Abstract

Transcription

Abstract

“NICOLAE BĂLCESCU“
LAND FORCES ACADEMY
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED
ORGANIZATION
THE 14TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
SECURITY AND DEFENCE
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 2
27-29 NOVEMBER 2008
“NICOLAE BĂLCESCU” LAND FORCES ACADEMY
PUBLISHING HOUSE
SIBIU, 2008
Scientific advisors:
Dipl.Eng. Vitězslav Jaroš, PhD
Prof. Baboş Alexandru, PhD
Assoc.Prof. Năbârjoiu Neculae, PhD
Assoc.Prof. Stoina Neculai, PhD
Copyright: out of charge, all reproductions are authorized
provided that specific references are made.
“Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy
Address: 3-5 Revoluţiei Street, Sibiu
Tel.: 0269/432990, Fax: 0269/215554
E-mail: office@armyacademy.ro
E-mail: editura@armyacademy.ro
web: www.armyacademy.ro
web: www.armyacademy.ro/editura
The authors take full responsibility of the content of their
articles.
ISSN 1843 – 6722
MILITARY SCIENCES. SECURITY AND DEFENCE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Security and Defence
Some Aspects of the National Defence and Security Policy, Assoc.Prof.
Dimitrova Sevdalina, PhD, Assoc.Prof. Banabakova Vania, PhD, “Vassil
Levski” National Military University, Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria
……………………………………………………………………………..…… 7
Command and Control in EU Operations, Cerny Jiri, University of
Defence of Brno, Czech Republic ……………………………………………. 14
The Internet Providers and Terrorist’s Guide, State Secretary Andreescu
Anghel, PhD, Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform, Bucharest,
Counsellor Nicolae Radu, Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform,
Bucharest ……………………………………………………………………... 26
Strategies and Implementation Instruments of European Social Policy,
Prof. Ionescu Romeo, PhD, “Dunărea de Jos” University, Galaţi
……………………………………………………………………………...…. 36
Regional Disparities Inside the European Union: Present and Forecast
Situations, Prof. Ionescu Romeo, PhD, “Dunărea de Jos” University, Galaţi
……………………………………………………………………………….... 43
Security Environment Under the Impact Globalization Process, at the
Beginning of the Century, Prof. Stăncilă Lucian, PhD, “Carol I” National
Defence University, Bucharest, Mărgărit Iulian, M.U. 01376, Ploieşti
………………………………………………………………………………… 53
The Anglo-Japanese Naval Cooperation during the First World War,
Assoc.Prof. Glodarenco Olimpiu Manuel, PhD, Romanian Naval Museum of
Constanţa ………………………………………………………………...…… 60
Global Ethics – Foundation for Global Human Security, Asst.Prof.
Crăciun Iulia, PhD, Faculty for Political Sciences, International Relations and
European Studies of Sibiu …………………………………………………… 68
The Global Economic Impact of Terrorism, Asst.Prof. Dinicu Anca,
“Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Sibiu ………………………….... 75
3
Fundamental Principles Specific to the Resilience Building-Up Process in
Belgium, Asst.Prof. Dinicu Anca, TA Neagoie Horaţiu Adrian, “Nicolae
Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Sibiu ………………………………….….. 82
Conflict Management in the Current Security Environment, Asst.Prof
Tureac Cornelia, Asst.Prof. Grigore Aurica, “Danubius” University, Galaţi
……………………………………………………………………………….. 88
A Model of Analysis for Foreign Policy Decision -Makers, Asst.Prof.
Megheşan Karin, PhD, Asst.Prof. Nacea Liana, PhD, The National
Intelligence Academy of Bucharest ………………………………………….. 93
Defence Diplomacy – A Way of Preventing Conflicts, Asst.Prof. Tureac
Cornelia, Asst.Prof. Bordean Ioan, PhD, Asst.Prof. Grigore Aurica
“Danubius” University, Galaţi …………………………………………….... 101
Boosting NATO’s Capabilities for Defence against Terrorism, TA Raţiu
Aurelian, “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Sibiu ………………. 108
Doctrinaire Capabilities and Concepts. The Implementation of a New
Group of Operational Concepts, TA Raţiu Aurelian, “Nicolae Bălcescu” Land
Forces Academy, Sibiu ……………………………………………………... 116
Right Extreme Threat to the European Security, Jr.TA Munteanu Nicoleta
Anne Marie, “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu …………………..……… 126
Considerations concerning the Journalists Protection in the Context of
International Humanitarian Law. Effects on Mass-Communication, Jr.TA
Munteanu Nicoleta Anne Marie, “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu
……………………………………………………………………………….. 135
Terrorism and Its Psychopathology, Jr.TA Kaiter Edith, “Mircea cel
Bătrân” Naval Academy, Constanţa ……………………………..…………. 144
A New Vision about Intelligence in France 2008 White Paper on Defence
and National Security, Blidaru Horaţiu, PhD, Oprea Alexandru, PhD,
Romanian Intelligence Service, Bucharest …………………………….…… 152
France’s Counter – Terrorism System after 9.11, Blidaru Horaţiu, PhD,
Oprea Alexandru, PhD, Romanian Intelligence Service, Bucharest
………………………………………………………………………………. 162
The Changes in the Security Environment and their Bearings on Security
Research, 1st SR Sarcinschi Alexandra, PhD, Centre for Defence and Security
Strategic Studies of Bucharest ………………………………………………. 172
Knowledge – Based Organization and Knowledge – Based Warfare,
Siteanu Eugen, PhD, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest
…………………………………………………………………………..…… 181
4
Maintenance Strategic Management Problems, Siteanu Eugen, PhD,
“Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest ………………….……… 189
The Role of Cultural Factors in the Security Environment Development,
SR Dinu Mihai Ştefan, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest
……………………………………………………………………………….. 196
Globalization and the European Union, Eng. Manolache Mihai, General
Staff, Ministry of Defence, Bucharest ………………………………….…… 205
Globalization and International Security, Eng. Manolache Mihai, General
Staff, Ministry of Defence, Bucharest ………………………………………. 213
The Forms, the Dimension and the Tendencies of the Terrorist
Phenomenon, Popa Teodor, Gendarmery Inspectorate of Alba Iulia
…………………………………………………………………………..…… 221
International Organisms and Security Elements within Europe History,
Mărgărit Iulian, M.U. 01376, Ploieşti ………………………………...…… 233
Considerations concerning the Solving of the Political Military Crises
Specific Statements Post Conflict in Current Stage, Pîrgulescu Ion, M.U.
02628, Caracal ………………………………………………………………. 238
Canonical Education and Political Decision Making in Islamic Society,
Comşa Corina Nicoleta, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest
……………………………………………………………………………… 248
The Relations between Economic Development and National Security,
Cucu Irina, “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest
……………………………………………………………………………….. 254
Orthodoxy and Globalization, Military priest Ţanu Constantin, General
Staff, Bucharest, Military priest Lazăr Valentin, Land Forces Staff, Bucharest
…………………………………………………………………………….…. 262
Dynamics and Manifestation Geopolitical Crises, Dinescu Ioana Mihaela,
Valentin Gabriel, Mountain Training Centre of Predeal ………………...… 271
Geopolitical and Geostrategic Tendencies at the Beginning of the Third
Millennium, Dinescu Ioana Mihaela, Valentin Gabriel, Mountain Training
Centre of Predeal ………………………………………………..………….. 277
The Afghanistan War as Humanitarian Intervention – a View over the
Implications of Military through the Process of Ensuring Human Security in
Zabul Province, Kiş Alexandru, “Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu
………………………………………………………………………………. 283
Geopolitical and Strategic Perspective of the Black Sea Region, Ioniţă
Daniela Maria, HP Ltd., Bucharest ………………………..………………. 292
5
The Power of Information during Conflict, Ioniţă Daniela Maria, HP Ltd.,
Bucharest ……………………………………………………………………. 302
Orthodoxy, Politics, State, Military priest Lazăr Valentin, Land Forces
Staff, Bucharest, Military priest Ţanu Constantin, General Staff, Bucharest
……………………………………………………………………………..… 308
Excursion into Geopolitics. Doctrines and Their Corpus of Idea Holders:
Ideologies, Metea Ileana Gentilia, Voievoda Ramona, “Nicolae Bălcescu”
Land Forces Academy, Sibiu ……………………………………………….. 318
Regional Security Dynamics, Năbîrjoiu Virgil Horaţiu, General
Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection of Bucharest ………...… 326
Security and Economic Development in the Wider Black Sea Region,
Ochea Lavinia , Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest ……………..……. 334
United States of America’s Interests in Central Asia: 1991- 2008, Pop
Irina Ionela, “Babeş Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca …………………..... 339
6
Knowledge Based Organization 2008 International Conference
SOME ASPECTS OF THE NATIONAL DEFENCE AND
SECURITY POLICY
Assoc.Prof. Dimitrova Sevdalina, PhD, Assoc.Prof. Banabakova Vanya, PhD
“Vassil Levski” National Military University,
Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria
e-mail: sevdalina_bg@mail.bg; v_banabakova@abv.bg
Abstract
The paper analyzes the characteristics of the social policy of the Ministry
of Defense and the System for individual social service as part of the
management of human resources for defense and security with the purpose of
their enhancement. Key words: social policy, centers for individual social
service, customers of social services.
Introduction
One of the important issues to deal with as a consequence of the
current conditions and tasks carried out by the NATO countries is the
necessity to optimize the social activities in compliance with the new
vision of the Commandment of the Alliance as to the recuperation and
recreation of contingents involved in NATO missions around the
world. [1].
It is necessary to emphasize that the social activities of the
Ministry of Defense (MOD) include not only organizing vacations,
but also other activities connected to solving current problems such as
the problem of adaptation of the personnel returning from missions
outside their family or military environment.
In connection to the above, NATO structures are keenly interested
in the System for individual social service that has been established
and developed in Bulgaria in the large garrisons and which is an
important part of the social policy of the MOD. [1]
7
The aim of the present presentation is to analyze the
characteristics of the social policy of the MOD and the System for
individual social service as part of the management of human
resources for defense and security with the purpose of their
enhancement.
1. Trends of the social policy for security and defense.
The social policy that the MOD is to implement in its current and
future activities is a substantial part of the overall policy of the MOD
which aims at establishing and functioning of armed forces adequate
not only to the current conditions, but also to the vision for the
functions of the armed forces in the next ten years.
The development of the System for individual social service is a
part of the social policy for security and defense. That is why it is
necessary to outline the strategic trends of the social policy; and it is
the purpose of the centers for individual social services to implement
these tendencies [4]:
• Income policy.
On one hand it is necessary to emphasize on the scope of
responsibility within the job description, and on the other hand – on
the expertise and quality of performing the tasks. It is advisable to
study the method for calculation of payment in the armed forces in the
USA, Germany, Great Britain and other NATO member countries.
• Housing policy.
In order to develop a new housing policy it is necessary to:
propose changes in the current normative regulation; modernize the
concept of the housing policy; reevaluate all available housing;
include representatives of the MOD in the inter-agency work groups
involved in the development of normative documents regarding the
implementation of the National housing strategy; ensure long-term
low-interest government loans for building private housing; exchange
or concession of military terrains to developing companies for the
construction of housing facilities for the military personnel;
construction of a new type detached houses; priority of housing
construction in the areas of location of military units with high level of
readiness and performing the most important tasks in connection to
the national security, or participating in missions abroad; develop an
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investment program of the MOD in cooperation with partners from the
bank sector that will provide loans at favorable terms and conditions.
• Recreation and recuperation of the military and civilian
personnel of the MOD.
The main trends are: taking into account the full
professionalization of the armed forces; evaluation of the economic
benefits of the available infrastructure and its competitiveness at the
tourist market; development of tour agent activities in order to
increase the income of the MOD; extending the Bulgarian
participation in the international organization linking the social
structures at the NATO MODs (CLIMS); improvement of the living
conditions in the military recreational institutions; establishment of
centers for individual social services in the garrisons and etc.
• Improvement of the working conditions and reduction of
the hazards for the health of the military personnel.
The main trends in the activities are: financially provided for
measures aiming at providing safe and healthy working conditions;
development of goal-specific programs; new approach in the
managing of the Labor Medicine Service; enhancement of the system
for payment in specific working conditions; control over the
compliance with the laws and other in-house regulations and others.
• Control over the expenditures
This trend of the social policy requires: assessment of risk in each
installation by the Labor Medicine Service; placement of financially
well-grounded orders; enhancement of the quality of the medical
services and improvement of the health status of the personnel at the
MOD, in the structures under the command of the Minister of Defense
and in the BAF; carrying out hygienic, anti-epidemic and sanitary
control in the specialized installations of the MOD, in the structures
under the command of the Minister of Defense and in the BAF.
• Motivation and social adaptation.
It is necessary that the policy in this area is connected with the
realization of programs and projects related to motivation,
qualification, re-qualification, job provision, establishing of private
business and conversion of unused military realty. An expedient
policy should be focused on researching the labor market and
consequently to provide for military personnel with courses or the
9
opportunity for higher education in specialties that are highly
demanded by employers. These activities are a priority for the centers
for motivation and social adaptation.
2. Characteristics of the System for individual social service.
The system for individual social service includes the
establishment of centers for individual social service under the Social
Activities Executive Agency at the MOD.
The purpose of these centers is to provide a range of social
services, to develop and implement individual projects and programs
for social inclusion, to provide social assistance and carry out
activities related to social and legal counseling, to give advice on
payment and remuneration issues; social, medical and pension
insurance, as well as full service on issues, that are of concern to all
the concerned parties [2].
The centers are funded at the expense of the MOD budget, hence
the categories of people entitled to their services are the following:
• Military personnel on active duty at the MOD and in the
BAF and their family members;
• Civilian personnel at the MOD, BAF and the structures
under the command of the Minister of Defense;
• Conscripted military personnel;
• Mobilization reserve personnel;
• Disabled military personnel or personnel who have
suffered accidents in connection with their duties;
• War veterans;
• Members of military patriotic unions and organizations and
associations of military personnel;
• Spouses, children and parents of military personnel who
have lost their lives while performing their military service.
The efficient functioning of these centers requires the
implementation of and compliance with a number of standards, such
as [3]:
• Equal, fair and polite treatment of all social services
customers.
10
This principle implies that the official in charge is helpful and
polite to all customers of social services, regardless of their education,
ethnos, age, physical or mental disadvantages.
It is important to show the necessary attention, respect and care
for the problems of the customer of social services. And at the same
time, when dealing with each separate case, confidentiality is vital.
• Providing
complete
information
and
open
communication with the customer.
The implementation of this principle requires that the customer of
social services is informed about the name of the official he is dealing
with in person or over the telephone. Direct contact with the customer
is essential when the information and consultation provided concern
issues such as filing a request, filing a complaint, a declaration, or
proposal. When there are requirements as to the form of the
documents, the officials at the center are responsible for providing the
necessary information and clarifications. This principle also calls for
providing easily understandable advice and oral information on the
raised issues concerning the procedure and the method of receiving
the service in cases when the answer does not need further exploring.
• Enhancement of the service process.
In order to achieve that enhancement, it is necessary to show
flexibility and reduce to minimum the complex and time-consuming
procedures. Customers may be provided with blank forms for
declarations, requests and etc. that could be filled out more quickly
and more easily.
• Feedback from the customers of social services.
Effective feedback means a clear, well publicized and easily
accessible system for providing opinion and suggestions that can serve
as corrective of the work process and facilitate making the appropriate
management decisions. It is also important to thoroughly analyze the
received feedback and use that analysis for taking the necessary
measures, if they fall within the scope of responsibility of the MOD.
• Providing complex social services through interaction
with other agencies and organizations.
This principle requires giving the customer information about the
social services that are provided by other agencies as well as
cooperation with other institutions. The efficiency of the social
11
servicing can be also enhanced through establishing close relations
with relevant organizations. It is advisable to pay attention to
providing complex social services, which will reduce the time
consumption and will improve the quality of the social services
rendered.
• Measuring the satisfaction of the customers of social
services.
In order to achieve this goal it is essential to build a system of
mechanisms for receiving feedback information from the customers of
social services within the MOD. This information can be received
through surveys and questionnaires. The information can be used as a
basis for corrective measures aiming at the improvement of the social
services provided and increasing the satisfaction of the customers of
social services within the structures of MOD and BAF.
The implementation of the abovementioned standards means that
the work of the officials in the centers for social service is guided by
the following principles: lawfulness; loyalty; integrity; impartiality;
responsibility; professionalism; expertise; positivism; accessibility;
effectiveness; humaneness.
Working in the centers for individual social service imposes
specific requirements on the officials, such as:
• To obey and implement the laws;
• To maintain and improve daily their professionalism and
expertise;
• To attend to each customer of social services with
impartiality, integrity and respect;
• To strive for expedient, efficient and high quality
performance;
• To be transparent in their actions;
• To apply the principles of communication and feedback;
• Not to use their position for gaining personal benefits;
• To set personal example of conduct and attitude towards
their colleagues.
The discussed characteristics of the social policy in general and of
the System for individual social service in particular lead to the
following conclusions, related to the improvement of their activities:
12
• Examining and implementation of the experience in the
field of social policy of the NATO member countries in
compliance with the tendency for unification of their
social policies and the social status of the military
personnel, and taking into account the specific
peculiarities of our country [1];
• Increasing the number of centers for individual social
service in order to provide better services (At present the
number of centers is 7 and is expected to increase to 12);
• Enhancement of the system for feedback from the
customers of social services in order to promptly correct
the weaknesses in the system;
• Improvement of the system for control over the work of
the centers in order to ensure lawfulness, transparency and
equal treatment of all customers of social services.
In conclusion we have to state, that the full membership of
Bulgaria in NATO and the European Union, and the consequent high
requirements, responsibilities and standards should have their
projection in the aria of social activities as well. The Bulgarian
military personnel need an efficient social program that will not only
guarantee a high social status, but will also contribute to the
enhancement of the fighting efficiency of the BAF in performing their
important international assignments.
References
[1] www.bgarmy.eamci.bg, issue 16775, 24. 01. 2008.
[2] Internal regulations for the activity of the Centers for individual social
service under the Social Activities Executive Agency at the MOD, C. 2008.
[3] Work standards, implemented in the centers for individual social, С. 2008.
[4] Conception for human resources management in the MOD, BAF and the
structures under the command of the Minister of Defense, С. 2006.
13
COMMAND AND CONTROL IN EU OPERATIONS
Cerny Jiri
University of Defence of Brno, Czech Republic
e-mail: jirdacerny@centrum.cz
Abstract
The author describes characteristics, principles and types of Command and
Control (C2) in expeditionary operations of the European Union (EU) in the
first part of this paper. In the second part, there are some aspects of C2
structure of an EU Battle Group with a view to the Organization of Command
and Control (Command Agencies and Command Posts) presented.
Keywords: Command, control, Battle Group, expeditionary
operations of the European Union (EU), leadership
Preface
Planning and command are difficult issues in multinational
integrated expeditionary operations after so many years of peacetime.
As the European Union is getting a more powerful active world's
factor, the EU evolves long-term processes for the conduct of an
integrated expeditionary operation. Since 2003, the EU has carried out
a number of successful military operations and civil missions in the
Balkans, in Africa, in the Middle East and in South-East Asia. The
ambition of the EU has been confirmed at the meeting of the European
Council in Nice and the following decision has been made. The EU
must be capable of conducting not only integrated expeditionary
operations, but also autonomous combined ones. For this purpose, the
use of facilities and capabilities of NATO sources by “BERLIN plus
agreement” convention is recommended. The integrated expeditionary
operations are instruments for the management of a critical situation
14
that has become extremely acute where the deployment of military
force seems inevitable. For the case of crisis management where it
will be required to implement the EU Rapid Response Forces under
the EU command, it is necessary to create such an organizational
structure of Command and Control that is based on the EU Military
Concept. The EU does not have any stable Command and Control
structure and it will be composed of an ad-hoc military chain of
commands for the leadership in its crisis management operations. This
would also meet the requirement for Rapid Response. In the process
of the Command and Control concept a principle of
bearer state appearance to diminish response time will be applied.
It is very important to determine the Command and Control system
(chain), commanders (an operational commander and a national force
commander) at a moment's notice.
1. Command and Control in the EU expeditionary operation
1.1. Characteristics of the Command and Control
We can describe Command and Control as a military leadership
that exercises authority over military forces, defines their mission,
provides them with support and information, and gives direction to
their operations.
Command is a complicated and dynamic process. It is an activity
focused on the regimentation of command controlled forces and the
accomplishment of an appointed task. The achievement in the
integrated expeditionary operation always depends upon the quality of
command. Therefore, a period of the build-up of the Battle Group EU
is also an interval for system development and methods of command.
The command is a process by the help of which a commander
works his own way and his intentions by determining forms and
proceedings of staff and troops activities under command. The
command includes conferred powers and direct responsibilities of
designated commanders in the employment of forces and operational
task fulfilling. Control may be described as the process through which
the commander (in support of staff) organizes, regulates and
harmonizes activities of designated forces. The control includes a
sustained controlling, regulation and co-ordination of subordinate
15
forces in conformity with the plan intentions of a commander. It
enables to regulate and to control processes of activities carried out by
designated operation troops. The performance of operation tasks
requires the competent application of Standing Operational
Procedures (SOP) by the commander and staff. Components of
command are authority, decision-making process, leadership and
control:
Authority is the delegation to issue orders or to enforce
obedience. Authority includes responsibility and the right to delegate
powers.
Decision-making process is the selection of the variant of Course
of action (COA), which is the most effective for the performance of an
operation task. Decision- making modifies the commander’s vision
towards effective army activities. The commander’s responsibility is
to make essential decisions. The staff is responsible for accepting
routine decisions (in terms of the application of the commander’s
intentions and their accomplishment).
Leadership is to gain confidence with people for the
accomplishment of an operational task. The commander leads helped
by the combination of his own personal example, persuasion and
coercion. One of the main tasks of Command and Control in the
integrated expeditionary operation is to provide readiness to fight and
integrity of the operational formation of troops. The principal aim of
the Command and Control, however, is not the achievement of
capacity for action and the integrity of operational structure. The
major task is to achieve a set objective of an operation. To secure the
high level of command in the expeditionary operations means that the
best decision is accepted and carried out for the case of crisis
management, i. e. the selection of such a variant that corresponds to a
particular operational situation and a set objective of operation.
Experience obtained in operations ARTEMIS, EUFOR RD CONGO
and EUFOR TCHAD/RCA show that it is possible to divide all tasks
of Command and Control into two basic groups according to the
character of activities:
► activation, planning and preparation of forces for the
operation, preparation of a strategic reserve troops, a creation of a
logistic and medical support concept,
16
► employment, conduct of operation, withdrawal of forces from
the theatre of operation.
The first group comprises command and control tasks that
concern directly the activation of the European Union Operational
Headquarters and European Union Force Headquarters (EU OHQ and
EU FHQ), military-strategic and military operational planning (joint
operational planning process), operational documentation processing,
and preparation of operational task force, organization of strategic air
transportation and adoption of logistic and medical support measures.
The second group of command and control tasks is formed by
operation
employment
organization
ISTAR
(Intelligence,
Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance), the conduct of
operation and the accomplishment of logistic service and medical
support, withdrawal of forces from the theatre of operation and the
implementation of strategic air transportation.
1.2. Principles of Command and Control in expeditionary
operations of the European Union (EU) specify the elements of
command and its fundamental responsibilities that are: mission
accomplishment and people. The most important condition of goal
accomplishment in the integrated expeditionary operation is a deep
knowledge of principles of command and control. There is a special
group of operational art principles, relating to the scope of activities
performed by the commander and managing bodies. To the most
important principles of command belong: basic principle, unity of
effort, independence and initiative, decentralization of performance,
delegation of powers, trust, mutual understanding, timely and
effective decisions and actions, anticipation and continuous
knowledge of situation, resolution, flexibility, continuity,
concealment, transparency, high operability, national objections and
joint working language. The principles of command and control
predetermine the way of meeting command and control requirements
by commanders and staffs to achieve the objective to fulfil the
operational task and to provide protection of forces.
17
1.3. Types of Command and Control in the EU operations
Types of Command and Control, which are enforced in the EU
operations, are based on STANAG 2199 (AJP 3.2.2 Command and
Control of Allied Land 3 Knowledge Based Organization 2008
International Conference
Forces) and they are entirely identical with types of command and
control applied in the NATO operations’. Types of command
unambiguously determine and limit the commander’s authorities to
determine an independent operation task, an option to change the
organization of forces to suit his intention or to issue more precise
tasks within the framework of an authorized and issued operation task.
Types of command are next:
a. Full Command (FULLCOMD). The military authority and
responsibility of the commander to issue orders to subordinates. It
covers every aspect of military operations and administration and
exists only within national services.
b. Operational Command (OPCOM). The authority granted to a
commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to
deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational
and/or tactical control as the commander considers necessary.
c. Tactical Command (TACOM). The authority delegated to a
commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the
accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
Similar to types of command, control is the authority exercised by
a commander to regulate major activities of subordinate organizations,
or other organizations not normally under his command which are
responsible for the accomplishment of orders or directives. The entire
authority to command or merely its part can be transferred or
delegated to particular bodies. The NATO levels of authority under
control are as follows:
a. Operational Control (OPCON).The authority delegated to a
commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may
accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by
function, time, or location; Operational control enables the
commander to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical
control of those units.
18
b. Tactical Control (TACON). The detailed and, usually, local
direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to
accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
c. Administrative Control. Direction or exercise of authority over
subordinate or other organizations in respect to administrative matters
such as personnel management, supply and services support and other
matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or
other organizations. This normally remains with national commanders
unless explicitly delegated to EU commanders, if so, valid only for a
limited time and purpose.
d. Coordinating Authority. The authority granted to a commander
or an individual assigned for coordinating specific functions or
activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or
two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He
has the authority to require consultation between the agencies
involved or their representatives, but he does not have the authority to
compel agreement.
Transfer of Authority (TOA):
National units come under the control of the designated multinational commander at a fixed moment. TOA is a legal act that the EU
member country transfers operational Command and Control of
earmarked forces to the operational headquarters of EU. TOA must be
accomplished as early as possible. The timing of the transfer must
become a part of the initial negotiations that modify the way of
deployment of the Battle Group EU to the expeditionary operation.
Planners must determine where the TOA—and the follow-on
integration of units and headquarters—will be carried out. A timely
TOA enables the multinational commander to plan and to conduct
effective integration training of the Battle Group EU in the area of
operation. Troops earmarked for Battle Group EU to the subordination
can be realized in permanent garrisons of peace dislocation, in the area
of temporary concentration of combatant forces (AO) of BG EU that
is situated on the axis of troop movement to AO and in the area of
operations.
Whichever option is chosen, the central coordination of the EU
BG is preferred. Then the transfer to subordination will not be carried
19
out by repetitive crisis management. The centralized control of force
supply provides the best support to the coalition’s requirements and
the best support to the forces.
2. Command and Control system
Options of the Command and Control system in military critical
operations conducted by the EU are published in „ EU Operations
Concept of Command and Control“ and „ The final report of EU
presidency on options of the European defence" (SN 307/03) of 11th
December 2003 that was authorized by the European Council. From
the above-mentioned documents it implies that the EU has two options
of the Command and Control system to cover the whole spectrum of
military operations:
► with the help of principal capital means and command and
control capabilities, disengaged in favour of the EU from NATO
sources – (based on the BERLIN plus convention) – combined system
of command,
► without principal capital means and capabilities, which are
released from NATO sources (only forces and resources of the EU) –
autonomous system of command, through activation:
► of one of the potential operation headquarters (EU OHQ)
named in the Catalogue of the EU forces",
► of the operational headquarters provided by the EU member
state (in conformity with „ The Concept of Leading Nation of the
EU"),
► of the operational centre of the EU (especially in cases when
an immediate civil and military solution of a crisis is necessary and no
operational headquarters provided by the EU member state EU are
intended).
The Concept of a Lead Nation
The member state of the EU that was determined as a lead nation
of the EU operation, this one bear’s responsibility for the build-up of
the multinational
Command and Control system. Every controlled system of the
command and control (in simplified view) consists of driving subject,
controlled object and their mutual ties. The Command and Control
20
system in the Battle Group EU operations is composed from command
agencies (commander), control agencies (commander, staffs,
command posts, operational centre etc.), and control objects (forces
equipment, combat sets, sensors etc.) and a communications and
information system that is supported by all elements of the Command
and Control system.
2.1. Organization for Command and Control
In the process of the organization for Command and Control in
expeditionary forces it is necessary to take into account increased
requirements on Command and Control system with the emphasis on
its continuity, concealment, operability, reliability of all components
of command and its multinational character.
2.1.1. Control Authorities and Command Posts on single levels of
EU Command and Control
The EU has no permanent Command and Control structure and it
will be composed of an ad-hoc military chain of command for the
conduct of its crisis management operations. This would also cover
requirements for Rapid Response. Two basic command options exist:
Either with recourse to NATO assets & capabilities under the
Berlin + arrangements. In this case DSACEUR will be the preferred
Operation Commander while the core of the Operation Headquarters
will be provided by the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in
Europe (SHAPE). Another option is to conduct the operation without
recourse to NATO. In this case the Operation Commander will be
appointed by the Member State that also provides the core of the
Operations Headquarters. We also call this option “EU autonomous“.
At present, five member states (Germany, France, Greece, Italy and
the United Kingdom) have established committed an HQ, as a
potential EU-OHQ. The envisaged EU Operational Centre (Opscentre)
will be an additional option in the longer run.
The five National HQ will be “multinationalised” by augmentees
from other states or even third countries as appropriate. At the same
time, there will be an exchange of liaison officers to the EUMS and
the OHQ concerned. And our newest C2 capability under
development is the EU Opscentre. A special case of the EU
21
autonomous option is recourse to a framework nation. In particular,
this could be envisaged in the case of urgency. The C2 structure for an
EU-led military CMO will encompass three levels of command below
the Political & Strategic Level. These are the Military-Strategic Level,
the Operational Level, and the Tactical Level.
a) The EU political and strategic level of control:
⇒ CEU - Council of the European Union in Brussels. The
Council has the overall responsibility for the conduct of EU-led
CMOs. It decides to launch and terminate the operation and to review
and adapt the mission as appropriate. The Council, inter alia, approves
the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), the Statement of Requirements
(SOR) and the Operation Plan (OPLAN), and authorises the Rules of
Engagement (ROE);
⇒ COREPER - Committee of Permanent Representatives- which
is the auxiliary authority for CEU;
⇒ GAERC - General Affairs & External Relations Council);
⇒ PSC - Political and Security Committee- The PSC approves
the Initiating Military Directive (IMD), submits to the Council its
opinion on the CONOPS and the OPLAN, and exercises the political
control and strategic direction.;
⇒ CivCom - Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis
Management- designed for information source and recommendation
elaboration- submits supporting documents to PSC;
⇒ EUMC - EU Military Committee. The EUMC is responsible
for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on
the planning and the conduct of EU-led military CMOs.
⇒ The EUMC is the highest military body established within the
Council (no formal Defence Ministers Councils yet). It provides for
maximum consultation and co-operation among EU members, gives
military advice and makes recommendations to relevant EU bodies. It
provides military direction to EUMS.
⇒ The EUMS - EU Military Staff. The EUMC. The EUMS
supports the EUMC regarding the situation assessment and military
aspects of strategic planning. The EUMS assists the OpCdr in Force
Identification, Generation/Activation and Deployment.
22
b) The EU military and strategic level of Command and
Control
The Operations Centre in Shape. Its main task is the improvement
of the EU operation preparation which it conducts with the aid of the
NATO recourses. The NATO provides capabilities and recourses in
conformity with a provision of the Berlin plus agreement. The Ops
Centre will not be a permanent HQ; it will operate separately from the
EUMS’s strategic role with a designated Op Cdr.
The European Union Operation Headquarters (OHQ). Until now,
five member states of the EU have declared their national OHQ
(France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Great Britain) .These are ready to
lead the EU autonomous expeditionary operation. This mother's
operation headquarters are placed in Mont Valerian near Paris,
Potsdam, Larisse, Centocelle near Rome and Northwood and they
may provide the EU with necessary installations and technical
infrastructure to drive a military operation in full multinational staff
on the militarystrategic level.
The EU OHQ will normally consist of the OpCdr, his staff and
any additional independent functional areas. The EU OHQ staff will
be directed by a Director of Operations (DO), who will carry out the
Chief of Staff functions within the EU OHQ. The EU OHQ will
normally adopt a structure of primary and special staff functions
tailored to the mission and staffed to fulfil the OpCdr's
responsibilities. The size of the EU OHQ and the internal manning,
composition and structure of the different elements may vary,
according to the type and scope of the mission. Other major factors
influencing the size and structure of the EU OHQ will include the
specific mission, the type and composition of assigned forces, the
tempo of the operation and the location of the EU OHQ.
Operational Commander (OpCdr) is the authority at the MilitaryStrategic Level and therefore he is responsible for the establishment
and maintenance of the EU OHQ, planning, conduct and termination
of the Operation. For the conduct of the EU-led military CMO, the
OpCdr will be vested with the appropriate Command authority over
forces by Transfer of Authority (TOA) from the contributing member
states (MS) and non-EU TCN. Interaction with other actors. On all
23
levels, mission dependent links will be established in order to ensure
the necessary co-ordination.
Prior to the fully augmented establishment of the EU OHQ, the
OpCdr is provided with advice and expertise by the Core Staff, and
under the authority of the OpCdr, the Core Staff's main
responsibilities are to activate the EU OHQ and to conduct the initial
Operational Planning at the Military and Strategic Level.
The EU OHQ will normally consist of the OpCdr, his command
group, a divisional staff and any additional independent functional
areas that may be required. The EU OHQ crisis establishment should
be tailored to suit the particular demands of the operation and its size
and structure is the decision of the Op Cdr. The EU OHQ staff will be
directed by a Director of Operations (DO) who will carry out the
Chief of Staff functions within the EU OHQ.
c) The EU operation level of Command and Control
The European Union Force Headquarters (EU FHQ) will be used
for the EU-lead operations in the whole spectrum of “Petersberg
tasks”.
d) Tactical level of Command and Control in the EU
operations
The EU Battle Group Headquarters- EU BG HQ is a command
post of battalion type. It is the basic organization of the EU BG
headquarters for exercising C2 during operations. Operational
activities of manoeuvring action elements will be controlled by a main
(supreme) command post EU BG and several tactical command points
(command posts) that are formed for this purpose.
3. Conclusion
The forces of rapid response are predetermined to perform
important tasks outside the European territory. The main strike force
is Battle Groups. Out of all units BG is the best adapted to blitz and
manoeuvre operational activities in a crisis environment. High
mobility and striking force make it possible to take advantage of
shock effect. The Battle Groups are considered a prospective nucleus
of future common European Forces.
A radical rationalization of the military results in a subsequent
decline of preconditions for the creation of a continuous front line and
24
exerts pressure on the intensive manoeuvrability of forces. With a
lower number of combatants it is impossible to create continuous front
lines, and this fact leads to the emergence of asymmetrical
environment that puts high requirements on the quality of command
agencies, on transportability, mobility and manoeuvre capabilities of
units and on the generation of conditions for advantageous shock
effect.
Applied literature
[1] STANAG 2199 (AJP-3.2.2 Command and Control of Allied Land Forces –
Ratification Draft 2). Brussels: NATO Standardization Agency, May 2007,
Chapter 2, pgs 17-21, ANNEX E, pgs 1-4; Appendix 1 to ANNEX E str. 1.
25
THE INTERNET PROVIDERS AND TERRORIST’S
GUIDE
State Secretary Andreescu Anghel, PhD, Counsellor Radu Nicolae, PhD
Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reform, Bucharest
Abstract
Terrorist organisations like Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and Al-Qaida all
have web-sites in English, Arab, Spanish or other languages (Jane’s Terrorism
and Security Monitor, May 2008). Once the internet providers have identified
extremist web-sites and closed them down, terrorists turn their attention to chat
rooms and other communication methods. The internet is first of all used as a
planning instrument as well as a training base. Manuals that contain training
and combat methods, written by veterans from the Afghanistan War and
instructors from training camps appeared on the internet from the early times of
Al-Qaida, offering numerous details on the clandestine preparing of attacks
abroad. The Anarchist Cookbook contains recipes and instructions for the
manufacture of explosives (Dengg, 2007), as well as the so called “training
manuals” such as “The Terrorist’s Guide” signed by Osama bin Laden or “The
Kamikaze Terrorists’ Manual” provides a minimum amount of training on how
to manufacture bombs and which is the best way to use it”. There’s another
reason in backing the idea that the Internet provides terrorists an enormous
operative flexibility.
A recent study, which carried on for 6 years, confirms the fact
that terrorist organizations and their supporters, made use of the
internet, by all possible means, in order to recruit new members, to
obtain funds and launch a “campaign of terror” world-wide. The site
was accessed 200,000 times between December 1996 and May 1999.
Communication networks, anonymous and discrete, provide a good
market.(Weimann, 2003). Under these conditions, in order to
26
efficiently combat terrorism, merely suppressing their virtual
instruments is not enough.
The most recent developments in the matter of Islamic
fundamentalists, mainly the discussions concerning the “road map”
proposed by USA, proves that Global Jihadist Movement, initiated by
Al-Qaida, became a phenomenon coordinated via internet. For
Islamists and Marxists, nationalists and separatists, racists and
anarchists, whether they came from Latin America (Sandero
Luminoso, Tupak Amaru, Peru, Revolutionary Armed Forces,
Columbia, etc) or the Middle East (Hamas, Al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade,
Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Kahane Movement, etc),
Europe (the Corsican Army, E.T.A. Basque Movement, etc) or Asia
(the Japanese Red Army, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, etc),
internet played an important role. Neo-Nazi groups were the first to
discover the advantages of internet communication (Thulenetz
network). The MRTA hostage-taking from the Japanese embassy in
Peru (1996-1997) gained worldwide media attention. The Islamic
organizations made full use of this opportunity. (Voicu, 2008) The
Association of Islamic students from Europe has an internet site
accessible only to his members (www.tawheed.org).
Terrorism and mass-media are linked together in a complex and
obvious relationship. This is determined by a mutual lack of trust,
intertwined with mutual interest: terrorism needs publicity and media
needs audience. The inner logic governing these entities gives rise to a
situation where each of them provides for the needs of the other.
(Septar, 2006). According to the researchers Ganor, Erlich, Shay
(2002) from the International Policy Institute for Counter Terrorism,
in terrorist attempts media is used with the declared purpose of
broadcasting their actions to the people. Terrorism cannot determine
the emergence of fear unless it resorts to a campaign of systematic use
of violence. (Buş, 2005)
According to the Al-Zawahiri guidance, the Jihadists are currently
using their IT knowledge in developing the Jihadist media capabilities.
The most efficient step is the TV station of the Islamic State of Iraq
(ISI) owned by al-Qaida, available on the YouTube 77 site. The ISI
YouTube account was created in January 2007, with only 40
registered but over 7.000 views. The site contains a great number of
27
video recordings of insurgents’ attacks over the Coalition and the local
Iraqi security forces, as well as moving discourses of the ISI
spokespersons, calling for the potential Jihadists to join the al-Qaida
forces in Iraq.
Currently, with the support of the TV channel on the YouTube
site, as well as the support of other host sites, al-Qaida made sure that
the announcements reach its followers without being intercepted
(Voicu, 2008). On Jihadist fora, several aspects were circulated,
certifying the existence of the leader of the “Islamic State of Iraq”
(ISI), known as Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi, as he was often presented in
the media as a fictive character.
Thus, several news broadcasted by the “Al-Arabiyah” TV station
were invoked as considered contradictory (RIS, June 2008). Even
though the media source previously announced that it posses evidence
certifying that the terrorist leader it is not a real character, it presented
photos of the person. It is possible that these messages aim at
consolidating the image of the organization as main force of the Iraqi
Jihad, as the representatives of the sunnit terrorism, “Hamas-Irak”
group included, argued that Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi is an invention of
the ISI, destined to induce the image of his Iraqi origins, due to the
attempts to counter critics according to which the agenda of the
“Islamic State of Iraq” exceeds the borders of this country.
The talibans disseminate their ideology on their own site,
considering that the Western media would not disseminate it or would
alter the ideology (www.Taliban.org). The Algerian islamists
communicate with their followers on the Internet, as well. For
example, FIS used the islamist press agencies, MSANEWS included,
through which its statements were disseminated. HAMAS is one of
the most prolific Internet users (Voicu, 2008). MSANEWS provides
the list of Internet sites where the statements can be found (Assabeel
On-line), as well as the statements of its military wing
(www.palestine-info.org).
If there is to cut down the analyses to a meritorious study
(Stanciu, 2005; Carafano, Weitz, 2008), the Jihadist organizations use
the Internet for:
• propaganda and demands: the terrorist groups blame the
limitations imposed to the freedom of speech and plead for
28
•
•
•
•
•
the cause of their comrades imprisoned for political
reasons by various regimes, themes of great concern for
the Western general population;
fund raising through charitable organizations, nongovernmental organizations and financial institutions;
recruitment and mobilization: the terrorist organizations
collect information about the frequent visitors of the
internet sites and they contact them. The chat-room, the
internet-café and the bulletin board are the most visited.
Afterwards, the relation works in a double way, as the
supporters offer their services through the Internet;
training: various Internet sites furnish handbooks and
user’s manuals of some poisonous matters and explosive
materials;
communication and coordination between the operative
members and the adherents and the planning of the
terrorist attacks: specialized Internet sites, chat rooms and
electronic mail are more and more used to hand over
instructions, knowledge and technical data necessary for
the planning and performance of the terrorist actions. Two
terrorist cells from Florida and Canada, which were
recently suppressed, were sending messages to each other
via the internet. Not less important is the fact that the AlQaida organization and other transnational networks as
well are massively relying on the Internet to communicate
with their operative members. The organization’s
messages are running on almost 6000 web sites (Carafano,
Weitz, 2008).
taking into consideration the fact that, according to certain
analysts in the field of terrorism, there are no information
to attest the planning of some offenses with weapons of
mass destruction by the terrorist entities, therefore the
message enrolls probably in the series of propagandistic
actions of terrorizing the Occident (The Romanian
Information Service, June 2008);
29
• collecting information: infrastructure for transport, nuclear
centrals, ports, airports, public buildings, etc. The
Department for National Security (DNS) manages a
password-protected site named TRIPWIRE, which offers
information regarding the possibility of combating
improvised explosives.
As a consequence to the interest for the mentioned issues, on the
th
7 and 8th of July 2006 the new and existing forum visitors (UNAP
documentary, 2007) have been organized for discussions into thematic
groups. The main themes were the news on Jihad and the leaders of
the Jihadist movements. The news for the mentioned period included a
“jihadist harvest” bulletin on the events in Iraq, an update of the”
Caucasus voice”, a collection of the most recent statements of the
Shura Council of the Iraqi Mujahedins, a statement of the Al-Quds
Brigades, the announcement of bringing down an American helicopter
in Iraq and the presence of the “death squads” in Iraq. In line with
increasing its media visibility, the “Ansar Al-Islam” group announced
the setting up of its own press centre, named “Al- Ansar” (RIS, June
2008). This action was presented as a “response to the changes in the
war deployment, due to the new strategies of the “enemy”, focused on
mass-media, in order to compensate the failures on the battlefield”.
As many other organizations, terrorist groups use the Internet for
obtaining financial funding. Al-Qaida for example largely depended
on donations, and fund raising was based on an extended charity
foundations network, NGOs and other financial institutions that use
websites and the Internet for online discussions and forum-like
activities.
Also, the Chechen fighters in the Russian separatist region have
used the Internet for publishing their banking accounts for their
supporters to be able to contribute sums of money. Another example is
the fact that in December 2001, the US Government has seized the
assets of a charity based in Texas due to their connections through the
Internet with Hamas.
The British investigators have found inside the house of the Arab
terrorist Abu Hamza the “Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad”, a
“perfect terrorist” handbook in which trainees are trained as for where
to place the bombs: the Eiffel Tower in Paris, the Big Ben in London,
30
the Statue of Liberty in New York. Now, Abu Hamza is under
investigation by the London Court of Justice for instigating to murder
against Jews and non-Muslims during public reunions. In his house
were found the ten volumes of “teachings for terrorists”, some of them
posted on Jihadist sites. According to this handbook, the terrorists that
wish to make a very large number of human victims are urged to plant
bombs in crowded places. The main targets are Eiffel Tower in Paris,
Big Ben in London and Statue of Liberty in New York. Football
stadiums, airports, museums or nuclear stations from different corners
of the world are included in this chapter. These ten volumes have been
written between 1989 and 1999 and it seems that they have been
initially dedicated exclusively to Afghans. The book offers detailed
information on how secret services act, on the way explosive devices
are made and on the way an assassination could be prepared.
Surprising or not is the fact that Al-Qaeda leaders tried to set up
the basis of an on-line library, while the possible new recruits have
access to a discussion forum called QALAH, where the most recent
information on hacking could be found in a chat area suggestively
named electronic jihad (Rollins, Wilson, 2007).
Taking into account these aspects as well, the internet
increasingly turned into “a forum for terrorist groups or individual
terrorists” (Stancu, 2000).
Terrorists proved that they hold not only the necessary abilities
for carrying out online marketing, but that they are able, by browsing
the internet, to obtain and subsequently benefit of the information on
the web pages available worldwide. According to the statement of
Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Secretary of Defence, a training manual of AlQaida terrorist organization, recovered from Afghanistan, explained to
its readers the following: “Use the free public information sources,
without resorting to illegal methods, these will allow you to gather at
least 80% of the needed information on foes” (Weimann, 2004).
In this context, Suleyman Anil, head of NCIRC – NATO
Computer Incident Response Capability, has warned that the
organization treats the threat of cybernetic war as seriously as the risk
of missile attack. He also underlined that online espionage and
internet terrorism nowadays represent one of the biggest threats to
global security, and a decisive attack over the information
31
infrastructure of a state is currently impossible to be stopped
(www.guardian.co.uk).
The EUROPOL evaluation shows that, in 2007, about 700
persons suspected of terrorism, majority Islamic, were detained in no
less than 15 UE states. Surprisingly or not, the fact that only 4 of 498
recorded assaults were connected to Islamic militants is to be
emphasized. 424 were committed by Corsican and Basques
separatists, respectively Corsican National Liberation Front and ETA
Basque organization.
Even if the numbers in EUROPOL’s report show significant
diminution of the Islamic fundamentalism threat in Europe, the
opinion is not shared by all European capitals. Should it be just a
preconceived idea?
The report on the situation and the trends of terrorism within the
European Union, posted on „NEFA Foundation” web-site, USA,
points out the imminence of terrorist assaults in Europe. According to
the German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), and to the Federal
Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Home
Intelligence Service, the Lebanese HEZBOLLAH has the necessary
logistics to launch massive terrorist attacks in Germany, over civil
population and important strategic target. According to the same
sources, connected to the public information sources, provided by the
domestic intelligence services, „900 Hezbollah members, present in
Germany, could be mobilized at any time to commit terrorist acts”.
What could this mean?
Terrorist assaults in Germany are anticipated to be committed
also by Islamic militants, trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Joerg
Zierke, the head of German Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA),
states that „over 50 Islamic militants had left Germany heading for
training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan operated by Al-Qaeda
Talibans and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) in Uzbekistan. Would this be
about a terror reconfiguration? Which would be its outcome in the
international life?
Shall we witness, in the following years, an increase – likely
accelerated by new synthetic terrorist assaults – in such holistic plans
of turning the world into a gigantic prison headed by an international
32
government, so that the entire power would belong to certain people,
taking the chance of population to do something in this regard?
Many times, history has proven that everything is possible. So as
the European Union was a long thought plan – mainly by Bilderberg
group - like so the North American Union was set up in March 2005,
by the so-called Partnership for Prosperity and Security, signed by the
presidents of USA, Canada and Mexico, avoiding the congress’s
supervision, and, in 2010, the single currency AMERO is expected.
We will certainly witness more and more pressure over Iran and
confirmed by the Bilderberg Meeting and by the USA officials, as we
predicted, they will lie in air strike over important targets in Iran,
excluding a terrestrial invasion, since a lot of European, Russia, China
and other countries have a stake in the game in Iran. (Dorneanu,
2007).
„I’m skeptical about the future... we will experience the
amplification of other dangers like: global warming, asteroids and...
why not... the last card, a false extraterrestrial threat”, as Warnher von
Braun – the founder of American space program and the head of
NASA – warned in 1972.
As a reaction to such developments, more and more people
become aware of the present global situation. A tangible result and a
criterion for anticipating the risk situations coming from terrorist
organizations is the setting up of the National Center CYBERINT as
part of Romanian Intelligence Service.
Having the mission to ensure the capabilities of preventing,
protecting, reacting and managing the consequences of a cyber-attack,
the Center provides the platform of cooperation between the
institutions within the national security system and the interface for
cooperation with similar NATO structures.
INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION
Terrorism means not only Osama Bin Laden, Islamic terrorism or,
according to media sources, the USA actions in Iraq. Whether we
have in mind only economic, political or mental reasons, terrorism
means much more. It comprises the worries from the beginning of the
third millennium, multiple interests and even ongoing attempts to
redistribute the power system at global level. Firstly, as Bill Clinton,
33
the former US president, stated, „terrorism is the dark side of
globalization which divides the world into rich and poor, promotes
competition and also conflicts, feeds hate, pain and alienation
systems.”
Even if the main purpose of the modern terrorism is to disrupt
society, the existing rule of law and to recognize new „power roots”
by export of chaos and terror, reaching consent in defining terror, at
the negotiations table, must not be neglected.
Not insisting upon the above debated themes, we summarize only
to see Europe as a veritable action theatre which begins from Ural
Mountains and spreads towards Atlantic. Terrorism is far from being
over; its dimensions can be compared with those of a war of future.
What is the stake and what interests are involved in this treacherous
game? Should it be just a war between civilizations? Does the West
mean civilization and the Arab world oil?
These are questions whose answers can open new comprehensive
opportunities of Islam – respectively Jihad vs Terrorism, part of them
being presented in the recent edited work „Islamic Jihad”.
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Disertatie, Academia de Politie „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Bucureşti.
17. VĂDUVA, GHE., şi colectiv (2002). Terorismul. Dimensiunea geopolitică
şi geostrategică. Academia de Înalte Studii Militare, Centrul de Studii
Strategice, Bucureşti.
18. VĂDUVA, Gh., (2007). Non erubescit. Terorismul intre realitate, imagine
si cuvant, in, Terorismul Azi", vol XI - XIII, an II.
19. VOICU, M., (2008). Terorismul virtual, în, “Sesiunea de Comunicări
Ştiinţifice Strategii XXI – Securitate şi Apărare în Uniunea Europeană”,
Ministerul Apărării, Universitatea Naţională de Apărare „Carol I”,
Bucureşti, 17- 18 aprilie 2008.
http://www.europa.eu/index_ro.htm
XXX www.infoeuropa.eu
XXX http://www.legi-internet.ro
www.adevarul.ro
35
STRATEGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION
INSTRUMENTS OF EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY
Prof. Ionescu Romeo, PhD
“Dunărea de Jos” University, Galaţi
e-mail: ionescu_v_romeo@yahoo.com
Abstract
The paper deals with social dimension of the E.U. which is transferred into
European Social Policy.
We demonstrated that European Social Policy is dynamic and based on
economic, social and politic argues.
As a result, we analysed European Employment Strategy and it impact on
social policy.
We talked about social dialogue, labour training, labour reconversion and
measures for new jobs’ creation.
More, we analysed the impact of PROGRESS program on European social
framework.
Last past of the paper deals with the new challenges for European Social
Policy.
Keywords: European Employment Strategy, management based
on objectives, national monitoring, divergence.
An important European strategy is that connected with labour.
This strategy was adopted as a distinct chapter of Amsterdam Treaty
in 1997 (Title VIII).
The main objective of the strategy is European unemployment
decreasing. It becomes an instrument of establishing and coordinating
community priorities about labour and unemployment. Practically,
this strategy coordinates specific policies in the Member States.
36
European Labour Strategy was created as a 5 years strategy. But it
was intermediary evaluated in 2000 and it was analysed like an impact
evaluation in 2002.
The strategy is based on four pylons, as the following: [1]
• engagement, which represents a new culture in labour
theory and which describe the ability to obtain a job in
order to decrease young’s unemployment and long-term
unemployment too;
• entrepreneurship: is connected with new jobs’ creation
under local development supporting;
• adaptability: implies work modernization and flexible
labour contracts promotion;
• equal chances, especially for women, in order to
reconciliation professional and personal lives.
The implementation of the strategy is structured on some steps.
First of them is Employment Guidelines, a yearly document based on
a proposal of the European Commission which is discussed and
approved by the European Council.
The second step consists in elaboration of National Action Plan
by every Member State. In these plans, there are described the
methods of implementation for the elements from the past document
in every Member State.
The next step is that of Joint Employment Report, based on
national action plans from the Member States.
Finally, the European Council, using European Commission’s
proposals, recommends some specific actions for every Member State.
The method used in this coordination process for labour policies
is named open coordinate method and it is based on some principle
like the following: [2]
• subsidiary: that means to divide responsibilities between
community and national levels, by establishing European
objectives and by encouraging Member States to adopt
national adequate measures in order to realise European
objectives;
• convergence: represents common objectives and correlate
measures for achieving them;
37
• management based on objectives: progress’ monitoring
and evaluating using common indicators for all Member
States;
• national monitoring: country reports which quantify the
progresses and which identify good practices in every
Member States;
• integrate approach: extension of the directions of labour
market policies to other policies (social, educational,
entrepreneurial, regional and fiscal).
The results of 2000 and 2002 evaluations relieved progresses in
order to create a integrate framework for national policies, to grow the
transparency of labour policies and the number of European and
national implied actors.
There were identify sensible aspects of labour policies and were
be defined next period’s priorities. As real progresses, we can
mention: a new perception about employment, connexion between
labour and continue learning, the efficiency of open coordination
method and so on.
As a result, the new employment strategy deals with: exact
objectives, directions’ simplification, a better social partnership, a
growing coherently and complementarily with other community
processes.
The Social Dialogue was promoting by Single European Act in
1986 and it was consolidated in 1998 as a main element of the
European labour strategy.
The Social Dialogue represents a European consulting procedure
which involves different social partners, on a side, and European
Commission, on the other side.
The most important social partners are: European Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC), Union Employers of European Community
(UNEEC) and European Centre for Public Enterprises (ECPE) which
represent labour, employers and liberal professions. [3]
The Social Dialogue becomes an efficient procedure of finding
common solutions in social policies’ development. Its output consists
in common opinions and collective agreements between social
partners and the European Commission. [4]
38
Opinions are formal expressions of the social dialogue’s result
which aren’t obligatory for the partners, but they represent a common
position about a specifically problem. There were adopted 15 common
opinions until nowadays.
Collective agreements represent a common engagement of the
partners and they are o modality of finding solutions for common
problems. The collective agreements which were adopted are the
following:
• parental holidays (1996): it allows labour to obtain
parental holidays after baby’s birth and maternity
expiration;
• part time work (1997): allows workers to adapt their work
program;
• limited term contracts (1999): allows employer to use
more limited term contracts for the same worker;
• worktime of maritime workers (1999): calculates
alternation between work program and rest program.
All these agreements were transformed into European Directives.
A specific aspect of social dialogue is sector dialogue, which
represents some un-centralized negotiation and consulting processes
in order to sign agreements as compromise solutions. These
agreements aren’t obligatory, but they show the wish of the partners to
obtain a common action in a specific direction.
Such an agreement was that between European Centre for Public
Enterprises (ECPE) and European Trade Union Confederation
(ETUC) in 1990. This agreement covered transports and energy
distribution.
The sector dialogue becomes an efficient manner of intervention
and ensures horizontal dimension of the consulting and negotiating
process using voluntaries.
On the other hand, the social dialogue represents an essential
element of the European social model. The implication and consulting
of social partners in decisions making process become more important
in order to develop common policies in Member States or to create
dialogue structures in candidate countries too.
The European social policy is financed especially by European
Social Fund. It was created by Rome Treaty and it is one of the
39
Structural Funds of the regional policy. More, the European Social
Fund is considered the instrument of European employment strategy’s
implementation and it finances three specific actions: labour training,
labour reconversion and measures for new jobs’ creation.
During the latest two programming periods (2000-2006 and 20072013) the priorities of the European Social Funds were changed.
The social policy is supported by EQUAL program too. It
promotes chances’ equity and fight against discrimination. More, it
support new innovative actions connected with training and industrial
adaptation in article number 6.
Nowadays, the European Social Policy has to face with new
challenges. Some negative demographic tendencies of population and
labour, changing the family nature (growth of mono-parental families
and their social protection’ correction), technologic changes, social
disparities and poverty are just a few of these new challenges.
More, the newest two enlarges of the E.U. consist two new
challenges for the organisation.
Maybe the most important challenge for the E.U. is ethnic
minorities’ discrimination. It is doubled by a great migratory labour
potential in the new Member States, which will affect the
communitarian social landscape.
In order to solve social problems, E.U. supports a greater role for
corporative social responsibility. This means that a company has to
justify its decisions to all parts which are affected by them. As a
result, the European companies become more social-responsible and
they analyse the impact of their decisions on communities and
environment, on employment and consumers too.
On the other hand, the social partners from E.U. try to introduce a
common minimum wage across E.U. Only 7 Member States haven’t a
minimum guaranteed wage nowadays: Cyprus, Germany, Denmark,
Finland, Sweden, Italy and Austria.
The other 20 Member States have minimum guaranteed wages
between 92 Euros/month in Bulgaria and 1570 Euros in Luxembourg.
In order to find new solutions to the social problems, E.U.
introduced a new program for employment and social solidarity:
PROGRESS. It became active in 2007 and it will be implementing
until 2013. It replaces other past four programs in order to rationalize
40
and fluidize European financing and to concentrate activities with
greater impact.
PROGRESS covers five domains: employment, protection and
social inclusion, work conditions, non-discrimination and sex equity.
The program deals with six general objectives:
• knowledge improvement and understanding for Member
States using analysis, evaluation and monitoring of their
policies;
• support for statistic instruments development;
• support and monitoring for common legislation’s
implementation and for political objectives in the Member
States in order to evaluate their efficiency and impact;
• developing of networks and reciprocal learning and
identification and dissemination of good practices and new
approaching at European level;
• a better participation of the ordinary public to every
policy’s domain;
• a better promotion, support and development for European
objectives and policies. [5]
During 2007-2013, PROGRESS has a budget of 743.25 millions
Euros. It is divided into: employment (23%), protection and social
inclusion (30%), work conditions (10%), non-discrimination (23%)
and sex equity (12%). Other 2% will cover program implementation
costs.
There are many aspects witch need for a special treatment or other
which can’t be solved in this moment, even that European social
policy is considered a real success. Some problems come from
globalization. Other problems come from E.U.’s enlargements and so
on.
On the other hand, we consider that we must be optimist about the
E.U.’s role of improving life quality. The variety of economic, politic
and social methods used by the E.U. gives it a plus of confidence.
References
[1] Diaconita I., Rotila A., România şi integrarea economică europeană, Editura
Alma Mater, Bacău, 2004.
41
[2] Ionescu R., Dezvoltare regională, Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică,
Bucureşti, 2008.
[3] Marin D., Socol C., Marinas M., Economie europeană. O prezentare
sinoptică, Editura Economică, Bucureşti, 2004.
[4] Marin D., Socol C., Marinas M., Modelul european de integrare, Editura
Economică, Bucureşti, 2005.
[5] http://ec.europa.eu
42
REGIONAL DISPARITIES INSIDE THE EUROPEAN
UNION: PRESENT AND FORECAST SITUATIONS
Prof. Ionescu Romeo, PhD
“Dunărea de Jos” University, Galaţi
e-mail: ionescu_v_romeo@yahoo.com
Abstract
The paper deals with the regional disparities between Member States and
inside these states. We realised a diagram of the causes which determined the
growth of regional disparities.
In order to quantify these disparities, the first step of the analysis is to
compare GDP per capita in Member States. During 1990-2007, the revenues’
disparities between Member States grew.
The next step of the analysis is to observe revenues regional disparities
using NUTS II. Under NUTS II, the unemployment disparities are more evident
than between Member States and more dynamic.
In order to decrease regional disparities connected with revenue and
unemployment, specialists enounced three theories which are presented in the
paper.
The final conclusion of the paper is that the disparities are very difficult to
decrease and they ask for great socio-economic and politic efforts.
Keywords: regional
convergence, divergence.
disparities,
convergence,
conditioned
There are great disparities across the European Union connected
with revenues, economic growth, output and labour.
The causes of these disparities are the following: insufficient
resources, especially capital; inadequate level of labour training;
economic structure of the region and low mobility.
43
Using revenues as base of disparities’ analysis, we can observe
great regional disparities, like in table 1. [1]
Table 1 – GDP per capita in European Member States
and in Candidate States in 2007 ($)
European Member
States
E.U.
GDP (mill. $)
GDP/capita
Nominal GDP/
capita
12954042
28477
29763
33436
72945
76224
Ireland
179516
42859
49533
Denmark
195788
36079
48530
Austria
286767
35002
37378
Finland
171848
32822
36928
Belgium
338452
32500
35843
Netherlands
524035
32062
38323
U.K.
1911943
31628
36875
Germany
2605373
31572
33356
Sweden
283802
31235
39562
France
1900467
30322
33387
Italy
1726869
29727
30144
Spain
1145078
27542
27815
Greece
261018
23519
20545
Slovenia
46384
23250
17535
Cyprus
18563
22334
20500
Malta
8103
20365
13847
Czech Republic
198931
19478
12587
Hungary
179606
18492
11375
Portugal
210049
18105
17224
Estonia
23927
17802
10342
Slovakia
93288
17239
9471
Lithuania
52705
15443
8310
526253
13797
8410
Luxembourg
Poland
44
European Member
States
GDP (mill. $)
GDP/capita
Nominal GDP/
capita
Latvia
31841
13784
8401
Bulgaria
76696
10003
3686
Romania
204412
9446
5254
Candidate countries:
Croatia
57983
12885
8710
Turkey
609987
8385
5692
16700
8080
2564
FYR Macedonia
Graphically, the disparities connected with revenues are evident
in the diagram 1.
E.U.
Luxembourg
Iraland
Denmark
80.000
75.000
Austria
Finland
70.000
65.000
60.000
Belgium
Netherlands
55.000
50.000
U.K.
Germany
Sweden
France
Italy
Spain
45.000
40.000
35.000
30.000
E.U.
25.000
Greece
Slovenia
20.000
15.000
Cyprus
Malta
10.000
5.000
Czech Rep.
Hungary
0
GDP/capita
Portugal
Estonia
Figure 1 – GDP/capita in Member States
45
During 1990-2007, the revenues’ disparities between Member
States grew. The exception was Ireland which had a remarkable
economic growth.
Portugal, Spain and Greece made important progresses too, but
Germany and France had to face difficulties. The main element which
affected Germany’s evolution was reunifying.
Luxembourg has the greatest average revenue from all Member
States. The newest 12 Member States have average revenues less than
50% from E.U.15, excepting Cyprus, Czech Republic, Malta and
Slovenia.
At global level, the evolution of the E.U., Japan and U.S.A. was
the following:
Table 2 – Trimester GDP growth rates
% changes comparing with
last trimester
2007
2008
nd
rd
th
2
3
4
1st
Trim. Trim. Trim. Trim.
E.A.15
0.4
0.7
0.3
0.8
E.A.13
0.4
0.7
0.3
0.8
E.U.27
0.5
0.7
0.5
0.8
Member States
Belgium
0.5
0.7
0.5
0.4
Bulgaria
:
:
:
:
Czech
1.6
1.6
1.7
0.9
Republic
Denmark
-1.1
1.7
0.3
:
Germany
0.2
0.7
0.3
1.5
Estonia
1.1
1.3
0.9
-1.9
Ireland
-1.4
1.2
-0.8
:
Greece
0.9
0.9
0.7
1.1
Spain
0.9
0.7
0.8
0.3
France
0.6
0.7
0.3
0.6
Italy
0.0
0.2
-0.4
0.4
Cyprus
1.1
1.0
0.8
0.9
Latvia
2.4
2.3
1.1
:
46
% changes comparing with the
same trimester of last year
2007
2008
nd
rd
th
2
3
1st
4
Trim. Trim. Trim. Trim.
2.6
2.7
2.1
2.2
2.5
2.7
2.2
2.2
2.8
2.9
2.5
2.5
3.0
7.3
6.4
2.8
4.9
6.4
2.4
6.9
6.6
2.1
:
5.4
-0.2
2.6
7.6
5.6
4.1
4.0
1.7
1.7
4.3
11.0
1.6
2.5
6.4
3.7
3.9
3.8
2.4
1.6
4.5
10.9
1.9
1.8
4.8
3.8
3.6
3.5
2.2
0.1
4.3
8.1
:
2.6
0.4
:
3.6
2.7
2.2
0.2
3.9
3.6
% changes comparing
with last trimester
2007
2008
Lithuania
2.2 2.9 1.3
0.2
Luxembourg 0.9
- 1.8
:
0.2
Hungary
0.2 0.2 0.1
0.3
Malta
0.9 1.1 0.9
:
Netherlands 0.3 1.7 1.1
0.2
Austria
0.8 0.7 0.6
0.8
Poland
1.6 1.4 1.8
1.4
Portugal
0.6
- 0.7
-0.2
0.1
Romania
:
:
:
:
Slovenia
1.0 1.4 0.4
:
Slovakia
2.4 2.4 2.2
2.1
Finland
1.0 0.5 0.9
:
Sweden
0.6 0.6 0.7
0.4
U.K.
0.8 0.6 0.6
0.4
EFTA’s states
Island
3.3 1.3 0.3
:
Norway
0.6 1.6 1.3
0.2
Helvetia
0.9 0.9 0.9
0.3
Economic partners
U.S.A.
0.9 1.2 0.1
0.2
Japan
- 0.3 0.6
0.8
0.6
% changes comparing with the
same trimester of last year
2007
2008
8.0 10.4 8.5
6.7
4.8 4.2 3.8
:
1.6
3.8
2.6
3.4
6.8
1.8
1.0
4.5
4.2
3.2
6.3
1.6
0.5
4.3
4.5
3.0
6.7
1.8
0.7
:
3.1
2.9
6.4
0.9
5.7
6.3
9.3
4.5
3.0
3.2
5.7 6.6
6.2 4.6
9.4 14.3
3.9 3.8
2.6 2.6
3.1 2.8
8.2
:
8.7
:
2.3
2.5
3.9
3.3
3.0
5.4
3.8
3.0
4.6
4.7
3.6
:
3.7
3.0
1.9
1.8
2.8
1.9
2.5
1.4
2.5
1.1
The next step of the analysis is to observe revenues regional
disparities using NUTS II. The lag between the most developed
country (Luxembourg) and the less developed ones (Latvia) is 6.3/1.
