Touching Art: Intimacy, Embodiment, and the

m
l
.
I ouchln g art
Intimacy,embodiment,and the somatosensory
system
EllenJ.Esrock
L ) e p a r t n r c n to f L a n g u a g e ,L i t e r a t u r e , a n d C o r n r n u n i c a t i o n , R e n s s e l a e r
PolytechnicInstitutc
Viewersl-rave
a way of using thcir somatoscnsorysystemto creatctcrnporary
boundary changesthat bring thern into intirnate relationshipswith art objects.Spcctatorsexperiencethis irnaginaryfusion whcn simultaneor"rsly
atter-rding
to tl-reirown somatoscnsoryscnsations,wl-ricl-r
occur insiclethc
body, and to qualitiesof the artwork, wlrich exist in the exterr.ral
world. At
such nromcntsviewersreinterprettheir sornJt()scnsory
scns.rtionsas a quali
ty of the artwork. When ir-rside
and outsideare reintcrpretcd,vicwcrscross
the conventionalbounclarybctwecnselfand object.This eftectcan trc illustrated in first pcrson reportsand supporteclby currcnt rcsc:rrchin the r-reu
rclsciertces
and the hun-rar-rities.
Keywords:somatic r-narkers,
somatoscnsorysystcnl,emboclirnent,projcction, enrpathy
Imagine you are standing in an art museum, mesmerized by an enormous
canvas of turbulent blue paint. Though you find no recognizable images, you
are fascinated by the swirling movements of rich azures and cobalt blues. Yclur
eyes follow the artist's long, energetic brush strclkesacross the work, and you
feel a powerful rush of motion inside your body. Sr-rdclenly,your attention is
caught by a small area of densely patterned paint flecked with hints of
scarlet. You linger. The thick color glows. As your awareness of the surroundings dim, the bright spot on the canvas expands, and the sensuoLrscolor flclws
into you. Yclu are immersed. Instants later, the bond breaks, as your lttentitln
shifts to the murmurs of a nearby cclnversatior.r.
( - ' t r t s c i o r r - s r r&
c s I- ss t t o t i L t t t : : z ( z o o r ) , 4 3 2 5 4 . r s s N 1 5 6 6 5 l J - 1 6
( ) : o o r J o l r n I l e t r j r t m i n sP u b l i s h i n g ( i r n r p a n v
23'4 Ellenl. Flsrock
What ir viewer is experiencingin such rlorlents of imr.nersionis a shifi in
the orclinary senseof one's boclily boundaries. For an instant, r'iewer and
artwork seem to merge. Other art forms create sirnilar ellects, whicl-r irre
Phraseslike lteing.fille
expressed
in common lingr.ristic
expressions.
d with nrtrsic
and absorbedin a storyspeakto a shift in the orclinaryextensionof the body.
Such boclily changeshave been central to markedly different theories of
aesthetics.Cor.rceptsllke sublintity,empathy,altsttrption,.flrtw-allcurrent at one
t i r n eo r a n o t h e rs i n c ea n t i q u i t y- c o n c e r ns o m ek i n c lo f e x p e r i e n c teh a t a l t e r s
o u r o r d i n i r r ys e n s eo f b o d i l y c o r r t a i n r n e n t I. n
' . l c c . l ,s u c h e h a n g c si n o u r
rnany
facetsof life
of
the
bodily
perin-reter
occur
in
though r.rot
experience
necessarily
with the kind clf motivation or volitional control thirt occursin the
arts.Eroticism,spiritualancihealingpractices,aswell aspathologicaiconclitions
can all involvethe body as a siteof fusion with objectsanclothers in tl-reworld.
My toprichereis the spectator'srelationshipto visual art. I hypothesizethat
viewerscan usetheir bodies,specifically,
tl-reirsclmatosensory
system,to create
temporary boundary changesthat bring thern into intimate relationshipswith
responsestc)
trrt objects.They achievethis effectby using their son.ratosensory
standfor aspectsof objectsin the world. I characterizethis as a reinterpretation
a sttntaticreinterpretatiorr.
lt coulcl be
of one's somatosensoryexperienct
clescribedas a kind of tacitly held, performanceknowledgethat evolvesover
our lifetimes,dependingon our bodily constitutions,aptitudes,and expsliqnces, which servesthe positive function of er-rhancingour experienceof the
artwork. Somaticreinterpretationis a powerful phenomenonbecansethe bcldy
is so intimately linked with our senseof iclentity erndego boundary tl-rat
altering our senseof the body, although irnaginativeancltenrporary,involves
c h a n g i n gs o m e t h i n gb a s i ct o w l ' r a t u, n d e r s o m et h e o r i e s i,s c o n s t i t u t i v eo f o u r
s e n s eo f s e l f .
In exploring this hypothesis,I undertaketwo relatedtasks.The first ar-rd
most basicis to rnakethis little recogniz-ed
bodily phenomenon rnore familiar
to reaclers.
As the production of theseboundary changesmight be considerecl
a non-verbal skill or practice,my challengeis tcl bring these char-rges
to the
attention of tl-rosewho unknowingly experiencethese shifts and to prrclvicle
sclmeguidancein their procluctionfor others.For thosewho clo not appearto
experiencevisual art in this way, even with instruction, my goal is simply tcr
render the experienceplausible.As the most compelling testirnony to tl"re
phenomenaarethe responses
I havereceivedby realviewersin lectureaucliences,I draw on thesefor cliscussion.
Touchingart 45
The second and more challengingtask is to develop an argument that
fleshesout my hypothesisabout how theseboundary changesoccur.Although
t h e p r t l p o s e dn o t i o n o f s o r n a t i cr e i n t e r p r e t a t i o inn v i t e st u r t h e re l a b o r a t i o ni,t s
coreicleasare supportedby a convergence
of scientificresearchand humanistic
Thesearepromisingtimes to considersuchicleas,fbr scientistsand
scholarship.
humanists are united in posing the kind of cluestionsthat were not even
conceivablein prior decades.This particular study,engageclwith interclisciplinary issuesof embodiment and artistic experience,is oft-erecl
in the spirit of
newly emergingresearchinto consciousness
and emotion.
The paperbeginswith an overviewof the major argumentand fbllowswith
a sectionon guided experiencesof viewing. A full treatment of the argument
follows. The final sectiondraws connectionsbetrveenthe key ideasproposed
here and cltherrelatedtheoriesand oractices.
r.
Overview of the argument
Takethe viewer'sexperiencein the museum describedabove.I strggestthat we
undergosuchan experienceby an interpretiveoperaticlnwe perform, Llnaware,
on our somatosensorysensations.In the exampleabove,we might experience
the sensationof our own lungs expandingand contractins in slow, rhythmic
surgesjuxtaposedto the sensationof our own bodily heat.The juxtapositionof
however,might appearto Lrsas a quality of the artwork. Were
thesesensations,
this to happen,we would be reinterpretingour bodily sensationsas a featllreof
the art object. We would be temporarily renaming, or reinterpreting, our
somatosensory
sensationsas the pulsatingluminescenceof color on canvas.In
short, we would identifl,what is insidethe boundariesof the body with what is
outsidethe body.
