer
na finančnih trgih, deloma so ga povzročili tudi regulatorji oziroma
spremembe, ki so jih sprejeli za zagotavljanje dolgoročne vzdržnosti
bank in finančne stabilnosti (Basel III oziroma CRD IV in CRR, ki ga
implementirata).
* Dr. Marko Simoneti, izredni profesor Pravne fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani, in mag. Božo Jašovič, svetovalec uprave,
Gorenjska banka d.d., Kranj.
75
Glede na spremenjeno regulativo in
spremenjeno poslovno prakso bank
se zastavlja vprašanje, kolikšen je
obseg potrebnega razdolževanja
bank, da pridemo do dolgoročno
vzdržne ravni. Enoznačnega odgovora na to vprašanje ni, saj je odvisen od več dejavnikov. Na potrebo
po razdolževanju banke vplivajo
strukturni dejavniki: spremenjeni poslovni modeli, potreba po povečanju
kapitala zaradi izgub na portfelju,
zmanjšanje odvisnosti od grosističnih
virov oziroma virov ECB in prestrukturiranje (zmanjšanje) zaradi prejete
državne pomoči. Poleg strukturnih
dejavnikov pa na razdolževanje
bank vplivajo tudi ciklične značilnosti
določenega ekonomskega okolja:
kreditna sposobnost države, splošne
finančne razmere, dinamika gospodarske aktivnosti in kreditno tveganje
nefinančnega sektorja. Negativne
ciklične razmere še dodatno pritiskajo na razdolževanje bank tako prek
ponudbe kot tudi povpraševanja po
kreditih.
Proces razdolževanja bank ima več
merljivih končni ciljev, ki so zapisani v bančni regulativi ali pa so
postali nekakšen splošno sprejemljiv
standard. Med slednjimi je najbolj
poznan kazalnik med krediti in depoziti (LTD, loan to deposit ratio), ki
ni predpisan, vendar pa je pogosto
predstavljen kot indikator odvisnosti
bank od grosističnih virov financiranja in kot kazalnik, v kolikšnem
obsegu so banke že prilagodile
svoje poslovne modele novim razmeram. Varno naj bi bilo razmerje,
pri katerem krediti dosegajo zbrane
depozite od bančnih komitentov.
Najpomembnejši kazalniki, ki so
predpisani z regulativo in vplivajo
na proces razdolževanja bank, so:
delež temeljnega kapitala v tvegani aktivi, razmerje med sredstvi in
kapitalom (leverage ratio) in količnik
stabilnega financiranja (NSFR, net
stable funding ratio), ki predstavlja
razmerje med razpoložljivimi dolgo-
ročnimi viri in zahtevanim stabilnim
financiranjem. Banke bodo morale
postopoma doseči ciljne vrednosti opisanih količnikov. Že bežen
pogled na količnike daje nedvoumen
odgovor, da jih je mogoče doseči na
dva načina: s povečanjem lastniškega kapitala ali pa z zmanjšanjem
sredstev (naložb) bank oziroma s
kombinacijo obeh. Tehnično gledano
obstajajo številne variacije, kako proces razdolževanja izpeljati v praksi,
bolj kot to pa je pomembno vprašanje, kakšen bo vpliv tega procesa na
primarno funkcijo bank – zagotavljanje kreditov nebančnemu sektorju.
Vsaki finančni
krizi nujno sledi
razdolževanje
bank pa
tudi njenih
komitentov.
Vsaki finančni krizi nujno sledi razdolževanje bank, pa tudi njenih komitentov – prezadolženih nebančnih
sektorjev gospodarstva. Podatki kažejo, da se je proces razdolževanja
tudi tokrat najprej začel v finančnem
sektorju ter šele z določenim časovnim zamikom tudi v realnem sektorju,
pri čemer pa Slovenija zelo zaostaja
za drugimi državami članicami EU.1
Ta proces razdolževanja je torej
neizogiben, vendar je od intenzivnosti in načina tega procesa odvisno,
kakšne so negativne posledice na
gospodarsko aktivnost v posamezni
državi. V primeru prehitrega zmanjševanja kreditne aktivnosti bank
lahko pride do povratne negativne
zanke, ko upad ekonomske aktivnosti povzroči dodatno poslabšanje
76
bančnih bilanc, kar vodi v nov krog
zmanjševanja kreditiranja in gospodarske aktivnosti.
Kot »dobro« razdolževanje bank bi
tako lahko načeloma označili vse
procese in ukrepe, ki ne povzročajo
še dodatnih in nepotrebnih omejitev na strani ponudbe kreditov na
gospodarsko aktivnost. Povečanje
kapitala v bankah je gotovo najbolj
neposreden ukrep, ki omogoča bankam po finančni krizi, da se soočijo
z izgubami v svojih bilancah brez
škodljivega omejevanja kreditiranja
tistih komitentov, ki so še kreditno
sposobni. Tudi krčenje bančnih
bilanc zaradi odpisov nima nobenih
negativnih posledic za ekonomsko
aktivnost, saj se obseg dejanskih
kreditov s tem ne spreminja. Japonska izkušnja kaže prav nasprotno:
skrivanje bančnih izgub, odlašanje
z dokapitalizacijami in odlašanje z
aktivnostmi za prestrukturiranje slabih kreditov (NPLs, non performing
loans) so lahko pomembni vzroki za
dolgoročno gospodarsko stagnacijo.2 Kot »dobro« zmanjšanje bilanc
univerzalnih bank lahko opredelimo
tudi odprodajo sredstev in aktivnosti, ki niso neposredno povezane s
komercialnim bančništvom: naložbe
v različne finančne instrumente,
investicijsko bančništvo, upravljanje premoženja, zavarovalništvo
in podobno. Pri bančnih skupinah,
ki poslujejo v številnih državah, se
pojavlja tudi možnost, da se večji del
razdolževanja opravi na tujih trgih
in tako omeji negativne posledice na
domačo ekonomsko aktivnost (home
bias in deleveraging). Razdolževanje bank, ki je »dobro« za domačo
ekonomijo in »slabo« za ekonomijo
gostitelja, je aktualna tema tako
na globalni ravni kot v okviru EU.
1
Glej na primer Košak & Košak (2012).
Več o delovanju »zombi« bank na Japonskem in
posledicah za ekonomsko aktivnost, če se odlaša
s priznanjem izgub in dokapitalizacijo bank po
finančnih krizah, je pojasnjeno v R. Caballero et. al.
(2008) in Tang G. & Upper C. (2010).
2
BV 11/2013
Možnosti za »dobro« razdolževanje
bank so večinoma odvisne tudi od
stopnje prezadolženosti osnovnih
sektorjev domačega gospodarstva:
prebivalstva, podjetij in države ter
od pomena, ki ga imajo domače
banke za financiranje teh sektorjev
glede na alternativne možnosti prek
trga kapitala in tujine.
Namen tega članka je analizirati
možnosti za izvedbo »dobrega«
razdolževanja bank v Sloveniji. V
prvem delu predstavljamo pomembna pravila in ukrepe na ravni EU,
ki jih mora Slovenija kot članica
EU in evrskega območja upoštevati
v tem procesu. Pri tem opozarjamo predvsem na primere, ko so ti
zunanji pogoji oblikovani oziroma se
dinamično spreminjajo na podlagi
razmer, ki prevladujejo v večjih državah članicah, razmere v Sloveniji pa
so povsem drugačne zaradi njenih
strukturnih značilnosti ali pa zaradi
njenih zamud pri odzivu na krizne
razmere. V drugem delu analiziramo strukturne posebnosti problema
prezadolženosti v Sloveniji in vlogo
bank pri njegovem nastanku in
reševanju. V nadaljevanju sistematično prikažemo na ravni posamezne
banke »dobre« in »slabe« načine
razdolževanja, ki v Sloveniji poteka
po spontanem scenariju od začetka
krize do danes. Na koncu podamo
oceno načrtovanega programa Vlade RS za sanacijo bank ter podamo
nekatera priporočila za izvedbo
»dobrega« razdolževanja bank v
razmerah, ki trenutno prevladujejo v
Sloveniji in njenem širšem evropskem
institucionalnem okolju.
2. Pregled razdolževanja v
bankah EU po krizi
Vsaki finančni krizi sledi proces
zmanjševanja dolga v razmerju
do BDP, ki ga ekonomska politika
poskuša uravnavati tako, da bi bila
prilagoditev čim bolj postopna in posredna prek rasti BDP, ter tako omejiti
BV 11/2013
potrebo po manj prijetnih alternativah za zmanjšanje bremen dolga:
fiskalna konsolidacija, odpisi ali
prestrukturiranje javnega in zasebnega dolga, odprodaja premoženja ter
inflacijsko razvrednotenje v primeru
lastne valute. Zmanjšanje obsega
zadolženosti večinoma poteka prek
bank, ki opravljajo posredniško
vlogo pri prenosu prihrankov med
sektorji.
Predstavimo nekaj dejstev iz zadnje
krize: finančni vzvod velikih evropskih bank je ob koncu leta 2008
znašal 30-kratnik kapitala in se je
zmanjšal ob koncu leta 2012 na
Finančni vzvod
velikih evropskih
bank je ob koncu
leta 2008 znašal
30-kratnik
kapitala.
22-kratnik kapitala.3 Večina tega
zmanjšanja je treba pripisati povečanju kapitala in le manjši del zmanjševanju naložb bank. Tako visok
finančni vzvod še vedno predstavlja
visoko tveganje za nestabilnost
bank, zato je proces nadaljnjega
razdolževanja neizbežen. Doslej se
celotna sredstva evropskih bank, v
nasprotju z ameriškimi, niso pomembno zmanjšala. Vzrokov za
bolj intenzivno krčenje ameriškega
bančnega sektorja od evropskega
je več: obsežne odprodaje finančnih
naložb na račun prevladujoče tržne
narave finančnega sistema, manjša
odvisnost podjetij od bančnega
financiranja in ustaljen mehanizem
prenosa hipotekarnih kreditov na
državno sponzorirane agencije.
77
Dodatno je treba pojasniti, da evropske banke v povprečju zagotavljajo
precej več kot polovico vseh kreditov
podjetjem in prebivalstvu, medtem
ko je ta delež za ameriške banke
zgolj 30 %. Na podlagi nanizanih
dejstev je mogoče ugotoviti, da se je
razdolževanje ameriških bank izvedlo z odprodajo finančnih naložb in
zmanjšanjem zadolžitve na finančnih
trgih. Evropske banke so bolj kot
ameriške odvisne od grosističnih
virov financiranja, izkazujejo višji
finančni vzvod in bodo zato v naslednjih obdobjih pod večjim pritiskom
glede razdolževanja. Tudi anketna
preverjanja evropskih bank4 potrjujejo omenjeno tezo: večina bank je
vgradila razdolževanje med ključne
strateške cilje zaradi zmanjševanja
tveganj (de-risking) in višjih kapitalskih zahtev regulatorja oziroma
trgov. V zvezi s tem se zastavlja
vprašanje, ali je mogoče ta proces
kontrolirati tako, da bo potekal brez
negativnih posledic na ponudbo
kreditov podjetjem in prebivalstvu.
Dilema ni navidezna, saj so tveganja
na obeh straneh. Hitro razdolževanje je ob dani strukturi portfelja
evropskih bank možno le z zmanjševanjem kreditne aktivnosti, ki vodi do
kreditnega krča in povezanih negativnih posledic. Da to ni nemogoče,
nakazujejo že podatki o dalj časa
zaostrenih standardih kreditiranja,
ki v povezavi z zmanjševanjem povpraševanja po kreditih lahko vplivajo
na kreditni krč. Po drugi strani pa
odlašanje s procesom razdolževanja
lahko sproži vprašanja o ustreznem
vrednotenju sredstev v bančnih
bilancah in posledično sproža nezaupanje vlagateljev v banke ter slabi
njihovo posredniško funkcijo. Proces
razdolževanja japonskih bank je
trajal predolgo in je zato povzročil
3
Financial Stability Review, ECB, May, 2013, str.
56.
4
Glej Risk Assessment of the European Banking
System, EBA, July 2013, str 16.
dodatne ekonomske stroške zaradi
prepočasnega prilagajanja. Prehitro
in nekontrolirano razdolževanje pa
prav tako lahko povzroči škodo podjetjem in prebivalstvu, ki so odvisni
od bančnih kreditov.
Povsem drugačno dinamiko ima razdolževanje bank v državah, ki imajo
finančne težave ali gospodarsko
nazadujejo. V teh primerih ciklični
dejavniki dajejo takt razdolževanju,
ki vključuje nujno in hitro čiščenje
bančnih bilanc kot prvi pogoj, da bi
bančni sektor lahko zopet opravljal
svojo primarno funkcijo. Vsako odlašanje razdolževanja (de-riskinga)
pomeni akumuliranje visokih stroškov
končne sanacije bančnega sistema.
Če je bilo do sredine leta 2012
razdolževanje v EU (merjeno s
finančnim vzvodom) predvsem na
račun povečevanja kapitala, poteka
v zadnjem času z zmanjševanjem
tveganjem prilagojene aktive (TPA),
medtem ko so celotna sredstva bank
ostala stabilna. Na prvi pogled gre
za protisloven proces, ki po razmisleku navaja na to, da so se evropske
banke osredotočile na »izkoriščanje
prostora«, ki ga dovoljuje regulativa
v zvezi z določanjem uteži za izračun kapitalske ustreznosti bank. Tu
so prakse bank raznolike: od tistih,
ki uporabljajo napredne metode in
izračunavajo uteži z uporabo lastnih
modelov (in praviloma izračunavajo
najmanjšo porabo kapitala), do drugih, ki še vedno uporabljajo standardni model, vendar se prisojene uteži
razlikujejo po državah. Slovenski
bančni sistem v povprečju uporablja
visoke uteži (razmerje med tvegano
aktivo in knjigovodsko vrednostjo
naložb – gostota tvegane aktive – je
med najvišjimi) in zato regulativno
»porablja« veliko kapitala. Po drugi
strani pa slovenski bančni sistem po
finančnem vzvodu (razmerje med
sredstvi in kapitalom) sodi med povprečje evropskih bank. V obdobju
2010–2012 so evropske banke
intenzivno spreminjale uporabo kapi-
Slika 1: Finančni vzvod bank v evrskem območju (sredstva/kapital)
Vir: ECB
talskih uteži, ki naj bi zagotavljale na
tveganjih temelječ izračun kapitala.
To je vzbudilo dvom o konsistentni
uporabi regulative tako pri nadzornikih kot tudi pri številnih kritikih uporabe kreditnih uteži, ki je nepregledna
in zato težje preverljiva.5
Evropske banke ocenjujejo, da bodo
do konca leta 2014 zmanjšale sredstva za 800 milijard EUR.6 Analitiki
menijo, da je razpon ocen zmanjšanja sredstev, upoštevajoč ključne dejavnike (ciklične, strukturne, kapitalske), lahko tudi precej večji, po drugi
strani pa relativizirajo te ocene z blažilnimi dejavniki. Med najpomembnejšimi omenjajo povečanje kapitala
bank, prevzem sredstev s strani
drugih bank in definirano zaporedje
skupin naložb, ki jih bodo prioritetno
zmanjševale (pecking order). Možnosti za povečanje kapitala bank
so zelo negotove zaradi dinamičnih
okoliščin, ki so povezane z bankami:
postavljanje enotnega evropskega
nadzora in mehanizma prestrukturiranja problematičnih bank, harmoniziranega sistema zavarovanja vlog,
napovedanih strukturnih sprememb
v bančništvu.7 Potencialni investitorji bodo pri investiranju v bančne
delnice vključili opisane negotovosti
v diskontne stopnje in vprašanje je,
kakšna bo ponudba bančnih delnic
ob takšnih pričakovanjih. Alternativa
78
je agresivno zmanjševanje tistih sredstev, ki so kapitalsko najbolj potratna
oziroma imajo najmanjši vpliv na
matična okolja bank. Podatki kažejo,
da so evropske banke doslej najbolj
zmanjševale izpostavljenosti do
drugih držav in nestrateške naložbe.
Več kot polovica tega zmanjšanja se
nanaša na države znotraj evrskega
območja, kar postavlja omejitve pri
zagotavljanju kreditov v državah, ki
so odvisne od tujih virov. Spremenjene poslovne politike mednarodnih
bank preusmerjajo svoje izpostave
na zbiranje depozitov na lokalnih
trgih perifernih držav, kar povzroča dvig obrestnih mer in dodaten
negativen impulz za kreditiranje.
Razne iniciative za blaženje preveč
agresivnih politik mednarodnih bank
do perifernih držav so bolj moralno
prepričevanje kot pa učinkovit ukrep
proti regionalno selektivnemu zmanjševanju sredstev.
V sedanjih kriznih razmerah v državah EU so tako povsem razumljivi
trendi umika zahodnoevropskih bank
iz financiranja drugih svetovnih regij
5
Več o tem glej v Haldane, (2012).
Financial Stability Report 2013, ECB, May 2013,
str. 57.
7
Gre za poročila različnih komisij, ki so jih
ustanovili v ta namen: Liikanenovo poročilo,
Vickersovo poročilo in Volckerjevo poročilo. Več o
tem glej v Vinals et. al., (2013).
6
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Slika 2: Delež bančnih kreditov v vseh kreditih podjetij
(vodoravna os, v %) in delež kreditov podjetjem v vseh kreditih
nebančnemu sektorju (pokončna os, v %)
Slovenija
30
Spain
Greece 25
Italy
Portugal
20
Large domestic corporate loan book Austria
15
France Germany
10
Ireland
Belgium
United States
United Kingdom
Small domestic corporate loan book
0
20
40
60
80
5
100
0
1
Vir: Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2012.
in iz financiranja drugih držav v
okviru EU, saj se želi čim večji del
razpoložljivih finančnih virov uporabiti za prehodno financiranje domačih deficitov. Takšno pristransko delovanje bank pri razdolževanju vodi k
dezintegraciji enotnega evropskega
bančnega trga in še dodatno destabilizira države uvoznice kapitala v
okviru EU. Po nekaterih ocenah naj
bi tako iz Italije in Španije v zadnjih
dveh kriznih letih prek tujih bank
odtekla sredstva v višini kar približno
35 % BDP.8 Nestandardne ukrepe
dolgoročnega refinanciranja ECB je
tako treba razumeti tudi kot način, da
se iz javnih virov začasno nadomesti
zasebne bančne vire financiranja
obrobnih evrskih držav. Vzpostavitev
evropske bančne unije pa naj bi že
na srednji rok ustvarila razmere za
zagotavljanje finančne stabilnosti
celotnega evrskega območja in za
odpornost evropskega modela čezmejnega bančništva na gospodarske
cikle v posameznih državah.
BV 11/2013
V začetku krize se je ocenjevalo, da
bodo zaradi pristranskega razdolževanja mednarodnih bančnih skupin
najbolj ogrožene države centralne in
vzhodne Evrope (CEE deleveraging
problem), kjer je pretežni del bančnega sektorja v lasti bank iz zahodne Evrope.9 Tuje banke so bančnim
sistemom teh držav v obdobju pred
krizo zagotavljale znanje, kapital in
dodatno financiranje iz tujine, ki se
za razdobje 2000–2008 ocenjuje
na približno 100 % BDP te regije.
V Sloveniji je prevladala nekoliko
drugačna bančna kombinacija z domačim (predvsem državnim) kapitalom, domačim znanjem in dodatnimi
tujimi viri. Po drugi strani pa je za
približno tretjino našega bančnega
sektorja značilna kombinacija CEE:
tuj kapital, tuje znanje in dodatni tuji
viri. Z vidika obsega slabih kreditov,
možnosti refinanciranja obveznosti
do tujine in zagotavljanja kapitalske
ustreznosti brez pomoči države razlika med domačimi in tujimi bankami
79
pri prenosu tujih prihrankov v Slovenijo skoraj ne bi mogla biti večja.10
Kako so se tuje banke odrezale po
finančni krizi na Sloveniji podobnih
hitro rastočih trgih, kadar so imele
prevladujoč delež? Predvsem so za
kapitalsko ustreznost svojih bank v
CEE poskrbele matične banke. V
prvem obdobju krize se je pokazalo,
da so bile tuje banke v nasprotju s
pričakovanji celo dejavnik stabilnosti
pri ohranjanju zunanjega financiranja teh držav.11 Po izbruhu krize evra
in krize javnega dolga perifernih
evrskih držav, ko so se pritiski po
razdolževanju bank v celotni Evropi
še dodatno povečali, pa se je to
pokazalo tudi v zmanjšanju kreditne
aktivnosti tujih bank v regiji CEE,
vendar zelo različno po državah. V
državah s pozitivno gospodarsko rastjo, nizkimi in stabilnimi deleži slabih
terjatev in visokimi profitnimi stopnjami v bančništvu tuje banke celo širijo
poslovanje, pri čemer pa se vedno
večji del financiranja zagotavlja iz
lokalnih virov. Trenutna ocena je, da
poglavitne ovire za rast kreditiranja v
teh državah niso na strani ponudbe,
vendar se lahko razmere hitro spremenijo, če bodo ukinjeni nestandardni ukrepi financiranja s strani ECB.12
Pri tem velja omeniti, da so bili povprečni donosi na kapital tujih bank v
8
Glej v CEE Banking Sector Report, Raiffeisen
Bank, (2013), str.10.
9
Številni analitiki so že ob začetku krize
opozarjali, da bi pretiran in nenaden umik
evropskih bank iz financiranja držav CEE zaradi
regulatornih ali kratkoročnih tržnih pritiskov lahko
imel uničujoče posledice za gospodarsko aktivnost
teh držav. (Glej na primer S. Gardó and R. Martin
(2010), Martin Brown et. Al. (2011), Erik Feyen
et. al. (2012)). Za usmerjanje in spremljanje tega
procesa razdolževanja v regiji CEE so na pobudo
Avstrije mednarodne finančne organizacije skupaj
z največjimi mednarodnimi bankami ustanovile celo
posebno koordinacijo (Vienna Initiative). To je po
svoje ironično, saj je avstrijski regulator med prvimi
začel omejevati poslovanje avstrijskih bank v tujini
na obseg sredstev, ki jih banke zberejo na lokalnih
trgih.
10
Za Slovenijo je razliko v poslovanju domačih in
tujih bank med krizo in po njej dobro dokumentirala
Banka Slovenije v vsakoletnih Poročilih o finančni
stabilnosti.
11
Glej na primer Berglöf E. et. al. (2009) in EBRD
Transition Report (2009).
12
Glej CESEE Deleveregaing Monitor (2012).
tej regiji za leto 2012 približno 15 %
do 16 %, donosi istih bank na trgih
razvitega dela Evrope pa komaj pozitivni.13 Večina trgov CEE je torej za
velike mednarodne bančne skupine
še vedno zelo zanimivih, vendar
Slovenije žal ni med njimi. Težko si je
trenutno predstavljati, da bi bile mednarodne skupine zainteresirane za
nakup slovenskih bank brez njihove
predhodne sanacije in konsolidacije
in dokler se ne izboljšajo obeti za
gospodarsko rast.
Na dinamiko procesa razdolževanja bank z zmanjševanjem sredstev bodo pomembno vplivali tudi
postopki povezani s prejeto državno
pomočjo in neugodne ciklične razmere v nekaterih perifernih državah,
ki delujejo tako prek zmanjšane
ponudbe kot tudi povpraševanja
po kreditih. Kar zadeva postopke
državne pomoči, lahko pričakujemo,
da bo pomemben del sredstev, ki
jih bodo morale banke dezinvestirati, pristal v portfeljih drugih bank.
Zanimivo vprašanje je, koliko bodo
taka nujna dezinvestiranja vplivala
na zmanjševanje cen oziroma potrebo po prevrednotenju tudi v drugih
bankah. Neugodne ciklične razmere
predstavljajo za nadzornike in banke
v teh okoljih največji izziv. Stagnacija ekonomske aktivnosti povzroča
poslabševanje kvalitete in potrebo
po prevrednotenju portfeljev bank,
kapitalske omejitve in s tem tudi omejitve pri kreditiranju. Po drugi strani
pa je zaradi ekonomske kontrakcije
tudi povpraševanje po kreditih
zmanjšano: podjetja in prebivalstvo
se razdolžujejo in odlagajo investicijske odločitve. Gre za okoliščine
»popolnega viharja«, ki zahtevajo
odločno ukrepanje (dokapitalizacijo
bank, prestrukturiranje podjetij) za
izhod iz negativne spirale.
Bojazen, da bo proces razdolževanja bank vplival na zmanjšano
kreditno aktivnost bank, je upravičena predvsem zaradi pritiska
finančnih trgov. Tržni udeleženci
Slika 3: Delež kreditov nebančnemu sektorju v bilančni vsoti (v %)
Vir: Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, April 2012.
prav tako želijo poslovati z manj
tveganimi institucijami in pri prilagajanju kapitalskih zahtev ne poznajo
prilagoditvenega obdobja. Podobna
je bila tudi reakcija Evropske bančne
agencije (EBA), ki je konec leta 2011
zahtevala od sistemsko pomembnih
bank najmanj 9 % prvovrstni kapital,
da bi trgom demonstrirale stabilnost
pred dodatnimi tveganji. Ta zahteva
pomeni v okoliščinah, ko je potreba
bank po razdolževanju očitna, še dodaten pritisk na omejevanje kreditiranja in zmanjševanje sredstev.14 Banke
morajo sedaj v skladu z usmeritvami
EBA na enoto sredstev vzdrževati
več kapitala. Poenostavljeno bi bilo
trditi, da je pičla kreditna aktivnost
evropskih bank med drugim posledica zahtev EBA po višjem kapitalu,
zagotovo pa ni le-ta prispevala k
lajšanju pritiskov v procesu razdolževanja bank. Morda je tudi zato ECB
intervenirala z dolgoročnima operacijama refinanciranja, da bi omilila
sicer upravičeno zahtevo regulatorja,
a sproženo v neprimernem trenutku.
3. Posebnosti razdolževanja
bank v Sloveniji
Geneza nevzdržne rasti slovenskega
bančnega sektorja do leta 2008 je
imela podobne vzroke kot v drugih
80
finančnih sistemih, dodaten pospešek
pa so slovenske banke dobile zaradi
nekaterih posebnosti, ki jih drugje ni
bilo. Slovenski bančni sistem je bil
že pred vključitvijo v EU in kasneje
v evrsko območje najpomembnejši
uvoznik tujih prihrankov, deloma tudi
na račun tečajne politike centralne
banke, ki je omogočala bankam
zamenjavo presežkov tuje valute
z rednimi operacijami zamenjave.
Banke so tuje prihranke uvažale v
obliki kreditov in jih v obliki kreditov
tudi posredovale naprej podjetjem.
Tuje direktne in portfeljske investicije
so bile ob obilici kreditnih sredstev, ki
so jih ponujale banke, za podjetja in
njihove lastnike nezanimive, še posebej ob dejstvu, da je pri nas potekal
drugi val privatizacij podjetij, ki je bil
večinoma financiran prav s krediti.
Če k temu dodamo še dodatno
likvidnost, ki jo je naš bančni sistem
dobil z zapadlostjo več kot 3 milijard
blagajniških zapisov ob vključitvi v
evrsko območje, in nizke oziroma
negativno realne obrestne mere,
potem lahko ugotovimo, da je bil
scenarij »popolnega viharja« pri nas
še bolj izpopolnjen. Posledica take-
13
Glej v CEE Banking Sector Report, Raiffeisen
Bank, (2013), str. 10.
14
Več o tem v Jašovič (2012).
BV 11/2013
ga scenarija je, da imamo v Sloveniji
opravka s podjetniškim sektorjem, ki
je med bolj odvisnimi od bančnega
financiranja, in na drugi strani bančni
sektor, ki ima največji delež kreditov
nebančnemu sektorju (podjetjem)
v svoji bilanci (glej sliki 1 in 2). V
takih razmerah ima gospodarska
stagnacija uničujoč vpliv na kvaliteto
kreditnih portfeljev bank.
Slovenski bančni sektor ima nadpovprečen delež kreditov nebančnemu
sektorju (65,4 % konec junija 2013),
med katerimi prevladujejo krediti
podjetjem. Razdolževanje slovenskih
bank bo zato potekalo pretežno
prek zmanjševanja kreditov nebančnemu sektorju, zato ne preseneča
podatek, da se ta agregat krči
že tretje leto zapored. Posledice
negativne spirale so zato očitne:
negativna ekonomska rast, slabšanje
kreditnega portfelja bank, pritisk k
razdolževanju in zmanjševanje kreditov podjetjem vodijo v vse slabše
razmere v bančništvu, ki se kažejo
v naraščajočem deležu nedonosnih
terjatev. Prekiniti jo je mogoče z
dokapitalizacijo bank in očiščenjem
bančnih portfeljev, sočasnim prestrukturiranjem podjetij ter ponovnim
zagotavljanjem kreditov nebančnemu sektorju.
Za prvo razdobje razdolževanja
slovenskih bank je značilno, da so
bili sistemski ukrepi države relativno omejeni in da so bile banke
pri reševanju tega problema bolj
ali manj prepuščene same sebi in
svojim lastnikom, ki so izkazali le
omejen interes za dokapitalizacijo
bank. Pri velikih državnih bankah je
bila omejitev predvsem v začetnem
podcenjevanju resnosti težav in v
politični opredelitvi, da se ohrani
domače lastništvo. Pri manjših
zasebnih domačih bankah so se tudi
lastniki sami znašli v velikih finančnih
težavah, te banke pa zaradi majhnosti in tveganosti kreditnega portfelja
niso zanimive za tuje vlagatelje. Pri
tujih bankah pa so bile potrebe po
BV 11/2013
dokapitalizacijah bistveno manjše,
omejitve pri financiranju pa so izhajale iz razdolževanja matičnih bank
in slabih perspektiv našega bančnega trga glede na alternativne geografske lokacije. Intervencija države
je bila omejena in premalo odločna:
lajšanje likvidnostnih pritiskov z depoziti državne zakladnice, ki so bili
ponujeni vsem bankam, nezadostna
in pozna dokapitalizacija državnih
bank ter jamstvena shema za kredite
podjetjem, ki ni bila pogojena z
nujnim restrukturiranjem podjetij.