At regional level, the lag between London and Lubelskie (Poland)
is 9.1/1. [2]
47
Table 3 – GDP/capita under NUTS-II (E.U.25=100%)
Regions with high GDP/capita
London
278
Regions with low GDP/capita
Lubelskie (Poland)
33
Brussels
238
Luxembourg
234
Regions with high GDP/capita
Hamburg
184
Île de France
173
Podkarpackie (Poland)
33
Podlaskie (Poland)
36
Regions with low GDP/capita
Świętokrzyskie (Poland)
37
Warmińsko-Mazurskie
37
(Poland)
Opolskie (Poland)
37
Észak Magyaroszág (Hungary)
38
Wien
Berkshire, Buckinghamshire &
Oxfordshire
Bolzano (Italy)
171
165
Oberbayern (Germania)
Stockholm
158
158
160
Východné Slovensko
(Slovakia)
Eszag-Alföld (Hungary)
Dél-Alföld (Hungary)
39
39
40
Using dates from table no.3, we can conclude that there are great
disparities between Centre of Europe and peripheral regions from
South and East.
Unemployment represents other important indicator for regional
socio-economic disparities.
There are some improvements of unemployment rate across the
E.U., especially in Ireland, Netherlands, Finland and Sweden. Greece
still has a high unemployment rate and Spain has a greater rate than
E.U.15’s average.
On the other hand, Portugal maintains a low unemployment rate.
The newest Member States from the latest two enlargements haven’t a
good situation. Maybe a better situation has only Hungary and
Slovenia.
Under NUTS II, the unemployment disparities are more evident
than between Member States and more dynamic. As a result, the
regional labour and regional jobs vary very much.
48
Table 4: Employment at regional level (%)
Region
Ciudad Autónoma de Ceuta
(Spain)
Hainaut
Ciudad Autónoma de Melilla
(Spain)
Region
Andalucía
Extremadura
Dytiki Makedonia
Principado de Asturias
Brussels
Liege
Dytiki Ellada
Halle
Voreio Aigaio
Kentriki Makedonia
Sterea Ellada
Berlin
Nord - Pas-de-Calais
Leipzig
Lorraine
Severozápad
Región de Murcia
Düsseldorf
Köln
Strední Morava
Bretagne
Cataluña
Stuttgart
Schwaben
Prague
Niederbayern
Oberbayern
Freiburg
Denmark
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
47.8
47.4
47.7
50.6
49.8
53.6
47.0
52.2
50.3
52.1
50.8
52.6
50.5
51.8
52.7
2003
2004
46.3
49.2
52.9
48.6
55.0
54.9
56.6
56.8
53.0
55.3
54.1
60.4
52.5
61.5
61.3
61.3
56.5
62.1
63.6
62.7
62.5
64.0
70.4
71.1
71.7
70.9
72.1
68.8
76.3
49
48.3
49.9
53.9
50.2
53.9
55.3
55.1
57.1
53.8
55.5
52.8
60.2
54.0
61.7
62.7
63.0
57.1
63.4
63.6
62.4
63.7
64.9
70.7
71.8
71.7
72.0
73.4
69.0
76.2
2005
49.6
50.2
54.7
51.3
54.5
54.7
55.6
56.9
53.1
55.4
56.8
60.1
54.1
60.1
63.2
62.3
58.4
63.4
63.4
63.1
63.9
64.5
70.7
71.5
71.7
71.2
72.3
69.6
75.9
2006
51.0
52.1
53.8
53.2
53.2
55.6
57.2
57.6
54.1
57.8
59.5
58.0
56.5
59.9
60.4
61.5
60.1
62.6
62.8
63.3
65.2
66.3
70.0
69.9
71.1
70.5
70.8
71.2
75.1
2007
52.8
52.8
53.3
53.7
54.1
54.9
55.6
55.7
56.4
56.9
57.2
57.9
58.5
58.8
58.8
61.5
61.5
61.6
61.8
61.8
63.7
67.0
70.0
70.3
70.3
70.3
70.6
70.7
75.7
Using this table, regions with the lowest employment are Ciudad
Autónoma de Ceuta (Spain), Hainaut and Ciudad Autónoma de
Melilla (Spain).
On the other hand, the regions with highest employment are:
Denmark, Freiburg and Oberbayern.
Using a new indicator- unemployment rate- regional disparities
are greater. [3]
The lowest unemployment rate
(%)
NE Scotland
2.6
Bolzano
2.6
Zeeland (Netherlands)
2.7
Praha
2.8
Tirol
2,9
Valle d’Aosta (Italy)
3.0
Salzburg
3.1
Trento (Italy)
3.1
Oberosterreich
3.2
Gelderland (Netherlands)
3.3
Utrecht
3.3
Gloucestershire,
3.3
Wiltshire&Somerset
Prague
Cheshire
Zeeland (Netherlands)
Gloucestershire,
Wiltshire&Somerset
Northern Ireland
Utrecht
Salzburg
Dorset&Somerset
Bolzano
Tirol
Herefordshire,
Worcestershir
&Warwickshire
2.7
3.0
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.3
3.6
3.6
3.6
3.6
3.7
The highest unemployment rate
(%)
Guyane (Fran a)
28.5
Reunion
28.3
Guadelupe
26.9
Martinique
24.1
Ceuta (Spania)
21,0
Dessau (Germany)
19.6
Halle (Germany)
19.4
Mecklenburg-Vorpommem
19.2
Vychodne Slovensko (Slovakia)
19.1
Berlin
18.7
Leipzig
17.9
Brussels
17.6
Women
Guyane (France)
Ceuta (Spain)
Reunion
Guadalupe
Martinique
Melilla (Spain)
Dytiki Makedonia
Dessau (Germany)
Warminsko-Mazurskie (Poland)
Stredne Slovenko
50
32.7
29.9
29.3
29.1
24.7
22.2
20.7
20.3
19.7
19.1
19.1
The lowest unemployment rate
(%)
3.7
Noord-Brabant
(Netherlands)
Oberosterreich
Utrecht
Overijssel (Netherlands)
Tirol
Noord-Holland
Freiburg
Oberbayern
Friesland (Netherlands)
Bolzano
Oberpfalz
The highest unemployment rate
(%)
Extremadura (Spain)
i Halle 19.0
(Germany)
Young people (15-24)
5.0
Guadalupe
59.9
5.2
5.7
5.8
6.0
6.3
6.5
6.5
7.0
7.1
7.2
7.2
Martinique
Reunion
Sicilia
Hainaut (Belgium)
Swietokrzyskie
Calabria
Campania
Podkarpackie (Poland)
Brussels
Dytiki Ellada
56.1
50.4
39.0
36.8
36.6
35.7
35.5
35.4
35.3
35.3
33.6
Nowadays, we can observe that the unemployment rate decreased
on the first trimester of 2008. [4]
Figure 2 – E.U. and Euro Zone’ unemployment rate evolution
Euro Zone
E.U.27
51
In order to decrease regional disparities connected with revenue
and unemployment, specialists enounced three theories. [5]
First of them is convergence theory which consider that the
revenues from an integrated economic area like E.U. have a tendency
of equalization as a result of the action of economic adjustment
mechanisms, including goods and labour free movement. As a result,
technical progress and technologies from integrate areas are
generalized. That means the same wages too and the same capital
efficiency for all integrated regions.
The second theory is conditioned convergence theory which
estimates the differences between technologies at regional level. In
order to eliminate regional disparities, are necessary an efficient
competition policy and free movement of goods, labour, capital and
technologies.
The third theory is the divergence one. It calculates the latest
differences between technologies, transport costs, regional economies’
structure, agglomerations’ effects and economic clusters. Practically,
this theory considers that economic development determines unequal
developed regions and accentuates disparities between centre and
periphery.
As a result, production factors migrate from poor areas to rich
areas and accentuate regional disparities again. More, this theory
argues the necessity of public intervention in order to decrease
regional disparities.
References
[1] IMF, Previsions, New York, 2006.
[2] http://ec.europa.eu/comm/eurostat/ramon/nuts
[3] Ionescu R., Dezvoltare regională, Ed. Didactică i Pedagogică, Bucure ti,
2008, pp. 80-81.
[4] Eurostat, News Release, no.78/2008.
[5] Fujita M, Krugman P., Venables A.J., The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions
and International Trade, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1999.
52
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT UNDER THE IMPACT
GLOBALIZATION PROCESS, AT THE BEGINNING
OF THE CENTURY
Prof. Stăncilă Lucian, PhD, Mărgărit Iulian
“Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest
M.U. 01376, Ploieşti
e-mail: map.um01376@yahoo.com
Abstract
The new millennium has debut under the impact of accelerate globalization
process impact, a phenomenon which mustn’t be separate by two political
processes – the fall down of communist political system, which has meant a
large extension of market economy and the explosion of liberal changes, taken
place into western Europe countries.
These contemporary realities, dimensioned by the extension of the two
international organizations NATO and EU, and also by the reconsideration of
security management and regional stability, took part to the permanent
transformations of the security environment on the international level.
Stability processes of the regional security have maintained their alert
rhythm. The initiatives, politics and programs adopted to fortify the security
medium in the world, have proven their utility, even if, sometime, final result
hasn’t been reached within planned schedule.
The present article shows these influences on the security environment
under the impact of acceleration of globalization process, and makes
appreciations on the evolutions and dimensions of this process in the near
future.
At the beginning of the 21st century, one of the most powerful
influences over the nations and their lives is, for certain, the
acceleration of the modifications courses who took places in the entire
world under the globalization process. People and nations are
becoming more inter-dependable, more international activities being
53
in the competition, but collaborating in the same time quickly
emerging social forces, political unions and organizations that deal
with global issues like world security and stability.
In the same time, globalization, and the relations from entire
world are stepping into a new and difficult era. This inter-correlation
at global level has at result phenomenons that aren’t easy to prognoses
and may lead to a growing level of understanding or, on the contrary,
it may create bigger non-understandings, hostility or other conflicts
predecessors.
There are several processes that define globalization. Few decades
ago, Marshall McLuhan spoke about “the global village” [1]
surprising with that expression the essence of nowadays phenomenon:
ultra-advanced technologies; distances compression, growing of the
reciprocal dependences, financial and commercial markets integration,
the emergence of some “planetary problems” that requires global
approaches like global security and stability [2].
Global security environment has exponentially evolved with the
new consumption society, a 21st century uncontested fact represented
by the growing dependence of world economies by the energetic
resources. World economy still depends on oil as a primary source of
energy and the struggle for resources is dominating the 21st century
geopolitics. This competition seams to dominate the beginning of the
millennium, polarizing the attention to Persia Golf states, Caspian Sea,
South-East Asia, and South America.
Most of the economically advanced states are disposing of few
resources to be able to sustain a growing consumption rate and
economy while the less developed countries possess these resources
form abundance. For instance, it is well knows some specialist opinion
that natural resources are to be find in the “wrong place”, in the
possession of those “who don’t deserve them” [3]. The access in a
differentially way to these resources affects the relational space
between states, with destructive consequences.
On the other hand, the international terrorist phenomenon, witch
represent main threat to human society and national security continues
to represent a serious danger for social cohesion and structure and also
for individual and states security.
54
Terrorist attacks revealed that the new forms of terrorism and
organized crime have reached an extremely dangerous level, helped
by the security institutions and democratic countries vulnerabilities in
front of new threats and risks. International terrorism represent for the
human community a complex and continuous threat, which requires a
multidimensional response at strategic level, requiring a significant
contribution from everybody.
Quoting Alvin Toffler, we have to remind that it is impossible to
talk about future with precision and certitude, that doesn’t mean that
we don’t have to talk about it at all.
That’s why, without rising a clime that we’ll approach in detail
the actual security environment, we propose to present a systemic
radiography of the security architecture deeply influenced by the
globalization process acceleration.
The 21st security environment is characterized by substantial a
transformation that requires the adaptation of classic international
security analysis criteria. Lately, global security has transformed
dramatically, new terrifying challenges generated by the instability
and the unpredictable politics of some states have made that security
environment to oscillate continuously.
At the global level, the security environment, analyzed under the
impact of globalization process reveals the multiplication of the risk
factors regarding national security due to growing importance of
stability and security and their dependence to multiple elements of
social, economical and political life, who become vital for security.
The new challenges, generated by the over posing of phenomenon
like globalization and fragmentation, are added to classical forms of
risks and regional vulnerabilities. Besides the fact that traditional
tensional places are maintained, it is find out that their way of
development is influenced by the birth of unconventional and risks
like terrorism, organized crime and mass destruction weapons.
Under economical globalization, social crisis are followed, most
of the time by identity crisis’s, which generates unexpected violence.
In this context, becomes more obvious that state’s security interests
and objectives can be achieved only through international cooperation
manifested not only in limit situations but in the whole nowadays
context – economical, social and financial.
55
This new unity can be express in multiple fields of activities
through the establishment of common forms of actions of the whole
nations who share common interests and values.
Some states have entered into a post-industrial development
stage, while other is in an economical and political transition stage to
modernism. In these regions has grown the number of fragile societies
and their inability to control evolutions on their national territories [4].
Profound transformations of the beginning of the century are in
direct proportion with growing role of international community in
conflict prevention, crisis management and also with democratization
process geographic extension.
All these facts have emphasized the fact that military approach of
security it is not adequately. Main condition to a cooperative security
management it’s not represented only by the institutional reforms but
also by the indivisibility security principles, transparency, regional
and global engagement of international community.
The main stability generator processes into a continuously
changing security environment are NATO an EU involvement into
global security strategies. To all of these, new forms of regional
cooperation are developed, and also the tendency to develop of some
crisis management systems, by coordination of responsible
organizations. Also in the new security environment, NATO
adaptation and transformation will lead to the configuration of new
forms of cooperation and partnerships and also will create new
specific instruments to counteract unconventional risks, the security
concept assuring states independence prosperity and durable society
development.
The states interests and security objectives are not conflict
generators, security environment being positively influenced by the
integration processes, the extension of the community of states who
share democratic values and free market economy. The risks of
emergence of traditional military conflicts in the world were
significantly decreased. In spite of that, there are still persisting
instability, crisis’s and isolation phenomena at regional level.
East and South-east European countries, Asian, Caucasian and
other states are confronting with economical, social and political
difficulties, associated to the transition process to a free market
56
economically based principles and also with cultural, ethnical and
religious animosities witch can generate enough risks to regional
security address.
The progresses in common security politics evolution, the
involvement and chosen solutions by the international organizations in
solving difficult situations worldwide are proving that humankind is
preparing to assume a substantial role in it’s own security architecture,
on rational and equal bases through conformation of their interests.
Sleeping crisis and frozen conflicts who manifested in different
areas have leaded to a loss of traditional economical relations and
have provoked to certain spaces (Balkans, Caucasian, Latin America
etc) great financial loses, have prevented elaboration and promotion of
long term development strategies witch limited foreign investments,
increasing economical difficulties .
In this way, energetic problems are becoming security issues, and
the security of power supply has become a common problem of the
greatest actors of this competition. An UN study reveals that “the
importance of the energy in general for industry and the vital role of
the oil as source of energy and as a vital product for military activities
seems to contribute to the transformation of energy problems into a
fundamental element of present security environment” [5].
An actor more present on euro-Asian oil market is Georgia witch,
in order to sustain its rhythm of development, needs that his voice to
be heard in the Caspian area, trying to integrate into global security
structures and to get away from Moscow control, the reason why a
very tense relation with Moscow has become soon a military conflict.
The destruction of Georgian system of access to resources, in
competition with the existing Russian system proves once more that
the conflict is a shown of the force of Moscow who tries to give an
example to other close neighbor countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Armenia and Turkmenistan who tried to subscribe to Georgian
proposals.
Although the situation in the Balkans is getting normal and it is
no longer potentially risky, the explosion of conflict in Caucasian area
requires a rapid, peacefully and long term solution. The obstacles that
can occur in finding a new peace solution in Georgia doesn’t have to
have a major impact over the European and Atlantic security system,
57
which is able to manage these conflicts [6]. In spite of the shortages
until now the ending of some irreversible processes have re-launched
the idea of security environment under the impact of globalization
process acceleration.
Following the ideas of presented context, we consider that, the
present security environment in the context of globalization process
acceleration is characterized by following elements:
- there are still maintaining high risk zones for global and regional
security, there are still unconcluded crisis witch may start again as
boldly conflicts ( Osetia, Abkhazia, Kosovo, East Timor);
- internal religious and ethnical conflicts witch may degenerate
into conflicts (Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia – Herzegovina);
- territorial demands meant to tension bilateral political relations
(Greece – Turkey, Greece – Macedonia);
- autonomist tendencies of some ethnic communities (the
Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia, Turkish minority from
Greece and Bulgaria, the Hungarians from Voivodina) and also the
penetration and extension of Islamic fundamentalism especially the
radical wing (Bosnia – Herzegovina and Kosovo);
- the tendencies of Russian federation to rebuild the spheres of
influences lost after the cold war has ended;
- tendencies of some enclaves to proclaim independence as states
and their assimilation into Russian sphere of influence (for example
the tentative to unify south and north Osetia, declaration of
independence of Abkhazia, presence of force in Transnistria).
To conclude, we appreciate that evolutions and possible
apportions of the security environment in the near future under the
influence of accelerate globalization process may follow next action
coordinates: amplified common efforts in Caspian Caucasian space to
strength the stability, to reduce first and eliminate in the end negative
impact of Georgian – Russian military conflict, the growing control
over the main drugs routes, organized crime and other asymmetric
risks and also the transit zones.
We consider that ex-Yugoslavian area will not have considerable
mutations, the situation will remain under a relatively control due to
building around the zone a security belt that includes Romania and
Bulgaria.
58
In the following years we appreciate that an economical
revilement of Russia will occur, and Russia will try to regain lost
positions after the cold war ended using special political relations with
china and controlling the instability from its periphery especially those
who interfere with Islamic world.
In the next stage, an active struggle to rearrange areas of
influences will occur, to influence and manage geopolitical and
geostrategical spaces from Asian continent (the development of
Cooperation Organization from Shanghai with the main purpose to
provide regional security in the Asia but where Islamic republic of
Iran wants to take part, witch will inevitable conduct to organization
transformation into a military and political block oriented against US
and NATO).
References
[1] McLuhan Marshall, “Understanding the Media: The Extensions of Man”,
New York, 1966, pp. 1-2.
[2] Geoffrey Mulgan, Convexity. How to live in a connected world? London,
Chatto and Windus, 1997.
[3] Dolghin, Nicolae, Geopolitical and energy recourses, Bucharest, U.N.Ap.
Publishing House, 2004, pp. 5-6.
[4] Falconi F., Sette A. - Osama Bin Laden - Terror in West, Publishing House
Alfa. Bucharest, 2002, pp.13.
[5] http:// www.eusec.org
[6] http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr
59
THE ANGLO-JAPANESE NAVAL COOPERATION
DURING THE FIRST WAR WORLD
Assoc.Prof. Glodarenco Olimpiu Manuel, PhD
Romanian Naval Museum of Constanţa
e-mail: muzeu.marina@rdslink.ro
Abstract
The Japan joins in to the war beside the allied forces does not modified
substantial the forces rapport on the Pacific battle theatre, the Rising Sun
Empire it was very concentrated on his interests in the German colonies
annexation. The Japanese navy fleet actions were set out by the British navy
forces after the pact from 1902.
Keywords: battleship, cruiser, ocean, Pacific, Tsingtao
1. The Origins of British Naval Dependence on Japan
The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 resulted from the threat that
Russia presented to both states by its moves toward India, Korea, and
Manchuria1. As the alliance matured, Winston Churchill (from 1911),
like his predecessors as First Lord of the Admiralty, pursued a naval
policy envisioning that the outbreak of a general war in Europe would
require Japanese assistance in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. As
tensions between Great Britain and Germany increased with the
Russo-Japanese War of 1905, British naval strength underwent a
reorganization that saw the Channel, Atlantic, and Mediterranean
forces battleship strength increased at the expense of those in the
Pacific Ocean. What had been an anti-Russian disposition of British
1
Ian H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 18841907, 2d edition, Athlone Press, London, 1985, p. 230.
60
naval forces tilted decisively toward an anti-German alignment after
the Russo-Japanese conflict1.
Churchill, almost from the day he took the helm as First Lord in
October 1911, accelerated the withdrawal of battleships from the
Mediterranean and China seas and their redeployment against the
growing naval power of Wilhelmine Germany in the North Sea. By
March 1914, British naval strength in the Far East had decreased from
five battleships and an armored cruiser in March 1904 to two
battleships, a battle cruiser, and two cruisers2.
In March 1914, Churchill, arguing for his policy in the House of
Commons, acknowledged that defeat of the main British naval force
in European waters would leave a small force of Pacific-based
dreadnoughts vulnerable. Any British naval force in Far Eastern
waters must inevitably be inferior to the main fleet of a European
rival. On the other hand, Churchill pointed out, “two or three
Dreadnoughts in Australian waters would be useless the day after the
defeat of the British Navy in Home waters”3.
This policy produced a growing naval dependence on Britain’s
allies. France took up the slack in the Mediterranean, and Japan
assumed a correspondingly larger role in the defense of the China
Seas. With France, this policy worked well, as the British attempted to
settle outstanding colonial problems with that nation and after wards
participated in the creation of the Entente Cordiale4.
No such reservoir of good will existed between Japan and Great
Britain; preexisting tension concerning Japan’s imperial ambitions
tested relations throughout the First World War. The strains ultimately
contributed to the collapse of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Japanese
expansion beyond Manchuria during 1913 and 1914 increased the
deep suspicion of Japanese intentions on the part of the British foreign
secretary, Sir Edward Grey5.
Grey opposed any Japanese participation in the war, fearing that
Japan would see an opportunity to expand beyond reasonable bounds.
1
Ruddock F. Mackey, Fisher of Kilverstone, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973, p. 328.
Peter Lowe, Great Britain and Japan, 1911-15, Macmillan, London, 1969, pp. 178-179.
3
Peter Padfield, The Great Naval Race, David Mckey, New York, 1974, p. 293.
4
Ibidem, p. 298.
5
Peter Lowe, op. cit., p. 185.
2
61
In the teeth of Admiralty objections, therefore, he worked to prevent
Japan’s entry into a European conflict as the situation worsened
throughout the summer of 1914. On 1 August, Grey notified his
counterpart in Tokyo, Kato Takaaki, that Great Britain would require
Japanese assistance only if Germany attacked its Far Eastern colonies
or fighting spread into the Far East. Grey worried not only about
Japanese expansion into the German colonies in China and the Pacific
Ocean but also that Australia, New Zealand, and the United States
would strongly oppose apparent British support of that expansion. In
the end, German steps to mobilize reserves at the key port of Tsingtao
and to disperse warships into the Pacific, along with the aggressive
First Lord’s insistence on expanding the war against German naval
forces worldwide, forced Grey’s hand1.
On 11 August 1914, Churchill, worried by what he considered
Grey’s clumsy attempts to prevent Japanese entry into the war, or
limit Japanese action once in it, warned the foreign secretary: I think
you are chilling indeed to these people. I can’t see any half way house
between having them in and keeping them out. If they are to come in,
they may as well be welcomed as comrades. This last telegram [to
Japan] is almost hostile. I am afraid I do not understand what is in yr
mind on this aspect – tho’ I followed it so clearly till today. …This
telegram gives me a shiver. We are all in this together & I only wish
to give the fullest effect & support to your main policy. But I am
altogether perplexed by the line opened up by these Japanese
interchanges .You may easily give mortal offence - we will not be
forgotten - we are not safe yet - by a long chalk. The storm has yet to
burst2.
Churchill’s remonstrance helped to alter Grey’s opposition to
Japan’s full participation in the war.
The Japanese government of Prince Yamagata Aritomo delivered
an ultimatum on 15 August 1914 requiring the dismantling of German
power in Pacific. The demarche demanded that German naval vessels
either leave or surrender at Kiaochow and that Germany allow the
destruction of fortifications there and surrender to Japan the Shantung
Peninsula. Japanese demands also included that the German islands
1
2
Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 1991, pp. 109-110.
Sir Martin Gilbert, Winston Churchill, vol. 3, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1971, p. 43.
62
scattered throughout the Pacific be turned over to Japan. The Germans
made no response, and Japan formally declared war on 23 August
19141.
Strong evidence existed that justified Grey’s fears of Japanese
ambitions. One was the substantial size of Japan’s navy. The Japanese
clearly entered the war in large part to increase their prestige among
the great powers and to expand their holdings in China and the
Pacific. Moreover, Japanese officials had chafed under several
unequal treaties imposed after the Western opening of the country in
the 1850s. Still, such motives for participation in the war were no
better or worse than those secretly advanced at the start of World War
I by other belligerents. What truly upset Japan’s Western allies was
their inability to act in a paternalistic fashion toward what they
considered an inferior. Hostile views of Japan prevailed at the
beginning of the war, and they did not diminish during the struggle
despite Japan’s help for its allies. In fact, such antipathy increased as
Japan dared to act as any Western state would have done. This racial
animosity is a reason why the institutional memory of the extensive
assistance that Japan rendered to the allied cause during the war was
so short-lived. Such memories were inconvenient for the account of
the war that anti-Japanese groups in Great Britain and the United
States wished to perpetuate2.
2. The Joint Expedition against Tsingtao
Wartime Anglo-Japanese cooperation in the Far East opened on a
sour note. Immediately upon entry into the war, Japan moved to
secure the Kiaochow or Shantung Peninsula, known as the “German
Gibraltar of the East”. The peninsula, where lay the German naval
base at Tsingtao (modern Qingdao, on Kiaochow Bay), served as the
peacetime station for the German Far Eastern squadron. Preparing for
its capture, Kato informed his British allies that Japan would return
Tsingtao to China after conquest, but only at a price. He also intimated
that Japan did not require British support for the operation, but Grey
ignored that and sent the South Wales Borderers and a detachment of
1
A. Morgan Young, Japan in Recent Times, 1912-1926, William Morrow, New York, 1929,
pp. 71-72.
2
Ian H. Nish, op. cit., p. 93.
63
Sikh troops under Brigadier General N. W. Barnardiston to join the
assault. A small British squadron participated in the blockade of
Kiaochow Bay, which began on 27 August1.
The Anglo-Japanese expedition arrived off Tsingtao on the 26th.
Major and modern units of the German fleet had evacuated Tsingtao
in the days preceding the Japanese declaration of war, leaving only the
antiquated
Austro-Hungarian
armored
cruiser
KAISERIN
ELISABETH, five gunboats, and two destroyers. The weakness of the
German vessels allowed the Japanese navy to use older ships; the
Japanese blockaded Tsingtao harbor with three obsolete, ex-Russian
battleships, two ex-Russian coastal-defense ships, seven cruisers,
sixteen destroyers, and fourteen support ships. The battleship
TRIUMPH, a destroyer, and a hospital ship formed the British
contribution to the blockading fleet2.
Vice Admiral Baron Kamimura Hikonojo’s Second Fleet
transported Japanese and British troops to China to conduct the siege.
The initial Japanese landing occurred at Lungkow (modern Long Kou)
on 2 September. A naval landing force captured Lau Shau Bay,
northeast of Tsingtao, on 18 September, for use as a forward base for
further operations against Tsingtao. British troops entered China via
other routes on 24 September. The Anglo-Japanese naval force
maintained a tight blockade of the Tsingtao harbor while clearing
mines and providing to allied ground forces vital intelligence collected
by the Japanese tender WAKAMIYA’s seaplanes. The
WAKAMIYA’s aircraft are also credited with conducting at this time
“the first successful carrier air raid in history”, sinking a German
minelayer at Tsingtao. Throughout the siege, troops ashore called
upon naval gunfire support and Japanese seaplanes to bombard enemy
positions3.
The Japanese navy suffered a serious loss and embarrassment on
18 October, when the old German torpedo boat S-90 evaded
destroyers guarding the harbor and sank the antiquated cruiser
TAKACHIYO with two torpedoes. The S-90 had escaped the notice
1
Masamichi Royama, Foreign Policy of Japan: 1914-1939, Greenwood Press, 1973, pp. 2325.
2
Ibidem, p. 31.
3
Peter Padfield, op. cit., p. 314.
64
of patrolling destroyers by waiting for them to reach the far end of the
harbor entrance, then running out at high speed and surprising the
second line of ships, a destroyer leader and older Japanese cruisers.
The Imperial Japanese Navy also lost the destroyer SHIROTAE, a
torpedo boat, and three minesweeping vessels in the process of
capturing Tsingtao, with a total of 317 personnel killed and seventysix wounded, the majority in the sinking of the TAKACHIYO1.
The German garrison of 3.500 regulars and 2.500 reservists,
joined by the entire crew of the KAISERIN ELISABETH, mounted a
vigorous defense of Tsingtao. Nonetheless, the Japanese kept British
ground forces from playing an active role in the campaign. The
combined German and Austro-Hungarian force surrendered on 7
November 1914, when the Japanese fought their way into Tsingtao.
The British contingent, deliberately excluded from Japanese plans,
learned of the assault only after the fact. German and AustroHungarian prisoners taken in Tsingtao spent the remainder of the war
in Japan. The Japanese army reported losses of 414 killed and 1.441
wounded in taking the German citadel.
The Japanese retained control of Tsingtao and steadily expanded
their grip over the Shantung Peninsula, occupying the German railroad
running through the region. Thus the effective result of the first
Anglo-Japanese operation of the war was the establishment of
Japanese control over large areas of Manchuria; mistrust between the
two states sharply increased2.
3. Japanese Patrols and Escorts
While Admiral Kamimura’s Second Fleet was aiding in the
conquest of Tsingtao, ships of the First Fleet joined with British,
French, and Australian ships in driving von Spee’s roving cruiser
squadron from the Pacific. Immediately upon the outbreak of war,
Vice Admiral Tamin Yamaya sent the battleship KONGO toward
Midway to patrol sea lines of communication and ordered the cruiser
IZUMO, then off the coast of Mexico, to defend allied shipping there.
On 26 August he detached the battle cruiser IBUKI and cruiser
CHIKUMA to Singapore to help allied forces in that region. The
1
2
Ibidem.
Peter Lowe, op. cit., p. 198.
65
CHIKUMA unsuccessfully searched the Dutch East Indies and the
Bay of Bengal as far as Colombo, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) for the German
cruiser EMDEN. Admiral Matsumura Tatsuo, with the battleship
SATSUMA and cruisers YAHAGI and HIRADO, patrolled sea routes
to Australia searching for German raiders.
More pressing duties soon diverted the IBUKI from Singapore.
Responding to the attacks by the German cruiser EMDEN on allied
Indian Ocean shipping, the IBUKI dashed across the South Pacific to
Wellington, New Zealand. On 16 October it conducted the first of
what would be many voyages wherein Japanese warships escorted
Australian-New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) troops to the Middle
East. The IBUKI and other Japanese warships were to accompany
ANZAC troops as far west as Aden on the Red Sea throughout the
war. Other Japanese units escorted French troopships sailing from the
Far East to reinforce units fighting on the western front. (Although the
Australian and New Zealand troop convoy did not encounter the
EMDEN, a radio report from the Cocos Islands led to the detachment
of the Australian cruiser HMAS SYDNEY from the escort. Near those
isolated isles, the SYDNEY surprised the EMDEN and destroyed the
raider by gunfire after forcing it onto the reefs.)1.
Also during October, Japanese naval forces under the command
of Vice Admiral Tochinai Sojiro reinforced British units searching the
Indian Ocean for German raiders. Tochinai ultimately employed the
cruisers TOKIWA, YAKUMO, IBUKI, NISSHIN, CHIKUMA,
HIRADO, YAHAGI, and IKOMA, plus part of the British fleet, in
hunting down the raiders. On 1 November 1914, the Japanese navy
agreed to a British request to assume all patrols in the Indian Ocean
east of ninety degrees east longitude. Much of Admiral Tochinai’s
force, and other warships withdrawn from Tsingtao, guarded this area
for the remainder of the month. In addition, after the German warship
GEIER’s appearance at the neutral port of Honolulu on 15 October
1914, the battleship HIZEN and cruiser ASAMA took up positions off
that port until the American government interned the GEIER on 7
November. The HIZEN and ASAMA then joined the IZUMO off the
coast of South America and swept those waters for German warships.
1
Michael Montgomery, Imperialist Japan: The Yen to Dominate, Christopher Helm, London,
1987, pp. 253-259.
66
The employment of Japanese ships provoked a mixed response
from the governments of Australia and New Zealand. They fully
endorsed using Japanese ships as escorts for troop convoys but sharply
disapproved when in late 1914 the Japanese First Fleet seized the
German colonies of the Marshall, Mariana, and Caroline Islands.
Tamin’s forces took Jaluit in the Marshall Islands on 4 October,
sailing from there to seize the superb harbor at Truk in the Carolines
on 12 October. A second force under Rear Admiral Tatsuo Matsumura
captured the German port of Rabaul, on New Britain, on 1 October. It
continued on 7 October to Yap, where it encountered the German
vessel PLANET. The crew of the PLANET scuttled the vessel rather
than have it fall into Japanese hands, and the Japanese captured Yap
without further incident. The Japanese navy stationed four warships at
Suva in the Fiji Islands and six at Truk for patrol operations in late
19141.
The British and Japanese governments reached a tentative arrangement in late
1914 concerning the captured German possessions in the Pacific Ocean. The
Japanese now held the Marianas, Carolines, and the Marshalls, as well as Yap.
Australian forces had taken New Guinea and nearby territories. Troops from New
Zealand, just beating Japanese forces to Samoa, now held a firm grip on the
strategic island. Rather than risk an incident that might lead to a confrontation, the
British agreed that thenceforth forces of the Empire would seize no German
territories north of the equator2.
In 1914 the Royal Navy could ill afford to offend its strongest ally in the
Pacific. Faced with worldwide responsibilities defending British trade and
possessions, it sought direct Japanese involvement in the European theater of
operations from the beginning of the war. Sir Edward Grey issued the first formal
appeal for Japanese naval assistance on 6 August 1914. It resulted in the previously
mentioned deployment of Japanese naval units to Singapore. On two further
occasions in 1914, British appeals for deployments of Japanese naval forces to the
Mediterranean and the Baltic met with rejection3.
1
Ibidem, pp. 264-268.
Peter Lowe, op. cit., pp. 207.
3
Ibidem, p. 211.
2
67
GLOBAL ETHICS – FOUNDATION FOR GLOBAL
HUMAN SECURITY
Asst.Prof. Crăciun Iulia, PhD
Faculty for Political Sciences, International Relations and
European Studie of Sibiu
Abstract
Human security is an universal issue which concerns both the people living
in poor countries and the ones living in rich countries. Many of the threats are
common to all the people, for example human rights violation, crime, drugs,
pollution and unemployment. The intensity in which these threats occur differs
from one country to an other, from region to region, but nevertheless the threats
are very real and in continuous growth. Thus, this article tries to highlight how
global ethics can make our everyday life more stable, predictable and safe.
Key words: global ethics, human security, justice, human rights
The XXI century is characterized by great changes in the security
domain. The world becomes more and more complex and
interdependent, and the development of humanity can not be realized
without the insurance of human security. People still wait for a new
global order in which there would be fewer wars, less violence, less
injustice, less famine and less needs. Security was targeted as a
multidimensional concept, attached not only to weapons and their use
but to the safety of the human being as well: society, economy,
environment, food and others. Therefore the theoretical approaches
have reached peak with a initiative at a global scale, with a strong
backup and a substantial contribution of scientists who launched the
concept of human security, a concept which defines the life and
68
dignity of human beings; this idea will certainly mark the direction
which global security will take in the XXI’st century.
Human security represents an universal issue, regarding people all
over the world, mainly from poor countries but from rich countries as
well. Many threats are common to all nations, for example: breaking
the human rights, crime, drugs, pollution and unemployment. Their
intensity varies from country to country, from region to region but are
these issues are real and increasing.
The human security components are interdependent. When the
security of one nation is in danger, all nations may be involved
someway or another. Hunger, epidemics, pollution, drugs trafficking,
ethnic tensions, social disintegration are no longer isolated events,
limited by nations borders. Their consequences can expand regional or
even global. Human security is easier protected through measures of
prevention than through later interventions.
Security regards the way in which a person is integrated in a
society and of how much freedom one has in order to exercise his
right to make a choice from a large number of possibilities. Therefore,
human security presents qualitative and quantitative issues as well. On
one hand, it’s about the fulfillment of basic material need’s, on the
other hand it’s about achieving human dignity which incorporates
personal autonomy, the control over ones life and unlimited
participation to community life which means protecting the individual
against some unwanted daily life events. Human security has been in
the attention of the international opinion starting with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948): “Everyone has the right to life,
liberty and security of person.1 “Everyone is entitled to realization,
through national effort and international co-operation and in
accordance with the organization and resources of each state, of the
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and
the free development of his personality.2”
Through human security it is understood a phenomenon with
many components: economical security, food security, health security,
ecological security, security of person, public security and political
security. Human security puts people in first place and recognizes that
1
2
A se vedea: Declaraţia Universală a Drepturilor Omului. (1948, 10 decembrie, art 3).
Ibidem, art. 22.
69
their safety is important for promoting and maintaining peace and
international security. Security of states is essential, but not enough to
fully ensure the security and welfare of people around the world.
However, we live in a world in which we notice that new
dangerous tensions and differences between believers and unbelievers,
churches and secular groups, clergy and nonclergy arise, in a world
threatened of what Huntington calls “the crash of civilizations”1 and
however, the threats of local conflicts become more urgent. The
answer to this challenge is that human security and democracy can’t
survive without a coalition between believers and unbelievers under
mutual respect; that there will not be peace between civilizations if
there isn’t peace between religions; and a peace among religions is not
possible without dialogue and as a consequence a global order can’t
be assured; an order which stays at the basis of global security without
a global ethics despite all dogmatic differences.
This global ethics is not imposed as a new ideology or
superstructure, nor dies, it wants to diminish specific ethics of
different religions and philosophies. A global ethics doesn’t mean an
unique culture and a global religion but a minimum of common
values, criteria and basic attitudes required, or more precise a basis of
consensus between unifying values, irrevocable criteria and
fundamental attitudes which are stated by all religions despite de
dogmatic differences between them, to which unbelievers can
contribute.
Because there are large differences between nations, cultures and
religions and also from the way of life point of view, economical
systems and social models, a single ethnic total consensus is not
possible but considering that it’s about human beings a minimal ethnic
consensus is possible.
This research is not based on a theory, but on a fact: nowadays the
entire world is displaced by some events which happened at a local
level. Through media a connection was formed and a unity in thinking
and in the way people act in different areas, was noticed.
Michael Waltzer professor of sociology at Princeton, identifies in
his books “Think and Thin” an universal element which can be
1
Samuel P. Huntington, Ciocnirea civilizatiilor si refacerea ordinii mondiale, Ed. Antet,
Bucuresti, 1997.
70
detected in the perception of political conflicts. He demonstrates the
existence of a “core of morality”, a set of basic ethical standards “a
minimum morality” which includes the fundamental right to life,
rightful treatment, physical and emotional integrity which applies no
matter of nationality, culture or religion. 1
An ethic consensus is possible, because this elementary morality
(pure and basic) is identified inside different cultures.
For example, the prohibition of child torture is connected to
elementary morality and it’s accepted in different cultures, from San
Francisco to Singapore. But the point where corporal punishment
becomes torture for a child is obviously one in San Francisco and
another in Singapore, and in this case comes into play a lot of
historical, cultural, political and religious elements. To introduce
specific rules from San Francisco in Singapore or vice versa, would be
a proof of cultural imperialism.
Continuing Walzers statements regarding the possibility of a
consensus in the case of elementary morality and it’s impossibility in
the case of cultural difference morality, the last one should be seen as
a continuity of the first, allowing various degrees of the concrete
which must be investigated regarding the consensus between different
nations, cultures and religions. Along with the universal concepts of
truth and justice, submitted by Walzer, a 3rd element should be added:
humanity.
Also, in order to illustrate remarks, Walzer refers to Kant’s
golden rule which is found in “Tora“: “Don’t do to others that which
you don’t like.” But it should be noted that this saying is found in
other formulations in all the big religions of the world.
Since the debate about human rights made by the French
Parliament in 1789, there has been an idea that the human rights
declaration to be improved with a declaration of its responsibilities.
Although human responsibilities were formulated before the
rights, in present we live in a society in which groups and individuals
appeal constantly to rights against others, without admitting their own
responsibilities.
1
Michael Walzer, Think and Thin. Moral Argument at Home and Abroad, University of
Notre Dame Press, U.S.A., 1994.
71
We can’t ignore the fact that the responsibility, makes the
difference between human and animal, which acts from instinct or
pressure. Thus the obligation represents the manifestation of ration
which tends to liberty but some extern authorities like right are
excluded.
Because it’s the manifestation of ration, the obligation involves
some moral compulsions. Although all rights involve responsibilities
not all the responsibilities proceed from rights. The rights are
composed by the legal obligations, but not all the responsibilities
proceed from legal rights because of the original responsibilities.
Samuel von Pufendorf, an ethic protester and the philosopher
Moses Mendelsson stand out the fact that the perfect obligations are
imposed by the law and by the state also punishing the encroach upon
it, when the imperfect obligations are ethic and they are based on
peoples conscience so only a totalitarian state can impose it. Thus an
understandable ethic of humanity can not proceed only from human
rights because it must include human responsibilities that exist before
the rights.
At the international law level, in 1955 Max Huber the president of
the International Justice Court from the Hague and also the president
of the International Committee of the Red Cross thought that the law
needs a moral fundament.
The ensurance of a human and global security means that a better
and safer world can not be created or imposed only by laws and
conventions. The human rights involve the acknowledge of
responsibilities and obligations by the human mind and soul at the
same time, the laws can not exist without the ethic so a global security
does not exist without a global ethic.
The global ethic isn’t the world ethic meaning a moral theory of
attitudes is a moral attitude understood in an individual and collective
way.
Hans Kung developed some of the principles that may improve a
global ethic suggesting the avoiding of three possible blinds: firstly is
the reduplication of the Declaration of human rights, a concrete form
of global ethic must be an ethic support for this declaration which is
some times ignored.
72
Secondly a moral sermon, a concrete form of global ethic can not
ignore the reality for example the private life sphere; but the solution
can not be limited to perceptions.
Thirdly this global ethic does not suppose to be an optimistic and
religious proclamation, anyhow a concrete form of global ethic can be
developed by motivated people but also not only by them.
But if this ethic will be limited only to a cosmic conscience,
global harmony and spiritual creativity without enough economic,
political and social reality from the industrial society will be removed
from reality.
Hans Kung considered that the next criteria should be taken into
account in order that for global ethics to be formulated:1
To be anchored in reality. The world must be seen realistically, as
it is and not as it should be. In order to recognize the true meaning of
directions that initially seem universal, it is necessary to begin with
some negative experiences. What is truly human is hard to define, but
anyone can give an example of what is truly un-human.
To penetrate the profound levels of ethics, those of the associative
values, of the irrevocable criteria and of the basic interior attitudes,
without limiting just to the level of laws.
To be understood at a general level, thus avoiding technical terms
and academic slang. All must be expressed in a language that is easy
to understand and to translate.
To be capable of assuring its acceptance: moral humanity must
be pursued and not number unanimity. Thus allegations must avoid
being a priori disclaimed by certain ethical or religious traditions.
Even if the pursue of a global ethic following these criteria seems
idealistic, however it has still been possible.
For the first time in the history of the Council for a Parliament of
the World’s Religions, which was first held in Chicago from the 28th
of august until the 4th of September 1993 with the participation of
65.000 people of all possible religions, it has presented such a
declaration of global ethics. It was compiled by Hans Kung and is the
base of a process of discussions and acceptance that will certainly last
for a long period of time.
1
Hans Kung, A global ethic for a global politics and economics, (SCM Press, London 1997 /
Oxford University Press, New York 1998).
73
A first sign of acceptance is a report of the Council of
Interactions, presided by Helmut Schmid, which has been discussed
under the title “In pursuit of global ethics standards” and approved in
may 1996. The basic ethic request of the Chicago Declaration is the
most elementary that can be addressed to human beings:
The commitment towards a culture of non-violence as regarding
life, towards a culture of solidarity and a right wing economic order,
towards a culture of tolerance and a life full of truth as well as one
towards the culture of equality in rights and partnership between men
and women. Each human being must be treated in a humane manner,
because each human being possesses inalienable and intangible
dignity no matter the age, gender, sex, race, skin color, psychical or
mental abilities, language, religion, political vision or national or
social origin.
No one is “beyond good and evil”, not even human beings, social
classes, interest groups, cartels, police, army or state. On the contrary,
all are obliged “to do good and avoid evil”.
Moral feelings, capable of course of giving birth to generous
actions, can’t serve as a key stone to the permanent functioning of just
and efficient institutions. Moral reason sets the goal and the
responsible institutions can’t get us closer to these. Injustices will
probably never go away but what we can do is limit their diffusion,
react smartly, take precautious measures ahead of time.
Thus the concept of human security requires all actors – states,
international organizations, NGOs, and businesses – to act
responsibly. This includes developing codes of conduct where
appropriate, working to establish new international norms regarding
the protection of peoples, and incorporating the human dimension into
the work of international organizations. At the start of this new
century, the protection of peoples is among the most important issues
before us. Peace and security – national, regional, and international –
are possible only if they are derived from people’s security.
74
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF TERRORISM
Asst.Prof. Dinicu Anca
“Nicolae Bălcescu” Land Forces Academy, Sibiu
e-mail: ancagdinicu@yahoo.com
Abstract
The former chief economist of the World Bank, Joseph Stiglitz noted a few
years ago that "The borderless world through which goods and services flow is
also a borderless world through which other things can flow that are less
positive." A wise statement which unfortunately is sometimes remembered only
after the harm is done. There is no doubt that the world is witnessing a global
economic integration, where progress goes shoulder to shoulder (for the time
being) with the dark side of globalization, including terrorism.
The September 11 attacks have illustrated to our societies the complex
interaction between national security and developments in the global economy.
The attacks have raised a wide range of issues tied to the economic
dimension of security including the vulnerability of the global economy to
devastating acts of terror, the need to better protect national economies, the
financing of terrorism and using economic tools to counter terrorism.
Keywords: globalization, terrorism, economical consequences
There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. Anyway,
when trying to define the concept, the authorities and academics from
democratic countries use to underline that terrorism is a premeditated,
politically motivated violence, aimed against non-combatant targets,
in order to influence an audience. And indeed it is the goal of terrorists
to spread fear and so to influence an audience that is wider than the
immediate number of victims.
75
In the last years, terrorism has changed pretty much, revealing us
new patterns, shifting increasingly from military targets to civilian
ones, including individuals and business activities.
Due to the process of globalization, a terrorist attack can affect
both the national and the global economy, and the consequences can
be on short term, on medium term or on longer term.
It is very difficult to explain in a very precisely way the
relationship between terrorism and globalization. It is not fair to
suggest that globalization is responsible for terrorism which, by all
means, it seems to be as old as the human society. But globalization
can help us to explain the incredible impact of some violent actions
based on terror carried out by some fanatics claiming “justice”. On
one hand, it is the technology that has improved communications,
helping terrorist groups to share information, work together and gain
audience. On the other hand, it is the very interdependent feature of
the global economy, where autarchy has no chance and more or less
everybody is involved in an economical network where state is no
longer the “supreme master”.
But why anyone would want to challenge a country by attacking
its economy if interdependence is all around the world? Firstly, the
terrorist groups are interested in the political change of the
world/region scene and they are willing to pay whatever it takes for
this, no matter the consequences. Secondly, they are much more
connected to an idea, an ideology, than to a national territory. Thirdly,
although globalization provides access to the world market for goods
and services, the net result of this process is, in their opinion, the
spreading of the Western economic imperialism.
It seems that the world is just now beginning to understand the
broader economical impact of terrorism, the starting point being
September 11. The attacks pointed out some issues concerning the
economic dimension of security, including the vulnerability of the
global economy in front of some acts of terror, the need to better safe
the national economies, and even the financing of terrorism and the
means to reduce this practice.
76
No National Power without Economics
It is a fact that the military power of the state is given by its
military potential (budget, personnel, infrastructure, logistics,
armament) in order to ensure its security and to fulfill political
interests. But no military power can be developed if it is not sustained
by a healthy economy. A political power compatible with democratic
principles must rely on a solid economy and any economical system
needs the intervention of the political agent for a normal development
[1].
During the Cold War, mainly the military dimension of security
was taken into account when perspectives upon international relations
were put on stake. For a while it worked and the balance between the
two superpowers was in equilibrium. But gaining, maintaining,
sharing and promoting security on the international scene is in straight
connection with the state power. And if we take into account that only
the democratic part of the world understood that “military” is not
everything and ensuring a certain standard of living for its citizenry is
another dimension of the national policy, we can explain ourselves the
essence of its survival – economics as a vital component of the ends,
ways and means of security.
Economics is a constituent of the national power. A state can use
economic power in order to impel itself among other world leading
actors, to influence other states through economic means or to deter,
coerce or fight an opponent by using embargoes, blockades or
sanctions. That is why usually it is considered that the economic
power is the condition of having sufficient productive resources at
command that give the capacity to make and enforce economic
decisions [2].
As economic issues affect national security activities and
capabilities, so might efforts that involve national security create
global economical impacts. For example, political disorder, not to
mention war, in a natural gas or oil producing region will generate
tremors in the international energy sector. Unfortunately it is a feature
of our globalized world that some oil production problems, credit
concerns, political instabilities in strategic regions, massive terrorist
attacks such as those that took place on September 11 could create
another global crisis and instability almost anywhere in the world.
77
The Financial Dimension of Terrorism
Terrorists pursue political goals of disturbing or destroying the
political and social structures of countries or bothering international
cooperation, by kidnapping or killing high officials and top
businessmen or by simply demonstrating the vulnerability of the
system they despite (through means like hijacking, bombing
governmental buildings, creating panics in very crowded places,
promoting through media false information and statements).
But doing these requires money. How do terrorist groups finance
their existence and activities?
The financing of terrorism takes many forms and involves an
economic structure that has many of the same characteristics as
transnational organized crime. The cost of maintaining a terrorist
network and, in particular, the cost of carrying out a terrorist attack, is
relatively small comparing with damages and consequences. And we
mean loss of lives, lost business opportunities, claims of insurance
payments, psychological effects, destroyed properties, burden on
public security forces.
Terrorism funds can have a lot of sources, such as: state
sponsorship; income generation from legal businesses; illegal income
generation (sometimes in partnership with organized criminal groups)
from such sources as kidnapping, trafficking of migrants, women,
drugs and sales of small arms and light weapons; misuse of charitable
donations; contributions from radicalized diasporas; informal money
transfers utilizing the hawala system, through an extensive network of
hawaladars (financial service providers operating on the basis of trust,
with minimal records and a light regulatory structure); and theft,
smuggling and corruption (particularly related to oil) [3].
State sponsorship is getting weaker as a result of the global war
against terror. The countries that are accused of supporting terrorism
are often among the poorest in the world, reality that doesn’t impede
their governments to provide funding, as well as technical resources,
training and sophisticated weapons. Beside this, some of these
countries have developed or have the capability to develop WMD and
other destabilizing technologies that could fall into the hands of
terrorists.
78
State sponsorship gradually going down, the terrorist groups are
being forced to diversify their resource base. As a result, they (and
we) have found themselves involved in organized crime which is not
quite a natural relationship, since organized crime is operating inside
the system not against it.
Terrorism is financed by illegal money, but also through legal
sources of revenue – different types of gains (cash, assets) acquired by
legitimate instruments and even declared to tax authorities end up
funding terror.
In its third section called “Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global
Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends”,
the US National Security Strategy from 2006 specifies the obligation
“to deny the terrorists what they need to survive: safe haven, financial
support, and the support and protection that certain nation-states
historically have given them”. Further it is said that “the United States
and its allies in the War on Terror make no distinction between those
who commit acts of terror and those who support and harbor them,
because they are equally guilty of murder. Any government that
chooses to be an ally of terror, such as Syria or Iran, has chosen to be
an enemy of freedom, justice, and peace. The world must hold those
regimes to account” [4].
The Economical Impact of Terrorism
A few years ago, the seriousness of terrorism was measured
almost exclusively in the number of victims, the economic costs
getting little attention. Now, the costs are measured not only in
financial terms (and, of course, in human suffering), but also in their
impact on the government and private sectors of countries throughout
the world.
The attacks from September 11 are used by politicians (but not
only) to emphasize to the world the human and economic costs
associated with terrorist acts of violence. If terrorism is certainly not a
new phenomenon, the gravity of these attacks vividly illustrates the
impact that terrorism has on the global economy. The deep global
economical interdependence became more obvious when after the
attacks international trade and travel reduced their velocity and
intensity, household and industrial consumers turned reluctant in
79
spending, increased security costs emerged and to many failures in the
supply chains appeared. Some sectors were more heavily affected than
others, mainly aviation (some companies halted flights totally and
dismissed many employees), travel and tourism, insurance and
reinsurance.
At the beginning of this paper it was mentioned that a terrorist
attack could generate three different types of effects upon both
national and global economies.
The short term consequences refer to the direct economic costs of
terrorism such as the destruction of life and properties, the proper way
to face emergency, quick restoration of the damaged infrastructure,
the provision of temporary living assistance. Direct economic costs
are likely to be proportionate to the intensity of the attacks and the
size and the characteristics of the economy affected. While the
September 11 attacks caused major activity disruption, the direct
economic damage was relatively small in relation to the size of the
economy. The direct costs resulting from the terrorist attacks were
estimated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development at $27.2 billion, which represented only about ¼ percent
of the US annual GDP [5].
The medium term consequences are related to the consumer and
investors confidence. The size of these effects depends on the nature
of the policies that are taken as a response to the attacks and the time
markets need to recover.
Concerning the longer term, there is a question of whether the
attacks can have a negative impact on productivity by raising the costs
of transactions through increased security measures, higher insurance
premiums, increased costs of financial and other counterterrorism
regulations and reduced speed of globalization [6].
In order to prevent such attacks to take place again, the challenge
for the global community will be in utilizing its advantages to win the
war of ideas that motivates and sustains those responsible for the
current wave of terrorist violence [7]. When shaping strategies to win
this war, the threat of terrorism must run like a reminder that a secure
globalized environment needs major changes in foreign policy and
open access to the world economic system.
80
A Little Bit of Titbite
Could these attacks be seen as the beginning of the American
financial/economic crisis and further as the starting point of the
unipolar system dissolution?
References
[1] Virgil Măgureanu, Studii de sociologie politică, Bucureşti, Editura Albatros,
1997, p. 71.
[2] http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/economic-power.html
[3] http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue2/english/analysis2.html (Adrian
Kendry, Money at the root of evil: The Economics of Transnational
Terrorism, NATO Review, Summer 2007).
[4] http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionIII.html
[5] http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp0560.pdf (IMF Working
Paper prepared by R. Barry Johnston and Oana M. Nedelescu, The Impact of
Terrorism on Financial Markets, March 2005).
[6] Ioan Bari, Probleme globale contemporane, Bucureşti, Editura Economică,
2003, p. 463.
[7] John Baylis, Steve Smith, Patricia Owens (2008), The Globalization of
World Politics. An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford
University Press, p. 384.
81
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES SPECIFIC TO THE
RESILIENCE BUILDING-UP PROCESS IN BELGIUM
Asst.Prof. Dinicu Anca, TA Neagoie Horaţiu Adrian
e-mail: ancagdinicu@yahoo.com; horatiuneagoie@yahoo.com
Abstract
There are lots of possibilities of numerous terrorists attacks, everywhere
throughout the world, that should never eliminated from the threats list,
supporting different extremist political forces, and therefore destabilizing and
destroying all the democratic organizations of any society. The population
resilience to any threat cannot be controlled by the government, thus any
government could be unprepared to get directly involved in the management of
resilience conducted occasionally in relation to any major incident. Thus, the
role of the government is still limited to developing different strategic means,
focusing on setting up and mobilizing all the specific rescue units, financing or
authorizing different requisitions regardless specific needed situations. These
actions are in fact part of every single government expertise.
Keywords: resilience, rescue management, risk, threats,
security.
The term of resilience, seen from the perspective of social
sciences, refers to the ability of an individual to overcome a
psychological trauma, or the effects of a major incident. This is
particularly the case with terrorist attacks, but the psychological
aggression can also be inflicted by natural or technological
catastrophes.
The experts in the field, most of them coming from the sphere of
crisis sociology or psychology recommend that the enemy’s
psychological advantages should be reduced or annihilated, including
82
through deterrence strategies of the type “do not strike: you will only
manage to take up risks and your actions will have a limited impact”.
State resilience is very difficult to measure. It is however obvious
that public action can undoubtedly favor the emergency of resilience
or strengthen its potential. Research has proved it that this capacity of
a society to overcome traumas, resides in the information given by
those authorities trusted by citizens, information which should by all
means be plausible and accessible. The Army and the Police, the Fire
and Emergency Units, are among the institutions trusted by the
population. The fact that the governmental authority, the political
dimension is not to be found among citizens’ “preferences” is to a
certain extent due to the fact that local authorities, by acting in
networks, manage to make the connection between the population and
the government.
Resilience development is also based on individual reactions.
Significant in this respect are the spontaneous reactions of those
individuals who although not directly affected by the terrorist attacks
of Madrid or New York, took measures in order to: develop volunteer
actions in hospitals, donate blood, assure the transportation between
the attack site and the first aid centers, clear the site, and search for
survivals. It is should not be overlooked however, the fact all the good
intentions and help given to the authorized institutions can sometimes
bring about more chaos and bother the professionals.
The possibility of terrorist attacks, which should never be
eliminated, can also give rise to phantasms supporting the extremist
political forces, thus destabilizing the democratic organization of a
society.
The government is consequently not directly involved in the
management of resilience occasioned by a major incident. Its role
remains limited to the strategic development of means, the
government focusing on mobilizing the rescue units, offering financial
support, authorizing requisitions, actions which are in fact its
expertise.
Resilience enforcement in Belgium
Complex from an institutional viewpoint, the idea resulting from
an analysis of Belgium’s security tasks, points to the fact that Belgium
83
has managed to create and promote an environment which can
diminish people’s lack of trust in their representatives. However,
studies developed in Flandra tend to point to the fact that the
community members feel a certain lack of information in terms of
terrorist attacks. This is the reason why we are entitled to believe that
the state institutions and political elite groups are soon to be faced
with the negative consequences. It becomes thus obvious the need to
ask ourselves how the government can participate in the development
of a resilient population, regardless of the cultural differences
characterizing it.
All analysis of the above mentioned issue should be placed
against the background of:
- the rule of law;
- the implementation of a mutually trusting relationship
between the population and the authorities in terms of
security;
- an effort that should rather be seen as one of social cohesion
rather than of communication on the issue of terrorism;
- European and international rules.
Is Belgium indeed threatened?
As is the case with many other countries, the population and
infrastructure of Belgium are not directly threatened by terrorist
attacks. The threat, however, though virtual, remains rather strong.
This somewhat confusing statement is easily explained if we think
about the fact that an indirect threat does meant that Belgium is
exposed to fewer risks than other countries. Belgium’s stand against
the war in Iraq, as that of France for that matter, does not
automatically place it outside the terrorist groups’ sphere of interests.
Moreover, it often happens that unsuccessful terrorist attacks are not
made public in order not to induce fear among the population. The
principle of caution becomes thus very important in ensuring the
security of one state and implicitly of its citizens.
Defining the objectives. Object defining is a ‘must have’ of any
project and should take into consideration all the types of objectives.
The political objective should be the first step of the process
meant to build up and implement the security providing process (in
84
our case). It is actually representing the attention paid by the
government in this respect. As it most often is the case, this objective
subsumes several goals:
- to defend the democratic principles;
- to ensure a certain level of safety for its citizens without
infringing their rights and liberties;
- to offer institutional support: to organize efficient information
services placed under the control of the legislative power, to
cooperate with the allies, to examine the possibilities of
receiving support from Belgium’s neighbouring countires.
The operational objectives. In order to achieve the political
objective, the state institutions have to make sure that the citizens are
offered sufficient information both in terms of quality and quantity,
and that the safety of the developing counterterrorist actions is not by
any means affected.
Belgian specialists strongly believe that when it comes to
information dissemination, a certain procedure should be followed to
the letter.
The government itself or the security institutions’ spokesmen
should offer the information referred to since the mass media might
not always be ready to offer an expert analysis, and might therefore
induce a climate of fear rather than of security among the population.
These aspects don’t eliminate all cooperation with the press
whatsoever, but do encourage the organization of specialized courses
by the Belgian universities for the media, in order to deal with the
international, strategic and terrorism issues, as is the case with the
High Defence Studies.
Without hindering the development of current operations in any
way, the information services and authorized institutions should
ensure a better communication with the population, by making the
threats as well as the number of accomplished operations known to the
public.
If the security studies show that the governmental authorities
suffer of a lack of trust, they also show that there are certain
institutions – medical and intervention services – that enjoy great
credibility.
85
The legal grounds of the action. The political definition of the
objectives should ideally be included in two documents.
The juridical framework: action legitimization. We are referring
to a bill on governmental communication on security issues, which
gives full authority to the permanent committee of information control
services to rule over the legal aspects concerning that matter, to open
and develop investigations in cases of abuse in terms of governmental
communication.
The doctrinary framework: overcoming the institutional
complexity. The great number and diversity of institutional
interventions related to a terrorist attack might hold back the process
of establishing a trans-institutional policy of resilience. The idea of
working in networks and of establishing a doctrinary body that could
serve as a “practical guidelines for interventions” is promoted. A
document of the type could:
- reassert the political and operational objectives of the action;
- make the decision chain clear;
- eventually lead to the drawing up of a Belgian Federal
Security Doctrine;
and should be available online at the disposal of everyone who is
interested, or if the document is classified it should be at the disposal
of the authorized parties.
Proposals. The implementation of a resilience policy does not
entail the reorganization of the already existing institutional
architecture. Given the institutional and operational configuration
specific to Belgium it would seem that the most profitable and
affordable thing to do I to adopt this network working referred to. We
can consequently make the following propositions:
- the general responsibility of this policy should be maintained
at the level of the Prime Minister, including through the
administration of the web site;
- action should be taken only through a security committee,
dependent on the inter-ministerial committee for information
and security with the purpose of maintaining the link between
the decisional and operational authorities. The security
committee should have the following structure:
representatives of the Information and Security College,
86
representatives of ministries participating in the interministerial committee for information, presidents of
journalists’ associations, spokespersons of intelligence
services, province governors, members of the permanent
committee for information service control, academicians, as
well as other individuals who are believed to make a useful
contribution.
Conclusions
Through the trans-national resilience policy the state can take
action and prove its capacity to integrate innovating solutions. It can
thus establish a stronger connection with the population and not
become a passive actor of its own security.
Bibliography
1. Schlenger, W. E., Caddell, J. M., Ebert, L., et al. (2002), ,,Psychological
Reactions to Terrorist Attacks: Findings from the National Study of
American’s Reactions to September 11”, in Journal of the American Medical
Association.
2. http://www/rmes.be/Resilience_et_antiterrorisme_en_Belgique%5B%5D%2
0(1).pdf
3. http://mwc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/1/1/50, Pieter A. Maeseele,
Gino Verleye, Isabelle Stevens, Anne Speckhard, “Psychological resilience
in the face of a mediated terrorist threat”, 2008.
4. http://lib.bioinfo.pl/pmid:16951709, “Markers of Resilience and Risks:
Adult Lives in a Vulnerable Population”, J.Heidi Gralinski-Baker, Stuart T.
Hauser, 2008.
87
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE CURRENT
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
Asst.Prof. Tureac Cornelia, Asst.Prof. Grigore Aurica
“Danubius” University, Galaţi
Abstract
The current security environment is in a permanent dynamics, changing all
the time and transforming continuously. Terrorist attacks, globalization, modern
telecommunication means, high technology allow a kind of mobility unknown
before and the conflicts we might have thought at the end of the world produce
effects in more far away regions. In this context, the conflict management must
adapt itself to the transformations of the security environment and evolve with
them. Therefore, it becomes more and more clear the importance of information
in conflict state of affairs.
Keywords: management, crisis, security
The current security environment is in a permanent dynamics,
changing all the time and transforming continuously. Terrorist attacks,
globalization, modern telecommunication means, high technologies
allow a kind of mobility unknown before and the conflicts we might
have thought at the end of the world produce effects in more far away
regions. In this context, the conflict management must adapt itself to
the transformation of the security environment and evolve with them.
Therefore, the number of actors on the international arena has grown
and diversified. It becomes more and more clear the importance of
information in conflict state of affairs.
Accordingly to the international law, the essential international
law subjects were states and international intergovernmental
organizations and collateral there were the nations and national
88
freedom movements, international nongovernmental organizations and
transnational companies. In the new international context these
matters of international law stay valid, but there must be added
religious or ethnic movements, terrorist groups, drug cartels, human
being traffic and smuggling and so on, so that together with these
evolutions the international law develops too.
The hereby paper refers to the term “crisis situations” including
crisis, conflict and difference. Some clarification must be made. Crisis
represents that period in a dynamic social system characterized by
emphatic difficulties accumulation and conflict out break of tensions.
It is materialized in manifestation of temporary or chronically
appearance of system organization and expresses the incapacity of
function in this state. Crisis outgo is realized either through substantial
system change or important and adapted changes of its structure.
Crisis has at its ground economical, political, social, religious,
juridical, ethnic and other causes, which weren’t solved within the
system in right time and smooth in order to harmonize the needs and
possibility ratio. But a crisis will never be generated by only one cause
such those enumerated above. It will be generated by a sum of causes,
from which one or some will have a primary role. The appearance and
evolution of the crisis situations have objective causes and therefore it
won’t solve or be solved by them. Diminishing of causes that
produced the crisis or removal of those causes can be done only
through institutions intervention, conscious factor, will and
controllable action of people, political, juridical, economical,
diplomatic, military institutions.
In international relations, the “crisis” term refers to situations in
witch international actors have the perception of a threat that can turn
into unforeseen events in which exist a great possibility of violent
means use and also a short time for political reaction1.
The crisis is a stage in conflict development and can be found in
any society in dormant or potential state.
The conflict represents a disagreement between two or more
internationals actors and appears as a result of perception between the
1
Brecher, Michael; Jonathan, Wilkenfeld – „Crisis in World Politics”, World Politics, vol.
XXXIV, nr. 3, p. 380 şi urm.
89
involved parties of incompatibility among their necessities, interests
and purposes.
The difference is a misunderstanding caused by interests or
opinions inconsistency between one or more persons; dissension;
dissonance. Largo sensu, the term of difference includes litigations,
divergences, disagreements or conflicts between law subjects.
International difference appears not only between states but also in
relations among states and international organizations or between
international organizations. In international law doctrine, in
international documents and jurisprudence, internationals differences
are classified in juridical and political differences.
The new international security environment raises some problems
referring to the role of international law, the application of its
principles and efficiency of using them.
In practice of international relations, states and international
actors have developed mechanisms for conflict regulation, in order to
prevent and/or solve them peacefully. Handling of crisis, conflicts,
difference suppose using of diplomatic and jurisdictional means
respectively negotiation, inquiry and collecting information, mediation
and conciliation, arbitration and judicial regulation.