To help explicatethis phenomenon, I draw on the sornaticmarker hypothesis of A.R. Damasio,which suggeststhat we can mark certain somatosensory
sensationsas positive or negative,depending on the context in which they
occur. Extending Damasio'shypothesis,I areue that in certain moments of
viewing,we mark, or reinterpret,thesesensations
aspropertiesof the clbjectswe
gazeupon. Thus marked,thesesomatosensory
sensations
function in two ways:
they referto somethingexternalto the body - whateverthey come to n-rarkand, given their neuroanatomy,they ref-erto somethingthat is ir-rternal
to us.
To advancethis hypothesis,I offer a central argllment concerning the
polaritiesof differentsensorysystems.Thesepolaritiesref-erto the origin of the
46
Ellenl. Esrock
infbrmation that is conveyedby the senses- whether the information referstcr
the subjectivepole of the selfor the objectivepole of the externalworld. Vision
is not usuaily considereda bipolar sense.Oriented to the polarity of the external
world, vision givesus information about objectsoutsidethe body. Conversely,
touch is bipolar. By touching, one can acquireinformation about an external
object - the feel of the thing in the world that is touched. But touch is alsir
oriented to the subjectivepolarity, for one can receiveinfbrmation about an
internal object - the subjectivefeelingof being touched. Visceralfunctions ancl
other somaticstates,which are not bipoiar,give us infbrmation only about the
inner world.
When looking at art works,vision and touch finction together.Oriented to
the objectiveworld, touch assumesthe externalobjectprovided for it by vision
and thus mentally touches the visually apprehendedobject. But touch also
orientsto the subjectivepole and, thus,conveysthe sensationof being touched.
In this casethe thing that doesthe (mental) touching is the externalobject of
vision. One'sbody feelstouchedby vision'sobject.Thus, in its bipolar capircities,touch refersboth to the self that is touched,as well as the touched object
outsidethe body. The combination of thesetwo polaritiesbridgesthe physical
distancebetween the visually perceivedobject and the viewer, bringing the
palpability of the object seen into the subjective,bodily boundaries of the
subject.Thus, in both casesinner and outer realitiesmergedeepinsidethe body
- not merely at the top layersof skin, where surfacetouch operates.One finds
the objectwithin one'sselfor one finds that one is within the object.
These changesin boundaries can be effectedthrough use of the entire
somatosensorysystem, not just its touch component. The somatosensory
systemcan becomebipolar in an uncharacteristicway.When visuallyengaged
with the object,the feel of the somatosensorysystemcan be interpretedas the
feel of certain qualitiesof the object viewed. h-rdeed,thesesensationscan be
interpretedto feellike the very substanceof the object- its weight, density,or
movement>in which caseour somatosensory
systemis being projectedonto the
systemcan alsobe interpretedasbeing
objectin the world. Our somatosensory
touched by the object viewed - in which casethe object is being introjected
into one'sbody. Whateverthe location, subjectiveor objective,the experience
retainsboth components.
When the somatosensory
systemis projectedoutward into the object,there
is still the sensethat what is projectedis one'sinner body, ancl,likewise,when
the somatosensorysystemreceivesthe externalobject, there is the sensethat
what is introjected into the body is a thing that inhabits the external world.
Touchingart 2J7
The participation of the entire somatosensorysystemin this engagementwith
vision substantiallyreinforcesthe narrow link between vision and touch by
themselves.
During theseexperiencesone feelsthat externalobjectsare not engaging
system- but somethingcentral
just a part of one'sbody - the somatosensory
to some kind of personalself, as dehned by specificconceptsof self identity.
Thus, through thesechangesof boundaries,one finds the object within one's
personalselfor one linds that one is within the object.
To strengthen this argument, I discuss converging concepts that are
formulated within different areasof scientific and humanistic research.I draw
on key conceptsin psychoanalysis,attribution theory in cognitive psychology,
image schemamodels in linguistics,sensorimotortheory of percepticln,and
simulationsof a phantom Iimb type of displacement.
2.
Guided viewing and audience produced somatic reinterpretations
When speakingto audienceson this topic, I begin by intrtlducing the ntltion of
bodily intimacy with art objects,which primes the audienceto the issuesof
bodily feelings.Severalslidesare then projectedon a large screen.With each
slide I instruct the audienceto perform a different task. Readersmight try to
recreatesome of theseeffectswith their own artwork. When attemptingthis at
home, one should usevisual imagesthat are larger than book-size,so that the
eyeshavea fairly largedistanceto scan.The imagesusedwith lectureaudiences
are Paul Strand's, Leaves,1929, Edward Weston's Shell, 1927, and Edvard
'the
Cry,1895.
Munch's
In viewing Leaves,a close-upphotographof long, blade-like'striped leaves
oriented vertically,I instruct the audienceto let their eyesslide up and down the
Ieaves.After a few seconds,I ask them to feel a corresPondingline moving
through their bodies.Somereportedthat they lirst thought the instructi()llwas
impossibleto perform but tried and found, to their surprise,that they produced
the line. Were these not lecturesbut workshops, orienteclto closely guided
introspection,the participantsmight havediscoveredother dimensionsof their
viewing experience.In theseremarks I shall explorethis broader spectrum of
possibleviewing experlences.
two imaginedtouchesare happenilg. Tlie first is our
With Strand'sLeaves,
eye touching the artwork and the secondis the senseclf a correspondingline
touching our body. That the eyemight foster a senseof imagined touch is not
238 Ellenl. Esrock
a new insight. What I call to attention, however,is the role of the sclmatosensory
systemin definingthe characterof this imaginary touch and its extensiondeep
inside the bocly.
Were the viewer's experiencesftrrther developed,the line within the
viewer'sbody might be f-eltto havea thicknessto it, a palpability. This palpability would consistof the backgroundfeelingof the sornatosensory
system.The
backgror.rndfeeling would lirnction in two ways. On the one hand, when
orientedto its subjectivepole, it would possess
associations
of the selfto which
it belongs.On the other hand, in its ob.iectiveorientation, the background
feelingwould acquirethe objectof the eyescan.As an imaginedtouch directecl
towardsan externalobject,it would becomethe palpablef-eelingof that object.
Perceptiblequalities of the object
its texture, weight, balance,emotional
tone, anclcolor saturation,could becomeidentiliedwith the palpablequality of
tl-reline echoing within the body. In this superimposition of objective ancl
subjectivepoles,this internally felt line createsa senseof the object f-eltwithin
us.'fhe object is within us, or, under a paralleldescription,we are within the
object,becausethe samepalpability,which is the object, is also the palpability
that is our own body.