Pritiski na refinanciranje domačih
bank so bili sicer omiljeni, pretežno
tudi s pomočjo dolgoročnega kredita
pri ECB, zaradi katerega sodimo
Evropske
banke bodo
do konca leta
2014 zmanjšale
sredstva za 800
milijard EUR.
med štiri najbolj zadolžene bančne
sisteme pri centralni banki. Omenjeni
ukrepi so zagotovili slovenskemu
bančnemu sektorju potreben čas za
nujno razdolžitev (de-risking), ki pa
ni bil izkoriščen.
V takšnih razmerah, ko so banke
prepuščene same sebi, se problem
kapitalske ustreznosti lahko rešuje
predvsem z notranjimi ukrepi, ki
zmanjšujejo TPA ali povečujejo kapital banke ali oboje hkrati. Pri tem posamezne banke delujejo predvsem
kot delniške družbe, ki zasledujejo
svoje lastne interese, širše posledice
na ekonomsko aktivnost pa niso in
ne morejo biti primarna skrb bančnih uprav niti v državnih bankah. V
81
stresnih finančnih razmerah tudi interesi lastnikov lahko postanejo zelo
kratkoročno naravnani, uprave bank
pa soočene z ultimatom, da prilagodijo obseg poslovanja zmanjšanemu
obsegu kapitala zaradi slabitev.
Večkrat gre tudi za ukrepe, ki škodijo
dolgoročni uspešnosti banke in njeni
sposobnosti zagotavljanja kapitala
iz lastnega poslovanja v bodoče.
Banke tako z agresivnim prilagajanjem poslovanja vse slabši kapitalski
ustreznosti škodujejo ne le svojim
komitentom in splošni gospodarski
aktivnosti, ampak z nekaterimi ukrepi
celo svojim lastnim dolgoročnim
interesom.
Problemi s kapitalsko ustreznostjo
povzročijo, da začnejo banke bolj intenzivno iskati notranje rezerve prek
znižanja operativnih stroškov, boljšega upravljanja s tveganji, opuščanja
slabo donosnih produktov, storitev in
aktivnosti ter sprememb v poslovnem
modelu. Tovrstni ukrepi krepijo kapital prek tekočega rezultata ali pa
znižujejo uteži pri ugotavljanju TPA,
vendar glede na resnost razmer niso
zadostni ali pa dajejo rezultate šele
s časovnim zamikom. Zato so potrebni tudi takojšnji in odločni posegi v
bilanco stanja. Možnosti za obsežna
zmanjšanja naložb domačih državnih in zasebnih bank so bile že v izhodišču relativno omejene, saj je bilo
v bilancah le malo primernih naložb,
tržne razmere za njihovo prodajo
pa neugodne. Najbolj učinkovite za
izboljšanje kapitalske ustreznosti so
prodaje odvisnih finančnih družb.
Nekatere domače banke v težavah
so tako uspele prodati svoje deleže v
družbah za upravljanje in v zavarovalnicah, medtem ko so bili poskusi
prodaje omejenega števila hčerinskih
bank v Sloveniji in v tujini neuspešni.
Tudi možnosti za prodajo tržnih
naložb, zaseženega finančnega premoženja in nepremičnin ter zdravih
bančnih terjatev so bile zaradi slabih
tržnih razmer zelo otežene. Možnosti
za nakup zavarovanj za obstoječi
kreditni portfelj na trgu ali pri državi
pri nas, v nasprotju z drugimi bolj
razvitimi in proaktivnimi državami
v EU, praktično ni bilo. Kreditna in
tržna tveganja so tako v času krize in
upada ekonomske aktivnosti večinoma ostajala v bilancah bank in
neposredno vplivala na zniževanje
kapitalske ustreznosti.
Ko postane poglavitni cilj poslovanja banke vzdrževanje kapitalske
ustreznosti, v banki dokončno
prevlada regulatorna logika nad
ekonomsko logiko. Vsaka prodaja
pod knjižno vrednostjo ima poleg
vpliva na zmanjšanje TPA tudi vpliv
na zmanjšanje kapitala in včasih je
z vidika kapitalske ustreznosti bolje,
da se s tako naložbo ne zgodi nič,
kar bi pokvarilo trenutno sliko v bilancah. Po drugi strani je vsaka prodaja
naložbe nad knjižno vrednostjo z
vidika trenutne kapitalske ustreznosti
ugodna, ker znižuje TPA in hkrati
generira dodatni kapital, pa čeprav
je moč pričakovati še višjo ceno že v
bližnji prihodnosti. Podobna regulatorna logika prevlada tudi na strani
obveznosti pri predčasnem odkupu
podrejenih instrumentov z diskontom,
ki so ga že izvedle največje domače
banke. Realizirani enkratni dobički
so tako z vidika trenutne kapitalske
ustreznosti dobrodošli, saj povečajo
najbolj kvalitetne sestavine kapitala,
pa čeprav se obseg celotnega regulatornega kapitala pri tem zmanjšuje,
»striženje« investitorjev pa tudi še
dodatno zmanjšuje možnosti, da bi
se take banke lahko v bližnji prihodnosti dokapitalizirale ali financirale
na finančnih trgih. Pomemben način
ohranjanja kapitalske ustreznosti
je tudi odlašanje s slabitvami ter
podaljševanje kreditov komitentom v
težavah. Tako se reševanje nakopičenih finančnih težav le odlaga v prihodnost, ko bodo možne rešitve za
banko in komitenta verjetno še bolj
neugodne. V razmerah samosanacije bank ostane kot najpomembnejši
način zmanjšanja TPA zmanjševanja
kreditne izpostavljenosti do dobrih
komitentov, ki so še sposobni vračati
kredite. Gre torej za tipičen primer
»slabega« razdolževanja bank, ko je
večji del bančne bilance zamrznjen
v težko prodajljivih naložbah in
slabih terjatvah, kreditne omejitve pa
občutijo predvsem finančno zdrava
podjetja. Po drugi strani so takšne
banke še naprej dejansko podkapitalizirane in izpostavljene velikim
kreditnim, tržnim in likvidnostnim
tveganjem, stroški njihovega vedno
bolj omejenega financiranja so
visoki, prihodki pri znižanem obsegu
poslovanja pa upadajo hitreje, kot se
lahko znižujejo operativni stroški. Ker
gre za sistemsko pomembne banke
Slovenski bančni
sektor ima
nadpovprečen
delež kreditov
nebančnemu
sektorju.
ali za sistemsko pomemben del
bančnega sektorja, postane organizirana intervencija države kot varuha
finančne stabilnosti le še vprašanje
časa.
4. Sklepne misli
Slovenija se je šele v letu 2012
odločila, da se bo sistematično lotila
očiščenja sistemsko pomembnih
bank s prenosom slabih terjatev na
slabo banko in glede na potrebe
zagotovila tem bankam dovolj
dodatnega kapitala s strani države.15
Pri tem ji pozno ukrepanje nikakor ne
bo v pomoč, saj se v EU po izhodu
iz krize že vzpostavlja nov sistem
82
za reševanje bank, ki ga bo treba
upoštevati tudi pri nas in je deloma
že vgrajen v bančno zakonodajo.16
V okviru novih pravil za dodeljevanje državnih pomoči finančnim
institucijam bo treba zagotoviti, da
del bremen sanacije poleg lastnikov
prevzamejo tudi podrejeni upniki.17 V
pravice velikih deponentov in drugih
nezavarovanih navadnih upnikov se
torej zaenkrat še ne posega, medtem
ko je položaj lastnikov zaradi državnega lastništva naših sistemskih bank
dokaj nenavaden. Drugje v EU, kjer
je država reševala predvsem zasebne banke, so vrednosti prenesenih
slabih terjatev, ki določajo potreben
obseg državne dokapitalizacije in
tudi cene delnice ob dokapitalizaciji,
odločilne z vidika državnih pomoči,
pravičnosti porazdelitve bremen
in skupnih stroškov intervencije za
državo. Pri nas bo država v javnem
interesu reševala sistemsko pomembne državne banke, pri tem pa
»razlastila« predvsem sama sebe. V
okviru nastajanja enotnega evropskega bančnega nadzora bo treba
po večkratnih skrbnih pregledih
aktive naših sistemskih bank, pred
prenosom slabih terjatev, opraviti še
standardizirane preglede kvalitete
sredstev (AQR) in stresne teste, ki naj
bi povečali mednarodno kredibilnost
te operacije.
Zamude, ki so povzročene tudi od
zunaj, povzročajo dodatno škodo,
saj se finančne razmere v bankah in
podjetjih poslabšujejo, nihče pa ni v
vmesnem času pripravljen sprejemati
nobenih pomembnih odločitev. V
času priprav na sanacijo sistemskih
bank je bil sprožen še postopek nad-
15
Zakon o ukrepih Republike Slovenije za krepitev
stabilnosti bank (ZUKSB) predvideva za sanacijo
bank ustanovitev Družbe za upravljanje terjatev
bank (DUTB) kot sistemske »slabe banke«. Bistvo
sprejetega modela »slabe banke« je v prenosu
»slabega« premoženja banke na DUTB, ki v
zameno zagotovi banki nadomestilo v obliki
obveznic, za katere jamči RS.
16
Več o tem glej v M. Simoneti, J. Radež (2013).
17
Glej European Commission (2013).
BV 11/2013
ziranega prenehanja dveh manjših
bank z uporabo državnih sredstev,
ki so bila sicer prvotno predvidena
za sistemske banke. Ali so odgovorni
ugotovili, da so razmere že tako
resne in medsebojno prepletene,
da je že vsaka banka sistemsko
pomembna? Vprašanje, kakšen bo
potem skupni fiskalni strošek sanacije
bank in ali ga bo država sposobna
financirati brez uradne prošnje za
mednarodno pomoč, je tako še povsem odprto. Z vidika dobre izvedbe
projektov sanacije bank in podjetij
je to tudi precej vseeno. Ne glede
na vse zaplete bo treba napovedani
projekt sanacije bank zdaj izvesti do
konca. Za njegov pozitiven učinek
na gospodarsko aktivnost pa bo
bistveno, kako hitro bodo prestrukturirane slabe terjatve bank do
prezadolženih podjetij. V Sloveniji
namreč velja visoka odvisnost poslovanja bank od poslovanja podjetij:
brez sanacije podjetij ni dokončne
sanacije bank in nasprotno. Komu
bodo posojale očiščene in dokapitalizirane banke, če bodo podjetja
z dobrimi programi ostala še naprej
prezadolžena?
Prenos slabih terjatev na DUTB bo
sicer omogočil delno koncentracijo
terjatev do velikih dolžnikov na
tej instituciji, za katero veljajo tudi
nekatere zakonske izjeme, kar naj bi
omogočilo bolj učinkovito reševanje
problema prezadolženosti podjetij.
Toda velik del slabih terjatev bo ostal
v bilancah drugih bank in za sanacijo posameznih podjetij bo treba doseči koordinirano ravnanje številnih
bank upnic. Zato poleg individualnih
ukrepov za posamične banke predlagamo tudi linearne ukrepe, ki bi bili
vezani na pomembnejše dolžnike,
s čimer bi nastale močne spodbude za aktiven nastop vseh bank v
sistemu za aktivno prestrukturiranje
prezadolženih podjetij. Odprle bi se
tudi dodatne možnosti za uporabo
regulatorno neugodnih konverzij
bančnih terjatev z namenom poznejBV 11/2013
še prodaje dolžnika pod ugodnejšimi
pogoji.18 Tudi prezadolžena slovenska podjetja potrebujejo kapital, ki
ga na dolgi rok lahko v zadostnem
obsegu zagotovijo le tuji investitorji,
konverzije bančnih terjatev pa so le
pragmatičen vmesni korak do tega
cilja. Pri prenosih na slabo banko pa
se je treba zavedati, da so sredstva
države omejena. Če bodo predmet
prenosa predvsem terjatve do podjetij, ki so že v stečajnih postopkih, bo
pozitiven učinek za bančne bilance
izbranih sistemskih bank večji, učinek
na sanacijo podjetij pa zelo omejen.
Če bodo predmet prenosa predvsem
še »žive« terjatve do posameznih
pomembnih dolžnikov iz celotnega
bančnega sistema, pa bo neposredni
pozitivni učinek na bančne bilance
manjši, koristi za sanacijo podjetij pa
večje. Dilema je velika, vendar čiščenje bančnih bilanc brez pozitivnih
učinkov za razdolževanje podjetij za
Slovenijo gotovo ni prava pot.
Tuje banke, ki imajo vodilno vlogo
pri prestrukturiranju podjetij v državah CEE, ki so nam po nastanku,
globini in dolgotrajnosti gospodarske
krize dokaj podobne, so izvedle
široko medbančno konzultacijo o
pridobljenih izkušnjah pri upravljanju s slabimi terjatvami. Nastala so
priporočila za ravnanje bank in za
vzpostavitev ustreznega institucionalnega okolja za hitro in učinkovito
prestrukturiranje dolžnikov, ki so
zelo zanimiva tudi za slovenske
razmere.19 Predlaga se proaktiven,
kooperativen in celovit način s
številnimi ukrepi za odpravljanje
različnih ovir za aktivno prestrukturiranje slabih kreditov: ustanovitev
posebne skupine za koordinacijo
projekta, realno ovrednotenje slabih
terjatev in zavarovanj v bankah in
odprava bančnih regulatornih ovir.
Med slednjimi omenjajo možnosti za
neposreden prevzem zastavljenega
premoženja in korporacijske kontrole
nad dolžniki, ustanavljanje posebnih
družb za prestrukturiranje, izboljša83
nje postopkov izterjave, podpora
zunajsodnemu prestrukturiranju,
izboljšanje insolvenčnih postopkov,
izboljšanje dela sodišč, odprava
davčnih ovir in kolektiven pristop
bank do dolžnikov v okviru bančnega združenja. Priporoča se tudi, da
se država neposredno ne vmešava
v prestrukturiranje slabih terjatev,
ampak se omeji le na vzpostavitev
ustreznega okolja za iskanje zasebnih rešitev med bankami in dolžniki.
V Sloveniji bo zaradi državnega
lastništva bank in prenosa slabih
terjatev na osrednjo državno slabo
banko pristop že v osnovi precej
drugačen, vendar so glavne ovire v
institucionalnem okolju za učinkovito
izvedbo projekta prestrukturiranja
dolžnikov verjetno zelo podobne.
Banka Slovenije (2013). Poročilo o finančni
stabilnosti. Ljubljana: Banka Slovenije.
European Banking Authority (2013). Risk
Assessment of the European Banking
System., London: European Banking
Authority.
Berglöf, E., Korniyenko, Y., Plekhanov, A., &
Zettelmeyer, J. (2009). Understanding the
crisis in emerging Europe. EBRD Working
Paper No. 109. London: EBRD.
Brown, M., Lane, P. R. (2011). Debt
Overhang in Emerging Europe? The World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper
5784. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
Caballero, R., Hoshi, T., & Kashyap, A.
(2008). Zombie lending and depressed
restructuring in Japan. American Economic
Review, No 98(5).
CESEE Deleveraging Monitor, Vienna
Initiative, November 9, 2012.
European Commission (2013).
Communication from the Commission
on the Application, from 1 August
2013, of State Aid Rules to Support
Measures in Favour of Banks in the
Context of the Financial Crisis (»Banking
Communication«). Brussels: European
Commission.
European Central Bank (2013). Financial
18
Več o ekonomsko smiselni institucionalni povezavi
med sanacijo bank in podjetij glej v B. Jašovič, M.
Simoneti (2013) in M. Simoneti, B. Jašovič (2013)
19
Glej Working Group on NPLs in Central, Eastern
and Southestern Europe, Vienna Initiative, March
2012, in publikacije IMF in Svetovne banke: Yan
Liu and Christoph B. Rosenberg, (2013) in Jose M.
Garrido, (2012).
Stability Review. Frankfurt: European
Central Bank.
Feyen, E., Kibuuka, K., & Ötker-Robe,
I. (2012). Bank Deleveraging: Causes,
Channels, and Consequences for Emerging
Market and Developing Countries.
Policy Research Working Paper 6086.
Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
Gardó, S. & Martin, R. (2010). The impact
of the global economic and financial
crisis on central, eastern and southeastern Europe: A stock-taking exercise.
ECB, Occasional Paper series No. 114.
Frankfurt: ECB.
Garrido, J. M. (2012). Out-of-Court Debt
Restructuring. V A World Bank Study.
Washington D.C.: World Bank.
Haldane, A. (2012). The Dog and the
Frisbee. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City's 366thEconomic Policy Symposium,
Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
International Monetary Fund (2012).
Global Financial Stability Review.
Washington: D.C.: International Monetary
Fund.
Jašovič, B., & Simoneti, M. (2013, 14. maj).
Sanacija bank ter razdolževanje podjetij in
bank. Ljubljana: Časnik Finance.
Jašovič, B. (2012). Dokapitalizacija bank
in kreditna aktivnost. Bančni vestnik, 61
(11), 69 – 76.
Liu, Y. and Rosenberg, C. B. (2013).
Dealing with Private Debt Distress in the
Wake of the European Financial Crisis.
A Review of the Economics and Legal
Toolbox. IMF Working Paper. Washington
D.C.: IMF.
Raiffeisen Bank (2013). CEE Banking
Sector Report. Vienna: Raiffeisen Bank.
Ruscher, E., & Guntram, B. Wolff, G.
B. (2012). Corporate balance sheet
adjustment: stylized facts, causes and
consequences. European Commission,
Economic Papers 449. Brussels: European
84
Commission.
Simoneti, M., & Jašovič, B., Prestrukturiranje
podjetij s strani bank upnic: kako skupaj iz
blokade? Bančni vestnik, letnik 62, št. 7-8,
str. 9-17, julij-avgust 2013.
Simoneti, M. & Radež, J. (2013). Krizni
institucionalni okvir za prestrukturiranje
bank in podjetij: kako naprej? Podjetje in
delo, leto 39.
Tang, G. & Upper, C. (2010). Debt
reduction after crises. BIS Quarterly
Review, Basel: BIS.
Vienna Initiative (2012). Working
Group on NPLs in Central, Eastern and
Southestern Europe.
Vinals, J., Pazarbasioglu, C., Surti, J.,
Narain, A., Erbenova, M., & Chow, Julian
(2013). Act Local But Think Global: Can
the Volcker, Vickers, and Liikanen Structural
Measures Create a Safer Financial
System? IMF Staff Discussion Note.
Washington D.C.: IMF.
BV 11/2013
UDK 338.124.4(497.4):336.71
Zadolženost slovenske
ekonomije in kreditna vrzel
Marjan Hafner in Urška Lušina*
INDEBTEDNESS OF
SLOVENIAN ECONOMY
AND CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP
Slovenia is classified
among the most affected
Member States in the Euro
Area by the last financial
crisis, which according
to our estimates is also
a result of unfavorable
financial structure of the
Slovenian corporate sector.
The corporate sector is
above average dependent
on debt financing. Since
financial resources are
highly limited, enterprises
are forced to deal with
financial difficulties
connected with debt
repayments instead of
focusing on their core
business, which further
reduces economic activity.
Limited access to finance
even for the less indebted
Slovenian enterprises
due to the poor situation
in Slovenian banks also
significantly contributes
to the poor economic
situation. We find that the
lending activity in Slovenia
is highly pro-cyclical. In
the period of economic
expansion the privatesector credit-to-GDP gap
was positive, whereas
in the period of financial
crisis, especially since the
last quarter of 2009, it has
been negative and more
pronounced than in the
euro area.
S
lovenija se v zadnji finančni krizi uvršča med bolj prizadete države članice evrskega območja, kar je po naši oceni
tudi posledica neugodne finančne strukture slovenskega
gospodarstva. To je namreč nadpovprečno odvisno od
dolžniških virov financiranja. V času izredno omejenih virov financiranja se tako podjetja pretežno ukvarjajo le s finančnimi težavami
poveznimi z odplačevanjem dolgov, medtem ko je njihova osnovna
dejavnost potisnjena v ozadje, kar dodatno duši gospodarsko aktivnost. K slabim gospodarskim razmeram pa pomembno prispeva
tudi slabo stanje v slovenskih bankah, z omejevanjem dostopa do
virov financiranja tudi manj zadolženim gospodarskim subjektom.
Ugotavljamo, da je bila kreditna aktivnost v Sloveniji izrazito prociklična. V času konjunkture je bila kreditna vrzel pozitivna, v času
finančne krize pa je kreditna vrzel vse od zadnjega četrtletja leta
2009 negativna in bolj izrazita kot v evrskem območju.
Slovenska podjetja in NFI so v primerjavi z EMU nadpovprečno
zadolžena. Čeprav se je obseg kreditov, najetih pri domačih bankah, v obdobju od leta 2010 do leta 2012 precej znižal (za približno
12 %) in je le še za približno 5 % nad ravnijo iz leta 2007, je zadolženost slovenskega gospodarstva še vedno precej nad predkrizno
ravnijo. To je v prvi vrsti posledica občutnejšega krčenja kapitala v
podjetjih in NFI zaradi negativnih gibanj na kapitalskih trgih. Tudi
poslovni rezultati podjetij niso več dopuščali krepitve kapitalske
osnove slovenskega gospodarstva, kar je občutneje povečalo kazalnik zadolženosti slovenskega gospodarstva.
JEL G01 G21 G28 O1
* Marjan Hafner in Urška Lušina, Urad RS za makroekonomske analize in razvoj.
BV 11/2013
85
Slika 1: Zadolženost podjetij in NFI v Sloveniji in EMU
160
140
120
100
V%
80
60
40
2004
1
Podatki za druge države članice EMU se
nanašajo na leto 2011.
2
Vključena so samo podjetja, ki so v obdobju od
leta 2006 do leta 2011 imela finančne obveznosti
do bank. Samo ta podjetja predstavljajo tveganje
za slabšanje kakovosti bančne aktive. Preučevali
smo jo na podlagi individualnih podatkov iz bilance
stanja in izkaza poslovnega izida gospodarskih
družb v Sloveniji, ki jih zbira Agencija Republike
Slovenije za javnopravne evidence in storitve (v
nadaljevanju AJPES) za obdobje od 2006 do
2011. Ta baza vključuje vse gospodarske družbe
v Sloveniji, pri čemer so od leta prijave stečajnega
postopka dalje iz baze izključene vse gospodarske
družbe, ki so v stečajnem postopku, saj niso več
zavezane k oddaji zaključnih računov. Iz baze
smo izločili ekstremne vrednosti, pri katerih je bila
rast finančnih obveznosti podjetij do bank več kot
50.000-odstotna, in holdinge, saj bi nam lahko
ta podjetja popačila sliko dejanskega stanja na
področju kreditiranja slovenskih podjetij. Končni
vzorec za celotno bazo vsebuje 28.014 podjetij
s povprečnim štiriletnim časovnim horizontom (kar
pomeni 112.056 enot), ki so v obdobju 2006–
2011 v povprečju predstavljala 85,6 % finančnih
obveznosti do bank vseh gospodarskih družb, ki so
v bazi podatkov.
2006
2007
2008
Ostali dolg
2009
2010
EMU
Slovenija
EMU
Slovenija
EMU
Slovenija
EMU
Slovenija
EMU
Slovenija
EMU
Slovenija
EMU
Slovenija
2005
Krediti
2011
2012
Dolžniški vrednostni papirji
Vir: BS, Eurostat, preračuni UMAR.
Slika 2: Delež dolga v virih sredstev (v %), razmerje med dolgom in
EBITDA ter donosnost sredstev (ROA) podjetij zasebnega sektorja, v
obdobju 2006–2011
7
60
64.1
61.3
67.5
66.7
66.9 65.7
ROA (desna os)
6
50
5
40
4
30
3
20
8.0
10
9.8
8.6
12.5
12.5
11.4
2
1
0
0
-10
V%
70
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Delež dolga v virih sredstev
Dolg na EBITDA
-1
Vir: AJPES, preračuni UMAR.
Slika 3: Delež finančnih obveznosti do bank in poslovne obveznosti
do dobaviteljev v virih sredstev podjetij zasebnega sektorja, v
obdobju 2006–2011
40
30
33.7
34
35
33.6
34.5
30.8
27.7
25
V%
Zadolženost podjetniškega sektorja
v Sloveniji, ki ima finančne obveznosti do bank, merjena kot razmerje
med dolgom in obveznostmi do virov
sredstev, se v času krize ni bistveno
znižala. Dolg je tako predstavljal
približno dve tretjini vseh obveznosti
do virov sredstev. Več kot polovico
celotnega dolga podjetniškega
sektorja pa so predstavljale finančne
obveznosti do bank, ki so v času
krize znašale okrog 34 % vseh obveznosti do virov sredstev. Pomembne
so tudi obveznosti do dobaviteljev,
a se je njihov delež v zadnjih letih
nekoliko znižal, kar je po naši presoji
posledica manjšega obsega poslovanja. V strukturi finančnih odhodkov
podjetij, ki imajo finančne obveznosti
do bank, prevladujejo odhodki iz
posojil, prejetih od bank (v letu 2011
EMU
Slovenija
0
EMU
20
Zadolženost podjetij,2
ki so imela finančne
obveznosti do bank
Slovenija
Celotna zadolženost podjetij,
merjena kot razmerje med celotnim
dolgom in kapitalom, je bila tako
leta 2012 na ravni okrog 130 %, kar
je sicer za približno 10 o. t. manj kot
leta 2011. Bolj zadolžena od slovenskih so le še podjetja in NFI v Grčiji,
Italiji in Španiji.1
20
15
14.4
14
13
12.1
12.3
11.7
10
5
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Finančne obveznosti do bank v virih sredstev
Poslovne obveznosti do dobaviteljev v virih sredstev
86
BV 11/2013
Analiza zadolženosti podjetij
po velikosti4
Najbolj so zadolžena mikro, najmanj pa velika podjetja. Pri mikro
podjetjih zadolženost, merjena kot
delež dolga v virih sredstev, presega
80 % in se v času krize ni občutneje
znižala. Mala in srednja podjetja
so nekoliko manj zadolžena, delež
dolga v virih sredstev se giblje okrog
70 %. Prva so svojo zadolženost v
času krize konstantno zniževala. Ta
je bila leta 2011 za 3,3 o. t. nižja
kot pred krizo. Srednja podjetja pa
so zadolženost v prvem letu krize
najprej povišala, nato pa so jo začela zmanjševati. Njihova zadolženost
je bila leta 2011 za 3,5 o. t. nižja
kot pred krizo. Daleč najmanj so zadolžena velika podjetja, pri katerih
delež dolga dosega le dobro polovico njihovih virov sredstev in je v času
krize upadel za 1,3 o. t. Glede na
razmerje med dolgom in EBITDA so
bila najbolj zadolžena mikro podjetja, ki so imela vrednost kazalnika
26, najmanj pa velika podjetja, ki
so imela vrednost kazalnika na ravni
okrog 7.
BV 11/2013
Slika 4: Delež finančnih obveznosti do bank v virih sredstev
po ročnosti in njihova rast po velikostnih razredih v podjetjih
zasebnega sektorja, v letih 2008 in 2011
2008
2011
Delež zadolževanja po ročnosti
KR
DR
Skupaj
KR
DR
Skupaj
KR
Srednja p. (51–250)
Velika p. (>250)
DR
Skupaj
KR
Mikro p. (<5)
Mala p. (6–50)
DR
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
Skupaj
V%
so imela podjetja 1,9-odstotni delež
teh odhodkov v prihodkih), precej
manj pa je odhodkov povezanih z
drugimi viri financiranja (posojila, ki
jih prejmejo od družb v skupini in z
izdajanjem obveznic). Delež odhodkov od posojil, prejetih od bank, se
je sicer v času krize nekoliko znižal,
a je bilo znižanje precej skromno
in bi po naši presoji lahko bilo
večje glede na intenzivnost zniževanja osrednje obrestne mere ECB.
Finančni odhodki od posojil, prejetih
od bank, so tako dosegali okrog
2 % prihodkov od podjetij, kar je za
približno 0,5 o. t. manj od najvišje
ravni iz leta 2008. Visoko ostaja tudi
razmerje med dolgom in EBITDA,3 ki
kaže na (ne)sposobnost podjetij za
odplačevanje dolgov, ki je bilo v letu
2011 na ravni 11,4.
2008
2011
Rast dolga po ročnosti
Mikro, mala in srednja podjetja so
najbolj odvisna od bančnih kreditov
in ravno te skupine imajo močno
omejen dostop do tovrstnega načina
financiranja. V teh treh skupinah
predstavljajo finančne obveznosti
do bank v povprečju 38 % virov
sredstev, medtem ko je pri velikih
podjetjih ta delež v povprečju
25-odstoten. V času krize so mikro,
mala in srednja podjetja znižala
delež zadolževanja prek bank, medtem ko se je le-ta pri velikih podjetjih
še celo za malenkost okrepil (za 0,4
o. t.). Slednje je posledica upada
obsega virov sredstev, ki je bil leta
2011 malenkost višji od upada
finančnih obveznosti do bank (ta
je bil skoraj pol nižji kot pri drugih
podjetjih). Še naprej se krepi delež
dolgoročnih finančnih obveznosti5
do bank. Po letu 2008 je v vseh
skupinah podjetij prišlo do krepitve
dolgoročnih finančnih obveznosti do
bank. To je po naši presoji predvsem
posledica prestrukturiranja kratkoročnega dolga v dolgoročnega.
Banke so tako blažile likvidnostne
pritiske na podjetja.
87
po izvozni usmerjenosti6
Analiza zadolženosti podjetij,
merjena kot razmerje med dolgom in
obveznostmi do virov sredstev, glede
na njihovo izvozno usmerjenost,
je pokazala, da so podjetja, ki so
usmerjena na domači trg, bolj zadolžena. V obdobju krize se je sicer
znižala zadolženost tako neizvoznim
(za 1 o. t.) kot tudi izvoznim podjetjem (za 2,8 o. t.), vendar je bila
dinamika različna. Pri izvoznikih se
3
EBITDA je določen kot dobiček/izguba iz
poslovanja, povečan za amortizacijo.
