minvuministry of housing and urban development government of chile

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WWW.MINVU.CL
MINVU
RECONSTRUCTION PLAN
GOVERNMENT OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
UNITED RECONSTRUCTING A BETTER CHILE HOUSING, NEIGHBORHOOD, CITY
Government of Chile
MINVU - Ministry of Housing and Urban Development
Rodrigo Pérez Mackenna
Minister
Andres Iacobelli Del Río
Undersecretary
RECONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT
HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
EMERGENCY CAMPS ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL CONDOMINIUMS PROGRAM
TERRITORIAL, URBAN, AND HERITAGE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
MINISTRY DIVISIONS
HOUSING POLICY DIVISION
URBAN DEVELOPMENT DIVISION
TECHNICAL DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
LEGAL DIVISION
FINANCE DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION
INFORMATIC DIVISION
OTHER DEPARTMENTS
MINISTERIAL INTERNAL AUDITOR
COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF CITIZEN ASSISTANCE & INTEGRAL SYSTEM FOR CITIZEN ASSISTANCE
STUDIES COMMISSION
We express our special gratitude to the Regional teams of the affected areas, especially
SEREMIs and SERVIUs, and the Divisions of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.
EDITION & DESIGN
RECONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT TEAM
The total or partial reproduction of the document is allowed for non-commercial
purposes by any means or process, as long as complete citation of the document is made.
First Edition – Spanish Version - August 2010
First English Edition – May 2011 © Ministry of Housing and Urbanism
ISDN: 978-956-7674-53-4
2
| Ministry of Housing and Urban Development
Index
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION: WORDS FROM THE MINISTER............................................................................................................... 4
1. NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION PLAN................................................................................................................................. 6
2. THE DESIGN OF MINVU RECONSTRUCTION PLAN....................................................................................................... 10
United Reconstructing a Better Chile
New Authorities
Institutional Structure
MINVU Reconstruction Plan Timeline 2010-2018
Compared Experience
MINVU RECONSTRUCTION PLAN PROGRAMS
A. HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM................................................................................................................ 16
1. Diagnosis
2. Basic Principles of the Housing Reconstruction Plan
3. Preliminary Estimate of Demand and Costs
4. Register of Disaster Victims
5. New Tools
6. Projections and Goals
B. EMERGENCY CAMPS ASSISTANCE AND SOCIAL CONDOMINIUMS PROGRAM....................................... 22
1. Repair of Social Condominiums
2. Reconstruction of Social Condominiums
3. Emergency Camps Assistance Program
C. TERRITORIAL, URBAN, AND HERITAGE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM........................................................ 28
1. Update of Risk-based Planning Tools
2. Restoration of the Urban Roadworks
3. Action Plan and Criteria for the Reconstruction of the Coastal Areas
4. Reconstruction Master Plans
5. Heritage Recovery
A CHALLENGE OF NATIONAL UNITY AND DECENTRALIZATION............................................................................... 35
3. 2011 SUMMARY - FIRST YEAR OF RECONSTRUCTION................................................................................................ 36
MINVU Reconstruction Plan | www.minvu.cl |
3
INTRODUCTION:
WORDS FROM THE MINISTER
UNITED RECONSTRUCTING A BETTER CHILE
With this axiom, the Chilean Ministry of Housing and Urbanization launched a year ago its National Plan
for Housing, Neighborhood, City, and Heritage Reconstruction after the massive earthquake and tsunami
on February 27, 2010. A few days after the disaster, President Piñera appointed me as Governor of the
O´Higgins Region, one of the areas most affected by the earthquake, giving me the opportunity to become
a witness and a key player in the government´s efforts to develop and implement this Plan. Despite the
loss of hundreds of invaluable lives and the thousands of families still suffering, the reconstruction should
be seen as an opportunity. As the recently-appointed Minister of Housing and Urbanization, I enthusiastically endorse this plan as a driver for national unity and a blueprint for the future development of our
country.
The 2010 earthquake and tsunami
has been the worst natural disaster
experienced by our country in the last
60 years. Our particular landscape and
diverse geography bring together a high
exposure and vulnerability to natural
disasters. In this sense, Chile has learned
its lesson, which has resulted in the
drafting and enforcing of consistent and
strong building codes that have evolved
over the years. This new disaster has
once again challenged us in terms of
preparedness and risk mitigation policies,
as well as processes, regulations, and
standards that should rule our planning
and building industries for the future.