Note, the echoingf-eeling
of the objectwithin neeclnot be experiencedonly
in terms of linear movement. There might be a focal point on a canvasor
sculpturethat can serveas a conduit from the eyeto the inner body. One miglit,
fbr example, gazeat a fairly circumscribed part of an artwork - a srnall areaof
lines along the contours of a well proportioned vase- anclf-eel
cross-hatched
a senseof internal balance that seemssituated within the palpability of a
reinterpretedsomatosensory
system.Or, one might gazeintently at a coior in a
painting anclf'eelthe color enter the body anclbecomeinfirsedthroughout the
blood stream. This is precisely how the poet Rilke experiencescolor in
Cezanne'sPortrait of Madarne Cezanne:
Ir-rnry fecling,the consciousness
of theirpresence
hasbecomea heightcning
which l can feelevenin n.rysleep;r.nyblood describesit within r.ne,but thc
namingof it passcs
try somcwhcre
outsideand is r-rotcalleclin. Did I write
about it? - A rccl,upholstcrcci
low arrnchtrirhasbecr.rplaccdir.rfl'or.rtol-ar.r
p.lttern(a crosswith tl.recenterleft
earthyereenwall in whicha cobalt-trluc
o u t ) i s v e r ys p a r i n g lrye p e a t c(d1 9 8 5p, . 7 9 ) .
A seconcldemonstrationinvolvestl-reuse clf Westcln'sSlrcll,a clclse-upphotograph of a nautilus shell againsta dark backgrouncl.In this caseI instruct the
audienceto placetl-reireyesat the bottom lefi of the large fan shapeanclmove
Touchingart 239
the eyeslowly around the curved top edgeofthe shelland then over the center
to wherethey began.I askthem to feelthe fragileedgeof the shellas they rnove
and then to let the eyetravelback and forth over a largecentralportion ofthe
shell.While they are doing this, I instruct them to feellinesbeing drawn insicle
t h e i rb o d i e s .
After a presentationat the Orange County Museum, Califclrnia,an cllder
"It
participant said to me about this particular experience, was so arclusingl"
'l'hough
her tone and manner did not suggestthat she was awareof reporting
sexualarousal,it seemeclto me, given the phallic connotations of Weston's
image,that the feelingof moving her eyesrhythmicallyover the shellwas highly
erotic.Others commentedon this particular image,though none as directly.
Arousal,whether or not keyedspecificallytcl the sexualsystem,is an aspect
of somatosensoryawareness
that can also be reinterpreted.We might experiencearousalrelatedto the subjectmatter of the representedobject,whether the
arousalis generatedthrough musculartensioncreatec'l
in respclnse
to the youth
in Chardin's YoungMan Blowing Bultblesor whetl-rerit is more cliffusely
experiencedas excitement in responseto the backstagef'lurry clf action in
Degas'Balletat ParisOpera.Arousalmight alsobe generatedin our responseto
the formal qualitiesof the object,suchas the agitationof paint or the precision
of a delicatecutout. There is alsothe arousalgeneratedin the subject'spursuit
of meaningor curiosity about the constructionof the artwork.
Howeverit is generated,arousalmight be reinterpretedas somethingit is
not. In the museum situation describedabove, the viewer's description of
arousalpertainedto her internalexperienceof imaginativetcluch- a reference
to the subjectivepole. I did not questionher as to whether the arousalbecame
reinterpretedas an object within. Others viewers might have describeclthis
same kind of experienceas an energeticheightening of the external
a
referenceto the objectivepole. With the Chardin painting, fcrr exantple,the
spectator'sarousalmight be reinterpretedas tl-reboy's concentration or the
expansionof the bubble as he blows it.
The final slidein my lecture-demonstrationis EdvarclMunch's lithograph
The Cry, a slightly different black and white version of the coloreclimaee that
decoratesgift shop windows. I instruct the audienceto let their eyes slide
rhythmically around on the lines and to become conscious of their own
breathing.Next, I ask them to find a way of using their breathing to interact
with the work. For instance,I suggestwhen inhaling they pretend they are
taking in the image with their breath and when exhaling pretend they are
propelling themselvesalong the long, fluid lines. Standing before the same
z4o EllenJ. Esnrck
Iithographin a Munch exhibition at BostonCollege,I brought this cluestionttr
a viewer willing to sharehis responses:
Q: Can you rnakethis work connectto yor"rrown breathing?
A: Oh sure.. . . breathingout takesthosefiguresin the backgroundaway
from me anclbreathingin bringsthem towardsme. (Persclnal
Intcrvicw,
February7, 200I ).
The spectator'sbreathcan serveboth as a meansof changingone'spsychological distanceto the externalobject,by inhalingand exhaling,and ofchanging the
nature of the selfand the object.The use of breath is somewhatdifferent from
the other somatic reinterpretationsbecauseof the strong emotional and
cognitive associationsthat it often carries. Breathing is a function of the
somatosensorysystemthat is regardedin many culturesas an activity of high
emotional and spiritual significance.In such contextsthe intake and releaseof
air is thought to havea transfcrrmative
quality. The ancient Hebrewsused the
sameword for both spirit and wind, the Navajoslinked the notions of awarenessand air, and the Buddhistsconceivedof the Chi as an interior, spiritual
breath(Abram, 1996).Furthermore,psychodynamictheorieslike Bioenergetics
and the Feldenkraismethod all conceiveof one's breathine as a conduit fcrr
emotion and consciousness.
One'slungsexpandingand contracting,one'sheart beating,and one'spulse
throbbing might all be experiencedin the dual capacity as subjective,as
belonging to the self, or objective,when ascribedto the external. Munch's
figures on the page might be drawn into one's own body
might say
suckecli n, or they might exercisetheir will on the observer,drawing him into
their immensity.Such feelingswould be in keepingwith Munch's own experiencesof being forcefullyand palpabilitygripped by his own paintings.
3.
Model of reinterpretation: The somatosensory system
The effectsof the somatosensorysystemhave been central to long-standing
discussionsof emotion and imagination.When we say we have a certain gut
feeling we are referring to the visceralfunctions of the autonomic nervous
system,those involving the regulationof musclesin the heart and lungs, the
intestines,the blood vessels,
the stomach,and the skin. My considerationof the
somaticsystemalso includesour tactile sensatior.rs
on the body's surface,and,
from deeperinside, our prclprioceptivesensations,those detectingvibration
Touchingart
and spatialposition, as well as the kinestheticsensesof boclilymovement and
baiance.Although the somaticsensationof temperatureis alsopertinentto this
study, pain sensationsare less scl.If this vast network of systemswere not
enough to consider,I augment it by addressingthe brain's own re-creationof
such bodily states,as in the phantom limb experience.By consideringthese
brain simulations, I can explore imaginary representationsas well as ftrlly
embodiedphenomena.