4
V nadaljevanju prikazujemo rezultate analize
zadolženosti slovenskih podjetij, ki so imela
finančne obveznosti do bank po velikosti. Mikro
podjetja imajo do 5 zaposlenih, mala od 6 do
50, srednja od 51 do 250, velika pa nad 250
zaposlenih. V celotni bazi imamo 58 % mikro, 34
% malih, 6 % srednjih in 2 % velikih podjetij. Vseh
zaposlenih je v povprečju 316.276, in sicer jih
je v mikro podjetjih v povprečju 13.815 (4 %), v
malih podjetjih okrog 68.456 (22 %), v srednjih
podjetjih okrog 81.440 (26 %), v velikih podjetjih
pa 152.565 (48 %).
5
Obseg dolgoročnih finančnih obveznosti do bank
se je sicer v letu 2011 zniževal, a je bilo znižanje
manjše kot pri kratkoročnih obveznostih.
6
Izvozno usmerjene so družbe, v katerih prihodki
od prodaje na tujih trgih presegajo prihodke od
prodaje na domačem trgu. V celotni bazi imamo
10 % izvozno usmerjenih in 90 % na domači trg
usmerjenih družb, slednje pa predstavljajo okrog
65 % dodane vrednosti vseh gospodarskih družb,
ki so imele finančne obveznosti do bank.
Slika 5: Delež finančnih obveznosti do bank v virih sredstev in rast
dolga po izvozni usmerjenosti podjetij zasebnega sektorja, v letih
2008 in 2011
40
Izvozniki
Neizvozniki
30
V%
20
10
0
2008
2011
2008
Delež zadolževanja po ročnosti
KR
DR
Skupaj
KR
DR
Skupaj
KR
DR
Skupaj
KR
DR
-20
Skupaj
-10
2011
Rast dolga po ročnosti
Slika 6: Delež finančnih obveznosti do bank in poslovnih obveznosti
do dobaviteljev v virih sredstev, v obdobju 2009–2011
45
Predelovalne dejavnosti
Gradbeništvo
Trgovina
Nepremičnine
40
35
30
V%
je zadolženost v letih 2010 in 2011
že nekoliko okrepila, kar povezujemo predvsem z oživljanjem izvoznih
trgov. Rast zadolženosti pri izvoznikih je pretežno posledica prirasta
obveznosti do dobaviteljev, medtem
ko so podjetja v celotnem obdobju
krize zmanjševala obseg bančnih
posojil. Zadolženost neizvoznikov
se je v prvih dveh letih krize najprej
krepila (za skoraj 1 o. t.) in se šele v
letu 2011 znižala (za skoraj 2 o. t.).
Zniževanje zadolženosti pri neizvoznikih je tako posledica manjšega
obsega bančnih posojil kot tudi
manjšega obsega obveznosti do dobaviteljev. Zadolženost, merjena kot
razmerje med dolgom in EBITDA, se
je pri izvoznikih že leta 2010 znižala
na predkrizno raven (7,2), leta 2011
pa se je še za malenkost znižala
(6,9). Pri neizvoznikih je še vedno za
dobro četrtino višja kot leta 2008,
ko je bila na ravni 11,2.
Neizvozniki so tudi bolj odvisni od
bančnega financiranja. Delež finančnih obveznosti do bank je tako za
dobrih 8 o. t. višji kot pri izvoznikih.
V letu 2011 se je zaustavilo tudi dolgoročno kreditiranje neizvoznikov,
medtem ko so pri izvoznikih dolgoročne finančne obveznosti do bank
še vedno naraščale, a je bil njihov
delež kljub temu precej nižji kot pri
neizvoznikih.
25
20
15
10
5
0
2009
2010
2011
Fin. obv. do bank v virih sredstev
2009
2010
2011
Obv. do dobaviteljev v virih sredstev
po dejavnostih7
Analiza zadolževanja zasebnega
sektorja po dejavnostih kaže, da so
bila v obdobju 2006–2011 najbolj
zadolžena podjetja v dejavnostih
finančnega posredništva, gradbeništva, trgovine in poslovanja z nepremičninami, najemom in poslovnimi
storitvami (v nadaljevanju nepremičnine).8 Delež dolga v virih sredstev
se je v obdobju pred krizo (2006–
2008) povečeval v vseh panogah, v
letih 2009–2011 pa je bilo gibanje
zadolženosti precej neenotno.
Znižala se je v dejavnostih nepremičnin, gradbeništva, predelovalnih
dejavnostih, medtem ko so se v drugih dejavnostih prirasti zadolženosti
precej umirili. Eden izmed vzrokov
za zniževanje zadolženosti v najbolj
zadolženih dejavnostih je tudi
propadanje podjetij iz teh dejavnosti (prijava stečajnega postopka),
zaradi česar ta podjetja od začetka
stečajnega postopka niso več oddala zaključnih računov in od tega leta
dalje niso zajeta v bazi podatkov.
To ne pomeni manjšega pritiska teh
88
podjetij do bank, saj terjatve do teh
podjetij ostajajo v bančnih bilancah,
obenem pa banke zanje okrepljeno oblikujejo dodatne oslabitve in
rezervacije. Banka Slovenije tako v
Poročilu o finančni stabilnosti (2013,
7
Zaradi večje konsistentnosti vzorca so podatki
razvrščeni po SKD 2002.
8
Poleg teh bolj zadolženih dejavnosti smo
nekoliko podrobneje analizirali tudi predelovalne
dejavnosti, ki predstavljajo pomemben del
slovenskega gospodarstva. Delež zajema v
finančnem posredništvu je izredno skromen, saj v
bazi ni podatkov za banke niti za zavarovalnice,
ki predstavljajo pretežen del dejavnosti. Zaradi
tega finančnega posredništva nismo podrobneje
analizirali.
BV 11/2013
BV 11/2013
15
150
10
100
5
50
0
0
V%
Slika 7: Razmerje med dolgom zasebnega sektorja in BDP in
njegov trend za Slovenijo (levo) ter primerjava dolžniških vrzeli za
Slovenijo in EMU
Q1 12
Q1 11
Q1 10
Q1 06
Q1 09
-100
Q1 08
-10
Q1 07
-50
Q1 05
-5
Q1 04
V o.t.
str. 65) ugotavlja, da med nedonosnimi terjatvami bank z velikim
in naraščajočim deležem izstopajo
nedonosne terjatve do podjetij v
stečajnih postopkih. Teh terjatev je
bilo marca za 2,6 mrd EUR oziroma
48 % vseh nedonosnih terjatev do
nefinančnih podjetij v primerjavi
z 38 % v decembru 2011. V vseh
razvrščenih terjatvah do nefinančnih
podjetij predstavljajo podjetja v
stečaju 11,7-odstotni delež.
Razmerje med dolgom in EBITDA,
ki kaže na sposobnost podjetij za
odplačevanje dolgov, se je v času
krize predvsem v najbolj zadolženih
dejavnostih močno povečalo, kar
kaže na njihove povečane težave z
odplačevanjem zapadlih obveznosti. Krepitev je posledica tega, da
se je v obdobju 2009–2011 obseg
prostega denarnega toka znižal
skoraj za petino.9 Leta 2011 se je
razmerje med dolgom in EBITDA v
nekoliko podrobneje analiziranih
dejavnostih gibalo na ravni med
7 (predelovalne dejavnosti) in 56
(gradbeništvo).
Med izpostavljenimi dejavnostmi
imata največji delež finančnih
obveznosti do bank v virih sredstev
dejavnosti gradbeništva in nepremičnin. V gradbeništvu se je še celo
nekoliko povečal, medtem ko se je
celotna zadolženost v tej dejavnosti
zaradi manjšega deleža obveznosti do dobaviteljev10 znižala. Večji
delež finančnih obveznosti do bank
pa je predvsem posledica močnega
krčenja virov sredstev, medtem ko
je bilo znižanje obsega finančnih
obveznosti do bank nižje (približno
15-odstotno).11
Struktura ročnosti zadolževanja se
je v vseh izpostavljenih dejavnostih
s krizo začela spreminjati v prid
dolgoročnega zadolževanja razen v
gradbeništvu, kjer še naprej prevladujejo kratkoročni krediti, kljub stalni
rasti deleža dolgoročnih kreditov.
V nasprotju s preteklimi leti pa je v
letu 2011 prišlo tudi do zniževanja
Razmerje med dolgom ZS in BDP – SLO (desna os)
Trend – SLO (desna os)
Dolžniška vrzel – SLO (leva os)
Dolžniška vrzel – EMU (leva os)
Vir: BS, ECB, SURS, preračuni UMAR. Opomba: ZS - zasebni sektor.
obsega dolgoročnih finančnih obveznosti do bank, kar je po naši presoji
posledica tega, da so banke zelo
omejile prestrukturiranje kratkoročnih
kreditov v dolgoročne; njihovo znižanje pa je še vedno na precej nižji
ravni kot pri kratkoročnih.
Dolžniška vrzel
zasebnega sektorja
Dolžniška vrzel zasebnega sektorja
(angl. credit-to-GDP gap) je instrument makrobonitetnega nadzora12
nad finančnim sistemom posamezne
države ali skupine držav. Prikazuje
spreminjanje sistemskega tveganja
v času (angl. time-varying systemic
risk) in je pomemben z dveh vidikov.
Prvi je zgodnje odkrivanje morebitnih
kopičenj neravnovesij in ranljivosti, tako da bi lahko že v obdobju
gospodarske in finančne ekspanzije
vzpostavili mehanizme in sprejeli
določene ukrepe, ki bi preprečili
pretirano krčenje v času finančnih in
gospodarskih kriz. Drugi vidik pa je
89
povezan z nakazovanjem, kdaj naj
bi se kriza končala in se bo tako v
gospodarstvo kot tudi na finančne
trge vrnila določena vzdržna rast
ter ne bo več potrebe po različnih
preventivnih mehanizmih in ukrepih.
Raziskave kažejo,13 da so kazalniki,
ki prikazujejo prekomerno rast dolga, dober napovedovalnik prihodnjega tveganja nezmožnosti poplačila
kredita s strani posojilojemalcev.
Bank of England (2011) v svoji študiji
sicer opozarja, da se ti kazalniki
izkažejo kot dober napovedovalnik
prihodnjih gibanj v času konjunkture,
9
Obseg EBITDA se je v prvih dveh letih krize
zniževal (predvsem leta 2009), v letu 2011 pa se je
zvišal za skoraj 6 %.
10
Njihov pomen je v primerjavi z drugimi
dejavnostmi še vedno razmeroma velik.
11
Krčenje vseh vrst virov sredstev je po naši oceni
tudi posledica propada nekaterih večjih gradbenih
podjetij, ki zato niso več vključena v bazo
podatkov.
12
Makrobonitetni nadzor (angl. macroprudential
supervision) preprečuje finančno nestabilnost kot
posledico makroekonomskega razvoja in razvoja v
celotnem finančnem sistemu.
13
Borio in Lowe, 2002 in 2004; Derehmann, M.,
Borio, C., Gambacorta, L., Jiménez, G., Trucharte,
C., 2010; Schularick in Taylor, 2012.
medtem ko se nagibajo k zaostajanju v času krize, tako da je treba biti
previden pri njihovi uporabi. Kljub
temu pa je baselski odbor za bančni
nadzor predlagal uvedbo rednega
spremljanja dolžniške vrzeli zasebnega sektorja kot osnovnega vodila za
kalibracijo in uvedbo proticikličnih
kapitalskih blažilnikov v skladu s
sporazumom Basel III.
Dolžniška vrzel zasebnega sektorja je razlika, izražena v odstotnih
točkah, in sicer med kazalnikom, ki
meri razmerje med dolgom zasebnega sektorja in BDP, ter njegovim
dolgoročnim trendom. Za izračun
slednjega je baselski odbor za
bančni nadzor priporočil uporabo
enostranskega Hodrick-Prescottovega filtra14 s parametrom za glajenje
v višini 400.00015 (za podrobnosti
glede izračuna glej Basel Committe
on Banking Supervision, 2010). Na
ravni EU pa je začel izračunavati
dolžniško vrzel tudi evropski odbor
za sistemska tveganja (angl. European Systemic Risk Board, ESRB),
ki jo uporablja kot enega izmed
kazalnikov pri ocenjevanju makroekonomskih tveganj. Njihovi rezultati
se razlikujejo od naših zaradi razlik
pri opredelitvi mere za dolg, kjer
oni uporabljajo ožjo opredelitev (tj.
dolžniške vrednostne papirje in posojila nefinančnih družb), ter zaradi
uporabe različnega filtra za izračun
dolgoročnega trenda (za podrobnejšo razlago uporabljenega filtra
glej Alessi in Detken, 2011). Kljub
temu pa tudi rezultati ESRB kažejo
pozitivno dolžniško vrzel v Sloveniji,
a je ta manjša.
Ocenjujemo, da je v Sloveniji prišlo
do prekomernega kopičenja dolga
predvsem v obdobju od drugega
četrtletja leta 2007 do vključno tretjega četrtletja leta 2009. Razmerje
med dolgom zasebnega sektorja in
BDP je bilo v povprečju za približno
3,8 o. t. nad dolgoročno trendno
oziroma »vzdržno« ravnijo. K
pozitivni dolžniški vrzeli v letu 2009
je največ prispevalo izrazito realno
krčenje gospodarske aktivnosti
(-7,8 %), saj je bil kreditni tok v tem
letu že precej skromen. Prekomerna
kreditna aktivnost je bila značilna
predvsem za leti 2007 in 2008, ko
smo tudi presegli mejno vrednost
za kazalnik zadolževanja zasebnega sektorja (15 % BDP), ki jo je
določila evropska komisija in jo le-ta
uporablja za ugotavljanje makroekonomskih neravnovesij. V omenjenih letih je prihajalo predvsem do
prekomernega kreditiranja nefinančnih podjetij, za katera se je kasneje
izkazalo, da niso bila sposobna
servisirati takega obsega dolga, ki
Bolj zadolžena
od slovenskih so
le še podjetja v
Grčiji, Italiji in
Španiji.
je bil predvsem v primeru na domači
trg usmerjenih podjetij marsikdaj
ekonomsko neutemeljen. Za slovenska gospodinjstva pa je bilo značilno, da so le zmerno sodelovala
pri napihovanju kreditnega balona
(največ leta 2007, pa še takrat le za
okrog 5 %). Ugotavljamo, da se je v
letu 2012 negativna dolžniška vrzel
ohranila na visoki ravni, kar je posledica še ostrejšega kreditnega krča
(leta 2012 je bila rast kreditov -4,3
%) in nizke gospodarske aktivnosti.
To močno vpliva tudi na investiranje
dobro stoječih izvozno usmerjenih
in tehnološko zahtevnejših podjetij
ter s tem na nadaljnje poglabljanje
gospodarske in finančne krize.
Naši izračuni tudi nakazujejo,
da je dolžniška vrzel v Sloveniji v
90
tem obdobju presegala povprečje
EMU, kjer je prišlo do prekomernega kopičenja dolga predvsem v
obdobju od tretjega četrtletja leta
2005 do vključno tretjega četrtletja
leta 2009. Razmerje med dolgom
zasebnega sektorja in BDP je bilo v
tem obdobju v povprečju za približno 2 o. t. nad dolgoročno ravnijo.
Tudi v EMU je bila v letu 2009
pozitivna dolžniška vrzel zaradi
skromne kreditne aktivnosti in krčenja gospodarske aktivnosti, ki sta bili
realno za skoraj polovico manjši kot
v Sloveniji (-4,4 %).
Sklep
Prezadolženost slovenskega gospodarstva in slabo stanje v slovenskem
bančnem sistemu sta dva izmed
ključnih razlogov za pričakovanje
nadaljnjega krčenja gospodarske
aktivnosti, ki je med najizrazitejšimi
v evrskem območju.16 Ugotavljamo,
da so slovenska podjetja na eni
strani prezadolžena, a na drugi
strani je v zadnjih letih zabeležena
negativna kreditna vrzel, kar kaže,
da je kreditna aktivnost v Sloveniji
tudi glede na trenutne gospodarske
razmere preskromna in si rezultati
na prvi pogled celo nasprotujejo.
Avtorja meniva, da bi bila za normalnejše funkcioniranje gospodarstva
potrebna takšna kreditna aktivnost,
ki bi bila usmerjena predvsem v tista
manj zadolžena podjetja, ki tudi v
tej krizi vidijo poslovne priložnosti, a
jih zaradi omejenih virov financiranja
ne morejo izkoristit v celoti, kar še
dodatno duši gospodarsko aktivnost. Na izredno pomembno vlogo
dolžniškega financiranja v prihodnje
14
Enostranski Hodrick-Prescottov filter za izračun
enostranskega dolgoročnega trenda uporablja
samo podatke, ki so na voljo do določene točke v
času, ko se odločimo za izračun samega trenda.
15
Implicitno se predpostavlja, da je dolžina
kreditnega cikla štirikrat daljša od dolžine
poslovnega cikla.
16
Več glej UMAR (2013) in European Commission
(2013).
BV 11/2013
pa kaže tudi struktura slovenskega
gospodarstva, kjer prevladujejo
mala in srednja podjetja, ki imajo
dostop do drugih virov financiranja
precej omejen.
Z uveljavitvijo ukrepov za sanacijo
slovenskega bančnega sistema in
vzpostavitev normalnejše finančne
in lastniške strukture slovenskega
gospodarstva že močno zamujamo.
Ugotavljamo, da se zadolženost
slovenskega gospodarstva v zadnjih
letih ni bistveno znižala kljub temu,
da so podjetja in NFI od konca leta
2009 do julija 2013 zmanjšala
obseg kreditov pri domačih bankah
za okrog 3,6 mrd EUR, prav tako pa
se še naprej izrazito poslabšujejo
razmere v slovenskem bančnem sis-
BV 11/2013
temu, kar močno poglablja težave v
slovenskem gospodarstvu. Zato brez
hitre izvedbe predvidenih ukrepov
za sanacijo bančnega sistema, v
okviru tudi drugih strukturnih reform,
ne moremo pričakovati trajnejšega
in trdnejšega okrevanja slovenskega
gospodarstva.
Literatura in viri/References:
Alessi, L., Detken, C.. (2011). Quasi real
time early warning indicators for costly
asset price boom/bust cycles: a role for
global liquidity. European Journal of
Political Economy, Vol. 27, No. 3.
Banka Slovenije (2013). Poročilo o finančni
stabilnosti. Ljubljana.
Bank of England (2011). Instruments of
macroprudential policy. A Discussion
Paper. London.
Basel Committe on Banking Supervision
91
(2010). Guidance for national authorities
operating the countercyclical capital buffer.
Basel.
Borio, C. in Lowe, P. (2002). Asset prices,
financial and monetary stability: exploring
the nexus. BIS Working Paper no.114.
Borio, C. in Lowe, P. (2004). Securing
sustainable price stability: should credit
come back from the wilderness?. BIS
Working Paper no.157.
Derehmann, M., Borio, C., Gambacorta,
L., Jiménez, G., Trucharte, C. (2010).
Countercyclical capital buffers: exploring
options. BIS Working Paper no. 317.
European Systemic Risk Board (2013).
ESRB Risk Dashboard. Frankfurt.
European Commission (2013). European
Economic Forecast-Spring 2013.
Schularick, M. Taylor, A. (2012). Credit
booms gone bust: monetary policy,
leverage cycles and financial crises, 18702008. American Economic Review.
UMAR (2013). Jesenska napoved
gospodarskih gibanj 2013. Ljubljana.
UDK 336.71:347.738:330.101.54
Macroeconomic implications
of banks and corporate
sector deleveraging
MACROECONOMIC
IMPLICATIONS OF BANKS
AND CORPORATE SECTOR
DELEVERAGING
This paper reviews the
overall balance sheet
adjustments in the
corporate and banking
sectors in the euro area
during the current crisis
and addresses their
macroeconomic and
policy implications. The
strong reversal of crossborder flows in the euro
area and policy response
to the crisis has led to
financial fragmentation.
Leveraged balance sheet
positions in banking and
non-financial corporate
sectors in the euro area
members are unwinding
with different degree.
The ECB policy has been
partly successful in easing
the overall deleveraging
pressures, but the effect
on asset prices and
economic recovery has
been uneven among euro
area members. The most
affected are peripheral
countries, which are
undergoing a process of
internal macroeconomic
adjustment mainly visible
in depressed domestic
demand and assets prices
and fall in employment.
This is taking place in an
unfavourable context
of the mal-functioning
interbank market, weak
external demand and
fiscal consolidation
pointing out to a slow and
credit-less recovery.
JEL E2 G01 G21 G28
T
Gonzalo Caprirolo*
he post dot-com bubble burst period leading to a crisis was characterised by a rapid credit expansion and
private debt accumulation in developed economies. The
intensity of the process and the sectors leading it has
varied among countries but in general private indebtedness has
risen to historically high levels.
The crisis has resulted in a massive financial retrenchment
and reappraisal of risk. Liquidity shortages, mounting losses and
increasing refinancing risk have triggered early government intervention in banking systems. The post-crisis period in the euro
area is characterised by non-functioning interbank market, massive
outflow of capital from vulnerable to the core euro area members
and financial fragmentation. Debt was reappraised in light of the
change in financial conditions and the policy response at the euro
area level which turn the crisis into systemic.
Liquidity provision, low interest rates, banks refinancing
(LTROs) and the recent ECB policy of “do whatever it takes” have
eased overall financing conditions and risks as they intensified.
The timing and broad macroeconomic effect from these measures
is still to be debated as well as their effect on different member
states. In some the economy has rebounded and asset prices recovered or their fall mitigated. Other member states are still struggling to emerge from recession while price of assets continues on a
downward path.
* Gonzalo Caprirolo, IMAD. The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author and should not be
interpreted as reflecting the views of IMAD.
92
BV 11/2013
While monetary policy is a key
instrument to offset the risk of unwinding leverage positions, there are
other relevant policies. However,
in the euro area the broad policy
response has led to contagion and
systemic crisis and, in particular, the
policy of pursuing private solutions
to debt problems amidst an unprecedented crisis of confidence.
In such a context pursuing an orderly
deleveraging process of adjusting
excessive debt without depressing
price of equity and hinder permanently productive capacity seems
particularly challenging for some
euro area members. Not only exchange rate policy is not available,
but interest rates in some member
states are high, price of equity is low,
the role of local central banks and
government in facilitating restructuring financial systems and enterprises
is strongly constrained by EU rules
and the support of EU institutions can
vary according to the relative size
of the countries. In such a set-up, a
relevant question to address is the
likely macroeconomic implications
of deleveraging of the corporate
sector and banks. Such an issue is
of particular relevance to Slovenia
since leverage ratios of both sectors
are relatively high.
Deleveraging in the
non-financial corporate
sector (corporate sector)
Deleveraging of banks and corporate sector can have different
implications for economic activity.
Since banks are the primary source
of external finance of the corporate
sector in the euro area and this
generates feedback loops between
the two deleveraging process, it is
relevant to look at their interaction
and macroeconomic implications.
In this regard, the analysis of credit
dynamics, the evolution of asset price
and economic activity can shed light
BV 11/2013
on what drives the credit market
conditions and business cycle, the
feedback loop among these variables and on policy options to pursue
orderly deleveraging and economic
recovery.
Regarding credit dynamics, the crisis
in 2008 brought a dramatic change
in banking funding and financial conditions in the euro area. The share of
interbank borrowing in total liabilities, which was the main source of financing before the crisis shrunk. This
and banks’ losses triggered balance
sheet adjustment and change in asset
positions, the so-called bank lending channel (Bernanke and Gertler,
The size of
corporate debt
in the euro area
was 50% bigger
in 2008 than in
2001.
1995). It is estimated that credit supply conditions accounted for almost
one third of the contraction in real
GDP in the euro area in the first half
of 2009 (ECB, 2011). In the aftermath, also banks’ risk perception
about the impact of macroeconomic
developments on creditworthiness
of the borrower increased (i.e.
borrowers’ balance sheet channel)
(ECB, 2010-2013). In the case of
corporate sector demand for loans
remained negative with exception of
the second half of 2010 until first half
of 2011. While the change in banks’
funding conditions and worsening
of their balance sheets constrained
credit supply, it is less clear to which
extent the macroeconomic outlook or
93
the drop in value of assets restrained
supply, but mostly demand for credit
as borrowers’ credit constraints tightened resulting from the gap between
debt and capacity to serve it.
An empirical issue to disentangle is
the trigger of the corporate sector deleveraging. Was caused by
banking sector deleveraging or by
collapse in economic activity and
equity prices? According to Gorreti and Souto (2013), the current
corporate adjustment follows those in
the past and is triggered by banking
sector deleverage. Yet, the dynamic
of asset prices and economic outlook
seem critical in explaining corporate
credit demand and the deleveraging process. According to Ruscher
and Wolff (2012), macroeconomic
downturns and equity price shocks
triggered past corporate balance
sheet adjustment periods. In Japan
it was the collapse in asset prices
which triggered corporate deleveraging (Koo, 2003) and also in
Germany contributed to explain the
corporate deleveraging during the
dot-com bubble (Ruscher and Wolff,
2012). More broadly, stock market
crashes are usually followed by recession (Farmer, 2013). In the current
crisis changes in banking funding
conditions, stock market crashes and
collapse of economic activity have
resulted in reappraisal of risk and
have triggered, in relatively indebted
countries, balance sheet adjustment
and negative feedback loops.
In disentangling the relation between
credit activity, growth and corporate deleveraging it is important
to highlight the high and positive
correlation between lags of credit
growth rate (three quarters) and the
economic cycle (ECB, 2013). Furthermore, stylised facts concerning
big five financial crisis involving the
non-financial corporate sector and
current one in the euro area suggest
that the ratio of bank loans to the
corporate sector-to-GDP, and thus
leverage, continue increasing after
the start of the crisis and then with
at least two years of lag credit starts
to fall (ECB, 2013). This suggests an
order of causation from economic
activity, including asset prices, to
credit activity and leverage. Adverse
shocks to economic activity can lead
to reassessment of creditworthiness
in light of risks and trigger balance
sheet adjustment. Two issues in this
regard seem relevant: the timing
when those risks are reassessed,
which can further worsen economic
conditions, and the adjustment
triggered when actual borrowers
risk is reappraised. With credit and
leverage overshooting business cycle
turning points, this suggests a lagged
change in risk attitude or that it feeds
in only gradually on credit dynamics. Yet, in a crisis and its aftermath
corporate leverage indicators do not
only reflect the impact of shocks but
also the underlying adjustments to
them that needs to be disentangled.
Thus, in assessing the deleveraging
process in itself, given that indebtedness exhibits pro-cyclical fluctuations
caused by the underlying shock that
drives business cycle, the emphasize
should be on the relative size of the
Figure 1. Share price indices (rebased); 2007=100 and change
2007-2012
120
Association of Stock
Exchanges
100
Athens Stock Exchange
general index
80
Irish Stock Exchange Equity
Overall Index
60
FTSE MIB Index
40
Portuguese Stock Index 20
Slovenian blue chip index
20
0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Source: Eurostat
Figure 2. Change in debt-to-equity ratio (Q3 2008 - Q4 2012)
50
40
30
20
Change owing to
valuation effects
10
0
-10
Change owing to
transactions
-20
Overall change
-30
-40
-50
LU MT IT PT FI SI EL AT FR ES EA CY EE SK DE BE IE NL
Source: ECB (2013)
94
debt in light of the evolution of asset
price and economic activity.
According to Farmer (2013), the
magnitude of the drop in stock
market and ensuing recession in the
US in 2008 was different than in the
Great Depression due to Federal
Reserve (FED) policy of Quantitative
Easing (QE). Such a policy underpinned stock market price recovery and eased deleveraging. The
importance of asset price evolution
in corporate balance sheet adjustment is also highlighted in the case
of Germany in which it played a less
supportive role at the beginning of
the 2000s (Ruscher and Wolff 2012)
than in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis which might be also explained by
flight to safety resulting from the euro
area crisis. In the euro area stock
market indexes fell in 2008 but their
recovery has been uneven among
members. In 2012, the average
index in Germany reached a similar
level than in 2007 (7 p.p. lower) but
the recovery was weaker than the
US Dow Jones Industrial average. In
countries more affected by the crisis
the average indexes remained low
or continued falling in 2012. In the
case of Slovenia the average index
level fell by 74 % between 2007 and
2012 (Figure 1).
The value of equity with few exceptions also remains below the 2007
level in most countries. Changes
in equity valuation are critical for
assessing indebtedness and deleveraging pressures as they contribute
to changes in debt-to-equity ratio
(Figure 2). They have adversely
affected most peripheral countries
in the aftermath of the crisis. In the
case of Slovenia the positive valuation effects that mitigated the strong
debt build-up in the pre-crisis period
turned negative in the post crisis
period increasing relative indebtedness and exacerbating deleveraging
pressures.
The fall and downward trend price
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a process will ensue as they depend
on overall economic conditions
and sustainability of asset price
dynamics. This was the case during
pre-crisis period when debt was not
perceived as major issue. It is the
change in underlying conditions and
policy to cope with them that change
the risk perception of debt which triggers balance sheet adjustment. Of
particular importance in this regard
is the type of shock affecting asset
prices, economic activity and the degree of involvement of the financial
sector. Nevertheless, the literature
rate with the intensity of corporate
debt accumulation prior to the crisis
but also with the severity of the
downturn (Jorda et al., 2010). The
trend evolution of debt since 2008
differs among members. Debt started
to decrease only more recently in
some countries including Slovenia,
Spain, Portugal and Greece. In other
countries it continues increasing.