The 2010 earthquake and tsunami
reconstruction process has imposed a
completely new challenge due to the wide
spread of the damage and its complexity.
We are talking about a massive
earthquake that severely affected more
than 900 cities and towns in six regions,
with more than 220 thousand families
requiring governmental help to repair
or reconstruct their homes, scattered
in more than 23 thousand settlements
including isolated locations.
4
Reconstruction is always a long-term
endeavor, and we know we´ll face
great challenges and difficult decisions
during the four years of implementation.
We will face dilemmas such as how
to build quickly enough to leave the
emergency behind, but slowly enough
to ensure quality, the preservation of
identity, community participation, and
the conservation of the environment.
Another feature of this process is the
necessity of de-centralization, where
regional and municipal capacities
will be tested to the limits of their
capabilities. The reconstruction process
involves coordinating more than 239
municipalities, the complexities and
vulnerabilities of which will be exposed
and scrutinized, along with their
determination, resilience, and deep
knowledge of their culture and territory.
A few months after the earthquake,
MINVU
delivered
its
National
Reconstruction Plan, which I endorse and
share with you in this publication.
This work has evolved during its first year
of planning and is constantly updated in
order to integrate three lines of action:
A. Housing Reconstruction Program
B. Emergency Camps Assistance and
Social Condominiums Program
C. Territorial, Urban, and Historic Heritage
Reconstruction Program
These three lines of action interact with
a myriad of institutions, agencies, and
policy decisions that go well beyond
the reconstruction agenda, revealing the
vision and spirit that President Sebastián
Piñera wants to engrave in the process as
a catalyst for a better future.
This vision is based on the following
premises:
1. Value existing communities, their ties
to the land, and their sense of belonging.
2. Reconstruct as quickly and as
effectively as possible.
3. Protect and recover the communities’
physical and cultural identity and history.
4. Respect and understand the territory
and its natural hazards.
5. Promote strategic and sustainable
urban planning.
6. Promote responsive innovation.
7. Ensure the legality and formality of the
the solutions.
The
implementation
of
our
Reconstruction Plan recognizes the
key role played by public and private
collaboration at all levels. In the early
days after the disaster, the myriad of
initiatives that emerged from community
organizations,
foundations,
private
companies, NGOs, universities, and
international organizations offering help
in the emergency and reconstruction
process was unprecedented in our
country, and we are extremely grateful
for this impulse that has persevered even
now into the implementation phase of
our plan. The mobilization and creativity
of local initiatives demonstrate the
great decentralization challenge and the
government´s trust in local capacities.
This Reconstruction Plan acknowledges
the values of self-determination and
solidarity, where the government grants
the access to opportunities, articulating
more than 2.5 billion dollars in housing
subsidies and urban infrastructure plans
and projects available to the affected
communities so that they can make the
most out of the opportunities realized in
this painful but hopeful reconstruction
process.
The fact that over 70% of the homes we
need to rebuild are located in the same
site where beneficiaries used to have
a house means that the problem is not
access to land, but rather rebuilding
homes that are spread throughout
thousands of miles and distant localities.
This process will require innovative
building technologies and designs that
take into account the logistical difficulties
and costs that imply bringing solutions to
all these families. All new construction
delivered by governmental reconstruction
subsidy funds will have to comply with
the highest current structural, climate,
energy efficiency, and comfort standards
to guarantee that we will not just replace
what was destroyed by the disaster, but
also provide a better grounding for the
future of Chilean families. Along this
quality-of-life challenge, there is always
a trade-off, since we will have to adapt
new housing designs to local vernacular
lifestyles and cultures. We must take
into consideration that Chile will reach
per-capita income and welfare standards
of a developed country by the end of
the decade. This takes us to the highest
qualitative challenge for reconstruction,
which is to merge this cultural translation
with new levels of complexity on the
design, delivery, and sustainability of the
solutions.
Reconstruction not only refers to
repairing or rebuilding homes, it also
refers to the reconstruction of the social
and urban tissue that was devastated
by the earthquake and tsunami. In this
holistic perspective, the reconstruction
-and in many cases conversion- of towns
and cities requires both economic and
social development along with necessary
infrastructural changes to promote the
communities’
competitiveness
and
resilience facing future natural disasters.