According to Damasio (1994) we have an ongoing awarenessof the
somatosensorysystem.Noting that the brain continually receivesfeedback
signalsfrom the body's autonomic processes,
Darnasioarguesthat this feedback
provides us with a constantbackground awarenessof our body's solrratosensory
systems.This low levelof awareness,he claims, is akin to a mocld that colors our
"The
ordinary consciousness:
backgroundbody senseis continuous,although
one may hardly noticeit, sinceit represents
not a specificpart of anythingin the
body but rather an overallstateof most everythingin it" (p. 152).
Even were this overall awarenessof the somatosensorysystemnot within
our backgroundconsciousness,
it would be reasonableto supposethat it can
come into consciousness
upon our inspectionof the artwork. As we look at the
work we can attend to differentkinds of things - formal elements,like colors
and lines, and subject matter, like balletsand lilacs. While engageclin such
reflections,the body can become aroused- whether through curiosity with
novel stimuli, through pleasure,or through associatedf'eelingsevokedby the
subjectsof the artwork. This changein the body'smetabolismproducesa shift
from the statusquo, which helps draw attention to the body. In short, whether
through speci{icarousalgeneratedin responseto the artwork or thror-rghthe
body's own continuous presenceto consciousness,
we can becorneaware of
somatosensorysensations.
To explain how we reinterpret these bodily sensationsI build upon a
processcharacterizedby Damasio as the sorrlrrf
ic marker hypttthesis.
Damasi<t
arguesthat when we experiencesituationsthat affectus as positivelyor negatively, the particular somatosensorystateof our body becomesmarked with
thesepositive or negativeevaluations.Thesemarked, or evaluated,bodily states
alsobecomeassociated
in memory with images(in any sensorymoclality)of the
stimuli that triggeredthem. When we subsequentlyreexperiencetheseimages
and their correspondingbodily states,we also reexperiencethe positive or
negativeassociations
that mark thesebodily states.For example,supposeyoll
oncehad a negativeexperiencein the stockrnarketand are now thinking about
making a risky investment.This past negativeexperienceis stored as irnages
z4r
z4z Ellcn I. Esrock
with a specific,negativelyfelt body state.When posedwith
that are associated
this new financial opportunity, your body might produce an unpleasant
internal feeling,which causesyou to p -eedwith caution. This so-calledgut
feeling would actually be a negativell ,rlarked bodily state, associatedwith
i m a g e so f r i s k yi n v e s l m e n l . l
Basedon his work with brain-damagedpatients,Damasiohypothesizes
that
we Llsethesesomaticmarkersin the reasonir-rg
As we can producethese
p:rocess.
boclily statesquickly, they might help us in sorting various possibilitiesand
callingto attention options that havepotentialbenefitsor drawbacks.What we
call intuition might be a reasoningprocessthat usesthesesomaticmarkers.
My hypothesistakesDamasio'snotion of somatic markers a step further.
WhereasDamasio claims that our somatic experiencesmight be rnarked as
positiveor negative,I suggestthat they might alsobe marked,or reinterpreted,
with specilic content. This content would be deriveclfi-onr the things we gaze
upon. It might include such things as the fbrrnal elementsof the artwork - a chair,a flower,a chilcl,or
blue dabs,repeatedlines,the objectsrepresented
the emotionsand associations
that the artwork evokes.(,az-ingintently at these
works, we might have a bodily sensethat we do r-roteven recognize as bodily
becauseit is reinterpretedas it arisesinto awareness.
In fbrmulating his somatic marker theory, Damasio also points out that firll
bodily circuits, body loops,need not be involved in our use of thesemarkers.
The brain has the capacityto respond to a stimulus by creatingthe kind of brain
statethat would be configuredwere a messageto havebeen receiveclfrom the
full body. Called an as-if loop,this brain statepermits quicker changesin our
registration of different somatic markers than would be possiblethrough use of
the full body. I suggestthat the production of as-if loops might be particularly
valuablein the arts experience,for it would permit rapid transitionsbetween
bodily states,which might thereby keep up in tempo with the spectator's
m o m e n t t o m o m e n t e x p e r i e n co
ef t h e w o r k . '
What is central to my reinterpretationhypothesisis that these somatic
markersfunction in two ways:They are markersof contentexternalto the bcldy
and, more basically,they are markersof what is ir-rternal
to us.'lb advancetl-ris
hypothesisfurther, I suggestthat when we experiencethese somatosensory
markers as internal, they convey something that, uncler certain definitions,
would be a calleda senseof the se1f.
Touchingart
24J
4. Model of reinterpretation: Concepts of the self
Scientistsand humar-rists
haveproposeddiversetheoriesof the self,ranginu in
emphasisfrom neurobiology to cultural construction, and severalof these
moclelsposit a connectionbetweentheir definitionsof selfanc'lthe somatosensory system.In respectof this connection,thesemodelsreinfbrcethe folk belief
that the self,at leastthe so-calledemotionnlsefi is constitutedbywhat is deep
insideof us, relatedto our somatosensorysystem.(lonventionalphraseslike ir
takesnty ltreathaway or yoive stolenrny hecrr expressthe power of wl-ratis notselfto affectthe coreof the selfby its capacityto appropri.rteou r v isceralorgans.
Although l do not intend to endorseany particular theory of selfhood,
plausibleconnectionsbetweennotions of selfand the somaticsystemshcluldbe
notecl,asthey might further explainthe viewer'ssenseof intimacy when gazing
on objects.For example,when reinterpretingthe body I might feelnot just that
my inner body is out in the world inside the object, but that 1 am out in the
world insidethe object.This is not to suggestthat the processof bodily reinterpretationalwaysinvolvesa profoundmergerof selfwith object,as this seemstcr
vary from encollnterto encounter.The impact of the link betweenthe somatic
body and the self might simply be to prime the viewer to feel self-involved.
It has been arguedfrom an evolutionaryperspectivethat certain som.rtosensoryrepresentations,
as linked tcl the motor systern.constitute the oldest
"Proprioception
representations
of the self.M. Sheets-fohnstone
writes that
in
generaland kinesthesiain particularadvertto a knowing subject,a subjectthat,
at minimum, knows when it is moving and knows when it is not" (1998,
p.291). Proposingthe concept of a prirnitive self (SELF) linked to sensorymotor activity,JaakPankseppwrites:
I advocate
the positionthat the rootsofthc selfgobackto specificmesencepl-ralic
anddiencephalic
sensory-motor
actioncircuitswithin tl-remarnmalian
(an auton'ratizcd
brain which can gcnt'ratca prinritivcsort of inter-rtionality
(globalafltctive
actionrcadiness)
and primitiveformsof psychiccohcrcncc
states
of thc brain)by interactionwith variouscr.notionarl
attcntionalcircuits
tl.rater.rcode
basicbiological
valucs.( l99lt,p. 566-7)
Whereas the subjectivedimension of self is illumir-ratedby Panksepp ancl
Sheets-Johnstone's
conceptsof the primitive self,the objectiveorientation of
the selfto the externalworld is made clearerthrough Damasio'snotion clf Cclre
which is one mode in a tripartite rnodel. Core CclnscioLlsness
Consciousness,
bestdescribesthe objectively-oriented
self,assomaticallymodified by an object
whose existencehas been located in time and space.In this rnode the self is
244 Ellenl. Esrock
aware of itself as the subjectwhose awarenessis directed to an object in the
world. Damasio'sdescriptionof the self'sengagementwith the object might
characterizewhat, in the processof somaticreinterpretation,correspondsto a
kind of absorptionof the self within the object. Certainly the allusion to T. S.