Although enterprise balance sheet
ratios can have important signalling
effect about deleveraging pressures
(Ruscher and Wolff, 2012), they
does not necessarily imply that such
Figure 3. Debt-to-gross operating surplus ratio
1000
800
600
Average Q1
2000- Q2 2008
400
Average Q3
2008- Q4 2012
200
Change
0
IE
PT
SI
FI
ES
IT
FR
BE AT EA
EL
NL DE
-200
Source: ECB (2013)
Figure 4. Non-financial corporations: Liabilities (Index 2001=100)
290
270
250
EA
230
DE
IE
210
EL
190
ES
170
FR
150
IT
130
PT
110
SI
Source: Eurostat. Own calculation
95
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
90
2001
of equity and other assets in the
aftermath of the crisis in peripheral
countries suggest strong deleveraging pressures. The fact that asset
prices, with the exception of Germany, have not recovered points
out to financial market fragmentation. An alternative ECB’s monetary
policy focused on direct purchases
of targeted asset classes in secondary market could help alleviating
the overall deleveraging process in
the common currency area while
targeted policies are continue being
implemented to address specific
sector leverage issues. Since a euro
area common asset does not exist,
banks could swap their existing
holdings of euro governments bonds
with bonds issued for this purpose by
European Stability Mechanism. This
could also reduce overall euro area
systemic risk. The US experience with
QE resulting in significant deleveraging of corporate and households
against a background of equity price
recovery is of high relevance.
Corporate gross operating surplus is
another variable to benchmark and
gauge deleveraging pressures. With
the onset of the crisis it worsened
in most euro area countries but on
average it improved to a similar
level than in the pre-crisis period.
There are some exceptions, including
Slovenia. Nevertheless, corporate
debt with respect to gross operating
surplus has worsened in most countries suggesting worsening in debt
repayment capacity (Figure 3).
Looking at nominal corporate sector
debt dynamics per se suggests an
intense period of debt accumulation
in the euro area during 2004-2008
(Figure 4). The size of corporate
debt in the euro area was 50%
bigger in 2008 than in 2001. The
degree of debt accumulation intensity varied and was particularly high
in Spain and Slovenia. According to
past deleverage episodes, the fall in
investment and output is commensu-
in Germany, has clearly a different
implication in terms of deleveraging
pressures. Similarly, the increases in
the size of debt-to-GDP ratio in the
countries where debt has declined or
its pace of increase has decelerated
also suggest deleveraging pressures.
In summary, taking into account
the increase in corporate debt with
respect to equity and GDP and the
increase of interest payments-to-profit
ratios (ECB 2013) this suggests that
indebtedness will continue depressing investment and growth in vulnerable countries.
An important dimension in the overall
also suggests that debt levels can
have important effect on growth (e.g.
Cecchetti et al., 2011 and Goretti
and Souto, 2013).
Based on various indicators and
available policy tools, we can assume that euro area countries face
different intensity of deleveraging
pressures. Since the onset of the
crisis, the debt-to-equity ratios have
increased primarily due to valuation changes in more vulnerable
countries while in the core countries
is the opposite (Figure 5). From that
perspective the debt-to-equity ratio
in vulnerable countries close to that
Figure 5. Debt-to-GDP and Debt-to-Equity ratios (Average Q3 2008 - Q4
2012)
300
Debt-to-GDP ratio
250
Debt-to-Equity ratio
200
150
100
50
0
GR ES MT CY IE
IT
SI
DE AT
FI
PT
EA NL EE
SK BE
FR
LU
Source: ECB (2013)
Figure 6. Loans to gross value added (Average Q3 2008 - Q4 2012)
500
All sectors
450
Industry
400
Construction and real state sectors
350
Wholesale and retail trade
300
Services other than real state
250
200
150
100
50
0
LU
CY MT ES
IE
PT
NL
SI
IT
AT
EL
EA EE
FR
Source: ECB (2013)
96
DE
FI
BE
SK
deleveraging process is the relative indebtedness of various sectors
of economic activity. In the period
leading to the crisis, the construction
and the real estate sectors together
became the most indebted sectors
across the euro area countries as
reflected in the ratio of banks’ loan
to gross value added (Figure 6).
Before the crisis in 2008 the exception was Slovenia. In the period
following the outburst of the crisis in
2008, indebtedness has continued
increasing across all sectors in most
countries and the construction and
real estate sector experienced the
largest increase across countries. In
the case of Slovenia the substantial
increase is largely explained by the
collapse in gross value added in the
construction sector. While the indebtedness of the two sectors remains
below the euro area average, they
have become the most indebted sectors of the economy followed by the
manufacturing sector which relative
indebtedness increased. The relatively high indebtedness in the real
estate and construction in the euro
area in general indicates substantial
adjustment needs affecting banks’
balance sheet and economic activity.
The issue regarding indebtedness in
real estate and housing sectors is that
they affect price in housing which
is the variable most correlated with
intensity of recessions and length of
the crisis (Claessens et al., 2008).
According to the literature corporate deleveraging can be lengthy
and the impact on macroeconomic
conditions severe. This depends
on the macroeconomic channels,
the state of banks’ balance sheet,
overall policy response and external
environment. The adjustment period
in which corporations improve their
financial performance (i.e. improved
their net financial position) in a
sample of developed countries lasted
between 5 and 10 years with severe
impact on economic activity (Ruscher
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Deleveraging in banking
sector
The rapid increase in private debt in
the run to financial crisis was caused
by low interest rates, financial liberalization and innovation, globalization
of financial flows and financial integration in euro area. Banks played
a pivotal role in this process as their
balance sheets expanded based on
wholesale and cross border funding. In many euro area member’s
banking systems the loan-to-deposit
ratio, a proxy for leverage, increased
or remained high before the crisis.
The average loan-to-deposit ratio
for large banks in Europe increased
BV 11/2013
ties in total assets in some members
reached 40% in 2008.
With the financial crisis in 2008
banks’ deleveraging process begun.
Besides financial disintegration in
euro area other drivers include the
overall policy approach to the crisis,
the negative feedback loop between
banks and sovereign balance sheets,
worsening of economic outlook
affecting the private sector, regulatory requirements and state-aid rules
underlying bank restructuring.
Government intervention in the
banking systems has been massive.
But, the models put forward to tackle
balance sheet problems in euro
from 115% in 2002 to close to 150%
in 2008 (Deloitte, 2012b). In most of
banking systems in euro area loans
to corporate-to-total deposit ratios
were above 100% in 2008 (Figure
8). Cross border financing increased
in all euro area banking systems
in the period 2003-2008. In most
members the levels of foreign financing more than doubled those at the
end of 2003 (Figure 9). In some
countries, included Slovenia, the
increase of bank’s foreign funding
was substantial although the share
of bank assets in GDP remains lower
compared to those other euro area
countries. The share of foreign liabili-
Figure 7. Net financial position percentage of GDP
4.0
Ireland
Spain
Slovenia
Portugal
Italy
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
1.0
-2.0
2012Q4
2012Q2
2012Q3
2012Q1
2011Q3
2011Q4
2011Q2
2011Q1
2010Q4
2010Q3
2010Q1
2010Q2
2009Q4
2009Q2
2009Q3
2009Q1
2008Q3
2008Q4
-4.0
2008Q2
-3.0
2007Q4
and Wolff, 2012). Event study on
10 past corporate crises episodes
suggest that the process of corporate
deleveraging last from 7 to 8 years
with an adjustment in leverage ratio
of about 8% of assets for the median
country (Gorreti and Souto, 2013).
Sutherland et al. (2012) indicate that
large debt reduction episodes last
6 1/2 years for the households and
non-financial sectors on average
across OECD countries.
Looking at progress made so far on
corporate deleveraging (Figure 4),
including balance sheet adjustment
as reflected in the evolution of corporate net financing needs (Figure 7)
suggests that the length of corporate
sector deleveraging will be still long
and felt during the next five-year
period. While corporate net financial
positions have improved in various
euro area countries (Figure 7), such
improvement is still small compared
to those experienced by corporate
sector in Japan and Germany. In the
case of Japan corporate net lending
as percentage of GDP averaged 5%
during 2001-2007 and in Germany
around 2% in the period 20042007. In both cases balance sheet
improvement was underpinned by
economic recovery at global level.
Source: Eurostat
Figure 8. Banking system: External debt stocks (2003=100)
2.5
2008
2013 (Jul)
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
EE
IE
SI
FI
Source:IMF
97
PT
IT
FR
NL ES
EA AT
CY MT DE GR SK BE
LU
area differ more substantially than
in previous crisis. The approaches
chosen have different implications
for the overall economic and debt
evolution of various sectors in the
economy including the government
sector. A review of approaches followed regarding asset relief measures indicates that at euro area level
individual bank measures have been
preferred than schemes at member
state level. Similarly, there is preference for asset guarantee measures
and capital increase rather than
asset purchase measures (Table 1).
Such an approach can be explained
by the complexity involved in the design, implementation, and valuation
of asset relief measures (Boudghene
and Maes, 2012a). Similarly, the
fiscal impact is minimized in the case
of guarantees and capital increases
and provides flexibility in handling
assets and result in different set of
incentive structures. The main exceptions have been Ireland and later
Spain which set up national schemes
in which asset purchase are pursued
by a “private entity”. Slovenia is the
only country in euro area in which
a state owned scheme will directly
purchase banks’ assets and thus
explicitly impact the government’s
accounts. Yet, there are plans to enable private investment in the scheme
to minimize the accounting burden
of the process. The choice of the approach chosen to deal with impaired
asset and their valuation have implications that go beyond technicalities
as it can have important bearing in
the overall deleveraging process and
Table 1. Public interventions in the EU banking sector
in the year 2008-2010
Used amounts
% GDP
2.4
Approved
amounts % GDP
4.6
Guarantees on banks liabilities
9.1
26.4
Relief of impaired assets
1.0
3.4
Capital injection
Liquidity and bank funding support
0.7
1.3
Total
13.1
35.7
Source: Boudghene and Maes (2012b)
Figure 9. Banking system: External debt stocks (2003=100)
800
2008Q4
2012Q4
2003Q4=100
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
SK
SI
EE
EL
FI
IE
FR
ES
AT
IT
NL
BE
Source: IMF
98
PT
DE
LU
pace of economic recovery.
Since 2008 banks’ cross border
funding collapsed restricting overall
supply of credit. European banks’
cross border lending fell by 41%
between 2008 and 2011 (BIS
2012). The level of foreign funding
decreased in absolute amount and
as share of total assets (Figure 9).
The cross-border bank deleveraging
process has been particularly strong
in some countries, including Slovenia,
where the share of foreign funding
of the banking system decreased by
half and only between Q3 2011 and
Q2 2012 it was reduced by more
than 10% of GDP.
A disorderly deleverage of banks in
the euro area has been prevented so
far in particular by the ECB policy.
Refinancing of the first tranche of
LTRO maturing in December 2015
will be important in this regard as
euro area’s cross border banking
activity came to historic lows in 2012
and has continued in 2013.
In addressing multiple challenges,
banks’ capital has increased (Figure
10). This process started already
early in 2009 linked to sub-prime
bonds losses. Since then trend
increase in tier 1 capital ratios is
observed in most euro area countries
to cope with bursting bubbles, balance sheet uncertainty and negative
feedback loop between sovereigns
and banks. The increase in capital
has been underpinned by regulatory
requirements and market pressure
to achieve the new BASLE III capital
ratios sooner. In the case of Slovenia
the increase in capital has been modest (Figure 10). It has been underpinned by regulatory pressure but,
since the onset of the crisis successive
governments have been reluctant
to increase capital in state largely
owned banks beyond minimum regulatory requirement. Future sizable
capital increases will be needed,
particularly at the time of transferring
assets to the bad bank.
BV 11/2013
The impact of the crisis on corporate
sector balance sheets is also pressing banks to further deleverage
creating a negative feedback loop
on economic activity (i.e. increase
in non-performing loans (Figure 11).
This and the need to break the negative interaction between banks and
sovereigns risk led to the decision of
setting up a banking union. Yet its effective impact on reducing sovereign
risk and mitigating the deleveraging
pressures on sovereigns is still far
from reality and seem questionable,
especially due to reluctance to use
European Stability Mechanism funds
to directly recapitalize ailing banks.
Banks deleverage process seems
to persist over the next years. Euro
area banks are confronting excess of
non-core and non-performing assets
in excess of € 1.7 trillion (Deloitte,
2012a). The drivers will continue to
be: market pressure and supervisory
capital requirements; liquidity constraints and reversal of cross-country
capital flows; state aid rules on banking restructuring and weak economic
recovery. This will exert pressure
on the corporate sector balance
sheet. A survey on large financial
institutions in euro area with assets
worth € 11 trillion (Deloitte, 2012b)
indicates that banks expect to re-size
their balance sheets through run-offs
of loans more than through divestment. This is because of the uncertainty surrounding asset valuation.
Banks indicate that a high proportion
of divestitures should be assets in
Western Europe. Loan books with
commercial real estate will be sold
as a priority. They estimate that the
process of deleveraging will take at
least five years to complete although
they expect it to be modest (7.5%
of total assets) compared with the
increase in banks’ balance sheet before the crisis. Banks have identified
the determination of price of assets
as the key challenge ahead.
So far (2009-2013), the pace of
BV 11/2013
12). Bank credit-to-GDP ratios in
Scandinavian countries and Japan
fell on average by 27 p.p. over
a period of seven years and then
returned to the pre-boom levels. In
Slovenia the ratio has slightly fallen
in 2013 but with the planned transfers of impaired assets to the asset
management company (bad bank)
the process of deleveraging should
accelerate.
To the extent that deleveraging reestablishes stability in the banking
sector and conditions for sustained
recovery, the speed of the process
might be important. Yet, the means,
bank deleveraging (i.e. reduction
in loan-to-deposit ratio) in some
euro area members seems to be
slow compared to other episodes.
In Scandinavian countries loan-todeposits ratios fell strongly in the first
three years following the crisis which
is quite a shorter period than in
Japan (7 years) which is regarded as
a lengthy process. The evolution of
bank credit to private sector-to-GDP,
also suggest slow pace of deleveraging in vulnerable countries with the
exception of Ireland (64 p.p.) and
Spain (30 p.p.), which nevertheless
started from very high levels (Figure
Figure 10. Tier 1 Capital
25
2008
2012
20
Change
15
10
5
0
EE
IE
LU
FI
BE
SK
DE
FR
AT
NL
PT
IT
MT
SI
ES
EL
CY
Source: ECB
Figure 11. Non-performing loans, %
25
2008
2012
20
15
10
5
0
EL
IE
CY
SI
Source: IMF
99
IT
PT
MT
ES
SK
FR
BE
NL
DE
AT
EE
LU
strategy, as well as framework conditions, are of outmost importance for
success. In this context selling troubled assets or the creation of bad
banks can speed up the process.
This was the case of Sweden which
however at that time enjoyed the
benefits of: independent monetary
policy; exchange rate depreciation;
strong external demand and the
possibility to set its own domestic
rules for asset valuation. Following
the path of Sweden in establishing a
bad bank under current conditions
seems challenging for the euro area
members in absence of independent
monetary policy, lack of exchange
rate and state aid rules for valuing
assets. One of the most important
risks being the cleaning up banks’
balance sheets at fire sale prices
(i.e. price liquidation level). Such
an outcome would magnify losses
in the banking system generating
significant and immediate negative
macroeconomic externalities. Pushing down asset prices from already
depressed levels can further increase
relative indebtedness, weaken
corporate and banks’ balance
sheets, worsen government fiscal
position, hinder potential output and
lengthen the recovery process. This
risk is higher given the uncertainty
of broad economic recovery of euro
area and for vulnerable countries
that face relative high interest rates.
In the case of Slovenia where there
seems no alternative approach to the
bad bank due to build-up of market
expectation and its pressure, the key
policy issue will be a careful determination of value of assets. At the
euro area level it will be important to
review state aid rules on asset valuation in light of their impact on overall
deleveraging process or its consistency with the overall policy set up
and broad economic recovery.
Macro implications of
corporate and bank
deleveraging
To understand the macroeconomic
implications of the deleveraging process in some EU peripheral countries,
largely triggered by change in funding conditions and massive reversal
of capital flows from core countries,
as for example reflected in Target 2
transactions, it is relevant to review
the stylised facts of the literature
dealing with episodes of sudden
stops and credit-less recoveries. A
sudden stop is a sharp and sudden
reversal in international capital flows.
It is followed by strong deteriora-
Figure 12. Loans to private sector % GDP
200
2004
2008
2012
2013 (June)
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
IE
ES
BE
DE
AT
EA
PT
SI
FR
IT
FI
NL
EL
tion of macroeconomic aggregates,
sharp changes in exchange rate and
declines in asset prices in equity and
housing markets (Calvo et al., 2006
and Korinek and Mendoza 2013).
Credit-less episodes occur when
output reverts to its pre-crisis level
without any significant recovery of
domestic or external lending (Calvo
et al., 2006). The probability of a
credit-less recovery increases after a
banking crisis and it is preceded by
large declines in economic activity
and financial stress. In particular
when private sector indebtedness
is high and the country is reliant on
foreign capital inflows (Bijsterbosch
and Dahlhaus, 2011). In such events,
recoveries tend to be relatively weak
with output and investment growth
lower that in events where credit
grows or is not constrained (Abiad
et al, 2011). The literature of the
sudden stop is relevant to peripheral
countries to the extent that they have
experiences such episodes since the
onset of the crisis in 2008 (Merler
and Pissani, 2012). It is less relevant
with respect to the macroeconomic
adjustment in which the sharp depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate (and thus the real exchange
rate) is a key variable in explaining the “v” shape type of recovery
which is not available to euro area
members. Nevertheless, the absence
of exchange rate adjustment points
out to the magnitude of the pressure
and adjustment the nominal prices
have to undergo or in their absence
the effect on economic activity and
employment.
The episodes of credit-less recovery
are relevant to euro area members to
the extent that they hint to the type of
economic recovery they can also go
through: a recovery not underpinned
by credit activity and therefore at
a slower pace than otherwise. In
episodes of credit-less recovery,
including the case of the Great De-
Source: ECB and Eurostat. Own calculation
100
BV 11/2013
pression, the nominal exchange rate
depreciates and consequently the
real exchange rate contributing to
the economic rebound (Calvo et al.,
2006). To the extent that some euro
are countries are likely to experience
credit-less recovery and the exchange rate is not available this also
points out to macroeconomic adjustment taking place through internal
devaluation or loss in output and employment. With financial systems still
to deleverage and nominal rigidities
in economies this hints to a slow and
credit-less recovery process in some
euro area members. This process is
likely to be more painful given that
interest rates remains substantially
higher in some members and have to
still undergo fiscal consolidation.
On the corporate side the balance
sheet adjustment affecting aggregate
demand is taking place through
reduction in investment, improvement
in corporate net borrowing position
(Figure 7) and increase in savings,
but a lesser extent through disposal
in financial assets, probably due to
depressed prices (Deloitte, 2012b),
and increase in equity. Deleveraging
is proceeding only gradually in highly indebted corporate sectors which
are less able to diversify their funding
sources and that have been exposed
to large assets losses from the crisis
(Goretti and Souto, 2013). Another
channel through which deleverage is
taking place is through bankruptcy,
affecting directly banks’ balance
sheet. With depressed external
demand, corporate investment has
fallen significantly and saving ratios
have increased, affecting unemployment and reducing wages. Economic
activity is slow and banks’ balance
sheets are adversely affected.
In addressing negative feedback
loops, effort is being centred on
the banking system. Although credit
activity is not likely to be a key driver
in the recovery, addressing banks’
balance sheets problems enhances
BV 11/2013
their resiliency and thus creditworthiness of institutions and sovereigns. In
the case of Slovenia the high yield
on government debt is most often
attributed to the uncertainty of banks’
balance sheet problems. At the euro
area level the approach has been to
increase capital, issuance of guarantees rather than selling assets due to
valuation issues in a decentralized
set up. In general the issue of asset
valuation is not trivial as it can increase the leverage, generate wealth
effects and contribute to a downward economic spiral. This is reflected in deleveraging strategies based
In some
countries the
increase of
bank’s foreign
funding was
substantial.
on capital increases, run offs rather
than divestures of largest banks located in core euro area which have
also benefited the most from ECB
policy and inflows of capital (flight
to safety). But the issue of shocks to
asset prices is particularly relevant
to peripheral countries in which a
centralized approach (bad bank)
to deal with bank assets is pursued
and for countries, such as Slovenia,
where leverage in corporate sector
is relatively high in relation to equity,
but not in terms of GDP (Figure 5). In
particular, in such institutional set up
the bad bank becomes the market
maker and thus pricing decisions
can have enormous macroeconomic
impact. The critical issue is that some
101
peripheral countries are undergoing
an internal adjustment process that is
likely to take time. In such conditions,
transferring or selling bank assets
at fire sale levels can trigger an additional massive shock.
For euro area peripheral countries
that chose a centralized approach
to deal with banks’ assets, the risk
of additional shock to asset prices
contributing to a protracted recession
is quite high. This is because of the
institutional set up of the approach,
its incentive structure, and the context
of already depressed asset prices.
In such an environment the entity
in charge of valuing assets has the
incentive to ensure that they are
priced in such a way that do not
loose further value to preserve its
reputation. State aid rules aiming at
an appropriate return to investors
push for attractive prices in already
depressed conditions. The aim of
the institution handling the selling of
assets is to maximise profit and thus
exerts downward pressure on the
assets transfer price. Finally, government under the pressure of investors
to swiftly remove impaired assets
might be willing to accept “fire sale”
transfer prices. Such a scenario
points out to the major risks facing
the pace of economic recovery
and to strong adverse effect for the
government’s balance sheet. In such
a case, the adverse fiscal impact
will not result only from a large
frontloaded capitalization to cover
the losses of transfer of assets at
“fire sale” level but the assets when
sold will not recover the cost of the
overall fiscal intervention. To some
extent similar risk might be present in
the context of the forthcoming euro
area Asset Quality Review (AQR)
with important impact on backstop
financial support. Thus, as part of
the policy effort of supporting and
orderly deleverage process and
internal macroeconomic adjustment
in some countries, it will be important
to revise state aid rules with a view
of mitigating their potential adverse
impact of an additional external
shock on prices when countries are
undergoing internal adjustment.
Refinancing maturing ECB’s LTROs
could ease deleveraging pressures
as well as ECB purchase of assets,
(preferable assets issued by the ESM
in exchange of government assets
currently held by banks), could also
contribute to orderly deleveraging
and, diminishing sovereign risk and
systemic risk of the common currency
area. At a national level the risk
of selling assets at “fire sale” level
on the government’s balance sheet
should be minimised. An approach in
this regard could be to put the assets
in custody for a given time period
and then only gradually proceed
to their disposal as the economy
improves.
Equally important to the economic
recovery is to pursue an orderly
deleveraging of the corporate sector. This is particularly relevant for
countries which do not receive fully
the stimulus of the common monetary policy, have to undergo fiscal
consolidation and lack of sources of
alternative investment and funding
than banks. In such cases, corporate
restructuring (financial and organisational), could facilitate the viability
of those enterprises under stress but
with a long-term viable business
model. In other cases liquidation
should be pursued to reduce the
drag on growth and improve allocation of resources. The recent change
in corporate bankruptcy legislation
in Slovenia is a step in such direction. Given, banks credit constrains
alternative source of funding to SMEs
should be pursued. In the concrete
case of Slovenia, in addition to the
mentioned measures and active
involvement of bad bank in restructuring viable enterprises, privatisation
and FDI should be pursued to enhance the speed and sustainability of
recovery. As in the case of banks, the
increase in capital of enterprises is of
utmost importance to avoid negative
impact on employment and growth.
Careful attention should be given to
asset pricing when cleaning banks’
balance sheets. In this regard a supportive role of the European Commission and the ECB are of outmost
importance to facilitate and ensure a
positive outcome.
American Economic Review 96
References:
Korinek, A., and Mendoza, E (2013),
“From Sudden Stops to Fisherian
Deflation: Quantitative Theory and Policy
Implications”. NBER. Working Paper
19362
Abiad, A., Dell’Ariccia, G. and Li, B.
(2011), “Credit-less recoveries”, Working
Paper 11/58, IMF.
Bernanke, B.S. and Gertler M. (1995),
“Inside the Black Box: the Credit Channel
of Monetary Policy Transmission”, Journal
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 9.
Bijsterbosch, M. and T Dahlhaus (2011).
“Determinants of Credit-less Recoveries”,
European Central Bank, Working Paper
Series, No 1358
BIS Quarterly Review, March 2012
Boudghene,Y. and Maes, S. (2012a),
“Empirical review of EU asset relief
measures in the period 2008–2012” (n 2).
European State Aid Law Quarterly 4/2012
Boudghene,Y. and Maes, S. (2012b),
“Relieving Banks from Toxic or Impaired
Assets: The EU State Aid Policy Framework”
Journal of European Competition Law &
Practice, 2012
Bouis, R., Christensen, A. K. and Cournède,
B (2013), “Deleveraging: Challenges,
Progress and Policies”, OECD Economics
Department Working Papers, No. 1077,
OECD
Calvo, G., Izquierdo, A., and Talvi, E.
(2006), “Sudden Stops and Phoenix
Miracles in Emerging Markets.” The
102
Cecchetti, S.G.,. Mohanty, M.S., and
Zampolli, F. (2011), “The Real Effects of
Debt”, BIS Working Papers 352
Claesens, S., Kose, M., and Terrones,E.
(2008), “What happens during recessions,
crunches and busts?” IMF, WP nº 08/274.
Deloitte (2012a), “ Managing non-core
assets: critical success factors for banks”
Deloitte (2012b), “Capital gain, asset loss:
European Bank deleveraging”. The Deloitte
Bank Survey 2012.
ECB (2011), Monthly Bulletin, January
2011
ECB (2013), “Corporate Finance and
Economic Activity in the Euro Area:
Structural Issues Report”. Occasional
paper No 151
ECB (2010-2013), “Banking Lending
Survey
Jordà, O., Schularick, M. and Taylor, A.M.
(2010), “Financial Crises, Credit Booms,
and External Imbalances: 140 Years of
Lessons”, NBER Working Papers, No
16567, The National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Koo, R. C. (2003), Balance Sheet
Recession; Japan”s struggle with
unchartered economics and its global
implications, John Wiley and Son,
Hoboken, USA
Garrote, D., Llopis, J., and Valles X. (2013),
“Los canales del desapalancamiento
del sector privado: una comparación
internacional”. Documentos ocacionals
1302. Banco de Espana
Goretti, M., and Souto, M (2013), “MacroFinancial Implications of Corporate (De)
Leveraging in the Euro Area Periphery”.
IMF Working Paper WP/13/150
Pisani-Ferry, Jean and Silvia Merler, S., and
Pisani-Ferry, J (2012), “Sudden stops in the
euro area”. Bruegel Policy Contribution
Ruscher, E. and G. Wolff (2012),
“Corporate Balance Sheet Adjustment:
Stylised Facts, Causes and Consequences”,
Bruegel Working Paper, No. 3.
Sutherland, D., P. Hoeller, R. Merola
and V. Ziemann (2012), “Debt and
Macroeconomic Stability”, OECD
Economics Department Working Papers,
No. 1003.
BV 11/2013
BEST PRACTICE CASES AND LESSONS
UDK 336.71:347.952:347.925
Problematika zunajsodnih
prodaj in težave bank v
insolvenčnih postopkih
Boštjan Kavčič in Andraž Kotolenko*
INSOLVENCY
PROCEEDINGS – LEGAL
CONCERNS AND BANK
EXPERIENCE
In the article we look
into the main cause for
extensive decrease in
prices of shares used as
collateral for bank claims
on their clients and the
level of indebtedness of
Slovenian companies,
including the most common
difficulties faced by banks
in sale procedures of
assets used as collateral
for their claims, initiated by
banks under Consortium
Sale Agreements in order
to recover claims on their
clients. Furthermore,
we describe difficulties
of banks – creditors in
insolvency procedures
by focusing on questions
regarding necessity of
approval of mortgage
creditor for transfer of a
proprietary right of the
debtor on a real estate
(serving as collateral of
creditor’s claim) to a third
party and the potential
consequences incurred
by the creditor in event of
such transfer (when the
debtor at commencement
of the bankruptcy
procedure has not been
recorded in the public
records as the owner
of the mortgaged real
estate) due to failure to file
for the right to separate
settlement.
JEL G21 G32 G33
BV 11/2013
D
ne 15. septembra leta 2008, nekaj pred eno uro popoldan
(po newyorškem času), je družba Lehman Brothers
Holdings objavila vest, da bo pri stečajnem sodišču
Južnega okrožja države New York (Southern District of
New York) vložila predlog za uvedbo stečajnega postopka1 oziroma
zaprosila za t .i. varstvo po določbah 11. poglavja Stečajnega zakona
Združenih držav Amerike2. V času vložitve predmetnega predloga
za uvedbo stečajnega postopka je imela družba Lehman Brothers
več kot sto tisoč upnikov, katerim je dolgovala prek sto petdeset
tisoč milijard dolarjev3 (največja upnika sta bila družbi Citigroup
Inc. in Bank of New York Mellon Corp., s skupaj več kot 138
milijardami terjatev iz naslova komercialnih oziroma blagajniških
zapisov – t. i. »senior notes«). Stečaj družbe Lehman Brothers je bil
največji stečaj v zgodovini Združenih držav Amerike in je, zaradi
posledičnega padca tečajev svetovnih delniških trgov, zamajal
celotni svetovni finančni trg, ameriško in evropsko gospodarstvo pa
je, zaradi t. i. »domino učinka«, začelo drseti v recesijo.
* Boštjan Kavčič, univ. dipl. prav., višji pravnik, bostjan.kavcic@nlb.si, NLB d.d., Center za pravne zadeve, Pravna pisarna
za svetovanje; Andraž Kotolenko, univ. dipl. prav., višji pravnik, andraz.kotolenko@nlb.si, NLB d.d., Center za pravne
zadeve, Pravna pisarna za izterjavo.
1
Lehman Brothers Press Release (Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Announces It Intends to File Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Petition« (PDF). Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. September 15, 2008. Retrieved 2008-09-15..