The Reconstruction Plan that follows
is a long-term, visionary, and realistic
navigation chart that attempts to
leverage all resources possible in order
not just to rebuild better, but in most
cases to also prepare our cities, towns,
and communities to become drivers for
the future of our country. This new phase
of our reconstruction will require the
best from all Chileans and international
friends, and a spirit of unity that comes
together with the celebration of our
200 years as an independent Republic.
Reversing the disaster and turning it to
an opportunity is our challenge, and we
invite you to join us in this venture, to
honor the memory of those we lost and
for the better future of our people.
The cities and towns of our reconstruction
should provide the sound platform for the
betterment of their communities, as well
as the necessary public spaces for social
interaction, energy efficiency, sanitation,
waste and storm water management,
transportation, productive and risk
mitigation infrastructure.
Our reconstruction work as Ministry
of Housing and Urban Development
is part of a major structure, lead by
President Sebastián Piñera and the “Inter
Ministerial Committee for Infrastructure
and Reconstruction”, where our work
is integrated with the Reconstruction
Plans from the Ministries of Public
Works, Internal Affairs and Regional
Development, Education, Health, Finance,
Economy and Social Development.
This committee allows the integration
of complex projects and their execution
over time. Reconstruction management
will be held at the regional and local
levels, to guarantee the sound and
diligent progress from plan to project and
from project to implementation.
Rodrigo Pérez Mackenna
Minister of Housing and
Urban Development
5
1. NATIONAL RECONSTRUC
27F 2010: EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI
Damaged houses
by region
Magnitude of the Disaster
Date:
February
27th
2010
3:34 AM
Magnitude:
8.8
Affected Population:
12,800,000
Degrees Earth- Habitants, equivalent to the
quake in Richter 75 % of Chile´s population
scale, followed
by a series of
tsunamis
Affected Area:
630 kilometers along the Chilean coastline and
central valleys
biggest
e a r t h q u a ke
in history
6
Valparaíso
31,410
15,277
Region
more than
220,000
Households
requiring
reconstruction
subsidies
over
$2.5
billion dollars
in housing
reconstruction
subsidies
Region
Maule
Santiago
Metropolitan
47,269
33,579
Region
The disaster affected six regions of central and
southern Chile, devastating an area of more than
6th
O´Higgins
Region
Biobío
Araucanía
Region
5,236
Region
87,229
TION PLAN
Disaster’s magnitude by area
Affected Cities:
Housing:
220 thousand houses with severe damage or destroyed.
:: Metropolitan Areas of
Santiago, Great Valparaíso y
Great Concepción
:: 5 Cities with more than 100
thousand inhabitants
:: 45 Cities over 5 thousand
inhabitants
:: More than 900 small towns
and villages
:: Distributed
Municipalities
in
239
524
Health:
40 Hospitals with severe damage and 17 Hospitals completely destroyed.
75% of the Health Network of the country was affected.
From the 19,000 hospital beds located in the affected area 4,249 were
destroyed.
Public Infrastructure:
1,702 points with damage in public infrastructure, considering roads,
highways, bridges, ports, drainage, and irrigation channels.
1,554 kilometers of damaged roads, 212 bridges destroyed or severely
damaged, 9 airports with different degree of damage, 28 fisherman coves
completely destroyed, 748 rural potable water systems with damage, 41
reservoirs, rain drainage systems and irrigation channels with problems,
and 53 ports damaged.
The earthquake destroyed the naval base and port infrastructure of
Talcahuano, and the better part of the ports located in the affected
area. The Army also suffered considerable damages in different kinds of
installations and military buildings.
missing persons
$$
4,538 damaged schools (1 of every 3 schools located in the area of
catastrophe). More than 1,250,000 students could not start their classes
until March 21, when emergency schools were set in place.
Armed forces:
fatal victims and
31
Education:
$
$
$
The total cost of the disaster is
estimated in US$ 30 billion,
which is equivalent to 18%
of the GNP (Gross National
Product).
Police:
The mayority of the police buildings located in the affected area suffered
considerable damages, with estimated losses of US$ 165 million.
Justice:
10 Penitentiary Complexes were destroyed, 2 Centers of Nocturnal
Seclusion, 30 Offices of Civil Registration, 2 Offices of Legal Medical
Service, and 437 offices and buildings with different degrees of damage.
Cultural Heritage:
The earthquake caused great damage in buildings declared National
Monuments and typical areas mostly located in the central area of the
country. Among the main affected buildings are the National History
Museum, the Regional Museum of Rancagua , and the access to Lota Mine.