Eliot'snotion of incarnationcarriesthis association.Describingthe experience
of Core Consciousness,
Damasiowrites:
Ycruknow itis yousecing
because
thestorydepictsa character you- doing
Youhardlynoticcthc storytelling
theseeing....
because
theirnages
thatdon.rir-rate
thementaldisplayarcthoscof tl"re
thingsof whichyou arenow conscious
- theobjectsyou sceor hear.. .. 1'.S.Eliotmightaswellhavebeenthinkingof
theprocess
... whenhesaid'youarethemusicwhilethemusiclasts.'
He wasat
leastthinkingof thefleetingmomcntin whicha deepknowledge
canemergc
a unior.r,
or incarnation,
1999,p.172)
ashe calledit. (Damasio,
In summary, our experienceof the somatosensorysystemcan be oriented in
two polar directions.The {rrstand most basicis an orientation to the subjective
world of the self.Our senseof blood pulsing,heart beating,heat changing,and
so on are all associatedwith one'sown subfective,internal states.The second
orientationis objective.It operatesthough a reinterpretingofone's background
somatic experienceto stand for things in the externalworld. Together,these
t w o o r i e n t a t i o ncso n s t i t u t e
s o m a t i cr e i n t e r o r e t a t i o n .
5.
Model of reinterpretation: Sensory polarities
The polaritiesof subjectiveand objectivewithin the somatosensorysystemare
reinforced by a more commonly recognizedbipolarity both within a single
component of this system- the senseof touch - and within a different system
not generallyascribedwith bipolar properties- the visual system.The visual
system might be understood to have a bipolar orientation, although it is
generallycharacterizedas providing us with knowledgeonly of the object world.
In David Katz'sanalysisof colors,for example,he writes:
Colorphcnomena
arealwayscharacterized
by objcctification;
theyarcalways
projected
into cxternalspace.... Experiencing
a colorpl-renontenon
assubjectivc alwaysoccurson the basisof certainsecondary
cucs.No matterhow
d c c p l yo u r a t t c n t i o np c n e t r r t ei\n t o a s u b j e c t i vpch c n o m c n o lni k c i n t r i n s i c
visualgrayor darklight,it nevergivesevena glimmerof whatwe readilyknow
to be a stateof our own bodilysclf( 1989,p.aI ).
Toucl-ring art
245
Although Katz explainsthat vision is oriented to the externalworld, there is a
sensein which vision might alsobe understoodto havea subjectivedimension'
As Damasiopoints out, a signalfrom the outside(like our visualperceptionof
a tree) is recognizedboth as a signalindicating somethingof the outsideworld
and a signal conveyingsomethingof the inner, bodily world, speci{ically,the
placein the skin where the specialsignalentered the eye.He writes:
you seeor hearexcitcsthc specialscnseof sightor soundas a
Sornething
"body"signalhailingfrom the placein
"nonbody"signal,but it alsoexcites
a
siglalcntered.... Whenyou sce'you do not justsee:
theskinwherethespecial
(Damasio,
1994,p'232)'
with youre1'cs
something
youfeelyouare seeing
To this I would add that what is carriedby this signalis a connotationof the self
with the bodily siteof the signal:the eye.Thus, we havesignals
that is associated
both of the objectiveworld and of the organ belongingto the self-asperceiving
it. This personalsenseof the eyeasbodily givesvision a subjectiveconnectiotl,
if only, I suggest,to prime it for subjectivity provoked by other senses.What
givesthe visualsensea greatercapacityfor communicatingsubjectivemessages
is its coordinationwith the senseof touch - real or imaginedtouch.
Unlike vision, touch is regardedas a wholly bipolar sense.When experiencing touch as a conduit to the objectiveworld, we can pressa fingertip to our
foreheadand feel the touchof an object- our forehead.Moreover,we can alscr
- the feeling of a
become awareof the subjectiveaspectof this same touch
warm, internalsensationin our fingertip or foreheadwhen the contactis made:
linkedto a
componentthat refersto thebodyseemsinescapably
A subjective
secondcomponcntthat refersto the propcrtiesof objects'We therefore
asbipolar.... At lny nlolncrlt'eitherthesubjcc
tactualphenomenon
describe
perceptionmaybe dominant,but thisbipolarity
tactual
side
of
objective
tiveor
(Katz'
p.4l ).
1989'
persists
ncverthcless
The phenomenologyof Maurice Merleau-Pontyis relevanthere,although he is
narrowerin the rangeof what he considersto be bodily than what I propose.f 4]
Focusingon the arts, Merleau-Pontyarguesthat the bipolar nature of touch and
vision permits spectatorsto lend their bodiesto the art objector the thing they
gazeupon. For Merleau-Ponty,the eyecan seeits own body as an object in the
"My
body is a thing among things" ( 1964,p' 163)' For
world, like other objects:
such purposesvision exemplifiesthe objectivepolarity. It identifies objects,and
one of theseidentilied objectsis the body. On the other hand, one has a sense
of cloing the seeing- a senseof one's eye movements,the sensationsof a
bodily self doing the seeing.This exemplifiesvision's subjective pole. By
246 EllcnJ. Esrock
interchangingthe subjectiveand objective- as both are aspectsof the same
sense'one'ssubjective,seeingselfbecomesan objectivething that existsin the
with the subjecexternalworid as an object.The object world, now associated
tive sell comesto existas part of the subjectiveworld of the self.''
A reversalaiso occursin the senseoftouch - the act oftouching and the
"l
feelof being touched. can feel myselftouched aswell and at the sametime as
"There
is
touching" ( 1968,p. 142).Tbuch and vision blend together,such that
evenan inscription of the touching in the visible,of the seeingin the tangible"
(p. 143).In viewingpaintings,then, the senseof selfassociated
with the eyethat
touchesthe painting becomespart of the painting as an object,and qualitiesof
the painting become incorporated into the self - self as constituted by a
seeing/touchingeye.
The hypothesisof somaticreinterpretationhas thus far been supportedby
sketchingout its variouscomponents,someoperational,somenelrroanatomical.