2
Poglavje 11 Stečajnega zakona ZDA ureja obliko stečajnega postopka, ki predstavlja kompleksno in eno izmed dražjih
oblik finančnega prestrukturiranja aktive in pasive prezadolženega dolžnika. (http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/
chapter11.asp; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chapter 11, Title 11, United States Code;)
3
»Lehman folds with record $613 billion debt«. Marketwatch. September 15, 2005. Retrieved 2008-09-15.
103
Problematika zunajsodnih
prodaj premoženja
1. Kratek opis vzrokov za
nastanek položaja bank
prodajalk delnic
V danih razmerah tudi slovenskemu gospodarskemu prostoru ni
bilo prizaneseno. V tistem času so
bila slovenska podjetja4 že močno
prezadolžena. Po nekaterih podatkih
naj bi konec leta 2011 razmerje med
dolžniškim in lastniškim financiranjem
(t. i. »leverage ratio«) slovenskih
gospodarskih družb dosegalo že do
143 odstotkov lastniškega kapitala.5
Zaradi takšnega stanja v slovenskih
podjetjih in vse večje gospodarske
recesije se je začel hitro poslabševati
tudi položaj bank, ki so imele svoje
terjatve do slovenskih gospodarskih
družb in podjetnikov zavarovane z
zastavnimi pravicami na delnicah teh
družb, pri čemer so bile tudi same
visoko kreditno izpostavljene do
svojih kreditodajalcev. Ob koncu leta
2011 je namreč razmerje med krediti
in depoziti nebančnega sektorja za
slovenski bančni prostor znašalo 137
% in je bilo višje od povprečja bank
evrskega območja, ki je znašalo 113
%.6 S padcem tečajev delnic na Ljubljanski borzi vrednostnih papirjev,
ki je povzročilo padanje vrednosti
zavarovanj za bančne kredite, in s
sočasnim kontinuiranim poslabševanjem stanja v realnem gospodarstvu,
se je finančna kriza začela seliti tudi
v slovenski bančni sektor, kjer so
njeni negativni učinki na kapital bank
vidni še danes.7
2. Organiziranje bank upnic v
obliki prodajnih konzorcijev
V takšnih razmerah so se banke
v Sloveniji, da bi čimprej poplačale svoje terjatve do insolventnih
komitentov ter da bi reševale lastne
bilance, začele medsebojno povezovati v obliki konzorcijskih prodajnih
pogodb, ki so rabile kot osnova za
izvedbo prodajnih postopkov večjih
paketov delnic.
Banke upnice so se v konzorcijskih
pogodbah dogovorile zlasti o (i)
skupnem nastopanju pri prodaji
delnic, ki prepoveduje prodajo
delnic zunaj konzorcija,8 (ii)vodji
prodajnega postopka (praviloma tuj
finančni svetovalci), (iii)koordinatorju
prodaje, (iv)prodajnih aktivnostih, ki
jih bodo izvedle za potrebe prodaje,
(iv)prepovedi unovčevanja zastavnih
pravic (razen za potrebe prodaje
končnemu kupcu), (v)obveščanju
uprave in nadzornega sveta družbe
glede oblikovanja konzorcija in poteka prodajnega postopka (skupaj z
zaprosilom za angažma in podporo
zlasti pri izvedbi skrbnih pregledov
poslovanja družb s strani potencialnih kupcev), (vi)načinu izbora zunanjih izvajalcev (finančnih in pravnih
svetovalcev ter ocenjevalca vrednosti
delnic družbe) in podelitvi mandata
za njihov angažma, (vii)stroških prodajnih aktivnosti, (viii)načinu določitve najnižje prodajne cene delnice,
(ix)fazi sprejema končne ponudbe
in sklenitve kupoprodajne pogodbe
ter (x)posledicah opustitve ali kršitve
pogodbenih obveznosti.
S sklenitvijo konzorcijskih prodajnih
pogodb so banke upnice zasledovale skupni cilj po čim hitrejši prodaji
deležev po čim višji ceni, saj vsakršno
držanje teh deležev v bilancah bank
izpostavlja banke padcu vrednosti
delnic. Posledično so te banke zavezane k izvedbi ustreznih prevrednotenj in oblikovanju slabitev, posredno
pa tudi k sprejemanju odločitev v
zvezi z upravljanjem teh družb v okviru njihovih delničarskih upravičenj, za
kar pa banke niso specializirane.
Usklajeno ravnanje bank pri reševanju prezadolženih podjetij, ki
so v finančni stiski, je v letu 2012
priporočila tudi Banka Slovenije v
svojih priporočilih.9 Priporočila se
(podobno kot konzorcijski prodajni
dogovori) nanašajo na ravnanje
bank v primeru podjetij v finančnih
težavah. Na tej podlagi Banka
Slovenije, kot regulator, priporoča
bankam zlasti tudi, (i)da se dogovorijo o vseh aktivnostih, ki naj bodo
usmerjene k skupnemu cilju – finančnemu prestrukturiranju podjetij
v težavah, da bi se zagotovila
njihova dolgoročna gospodarska
uspešnost, (ii)da obravnavajo vse
upnike pošteno in enakovredno in da
se dajanje prednosti posameznemu
upniku s strani dolžnika obravnava
kot diskriminacija, proti kateri lahko
ukrepa posamezni upnik ali skupina upnikov, (iii)da skupina imenuje
vodilno banko (koordinatorja) in celo
poseben odbor upnikov, ki ga vodi
koordinator, za pogajanja s podjetjem, (iv)da vzpostavijo moratorij na
odplačevanje dolgov (t. i. »standstill
dogovori«), ki onemogočijo posameznim upnikom (strankam takšnih
dogovorov) aktivnosti, ki bi izboljšale
njihov položaj na škodo položaja
drugih upnikov, (vi)imenovanje pooblaščenega revizorja za pridobitev
neodvisne ocene družbe, (vii)zagotovijo oziroma omogočijo kratkoročno
likvidnost podjetja in podobno.
4
Slovenske gospodarske družbe, njihove odvisne
družbe in samostojni podjetniki posamezniki.
5
Članek Sanacija bank ter razdolževanje podjetij
in bank, Božo Jašovič in Marko Simoneti, Finance
14. maj 2013.
6
Članek Sanacija bank ter razdolževanje podjetij
in bank, Božo Jašovič in Marko Simoneti, Finance
14. maj 2013.
7
Najpogostejši bančni posli, ki so predstavljali
podlago za ustanovitev in vpis zastavnih pravic na
delnicah družb, so bili bančni krediti, dani večjim
gospodarskim družbam v obliki sindiciranih kreditov
in večjih bilateralnih kreditov. Velik delež kreditov
so predstavljali gradbeni krediti in krediti dani
finančnim holdingom, ki so svoja sredstva plasirali
naprej v nakup delnic slovenskih gospodarskih
družb. Določen odstotek kreditne izpostavljenosti
pa predstavljajo tudi nekoliko bolj »eksotični«, a še
vedno vrednostno izredno veliki posli z delnicami v
obliki delniških terminskih poslov in opcijskih poslov.
8
Izjeme predstavljajo zlasti prodaje delnic s
strani investicijskih skladov, ki se zaradi zakonskih
omejitev ne morejo zavezati prepovedi prodaje
svojih naložb, do katere lahko pride v primeru,
kadar npr. vlagatelj zahteva odkup svojih
investicijskih kuponov.
9
Priporočila Banke Slovenije za usklajeno
postopanje bank upnic v primeru podjetij v
finančnih težavah (september 2012) .
104
BV 11/2013
3. Težave z določanjem prodajne
cene in pritiski tretjih na prodajni
postopek
Če pustimo ob strani običajno dolgotrajno odločanje vseh organov bank
pri sprejemanju potrebnih sklepov za
izvedbo prodaje delnic, nastanejo v
fazi sklepanja konzorcijskih dogovorov prve težave zlasti v delu, ki se
nanaša na način določitve cene, po
kateri so pogodbene stranke zavezane prodati delnice končnemu kupcu.
Problem nastane zaradi različne
višine terjatev posameznih strank konzorcija, ki so zavarovane z delnicami, ki so predmet prodaje, in zaradi
odsotnosti morebitnih drugih dodatnih zavarovanj. Posledično banke
upnice z višjimi terjatvami (in slabšim
zavarovanjem slednjih) zahtevajo
višjo ceno za delnico, saj bodo le
tako lahko prišle do poplačila in se
izognile izgubi, ki bi sicer prizadela
njihov kapital. Zaradi nevarnosti odtekanja informacij (žal pogost pojav
v slovenskem finančnem prostoru)
je sporazum o višini prodajne cene
v fazi sklepanja konzorcijskega
dogovora izredno tvegano početje,
zato nekateri v dogovore vključujejo
pravilo, po katerem se zahtevane
najnižje cene razkrijejo šele v fazi, ko
je na mizi že zavezujoča ponudba
potencialnega kupca.
V povezavi z določanjem prodajne cene je treba izpostaviti tudi
občasne pritiske javnosti in politike
ter medijev, zlasti glede očitkov o
razprodaji državnega premoženja
in varovanju nacionalnega interesa.
Določena nasprotovanja posameznim prodajam pa so izražali tudi
sindikati prodajanih družb, slednji
največkrat iz utemeljenih razlogov, saj v tovrstnih prodajah kupci
običajno izvedejo prestrukturiranje
družbe in racionalizacijo poslovanja,
vključno z znižanjem števila ali plač
zaposlenih zaradi znižanja stroškov
poslovanja in povečanja donosa na
vloženi kapital.
BV 11/2013
4. Problem dualizma v
prodajnem postopku zaradi
položaja bank prodajalk kot
imetnic delnic in položaja bank
prodajalk kot zastavnih upnic
Kreditni posli, ki so jih banke
sklepale s svojimi komitenti, so bili
običajno zavarovani tudi z zastavnimi pravicami na delnicah, ki so bile
ustanovljene in vpisane v centralni
register KDD10 po določilih zakona
o nematerializiranih vrednostnih
papirjih11 (ZNVP) ali po določilih
Stečaj družbe
Lehman
Brothers je
bil največji
stečaj
v zgodovini
ZDA.
zakona o finančnih zavarovanjih12
(ZFZ). Banke so zastavne pravice
na delnicah pridobile tudi v postopkih izterjav, ki so jih sprožile zoper
tiste komitente, pri katerih terjatve
predhodno niso bile zavarovane.
Na tem mestu opisana kategorija
bank–prodajalk sodi v kategorijo
zastavnih upnikov, ki so v prodajnih
postopkih bistveno bolj omejeni
z razpolaganji z delnicami, ki
so predmet prodaje, kot imetniki
takšnih delnic.
Druga kategorija bank–prodajalk
so banke, ki so delnice pridobile v
imetništvo zaradi poslovanja za svoj
račun,13 pri čemer sodijo slednje v
kategorijo imetnikov navadnih delnic z vsemi razpolagalnimi upravičenji, do katerih jih takšno imetništvo
105
upravičuje po zakonu o gospodarskih družbah14 (ZGD–1), torej do
pravice do udeležbe pri upravljanju
družbe, pravice do dela dobička
(dividenda) in pravice do ustreznega dela preostalega premoženja po
likvidaciji ali stečaju družbe.15
V takšnem položaju so imele banke
prodajalke delnic, ki so imetnice
delnic, pravico v prodajnih konzorcijskih pogodbah nastopati z vsemi
zakonskimi razpolagalnimi upravičenji, kar pomeni, da so lahko (odvisno od velikosti svojega deleža)
sklicale skupščino družbe in na njej
predlagale in glasovale o predlogih
sklepov (dokapitalizacije, statusna
prestrukturiranja), se izrekale o
predlogih uprave glede finančnega
prestrukturiranja družbe (od katerega je bilo odvisno povečevanje ali
nižanje vrednosti cene delnice), od
uprav, v okviru zakonske pravice do
informiranosti, zahtevale pojasnila
o posameznih poslih, vključno z
informacijami o angažmaju uprave
v prodajnem poslu, ki so ga vodile
oziroma v katerem so sodelovale
same kot stranke prodajne konzorcijske pogodbe, pri čemer banke–
zastavne upnice takšnih pravic in
upravičenj niso imele. Imetništvo
delnic (v primerjavi s položajem zastavnega upnika) je bilo še posebej
pomembno v primerih, kadar takšen
delež predstavlja 25 % premoženja
družbe ali več (aktualen primer pro-
10
KDD – Centralna klirinško depotna družba, d.d.,
Ljubljana, Tivolska 48, Ljubljana, Slovenija.
11
Zakon o nematerializiranih vrednostnih
papirjih (Ur.l. RS, št. 23/1999, s spremembami in
dopolnitvami).
12
Zakon o finančnih zavarovanjih (Ur.l. RS, št.
47/2004 s spremembami in dopolnitvami).
13
Po določbi 3. odst. 8. člena (Investicijske storitve
in posli) zakona o trgu finančnih instrumentov (Ur.l.
RS, št. 67/2007 s spremembami in dopolnitvami)
je poslovanje za svoj račun poslovanje v breme
lastnega kapitala, katerega izid je sklenitev posla
za lasten račun z enim ali več finančnimi instrumenti.
14
Zakon o gospodarskih družbah (Ur.l. RS, št.
42/2006 s spremembami in dopolnitvami).
15
Omenjene pravice se nanašajo zgolj na imetnike
navadnih delnic po določbah 176. Člena ZGD–1
(navadne in prednostne delnice). Položaja in pravic
imetnikov prednostnih delnic zaradi svojevrstnih
specifik posebej ne obravnavam.
daje delnic družbe Mercator d.d.16).
V takšnih primerih namreč ZGD–1
kot pogoj za sklenitev prodajnih
pogodb za takšne deleže zahteva
sklep skupščine družbe, ki je sprejet
z večino najmanj treh četrtin pri
sklepanju zastopanega osnovnega
kapitala.17
V svojstvu imetnic delnic so banke
za izpolnitev svojih obveznosti iz kupoprodajnih pogodb lahko delnice
same prenesle neposredno na kupca
z enostavnim nalogom za preknjižbo
delnic18 in niso imele težav zastavnih
upnic, ki so v ta namen praviloma
morale podati nalog za unovčitev
zastavne pravice na delnicah, saj bi
se v nasprotnem primeru izpostavile
različnim tveganjem. Prvo v vrsti tveganj predstavljajo morebitni ugovori
ali celo odškodninske tožbe imetnika
delnic ali dolžnika zaradi netransparentne prodaje delnic (ki kotirajo
na borzi) oziroma prodaje delnic
v nasprotju z ZNVP,19 ki določa,
da lahko zastavni upnik v primeru,
kadar dolžnik ob zapadlosti ne poravna terjatve, zavarovane z zastavo
vrednostnega papirja, s katerim se
trguje na organiziranem trgu, proda
zastavljeni vrednostni papir na
organiziranem trgu po osmih dneh
od dneva, ko je opozoril dolžnika,
pa tudi zastavitelja (če to ni ista
oseba), da bo tako ravnal. Iz tega
sledi, da mora zastavni upnik pred
samo prodajo zastavljenih delnic
sprva izvesti postopek obveščanja,
nato pa delnice obvezno prodati
prek organiziranega trga in ne na
primer z neposredno preknjižbo na
ime kupca mimo organiziranega
trga,20 kot je to običajno pri prodajah večjih paketov delnic končnemu
znanemu kupcu. Po določbah ZTFI
sodi med organizirane trge finančnih
instrumentov21 borzni trg,22 ki ga
po določilih pravil borze23 upravlja
borza. Zaradi navedenih značilnosti
organiziranega trga je vsakršno
unovčevanje zastavne pravice zunaj
borznega trga, po poslovni praksi,
že vnaprej izpostavljeno tveganju
ugovorom tretjih zaradi domnevne
netransparentnosti prodaje in kršitev
dolžne skrbnosti prodajalcev pri
prodaji zastavljenega premoženja.
Poseben primer tveganja za imetnike
zastavne pravice na delnicah so
prodaje zastavljenih delnic zastavnega dolžnika, ki je v stečaju. Takšni
zastavni upniki imajo namreč po
določilih ZFPPIPP v stečajnem postopku položaj ločitvenih upnikov24
z ločitveno pravico25. Po splošnem
zakonskem pravilu26 začetek stečajnega postopka ne vpliva na ločitveno pravico in terjatev, zavarovano s
to ločitveno pravico. Posledično daje
ZFPPIPP, v okviru posebnih pravil
za ločitvene pravice, ki se lahko
uveljavijo zunajsodno, takšnim imetnikom zastavnih pravic na delnicah
pravico opraviti zunajsodno prodajo
premoženja, ki je predmet ločitvene
pravice.27 Iz navedenega sledi,
da imajo banke–zastavne upnice
pravico same zunajsodno prodajati
delnice, vendar se v tem primeru pri
prodaji dodatno izpostavljajo tudi
ugovorom oziroma odškodninskim
tožbam, ki bi jih v zvezi s takšno
prodajo imel oziroma bi jih zoper
prodajalce vložil stečajni upravitelj
ali drugi upniki stečajnega dolžnika,
zlasti tudi v primeru, če prodaje ne bi
izvedli prek borze.
Osnovni »problem« ugovorov
dolžnika ali stečajnega upravitelja
ali drugih upnikov dolžnika, ki se
nanašajo na prodajni postopek
oziroma na način prodaje (če je
bila ta izpeljana prek zunajborznega posla), je namreč v tem, da bi,
kolikor bi zastavni upniki–prodajalci
prodajo zastavljenih delnic obvezno
izvedli prek organiziranega trga s
prodajo tržnega naročila v borzni trgovalni sistem (po določbah ZNVP),
zaradi velike količine delnic, ki so
običajno predmet takšnih pogodb,
in velike nelikvidnosti borznega trga,
nedvomno potisnili tečaje teh delnic
navzdol, s tem pa bi bistveno zmanjšali možnost poplačila svojih terjatev.
S takšnim ravnanjem bi najverjetneje
nastala tudi škoda dolžniku oziroma
stečajni masi. Sicer tudi v takšnih
primerih obstaja možnost, da se kupec paketa delnic s svojim nakupnim
nalogom postavi v borzni trgovalni
sistem, vendar pa v tem primeru
nastane tveganje konkurenčnih nakupnih nalogov špekulantov ali drugih
dobrovernih udeležencev borznega
16
instrumentov je večstranski sistem, ki ga vodi
oziroma upravlja določena oseba in ki ima
naslednje značilnosti (i)v tem sistemu in v skladu
z vnaprej določenimi pravili se povezuje ali
omogoča povezovanje interesov glede prodaje
ali nakupa finančnih instrumentov številnih tretjih
oseb tako, da se sklenejo pravni posli v zvezi s
finančnim instrumentom, ki je uvrščen v trgovanje
po njegovih pravilih oziroma sistemih tega trga, (ii)
ima dovoljenje pristojnega nadzornega organa
(kar pomeni, da je nadzorovan), (iii)deluje redno
in v skladu s pogoji določenimi v ZTFI. Slednji tudi
določa, da je organiziran trg.
22
15. Člen ZTFI (borzni trg, borza, borzni posel in
uradna borzna kotacija) Borzni trg je organiziran
trg, katerega upravljavec ima sedež v Republiki
Sloveniji. Borzni posel je posel s finančnimi
instrumenti, sklenjen na borznem trgu.
23
1. Odst. 6. člena Pravil borze (Struktura
borznega trga)(Pravila Borze, neuradno prečiščeno
besedilo 26. marec 2013).
24
2. Odst. 19. člena ZFPPIPP (ločitvena
pravica;ločitveni upnik) Ločitveni upnik je upnik, ki
v postopku zaradi insolventnosti uveljavlja terjatev
zavarovano z ločitveno pravico.
25
1. Odst. 19. člena ZFPPIPP (ločitvena
pravica;ločitveni upnik) Ločitvena pravica je pravica
upnika do plačila njegove terjatve iz določenega
premoženja insolventnega dolžnika pred plačilom
terjatev drugih upnikov tega dolžnika iz tega
premoženja.
26
1. Odst. 179. člena ZFPPIPP (splošno pravilo).
27
1. člen 282. člena ZFPPIPP.
V primeru prodaje delnic družbe Mercator d.d.
je morala skupščina družbe Union d.d. odločati
o sklenitvi pogodbe za prodajo delnic družbe
Mercator d.d., katere pogodbena stranka je bila
tudi družba Union d.d., saj je njen delež delnic, ki
so bile predmet prodaje, predstavljal več kot 25 %
njenega osnovnega kapitala.
17
330. Člen ZGD – 1 (prenos najmanj 25 %
premoženja družbe).
18
Nalog za prenos delnic med računi različnih
imetnikov.
19
47. člen ZNVP (Prodaja zastavljenega
nematerializiranega vrednostnega papirja).
20
Tako imenovani OTC oziroma zunajborzni posel.
21
14. Člen ZTFI (organizirani trg in upravljavec
organiziranega trga) organizirani trg finančnih
5. Poseben primer tveganja v
primeru prodaje zastavljenih
delnic stečajnih dolžnikov
106
BV 11/2013
trga, ki utegnejo s svojimi nakupnimi
nalogi pobrati celoto ali del prodajne količine tako konzorcijskih prodajalcev, posledično pa slednji tudi
ne bi izpolnili osnovne obveznosti
iz prodajne pogodbe, to je prenosa
vseh delnic, ki so predmet prodaje,
na kupca, ki je bil izbran kot končni
kupec v prodajnem postopku.
Zaradi takšnih tveganj so delnice, ki
so zastavljene v korist bank upnic,
komercialno bistveno manj zanimive
za prodajo strateškim ali finančnim
investitorjem, saj se slednji zavedajo
tu opisanih tveganj in zato praviloma
ne želijo imeti opravka z obremenjenimi delnicami ali insolventnimi
imetniki teh delnic, kar kažejo tudi
izkušnje iz nekaterih dosedanjih
prodajnih postopkov.
6. Problem konzorcijskih zavez
bank zaradi ukrepov po ZUKSB
ZUKSB, (ii)o razvezi ali spremembi
pogodbe zaradi spremenjenih okoliščin, (iii)o čezmernem prikrajšanju
in (iv)o oderuški pogodbi30. Iz tega
sledi, da je takšna banka primorana
v skladu z zakonom in pogodbo z
DUTB prenesti svoje terjatve, ki so zavarovane z zastavno pravico na delnicah (vključno z zastavno pravico),
ali delnice, ki so predmet prodajnega
postopka, na DUTB, zaradi česar
lahko s tem preostale stranke prodaj-
Banke so lahko
delnice prenesle
na kupca z
nalogom za
preknjižbo
delnic.
Zaradi uvedbe ZUKSB28 so banke
zaradi zavez, podanih v konzorcijskih sporazumih, postale izpostavljene tveganju nemožnosti izpolnitve
teh zavez, saj v primeru prenosa
slabih terjatev teh bank na DUTB29 (t.
i. »slabo banko«) ali v primeru uvedbe drugih ukrepov po ZUKSB, banke
ne bi bile več imetnice prenesenih
terjatev in zastavnih pravic, vpisanih
na delnicah za namen zavarovanja
teh terjatev. Smiselno enako velja v
primeru prenosov delnic na DUTB.
Po določbah ZUKSB se namreč
za pogodbe DUTB z bankami, ki
so deležne ukrepov po ZUKSB, ne
uporabljajo določbe zakona, ki ureja
obligacijska razmerja, (i)o izpodbijanju pravnih dejanj dolžnika, če je
dolžnik banka deležna ukrepov po
nega konzorcija izgubijo pomemben
delež v izdajatelju31 in posledično s
tem tudi prodajno premijo. Sicer je
v tovrstnih primerih pričakovati, da
se bo DUTB pridružila prodajnemu
konzorciju, vendar prakse s tega
področja trenutno še ni, zato ni moč
podati ocene v tej povezavi.
Zaradi navedenih tveganj vsebujejo
novejše konzorcijske prodajne pogodbe izjeme od obveznosti skupne
prodaje delnic za primer prenosov
terjatev in zastavnih pravic ali delnic
na DUTB, pri čemer takšen položaj
tudi ne predstavlja kršitve zavez
takšne banke, podanih v konzorcijski
pogodbi.
28
32
Zakon o ukrepih Republike Slovenije za
krepitev stabilnosti bank (Ur.l. RS, št. 105/2012 s
spremembami in dopolnitvami).
29
Družba za upravljanje terjatev bank ustanovljena
v skladu s 4. členom ZUKSB.
30
29. člen ZUKSB (izjeme od uporabe drugih
zakonov)
31
S prenosom terjatve se, zaradi akcesornosti,
skupaj s terjatvijo na DUTB prenese tudi zastavna
pravica na delnicah.
BV 11/2013
373. člen ZTFI (notranja informacija) določa,
da je notranja informacija vsaka informacija, ki
ima naslednje značilnosti: 1. je natančna, 2. ni
bila objavljena, 3. se neposredno ali posredno
nanaša: (i)na enega ali več izdajateljev
finančnih instrumentov ali (ii) na enega ali več
finančnih instrumentov, in 4. bi, če bi postala
javna, verjetno pomembno vplivala na cene
teh finančnih instrumentov ali na cene z njimi
povezanih izvedenih finančnih instrumentov (torej
informacija, ki bi jo razumen vlagatelj uporabil
107
7. Problem posredovanja zaupnih
podatkov v prodajnih postopkih
v povezavi s trgovanjem na
podlagi notranjih informacij
V primeru prodaj večjih paketov
delnic je običaj, da potencialni
kupec izvede skrbni pregled poslovanja družbe, izdajatelja delnic, ki
so predmet prodaje v okviru prodajnega konzorcija. To je tudi običajna
zahteva potencialnih kupcev. S tem v
zvezi trčimo na dilemo posredovanja
zaupnih in cenovno občutljivih podatkov potencialnim kupcem. Zlasti
so za družbo občutljive poslovne
skrivnosti, do katerih utegne priti
potencialni kupec v procesu izvedbe
skrbnega pregleda, pri čemer je
težava še večja, če gre za neposrednega konkurenta. Rešitev je obvezno sklepanje pogodb o varovanju
zaupnosti podatkov, ki natančno
določajo, kateri podatki sodijo v
kategorijo zaupnih podatkov in ki
takšnemu pregledovalcu (i)prepovedujejo uporabo zaupnih podatkov, ki
so mu posredovani v postopku skrbnega pregleda poslovanja družbe,
za kakršen koli drug namen kot zgolj
za nakup delnic družbe, ter prepovedujejo trgovanje na podlagi tako
pridobljenih informacij, še zlasti če
imajo te informacije naravo notranjih
informacij32, (ii)zavezujejo k vzpostavitvi ustreznih sistemov in preprek
za potrebe varovanja pridobljenih
zaupnih podatkov ter (iii)zavezujejo
k uničenju vseh pridobljenih zaupnih podatkov na zahtevo družbe.
Dodatna varovalka je tudi postopno
posredovanje posameznih kategorij
zaupnih podatkov potencialnemu
kupcu, glede na fazo prodajnega
kot del podlage za svojo naložbeno odločitev).
Nadalje določa še, da se domneva, da je
informacija natančna: 1. če označuje: – sklop
okoliščin, ki obstajajo ali je mogoče razumno
pričakovati, da bodo nastopile, ali – dogodek, ki
se je zgodil, ali je razumno mogoče pričakovati,
da bo nastopil, in 2. če je zadosti podrobna,
da je na njeni podlagi mogoče sklepati o
mogočih učinkih teh okoliščin ali dogodka na
cene finančnih instrumentov ali z njimi povezanih
izvedenih finančnih instrumentov.
postopka, torej bolj kot se približuje
podpis kupoprodajne pogodbe za
paket delnic, večji dostop ima potencialni kupec do pomembnih zaupnih
podatkov o poslovanju družbe.
Poseben problem predstavlja tudi
striktna zakonodaja, ki ureja trgovanje na podlagi notranjih informacij.
ZTFI namreč izrecno prepoveduje
vsakršno trgovanje na podlagi
notranjih informacij33 in takšno
ravnanje opredeljuje kot prepovedano ravnanje zlorabe trga (kazenski
zakonik pa ga klasificira tudi kot
kaznivo dejanje)34, pri čemer pa
ZTFI ne ureja tudi morebitnih izjem,
ki jih predstavljajo zlasti tudi primeri
pridobivanja takšnih informacij s strani končnega kupca delnic v okviru
skrbnih pregledov poslovanja družb
(izdajateljev teh delnic), kar bistveno
otežuje razkrivanje cenovno občutljivih informacij potencialnim kupcem
in s tem posledično tudi prodajo bančnih naložb oziroma premoženja,
ki je namenjeno za poplačilo slabih
terjatev bank.
Aktualne težave bank upnic v
insolvenčnih postopkih
Čeprav naj bi po C. Warrenu veljalo, da je stečaj turobna in depresivna
zadeva, stečajno pravo pa suhoparna in pogum jemajoča tema,35 je
nesporno, da je insolvenčna zakonodaja pomemben del gospodarstva,
pri tem pa praksa dokazuje, da gre
vse prej kot za suhoparno področje.
Problemov, ki so tako ali drugače
33
372. člen ZTFI (prepovedani ravnanji zlorabe
trga).
34
243. člen KZ (Zloraba notranje informacije) Kdor
notranjo informacijo, ki bi lahko pomembno vplivala
na ceno vrednostnega papirja ali izvedenega
finančnega instrumenta, uvrščenega na organizirani
trg v Republiki Sloveniji ali v vsaj eni državi članici
Evropske unije oziroma za katerega je bil vložen
predlog za uvrstitev na tak trg, ne glede na to, ali
se z njim trguje na tem trgu ali ne, pridobi v zvezi
s svojim položajem pri izdajatelju vrednostnega
papirja, z lastniškim deležem v kapitalu izdajatelja
vrednostnega papirja, s svojo zaposlitvijo ali pri
opravljanju dejavnosti, in jo izkoristi z nakupom ali
prodajo tega vrednostnega papirja ali izvedenega
finančnega instrumenta zase ali za koga drugega,
povezani z insolventnimi postopki, je
nedvomno veliko in njihovo število ter
obseg presegata predmetni članek,
zato bodo opisani in izpostavljeni
(le) najbolj pereči.