7
THE NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION PLAN
Chile has been able to overcome the
February 2010 earthquake emergency
and tsunami as a united country and
today is facing the reconstruction
process. Under government leadership
and the participation of regional and
municipal authorities, with an active role
played by private sector workers, the
civil society, and representatives from
all political parties, the national course
of action is to move forward in a planned
and systematic manner that requires a
continuous effort throughout the fouryear government period.
Principles:
- Reconstruct communities, not only
infrastructure. This principle implies
that the reconstruction process must
aim further than the reposition of assets
lost with the disaster, by also directing
the reconstruction actions to restore
governability and sustainability in
affected areas, including their habitats,
ways of life, and social networks.
- The Reconstruction is an opportunity to
plan the future and preserve our heritage.
It must tend to correct agents and
conditions that generate vulnerability,
preserve and maintain the cultural
heritage, and strengthen urban planning
with due consideration of risks.
- The Reconstruction is mainly a social
process that actively involves all actors
and stakeholders with interests in the
area and related with the economic and
cultural activities affected by the disaster.
Objectives:
These basic principles set the main objectives
of the National Reconstruction Plan:
- Reconstruct while considering existing
needs for local developments
8
- Generate Inter-sector coordination
mechanisms to guarantee decisions
that respond to a general vision of the
reconstruction and development in a
territorial scale
- Design and implement a plan to work on
the basis of realistic expectations, providing
transparency of the process in question
- Return to “normality” as soon as possible,
with reference to day-to-day life in the
areas of housing, education, health, and
employment
- Support small- and medium-scale local
initiatives in order to replace lost activities
or generate new ones
1. STAGES OF THE PLAN
The Plan has been designed and
structured in three phases:
Immediate Action:
Its main objectives were, on the one hand,
to accompany families in the painful
process of aiding the wounded, searching
for the disappeared, and burying
tragically affected relatives and, on the
other hand, to re-establish public order
and the normal supply of basic services
such as food, electricity, and potable
water, as well as communications and
land transportation systems.
Winter Emergency:
It operated from March 2010 up to the
beginning of the Winter Season. The
main measures were the reinstallation
of education services and the provision
of emergency shelter. The latter was
expressed in the construction of 80,000
emergency housing units within four
months of the event, timely access
to dignifying health services, and the
creation of 60,000 reconstructionrelated jobs.
Reconstruction Plan:
It has been programmed and is being
implemented parallel to the 2010-2014
government action plan. Its main target
is to achieve the recovery of all affected
areas by March 2014 within a framework
of sound public sector resource allocation
and fiscal policy.
2. INSTITUTIONAL ORGANIZATION
Given their urgency and priority,
the Immediate Action and Winter
Emergency Action were coordinated by
an Emergency Committee established by
the President of the Republic under his
direct supervision.
The Reconstruction is being coordinated
by the National Committee for
Infrastructure, the City, and the Territory
(NCICT). It is led by the Minister of
Public Infrastructure and includes the
participation of the Ministers of Housing
and Urban Development, Transport,
Economy, Planning, National Endowment,
Secretary of the Presidency and the
special participation of the Ministers of
Health and Education.
In order to reassure the participation of the
regional governments with responsibility
in the affected areas, the NCICT depends
on the executive coordination of the Vice
Minister for Regional and Administrative
Development of the Ministry of the
Interior.
Starting in the second semester of the
year 2010 and after six months of work,
NCICT achieved an efficient level of intersector coordination for both the design
and evaluation of public investment.
3. LEGISLATIVE AGENDA FOR THE
EMERGENCY AND RECONSTRUCTION
The emergency has also been attended
by an intense legislative agenda. It has
been organized in three different tools:
• Decree (DS), legal operational
instruments under the direct supervision of
the President
• Legislation to facilitate funds for
reconstruction
• Complimentary Legislation oriented to
provide direct aid to those in need.
The most relevant Presidential Decrees
are:
• DS N°173, 11th of March 2010: Declares
condition of constitutional exception due
to catastrophe in the O’Higgins Region
• DS N° 861, 11th of March 2010:
Delegates presidential faculties to
the Chief of National Defence of the
O’Higgins Region
• DS N° 317, 11th of March 2010:
Creates Inter-ministerial Committee for
Reconstruction
• DS N° 350, 22nd of March 2010:
Creates the National Emergency
Committee
• DS N° 338: Budgetary re-arrangement
to finance the measures to attend the
emergency
Funding Legislation
The following laws were approved
following the emergency:
• Law N° 20,455: Reconstruction Public
Funds
• Law N° 20,.469: Modified Mining
Extraction Royalty
• Law N° 20,444: Created the
Reconstruction Fund and established
donations incentives.