Peacefully solving can not only settle differences, crisis or
conflicts but can build up a security environment, hardened relations
between international actors. In the literature it is showed that using
the differences peacefully solving means build up an environment of
mutual trust between the parties involved in dispute.
All major aspects of social life can generate crisis situations: from
security – high military expenses, different nature abuses, limited
capacities of security forces, to politics – corruption, weak civil
society, social exclusion, to economy – high level of unemployment,
inflation, tendency of the people to get poor, lack of resources.
The contemporary security environment isn’t made up only by the
military security but also by the economic, medium, political and
social security so that the conflict situations in which state must take
action are more diversified. The management of these conflict
situations must lead to diminishing of tensions that generate these
conflicts and also effects control. The analysis of these must be
impartial and must enclose different forms of manifestation, period in
90
which can develop, duration, interests of leading actors in case of
initiating these conflicts.
It is necessary that involved parties must meet at negotiation
table, to wish to meet, to increase the dialogue and to solve all aspects
accordingly to each interest. The parties can be brought to the
negotiation table by its own will or by a third party
(international/European organization).
Crisis situations management is a complex process, made of
distinct stages and actions such as:
Analysis of existing contradictions within or between the
states, that can appear and lead to important conflict
situations;
Closely and permanent tracing of crisis situations
evolution, finding suitable modality to counteraction of
negative tendencies accordingly to the principles of
international law;
Political, diplomatic, economic and other nature actions in
order to discourage violent manifestation, debating and
solving the conflict situations by the international bodies
(ONU, OSCE, other bodies and organizations);
Sustained actions in order to stop violent manifestations;
Bringing the parties to the negotiation table;
Peacefully solving of differences;
Tracing the implementation of decisions taken by the
international bodies responsible for these situations
management.
In this context, readiness of obtaining accurate information is a
very important component, being inverse proportional with the time
for solving the conflict situation. Fastness of managerial crew act,
good coordination of team members, the existence and respecting of
standards in the field make the difference in solving modalities of a
conflict situation.
Bibliography
1. Baltă, Corneliu – „Aspecte teoretice privind gestionarea situaţiilor de criză”,
în Coloviu strategic, nr. 8 (XXXIX), august 2005.
91
2. Brecher, Michael; Jonathan, Wilkenfeld – „Crisis in World Politics”, World
Politics, vol. XXXIV, nr. 3.
3. Buzan Barry - „Popoarele, statele şi teama. O agendă pentru studii de
securitate internaţională în epoca de după Războiul Rece”, Editura Cartier,
Chişinău, 2000.
4. Ghica, Luciana Alexandra; Zulean Marian – “Politica de securitate
naţională”, ed. Polirom, Bucureşti, 2007.
92
A MODEL OF ANALYSIS FOR FOREIGN POLICY
DECISION-MAKERS
Asst.Prof. Megheşan Karin, PhD, Asst.Prof. Nacea Liana, PhD
The National Intelligence Academy of Bucharest
e-mail: email_nacea@yahoo.com
Abstract
Starting out from the idea that the study of foreign policy can provide
answers regarding the many changes in the international system, this paper
presents an adapted model of foreign-policy analysis as potentially useful in a
longitudinal study of a country’s foreign policy decision-making. Drawing on
James Roseanu’s model of analysis, the authors believe that certain sociological
and psychological factors can be regarded as both sources and filters of foreign
policy, that the resulting decisions are both individually and institutionally –
determined and find the case of US foreign policy to be an illustration in point
of Rosenau’s view of “foreign policy as a tunnel of causality”
Keywords: foreign-policy decision-making, model
1. An introduction
The art of governing, the ties connecting the governed and the
governors, the influence of social and political organization on the
build-up of a coherent foreign policy, the use of national interest as an
argument in conflicting political stances have been topics of current
interest for the last thousand years.
Understanding decision-making mechanisms in foreign and home
affairs has permanently been an incentive to research for philosophers
as well as for psychologists, sociologists, political thinkers and
journalists or for anyone directly involved in such mechanisms.
Unlike many other fields of study concerning international
relations (power, security, national interest, globalization, nationalism,
93
ethics), foreign policy has not been a fertile ground for divergent
concepts or diverse scientific approaches. Paradoxically, in the Cold
War era, while engaged in altogether conflicting or opposed
ideologies and political systems, researchers on either side of the Iron
Curtain used to define foreign policy along similar lines.
2. Some epistemic problems and a host of questions
Epistemic problems emerged with the effort of going more deeply
into the decision-making mechanisms. The inability or reluctance to
understand the subtleties and peculiarities of the decision-making
mechanisms of the ‘other’ led to some of the most serious
consequences possible, outlining the successive containment and
détente periods characteristic of the Cold War era.
In the study of international relations, foreign policy decisionmaking accounts for more than projecting power, bolstering domestic
and international security or adapting to the emerging changes in the
international environment: foreign policy studies can provide answers
with respect to the very changes in the international environment.
As a rule, a different systemic order can be identified by
answering three major questions: What are the core units of the
international system? What foreign policy goals do the actors pursue?
To what extent can one affect another actor, function of one’s military
and economic capabilities?
Like any other political phenomenon, foreign policy cannot be the
object of experimental science. As Emile Durkheim said in The Rules
of Sociological Method (1895), we only have one way to prove that a
certain phenomenon is the cause of another: to compare such cases as
in which the two phenomena are both either absent or manifest.
The study of comparative political sociology is a must in
international relations, a perspective from which the growing
bipolarity in the international system of the Cold War era is a premise
for binary comparative analysis.
The advantages of binary analysis: “an overall survey of political
life, including institutions, structures, cultures, socializing and
recruiting processes”1, a more rigorous assessment of the relations
1
Our translation , apud Matei Dogan, Dominique Pelassy, Cum să comparăm naţiunile,
Editura Alternative, Bucureşti, 1993, p.132.
94
between systemic variables, and a functional clarification of certain
key sectors in the political system – are counterweighed by its
disadvantages: “ binary strategy has often proved unable to clearly
distinguish between the referential content of the cultural context, of
the political system or of a specific variable. ”1
Analytical studies of US foreign policy, of its defining goals,
means and mechanisms, can be instrumental in the elaboration of
some functional models of a foreign policy-making mechanism.
Nevertheless, the literature has shown some restraint with respect
to generalizing the American foreign policy system. As Joseph La
Palombara said: „I take it as a lesson that political science experts are
against any generalization of the American foreign policy system” 2
thus pointing to the gap between over-generalizing theories and „self–
contained empirical research.” 3
The rise and fall of empires and of the nation-states, the
absorption or migration of various populations, the very existence of
nations, states, and even that of individuals, are all closely related to
foreign policy.
Alongside concerns with the formation of the political subjectthe state, with governing and better governance, with the need for and
the limits of authority, philosophers, statesmen and political thinkers
have questioned the reasons of one state’s superiority over another,
and the need for a global authority. Why is it that war is declared and
when is it proper to make peace? What is international power and
which are the factors outlining a state’s national interest? Had a state
better set out long-term objectives or should it sooner adopt short-term
goals for the welfare of its own nation?
Does foreign policy reflect a nation’s character, its ethnic and
psychological traits? What are the critical factors that make the states’
foreign policy differ ?
1
idem, p.133.
Joseph LaPalombara, Macrotheories and Microapplications in Comparative Politics: A
Widening Chasm, Comparative Politics, nr.1, p.56, apud. Matei Dogan, Dominique Pelassy,
Cum să comparăm naţiunile, Editura Alternative, Bucureşti, 1993, p. 36.
3
Idem.
2
95
3. US foreign policy: models of analysis
„ A model is based on streamlining and approximating various aspects of reality.
Models are never simply „ true” or „false” , though proper models will only preserve
the „appropriate” characteristics of the reality they represent. 1
A dictionary of sociology defines model as a „graphic, logical or
mathematical representation of the structure of an object phenomenon
or process. Modelling can be used to represent, explain or discover.”2
One of the problems which can occur in modelling is, when
working with a multitude of ’historical details’, to summarize those
details. According to the authors of „Fundamentele Sociologiei”, we
can never render all that we know about a set of events. Summing up
or summarizing ought to ease up our swimming in the sea of
information.
The architecture of a foreign policy-making model ought to
comprise cause related explanations. Adopting a foreign policy
decision is after all a process of social causality. There are a host of
variables and conditions which do affect our abilityy to generalize
social cause relations,yet this does not rule out the cause relation
itself.
In his studies of 1966,1973,1980,1984, James N. Rosenau called
the model of analysis that he used „ Foreign policy sources as a tunnel
of causality”.
Although other political science analysts have used modelling to
facilitate comparative foreign policy studies, we think Rosenau’s
model can be successfully used to provide explanations and facilitate
research on the foreign policy decisions of one nation-state over
several, longer time-periods in its history, in the ever-changing
international environment. Rosenau called his research pre-theories,
thus accounting for the fact that they only offer working hypotheses.
Pre-theory facilitates, in the analyst’s view, building a conceptual
1
G.King, R Keohane, S. Verba, Fundamentele cercetării sociale, Ed Polirom, Bucureşti,
2000, p.58:„Un model este o simplificare şi o aproximare a anumitor aspecte ale lumii.
Modelele nu sunt niciodată pur şi simplu „adevărate” sau „false”, deşi modelele adecvate
reţin doar caracteristicile „potrivite” ale realităţii pe care o reprezintă.”
2
Dicţionar de sociologie, coord. Cătălin Zamfir, Lazăr Vlăsceanu, Ed.Babel, Bucureşti, 1993,
p.365.
96
order for the construction of future models. With the international
system, there will never be identical contexts, situations, events or
decisions. „The same causes will never result in identical effects
because they can never form identical combinations.1
Rosenau’s proposed research pattern2 set out from the idea that,
irrespective of their number, the factors (variables, situations) that
may influence a state’s foreign policy can be grouped into five main
categories deemed to be decisive in the adoption of a political
decision:
1. the global, external environment
2. the societal environment (the type and mobility of a society, the
system of governmnent, the state of the nation, its economic and
social development, the power of public opinion)
3. governmental organizations (the institutional apparatus
interested in foreign affairs, bureaucracy and the hierarchies inside the
institutional apparatus)
4. the policy-makers’ assumed role3 (here we include the role
assumed by an institution as a foreign policy determining factor,
which also implies individual roles assumed by dint of one’s
awareness of belonging to a certain institution with a well defined role
in the making of foreign-policy decision)
5. the psychological profile of the members of an elite which has
the power to make and conduct foreign policy.
The five categories: external, governmental, societal, individual pshychological and role factors are the foreign policy sources
outlining a state’s conduct in international relations; in other words
these are the causes of foreign-policy behaviour, the effect of which
is the foreign-policy decision. A state’s external conduct becomes an
endogenous or dependent variable which represents the effect of the
indogenous or exogenous variables (the five categories of factors).
Independent variables interrelate and combine to determine the
adoption of a certain decision. These variables generate the necessity
1
Mattei Dogan, D. Pelassy, Cum să comparăm naţiunile, Ed. Alternative, 1993, p.198.
James N. Rosenau, Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy, The Scientific Study of
Foreign policy, Nichols, NY, 1980, p.115-169.
3
A pattern of conduct pertaining to a certain social position or status See Dicţionarul de
sociologie, Ed. Babel, 1993, p. 517.
2
97
of taking a certain political decision but also exert an influence on the
whole process: methodology, procedures and means. As for causality
in foreign policy decision-making, the many sociological,
psychological, individual and role factors, grouped under the generic
‚individual and role factors’, these are to Rosenau, sources or causes.
For a better understanding of his pre-theory, Rosenau used the
causality tunnel (Campbell, 1971:(See fig.1).
We consider sociological and psychological factors to be
potentially both external foreign policy sources and filters. Foreign
policy-makers, either individual or institutional, receive the
information that they need to make a certain decision from their
sources, but the output or the resulting foreign policy behavior is
directly determined by the decision-maker’s individual characteris
tics or by the corresponding role he plays inside each institution or
among institutions.
INPUT
Role filter
feedback
feedback
External sources
Individual filter
Societal sources
Governmental sources
Role filter
Individual filter
input
Role sources
Individual sources
OUTPUT
foreign policy
decision
Figure 1– An adaptation of the causality tunnel, Campbell, 1971
98
Similar categories of factors may simultaneously determine
different decisions, due to the different psychological and personality
traits of the decision-maker(s) and to the different perceptions they
have of their play-role in the decisional apparatus.
A state’s behaviour on the global stage cannot be determined by
the presence of a single category of factors. External foreign-policy
sources intertwine, have a similar bear on the decision-making process
and, moreover, influence each other.
As mentioned before, there are long-term national interests, and
implicitly, there are foreign policy objectives which must be attained
if the state is to exist, protect its own power and security, and play a
significant or a dominant role on the global stage. Designed to secure
the attaining of vital objectives of national interest, foreign policy
tends to be marked by „conservatism”, continuity, and a certain degree
of inflexibility in both decisions and action. Objectives can be
„desirable” but not „indispensable”. Attaining such objectives is a
matter of flexibility and compromise at both the decision-making and
action-taking level.
Whatever the foreign policy goal pursued, policy-makers have to
cope with the permanently ongoing changes in the operating
environment of the international system. In the outlining process of
foreign policies, decision-makers are supposed to provide real-time
response to varied situations caused by a multitude of external stimuli.
In other words, foreign policy sources, which influence the foreign
policy decision, are in turn under the influence of external stimuli.
The underlining process through which independent variables (the
input) turn into dependent ones (the output) is extremely complex. Its
complexitiy derives from both the diversity and the interrelatedness of
the sources and the great number of the decision-makers, societal
structures and organisation hierarchies involved in the decisionmaking process.
In certain analysts’ opinion, what characterizes American foreign
policy is continuity.1 This has always been a contentious subject as the
foreign policy play in Washington has long been based on
downplaying the former administration’s foreign policy as well as on
1
Kegley Charles, Wittkopf Eugene, American Foreign Policy, Pattern and Process, St.
Martin’s, 1982, p.7.
99
the new administration’s “loud heralding” of new initiatives and foreign
policy programs.
Pointing to US foreign policy, President Ford declared before
Congress, in 1975: ”There have been changes of course but not of
destination”. The United States’ position on the world stage, mainly
during the Cold War era, asked for consistent foreign policy
coordinates, for the preservation of the U.S. role as a global
watchdog and a guarantor of democracy worldwide. Changes
occured but only in times of crisis and were mostly in form (in the
ways and means), not in essence.
Institutional wars have been characteristic of the US foreign
policy under most administrations. The power play that US foreign
policy has played so far „follows a tribal-war pattern: an institutional
conflict drawing on a big democratic clan’s pride, interests, loyalties
and jealousy, aimed at preserving the United States’ political influence
and resorting to strategic scheming as a clinching argument. The
patterns of this conflict are clearly set in the national security troyka
formed by the Secretary of State, the DoD and the White House staff
for national security.1
Bibliography
1. Campbell, John, Franklin. The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory, N. York, Basic
Books, 1971.
2. Rosenau, James, N. Pre-theories of Foreign Policy: The Scientific Study of
Foreign Policy, Nichols, New York, 1980.
3. Viotti, Paul, Kauppy, Marc. International policy and world politics, Prentice
Hall Inc., 2001.
4. Henry Kissinger, American Foreign policy, N.York, Norton, 1977.
5. Modellski, George, A theory of Foreign policy, N York, Praeger, 1962.
6. Destler I, Gelb, Leslie. Lake, Anthony. Our own worst enemy; The making of
American foreign policy, New York, Simon Schuster, 1984.
1
Hedrick Smith, Jocul puterii, Editura Bic ALL, Bucureşti, p.574.
100
DEFENSE DIPLOMACY – A WAY OF PREVENTING
CONFLICTS
Asst.Prof. Tureac Cornelia, Asst.Prof. Bordean Ioan, PhD,
Asst.Prof. Grigore Aurica
“Danubius” University, Galaţi
Abstract
The current security environment proved that a war – in the classical sense
of the term - is not necessary for solving a conflict and sometimes other means
of solving are sufficient and appropriate. Among these there is the defense
diplomacy, a basic component of the state policy. The defense diplomacy is also
part of the international affairs of a state. The role, functions and an assessment
of this domain are the subject of the hereby presentation, referring also to the
attributions of the military attaché.
Keywords: security, diplomacy, defence, military attaché
In the contemporary political environment diplomacy plays an
essential role in the relationships between states. The military
confrontation between states has diminished as importance and as a
method of getting some desiderates and it has been replaced with
cultivating good relationships between states as actors of international
law. Diplomacy can be preventive or coercive, each of them with a
specific percent in certain moments. But the role of defense diplomacy
appears in both situations. The coercive component of diplomacy is
the attribute of alliances and coalition of states and sometimes of the
big and powerful states. Within preventive diplomacy the component
of military diplomacy is the one which builds trust needed to develop
political, economic and financial relationships between two states. The
best solution in preventing a confrontation of any kind is to identify
101
common interests and to extend cooperation in military field.
Developing mutual trust and consolidating the trust climate lead to
straightening the political-military relations. Mutual visits at the level
of armies, experts, exchanges of experiences, mutual training for
experts in different domains, participating in common exercises are
only a few stages to go before participating in concrete missions for
imposing and/or maintaining peace. While developing this delicate
and complex process, the military diplomat is the one who „feels the
pulse” of development of the relation and makes proposals on the
future evolution. The domain which constitutes the „barometer” of
trust development between the two armies is related to cooperation in
the field of military information. When two armies reach cooperation
in this field means that they reached a level of trust which allows them
to get to concrete actions in real battle fields.
Defense diplomacy has extended functions which interpenetrate
in many fields with the functions of diplomacy itself. Among these are
the following:
Identification of the ways and means of preventing crisis,
conflicts, their monitoring and management;
Participating in diplomatic negotiations to prevent crisis,
conflicts as well as in other negotiations until total end of
the pre and post conflict situation;
Promoting measures for arms control;
Promoting and implementing measures to control arms
export and technology;
Promoting and implementing measures to build trust
between states, armies and between states and international
organizations;
Developing cooperation program in the field of education
and training of civilians and military;
Efficient use of the concept of discourage;
Developing other means including military of tension
releasing and consolidating a climate of peace and trust
between states;
Strict application of the concepts of international and
humanitarian law.
Defense diplomacy is a component part of state diplomacy whose
102
external affairs are elaborated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For
this reason the military attaché is the main counselor of the
ambassador on military and politico-military issues. The military
attaché had the duty to inform the ambassador with respect to all
military or politico-military problems related to the relationship
between the two states.
Defense diplomacy has more roles, respective:
To increase the trust between states;
To assure activities of arms control;
To prevent proliferation of conventional weapons, of mass
destruction weapons, nuclear technologies and dual
technologies;
To prevent diplomatic, economic, technologic, military
surprise;
To prevent or reduce the risk of initiating conflicts;
To limit the evolution and effects of conflicts;
To propose and implement methods of ceasing conflicts;
To assure conditions for getting back to peace
environment;
To impose, maintain and consolidate peace;
To assure the application of the principle of international
and humanitarian law in all military actions.
The mail functions of external affairs on military level, respective
on defense diplomacy are the following:
a) Representing the army in exterior by official bodies such as
military attaché, military missions and representatives at
different military and international security organizations;
b) Maintaining and developing friendly relationships with
armies of allied and partner states;
c) Participating in realizing the dialog, the partnership and
cooperation with some military and international security
organizations;
d) Defending and promoting the state’s interests in relation
with military and politico-military subjects of international
relations;
e) Negotiating and concluding treaties and international
agreements of military and politico-military nature;
103
f) Informing by all legal means according to Convention of
Vienna on politico-military and military evolutions from
the accrediting state and these evolutions on international
level;
g) Participating in conferences, international seminars, round
tables, exhibitions and other public manifestations with
military or politico-military topic;
h) Participating with troops and/or observers in exercises
organized by alliances/coalitions or by states with which
Romania has relations of military cooperation.
Diplomatic mission is made up of different sections or offices
which correspond to a certain specialization of diplomats. Specialized
offices can enjoy certain autonomy.
The structure of a diplomatic mission is determined by the
legislation of the accrediting state but usually states establish offices
for their missions according to a preexisting practice. In Romania the
structure of a diplomatic mission is established by regulations
approved by the ministry of foreign affairs. Generally speaking the
structure of a diplomatic mission is as follows:
The Chancellery – the main body of mission. The
chancellery receives, elaborates and sends documents
which fall under the competence of the chief of mission. At
the embassies the chancellery is run of a counselor and at
legations by the first secretary.
The office of defense attache is liable of military and
politico-military relations between the two states.
Economic Department, which takes care of the economic
relations between the two states.
The office of the cultural attache, in charge with
promotion of social and cultural values of the represented
state in the acrediting state.
Press office, which represent the source of information
from mass-media for the diplomatic mission and for the
represented state.
Specialized offices, which represent different institutions
of the represented state (ministry of internal affairs,
intelligence etc).
104
Among the diplomatic personnel of the mission there are: chief of
mission, counselor ministers, secretaries, attaches.
The hierarchy of diplomatic ranks is the following: chief of
mission, counselor ministers, defense attaché, counselors, first
secretary, second secretary, third secretary, diplomatic attaché. A
distinction must be done between the defense attaché and diplomatic
attaché: the last mentioned represent the smallest diplomatic rank.
The defense attaché is part of the army forces of the represented
state but he/she is administrative subordinated to the chief of
diplomatic mission. From the point of view of his/her professional
activity, the defense attaché is subordinated to the Ministry of
Defense. He/she is the main counselor on security/defense issues of
the ambassador and has the duty to inform the ambassador
permanently on the problems of military or politico-military interest
from the accrediting state. He/she has the mission to permanently
assure the relation between the ministry of defense and the chief of
General Major State and the ambassador. The defense attaché
participates in all embassy activities.
Different from the other diplomatic agents who are active within
the mission, the defense attaché can communicate directly with the
Ministry of Defense if the transmitted information is military secrets.
The denomination of the defense attaché is given to underline the fact
that it represents the military and politico-military structure of the
army to whom it belongs and is the representative of the minister of
defense and the chief of General Major State.
Some states have only one officer as defense, military, aero and
naval attaché, some other have one attaché for each function. The
military, defense, aero and naval attaché can be only active military.
This attaché is the only one for which the agreement is asked for
accreditation. If the accrediting state relies negative tot he agreement
solicitation, there is no obligation to justify the taken measure.
The military, defense, aero and naval attaché of Romania has
mainly the following missions: diplomatic representation of the
Ministry of Defense and of Romanian Army in the accrediting
country, promoting the interests of Romanian defense industry,
collecting, exploiting, analyzing and transmitting information and
advising the ambassador in matters related to defense issues.
105
The military attaché has a special role in case of belligerency.
Establishing the belligerency condition imposes attitudes of the
defense attaché different towards those from peace condition. Passing
from peace condition to belligerency is done following a previous
warning. Within the Peace Conference in The Hague in 1907, at the
proposal of France the Third Convention was adopted and
denominated „Convention on hostility starting” which imposed itself
as an international norm. According to this Convention, warning must
be previous and without doubt and it is in fact a communication of one
state to another one saying that the peace condition stopped being
replaced by war condition.
The warning of the belligerent parties is done by two means:
motivated war declaration or ultimatum with conditioning war
declaration. The war declaration produces immediate effects between
the belligerent parties while the ultimatum is a notice for starting the
hostilities.
According to his/her duties, the military, defense, aero and naval
attaché plays the main role in transmitting or receiving information on
warning about the belligerency.
The military, defense, aero and naval attaché can be in situations:
as part of one of the belligerent states or as part of a third neutral state.
In the first situation, the belligerency presumes the breaking of
diplomatic and consular relations between the parties. The breaking of
diplomatic relations is not imposed by a norm of positive law but a
logical consequence of the belligerency condition because the
functions of diplomatic missions have no object anymore.
Establishing the belligerence condition does not necessarily mean
the breaking of diplomatic relationships. If the diplomatic missions of
the belligerent states have not been withdrawn, they might be the
authority for negotiations in order to finish faster the armed conflict.
Negotiations on military line are done by the governments of the
countries in conflict by the diplomatic agents, respective the defense,
military, aero and naval attaché.
If the defense, military, aero and naval attaché is part of a third
state, which is not actively involved in the armed conflict, he/she may
be nominated by the diplomatic mission of a belligerent state which
has no diplomats on the respective country, as a protector of it interests.
106
This norm of international law was translated from the diplomatic
law in the humanitarian law as the “institution of protection by the
third party” being stipulated in all four Conventions of Geneva.
The defense, military, aero and naval attaché has the following
duties:
a) To contribute
to application of the humanitarian
international law in development of military operations and
to control their respecting;
b) To visit and control the camps with war prisoners and
civilians in order to check the life conditions, the supplies
and health conditions, to assure the free communication
with their families and relatives;
c) To control or take measures to hospitalize the foreign
civilians and to take measures in case of criminal pursuing
against war prisoners and foreign civilians;
d) To check the supplying conditions in he occupied territory;
e) To perform investigations in case of violation of cultural
goods protection.
Therefore, the role of the defense diplomacy is an active, dynamic
one, with great responsibility both in peace and war condition and the
defense attaché is the main actor in this framework.
Bibliography
1. Convenţia de la Viena cu privire la relaţiile consulare, 1963.
2. Convenţia cu privire la relaţiile diplomatice, Viena, 1961.
3. Sergiu T. Medar – “Diplomaţia apărării”, Editura Centrului Editorial al
Armatei, Bucureşti, 2006.
107
BOOSTING NATO’S CAPABILITIES FOR DEFENCE
AGAINST TERRORISM
TA Raţiu Aurelian
e-mail: aurelian_ratiu@yahoo.com
Abstract
The fight against terrorism has become a key priority for Allies and
Partners alike. NATO also has a clearly stated, albeit rather general, resolution
on terrorism stating it is “protecting Allied nations’ populations, territories,
infrastructure and forces, and fighting terrorism together as long as necessary
and in all its forms”.
The debate about NATO’s role in fighting terrorism reflected two
contending approaches to terrorism: the war approach and the riskmanagement approach.
To better understand NATO’s potential and develop realistic expectations
for the organisation, we should consider where NATO fits in the broad fight
against terrorism from both structural and functional perspectives.
Structured international terrorism requires an international, multifaceted
and comprehensive response. The means at NATO’s disposal make it
undoubtedly one of the best equipped international organisations to deal with
the threat posed by transnational terrorism.
Keywords: structured international terrorism, concepts, plans
and programmes to fight against terrorism.
Today, the Alliance is engaged in an increasingly broad range of
activities, designed to promote cooperation with countries inside or
outside NATO and to confront proactively the new security challenges
of the 21st century, such as those posed by international terrorism and
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
108
The terrorist attacks against the United States of 11 September
2001 – in which passenger airliners were used as weapons of mass
destruction – brought home the way in which the security environment
has changed since the end of the Cold War and the vulnerability of
modern society to new security threats.
In response, the Allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty, for the first time, and moreover, since then, they have both
assisted the United States in its response to the terrorist attacks and
taken steps to enhance NATO’s capacity to deal with the threat posed
by international terrorism.
The destroyer capacity of terrorist organisations is growing
continually as terrorists prove themselves adept at using modern
technology for their own ends. In response, NATO Allies are working
together to develop new and improved technologies to combat this
increasingly sophisticated threat.
Using the Internet, terrorists have also developed sophisticated
and versatile communication techniques. And they have demonstrated
the expertise to fabricate explosive devices out of a wide range of
objects (from mobile phones to doorbells) and materials (from
military explosives to commercial dynamite) to improvised fertiliser
mixes.
The events of 11 September 2001 moved the fight against
terrorism right up NATO’s agenda and the Alliance has developed and
articulated a consistent policy with respect to terrorism. “We are
appalled by these barbaric acts and condemn them unconditionally.
These acts were an attack on our common values. We will not allow
these values to be compromised by those who follow the path of
violence. We pledge to undertake all efforts to combat the scourge of
terrorism. We stand united in our belief that the ideals of partnership
and cooperation will prevail” [1].
That policy, set out in Summit and ministerial statements and in
other decisions, combines forceful condemnation of terrorism in all its
forms, a commitment to unity and solidarity in the face of this threat,
and a determination to combat it for as long as is necessary.
The Alliance identified terrorism as one of the risks affecting the
security of its members in its Strategic Concepts in 1991 and 1999.
109
Then, NATO’s role in combating terrorism was refined in Prague
Summit 2002 with the development of a military concept against
terrorism, specific military capabilities to implement this new mission,
agreement on a Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T),
to exchange intelligence and to improve civil preparedness against
possible chemical, biological or radiological attacks against civilian
populations, to help deal with their consequences and a stated
willingness to act in support of the international community.
Through the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, EuroAtlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) states will identify, organize,
systematize ongoing and new EAPC and PfP (Partnership for Peace)
activities, which are of particular relevance to the international fight
against terrorism.
The principal objectives of the Partnership Action Plan against
Terrorism are to [2]:
• reconfirm the determination of EAPC states to create an
environment unfavorable to the development and expansion of
terrorism, building on their shared democratic values, and to assist
each other and others in this endeavour.
• underscore the determination of EAPC states to act against
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their willingness to
co-operate in preventing and defending against terrorist attacks and
dealing with their consequences.
• provide interested Partners with increased opportunities for
contributing to and supporting, consistent with the specific character
of their security and defence policies, NATO’s efforts in the fight
against terrorism.
• promote and facilitate co-operation among the EAPC states in
the fight against terrorism, through political consultation, and practical
programmes under EAPC and the Partnership for Peace.
• upon request, provide assistance to EAPC states in dealing
with the risks and consequences of terrorist attacks, including on their
economic and other critical infrastructure.
NATO, in a very short period of time, has made significant
progress in adapting every aspect of its work to face this threat.
Nearly all alliance documents and doctrines have been reviewed
in the light of the threat posed by terrorism. The most important new
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Alliance document in this connection is NATO’s Military Concept for
Defence against Terrorism that was agreed at the Prague Summit
(2002). With the approval of the Military Concept, defence against
terrorism became an integral part of the missions of the Alliance’s
forces.
The Concept identifies four different roles for military operations
for defence against terrorism. In each of the four roles, Force
Protection (FP) is an essential consideration. The four roles are [3]:
• anti terrorism, essentially defensive measures;
• consequence management, which is dealing with, and
reducing, the effects of a terrorist attack once it has taken place;
• counter terrorism, primarily offensive measures;
• military co-operation.
Accordingly, defence against terrorism includes activities by
military forces, to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against
terrorist attacks, or threats of attacks, directed from abroad, against
populations, territory, infrastructures and forces, including by acting
against terrorists and those who harbors them.
Firstly, NATO is capable of mounting a full range of significant
multinational military operations, including with respect to fighting
terrorism, due to its integrated military structure, capacity for
operational planning, and ability to call on a wide range of military
assets and capabilities. The Alliance is continuously building on the
experience and lessons learned through its ongoing operations linked,
directly or otherwise, to the fight against terrorism, including
Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean Sea, its operation in
Afghanistan, and the training mission in Iraq.
Secondly, the Alliance can continuously adapt its military
capabilities to new threats and risks. A couple of examples are the
creation of the NATO Response Force and the modernisation of the
command structure.
Of even greater concern is the interest of terrorist groups in
chemical and biological weapons, as well as in radiological (and
presumably) nuclear devices. The leaders of terrorist organisations
have been explicit in their desire to acquire and use weapons of mass
destruction. This is clearly of serious concern and a threat to all nations.
111
The Istanbul Summit provides an opportunity to review and
invigorate the implementation of the Partnership Action Plan against
Terrorism, in the context of a wider review of the objectives and
priorities of Partnership in relation to all threats and challenges to the
Euro-Atlantic security, including terrorism.
At the Istanbul Summit, in addition to other decisions taken to
enhance the Alliance’s capabilities against terrorism, NATO leaders
formally endorsed a Programme of Work for Defence against Terrorism
provides a framework for NATO’s cooperation in this area with all its
Partners. This Programme was launched by NATO’s National
Armaments Directors, who formally meet twice a year in a group known
as the Conference of National Armaments Directors or CNAD, and is
aimed at leveraging national expertise and research programmes to
develop new and improved technologies to combat terrorism.
Several key initiatives, including a deployable nuclear, chemical
and biological (NBC) analytical laboratory, an NBC event response
team, a virtual centre of excellence for NBC weapons defence, a NATO
biological and chemical defence stockpile and a disease surveillance
system, are being developed to improve NATO’s defences against NBC
weapons. In addition, a NATO CBRN Defence Battalion has been
formed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of
weapons of mass destruction, especially against deployed forces [4].
Allies states and partner’s states work together on how to manage
situations following a terrorist attack with weapons of mass
destruction. They also focus on protecting civilians, infrastructure
(bridges, buildings, tunnels, water supply systems, power generation
systems, ferries, embankments, weirs, jetties sluices, and many other
engineering works) and deployed NATO forces against the effects of
terrorist attacks that could include chemical, biological and
radiological agents.
Also, the Alliance provides a permanent forum for political
consultation, not only among the Allies but also with the Alliance’s
partners and other international organisations. These consultations
present a unified front against international terrorism, through sharing
information and intelligence, and collaborating when appropriate.
112
NATO’s commitment to work with Partners and other
international organisations against terrorism is reflected in a series of
initiatives and concrete measures.
NATO’s efforts to transform its military capabilities better to
carry out the full range of its missions also contribute to strengthening
the Alliance’s response to terrorism. This is especially the case in the
creation of the NATO Response Force, the new Command Structure
and the Prague Capabilities Commitment.
NATO operations have, directly or indirectly, shown the
Alliance’s preparedness and determination to act decisively against
the threat of terrorism.
Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s counter-terrorism operation
in the Mediterranean, launched in October 2001 in the context of the
invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, has evolved from a
small-scale deployment providing a modest military presence in an
important stretch of sea into a comprehensive, continuously adapting
counter-terrorism operation throughout the Mediterranean.
In the process, the Alliance has contributed to maintaining peace,
stability and security in a strategic region, obtained invaluable
experience of maritime interdiction operations and developed
increasingly effective intelligence-gathering and information-sharing
procedures relevant to the wider struggle against international terrorism.
In the intervening years, the operation, subsequently named Active
Endeavour, has become increasingly sophisticated as the Alliance has
refined its counter-terrorism role and integrated lessons learned in the
course of the operation. In this way, Active Endeavour’s mandate has
been regularly reviewed and its mission and force composition
adjusted to create an effective counter to terrorism throughout the
Mediterranean [5].
NATO-led operations in Afghanistan (International Security
Assistance Force – ISAF) and the Western Balkans (Kosovo – KFOR,
Bosnia and Herzegovina the residual NATO headquarters in Sarajevo,
the NATO headquarters in Skopje – the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and Tirana – Albania) is continuing to gather intelligence
on extremist and terrorist groups and help to prevent their
undermining efforts to establish peace and stability.
113
The experience that NATO has acquired in Active Endeavour and
other operations has given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in this
field. This expertise is relevant to wider international efforts to combat
terrorism and, in particular, the proliferation and smuggling of
weapons of mass destruction.
Another important capability for combating terrorism is effective
intelligence such as in Active Endeavour. This contributes to
providing a common understanding of the terrorist threats and the
preparation of appropriate responses to them. Enhancing intelligencesharing among Allies and Partners is, therefore, a high priority within
the Alliance.
Efforts have been undertaken to address issues related to
financing terrorism. A workshop in Geneva on “Combating the
Financing of Terrorism” highlighted that cooperation between States,
the Private Sector and International Organisations has but started and
needs to be further strengthened. There is a need for an integrated and
interdisciplinary approach both at the national and international level,
and partnership can make a useful contribution via Partnership Action
Plan against Terrorism that supports and complements the efforts of
other international organisations directly involved in this issue.
So, NATO already makes a major contribution to the fight against
terrorism; a contribution that has been enhanced by the political and
military impetus, guidance given at the 2002 Prague, 2004 Istanbul,
2006 Riga and 2008 Bucharest Summits. However, seven years after
the events of September 11, the Alliance still suffers from a lack of a
clear, forward-looking vision that would guide long-term planning.
This could be based on its strengths and resources related to the fight
against terrorism and defined around the Alliance’s core values and
the security priorities of its populations. Without such a long term
vision, NATO risks making a less effective and robust contribution to
this fight than would otherwise be possible – and desirable [6].
The last NATO’s Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism
was developed in light of the September 11 attacks; however the
threat has evolved considerably since then, in terms of changed
tactics, techniques, means and organisation of terrorist networks.
Although NATO continued to keep “fight against terrorism” among
its priorities and continued to adapt progressively its means and
114
capabilities, the Allies have not updated the Military Concept; nor
have they deemed it necessary to endorse a NATO Strategy for
combating Terrorism at the political level, based on the earlier
developments.
A NATO Strategy for combating Terrorism should clearly define
the nature of the current terrorist threat that the Alliance and its
members are facing. A political consensus on what type of terrorist
threat NATO member countries are most likely to face over the next 5
to 10 years should be established at the highest level.
References
[1] Statement by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, 12 September 2001, on
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-123e.htm.
[2] NATO Basic Texts, Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, Paragraph
9, on http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b021122e.htm, accessed at
14.08.2008.
[3] International Military Staff, NATO’s military concept for defence against
terrorism, http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/terrorism.htm,
[4] Marshall Billingslea, Combating terrorism through technology. In: NATO
Review (Special issue), “Examining NATO’s Transformation”, Spring 2005,
pp. 60-62.
[5] Roberto Cesaretti, Combating terrorism in the Mediterranean. In: NATO
Review, Autumn, 2005.
[6] Seda Gurkan, Time to get strategic on terrorism? In: NATO Review, April,
2008.
115
DOCTRINAIRE CAPABILITIES AND CONCEPTS.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A NEW GROUP OF
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS
TA Raţiu Aurelian
e-mail: aurelian_ratiu@yahoo.com
Abstract
Transforming the defense establishment and Romanian Armed Forces
remains a major strategic challenge. Operational concepts are a notion or
statement of an idea, an expression of how something might be done.
A future operational concept is a visualization of future operations that
describes how a commander, using military art and science, might employ
capabilities to achieve desired effects and objectives.
The Future Operational Concepts are intended to guide the transformation
of the joint force so that it is prepared to operate successfully against the most
important security threats it will face in the next 10 to 20 years.
Keywords: Future Operational Concepts, Decision Superiority,
Coherent Effects, Joint Deployment and Sustainment.
From 1990, consensus was growing that the Nation should put more
emphasis on transforming its military, even as it was drawing down its
force structure from Cold War–era levels. Today, many believed that the
information revolution, stimulated by advances in modern computing
power and associated effects, was fundamentally altering social,
economic, and political affairs and would do the same for military
capabilities. Defense leaders came to believe that transformation was
necessary to exploit the information revolution for a dramatic increase in
military capabilities.
116
Transformation is more than just acquiring new equipment and
embracing new technology. It is rather the all encompassing process of
thinking creatively in order to work better together with other parts of
the military and other agencies within the Government. It also means
working better with our numerous coalition allies, leveraging new
technologies and operational concepts in order to create NATO, Allied
and coalition advantage against current and potential future adversaries.
Transformation is a continuous process – not an end state it is about
change – that seeks to adapt to and master unexpected challenges in a
dynamic and shifting environment. Many nations have engaged in this
process for years, but change across NATO had been uneven,
inconsistent and uncoordinated. Transformation is a continuous process
that creates and maintains competitive advantage.
Transformation process will continue indefinitely. Those
responsible for defense transformation must anticipate the future and
wherever possible help create it. They must seek to develop new
capabilities to meet tomorrow’s threats as well as those of today.
DOD has defined transformation “as a process that shapes the
changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new
combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that
exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric
vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin
peace and stability in the world” [1].
MC 324/1, the document that in 2004 laid out the NATO military
command structure, defined transformation as a continuous and proactive process and involved developing and integrating innovative
capabilities to improve the effectiveness and interoperability NATO and
partner forces.
In the military context, capabilities is an all encompassing word but
for the alliance it means doctrine, organisations, training, material,
leadership, personnel, facilities and interoperability. Four principal
components of capability people, process, organisation and technology,
can be expanded to include additional capability building blocks.
Transformational capabilities are only obvious in retrospect. The
conceptual struggle to comprehend and anticipate the changing character
and conduct of war is always intense, as is the bureaucratic struggle to
acquire resources in support of any given vision of the future.
117
Transformation theorists argue that it is profitable, even indispensable,
to have a rich competition of ideas, concepts, and prototype systems in
order to stimulate innovation. Ultimately, however, some process for
picking the most promising initiatives for major investment
opportunities is necessary.
The defense transformation involves linking operational concepts,
organizations and technology development in order to ensure the base
capabilities. Overall, encompasses three major areas: how we do
business inside the military, how we work with our interagency and
multinational partners, and how we fight.
How We Fight? The Comprehensive Political Guidance, endorsed
by NATO Heads of State and Government on 29 November 2006, the
Strategy for Transformation (Bucharest 2007) and Joint Vision 2010
(Bucharest 2000) includes a detailed approach to force transformation,
or the transformation of how we fight. Force transformation depends on
the innovative development of future joint warfighting concepts and the
experimentation necessary to evaluate these new concepts under
rigorous combat simulation conditions at our various national training
facilities, incorporating lessons learned from recent operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq and other aspects of the ongoing global war on
terrorism.
In this way, new operational concepts would help senior
decisionmakers decide between competing investment options by
helping clarify which capabilities are most useful.
Complex and uncertain challenges in the strategic environment will
demand new ways of thinking, planning and acting. Driven by political
constraints, legal influences, and with the availability of new
technological capabilities, the focus will increasingly be on the effects
that need to be created in order to achieve the strategic campaign
objectives. Given these factors, future Alliance operations will be more
efficiently conducted by adopting an effects-based approach.
From an analysis of the elements of an effects-based approach to
operations, the conduct of such operations will require a new Joint
Operations Concepts Family and capabilities that are characterised by
the ability to achieve decision superiority, coherent effects and joint
deployment and sustainment.
118
A Joint Future Concept is a visualization of future operations that
describes how a commander, using military art and science, might
employ capabilities to achieve desired effects and objectives. A concept
may, after further development, experimentation, assessment and
refinement, lead to an accepted way of doing something.
Joint Operations Concepts: explores a wide range of capabilities
with a transformational mindset to enhance allies’ ability, as well as
dissuade, deter, or defeat potential adversaries; encourages exploration
beyond the boundaries of our current capabilities, foster progressive and
provocative new ideas and accept discord as part of the process; These
are not limited nor confinement by current or programmed capabilities.
This family (Joint Operations Concepts) consists of a Capstone
Concept for Joint Operations, which guides the following: Joint
Operating Concepts – address military problems associated with broad
joint force operations; Joint Functional Concepts – address broad
enduring functions across the range of military operations; and Joint
Integrating Concepts – address specific military problems associated
with narrowly scoped operations or functions.
The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) is written in
concept format, with a military problem and proposed solution. The
CCJO focuses on how the joint force will solve the military problem
while underscoring the importance of operating in concert with
Interagency and multinational partners to achieve broader objectives.
The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations heads the family of joint
operations concepts that describe how joint forces are expected to
operate across the range of military operations in 2010-2025. Its purpose
is to lead force development and employment primarily by providing a
broad description of how the future joint force will operate. Service
concepts and subordinate joint concepts will expand on the CCJO
solution. Experimentation will test the concepts and offer
recommendations for improvements across doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities
(DOTMLPF) and policy [2].
The joint concept community has developed a family of concepts in
the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and includes, in present, 26
operational, functional and integrating concepts.
119
Joint Operating Concepts (JOCs) – operational-level descriptions of
how a Joint Force Commander will accomplish a strategic mission
through the conduct of operational-level military operations within a
campaign. Applies the “capstone concept” solution and joint force
characteristics to a more specific military problem. Identifies challenges,
key ideas for solving those challenges, effects to be generated to achieve
objectives, essential capabilities likely needed to achieve objectives and
the relevant conditions in which the capabilities must be applied.
Since new capabilities can help make possible new concepts of
operation, and new concepts can help guide the development of new
capabilities, both concepts and capabilities need to be developed in light
of one another.
However, the overarching concept is too broad to describe the
different approaches that Romanian army and allied forces will take for
different reasons, which by extension require different capabilities.
Accordingly, the decisionmakers conduct the development of six
subordinate joint operating concepts: Homeland Defense and Civil
Support, Deterrence Operations, Major Combat Operations, Military
Support to Stabilization, Security Transition and Reconstruction
Operations, Irregular Warfare and Military Support to Cooperative
Security Engagement (under development) [3].
These six concepts broadened the traditional focus of the defense
establishment on deterring and winning wars.
Joint Functional Concepts (JFCs) describes how the future joint
force will perform a particular military function across the full range of
military operations. Functional concepts apply the Capstone Concept for
Joint Operations solution and joint force characteristics to the specific
military problem. They identify the required functional capabilities
needed to generate the effects identified in Joint Operating Concepts and
identify attributes needed to functionally support the future joint force.
Joint Functional Concepts are: battlespace awareness, command and
control, force application, focused logistics, force management, netcentric, force protection, joint training.
JFCs influences development of Defense Planning Scenarios and
provide the framework for the development of Joint Integration
Concepts.
120
Joint Integration Concepts (JICs) describe how a Joint Force
Commander will perform his operations or functions that are a subset of
Joint Operating Concepts and Joint Functional Concepts capabilities.
JICs have the narrowest focus of all Joint Future Concepts and describe
capabilities and decompose them into task level detail. An illustrative
vignette is applied to the JIC to describe the environment in which these
tasks will be performed. The standard of performance for these tasks is
described in a common taxonomy for concepts and capabilities.
Joint Integration Concepts integrates tasks, conditions and standards
about: Combating Weapons Mass Destruction (WMD), Joint Urban
Operations, Persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
(ISR), Joint Logistics – Distribution, Net-Centric Operational
Environment, Joint Command & Control, Seabasing, Joint Undersea
Superiority, Integrated Air and Missile Defense, Global Strike,
Defeating Terrorist Networks (under development), Strategic
Communications (under development).
Consequently, the overarching concept, originally called the joint
operations concept, is now referred to as the Capstone Concept for Joint
Operations. The joint operations concept was constructed around the
tenets of networkcentric warfare and effects-based operations in a joint
environment. It emphasizes high-quality shared awareness, dispersed
forces, speed of command, and flexibility in planning and execution.
The premise of the concept is that if allied forces fight first for
information superiority and to the future joint force commander will be
able to bring all available assets together rapidly to achieve desired
effects better. The concept assumes the availability of the requisite
information and the existence of more agile and rapidly deployable
forces that are characterised by the ability to achieve decision
superiority, coherent effects and joint deployment and sustainment [4].
Decision Superiority. The state in which better-informed decisions
are made and implemented faster than an adversary can react, allowing
the future joint force commander to shape the environment to best fit his
needs and objectives. Decision superiority is critically dependent on
achieving and maintaining a position of information dominance and
shared situational awareness during all phases of an operation. It enables
a better understanding of the operational situation than the adversary,
which means that the pace, coherence and effectiveness of operations
121
can be dramatically improved. Decision cycles once measured in days
will reduce to hours and perhaps minutes.
Coherent Effects. The state in which military forces are able to
integrate their capabilities with all the instru ments of Alliance power to
rapidly produce desired effects. Greater operational coherence will be
achieved by more closely harmonising military efforts with
international, national, and non-governmental agencies operating in the
theatre of operations. Coherent military effects are dependent on the
ability to effectively locate, observe, discern, and track objectives or
targets; generate desired effects; assess results; and, reengage with
decisive speed. More effective engagement at the earliest stages of a
crisis will require better situational awareness and be achieved through
continuous analyses, dialogue and consultation with nations and
militaries in possible conflict areas.
Joint Deployment and Sustainment. The state in which the Alliance
can deploy mission-tailored military forces in a timely manner wherever
they are needed and conduct continuous, distributed, non-contiguous
operations throughout an area of operations. Once deployed, the
Alliance will be able to sustain these forces over distance for as long as
required across the spectrum of conflict.
Three concepts (transformation goals) decision superiority, coherent
effects and joint deployment and sustainment have been identified to
transform NATO’s forces.
Seven operational concepts (transformation objective areas) will
support the achievement of these goals and will drive the development
of pertaining concepts and capabilities on the way to a coherent NATO
force. These are Effective Engagement, Joint Maneuver, Enhanced
Civil-Military Cooperation, Information Superiority, Network-Enabled
Capability, Expeditionary Operations and Integrated Logistics.
From the foregoing discussion, three operational concepts have
been identified as main contributors to Decision Superiority:
Information Superiority and NATO Network-Enabled Capability.
Information Superiority is a condition where an entity has the
information needed in time to assess, decide and act decisively.
Information Superiority requires the ability to acquire, take advantage of
and share information wherever and whenever needed. It depends
heavily on a NATO Network Enabled Capability to foster the exchange
122
of information[5]. Information Superiority is the capability to collect,
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while
exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.
NATO Network-Enabled Capability (NNEC) is the ability for any
entity involved in a network to reliably provide, access, share and
exploit trusted information, within a relevant time cycle. NNEC directly
supports the attainment of all three transformation goals and objective
areas through enabling networking and the conduct of net-centric
operations.
Coherent Effects is a state wherein forces have the ability to
integrate their capabilities with those of other instruments of power. To
arrive at this state, the concepts and capabilities encompassed by the
Effective Engagement, Joint Maneuver and Enhanced Civil-Military
Cooperation are necessary.
Effective Engagement and Joint Maneuver (provides a practical
application of Effective Engagement once the Alliance military
instrument of power is committed to control a crisis) can be described as
the prosecution of the right target, in the right manner, at the right time,
for the right reason to achieve the right effect for the situation.
Increasingly, accurate weapons, supported by precise targeting, will be
used to create the desired effects by lethal or non-lethal means, causing
minimal damage to civilian infrastructure or loss of life. A high priority
in Alliance research and development, procurement and training must be
given to accurate weapons and precise targeting methods. By leveraging
knowledge and decision superiority with effective engagement, the
Alliance will significantly increase the speed and efficacy of its
operations. Importantly, this capability will also facilitate rapid postconflict stabilisation and reconstruction
Joint Maneuver is the expeditionary projection and sustained
application of Coherent Effects. Joint Maneuver directs the rapid,
precise, and continuous employment of Alliance military and nonmilitary effects. The objective of Joint Maneuver is to provide to the
Alliance forces, positional (spatial, temporal, and cognitive) advantage
over an adversary to achieve operational military and political objectives
or the most effective positioning from which to accomplish the security
or humanitarian mission.
123
Enhanced Civil-Military Cooperation. New capabilities required to
succeed in low-intensity conflicts must be acquired, as it is likely that
peace support, stabilisation and reconstruction operations will be the
most frequent actions undertaken in the future.
Civil organisations in post-conflict situations – ranging from
governments to non-governmental organisations – often find themselves
having to interact with military forces. Although both civil and military
actors are required to build stability, many complex issues arise from
operating in the same geographic area. The interface between civil
organisations and military forces is referred to as civil-military
coordination, or CIMIC.
Informal and occasional interactions need to be replaced by
concerted and coordinated political, military, civil and economic
approaches between NATO and non-NATO entities; NATO must
therefore adopt a broad approach to the civil-military dynamic that gives
comprehensive consideration to the full range of international, national
and regional actors at all levels of interface (political, political-military,
military strategic, operational and tactical). Future relationships should
be based on formalized, permanent engagement and will assist the
Alliance’s understanding of the civil environment, and ensure a greater
ability to cooperate, coordinate and communicate with, and operate
alongside civil actors [6].
An Effects-Based Approach to Operations indicates that the conduct
of such operations will require forces and capabilities characterised by
the ability to achieve joint deployment and sustainment. From within
this context, the operational concepts of Expeditionary Operations and
Integrated Logistics are derived
Expeditionary Operations describes the conceptual ability of
Alliance forces to deploy (and redeploy) sufficient task-tailored forces
when and where required [7].
The Alliance must have the ability to mount military operations
beyond NATO boundaries over extended distances with the possible
absence of secure lines of communication and/or host nation support to
meet the challenges of the future.
Expeditionary Operations connotes more than the mere capability of
forces to deploy when directed. Rather, it is a broad concept that
124
influences all aspects of organizing, training, and equipping by
acknowledging the requirement to adapt to the mission conditions.
Integrated Logistics is the ability to provide the joint force the right
personnel, equipment, and supplies in the right place, at the right time,
and in the right quantity, across the full range of military operations.
This will be made possible through a real-time, web-based information
system providing total asset visibility as part of a common relevant
operational picture, effectively linking the operator and logistician
across Services and support agencies. Through transformational
innovations to organizations and processes, focused logistics will
provide the joint warfighter with support for all functions.
These concepts will be translated into requirements and plans
through the defence planning process and incorporated into training
programmes set within the context of an effects-based approach to
operations across the spectrum of conflict.
References
[1] Apud, Ronald O’Rourke, Defense Transformation: Background and
Oversight Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress, Updated 9
Noiembrie 2006, on http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32238.pdf, p. 6,
accessed at 14.08.2008.
[2] Department of Defense, USA, Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, 2005,
on
http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf,
p. vii, accessed at 14.10.2008.
[3] http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/joc.htm accessed at 14.10.2008
[4] Strategic Vision: The Military Challenge, NATO Public Diplomacy
Division, 2006, pp.11-12.
[5] Final draft, Concepts for Alliance Future Joint Operations, August, 2005,
p. 19.
[6] Ibidem, p. 13.
[7] Doctrine for the Deployment of Forces – AJP 3.13 (Final Draft) dated 14
April 2005.
125
RIGHT EXTREME
THREAT TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY
Jr.TA. Munteanu Nicoleta Anne Marie
“Lucian Blaga” University of Sibiu
Abstract
The world is into an economical and political crisis, as well as it is in an
ideological crisis. Even if we are exploring the free capitalist market`
conceptions, even if we are evaluating the liberalism, the state intervention or
the traditional theories of the Three World development, all these seem to
appear to become more an more irrelevant, while the events are going to go
over the theoretical statements. This ideological crash could represent a
necessary phase for future new ideologies.
The recent period shows us a peculiar situation in Europe for the last
decades. The right extremists seem to be more desirous to show their intentions.
Will try to define the main elements of the right movement, from a theoretical
view, and also to see in a comparative way the actual situation in some of the
European countries, where the right extreme continues to become powerfully.
Will see how these is movements affect the European security.
Trying to define the right extreme was influenced by the
reactionary-traditionalist developments dynamics of the XIXth Europe
century. Looking from this point of view, the right extreme parties are
considered as reactionary, based on the right definition as making a
stand against the progress, but also on the differentiation between
conservative-right extreme1. After the second war ending, there were
voices which claimed that were buried for always all the ideas
associated to the right extreme2; after 1945, although there were right
1
Hosbawm, Eric, Secolul extremelor, Ed. Lider, Bucuresti, 1994, p. 139.
Tismăneanu, Vladimir, Fantasmele schimbării. Democratie, nationalism si mit în Europa
post-comunistă, Ed. Polirom, Iasi, 1999, p. 42.
2
126
extreme parties, these had a short success in election period. For many
years, right movements were associated with the Nazism. The victory
against Germany and its allies was followed by a major ostracism
grade beside the right organizations; practical, these were eliminated
from the European political life. At the end of the `70th, the right
extreme parties know a powerful popularity ascension in Western
Europe; this fact got back in actuality the literature about the right
extreme, which can identify the background of its development. After
this period, it is shown that the actual right extreme doesn’t include
parties which are the on-going of the similar parties of the inter-war1
period, because are not having a fascistic ideology. Thus, we can
affirm that the right extremism become a self ideology.
Concerning the terms ”right” and ”left”, it is important to present
the Alvin Toffler point of view who consider that these terms are
”relicts of the industrial period, which now start to become history.
”Right” and ”Left” are determinated by who has what – how the
richness and poverty were divided in the industrial system. (...).
The”right/left” terminology was always one-dimensional. Today, it is
more out of shape as it was”2. The existence of one ideological body,
called the right extreme, is the main characteristic of the right extreme
parties. We must say that there is not an accepted definition of the
right ideology; there are some elements which can be found in almost
all the actual definitions: nationalism, ethnocentrism, racism,
xenophobia and anti-democratic attitude3. Defining the right extreme
is also different because of the geographical area: trying to answer the
question ”which are the main characteristics of the right extremism in
Western Europe?”, the study made by Meijerink, Mudde and van
Holsteyn came to the next conclusions: the right ideology is having
two main features: the first one defines the relations between in-group
and out-group (including racism, xenophobia and nationalism); the
1
Ignazi, Piero, The Silent Counter Revolution, European Journal of Political Research, 1992,
p. 9-12.
2
Toffler, Alvin, Previziuni si premise, trad. de Mihnea Columbean, Ed, Antet, 1996, p. 84.
3
Mudde, Cas, Rigt-wing Extremism Analyzed. A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of
the Three alleged Right--wing Extremist Parties. European Journal of Political Research, no.
27, 1995, p. 203-224.
127
second one determines the hierarchic relations (including the
nationalism and authoritativeness)1.
The right extreme parties’ features from the post-communist
period are: rejecting the democratical institutions and political
pluralism (anti-system attitude), nationalist orientation, xenophobia,
racism, preference for a powerful state. Another difference in regard
to the similar occidental movements, is the implication tendency of
the state, not only in social and political ground, but also in
economical2. Promoting the nationalism, decelerate the European
Union institutions, stoping the immigration coming, the battle against
the Islam process in Europe, are only few of the main ideas which
have the role to win more sympathizers. We have to remember what
happened in Wien, in autumn of 2005, when there was a close door
meeting of the parties and nationalists movements of the right extreme
from Europe, having the purpose to initiate, then, a group in European
Parliament and an ”International Nationalist”. The Liberty Party from
Austria had this initiative; there were ten organizations of right
extreme, from seven countries. The meeting was finished through a
declarations which claimed: an instantly stoping of the European
Union extension process, the abandonment of the European
Constitution, concrete actions of defending Europe against threats as
terrorism, aggressive Islam, the imperialism of big powerful countries
and the economical aggression of the countries concerning the low
work costs. If we take a look now, after three years, it is enough to see
the negative vote given to the European Constitution or the elections
results in Austria, so we can admit a minimal evolution and a minimal
effect at that meeting in 2005.
In order to present the potential risks to the European security, we
will look forward, in a comparative way, the situation in some of the
European countries, where the right extreme is pregnantly developed.
Will start by presenting the right extreme situation in Hungary, which
had become more and more aggressive; in 2006, because of the 50th
1
Meijerink, Frits, Mudde, Cas si van Holsteyn, Joop, Right-wing Extremism, Acta Politica,
vol. 22, no. 2, 1998, p. 165-178.
2
Irvine, Jill A., Nationalism and the Extreme Right in the former Yugoslavia, în Luciano
Cheles, Ferguson Ronnie i Michalina Vaughan, The far Right in Western and Eastern
Europe, Ed, Longman, London and New York, 1995, p. 145-174.
128
anniversary of the 1965 events, more then 30 right extreme groups
called its own sympathizers in the street; was a marathon
manifestation which accomplished with store breakages, cars arsons
and violent collations with the order forces. Very well organized,
more then 10,000 sympathizers have demonstrated in front of the
public opinion that the right extreme in Hungary has resurgence with
its own xenophobia elements and an irredentist character. At the end
of the August 2007, in Budapest was created and legitimated the first
paramilitary organization of right extreme, ”The Hungarian Guard”1;
the founder members are personalities and preeminent political groups
in the Hungarian society, jointed by the desire to fight for reestablishment of ”The Big Hungary”; they promote very clear
territorial demands, extremely alarming for the borderer states. This
type of speech is dominated of racist and xenophobic accents.
This phenomenon is not singularly in the East Europe, the
extremist nationalism being found in many other places. The
extremists have passed from the harmless actions: setting up the
paramilitary groups, killing the immigrants, blackmailing the
politicians. The Hungarian Guard caused a big and anxious wave for
Hungary neighbors as: Slovakia, Serbia and Romania. The German
newspaper “Die Tegeszeitung” wrote at that time: ”The right
extremism from the East Europe is more than a tremendous ghost
which is knocking to our doors. The communist regime collapse left
behind, in many central and East-European countries, an ideological
void”2. In order with the Hungarian Report for the National Security,
on 2007, the right extreme organizations from Hungary become more
and more aggressive, because there is the will to have weapons, but,
for now, the demarche went under.
In Bulgaria, the prosecution released in the autumn of 2007 an
investigation about alleged ”national guard”, after what, for many
months, the streets were not save anymore because of the right
extremists3. The former leader of the Bulgarian National Alliance1
Vladimir, Alexe, Garda Ungariei si proliferarea extremismului în Europa de Est, în
”Adevărul”, nr. 4106 din 08.12.2007.
2
George, Jiglău, Ce loc are extremismul în Uniunea Europeană?. în Tribuna, nr. 123 (16-31
octombrie 2007).
3
Dan, Stefan, Si în Bulgaria exista o ”gardă natională” extremistă”, în ”Cronica Română”,
nr. din 03.09.2007.
129
BGNS – right organization, Bujan Rassate, established in march 2006
”the defense troops”, as an armed arm of this alliance, having the
purpose to promote the Bulgarian nationalism and the cooperation
with the nationalists out of the Bulgarian borders. The group
organized military manifestations in schools, universities and public
spaces. The Bulgarian guard is responsible of nightly raids in gipsy
neighborhood; though, the organization leader affirmed that wants to
help the Bulgarians against the gipsy gangs. The conflicts degenerated
in august 2007, when, during a raid, more persons were hurt. The
group leader is sustained by the Bulgarian nationalist party ATAKA,
which members are parliamentarians1.
We are getting use to speak more often in France about the Jean
Marie Le Pen Extremism, which speech is described by some
elements: xenophobia, anti-immigrations and anti-European accents.
The fever heat of this character was in 2002, in the second tour of the
presidential elections, when he affirmed that he will get out France
from the European Union, if he becomes president. This aspect
produced concernment on the French society and not only.
In Italy, GAPE – the armed group for ethnically purification
claimed the 10 to 11 of august 2008 night fire proof, in a gipsy camp
in Livorno, when four gipsy children, Romanian origin died2. The
group leaders affirmed the effect should have been more murderous,
its purpose being gypsies’ removal of the Italian territory. They also
announced that every month will be an attempt in a different camp,
with more murderous consequences. More than that, they have given
an ultimatum for migrants to leave the Italian territory.
In Switzerland, The Swedish Popular Party proposes deportations
by Nazi inspiration; the plan has the purpose to expulsion of whole
immigrant’s family if one of its members is on trial for violent facts,
drugs delicts or malversation. The party started a crusade for
signatures additions in order to organize a referendum on this issue.
Similar practices were in the case of the Stalinist purges and Cultural
Revolution in China, between 1966 and 1976. In 2004, The Swedish
Popular Party succeeded to urge tightening of the immigrations laws,
1
Andrei, Bădin, Vadim, Ataka si Le Pen în Parlamentul European, in newstoday.ro nr.
10.10.2007.
2
Alex, Nedea, Ce-am căutat aici, Doamne?, în ”Jurnalul National”, 14.09.2008.
130
using the image of a black hand which crossover a bowl full with
Swedish passports.
In Germany, the right extreme conscripts in September of this
year, when in Köln was the ”anti-Islamization” congress, having the
purpose to defend the cultural and Christian values at the Europe and
also to protest against the big number of Islamic people. Organized by
the organization ”Pro Köln”, which denounces the Germany
”Islamization”, the meeting had important figures of the radical
European right extreme; there was a surprise, though, in absence of
Jean Marie Le Pen, the president of the National French Front. The
former vice-president of the European Commission, Franco Frattini
has declared for the German newspaper ”Bill am Sonntag”1 that
Germany, and also France, Belgium, Denmark and Italy are counting
as the European Union States where the right extreme is a real
problem. Conforming to some social study in 2006, on 885 samples,
minimum age of 18 years, on the former East Germany, 74% of the
interrogated persons took an interest in a xenophobic attitude.
Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest) is the Flemish party which is
having the best results on the last elections2; it is self-stated as socialpopular also called as being of right extreme. From the others parties
point of view, Vlaams Belang should be isolated because of its
antidemocratically tendencies – xenophobia accusations, racism; this
party participate to all right extreme meetings, being considered very
important. At the beginning of 2008, it was the host of an event
organized in Belgium, Anvers, where participated the European right
extremists leaders; they laid the foundations of “Towns against
Islamization” organization.
In Austria, the right extreme re-emergence owed, first of all, the
anti-immigration, xenophobic and anti-European Union campaign, but
also because of the electors’ disappointment towards the disintegrated
government and thin campaign of the ecological party. The population
fear because of the health losing was taking as an advantage by the
extremists, which were having a populist speech. The right extremists’
success caused concernments in Brussels, worried because a 2000
script repetition; then, the party headed by Jorg Haider was appealed
1
2
Alex, Nedea, Ce-am căutat aici, Doamne?”, în ”Jurnalul National”, 14.09.2008.
Eva, Galambos, Secesionismul amenintă Europa, în ”Adevărul, 12.09.008.
131
on governance, and, because of that, Austria was isolated inside the
European Union. According the Gallup polls1, almost half of
Austrians received with a grain of salt the solutions proposed by the
big powerful countries. This situation was taken as an advantage by
the right extreme organization leaded by Heinz Christian Strache,
which promised to put an end to the social problems, being based,
mostly, on abatement or even dismission of the social aids for the
strangers which demand refuge. The extremist leader death, Jorg
Haider, on 11th of October 2008 is still under a big answer sign. His
disappearance could bring back Austria in front of a new ballot2.
After the communism collapse, the European political medium
suffered dramatically changes; the European rebuilding, and its values
spaces and principles extension to the out of ”iron curtain”, become
important terms of references. One of the major dangers to the
European security is represented by the inter-ethnical conflicts in
Central and East Europe, as it is sustaining by the new NATO concept
definition. Those conflicts source is, among others, aggressive
nationalism resurrection, intolerance and totalitarian ideologies, as is
presented in the Wien Declaration of the state leaders and
government, members of the European Council, on 9th of October
1993. This is the reason why, the officials, concerned of aggressive
nationalism development and ethnocentrism, adopted the Declaration
and Action Plan, for combating xenophobia, anti-Semitism, bigotry,
taking the pledge to fight against all ideologies, politic and practice
which constitute incitation race hatred, violence and discrimination3.
We consider that this issues of the aggressive nationalism is a
major security problem, especially after the inter-ethnical accessions
in former communist space, and not only there. For the European
security, the ethnically nationalism is not in an absolute way
dangerous, if it is identified only with those political beliefs which are
dealing with the state as a national base. Can be eligible if it reduce at
the fact that your own nation is unique or special and is normal to be
proud of that; but, if it is evolving to the right extreme, where one
1
Mătăchită, Mihaela, Legislative in Austria. Luptă dură pe extrema dreapta, în ”Jurnalul
National”, nr. din 20.09.2008.
2
Anthony, Mihai, Extrema austriacă, îndoliată”, în „Adevărul”, nr. din 12.10.2008.