8. Prenos lastninske pravice
na s hipoteko obremenjeni
nepremičnini na stečajnega
dolžnika
SPZ36 določa, da je prepoved
odtujitve in obremenitve dovoljena le
v točno določenih primerih, kar pomeni, da hipotekarni upnik, razen z
izjemo določeno v četrtem odstavku
navedenega člena, ne more doseči
vknjižbe prepovedi odtujitve in obremenitve. V primeru, ko sta osebni in
realni dolžnik različni osebi,37 lahko
realni dolžnik lastninsko pravico na
(s hipoteko obremenjeni) nepremičnini prenese na tretjo osebo (pridobitelj) brez dovoljenja in/ali soglasja
hipotekarnega upnika. Stečaj
dolžnika, ki je hkrati tudi zastavitelj,
praviloma ne povzroča težav. Ločitvena pravica je pravica upnika do
plačila njegove terjatve iz določenega premoženja stečajnega dolžnika
pred plačilom terjatev drugih upnikov
tega dolžnika iz tega premoženja,
pri čemer je ločitveni upnik tisti, ki v
postopku zaradi insolventnosti uveljavlja terjatev zavarovano z ločitveno
pravico.38 Terjatve, ki so nastale do
dneva začetka stečajnega postopka,
mora upnik v stečajnem postopku
prijaviti v zakonsko določenem roku,
kolikor pa je ta terjatev na dan začetposredno ali neposredno, se kaznuje za zaporom
do treh let. (2) Enako se kaznuje oseba, ki
notranjo informacijo sporoči nepoklicani osebi
ali na podlagi notranje informacije priporoči tretji
osebi nakup ali prodajo vrednostnega papirja ali
izvedenega finančnega instrumenta. (3) Enako
se kaznuje oseba, ki nepooblaščeno pride do
notranje informacije in jo izkoristi z nakupom ali
prodajo tega vrednostnega papirja ali izvedenega
finančnega instrumenta zase ali za koga drugega,
posredno ali neposredno. (4) Če je bila z
dejanjem iz prejšnjih odstavkov pridobljena velika
premoženjska korist, se storilec kaznuje z zaporom
do petih let.
35
Charles Warren: »Bankruptcy in United States
Histroy 1«, 1935.
108
ka stečajnega postopka zavarovana
z zastavno pravico upnika nasproti
stečajnemu dolžniku, mora upnik v
stečajnem postopku v istem roku (za
prijavo terjatve) prijaviti tudi ločitveno pravico, saj zakon v nasprotnem
primeru (če upnik v roku ne prijavi
ločitvene pravice) določa, da le ta
preneha.39 Postopek in navedene
posledice verjetno niso sporne. Situacija pa se lahko zaplete (oziroma
se je zapletla), ko stečajni dolžnik
postane lastnik s hipoteko obremenjene nepremičnine po začetku
stečajnega postopka in/ali po izteku
roka za prijavo terjatve. Povsem
življenjsko je, da lastnik lastninsko
pravico na s hipoteko obremenjeni
nepremičnini prenese na pridobitelja, s čimer hipotekarni upnik ni
seznanjen; nad pridobiteljem se
začne stečajni postopek, vendar pa
pridobitelj ob začetku stečajnega
postopka v zemljiški knjigi (še) ni
vknjižen kot zemljiškoknjižni lastnik.
Hipotekarni upnik je v konkretnem
primeru v stečajni postopek nad
stečajnim dolžnikom (pridobiteljem)
prijavil vse svoje terjatve do stečajnega dolžnika, ki jih je imel na
dan začetka stečajnega postopka,
ne pa tudi ločitvene pravice, saj
stečajni dolžnik lastninske pravice
na nepremičninah, na katerih je imel
hipotekarni upnik vknjižene hipoteke
(v zavarovanje svojih terjatev), ob
začetku stečajnega postopka (še) ni
imel oziroma je lastninsko pravico na
teh nepremičninah pridobil šele po
začetku stečajnega postopka. Višje
36
Stvarnopravni zakonik 38. člen; Ur. l. RS, št.
87/2002 in spremembe.
37
Možni varianti: zastavitelj zastavi svojo
nepremičnino za tuj dolg ali osebni dolžnik, ki
je hkrati tudi realni dolžnik, odtuji s hipoteko
obremenjeno nepremičnino tretji osebi (ki pa ne
prevzame tudi osebnega dolga).
38
19. člen zakona o finančnem poslovanju,
prenehanju (ZFPPIPP); Ur. l. RS, št. 126/2007 in
spremembe.
39
Prvi odstavek 298. člena ZFPPIPP v povezavi
s petim odstavkom istega člena. Posebna pravila
o ločitvenih pravicah, ki se lahko uveljavljajo
zunajsodno in jih ni treba prijaviti v stečajnem
postopku, so določena v 282. členu ZFPPIPP.
BV 11/2013
sodišče je potrdilo sklep prvostopenjskega sodišča o zavrženju naknadne
prijave ločitvenih pravic, pri čemer
je višje sodišče zavzelo stališče, da
»... je upnik prijavil ločitveno pravico
v predmetnem stečajnem postopku
po preteku prekluzivnega roka za
prijavo ločitvenih pravic. Po določilu
prvega odstavka 296. člena ZFPPIPP
morajo upniki v stečajnem postopku
prijaviti vse terjatve in tudi ločitveno
pravico (prim. prvi odstavek 298.
člena ZFPPIP) do stečajnega dolžnika, ki so nastale do začetka stečajnega postopka; razen če gre za terjatve iz drugega in tretjega odstavka
59. člena ZFPPIPP). Okoliščina, da
stečajni dolžnik postane lastnik s
hipoteko obremenjenih nepremičnin
po preteku roka za prijavo ločitvenih
pravic, ne opravičuje hipotekarnega upnika do podaljšanja roka za
prijavo ločitvenih pravic, saj gre za
prekluzivni rok40«. Že iz citiranega
stališča izhaja dolžnost upnika, da
mora v stečajnem postopku nad
stečajnim dolžnikom prijaviti (le) tiste
terjatve in ločitvene pravice, ki so
nastale do dneva začetka stečajnega postopka. Dan začetka stečajnega postopka je namreč pomemben
mejnik za presojo pravnih posledic.41
Popolnoma nasprotno stališče pa je
isto sodišče zavzelo v drugi zadevi,
kjer je zapisalo, da »rok za prijavo
terjatve, zavarovane z ločitveno
pravico, iz 2. odstavka 59. člena
v zvezi s 1. odstavkom 298. člena
ZFPPIPP, predpostavlja situacijo,
ko je upnik terjatev in ločitveno
pravico pridobil še pred začetkom
stečajnega postopka. V obravnavanem primeru pa je – bo upnik
ločitveno pravico zoper stečajnega
dolžnika pridobil šele med stečajnim
postopkom, saj je/bo premoženje,
na katerem ločitveno pravico upnik
uveljavlja, prišlo v stečajno maso
stečajnega dolžnika šele, ko je/bo ta
postal lastnik nepremičnin (na katerih
upnik uveljavlja pravico do ločenega poplačila) z vknjižbo lastninske
BV 11/2013
pravice stečajnega dolžnika na teh
nepremičninah. Evidentno je, da v
roku za prijavo terjatev in ločitvene
pravice iz 2. odstavka 59. člena v
zvezi s 1. odstavkom 298. člena
ZFPPIPP upnik še ni mogel prijaviti
svoje ločitvene pravice zoper stečajnega dolžnika, ker nepremičnine,
na katerih uveljavlja upnik ločitveno
pravico, še niso bile del premoženja
stečajnega dolžnika. Na vprašanje,v
kakšnem roku bi torej upnik moral
prijaviti ločitveno pravico v obravnavani situaciji, ZFPPIPP ne daje
Zakonodaja
izrecno
prepoveduje
vsakršno
trgovanje
na podlagi
notranjih
informacij.
eksaktnega odgovora.42 Vsebinsko
enako stališče je sodišče zavzelo
tudi v drugi zadevi, ko je odločilo,
»da upnik še ni pridobil ločitvene
pravice, ker nepremičnine, na katerih
ima upnik zastavno pravico, še niso
last stečajnega dolžnik«.43
V zvezi s tem se seveda postavi
vprašanje, kdaj stečajni dolžnik
(pridobitelj) na podlagi pravnega
posla pridobi lastninsko pravico na
nepremičnini, saj je treba poleg SPZ
upoštevati tudi določbe (procesnega) ZZK-1,44 in sicer (vsaj) določbe
v 5. 6., 7. in 10. členu. V zvezi z
načelom začetka učinkovanja vpisov
je treba opozoriti, da je tovrstna
ureditev potrebna zaradi uresničitve
prednostnega načela iz 6. člena
SPZ45, zaradi katerega je potrebno,
109
da zakon varuje vrstni red predlog
za vknjižbo stvarnih pravic v zemljiško knjigo. SPZ v 49. členu jasno določa, da se za pridobitev lastninske
pravice na nepremičnini s pravnim
poslom zahteva vpis v zemljiško knjigo. Tudi Višje sodišče v Ljubljani je
zavzelo jasno in nedvomno stališče:
»Za pridobitev lastninske pravice na
nepremičninah s pravnim poslom
se zahteva vpis v zemljiško knjigo
(1. odstavek 49. člena SPZ). Zgolj
s sklenitvijo pravnega posla torej
kupec na nepremičnini ne pridobi
lastninske pravice. Tudi ne zadošča,
da je kupec vložil zemljiškoknjižni
predlog za pridobitev lastninske
pravice. Res bo, če bo njegovemu
predlogu ugodeno, vpis pravice
učinkoval od trenutka, ko je zemljiškoknjižno sodišče prejelo predlog
za vpis (5. člen ZZK-1), vendarle pa
še ni vpisan kot lastnik, ker o vpisu še
ni odločeno.46« Nujna predpostavka
za (uspešno) uveljavljanje ločitvene
pravice za poplačilo terjatve v insolventnem postopku je tako dejstvo,
da je premoženje, ki je predmet
ločenega poplačila, v času prijave
last stečajnega dolžnika. Če ni tako,
upnik (na tem premoženju) ne pridobi ločitvene pravice, saj ne gre za
premoženje, ki bi bilo v času prijave
last stečajnega dolžnika. Šele če
oziroma ko bo prišlo premoženje v
stečajno maso stečajnega dolžnika,
bo oziroma bi lahko upnik uveljavljal
ločitveno pravico. Prav tako velja
omeniti, da (previdnostne) prijave
ločitvenih pravic pod odložnim pogojem – da bo premoženje, na katerem
40
Sklep VSL Cst, opr. št. 281/2011 z dne
17.11.2011.
41
244. člen ZFPPIPP.
42
Sklep VSL opr. št. III Cpg 142/2010 z dne 03.
03. 2010.
43
Sklep VSL opr. št. Cst 177/2012, z dne 04. 07.
2012.
44
Zakon o zemljiški knjigi; Ur. l. Rs, št. 58/2003 in
spremembe.
45
Če obstaja na isti stvari več stvarnih pravic, ima
prej pridobljena stvarna pravica iste vrste prednost
pred pozneje pridobljeno stvarno pravico.
46
Sklep VSL opr. št. I Cp 1257/2006, z dne 09.
03. 2006.
ima upnik zastavno pravico, prišlo
v premoženje stečajnega dolžnika
– niso ustrezne, saj po ZFPPIPP ni
vsak odložni pogoj razlog za prijavo
terjatve in ločitvene pravice kot
pogojne. Kot pogojno terjatev z odložnim pogojem ZFPPIPP, ki jo mora
upnik prijaviti v stečajnem postopku,
opredeljuje v tretjem odstavku 59.
člena za primer, če je zoper upnika vložena tožba za izpodbijanje
pravnih dejanj stečajnega dolžnika
in če bo tožbenemu zahtevku pravnomočno ugodeno, ter v drugem
odstavku 296. člena za situacijo,
ko obstaja možnost, da bo upnik
med stečajnim postopkom pridobil
regresno terjatev zoper stečajnega
dolžnika, torej v primeru, ko je upnik
odgovoren za obveznost stečajnega
dolžnika kot solidarni sodolžnik, porok ali zastavitelj in to obveznost po
začetku stečajnega postopka izpolni.
Že je bilo rečeno, da ZFPPIPP roka,
v katerem naj upniki prijavijo pravico
do ločenega poplačila (njihove
pravočasno prijavljene terjatve) iz
premoženja stečajnega dolžnika, ki
ga bo ta pridobil po dnevu začetka
stečajnega postopka, ne določa, kar
pa ne pomeni, da kasnejše uveljavljanje ločitvenih pravic ni mogoče
oziroma celo, da bi tovrstne ločitvene pravice »avtomatsko« prenehale.
Glede na izpostavljena stališča
menim, da je (bila) odločitev sodišča
v zadevi Cst 281/2011 nepravilna,
saj stečajni dolžnik ob vložitvi prijave
ni bil lastnik nepremičnin, čeprav je
zemljiškoknjižni postopek (pridobitev
lastninske pravice) že bil sprožen.
Četudi rok za naknadno prijavo ločitvene pravice res ni določen, bi moralo sodišče v takih primerih, ko stečajni dolžnik na podlagi pravnega
posla postane zemljiškoknjižni lastnik
s hipoteko obremenjene nepremičnine, hipotekarnemu upniku dopustiti
naknadno prijavo ločitvenih pravic,
saj ni nikakršnega razloga za npr.
smiselno uporabo 4. odstavka 299.
člena ZFPPIPP, po katerem upnik, ki
v roku ne prijavi izločitvene pravice,
izločitvene pravice ne izgubi, pač pa
je prijava izločitvene pravice možna
do prodaje premoženja oziroma
za pravico do plačila denarnega
zneska pridobljenega s prodajo do
objave načrta prve splošne razdelitve. Ni razloga, da enaka logika ne
bi veljala tudi v situaciji, ko stečajni
dolžnik lastninsko pravico na s hipoteko obremenjeni nepremični pridobi
po začetku stečajnega postopka in/
ali po izteku roka iz drugega odstavka 59. člena ZFPPIPP.
9. Odgovornost zastavitelja po
izbrisu stečajnega dolžnika
V povezavi z navedenim je treba
opozoriti na tudi sicer zelo aktualno
vprašanje, ali hipotekarni upnik od
realnega dolžnika, ko osebni dolžnik
kot pravna oseba zaradi zaključka
stečajnega postopka preneha obstajati, lahko zahteva plačilo obveznosti.
Navedena situacija je možna, če
zastavitelj svojo nepremičnino zastavi
za tuji dolg, ko torej osebni dolžnik
že od samega začetka ni tudi realni
dolžnik, ali pa če osebni dolžnik,
ki je sprva bil tudi realni dolžnik,
po ustanovitvi hipoteke lastninsko
pravico na (s hipoteko obremenjeni)
nepremičnini prenese na tretjo osebo.
Temeljna posledica in značilnost
zastave za tuji dolg je, da za eno
obveznost odgovarjata dve osebi, pri
čemer pa je odgovornost realnega
dolžnik omejena na kupnino, ki je
dosežena v (potencialnem) izvršilnem
postopku. Vrhovno sodišče Republike Slovenije je zavzelo negativno
stališče, saj »da ugasitev zavarovane
terjatve hipoteko vsebinsko izvotli in
ji odvzame ves smisel, zato bi bilo
pripisovanje prevelikega pomena
dejstvu, da hipoteka formalno sicer še
obstaja, v nasprotju s samim bistvom
akcesornosti tovrstnega zavarovanja«.47 Z zaključkom stečajnega
postopka nad osebnim dolžnikom
v celoti ugasnejo vse terjatve zoper
110
stečajnega dolžnika, ki so nastale do
začetka stečajnega postopka, zato
je bila hipotekarna tožba, ki je bila
vložena več kot leto dni po zaključku
stečajnega postopka, zoper realne
dolžnike po mnenju vrhovnega sodišča neutemeljena. Tudi pri poroštvu
gre za odgovornost za izpolnitev tuje
obveznosti, pri čemer je tudi porokova obveznost odvisna od obstoja
obveznosti glavnega dolžnika. Ni
dvoma, da gre tudi poroštvu za enak
namen, in sicer zagotoviti upniku
poplačilo terjatve, kolikor je ne bo
izpolnil glavni dolžnik. Sodna praksa
je tu drugačna: »Zaradi začetka
stečajnega postopka nad dolžnikom
se izpolnitvena dolžnost poroka ne
spremeni in je porok dolžan izpolniti
obveznosti na način in v rokih, kot se
je zavezal ob sprejemu poroštvene
zaveze«48 in »Prenehal je le dolžnik
glavne obveznosti. V primeru, ko
glavni dolžnik preneha zaradi stečaja
in ko torej ni pravnega nasledstva,
ostaja porok zavezan za celotno
obveznost.«49 Sodna praksa je torej
enotna – zmanjšanje obveznosti glavnega dolžnika v stečajnem postopku
ali postopku prisilne poravnave50 ne
pomeni tudi sorazmernega zmanjšanja obveznosti poroka,51 pač pa, kot
že citirano, porok ostaja zavezan za
celotno obveznost. Navedeno mora
smiselno veljati tudi za zastavno pravico, ko sta osebni in realni dolžnik
različni osebi, saj ni utemeljenih razlogov za različno obravnavo poroštva
in hipoteke, ko zastavitelj jamči le kot
realni dolžnik za tuji dolg.52 Vrenčur53
tudi opozarja na nevarnost prenosa
lastninske pravice na s hipoteko
obremenjeni nepremičnini, saj le to,
kot je že bilo ugotovljeno zgoraj,
47
Sodba VS RS II IPs 120/2007 z dne 14. 10.
2009.
48
Sodba VSL I Cpg 754/2009 z dne 10. 12.
2009.
49
Sodba VSK I Cpg 37/2005 z dne 20. 10.
2005.
50
Skladno z določbo 1022 člena Obligacijskega
zakonika; Ur. l. RS, št. 83/2001 (OZ).
51
Ena od zakonsko določenih izjem glede
akcesornosti.
BV 11/2013
praviloma ni onemogočeno, kar pa
bi izvotlilo smisel realnega zavarovanja terjatev. Stališče, da prenehanje
glavnega dolžnika ne vpliva na odgovornost zastavitelja za zavarovano
obveznost, zato tudi ne povzroči
prenehanja hipoteke, zastopa tudi
dr. Plavšakova,54 ki opozarja, »da
zastaviteljeva odgovornost za (tujo)
obveznost ni odvisna (akcesorna)
od odgovornosti (glavnega) dolžnika za to (z vidika dolžnika lastno)
obveznost, temveč samo od obstoja
te obveznosti. Zato s prenehanjem
odgovornosti glavnega dolžnika za
obveznost ne preneha tudi porokova
oziroma zastaviteljeva odgovornost
za to obveznost«. Avtorica sklene:
»Ker s prenehanjem pravne osebe kot
glavnega dolžnika njene obveznosti
ne prenehajo, tudi po njenem prenehanju še vedno obstaja odgovornost
poroka oziroma zastavitelja za to
obveznost. Zato prenehanje pravne
osebe kot glavnega dolžnika ne
povzroči prenehanja hipoteke.« Ker
je (glavni) namen poroštva in zastave
za tuji dolg ravno v dodatnem varstvu
upnika (upnik dobi jamstvo, da bo
obveznost glavnega dolžnika, kolikor
je ne bo poravnal glavni dolžnik sam,
poravnala druga oseba), je stališče,
da s prenehanjem pravne osebe prenehajo tudi njene obveznosti, s tem
pa tudi dana zavarovanja, v popolnem nasprotju z logiko, namenom in
pomenom tovrstnih institutov55 in zato,
ter skladno z gornjimi argumenti, tudi
nepravilno. Stališču, da obveznosti
kapitalske gospodarske družbe, nad
katero je bil opravljen postopek stečaja, z izbrisom iz registra na podlagi
pravnomočnega sklepa o končanju
stečajnega postopka ne prenehajo, je
na(vse)zadnje pritrdilo tudi vrhovno
sodišče.56
10. Sklep
Zakonodaja seveda ne more
predvideti vseh življenjskih situacij
in potez dolžnikov, ki so nemalokrat
BV 11/2013
v škodo upnikov, zato je pri iskanju
rešitev treba uporabiti tudi zdravo
logiko in upoštevati namen institutov
zavarovanja. Zlasti sodišča bi si
morala prizadevati za enotno sodno
prakso, ki lahko bistveno pripomore
k izboljšanju pravne varnosti vseh
deležnikov v pravnih razmerjih. Upoštevaje trenutno stanje v slovenskem
bančnem sektorju lahko ugotovimo,
da bi bilo, podobno kot sanacijo
slovenskih bank, smiselno tudi prodajo bančnega premoženja izvesti
bolj organizirano in z večjo podporo
politike, zlasti v pogledu prilagoditve
zakonodaje v obsegu, ki bi olajšal
prodaje večjih paketov delnic in tako
omogočil razbremenitev bančnih
bilanc slabih terjatev, sočasno pa
tudi kupcem omogočil hitrejši prihod
na slovenski trg, slovenski državi pa s
tem tudi dostop do še kako potrebnih
neposrednih tujih investicij.
RS, št. 105/2012 s spremembami in
dopolnitvami).
Pravila borze (Pravila Borze, neuradno
prečiščeno besedilo 26. marec 2013).
Priporočila Banke Slovenije za usklajeno
postopanje bank upnic v primeru podjetij v
finančnih težavah (September 2012) .
Kazenski zakonik (KZ-1) Ur.l. RS, št. 55/2008
(s spremembami in dopolnitvami)
Sklep VSL Cst, opr. št. 281/2011 z dne 17.
11. 2011.
Sklep VSL opr. št. III Cpg 142/2010 z dne
03. 03. 2010.
Sklep VSL opr. št. Cst 177/2012, z dne
04. 07. 2012.
Zakon o zemljiški knjigi; Ur. l. Rs, št.
Sklep VSL opr. št. I Cp 1257/2006, z dne
09. 03. 2006.
Sodba VS RS II IPs 120/2007 z dne 14.
10. 2009.
Sodba VSL I Cpg 754/2009 z dne 10.
12. 2009.
Sodba VSK I Cpg 37/2005 z dne 20. 10.
2005.
Obligacijski zakonik; Ur. l. RS, št. 83/2001
(OZ).
Vrenčur Renato, Usoda akcesornih
zavarovanj v primeru prenehanja
insolventnega dolžnika, Podjetje in delo, št.
5/2012, str. 774 in dalje.
Lehman Brothers Press Release (Lehman
Brothers Holdings Inc. Announces It Intends
to File Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Petition”
(PDF). Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
September 15, 2008.
Plavšak Nina, Učinek prenehanja glavnega dolžnika na hipoteko za tujo obveznost,
Pravna praksa, št. 22/2012, str. 22.
Marketwatch. September 15, 2005. “Lehman folds with record $613 billion debt”.
Posvetovanju sodnikov o nekaterih
problemih v zvezi s stečaji v Ljubljani (28.
11. 1996 in 29. 01. 1997), Podjetje in
delo, 1997, št. 3, stran 408 in nadaljnje.
Članek: Sanacija bank ter razdolževanje
podjetij in bank, Božo Jašovič in Marko
Simoneti, Finance 14. maj 2013.
Charles Warren: “Bankruptcy in United
States History 1”, 1935.
Stališča in pravna mnenja Vrhovnega sodišča
Republike Slovenije z dne 06. 04. 2012.
VS RS Sodba III Ips 22/2009, z dne 28.
02. 2012.
Stvarnopravni zakonik 38. člen; Ur. l. RS,
št. 87/2002 in spremembe.
Zakon o gospodarskih družbah (Ur.l.
dopolnitvami).
Zakon o nematerializiranih vrednostnih
papirjih (Ur.l. RS, št. 23/1999, s
spremembami in dopolnitvami).
Zakona o trgu finančnih instrumentov
(Ur.l. RS, št. 67/2007 s spremembami n
dopolnitvami)
Zakon o finančnih zavarovanjih (Ur.l.
dopolnitvami).
Zakona o finančnem poslovanju,
prenehanju (ZFPPIPP); Ur. l. RS, št.
Zakon o ukrepih Republike Slovenije
za krepitev stabilnosti bank (Ur.l.
111
52
Vrenčur Renato, Usoda akcesornih zavarovanj
v primeru prenehanja insolventnega dolžnika,
Podjetje in delo, št. 5/2012, str. 774 in dalje.
53
Ibidem.
54
Plavšak Nina, Učinek prenehanja glavnega
dolžnika na hipoteko za tujo obveznost, Pravna
praksa, št. 22/2012, str. 22.
55
Glede vprašanja, ali mora zastavitelj, ki za
zavarovano terjatev upnika do glavnega dolžnika
jamči s hipoteko in kot porok, dopustiti poplačilo iz
zastavljene nepremičnine, kadar je glavni dolžnik
gospodarska družba, ki je prenehala zaradi
zaključka stečajnega postopka in bila izbrisana
iz sodnega registra, je bila dopuščena revizija, o
kateri pa po javno dostopnih podatkih še ni bilo
odločeno.
56
Stališča in pravna mnenja Vrhovnega sodišča
Republike Slovenije z dne 06. 04. 2012; dostopno
na http://www.sodisce.si/znanje/sodna praksa/
pravna mnenja in stalisca/42640/.
UDK 336.71:338.124.4:347.738:061.1EU
Reševanje bank
z zasebnimi sredstvi
Maja Koritnik in Peter Merc*
BAIL-IN TOOL FOR BANK
RESOLUTION
The approach for the
rescue of ailing banks
in the EU has switched
over the recent years
from the initial bail-out
measures, backed by
public finances, to the
bail-in measures, which
ensure the minimisation
of the taxpayer costs by
means of contributions the
shareholders and certain
creditors give to the bank.
The bail-in measures have
developed in the course
of the adaptations of the
state aid regime for banks
and have been adopted as
one of the resolution tools
within the forthcoming
EU framework for the
recovery and resolution of
banks. This major change
in the rules of the game is
likely to affect the capital
structure of banks as well
as their costs of funding.
JEL G01 G21 G34
S
anacija bank v težavah poteka v več državah članicah
EU že več kot pol desetletja. Ukrepi za reševanje bank so
sprva temeljili na finančni pomoči zagotovljeni iz javnih
sredstev (t. i. »bail-out« ukrepi); ob tem je evropska komisija (EK) oblikovala vrsto pravil in ukrepov, s katerimi je postavila
regulatorni okvir za sheme državnih pomoči, namenjene bankam
v težavah. Regulativa EU pa se je postopoma vedno bolj nagibala v
smer ukrepov, ki breme reševanja bank prenašajo z ramen davkoplačevalcev na ramena delničarjev bank, podrejenih upnikov in v
skrajnem primeru v določenem delu tudi na nekatere nepodrejene
upnike (t. i. »bail-in« ukrepi). V članku predstavljava razvoj teh ukrepov, ki je vzporedno potekal po dveh »frontah«, in sicer (i) v okviru
režima podeljevanja državnih pomoči za banke in (ii) skozi oblikovanje širšega okvira EU za sanacijo in reševanje bank.
Sanacija in reševanje evropskih bank
Po začetku finančne krize so banke v težavah najprej reševale
države z javnimi sredstvi. V EU so se tako v okviru režima podeljevanja državnih pomoči, ki temelji na določbah pogodbe o delovanju
EU, oblikovala posebna pravila za banke na podlagi sporočil, ki jih
je EK izdajala od leta 2008 naprej.1 Gre za sistem pravil, ki sledi
sprotnim spremembam razmer v bančnem sektorju in se posledično
postopoma spreminja, dopolnjuje in razvija.
* Mag. Maja Koritnik (LL.M.), Sektor za poslovanje s finančnimi institucijami v Novi Ljubljanski banki d.d., in mag. Peter
Merc, Center za skladnost poslovanja v Novi Ljubljanski banki d.d. Predstavljena so stališča avtorjev, ki niso nujno tudi
stališča družbe, v kateri sta avtorja zaposlena.
1
Postopek pred EK sta avtorja predstavila v članku Postopek ugotavljanja dovoljenosti državne pomoči pred evropsko
komisijo, Bančni vestnik, leto 62, št. 5, maj 2013.
112
BV 11/2013
Hierarhija bančnih sredstev
in kategorije kapitala
Opisani ukrepi za reševanje bank
temeljijo na hierarhiji sredstev gospodarske družbe, ki izhaja iz insolvenčnih postopkov. V primeru stečaja se
iz stečajne mase najprej poravnajo
vse nepodrejene (senior) obveznosti; ko so te poplačane v celoti, se
poravnajo podrejene obveznosti in
šele po njihovem celotnem poplačilu
pridejo na vrsto delničarji.
V primeru bank so podrejene
obveznosti še nadaljnje hierarhično
razporejene. Skladno z zadnjimi
spremembami bančne regulative
(CRR1) bančni regulatorni kapital
sestavljata temeljni kapital (Tier 1) in
dodatni kapital (Tier 2). Prvo kategorijo sestavljajo vplačani kapital, zadržani dobiček (skupaj temeljni kapital)
in najkvalitetnejši hibridni instrumenti
(dodatni temeljni kapital), ki so po
svojih lastnostnih podobni navadnim
delnicam. Za te kategorije lastniškega kapitala velja največja podre-
Slika 1: Shematski prikaz kategorij kapitala T1 in T2
(glede na lastnosti iz naslova pokrivanja izgub)
po dosedanji ureditvi in uredbi o bonitetnih zahtevah
za kreditne institucije in investicijska podjetja (CRR1);
going concern
Podrejeni dolg
dodatnega
kapitala I (UT2)
Hibridni
instrumenti
dodatnega
kapitala I (UT2)
Hibridni
instrumenti
temeljnega
kapitala (T1)
KAPITAL
(Core T1)
BV 11/2013
Vir: avtorja
113
CRR 1
Podrejeni dolg
dodatnega
kapitala (T2)
Dodatni
temeljni
kapital
(AT1)
going concern
gone concern
dosedanja
ureditev
2
Utemeljitev EK iz sporočila EK o bančništvu #2.