Although this constitutesthe major support for the hypothesis,the clarity of the
hypothesismight be enhancedby illuminating it againstthe backdropof similar,
more well-known theories, which contain concepts analogous to varitlus
componentsof the reinterpretationhypothesis.Although the plausiblity and
power of theseanalogousconceptscannot be transferrecldirectlyto the reinterpretationhypothesis,they can havean inc'lirectimpact, temperedby the extent
to which one regardsthe comparisionsassubstantial.Theseindividual analogies
In effect,the assemblage
becomeevenmore persuasivein their convergence.
of
these analogousconceptsstrengthensthe credibility of the reinterpretation
hypothesisand suggests
other avenuesfor its clevelopment.
6.
Converging concepts: Cognitive psychology
Within the disciplineof cognitivepsychologythe theory that containsthe most
closely related concept of reinterpretingsomatosensorystatesis attribution
theory, which emerged during the 1960swith the experiments of Stanley
Schachterand ]erome E. Singer (1962). Schachterand Singerinjecteclpeople
with Epinephrineto raisetheir heart rate and bring about other physiological
changes.Some of the subjectswere made awareof the effectsthat this would
produce and others were not. Each of the groups was then piaced in social
situationsthat were designedto evokeeither positive or negativefeelings.Those
who were injected with the drug and not told of the physiologicaleffects
describedtheir emotional responseto these situations as more emotionally
Touching art
positiveor negativethan did the other subjectsin the samecontexts.Schachter
and Singerarguethat thosesubjectswho experiencedarousalbut did not know
it was drug-induced attributed this physiological effect to the particular
emotion that was most likely to be experiencedin that situation. In other
words,thosewho did not know their arousalwas drug-inducedinterpretedthis
arousalaspart of eithera positiveor a negativeemotion. By contrast,thosewho
were aware of the side effectsof the drug reported havir-rgmllch less of an
emotional responseto the samesituations.
Although their findings have been challengedon various grounds, their
conclusionthat emoticlnis producedby one'sinterpretationof what is happening in ar-ryspecific,socialsituation - one'sattribution, along with a general
stateof bodily arousal,remainsa dominant explanatoryrnodel within psycholoey. What attribution theory has in common witl-rsomatic reinterpretationis
that both involve an interpretive operation that we impose upon our own
bodily sensations.
With attribution theory,however,what one imposesis uot a
quality of an external object but a feeling state, an emotion, and thus the
interpretationdoesnot servethe function of changingour bodily boundaries.
7.
Converging concepts: Psychoanalysis
Freudiantheory containsa number of conceptsthat bear a closerelationshipto
the proposednotion of bodily reinterpretation.Notably,there is the condition
known as hysteria,a situation in which a person suffersa bodily allliction, such
asblindness,paralysis,or memory lossthat doesnot appearto havean clrganic
cause.In treating such patients, Freud concluded that the disabilitieswere
producedby conflictswithin the mind involving the unconsciousand that the
bodily alfliction was a symptom of an underlying problem that was psychological. Thus, with hysteriathe somatic body becomesmarked as a sign of a conflict
existingin anotherdomain. In the caseof somaticreinterpretation,the body is
also marked as a sign of somethingoutside of itself. However,in this casethe
marked body is feh to becomethe specificthing that is represented,not only to
mark it indexically,as with hysteria.
Also relatedto the reinterpretationhypothesisare the key psychoanalytic
notions of projectionand interjection.Accordingto psychoanalysis,
projection
occurswhen one'sown wishesand feelingsare ascribedto another person or
object.Analogously,introjection occurswhen qualitiesof externalobjectsare
ascribedto the self. Whereas the psychoanalyticnotion of projection and
247
248 Ellenf. Esrock
introjection concernf-eelings
and wishes,in the reinterpretationhypothesisthe
spectatorengagesin theseboundary-alteringstrategieswith regardto a different
range of object and self properties and with different motivations. As the
psychoanalyticalconceptsof introjection and projection pertain to f-eelingsand
wishes,there is not any transferof somethingspecificto a bodily system,as in
the caseof the reinterpretationhypothesis.Furthermore, the reinterpreting
spectatorexercisesmore volitional control over the transfersthan in cases
where projection and introjection are psychoanalyticallyapplied. In both
theories,however,the subjectascribesaspectsofthe selfor the non-selfto the
other entity, thus shifting the boundaries of the self.
8.
Converging concepts: Linguistics and the sensorimotor
theory of perception
Various linguistic theoriesutilize the notion of projection, and in thesecases
what is projectedis relatedexplicitlyto bodily systems.Language,which offers
numerousmetaphorsof boundary change,is saidto contain the framework frrr
a deepand systematicuseof the body. Mark fohnson and GeorgeLakoff(19U7)
arguethat this frameworkis build upon imageschemasof the body, a founding
set of bodilymetaphors that orient us in time and space,with objects,ancl in
social interactions(Johnson, 1987,p.29). In contrast to the caseof somatic
reinterpretation,Johnsonand others do not describetheseprojectionsas online, moment-to-moment eventsthat a person experiencesbodily. Nonetheless,
their conceptof image schemessupports the reinterpretation hypothesisinsof-ar
as these schemasare based upon a belief in the importance of our bodily
awarenessand the projection of this awarenessinto all domains of human
experience,non-linguisticaswell as linguistic (Newton, 1996,p.22).
Argumentsframed from a linguisticperspectiveabout the projection ofbodily
imageryonto non-physicalactivitiesand conceptsmight be understoodwithin
the broader context of a sensorimotor theory of perception, which readily
accommodatesthe somaticreinterpretationhypothesis.Such a theory positsa
"Perception
deepconnectionbetweenmovement and perception:
is simulated
(Berthoz,
action"
2000, p. l0). Differing in terms of where the origin of the
motor intention is located- whether in a centrai or a peripheral source,all
versionsof sensorimotortheory hold that the notion of live, independentsenses
is misleading.Sensoryperception does not occur without the use of motor
images,which are schemasof motor activity stored in memory and deployed in
Touclring arr 249
connection with the various sensesto achievespecificgoals.Such motor images
c a n b e c o m e c o n s c i o u s u n d e r c i r c u m s t a n c e sw h e r e o n e ' s u n c o n s c i o u s
preparationsto perform a motor actionare frustrated(leannerod,1994,p. 190),
as,I suggest,in casesof viewing art. Generallyplacedin situationswhere one is
expectednot to touch the artwork, a spectatormight nonethelessengagein a
kind of imaginative play with an object that consitutes a form of motor
preparation,though it never resultsin action. The very lack of action would
bring this motor preparationto awarenessas a motor image,which might be
reinterpreted. Although the somatic reinterpretation hypothesis is not
incompatiblewith other theoriesof perception,it is supported at a fbundational
levelby the sensorimotortheory of perception.