3
Comisia Europeană împotriva Rasismului si Intoleranţei:www.ecri.coe.int
132
nation is superior to other, the ethnically nationalism becomes
dangerous and a possible attempt to the European security. Asbjorn
Eide, ECOSOC, said ”the most malignant manifestation of the ethnonationalism in recent history was the fascism, especially the Nazism
since 1933 till 1945 (...); an ideology can be considered malignant
when is possible to go to important violations of the human rights”1.
Extremist forces are concerned almost in every state of the
European Union, most of its expressing especially in the parties
systems medium. The European extremists have, in this moment, a
European voice through the group “Identity, Heritage, Sovereignty”2
of the European Parliament, which includes some of the extremist
parties of the European Union states – we already spoke about its.
Also the principles are the same: accreditation of the different
identities inside the European Union and also of the national interest
of each country, the opposition towards unitedly and red tape Europe.
In the European politics, the extremism remains a constant and a
threat to the European security. For counter the negative effects, we
have to reconsider the causes of the extremist movements in every
European country. The events movement will prove us the risks of the
right extreme actions, not only for the stability in the countries where
it exists, but also for the whole European security system.
This issue, from our point of view, should be brought to heel to an
empirical delimitation, which should not interfere with needless
emotions and flames; in the same time, our opinion is that an
important accent has to be put on the right of free speech, domain
which should dominate, in the same time with conformation to each of
one rights and freedoms.
Bibliography
[1] Irvine, Jill A., Nationalism and the Extreme Right in the former Yugoslavia,
în Luciano Cheles, Ferguson Ronnie şi Michalina Vaughan, The far Right in
Western and Eastern Europe, Ed, Longman, London and New York, 1995.
[2] Ignazi, Piero, The Silent Counter Revolution, European Journal of Political
Research, 1992.
1
2
ECOSOC: http://www.edrc.ro/docs/docs/provocdivers/092-127.pdf
http://europa.eu/generalreport/ro/2007/rg108.htm
133
[3] Meijerink, Frits, Mudde, Cas şi van Holsteyn, Joop, Right-wing Extremism,
Acta Politica, vol. 22, no. 2, 1998.
[4] Mudde, Cas, Rigt-wing Extremism Analyzed. A Comparative Analysis of the
Ideologies of the Three alleged Right--wing Extremist Parties. European
Journal of Political Research, no. 27, 1995.
[5] Tismăneanu, Vladimir, Fantasmele schimbării. Democraţie, naţionalism şi
mit în Europa post-comunistă, Ed. Polirom, Iaşi, 1999.
[6] Toffler, Alvin, Previziuni şi premise”, trad. de Mihnea Columbean, Ed,
Antet, 1996, p. 84.
http://www.edrc.ro/docs/docs/provocdivers/092-127.pdf
http://europa.eu/generalreport/ro/2007/rg108.htm
134
CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE
JOURNALISTS PROTECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW. EFFECTS
ON MASS-COMMUNICATION
Jr.TA. Munteanu Nicoleta Anne Marie
Abstract
Also called war law or armed conflicts law – jus ad bellum – the
international humanitarian law is one of the oldest parts of the international
public law. In actual conditions, of the century and millennium beginning, the
international humanitarian right is often called the king of the human rights.
The journalists’ protection in conflicts zone is dealing with humanitarian
international law, because of the civil affiliation of the journalists. Is there
possible for the humanitarian international right to protect, through rules a
regulations, to protect a war correspondent? Or is demanding other institutions
to concur on this purpose?
Also, these aspects are having effects on mass-communication, especially
on the message and receiver. As more as a journalist is protected, as more the
communication will be a better one.
International humanitarian law is a distinct discipline inside the
public international law, along with year of 1864, through enactment
of the first humanitarian convention1. Associating the justice with the
war presume facing between two contrary realities: military
emergency and humanitarian laws2. If the first one acts according to
1
Convention for the Improvement of the Militaries Murted Status of the Armed Forces in
Campaign, Geneva, 1864, in vol. ”Humanitarian Intenational Law of the armed conflicts,
documents”, Ed. Sansa, 1993.
2
Scaunas, Stelian, Drept international public, Ed. 2, Ed. C.H. Buck, Bucuresti, 2007, op.cit.
135
the criterion ”burst as much as you can”, the last one send us to the
life respect ”protect and save as much as you can”. These two
perspectives about the war took shape inside of jus ad bellum – right –
at war and of jus in bello – the right of war, which defines belligerents
behavior after the war beginning. International humanitarian law is
applied in the armed conflict estate. In these situations are applicabled
The Geneva Conventions – all the world states are parts and the First
Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Also, the
humanitarian law is called The Right of Geneva1. The codification of
the war customs started in the XIXth century, containing two judicial
rules systems: the Haga law and the Geneva law2.
The distinction between equitable an unjust war has lost the
importance today, when the international law call in question war
right of the states and punish the force using in international relations.
Though, the war continues to be a grisly reality of present days, which
reclaim young lives in the name of some foolishness3.
The war doesn’t involves a relationship between one man and
another, but one between a state and another, where the individuals
are enemies only casual, not as human beings or as citizens, but only
as soldieries…”4. From this premise we want to start in presenting the
international protection of the journalists in the middle of the armed
conflicts.
A sentence affirms that the truth is the first victim of the war. Will
be the second victim that one who makes the truth known for the
public opinion?
The protection which is provided by the international
humanitarian law rules consists in that the journalists, being in a
professional mission in a operations field, is considered to be a civil;
so, the journalist benefits of all the rights attached to this statute. In
these conditions, molestations or killing are considered war crimes.
1
Closca, Ioan, Ion, Suceavă, ”Drept international umanitar”, Ed. Sansa, Bucuresti, 1992, p.
11.
2
Gasser, Peter, ”International Humanitarian Law”, Henry Dunant Institute, 1993, p. 7.
3
Vlad, Monica, Death and state. The perspective of one Outsider over the art. 9 of Japan
Constitution, in ”International public Law Review” of the Faculty of Law ”Simion Barnutiu”,
Sibiu, 2002.
4
Jean Jacques Rousseau, A Treatise on the Social Contract, Book I, cap. IV, citat de Hans
Gasser, International Humanitarian Law, Henry Dunant Institute, 1993, pg. 7.
136
The protections rules applied on the civil population and on the
civil person’s individual are decisive: the civil person has an absolute
immunity as long as doesn’t participate to a hostility act1. In case is
captured, the journalist has to be treated as a war captive, keeping the
civil statute; there is a condition: to have a identification card, given
by the military authorities of his own country2. The journalist’s
activity in an intern or international conflict always presume risks, in
some cases even looked by the journalist himself. Through war
captive we understand any person who was part of armed forces of a
belligerent part and who was captured by the enemy forces. The
agents and mercenaries (persons recruited in their own country to fight
in an armed conflict, which participate in a direct way to the hostilities
to obtain personal advantage) aren’t considered captives.
The order of the land war laws and customs of 1907 provides that
the war captives are in the enemy government power, and not in the
power of who captured them. The captives have to be treated in a
humaneness way and repatriated. The Geneva Conventions provide
that they should be protected against the tortures, the life and dignity
attempt, the summary executions3. The journalists are considered civil
persons; the civil population contains all the civil persons4. In this
category we can include all the persons on a territory, who are not part
of armed forces. We will present some protection rules of a civil
persons and population. Either civil population or civil persons
shouldn’t be the attack purpose. The acts or violence threats which
have the purpose to spread terror are forbidden. The civil persons
aren’t protected when are participating on hostilities; there are
forbidden no discriminations attacks.
The journalists’ protection5 refers to those one who are in the
dangerous professional missions in the armed conflict and they are
considered as civil persons; the journalists will be protected, as civil
persons, on condition of doesn’t initiate any actions in contradiction
1
Romcea, Mihaela, Evolutia istorică a dreptului international umanitar, în ”Curentul Juridic”
nr. 3, Târgu Mures, 1998, p. 50.
2
Idem, pg. 51.
3
Vlad, Monica Drept international public, Ed. Servo Sat, Arad, 2002, pg. 207.
4
Protocolul additional I, Geneva, 1977, art. 50, paragraph 1.
5
Scaunas, Stelian, La protection internationale des journalists pendant les conflicts armes, in
Studii de drept international public, Ed. Burg, Sibiu, 2006, p. 265.
137
with their statute and without giving up the approved war
correspondent. Those are under the benefit of art. 4 align. (4) of The
3rd Convention (1949). The journalist quality must be certificated by
an identification card released by their own government or the
territory they have residence or where the agency/press company
functions.
The international law can not protect the journalist by the
consequences of a free but dangerous decision. Through The
Declaration adopted in 1996, The European Council reasserted that all
the journalists working in conflict and tension situations benefit of all
the international law rules, of The International Convention of Human
Rights and of all the international instruments.
Between 1949 and 1777, in Geneva, four conventions1 and two
protocols were adopted2; these are today the fundamental documents
on the humanitarian international law and protect the war victims:
hurt/sick military staff, invalids, wrecked in a maritime fight, medical
staff, war captives, civil population etc. Through an Unite Nation
Convention project is provided the amelioration of the journalists
situation during the dangerous missions, by a special statute, where
the parts being in conflicts to make all the best for: presuming the
protection against the dangerous situations specific to the war;
warning the journalist to keep out of the dangerous fields; endowment,
in a detention case, of the same treatment as it is in The Geneva
Convention3; giving the information about journalist in case of death,
disappearance, imprisonment; these elements are specific for a
personal category which gives assistance to the conflict victims, as the
staff from civil protection, sanitary religious staff.
Like any other armed conflict, anywhere in the world, the tribute
paid by the press correspondents runs high alarmingly. In a report of
the organization ”Reporters without Borders” it is shown that between
1992-2002, 531 journalists lost their lives during the profession
exercise, more than half in a war areas, especially in Algeria, Rwanda,
1
Kalshoven, Frits, Contrains on the Waving of War, International Committee if the Red
Cross, Geneva, 1991
2
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventios of August 12, 1949 and Resolutions of the
Diplomatic Conference from 1974, Geneva, 1996.
3
Idem.
138
Balkans and Columbia. 73 percents of them were killed during the
dangerous missions, being taken captives and deliberately in the
weapons eye slit. Most of the victims were in the written press
journalists (61 percents), The local journalists represent 87 percents of
those who were killed. In all the world regions, the journalism is put
on hard attempt through the security degradation at the global level,
living in the terrorism and war shadow1. So, being a journalist in these
fields becomes more dangerous.
The International Journalists Federation consider that the
journalists protection is an issue which demands a special
preoccupation, so the media factors should be ready, assured and to
hold specifically equipment when they are engaged to air from the
operations theatres. According to The professional Code Concerning
the Security Guarantee during the Journalist Exercise Profession
(made by the big media groups as CNN, BBC, Reuters and Associated
Press), the journalists and media technicians will have the benefit of a
specific equipment for all the missions, including a first-help handbag,
specific carriage and protection clothes2.
The map of the independent journalist security in the tension or
conflict area was elaborated in march 2002 by the organization
”Reporters without Borders”, in collaboration with The International
Red Cross Committee, European Council, OSCE and UNESCO, but
also the journalists syndicates. There are eight main proposals:
engaging media; the journalists’ possibilities to search for specific
ways to measure and limit the risks; departure of the journalist of his
own will; specific equipment; medical assurance; repatriation;
disability and decease; psychological sustaining and the judicial
protection3.
The years of 2003, on world level, was tragically because of the
big number of the bounded and threaten journalists: 1460 bounded or
threaten; more then 500 media were censorship. During the Vietnam
War (1964-1975) and in the Cambodia 60 journalists were killed. The
Yugoslavian War (1990-1995) made 94 dead among journalists and
1
Ripa, George, Jurnalisti împuscati în Georgia, în ”Adevărul”, 16.08.2008.
Barry, W., The Military-Media Connexion: For better or for Worse, în ”Military Review”,
USA, vol. 78, nr. 6, dec-feb, 1999, p. 14-20.
3
http://www.crucearosie.ro/
2
139
media collaborator. In the Golf War (1991) 4 journalists were killed in
the fights after the post-war period. In the Afghanistan War (2003) 8
journalists died in only two weeks1. On 3rd of May, 2004, 133
journalists were imprisoning in custodies of 22 countries: Cuba-29,
Iran-12, and Birmania-11. From the 2004 beginning, 13 journalists
were killed all over the world. In the first months of the year, 10
journalists lost their lives in Iraq; for all the period, since the war
beginning, at least 23 journalists were killed during the profession
exercise; 6 media collaborators were killed; 1431 journalists were
interviewed; 1366 journalists were threaten or bounded; 1178 media
were censorship2.
The communication is influenced by these aspects. The public’s
right to know is part of any democratical society. Ultimately
whichever role the war correspondent chooses to guide his or her
reporting it has to be legitimated in a democratic society by an appeal
to the public interests. The public’s right to know is the guiding
principles for honest and open reporting in war or peace. As one
American newspaper editor clearly put it during the Second World
War:”The final decision rests with the people, and the people, so that
they may make up their minds, must be given the facts, even in war
time, or, perhaps, especially in war time”3. The point about the public
and their desire to know is very important in any discussion of the
reporting of truth in war, in any communication through the media.
Communication during the war period has some specific features
and is influenced by the aspects we have been mentioned before.
There are many obstacles to the truth being told in wartime, although
it should be stressed that these also apply in peacetime but are less
apparent. War should not be seen as a special case of how the media
works. War highlights and intensifies many of the things that happen
in peacetime.
In democratic societies the only area in which it is openly
accepted that censorship has a part to play is in the field of military
security. Every journalists in this field should know these and action
1
Badicioiu, Alexandra, Amintiri din casa presei libere, in ”Cotidianul”, nr. din 09.10.2006.
Ibidem.
3
Knightley, Philip, The first Casualty: The War Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and
Myth Maker, Quartet, London, 1982, p. 253.
2
140
in this spirit. Censorship goes hand in hand with self-censorship by
journalists. Journalists at war have censored, because they or their
editors decide that is not in the “national interest” to publish, because
of their commitment to a cause or simply because of personal loyalty
to the soldiers they accompany.
The communication process, in an idealistically way, shouldn’t be
affected by the journalists security in war area. But, it is. Through
mass-media the message reaches to the audience. It is important that
message to be according to the standards. Is hard to speak about truth
in this field of journalism. The above discussion has indicated the
fragile nature of truth in wartime. Censorship, political commitment,
patriotic duty, the routines and limitations of daily journalism are just
a few obstacles to the public, in mass-communication, ever getting s
truthful account of war, particularly when their country is involved1.
The importance of the mass-communication freedom and free
practice of the journalism are main aspects in a democratical society,
having the role to inform the audience, to free expression of the
opinions and ideas.
After the ratification of the Geneva Conventions of 12th of August
1949 and of the Additional Protocols of 1977, the Romanian state
assumed the obligation to reveal these international documents which
constitute the international humanitarian law and consecrate the hurt
militaries, captives, civil populations (including journalists) rights,
during the armed conflict period.
The international humanitarian law is an ensemble composed by
international rules, which are intended to solve some humanitarian
problems caused by an armed conflict. In this ensemble, the mass
communication, through the journalists, has a special place, because
of its importance. The journalist security has an impact on masscommunication and that is why some of law elements are always
present when we are speaking about the war correspondent.
Concluding, we can affirm that the journalists’ protection through
the international humanitarian law is still precarious. In this way, there
was adopted by the Committee of Ministers, on 3 of May 1996, a
1
Quoted in Index of Censorship, 20 (1991), no. 4/5, p.8.
141
Declaration1 and Recommendation R (96) 4 of the Ministers
Committee by the Members States on the Journalists Protection in
Conflicts and Tensions Conflicts2. In the Declaration, the Ministers
Committee of the European Council condemns the increasing number
of the journalists hurt during their profession exercise and considers
that acts as being an attack to free profession exercise. It is
accentuated the importance of the European Convention of the Human
Rights and other international instruments on human rights.
On the Recommendation, The Ministers Committee draw the line
of 12 Principles based on journalists protection in the conflicts or
tension situations, like the protection of physical security, the rights of
the working conditions, the confidentiality sources and many other.
In dangerous places many war correspondents are killed or
physical mutilated. The civil journalists become aggression victims.
No matter how helpful could be some judicial regulation; this job
remains one of the dangerous. The statistics shows that as long as is
facilitated the journalist` access in war areas, as long we will be
dealing with deceases registered.
Bibliography
[1] Barry, W., The Military-Media Connexion: For better or for Worse, în
”Military Review”, USA, vol. 78, nr. 6, dec-feb, 1999.
[2] Convention for the Improvement of the Militaries Murted Status of the
Armed Forces in Campaign, Geneva, 1864, în vol. ”Humanitarian
Intenational Law of the armed conflicts, documents”, Ed. Șansa, 1993.
[3] Cloșca, Ioan, Ion, Suceavă, ”Drept interna ional umanitar”, Ed. Șansa,
București, 1992.
[3] Jean Jacques Rousseau, A Treatise on the Social Contract, Book I, cap. IV,
citat de Hans Gasser, International Humanitarian Law, Henry Dunant
Institute, 1993.
[4] Gasser, Peter, ”International Humanitarian Law”, Henry Dunant Institute,
1993.
[5] Kalshoven, Frits, Contrains on the Waving of War, International Committee
of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1991
1
The Declaration of the Protection of the journalists on conflicts and tension situations,
adopted by the Ministers Committee, on 3 of May 1996, on the 98th Session.
2
The Recommandation R (96) 4 of the Ministers Committee by the Members States on the
Journalists Protection in Conflicts and Tensions Conflicts.
142
[6] Romcea, Mihaela, Evolutia istorică a dreptului international umanitar, în
”Curentul Juridic” nr. 3, Târgu Mureş, 1998.
[7] Scaunas, Stelian, La protection internationale des journalists pendant les
conflicts armes, în ”Studii de drept internaţional public”, Ed. Burg, Sibiu,
2006.
[8] Scaunas, Stelian, Drept internaţional public, Ed. 2, Ed. C.H. Buck,
Bucureşti, 2007.
[9] Vlad, Monica, Death and state. The perspective of one Outsider over the art.
9 of Japan Constitution, in ”International public Law Review” of the Faculty
of Law ”Simion Bărnuţiu”, Sibiu, 2002.
[10] Vlad, Monica, Drept internaţional public, Ed. Servo Sat, Arad, 2002.
http://www.crucearosie.ro/
143
TERRORISM AND ITS PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
Jr.TA Kaiter Edith
“Mircea cel Bătrân” Naval Academy, Constanţa
Abstract
The majority of authors who have tried to study as many aspects as they
could, have come to the conclusion that the psychology of terrorism is to
command considerably more attention compared to other threats to life.
Among the things we know is that the terrorists have many different
reasons or motives for their acts. Many politically motivated terrorists, whether
they are of the left or the right, want to bring down an existing government or
regime. Many religious terrorists want to attack those that they see as attacking
their religion. Others want publicity for their cause. Suicide terrorists have
almost always had at least one relative or close friend who has been killed,
maimed or abused by an enemy.
The paper deals with some of these aspects, considered as basis for the
psychopathology of terrorism.
Keywords: terrorism, psychopathology, behaviour, thinking,
background
The word “terrorism” traces its roots in the English language to
the French revolution (1789-1794). The German philosopher,
Immanuel Kant used the word in 1798 to describe a pessimistic view
of the destiny of mankind. Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin (18421921) called it “propaganda by deed”. Carlos Marighella (~1930)
wrote the Latin American handbook on terrorism, claiming it required
adherence to a “higher morality”, and that one man’s terrorist is
another man’s liberator.
An important number of psychologists tried to interview people
who used violence, such as bombing or shooting. Merari for example
144
is one of the few psychologists who succeeded in interviewing suicide
bombers. He has said of them: “Culture in general and religion in
particular seem to be relatively unimportant in the phenomenon of
terrorist suicide. Terrorist suicide, like any other suicide, is basically
an individual rather than a group phenomenon: it is done by people
who wish to die for personal reasons. The terrorist framework simply
offers the excuse (rather than the real drive) for doing it and the
legitimacy for carrying it out in a violent way.”[1]
Considering this, most terrorists feel that they are doing nothing
wrong when they kill and injure people, or damage property. Most
seem to share a feature of a psychological condition known as antisocial personality disorder or psychopathic personality disorder, which
is an absence of empathy for the suffering of others – they don’t feel
other people’s pain. However, according to some psychologists’
opinion, they do not appear unstable or mentally ill. For example, the
behaviour of Nezar Hindawi, a freelance Jordanian terrorist is very
similar to that of those diagnosed with psychopathic personality
disorder. In April 1986 he sent his pregnant Irish girlfriend on an El
Al flight to Israel, saying they would be married when he joined her
there. She apparently was not aware that Hindawi had hidden a bomb
provided by the Abu Nidal Organization in her luggage. Hindawi’s
willingness to sacrifice his girlfriend and unborn child displays an
exceptional lack of empathy.
Terror groups usually dislike or distrust those who wish to join
them, who appear to be unstable. Silke goes so far as to say: “It is very
rare to find a terrorist who suffers from a clinically defined
‘personality disorder’ or who could in any other way be regarded as
mentally ill or psychologically deviant.” [2] Someone who is mentally
ill may want to commit an act of terror, but as most terrorism requires
cooperating with others, this makes it less likely that a mentally ill
person will actually carry out such an act because of the difficulty they
have in working with others.
A common, but by no means universal feature of terrorists is a
type of simplistic thinking in which ‘I am good and right. You are bad
and wrong.’ It is a very polarized thinking which allows them to
distance themselves from opponents and makes it easier for them to
kill people who are connected with their enemies, with apparently
145
little or no sense of remorse or guilt. This is not a lack of intelligence
however. Many terrorists are of above average intelligence. It would
also be wrong to think that this mode of thought is exclusive to
terrorists. It is common among young children and also among
psychologists who display the same mode of thinking! [3]
A closed-minded certainty is also a commonly observed feature
of much terrorist thinking. A document left behind by Mohamed Atta,
one of the 11th September attackers, illustrates this. In it is the
following: “Everybody hates death, fears death, but only those, the
believers who know the life after death and the reward after death,
would be the ones who will be seeking death? […] Check your
weapon, say Morning Prayer together, and, if you take a taxi to the
airport, when you arrive, smile and rest assured, for Allah is with the
believers and the angels are protecting you.” [4]
Apart from the reference to weapons, similar sentiments were
expressed by the members of the Heavens Gate cult, who committed
collective suicide in 1997. Again, however, this mode of thinking is
not exclusive to terrorists and suicide cults. Many religious people, for
example, can be similarly closed to ideas or evidence that contradicts
their belief systems.
1. Developmental Models
Terrorists, particularly political terrorists, may come from upper
rather than lower class backgrounds, as in the vigilante groups that
make up right-wing, pro-government “death squads” in Latin America
and Asia. Terrorists are often the products of overly permissive,
wealthy families with whom they were in conflict, had inconsistent
mothering, or were isolated from. [5]
The point above about this way of thinking suggests that a useful
avenue for research may be to look at some aspects of terrorist
behaviour as reflecting an immature form of thinking or moral
reasoning.
Kaplan assumes that terrorist behaviour is pathological. He
differentiates between the reasons and causes of terrorism by
proposing that reasons are the social variables that facilitate terrorism
or help rationalize terrorist behaviour. However, he says that the
causes of terrorist behaviour “must be sought in the psychopathology
146
of the assassin”. [6] He proposes that terrorists have a pathological
need to pursue absolute ends. Kaplan proposed that this is an
overreaction to childhood experiences of humiliation at the hands of
an aggressor, which results in a sense of failure and lack of selfesteem. Thus, their personality is defective and cannot cope with life
stress through socially appropriate means.
Research by Israeli suggests that suicide bombers often come
from broken families and he also proposes that they suffer from low
self-esteem. While this may be the case for those studied by Israeli, it
is not entirely consistent with known psychological principles. For
example, people with high self-esteem are more prone to perpetrating
violence than those with low one. [7]
2. Social Learning Models
It is not a coincidence that many terrorists come from places
where peace is not the norm; places like the Middle East or Northern
Ireland, where all the present generation of young people have known
is regular, extreme, well-publicized violence. Violence could be the
norm for such young people, whether it is on a wide scale or within a
smaller community or family. It may come to be considered the
normal response to achieve objectives. [8] Silke is exemplifying this
approach when he describes the process of becoming a terrorist as
being primarily an issue of socialization. He further states that the
move from being disaffected to becoming an active terrorist is usually
precipitated by a catalyst: “Normally this is an act of extreme physical
violence committed by the police or security forces or other rival
group against the individual, family, friends or simply anyone they
can identify with. The fatal shooting of a 12-year-old boy by Israeli
soldiers in September 2000 at Netzarim acted as such a catalyst event
for Palestinians. Captured on television, the shooting of the boy as he
cowered with his father behind a water barrel contributed to a
dramatic resurgence in terrorist violence in the region.” [9]
Supporters of terror groups in the UK are using this approach
when they circulate films among potential recruits and supporters,
made by radical Islamic groups, showing attacks on Muslims in
various conflicts and then show apparently successful attacks in turn
on those who attacked those Muslims. They have had considerable
147
success in evoking outrage and convincing significant numbers of
young, British Muslims that violence is an appropriate and successful
way of helping Islam. [10]
Some terrorists are following family tradition, as in the case of
either Protestant and Catholic fighters in Northern Ireland or some
groups of Palestinians in the Middle East, and the social learning
model, with its emphasis on imitation and role models, can easily
accommodate this. Other scientists, for example Fields in 1978, found
– in an eight-year longitudinal study – that exposure to terrorism as a
child can produce a tendency to terrorism as an adult. Again, this
cannot be the only factor because relatively few children exposed to
terrorist violence grow up to become terrorists. [11]
There are also some terrorists who appear to be rebelling against
their parents through attacking authority figures and organizations, as
with violent Marxist groups that terrorized Europe, particularly
Germany and Italy, in the 1970s. Some observers have commented on
the lack of a strong father in the upbringing of many of these
terrorists. This approach, which generally assumes a psychopathology
model of terrorists, would emphasize better upbringing, including the
resolution of childhood conflicts, as at least part of the solution. [12]
3. Frustration
One of the oldest and most widespread sociological theories on
the causes of terrorism is that terrorists come from groups that
experience marginalization, poverty, unemployment, and social
alienation. People with such social disadvantages are thought to be at
a higher risk for getting generally involved in acts of violence, and by
inference in terrorism. Several paths have been thought to lead from
social affliction to violence; two hypotheses occurred in this way: the
frustration-aggression hypothesis and the hypothesis on vulnerability
to fanaticism. [14]
It is fairly well-established that frustration is an emotion that
occurs in situations where one is blocked from reaching a personal
goal. The more important the goal is, the greater the frustration. It is
comparable to anger and it generally leads to aggression although it is
too simplistic to postulate that it always leads to aggression
(frustration can for example also provoke stress and depression). For a
148
long time, however, the frustration-aggression hypothesis played the
most important role in the literature on terrorism and still figures as a
major causal factor.
According to Joseph Margolin’s often cited work “much terrorist
behavior is a response to the frustration of various political, economic,
and personal needs or objectives.” [15] Others have also suggested
that some people engage in terrorism as a result of feelings of rage and
helplessness over the lack of alternatives, e.g. regarding education or
social mobility. [16] There is little doubt that young people with little
education, such as Palestinian youths in the Middle East, or second
generation immigrants in the underprivileged areas of big European
cities live in constant frustration at being excluded from the higher
status majority groups that surround them, from the realization that
they do not share the same opportunities, and from lack of hope of
ever improving their living conditions. The higher rates of aggression
and criminality found among such minority groups compared to the
same age groups of the majority could lend support to the frustrationaggression hypothesis.
However, many of the persons who have run acts of violence
against civilians in the recent times do not show this kind of profile.
Many are well-educated, goal-directed, and not particularly
necessarily underprivileged.
Bin Laden, for example, is definitely not a prototype of an
economically disadvantaged person. This of course, does not mean
that there have not been other types of frustration in his life, which
have led him on the path of terrorism, frustrations of a more
psychological rather than sociological character.
Bin Laden had a difficult childhood, he was one of 52 children in
a strict, fundamentalist household, and his father died when he was
young. He developed a close relationship early on with Abdullah
Azzam, a Palestinian who played a major role in the re-emergence of
Islamic traditionalism. Azzam was the head of the Muslim
Brotherhood, a group which could have competed with the Davidians
in terms of religious faith and zeal. [17]
In 1979, when he was 22, Bin Laden joined countless other
Muslims to fight the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. In 1980, Azzam
founded an organization that later came to be known as Al-Qaeda. Bin
149
Laden rejoined his mentor, and served as his chief financer and a
major recruiter. After Azzam was murdered by an assassin, Bin Laden
stepped in to head Al-Qaeda.
Over the next few decades, Bin Laden became angrier with the
world – with the Communists, with the Westerners who invaded
Islamic territories with their weapons, not to mention their Christian
and Jewish heritages and risqué women and rock ’n roll, and even
with conflicting Islamic groups who seemed unmotivated to join the
Jihad and defend God’s honour. [18]
Bin Laden began to recruit heavily, while at the same time
distancing Al-Qaeda from everyone else: “we fight the governments
that are bent on attacking our religion and on stealing our wealth and
on hurting our feelings. And as I have mentioned before, we fight
them, and those who are part of their rule are judged in the same
manner,” Bin Laden said in a 1998 interview with Frontline. [19]
Bin Laden sees the world composed of evil forces converging to
rape them of their goodness, and both devised similar means to defend
themselves. He isolated his organizations, cited multitudes of
injustices and blamed them on the defined oppressor. Bin Laden
thinks Allah is on his side. He has used his respective holy books to
rationalize the totalitarian ideology. And he has viewed violence as
inevitable. He has believed that the forces of evil would soon march
upon them, and he wanted them to be prepared to defend themselves
in God’s name before they ascended to heaven. [20]
References
[1] A. Merari, “The readiness to kill and die: Suicidal terrorism in the Middle
East” in W. Reich (Ed.), Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies,
theologies and states of mind, Cambridge University Press, p. 206, 1990.
[2] A. Silke, “Cheshire-cat logic: The recurring theme of terrorist abnormality in
psychological research”, Psychology, Crime and Law, 4, p. 51 – 69, 1998.
[3] http://www.blue-oceans.com/psychology/terror_psych.html
[4] Ibid.
[5] J. Martin & A. Romano, Multinational Crime, Newbury Park: Sage, 1992.
[6] A. Kaplan, “The psychodynamics of terrorism” in Y. Alexander & J.
Gleason (Eds.), Behavioral and quantitative perspectives on terrorism, New
York: Pergamon, p.36, 1981.
150
[7] R.Israeli, Islamikaze and their significance. Terrorism and political violence,
9, p. 96 – 121, 1997.
[9] A. Silke, Terrorism. The Psychologist, 14, p. 580 – 581, 2001.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] http://www.psy.ku.dk/mirdal/terrorisme1.htm
[15] J. Margolin, “Psychological Perspectives in Terrorism” in Y. Alexander
and S. M. Finger (eds.), Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New
York: John Jay, p. 273-4. 1977.
[16] J.N. Knutson, “Toward a United States Policy on Terrorism”, Political
Psychology, 5, 2, p. 287-294, 1984.
[17] http://www.causes-of-terrorism.net/binladen.htm
[18] Ibid.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Ibid.
151
A NEW VISION ABOUT INTELLIGENCE
IN FRANCE 2008 WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY
Blidaru Horaţiu, PhD, Oprea Alexandru, PhD
Romanian Intelligence Service, Bucharest
Abstract
On June, 13th, 2008 France adopted a new White Paper on Defence and
National Security - the third in its history, which integrated the defence and
national security dimensions in a global national security doctrine aiming to
ensure both the security of the France and shoulder their international
responsibilities, in a 15-year perspective. After the 1994 White Paper, taking
stock of the changes brought by the end of the Cold War, the 2008 White Paper
look ahead to the challenges of the 21st century.
French decision-makers opted for organizing the national security around
five major strategic functions: knowledge and anticipation; deterrence;
protection; prevention and intervention. The first function is connected with the
knowledge-based security concept, which covers the following dimensions:
intelligence, the knowledge of areas of operation; diplomatic action; analysis of
future trends (horizon-scanning) and information management.
This paper is focused on the significant changes in France’s national
security sector and intelligence community arhitecture brought by the strategic
document, not only at the institutional level and mechanism of coordonation, but
also in the field of atributtions and priorities.
Keywords: defence, national security, White Paper, intelligence
1. The mission: a “no-taboo” approach
On 23 August 2007, French president Nikolas Sarkozy installed a
35-member Commission in charge of drafting a new White Paper on
Defence and National Security (Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la
152
Sécurité Nationale), officially invested by presidential decree [1]. His
instructions were to have a ‘no-taboo’ approach in adapting the French
security apparatus to 21st century threats and risks [2].
Half of the Commission was made up of senior administration
staff and the other half of civil society representatives, including
security experts, academics from several different fields and other
non-expert personalities able to bring a fresh perspective to the
security debate. Most notable, it included two senators and two
deputies from both the majority party and the opposition - a break in
traditional French practice, according to which the legislative branch
takes a back seat in defence decision-making [3]. The Commission’s
Chairman, also nominated by presidential decree [4], was Jean-Claude
Mallet [5], a high-level, non-partisan civil servant with wide
experience of the defence and security bureaucracy, which had been
the key drafter of the previous White Paper [6].
In a Letter of engagement addressed to him, president Sarkozy
argue the necessity of a new White Paper thus: “Since 1994,
significant developments have drastically altered the international
environment and our strategic defence and security situation: 11
September terrorist attacks, emergence of new centres of regional
power, proliferation, effects of globalization and technological
developments...” [7].
From September 2007 to June 2008 the Commission met every
week for a session of at least three hours, with additional sessions in
smaller formats as required, as well as several brainstorming seminars.
It started its work by auditing the system and listening to testimonies
and personal experiences.
This first part of the process was a novelty for France, where key
political decisions, in particular in this field, are often taken under a
veil of secrecy. 40 public hearings were conducted, to which should
be added more informal meetings in smaller formats. In a break with
past practice, the Commission proceeded with far-ranging publicly
televised and on-line hearings of some 52 personalities, from 14
countries and 5 continents. A website for public discussion of the
main issues (9 Internet forums) received more than 250,000 visits [8].
The next phase was conducted in working groups, which included
staff from relevant departments, including various ministries and
153
intelligence services. Members of the Commission also realized more
than twenty visits in the field in defence and national security
facilities, in France and abroad, on the various theatres of operations
where French forces are engaged. In an unprecedentedly open process,
exchanges have been realized with trusted foreign partner-states
(Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain) and with the European Union
and Atlantic Alliance.
2. The outcome: a strategy for the twenty-first century
At the outcome of this complex process, the 2008 White Paper
was published on 13 June 2008, in a 336-page volume [9], with a
companion document which included the text of all public hearings
conducted by the Commission [10]. For the first time, France
simultaneously included in the same strategy the defence and
homeland security issues, in a 15-year perspective. This was
interpreted as a major shift from external security to interior security.
The strategic document outlines a new framework for French
security in the twenty-first century. Included in this cadre are positions
about transatlantic security, further French military integration into the
EU and NATO, and an assembly of policy prescriptions designed to
aid France in adapting to the changing global security environment.
As expected, counterterrorism and the integration of defence with
homeland security play a prominent role, with an emphasis on
developing intelligence capacity, both human and satellite-based, in
the context of a newly added strategic function: knowledge and
anticipation.
On 17 June 2007, President Nicolas Sarkozy unveiled the
conclusions of the 2008 White Paper, in front of 3,000 military
personnel gathered at Porte de Versailles, Paris. The reform of the
intelligence sector was described as one of the France priorities: “I
have decided on a massive investment in our intelligence - and
particularly space-based intelligence - capabilities, which will benefit
equally military chiefs and political decision-makers” [11].
3. The national security strategic functions
The 2008 White Paper organized national security around five
basic strategic functions: knowledge and anticipation; deterrence;
154
protection; prevention and intervention. The first function - a new one
- is at the heart of the new security arhitecture, beeing connected with
the knowledge-based security concept, which covers the following
dimensions: intelligence, the knowledge of areas of operation;
diplomatic action; analysis of future trends (horizon-scanning) and
information management.
4. Axes of the intelligence community reform
4.1. A better institutional coordination
In organizational terms, the 2008 White Paper proposed the
creation of a new mechanism of coordination of the national security
system and intelligence community (six intelligence agencies with a
total effective of 12,000 employees and another 4,000 which worked
in the intelligence units of the army, navy and air force).
Under the direct authority of the President of the Republic several
new bodies were created, which assure the strategic orientation of the
intelligence services.
• The Defence and National Security Council (Conseil de Défense
et de Sécurité nationale - CDSN) [12], responsible for all the public
policy issues involved in the areas of defence and national security
where the President of the Republic’s powers are defined by the
Constitution. The implementation of the decisions taken by the CDSB
is in responsibility of the Prime Minister.
The CDSN is composed of the President of the Republic, the
Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, the
Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of the
Economy and the Minister of the Budget. Other Ministers may be
convened depending on the subjects discussed, for example, the
Minister of Justice for the fight against terrorism, the Minister of
Health for the prevention of sanitary crises etc.
The CDSN may also function in two restrained formula:
The National Intelligence Council (Conseil National du
Renseignement - CNR) elaborate the strategies and priorities assigned
to the Intelligence services, conducts planning for human and
technical resources, and examines the evolution of the legal
framework governing intelligence operations [13].
155
The CNR is chaired by the President of the Republic and meets in
plenary session with the Prime Minister, the Ministers of the Interior,
Defence, Foreign and European Affairs, Economy and the Budget and
in certain circumstances other Ministers, depending on the subject
discussed. There will be present also the national intelligence
coordinator and the general secretary for Defence and National
Security, who provides the secretariat during meetings.
The Restricted Council (Conseil restreints) analyzes sensitive
issues related to foreign operations and nuclear deterrence.
• The Advisory Board for Defence and National Security (Conseil
consultative de Défense et de Sécurité nationale - CCDSN), was
authorized to submit independent assessments to the President of
Republic and Prime Minister.
The CCDSN is composed of independent experts appointed by
the resident of the Republic and can call on Senior Civil Service
experts.
• The National Intelligence Coordinator (Coordinateur national
du Renseignement) [14], as designated point of contact for the
Intelligence Services with the President of the Republic, supervises
the planning of the intelligence objectives and assets and their
implementation. The Coordinator prepares the decisions of the CNR
and monitors their implementation. He also chairs periodic meetings
of the Directors of the intelligence services in order to set forth
priorities for intelligence collection and to address requests from the
intelligence community and the Inter-Ministerial Committees for the
orientation of intelligence related technical investments.
Prime Minister has also important duties in the field of
intelligence coordination. Under his authority were placed:
• The General Secretariat for Defence and National Security
(Secrétariat général de la Défense et de la Sécurité nationale SGDSN), which replaced the National Defence General Secretariat
(Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale - SGDN), has the same
functions as the older organism, extended to include the wider scope
of national security exposed in the White Paper [15].
• The Security of Information Systems Agency (Agence de la
Sécurité des Systemes d’Information - ASSI), in charge of the
implementation of a preventive and reactive policy in defence against
156
cyber-attack, cyber-terrorism and cyber-warfare. Those domains
represents a major concern for which the French decision-makers
develop a two steps strategy: a new concept of cyber-defence,
coordinated by the SGDSN, followed by the establishment of an
offensive cyber-war capability, part of which will come under the
Joint Staff and the other part will be developed within specialised
services.
The ASSI is composed of a network of experts in security and
information system observatories throughout the territory, established
in defence and security zones under the authority of the competent
Prefect.
One of the major change at the level of the intelligence
community was the creation of the Central Interior Intelligence
Directorate (Direction centrale du renseignement intérieur), by
merging the traditionally Directorate for the Security of the Territory
(Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire - DST) and the General
Intelligence Directorate (Direction Centrale des Renseignements
Généraux - DCRG) into a single intelligence agency dealing with
internal security, which reports directly to the Ministry of Interior. The
main functions of the DCRI are: counter-espionage, counter-terrorism,
countering cybercrime and surveillance of potentially threatening
groups, organizations and social phenomena [16].
4.2. The improvement of human resources
The 2008 White Paper considers the human resources an
indispensable element for the intelligence reform. Among the
measures proposed in terms of humans, we mentioned: improving
career paths in intelligence; recruiting additional specialists (notably
engineers, computer specialists, imagery analysts, language
specialists) and promoting the acquisition of area expertise.
The document also established three new entities with
responsibilities in the specific educational field: the Intelligence
Academy (L’Académie du renseignement), which develops a basic
training course common to all intelligence services and agencies,
sanctioned by a diploma; the Joint National Training Centre (civilian
and military) in the fight against chemical, biological, radiological and
nuclear threats (Le Centre national commun civil et militaire de
157
formation et d’entraînement a la lutte contre la menace nucléaire,
radiologique, bactériologique et chimique - NRBC), enabled with the
development of a shared culture and working methods in the highly
sensitive field of the fight against the NRBC threats and an Interdisciplinarian University pole for research in social sciences, and in
security and defence, addressed to all issues related to military
matters, from warfare to the new forms of violence in the
contemporary world [17].
A special attention was conferred to human intelligence
(HUMINT), in both a qualitative and quantitative perspective.
Research in the intelligence field was also considered an important
component of the reform. The 2008 White Paper established beginning with January 1th, 2010 - the Defence-Foreign Affairs pole
and the Interior Security pole, by merging The Higher Institute for
National Defence (Institut des hautes études de défense nationale IHEDN) with the Centre for Higher Armament Studies (Centre des
hautes études de l’armement - CHEAr) and respectively the Institute
for the Study and Research on Corporate Security (Institut d’études et
de recherche pour la sécurité des entreprises - IERSE) and the
National Institute for Higher Studies in Security (Institut national des
hautes études de sécurité - INHES) [18].
4.3. The development of technical capabilities
In technical terms, a major boost will be given to space-based
applications, sustained by a doubling of the corresponding budget
(estimated at 380 million euro in 2008). The technical capabilities of
intelligence agencies will be enhanced, keeping pace with information
and communication technologies. Airborne imagery (mainly drones)
and eavesdropping capabilities will also be developed. As a successor
program to the Helios satellite series, the French new program has a
major contribution to the European MUSIS (Multiuser Satellite
Imagery System) program, in order to optimize the imagery products,
in parallel with a space-based capability for signal interception - the
CERES (Capacité de renseignement électromagnétique spatiale)
program.
158
4.4. A new legislative framework
In legislative terms, the 2008 White Paper mentioned as priorities
the drafting of a bill concerning intelligence-related activities and a
better legal protection of defence and security-related secrecy and of
intelligence personnel. Those measures carry on other recent
legislative initiatives such as the adaptation, for the first time in
French history, of a law regarding parliamentary oversight of the
intelligence services [19].
The 2008 White Paper’s decisions are to be reflected in the next
five-year defence plan, which will cover the years 2009-14, and is due
to be presented to the French Parliament in late 2008. This will be the
first test of the actual will of the Elysée to implement the Paper’s
recommendations. The White Paper is then meant to be updated every
four or five years, coinciding with a new presidential mandate.
References
[1] Décret n°2007-1144 du 30 juillet 2007 portant création d'une commission
chargée de l'élaboration du livre blanc sur la défense et la sécurité
nationale, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
[2] Discours lors de l'ouverture de la commission du livre blanc sur la défense et
la securité nationale, http://www.elysee.fr
[3] Composition de la commission du Livre blanc, http://www.premier _ministre
.gouv.fr
[4] Décret du 25 juillet 2007 portant mise en position de délégation (Conseil
d'Etat), http://www. legifrance.gouv.fr
[5] Biographie de Jean-Claude Mallet, http://www.premier_ministre.gouv.fr
[6] http://merln.ndu.edu/ whitepapers/France1994part1.pdf
[7] Letter of engagement from M. Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the Republic, to
M. Jean-Claude Mallet, Member of the Conseil d’Etat, Paris, 31 July 2007,
http://www.elysee.fr
[8] The French White Paper on Defence and National Security: Towards a
Stronger and More Streamlined Force, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org
[9] Mallet Jean-Claude, Défense et Sécurité nationale: le Livre blanc, Paris,
Odile Jacob: La Documentation française, 2008.
[10] France, Présidence de la République, Le Livre blanc sur la défense et la
sécurité nationale. Les debats, http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr
[11] Discours de M. le Président de la République sur la Défense et la Sécurité
Nationale, http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr
[12] Corresponding to the US National Security Council. See http://www.
159
whitehouse.gov/nsc
[13] A simillar organism was created in the United States, representing the
Intelligence Community's center for midterm and long-term strategic
thinking. See http://www.dni.gov/nic
[14] The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004
created a similar position in the US Intelligence Community. The Director
of National Intelligence (DNI) serves as the head of the IC, acting as the
principal advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the
Homeland Security Council for intelligence matters related to the national
security. See http://www.dni.gov/who.htm
[15] http://www.sgdn.gouv.fr
[16] http://www.interieur.gouv.fr
[17] This pole is to take on the form of a Research and Scientific Cooperation
Foundation and support the European Doctoral School for research on
defence and security issues.
[18] Défense et sécurité: le rapport Bauer met en cohérence la formation et la
recherche, http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr
[19] Loi n° 2007- 1443 du 9 octobre 2007 portant création d'une délégation
parlementaire au renseignement, http://www.senat.f
160
The New Arhitecture of the French Intelligence Community
President of the Republic
Prime Minister
General Secretary
National Intelligence Coordinator
Advisory Board for
Defence and National
Security - CCDSN
Defence and National
Security Council - CDSN
replaced the Internal Security Council
and the Defence Council
Specialised bodies:
National Intelligence Council
- CNR
Restricted Council
Defense Ministry
Interior Ministry
Interministerial
Intelligence
Committee - CIR
General
Secretariat for
Defence and
National Security
- SGDSN
replaced the SDGN; provides
the secretariat for all the CDSN
Security of
Information
Systems Agency
- ASSI
Finance Ministry
Interministerial Counter-Terrorist
Committee - CILAT
Central Directorate of
National Police - DGPN
General Directorate for
External Security - DGSE
responsable to the President and Prime Minister
Directorate of Military
Intelligence - DRM
subordonated to the Armed Forces Chiefs of Staff
Directorate for Defence
Protection and Security - DPSD
Central Interior
Intelligence
Directorate - DCRI
replaced the Territorial Surveillance
Directorate – DST and the Central
Directorate ofGeneral Intelligence DCRG
Anti-Terrorism
Coordination Unit UCLAT
161
National
Intelligence and
Customs Inquiries
Directorate DNRED
Treatment of
Information and
Action Against
Clandestine
Financial Circuits
- TRACFIN
FRANCE'S COUNTER - TERRORISM SYSTEM
AFTER 9.11
Blidaru Horaţiu, PhD, Oprea Alexandru, PhD
Romanian Intelligence Service, Bucharest
Abstract
Being one of the first European countries from an early stage confronted
with international terrorism threat, France has set up a prevention and
suppression system that has proven its value and has become the most
accomplished counterterrorism practitioner in Europe.
The 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington marked the emergence of a
new type of terrorism, capable to borrow from globalization process the very
tools that have enabled its success, and the attacks on the French engineers in
Karachi (May 2002), or on the tanker ‘Limburg’ (October 2002) have confirmed
that France was not spared from this major threat.
The March 2004 and July 2005 terrorist incidents in Madrid and London
determined the French decision-makers to adopt the counter-terrorism law of
23rd January 2006 and, in the same year, the White Paper on Domestic Security
Against Terrorism, a comprehensive assessment of the terrorist threat to France
and of French response policy.
This paper focused on the ensemble of measures included in the French
antiterrorism strategy in order to strengthen the capabilities of intelligence and
security agencies.
Keywords: terrorism, security, intelligence, strategy
1. The fight against terrorism at home
France has had a long experience with terrorism, suffering
repeated waves of attacks of both domestic and foreign origin. In
addition to the regionalist or left-extremist terrorism that many
European countries suffered from in the 1970s, France was the first
Western country to experience on its soil international terrorism
162
linked to the situation in the Near and Middle East since the 1980s and
then the Algeria in the 1990s. Confronted from an early stage with this
form of war”, as President Jacques Chirac stated in 1986, France has
gradually set up a prevention and suppression system that has been
successful [1].
The main deficiency of the French governmental structures in the
domain of fighting terrorism in the early 1980 was poor coordination.
Four different cabinet ministers and at least seven different
departmental agencies had responsibilities in matters related to
terrorism1 [2].
These agencies met rarely and often misled each other. In 1981,
for example, the interior minister refused, in the presence of the prime
minister, to share intelligence about terrorism with foreign intelligence
agency - General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), because it
considered it “a nest of soviet spies” [3].
A series of deadly attacks in Paris, carried out by Action Directe,
as well as Basque and Corsican groups in the mid-1980s2 [5]
prompted the adoption on September 9, 1986 of the comprehensive
Antiterrorism Law 86-1020 [4].
There are three characteristics of France’s antiterrorist penal
system introduced in 1986. The first is the existence of a specific
offence - “criminal association in relation to a terrorist undertaking”
(association de malfaiteurs en relation avec une entreprise terroriste),
that enables not only the suppression of support structures of terrorists
or their accomplices, but also the prevention of attacks still under
preparation. Raised to the level of a specific offence by the Law No.
96-647 of July 22, 1996 [5], it is undoubtedly the centerpiece of the
French judicial counterterrorism approach and enables the legal
system to take preemptive action before an attack is perpetrated. The
application of this offence requires an exchange between magistrates
and intelligence services.
1
The Police Judiciare, the Direction Centrale des Renseignements Généraux (DCRG), the
Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), the Brigade Criminelle, the Police de l'Air
and des Frontieres, the Gendarmerie Nationale, the Direction Générale de la Sécurité
Extérieure (DGSE), the Direction de la Protection et de la Sécurité de la Défense (DPSD).
2
Three waves of attacks (in all, at least 14), in February, March and September 1986 targeted
large Paris department store, train, subways and public buildings, causing 11 deaths and more
than 220 injuries.
163
Since the 1990s, the French domestic intelligence service has had
the attribute to ask magistrates to open investigations. Judges can in
turn assist the agency by ordering warrants, wiretaps, and subpoenas.
The second specificity of the French system is that it takes into
account the seriousness of terrorist acts in the definition of procedural
rules, which are more flexible than in the case of normal offences.
According to the 1986 antiterrorism Law, a terrorist suspect could
be held for up to 96 hours, compared with 48 hours under the normal
system. The intervention of a lawyer is pushed back to the 72nd hour.
The specialization of counter-terrorist magistrates is the third
specificity of the counter-terrorist penal regime. Its main characteristic
is the centralization of the prosecution, investigation, and judgment of
cases in Paris: the Central Counterterrorism Department of the
Prosecution Service, known as the “14th section”, with jurisdiction
over all terrorism cases, led by Alain Marsaud1 and later by Judge
Jean-Louis Bruguiere2.
Seven magistrates of the public prosecutor’s office and seven
specialized juges d'instruction (investigating magistrates) are
responsible for terrorism cases. The judgment of misdemeanours is
delegated to the Tribunal de Grande Instance of Paris, while that for
felonies is the responsibility of a cour d'assises (trial court) made up
entirely of professional magistrates, as opposed to a cour d'assises for
normal offences, in which the jury is made up of ordinary citizens [6].
2. Specialised Counter-terrorism Agencies in France
In the Interior Ministry, most of the specialized counter-terrorism
agencies are under the Central Directorate of National Police
(Direction Générale de la Police Nationale - DGPN).
The Central Interior Intelligence Directorate (Direction Centrale
du Renseignement Intérieur) was created on July 1, 2008, by merging
1
Deputy and former judge at Paris High Court, commissioned with files regarding to
terrorism, was in charge on the Antiterrorist Section and then the Central Service for Fighting
Terrorism (Service pour Coordination de la Lutte Antiteroriste - SCLAT).
2
He began specialising in anti-terrorism in 1982 and took over the running of the 14th Section of
the Paris Prosecutor’s Office in 1986 to apply the first set of anti-terror laws. During his 20 years
tenure (he stepped down in 2007), Bruguiere earned a reputation for uncompromising
dedication to his work. Known by nicknames such as “sheriff” and “the admiral,” Bruguiere
claimed in 2004 he had arrested over 500 people in the previous decade
164
the traditionally DST and the General Intelligence Directorate
(DCRG) into a single intelligence agency dealing with internal
security, including counter-terrorism [7].
The Central Directorate of Judicial Police (Direction Centrale de
la Police Judiciaire - DCPJ) undertakes investigations through its
National Counter-Terrorist Division (Division Nationale AntiTerrorist - DNAT).
The RAID (Recherche, assistance, intervention et dissuasion), the
intervention force of the national police, is constantly available to the
DGPN in case of a terrorist crisis, and the Border Police (Police aux
Frontieres - PAF) watches out for terrorism suspects entering/exiting
the country.
The Anti-Terrorism Coordination Unit (Unité de Coordination de
la Lutte Anti-Terroriste - UCLAT), created in 1984, brings together
the relevant operational information, making sure that it is shared with
all the counter-terrorism agencies/authorities, including the
counterterrorist magistrates and the prison management authorities.
In the Defence Ministry, the DGSE plays an essential role by
providing intelligence gathered outside of France. The Military
Intelligence Directorate (Direction du Renseignement Militaire DRM) used his detection and analysis capabilities (including satellite
imagery) in combating terrorism.
By virtue of its military attributions, particularly for external
operations, the national gendarmerie also plays an important role.
Moreover, within its Security and Intervention Group (Groupement de
Sécurité et d'Intervention - GSIGN) it makes the Gendarmerie
Nationale Intervention Unit (Groupement d'Intervention de la
Gendarmerie Nationale - GIGN) constantly available for
counterterrorist action.
Finally, the Defense Protection and Security Directorate (DPSD)
ensures that the personnel and installations of the wider defense sector
(state and industry) are protected against terrorism.
The Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry has also
several agencies associated with counter-terrorism. The National
Intelligence and Customs Inquiries Directorate (Direction Nationale
du Renseignement et des Enquetes Douanieres - DNRED) gathers,
analyzes, and distributes customs information related to terrorist
165
financing. The cell called Treatment of Information and Action
against Clandestine Financial Circuits (Traitement du Renseignement
et Action Contre les Circuits Financiers Clandestins - TRACFIN) [8]
gathers information then compares it with information from other
ministries before passing it on to the judicial system.
3. The post 9/11 antiterrorism measures
The attacks in New York and Washington marked the emergence
of a new type of terrorism, capable to borrow from globalization
process the very tools that have enabled its success. The attacks on the
engineers of a French naval shipbuilder on 8 May 2002 in Karachi, on
the tanker ‘Limburg’ on 6th October 2002, and the kidnapping of
French hostages in Iraq started in 2004 have confirmed the fact that
France was not spared from the international terrorism threat.
Since September 11, 2001, four new major pieces of legislation
have adopted further reinforced counterterrorism measures. These
laws extended police powers to conduct vehicle and building
inspections, imposed data retention and disclosure obligations on the
Internet and telecommunications services, required disclosure of
encryption codes where necessary in relation to a terrorism
investigation, shored up security measures at airports and seaports,
increased surveillance measures generally, and instituted new
measures to fight financing of terrorism1.
In case of an imminent risk of attack or necessity linked to
international cooperation, the counter-terrorism Law No. 2006-64 of
January 23, 2006 [9] mentioned that a terrorist suspect can be held up
to six days. The means of investigation have also been expanded: it is
possible, under certain conditions, to carry out searches and seizures at
night and infiltration and ‘bugging’ of automobiles and residences is
permitted. Finally, the serious risks involved justify special protection
for witnesses (which can be heard anonymously) and even
investigators.
1
Law No. 2001-1062 of 15 November 2001 concerning everyday security; Law No. 2003-239 of
18 March 2003 for internal security; Law No. 2004-204 of 9 March 2004 adapting justice to the
evolution of criminality; and Law No. 2006-64 of 23 January 2006 concerning the fight against
terrorism and adopting different measures or security and border controls.
166
Following the attacks of September 2001, the statutory provisions
seeking to prevent money laundering were extended to the fight
against financing of terrorism. The main role of the Cell for the fight
against financing of terrorism (FINATER), created in October 2001
within Ministry of the Economy, Finance and Industry, is to freeze
terrorists’ financial assets.
The Monetary and Financial Code provides that a „Declaration of
suspicion” must be made whenever funds “may be used for the
financing of terrorism”. This obligation lies upon credit
establishments, financial institutions, insurers, notaries, real estate
agents, advocates (in the context of their advisory activities), auditors,
official auctioneers, sellers of works of art, of antiques, and of
precious stones, the managers of casinos, and welfare insurance
institutions [10].
At the level of the intelligence community, the main measures
adopted by French decision-makers after 9/11 were: developing a
counter-terrorism division within DGSE; refocusing the DST on
counter-terrorism; developing a mission to monitor radical Islam
within the DCRG; coordinating the police and national gendarmerie
by the UCLAT.
On March 26, 2003 a new version of Vigipirate Plan1 was
adopted. It was completed by the series of ‘PIRATE’ intervention
plans, each of which being tailored to a particular risk (PIRATOME radioactive risk, PIRATOX - chemical risk, BIOTOX - biological risk,
PIRANET - attack on information systems), or a certain aria
(PIRATE-MER - maritime terrorism, PIRATAIR-INTRUSAIR terrorism related to aircraft, PIRATE-EXT - threat/attack against
French nationals and interest aboard) [11].
Another initiative was the creation, in 2004, of a joint FrenchSpanish anti-terrorism investigation team, in which officers had equal
1
Plane Vigipirate is France’s national security alert system, created in 1978 by President
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, in order to protect France’s population, infrastructure and
institutions and prepare responses in case of a terrorist attack. The system defines four levels of
threats represented by four colours: yellow, orange, red, crimson, and calls for gradually
specific security measures. Until September 11, the plan has been activated two times: in
1995 (following an Islamist terror bombing campaign) and 2000. At the time of the attacks in
Madrid of March 11th, 2004, the Vigipirate Plan passed at the orange and then at the red level for
the train stations. It was high at the red level after the attacks of July 7th, 2005 in London.
167
operative powers on each other’s territory - a premiere in
contemporary European police cooperation. Also a premiere was the
reinforced French-US counter-terrorism cooperation under the name
‘Alliance Base’, that has been in place since 2002, though became
public only in a 3 July 2005 “Washington Post” article [12].
In 2004 the political responsible decided to elevate the fight
against terrorism to the status of a Chantier national, meaning a
prioritized cause requiring nation-wide efforts [13]. Amongst other
things, this entailed an appeal on all government institutions to
actively search for indications and information pointing to processes
of radicalism in society.
4. The White Paper on Domestic Security against Terrorism
The March 2004 and July 2005 terrorist attacks in Madrid and
London urged the French decision-makers to adopt a White Paper on
Domestic Security against Terrorism (Livre blanc sur la sécurité
intérieure face au terrorisme) [14]. Commissioned by the prime
minister and drafted by an interagency team, the paper is a
comprehensive assessment of the terrorist threat to France and of
French response policy, including a complex of measures in order to
strengthen the capabilities of intelligence and security agencies.
4.1. Improving Surveillance of Electronic Communications
The new generations of terrorists frequently use the Internet,
whose characteristics offer them privacy. From this reason the
intelligence agencies must be able to identify and extract relevant data
from the huge volume of information that is available in the open part
of the Internet, and, under certain conditions, to access data that
circulate on the hidden part.
The Law No. 86-1020 created a procedure enabling governmental
access to connection data, under the monitoring of an independent
authority, in order to allow the specialized agencies to act more
effectively and rapidly to prevent terrorist acts. This system can be
activated 24 hours a day in case of an emergency.
The text of the law states that Internet Service Providers, Internet
cafes, hosting providers and operators must communicate the traffic
data, called numbers, IP addresses to specialized services in case of
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investigations related to suspect terrorist activities. Mobile phone
operators and internet cafes will be required to keep records of client
connections for one year under its provisions. The law also gives the
possibility to use surveillance cameras in public spaces such as train
stations, churches and mosques, shops, factories or nuclear plants.
The 2006 White Paper plead for technical and legal decisions that
make it possible to limit anonymous communication, mainly by a
policy that seeks more actively to influence the authorities that
regulate the Internet, both in terms of its operational development and
in the area of research [15].
4.2. A Better Access to Certain Administrative Data Bases
Until 2006, the intelligence agencies did not have legal access to
ordinary administrative data bases, for identity cards and passports;
visas and residence permits; vehicle registrations and drivers licenses.
The counter-terrorism Law of 23 January 2006 allowed access to
the personal data in these bases managed by the Interior Ministry, so
that the necessary verifications could be made within operationally
useful time limits. All such investigations carried out by the police are
kept and put under the control of the National Commission on Data
Processing and Liberties (Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et
des Libertés - CNIL).
The access to more sensitive data, such as that contained in
banking, tax, or social security data bases, is only allowed in the
framework of a judicial procedure.
4.3. Identifying dangerous travelers
By authorizing automatic information feeding of the National
Cross-border Index (Fichier National Transfrontiere - FNT) with
optical reading of the travel papers and visas at the time of the border
controls, the counter-terrorism Law of January 23, 2006 opened the
way to the rapid modernization of this data base.
The data bases of airlines - commercial reservation databases and
departure-monitoring data bases - are also a source of useful
information in counter-terrorism. Both contain identifying information
relative to the travelers, as well as information about the flights taken.
The counter-terrorism Law of 23 January 2006 enables the regulations
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governing air travel to be extended to international sea and rail travel
whenever an external European Union border is crossed [16].
4.4. A better coordination
In France, the main decisions in the area of counter-terrorism are
taken in a number of different high-level bodies.
The Internal Security Council (Conseil de Sécurité Intérieure CSI), chaired by the President of the Republic, defines the orientation
for domestic security policy and establishes priorities1.
The Prime Minister chairs the Interministerial Intelligence
Committee (Comité Interministériel du Renseignement - CIR),
bringing together the ministers involved with counter-terrorism to
coordinate their actions and establish their orientation.
The Interior Minister leads the Inter-ministerial Counter-Terrorist
Committee (Comité Interministériel de Lutte Antiterroriste - CILAT)
in order to coordinate action undertaken at the interministerial level.
The Prime Minister’s chief of staff extends the Prime Minister’s
leadership by chairing regular meetings of the senior officials
responsible for security.
The ‘intelligence meetings’ chaired by the Prime Minister's chief
of staff include the representatives of the President of the Republic’s
private office (état-major particulier), of the CSI, the chiefs of staff of
the Interior, Defence, and Foreign Ministers and the Permanent
Secretary for National Defence (SGDN), as well as the directors of the
main intelligence services (DGSE, DST, DRM).
References
[1] Jeremy Shapiro, Suzan Benedicte, The French Experience on
Counterterrorism,
http://www.brookings.edu/view/articles/fellows/Shapiro20030301.pdf
[2] Daniel Burdan, DST: Neuf ans a la divison antiterroriste, Paris, Editions
Robert Laffont, 1990, p. 97.
[3] Pierre Marion, La Mission Impossible: a la tete des Services Secret, Paris,
Calmann-Lévi, 1991, p. 22.
1
Replaced by the Defence and National Security Council (Conseil de Défense et de Sécurité
nationale - CDSN), created by the 2008 White Paper on Defence and National Security.
170
[4] Loi n° 86-1020 du 9 septembre 1986 relative a la lutte contre le terrorisme
et aux atteintes a la sureté de l'etat, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr
[5] Loi no 96-647 du 22 juillet 1996 tendant a renforcer la répression du
terrorisme et des atteintes aux personnes dépositaires de l'autorité publique
ou chargées d'une mission de service public et comportant des dispositions
relatives a la police judiciaire, http://legifrance.gouv.fr
[6] Marc Perelman, How the French Fight Terror, in “Foreign Policy”, January
18, 2006.
[7] http://www.interieur.gouv.fr
[8] http://www.tracfin.minefi.gouv.fr
[9] Loi n° 2006-64 du 23 janvier 2006 relative a la lutte contre le terrorisme et
portant dispositions diverses relatives a la sécurité et aux contrôles
frontaliers, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr
[10] Counter-Terrorism Legislation and Practice: A Survey of Selected
Countries, http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/pdf12
[11] See http://www.dhs.gov and http://www.intelligence.gov.uk
[12] Dana Priest, Paris's 'Alliance Base' Targets Terrorists, Washington Post,
July 3, 2005.
[13] Ludo Block, Evaluating the Effectiveness of French Counter-Terrorism,
Terrorism Monitor, Volume 3, Issue 17, September 8, 2005
[14] http://www.archives.premier-ministre.gouv.fr
[15] http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr
[16] http://www.defense.gouv.fr/livre_blanc
171
THE CHANGES IN THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
AND THEIR BEARINGS ON SECURITY RESEARCH
1st S.R. Sarcinschi Alexandra, PhD
Center for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, Bucharest
alex_sarcinschi@yahoo.com
Abstract
Challenges to security studies caused by the development of a new
international background are obvious. The global emergence of new threats has
proved the inefficiency of older concepts. That is why we argue that the field of
security research should be subjected to conceptual re-evaluations triggered
both by new scientific theories and changes in the national and international
security environment.
The paper shows how the contemporary security researcher is provided
with a wide range of methodological options that are both antinomic and
complementary. Those analyzed elements show us the fact that the security
analysis is, in fact, the result of a bricoleur similar with the one in the human
sciences. The security researcher elaborates a bricolage, a set of
representations that illustrates the characteristics of a special situation and
adds new instruments, methods and techniques of representation and
interpretation of social reality’s puzzle that are adapted to events. Thereby, the
paper introduces another approach on security - a methodology built on the
concept of “psycho-social representation on security”
Keywords: security
representation on security
environment,
security
studies,
psycho-social
1. History, security environment and security studies
The object of reference in security studies – security at each and
every level and field of manifestation – was recently subjected to new
conceptual re-evaluation. It is no longer possible to analyze security in
terms of political choices, state’s capabilities and intentions. In our
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days, vulnerabilities, risks, dangers, and threats to security have a
systemic meaning.
Still, the present security studies had an interesting evolution
marked by three important stages that are to be identified to some of
the main historical periods of time. First of all, the two World Wars
marked the emergence of security studies as a discipline, but not a
predictive, prospective and rigorous one. The second stage in
structuring security studies started in 1989, when the end of the Cold
War triggered an avalanche of such studies, some of them even
predicting the major transformation in the security environment. On
the one hand, the security studies were oscillating between these
concepts and, on the other hand, they were trying to move the center
of gravity from military dimension of security to the nonmilitary ones.
The 9/11 events triggered the revival of the old Cold War fears in the
same time in which the security studies gained a new discourse, but
similar with the one of the ‘60s. The military dimension of security
gained new meanings especially in the Anglo-Saxon world. Still, the
scientific community tries to preserve and develop the multifaceted
approach on national and international security.