Complimentary legislation
• Modified time lapses to declare
presumed death
• Simplified requisites to obtain benefits
of Unemployment Insurance
• Lengthened and improved incentives
for pre-contracting and training
• Modified fishing law and established
transitory norms for reconstruction
• Established norms of exception for
education subventions
• Established free services for the
regularization of property in areas
affected by the emergency
• Increased the 2010 funds for the media
• Delegated extraordinary resources for
the National Municipal Fund
• Updated the telecommunications
network (Law N°20,475)
4. FINANCIAL PLAN
Total losses after the earthquake are
estimated at US$30,000 million, out of
which US$10,000 million corresponded
to public infrastructure.
The national budgetary sources used by
the Ministry of Internal Economic Affairs
were:
• Economic growth recovery fund:
US$2,500 million per year
• Austerity measures and budget reallocations: US$730 million
• Donations law
• Prescindible actives sales
• Internal and external debt emissions
• Social and Economic Stabilization Fund
(FEES)
• Copper law fund
The following taxes were raised:
• First Category tax for companies
(transitory raise)
• Specific mining tax (royalty)
• 0.25 % over-rated property tax applied
during two years to the 5% of houses
with highest value according to fiscal
estimations. This was applied to those
houses not affected by the earthquake
• Special tobacco law
related initiatives affecting convened
deposits and economic housing under
decree-law DFL2.
Another source of fresh resources was
international donations. According to
the Ministry of External Affairs, these
accounted for US$ 22 million (0.1% of
the total estimated damage).
It is worth mentioning that, in spite of the
exceptional economic year that resulted
from the emergency, some dues that
affected low- and middle-income sectors
were reduced. Such is the case of the
50% cutback in the stamps and seals tax,
or the exemptions on taxes applied to reinvested capital in the case of small- and
medium-sized enterprises.
5. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF A NEW EARLY WARNING AND
EFFECTIVE ACTION SYSTEM
The following initiatives are being taken:
• Updating of the telecommunications
Network (Law N°20,475) – already listed
• 24/7 operation of all regional
emergency offices since June 2010
• Satellite networking among all regional
emergency offices
• Location of regional public buildings in
safe places
• Catastrophe simulation programmes
(over 260,000 people have already
participated in the program “Atento
Norte” (North in Alert)
• Operational agreement between the
government and the national network of
independent radio operators
• Operational agreement with the
National Safety Association to develop a
joint Early Warning System.
Other measures were taken to improve
tax revenue by reducing evasion and
9
2. THE DESIGN OF MINVU
THE CHALLENGE
239
municipalities
devastated
The challenge we face is the greatest planning
and implementation effort undertaken by our
country. It requires a decentralization process,
with regions, and particularly municipalities,
pushed to the limits of their capabilities. This
challenge exposes their vulnerabilities, but also
their determination, strengths, and knowledge
of their territory and culture, which is the
foundation of our country.
V
RM
VI
VII
VIII
Recognize community /
Avoid Displacement /
The reconstruction will take
place in the same location
and on the same land on
which the disaster ocurred.
IX
This cataclysm was initially
compared to a nuclear bomb, but
as more information available on
the vastness of the damage, the
more it resembles a cluster
bomb that spread through the
entire Central Chilean valley and
coast.
It is impossible to expect that the State will
reconstruct everything or that it will, on a
centralized basis, dictate from Santiago how to do
so. It will have to be the communities themselves
that, with substantial support and protection
from the State, determine the paths toward their
own reconstruction.
Over 220,000 housing reconstruction subsidies considered in this plan.
Over 70,000 correspond to reconstruction on beneficiary-owned sites.
The dispersion of an important percentage of the housing that we will rebuild
throughout various neighborhoods or distant locations requires construction
technologies to bridge the logistical complexities and costs that this implies.
10
RECONSTRUCTION PLAN
27F Disaster
The largest known urban earthquake and
spread of damage
3
metropolitan areas
5
cities with over 100,000 inhabitants
45 cities with over 5,000 inhabitants
over
900 rural and coastal towns
and communities.