9,
Converging concepts: Phantom limbs
The linal analogyis perhapsthe most interestingin its power to advancethe
theory of somatic reinterpretation,though the researchis speculativein its
original context. Exploring the phenonemon of phantom limbs, in which a
subjectfeelssensationsin a body part that is no longer attachedto the body,
V. S. Ramachandranand William Hirstein induce phantom limb type experiencein thosewith intact bodies.For instance,they report creatingcontextsin
which a subjectfeelsas if his nose has been displacedto a different location.
This illusion is createdby an experimenter taking the left index finger of the
subject and tapping it on the faceof another person, who is sitting next to the
subject,looking in the samedirection.The experimenterthen tapsthe subject's
nose in exactlythe samepattern as that being usedwith the subject'sleft finger.
They note that 12 out of l8 subjectsreportedthat their nose felt dislocated.
Their explanation for this senseof displacementis that we take the similarityof patternedtapping on the nose and on the finger not to be coincidental.
Thus, we unif, the two taps under one category, in accord with what they
describe as Bayesianlogic (Ramachandran & Hirstein, 1997, pp.452 3).
Concerning a relateddemonstrationhaving to do with a subject gazing in a
mirror at a dummy's face, the experimenterswrite: "The subfect comes to
experiencethe dummy's head as being his own to such an extent that it is now
hooked up to his own limbic systemand autonomic output" (p.a53).
The most striking demonstrationof this occursin an experimentin which
Ramachandran and Hirstein had subjects rhythmically stroke chairs and
tabletopswhile they were having their own hand strokedin the samerhythm.
z5o Ellcn J. Esrock
Although the subjectis stroking inanimate objects,she feelsthat the sensation
explain:
of his or her hand emanatesfrom theseobjects.The researchers
Youwill startcxpcricncing
tapsanclstrokes
asemerging
from thetablesurface
though your consciousrnind krrowspcrfcctlywcll that this is logically
ever.r
improbabilityof thc two scqucnccs
of taps
absurd.Again,the sheerstatistical
your
hand
leacl
and strokcs onc sccnon the tablesurfaceanclone felt on
(Ramachandran.,
thebrainto conclucie
thatthetableis nowpartof yourbody
1998,p.60).
& Blakeslee,
"can
From the evidencethat you
actuallyproject your sensationsto external
and Blakeslee
objects"(Ramachandran& Hirstein, 1997,p.60), Ramachanclran
"your
concludethat
body image, despiteall its appearanceof durabilty, is an
entirely transitory internal construct that can be profoundly modihed with a
f e w s i m p l et r i c k s " ( p . 6 2 ) .
The claim that the boundariesof our body imageare malleableis consistent
with viewsarticulatedby PaulSchilder(1950)and others.Although the reinterpretationhypothesisdoesnot seemto describesomethingas strikingly illusory
as the feeling that one's nose has been displaced,it does involve manipr,rlating
one'ssenseof bodily boundariesso asto givethe sensethat one inhabits things
in the world. In this respect,Ramachandranand Hirstein's demonstrations
support the hypothesisabout reinterpretingthe somatosensorysystem.
Their demonstration, however, need not be used only to reinforce the
generalclaim that body images are malleable.Concluding this section on a
speculativenote, I raisethe possibilitythat the analysisof dual touchesin the
demonstrationmight be applicablealso to the perceptionof visual art. fust as
Ramachandranand Hirstein's subjectsmove their hands back and forth over a
table top, so too, with the photo of Strand'sLeaves,the spectatorsmove their
eyesback and forth over the leaves.In place of having an experimenter stroke
the subject'shand in a pattern that correspondsto what the subjectis actually
doing to the table, spectatorsof the artwork stroke themselves- imaginatively.
They produce an imaginative,bodily stroking,which correspondsto what the
spectator'seyes are doing with the photograph. Perhaps the coordination
between a spectator'srhythmic eye scanning and rhythmic internal stroking
changesthe spectator'sbodily relationshipto the art object."
This sectionhas describeda number of theoriesfrom different disciplines
t h a t b e a r s t r o n g a n a l o g i e st o c o m p o n e n t so f t h e s o m a t i c r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
hypothesis.Theseinclude our use of the somatosensorysystemto represent
somethingother than the body, the capacityof projection and introjection to
Touching art
25r
changethe boundariesof selfand object,the use of motor imagesin the act of
visualperception,the projectionof one'smotor imagesinto the thing perceived
and, finally,the malleabilityof the boundariesof body image and its displacements, through rhythmic movement, into tl-reobject world' Although these
they both
points are situatedwithin independenttheories,in their convergence
clarify and strenghtenthe reinterpretationhypothesis'
To exploremore fully the issuesraisedin this paper it would be helpful to
expandthe Iimited and sometimesmisleadingdescriptionsof internal experiencethat are availablein our language- a problem noted by William Iames
( l g 1 g , p . 1 9 4 - 5 ) a n d r e i t e r a t e db y o t h e r s( J e a n n e r o dp, . 1 8 7 ) . T h i s i s a c c o m plishednot only by sharpeningour introspectivetechniquesand our analytical
descriptionsbut also by broadeningthe questionsposed for experimentation
and humanistic study. How might we better describethis senseof changing
bodily boundaries and our production of motor images?Do traditional'
scholarlydescriptionsof the imagination sufliceto describetheseexperiences?
What kind of belief statesare are generated?
Without losing the senseof the art object as directive,I suggestthat we
might further exploreindividual differencesin bodily viewing experiences,in
background skills, aptitudes,and personality types for trained viewers and
makersof art, aswell as for collegestudentswho volunteer for psychologytests';
The study of empathy, originating in lgth century aesthetics,might be
productively reexaminedin light of current cognitive neuroscienceresearchand
humanistic scholarship. Similarly, the distinction between emotion and
rationality - a dominant cultural construct that informs much art theory,
might alsobe reappraised.In short, the possibilitiesare rich for exploring the
subtle ways that we move our embodied selvesthrough the object world that
envelopsus.
Notes
r. Theideaofprojectingone'sselfintoanobject-ernpathy-wasexploreclincicpthb
of the lgth century.The
traditions
numberof writerswhoseworkis tiedto theintellectual
( l e r m a n R o m a n t i c p o e t s p r o v i d e d g e n e r a l n o t i o n s o f n ' r c r g e rw i t h n a t u r e , a n d a e s t h e t i c i a n s
under thc
l i k c R o b e r t V i s c l - r e r( l t t 7 2 ) a n c l T h e o d o r L i p p s ( 1 8 9 7 ) f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d t h e i c l t - ; r
name of errpat hy (EinJ'i.thlung).Though the bodily component becone more specific in tl-resc
aesthetictheorics, their concepts rcflect the dominirnt philosophical ir-rfluencesof their culture.
z. peter Munz examines the rclationship betwecr-rersomatic markcr ancl a verbal description
o f i t i n C r i t i 4 u t o l l n p u r c R t ' a s o r (r i 9 9 9 ) .