It is obvious that the definition of security has dramatically
changed for the last decades. The gaps between security issues, actors
and solutions are deepened by various interests and limited resources
of the world’s states. The meaning of the transformation was from a
traditional concept that emphasizes the military issues to a broader
concept that focuses on nonmilitary security issues, especially the
domestic ones, and their impact on human and state security. The
insufficiency of traditional security concept’s definition has generated
various interrogations regarding the type of values to be protected,
their holder(s), the threatening entity, the measures to be taken for
protection, the security provider(s), the ones who pay for security, etc.
The relation between security dimensions has changed too in terms of
priorities, due to the new characteristics of the international security
environment. The military dimension is no longer enough to provide
security and win the war against terrorism or other asymmetrical
threats. Achieving security depends on simultaneous approach of its
dimensions (military, political, economic, social, cultural, and
environmental) beside the psycho-social one that is the most
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important in our opinion.
The pattern of social dynamics that triggered these conceptual
changes is simple: the changes in the external conditions determine
the changes in social practices and then the changes of conditional
prescriptions into absolute prescriptions [1]. This pattern reflects the
link between social representations and social changes (historical
evolution of humanity). The events touch social groups and imply
their subjects.
Thus, the diversity of security theories does not hinder the
analysis, but underlines the concept’s complexity. This concept acts
on many dimensions: military, political, economic, social, cultural and
environmental. More than that, we must take into account the
psychological, local, social, cultural and historic conditions of the
reference object in this analysis. The result is a new dimension of
security – the psycho-social one.
2. The need for changing methodology of security studies
In 1994, the UN Program for Development has published the
Annual Report on Human Development that introduced the concept of
human security. In the following years it has become a rough guide
for a new model of security and a new paradigm. This approach was
also adopted by Europe and a large number of security specialists.
Still it is not a real success, but mostly a metaphor.
The UN approach argues that the human society must rapidly
enter in a two-level process of transformation that will trigger two
effects: on the one hand, the center of gravity will be transferred from
territorial security to human security, and on the other hand the means
for achieving security will be the sustainable human development, not
the acquisition of weapons. That is why the UN experts argue that the
human security requires counteracting a large scale of threats to
humankind by providing: a minimum income; the access to basic
food; the minimum protection against diseases, an unhealthy life and
natural or man-made disasters; protection against physical violence,
traditional values degradation, ethnical and sectarian violence;
protection of human rights, etc.
More recently, this concept was included into ESDP debates
offering it a human dimension that reflects the new trends in
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structuring national and international security policies. ESDP
approaches human security in a way that refers exclusively to the
security policy. Its bringing into force includes crises prevention, civil
conflict
management,
political
mediation,
socio-economic
stabilization, and state reconstruction.
Still, the issue of human security seems to fade away. Neither
Millennium Summit nor the Millennium Declaration focused on this
problem. Perhaps the main problem is the heterogeneous character of
this concept and also the lack of enthusiasm characterizing the
countries of the world on implementing the human security strategies.
Thus, the need for change is obvious.
We argue that the conceptual understanding of security implies
also the analysis of changes in psycho-social representations’
dynamics. The transformation process must be seen in a broader
perspective. The psycho-social representation is modifying itself due
to the social events that are occurring and this requires combining the
analysis of objective factors with the subjective ones. The suggested
methodology gravitates around the notion of “human” as a creator of
meanings, around the desire to understand the way in which humans
construe the world they are living in. There are some ideas that seem
to burden the security analysis, but in fact they help explaining this
reality. First of all, the social behavior can not be reduced to
predictable variables similar with the ones of the natural sciences.
Secondly, the security analysis must take into account the fact that
individuals actively cooperate to build and maintain the cultural
meanings that suggest their actions, and that is why the security
researcher is bound to find various ways to understand both the
meanings and the processes of this building.
The security analysis requires firstly to establish a reference
object that is reflected in the concept’s definition, such as: the state,
some alternative referents (society, economy, environment, etc.), and
finally the human being. The existing security theories have agreed to
establish as reference object one of the following: individual, group,
national, regional, and global.
For instance, at individual level, security is often understood as
safety, and insecurity – obviously, as uncertainty. The individual
security concept might be linked in a first phase of analysis on his
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perception on quality of life and thus there is a tendency to identify
the security state with a higher standard of living. Still, we need to
study both objective and subjective living conditions unified as
psycho-social representation on security concept, in order to be able
to develop a more accurate analysis.
Group security concept is similar with the previous. As the
individual has some expectation regarding his security, also has the
group. Nevertheless, the most important aspect of group
security/insecurity is the absence/presence of discrimination. If one
individual might be marginalized on religious, national or ethnical
bases, the discrimination regarding a group is more visible and easier
to prevent. Whatever the typology or the nature of the analyzed group
are, security might be defined as the absence of threats to the group’s
identity. As in the case of individual security, there is a certain level of
group security that can be provided by legislation. If the rules are
discriminatory, new conflicts might emerge.
The national level of security is probably the most commonly
used in defining security. The nation-state is the actor that usually
assumes the role of individual, group and even regional security’s
guarantor. Instead, the state’s security is defined by the totality of
political, economic, social, military, and ecological situations that are
requisite to ensure its sovereignty, independence, and the
advancement of national interests. If we will agree on the nature of
such situations and requirements, it will be obvious that both threats to
national security and counteracting solutions are the same in their
nature.
The security analysis at regional level requires region’s defining.
There are some points of view arguing that the region is “a nation’s
physical area” [2] and others defining it as an aggregate of provinces,
states or even towns. In the security studies, the most used definition
is the one that asserts that the region includes an aggregate of physical
and geographical bounded states. The threats to regional security are
both those against the concerted interests of the states and their
security as distinct entities.
The global security is a concept that is simultaneously a reflection
of UN’s image and a subject of controversy due to its broad realm.
The global security is easily to undermine by the pursuits to establish
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a certain level of national security: if one nation is felling threat by
another and world’s actors are disagreeing, then the global security
will not be fulfilled. That is why the global security concept is not so
solid. It implies the existence of a supranational entity that should be
able to take decisions for the entire humankind. Moreover, it is
unlikely that this concept will became an important one in the
international relations due to the strengthening of the competition for
natural resources.
It is obvious that the analyses of security at each level are largely
based on basic psychological and sociological theories. The concepts
denote an ideal state for humanity to feel secure each day, to be
protected from diseases, starvation, unemployment, criminality,
ecological disasters, etc. The framework for the world of security
might be translated into security needs in the political, economic,
social, military, and ecological fields, but the daily life is
characterized by a state of insecurity. Therefore, to achieve the total
security state is an impossible mission because each level of security
implies the existence of a certain level of insecurity. That is why we
argue that the most relevant reference object for national and
international security analysis is the individual.
We argue that the methodological project that answers to the
needs of security analysis is built on a combination between system
analysis and interpretative methodology that illustrates the complexity
of the analyzed field: from individual to global level, from objective to
subjective level. We suggest that the instrument for studying such a
complex reality should be an analyzing pattern build on six
dimensions, sub-dimensions and indicators:
1. Political dimension with two sub-dimensions, each of
them characterized by specific indicators: government and
political stability (level of democracy, regime’s endurance,
level of restrictions on civil and political rights, level of
corruption) and international relations (diplomatic
representation, economic organizations, military/security
alliances, another type of organizations, international
disputes).
2. Military dimension with two sub-dimensions and specific
indicators: history of armed conflicts (armed conflicts,
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refugees in and outside country’s borders) and
militarization level (military spending, number and
structure of
armed
forces,
conventional
and
unconventional equipment and arsenal).
3. Economic dimension with two sub-dimensions and their
indicators: economic development (GDP rate, GDP/capita,
level of currency reserves, inflation, unemployment,
external exchange rate, direct foreign investments,
commercial balance, external debt, quality of living) and
development of telecommunications and informational
infrastructures (existence, spread and development level of
the telecommunication systems, existence, spread and
development level of the informational systems,
population’s access to national and international
communication networks).
4. Social dimension with three sub-dimensions and their
specific indicators: demography (population’s structure
and dynamics), cultural, ethnical and religious
heterogeneity (scores of cultural, ethnical and religious
diversity,
existence
of
cultural/ethnical/religious
tensions/conflicts) and human development (human
liberty, expectancy of life, level of education and
schooling, access to information, individual income, health
indicators, housing indicators).
5. Environmental dimension with one environmental subdimension and its indicators: deforestation rate, pollution,
natural resources, ecologic disasters, natural calamities.
6. Psycho-social dimension that shows the psycho-social
representation on each of security’s other dimensions:
political, military, economic, social and environmental.
There are only few of the indicators that are specific to each subdimension. Each and every indicator needs a measuring scale and a
standard value of reference that must reflect the variation of the
analyzed characteristic from one case to another. Thus, the pattern will
provide the necessary mean to identify vulnerabilities, risks, dangers,
and threats for each dimension and sub-dimension of security.
The next step of the security analysis will be the relationship of
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the identified elements with other social actors, from humans to
international community, in order to recognize the type of relations
between them (normality, tension, crisis, conflict) and the way in
which the security state is affected.
3. Conclusions
The most important dangers to the security - international
terrorism, failed states, and organized crime – are caused by the
human being’s feeling of insecurity that is emerging from degradation
of humanity, various levels of development, struggle for power,
diverging interests of humans and alliances, etc. That is the reason for
which we cannot argue about the national, zonal, regional, and global
security in such environments in which the individual does not feel
secure. If one human being is threatened, his/her group and other
related communities are threatened. If all of the social groups want to
achieve and preserve the state of security, they should achieve the
individual security on the basis of humanity’s intrinsic connection.
After all, the real challenge for the entire group of security
managers (starting with local leaders and ending with multinational
structures) is the management of the mechanisms that transfer
individuals’ insecurity to society. The success or the break-down of
any security initiative depends on the realism and the correctness of
the process of identifying those mechanisms.
This paper is the preamble for suggesting a security analyzing
methodology that unites the already existing elements with the new
ones, the sociological ones with the politology’s and international
relations’. We argue that the security analysis on the mentioned
dimensions that is integrated in the theory of psycho-social
representations is the answer to the needs caused by the last changes
of the international system. Thus, is necessary to use the suggested
methodological pattern in order to obtain an image of the countries,
zones, regions that are interesting for security reasons and to be able
to predict the future developments of the security environment.
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References
[1] Claude Flament, Pratiques et représentations sociales, in Beauvois, J.L.;
Joulé, R.V.; Monteil, J.M., “Perspectives cognitives et conduites social”,
Vol. I, Fribourg, Delval, 1987.
[2] Omario Kanji, Security, Beyond Intractability Knowledge Base, 2003.
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KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION
AND KNOWLEDGE-BASED WARFARE
Siteanu Eugen, PhD
Abstract
Following the interest shown by the American University scientific
research environment for the syntagms “knowledge-based warfare” and
“knowledge-based organization”, this paper stresses the decisive role of
knowledge and its development in military and political strategic context, in
view of networking leading to the development of thinking in operations and
battles by using several intellectual tools that ensure winning and maintaining
the cognitive superiority.
Keywords: knowledge-based organization, knowledge-based
warfare, cognitive superiority, thinking, battle.
The cognitive warfare belongs to concepts, economic, political
social and informational entities for the development of action and
reaction concepts and is also a warfare of intelligences. The cognitive
warfare objectives are the following: rethinking the warfare
philosophy and physiognomy, shifting from type A Clausewitzian
warfare to type B dynamic and complex warfare, a flexible warfare
shaped by the theory of chaos (the concept of chaotic warfare) and the
epistemological dominance. In our opinion, the cognitive warfare has
the following effects: gaining advantageous strategic positions,
achieving strategic security, obtaining the access to the markets and
resources and security systems, reducing the own vulnerabilities,
developing certain capabilities of action and reaction to crises and
conflicts. [1]
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The cognitive warfare or knowledge-based warfare (KBW) is a
means to use knowledge in a conflict purpose. Thus, KBW is “a
warfare carried in the knowledge realm using knowledge as a weapon.
It has a common cognitive dimension and another one more complex,
epistemologic” (epistemic). Although warfare has always relied on
information that is knowledge, it wasn’t based on information
technology that transformed information in a weapon and the process
of knowledge as a strategy even in its scientific dimension, thing that
is in fact “the manipulation of knowledge and its comprise within a
conflict system”. [1]
In this century, warfare moves to “the realm of knowledge, the
philosophic and economic realm of knowledge”.
The American researchers conduct thorough studies in the field of
informational security and capitalizing the diplomatic, economical,
scientific and cultural preponderance. They define “perception
management” as “consistent action”.
Of all KBW offensive strategies, “the most useful now is
deterrence through information and knowledge” which is not only
offensive but also defensive.
The information and the cognitive realm security is more and
more necessary to ensure the stability and protection of information,
knowledge and cybernetic space.
KBW is conducted particularly in the philosophical, political,
economical, cultural and informational space and permeates the
military domain.
The 21st century fundamental warfare is the economic warfare
representing a cognitive warfare of markets and resources, a warfare
of globalization between the globalization supporters and those of
maintaining entities, a warfare of economic, technological and
informational centres.
In the informational society which is a society of knowledge,
military organizations, like any organization, can reach its maturity if
they are based on knowledge. That is why, for the good development
of modern military organizations, we must focus on new knowledge,
collecting, processing and ongoing dissemination of tactical and
strategic information and also the commanders’ and soldiers’ ability to
take correct and rapid decisions. Starting with the team and group,
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platoon, company and finally strategic organizations, there must be a
convergence between knowledge and organizing and planning in order
to reach high performances in military actions. [2]
This concept, of knowledge-based organization is based on a
determinist approach starting with the technological and
organizational factors. Two decades ago, the knowledge-based
organization was defined as a collectivity whose members have a
conception work and are interconnected through a computerized
infrastructure. Such an organization with information technology
communication channels and knowledge collections uses also
artificial intelligence. In 1988 however, Drucker defined the
knowledge-based organization as a 21st century organizational model
with professionals and a reduced number of intermediate levels of
hierarchic leadership and where the coordination is achieved through
non-authoritative ways.[2]
The different approaches have lead to a diversified technology:
memory-focused organization, intelligent organization, brain
organization. At the end of the last century appeared the convergence
between the technological and the managerial perspective through the
merging of the organization’s necessities and the information
technology.
Thus, a new constructive paradigm of knowledge-based
organization appeared, superior to the positivist paradigm of the
organization based on control and authority.
The members of such an organization are aware of the
relationships between goals/objectives, means and results and also
those between organization and environment. They communicate in
order to interact in a coordinate manner, establishing their own
behaviour depending on common norms and values to ensure the
organization’s integrity, viability and coherence in terms of structure,
strategy and action. The 21st century organizations have become some
net-based non-hierarchy structured forms, respectively 5th generation
organizations.
The managers/commanders need new competences now that
knowledge as a resource and organizational process needs a type of
dedicated managerial intervention which has to be officialized and
professionalized, the excellence being reserved to the best ones.
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In the organizational environment, knowledge derives from
information transformed by those having them as efficient action,
through assimilation and integrative understanding followed by
effectiveness in given contexts.
The knowledge-based concept is used in an extended
understanding for organizations and it integrates the knowledge
personalized dimension of the individuals and groups and also its
artificial dimension of intelligent information systems.
In this context, the knowledge base has the attributes of an
extended organizational memory meant to cognitively support the
specific autonomous projects and cumulatively benefit by their results.
From all these result the strategic valences which trigger the
organizational actors in synergic behaviours of co-elaboration
(interactive generation of new knowledge) and of co-learning of
capitalized knowledge. They refer to organizational knowledge as a
resource and also as a process and triggering the actors in a common
environment; here the dominant relations are those horizontal (nonhierarchic) of interaction between counterparts thus resulting systemic
effects of their co-evolution in a cognitive plan.
Knowledge has also an interorganizational dimension because in
contemporary society, organizations assess one another by analyzing
their environment, watch the domain leaders, learn from each other,
imitate, confront each other or become allies in order to create and
utilize new ideas. “In such conditions, the extraorganizational
environment acquires new knowledge resulting in possible
development and learning alternatives and also in exigent performance
standards in an ongoing evolution.”
The military organizations can learn from the civilian ones the
way to integrate intuition and reasoning – key of knowledge – in
preparing and conducting the net warfare. We have to use knowledge
so that to improve the power of thinking during combat. However,
knowledge in combat/operation and the combat knowledge must be
examined and studied in a strategic and political context.
Today, commanders seek to be wise conducting troops at the
tactic, operational and strategic level by acquiring information (with
the help of sophisticated technology) in time and achieving superiority
in KBW. For this, during the past years, forces of wisdom in battle
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have been created by strengthening the cooperation between
information technology and brain’s capabilities.
These vanguard ideas can be found in “Battle-wise. Seeking Time
– Information Superiority in Networked Warfare” written by David C.
Gompert, Irving Lachow and Justin Perkins and published by the
Center for Technology and Nayional Security Policy by National
Defense University Press in 2006 in Washington.
In this paper the authors have shown that the modern ways to
extract, process and rapidly disseminate tactical information as well as
the ability to elaborate and choose from a multitude of tactical options
during the operation/combat will improve the American soldiers’
capacity to win against any enemy, even terrorists acting in a crowded
city and hidden among peaceful people of that city. This is the essence
of wisdom in battle; its result will be the amazing ability of platoon or
company commanders to take decisions the battalion used to take and
the battalion commander will be able to take decisions a brigade used
to take and so on.
That’s why big changes in education are necessary and also in
military training in accordance with the big geopolitical
transformations of the 21st century which have produced fundamental
changes in conducting wars/armed conflicts. The war in Iraq (Desert
Shield and Desert Storm) lacked the technical capacity to update,
collect and rapidly process the information and also to analyze them
so that to maintain the technical advantage during operations/battles
behind enemy lines. All these had to occur while absorbing an
ongoing flux of information. Such abilities/skills can be achieved only
through intense training giving the military fighter the possibility to
link the use of his instinct with real-time information, not available
once.
The commanders’ and soldiers’ wisdom in battle/operation must
be analyzed in their working and fighting conditions in the new global
security environment in which act the Al-Qaeda terrorist groups as
non-state threats.
It’s also necessary to use battle experience of the coalition in Iraq
which faces terrorists also working in the network together with their
allies. In this context, it’s necessary to identify the mental abilities
such as anticipation and rapid adaptation so that they can be used in
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the methods of recruiting, learning, training, development and
organization.
Working in the network allows the subunits and dispersed units to
collaborate through the exchange of information. The sensors and high
tech weapons together with the communication networks transform
the power of information into military power. In this paper, networks
comprise the information processing systems, communication links,
sensors, battle platforms, command centers and the respective force.
Networks allow for the exchange of information, increase the
knowledge (information) sharing, ensure a good collaboration and
high speed of information and decision making, all these leading to a
much better efficiency of military actions. The military expenses
change from mechanized platforms and weaponry to information
technology. But now, at strategic level, the most important element we
must focus on is the soldier’s mind as the knowledge capabilities are
the most important in decision making during KBW. It’s very
important to focus on improving the quality and speed of decision
making (operational reasoning), in the conditions of the operations
conducted during the current security environment, informational and
geopolitical revolution, enemy access to information and network
technology, strategic and operational disorder and the increase of the
amount of information.
For decades, the American soldiers have had the best weapon
systems US can produce but time has come to add certain intellectual
tools to those systems and the current use of working within the
information network, tools which enable them to gain and maintain
the cognitive superiority. Only with wise soldiers we will be able to
avoid the failure of our soldiers’ first attack. Consequently, there will
be a better operational thinking and ability to make right decisions by
soldiers, teams and subunits/units and even forces. Working within the
information network improves the cognitive efficiency in
operation/battle. But unlike civilian network, the military ones have
several levels: 1. level borrowed from the civilian environment
(media) which has communication means, computer systems etc; 2.
technical systems, weapons, weapon systems, weapon platforms,
sensors, command centres etc all linked by means of data
communications and processing belonging to the first level; 3. the
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third level represents the link between echelons (platoons, companies,
battalions, brigades) and between armed forces and services –
vertically, horizontally, diagonally. But the most important thing is the
fact that the network links/connects people not only to communicate
but also to think, reason, feel, create, solve problems and make
decisions together. But in order to do this, the network must ensure the
same image to those who communicate and are connected the same
way as the chessboard gives the same image to those who look at it.
Thus, knowing in real time the disposing of forces and own means and
also the enemy ones, those who communicate within the network can
understand and help each other, make decisions together as if being in
the same room.
Today it’s necessary to create a room of reason, thinking wisdom
to defeat the enemies working within the network. Creating this room
is part of the strategy to improve the military decision making process.
But in order to establish this strategy to increase the quality of short
time decisions we must take into account the following: knowing the
objective reality; identifying the complex problems as complexity is
the problem of today’s information era; ability to know the sort of
information needed; the ability to make the difference between true
and false information; interpreting the behaviour of the others;
anticipating the reactions of the others; understanding the enemy’s
way of thinking and feeling; setting objectives that can be achieved;
establishing priorities; imagining realistic ways to achieve the goals;
perceiving the opportunities in due time; finding/assessing
consequences and different courses of action; analyzing the costs and
benefits of multiple options; understanding and managing the risks,
rethinking the goals and adapting the strategies.
These are some of the skills of the soldiers taking part in decision
making process.
Working within the network allows the battle platforms to focus
the attacks on the most dangerous enemy targets due to mutual
informing and rapidity in decision making.
The commanders will have the possibility to choose from a larger
variety of alternatives and make decisions dangerous for any enemy.
The increased quality and quantity of the interactions between
platforms and commanders at all levels will generate certain useful
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information regarding the extended battle space, information which
will be better used and spread for the successful operations.
Increasing the level of learning will help the subunits, units and
greater units to increase their efficiency in battle/operation.
Consequently, they will have a greater warfare experience by the
ongoing exploration of options and their variables and improvement.
Thus, experiencing new ideas, the knowledge level will increase, the
soldiers will learn more and faster and in the end they will be wiser in
battle and in knowledge-based warfare.
The quick changes in the military field will provide information
helping the commanders to orientate the planning of their operations
in an unsafe world starting with generalities and essential
determinations, developing as many scenarios as possible and dealing
with the possible future variables in the same way.
Adapting progressively to the general objectives of knowledgebased warfare, the commanders can analyze information and establish
the best ways to achieve the set objectives.
From the strategic point of view, in order to get advantages from
the network-based warfare, working in the network must be organized
on three directions: dissemination the information to the individuals;
mobilization of individuals and the coordination of a collective
thinking. That’s why, in order to increase the contribution of
knowledge in successfully accomplishing the missions, it’s necessary
to focus on: improving the military abilities to use information in
thinking and decision making; delegating several military men to
make decisions at the same time with sending (receiving) information
through the network; sustaining and using the power of awareness and
of shared thinking.
References
[1] Eugen SITEANU PhD, Knowledge-based warfare (cognitive warfare),
Strategic Impact, Bucharest, No 1/2007.
[2] Eugen SITEANU PhD, Maria PRIOTEASA, Organizaţia bazată pe
cunoaştere şi războiul bazat pe cunoaştere, Revista de Stiinţe Militare,
Bucureşti, Nr. 1/2007, p. 85.
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MAINTENANCE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT
PROBLEMS
Siteanu Eugen, PhD
Abstract
Within defense logistics sector, logistics engineering and management
activities include product/equipment design and maintenance support. This
paper is about maintenance strategic management as it applies to military
equipments/systems, and it addresses to maintenance management from a
strategic perspective. The paper shows integrated logistic support and
maintenance analysis through the system life cycle and maintenance design in
the following phases: production/construction phase; utilization and support
phase; equipment (system) retirement, material recycling and disposal phase.
Keywords: maintenance, management, problems, integrated
logistic support, system life cycle.
1. Introduction
A large portion of military (Army, Navy and Air Force) budget
has gone for maintenance costs. However, some supplemental
maintenance activities are not funded in the regular budget.
Another portion of the budget is spent for replacing ageing
equipments/systems, for example aircrafts and tanks, and take
advantage of the capabilities offered by new systems. A heavy
emphasis was placed on the service systems recapitalization plans.
There is a trend of increased spending on modernization of the service
communications, navigation etc. These all need studies on how to
proceed with that effort (for example, mobility capabilities study).
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A strategy of reducing the number of maintenance personnel and
of acquiring the required maintenance support at minimum cost
through the use of new technology and applying the savings to
additional research, development and acquisition accounts is needed.
[1]
2. Maintenance strategic management problems
Army, Navy and Air Force continue to face challenges on how to
pay for high production/ construction and maintenance costs, as well
as to reduce these costs.
It is also necessary the desire to improve the systems and to
promote the new technologies, while coping with the logistics
realities.
Webster defines the concept of logistics as “The aspect of military
science dealing with the procurement, maintenance, and
transportation” of military material, facilities and personnel [2].
Thus, maintenance is an integral part of logistics. One can
paraphrase Benjamin S. Blanchard and say the concept of integrated
logistic support (ILS) may be defined as a disciplined, unified and
iterative approach to the management, reliability, terotechnology,
maintainability, maintenance, economic, engineering process and
other technical activities necessary to (1) integrate maintenance and
other support consideration into equipments/systems design; (2)
develop maintenance and other requirements that are related
consistently to readiness objectives, to design, and to each other; (3)
acquire the required support (the maintenance support included) at
minimum cost; and (4) provide the required support (the maintenance
support included) during the operational/operations and support phase at
minimum cost. [3]
Within the context of this definition the requirement dealing with
the design for maintenance support is inherent.
A military
equipment/system must be designed so, as to be supportable, produced
(manufactured), distributed and maintained effectively and efficiently
throughout its life cycle [4].
It is necessary to integrate the maintenance in logistic support,
which is life – cycle oriented, so that defense equipments/systems
could be designed in order to lower the costs of equipments/systems
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operation and maintenance over their planned life cycle. There are
some cause – and – effect relationship between the costs of
equipments/systems operation and support and maintenance strategic
management decisions made during all conceptual and design [5]
stages/phases.
These strategic decisions together with the selection of material
and technologies, two or three levels of maintenance have a great
impact on life – cycle cost (LCC). We think, the combat/support and
maintenance – support systems are weak, with consistent backlogs in
equipment maintenance. It is necessary to remedy these and other
deficiencies in maintenance strategic management.
The current financial dilemma of decreasing budgets has imposed
that system maintenance to be taken into account in the early phases
(stages) of design and development of new equipments (systems). The
maintenance and support infrastructure is considered to be a major
problem from the beginning of the equipment life-cycle. This means
that design for supportability bears importance upon maintenance
strategic management. Thus, maintenance strategic management
(MSM) addresses maintenance management process from a systemic
perspective. The successful implementation of the technical aspects of
maintenance strategic management is highly dependent on the
logistics function accomplished during the integrated logistic support
and logistic support analysis through life-cycle (system engineering
process, supportability analysis – an iterative process - , logistics
functions accomplished during the concept exploration, demonstration
and validation of the prototypes, production, operational use, and
system retirement and disposal phases).
Within the context of each system is inherent the function of the
sustaining maintenance and support of the system throughout its
planned life cycle, which is included within the concept of logistics.
One of the logistics activities is the sustaining life – cycle
maintenance and support of a system or equipment while being
utilized by the military forces (user). The costs of the maintaining and
supporting the systems and the requirements for logistics have been
increased.
An effective and efficient method for concept and design of
military systems and their resources is necessary.
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Maintenance (maintenance management) needs to be improved
first of all by logistic process, which must become an important factor
throughout the system life – cycle.
Maintenance strategic management (MSM) can have a significant
and major impact on overall LCC. Much of the projected LCC can be
greatly impacted by maintenance decision made during the every
phase of integrated logistic support (ILS). Maintenance management
and design decisions have a great impact on the maintenance activities
and operations in all phases of the planned life – cycle. They have
considerable implications for the system's capacity to achieve the
levels of capability commensurate with those required by the armed
forces. Testing must demonstrate that the equipment/system is robust
enough to go into service. Benjamin Blanchard has identified that
maintenance requirements have to be initially planned from beginning
and integrated into the system/equipment design process. Equipments
must be developed and produced (manufactured) so that they can be
operated and by maintained in an effective and efficient manner [5] by
applying lessons learned.
In fulfillment of the logistics requirements (requirements for the
design for supportability, the procurement and flow of materials in
production, the transportation and distribution of equipments/products
to the military forces – user, the maintenance and support of
equipments/systems throughout their life – cycle, and equipment
retirement and disposal of materials) a maximum utilization at the
lower cost (maintenance cost per system/equipment) should be made.
Maintenance activities are integrated in an outward flow of
logistic activities where materials and services are provided (there is a
reverse flow when item are returned for maintenance). When the
equipment/system is utilized, “there is an on-going maintenance and
support capability that needs to be installed and in-place to ensure that
the system continues to be available when required. As failures occur,
faulty items will be returned as necessary for intermediate level or
depot/producer-level maintenance”. [6]
There are also a flow of personnel, test equipment, spares and
repair items (parts), documentation, etc. necessary to support the
maintenance actions, which are performed at the unit (military unit)/
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user, at the intermediate level of maintenance), or at producer/depot
(overhaul and repair).
Maintenance and support infrastructure, as a part of the logistics,
includes organizational maintenance, intermediate maintenance, and
depot/producer maintenance, within a support infrastructure system.
Organizational maintenance includes: on-site corrective and
preventive maintenance; supply support; system built-in test
capability; low skills personnel, and operational environment.
Intermediate maintenance contains: subsystem level of corrective
and preventive maintenance; supply support; test and support
equipment; medium skills personnel, and field shop facility.
Depot/producer maintenance includes: detail maintenance;
overhaul; calibration; manufacturing; supply support; high skills
personnel; factory test equipment, and fixed facilities.
Total productive maintenance (TPM), total asset management (TAM)
and integrated maintenance management (IMM), which is comparable
with ILS – integrated logistics support – must be integrated in the
maintenance strategic management.
The elements of logistic support (required at each level of
maintenance) are the following: maintenance and support planning;
supply support (spare/repair part and inventories); maintenance and
support personnel; training and training support; test, measurement,
handling and support equipment/resources; maintenance facilities;
technical data, information systems and data base structures;, which
allow for the implementation of the requirements associated with
continuous acquisition and life – cycle support (CALS) and of
effective data interchange (EDI) [7]. New EDI contributes to lower
spares/repair parts inventories and technical manuals etc. at each
maintenance location.
Maintenance has been considered after-the-fact and the
maintenance activities and other logistic activities have not been
correct understood, and have to be implemented downstream in the
equipment life cycle. This was a mistake of maintenance strategic
management because it has been harmful and the resultants have
proved costly. As a result, for future equipment design and
development activities emphasis must be placed on organizing and
integrating the necessary maintenance – related activities into the
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mainstream equipment design effort, and establishing a disciplined
approach of the concurrently review, evaluation, and feed-back
provision in order to sure that maintenance and logistics are
adequately considered in the overall equipment acquisition process.
[8]
Political and security events around the world have changed
logistics and maintenance priorities in defense industry and in the
maintenance strategic management.
The governments have elaborated their programs, of reassessing
logistics priorities, implying to the maintenance design.
The third Defense Industry Conference/2005 has given defense
companies the new priorities for defense spending and the logistic
impact this will have on current and future defense industry programs
[1], and on strategies for logistic and maintenance management
This conference has also been addressed to international audience
(senior executives from the defense aerospace and military sectors,
strategists and analysts specialized in defense industry).
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, maintenance and maintenance management should
be considered as an integral part of the engineering process. It is
necessary to identify and define the proper logistics requirements in
the very beginning. This will lead to the effective and efficient
implementation of all subsequent maintenance management activities.
The definition of requirements for supportability as part of the
equipments engineering process from the very beginning should be
placed in front of the concept exploration and definition phase
activities.
References
[1] Jane’s Defence Weekly, jdw.janes.com vol.42/16 February 2005/ISSUE
no.7. p.2.
[2] Webster’s Nints New Collegiate Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, Inc.,
Springfield, Mass., 1988.
[3] Benjamin S. Blanchard. Logistics engineering and management, PRENTICE
HALL, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458, p.3.
[4] Harvey, G. / Life Cycle Costing / A Review of the Technique / Management
Accounting, II, London, 1976.
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HALL, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458, p.XIII and Harvey, G.- Life
Cycle Costing-A Review of the Technique-Management Accounting, II,
London, 1976.
HALL, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458, p.XIII
HALL, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458, p. 5.
HALL, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458, p. 19.
195
THE ROLE OF CULTURAL FACTORS IN THE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT DEVOLOPMENT
S.R. Dinu Mihai Ştefan
mihaistdinu@yahoo.co.uk
Abstract
Diverse and frequent mutations occur in the evolution of security
environment directly influencing it. In this environment, the cultures tend to
extend and influence other cultures. We must admit that our today activities are
taking place in multicultural environments, facilitated by the development of
technology in communications and transportation, stimulating our demarches
which can be built starting from the educational process that can become a
favorable environment for developing the communication capacities between
individuals belonging to diverse cultures.
The paper will approach some issues regarding military transformation,
the “cultural interoperability” in the context of the War against Terrorism from
the cultural point of view and focusing on culture (religion, language and
ethnic)as an universal dimension of humankind, belonging to every community,
and influencing every aspect of their lives.
We choose this approach being sure that a real understanding of the
cultural factors supports the idea of developing relations between nations in
divers’ structures (alliances, coalitions) on the one hand, and facilitate the
easiness to predict future violent actions of the adversaries, on the other hand.
Keywords: security environment, cultural factors, religion,
linguistics, Islam, Islamism, military operations
1. The impact of cultural factors on security
Although the major processes of today’s world are globalization
and regionalization as constructive phenomena we must not ignore the
existence of the tension between the globalizing economies, on the
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one hand and the recall of local and territorial identities, on the other
hand. This tension deserve a much more attention, as it plays a major
role in reconfiguration of the security environment, considering the
fact that many communities, marginalized or not, under the influence
of the globalization processes, tend to find marks deeply rooted in
local cultures, religions or traditions.
In its history, the humanity had as a priority the preservation of
identity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The major
role in accomplish that was given to state as major framework of
communities. In order to assume their role, the states built security
policies in accordance with their national interests. At the beginning,
at the time of classical works of Machiavelli or Hobbes, the term
«security» was signifying the state security, regarding especially
sovereignty of the state. But the world changed, and the term security
got extended. We talk today about “human security”, “environmental
security” and “economic security”.
After the Cold War was ended, new factors emerged on the
international arena. The role of cultural, religious and ethnic factors
was significantly increasing. Obviously, there were some reasons
competing to this situation: the breakdown of ideologies, which had
gradually been replaced by ethnic and religious trends. More and more
tensions, accumulated in the cold war era, had been triggered or
exaggerated by the immoderate overstatements that emphasized
ethnical or religious differences, leading this way to violent conflicts.
At least in Europe, this was the signal that issues related to the cultural
identity or religious faith, are vital in the security equation. Hereby,
the cultural/religious factors got new relevance in the global security
environment.
At this point it is mandatory to stress the fact that the culture, and
especially religion, has the potential to heat tension, but to calm down
them also, because they are not some freeze systems, but integrator
and evolutionary ones, opened to dialog and co-operation for world
peace, contrary to the well known Samuel P. Huntington’s theory.
From the point of view of our analysis, today, at the beginning of
the 21st century, when the world is changing more and more as an
effect of globalization, there is a need to attentively identify all of the
aspects involved by this process. Everything makes the present-day
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security environment to be characterized as fluid and complex,
starting from the ever tighter global economical interconnection (with
all the aspects related to it - IT, financial, and commercial networks) which brings about the necessity to implement policies able to
regulate the new realities - to the tendency of some states to segment,
trend noticed in the last few decades. All this can confirm the opinion
expressed by most of the specialists in the field that the global
environment has been undergoing a process of re-settling, of reconfiguration and of re-positioning of the main actors within the
international arena, as well as of re-building or building - from case to
case - of some institutional structures (at national, regional, and
international levels) in order to be as adequately adjusted as possible
to the new conditions of this order in full transformation. Obviously,
in this environment, it is quite natural for conflicts to emerge, the vast
majority of those conflicts being generated by these very new
conditions, or, better said, by the process of adjustment to these
conditions.
Most of the specialized literature in the domain of security
analyses in the second half of the 20th century does not seem to pay
enhanced attention to the cultural dimension of national security, most
of the times treating cultural aspects (ethnicity, religion, language, and
so on) as part of the social dimension. But the changes that occurred in
the international arena at the turn of the millennium have made both
the scientific community and the decision-making factors pay more
attention to this domain so that we will not omit the influences that
each of these components has on the others. This attitude is justified,
as a matter of fact, since the national security system is considered an
interdependent one - the fields of politics, military, economy, social,
cultural as well as environmental are not separate entities, as the
processes undergone at each such level induce, from case to case,
mutations at the level of the entire system.
Because the states are dominant units, security is a central issue
not only in the case of its referring to the state, but also in its more
direct application to its ethno-cultural and religious elements. The
permeability of states both to the ideas and to the peoples associated to
other states erases the boundaries between the internal security and the
national one. The differences, thus, disappear between domestic
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citizens and foreigners, internal and international policies, hereby even
the simple exchange of ideas and communication can lead to cultural
threats with relevance on the political level (such is the case of the
reaction of the Islamic fundamentalists against the penetration of
western ideas into the Arab world). Problems related to language,
religion and cultural heritage still hold an important place within the
concept of state and hence, they may need to be defended or protected
in the event of cultural "imports" that may often be so seductive.
It is well known that the action of risk’s factors to state security,
considered as major entity on the international arena, are taking place
at the level of territory, population and identity. On this former level,
the identity one might emerge integration, participation or distribution
crisis, as the identity is a defining element in the formulation of
interests, the foundation of their articulation. Such crisis might get a
multidimensional aspect, with economic and socio-political
implications. The social and economic institutions might be
weakened, same time with the existence of external influence owed to
the high level of regional and global interconnectivity. All these can
provoke different and complex reactions, being directly determined by
the civilization area they are manifesting in.
2. Cultural factors in the military
From the military point of view, our opinion is that the potential
of cultural and religious issues have to be kept in mind when we talk
about, at least, two aspects: the military operations conducted abroad,
in a multinational environment, and the linguistic aspects of the war
against terrorism.
2.1. The role of culture in military operations
Concerning the first of these two aspects, we must take in
consideration that today military forces accomplish their missions in
areas beyond their national borders, at considerable distance, in
special geographical, social and cultural conditions. In this case the
commander role is twice difficult, not only regarding condition of his
forces, but concerning the cultural and especially the religious issues
which characterize the local communities within the operations area,
and obviously the cultural/religious traits of the adversary in order to
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easily predict future violent actions that can impediment the mission
success [1].
Cultural, linguistic and religious factors need a special attention
because they can negatively affect the operational course. Every
partner in a multinational force posses a unique cultural identity – as a
result of language, religious faith and moral values. In this regard, the
commander must offer a special attention to major religious holydays,
calls to prayers or other cultural traditions of allied partners or
members of a coalition. This is a very important aspect because
sometimes, even the alimentary restrictions or diets imposed by the
religious fast might have a negative impact on the evolutions of
operations. In this regard, cultural/religious differences between the
participant nations taking part in multinational operations must be
attentive and carefully identify and managed during the planning and
execution phases of the operations, and the commander has the
primary responsibility in accomplishing that.
Considering all these, we can appreciate that is a mandatory duty
for those in command of a multinational force to take in consideration
the impact of religious faith in the area of operations. As Paul R.
Wrigley [2] stated, “an operational commander, however well trained
in the military issues, who is ignorant of or discounts the importance
of religious belief can strengthen his enemy, offend his allies, alienate
his own forces, and antagonize public opinion. Religious belief is a
factor he must consider in evaluating the enemy’s intentions and
capabilities, the state of his own forces, his relationship with allies,
and his courses of action.”
In our opinion, the military commander have to be aware of the
fact that religion is often perceived as a particular system of believes
and practices that give a sense, aim and motivation to people’s life. In
those circumstances the commander must acknowledge and evaluate
these issues from an objective posture. For such an evaluation an
analysis is mandatory. We state that an efficient at all analysis must
take in considerations factors as follows: the existence of significant
religious holydays, practices and rituals performed, the existence and
locations of sacred grounds, the fundamentals values and dogmas of
analyzed religion, organization and types of organization, hierarchy,
religious leaders, historical past etc. Obviously, such an analysis
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would not give the complete image of an analyzed religion or
confession, but would be as close it can be to reality. A very important
role has in that part the professional expertise of who is commissioned
for this job, and the connections that he has in the local community of
experts as well as in that of religious leaders.
We must be aware that cultural and religious issues will remain
defining elements in many societies, at least in the near future, and in
this regard, a special attention is need to be given to the local religious
groups, as well as religious leader within the area of operations. The
success of the operations in support for peace depends in a major
grade on this issue.
Concluding, we must agree that the research in this field must to
be focused on identifying and clarifying the fundamentals
competences and training needed to obtain the necessary capabilities
in addressing cultural and religious issues from the area of operations.
We must even establish a guide regarding the cultural and religious
aspects of military operations.
2.2. Some linguistic aspects of the War against Terrorism
Regarding the second aspect that we consider in our presentation,
the linguistic aspects of the war against terrorism, there are, as far as I
know, advanced preoccupation about this issue in some states that are
taking part in the war on terrorism. What it is all about?
The starting point seemed to be the question addressed by
American ambassador Richard Holbrook in a Washington Post
editorial: "How can a man in a cave in Afghanistan out communicate
the world's leading communication society?”. Beyond the fact of
being a problem of image, the question raised an aspect ignored till
then: the words used to describe the war on terrorism can promote
exactly the causes of the enemies we fight. Obviously, new ideas
appeared from the academics that stated the proposal that we not must
use the same words the terrorists use in their speeches, but to correct
this vocabulary because using words like jihad, for instance, we
recognize their ways of actions a being in the path of God, a legitimate
fact for a Muslim, but not for a Christian, for example, because, in the
given context of the war against terrorism, it might me interpreted in
the sense that the Christian speaker designate himself as an enemy of
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Islam.
Our point of view is that as an initiative, this might be interesting,
but some observations must be added.
I think that you agree with the fact that every language represents
the image of a certain mentality, the mentality of its natural speakers.
There are numerous linguistic studies, beginning with those of
Professor Ferdinand de Saussure, which came in support for this
affirmation. (I consider this a major reflection issue; I mean the
language study as a tool for understanding its speaker’s mentality, a
tool that adequately used, may provide significant indications about
future plans or actions of possible enemies.) Obviously, the simple
use of languages is not quite enough, a proper way of communication
being needed in order to clearly present intentions and accomplish the
proposed objectives.
Regarding the unintentionally promotion of the same type of
ideology the speaker is in fact, confuting, I would like to approach the
case of the term “jihad”. One of the given terms, “jihad”, is a good
example. In many cases it doesn’t get negative meaning for many of
the Muslims individuals. And that is not happening only for linguistic
reasons, but because of the fact that in Islamic religion the term has
double meaning: The Great Jihad, and The Small Jihad. Refering to
the Great Jihad (or the Profound or Spiritual Jihad – „jihad annafsii”), which is an interior one, it primarily represents the
establishment of Maruf (justice) and the eradication of Munkar (evil)
from personal life and from society. In other words, as the Islamic and
Cultural League from Romania stated, Jihad means that “all energies
and resources are used to establish Islamic way of life, in order to
obtain Allah’s grace”. As a conclusion, this represents any
constructive activity of a Muslim, in this way bringing benefits for its
own person or community. The Small Jihad is that part characterized
by militant nuances, and it signifies the battle fought against the
enemies of Islam or the battle in support for Islam dissemination in the
nonislamic areas. But the Small Jihad has a historical value, being
strictly linked of military activity of The Prophet Mohammed. There
are Muslim writings confirming this fact, The Prophet Himself saying
at the return from a military campaign that:” We have return from a
small jihad in order to turn to a great jihad” [3].
202
Another linguistic aspect is the use in media or academics of
formulations like “Islamic totalitarian terrorism”. The subject of our
discussion is language and we should be careful when we made the
distinction between those regarding religious matters (and use the
term Islamic) and those regarding Fundamentalist Movements issues
(in that case using the term Islamism).
Withal, we think that a more precaution is necessary in using such
a categorical collocations, a distinction between Islamic and Islamism,
and in conclusion between religion and political movement, being
needed.
Before the public official launch of this “linguistic
transformation” initiative, we may take a closer look on consequences.
It’s possible to get an opposite effect, similar, maybe, with the one in
the “Prophet Cartoons” case, the “famous infamous” cartoons that
lead to public protest initiated by the Muslim communities not only
from Europe, where they were published, but also in USA and various
Middle East states. We affirm that because there is the conviction
among the Muslims that: “Mohammed’s people were preoccupied by
literature and its sciences in a manner that even the salute, dialogue
and whole them life was in a form of a lyric and that is why the
miracle given [to them] was the Koran which is amazing for its
rhetoric proceedings and eloquence” [4].
Concluding, we think that a language study is very necessary in
order to understand the mentality of those who do the communication
act, but trying to not touch the sensible identity aspects which may
inflame the tensions not only between the Western World and Islamist
movements or groups, but between Christianity and Islamic world.
References
[1] William Wunderie – Through the Lens of Culture Awareness: Planning
Requirements in Wielding the Instruments of National Power, Rand
Corporation, 2007.
[2] The Impact of Religious Belief in the Theater of Operations, Naval War
College Review, Spring 1996.
[3] Encyclopedia of Jihad: Islamic Jihad, William R. Nelson Institute, 2001
203
[4] This fragment is cited from the Taiba Foundation site, a foundation that
sustains
the
Muslim
culture
in
Romania,
www.islamulazi.ro/articole/quran.php
204
GLOBALIZATION AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
Eng. Manolache Mihai
General Staff, Ministry of Defence, Bucharest
Abstract
Globalization, refers to processes, economic, military, environmental and
social, that thicken interdependence among individuals across different
countries.
Globalization undercuts the normal patterns of interaction in Europe,
which, for much of the twentieth century, had been confined within the
boundaries of the national state and regulated by sovereign national
governments. Globalization, then, can be expected to create conflict since
private actions and government measures often adversely affect neighbors.
Actual responses to globalization differ from the ones predicted by
functional imperatives. A major reason is that individuals do not agree on what
is efficient or functional. Which solution is considered “efficient” or
“functional” is the outcome of political struggle, not of value-free analysis. That
leads us to examine the coalitional politics that underlies particular institutional
responses to globalization.
Introduction
The European Union is different from the other political systems.
It is not a state because it is not ruled by a single regime. The
European Union does not have a constitution; it is based in treaties.
There is more that distinguishes the EU from the other cases. The EU
was born out of the ashes of war. In technical terms, we could say it
was a direct response to a security dilemma (military interdependence)
in Western Europe fifty years ago. These links of interdependence
have broadened into the economic and social sphere. At one level,
therefore, the EU is not only at the receiving end of globalization but
it is itself an agent of globalization in Europe. Over the past fifty-five
205
years of its existence, it has been transformed from a security and
trade organization into a polity in which:
(a) national states as large and powerful as Germany, France and
the United Kingdom have ceded national sovereignty, ultimate
authority, over virtually all policy areas, and
(b) decision making looks and feels very much like the kind of
politics one finds in democratic federal states such as the US, Canada,
or Germany. That transformation has happened at break-neck speed.
So we can see chasing independent variables. We can see
European integration, as a process of interdependence between
societies and groups in Europe which is promoted and regulated
through EU membership. In other words, we can speak about the
European Union, as the specific embodiment of globalization in
Europe, which affects interstate and intersociety relations in Europe.
EU can be considered as a independent variable and an amalgam of
global and regional economic, social, cultural and other pressures that
are pounding on the EU’s institutions, policies and politics. This
makes of the European Union the dependent variable. I feel I need to
address both, and that explains the somewhat different structure of this
paper.
We can begin by positing the European Union as the dependent
variable. I will briefly sketch the institutions of the EU, I go on to
examine the effect of globalization and European Integration on
Europe’s politics and society, and I will try to examine how global
and EU pressures have affected key dimensions of politics in Europe.
Institutions and Decision-Making Rules
Decision-making in the European Union evolves around five
institutions: the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the
European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European
Court of Justice. The last four were created with the Treaty of Rome;
the European Council was only formally added in the 1986 Single
European Act, though it existed informally.
The European Council is the summit of the government leaders of
the member states (plus the president of the European Commission),
which is held three or four times a year. The European Council has
immense prestige and quasi-legal status as the body that defines
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“general political guidelines”. This is the body where major deals are
clinched and treaty changes are negotiated. But outside these roles, its
control of the European agenda is limited.
The European Commission is the executive-bureaucratic body of
the European Union. It consists of a political and bureaucratic layer.
The College of commissioners, one commissioner per member state
and two for the five largest countries, is appointed every five years by
the European Council and requires majority support in the European
Parliament. The Commission has the formal, and exclusive, power to
initiate and draft legislation, which includes the right to amend or
withdraw its proposal at any stage in the process1.
The Commission has significant autonomous executive powers in
competition policy; it vets mergers of a certain economic size in the
internal market, and it scrutinizes whether national, regional or local
state aid is compatible with EU competition law.
Policy-making involves regional and local governments as well as
social actors in all stages of the policy process in “partnership
arrangements:” the selection of priorities, choice of programs,
allocation of funding, monitoring of operations, and evaluation and
adjustment of programs.
According to the EU treaties, the main legislative body is the
Council of Ministers, which is composed of national ministers.
Member states have votes roughly proportionate to their population,
though small countries are over represented, and Germany is
considerably under-represented.
The proportion of rules stipulating unanimity in the Council has
steadily declined. That includes the single market, competition policy,
economic and monetary union, regional policy, trade, environment,
research and development, transport, employment, immigration and
visa policy, social policy, and education. Qualified majority voting
also applies to some provisions of foreign and defense policy, and
some issues on policy cooperation, justice, and immigration.
The Council of Ministers shares legislative authority with the
European Parliament, which has been transformed from a decorative
institution to a directly elected co-legislator.
1
Except for foreign and defense policy, immigration, and justice affairs, where it shares this
power with the Council of Ministers.
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The European Parliament has three major powers. First of all, it
can fire the European Commission. Second, its assent, an up or down
vote, is required over enlargement of the EU and over most
association agreements and treaties between the European Union and
third parties. And third, under the co-decision procedure the European
Parliament colegislates with the Council of Ministers on single market
issues, and most other policy measures; the main exceptions are fiscal
policy, foreign and defense policy, police and justice cooperation, and
monetary policy. The co-decision procedure gives the European
Parliament the power to amend and veto Council legislative proposals.
If Parliament and Council are deadlocked, a conciliation committee,
consisting of representatives from both institutions, with a
representative of the Commission as broker, hammers out a
compromise. To become EU law, a compromise needs to be approved
by a majority in the Parliament and a qualified majority in the
Council. So the co-decision procedure comes close to putting the
European Parliament “on an essentially equal footing with the
Council”1.
The final EU body is the European Court of Justice (ECJ). It may
be argued that an impartial dispute settlement arrangement is
necessary to solve problems of incomplete contracting in international
agreements. With the help of the Commission, and in collaboration
with national courts, the ECJ has transformed the European legal
order in a quasi-federal order.
ECJ case law has established the treaties as documents creating
legal obligations directly binding on national governments and
individual citizens. These obligations have legal priority over laws
made by member states. Directly binding legal authority and
supremacy are core attributes of sovereignty, and their application by
the ECJ suggests that the EU is becoming a constitutional regime.
The substantive extension of European integration into all policy
areas has gone hand in hand with an institutional transformation from
a limited, primarily intergovernmental form of international
1
FALKNER, Gerda, Michael NENTWICH - The Amsterdam Treaty: The Blueprint for the
Future Institutional Balance?” In European Integration after Amsterdam. Institutional
Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy, edited by Karlheinz Neunreither and Antje Wiener.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p.26
208
cooperation to a system of multi-level governance, where autonomous
supranational institutions Commission, European Parliament,
European Central Bank, and European Court of Justice and
institutions representing national governments European Council and
Council of Ministers share authority. The result is a malleable and
open system that is accessible to diverse actors. It is true that decisionmaking rules are biased in favor of governments. Decision-making
rules also allow for other actors political parties, subnational
authorities, and national and European interest groups to influence EU
decisions.
The effect of Globalization and European Integration on
Europe’s politics and society
The factors which can influence the globalization / European
integration on Europe’s politics and society are the following:
− decrease or increase regional conflict;
− ideological conflict;
− national identity;
− centralization or decentralization of authority.
Maybe the greatest achievement of European integration is its
pacifying impact on centuries-old warring relations in Europe. The EU
can be conceived as a response to the horrors of war in Europe, as a
means to tame destructive nationalism. We can imagine as a way to
weaken national animosities by establishing an international legal
order that would constrain realist anarchy and can to domesticate
international tensions within stable supranational institutions.
On the whole, EU member states have learned that they tend to be
better off when they stick together. European integration has
effectively defused interstate conflicts in Europe. Moreover, it has, so
far, not led to the emergence of quasi-permanent regional blocs. This
may be because the EU deals with a vast range of issues. While it is
possible to frame some issues in terms of national interest, most issues
are divisive within societies, and this ideological contestation is likely
to undermine efforts to forge a “national position.” Instead, groups are
tempted to take their ideological positions from the national to the EU
arena where they can find like-minded allies from other countries.
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The challenge for proponents of political regulation is that there is
generally a mismatch between the territorial scope of the market and
government authority. In a world where markets are increasingly
transnational or global, international institutions with real authoritative
capacity are generally weak or non existent. Absent international
regulation, proponents of regulation can push for national regulation,
but that risks being ineffective, or it may only be possible if one is
willing to sacrifice growth. It is rational, then, for the left to be wary
of globalization.
The European Union is an exception. It is the one supra-national
institution with considerable capacity to regulate market forces
beyond the national state. European integration encompasses a variety
of particular policies and reforms with very different implications for
left and right. Parties on the economic right should be in favor of
market integration in the European Union, and policies that constrain
government spending, but they should be wary of political integration
that may strengthen re-regulation at European level. Parties on the left
and center-left too should be weighing conflicting considerations.
Globalization produces economic insecurity, and at the same
time, it brings about increased cultural and social transactions that
make it more difficult to insulate one’s own community from
interference. Small, formerly homogenous cultures, are drawn into the
global trading place. The law of the numbers predicts that, in a
situation where two or more cultures interact, there is a good chance
for the smaller culture to be ultimately assimilated by the larger one.
For many EU citizens, European integration signifies increased
economic, cultural and social interactions that cut across traditional
communal identities.
The national orientation of these parties has an unambiguous
bottom line for their position on European integration: the national
state should be extremely wary in weakening its legitimate sovereign
right to govern persons living in its territory.
There is no simple answer to the question of whether national
identity politics has been mitigated or hardened as a result of
European integration. The empirical evidence suggests that it has been
a bit of both.
The deepening of European integration represents an
210
unprecedented centralization of authority in Europe.
The direct effect of European integration on regional
empowerment has been limited, although real. The most tangible
impact has been through EU cohesion policy.
Partnership became a powerful tool for the Commission to break
open its two-level, dyadic relations with each national government
into multi-level relations among supranational, national, and
subnational governments.
Membership of an economic and monetary union is qualitatively
different from membership of a free trade association. National
leaders, from their side, may find it attractive to devolve authority to
the extent that, by doing so, they can shed responsibility for the
implementation of unpopular EU regulation. The European Union sets
the economic and political parameters within which diffusion of
authority takes place.
The Future of Globalization in Europe
European integration is both a dependent variable, influenced by
globalization, and an independent variable, a specific embodiment of
globalization. As an independent variable, it resembles most closely
the model of shared governance set out in the scenarios. It is a mode
of governance that transcends traditional interstate relations. Authority
is diffused across national, subnational, and supranational actors. EU
policy making is decided primarily through negotiations between
supranational and national institutions. And shared governance also
includes subnational governments and domestic interest groups; this is
more likely to happen in some policy areas (e.g., regional policy,
environment, social policy, and industrial relations) than others
(foreign policy, trade policy, competition policy), in certain policy
stages (implementation stage) than in others (legislative process), or
by actors other than national governments of some member states
(federal countries) than others (unitary states). National governments
are still the most powerful players, but their exclusive control over EU
decision making, both individual and collective, has slipped away.
Shared governance in the European Union has helped a budding
European public space, where basic options for European societies can
be and are contested. The public space is still largely segmented into
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national public spaces, but political parties have begun to formulate
explicit connections between domestic contestation and European
integration. European integration has heightened unease with the
erosion of national identity, and this has benefited the radical right.
The kind of governance that prevails in the European Union may
influence disproportionately the future of global governance.
Global regulation of regime competition is bound to be less
encompassing, less binding, and less specific than EU regulation. It
would be confined primarily to negative integration (trade
liberalization), while it would not create much in terms of political
regulation of markets, and certainly not a level of environmental and
social standards that is equivalent to the EU level.
The future shape of the European Union will influence global
governance, though one can only speculate how. If shared governance
prevails in the European Union, it would certainly help to bring about
global shared governance. If shared governance gives way to a club
model, chances for global shared governance seem much diminished.
Bibliography
1. FALKNER, Gerda, Michael NENTWICH - The Amsterdam Treaty: The
Blueprint for the Future Institutional Balance?” In European Integration
after Amsterdam. Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy,
edited by Karlheinz Neunreither and Antje Wiener. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999.
1. HOOGHE, Liesbet, Gary MARKS and Carole WILSON, “Does Left/Right
Structure Party Positions on European Integration?” Comparative Political
Studies 35: 8, 2002.
2. HOOGHE, Liesbet, and Gary MARKS, European Integration and Multilevel Governance. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.
3. HUBER, Evelyne, and John D. STEPHENS, Political Choice in Global
Markets: Development and Crisis of Advanced Welfare States. Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 2001.
4. MARKS, Gary, and Carole WILSON, “The Past in the Present: A Cleavage
Theory of Party Positions on European Integration.” British Journal of
Political Science 30, 2000.
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GLOBALIZATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
Eng. Manolache Mihai
General Staff, Ministry of Defence, Bucharest
Abstract
Globalization can be consider to be a enormous issue, one which bring
together a complex mix of economic, political, military, cultural and social
factors. And as we can all sense, it is a phenomenon that is transforming every
aspect of human affairs. Globalization is full of promise, the solution to many of
the world’s ills and, properly managed, a source of prosperity, stability and
security. Many, of course, adamantly reject such a possibility, as witness the
massive and sometimes violent demonstrations that we have seen against it. To
them, globalization is disruptive and intimidating change: it is uncertainty about
the future and it is fear for people’s livelihoods and their accustomed ways of
life.
But beyond this controversy - though certainly not unrelated to it globalization, by its very nature, is also changing the way we have to think
about international security.
Globalization
These papers try to discuss the idea of globalization itself,
including its origins, its perceived benefits, and its perceived dangers.
Economic globalization refers to the increasing integration of
economies around the world. It occurs primarily through trade and
financial flows, but also through the flow of ideas and people. Its
result is increasing integration of the world’s cultures, its economies,
and its political infrastructures. This is a simple enough idea, but it has
immense implications.
Globalization has had two powerful drivers: technological
change, on the one hand, especially in communications and
213
information technologies, and, on the other, a lowering of national
barriers to foreign trade and investment, what we call economic
liberalization.
First of all, and most obviously, the origins of globalization are to
be found in the technological advances that have made it easier,
cheaper and quicker to carry out international transactions. These
include the jet transport, the fax, satellite communication, the
computer, and especially the Internet. These innovations have reduced
the costs of time and distance to such an extent that they have become
essentially irrelevant in many commercial transactions. As a result, the
market space for most goods and services has become global space.
But technology alone cannot completely explain our current
experience with globalization. Economic liberalization - the deepening
and extension of free market institutions across the globe - has been
the other indispensable factor.
It is the convergence of all of these factors that accounts for the
dramatic thrust of globalization over recent decades. In a word,
though, all of them come down to two great phenomena: first,
incredibly rapid technological change, and second, triumphant, even
strident, free-market capitalism, one characterized by a muchdiminished economic role for government.
This performance reinforced the notion that free market
capitalism was the economic system best able to produce economic
growth and high standards of living.
Certainly there have not been many demonstrations in favor of
globalization. Indeed, it is hard to think of any city that has actually
been besieged by crowds demanding more globalization. But perhaps
there should have been. For globalization does have a positive side. It
is based on the simple idea that the liberalization of markets for goods,
services and investment on a global scale can lead to increased world
production through competition and division of labor - the
specialization that allows people and economies to focus on doing
what they do best. Globalization therefore offers the possibility – not
necessarily the promise – but at least the possibility of widespread
economic growth, development, and most important of all, the
reduction of poverty.
Encouraging this trend, many believe, is the key to progress in
214
democracy, in raising living standards, in improving health, in
protecting the environment, and indeed in promoting peace, stability
and security.
Some see the forces of globalization – especially the supposed
materialism and individualism of Western culture – as posing an
irreconcilable threat to fundamental national values, including
language, community, family relationships, social mores and so on.
And even if there can be no question that globalization has
dramatically increased total world income, it is unfortunately true that
it also appears to be linked to an increasing inequality in the
distribution of that income. Around the world, there is a growing gap
between rich and poor.
Many also see globalization causing unrelenting erosion of
national borders. They complain that transnational corporations
operate beyond the laws of individual states and that they unduly
influence economic and social policy through their ability to shift
operations to jurisdictions seen to be more cooperative with respect to
taxes, labour laws, and environmental standards. Anti-globalization
activists also complain that multilateral institutions such as the UN,
the G8, the IMF and the WTO, the institutional embodiments of
globalization, were not elected and exceed their mandates by
encouraging an unwanted homogenization of cultures through the
creation of universal norms for a wide range of national social and
economic policies.
Globalization, has been held responsible for much of the
migration that characterizes our times and which is held by many to
threaten social stability. And there is of course much truth in that.
Given the unevenness with which the benefits of globalization have
been distributed across the globe, it is inevitable that more and more
people will see migration to the wealthy zone as their only salvation.
If the jobs and incomes will not come to them, they will go to the jobs
and income - legally or otherwise. For the recipient countries,
however, large-scale migration can be socially destabilizing and even
threatening.
Globalization and Security
Thinking to the linkages between globalization and security, it is
215
possible to clearly see four critical points where globalization’s
implications and security issues come together: the clash of values, the
marginalization of countries and regions, political disintegration, and
the emergence of failed states. Globalization involves an integration of
economic, political, social and cultural values. But it also involves a
clash of those values. The events of September 11th were very much a
product of this dichotomy. On the one hand, the perpetrators of those
events relied on modern technology to conduct their activities, on
political openness to move relatively freely across borders, and on
social diversity to blend into a foreign society. All the pieces of
globalization – the free flow of capital, a sophisticated and efficient
international financial system, immigration, airline travel, the Internet,
and the global media – were used by these terrorists as adroitly as they
are used in international business. On the other hand, their extreme
religious beliefs collided violently with values of modernization,
political openness, and social tolerance – in a word, with what we call
globalization. In this light, transnational terrorism has to be seen both
as a direct product of globalization and as its implacable enemy.
Globalization can provide means, motive and opportunity for
those in the vanguard of terrorist activities. But, it can also provide
popular support and sustenance, especially in those countries and
regions that have been by-passed by globalization or which are unable
to adjust to it. Here, a rising proportion of people find access to basic
necessities severely restricted, while at the same time television and
movies raise in them unrealizable aspirations. Globalization makes
economic disparities graphically obvious, making misery, injustice,
and humiliation painfully evident. It can, therefore, be a powerful
source of resentment. Resistance to what is seen as an unjust
economic globalization can then fuel terrorism. Resistance is
intensified when that unjust globalization is clearly associated with a
Western culture seen to be threatening local religions and cultures.
But we have to be careful not to exaggerate this, especially since the
terrorists involved in September 11th were all well educated, young
men from middle class and even wealthy families. Nevertheless,
terrorists, even wealthy terrorists, are very much more likely to find
support for their cause, sanctuary, and an ample supply of foot
soldiers in areas marked by instability and extreme poverty.
216
Another curious security implication of globalization seems to be
that economic integration on a global scale can encourage political
disintegration. The reasoning seems to be that when the whole world
becomes the market place – the ultimate consequence of globalization
– then the economic justification for large political conglomerates,
those that transcend ethnic, linguistic, or religious divisions can no
longer be justified on economic grounds alone. In other words, the
relevant economic space for a nation-state may no longer match the
relevant political space. The result can be fragmentation, often leading
to secessionist movements and conflict.
Failed states can also provide secure bases for other groups,
groups just as threatening to international stability and security,
including those engaged in illicit trade in drugs, people, body parts,
arms, counterfeit goods and money. And, like terrorist organizations,
criminal networks skillfully exploit the technologies and structures of
globalization. They operate in incredibly efficient market systems
where the economic rewards of their illicit activities are immense.
These organizations have refined global networking to a high science,
entering into complex and improbable strategic alliances that span
cultures and continents. Human traffickers deal with counterfeit goods
makers who deal with arms dealers who deal with terrorists and so on.
The result is a noxious brew of motivations and opportunities.
Religious or political fanaticism drives terrorist networks. The
promise of enormous profits drives the criminal networks. And
networking between them is a potent recipe for murder, mayhem and
global instability and insecurity.
These security threats – the clash of values, marginalization,
political disintegration, and failed states – all come together to create
fertile breeding grounds for terrorism. This suggests that our
globalizing world is a divided world, one split between a more-or-less
successfully globalizing space and another, where globalization has
completely failed to take root. The divergences between the two go a
long way towards explaining the polarization in the world system
between a zone of relative peace, stability and prosperity and a zone
of turmoil, instability and economic stagnation. The non-globalizing
space is characterized by backwardness, underdevelopment,
instability, authoritarianism and oppression. Not surprisingly, it is also
217
home to the major threats to global stability and security. It is here
where the security agenda facing the world is largely defined. And it
is a very complex agenda, one that goes beyond terrorism and WMD
to include the new international threats emerging out of globalization:
economic inequality, economic instability, migration, organized
crime, environmental degradation, disease, illicit trade in humans,
drugs, arms, and so on. None of these problems is really new, but in
an age of globalization, they become universal in scope. All of them,
too, are highly interrelated, greatly compounding the security threats
that have emerged with globalization.
However, not only does globalization present the world with a
broader and deeper set of security threats, it also renders it ever more
vulnerable to those threats. For one thing, globalization increases the
interconnectedness and complexity - and hence the fragility and
vulnerability - of national and international infrastructures. Thus, a
successful attack against a single sector in one country can have
adverse and unexpected effects in other sectors around the globe. Such
a climate of fear can, of course, lead to a turning inward and a turning
away from global integration. Rich countries could increasingly
attempt to insulate themselves from the negative aspects of
globalization and emphasize a re-nationalization of security.
In confronting the tradeoff between global integration and
security, they would likely opt to move in the direction of what we
could call the “national security state”, one where security concerns
become paramount. They will be tempted to create what could be
considered “gated communities” of economic and political stability.
And, of course, it just such a climate of fear that terrorism wants to
create.
All of this would seem to bring into question the future viability
of globalization itself.
There are a number of reasons to suggest that it might just be
possible. One of these is the very nature of globalization itself.