The reconversion of the operational
infrastructure of large urban centers
such as Talcahuano, Constitución, or
Talca, poses a challenge in relation to
approaching the Reconstruction from an
integrated perspective, where aspects
of economic and social development
converge with projects on urban
landscape, drainage, transportation,
production, and risk mitigation
infrastructure.
Foreseeing the magnitude of the damage, the National Reconstruction Program was established
within the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MINVU) and is coordinated by a special task
force headed by the Minister and the Undersecretary. It covers three areas that relate to MINVU’s
approach to work: Housing, Neighborhoods, and City.
A. Housing:
B. Neighborhood:
C. City and Territory:
The Reconstruction and
Repair Subsidy Task Force
is in charge of ensuring
access to permanent
housing by families left
homeless by the disaster.
The objective of the Camps
Assistance and Social
Condominiums Task Force
is to provide a sustainable
solution to the urban housing
deficit.
This task force must update
the Zoning Plans to include
risks, heritage recovery, and
the development of the
Master Plans that guide the
reconstruction process.
The government´s commitment to the affected families is to provide permanent housing solutions
through a participative and holistic process that takes care of the most urgent needs resulting from
the emergency and also contains a medium- and long-term urban planning perspective.
11
UNITED RECONSTRUCTING A BETTER CHILE
The disaster of February 27th, 2010 may be considered, in scope, the largest known urban
earthquake, as it severely affected the metropolitan area of Concepción, 5 cities with over
100,000 inhabitants, 45 cities with over 5,000 inhabitants, and over 900 rural and coastal
towns and communities. The area running from the Region of Valparaíso to Araucanía,
including the Metropolitan Region of Santiago, was declared a Disaster Area.
This plan involves over 2.5 billion dollars
in Reconstruction Subsidies, in addition
to existing programs. We refer to more
than 200,000 exceptional subsidies for
repair and reconstruction on beneficiaryowned sites, subsidies for new housing
on new sites, or special subsidies for
rural and heritage housing, focused on
the neediest families and the vulnerable
middle class, which are mostly those that
are not able to stand on their own after
the disaster.
At the same time, an urban and territorial
action plan has been deployed to update
the risks considered in Zoning Plans, to
restore the urban road network, and to
guide a comprehensive reconstruction
of urban centers and localities severely
damaged by the earthquake and tsunami
in order to potentiate their development
and to recover their identity.
The commitment of President Piñera’s
government to the affected families is to
provide permanent housing solutions by
means of a participative and integrated
process that takes care of the most urgent
needs resulting from the emergency.
It also contains a medium- and long-term
urban perspective according to which
the affected areas can be rebuilt and the
quality of life in them improved.
12
NEW AUTHORITIES
In view of the magnitude and scale of
the catastrophe on February 27th, 2010,
President Piñera instructed his entire
cabinet to adopt a special commitment
to urgency and efficiency. Thus, only
a few days after taking office, he
appointed an Interministerial Emergency
Committee and an Interministerial
Reconstruction Committee. The first of
those committees focused primarily on
the emergency stages and rehabilitation,
in conjunction with the Ministries of the
Interior and Planning. The Reconstruction
Committee, in turn, focused on mediumand long-term coordination and on
activities such as the channeling of
important private contributions and
donations to the reconstruction fund.
These committees helped articulate the
coordination in the early months of the
new Administration, and by the end of
five months after the disaster, these tasks
were taken over by the corresponding
Ministries.
The primary sectorial activities of the
Reconstruction have been implemented
by the corresponding Ministries to
avoid the duplication of functions. Such
is the case of the Ministries of Public
Infrastructure, Health, and Education,
which have set up Reconstruction
Committees
that
are
already
implementing
their
corresponding
Reconstruction Plans. These plans are
coordinated and controlled by the normal
management systems through the
Office of the Presidential Chief of Staff,
as is the case with the other Ministerial
responsibilities.
The Reconstruction Plan of the
Ministry of Housing and Urban
Development was developed
differently.
Foreseeing
the
magnitude of the damage, the
National Reconstruction Program
was established within MINVU
and is coordinated by a special
task force headed by the Minister
and the Undersecretary.
It covers three areas which relate
to MINVU’s approach to work:
Housing, Neighborhoods, and
City.
HOUSING:
The Reconstruction and Repair Subsidy Task Force is in charge of ensuring access to
permanent housing by families left homeless by the disaster.
NEIGHBORHOOD:
The objective of the Settlement and Social Condominium Task Force is to provide a
sustainable solution to the urban housing deficit and to assist the Emergency Camps.