252 Ellen J. Esrock
the valueof as-ifbody loopswitl-rDonaldHoftman lPersonalconvers.ition,
3. In discussing
February2 l, 2001], he pointedout that full-body circuitsmight alsobe valuablebecausethey
might createa rich, complexlayeringof somatoscnsorl,
experiences,
much like William
James'notion of consciousness.
4. Speakingto the narrownessof Merleau-Ponty'sbodily model, Drew Leder notes in Tfte
"The
AbsentBody,
livedbody he IMerleau-Ponty]
describes
is nevercompletc.Thcreis little
discussion
of n-retabolism,
visceralprocesses,
birth, and death"(l.eder,1990,p.6). Whereas
Ledergoeson to investigatethe way in which visceralprocesses
arepowerful but nllsentfron-r
"My
awareness,
corporeal depths disappearnot only from perception but relativeto my
structureofwill and action" (p.a5),I explorehow theybecomepresentto consciousness.
5. Becausctheeyeoftheselfseesobjectsandthebodilyselfisanobject,sotoo,objcctssee
"things
thc self.This explainswhy, Merleau-Pontynotes, painterssay that
look at them"
(Visibleand the Invisible,p. 167).
0. If the changesin bodilv boundariesare effectedthrough some kind of internalized,
rhythmicmotions,it would be interesting
to exploremusicalrhythmsof viewingasa means
of creatingout-of-body states.I refer to the intriguing work of William H. McNeill, Keeping
Togetherin Tinre:Dnnceand Drill in Huntan History,and to Ellen Dissanayakc's
provocative
Art ontl Intitnocy:How the ArtsBegnn.
7. I intervieweda spectatorbeforea painting that I thought would readilyevokethe senseof
a bodily line. Though thoroughly engagedwith the image,the viewer confessedthat he felt
nothing somatically.Followinga hunch, I then askedhim to form a motor imageof himself
taking somekind of action while playinga sport he liked - swinginga bat, kicking a ball. He
repliedthat he wasn'tsurehe wasableto do it. He could seehimselfhitting a ball but could
not feel himself performing the action. lt seemsto me that this was an individual who wirs
producing visual imagery,a third personviewing of himself,and not motor imagery,a first
personperspectivein which he is the performer.His seeminginability to form a motor image
ofa sport he thoroughlyenjoyedreinforcesmy suspicionthat the somatosensory
experiences
ofthe sort I havedescribedarecloselyconnectedto a person'sskill in the creationofmotor
images,the habitual choiceabout when to producethem, and the ability to recognizethem.
lf this is the case,then,asI suggest,
somaticreinterpretation
would not be equallycommon
to all viewers.
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Guidelines for Contributors to Consciousnessand Emotion
t
Contributionsshouldnotexceed6000words.TheyshouldbeinEnglishfollowingtheAPAstyle.Ifnotwritten
by a native speakerofEnglish it is advisableto have the paper checkedby a native speaker.Pleaseavoid excessive
use offield-specihc terms, or add a short glossary.
z. Manuscripts:Pleasesubmit 4 copiesof your paper, double spaced,with margins of 3 cm all round. The first
page of a manuscript should contain the title of the article, the name, alfliation and addressof each author,
followed by a self-containedabstractin English (max. I50 words), a short list ofkey words, and a biosketchofthe
author(s).
3, Upon acceptancethe author will be requestedto send the final version on disk in any standard format, but
preferablyin WordPerfect;or as an attachment,preferablyin MIME, UU, or Binhex encoding, and send a paper
copy by mail.
4, Authors are responsiblefor observingth e laws of copyrighr when quoting or reproducing rnaterialfrom other
sources.Thecopyright to articlespublished in Consciousness
nnd Emotion rsheld by the Publisher.Permissionsfor
the author to use the article elsewherewill not be withheld unreasonablyupon written request.
5. Papersshould be reasonablydivided into sectionsand, ifnecessary,subsections.
6. Spe//lngshould be American English consistentlythroughout the paper.
7. Line drawings (Frgures)and photographs (P/ates)should be submitted as reproducible originals or as TIF or
EPS files accompanied by the creation file and a hard copy. They should be nurnbered consecutively and
appropriate captions should be provided. Referenceto any Figuresor Plates(including captions to Figuresand
Plates) should be made in the main text and an indication should be given where they should appear
approximately.
8. Visual information and data that are not suitable for printing in the journal may be placed on C&E's
accompanyingwebsite.Pleaseconsult with the Editors as to the necessityof such additional information.
9. Tn&lesshould be numbered consecutivelyand should be referred to in the main text.
ro. Noresshould be kept to an absoluteminimum. They should be numbered consecutivelythroughout the paper.
'Notes'
Notes should be listed in a section
following the main text.
rr. References:
Referencesin the text should follow the style: (Brown, 1989,pp. 224-256).
The References
section shoulcl follow the notesand should list all referencescited in the main text. References
should be listed ( 1) alphabeticallyand (2) chronologically.Authors' names and journal titles should be given in
full with pagereferences.Examples:
Books and unpublished manuscripts/theses
Lightbrun, L.T. (1995). The relation of critical fusion frequency ro agc. Unpublished doctoral dissertation,
U n i v e r : i t yo f N e w l e r . e y .
Niemeier, S. & R. Dirven (Eds.) (1997). Tlrc Languageof ernotions.Amsterdam & Philadelphia:.lohn Benjamins.
Sperber,D. & D. Wilson (1986/1995).Relevance:
Communicotionand cognition.Oxford: Blackwell.
Article in book/journal
Ziv, O. (1,996).Writing to work: How using e-mail can reflect technological and organizational change. In
S. Herring (Ed.), Computer-mediatedcommunication: Linguistic, sociol ond cross-culturalperspectives
Qp. 2a3-26\. Arnsterdam & Philadelphia:.[ohn Benjamins.
A t k i n s o n ,R . C . , & R . M . S h i f f r i n ,( 1 9 7 1 ) .T h e c o n t r o l eo f s h o r t t e r m m e m o r y . S c i e n t i J iAcm e r i c a n , 2 2 5 , 8 2 - 9 0 .
Pleaseconsult the PublicatiotrManual of the Americnn Psychological
Association4th ed. for details.
rz. Authors are kindly requestedto check their manuscripts very carefully before submission in order to avoid
delays and extra costs at the proof stage.Once a paper is acceptedfor publication, it will be allocated to a
forthcoming issue and the author will receive two copies of page proofs of his/her contribution for hnal
correction. These must be returned to the Editor with corrections by the dates determined by the publication
schedule.Any author's alterationsother than typographical correctionsin the pageproofs rnay be chargedto the
author.
r3. Authors (first named) of articleswill receivea complimentary copy and 30 olfurints of the issuein which their
paper appears.
r4. Manuscripts and all editorial correspondenceshould be sent to The Editor, Ralph D. Ellis, P.O.Box 81, Clark
Atlanta University,Atlanta, GA 30314,U.S.A.E-mail: ralphellis@mindspring.com