Globalization is essentially a measure of the ease with which goods,
capital, labor, ideas, and technology can move across borders. But, as
we have seen, such free movement can generate very real security
threats. Globalization is about opening borders; security is about
closing them, or at least carefully controlling who and what goes
218
through them. This underlines the fact that there is a very real tension
between globalization and security, indeed a clear trade-off between
them. Security measures raise the cost of travel and transportation and
slow the pace of trade and commerce. At the same time, combating
the financing of terrorism, particularly through initiatives designed to
counter money laundering, involves greater scrutiny of banks and
increased oversight of capital movements. As a result, the very
mechanisms that have made globalization possible are being slowed.
But even beyond the security issue - which probably represents
the most important threat to globalization - there are other grounds for
suspecting that globalization is not quite as robust as we tend to think.
For one thing, as we have all witnessed, the anti-globalization forces
are powerful, determined, organized, articulate and very persuasive.
Many people are convinced that they are right. As a consequence, they
might well succeed in rallying sufficient political support to reverse
the globalization process. At the very least, they may very well
succeed in significantly slowing it down.
Unfortunately, the obvious losers from such a trend would be
precisely those countries that lie outside of the major regions, chiefly
the developing and transition countries.
We have to acknowledge, then, that there are positive sides and
negative sides to globalization. The difficulty is that it at least appears
that the great benefits of globalization are flowing disproportionately
to the already-rich countries. The negative effects, on the other hand,
are seen as flowing disproportionately to the poorer areas of the world.
This perception has to be a fundamental cause of global instability,
and has to be a considered as a major factor in the propagation of
international terrorism.
Globalization is about change, and change is disruptive. While
overall most nations will be better off as a result of opening up to
globalization, there can be no question that there will be losers as well
as winners. To make globalization acceptable, then, the rich world
will have to take measures to minimize globalization’s disruptive
effects. For one thing, some creative thinking has to be done about
stemming the destabilizing effects of short-term capital flows.
Banning them outright - through the imposition of capital controls would seriously impede the free flow of capital across the globe and
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thus cut off one of the major benefits of globalization.
Integrating a developing economy into a competitive world
economy requires first and foremost a healthy and educated work
force. But adequate health and education are beyond the financial
means of the poorest countries, and it is here that properly managed,
targeted aid can make a huge difference, not only in economic
development, but also in terms of international security.
Bibliography
1. http://www.globalization.com
2. http://globalization.about.com
3. http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200.htm
4. http://www.ifg.org
5. http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization
6. http://www.emory.edu/SOC/globalization
7. http://www.globalresearch.ca
8. http://www.globalisationguide.org
9. http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz
220
THE FORMS, THE DIMENSION AND THE
TENDENCIES OF THE TERRORIST PHENOMENON
Popa Teodor
Gendarmery Inspectorate of Alba Iulia
e-mail: teo_popa63@yahoo.com
Abstract
The contemporary terrorism has become the major threat of democracy,
the worst evil of our contemporary world or the disease of the XXIst century,
as defined by Putin: „ The Big Bang of a new historical era of mankind, a pole
of the new world order, mega-terrorism, hyper-terrorism and nothing would
ever be as before, having to anticipate that the orgies of September 11,
2001„will be repeated elsewhere, perhaps even in different circumstances, but
without a doubt they shall be repeate”.
Concerning the terrorist threat, the post-September 11, 2001period
indicates in more emphatic manner that if we talk about a medium of security we
are not necessarily considering it only from the military factor’s perspective. A
deeper analysis shows us that along with institutional reforms and implicitly the
cooperative management in the domain of security we must also approach the
indivisibility of security and regional even global commitment of the
international community.
The forms of terrorism
As the main forms of terrorist manifestation, depending on the
means of perpetration of the terrorist acts, the following forms can be
distinguished:
1. Direct Action
Catalogued as the main form of perpetration of extremist terrorist
acts, it consists of the open armed attack against an individual, a fixed
or mobile asset with a view to its destruction, occupation, capture or
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annihilation, premeditatedly spreading at the same time panic and
terror among the population in the area.
According to the means of execution of direct action the
following could be mentioned:
The terrorist attack
It is the method which is usually aimed at the physical removal of
outstanding personalities from the political, economic, social,
religious or military sphere.
Carried out by terrorists, most often through a swift full force
surprise attack on the targeted person, this type of action has as a final
aim the murder, capture, kidnapping or abduction of the target.
The terrorist attack stands out among all other forms of terrorism
through the fact that the chosen victim must embody a “symbol of the
enemy”.
The assassination is considered by terrorists as the “exemplary”
action, and the abduction of persons are actions of firm warning meant
to coerce certain factors of decision into accepting the imposed
conditions, including the ransom price for the abductees.
The terrorist attack on fixed objectives
Extremely grim in nature, the actions undertaken against various
fixed objectives constitute another form of exacerbated manifestation
of the terrorist phenomenon. Due to their increase in number, the
serious consequences of these acts and their diversity of methods,
lines of action and means employed corroborate the accountable and
unaccountable factors of risk which must be identified and taken into
account.
The terrorist attack on mobile objectives
Concerning the mobile targets, it is notoriously known that in the
course of the past years the means of transportation have constituted a
favorite target of terrorist attacks, most often targeting aerial, naval,
railways and road means of transportation.
Among the chief methods employed by the terrorists in the
perpetration of their acts targeting means of transportations, the
following could be mentioned:
- hijacking;
- setting off explosives with the aim of destroying the respective
means of transport and causing loss of human lives;
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- the armed attack on means of transportation resulting in the
killing of the passengers and hostage taking.
Depending on the methods, lines of action and means employed
by the terrorists in their actions targeting mobile objectives, a closer
look will be taken at the attacks undertaken against the main means of
transport, namely:
Terrorist acts that targeted aircrafts, otherwise known as aerial
terrorism
The menace posed by the acts of aerial piracy is evinced by the
fact that annually, over a billion people travel by air in the world, any
of these being potential victims of hijacking. At the same time, any air
pirate knows that his action would be the center of attention anywhere
in the world.
As a sensitive area for each country’s defense capacity, the aerial
transport constitutes an important instrument of national policy. The
aerial companies are considered an illustration of the state’s economic
development and vitality, representing a symbol of its international
prestige. Consequently, the problem of air transport security
constitutes a priority political task, being allotted considerable
resources. The simple reason behind it is the fact that aerial insecurity
can lead to serious hazard for the lives of the people travelling, a
situation with severe implications for the states which own hijacked
aircrafts and whose citizens are their passengers as well as for those
states upon whose soil the terrorists demand the landing of the
airplanes.
The recrudescence of the terrorist acts with their peak moment on
September 11, 2001 lead to a so-called competition between the
experts in the domain of high technology and the experts of terror.
Still, some attempts at introducing weapons on board of airplane have
proved successful, which resulted in disasters.
Hijacking is one of the chief methods employed by the terrorist
groups and organizations against airplanes. It represents the
premeditated act of capturing an airplane by terrorists, taking the
members of the crew and the passengers as hostage and the coercion
of the flight crew to change the flight course and the final destination,
all actions aimed to compel some state authorities to accept the
demands phrased by the terrorist commando.
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The magnitude of the hijacking act arises from the danger to
which the passengers and the crew on board of an airplane are
exposed, even more serious since in the case of a refusal, or according
to the initial intent, the airplanes were directed towards objectives that
were hit by the planes boarding the suicidal terrorists.
Terrorist acts that targeted maritime or fluvial crafts
The study of the terrorist phenomenon’s casuistry on the
international level reveals the fact that more often the maritime and
fluvial crafts have become targets of terrorist attacks. Two of the
actions committed on the globe against some vessels of maritime
transport must be mentioned here to be analyzed from the point of
view of methods and means employed by the terrorists.
According to the data published by the International Maritime
Bureau located in London, lately, there has been an alarming increase
in the number of maritime piracy acts. Thus, it is estimated that in the
course of these past years, these types of acts have been on the
increase especially in the Far East oceans and seas, their number
surpassing the 100 figure.
The recrudescence of the maritime piracy phenomenon must be
partially accounted for by the unjustified expansion of the boundary of
some states’ territorial waters, which allowed pirates to act more
easily along the shore waters of certain states that don’t have the
ability to protect their territorial waters.
The areas where there is an active presence of maritime piracy,
according to the quoted analysts, are the Gulf of Thailand, The
Malacca Straits, the coast of Western Africa, the east of the
Mediterranean Sea and the Caribbean Sea.
According to the statistics of the New York Harbor
Administration, in the last 25 years, over 300 acts of maritime
terrorism have been registered in the entire world.
In what concerns the methods used, it can be observed that the
terrorists use with predilection the hijacking of such means of
transport, resulting in sequestering the ships and taking the passengers
hostage, the forceful attack and the placing of explosive devices.
The means employed consist of the use of fire weapons and
explosives, used either directly in the course of action, or indirectly
through their concealment or planting on board of the ships.
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Terrorist acts that targeted railway or road means of
transportation
Starting from the fact that ensuring a regular railway and road
traffic represents a vital condition for the smooth running and
organization of the socio-economic life in any state, and by seizing
upon the difficulties that can be caused to the socio-economic
mechanism in any country by interfering in this circuit, the terrorist
groups and organizations have resorted to multiple terrorist acts that
have targeted directly these means of transport, using diverse methods
and lines of action with the same end result.
2. Covert action
The purpose of this type of action is similar to the purpose of
direct action but the method differs, since the terrorists act by using
explosive, toxic or incendiary charges placed in the targeted locations
and by remote hit of the targets through remote controlled devices.
In this sense the terrorists use modern technology, setting off
explosives from a distance or programming them to explode through
some devices attached to the explosive charge. The great advantage of
covert actions from a terrorist point of view consists in their
protection. The covert actions are also used when terrorists cannot
break through the security devices installed in their targeted
objectives.
Usually, the objectives targeted by terrorists can be:
- the destruction or partial disabling of some fixed or mobile
objectives;
- the killing or injuring of some individuals or groups of persons.
The terrorist acts perpetrated lately evince the fact that explosives
are frequently employed for this purpose, as a consequence of the
strategy adopted by the extremist groups, aimed at the protection of
their members, hence in this context, the planning of terrorist attacks
that do not engage direct confrontation with the antiterrorist combat
organizations.
The manufacture of explosives, incendiary bombs, even
homemade ones, by the members of the terrorist groups ensure an
increased level of conspiracy protecting their intentions, being also
aided by the fact that they can procure the necessary equipment from
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the black market or by stealing it from various warehouses, including
army warehouses.
The most frequently employed method of the terrorists is the
placing of explosives, and as such, it consists of the introduction, the
placing or attachment of the explosive charge in the targeted locations
and objectives with an aim to result in assassinations, destructions,
arson etc.
In the context of the use of explosives, there has been noted a
concern of the terrorist organizations to increase the range of their
possibility of concealment. For this purpose the terrorist elements
have made use of new techniques, like the execution of oil paintings
over a thin layer of plastic explosive, the confection of chocolate eggs
or “explosive candies” where a plastic type of explosive as “Samtex”
is introduced, making it extremely difficult to identify its presence as a
consequence of its particular characteristics.
In conclusion, it can be stated that the explosives have come to
represent the most commonly used means in the perpetration of
terrorist acts, due to their possibility of concealment, containment and
placement with no practical difficulties in the targeted area or
objective.
The known casuistry reveals a portion of the multiple techniques
of placing the explosives, the incendiary or toxic devices in certain
locations, namely:
- stationing or parking booby trapped vehicles in the perimeter or
in the immediate location of the targeted objective;
- the concealed insertion of explosive devices in the interior of the
objectives by tricking, disguising or hiding them in innocuous objects
(fake bottom purses, technical equipment, toys, food items etc.);
- addressing by mail or other means bomb letters or parcels for
the targeted objectives;
- abandoning concealed explosive charges in the objective’s
vicinity;
- the infiltration of terrorist elements in the targeted objectives,
under various guises and placing the explosive material in a hidden
location, with the explosion set off at an appointed time;
- the employ by the terrorist elements of corrupt individuals
within the personnel of public service plants or institutions (electricity
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or water supply, postal services etc.) to insert the explosive charges
concealed within various objects and materials in the perimeter of the
objectives;
- the use by terrorist elements of lost identification documents
belonging to the personnel of the objective or the use of fake IDs in
order to enter the objective and place the explosive charges etc.
As to the means employed by the terrorists in such actions, they
often rely on the use of explosive and incendiary devices.
In what concerns the attack from afar of certain objectives by
remote controlled devices, this method is used when the terrorists do
not have the possibility to approach the objectives in order to commit
the act. Belonging to this method, a prominent place is given to fire
weapons with indirect aim (mine throwers) or guided missiles.
The factors behind the resort to this method consist in:
- the impossibility to approach or to station terrorists in the area
surrounding the targeted objective due to measures of security instated
by the security forces;
-protecting the terrorist elements from the riposte of the security
forces;
- the impossibility of using other methods for the attack of the
targeted objective;
- the existence of means of propelling and directing explosive
charges in the possession of some organizations.
This method has been employed in the past years by some
terrorist organizations in Japan in particular.
A special category of weapons used by the terrorist organizations
is nuclear warheads armament or mini nuclear bombs, devices whose
advanced technological progress made them fit to be carried in a hand
bag or case. The danger of a possible use of such devices subsists
especially after 1990, the year when due to the fall of the Communist
block, hundreds of such devices were listed as missing.
3. Indirect (psychological) action
As an extremely effective action, it has as an objective the
annihilation or the weakening of the psychological resistance of the
targeted individuals or group of people with the purpose of diverting
their judgment and subjugating their will.
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As a technique, the psychological action uses misinformation,
consisting of launching (usually by telephone announcements)
shocking information or rumors meant to engender insecurity and
panic among the targeted persons or among various social spheres,
rising even to national level.
The techniques employed may consist of telephone threats and
anonymous letters, or the launching of false alarms through various
means of mass-media.
Such a form is more often met in terrorist practice especially in
crisis situations undergone by some states.
The dimensions of terrorism
From the beginning of the century and up to present terrorism has
been radically transformed. The left-wing terrorists of the 70s ceased
to exist; they died or are either incarcerated or too old to spread terror
anymore. The present day terrorists and their motivations have
changed. According to Walter Lacquer, the president of the
International Committee of Investigation in Washington, the most
important difference from the past lies in the fact that terrorists fueled
by ethnical or religious motivations are stronger than their
predecessors, especially since their financial support originates in a
larger circle of persons.
The terrorists have changed their own method of action. The
attacks multiply in number, the destructive potential rapidly increases
and their authors become more skillful and more difficult to identify.
One thing is certain, namely, the lack of any prejudice in the face of
classical military opposition between two or more states. A country or
a group of countries will be engaged in armed confrontation with the
terrorist formations which have no direct state affiliation. In
confirmation of this aspect, as noted by the Israeli military historian
Martin Van Krevell lies the fact that none of the existing military
conflicts in the world are inter –state conflicts.
Seen from a historical point of view, the present wave of
terrorism, almost epidemic in its nature would not appear as serious,
yet statistics cannot always depict the real dimensions and importance
of a terrorist action.
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Weapons of an increasingly sophisticated nature include paralysis
gas, individual ground-air rockets and probably rudimentary yet
effective nuclear hits.
The types of terrorism we would have to face in the future go well
beyond the hijacking of planes and hostage taking. The new
generation of conflicts will replace contemporary military conflicts.
The terrorist can acquire sophisticated charges like chemical and
biological weapons. At the same time they could solve complex
logistics and communication problems, use delayed action or multiple
stage explosives or portable satellite connection systems. They have
the technical training necessary to attack and neutralize the
infrastructure, the Intel networks, and the energy and transport grids.
The efforts already undertaken for the protection of the vital
sectors of society do not even represent a proper start towards facing
the danger embodied by the new terrorism.
According to the former director of the MI-6 for the years 19891994, Sir Colin Mc Call, terrorism will accompany us, in one way or
another, for a long period of time. Also, the experts with the
International Terrorism Monitoring Organization in Paris have made
ample reference to the use by some Islamist movements of the socalled “techno-terrorism”, namely the employ of methods belonging
to advanced technology like satellite communication, electronic mail
and the Internet. They have disclosed the danger posed by the
intensification of the relations and military cooperation between
extremist Islamist movements and international terrorist organizations,
which have no connection to Islam, drawing at the same time the
attention to the danger which will threaten in the following years the
entire world, the result of their cooperation with the Russian Mafia
through which they can acquire nuclear and bacteriological weapons.
For the following years, the analysts foresee an alarming increase
of extremist-terrorist actions as a consequence of the international
community’s response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001
on the U.S. territory. Therefore, we can expect a diversification of
forms, methods, techniques and means of action, a major role
probably being assigned to chemical and biological means, as well as
to the informatics ones, relying first on their psychological impact on
the public opinion. At the same time, the international relations will be
229
influenced, as a result of the probable reevaluation of risks and threats
posed to the regional and global security as well as the reconsideration
of the International community’s priority towards them.
The tendencies of the terrorist phenomenon
After analyzing the genesis mechanisms, the emergence and
shaping of the terrorist phenomenon on an international scale, the
following aspects appear as relevant:
- the geopolitical climate specific to the process of economic and
politico-military reconfiguration, marked by the radical and
continuous change of the balance of forces;
- the augmentation of the interference between terrorism and
some segments of organized crime;
- the internationalization of some conflict situations has created
favorable conditions for the development of terrorism, while the
disappearance of some of its traditional sponsors has determined the
extremist-terrorist organizations to turn more frequently to organized
crime as the main source of financing.
- in the context of the globalization phenomenon, the terrorist
organizations identify a multitude of specific opportunities, derived
especially from the processes of geopolitical transition towards the
configuration of a different type of world order;
- the emergence of new organizations, structured according to
some extremely diffuse principles with less comprehensible
motivations and less logical methods of actions;
- the ideological terrorism will continue to be favored by
economic crises and the ascension dynamics of the migration fluxes;
-the tendency to intensify the cooperation between terrorist
organizations, being able to plan and carry out desperate actions;
- the increase of the potential and aggressiveness of the actions
targeting the informatics infrastructure; the cybernetic attacks offer the
terrorists a greater flexibility, being able to launch operations from
anywhere in the world, without being directly exposed and without
having to confront the politico-military countermeasures of the attack;
At the beginning of this century, we are witnessing the
manifestation of a new phenomenon, namely the transnational
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terrorism. In the past years, this phenomenon cannot be considered as
a regional phenomenon any longer but as a global one.
Concerning the E.U, the TE-SAT 2007 report, as a final
conclusion, evinces the fact that Spain, France and the U.K are the
states that were the most affected by the manifestations of this
scourge, with countries like Estonia, Finland, Hungary etc. situated at
the opposite pole.
Returning to the Al-Qaeda network, the analysis of the past
attacks undertaken by it, carried out by activists of various
nationalities, illustrate the evolution of the organization led by Bin
Laden towards a model of a multi-cell organization. Besides the
already mentioned leader, the network is also led by the Islamic World
Front for the Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders, a political
organization which acts as an umbrella in order to gain the support of
several Islamic groups of radical terrorists.
Another major transformation is represented by the reorientation
of the terrorist groups from governmental, diplomatic ands military
targets to the so-called “easy targets” (trains, synagogues, hotels, etc.)
particularly important because they have a strong symbolic
connotation and ensure a large number of victims. Such actions have
as an objective to cause the exertion of pressure from the public
opinion on the decisional factors to accept the demands of the
terrorists.
The terrorists have perfected a sophisticated manner of exploiting
the so-called “grey areas” where the governments have weak authority
and where there are important quantities of armament, poor,
preponderantly Muslim population, the corruption is widespread and
the state power is almost inexistent. Not to mention the fact that these
countries represent veritable “paradises” for financing their activities.
The organization of their activities proves a great degree of
adaptability and flexibility in all actions undertaken.
Finally, we are witnessing the proliferation of the global message
of terrorism. The technological progress allows them to transmit
messages across great distances and to the desired targeted public.
Undoubtedly, the development of the public dimension of violence
has become one of the most aggressive targets with a tactical effect,
chosen by the terrorist groups, this purpose being illustrated by
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kidnappings followed by intense media coverage, being the easiest to
achieve and producing the maximum shock on the level of the entire
public opinion.
Bibliography
1. General quaestor, university teacher dr. Andreescu Anghel-The Military
Sciences Magazine, Bucharest, nr. 2/2002.
2. Andreescu Anghel, Dan Nita- The terrosrism- a psycho-sociological
analysis, Ed. Timpolis, Timisoara, 1999.
3. Andreescu Anghel- The contemporan terrorist phenomenon, theme
presented at The Academy of the Romanian scientists, section Military
Sciences, Bucharest, 2007.
4. Andreescu Anghel; Nicolae Radu- The Terrorist Organizations, ed. Artprint,
Bucharest, 2008.
5. Olimpiodor Antonescu ; Stan Petrescu - The Organized Crime Between a
Risk Factor and a Threat, ed. The army technical territorial centre,
Bucharest, 2008.
6. Cristian Delcea, The psychology of terrorism: psychological study on
terrorists, ed. Diversitas, the 2nd revised edition, Brasov, 2006.
7. Neculai Stoina-The Megaterrorism- a challenge of the IIIrd millennium,
2004.
8. Popescu Ilie& co- The International Terrorism-Scourge of the contemporary
World, ed. M.A.I, Bucharest, 2003.
9. Candea Vasile- The Military Sciences Magazine, Bucharest, nr. 2/2002.
10. Opre A. –The psychology of the personality, a course support, UBB, The
Faculty of Psychology, 2005.
11. The E.U report concerning the terrorism and its tides, 2007.
232
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISMS AND SECURITY
ELEMENTS WITHIN EUROPE HISTORY
Mărgărit Iulian
M.U. 01376, Ploieşti
e-mail: map.um01376@yahoo.com
Abstract
The concerns for security were always connected with the force – the
coverage of necessary means and conditions to prevent and reject the
aggression.
The beginning of balance of forces paradigm, the idea of creating systems
to dissolution the conflicts through conciliation - “Podiebard’s plan” – and
creation of the alliances to maintain the balance, adopted in Italy in 15th
century and extended for the entire Europe, are only few security initiatives
adopted at the continental level, that can be considered pioneers of present
stability organisms and organizations and even the EU base.
The present article brings into discussion these researches for a
continental level security system, starting from the middle edge and following
this phenomenon until present time.
1. Introduction
Since the beginning, the concerns for security were always
connected with the power, the coverage of necessary means to prevent
and reject the aggression.
The balance of force paradigm has been dated in the same time
with the use of force, so that Hume noticed in the essay Balance of
power (1752) that the elements of these principles can be find also in
Demosthenes speeches for megalopolises and expanded after the
modern states has formed [1].
233
One of the oldest plans belongs to Maximilian Bethune while he
was minister of King Henry the 4th of France. One of these plans has
forecasted split of Europe into 15 “equal states” managed by France.
Another moment was the idea to form systems to solution
conflicts through conciliation as a form to maintain balance of force.
The idea emerged in the beginning of 2nd millennium and it was
based on the Christian idea of mankind universality. Regarding the
free will, the misunderstandings were manifested among pope and
emperor cohorts until national principle has asserted.
2. Maintain peace and creation of first European alliances
Later, a new thesis emerged, the thesis of creation of a European
institution to maintain peace. Idea was reaffirmed in 1464 by a certain
Antonie Marini, French refugee at Bohemian King Potiebard,
becoming Potiebard’s plan who alleged a sort of king’s
representative’s league to maintain peace using peaceful means [2].
Another way to maintain peace was also the creation of alliances
to maintain the balance, adopted in Italy in 15th century, then
extended to entire Europe. With the help of this system it has been
followed to achieve the limitation of two dangers who threaten states
independence: Turkish Empire extension and Habsburg power grow.
So, to be able to deal with the invasion of France, in Italy, king of
Spain, Pope, Venice, Milano and King Maximilian the 1st have united
into the League of Venice.
After that, as an alternative to these primitive beginnings,
European congresses have constituted a new form to promote
European level force balance. So, the congress of Vienna was
determined by the hegemonic actions of France under Napoleon the
1st to create coalitions with England, Austria, Prussia and Russia
whose objective was to establish a “real and permanent power balance
in Europe” [3].
“European Concert” has been the result of the opposition of
powerful monarchs to the revolutionary wave started by the French
revolution against feudal arrangements from Europe. The initiative
has belonged to Alexander the 1st who suggested a “Holly Alliance”
among suzerains. The treaty was signed on 26 of September 1815 by
Russia, Prussia and Austria being “opened to all Christian princes”. In
234
November 1815, England has signed the treaty creating a secret
alliance with the purpose to interfere in France in case of
revolutionary actions and common border guarantee.
Nations league system, which contained “14 points” who lead to
creation of an international organism meant to assure continuous
peace as a collective force able to be “indeed bigger than the force of
any other nation engaged in the alliance so that no nation nor any
combination of nations to not be able to confront or resist it” has tried
to maintain balance of force between WW I and WW II [4]. But the
idea of common actions starting from economical and financial
boycott to common military action, didn’t find the reflection into an
instrument capable to put it into practice.
Re-emergence to the policy of balance was determined by the
great powers witch, when the league was a stoppage against own
interests promotion, looked for answer outside the League. The most
powerful adherent of the concept was England who wanted to weaken
France and strengthen Germany. The contradictions among Great
Powers allowed Germany to arm and prepare the infernal war machine
who leaded inevitably to the second world confrontation.
The searches for a new security system have begun during the
war, the purpose being “to elude future generations from war rod,
which, twice during a human lifetime have brought humanity
immeasurable suffer”.
Founders of UN have started also from a force when they defined
a primary purpose of the organization “to maintain the peace and
security”. Starting from the fact that relations between states are force
related relationships, it has been considered as necessary that the
organization to have armed forces capable to eliminate any threat
regarding the peace. The main concern was not to eliminate the force
but to control it. Instead of the decentralized system envisaged by the
League, UN has enforced “an international security system
characterized by a high degree of centralization”.
UN book has put into member countries hands a large variety of
possibilities to deal peacefully any arguments: negotiation,
investigation, meditation, arbitration, legal way.
Parallel with UN actions, on the European site, a separate security
system based on the same concept is developed: alliances among
235
Great Powers. Since 1943, USSR has proposed the creation of a
European alliance from which should take part USA, England, Russia
and other power and USA has proposed a world organization. USA
and other Western powers have created on 4th April 1949 NATO
while, after the entrance of RFG into Alliance on 9 May, on 14 May
1955 Varsovia treaty has been formed. The result was the increase of
political and economical hostilities, known as Cold War.
The high degree of weaponry and mass destruction weapons
accumulation has made from “power balance” policy an absurd goal.
In the beginning of the 70’s Europe was divided by the two military
blocks, inside were arms race, weaponry stocks including nuclear
have reached alarming rates. In these conditions, a new security
system was necessary, based on military disengagement, cooperation
and trust among states, principles meant to replace use and threaten of
use of force, among states. The concept of security has the base of
creating the relations among European states on new bases, “military
blocks politics will have to make room for a security organization
with a new engagement system and measures which will exclude the
use of force and to provide a peaceful development of the European
countries, based on understanding, cooperation and coexistence”
The beginning of the new millennium has dramatically influenced
and modified main institutions and security organizations profile by
an increased number of members and by the adaptation of the
strategies to the security environment. In this way, within the united
Europe, main topics on the agenda were about: the assessment of
declaration against terrorism, the assessment of Adheretion treaty of
those countries to create an extension, and also to create an area of
freedom, security and justice.
At the organizational level, the EU extension it is not the only
event of the beginning of the new millennium. Military concerns of
EU members like France, Germany and England were crystallized into
the idea of creating of some quick reaction forces, composed of joint
military forces, capable to conduct at least a complex military
operation.
In this moment, common foreign and security policy at the EU
level is concentrating on the following main fields, established by the
EU Council:
236
• multiple efficiency were UN has the primary role;
• fight against terrorism;
• the elaboration of a new strategy regarding Middle East.
The creation of the freedom, security and justice area has
represented an emergency revealed by the UN and member states need
for security. In this way, consents have been reached about the
strategy of creation of this zone and were established the priorities:
• fight against terrorism;
• exchange of information;
• cooperation in the justice field of activity;
• creation of a common system for illegal immigrants;
• elaboration of a strategy to fight against drugs.
In conclusion, the main factors that work to create the new
security system are the states like independent entities. All states have
to engage themselves that force will not be used and the relations
among them will be based on international human rights, about:
• equal rights;
• respect for national integrity and independence;
• no engagement into internal affairs;
• the right to determine its own faith.
To apply all these principles and rules witch comprehend the
entire field of relations among states, (political, legal, economical,
military and cultural) it is necessary to enforce real measures that
states have to apply at all levels of representation.
References
[1] Prof. univ. dr. Gyemant Ladislau, Europe history, Vol I, pp 15
[2] Nolte Ernst, European civil war, Bucharest, Runa Publishing House, 2005,
pp 7.
[3] *** History Magazine, Vol. I , 1997, pp. 12
[4] Political and Millitary History, Studies, Bucharest, Protransylvania
Publishing House, 1997, pp 24.
237
CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE SOLVING
THE POLITICAL MILITARY CRISES SPECIFIC
STATEMENTS POST CONFLICT IN CURRENT
STAGE
Pîrgulescu Ion
M.U. 02628, Caracal
Abstract
The evolution of the political situation and a strategic area of conflict must
lead to the permanent cessation of armed confrontation. Even if the military
actions or any kind of specific actions to the armed confrontation have ceased
definitively on both sides, the attitude of forces located in conflict can not be
considered in this case as being already a characteristic of the state of peace,
but only a premise to achieve this desideratum. The inexistence of a peace treaty
expresses maintenance for a period of time to a situation where one has not
ended the state of war.
The concept of the post conflict military operations covers all the
operations which can be unfolded over the period which follows
military actions. The different typology of the actions comprised in
this operations scale varies very much, from the control of the armies
or the humanitarian assistance (in which the military force is only a
component much or less significant), to the peace imposition
operations (in which the military force is the determinative element
for the mission accomplishment).
The spectre variety of the post conflict military operations doesn’t
allow their framing in a juridical basis well defined, because, at the
present, doesn’t exist a “code” or an assembly of juridical and political
settlements which refer to this type of operations. Anyway, in many
authors’ opinion1, and in our too, the legal basis of the post conflict
238
military operations is constitute by assembly of regional and world
organisations settlements, humanitarian and international law
principles, and from the documents which settle the constitution and
the operation of some political regional organisations or NATO, UE,
OSCE ones.
The primordial condition for the execution post conflict military
operations is, in our opinion, the existence of a legal frame. In
essence, the key element of legality basis of these military operations
scale is constitute by the right to appear on the others countries
territory. Thus, excepting a belligerence report, the international right
considers as illegal the sending of the military forces on the territory
of another state, because this should constitute an offence of its
sovereignty and un aggression fact. But, in the opinion of certain
authors, the sending of the military forces on the territory of another
state can become legitimate only in certain conditions, namely:
- the existence of a specific agreement with the host country, in
the space limits, time and the modality of operation unrolling then the
intervention of these forces is authorised;
- the exercise of the individual or collective auto-trusteeship right
in the article 51 of ONU Book, in case of armed aggression, until the
Security Council make a decision;
- the unrolling of operations, limited in time and space, to
save/evacuate the own citizens in danger situations, in which the host
country doesn’t want or it isn’t in the situation security ensure and
their evacuation;
- the execution of the measures planned in the chapter VII of
ONU Book and decided by the Security Council, to obtain and to reestablish the peace and the international security;
- so-called humanitarian intervention right.
The Force Missions in the post-conflict military operations frame
are very complex because of many variables presented in each
individual case. However, we consider that it may design a general
framework of action which contain most operations that can be taken
into consideration. In our view, in the content of this general
framework can be define three conceptual phases: the initial response,
transformation and durability initiation.
239
During the initial response phase the task of forces is to establish
a climate of security and safety, in the phase transformation are
founded stable and legitimate institutions, while in the last phase one
follow that the new authorities be able to lead themselves. The
missions elaborate in this framework are formulated around four
distinct areas: security and justice / reconciliation and social /
economic welfare and government / participation.
The units that have enabled in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo
and Afghanistan have provided aspects to be taken into consideration
starting from the organization of force for the mission and which must
be different from the one for a combat mission. In military operations
post-conflict the focus is not the military force, but rather on political
skills3. This hierarchy is the reverse against conventional war. In
addition to this, the nature of forces and political typology shares used
in the war in comparison with military operations post-conflict are
essential. For example, in Iraq, Anthony Cordesman claims that
information, the formations of experts, language and area specialists,
while constant civic action and an adequate policy of war are essential
for success in this country and not to supplement numerical troops.
These things demonstrate the need to change the force component
along with the passage of specific actions to armed fight at the postconflict military operations.
An essential factor is represented by the major differences
between the operations specific to the armed fight and the military
operations post-conflict. These differences can be found in the
purposes, accomplish ways and means necessary to accomplish goals
in each phase. In conventional operations, armed forces concentrate
their on efforts and on the military leadership of a state. Military postconflict operations are not pointed against the military leadership and
a state, but rather take action on population of a country. Changing the
main effort combined with ambiguity objectives, and how media
accomplish tasks necessary to get the victory are filled by the
temporal coordinate extended of the problem to be solved. Missions of
the forces are not as concrete as in the case of conventional
operations, and the accomplish mode of the missions are the result of
plans that are not very detailed, substantiated or repeated. In the end,
240
the necessary means to accomplish the missions are not always
available in adequate quantities.
Dr Steven Metz claims that the main features of forces
participating in military operations post-conflict are: compatibility
with other governmental agencies, non governmental and coalition
partners, and possesses very good trainers and executors, able to act in
the theatre during the many years and the force be able to execute
independent missions on structures at the brigade level.5 Some
missions of the military operations post-conflict such as peacebuilding or peacemaking, does not involve techniques and skills far
different from those against the soldiers they currently possess. On the
other hand, the missions of the kind involving weapons of mass
destruction, actions in urban areas or struggle guerrilla involve special
skills and tactics.
Regular units combat type units can perform a part of the specific
missions of post-conflict military operations but there are also
missions that require forces specially trained to accomplish them. The
main missions needing specialforces are: protecting the civil
population, mine clearance and unexploded monition, restoring the
legal system, rebuilding the community, management of refugees and
the restoration of investments.6
In the general framework of military operations post-conflict in
our opinion, are developed two types of operations: establishment
operations and support operations.
In their turn, the typology of stability operations is diverse, they
include: arms control, combating terrorism, drug-support operations,
humanitarian and civic assistance, assisting a nation; evacuation of
non combatants; imposition of sanctions; peace operations;
demonstration of force.7
The control arms is developed by the diplomatic rules, but it is an
operation in which military forces and participate. The action of arms
control and verification consists of military structures in preparation
for receiving inspections of foreign partners, escorts inspection teams
and with the participation of personnel in inspection teams.
Fighting terrorism includes both operations to reduce
vulnerability against acts of terrorism (antiterrorism), and offensive
actions undertaken to prohibit such actions (against terrorism).
241
Support drug operations consists of specialized support units to
prohibit the production, transport and distribution of drugs.
Humanitarian assistance and civic conjunction run in other
operations and consists of: medical and veterinary care for rural areas,
construction of simple ways of surface transport; arrangement of
sources of water and waste systems, development or repair of public
utilities, activities linked to detect mines and demining, including
training and technical assistance.
The support given to a nation is executed at the express request of
a state based on existing bilateral agreements to promote security and
stabilities in the region, according to the entrusted mandate, rules of
engagement and national normative acts. The support given to a
nation includes: indirect support (programs of security assistance,
multinational exercises, bilateral exchange programs); support directly
(civil-military operations, change of information and communications,
logistical support); armed fight operations ( offensive operations and
of defence in the support of the host nation’s fight against insurgents
or terrorists). Evacuation of non combatants may take place in a
permissive environment, unsafe or hostile and run at order of higher
echelon, with the assent evicted. Imposition of sanctions is made,
usually by combining operations with the land and naval air. Planning
and mode of action of the forces engaged run in strict accordance with
the mandate set by international organisms and the specific rules of
engagement.
The peace operations consist in: prevention of conflict, achieve of
the peace, peace building, peacemaking, imposing peace.
The forces are intended, as a rule, international or forming part of
an alliance and have the mission or continue starting deterrence of
armed conflicts. They operate on the basis of a mandate and rules of
engagement set by the organization under the aegis of whom
participate.
Within the operations of the multinational peace force may
attend: preventive deployment of forces; observation, monitoring and
supervision areas for action and separation forces are in conflict,
establish safe areas; the interposition between the forces that are in
conflict, separation by force of the parts that are in conflict, guarantee
or prohibiting the freedom movement, demobilization forces are in
242
conflict, military assistance, the imposition of sanctions; evacuation
non combatants; protection of vital objectives in the areas of
responsibility; the repair of bridges, protection and monitoring of
refugees camps, monitoring the exchanges of prisoners of war held
between the parties conflict; supply of water, food and fuel;
monitoring and storage of arms and munitions.
The force demonstration run by unities which act independently
or in the framework of multinational forces, for proving their decision
to de-tensioning a situation which may be contrary to national
interests or alliance / coalition. In the operations support armed forces
are used to help civil authorities external or internal, when they
prepare or respond to crises and other special situations which exceed
the possibilities, by providing support services, means or resources
specialized basis, after case.
Typology of operations support include: internal operations
support (on the national territory); foreign humanitarian assistance
(outside the national territory). Within the operations of domestic
support can run the armed forces: rescue operations in case of natural
calamities and disasters; management support CBRN consequences of
nuclear accidents, support the imposition of civil law and community
assistance.
Within the humanitarian assistance the armed forces execute:
rescue operations in case of natural calamities and disasters, the
support of the management of CBRN nuclear accidents consequences,
and community assistance.
Rescue operations in case of natural calamities and disasters,
involving the execution of the following actions: flood control,
identify hazards, population and security forces to support, food
distribution, production and distribution of water purification: the
provision of clothing and fuel for heating and cooking.
Temporary shelting; supporting public transport; fire medical
support; production of electricity, communications support and health
informatics; reconstruction after the conflict through demolition or
repair items damaged infrastructure, rehabilitation or construction of
bridges, roads and aerodromes, removing obstacles on the roads and
supply of places rescue. Within the support of management
consequences of accidents chemical, biological, radiological and
243
nuclear and those caused by explosions High CBRN, structures
military assistance of civil authorities to prepare the territory,
population and infrastructure production before the disaster / attack by
supporting and protecting the internal preparations chemical facilities.
Also, military structures answer CBRN incidents and participate in the
elimination of the consequences.
Support to impose the civil law involves activities as: combating
terrorism, drug operations, military assistance during civil disorders;
general support. Community assistance comprises a wide range of
activities that provide support and maintain a closer link between civil
and community the military.9 To implement the entire range of
stability operations and support, distribution of tasks by the
participating forces will have to make depending on the specifics of
each structure, a real opportunity to fulfil the mission by each entity in
hand and last but not least, taking into account the obligations
assumed and limitations of each national quota.
At the NATO must be considered lessons learned after the
execution of military operations post-conflict. This is important both
for operations in progress, as well as for the future.
As I mentioned, military operations in post-conflict participate
rule, a coalition member. Thus, each participant will receive state
tasks and missions according to the capabilities with which they can
deploy in a specific theatre of operations. The contribution of each
member will be clearly established through technical agreements,
which will stipulate the nature and value of participating forces, the
types of missions they can perform and contribute to the logistics
support mission in the theatre of operations.
On the distribution missions should be established in theatres of
operations interdepartmental regional teams.10 In this respect are set
four directions of action:
- necessary capabilities to accomplish successful military
operations of post-conflict must be under the command of
multinational regional teams. These capabilities are available to the
governments that participate and involve strong ability to manage the
power (to change a regime and set up a new one), avoidance and
reduction the effects of a humanitarian crisis and restore a legitimate
government. In order to fulfil these responsibilities, regional teams
244
should be able to work in interdepartmental and multinationals
environments;
- military structures had to explain conception operations and
practices relevant to post-conflict missions;
- military Commandants must do interdepartmental part of the
leadership responsible for drawing up plans for situations
unexpected11. In case of war, an interdepartmental group can be
attached besides the commander of forces to become the nucleus
staff's occupation.
- at the level of each state must be developed strategies and
methods of training troops in accordance with the tasks of military
post-conflict operations. To realise a desideratum there three ways:
training and equipping soldiers from allied troops situated outside the
theatre of operations to the execution of such missions through the
reorganization and retaining forces who have executed a combat
operations and last but not least through the organization of a postconflict response cell12.
In inevitable way, post conflict operations will have communes
military and politic aims, therefore, any the less with respect to the
line of military actions, in many situations will not touches the final
state. In a certain point military actions will not represent the main
effort, so from that point we shall can speak more about transitional
notions, namely the transfer of all responsibilities to the public
authorities of the state in question.
Bibliography
***
Law no. 42 of 15 March 2004 regarding participation in the
armed forces in missions outside the Romanian state
***
Romania’s National Security Strategy, Bucharest, 2007
***
Romanian Army Doctrine, Bucharest, 2007
***
The Doctrine of the Multinational Operations, Bucharest,
2001
***
F.T. - 3, General Tactics of Land Forces Manual, Bucharest,
2006
Eugen Cican Stability operations, Publishing Academy of High Studies
Military, Bucharest, 2003
Ion Pîrgulescu Post-conflict military operations in the system of developed
245
actions for the management of conflict states in the
contemporary world, Scientific research thesis
Lucian
The post-conflict state. Publishing of National Defence
Stăncilă
University „Carol I”, Bucharest. 2007
Gheorghe
Temporarily cessation military confrontation during the
Jilavu
defence war of the country. Terms of its evolution to final
cessation of armed conflict, Doctorate thesis, Academy of
High Military Studies, Bucharest, 2002
Post Conflict Reconstruction, CSIS and AUSA
Anthony
What is Next in lrak? Military Developments, Military
Cordesman
Requirements, and Armed Nation Building, Washington
DC: CSIS, 2003
Boullé R.
Operational Planning and Conflict Termination, Joint Force
John
Quarterly, 2001 – 2002
Charles Wolf, Controlling Small Wars, Arlington, VA: RAND
Jr.
CORPORATION, 1968
James Jay
Carafano Shaping the Future of Northern Command, Center
Carafano
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessements Backgrounder,
April 29,2003
John R.
Operational Planning and Conflict Termination, Joint Force
Boullé II
Quarterly, Autumn / Winter 2001 – 2002
Rotermund K. The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities,
Manfred
Strategic Studies Institute, 1999
Steven Metz
Improving Army Capabilities for Stabilization and Support
Operations, US Army College, Strategic Studies Institute,
2004
*
*
*
* Lt.col. drd., Battalion Commander 290 “Romanaţi” Supply / Brigade 1
Logistics "Prahova,,
1
Cf. Eugen Cican Stability operations, Publishing of Academy of High
Military Studies, Bucharest, 2003,p.28
2
lbidem- p.29
3
Charles Wolf. Jr.. Controlling Small wars, Arlington, VA: RAND
CORPORATION. 1968. p.4
4
Anthony Cordesman, What is Next in lrak? Military Developments,
Military Requirements, and Armed Nation Building, Washington DC:
CSIS, 2003, p. 5
5
Dr. Steven Metz Improving Army Capabilities for Stabilization and
Support Operations, IJS Army College, Strategic Studies Insritute,2004.
slide 6
6
Post Conflict Reconstruction, CSIS and AUSA, p. 4-5
246
7
8
9
10
11
12
F.T. - 3, Manual of General Tactics of Land Forces, Bucharest, 2006, art.
517
lbidem- art. 525
lbidem- art. 532-539
www.heritage.or
John R. Boullé II Operational Planning and Conflict Termination, Joint
Force Quarterly, Autumn / Winter 2001 – 2002, p. 99-100
James Jay Carafano Shaping the Future of Northern Command, Center
for Strategic and Budgetary Assessements Backgrounder, April 29, 2003,
p. 12
247
CANONICAL EDUCATION AND POLITICAL
DECISION MAKING IN ISLAMIC SOCIETY
Comşa Corina Nicoleta
“Carol I” National Defense University, Bucharest
Abstract
The process of political decision making is an important one in each and
every state and it is performed taking into consideration the political and
economic environment, cultural and social elements. In western societies the
political decision is a democratic one based on democratic levers but in Islamic
society the decision is made in close relation with religion as religion is a
defining element of public and private life. Therefore, religion has an important
word to say in political issues.
Keywords: Islam, political decision, democracy
People often speak about Islam as it is associated with
fundamentalism, terrorism, refuse of democracy, inequality of
opportunities, no respect for human rights and we forget to ask
ourselves what does Islam really mean. Religion corresponds –
together with other elements as ethnicity, language, nationality etc – to
a certain form of identity which is found in society on one hand as
religious institutions and their representatives and on the other hand as
conscience which leads to specific languages and practices, to a
certain model of behavior. In some opinions, „religious beliefs can
take political forms by the strong support they bring to ethnicity and
by their association with transcendental values which bring direction,
cohesion, virtue and stability to society. The use of religious values
can lead to fundamentalist moves, to establishing strategies by which
believers tend to conserve their identity as a group or community
248
while facing areal or supposed attack of those who apparently threaten
them. Sometimes such defensive attitudes can transform inoffensive
political actions leading to debasing of the social, political and even
economic environment [1]”.
On the other hand, religion – especially Islam – is guide for
believer. Islamic world differs from this perspective from the western
world and the decision making process – including political decision
making or maybe especially this one – is totally different. We are
talking about two opposed systems of decision making with different
mechanisms and adapted to the social conception they devolve of.
Globalization, modernization, industrialization from the last
centuries had as a result in some states the diminishing of the role
religion has in the social life. Secular state and human rights on
freedom of conscience and thinking develop differently not only in
different regions with specific cultures and religions but within the
same region. Europe and America tend to a precise delimitation
between secular and religious especially with respect to the state
attributions.
Contrary to the European and American trend of secularization of
public space, of eliminating religion from public life, Islamic
countries – trying to oppose modernization and globalization – keep
religion in public sphere and promote it strongly. In these states the
religious authority is recognized and unanimously accepted and
religion exercise a quasi-total influence over all fields of social life
irrespective of public or private ones. Affected in different proportions
of modernity, urbanization, industrialization, Islamic states react by
rejecting these phenomena and going back to religious precepts which
guide their lives. Sometimes adepts of fundamentalism are enemies of
consume behavior, of globalization.
Those states do not know democracy, their population is seen
more like consumers even if their buying capacity, economy bases on
oil and gas but they oppose vehemently to globalization. For them
globalization is a danger. Religion becomes „a last sanctuary of
identity. For fundamentalists, it represents the last redoubt against an
economic invasion which staggers the socio-cultural functions [2]”.
249
In Islam the fundamental concept is unique identity of God and
the Quran is the Holly book. Muslims consider that Allah revealed his
word directly to Mohammad.
The Quran is an infallible guide for Muslims for their personal
piety and life in community, a historical truth. Quran is uncreated and
eternal and has the main role in a Muslim’s education. Learnt by heart
since childhood, the Quran is recited by Muslim in all circumstances
of his/her existence.
The second source of Islam, not divine, is the Prophet’s Sunna, a
text book containing the Prophet’s words, gestures, attitudes, the way
he ate or drank, the way he dressed up or fulfilled the religious duties.
By Sunna the Prophet teaches the Muslim with respect to all fields of
life.
Political actions have legitimacy only if they are based on shari'a
(Islamic law). Fundamental values in Islam are related to respecting
the norms of shari'a. Islamic law represents a series of orders,
interdictions and recommendation as they have been kept in Quran
and Sunna or as they have been deduced. Human activities are divided
in five categories: what it is allowed, what it is recommended, what it
is mandatory, what it is scornful, what it is forbidden. Shari’a makes
difference between cult duties and duties referring to people
relationships in society. Islamic law is applied while governing and in
social justice only where there is an Islamic government. Shari’a
regulates social relations such as marriage, divorce, heritage and even
criminal and commercial deeds.
Muslims consider that women have a very important role in
Islamic society. Prophet Mohammed showed her importance as a
mother and wife. For western individuals, the Muslim woman is
considered as a prisoner within her own house, a non-person, without
rights and living under man’s domination. The Muslims show that
Islam is a religion of common sense and it identifies with the human
being. Islam recognizes the realities of life but not the equality of
women and men in all fields arguing that Allah did not make man and
woman identical and therefore it would be against nature to have a
total equality between them. That kind of equality might destroy the
social balance, the society would not develop as it had unsolved
problems such as broken marriages, illegitimate kids, no family life.
250
Social life is based on the term of community „umma” which is
guided by the principle of fraternity and equality between the adepts
of the same belief. Reciting the Quran and using the Arab language as
a liturgical language are elements of unity of Islamic world which
identifies itself by practicing canonic duties and certain traditional
customs.
The appearance of a secular system able to exercise a control over
the state would mean that the system would be above umma, which is
an impiety. The state can be liable for breaking the law or for failure
in applying it but not in front of a system imposed by human will and
opposed to divine will. In umma’s perspective the only binder within
the society is faith.
We can notice that Islam covers all fields of social, economic,
political life. Islam is more a normative model for individual and for
society than a religion concerned with individual’s redemption.
Muslims argue that Islam expresses in the same time eternal
aspirations and practical needs of individual. Organization of the
society, of the believers’ community is done starting from the Quran
and the Prophet’s instructions which exceed the contingent and tend to
transcendent. The relationship between religion and power is reported
on the relationship between Quran and the model of ideal stronghold
represented once of Medina and which is prolonged nowadays.
It is to be analyzed if and to what extent the function of leader of
community represents a religious investiture or not. At the beginning
the function of caliph did not have anything sacred but afterwards it
has been made sacred both by popular beliefs and by savants’
activities – ullema – who interpreted the Islamic law. Caliph is the
supreme leader of Muslim community. The Quran does not mention
the way the succession to the community leadership is done and the
Prophet did not leave male descendent neither had he nominated a
successor. Since 1258, when Mongols conquered Baghdad, even if
some leaders offer themselves the function of caliph, the function does
not mean anything. Yet the institution stays the symbol of unity of
Muslim community.
In the relationship religion – politics, ullema plays an important
role. Ullema is a savant who knows the traditions and who also has
juridical and theological knowledge. These savants are organized in a
251
body in charge with the consensus of community, which is entitled to
decide issues about dogma and legislation according to Quran and
shari’a. Often this body gets an official or semiofficial status
becoming a supporter of the political power and being protected by it.
The conception of ulemas about modernity consists of the idea that all
achievements and inventions of human civilization such as artillery,
satellites, television etc, can not replace the human aspect of
individual and they are totally devoid of value unless used to intensify
his/her humanity, to make him/her happy.
In Islamic world, secularism is refused because this world does
not understand the secession of the church from the state neither the
total segregation of the public sphere from the private one. The
Muslim appeals to Allah all the time and links everything to the
divinity either he/she makes a decision related to the family or a
political decision. There is a permanent relation with Allah, applicable
to all fields. Modernization harmed Muslims because they attended to
the Muslim’s real identity and to the Islamic personality.
The Muslim’s fear devolves from absolute opposition between the
conceptions of western world and those of Islamic world. In Islamic
world the individual is indissoluble linked to the family which is the
center of the life. Without family the Muslim is not taken into
consideration. In western world the individual is seen separately, the
family he/she belongs to is found only in private sphere. The
individual is the one who matters, family comes in second place.
For Muslim religion is a live presence in all levels of life, for
western person rationalism, the right to freedom of conscience –
including atheism – are strong pylons of democracy.
Even in this context, the reform of the traditional law was
possible in some regions such as Saudi Arabia meaning that some
interpretations have been done according to Islamic tradition.
Therefore, based on Quran and Sunna innovations such as
photography, radio or television has been introduced. Although
women had to wear the headscarf they were allowed to get education.
The whole process of modernization in Saudi Arabia was developed in
cooperation with clerical structures (ullema) so that the achievements
so not affect the essence of tradition which stays unchanged.
252
In conclusion we notice that for the states in Islamic world
religion is part of their citizens’ identity, it is part of their every day
life and the political decision is made taking into consideration the
interpretations devolving from savants, the Quran precepts and
religious traditions.
References
[1] Dinu, Mihai-Ştefan – “Componenta etnico-religioasă a conflictelor”,
Editura Universităţii Naţionale de Apărare „Carol I”, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 18.
[2] Laidi, Ali – „Efectul de bumerang – Cum a determinat globalizarea apariţia
terorismului”, House of Guides, Bucureşti, 2007.
[3] Anghelescu Nadia – „Introducere în Islam”, Editura Enciclopedică,
Bucureşti, 1993.
[4] Delcambre Anne-Marie - „Islamul”, Editura CNI Coresi, Bucuresti, 1999.
[5] Sourdel Dominique – „Islamul”, Editura Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1995.
[6] Sourdel Dominique; Sourdel-Thomine Janine - „Civilizaţia islamului
clasic”, Editura Meridiane, Bucureşti, 1975.
[7] Tariq Ali - „Ciocnirea fundamentalismelor. Cruciade, jihaduri şi
modernitate”, Editura Antet XX Press, Filipeştii de Târg, 2006.
253
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY
Cucu Irina
“Carol I” National Defense University, Bucharest
Abstract
It is a well-known fact that a state with a stable security environment is
also an economically developed state. A stable security environment is an
important factor in attracting foreign investments, it enhances the value of
material, as well as human resources. A state which has a powerful economy
can afford to develop a stable security environment. On the other hand, an
economically powerful state can afford sustaining a well-trained and
professional army, being part of alliances and international organizations under
good conditions and having the power to make decisions, elements which bring
that state important advantages.
The Energetic Resources- in the economical development
The energy issue continues to be a top element on the global
agenda of world economy. The need for oil is increasing gin a fast
manner because of the chinese and indian economy boost. Some
authors consider energy a real „economical barometer of the world
economy, the energetic balance is submitted to unprecedented
geopolitical changes.”1.
The underdevelopment, the food crisis (in the future also the
water crisis), the degrading of the environment, the rapid growth of
population (especially in the underdeveloped areas), the restrictions in
what concerns energy and raw materials, the struggle to maintain
control in the cosmic and planetary space, the emerging economic
crisis, inflation and uncontrolled development of urbanization are the
1
Nicolae Geantă, Agresiuni energetice pe piaţa europeană de gaze, în GeoPolitica nr. 23,
Editura Top Forum, Bucureşti, 2007,p. 67.
254
base issues of the 21st century. Oil has been and still is the base
source of economic growth and technological development.
Taking into consideration the limited sources of oil, the best
option is, in the present, the development of nuclear energy. Presently,
there are 26 nuclear plants under construction in the whole world
(information taken from a report of the International Energy Agency),
most of them in states currently being developed.
Along with the economic development of a number of states
(China, India, the enlarged European Union), the need for energy has
increased considerably, a large number of states being dependent on
the energetic resources and the foreign policy of their neighbor states.
Considering this increasing request for energy, there is a need to
develop energetic policies and strategies at national, regional and
global levels, it is necessary to have an international planning in order
to solve these problems. Up to present, the world economy hasn’t
been led by a unilateral superpower, but by the interests of the states1.
This prooves again the necessity for economic alliances, both at
regional, and at global level, and as well the importance of diplomacy.
On the 8th of March 2006, the European Commission has issued
the new Green Handbook with the purpose of finding the means to
increase the cooperation among the European states in the energy
field. The document highlights the urgent necessity for new European
investments in the energy field, estimating investments of around
1000 billion euro for covering the request for energy and replacing the
infrastructure2.
The energetic issues, whether we are talking about energy
production or transportation networks, along with the ecological and
social protection measures are, in present, a part of any national
security strategy.
Having into consideration those stated up to now, I consider that
economic development plays a fundamental role in providing national
security.
1
Darius Stan, Politica economică – principala generatoare a conflictelor lumii, în
GeoPolitica nr. 23, Editura Top Forum, Bucureşti, 2007, p.115.
2
Conf. univ. dr. Sergiu Medar, Gazele naturale şi securitatea naţională, în Anuar 2007, p55
255
National Security and Economic Development
The concept of national security cannot be achieved but on a
well-defined economic support, with enough material, human,
financial and scientific premises etc. „Discussing about national
security or projecting it is like building a sandcastle close to the sea
waves”1.
National security is one of the fundamental necessities of a state.
The risk factors which threaten the security of a state are mainly of
economic nature (the risks regarding the raw materials, the lack of
markets and of necessary funds for investments, the degradation of the
environment, the lack of nuclear plants etc.)
The economy only develops practically a political concept, a
rational and efficient economic and financial policy. At the same time,
the economic and financial interests form a solid support of politics.
By the way these interests combine, as a main factor, along with the
social, ecological, cultural and military ones, we see the quality of an
economic and financial policy that can elaborate favorable decisions
to some positive solutions for economic security.
Providing security and national defense is definitely influenced by
the economic resources which the state depends on at a given moment,
mostly under the conditions of globalization, when the economic
power is the most important in defining the role of a nation.
The recent evolutions have brought a new hierarchy in the
security field, giving more importance to the economic, political,
ecological and, last but not least, the military component. Therefore,
there is a more intense struggle for resources, the battlefield for
achieving the strategic and political objectives, and moreover the
objectives related to national security. The loss of the economic
competition draws the loss of the political one, this being a defeat
harder than the military one.
In Romania, the quality of economic growth is still a low one.
The major source for economic development is the consumption. An
important issue is the quality improvement of economic development.
What does this mean? First of all, the development of industry and
agriculture. The rate of growth in the industry field, especially the
1
Marin Dumitru, Componenta economică a secuităţii, Editura UNAP, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 26.
256
industry has decreased. The economic restructuring is going slowly.
The national producers cannot handle the increasing demand.
Consequently, over 82% of the internal growth is satisfied through
imports. The demand grows because of the fact that more and more
money is being sent home by the people who work outside the
country, but also because of the increase in income. Exports are
discouraged by many factors. The competition of national production
decreases because of the higher prices for energy. The merchandises
are becoming more and more expensive because the producers spend
more on electric energy, gas etc. Both on the local and the European
market our products cannot compete with the foreign products
because the foreign producers are granted subsidies and other facilities
by the governments of their states. The sanitary and fitosanitary norms
for export in the European Union states are very strict.
The objectives which the EU has stated in 2007 for 2020 are:
reducing by 20% the gas transmissions; enhancing the energetic
efficiency by 20% and increasing the regenerating resources up to
20% of the total energy consumption. „Our mission, in fact our duty is
to offer an adequate political framework for the transformation of the
european economy in an economy with reduced carbon transmissions
and to maintain our leading position in the international action of
protecting the planet ”, explained the President of the European
Commission, José Manuel Barroso. The measures regarding the
climate changes aims at developing the planet, offering new
economical opportunities to European companies and improve the
energetic security by focusing on alternative sources of energy 1.
Taking into account the fact that the economic and social
development are enhanced and influence each other, it is necessary to
give more importance to the coordinated and multilateral development
of economy adn society.
We cannot aim only at economic development and ignore social
issues, because these will only develop and the whole society will
become instable. Therefore, we must mention the initiative of the
General Secretary of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, regarding the
implementation of a new and complex strategy concerning the
1
http://ec.europa.eu/news/energy/080123_1_ro.htm
257
economic and social development, because this favors the elimination
of poverty, creates more work opportunities and builds a balanced
society.
The environment is threatened more and more by the human
activities which pollute on a large scale the air and water, in their
attempt to over use natural resources. During the last 30 years, the
European Union has been more and more active in this field,
providing projects and approving policies regarding the protection of
the environment, stimulating the investments in creating new
unpolluting production means and drawing the attention on these
serious issues. The European Union has implemented a series of
measures to stop pollution and climate changes. The states will have
to work together in order to protect the environment, because
pollution cannot be stooped by national borders.
Being aware of this, the European Union has issues in 2001 the
sixth Environmental Protection Programme, establishing the action
priorities and objectives to be attained by 2010. In all fields of
activity, the European Union guides mainly after the durable
development principle, in its attempt to find a stable balance between
the protection of the environment and ensuring progress in economy
and social protection. The main goal is to improve the quality of life,
protecting at the same time the environment, so that the future
generations may live and develop in a healthy environment.
For Romania, a restriction which prevents relaunching the
economy are the convergence criterias of the inflation rate, which will
have to decrease in the period 2007-2012, and not grow higher than
2.5-3%. The major difficulty is making the protection objectives
compatible with the internationalization of the economy, connected to
the european construction.1.
The UN estimates the world economical development, the fact
that the world economic increase will slow down in 2008 by 1.8% and
in 2009 by 2.1%, it is stated in the UN Report, presented on the 16th
of May 2008, regarding the world economic situation and its
perspective in 2008. According to the data of the Economic and Social
Department of UN, the reason for the decrease of world economic
1
http://www.uvvg.ro/studia/economice/index.php?categoryid=10&p2_articleid=68&p142_dis
=3&p142_template=Default
258
development is the worsening situation on the USA market at the
beggining of 2008, which is extending on the other states and which in
2009 will be „ the main drawback in the development of world
economy”. The UN experts highlight the fact that the global instability
and the increase in the price of oil and gas, the US crisis and the
devaluation of the american dollar are the main threats not only for the
developed states, but also for the ones which are currently
developping. According to the estimations of UN, the economy of
these last states will grow by 5% in 2008, by 4.8% in 2009, in
comparison with 7.3 in 2007. The estimates regarding the rhythm of
development is set by the situation in the USA. According to this, the
indicator can decrease to 0.8% or can increase by 2.8%. UN consider
that the market will not stabilize until 2009 and the rhythm of the
economic development of Western Europe will decrease from 2.6% to
1.1%, while the inflation will increase to 3.7%1.
Economy- main component of the national security
environment
Assuming the importance of economy for the security
environment, every member state of the EU has issued a durable
development strategy and is trying to go towards clean technologies,
protect the environment and develop their communities according to
the necessities and the priorities of the governments.
Romania, as a member state of the European Union, is working
on a durable development strategy which should be placed into
practice in the next three decades. It should focus more on regenerable
resources. It should give up very polluting plants in favor of solar
energy. Also, it should build more nuclear plants in order to contribute
to the reduction of gas transmissions and be more efficient in the
production of electric energy. The National Strategy for Durable
Development (SNDD) is the programmatic document issued
according to the EU requirements by the Romanian Government
through the Ministry of Environment and Durable Development, in
collaboration with the UN Programme for Development thorugh the
National Center for Durable Development. The SNDD was issues on
1
http://www.amosnews.ro/ONU_prognozeaza_incetinirea_dezvoltarii_economiei_mondiale245895
259
January 22, 2008 and should be finished and presented to the
European Commission by the end of 2008. The main decisive forum is
the National Council for Public Debate, which must meet minimum 5
times until the end of the paper. Three of these meetings have already
been ended and the results only raised protests form the part of the
Ecologists. Practically, the civil society accuses the National Center
for Durable Developmentthat it does not know what it is supposed to
do and that the Strategy will be a real fiasco. Even the Minister of
Environment stated that the strategy has no vision. The future strategy
has 400.000 euro from the Ministry budget. There are over 30 nongovernmental organizations which do not approve with this strategy1.
In the Romanian National Strategy for Durable Development on a
medium basis it is stated that the fundamental objective of this project
is the creation of a functional market economy, compatible with the
principles, norms, mechanisms, institutions and policies of the
European Union. The options of the strategy aim at creating proper
conditions in order to ensure economic growth by increasing the
investment rate thorugh the participation of the national capital and
acquiring foreign resources, expecially under direct investments, in
complete transparency. Given these conditions, the average rhythm of
increase in the PIB should be between 4-6%. There is a need to
continue the stabilization of the macroeconomy by ensuring
reasonable budgetary deficits of around 3% from the PIB, reducing
the quasi-fiscal deficit, managing the public debt and current account
debt. Also, there must be a proper business environment based on a
legal, coherent and stable framework which should ensure the
development of the market competition, reducing the tranzaction costs
and diminishing the fiscal burdain. It is necessary to promote specific
measures to stimulate the medium and small companies, a clear
definition of the property rights, ensure administrative and judicial
structures, capable to ensure the respect for law and contractual
obligations. A great importance is the modernization and the
development of public utility services, so that these may correspond
better to the needs of the citizens and the national economy, thus
coming closer and closer to the standards of the European Union. The
1
http://www.jurnalul.ro/articole/120613/strategia-nationala-de-dezvoltare-durabila
260
need for the elaboration of a long term programme is felt in order to
eliminate the risks of ecological accidents and reduce the level of
pollution of the environment1.
Taking into consideration all these aspects, we consider necessary
to consider adopting some measures of economic protection necessary
for development, as only a developed economy can ensure a stable
security environment.
1
Strategia naţională de dezvoltare economică a României pe termen mediu,
http://www.cdep.ro/pdfs/strategie.pdf
261
ORTHODOXY AND GLOBALIZATION
Military priest Ţanu Constantin, Military priest Lazăr Valentin
General Staff, Bucharest, Land Forces Staff, Bucharest
Abstract
This essay illustrates the role the Greek philosophy played in the Christian
way of thinking and its repercussions on the current global culture. Thus,
besides the positive aspects of this process, some other characteristics, less
beneficial in the Church view, are presented.
Then, we point out that a global culture, as well as a particular one is
needed, especially as globalization is an irreversible process. It happens in the
context in which the Holly Scripture meets science to emphasize the fact that the
Universe is a whole in all its parts.
We can state that for the Orthodoxy, in general, globalization and the EU
accession do not mean getting far from what we are as a nation but to keep this
identity. In our opinion, this thing will be possible only through a permanent
and real dialogue between religions and cultures, a dialogue that promotes
spiritual and cultural values.
The subject we try to bring to your attention makes us think of the
considerable role the Greek philosophy played in influencing the
Christian thinking. Throughout centuries, the Church has remained
profoundly grateful to the Greek philosophy for its important
contribution to Christianity, being accepted within the Ancient World.
Through promoting the ideas of good, truth and beauty or through
more rationally interpreting the world instead of remaining stuck to
mythology, the Greek philosophy played the role of a teacher towards
Christ in the Ancient World. The Church has manifested its gratitude
towards the Ancient philosophy by introducing its outstanding
representatives – Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in the Christian painting
we can admire in the Orthodox Church porches. There are churches in
262
which the image of the great philosophers of the Ancient World, more
than those we have already mentioned, is painted even in the altar.
Moreover, there are many terms used in the Christian theology, such
as “communion”, “perichoresis” “synergy” or “divinization”
(theosis), and others that are of Greek origin.
However, beside these incontestable merits, the Greek philosophy
promoted, throughout centuries, the dichotomy between the sensible
and intelligible world, which profoundly marked the Christian
thinking, making the Church life and mission more difficult, not only
in the past but also today. In the past, the dichotomy between the
sensible and intelligible world was used to force many Christians to
praise the soul in the detriment of the body. The body and the matter
were perceived as the prison of the soul, and the Christianity role was
to repress the body in a manichaeistic way so that the soul, freed from
the chains of the flesh, could find rest near God. This is the
explanation for the Christian aversion to the matter and the
millennarist expectations that have accompanied Christianity since its
birth, leaving the impression that the matter would not have been
created by God but it would have been a principle of the evil. The
aversion to the body and matter has gone so far that the embodiment
of God’s Son was considered to be more an appearance than a reality,
as the Dochetism asserts.