CITY AND TERRITORY:
This task force must update the zoning plans to include risks, heritage recovery, and the
development of the Master Plans to guide the Reconstruction process, potentiate the
identity of the most devastated localities and urban centers, and create a recognizable
urban image.
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
The extent of the damage provoked by
the February 27th 2010 earthquake is
so wide that it is considered one of the
largest urban earthquakes known. In this
context, to expect the Government to
handle the reconstruction in a centralized
manner would be counterproductive and
would jeopardize its viability. The actual
challenge that the Reconstruction poses
at the central government level is to trust
local, municipal, and regional capabilities
because the devastated communities
are those who best understand their
needs and the identity that must be
reconstructed.
This decentralization effort proposes
not being a homogeneous or generic
reconstruction plan but instead, that
each community takes ownership and
is co-responsible for its own plan as the
Reconstruction progresses.
So, it is that regional coordination has
been adapting to the needs of each
Region, and as the constituted authorities
progress in formalizing these initiatives,
it will be possible to consolidate this
commitment to decentralization and
trust in regional capabilities.
Concretely, in the case of Housing
and Urban Development, the
Plan is structured on the basis of:
- A centralized structure, but
decentralized
and
flexible
implementation.
- A central structure, where each
Regional Unit counts on its own
Reconstruction team.
13
MINVU Reconstruction Plan Timeline 2010-2018
mar 2010
abr 2010
may 2010
jun 2010
jul 2010
ago 2010
sep 2010
oct 2010
nov 2010
dec 2010
ene 2011
feb 2011
mar 2011
abr 2011
may 2011
jun 2011
jul 2011
ago 2011
sep 2011
oct 2011
nov 2011
dec 2011
ene 2012
feb 2012
mar 2012
abr 2012
may 2012
jun 2012
jul 2012
ago 2012
sep 2012
ocy 2012
nov 2012
dec 2012
feb 2013
feb 2014
feb 2015
feb 2016
feb 2017
feb 2018
Carta Gantt General // Plan de Reconstrucción Minvu 2010-2018
HOUSING PROGRAM
Initial Diagnosis: Types and Solutions
Program Basics
Preliminary Estimate of Demand
Preliminary Estimate of Costs
New Tools for the Housing Reconstruction Plan
Estimated Demand EFU Survey
Register of Disaster Victims
Subsidies Application and Allocation
Housing Delivery
NEIGHBORHOODS
Social Condominiums (SERVIU Apartments)
SERVIU Damaged Buildings Cadastre
Structural Damage Assessment
Designation of Project Managers
Enabling Management Committees
Social Diagnosis and legal co-ownership
Designs, feasibility and budget
Subsidies Application and Allocation
Construction of housing solutions
Emergency Camps
Emergency Solutions Installation
Common Spaces Installation
Project Executives Installation
Neighborhood Committee set up
Execution of Psychosocial Support Program
Design, Feasibility and Budget of definite works
Application and Allocation of subsidies
Instant Solutions (Built housing acquisition + Existent offer)
Construction in new sites
CITY
Updated Regulatory Zoning Plans
State Cadastre of Instruments of Territorial Planning (IPT)
Cadastre of Risk Areas
Risk Informs
Risk Studies
Modification or Upgrade of Coastal Regulatory Plans
Modification or Upgrade of Interior Regulatory Plans
Urban Road Infrastructure Rehabilitation
Damage Cadastre
Defining Project Portfolio
Budget Definition
Design and Implementation
Heritage Recovery
Typical Zones Damage Cadastre (ZCH, ICH y ZT)
Interministerial Coordination Board
Protection Plans of damaged monuments
Collaboration and training programs
Heritage Reconstruction Office VI Región
Recovery and Development of recovery Programs
Heritage Reconstruction
Subsidies for heritage recovery
Urban Regeneration Plans (PRU)
Diagnosis
Development of urban Proposals
Implementation and detailed studies
Master Plans for Reconstruction
Cadastre of initiatives and needs
Development of PRES
Definition and project portfolio prioritization
Project design application for Social Rentability (RS)
Signature of Reconstruction Agreements
Bid for design and implementation of detonating projects
Execution of reconstruction works
14
COMPARED EXPERIENCE
The following tables show the vastness of the earthquake on February 27. It is easier to
understand the magnitude of the disaster and the scale of the damages when it is compared
with earthquakes and natural disasters nationally and internationally. At the same time we
analyze the construction time in each of the disasters noting that our rebuilding process is
advancing at a faster pace than the rhythm that characterizes this type of disaster.