3
Prvi predlog direktive, ki ga je pripravila EK, je
bil natančneje predstavljen v članku M. Koritnik:
Predlog novega režima EU za reševanje krize v
finančnem sektorju; Bančni vestnik, leto 60, št. 4,
april 2011.
jenost, kar pomeni dvoje, in sicer
da instrumenti temeljnega kapitala
absorbirajo največ izgube, ter da jo
absorbirajo prvi, že tekom rednega
poslovanja (ang. »going concern«).
Tier 2 kapital pa sestavljajo datirani
podrejeni dolžniški instrumenti, ki so
v primeru stečaja banke nadrejeni instrumentom temeljnega kapitala in se
poplačajo, ko so v celoti poravnane
obveznosti do nepodrejenih upnikov
(ang. »gone concern«).
V okviru trenutnih reševanj bank pa
so pomembni obstoječi kapitalski
instrumenti bank, ki so bili izdani
skladno z do sedaj veljavno bančno
regulativo, v kateri je bila kategorija
Tier 2 kapitala (»dodatni kapital 1«)
razdeljena na (i) trajne hibridne instrumente dodatnega kapitala I (ang.
»Upper Tier 2«, UT2), ki so namenjeni pokrivanju izgub banke v času
njenega rednega poslovanja, in na
(ii) datirane instrumente podrejenega
dolga (ang. »Lower Tier 2«, LT2), ki
pokrivajo izgube banke šele v primeru njene insolventnosti; izven stečaja
gone concern
Reševanje bank pa se je za marsikatero državo izkazalo za prevelik
zalogaj, ki je nekatere privedel tudi
do nevzdržnega javnofinančnega
položaja, tako da so zaprosile za
mednarodno pomoč (npr. Španija,
Ciper). Poleg tega pa reševanje
bank z javnimi sredstvi tudi ni primerno, saj bi ustaljeno načelo, da se
tako rešuje banke, ki so se spuščale
v preveč tvegane posle, lahko vodilo
do moralnega tveganja njihovega
vodstva.2 Zato se je na ravni EU pojavila ideja o vzpostavitvi regulatornega okvira oziroma sistema pravil
za sanacijo ter reševanje bank. Prvi
predlog je EK objavila že leta 2010
in je predvideval okrepljen nadzor
bank, poudarek na preventivnih
ukrepih in pripravah na morebitno
krizo ter obsežnejše pristojnosti nadzornikov za zgodnje reševanje bank
(v okviru katerih je predviden tudi
instrument za reševanje z zasebnimi
sredstvi, ang. »bail-in tool«).3 Predlog
direktive o vzpostavitvi okvira za
sanacijo ter reševanje kreditnih
institucij in investicijskih podjetij je
po nadaljnjem usklajevanju v juniju
2013 potrdil Svet EU (predlog direktive), trenutno pa je v postopku pred
evropskim parlamentom. Gre za
enega od elementov bančne unije,
poleg, med drugim, nove bančne
ureditve (CRR1 in CRD4) in predlogov za enotni mehanizem za reševanje ter enotno jamstveno shemo za
bančne vloge. Cilj teh ureditev je, da
se reševanje bank z nacionalne ravni
prenese na evropsko ter da se tako
prekine začaran krog med težavami
bank in z njimi povezanimi višjimi
stroški zadolževanja za države, kjer
imajo te banke sedež (sporočilo za
javnost).
LASTNIŠKI
KAPITAL
(Common
Equity T1)
pa so Tier 2 obveznosti enakovredne
nepodrejenim obveznostim banke.
Ukrep odpisa dolga
Med instrumenti za zgodnje reševanje bank, ki jih predvideva predlog
direktive, najbolj odmeva reševanje z
zasebnimi sredstvi, ki je predvideno
v okviru ukrepa odpisa dolga. Z namenom zmanjševanja kapitalskega
primanjkljaja banke v težavah bodo
namreč lahko organi za reševanje
po odpisu terjatev delničarjev in
podrejenih upnikov odpisali tudi
nekatere terjatve nepodrejenih in
nezavarovanih upnikov banke v
težavah oziroma pretvorili dolžniške
terjatve v delnice.
O izboru instrumentov, ki bodo predmet odpisa oz. konverzije v kapital,
bo odločal njihov vrstni red poplačila
v primeru prenehanja banke (podrejenost). Bistven element predloga pa
je, da lahko organi reševanja ukrep
uporabijo ne le, ko je banka insolventna, ampak tudi že, ko ocenijo,
da je zelo blizu insolventnosti in da
je tak ukrep nujen za zagotovitev
njenega nadaljnjega poslovanja. To
v povezavi z možnim obsegom ukrepa pomeni, da bodo nepodrejene in
nezavarovane naložbe v bankah naenkrat postale bistveno bolj tvegane,
kot so bile do sedaj.
Načelo porazdelitve stroškov
sanacije v režimu za državne
pomoči bankam
Ukrep odpisa dolga, kot ga predvideva predlog direktive, se je v zadnjih
letih ob reševanjih bank razvijal v
okviru sistema EU pravil državnih
pomoči in postal del enega njegovih
bistvenih načel, tj. načelo porazdelitve
finančnega bremena stroškov sanacije med javnim in zasebnim sektorjem
(ang. »burden sharing«). Obseg
načela se je razvijal postopoma:
• v prvem izmed sporočil EK (sprejeto leta 2008) so bili postavljeni
temelji omenjenega načela, in
sicer je bilo kot eden od kriterijev
za dovoljeno državno pomoč
določeno, da mora biti višina
državne pomoči omejena na
najmanjšo potrebno. To naj bi se
zagotovilo s prispevkom finančne institucije, ki je prejemnica
pomoči, ter s prispevkom zasebnega sektorja (sporočilo EK o
bančništvu);
• sporočilo EK o oslabljenih sredstvih (2009) govori o nujnosti
porazdelitve bremena stroškov
iz naslova oslabljenih sredstev
v bankah na državo, delničarje
in upnike, vendar ga ne ureja
Reševanje
bank se je za
marsikatero
državo izkazalo
za prevelik
zalogaj.
podrobneje;
• vprašanje bolj podrobno opredeljuje sporočilo EK o prestrukturiranju (2009). Nujnost upoštevanja
tega načela EK utemeljuje z omejevanjem moralnega tveganja
in z zmanjševanjem izkrivljanja
konkurence. V okviru zasebnega
sektorja sporočilo EK porazdelitev bremena prestrukturiranja
prenaša na banko in na njene
delničarje, uporabo načela pa
omejuje le na primere, ko s tako
porazdelitvijo bremena v fazi
reševanja banke ne bi bila ogrožena finančna stabilnost banke. V
tem primeru sporočilo EK predvideva nadomestitev porazdelitve
bremena s prispevkom banke na
poznejši stopnji njenega prestrukturiranja.
114
V zadnjih letih so nekatere države EU
pri reševanju svojih bank z mednarodno pomočjo, predvsem pod pritiski
t.i. trojke, uporabile ukrep prisilne
konverzije ali odpisa posameznih obveznosti bank. Opaziti je bilo vedno
strožje ukrepe, četudi je bila njihova
uporaba precej nekonsistentna:
• Pri reševanju irske banke
Northern Rock v letu 2008 so bili
na primer odpisani samo nekateri
instrumenti temeljnega kapitala.
Pri reševanju banke Bradford &
Bingley v istem letu so bili nato
odpisani vsi Tier 1 instrumenti
banke (Yu P. in Luu B. V.).
• Pri sanaciji Banco de Valencia, ki
je prejela finančno pomoč v višini
28% bilančne vsote, je prišlo
do celotnega odpisa navadnih
delnic, 90% odpisa prednostnih
delnic in 85% odpisa datiranega
podrejenega dolga. Preostanek
je bil konvertiran v navadne
delnice banke. V primeru Bankia
je banka investitorjem v Tier 1 in
UT2 instrumente ponudila naložila konverzijo v navadne delnice
banke s 38% odpisom vrednosti,
imetniki LT2 instrumentov pa so
ob odpisu 13% vrednosti svoje
instrumente lahko konvertirali v
delnice ali pa jih zamenjali za
nepodrejene obveznice z ničelnim kuponom, tudi s precejšnjim
diskontom (1,5% od nominalne
vrednosti za vsak mesec do
dospelosti instrumenta, s čimer
so želeli imetnike odvrniti od te
možnosti) (FROB, press release).
• Za uporabo ukrepa odpisa dolga
se je februarja 2013 odločila tudi
nizozemska vlada pri prestrukturiranju četrte največje banke SNS
Reaal, ki je sicer državno pomoč
prejela že v letu 2008. Z vladnim
dekretom je odločila o celotnem
odpisu kapitala, hibridnih instrumentov in podrejenega dolga
banke ter njeni hkratni dokapitalizaciji (Evropska komisija, state
aid decision).
BV 11/2013
Ukrep odpisa dolga v
predlogu direktive
Vzporedno z opisanimi različnimi
pristopi k reševanju bank je EK leta
2010 začela pripravljati enoten okvir
za sanacijo ter reševanje bank, ki v
okviru reševalnih ukrepov predvideva širok obseg odpisov dolga, tudi
nepodrejenih obveznosti, in sicer že
pred nastopom insolventnosti banke.
Obseg ukrepa
BV 11/2013
sedem dni (medbančne obveznosti
in obveznosti iz sistemov plačilnega
prometa), ter obveznosti, ki so ključne
za dnevne operacije banke.
Poleg tega daje predlog direktive
državam tudi diskrecijsko pravico,
da iz uporabe ukrepa odpisa dolga
izključijo določene instrumente,
ki bi sicer bili predmet odpisa ali
konverzije. Diskrecijsko pravico bo
država lahko uporabila le v primeru
izpolnjevanja vsaj enega izmed štirih
razlogov in sicer, če odpis (i) ne bi
mogel biti izveden v razumnem času,
(ii) če bi imel za posledico širjenje
negativnih vplivov, (iii) če bi ogrozil
nadaljevanje opravljanja ključnih
funkcij banke, ali (iv) če bi povzročil
izgube ostalim upnikom.
Diskrecijo države nadalje omejuje
še pogoj, da lahko iz okvira ukrepa
določene instrumente izključi le, če je
z odpisom ali konverzijo dolga delničarjev in upnikov že zagotovljena
njihova participacija pri pokrivanju
izgub v višini vsaj 8% od vsote skupnih obveznosti in lastnih sredstev. V
primeru uporabe diskrecijske pravice
bo država lahko izgubo prenesla na
ostale upnike banke (ob upoštevanju načela, da ti upniki ne smejo ne
smejo utrpeti več izgub, kot bi jih utrpeli v primeru stečaja banke) ali pa
razliko kompenzirala s prispevkom
nacionalnega reševalnega sklada.
Slika 2: Podrejenost kategorij instrumentov in
vrstni red odpisa po predlogu direktive
Delnice
Hibridni instrumenti TK oz. instrumenti
dodatnega temeljnega kapitala (AT1)
Podrejenost
Upoštevati je treba, da ima prenehanje banke lahko tudi sistemske
učinke, zato mora biti temu prilagojen sam insolvenčni postopek –
predlog direktive tako z nekaterimi
pravili posega v sistemsko ureditev
insolvenčnih postopkov na način, da
spreminja hierarhijo terjatev. Načelo,
po katerem se terjatve istega reda
obravnava enako (pari passu), bo
v primeru uporabe ukrepa odpisa
podrejenega dolga pri bankah
lahko izključeno: v okoliščinah, ko
bo to zahteval javni interes, se bodo
upniki istega razreda lahko obravnavali različno. Predlog direktive tudi
natančno določa vrstni red terjatev,
ki bodo predmet uporabe ukrepa.
Osnovno načelo je, da vrstni red
odpisa oz. konverzije sledi splošno
veljavni shemi, ki sicer velja za
insolvenčne postopke: izgube bo
treba najprej v celoti razporediti med
delničarje in nato po hierarhiji po-
drejenosti še na upnike. Za odpisom
temeljnega kapitala (delnic), sledi
odpis instrumentov dodatnega temeljnega kapitala (AT1) ali hibridnih
instrumentov temeljnega kapitala
(T1). Če izgube s popolnim odpisom
instrumentov Tier 1 kapitala še ne bi
bile pokrite, se nadalje pokrijejo z
odpisom manj podrejenih instrumentov: instrumentov dodatnega kapitala
(UT2), nato instrumentov podrejenega dolga (LT2) oziroma dodatnega
kapitala (T2), ter v skrajnem primeru
tudi še določenih terjatev iz naslova
nepodrejenega in nezavarovanega
dolga.
V nasprotju z načelom enakovredne
obravnave vseh nezavarovanih
upnikov banke pa predlog direktive
pri odpisu nadrejenega dolga v
preferenčni položaj postavlja depozite fizičnih oseb, depozite malih in
srednjih podjetij (SME) ter obveznosti
do Evropske investicijske banke: v primeru odpisa so te obveznosti banke
nadrejene obveznostim do ostalih
nezavarovanih upnikov in depozitom
velikih gospodarskih družb. Poleg
tega naj bi bile določene kategorije
obveznosti banke eksplicitno izključene iz okvira ukrepa. Gre za zajamčene vloge, zavarovane obveznosti
(npr. krite obveznice), finančne obveznosti banke do zaposlenih, kratkoročne obveznosti z ročnostjo manj od
Hibridni instrumenti dodatnega kapitala I (UT2)
Instrumenti podrejenega dolga (LT2)
Izbrani instrumenti nadrejenega dolga
Vir:Barclays
115
Odpis
• Še bolj radikalen je bil aprila
2013 pristop v primeru dveh
največjih ciprskih bank, Bank of
Cyprus in Laiki. Po odpisu celotnega kapitala, hibridnih instrumentov in podrejenega dolga so
posegli tudi v nepodrejeni dolg.
Del nezavarovanih depozitov je
bil konvertiran v delnice, del je bil
začasno zamrznjen kot kapitalska rezerva, del pa začasno
zamrznjen za morebitne likvidnostne potrebe (Natixis in ESM).
Učinkovanje ukrepa
Predlog direktive predvideva, da
bodo imeli reševalni organi možnost,
da uporabijo ukrep odpisa dolga
še pred nastankom insolvenčnih
razlogov,če bi bilo to potrebno
zaradi javnega interesa. Ravno v tem
premiku je glavna sprememba pravil
igre: do sedaj je za prelomnico veljal
stečaj, skladno s predlogom direktive
pa bodo terjatve upnikov odvisne
od bolj subjektivnega faktorja.
Odvisne bodo od ocene organa za
reševanje, da banka propada ali bo
verjetno propadla in da bi alternativni ukrepi v razumnem roku takšen
propad preprečili.
S tem se tveganost bančnih naložb,
ki so lahko predmet ukrepa, bistveno
poveča. Ker gre za tako spremembo pravil igre je pomembno, da je
pred uvedbo novosti predvideno
dovoljšnje prehodno obdobje, ki
akterjem omogoči ustrezne prilagoditve. Predlog direktive tako ob
siceršnji predvideni veljavnosti okvira
za sanacijo in reševanje bank, ki
je načrtovana leta 2015, za ukrep
odpisa dolga določa izjemo: zaradi
pomiritve investitorjev naj se ne bi
uporabljal pred letom 2018.
Nova pravila EK v okviru režima
državnih pomoči za banke
Če se okvir za sanacijo in reševanje
bank šele vzpostavlja, pa je EK s
podobnimi ukrepi zelo pohitela
pri vzporednem sistemu EU pravil
za podeljevanje državnih pomoči
bankam. Režim, vzpostavljen z
opisanimi sporočili EK, je pri vprašanju porazdelitve bremena državam
članicam po mnenju EK dopuščal
preveč manevrskega prostora, kar je
imelo za posledico različne stroške financiranja bank. Zato je EK z novim
sporočilom, ki je začel veljati avgusta
2013 (sporočilo EK o bančništvu #2)
postavila bistveno strožje minimalne
standarde:
• ustrezna porazdelitev bremena: po začetnem pokritju izgub z
lastniškim kapitalom EK pričakuje
še prispevke imetnikov hibridnega
kapitala in imetnikov podrejenih
dolžniških instrumentov, ki morajo
kar najbolj prispevati k zmanjšanju kapitalskega primanjkljaja (v
obliki pretvorbe instrumentov v
navaden lastniški temeljni kapital
ali pa v obliki odpisa glavnice
instrumentov); denarni odlivi v
korist imetnikov takih instrumentov
morajo biti preprečeni v pravno
sprejemljivem okviru.
• omejitve: izvzetje je mogoče le,
kadar bi izvajanje takih ukrepov
Izguba banke
iz poslovanja
se bo morala
kriti v breme
razpoložljivega
kapitala banke.
ogrozilo finančno stabilnost
ali povzročilo nesorazmerne
rezultate; poleg tega je treba
pri izvajanju ukrepov upoštevati
načelo, da »noben upnik ne utrpi
večjih izgub, kot bi jih sicer« (tj.
podrejeni upniki z ekonomskega
vidika ne bi smeli prejeti manj, kot
bi bil njihov instrument vreden,
če državna pomoč ne bi bila
dodeljena).
EK v sporočilu še določa, da je
uporaba teh ukrepov predpogoj za
uporabo katerih koli ukrepov državne pomoči, v prvi vrsti ukrepa za
oslabljena sredstva (npr. mehanizem
slabe banke) in dokapitalizacije.
S tem sporočilom je EK za banke,
116
ki so prejemnice državne pomoči,
dejansko že v letu 2013 uveljavila
ukrepe odpisa dolga za vse podrejene instrumente, ki jih sicer predlog direktive za sanacijo in reševanje bank,
kot že omenjeno, predvideva šele z
letom 2018. Na možno destabilizacijo finančnih trgov zaradi hitrega
sprejema ukrepa je EK v svojem pismu
opozoril guverner ECB Mario Draghi.
V pismu je predlagal odložitev uporabe ukrepa do dneva polne operativnosti bančne unije (Reuters).
Uporaba ukrepa v primeru
slovenskih bank
Tako zadnje sporočilo EK kot tudi
predlog direktive nalagata državam
članicam, da vzpostavijo normativni
okvir, ki bo omogočal uporabo ukrepa odpisa dolga.
Kot omenjeno je v zadnjem sporočilu
EK določeno, da je uporaba ukrepa
predpogoj za uporabo katerih koli
ukrepov državne pomoči. ZUKSB
v tretjem odstavku 23. člena sicer
predvideva, da mora banka pred
povečanjem osnovnega kapitala z
ukrepi po ZUKSB zagotoviti, da se
izguba banke iz poslovanja krije v
breme za to razpoložljivega kapitala banke. Vendar ta določba ni
ustrezna glede na obseg zahtevanih
ukrepov, kot so določeni v zadnjem
sporočilu EK.
Pravno podlago za uporabo ukrepa
odpisa dolga vzpostavlja novela
zakona o bančništvu, ki jo je vlada
potrdila v oktobru in jo po nujnem
postopku v obravnavo in sprejem
posredovala Državnemu zboru
(ZBan-1, novela L). Predlog med
drugim širi nabor izrednih ukrepov,
ki jih ima na voljo Banka Slovenije
za reševanje banke, ki v naslednjih
šestih mesecih verjetno ne bi izpolnjevala zahtev glede minimalnega
kapitala ali likvidnostnega položaja.
Banka Slovenije bi lahko v takem
primeru z odredbo določila, da
določene obveznosti banke (t.i.
BV 11/2013
kvalificirane obveznosti) prenehajo
ali pa se konvertirajo v delnice.4 Kot
kvalificirane obveznosti so določeni
osnovni kapital in podrejene obveznosti banke.
Glede na lastnosti posameznih
instrumentov je taka ureditev najbolj sporna v primeru instrumentov
podrejenega dolga (»LT2«), ki so v
nasprotju z bolj podrejenimi instrumenti namenjeni za kritje izgub v primeru prenehanja banke. Tak poseg
je lahko sporen z vidika več ustavnih
določb: pravice do zasebne lastnine
in dedovanja, načela prepovedi
povratne veljave pravnih aktov, ter
načela zaupanja v pravo. V obrazložitvi predloga Vlada RS utemeljuje
dopustnost posega v ustavno varovano pravico do zasebne lastnine s t.i.
strogim testom sorazmernosti. V zvezi
s tem ocenjuje, da je poseg (i) nujen,
ker cilja ni mogoče doseči brez tega
ukrepa, oz. ga ni možno doseči z
milejšim ukrepom, (ii) primeren, ker
je z njim dejansko možno doseči cilj,
ki mu ukrep sledi, in (iii) da je teža
posledic uporabe ukrepa proporcionalna cilju ukrepa. Poseg v pravico
do zasebne lastnine je zato po mnenju Vlade dopusten. Glede povratne
veljave ukrepov pa Vlada navaja,
da gre za t.i. nepravo retroaktivnost,5 ki načeloma ne pomeni kršitve
prepovedi povratne veljave pravnih
aktov. Lahko pa predstavlja kršitev
načela zaupanja v pravo, vendar je
tak poseg dopusten, če je skladen s
testom sorazmernosti. Končno oceno
skladnosti ukrepov pa lahko poda le
Ustavno sodišče RS.
Namesto sklepa
Kot rečeno je bila uporaba ukrepa
odpisa dolga zaradi svoje »revolucionarne« narave v predlogu direktive
zamišljena šele nekaj let po uveljavitvi novega okvira za reševanje bank.
Zadnje sporočilo EK pa ga je za vse
podrejene instrumente banke, ki so
v postopku pridobitve državne poBV 11/2013
moči, uvedlo že z avgustom 2013. S
tem je akterjem onemogočen čas za
prilagoditev; v tem pogledu so najbolj problematični izdani instrumenti
podrejenega dolga (LT2), ki v svojih
pogojih predvidevajo kritje izgub
banke samo v primeru stečaja, EK
pa njihov prispevek k zmanjševanju
kapitalskega primanjkljaja zahteva
že prej (ko banka prejme državno
pomoč) – gre torej za poseg v pridobljene pravice njihovih imetnikov.
Kar zadeva učinka opisanih sprememb na kapitalsko strukturo bank
pa morda lahko rečemo, da bo
predvideni okvir reševanja bank
kategoriji dodatnega kapitala bank
(Tier 2) takorekoč vdihnil novo
življenje. Ta kategorija je namreč s
prenovo kapitalske regulative (CRR 1
in CRD 4) in poudarkom na količnikih kvalitetnejšega kapitala (T1 in
CT1) precej izgubila na pomenu, s
predvidenimi mehanizmi reševanja
bank pa ponovno pridobiva na pomenu, saj jo bodo nepodrejeni upniki
banke verjetno šteli za svojo »varnostno blazino« v primeru reševanja
banke, saj bodo skladno s predvidenim vrstnim redom njihovi instrumenti
prišli v poštev šele potem, ko bodo
podrejeni instrumenti v celoti odpisani. Verjetno lahko zato pričakujemo,
da bodo banke zato še izdajale
instrumente dodatnega kapitala (T2),
kljub manjšemu pomenu kategorije
za kapitalsko ustreznost, saj jim bo
to omogočalo lažji dostop do (tudi
cenejšega) zadolževanja.
Nedvomno pa bodo opisani ukrepi
imeli očitne posledice na ceno zadolževanja bank, saj postaja zaradi njih
večina naložb v banke bistveno bolj
tvegana, kot je bila do sedaj. Če se
podobni ukrepi ne uveljavijo tudi po
svetu, se bo to nedvomno odrazilo
na dobičkonosnosti sektorja v regiji.
Artus, P.: Bail-ins instead of bail-outs
in Europe: Why, and what impacts?,
economic research, Natixis, 2013.
Direktiva o dostopu do dejavnosti kreditnih
117
institucij in bonitetnem nadzoru kreditnih
institucij in investicijskih podjetij, spremembi
Direktive 2002/87/ES in razveljavitvi
direktiv 2006/48/ES in 2006/49/ES
(CRD4), 2013/36/EU, Ur. l. EU št. 176 ,
27. junij 2013.
European Stability Mechanism (ESM): FAQ
- Financal assistance for Cyprus.
Evropska komisija: Odločitev o državni
pomoči: Nizozemska - reševanje SNS
Reaal, 2013/N, Bruselj, 2012.
Evropska komisija: Sporočilo Komisije o
uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za ukrepe
v zvezi s finančnimi institucijami v okviru
trenutne svetovne finančne krize (sporočilo
EK o bančništvu), Ur. l. EU, št. C 270,
2008.
Evropska komisija: Sporočilo komisije
o obravnavanju oslabljenih sredstev v
bančnem sektorju Skupnosti (sporočilo EK
o oslabljenih sredstvih), Ur. l. EU, št. C 72,
2009.
Evropska komisija: Sporočilo Komisije o
ponovni vzpostavitvi uspešnega poslovanja
in oceni ukrepov prestrukturiranja v
finančnem sektorju v sedanji krizi na
podlagi pravil o državni pomoči (sporočilo
EK o prestrukturiranju), Ur. l. EU, št. C 195,
2009.
Evropska komisija: Sporočilo komisije
o uporabi pravil o državni pomoči za
podporne ukrepe v korist bank v okviru
finančne krize od 1. avgusta 2013 dalje
(sporočilo o bančništvu #2), Ur. l. EU, št. C
216, 2013.
FROB: Press release disclosing the
resolutions adopted in the FROB steering
committee; Madrid, marec, 2013.
J.P. Morgan: The Dynamics of Burden
Sharing, Europe Credit Research, London,
2012.
Sporočilo za javnost o vrhu Sveta Evropske
Unije junija 2013.
Yu, P. in Luu, B. V.: Lessons from the
Collapse in Hybrid Bank Capital Securities,
University of East London Business School,
London, 2010.
Reuters: ECB‘s Draghi has asked to delay
bank bail-in plans, 19. oktober 2013.
Societe Generale: Spain Banks: Banco
de Valencia haircut read across, februar
2013.
Uredba o bonitetnih zahtevah za kreditne
institucije in investicijska podjetja ter o
spremembi Uredbe (EU) št. 648/2012
(CRR1), Ur. l. EU št. 176, 27. junij 2013.
ZBan-1, novela L.
4
Prenehanje kvalificiranih obveznosti bi se
določilo v obsegu, ki je potreben zaradi pokrivanja
izgub banke, konverzija pa v obsegu, potrebnim
za doseganje kapitalske ustreznosti banke. Predlog
predvideva še, da posamezni upnik zaradi ukrepov
ne sme utrpeti večjih izgub, kot bi jih utrpel v
primeru stečaja banke.
5
V primerih neprave retroaktivnosti ima zakon
učinek za naprej, saj posega v že oblikovana, a še
ne zaključena pravna razmerja.
SKLEPNE MISLI / CONCLUSION REMARKS
The Slovenian banks between
rock and hard place
Emil Lah*
The macroeconomic situation in
which the Slovenian banks have been
coping with the consequences of a
long-delayed clean-up plan, has gone
from bad to worse in 2013 after the
last year’s vague promise of recovery. Slovenia’s economy remains in
recession, the rate of unemployment is
getting very close to 10 per cent, the
general government deficit forecast to
soar by the year-end from 3.8 per cent
to 5.7 per cent of GDP, public debt
is set to exceed the magic Maastricht
convergence criterion of 60 per cent
of GDP. The only star on the country’s dark macroeconomic sky is the
positive balance of payments with the
current-account surplus of around 2.5
per cent in 2012 and expected to soar
to approximately 7 per cent of GDP at
the end of 2013 fuelled more by ebbing imports than by swelling exports.
Even a quick glance at the situation
in the real sector reveals that during
the period between 2010 and 2012,
the volume of lending by the domestic banks fell by approximately 12
per cent, but the indebtedness of the
national economy still remains at a
level where deleveraging is “a bridge
too far”. In addition, the net debt to
EBITDA ratio stays high indicating that
about one third of local companies
are in dire straits when it comes to
their ability to decrease their bank
debt burden and take on the additional debt required to grow the business.
It is no wonder that the local banks
have found themselves in a vicious
circle when after raising the bar for
credit applicants their credit offering
was reduced to a trickle leaving them
with gross income posted for the first
eight months of this year plunging by
approximately 30 per cent. On the
other hand, if the local banks had
neglected “the prudent man’s rule”
when lending to their corporate customers, the portion of non-performing
loans would have grown to unmanageable proportions. Even though
bank managers realise that for the
credit institutions to restore soundness,
their customers must first complete
restructuring programmes and to do
that, they need funding. The three biggest Slovenian banks are controlled
by the state and no significant statefunded aid has been available so far.
To illustrate the scope of state-funded
aid poured by the EU countries on
their ailing credit institutions there
is the figure of 1,600 billion euros
handed out until the end of 2011. On
the other hand, the Slovenian government has bowed to the pressures of
the European Banking Authority (EBA)
and has allocated minimum amounts
for the recapitalisation of the stateowned banks. There is a brain-twisting
paradox that, in line with its position
of the principal shareholder, the government would not only meddle on a
daily basis with the credit policy of the
three biggest banks under its wing,
but it would nudge their management
to lend even to the “lame ducks” of
the Slovenian economy on the one
hand, and to finance management
buy-out constructed on a razor blade.
The strategy backfired shaking the financial stability of the banking system
in September 2013 to the point where
the Bank of Slovenia was forced to
take the extraordinary measure of the
so-called controlled liquidation of two
illiquid banks.