We witness today a reverse situation as, by virtue of the same
dichotomies between the sensible and intelligible world established by
the Greek philosophy, we see the body is praised exaggeratedly and
the soul is treated with indifference and disinterest. The place of
Manichaeism and Dochetism has been taken by Hedonism,
Utilitarianism and Consumerism, which orient the man more towards
the material values than towards the spiritual ones and promote the
ruthless exploitation of the creation to obtain profit and earthly power.
The idea of unlimited material progress that does not consider spiritual
values has replaced the millennarist expectations and the Spirit of God
has been eliminated from the sensible world to be isolated in the
intelligible world, thus a total breach between the sensible and
intelligible realities being established. Even the person of Jesus Christ
the Saviour has been divided between Jesus of History and Jesus of
Glory, so the Saviour appears to be the founder of one of the religions
263
on Earth, like Buddha, Moses or Mohammed, the fact that He was
God and Man at the same time being forgotten.
In this context, of praising the material values of the sensible
world more than the spiritual or intelligible ones is placed the problem
of globalization. As Benjamin Barber notices, the notion of “global
culture” denotes a homogenous reality whose cohesion is ensured by
the communication systems, information, entertainment and
commerce. Its symbols are the Internet, VCR, TV series, blockbusters,
hard-rock, Disneyland parks, McDonald’s fast food, which all induce
a global way of life without taking into account the specific of
national cultures.[1] It is in fact a “super-culture” that is totally
disinterested in spiritual values, up to abandoning them, the spiritual
values that lead the human being to self development, according to an
unlimited and eternal ideal of humanity, as Herder understands this
term. This type of applied global culture reshapes reality following
utilitarian or hedonistic principles and propels the utilitarian and
civilizing values in the first place, engaging the individual in a
shallow, superficial existence. This unbalanced system of values,
which is to be blamed for the current crisis of culture, is deepened
more and more on civilization’s side, which is the bearer of
globalization factors [2].
Of course, the global culture has its positive aspects, as
globalization is based on “human rights” that promote democracy,
thus opposing any dictatorship. Moreover, global culture can be
considered a chance for religion to be rehabilitated in a secularized
world, as it “tends to deepen the new metaphysical and religious
dimensions that are significant and valuable and with which our spirit
coexists”1. However, beside the fact that this metaphysical and
1
At the international conference related to the Churches and the Euro-Atlantic values, which
was held in Bucharest on June 3, 2002, it was made public a final communicate highlighting
that “the conference participants consider that an unprecedented perspective was open in
Europe for the citizens in the Euro-Atlantic area, through the accomplishment of a large and
free community, united under the democratic, cultural and spiritual values and practices and
common security. All the cults that are recognized in Romania support, without difference,
Romania’s integration in the Euro Atlantic structures, in an area of common values,
prosperity and peace”. After being obliged to change the economic and political system many
times and to live under different dictatorships, especially under the Communist one, Romania,
as well as its neighbour countries, consider the process of integration in the Euro-Atlantic and
European structures can contribute to the enhancement of security and stability in the regions
264
religious dimension of globalization is understood as a sort of
religious and philosophical amalgam, as a “system of beliefs that are
offered to the public to be consumed”, global culture has an obvious
utilitarian character and does not show much interest in the nations’
cultural identity. Made of goods and symbols which are being spread
with the help of the new communication technologies and of the
instruments that are proper to the market economy, the global culture
does not enter into dialogue with the other cultures but, on the
contrary, it imposes values, mentalities, lifestyles that are not proper
to those cultures, violating traditions, religious beliefs, moral and
juridical norms, through which those cultures have built their
identity.[3] The Egyptian, Hindi, Hellenistic, Roman and other
civilizations that are delimited on historical criteria by Spengler,
Toynbee or on religious criteria by Huntington, understood as a reflex
of the existing cultures, leave their place to the global super-culture
that conquers all the particular cultural spaces that exist in the world.
In terms of dichotomy between the sensible and intelligible world,
the natural world is considered to be a simple material reality,
enclosed in its own autonomy, with no internal spiritual structure, that
can be easily modeled by a global ideology, without taking into
account God’s will. It is only because the world lacks its spiritual
fundament that global culture acquires a purely utilitarian character
and unilaterally orients itself towards material values within which the
money becomes the operator, the means and the absolute finality of all
economy processes.[4] This trend is also increased by the fact that
globalization and its global culture mingle with the deconstructive
influence of postmodernism that questions the traditions and values
that are proper to ethnic and national communities and becomes an
easily manipulated, depersonalized and individualist component of a
leveled and leveling global society dominated by consumerism.
We think that Pope John Paul II was right when he stated that
“globalization must not become a version of colonialism. It has to
respect the sovereignty of cultures that, in the context of nation’s
universal harmony, are the interpretative keys of life. In particular,
those who are poor should not be deprived of what is the most
that are confronted with ethnic and religious conflicts and can offer the necessary frame for
the common welfare.
265
precious for them, respectively their religious beliefs and practice, as
the authentic religious convictions represent the clear manifestation of
human liberty. No power has the right to disregard human rights and
the variety of cultures”.[5] In fact, the fundamental problem
globalization has not been able to resolve is that of the relation
between global culture and particular cultures. In the absence of an
interior fundament of the Universe, which might hold together the
natural and spiritual aspects of creation, the human being transforms
itself into a being without roots that becomes the perpetual source of
violence and terrorism. As long as it does not overcome the gap
between the material and spiritual aspects of reality, through the
internal fundament of creation, it will be impossible for the true
relation between the universal and local cultures to be discovered.
This lack of balance continually deepens the spiritual crisis the
contemporary man is confronted with. Without the internal fundament
of creation, global culture becomes a uniform supranational structure
that seeks to wipe out particular cultures to the end of achieving
purely utilitarian purposes.
The Eastern patristic thinking has been forced to reconsider the
relation between universal and particular in the light of the divine
Revelation, to overcome the dichotomy between the sensible and
intelligible world that made impossible for God’s real embodiment as
the absolute Spirit within the confinement of the sensible or natural
world. The one who succeeded for the first time in overcoming this
dichotomy and in reconciling the universal and the particular in the
light of the divine Logos that embodied so that we could be saved was
Saint Athanasios the Great of Alexandria, Egypt. He undertakes a real
cosmological reconstruction that can surpass the limits imposed by the
dichotomy between the universal and the particular, between the
natural and the spiritual, in the light of a harmonious order and of the
entire creation, both the one that can be seen and the one that cannot
be seen, having the gravity centre in the person of the divine Logos,
God’s Word, through which “everything was created”. Here are his
words related to it: “It is God’s Word, dwelling and stretching its
power over everything and everywhere and enlightening all the visible
and invisible things, keeping and gathering them, leaving nothing
outside His power but guarding all them together, that makes only one
266
world and only one wonderful and harmonious order, He himself
being immutable while moving everything, in accordance with God’s
will”.[6]
This entire creation universal and harmonious order, which
surpasses the dichotomy between the perceived and unperceived
world, is the fundament of a global Christian culture that is not
oriented towards utilitarian values, the material values in this world,
but towards the supreme values that become one with Christ, as the
Logos, Creator and Saviour, Who asserts “I am the Way, the Truth
and the Life”. It does not mean that, in fact, Christianity despises the
world of material values, as God created them too, in order to be a
means of communion between people. The role of Christianity is not
that of despising the matter, as it used to happen in the past and not
that of worship it either, as it happens today but to transfigure it in
Christ, the embodied Son of God. The heavens and the earth
mentioned in Genesis at the beginning of the Holy Scripture are meant
to become, in Christ and in the Church, the new heavens and earth the
Apocalypse speaks about at the end of the Holy Scripture. This is the
main reason for the Eastern Patristic Theology to speak about God’s
creation, “God Who became man so that we might become God” or
about the dimension we owe to this order that allows for the divine
Logos to put them together and each in its turn. Thus, global culture is
not above particular cultures but it affirms each culture in part and all
of them together, the Cosmic culture, in fact, the one of redemption in
Christ.
Therefore, this unique and harmonious order of creation in God’s
Word has a capital importance for the problem of the relation between
global and particular culture that is of great interest for us. Thus, by
virtue of the unique order of creation in the light of the divine Logos,
universal and particular cultures do not constitute two separate and
opposing realities anymore but two inseparable aspects of the same
reality. The great importance of this order, which is the spiritual
fundament of the entire creation, consists in the fact that not only
particular cultures but also the global culture are seen as realities
rooted in the internal constitution of the creation that follows the
God’s will. In the light of the unique and harmonious order of creation
in the divine Logos, One of the Trinity, the cosmological
267
reconstruction undertaken by Saint Athanasios the Great allows us to
understand global culture as a reflex of the Trinity communion that
stresses out the identity and the particular culture of each nation, as
well as the relation of love between them.
It is interesting that this cosmic order or global culture is
symbolically represented under the form of the Tree of Life on the
mosaic pavement of the cathedral in Otrano, near Bari, under the
Byzantine influence. All the cultures of the world, under the form of
branches, come out of the Tree of Life, which symbolically stands for
God. Each branch bears a symbol of the culture it represents, no
matter it’s the Persian, Egyptian, Babylonian, Greek, Roman or other
culture. This iconographical representation intends to show that
nations and their particular cultures are entities accepted by God that
have their particular identity, inscribed in the internal constitution of
creation, as all have their common origin in the Tree of Life, through
Whom everything was made, enlightening every man and being the
light of peoples. He is also the One who sent the Apostles to preach
the Gospel among all the peoples (Mathias 28, 20). Father Stãniloae
tells us that “at the basis of all particular culture lies and works an
eternal Godlike pattern that particular culture should follow as close
as possible”.[7] Pope John Paul II considers that the “Christian
Orient has taken different internal forms that have proven capable to
adopt each culture particular traits and to show respect for each
particular community”.[8] In this light, Orthodoxy cannot agree with
neither uniform global culture that does not take into account the
national identity or with closed national identities, which promote
chauvinism towards other peoples or towards national minorities.
Each nation identity must be open and capable to keep the specificity
of each nation and to promote, at the same time, the cooperation with
other nations, towards the common welfare.
It is also interesting that this order of creation, in which the
universal mingles with the particular, has come to be evinced by
scholars in the field of fundamental physics who cannot make
progress, without relying upon it, in studying the microcosms where
disorder seems to be reigning. Here is what they say: “A very
profound and invisible implicit order works beneath the explicit order.
Nature shapes in the chaos the complicate and highly organized forms
268
of life. There are not accidental events, there is no hazard, but an
order that is superior to all that we can imagine, the supreme order
that adjusts physical constants, initial conditions, atoms behavior and
stars life. Powerful, free, existing ad infinitum, mysterious, implicit,
invisible, sensible, this order, eternal and necessary, is there very
high, above the Universe, both at the base of all phenomena and in
each and every particle”.[9]
After more than a millennium and a half, scientists find out that
not only this “eternal order” does exist in the Universe but also that
this “order that is present in each particle” is a reality inscribed in the
created being. This way, the Holy Scripture meets Science to
emphasize the fact that the Universe is a whole that remains a whole
in each of its parts, highlighting the fact that it is impossible for a
global culture to exist without particular cultures. This principle of the
universal manifested in the particular and also of the particular opened
to the universal will become largely recognized in the future, as it is
grounded on both the divine Revelation that is present in the Holy
Scripture and the natural revelation, represented by science and by the
gifted scientists whom Orthodoxy has always praised as natural
prophets”.
The global culture or globalization is an irreversible process. Our
duty, as both clergy and military, is neither to reject the process as
such, as the global is inscribed in the consciousness of creation, nor to
accept it as a fatality, to the detriment of particular cultures, but to
plead for a global culture that is capable to defend not only peoples
identities but also the fruitful cooperation between them, to the end of
everyone mutual welfare. A declaration of the cults in our country,
signed by not only His Beatitude Teoctist, the Patriarch of the
Romanian Orthodox Church but also by the heads of the other
denominations, meant to support Romania’s integration in euroatlantic organizations, lets us know that “the process of European
unification, which mainly aims at an economic unification, may be
completed only if Europe becomes spiritually richer. Maintaining its
own spiritual identity that has been shaped throughout the history
together with the other countries in Europe, Romania will contribute
to the enhancement of the European spiritual and cultural thesaurus”.
269
It is true the Western world has a lot to offer, from the cultural
point of view, within the process of globalization and European
integration, be it related to ethics and discipline or to responsibility;
however, in all modesty, we are aware of the spiritual values we can
contribute to the promotion and disambiguation of the concept
“globalization”. Under these circumstances, Orthodoxy mission is that
of militating for a globalization capable to respect nations’ identities,
as a reality inscribed in creation, and to promote an authentic dialogue
between religions and cultures, capable to promote, in its turn,
spiritual, cultural and ecological values that may contribute to the
world peace that has been so many times threatened.
References
[1] Benjamin Barber, How globalism and tribalism are reshaping the World,
Ballantine Books, New York, 1995, p. 35.
[2] Marin Aiftincă, Cultură globală şi identitate naţională, Bucureşti, 2001, p.
9.
[3] Ibidem, p. 6.
[4] Ibidem, p. 8.
[5] Discorso di Giovanni Paolo II ai partecipanti alla plenaria della Pontificia
Academia delle Scienze Sociali, Concilium 4/2001, p. 20.
[6] Sfântul Atanasie cel Mare, Cuvânt către elini, Colecţia Părinţi şi Scriitori
Bisericeşti, IBMBOR, Bucureşti,1987, vol. I, p. 79.
[7] Pr. prof. dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Ortodoxie şi românism, Editura Albatros,
Bucureşti, 1998, p. 23.
[8] Papa Ioan Paul al II-lea, Orientale lumen, Paris, 1995, p. 11.
[9]
Jean Guitton, Dumnezeu şi ştiinţa, Harisma, Bucureşti, 1992, p. 57.
270
DYNAMICS AND MANIFESTATION
GEOPOLITICAL CRISES
Dinescu Ioana Mihaela, Valentin Gabriel
Mountain Training Centre of Predeal
e-mail: deardevil_ioa@yahoo.com, gabbyvally2000@yahoo.com
Abstract
The XXth century does not resemble to any other century that lapsed on our
planet. It is unique. Its uniqueness consists of the coming into being and flashing
disappearance of the greatest empires, the cycle development of the two world
wars, the incredible and breathtaking technological progress, the highly
improbable and always perfectible capacity of man to cross out life in all its
forms of manifestation. It is the most revolutionary century both in good and bad
aspects.
The word ‘crisis’ is used on a regular basis. The dilemma to which the
XXth century people will have to answer still persists: can crises be analyzed,
administrated and managed with an efficiency permitting to the decision centre
the taking of some coherent measures for the survival of the social system?
Starting from this state of fact, the paper aims at presenting the dynamics
and manifestation of the crises.
Keywords: crises, geopolitical, dynamics, strategy
1. Introduction
The XXth century does not resemble at all with any other that
went along our planet. It is unique. This uniqueness can be noticed in
the “sudden” apparition and flashing disappearance of the greatest
empires, in the cyclic development of the two World Wars, in the
incredible and stupefying technological leaps, in the incredible and
almost unbelievable perfect human capacity to conquer life under all
its form of manifestation.
271
It is the most revolutionary century and also the most prolific both
in good and evil.
Paradoxally speaking, it has been the most prolific century in
scientific conquests, but in the same time the bloodiest.
The Cold War was the moment “to breath”, when there was
believed that “the balance of terror” is enough to make wars
disappear. If we are to analyze the critical situations that also this
“calm” period faced, as well as the fragility of the balance that was
created by the powers of the world, we can easily notice that how
wrong we are and also for how many times the mankind depended
upon simple happenings.
2. The eterogenity of the interpretations given to „crises”
In order to evaluate a critical situation, moreover a crisis, it is
necessary to know the entire mechanisms that generate it and put it
into action. Even today there are being stated hypotheses about the
poverty of the analytical progress and decision making regarding the
first worldwide conflagration, without underlining the fact that the
crisis analysis and management methodology were as unexisting, the
fact that the political interventions had nothing rigorous in them, being
dominated by mannerism, traditions and habits, by a subjectivity note
that demolished even from the start any intervention be it justified
both legally and logically.
The international crisis represents a decisional stimuli, with
definite properties that can produce reactions in an adequate measure,
pre-determined reactions at the nation’s, the organization’s, the
decision making factor’s and the individual’s level.
For Holsti [4] an international crisis is “a non-anticipated
threatening situation that has important values and a reduced time for
decisions”.
For Herman [3] the crisis is „a situation that threatens the
objectives that have a high priority for the decision making unit,
restraining the available time for an answer, before the situation is
being modified and when it is produced and when it surprises the
members of the decision making unit”.
For Brecher [1] „a crisis is a situation characterized by four
necessary and sufficient conditions, like the ones perceived by the
272
decisional members at the maximum level of the other persons
involved:
- a mutation in the internal or external environment;
- a threat of the basic values;
- a high involving probability in hostilities that mostly have a
military character;
- for an answer to the value threatening”.
Lebow [5] states three properties belonging to an international
crisis:
- the decidents’ perception regarding the fact that the actions of
another international actor may affect the concrete national interests,
the peace negotiator’s reputation or its own capacity of keeping the
power;
- the decidents’ perception that, regardless the action meant to
confront this threat (excluding surrendering) amplifies the probability
of starting an armed conflict;
- the perception of acting upon the pressure of time.
The enumeration of the ways of understanding the international
crisis could continue, but it is neither sufficient nor satisfying. The
result of these analyses at a theoretical and empirical theoretical level
cannot be transferred immediately into the middle of the activities’
management, in our case, of a crisis.
When we talk about solutions we must take into consideration a
complex of decisions, papers, tryouts, correlations, which act together
for a difficulty, a problem, and in our case of a crisis.
In this case the solutions can be individualized only upon the
capacity of the politic factor to process the relevant information, to
conceive real objectives in order to take the necessary measures for
the prevention of the unorganized processes.
3. The crises dynamics: ways of manifestation
The new sources can manifest under different forms that become
more and more complex, diversified and typical, coming from
different fields of activity and diverse directions, making the process
of prevention and solving even more difficult. These risks, identified
even more by critical situations (probable or real) just as the
consequences of the economical, social, political and of any other kind
273
difficulties, that are less linked to the possibility of several typical
aggressions, having global or regional effects that are connected to the
manifestation of some internal and international spasms. Even more
often now within these situations can we notice certain ethnical and
territorial rivalry, the spreading of certain conflicts or most likely to
become conflicts, both in the European space and on the other
continents [2].
During the last few years, within the area of critical situations, we
have witnessed several risk factors that tend to spread and that tend to
become uncontrollable due to a lack of an intense cooperation at an
international level, situation in which we could determine a new era
for the humankind, an era “without any frontiers”.
Among these risks we can enumerate the terrorism acts, drugs’
traffic, nuclear materials and components, the spreading of mass
destruction weapons, the seizing of the vital recourses’ delivery,
misinformation, informal aggressions and all its components, human
being traffic, money washing, illegal immigration etc. All these risks
can also transform themselves into crises.
Against all these threats (that can become real crises) the safety
measures must have as a basis the evaluation of the planning and
development capabilities for different types of crises.
The threat evaluation must also take into consideration the
already existing vulnerabilities of the systems and the plans of attack.
Against all the utopist thoughts, the military force remains a
factor that can establish the order along the troubled times of the
worldwide geopolitical context. It is important to understand that a
war is a “chameleon” that changes into a particular situation from a
certain period of the history of the state. It is also known that no war
resembles another and that it is necessary to keep in mind the things
the nation learnt from the previous one.
The European civilization, the Russian and the American one,
separately from the Japanese one that do not share the same essential
strategic interests in a totally different cultural context, must decide
how to protect themselves against the military or non military threats
coming from The III rd World, and especially from its own
demographic pressure combined with the decolonizing and
development’s collapse, with the Balcanic politics, with the
274
intensification of the religious radical movement and with the short
term possibility of spreading the mass destruction weapons.
4. Conclusions
For the solving of the problems we can see the possibility of two
types of strategies [2].
The first strategy is that of “open gates”, through which the
Occident allows the access for the Eastern immigrants, though
selectively, trying to homogenize the values of the ones who came
from the European culture and civilization. The measures taken and
the initiatives towards the extension of the European Union and
N.A.T.O. are conclusive as well.
Through this attempt we must notice a series of extremely
important aspects of the European demographical configuration:
- the occidental countries are facing a strong demographical crisis
and there are no clues for an improvement of the birth rate without a
series of measures that do not come in contradiction with the field of
individual liberty;
- both the East, an immigrants’ supplier, and Russia, find
themselves in a deep demographical crisis. Moreover, Russia is facing
the most rapid growth of the population having a Mongolo-Turkish
origin as compared to the Slavic one;
- the Islamic population, untouchable from the point of view of
their politico-religious identity, is not being assimilated by the
European culture not even if, ab absurdo, it would give up its own
values and it would transform itself in a “multicultural civilization”;
- the existence of a mechanism that can ensure the immigration
control and the selection of the most valuable subjects towards their
integration in the European values’ circuit. Towards such a situation,
such a mechanism seems impossible to exists in the Occident.
The second strategy might be the adoption of the “the Bezant
strategy”, meaning the closure of the gates towards the Occident.
Through the acceptance of such a strategy we can notice a series of
risks and lacks from which we mention the most important ones:
- the closure strategy would not bring the cancellation of the
decline and the crises, but only their delay;
275
- the decline, the crisis and the decay may become insensitive if
there are not taken the measures to improve the demographical
situation from the Occidental countries;
- the maintenance of the technological superiority with the price
of aggravating the economical conditions from the countries of The III
rd World will not eliminate the spreading sources of the terrorism or
of the regional conflicts;
- this considerably enlarges the importance of the diplomatic
approaches that are orientated towards the scission of the possible
opponents with the purpose of avoiding their alliances of the
Occident;
As to sum up the procedural character of the social existence
determines the types of critical situations to et modified. If the
existential pressures keep changing the decisional centers can enter in
a critical situation if they do not seize the new threats in due time.
The new situations can become useful but only in new types of
solutions; the decision making factors can start critical situations if
they remain to the old ways of interfering. In the globalizing
conditions, as a natural process, trying a new part of the world in order
to keep the other one under control is an old fashioned situation, a
colonial scheme.
References
[1] BRECHER, M. Studies in Crisis Behavior, Special Issue the Ierusalim of
International Relations, 1978.
[2] DINESCU, I.M., s. a. Geopolitical crises management – dynamics and
manifestation, International Scientific Coference „MANAGEMENT –
THEORY, EDUCATION AND PRACTISE 2008”, Liptovsky Mikulas,
Slovacia, 25-26.09.2008.
[3] HERMAN, C.F. Crisis In Foreign, Policy. A Simulation Analysis,
Indianapolis, 1969.
[4] HOLSTI, O. Crisis, Escalation, War, Montreal.
[5] LEBOW, R. Between Peace and War the Nature, Baltimore, 1981.
276
GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC
TENDENCIES AT THE BEGINNING
OF THE THIRD MILENIUM
Dinescu Ioana Mihaela, Valentin Gabriel
Mountain Training Centre of Predeal
e-mail: deardevil_ioa@yahoo.com, gabbyvally2000@yahoo.com
Abstract
In the modern epoch, The BLACK SEA zone it became a zone of major
interest, phenomenon that lead to the modification of the geopolitical position of
Romania.
In fact, the three geopolitical elements of major importance that define the
position of Romania in Europe are the following ones: the position at the mouth
of the Danube, the access to the Black Sea and the Carpathian mountains.
The whole history of the Romanian people is marked by this primordial,
essential and emblematic triplet: mountain, river and sea.
Taking into consideration these realities, the paper aims at presenting the
crises that took place in the east-European geopolitical zone.
Keywords: geostrategic, geopolitical, crises
1. Introduction
The settlement of the ”ideological conflict” that has kept for a
half of century the mankind under the terror of the cold war has been
followed by a series of very significant events.
”The Maltese scenario” has been the common work of the two
partners possessing the bipolarity of the whole world seraching for a
new equilibrium meant to sustain the power system that was
dominated by them in a favourable way.
The liberation of the East has dissolved the structures of the
Warsaw Pact, but it has affected in a decisive way the Atlantic
277
character of the West defence, which will be managed by a more selfconfident Europe clearly dominated by the great European powers.
Europe had and will undoubtedly have its own emancipation
scenario of the East in which the power vector, engaged in change, is
represented by the economic stake.
Europe will undergo, în continuare, a process of change, a painful
and dangerous, but also a promissing one.
We have lately noticed with a great interest that in many
countries, here included Romania, we assist at a great improvement of
the geopolitical and geostrategic types of adoptions.
The public opinion, the specialists, the politicians, the military
have already taken over in their language certain concepts, phrases
and ideas specific to this type of approach.
The “geo-” prefix appears mainly when having in view larger
spaces, when the regional problems are integrated in the specific
political context or when the economic issues are approached by
means of geographic methods.
2. The influence zone of Romania
The Balkanic Peninsula is the third European peninsula situated
in the south-eastern part of the continent delimitated by the Adriatic
Sea and Ionic Sea in the west, and by the Black Sea, Maramara Sea
and Aegean Sea in the east. Starting from the XIVth and XVth
centuries, almost the whole Balkanic Peninsula entered under the
domination of the Ottoman Empire. After 1918, when the Ottoman
and Austro-Hungarian Empires were dissolved, the peoples of this
peninsula regained their independance. [1]
From a geographic point of view, the Balkanic States are situated
in the following way: two States in the western part of the peninsula
(Yugoslavia and Albania), one State in the eastern part (Bulgaria) and
to the extreme south lies Greece.
The events that took place in the last years of the XXth century
clearly confirm the geopolitical thesis according to which the struggle
between the great powers started having in view the control of the
Balkans. At the beginning, the occidental governments knew that they
would confront with the position of Russia. N.A.T.O. made
calculations that it would pass over Russia as long as it is an awkward
278
situation needing occidental financial assistence. Russia understood
that the best possibility to influence the events in the Balkans is cooperation and not confrontation with the Alliance. Many territorial
issues, inter-ethnic conflicts and cultural differences generated
towards the end of the XXth century bloody conflicts in which the
intervention of U.N.O. was required (here included the miliary
intervention for imposing peace). Everywhere in the Balkans are
contradictory interests and conflicts: Bosnia and Kosovo. The
Albanese issue will influence Macedonia şi Montenegro. Macedonia
will be a controversial territory where the interests of Greece, Bulgaria
and Serbia will clash. In the near future, the apparition of Bulgaria
among the actors in this zone might provoke restlessness in the region
and the Bulgarian-Serbian-Greek-rivalry towards Macedonia might
generate a new conflict.
The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia and the inter-ethnic
conflicts in the interior are other conflicts in course of development. In
essence, the Balkans constitute a region breathing insecurity sources
and the mission of their solving is long and tiring.
In this zone of numberless conflicts, there are a part of Romania’s
neighbours in the south of the Danube and the Black Sea.
In between the world wars a lot of ink has flown in order to
clarify an issue of the European geopolitics, namely: is the position of
Romania in the Balkans or in Central Europe? In this theoretical
dispute, blows changed on the one side and the other, the most
important geographers of the time were summoned for a scientific
confrontation. A study published in 1938, entitled “The Geopolitical
Position of Romania”, briefly renders the evolution of the
confrontations in this question. A fragment shows the conclusion
drawn by the geographers concerning this topic about the time of the
WWII”. After analyzing the previously cited work, one can draw the
conclusion that the most recent works consider the Great Romania as
a fragment of Central Europe leaving thus out forever the ideea of
placing our country in the centre of the Balkanic Peninsula. It is a
right that was refused to us for too long although we fully deserved it
looking with gratitude at the occidental researchers who expressed it”.
[3]
279
In 1940, the Romanian geographer N. Rădulescu published the
study entitled “The Danubian Romanian Border”. In this study, he
suggests an elegant and precise analysis of what the geopolitical status
of the European frontiers means referring to the fundamental role of
the Danube – that of a borderline. By this study, the famous Romanian
scientist takes into consideration once again the previous reasons that
settle the position of Romania in Central Europe “It is obvious that the
Danube separates here the Balkanic Europe from the Central-Oriental
Europe to which Romania belongs”. [2]
More than half of a century has passed since the issue of the
geographic position of Romania constituted the subject of certain
controversies that clarified this issue eventually. The Black Sea zone
has long been a region with obvious geopolitical and geostrategic
significances which diminished after a certain period of time. In the
modern time, it became again a zone of major interest, phenomenon
that lead to the modification of the geopolitical position of Romania.
The three major geopolitical elements that define the position of
Romania in Europe are the following ones: the position at the mouths
of the Danube, the access to the Black Sea and the Carpathian
Mountains. The Romanians’ whole history is marked out by this
essential and emblematic primordial triplet, three main geopolitical
and geostrategic factors dated in the Romanians’ history with the
attribute of perennial identity: mountain, river and sea.
These three elements have major geopolitical and geostrategic
significances and their dominance generates great advantages. The
Danube-Black Sea Channel turned into a very important objective
mainly because when the Rhine-Main-Danube Channel was finished,
a new river system communication way was created in between the
North Sea and the Black Sea. The Black Sea bathes the seaside of our
immediate or more far off neighbours such as: Ucraina, Bulgaria,
Turkey. It is not a closed sea as it directly communicates towards the
Aegean Sea and Mediterranean Sea through the Bosphorus and
Dardanel Straits, towards the Azov Sea through Kerci Straits, thus
giving Romania access to the Mediterranean Sea and hence, to the
Planetary Ocean.
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There are only a few reasons which, through their strategic
importance in the geopolitical perspective, will essentially contribute
to the growth of the weight and importance of the Romanian State.
The specific geographic setting has always been doubled by an
active political and military solution. We are settled down in a region
where the neighbours’ influences interfered from three different
directions: from Central Europe, from the South (from the Balkans),
from the East and the Euro-Asian steppes.
History shows us that, in all situations, the forces, which
penetrated and exerted influence, overlapped and intersected. A brief
historic overview demonstrates that the geopolitical advantages of
Romania generate the biggest risks against its security. The vicinity
with the Russian Empire represented, first of all, a source of insecurity
for the Romanian State. Because of certain expansionist policies,
various neighbours annexed Romanian territories, and the Romanians
lost step by step important territories. Using the force of army, the
diverse historical conjunctures, sometimes the indolence, duplicity or
the fear of those self-entitling themselves the leaders of Romanians,
various countries subdued the body of the country and tried even to
put to sleep step by step the memory by hiding or minimalizing what
happened.
We live in a geographic, geopolitical and geocultural point from
which we must look and understand each and every moment the world
evolution. Romania cannot be voluntarily and enthousiastically turned
into the colony of a certain empire. We refused the supremacy of the
giants in the politics of the past century, we refused Hitler’s genocide,
we succeeded in surviving the Bolshevism, we defied the hegemony
of those who were and are willing to redivide the world, we promoted
in yesterday’s political world and we will promote – today and
tomorrow – the right of peoples to independance, equality and dignity.
We are a people which raised the human relations to a supreme
height making out of “humaneness” the highest virtue governing
them, a people that preserves the joy of a man toward the other in a
world that tries to delete the bridges of soul cooperation and to close
the ecumenical spirit of the biped being.
However at the beginning of the third millenium, three major
changes can be foreseen in the relations between the occidental and
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oriental democracies. As the whole Europe makes headway, there can
be perceived a lower interest of the United States of America in the
west-European zone. Thus, it is expected to progressively grow the
interest of the United States of America towards the Balkans and
Eastern Europe. Having in view such a perspective, Romania can
assume a vanguard role, fact that would place our country in a
favourable vision towards the geopolitical and geostrategic interests of
the United States of America in the zone.
At the same time, Romania is interested by the consolidation of
the good close proximity relations with all the States from the Black
Sea Basin in order to offer stability and security in the region. [1]
3. Conclusions
The Balkans were, are and will remain an important pivot
concerning the geopolitical and geostrategic crisis management.
Romania lies in a very important place from a geographic,
geopolitical and geocultural point of view. That is why it must look
and understand in each and every moment the regional and world
evolution having in view monitoring, informing and solving crises
peacefully.
The military man must be not only an executant in the theatre of
operations, but also a very good diplomat.
Diplomacy must have the capacity of delivering security. The
blockheadedness to openess towards the capacity of offering security
through diplomacy represents a major risk for the States all over the
world.
References
[1] DINESCU, I., s. a. The management of the geopolitical and geostrategical
crises in the Balkans – the influence zone of Romania, International
Scientific Coference „MANAGEMENT – THEORY, EDUCATION AND
PRACTISE 2008”, Liptovsky Mikulas, Slovacia, 25-26.09.2008.
[2] RĂDULESCU, N. Hotarul românesc danubian, Editura Cartea Românească,
Bucureşti, 1941, pag. 290.
[3] *** Revista geografică română, Vol. I, Fasc. 1, 1938, pag. 44.
282
THE AFGHANISTAN WAR AS HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION – A VIEW OVER THE
IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARY THROUGH THE
PROCESS OF ENSURING HUMAN SECURITY IN
ZABUL PROVINCE
Kiş Alexandru
e-mail: alexandru_kis@yahoo.com
Abstract
The situation in Afghanistan has been considered a humanitarian
emergency from longtime ago. After years of foreign presence, improvements
are visible, but not enough to depict a massive amelioration of human security
references.
The military structure has adapted its reconstruction and development
effort in accordance with the concept of “human security”. “Freedom from
fear” is the end state of maneuver units’ mission, which hold CIMIC
capabilities, with similar tasks, but different purpose in comparison to militarylead Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the tactical expression of the politicaleconomic view of “freedom from want”.
Keywords: human, security, CIMIC, intervention, Afghanistan
1. Introduction. The „human security” concept
The whole world is ready to enter a new era after passing the
illusion of a prevalent non-military dimension of security post Cold
War.
The global perception of the progress is falling under a global fear
of crisis. Over this, there are events when states and nations are
declined to use classical relationship tools; the international law is
283
discriminatory applied, interests and diplomacy overpass customs and
serve sorry players.
The competition is strong and shows irrational accents dictated by
basic instincts. Therefore, there is a legitimate tendency of small states
to seek the protection of strong states or security organizations.
Nevertheless, what about those who don’t act like that? Is theirs
marginal experience a potential risk? Is the index of states’ selfsustainability [1] a tool used to make the decision of who justifies its
existence and who does not?
Whatever, we may say that the actual situation is a balance
seeking in a world of redundant concepts of security, status that could
be – according to a processual-organic point of view [2], assimilated
with a disorganizing process which emerge new organizing processes,
even there is not a scientific-made reference system able to shape the
new paradigms of sustainable existence.
Even though the globalization of the solutions does not suppose
to ignore theirs particularizations for each nation, it is hard to reach a
balance without an honest general attitude toward real problems and
the refuse of subversive spreading of fake problems.
The “human security” concept reefers to an emergent paradigm
seeking to approach global vulnerabilities, whose proponents
challenge the traditional notion of national security1 arguing that the
best reference in security matters is the human been, prevailing the
state/ nation. Mastered by two schools of thoughts (Canadian and
Japanese), the human security concept has defined two references,
much closed than opposite as core-function: freedom from fear and
freedom from wants [3].
Strongly connected with the human security concept are those of
“human development” [4] (having three main common issues: focus
on population, multidimensional horizons and identifying the poverty
and inequity as sources of individuals’ vulnerability) and
“responsibility to protect” – R2P, launched by Kofi Annan [5], who
promotes three ways of action: prevention, reaction and rebuilding.
1
Over this challenge, the concepts of human security and national security are not mutually
exclusive
284
2. The responsibility to protect and the humanitarian
intervention
State’s sovereignty implies a series of responsibilities. Its own
population protection is crucial, as long as the national interest
becomes a collective interest of the citizens mass. When a state is no
more able or does not have the necessary determination to intervene in
situations menacing the security of its own citizens, the principle of
not interfering with state internal affairs is questionable, over any
reference on ethics [6] related to such interventionism.
The paradigm of human security, as a reference of sustainable
development, needs a conceptual clarification1 able to emphasize
specific tasks for international actors. In addition, not having
prioritizing criteria of human security risks, the concept may be
manipulated or embezzled to serve justifying actions motivated by
subversive interests – therefore an insecurity issue.
The humanitarian intervention defines an armed2 interference of a
state on the territory of another state, with a declared objective to cut
off or reduce the suffering of the population (related to an internal
armed conflict, a humanitarian crisis or administration’s crimes).
With a consistent history in this domain, nowadays it’s less
probable that the civilized world will stay aside when such violations
of human rights occur. On the other hand, this kind of interventions
must base on universal and legitimate principles. Practically, there are
two issues linked to the subject: the right to intervene and the
obligation to intervene, separating humanitarian reasons by politics
and aiming a disinterested approach of intervening powers. G-77
criticizes the promotion of a “law of humanitarian intervention”,
motivating with a potential doctrinal support of neo-imperialist
politics and emphasizing the danger of elimination for alternate
cultural and political systems, which may be considered as less
valuable.
1
There are four current versions debating the human security concept (U.N.D.P., Japanese,
Canadian and U.E.)
2
This is a disputed issue – see Kofi A. ANNAN, Two concepts of sovereignty, in The
Economist, 18 .09. 1999, apud
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/articleFull.asp?TID=33&Type=Article
285
3. Afghanistan – the war against terrorism vs. humanitarian
intervention. The ISAF mission
There is an universally accepted view over Afghanistan situation
– there is a disorganized society, a failed state. Therefore, it is a
perfect site for a humanitarian intervention. This is, in fact, the reality
of the actual impact of military presence there, even the war started
with other objectives – war against terrorism.
We are not going to insist on these, but there is necessary to
observe that, after a first phase of defeating Talibans and Al Qaeda,
the argument of human security prevailed as a solution to fight
terrorism. This was a psycho-politic strategy aiming to gain the
adhesion of communities previously supporting the terrorists.
Because of this attitudinal shift, a politic mission of U.N. and
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission have doubled
the “Enduring Freedom” operation efforts. The current objective is to
assist the Afghan Government in extending and exercising its
authority allover the country, creating the necessary conditions for
stabilization and reconstruction (all these with more specific and
detailed tasks in the human security concept field).
4. Afghanistan and humanitarian crisis
The actual situation in Afghanistan is, theoretically, a stage of
reconstruction
and
post-intervention
rehabilitation,
peace
consolidation and conflict prevention, promotion of well governing
and sustainable development, with reforming efforts in fields of:
security, justice, reconciliation, disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration, encouraging of economic growth.
Despite of this, Afghanistan holds its status as one of the most
pauper countries, occupying the 174th place (of 178) in accordance
with U.N.D.P. Human Development Index 2007 (a comparative
situation of human security references are available in Table no.1)
286
Table no. 1 – Human security indicators Afghanistan
AFGHANISTAN
SOUTH
ASIA
DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES
INDUSTRIALIZED
COUNTRIES
The Human Development Index
quotation (of 174 states)a
169
-
-
-
% of population with access at:
medical services (1985-93)a
potable water (1990-95)b
29
12(rural 5, urban 39)
65
77
79
69
100
100
1,523
2,356
2,546
3,108
Infant mortality at 1000
live born (1993) b
165
85
70
-
Infant mortality up to 5 months at
1000 live born (1993)c
257
122
101
-
Maternal mortality at
100,000 new born (1993)
1,700d or 640e
469
351
10
Life hope at born (1993)a
44
60
62
76
28 (males 45,
females 14)
48
68
98
INDICATORS
Daily caloric contribution
per capita (1992) b
Adults alphabetization rate (%,
1993) a, b
SOURCES:
a. UNOCHA, 1996, p. 4; UNDP, Human Development Report 1996.
b. UNOCHA, 1997, p. 4; UNDP, Human Development Report 1997.
c. UNICEF, State of the World's Children Report 1996.
d. UNICEF/World Health Organization, 1996.
e. UNDP, 1997.
However, we cannot neglect an evident improvement of these
conditions, as is shown in Table no. 2, but far from the real needs.
Table no. 2 –Comparative situation - Afghanistan during and after Taliban era (apud
ISAF, Afghan Mirror, no. 48, May 2008, p. 11)
287
There are still uncounted incidents related to education process, as
well as an important financial deficit (81%) in this branch [7].
UNICEF revealed the need of about 7 millions USD to meet
exclusively the specific needs of females and children [8], while WFP
estimates at about 80 millions USD the value of necessary food
supply. The lack of potable water and basic alimentation generates an
increase of diseases and malnutrition incidence. Bad weather, lack of
medical support, the significant amount of refugees and displaced
persons, fights between Talibans and ISAF-ANSF troops, all these
influence the quality of life.
5. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in Afghanistan. The
specific of military involvement in human security affairs in Zabul
Province
CIMIC is nowadays a universally recognized task within peace –
support operations, with a serious knowledge package based on
accumulated experience and clear doctrinal support. However, under
human security vision, the problem of military involvement within the
reconstruction effort gets a new dimension. Constraint levels supposed
by following the commander’s intent in support to the operational end
state are surpassed. CIMIC knows a massive development of its range
of action, encompassing important references of human security
concept and promoting another way to approach civilians, especially
regarding the relation with host country’s administration. Having the
reality of a ponderous doctrine’s transformation, we do not expect
crucial changes of the tactical expression of these tasks.
In Zabul, as in other Afghan provinces, ISAF manifests its
cooperation with civilians through a Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT), an equivalent structure for the known CIMIC Centre, but with
a different concept [9]. Beside PRT, the maneuver units relate with
host administration and local population through various CIMIC
entities, but with a limited impact in the general process of
communities’ development.
As general issues of civil – military cooperation, we will depict a
series of situations that may be taken as reference points in running
such programs.
288
The main concern is to communicate in the right way with
civilians. Additional to a consistent information campaign, another
channel of passing messages is meeting local leaders through regular
or ad-hoc “shuras” (councils), but with an appropriate knowledge of
indigene vision over a series of usual concepts as “perspective”,
“estimation”, “plan” or “project”. A different perception of the time
generated within communities confusions toward theirs great
expectations, and consequently frustration and lack of trust. All these
originate in afghan mentality, where a leader holds his legitimacy as
long as he is able to meet the community needs. Another risk issue is a
possible inability during the project opportunity assessment.
Expressing such intentions may be considered as firm engagement,
therefore a perception conflict.
If CIMIC is essential for military commanders, civilian structures
acting in the field of reconstruction or humanitarian support see the
military intrusion as a risk issue, compromising theirs apriority neutral
image. Not having a clear distinction between military activities and
reconstruction or human relief efforts may endanger even the project
beneficiary, as well as neutral civilian workers of the humanitarian
domain (whom presence may be associated with that of military, so
they seem to belong to the adverse party). Civilians have a full
freedom of interpreting who’s who; with a heterogenic spectrum of
actors, any foreigner’s image is associated with the military
interventionist structure.
Relating with local administrative leaders, top military
commanders must exceed a narrow range of exclusively physical
security (“freedom from fear”). There is a dual approach, which also
implies, beside “pacification”, a certain degree of involvement in the
general process of development (economical, cultural, social a.s.o.).
This is not possible yet without the coherence offered by a clear and
integrated concept, based on designated financial resources, also
without the support of a specialized branch. There must be a long
term commitment (avoiding so-called “visibility projects”), with a
strong social impact.
The US Zabul PRT is appointed rather with combat units than
relief elements, because of security effort prevalence; consequently,
its expressed development ambitions over fulfill a tiny specialized
289
structure [10]. Other specific realities conditioning civil – military
cooperation and a sustainable developing process are: the lack of
experience, the incompetence and the corruption of the host
administration apparatus, which needs a strong counseling and
advisory commitment; the need of cooperation with civilian relief
organization acting within the province, in order to coordinate and
deconflict efforts; serious difficulties to find earnest companies for
general works; poor infrastructure and limited mobility; insurgents or
even local conservators adversity a.s.o.
For maneuver units’ CIMIC structures, as a difference related to
Iraq, where the commitment was to locally “win hearts and minds” in
support of the military operation, the directives in Afghanistan aim to
solve pieces of the human security puzzle in a generally quantified
effort. This reality clearly sanction a transition of the perception from
classical CIMIC to another approach of the holistic concept of human
security: the military structure no more subordinates the CIMIC main
effort to its objectives, but lines it up with the political intentions of
general human security amelioration.
6. Conclusion
The coherence of branches’ projects is strongly affected by a
various and not coordinated number of civilian and military structures
acting in the field of reconstruction and human relief, by a mainly
illicit economy, inconsistence of governmental territorial services
competing the authority of local leaders, inequitable effort distribution
and funds embezzlement [11], donors’ preferential policies [12] and
lack of correlation with governmental programs [13], corruption and
smuggling mastering at high-level, focus on short-terms projects
because of inconstant funding [14].
There is an obvious fracture between ministry decisional level
and provincial authorities, therefore the idea of promoting a
subnational (provincial and districtual) effort of development and
reconstruction in order to get strengthen communities and individual
capacities, otherwise neglected.
In the light of human security concept, the military structure
reconfigures itself and adopts new frames able to meet new
challenges. If maneuver units hold the task of ensuring a safe and
290
secure environment (“freedom from fear”), PRTs are tactical
expressions of political and economic visions of “freedom from
wants” related tasks. Even partially similar with CIMIC tasks, these
are based on a different motivational settlement, both forms justifying
the granted attention.
References
[1] The African Studies Centre (Leiden),The Transnational Institute
(Amsterdam), The Center of Social Studies/ Coimbra University, The Peace
Research Center CIP-FUHEM (Madrid), Failed and collapsed states in the
international system, in
http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/failed/2003/12failedcollapsedstat
es.pdf, 2003
[2] Lucian CULDA, Promovarea securităţii globale – repere teoretice, Centrul
de Studii Sociale Procesual – Organice, Sibiu, 2006, p.71
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_security
[4] Sabina ALKIRE, A conceptual Framework for Human Security, Centre for
Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRSE), Working
Paper 2, University of Oxford, London, 2003
[5] ICISS Report, The Responsibility to Protect, International Development
Research Council, Ottawa, 2001, in http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp
[6] C. A. J. COADY, The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention, U.S.
Institute of Peace, Peaceworks No. 45, august 2002, in
http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks45.html
[7]http://www.unicef.org/french/infobycountry/files/Afghanistan_final_DU_25J
ul07.pdf
[8] http://www.unicef.org/french/infobycountry/afghanistan_31224.html
[9] http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/recon_dev/prts.html
[10] http://www.fumento.com/weblog/archives/2007/05/blaming_the_msm.html
[11] http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/03/eea90a1c-0374-4b58-88a476c30e6e3275.html
[12] The High-Level Forum on Human Relief Activities Improvement, Paris
declaration on aid effectiveness, 2005, in
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf
[13] Anne DAVIES, Juha-Matti SEPPÄNEN, Hassina SHERJAN, Evaluation
Report 2007. Finnish Aid to Afghanistan, Ministry For Foreign Affairs Of
Finland, Department For Development Policy, 2007
[14] http://news.webindia123.com/news/Articles/World/20080325/917129.html
291
GEOPOLITICAL AND STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE
OF THE BLACK SEA REGION
Ioniţă Daniela Maria
HP Ltd., Bucharest
Abstract
For centuries and up to recently, the Black Sea has been considered a
closed space because of the fact that its only straits which make a connection
with the World Ocean are the Bosporus and the Dardaneles. Moreover, the
Black Sea was not given any significant strategic importance due to several
factors: it was a closed sea, it had always been a Russian space, there were not
so many oil and gas pipelines so as to consider it important from an economical
point if view. Furthermore, the Black Sea region was banned from Western
interest, as the states which form the area were in the past Soviet states with
little, if any, Western perspective. Consequently, the United States of America or
the European Union sought first to change the regimes of these states and to
transform them in democracies through a perseverant influence of their internal
policies, and then get involved in their foreign policies and greater aspirations.
I. General Perspective
The Black Sea basin has been considered for several centuries a
closed area, due mainly to the fact that its only exit to the World
Ocean is through the Bosporus strait. Not only does the Black Sea
form a corridor between East and South-East Europe and Asia and the
Middle East, but it is so from a cultural point of view also. Moreover,
the Black Sea is also an area where several trade routes meet, thus
marking an important economic environment.
Even from ancient times, the Black Sea was the object of several
naval wars, its control being the objective of both military and
political power games. This was mainly due to the fact that its position
292
has always been at the crossroads of great empire’s expansion, such as
the Roman, the Ottoman and the Tsarist Empire.
After the Second World War, the Soviet Union made several
attempts at gaining control over the Eastern part of the Mediterranean,
thus creating a lot of tensions in the area. Furthermore, the Black Sea
region was one of the strategic areas of dispute between the two great
powers during the Cold War.
The end of the Cold War meant a realignment of power in the
international arena. Moreover, this brought an increased dynamics in
the world due to the difference in economic, military and political
development of the actors that emerged in the newly created
environment. This fact influenced the Black Sea area and
consequently the whole international community because there were a
lot of newcomers here, states which had been under direct control of
the Soviet Union and which all of the sudden acquired their own
control, and a new role on the international arena.
Up to 1990, the dominant power in the region was the Soviet
Union, whose dissolution allowed the creation of sovereign
independent states in the area, thus balancing the power which the
Soviet Union used to hold. Thus appeared Ukraine, who has a large
part of the Northern shore (about 30%), Crimea, as well as the main
maritime bases such as Sevastopol, where a large part of the Black
Sea Fleet is deployed. Moreover, there was the emergence of Georgia
which has around 12 % of the shore, one percent less than Russia.
Since 1991, the Black Sea experienced a great transfomation,
both from the part of its direct actors, and with the help of the indirect
ones. When I say transformation, I am thinking of the former
communist regime which governed the states in the region which
developed into an emerging democratic area. This was the moment
when the ideological factor no longer represented the main objective
for the strategic confrontations. This was the moment when several
actors got involved, pursuing their own national interests, therefore it
was the moment when strategic partnerships emerged.
That is why the events have unfolded into a different perspective
on the Black Sea and the surrounding region, thus leading to the
concept of Extended Black Sea Area. This concept included, besides
the 6 states which have opening at the sea, that is Russia, Turkey,
293
Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia), Moldova, Armenia and
Adzerbadjan.
The fact that the Black Sea has been considered an open sea after
the fall of the Soviet Union has easened cooperation on several levels
among the actors directly or indirectly involved. Moreover, this
outcome was also influenced by the opening of the Danube-Main-Rin
channel in September 1992, which provided a straight communication
way between the Black Sea and the North Sea. Consequently, the
Bospor and Dardanele straits were no longer considered as the most
important strategic points in the area. This is why Romania is a
strategic target of influence, as it controls two major sea
communication channels: the Danube and the Black Sea.
The NATO and EU enlargement process towards the West coast
of the Black Sea has brought the region in the attention of the
international relations. Although it was once thought of the Black Sea
as being „the periphery of Europe and a Russian lake”1, nowadays the
Black Sea is considered as having an important strategic outcome.
Moreover, the recent events in Georgia (The Rose Revolution2003) and Ukraine (The Orange Revolution- 2005) have created the
proper environment and timing for the „offensive of democracy and
freedom”2 in the Black Sea region. Furthermore, the civil society’s
consent for these developments in the countries above-mentioned
allow the international community to put its hopes up in what
concerns the other states in the area which are still strongly influenced
by communist elites. If democracy were to govern the area, then the
Black Sea region would be ideologically united to the trans-atlantic
community (NATO) and the European community, which is where the
region belongs.
The economical interests which govern the international arena
have moved towards the Black Sea soon after the discovery of
important oil and gas reserves in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The
economical and commercial factors, along with the Black Sea’s
geographical position as a corridor between Europe, Central Asia, the
Mediterranean and the Middle East led to the focus on the area of
1
Romanian President Traian Basescu’s speech „Advancing Freedom, Democracy and
Regional Stability, Council on Foreign Relations, March, 10, 2005, on www.cfr.org
2
Ibid.
294
global powers, such as the United States, the European Union, Japan,
some Arab states and other continental powers.
Given these circumstances, the Black Sea has acquired a new
dimension in the process of ensuring regional stability, which might
be jeopardized by economical interests and/or the open and frozen
political and military conflicts which intersect in the area. In military
strategy, it is often spoken of the triple role of the Black Sea: that of a
platform for troop deployment in Asia and the Middle East, that of a
shield against asimetric threats (terrorist activities, trade with guns,
drugs, humans, extremist movements etc.) and that of a key area to
promote and implement democracy and security outside Europe.
Controlling the area is seen by the international arena not only as
a challenge which rises national interests and egos, but also as a
necessity in order to develop regional cooperation and security.
II. Elements of international interst
The Black Sea area has become a key element on the international
organisations’ security agenda from the moment the war against
terrorism was declared. Up to that moment, the only international
organisation which developed security programs in the region was the
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), even
though there had already been conflicts emerging in the area. The
main reason for which the international influence developed only
recently was Russia’s rejection of any other actor involved in the area
for fear it would diminish its own influence.
The terrorist attacks which occured in the United States and
Europe made the international community rethink its policies
regarding the Black Sea, or provided the international actors with
pretexts to interfere in the region. Having a good excuse to do that,
Russia would not act aggresively against states or organisations that
try to prevent disasters and ensure security on the continent.
Therefore, the NATO Summit in Istanbul officially stated for the first
time the need to secure the area and to build a coherent security
strategy. Moreover, it admitted the importance of the Black Sea in
what concerns euro-atlantic cooperation: „We note the importance of
the Black Sea region for Euro-Atlantic security. Littoral countries,
Allies and Partners are working together to contribute to further
295
strengthening security and stability in the area. Our Alliance is
prepared to explore means to complement these efforts, building upon
existing forms of regional cooperation.”1
Moreover, the decision of NATO to get more involved in the
Black Sea area was directly shown through the accession of Bulgaria
and Romania, fact which determined a decrease in Russian influence
and a tighter cooperation between Russia and NATO. Despite the fact
that Russia sees international involvement in its so called area of
influence as a constant threat, it seems that Russia has realized that it
cannot oppose a growing phenomena of democratization in former
Soviet states and has reconsidered its relations with the West. In order
to support better relations with Russia, NATO has extended its
influence in the Black Sea region in a diplomatic manner, assuring
Russia that there are no hidden intentions which could jeopardise its
national security.
However, NATO gained several important strategic key elements
in the Black Sea area. Besides the fact that Turkey is one of the oldest
NATO members (since 1952), Romania and Bulgaria have provided
NATO more supportive elements and channels through which NATO
can exercise its influence. Furthermore, the North-Atlantic Alliance
has developed relations with Georgia, Armenia and Adzerbaidjan
through the program Partnership for Peace and a special relation with
Ukraine through the Individual Plan of Assistance and Partnership and
the Commission NATO-Ukraine. Moreover, NATO also tried to
develop good relations with Russia, that is why it founded the NATORussian Council. In spite of the fact that NATO does not foresee
Moldova as a member on a short term basis, it has also developed an
Individual Plan for Assistance and Partnership with it.
Presently, NATO has a very important role in the region, role
which is expected to grow considerably in the near future, as two
other states have announced their intention of becoming NATO
members and are making serious efforts to meet the organisation’s
requirements: Ukraine and Georgia. Furthermore, NATO’s presence
in the region has helped to secure the maritime channels and
communication. However, NATO’s military presence is limited here,
1
NATO Press Release, Summit held in Istanbul, June 28-29, 2004 on www.nato.org
296
mostly due to the Montreaux Convention in 1936 which regulates the
passage of non-riverain military ships through the Black Sea straits.
There have been several heated debates between Turkey, backed up
by Russia and NATO regarding this topic.
Turkey’s suspicious attitude, along with Russia’s opposition
towards US or any other state military present in the area have forced
NATO to turn to the regional security organisations and programs and
quit the idea of being military present in the area. Therefore, programs
such as BLACKSEAFOR, SEEBRIG and „Black Sea Harmony” have
become instruments of military presence o the part of NATO.
We have to admit though that the United States’ intensions are
clear and visible behind NATO’s strive to ensure security and stability
in the area. It is convenient at present that the United States move their
troops towards Eastern Europe in order to have a better strategic
position and logistic support towards the Middle East and Central
Asia.
The European Union is a newcomer in the Black Sea region and
has shown interest only recently. However, the European Union does
not have a coherent plan regarding regional conflicts and the security
of the region. Its interest is rather based on political and economic
issues than on strategic and security ones.
Nevertheless, along with the acceptance of two new members,
Romania and Bulgaria, the region’s insecurity factors have become a
matter of concern for the European Union also, as now they are
factors which involve the Union as a body, not only the Black Sea
riverain states. Consequently, in order to ensure security at the
European level, the organisation must first deal with regional threats
or threats that affect any member state.
Despite the fact that the European Union has not developed any
security policy for the Black Sea area, the experience of several other
regional programs such as EuroMed (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,
also known as the Barcelona program) and the initiative of Finland to
create a cooperation program in Northern Europe form the basis of an
efficient security cooperation initiative on the Black Sea shores.
Especially since this factor is one of great interest for the European
Union and its future development and legitimacy as a supportive
international actor.
297
The most notable attempt lately was the first summit of the Black
Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership, held in Bucharest on the 5th
of June 2006. The Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership „is
an evolving process nourished and driven by active involvement and
interaction between stakeholders interested in the present, but most
importantly in the future of the Black Sea region. Therefore it can help
them sharing their expertise, projects and practical solutions for a
wide range of issues. Black Sea Forum for Dialogue and Partnership
sets the framework for launching an integrated and transparent
thinking process aimed at the region itself, its identity and future.”1
The purpose of the Black Sea forum was stated as „to create a
platform for cooperation and commitment to development of a
regional strategy and a common vision, as materialization of a new
political vision, and to identify coordination opportunities based on
this vision.”2
Regarding security issues, the Black Sea Forum released also a
coherent security policy which is meant to answer several threats in
the area and try to solve the conflicts, either frozen or emerging,
strtegy which numbers the following elements: „recalling the
experience acquired from regional cooperation in South Eastern and
Central Europe, the Baltic Sea and Northern Europe, which generated
enhanced confidence among participating countries; acknowledging
that existing regional initiatives, processes and structures have so far
fostered closer cooperation in the region and encouraged the
participating countries to seek regional answers to their common
challenges; affirming the conviction that the States in the Black Sea
Region should continue to uphold their responsibility for maintaining
peace, stability, prosperity and good neighbourly relations in the
Black Sea area, by utilizing effectively and efficiently all available
organisations (BSEC), initiatives and processes in the area,
contributing to democratic transformation and sustainable
development; emphasising that the evolving common security
challenges in the region, such as those pertaining to energy, terrorism
and WMD proliferation, environmental degradation, natural disasters,
illegal trafficking, organised crime require correlated and cooperative
1
2
Black Sea Forum, Bucharest, June 5, 2006, on www.blackseaforum.org
Ibid.
298
responses of the countries in the region; stressing that unresolved
conflicts in some Black Sea states represent a challenge to security
and stability in the region; recognising that a reinforced strategy of an
action-oriented nature, which will build upon the existing regional
cooperation initiatives and make use of all other relevant mechanisms
and programmes, as well as the contribution of interested parties in a
complementary fashion, is needed to effectively deal with these
common challenges.”1
The European Union’s role in the region was not minimized and
was received very positively: „We, Heads of State or Their
Representatives from the Black Sea region: Republic of Armenia,
Republic of Azerbaijan, Republic of Bulgaria, Georgia, Hellenic
Republic, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Turkey and Ukraine
Welcome the increasing interest of the EU in the Black Sea region and
take note with appreciation of the recent initiatives undertaken by EU
member states, resulting in the undergoing efforts within the EU to
elaborate a comprehensive regional approach for the Black Sea, which
should significantly contribute towards achieving the goals we all
share. In this context, we encourage the EU member states and the
European Commission to make full use of their policy and financial
instruments available for the region from 2007 onwards, including the
European Neighbourhood Policy, the European Neighbourhood Policy
Instrument (ENPI) and the Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA). We
also welcome the involvement of development, financial and cultural
partners in the Black Sea region.”2
The most important indirect actor with special interests in the
Black Sea area is undoubtedly the United States of America. The
official discourse of the US Administration states that the main
interest in the Black Sea region is advancing democracy in former
Soviet states and maintaining it in the core of Europe. The common
known view on the Black Sea is that of an area still vulnerable to
Russia in what concerns ideologycal, economic and political interest,
the oldest and most powerful enemy of democracy.
„The U.S. interests in the Black Sea area energy transit, security,
counterterrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
1
2
Ibid.
Joint Declaration, Black Sea Forum, Bucharest, June 5, 2006, on www.blackseaforum.org
299
(WMD), and the traffic in drugs, weapons, and people have taken on
particular significance since 9/11. The Black Sea basin is a strategic
region bordering the Greater Middle East and a key transit route for
Caspian oil. The U.S. needs a comprehensive regional policy to
protect American interests and security.”1
Nevertheless, the United States also admitted another area of
interest regarding the Black Sea, and that is the strategic position of
the region which allows America to develop its policy in the Middle
East. The Black Sea provides a great strategic instrument in the
accomplishment of US’s objective of launching and supportng its
policies in the Middle East, as well as taking control over the Caspian
Sea. ”The Black Sea region provides excellent power projection
toward the heart of the Greater Middle East (roughly the area between
Morocco and Pakistan). It is also the region which connects the
Caspian Sea oil and gas-rich zone with the eastern Mediterranean Sea,
an area of crucial importance for the European Union's energy
needs.”2
Moreover, another interest which the United States have in the
region is the post-Cold War need to reduce Russia’s influence on
certain territories, in order to weaken Russia’s power and strengthen
its own geo-strategic power. Furthermore, the United States have
explicitly shown a great interest in aligning the two regional states,
Bulgaria and Romania, with the Western principles.
“With the United States securing its strategic positions in
Bulgaria and Romania, the Black Sea region is moving fast toward a
new power configuration. Since the European Union's integration
process is flawed by its inability to quickly adapt to the new
configuration and by the European public's dissatisfaction with the
enlargement itself, the U.S. is rapidly taking the lead in Western
penetration of the once Russian-dominated region.
1
Ariel COHEN, Conway IRWIN, „U.S. Strategy in the Black Sea Region”, December 13,
2006, Heritage Foundation, on www.heritage,org
2
Federico BORDONARO, “US Military Bases in the Black Sea Region”, in Power and
Interest News Report, November 19, 2005, on www.globalpolicy.org
300
Biblography
1. AELENEI, Ana, CHIRITA, Damian, “The Stakes of the Black Sea Game:
Complicated Solutions to Simple Problems”, in South-Eastern Space in the
Globalization Context, International Scientific Session of Communications,
Editura Universitatii Nationale de Aparare “Carol I”, Bucuresti, 2007
2. ASMUS, Ronald, DIMITROV, Konstantin, FORBIG, Jeorg (editors), O
noua strategie Euro-atlantica pentru regiunea Marii Negre, Institutul roman
de studii internationale “Nicolae Titulescu”, Bucuresti, 2004
3. ROSINSKI, Herbert, The Development of Naval Thought, Naval College
Press, Newport, Rhode Island, 1977
4. SARCINSCHI, Alexandra; BAHNAREANU, Cristian, „Configuration of
the Regional Security Environment (The Black Sea Area and the Balkans)”,
Editura Universitatii Nationale de Aparare “Carol I” , Bucuresti, 2005
5. SNYDER, Glenn H., „The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”, in World
Politics, Vol.36, No.4, July 1984
6. SOCOR, Vladimir, „Advancing Euro-Atlantic security and democracy in the
Black Sea region” in The Black Sea Security Program, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, 2005
INTERNET SITES:
1. www.nato.int
2. www.heritage.org
3. www.cfr.org
4. www.irtheory.com
5. www.securityconference.de
6. www.globalpolicy.org
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10. www.cs-education.standford.edu
11. www.mfa.gov.ge
301
THE POWER OF INFORMATION DURING
CONFLICT
Ioniţă Daniela Maria
HP Ltd., Bucharest
I. Introduction
The present society has known a development one could have
never foreseen. This was mainly due to the evolution of information
technology, and consequently, the evolution of knowledge. Most
political thinkers have identified the information science as the
domain in which the most revolutionary developments have occurred.
Therefore, information is both the means by which society develops,
and it also is a goal on its own (science nowadays is focused on the
development of information). This is mainly due to the fact that the
process of gathering, coding/decoding and proper use of information
is considered the trigger of development.
These factors have pointed out the need to develop a theory which
analyzed the processes that revolved around the use of information.
Along with the constant increase of producing and consuming
information, of gathering, analyzing and passing information, came
the need to develop studies, to put the scientific basis of an
information theory.
However, despite the fact that we are now on the highest peak of
development, it is within the human nature to cause and live in
conflict. Despite the fact that we now receive and pass information
that could improve our condition as human beings, we often use this
advantage for other purposes. In order to acquire power or to prove
their strength, human beings tend to start conflicts against one another.
The political theory that has developed the most complex analysis
regarding this constant state of conflict among entities is realism.
302
Moreover, the main concept which comes in the center of political
realism is power politics. In order to ensure their security which is the
ultimate interest of the actors, states must acquire power. Power
implies the concept of force. Realist scholars consider that states must
always be prepared to use force, either alone or in coalition, in order
to gain power and attain their interests. “Whether or not by force, each
state plots the course it thinks best serve its interests.”1
Presently, it is more and more certain that information is the most
powerful weapon when analyzing a conflict. Whether we are talking
about emerging conflicts or developed ones, information is the
element which decides who is more powerful and who is most likely
to win. Moreover, not only having the information first, but finding
the proper means to use it may ensure the outcome of a conflict.
Along with the development of impressive technologies in the
information field, we are witnessing a transformation of the term
“conflict”. Conflict is no longer armed, but it is becoming more
dangerous as it destroys by means of information.
This paper focuses on how acquiring information and knowing
how to use it can decide the victorious part in a conflict, and, on the
other side, how can the lack of information or the inappropriate timing
may destroy the other part.
II. General Thoughts on the Terms “Information” and
“Conflict”
As a general definition, the term conflict comes from the Latin
word ”conflictus”(hitting together with great force), thus implying
“disagreements and frictions among the members of a group, emotions
and affection…T.K. Gamble and M. Gamble define conflict as a
positive variable, meaning that beyond every perspective, conflict is a
natural consequence of diversity.”2
What makes states become aggressive and start a conflict with
other states? Most international relations theorists identify the security
dilemma as the factor that causes states to worry about one another's
future intentions and relative power. Pairs of states may pursue purely
1
Kenneth WALTZ, Theory of International Politics, Random House, New York, 1979, pg.
113.
2
Ion-Ovidiu PANISOARA, Comunicarea eficienta, Iasi, Polirom, 2008, pg. 156.
303
security seeking strategies, but inadvertently generate spirals of
mutual hostility or conflict. “States often, although not always, pursue
expansionist policies because their leaders mistakenly believe that
aggression is the only way to make their state secure. Defensive
realism predicts great variation in internationally driven expansion and
suggests that states ought to generally pursue moderate strategies as
the best route to security. Under most circumstances, the stronger
states in the international system should pursue military, diplomatic,
and foreign economic policies that communicate restraint.”1 States
face the ever-present threat that other states will use force to harm or
conquer them. This compels them to improve their relative power
positions through arms build-ups, unilateral diplomacy, mercantile (or
even autarkic) foreign economic policies, and opportunistic
expansion. Ultimately every state in the international system strives to
become a regional hegemon - a state that enjoys a preponderance of
military, economic, and potential power in its part of the globe.
What is information? Generally speaking, information is a piece
of knowledge which may take different forms (oral, written, visual,
digital etc.), has a meaning and is transmitted to a conscious being
through a communication channel. The amount of information we
possess defines the knowledge we have on the world. Therefore, the
need to acquire information has the following reasons: understanding
the environment we live in, finding answers to the questions which
may appear, the primary need of man to feel safe (knowing what
surrounds us helps develop defense strategies).
The following factors describe the process of information:
- gathering the information
- analyzing of the information: identifying out of the general
facts, the piece of information which is of interest, which is useful;
organizing the information you have in order to build theories
- communicating the information: passing it to the other receptors
- using the information: properly use the information you have in
order to obtain beneficial effects- knowing the goals you aim at
provides the framework to establish the information you need to
acquire.
1
Jeffrey W. TALIAFERRO, „Security-Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism
Reconsidered”, in International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2000, on www.irtheory.com
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III. The Role Of Information During Conflict
According to Frederick Forsyth, there are six phases of a conflict,
out of which we will only address three. The first phase, the
disagreement (disagreement can be either real or pretended, in case
this suits the interests of one or more of the parts involved). This is the
phase in which the parts concerned analyze their interests and the
means by which they can obtain what they want. In other words, this
is the phase in which all parts gather information. This phase is of
utmost importance for the development of the conflict because,
depending on the amount of information which the parts obtain and
the analysis of that information, one or both parts decide whether they
can pass on to the next phase (the confrontation) or not.
During this phase, the parts try to gather information on their
opponent (regarding the interest, means, logistics, power, technology,
economic stability etc.) and try to predict as accurately as possible the
outcome of a potential confrontation. If we refer to conflicts between
states, this is the part where secret services come in and, depending on
their degree of development and professionalism, a state can win or
loose a conflict.
There have been many cases in which the confrontation was
already won even in the phase of the disagreement, because one part
knew that the opponent was weaker and thus would give in to its
demands. On the other side, there have been cases when the
confrontation was lost because one of the parts was poorly informed
on the other, or had inaccurate information.
As an example, the battle which caused Germany to loose the
Second World War was the result of a massive disinformation
operation. In order to cover their intentions, the Allied Forces tried to
make Germany believe that the attack were to take place at Pas de
Calais and the fact that they were preparing troops on the coast of
Normandy was a simulation in order to trick them. In this case, all the
information channels were prepared to take part in the operation:
American magazines were publishing fake reports of Allied Troops,
double agents were used in order to make the Germans believe Pas de
Calais was the place of the invasion. The English Intelligence Service
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used a war prisoner, Hans Cramer, and set him free in exchange of an
English prisoner (this was a trick because, while transporting him to
Germany, the escorts intentionally made him believe that the troops he
was seeing on the coast were between Kent and Sussex, while they
were driving along the Dorset coast). All the elements of espionage
were used in this complex operation and the operation succeeded, as
the Germans focused the major part of their army in Pas de Calais,
while the attack was in Normandy. When they figured this out, it was
too late, as most part of the German army had been destroyed.
This illustrates the great importance any piece of information may
have on the outcome of a conflict, especially if it is revolved around
matters of life and death, around security issues, around winning a
war.
The second phase of a conflict, the confrontation, is the phase in
which the forces involved in the conflict decide to collide in order to
prove their strength and achieve their goals. The confrontation phase
is characterized by an increasing intensification of tension. Often,
there are cases in which the parts form coalitions with other states in
order to strengthen their position. Moreover, there are cases in which
the instigator appears (the instigator is a part which tries to maintain
the conflict between other parts because it serves its best interests).
This is the phase in which the information science uses all the possible
means in order to support the planning and the leading of operations.
Because this phase is characterized by pressure (time, logistics
etc.), it is important that the information one part gathers is extremely
well filtered (in this phase only relevant information counts) and
properly used in one’s favor and against the other’s. This phase is
relevant for the great role information has during a conflict, as the
technological superiority of a part is notable especially during this
phase.
A good example in this sense would be the case of Paul Rosbaud,
a German scientist used by the English secret services in order to find
out the degree of development that the Germans had reached. Paul
Rosbaud started to work for a Publishing House in order to make more
contacts in the German scientific society. This is how the English
secret services found out that the Germans had managed to bomb
uranium atoms and create energy (this information, along with the
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necessary resources could create the atomic bomb). However, it was
clear for Rosbaud (and thus for the English) that Germany did not
have enough resources to create the bomb. This precious information
was crucial for the Allied forces during WWII because, if the
Germans had created the bomb, it would have meant the victory of
Germany.
The third phase is the final one, in which the parts involved in the
conflict relax, reach an agreement, or pass on to a more violent
conflict (sometimes to war). This phase is mostly characterized by
negotiation and settlement. Why is information important now that the
conflict has ended? Because negotiation is all about using information
in order to get what you initially wanted when you entered into
conflict with the other side. Information is relevant now because it
helps one part know the interests of the other, its strengths and
weaknesses. Therefore, it helps one part know what to ask from the
other.
During the centuries and up to the present times, information has
been the main factor which influenced the development of world
conflicts. In comparison to the old times when army commanders used
to send informers to gather the information necessary for them to plan
the battles, nowadays the information technology has known an
impressive development. All international actors are aware of the
importance of information, that is why the main competition
nowadays is between the states with powerful secret services.
Bibliography
[1] Ernest VOLKMAN- Spionaj, Bucuresti, RAO, 2008
[2] Valentina MARINESCU- Comunicare şi putere, Bucuresti, Ed. Niculescu,
2005
[3] Jean-Noel JEANNENEY- O istorie a mijloacelor de comunicare, Iasi, Ed.
Institutul European, 1997
[4] Vladimir VOLKOFF - Dezinformarea, arma de razboi, Bucuresti, Ed.
Incitatus, 2002
[5] Efrim CERNEAK - Cinci secole de razboi secret- Bucuresti, Ed. Politica,
1968
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ORTHODOXY, POLITICS, STATE
Military priest Lazăr Valentin, Military priest Ţanu Constantin
Land Forces Staff, Bucharest, General Staff, Bucharest
Abstract
This essay illustrates the concerns of the deepening and diversification of
fundamental research about politico-military security in internal (national) and
international context. Also, this essay correlates with the main trends in the
areas of international analysis security, dinamizated by processes of
technological and other kind of XX centuries the turn - XXI.
The research sought to determine whether the religious factor, through
actions they generate, may involve risks to national security and international,
and if there are favorable prerequisites for fostering strategies that should be
followed to avoid transforming this factor into a source of kind of religious
conflict.
In the first half of the nineteenth century (since the French
Revolution) starts secularization in modern societies in West.The
European culture, in particular, has become a secular culture, a culture
that tends to eliminate him from God to objective reality put in place
his man. If until the French Revolution (1789), the church had one of
the most important positions in public life after this event with broad
international implications, it was ordered to remain in private space.
Thus, religion is seen excluded from public life, becoming a matter of
personal opinion. As a result, the Christian religion can not be an
"objective role" in European society, but, eventually, one in the
partialism staff, is a prerequisite for "spreading" in many sects of
Christianity. "Once religion is defined as a business of private, then
each individual can choose from religious messages on who likes
him," says Thomas Luckmann. But what is meant by secularization?
Fr. Gogarten said about the origins of secularization: "secularization is
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a consequence of freedom from the human being to the world and to
its dominance over them. This requirement of freedom leads to
secularization world, in the sense that this world is no longer a world
dominated and ruled by gods and masters. The world and all that it
contained now become a thing available. It is the world, secular world.
" In other words, was moved from a pantheistic vision of the world, it
is confused with the divinity - the man by pressing saintliness them - a
theist concept that deconsecrate human world and restore freedom and
play against her.
In the process of secularization is precisely this idea of autonomy
in the world (the world is divided by God because it is created,
becoming an autonomous reality of God). The consequences are
overwhelming for the Christian life and mission. The word refers to
secularization century. The laics are those who live "forever" among
other people in towns and villages, unlike the clergy, monks, priests
and faithful who live by the monachal rules and communities more or
less isolated, more or less closed .
Secularization means an entry in the century, an experience in
time in history. This political power, economic, social, education,
justice, and even culture are autonomous against religion. This
autonomy means own laws, means experience by itself, but not
equivalent to abandonment of religion by individuals.
The fact that religious practice is diminishing, that increase the
degree of indifference, atheism and agnostic attitude are not
necessarily signs of religion “abandoning” but freedom of conscience.
Secularization becomes the average life and thought, what makes
abstraction of religious principles in action taken.
Does not mean, however, that religions do not have performed
public, because it can store and play an important social role. But their
word is no longer so hard to hang in public, resume to the role of
lobbying to influence policy or governments. There are also cases in
which it is intended policy direction and even morals to impose
standards throughout the company, leading to conflicts and crises. Are
well known dispute that bring laws that allow the interruption of
pregnancy and willfully euthanasia is considered moral barbarians.
Secularism was in the West, in the range of Christianity.
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The desire of identity which crosses the great religions is not that
they be avoided by sectarian attitudes and exclusive, directed in
particular against the modern world, convicted in part or in full.[1]
State - Church
Relationship State - Church is the relationship between the civil
and religious authority, between political and religious communities.
After the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" of December
th
10 , 1948, the thesis Vatican Council II reveals a trend towards a
general consensus ecclesiastical society open to any religion, and
before all, giving hope of theological dialogue of mutual assistance.
By theses Vatican Council II were awake even hope to deter political
trends fundamentalist, nationalist or ultra-orthodox.
Binomial Church - State is not equivalent to religion - politics.
Production is frequent confusion because it does not distinguish
between them. Binomial Church - involving state institutions and
spheres of action that are characteristic for each. This operating
principle of the separation, the second thorny issue arise, however, in
social practice:
1. tend to swing between avoiding institutionalize a religion and
permit and guarantee the free expression and practice;
2. some states conflict between religious beliefs and practices, the
laical law and "reason of state"
Binomial religion-politics defines another set of controversial
issues. If the binomial Church-State relations concerns the institution
of an independent to the other, the relationship religion - politics is
about two spheres of individual human life. Citizens who belong to
religious groups are also members of secular society, this combination
dualistic generating complications.
Religious beliefs have moral and social implications, so it is
normal for these people and express the civic or political activities.
The fact that the roots of ethical beliefs come from religious belief
does not make them less able to enter the political sphere. However,
they will not get valid as long as secular will be perceived as having a
religious authority. Member modern democratic practice the
separation of political and administrative activities of the specific
Church. Totalitarian regimes post-communist, turns religion into
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ideology and institutions subject to religious institutions, religious
influence reaches so far in fundamentalist regimes (Islamic) religious
precepts that replaced laws and moral values. Politics, in turn, tends to
confuse religion with the fundamentalist states and societies. Often
areas dominated by Islam, the repeated failures of the policies of
modernization can be red shift fundamentalism at the forefront of
public life (Algeria, Turkey and partly Asian republics of the former
USSR).
Training religious identity Religion and corresponds to a form of
identity with a strong impact on society and even in the political life
of a state or region, especially in the context of a cultural conflict.
What has increased religiosity and religious conflicts in many
countries?
We use the term religion here in two related but distinct
meanings. The first relates to institutions, officials and religious
groups and social movements whose purpose is to express the issues
relating to religion; the second, the spiritual (religion offers models of
social and individual behavior). In the latter sense, religion has more
to do with the idea of Transcendental, the sacred, languages and
practices which organizes the world in terms of what the sacred.
If we take into account only the past 20 years, we can easily see
an increase in the influence of religion on politics in many regions
around the globe.
The belief that the development and spread of urbanization,
education economic development of scientific thought and social
mobility would weaken the position of socio-political religion, was
not valid.
The collapse of communist ideology in industrial societies of
industrial companies in Europe and Central Asia have encouraged the
rebirth of religious movements. Sacred space occupied for decades to
turn the Supreme Leader and the Party-State tends to be conquered,
especially in Central Asia, by Allah. And in post-communist European
states, the dominant churches and sects, seeking to "cut" Sacred
spaces important.[2]
Religious political forms may take the strong support that you get
Ethnicity, and through their association with Transcendental values by
which the company would get a direction, cohesion, stability and
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virtue. Using religious values but can lead to symptoms of a
fundamentalist, the establishment of strategies by which the faithful
tend to preserve their identity as a people, in front of a real or alleged
attack those who threaten it apparently.
Sometimes such defensive attitudes can turn into political
offensive actions leading to altered environmental social, political and
even the economy.
Religion is cross policy (especially with the nationalist) on ways
related to the history of private and trajectories development of
individual, whether traditional or modern. In the traditional
relationship between religion and politics is a very close. Political
power is supported by religious beliefs and practices, while political
things entering into the religious sphere. Beside the ethnical-linguistic
identity and cultural-linguistic, religious identity continue to define
today's peoples, to or coming or to disunite. “Perspective of a uniform
world, governed by abstract ideas of rationalism - reveals Ignacio
Ramonet - and nationalists have opposed some hallowed
particularities: land, language, religion, blood. Nationalism comes out
to light with anger each time threatening to impose utopia of a
universal and perfect society. Communism was an internationalist in
these utopias, as is now the market without borders and economic
Universalism, which imposes the same rules throughout the
production and the same lifestyle.”
Religious conflicts. The dynamics of conflict in the monotheist
religions
All three monotheist religions have similar patterns of
development that creates entities prone to conflict, regardless of the
place occupied by violence in the values of each religion. Propensity
for conflict stems from reports that:
• all three religions have been initiated by leaders visionaries
whose actions led to the formation of communities religious political;
• these religions have a deep and indestructible sense of "Sacred
History," which exceed national borders, defining the vision and ethos
of a people;
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Each of these religions was formed in opposition to other
communities religious-political: Moses lead the people from Egypt,
aggrandize Iahve against the egyptians gods and the pharaoh, Jesus
was crucified by the forces of the Roman empire with the support of
conservative religious leaders of Jerusalem , His title "King of the
Jews" putting him in a state of conflict with Caesar laical authority
and the religious one, Mohammed and his disciples have used all
religious and political resources to bring in obedience of Allah on all
"heathen" and their political structures .[3]
So identity nucleus of each of the three monotheist religions was
made in the context of controversy with other political and religious
communities. This oriented opposition could have the negative aspects
propensity to religious conflicts.
Models of formation of identity leads to several features that are
difficult to control religious conflicts:
• tend to "look" into history as seeing ongoing conflicts similar
extension or as a Why fight the "sacred history";
• frequent use of models or biblical contexts to describe the
current conflict;
• resentment arising in connection with religious and political
achievements of a group can generate fears related to the persecution
suffered in the initial stages, when the community of believers was in
training;
• because of the singular purpose of the monotheist religions is
difficult for them to coexist without one of them may not require or
expect their superiority;
• aggressive actions against "others" are much more easily
accomplished because the initial phases of each religious community
were abundant in conflict situations, for each confession of faith and
survival are based on the idea of sacrifice and suffering (Exile /
Holocaust - Hebrew, persecution / Crucifixion - Christians, Jihad
Small / Big Jihad - Muslims).
Faith each religion is based on loyalty to any alternative political
structures under which they live. This loyalty is often an alternative to
the forefront in trying to form a religious state: an Islamic republic, a
Judaic Israel, a Christian America, a union euro-asian Slav - orthodox,
etc..
313
Many conflicts are based on beliefs, but most result from the
collision religious-political aspects of the communities in conflict and
their association with government policies.
Religions "militant" with an "aggressive proselytism", educate
their adherents in the spirit of hatred or adversity over what constitutes
"outside world".
Followers of these religions can use relatively simple to armed
violence to achieve political objectives, cultural and economic. Even
Christianity, which has raised over the love of man "to the rank of
principle”, has known - and still knows - moments of violent reaction
in intercommunity relations or with adherents of the other religions
(Croatian Catholics - Orthodox Serbians). Therefore we can not
consider religion as a whole, as a factor inhibition of violent actions in
political and religious disputes. Domestic and international order must
relate to law and institutions, the arrangements, negotiations,
compromises, in rational ways.
Orthodoxy and secularization
If the Orthodox Church has managed to keep religiosity "her
people", resists to the process of secularization is because consistently
said the presence of God in creation and humans. As regards the
command received by the first people from God to govern the earth,
Christianism is in a sense of metamorphose creation in Christ and the
Church. "Adam and Christ - reveals Staniloae parent - are choosing
types for the two alternatives of the human nature: the spirit enslave
by the fruit sweet part of a sensitive nature, or her mastery of the
spirit, of course, not without effort stopping them and the pain of the
cross. Only through this the spirit defeats against of the sensitive part
of nature and a metamorphose her until resurrection. " In Christianity
transfigure the material is in Christ, restoring the link man with God
and nature with their peers as a whole. It says, usually about
Orthodoxy that handles much of the interior of human life and show
restraint towards social or political commitment of Christianity. It's
true, on the one hand that the Church does not explicitly political role
is not to divide the faithful as their options, but to unite all with Christ.
By tradition, Orthodox Church are subject to "Caesar" (but sometimes
patriarchs and metropolitans were substituted "Caesar"). To preserve
314
the unity of the people and believers, the Church must be beyond the
options of political parties. On the other hand, the acceptance eastern
theology, the word of God is addressed not only the soul, favoring
withdrawal of believers in the world in a pietist mentality but is
addressed and the body to release the passions and their consequences
that are manifested in social relations. In the Orthodox vision, there is
a political commitment of the Christian intended to contribute to the
issue of human society and any form of alienation, exploitation,
oppression, commitment to social justice, but not as a result of any
ideology, but as a result of its participation in the life the communion
of the Holy Trinity Church.[4]
Church and religion may be, however, and instruments of
nationalists:
- Through "national church or churches motherland" spreads
revisionist policy, deforms the Christian policy and misappropriates
them in the spirit of humanitarian organizations. Ecclesiastical
Messianic nationalist character.
- Nationalism of the right and left that advocate for defense
"people", "the holy shrine of the motherland," presenting a sacralized
exclusivist Orthodox vision of history. ( D. Staniloae, Living God in
Orthodoxy, Ed. Dacia, Cluj-Napoca, 1993)
Be considered in the analysis of our role very important that you
religion can have on the stability of countries and international
relations in terms the institutions, the practice of political life, and
churches.
Recent political and military events in South-Eastern Europe
highlights trend-nationalist extremist groups handling traditions and
contexts in contrast to the values and principles of liberal democracy.
After 1990, some outside political circles were vehicle projects
"crusade" in anti -islamism in Balkans region or the creation of "ax"
Balkans (Belgrade-Skopje-Sofia-Athens) or Eastern and Southeastern
Europe (Belgrade-Bucharest-Kiev-Moscow). In the Russian
Federation, although it has expressed the view that the panslavist
variant lost accounts, tend to strengthen the position of the Russian
Orthodox Church is evident, both through the entry into force of the
Law Association for 1997 Freedom of conscience and religion (the
premise of providing for future growth Her role and externally) and
315
the recent actions of the Church. After failure suffered in the
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia prevent the establishment, under
the canonical subordination of the Romanian Orthodox Church, - as a
result of the decision data The European Court of Human Rights Russian Patriarchate practical messages canonical out of bounds.
Kiril, Metropolitan of Kaliningrad and Smolenski, a said recently, in
Chisinau: "We consider the creation of so-called Metropolitan Church
of Bessarabia on the territory of Moldova as a religious schism,
"having" a one explanation and it is a mark of shame. This may be not
a church opportunity, not about the salvation of men, but about a
political, such is creating a serious precedent. " His Holliness Kiril
said that the idea about schism comes from Romania, making use by
clergy and society does not attend the churches of Metropolitan
Church of Bessarabia, because in creating them were not canons and
respected "if rules are violated church also way, those who violate
them will suffer because of this. " The Russian Orthodox Patriarchate
tends sometimes to extend its authority - or primacy - and its relations
with churches in Ukraine and the Caucasus, seems what the Filotei
monk said, contemporary with Basil III (his father at Ivan Terrible) in
a report by Russia's great Knyaz: "Moscow is successor major capitals
of the world: first - Ancient Rome, the second -- Constantinople,
Moscow - the Third Rome, Rome and a fourth will be. "[5]
Orthodoxy and the false problem huntingtonian problem
"... Where Europe ends? Europe ends where the Western
Christianism ends and start Orthodoxy and Islam. This is the answer
which the West Europeans wish to hear him, which he supports .... "
That sounds S.P. Huntington’s “axiom “, author of a work in vogue in
the 90s. Although this target questions seems to be rather Islam, the
response they generated perplexity in the Orthodox world. "Axiom"
suggests that the cultural heritage of Europe is incompatible with the
orthodoxy, while inducing the idea that political leadership of Europe
cease where spirituality begins Orthodox. A minimum knowledge of
historical facts we reveal, however, roots of European civilization
from the Byzantine Orthodox. In this space spread in the West Roman
law, the Emperor Justinian (the famous Corpus Juris Civilis)
translated into Greek, later published as "Basilicals" and transmitted in
316
Europe. S.P. Huntington has, however, merit to be pointed out - in an
era globalization - the factor civilization, including religious, the
aggregation major economic and political grouping of the world. Also,
in "The Collision of Civilizations ", underlined the determination of
ethno-religious confrontations and politico-military conflict today.
Religious factor acting both at the level coagulation ethno-cultural
camps that dispute and certain territories and resources, both and the
spiritual motivations of adversities. Religious factor enables fast
mobilization moral-cultural of adherents of a movement or a terrorist
nationalist-extremist organizations, as demonization of adversaries.[6]
On the other hand, S.P. Huntington overact size of adversities
between "worlds" Catholic, Orthodox and Protestant and exclude the
mutations produced in over than more 200 years, the processes of
modernization in Europe. Currently, the European Union consists of
most countries Western Europe. In various treaties of U.E.
(Maastricht, Amsterdam) is reference to the cultural heritage of
Europe. The planned enlargement of the Union until the geographical
frontiers of the continent (that is, until Urals), and led to concern that
the status U.E. that there is no discrimination. This position is clear of
the Declaration no.11 of the Treaty of Amsterdam on status of
churches and non-confessional groups, paragraph 1: "The EU comply
and not prejudge what appropriate national legislation is defined as the
status of Churches and religious groups or communities. " Which
shows that expansion, so the establishment of other European borders,
is based on criteria economic and political, not religious (that can not
be, however, totally ignored.
References
[1] Sfântul Atanasie cel Mare, Cuvânt către elini, Colecţia Părinţi şi Scriitori
Bisericeşti, IBMBOR, Bucureşti,1987, vol. I, p. 35.
[2] Marin Aiftincă, Cultură globală şi identitate naţională, Bucureşti, 2001, p.
17.
[5] Pr. prof. dr. Dumitru Stăniloae, Ortodoxie şi românism, Editura Albatros,
Bucureşti, 1998, p. 64.
[3] Papa Ioan Paul al II-lea, Orientale lumen, Paris, 1995, p. 27.
[4] Jean Guitton, Dumnezeu şi ştiinţa, Harisma, Bucureşti, 1992, p. 123.
[6] Benjamin Barber, How globalism and tribalism are reshaping the World,
Ballantine Books, New York, 1995, p. 83.
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EXCURSION INTO GEOPOLITICS, DOCTRINES AND
THEIR CORPUS OF IDEA HOLDERS: IDEOLOGIES
Metea Ileana Gentilia, Voievoda Ramona
Abstract
Doctrines are conceptual corpora, comprising values and symbols that
integrate concepts on human nature and that indicate what is possible or
impossible for human beings to achieve; critical reflections on the nature of
social interactions; values that people should reject or thrive for; technical
corrections on the abstract improvement of human reality in terms of the
political, economic and social life of a nation or even humanity.
Unlike doctrines, ideologies are more flexible and adjustable to reality.
Ideologies extract from doctrines the corpus of ideas and values they promote
and attempt to have them tailored to the realities of society.
Geopolitics is a political science that studies the impact of a
nation’s geographic positions, its external and internal politics as well
as the impact that space has on international politics, in general. The
notion of geopolitics was first introduced by Swedish scientist, Rudolf
Kjellen in 1899, although the bases of the new science were set by
German geographer Friedrich Ratzel, two years before, in the paper
Political Geography [1]. Geopolitics is a theory, a research orientation
that highlights the connection between a state’s geographic
positioning and its politics. The very etymology of the word explicitly
states that, as geo means ground, territory.
The relationship between geographic setting – politics was
asserted to strategists or scholars long before the theory actually
appeared. Herder used to say “history is geography in motion”[2].
Napoleon, in his turn, stated that „the politics of a state lies in its
geography“[3]. Such statements cannot be regarded as geopolitical
318
remarks. They are plastic suggestions that capture a relationship, that
between politics and geography.
Geopolitics was born at the moment where scholars tried to
explain this connection, to set a theoretic perspective. The doctrinaire
character appeared where the new theory, capturing the actual role of
the setting in the configuration of politics, transformed this element
into a main, if not exclusive, explanatory factor, disregarding others,
sometimes just as important.
The true father of geopolitics is Rudolf Kjellen, a Swedish
professor. He uses the actual term in a public lecture, in 1899 and then
in the study “Introduction to Swedish Geography”, published in 1900.
The term consecration occurs in 1916 when Kjellen publishes “The
Scientific Issue of the World War”, whose first chapter was entitled
“Geopolitical Issues”. “...from that point on, the term is to be found
everywhere, especially in German and Scandinavian (scientific)
literature” [4]. Under the strong influence of German culture, Kjellen
saw the state as a living being – one of his papers, published in 1917,
at Leipzig, was entitled “Der Staat als Lebensform”. The state is
studied from various perspectives:
1. The country: setting, appearance and territory;
2. The country: foreign commerce, internal economy and
economic life;
3. The people: its nature, composition;
4. The society: social life and structure;
5. The government: state administration and authority [5].
Therefore, Kjellen suggests a multi perspective approach on state
that would provide us with a complete explanation of its functioning.
Geopolitics, was meant to examine the natural, geographic support of
the state. “The State cannot float in thin air; instead it is bound much
like a forest to the ground where it gets its nourishment. Under its
face, its special trees interknit their roots” [6].
The Swedish author considers geopolitics to be a chapter of
politics, a science in itself. In this intercession, Kjellen appoints a
certain object to geopolitics, a certain angle of state analyses, that
started from its natural existence conditions. But once again,
geopolitics was part of a bigger picture.
319
One can identify here another sense of geopolitics highlighted by
its rightful founder that of foreign political information, of broader
political study, of research of what Kjellen used to call political
background. And all of this infers proper measures, as well as
evaluations, judgments and types of adjustments. In fact, the issue is
about political state frontiers and examining them implies going
beyond the precise field of cartography.
Kjellen also makes a distinction between geographic and
geopolitical positioning. The former is fixed; the latter is everchanging. Geographic positioning can be accurately determined by
physical measurements, the geopolitical one implies the state’s
“positioning in relation to the circumfluent ones“, therefore it infers
retrospection to a political environment that doesn’t necessarily have
to do with the respective state, but that has to be taken into account for
this purpose.
Political Geography, founded by Friedrich Ratzel studies the
„relationship between political processes and geographic
environment”[7], “the geographic circumstances of the states’
establishment, development and activity”, according to the Dictionary
of sociology (coordinators Cătălin Zamfir and Lazăr Vlăsceanu).
Focusing the intercession on the relationship between forms of social
and political organization on one side, and the geographic
environment on the other, political geography tries to answer the
question: is there a connection between political forms and the natural
environment and if so, what would be that? The first part of the
question is positive, for sure. From Friedrich Ratzel’s point of view,
the state is treated as an organization whose particularities depend
partly on the characteristics of the people, partly on those of the
ground, the most important role belonging to the latter. Among these
particularities, the most important ones are extent, positioning, ground
type and relief, vegetation, water a.s.o. We can infer the cardinal
distinction between political geography and geography. The first
attempts to catch movement, a certain evolution, the dynamic of the
aforementioned correlation, while geography describes the natural
conditions of the physical environment.
Geo-strategy has a more limited sense and it designates the
specific value of a place, especially from a military point of view.
320
Actually, geo-strategy deals with handling the military in special
terms; that of identifying advantageous positions form a strategic
point of view. Nowadays, the term has broader meaning, being used
for the points, areas that have significance for the military, as well as
for the commercial potential of various regions.
Geopolitics, however, is not confined to German geopolitics. For
instance, English geographer, H. Mackinder, considered to be one of
the founders of geopolitics, does not use the term in his works. He
suggests a different approach on geography as geographical causes of
history, as well as another perspective on territory, using new terms
such as “Natural Seats of Power”, “history’s pivot zone”, etc.
(“Democratic Ideals and Reality”). French author, Jacques Ancel used
to say “La geopolitique c’est une affaire d’apres guerre” (originally
the quote was “une science allemande d’apres guerre”) [8].
Richard Falk thought that the world was moving fast from
geopolitics “towards a more economically, cultural and political
integrated reality” fact that would require the emergence of geogoverning. The state, sovereign over a territory, as actor in an everchanging world, where many of the problems and defiances are of
transnational nature, has a lower and lower ability to intervene and
influence. Under these circumstances the states ability to govern
decreases as well. The global politics’ stakes no longer consist of
geopolitics, but of geo-governing, meant to ensure efficient global
government structures.
If geopolitics stands for full complexity political science,
doctrines are produced by the human knowledge evolution, by
ideology
proliferation,
science
development,
conviction
crystallization, option imposing, be they established, and/or officially,
institutionally accepted [DOGMA].
Therefore, doctrine could be defined as a relatively coherent set of
principles and rules selected based on unifying options, from the
ensemble of scientific theories, theoretical knowledge, practice-based
generalizations, with the purpose of orienting specific activities
belonging to various fields of the social (politics, economy, law,
religion, ethics, military, a.s.o.) or scientific life [9].
321
The political doctrines field cannot be fit into a science because
the research space includes both elements belonging to socio-humane
sciences and issues concerning mentalities, culture and civilization.
For this reason, political doctrines stand as a field of political
sciences in their broader sense, bearing an explanatory role for the
understanding of various political situations, but not for theoretic
explanations of specific political situations, except for exceptional
situations. Most of the times doctrines envisage possible realities, with
a starting point in the respective period realities. Political doctrines are
usually made up of systematic papers on political, social or economic
realities that, some of the times, are interconnected and produce
doctrinaire chains.
Political doctrines can be defined as a border field of expertise
that tries to cover an entire array of political thinking, which covers
and is inspired by: political ideologies, theories and philosophy.
Therefore, doctrines are conceptual corpora, comprising values and
symbols that integrate concepts on human nature and that indicate
what is possible or impossible for human beings to achieve. Moreover,
political doctrines are critical reflections on the nature of social
interactions, values that people should reject or thrive for; technical
corrections on the abstract improvement of human reality in terms of
the political, economic and social life of a nation or humanity as a
whole. This is why political doctrines have a double function: that of
describing and that of prescribing.
Unlike doctrines, ideologies are more flexible and adjustable to
reality. Ideologies extract from doctrines the corpus of ideas and
values they promote and attempt to have them tailored to the realities
of society. Ideologies exceed theoretical backgrounds and transgress
the real over the ideal. This is why ideologies impose themselves on
collective mentalities becoming parts of them as well as models of
faith and collective behavior. Ideologies appeal to the values created
by doctrines, but also try to assert them as facts of life and political
action. [10]
Military doctrine is defined as: “...a set of fundamental principles
that guide the military forces or parts of them in their pursuit to
support national objectives. Doctrines are authoritative and must be
implemented wisely” [11].
322
Security doctrine is a concept common to analysts’ and
journalists’ specialty language. In UK, the “doctrine and
security/defense” collocation stands for the equivalent of the
“national security strategy” American concept.
The term of ideology is quite recent, despite its Greek roots –
eidos – idea, logos – science, as it was used only in 1796 by Antoine
Destutt de Tracy in a paper that linked the concept of ideology to that
of political doctrine. Hence, only in the 19th C did the term become
popular, in France for a big amount of time political doctrine and
ideology being interconnected.
Ideology’s specific conception deals with the way one group of
interest relates to another. Each of them tries to singularize one way or
the other or to justify its actions. They do not impose a totalizing
conception on the world and society, they merely relate to each other.
Ideology is, therefore, a set of ideas and beliefs shared by a certain
amount of people, who understand what is valuable and valid, what
must be kept instead of changed, generating attitudes towards other
members of the same ideological group and the opposing parties, as
well.[12]
In its present-day significance, the ideology stands for an
ensemble of ideas and principles that establish a certain form of
government or a social philosophy on the best organization form of
the state that would satisfy the highest degree of citizens’
expectations. In conclusion, should we take into account some of the
classic and modern denotations of the ideology, such as:
• de Tracy: objective study on ideas (origins);
• Gramsci: oration, usually idealistic, of “traditional” intellectuals
meant to camouflage their complete staleness (arbitrary ideologies);
an oration that organizes human masses and creates the grounds for
human action, fight a.s.o. (organic ideologies);
• Althusser: ideologies have a quasi material existence capable of
defining what people think, in our society, incarnated by the
“ideological State Apparatus”: churches, schools and unions;
ideologies are not mere delusive representations of reality, but also the
means for the human being to live his/her relationship with reality;
any ideology has the defining) role of “building” material individuals
as subjects (of authorities a.s.o.);
323
Minogue: shared hostility towards modernism: for political
liberalism, practical individualism and economic market;
• Sartori: analyses tool; the opposite of pragmatism;
• Seliger: any action-oriented set of beliefs coherently organized
McLellan: an angle of all sign and symbols structures as far as they
are involved in an asymmetric distribution of power and resources.
McLellan considers that: there is a certain internal self-defense
mechanism, that manifests itself as a methodological naïveté that
determine theoreticians to fall into the widely known temptation of
qualifying as ideology the other one’s perspective alone, in relation to
which his/her own vision becomes a objectivity reference point, which
allows a correct highlighting of the ideological thinking characteristics
and mechanisms.
We can observe the tight interdependence between doctrines and
ideology, as well as the latter’s development on the fundamental ideas
of the former.
•
References
[1] ww.wikipedia.ro;
[4] Conea,“Geopolitics. A new science”, vol. Geopolitics, p. 67). These are the
titles of the chapters and subchapters of the second volume “Grundriss zu
einem System den Politik”, Elements of a Political System- Leipzig, 1920, în
I. Conea, “Geopolitis. A new science”, p. 6.).
[5] (“Der Staat als Lebensform”, în I. Conea, “Geopolitics. A new science”, p.
5).
[6] (“Der Staat als Lebensform”, în I. Conea, “Geopolitics. A new science”, p.
5).
[7] V. Bodocan, “Geografie politică”, p. 9.
[8] I.Conea, “Geopolitics. A new science”, vol. “Geopolitica”, p. 37.
[9] Dr. Constantin, Degeratu, Security Doctrine and Strategy, Sinteze,
Universitatea Bucureşti Facultatea de Sociologie Master: Studii de securitate
- 27 Octombrie 2007.
[10] Andrei Ţăranu, Contemporary Political Doctrines, 2001, p. 2.
[11] The descriptive function refers to the analysis and critique of the society
where the respective doctrines appears, whereas the prescriptive function
324
refers to offering theoretical ways for political change of the society by the
specific proposed means with a concrete theoretic finality. See also Pascal
Ory, coord, Nouvelle histoire des idees politiques, Hachette, Paris 1987.
[12] DoD Term Guide.
325
REGIONAL SECURITY DYNAMICS
Năbîrjoiu Virgil Horaţiu
General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection of
Bucharest
e-mail: horatiunabirjoiu@gmail.com
1. Global Security Environment
The end of Cold War has generated large geopolitical,
geoeconomical and even geocultural reconfigurations. That has visibly
developed the risks and threats to regional and global security:
increasing the cleavage between North-South/East-West, with direct
effect regarding massive movement of population; degrading of the
states institutions when facing the underground economic processes;
interconnection of national economies and increasing their
vulnerabilities regarding the global market fluctuations; fully acting of
some new forms of crimes with trans-borders tendencies, connected
organically with terrorism and mass destruction weapons proliferation.
The philosophy that stayed at the base of the XX century
international security environment has changed fundamentally. The
background of all these changes is the globalization, who has led to
multiplying the opportunities of development and cooperation, to
exponential increase of the number of entities acting on the global
stage, especially by bringing in front some non-states actors, to a
complex process of decision making regarding the external and
security states policies and regarding the international organizations.
On the other side, we assist to the globalizing of the
vulnerabilities, risks, threats, dangers and aggressions, whose carrying
vectors are no longer just states, but groups or even individuals
organized within international networks, very difficult to control, who
can show and hit wherever they want. The international community is
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no longer confronted with crisis having a high level of predictability
and, though, manageable, but with the necessity of identifying new
solutions for efficiently approaching the new challenges.
2. Regional Security Dynamics
The South-East Europe forms a security complex well
individualized, both geographically and as civilized area. Nowadays,
this region, a traditional area of confrontation between the great
modern European powers (Germany, Russia, United Kingdom,
France) and between the post-war superpowers (USA – SSSR), faces
a deep process of political, economical and military reconfiguration.
USA and NATO, within UNO and OSCE and outside those
institutions, control the most significant local evolutions, oriented
towards preventing, stopping and managing armed and political
conflicts, Balkan countries democratization, development of society
and market economies, and integration within regional, European and
Euro-Atlantic structures.
The sensibility of the regional security environment is determined
mostly by internal factors, derived by weak governating act of the new
state entities that popped out within that area: the incapacity of states
institutions to ensure the law enforcement, the economic instability
and the growing underground economy, unequal distribution of the
resources within the society, corruption, breaking the human rights,
ethnical and confessional cleavage.
The analyze of the regional security environment shows several
types of threats against security, that concerns both the states within
the area and the international community, and with priority NATO
and EU: unsolved conflicts, the instability or failure of the new states,
terrorism, recrudescence of the organized crime, the existence of some
important conventional arsenals, the illegal immigration phenomenon.
Borders opening, freedom of move, liberalization of stocks and
services exchanges, fast exchange of information allowed terrorism
and the organized crime to make an important leap regarding the
concepts and the way of actions; the terrorist and criminal
organizations have rapidly adapted their structure, methods and means
to the new realities, have diverted the personnel training and have
327
ensured a more pronounced conspiracy to their networks, members
and activities.
The insecurity factors, generated by the arms race have been
amplified after the dismemberment of the Warsaw Treaty, USSR and
FR Yugoslavia, having as effect the disponibilization of large amounts
of weapons and strategic materials, as well as of a part of the military
or civil personnel involved in research, production, trade and guarding
of such materials. For these reasons, it comes to proliferation of
groups and gangs of illegal traffickers of weapons, strategic
components and products, some of them being created and led by
former representatives of defense and intelligence structures within
those countries, who used the already existing connections, their
professional experience, the information held and exploited the crisis
situations, chaos, confusion, corruption and superficiality of the
control system, permeability of the border points etc.
The regional instability favored a much more significant
increasing of the drug trafficking, which meant a major income source
for mafia or terrorist groups, especially the international ones. The
asymmetric threats against the security climate in South-Eastern
Europe and, mostly, against the states involved in countering
international terrorism, organized crime and proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction will persist, due to the logistic discrepancies
between states regarding borders security, lacks of legislation or
imperfections in law enforcement in the field of counterterrorism and
countering transborder crimes, insufficiency of the adopted measures
in order to block the financing of the terrorism and the access of
extremist groups to chemical and biological weapons or nuclear
technologies and devices, modern communication means.
Counteracting the threats against security in the South-Eastern Europe
assume proving political solidarity and a firm will of acting in
common against every terrorist and organized crime structure,
identification of the causes that can generate extremist-terrorist
attitudes, as well as of the factors which help transborder crime
development, in each of its forms and, more important, ensuring
consensus, unity and complementarity of the measures adopted by the
international community for countering such phenomenon.
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3. The Implications of Euro-Atlantic Extension
The security of South-Eastern Europe represents an important
concern due to local tensions and crises, to crystallization of some
convergent and slightly different options about the region, between
USA and EU and to Russian Federation tries to maintain the influence
by political, diplomatic, economic, cultural or even military means, as
we have seen recently.
In order to overcome the difficult situation they are facing, the
south-eastern European states have chosen, as a guarantee for the
national security, the integration within the European and EuroAtlantic Structures. The recorded results of this process are extremely
heterogeneous so, without any relevant evolution, neither NATO nor
EU can define a clear horizon for integration of the states within the
area. The “open doors” policy promoted by the USA within NATO
and the successful examples of some regional countries regarding the
EU accessing process confirm our hopes that the Balkans pacification
and European and Euro-Atlantic integration of the region represent a
feasible project.
Cooperation process facilitates the access of the states partners in
the West Balkans within the Euro-Atlantic structures, especially in the
field of politic and economic stability, by using the Alliance (EAPC
and PfP) and EU (Stability and Association Agreements) mechanisms,
but also by using the framework of some regional successful
initiatives – South-East European Cooperative Initiative - SECI,
South-East European Cooperation Process - SEECP, South-East
European Stability Pact - SEESP, South-East European Defense
Ministers Reunion - SEDM, South-East European Multinational
Brigade - SEEBRIG etc.
3.1. Implications of NATO extension
After 11th of September 2001, “the projection of stability”
became an imperative of Euro-Atlantic security’s assuring, as the
allied communities pass an ample process of reconfiguration of
NATO’s role and place within the international security’s architecture.
The active promotion by the Alliance of the so-named “open
doors policy”, finds its main motivation in the necessity of securing
the Euro-Atlantic area towards the origin of asymmetric threats, as
329
Caspian, Central-Asian, Mediterranean and Middle-East regions,
without ignoring the lacks of security maintained within the
unintegrated area of West Balkans. The extension of the South-East
European space of stability and security, integrated in NATO, is
favorable to the transfer on stability and security within the extended
Black-Sea area, including Caucasian region, in the vicinity of Central
Asia1.
Either is about the extended Black-Sea area or the not yet
integrated South-East European space, the indivisible feature of
security oblige to a common task for the effective management of the
main vectors of threat against the regional security climate.
Furthermore, the new risks aiming the Euro-Atlantic security require
the adaptation of the objectives in partnership dimension:
intensification of the politic dialogue, support for the processes of
military reform and forces’ inter-operability, considering that the
allied approaches should be reoriented towards the extension and
intensification of co-operation among partnerships in the fields of
border securing, crisis management, counter-terrorism and
nonproliferation, exchange of intelligence as well.
Consequently, the encouraging of the partners to an enhanced
attending at the Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism become a
priority, this plan being the most important tool that define the
partnership’s role in counter-terrorism and crisis management.
The Partnership for Peace, the main co-operation program
proposed by NATO to the states in Central and Eastern Europe, has
permanently changed its design, extending in Central Asia as well,
especially in counter-terrorism campaign context, unleashed after the
terrorist attacks on 11th of September. In the same time, PfP has been
an important instrument within the process of preparedness of
candidateship to NATO, so that, in only ten years, ten partners became
NATO members. PfP has significantly contributed to the stabilization
of the conflict areas within Central and South-Eastern Europe,
establishing an understanding climate, trust and co-operation between
alies and partner states, also promoting military reform in these states.
The programme will continue play an important role in co-operation
1
FULGA Gheorghe, „Implications of NATO’s Extension over the Regional Security
Climate”, in Spanish magazine „Defensa” no. 320, December 2004.
330
and in the common approach of the regional security and stability of
the allied and partner states within Euro-Atlantic space. In the future,
the necessity of finding the main sources of instability in Caucasian,
Central Asia, North Africa and Middle-East areas, with a likely impact
on the Euro-Atlantic security, will make NATO to consolidate the
partnerships with the states within these regions, without ignoring the
present situation in Western Balkans.
3.2. Implications of European Union extension
European Union’s extension to the East has brought in foreground
the matter of the new neighbours. The neighbouring policy of EU
responds in the same time to an internal concern and to an external
one as well. This policy is linked to the EU’s interest to consolidate its
own prosperity and security, transforming, as much as possible, its
neighbours in alies, thus showing them that EU’s interests are their
interests too.
Through the extension process, EU was able to create stability in
its vicinity. Due to its attraction abilities and not through coercion, EU
has managed to mitigate minorities’ disputes and border conflicts. A
new task for EU is that to acquire the same success in broader vicinity.
Security environment from the neighbourhood of EU is different
from that within. There remains regional instability and long lasting
frozen conflicts areas, on the European continent as well as around it.
In this respect, it would be useful to set up strategies and programs
that establish, on the one hand, the objectives and the reference
criteria regarding EU expectations concerning its partners, and, on the
other hand, the advantages of whom the neighbours could benefit,
after assessing the objectives they would have fulfilled.
The European Union is reforming by itself, during the procedures
for accepting new members. The progress within the Common
External and Security Policy, the involving and the solutions chosen
by the European and international organizations regarding the crisis
situations on the continent, prove that Europe is preparing to assume
an important role within the architecture of its own security, including
the defense one, and to provide security patterns.
331
4. Conclusions
Within the specific case of the Eastern European states, the
dissolution of the bipolar security architecture and the transition to
democracy and the market economy have determined a large
transformation of the structures that provide authority, the reforms
being focused not only on the adaptation to the law state’s specific
realities, but on the increasing of their efficiency when connecting to
the new international context, characterized by the emergency and
amplification of certain asymmetrical and unconventional risks.
So, a very accurate assessment of “the new neighborhoods” or of
the future candidates to accession to NATO and EU is essential,
considering the elaboration and applying the partnership documents,
for the interest of conflicts prevention and pacification of some
regions of vital importance, situated next to the Euro-Atlantic space.
The NATO and EU’s extension process brought the Euro-Atlantic
Community on the Black Sea’s Western Coast, changing the concept
“Black Sea is the Outskirt of Europe” its geopolitical role of interface
with Central Asia and Middle Orient being recognized. Through its
features, the Black Sea area is somewhere between the Asian
continent and the European one1.
Within the new geostrategic conditions at the Black Sea, there is a
connection between the Euro-Atlantic Community, represented by
NATO and EU member states, on one side, and the ex-soviet and
Extended Middle Orient states, on the other side.
The European states’ security interests and objectives led more
and more to creating a unite Europe, with no longer existing reasons
for conflicts, the global security environment being positively
influenced by the EU and NATO’s integration processes and by the
European Community extension.
The extension experience shows that simultaneous on-going of the
two processes (acceding to the NATO and EU) significantly
contributed to bringing the occidental values to the candidate states,
to participating in common to the efforts of creating and developing a
regional and international environment, favorable to the guaranteeing
of the regional and global security, mostly by taking part into common
1
PETRESCU Stan, „European Defense and Security”, Military Publishing House, Bucharest,
2006.
332
operations, by creating a general European security system and by
developing the regional cooperation.
Bibliography
1. BRĂTIANU Gheorghe I., Foreword to Geopolitics and Geohystory,
Romanian Magazine for the European South-East, 1st year, no. 1,
September-November 1941.
2. FULGA Gheorghe PhD, „Implications of NATO extension on regional
security climate”, in Spanish magazine „Defensa” no. 320, December 2004.
3. FULGA Gheorghe PhD, „Romania and Stability within the Balkans”, Italian
Magazine „Analisi XXI”, no. 1/2005.
4. FULGA Gheorghe PhD, „Romania and the New Threats against Security in
South-Eastern Europe”, „La Lettre Diplomatique” Magazine, no. 67/2004.
5. FULGA Gheorghe PhD, „Romania and the Resional Security Environment”,
German Magazine "Europäische Sichercheit" no. 4. year 54, April 2005.
6. OPREA Roxana, Regional Security Environment within the Context of EuroAtlantic Extension, International Session for Scientific Communications
STRATEGIES XXI/2007, BUCHAREST, 12th-13th of April 2007.
7. PETRESCU Stan, “European Defense and Security”, the Military Publishing
House, Bucharest, 2006.
8. VIDRAŞCU Ruxandra, “Eastern Europe between NATO, EU and ISC”,
Lumea Magazine 2005, political and military Encyclopedia, Bucharest,
2005.
9. „The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive
Diplomacy”, http://www.ccpdc.org/pubs/warning/warning1.html
333
SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION
Ochea Lavinia
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bucharest
e-mail: lavinia.ochea@gmail.com
Abstract
The Wider Black Sea Region, who also includes, beside the littoral
countries, a part of the Balkans and the three South-Caucasian states,
represents a natural partner for the western countries. Energy is one of the
reasons who determine the involvement of the major countries regarding their
interests. This makes the Wider Black Sea Region to be seen, continuously, as a
geostrategic area.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War the
strategic analysis showed that the huge reserves of energy resources are
deposited in three adjacent areas, situated on the north-south axe: Russia, The
Caspic Area and The Persic Golf. The Wider Black Sea region is on the way to
become one of the most important transit routes, much more that it was initially
estimated, for the Russian and caspic oil flux through Europe. Nowadays there
are in analysis new by-passing routes of transport, because of the excelling
capacity of the Turkish straits for oil exports. These new pipelines connect the
west littoral with the European markets.
In the Wider Black Sea Region, there is the need of a platform of
cooperation between the United States and the European Union,
because their own interest are almost the same. This tendency is more
visible in the Wider Black Sea Region than in other regions.
On one way, the US and EU should not have divergent reasons in
the region because their interests are almost the same. On the other
hand, the signals send in the region, as also in the Central Asia, are
334
that the new democracies don’t like to choose between the „Old
Europe” and the United States.
The transatlantic cooperation in conflict resolution, from
Transnistria to Nagorno-Karabach, functioned quite good in the
framework of the Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe
and created the premises for evolution.
The strategic concept highlighted in the political paper of the
European Commission in 2004 who includes the three Caucasian
states in the European Neighbourhood Policy, extends the same
treatment and opens the same perspectives for all the states in the
wider Black Sea Region. NATO should straighten its capacity to
operate out of the region, probably in the great Middle East, and to
have the support of NATO partners.
From the twelve BSEC member states, four are now NATO
members, four of them declared that want to join NATO and four are
actively participating in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. So,
NATO represents an important partner, military and politically. One
of the priorities is to the advantage of the structured partnerships to
face the continuous tensions existed in the region, especially ones
linked with the campaign against international terrorism and it’s
connections with organised crime.
The Russian Federation should be engaged actively in the region,
having a major role in defrosting the conflicts and creating framework
of economic development. The legitimate interests, political,
economical and ensuring security, has to be taken into account in all
regional projects of the Occident. The cooperation with Russia will be
crucial in solving all the frozen conflict in the region, who represents a
major obstacle in multilateral cooperation and regional stability.
Some proposals of cooperation were issued in order to create a
possibility of co-managing the „closing neighbourhood” of Russia and
EU who overlaps in some extensions. A creative approach could be
materialised in an US-EU common offer for technical assistance and
limited financial support but efficient for good governance and
economic development in the autonomous entities from the North
Caucasus who are under the sovereignty of Russian Federation. An
offer for assistance development coming from the Occident could
shrink the gap between the South and North Caucasus.
335
There is a need to encourage regional development and creating a
Black Sea Identity in order to become a viable partner for the
Occident. Concerning institutional framework, main developments in
the region are under the patronage of the Organisation of the Black
Sea Economic Cooperation. The organisation cooperate in different
areas but the major one in assuring security in the region remains
energy. Vast energy resources of the region, including the Caspian
basin, second only to the Gulf area in the world, are not only a major,
strategic asset but also an unavoidable subject in bilateral and
multilateral economic cooperation.
Energy-rich BSEC Countries, various Member States, major
industrial economies and multinational companies will have to join
forces for their realization. This will be a major, meaningful
investment towards enduring security and stability in the region.
Interconnection of electric power systems encompassing all the
member states is a striking project under progress guided by the
Ministers of Energy of the Member States. The objective is to bring
about a rational and more effective production and utilization of
electric power in the region. The Terms of Reference of the feasibility
study are already endorsed. A Steering Committee established at the
level of Deputy Ministers of Energy is charged with the follow-up of
implementation of the Terms of Reference. The feasibility study is
about to begin. Enquiry for financing is under way.
Cooperation in the energy field should focus on: Energy
Efficiency; Renewable Energy; Oil and Gas Transportation; Creation
of a Data Bank on Energy Programs; Other Energy Related. The
Member States also have to cooperate in the fields of Electrical
Networks and Hydrocarbon Resources.
The fact the the Wider Black Sea Region is one of the most
politically heterogeneous from Europe - including NATO and EU
members and non-members, candidates who are in process of
negotiation or other states who aspire to the member statute or even
countries who are in none of these positions – should be seen as a
positive aspect, not as a disadvantage, because it allows an unusual
flexible approach and to accommodate different political cultures.
If the Occident will manage to articulate a coherent package of
common political measures in the Wider Black Sea Region, the BSEC
336
could be considered as a partner in actions in specific fields as good
governance and institutional reform, non-proliferation, unconventional
threats and civil protection. It can also lead to cooperation for more
ambitious regional projects as energy infrastructure, transport, science
and technology.
Taking into consideration these conditions and promoting a
strategy for Russia regarding the Wider Black Sea Region, the nordAtlantic community has three options: fast integration; integration and
cooperation and cooperate involvement.
Fast integration will try to incorporate the Wider Black Sea
Region in the euro-Atlantic structures as soon as possible. This
approach is base don the idea that Russia will cooperate because of the
straight opinions of the western powers. The western countries will
want to create the framework to adapt Russia not to negotiate with it.
Integration and cooperation means a strategy who will try to
engage Russia to create a stable security framework in the region and
will try to push the Wider Black Sea Region in the western structures
in cooperation with Russia as much as it could be possible. It means to
treat Russia as a potential partner but it won’t give a veto right in the
Occidents politics. The Occident will complete the process of
integration of the states in the euro-Atlantic structures even without a
cooperation with Russia.
Cooperate involvement wants to engage Russia and the Occident
will act only if Russia’s opposition can be removed. Russia will be a
partner in the efforts to create a stable security framework in the
region, but the Occident’s actions will depend on Russia’s consent.
The first premises of this strategy will be that, in the end, any western
strategy will need to have the consent of Russia in order to be
successful.
Taking into account all these options, the Occidents seems to tilt
through Integration and cooperation strategy. This fits better to the
western countries interests and avoids a collision with Moscow. In
order to be viable, this strategy needs to give incentives to Russia, to
understand that it will have much more to gain from a cooperation
with the Occident rather than a confrontation.
Therefore, the Occident needs to create a coherent package of
incentives. One possibility is to offer Russia assistance for the North
337
Caucasus. The North Caucasus is deserted and depends economically
from Russia. A western package of assistance for this region could
lead to reduction of the losses in Russian economy and could
contribute to the stabilisation of the region. On the other hand, the
Russian military basses in the Black Sea lost their military value,
being now more a political weapon, as a tool of negotiation.
References
[1] Guvernul Romaniei, Strategia României pentru regiunea extinsă a Mării
Negre, Bucureşti, 2006.
[2] Mareş Nicolae, O nouă strategie euro-atlantică pentru regiunea Mării
Negre, Institutul Român de Studii Internaţionale, Nicolae Titulescu,
Bucureşti, 2004.
[4] http://www.bsec-organization.org/Pages/homepage.aspx
[5] http://www.gmfus.org/template/index.cfm
[6] http://www.ahtisaari.fi/
[7] http://www.icbss.org/index.php
338
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA’S INTERESTS IN
CENTRAL ASIA: 1991-2008
Pop Irina Ionela
“Babes-Bolyai” University, Cluj-Napoca
e-mail: irinapop2007@yahoo.com
Abstract
Today, Central Asia and South Caucasus are epicenters of international
rivalry. The visible rivalries among Moscow, Washington, Beijing, and even
Brussels, for influence in either or both of these areas are the stuff of headlines.
But the competition for great power influence in these areas is hardly new. Even
before September 11th, 2001, American interests in Central Asia and
Transcaucasus were growing. But the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
have triggered a commensurate and enormous growth of US interests in those
two adjoining regions. Considering the Georgian crisis, the Western interests in
Central Asia will further diversify and transform. This paper tries to offer an
image of the American interests in Central Asia, from the National Security
Strategies’ point of view, analyzing their sustenability.
Keywords: Central Asia, National Security Strategies (NSS),
interests, energy, terrorism.
1. Introduction
For the first ten years after Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan became independent, sovereign states,
the United States saw its interests in the region as limited. Although
Central Asia´s energy resources and proximity to Russia, Iran and
China required some US attention, and the weapons of mass
destruction infrastructure remaining after the Soviet Union`s breakup
made for an even more compelling concern, the region was far from
critical to the United States.
339
Among the many changes brought to the American security
policy by the attacks of September 11th, 2001, is a shift in the strategic
geography. Regions and nations that had been at the periphery of
concern have taken on new importance because of their relationship to
terrorists and the states that sponsor them. Nowhere is this more true
than in Central Asia.
Since that time, forces have been reconfigured and one host
country, Uzbekistan, has requested that the USA remove its military
forces from its soil. However, a USA presence remains in the region
and continues to support ongoing operations in Afghanistan. This
presence assumes a succession of strategic risks, such as: Western
ideals and support may fail to meet the high expectations of the local
population; its policy may only strenghthen the current regimes’ hold
on power and the New Great Game intensifies.
2. Identification of the USA’s interests in Central Asia
Before 1991, the United States of America had only indirect and
informal connections with this area, in the context of the Soviet
Union’s intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979. Volunteers
from Tajikistan and Turkmenistan fought side by side with the Afghan
forces against the Soviet army. The latter had also Central-Asian
soldiers. [1]
The National Security Strategy from August 1991 expressed the
worries regarding the internal crisis of the Soviet Union. Although it
didn’t anticipate the disintegration of its traditional rival, it advanced
an important question: what type and distribution of forces are needed
to combat not a particular, poised enemy, but the nascent threats of
power vacuums and regional instabilities? [2] In that moment, the
USA’s interests were: to promote democratic change in the Soviet
Union and support an international economic system as open and
inclusive as possible. This strategy had the merit of building the
framework for the next national security strategies.
Freedom Support Act of 1992 was more an operational plan for
Russia and the Newly Independent States than a strategy. It contained
provisions regarding: bilateral economic assistance activities, business
and commercial development, Democracy Corps, nonproliferation and
340
disarmament programs, space cooperation, agricultural trade, the
USA’s support in international financial institutions. [3]
We consider that the Freedom Support Act of 1992 provided a
flexible framework to constructively influence the events transforming
Russia and Eurasia. The intentions were: to mobilize the executive
branch, the Congress and the private sector to support democracy and
free markets and also to share responsibilities with others in the
international community.
Graham E. Fuller offered, in 1994, one of the most
comprehensive identification and discussion of American national
interests in Central Asia, apart from the national security strategies.
He identified six primary interests: “Arrange American policies vis-àvis Russia to avoid a reemerged radical or ideological Russia that
could return the world to global nuclear confrontation. Work to ensure
security of the Russian diaspora in Central Asia. Ensure Russia
evolves as a democratic and moderate state in the international
community; Avoid or maintain damage control over further civil war
or breakup of nations that will spill over into neighbouring states.
Avoid regional ethnic conflict by the many minorities in Central Asia;
Avoid nuclear proliferation; Avoid the development of radical antiwestern forms of political Islam in the region. The problem is with
radical governments that polarize the struggle between Islam and nonIslamic societies, not Islam itself; Support the growth of human rights,
democracy, free market economies and a cleaner global environment;
Enable the United States to play a role in the economic development
of the region, especially its raw materials.” [4]
We appreciate that Fuller’s point of view is representative for the
American priorities in the NIS at that time. The USA-Russia bilateral
relations formed the core of the American strategy in the area. The
USA’s interests in Central Asia were a result of this relationship and
occupied the second or even the third place in the USA’s strategy
towards the NIS.
In 1995, the USA Department of Energy asserted the existence of
rich hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian Basin and Central Asia.
This statement produced a change in the US National Security
Strategies. Beginning with 1995, they had special chapters dedicated
341
to regional approaches. In Eurasia, the Central Asian states were
mentioned more often.
The National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement
of February 1996 established three important interests: promoting
democracy, bolstering prosperity at home and around the world,
enhancing USA security, and gave examples of achievements in
Central Asia, such as: NATO’s Partnership for Peace, NonProliferation Treaty, START I, trade agreements, financial aid. [5]
The National Security Strategy for a New Century, from May
1997, said that “The United States has vital security interests in the
evolution of Russia, Ukraine and the other NIS into stable, modern
democracies, peacefully and prosperously integrated into a world
community where representative government, the rule of law, free and
fair trade and cooperative security are the norms.” [6]
This strategy also emphasized the potential oil reserves of the
Caspian Basin, concluding that “A stable and prosperous Caucasus
and Central Asia will help promote stability and security from the
Mediterranean to China and facilitate rapid development and transport
to international markets of the large Caspian oil and gas resources,
with substantial US commercial participation. While the new states in
the region have made progress in their quest for sovereignty, stability,
prosperity and a secure place in the international arena, much remains
to be done, in particular in resolving regional conflicts such as
Nagorno-Karabakh.” [7]
In 2001, in the testimony to a newly created Senate Foreign
Relations Sub-Committee on Central Asia and the Caucasus (its
formation in itself is a testament to the increasing importance of the
region for US foreign policy), Assistant Secretary of State A.
Elizabeth Jones hailed the important role the Central Asian states
played in providing a corridor for shipments of humanitarian aid to
Afghanistan and in supporting coalition anti-terrorism efforts. She
outlined three sets of long-term interests that the United States would
continue to pursue in the region: preventing the spread of terrorism;
assisting the Central Asian states with economic and political reform
and the rule of law, and ensuring the security and transparent
development of Caspian energy resources. [8]
342
However, the National Security Strategy from September 2002 is
less clear in the identification of the USA interests in Central Asia,
excepting the energy issue: “We will strengthen our own energy
security and the shared prosperity of the global economy by working
with our allies, trading partners, and energy producers to expand the
sources and types of global energy supplied, especially in the Western
Hemisphere, Africa, Central Asia, and the Caspian region.” [9]
The National Security Strategy of March 2006 asserts that “South
and Central Asia is a region of great strategic importance where
American interests and values are engaged as never before.” [10]
We observed that the USA strategies didn’t always use the terms
of “Central Asia” or “Central Asian states” in the text. Sometimes the
language is ambiguous and there are present alternative expressions
such as “the newly independent states” and “our allies”. But these
documents were completed by various statements and fact sheets of
the American government.
From 1991 to 2008 we can say that the American interests in
Central Asia were: nonproliferation of WMD materials, reduction of
illicit trafficking, development of the Caspian energy, global
integration (political and economic), democracy and human rights,
stability, war on terrorism, humanitarian aid.
Usually, these interests are re-classified into three sets of interests
as follows: security, energy, internal reforms. The Americans consider
these interests inseparable, but we can observe the predominance of
one set in a given period: 1991-1995: internal reforms; 1995-2001:
energy; 2001-present: security.
These changes of intensity represent the adaptation of the
American foreign policy in Central Asia to the challenges of the
international environment. The USA interests were identified in a
realist manner, but the instruments chosen didn’t always fulfill the
objectives.
3. The evaluation of interests. The Georgian crisis
Regarding the US presence and the US interests, some argue that
military presence can support the goal of stability and even provide
incentives for local regimes to democratize and liberalize their
343
policies. However, it is unclear that this has, in fact, happened in
Central Asia.
Moreover, what economic benefits have been gained from US
presence in the region, they have tended to reinforce the ethnic, clan
and regional economic and political divides that already existed.
Although there are few signs that the US presence is particularly
unpopular, those radical groups that are active (such as Hizb utTahrir) have spoken out against it.
The states of Central Asia had their own motivations in pursuing
ties before September 11th and in supporting OEF after that date. Their
interest in continued cooperation is not entirely in line with US
reasons for advancing these relationships. This, in turn, affects the
capacity of the USA to influence their behaviours. Uzbekistan is an
illustrative example.
The continued US presence has also affected relations with other
interested parties: Russia, China, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Iran.
Although most of these states supported OEF, many are concerned
that the USA has embarked on a new policy with imperialistic
overtones.
Russian officials have emphasized US statements that the military
presence in Central Asia is temporary and it will end when OEF ends.
But US forces remained, so this position was heard less and less in
Moscow. The deterioration of USA-Russian ties, Chinese concerns
and Uzbekistan’s increasing dissatisfaction with the US reflected in a
July 5th, 2005 statement of the SCO, which asked the USA to set a
date for the departure of its forces from Central Asia. A few short
weeks later, Uzbekistan officially requested that the US forces leave
the base at Karshi-Knanabad within six months.
We consider that, although some military activities can support
the US interests in Central Asia, the real nucleus of any effort to
ensure that Central Asian states are part of the solution to global
instability rather than part of the problem, must rely on economic and
political reforms. Past experience has demonstrated that pressure and
economic assistance cannot effect reforms. The states of Central Asia
continued to attempt to play off interested parties against one another.
So, what can be done?
344
Our proposal is the multilateralism. Coordinated efforts by the
USA with others have a better chance of influencing the situation than
do individual, uncoordinated policies. The developments in Russian
foreign policy and its intervention in Georgia need new Western
strategies towards Russia, CIS and Central Asia, strategies of response
for conflict and crisis situations. We consider that, in this moment, the
American and European interests must be focused on the freedom and
the integrity of Georgia, as a way of acces to Central Asia, in order to
demonstrate, to the CIS countries, their capacity to manage the
Russian revisionist ambitions.
There are many sources of conflict in Central Asia: borders,
ethnic and regional rivalries, radical movements, the distribution of
natural and financial resources, etc. Kazakhstan is placed in a difficult
situation because of its large Russian minority. A possible Russian
intervention in Central Asia could challenge the Chinese reactions. A
renewed and closer cooperation between USA, EU and China towards
Russia could be again a possible solution.
References
[1] Amirahmadi Hooshang, The United States and the Middle East. A Search for
New Perspectives, State University of New York Press, 1993, pp. 54-55.
[2] White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, August 1991,
http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm (accesed in February, 4th,
2007).
[3] USA House, Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and
Open Markets Support Act of 1992 or FREEDOM Support Act, 102th
Congress, 1992, http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/laws/majorlaw/pl10251.htm (accesed in February, 15th, 2007).
[4] Malik Hafeez (ed.), Central Asia. Ist Strategic Importance and Future
Prospects, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1994, p. 130.
[5] White House, A National Security Strategyof Engagement and Enlargement,
February 1996,
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/national/1996stra.htm (accesed in
February, 5th, 2007).
[6] White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, May 1997,
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss-97.htm (accesed in March 16th
2007).
[7] Idem.
345
[8] Elizabeth Wishnik, Growing US Security Interests in Central Asia, Strategic
Studies Institute, 2002, pp. 6-7.
[9] White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, September 2002, pp. 19-20.
[10] White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, March 2006, p. 39.
346

Abstract

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