The fact is that the exposure of the
banking system to the risk of earning
lower returns has been increasing;
no process of bank consolidation is
taking place, while the processes of
bank restructuring or using internal
rehabilitation tools still have to gain
impetus. The whole banking system in
Slovenia continues to suffer in 2013
and the cumulative loss keeps rising
mostly as a consequence of swelling provisions and the fact that the
national economy in recession1. What
may also be a problem is the (dangerously) low capital adequacy ratio of
most Slovenian banks in comparison
with other credit institutions in the
euro area. The question to be asked
at this point is whether Slovenian
banks will be able to keep pace with
the capital regulatory framework for
banks Basel III with ever more strict
capital requirements. Should the socalled Asset-Quality Review (AQR) or
due diligence of bank assets and the
stress tests reveal that the Slovenian
banks are too vulnerable to possible
new macroeconomic shocks, it would
be a serious blow. It is clear that to
carve out bad assets from the banks’
balance sheets and transferring them
to the so-called bad bank will be a
very painful and highly demanding
operation. It will strip the banks bare
to show how much the banks’ total assets will decrease and what the price
* Emil Lah, Chief Editor of Bančni Vestnik. The information and views set out in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of
the Bank Association of Slovenia.
1
The loss accumulated by the Slovenian banking system for the period ended 31 August 2013, is 375 million euros, mostly as a consequence of net impairments and
provisions totalling 677 million euros.
118
BV 11/2013
SKLEPNE MISLI / CONCLUSION REMARKS
for the bank rescue will be so that the
bills can be issued to the government,
to the shareholders and to the large
depositors to foot them.
The European Commission agreed
in August this year the new deal on
bank rescue and resolution using
public funds which introduces the socalled “bail-in” rule2. The bottom line
of the new rule is that a bank rescue
plan can kick off also before it is formally made bankrupt and the burden
of its rescue falls first on the shoulders
of its shareholders and then of its uninsured creditors before public funds
(taxpayers’ money) can be used. By
forcing losses on creditors, public
finances will be supposedly relieved
of the entire burden of footing the bill
of bank failure. As far as the case
of Slovenia is concerned, the bail-in
model for a failed bank rescue is not
bear much fruit since the Republic of
Slovenia is the principal shareholders
of the country’s top three banks and,
in addition, figures as a holder of big
chunks in the share capital of a number of state-owned enterprise, which,
in turn, are formal owners of private
banks. This means that to handle the
cost of future bank bailouts, funds will
be taken from Peter to give to Paul
and, at the end of the day, Slovenian
taxpayers will pick the tab. Clearly,
we will be forced to participate in a
dangerous game of imposing losses
on junior bondholders in banks that
need recapitalisation by taxpayers
and these investors include important
institutional investors such as insurance companies and pension funds.
Hurting financially pension funds
could be a fatal blow since pensions
funds are still on wobbly legs and
must get stronger as the population is
aging. With pension funds in the line
of fire, further pension system reforms
would be futile exercise.
There are voices arguing that the best
solution for the Slovenian state-owned
banks would be to use the option
of asking for financial aid from the
European Stability Mechanism (ESM)
and to launch as soon as practicable
a wide-reaching bank resolution plan,
which will be complex and pains-
BV 11/2013
taking. Slovenia is indeed in a tight
corner but asking for an international
bailout would be forcing its citizens
to swallow a bitter pill. The treatment
may be efficient but the suffering
imposed in exchange for financial aid
is seen by all recipients of such aid
as excessive. Whatever the doctor’s
orders will be, it is clear now that by
sweeping the bank problems under
the carpet, the Slovenian governments
have not got rid of them as one of
former prime ministers has recently admitted in public and by downplaying
the leverage issue, they have ill served
the country’s indebted real sector.
The productivity level of the Slovenian
companies and the output of certain
sectors is too modest, and we will
have to take steps in the right direction
if we are to overcome the problem
of struggling to raise the competitiveness level of the national economy in
order to stay afloat. It does not mean
that we are in a position to delay
taking new austerity measures in the
light of the further downside risk to
GDP growth in 2014. The European
Commission is expected to demand
that the Slovenian government stays
firmly on track of fiscal consolidation,
and further belt-tightening will strip
us of the chances we have to revive
the economy. In plain language,
should more funds be allocated to
capital expenditure, we will have to
cut even deeper into all segments of
government spending. Since investors
demand the eye-popping yield on
ten-year government bonds of some
6.5 per cent, there is little room for
manoeuvre should we wish to escape
the iron handshake of Brussels3.
This year’s developments in the euro
zone will remain in our memory for
quite a while with Cyprus taking the
centre stage as a guinea pig to test
whether the new bail-in principle
for bank rescue and reach into the
pockets of unsecured depositors of
two Cyprian banks. The citizens of
Slovenia will certainly remember the
first pan-Slovenian protests against
austerity measures, corruption and
nepotism of the ruling elite. According
to the published figures and forecasts,
119
most euro-zone countries are “out of
the woods”. Sadly, Slovenia is not in
that group and whatever imbalances
are prolonging recession, a turnaround of the country’s growth prospects remains distant. The fact that the
share of non-performing loans has
soared to around 30 per cent of total
loans must be rather painful for the
executives in the state-owned banks.
The government minister must feel bad
about the general government debt
shooting to over 60 per cent of GDP
and the general government deficit rising in 2013 year-on-year. we should
all brace for the day when the results
of the Asset-Quality Review and of
the stress tests are announced. There
are legal experts in Slovenia who
should at least feel uncomfortable for
sabotaging back-loaded bank efforts
to promulgate a law on the systematic
deleveraging and providing a life
raft to creditors instead of bailing out
irresponsible owners of chronically
indebted companies.
Conventional wisdom tells us that for
the Slovenian banks, companies and
the government to go on, a growthfriendly policy is as necessary as
preserving a sound fiscal position. The
same applies to other less developed
EU Member States. Choosing the
model for re-trenching Slovenia’s
economy is still in our hands4 but it
also relies heavily on investors seeking to earn as much as possible in the
international financial markets.
References:
European Commission, European Economy,
Occasional Papers 142, April 2013.
Banka Slovenije, Eurosystem,
Macroeconomic Developments and
Projections, October 2013.
2
The bail-in rule is not acceptable from the political
and legal view since it is a retroactive measure
affecting the rights of all bank creditors and
jeopardises the financial stability of the Slovenian
financial system.
3
The policy imposing spending cuts also called
»austerity policy« as advocated by the European
Commission has only exacerbated recession
in Greece, as well as in other »problematic«
member states of the euro area and has been
counterproductive so far as argued both by the ECB
and the IMF.
4
The serious problem of the Slovenian banking
system and its regulator is that the insurance scheme
for bank deposits is not in place yet.
STATISTICAL APPENDIX / STATISTIČNA PRILOGA
Selected macroeconomic indicators
Luka Žakelj*
Figure 1: Slovenia: projection of expenditure
contributions to GDP growth rate
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
-12
-14
-16
-18
-20
in p.p.
4.4
4.0
7.0
5.8
1.3
3.4
1.4
0.7
-0.7
-2.6
-2.5
-7.9
households
government
gross fixed investment
change in inventories
net foreign trade
GDP (proj. - Oct. 2013)
GDP
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
Figure 3: Slovenia: projection of contributions
to inflation by components
7
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
-12
-14
-16
-18
-20
6
current account
current account (projection – Oct. 2013) 6.1
-5
-6
6.8
current account (projection – Apr. 2013)
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
7.7
3.3
0.4
-0.5 -0.1
-2.6
-1.7 -1.8
-4.2
-5.4
04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
2
7
6
5
4
2.1
3
2.8
3
2.2
2.1
1.7
0.9
1.5
2
1
1
0
0
-1
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
-1
Sources: SORS, projection Bank of Slovenia.
Note: Due to rounding, sums of components may differ
from aggregate values.
Figure 4: Projections of GDP growth in Slovenia's
main trading partners for the year 2013
6
8
7
6
5
5
4
3
2
1
annual growth in %
6
Austria
Germany
Italy
Croatia
France
Serbia
Russia
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
0
0
-1
-1
-5
-6
-2
*
5.5
4
Figure 2: Slovenia: current account projection
% BDP
services
non-energy industrial goods
processed food
unprocessed food
energy
HICP, y-o-y in %
5
8
7
6
in p.p.
2012
2013
-2
Source: Consensus Economics.
Luka Žakelj, Analitsko - raziskovalni center, Banka Slovenije
120
BV 11/2013
Figure 5: Projections of GDP growth in Slovenia's
main trading partners for the year 2014
5
annual growth in %
Figure 7: Differences in y-o-y growth rates of
GDP components between Slovenia and the
euro area - production side
5
20
20
*y-o-y growth rates for Slovenia minus y-o-y
growth rates for the euro area
15
4
4
in p.p.
10
3
3
2
1
0
5
2
Austria
Germany
Italy
Russia
Croatia
France
Serbia
0
-5
-5
-10
-10
0
2013
-15
08
in p.p.
GDP*
gross investment*
final consumption - households and NPISH*
final consumption - government*
difference in net foreign trade contribution
-15
15
30
-10
10
20
-15
5
10
-20
0
-15
11
12
13
60
40
-10
*y-o-y growth rates for Slovenia minus
y-o-y growth rates for the euro area
70
LFS unemployment rate - overall
LFS unemployment rate - youth (15-29 years)
share of long-term unemployed in total unempl. (rhs)*
20
-5
-25
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
Sources: SORS, Employment office of the Republic of Slovenia,
Bank of Slovenia calculations.
Note: *Based on data from registry of unemployed.
Sources: Eurostat, ECB, Bank of Slovenia calculations.
BV 11/2013
13
50
-5
10
12
25
0
09
11
in %
30
10
0
08
35
15
5
-25
10
Figure 8: Slovenia: selected
unemployment figures
20
5
-20
09
Sources: Eurostat, Bank of Slovenia calculations.
Figure 6: Differences in y-o-y growth rates of
GDP components between Slovenia and the
euro area - expenditure side
10
5
1
2012
15
10
0
Source: Consensus Economics.
20
15
GDP
industry
construction
private services
public services
121
0
Figure 9: Slovenia: contributions to y-o-y growth
in the number of people in employment
5
4
3
2
in p.p.
Figure 11: Nominal unit labour costs in Slovenia
and the main trading partners from the euro area
14
5
public sector services
private sector services
construction
industry
agriculture, forestry, fishing
people in employment, y-o-y in %
4
y-o-y growth in %
14
Slovenia
Germany
12
3
10
2
12
France
Austria
Italy
10
8
8
0
6
6
-1
-1
4
4
-2
-2
-3
-3
2
2
-4
-4
0
0
1
1
0
-5
2010
2011
2012
2013
-2
-5
Figure 10: Slovenia: total wage bill and
average gross wage per employee
y-o-y in %
nominal gross wage per employee
real gross wage per employee*
nominal wage bill
real wage bill*
8
6
4
*HICP deflator
10
11
12
13
-2
-2
-4
-4
-6
-6
-8
-8
in mio EUR
balance (rhs)
exports
imports
20
4
0
2013
y-o-y in %
6
0
2012
25
8
2
2011
10
Figure 12: Slovenia: international trade
in goods and services
2
2010
09
Sources: Eurostat, Bank of Slovenia calculations.
Source: SORS, Bank of Slovenia calculations.
10
-2
08
800
15
600
10
400
5
200
0
0
-5
-200
-10
-400
2010
Source: SORS, Bank of Slovenia calculations.
Note: Wage bill is calculated as the product of average
gross monthly wages for employees of legal persons who
received pay and the total number of employees of legal persons.
1000
2011
2012
2013
Source: Bank of Slovenia.
122
BV 11/2013
Figure 13: Slovenia: current account components
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
in % BDP, 3-month moving sums
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
current account
goods
services
factor income
current transfers
2010
2011
2012
Figure 15: Slovenia: confidence indicators
2013
50
30
2009
2010
30
20
10
10
0
0
-10
-10
-20
-20
-30
-30
-40
-40
-50
-50
-60
-60
-70
2010
2011
2012
-70
2013
non-financial corporations
government
2011
2012
2013
Figure 16: Slovenia: business tendency in
manufacturing – limits to production
100
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
-12
90
80
% of enterprises
90
80
70
60
60
50
50
40
40
30
30
20
20
10
10
07
08
Source: SORS.
123
100
uncertain economic conditions
insufficient domestic demand
insufficient foreign demand
financial problems
70
0
Sources: Bank of Slovenia - consolidated financial accounts, SORS.
BV 11/2013
40
Source: SORS.
% GDP, 4-quarter moving sum of flows
2008
50
consumers
retail trade
construction
20
Figure 14: Slovenia: savings-investment gap
rest of the world
financial corporations
households and NPISH
total economy
manufacturing activities
services
40
Source: Bank of Slovenia.
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
-12
points of balance, seasonally adjusted
09
10
11
12
13
0
Figure 17: Slovenia: business tendency
in construction – limiting factors
90
enterprises in %
90
high cost of capital
insufficient demand
access to bank credits
no limits
80
70
Figure 19: Slovenia: business tendency in services
excluding retail trade – limiting factors
70
80
enterprises in %
70
financial constraints
insufficient demand
shortage of labour force
none
60
70
60
50
50
50
40
40
40
40
30
30
30
30
20
20
20
20
10
10
10
10
60
60
50
0
0
0
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
Figure 18: Slovenia: business tendency in
retail trade – limiting factors
enterprises in %
high cost of money
low demand
access to bank credits
no obstacles
60
11
12
13
0
60
3
3
2
2
1
1
0
0
-1
-1
40
30
30
20
20
10
09
10
11
12
13
y-o-y growth in %
4
40
08
10
70
50
07
09
Figure 20: HICP growth rates in
Slovenia and the euro area
50
0
08
Source: SORS.
Source: SORS.
70
07
-2
10
-3
0
-4
4
Slovenia
excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco
euro area
excluding energy, food, alcohol and tobacco
2010
2011
2012
2013
-2
-3
-4
Source: SORS, Eurostat, Bank of Slovenia calculations.
Source: SORS.
124
BV 11/2013
6
ECB main refinancing rate
S T A T I S T I C A L A P P E N D I X / S T A T I S T I Č N A P R I L3-m
OEURIBOR
GA
5
12-m EURIBOR
4
BANKING SECTOR INDICATORS
3
Franc Remšak*
2
1
0
Figure 1: Credit to nonfinancial enterprises
and households
2007 2008
2009 rates
2010 for
2011
2012 approved
2013
Figure2006
3: Lending
interest
newly
loans to corporates in Slovenia and in the euro
area for loans of up to EUR 1 million (in %)
(annual growth in %)
40
USA
Euro area
Slovenia
35
30
40
9
35
8
30
7
25
25
20
40
15
35
10
30
5
25
0
20
-5
15
-10
10
20
40
15
35
10
30
5
25
0
20
-5
15
-10
10
USA
Euro area
Slovenia
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
5
2006 2007
2008 2009 2010
2011
2012 2013
Figure
2: Comparison
of the
EURIBOR
and
3-m
EURIBOR
4
(in %)
-10
ECB refinancing
rate
12-m EURIBOR
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
0
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
-1
Source: ECB, Bank of Slovenia
Figure 4: Lending interest rates for newly
approved loans to corporates in Slovenia and in
the euro area for loans of over EUR 1 million (in %)
9
7
12-m EURIBOR
4
1
3
0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
2
1
8
Spread (right scale)
0
7
8
Slovenia
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Euro area
6
7
9
6
5
5
9
4
8
4
8
Slovenia
Franc Remšak, Finančna stabilnost, Banka Slovenije
Euro area
3
7
BV 6211/2013
Slovenia
Euro area
8
3-m EURIBOR
5
2
1
5
7
-5
6
3
*
8
6
0
5
Source:
ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (http://sdw.ecb. 5
europa.eu)
and Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of
St.
0
0
Louis (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/)
-5
6
-10
Slovenia
Euro area
1
5
0
4
5
4
4
3
3
2
2
1
1
0
190.0
170.0
125
6
5
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2
6
7
6
0
3
7
8
150.0
130.0
Slovenia
Euro area
-1
Euro area
7
6
9
STATISTIC
5
8
4
7
6
5
8
ASlovenia
L A P P E N D I47X
Euro area
3
6
3
6
2
5
2
5
1
4
1
4
0
3
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2
-1
2
1
Figure 5: Ratio of loans to non-banking sectors to
1
0
deposits by non-banking sectors (in %)
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Slovenia
Euro area
-1
100%
170.0
80%
70%
150.0
Slovenia
Euro area
190.0
130.0
60%
50%
170.0
110.0
100%
40%
150.0
90.0
90%
30%
70%
10%
110.0
50.0
60%
0%
90.0 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 H1
50%
Source:
70.0 ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW)
40%
50.0
25% 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 H1
Figure 6: Bank Nonperforming 2009
2010
Loans to Total Loans
2011
2012
(in %)
20%
2013
20%
10%
30%
20%
20%IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators, October 2013
Source:
10%
2008
http://fsi.imf.org/fsitables.aspx
(See Notes under “Table 4.
18%
2009
Bank 0%
Provisions
to Nonperforming Loans”)
16%
14%
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
10%
20%
8%
18%
6%
10%
0%
14%
2%
16%
4%
Source: IMF, Financial Soundness Indicators, October 2013
http://fsi.imf.org/fsitables.aspx (See Notes under “Table 3.
Bank Nonperforming Loans to Total Loans” )
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
12%
0%
Austria
Austria
Belgium
Belgium
Cyprus
Cyprus
Czech Republic Czech Republic
Denmark2
Denmark2
Estonia
Estonia
Finland3
Finland3
France4
France4
Germany5
Germany5
Greece
Greece
Ireland
Ireland
Italy9
Italy9
Netherlands
Netherlands
Norway13
Norway13
Portugal14
Portugal14
Slovak Republic Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Slovenia
Spain
Spain
Sweden16
Sweden16
United States53 United States53
0%
2010
2011
2012
Figure
8: Capital adequacy in Slovenia and EU
12%
(in %)
15%
5%
5%
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
80%
20%
130.0
70.0
25%
15%
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
90%
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark1
Estonia
France
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Portugal9
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain10
United Kingdom
United States
190.0
2008
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark1
Estonia
France
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Portugal9
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain10
United Kingdom
United States
0
Figure 7: Bank Provisions to
Nonperforming Loans (in %)
10%
8%
6%
30%
4%
2%
25%
0%
20%
15%
Slovenia EU banks, EU banks, EU banks, EU banks,
All
Large Medium-size Small
domestic domestic domestic institutions
institutions institutions institutions
2008
2009
2010
2011
Slovenia
2012 EU banks, EU banks, EU banks, EU banks,
All
domestic domestic domestic institutions
institutions institutions institutions
Source: Bank of Slovenia, ECB, Statistics on Consolidated
30%
Banking
Data2008
(Domestic banking groups and stand-alone
10%October 2013
banks),
2009
25%
5%
20%
126
0%
15%
2010
2011
2012
BV 11/2013
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Germany
Estonia
Spain
Finland
France
ece (GR)
Ireland
Italy
embourg
Malta
therlands
Portugal
Slovenia
Slovakia
0
3
/ STATISTIČNA PRILOGA
15%
12%
10%
25%
10%
8%
6%
2%
15%
0%
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Germany
Estonia
Spain
Finland
France
Greece (GR)
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Portugal
Slovenia
Slovakia
0%
Slovenia EU banks, EU banks, EU banks, EU banks,
All
Figure 9: Capital
adequacy;
domestic
domestic overall
domesticsolvency
institutions
institutions
institutions
institutions
ratio in EMU
member
states
(in %)
25%
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
20%
15%
10%
8
10.7
11.3
11.4
12.3
13.1
12.8
15.9
16.3
16.7
18.3
13.7
in b) EU; consolidated data (in %)
2008
2011
2009
2012
2010
15.9
16.3
16.7
18.3
10
20
8
18
6
16
4
14
2
12
0
10
13.7
Figure 10: Tier 1 ratio in EMU member states
(in %)
15.5
15.8
16.4
17.1
17.1
Source: ECB, Statistics on Consolidated Banking Data
(Domestic banking groups and stand-alone banks), October
2013
11.8
12.8
13.0
13.0
14.4
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Germany
Estonia
Spain
Finland
France
Greece (GR)
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Portugal
Slovenia
Slovakia
0%
15.5
15.8
16.4
17.1
17.1
9.5
9.6
10.9
11.2
11.2
11.6
5%
12.1
11.9
11.3
11.7
10.9
10.7
10%
11.8
12.8
13.0
13.0
14.4
15%
11.7
11.7
11.3
11.8
11.4
11.2
Austria
11.7
11.7
Belgium
11.3
Cyprus
11.8
11.4
Germany
11.2
Estonia
12.1
Spain
11.9
11.3
Finland
11.7
10.9
France
10.7
Greece (GR)
10.9
Ireland
11.2
11.2
Italy
11.6
Luxembourg
9.5
9.6Malta
Netherlands
10.7
11.3
Portugal
11.4
Slovenia12.3
13.1
Slovakia 12.8
5%
16
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Jun. 2013
15
14
0%
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
16
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Jun. 2013
6
15
5
14
4
13
3
12
2
11
1
10
0
9
Banking
Large
Small
Banks under
8
sector
domestic
domestic majority foreign
7
banks
banks
ownership
6
5
4
Source:
20 Bank of Slovenia
3
2008 2009 2010
2
2011 2012
18
1
16
0
Banking
Large
Small
Banks under
14
sector
domestic
Figure 12: Capitalbanks
adequacybanks
by bank
group
ownership
12
13.1
13.6
13.5
14.6
20%
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
10% 11: Capital adequacy by bank group in a)
Figure
Slovenia; consolidated data (in %)
11.4
25%
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
20%
5%
4%
30%
2010
2011
2012
20%
13.1
13.6
13.5
14.6
14%
2010
2011
2012
11.4
16%
Large
domestic
banks
Medium
domestic
banks
Small
Banks under
banks
ownership
Large
domestic
banks
Medium
domestic
banks
Small
Banks under
banks
ownership
6
5%
4
2
0%
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Germany
Estonia
Spain
Finland
France
Greece (GR)
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Portugal
Slovenia
Slovakia
0
BV
10.7
11.3
11.4
12.3
13.1
12.8
Source: ECB, (SDW)
9.5
9.6
10.9
11.2
11.2
11.6
11.7
11.7
11.3
11.8
11.4
11.2
13
12
11
10
9
8
11/2013
7
6
12.1
11.9
11.3
11.7
10.9
10.7
Source: ECB, Statistics on Consolidated Banking Data
16
2008 2009
2011 2012
Jun. October
2013
(Domestic
banking
groups2010
and stand-alone
banks),
15
201314
127
Figure 13: Tier 1 Capital Ratio by bank group
in a) Slovenia; consolidated data (in %)
2011
2009
2012
2010
9.2
9.5
9.7
2012
Jun. 2013
2010
1.5
0.5
10.7
11.6
11.5
9.2
9.5
9.7
-1.0
1.5
7.7
7.7
9.0
8.8
8.9
9.4
8.7
8.9
8.2
8.8
9.2
9.1
-0.5
2.0
Banking
sector
Banking
Slovenia
sector
EU
USA
15.1
11.1
12.3
12.8
13.1
11.7
12.2
12.4
12.9
13.6
15.1
11.1
12.3
12.8
13.1
11.7
12.2
12.4
12.9
13.6
11.8
9.9
10.5
10.7
12.0
8.5
9.6
10.0
10.1
11.8
2012
Small
domestic
Banks under
majority foreign
Small
domestic
banks
Banks under
majority foreign
ownership
Slovenia
EU
USA
Banking
sector
Medium sized
domestic
banks
Slovenia
EU
USA
15.1
-2.0
5
Small
domestic
banks
Banks under
majority foreign
ownership
Medium sized
domestic
banks
Small
domestic
banks
Banks under
majority foreign
ownership
-10
10
-20
0
2011
2012
2013 H1
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013 H1
Figure 16: Return on equity
(in %)
Slovenia
EU
USA
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013 H1
2010
2011
2012
2013 H1
-5
-10
-15
-20
Slovenia
EU
USA
2010
-5
15
-15
5
Medium sized
domestic
banks
2008
0
15.1
2012
2009
-0.5
Source:
Bank of Slovenia, ECB, Statistics on Consolidated
Banking
Data (All domestic banks), October 2013 and
15
-1.0
Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/),
Quarterly, End of
-1.5
10
Period, annualized data
11.1
12.3
12.8
13.1
11.7
12.2
12.4
12.9
13.6
2011
2008
0.0
11.1
12.3
12.8
13.1
11.8
8.5
9.6
10.0
10.1
2010
8.5
9.6
10.0
10.1
8.3
9.9
10.5
10.7
12.0
8.3
2009
11.7
12.2
12.4
12.9
13.6
9.9
10.5
10.7
12.0
2008
11.8
EU b); consolidated data (in %)
-2.0
0.5
Source: ECB, (SDW)
1.5
0.0
Medium sized
domestic
2011
Figure 15:
Return on
assetsownership
banks
banks
(in %)
0.0
1.0
2.0
0.5
Banking
sector
2010
Banks under
majority foreign
ownership
-1.5
1.0
2
0
2.0
2009
Small
domestic
L O banks
GA
1.0
0
7.7
7.7
8.7
8.9
8.2
8.8
9.2
9.1
2009
9.0
8.8
8.9
9.4
8.8
9.0
8.6
9.3
9.8
9.6
2011
2008
16
4
6
2.0
4
1.5
2
Jun. 2013
Banking
Large
Small
Banks under
4
sector
domestic
3
banks
banks
ownership
2
1
Source:
Bank of Slovenia
0
20
Banking
Large
Small
Banks under
2008
2010 2011
2012
sector 2009domestic
domestic
majority foreign
18
banks Ratio
banks
ownership
Figure
14: Tier 1 Capital
by bank
group in
14
20
12
18
10
16
8
14
6
12
4
10
2
8
0
6
8
10.7
11.6
11.5
2008
8.8
9.0
8.6
9.3
9.8
9.6
16
15
14
13
12
11
16
10
15
9
14
8
13
7
12
6
11
5
10
4
9
3
8
2
7
1
6
0
5
10
2008
Large
domestic
A banks
PRI
8.5
9.6
10.0
10.1
8
20
6
18
4
16
2
14
0
12
ISTIČN
8.3
10
Banking
sector
9.9
10.5
10.7
12.0
STATISTICAL APPENDIX / S
T12A T
8.3
1
16
0
14
Slovenia
EU
USA
2008
2009
Source: Bank of Slovenia, ECB, Statistics on Consolidated
Banking Data (All domestic banks), October 2013 and
Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (http://
research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/), Quarterly, End of Period,
annualized data
1.0
-0.5
0.5
-1.0
0.0
-1.5
-0.5
-2.0
-1.0
-1.5
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013 H1
128
BV 11/2013
CORPORATE SECTOR INDICATORS
Figure 1: Total pre-tax profit and loss of nonfinancial corporation in Slovenia in EUR billion
Figure 3: Leverage by sector in Slovenia
(in %)
Source: AJPES, Bank of Slovenia
250
300
100
125
200
250
Industry
Services
Wholesale
Industry and retail trade
Overall
Services
Constructionand
(right
scale)
Wholesale
retail
trade
150
200
100
150
50
100
2012 2012
2011 2011
2010 2010
2009 2009
2008 2008
Overall
Construction (right scale)
2007 2007
2006 2006
2005 2005
2004 2004
2003 2003
0
2002 2002
0
25
0
50
0
Leverage
is calculatedasaspercentage
percentage debt-to-equity
ratioratio
Note: Note:
Leverage
is calculated
debt-to-equity
Source:
AJPES,
Bank
Slovenia
Source:
AJPES,
Bank
of of
Slovenia
Figure 4: Ratio of non-current liabilities to EBITDA
by sector in Slovenia
Source: AJPES, Bank of Slovenia, Supreme Court
Source:
Ajpes,
Bank
of Slovenia
Source:
Ajpes,
Bank
of Slovenia
129
2012 2012
2011 2011
2010 2010
Source: Ajpes, Bank of Slovenia
2009 2009
Source: AJPES, Bank of Slovenia, Supreme Court
2008 2008
Aug. 13
0.5
0.0
2007 2007
Aug. 13
2006 2006
2011
Construction
Industry
Services
Construction
Industry
Overall
Services
Overall
2005 2005
8.0
7.5
7.0
8.0
6.5
7.5
6.0
7.0
5.5
6.5
5.0
6.0
4.5
5.5
4.0
5.0
3.5
4.5
3.0
4.0
2.5
3.5
2.0
3.0
1.5
2.5
1.0
2.0
0.5
1.5
0.0
1.0
507
507
464
464
590
590
517
517
2012
0 Source: AJPES, Bank of Slovenia, Supreme Court
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
BV 11/2013
125
150
25
50
681
2010
300
350
2004 2004
2009
150
175
2003 2003
2008
350
400
2002 2002
0
100
88
64
100
200
88
64
200
300
175
200
2001 2001
300
400
400
450
50
75
242
242
199
199
436
400
500
587
500
600
200
225
Note: Leverage is calculated as percentage debt-to-equity ratio
Source: AJPES, Bank of Slovenia
681
587
600
700
515
515
436
700
800
450
75
100
Figure 2: Number of bankrupcy proceedings
initiated against firms in Slovenia
800
All corporates
Non-financial
corporations
All corporates
Non-financial
corporations
225
2001 2001
2012 2012
2011 2011
2010 2010
2009 2009
Source: AJPES,
Bank
of Slovenia
Source: AJPES,
Bank of
Slovenia
2008 2008
2007 2007
2006 2006
2005 2005
2004 2004
2003 2003
2002 2002
-2.5
-3.0
2001 2001
5.0
Total profit - loss
4.5
Total profit
4.0
5.0
Total loss
3.5
Total profit - loss
4.05
4.5
Total profit
3.0
4.0
Total loss
3.17
2.5
3.5
4.05
2.0
2.33
3.0
2.23
1.5
1.93
3.17
2.5
1.59
1.0
2.0
2.331.14
1.04
1.09
2.23
0.5
0.08
1.5
1.93
0.99
0.0
1.59
1.0
1.14
1.04
-0.5
0.5 -0.971.09
0.08
0.99
-1.0
0.0
-1.5
-0.5 -0.97
-2.0
-1.0
-2.5
-1.5
-3.0
-2.0

Special Issue No. 11, 2013: To Rescue or not Rescue

Transcription

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