Table 1: Comparison of Recent Major Earthquakes in Chile
event
earthquake 1960
earthquake 1985
Magnitude (° Richter)
Epicenter
9.6
Valdivia and Concepción
(two earthquakes and one tsunami)
Affected Area
13 of 25 provinces (between Talca
and Chiloé) = VII - X Regions
Fatal Victims
6.000
Destroyed houses
45 thousand
Affected Extension (km2)
166,220
National Extension Affected (%)
8.3%
Population in affected area
2,780,213
Chile’s National Population
7,374,115
Population affected (%)
38%
Total damage (million US$ 2010)
3,089
1
earthquake 2010
7.7
San Antonio
8.8
Cobquecura
Mainly V, VI Y RM
Regions
177
142 thousand
48,186
2.4%
6,114,846
12,102,174
50%
2,106
From V to IX region
524
220 thousand
131,006
6.5%
12,800,000
17,094, 275
75%
30
The number of alleged mishaps is estimated in 31.
Source: Ministries of Interior, Housing, Finance among others.
1
Table 2: Comparison of Recent International Disasters
event
earthquake
chile
27- 02 -2010
8,8
Cobquecura
From the V to the
IX Region
524
Fatal Victims
220,000
Affected Houses
131,006
Affected Area (km)
12,800,000
Population Affected Area
30,000
Total Damage (million US$)
4 months
Emergency period
4 years
Reconstruction time
Date
Magnitude
Epicenter
Affected Area
1
2
1
2
earthquake
colombia
earthquake
japón
earthquake
haití
hurricane
mitch
hurricane
katrina
earthquake
california
25- 01 -1999
6,2
Armenia
28
Municipalities
1,185
129,000
1,350
1,500,000
n/a
n/a
3,5 years
17- 01 -1995
7,2
Kobe
n/a
01- 12 -2010
7
Puerto Principe
n/a
21- 10 -1998
n/a
Honduras
All the country
23- 08 -2005
n/a
Nueva Orleans
7 states
9,937
41,420
112,000
10,700,000
3,600
2 years
n/a
1,836
275,000
233
15,000,000
81,200
n/a
8-11 years
17- 10 -1989
6,9
Loma Prieta
Region of San
Francisco & Bahía
63
12,000
103,600
n/a
n/a
1,5 years
At least 8 years
6,000
100,000
552
1,500,000
102,500
3 years
n/a
222,570
188,383
10,335
3,500,000
7,754
1 year
6 - 10 years
Immediate emergency plus winter emergency
Includes Housing Reconstruction
Acronyms
ZCH: Historic Conservation Zone
ICH: Building of Historic Conservation
ZT: Typical Zone
SERVIU: Servicio de Vivienda y Urbanismo
PRES: Sustainable Reconstruction Estrategic Plans
EFU: Emergency Special Family Survey
15
A. HOUSING RECONSTRUC
THE CHALLENGE
Construction of Projects on Owned Site
The challenge posed by the earthquake implied
the construction of a large number of homes in
geographically disperse locations due to the families'
need to rebuild on their own land.
The extent of the area affected
by the disaster requires the
preparation of a Housing
Reconstruction Plan with
various solutions and flexible
resource allocation to allow
adaptation
to
different
problem situations.
Types of problems:
1.
The first goal of the Reconstruction Housing Program
is to allocate 220 thousand subsidies by December of
2011.
220,000
reconstruction
housing
subsidies
110,000
110,000
Houses to reconstruct
Houses to repair
15,000
Acquisition of
previously
existing houses
16
25,000
Construction of new
houses in new sites
70,000
Construction
of Projects on
Owned Site
Severely damaged
or
destroyed SERVIU (Housing and
Urban Development Service)
housing projects.
2.
Homeless families at great
social risk.
3.
Coastal cities and towns
affected by the tsunami.
4.
Severely damaged or
destroyed adobe housing.
5.
Housing in
heritage interest.
areas
6.
of
Families with debt capacity
with homes affected by the
earthquake.
7.
Housing with minor and
repairable damage.
TION PROGRAM
Basic Principles:
Legality and Formality of
the Solutions
Construction on Owned
Site
Competition for Demand
Territorial Scale
Citizen Participation and
the Possibility to Choose
Innovation
Dynamic Structure
Targeting of Resources
Register of Disaster victims:
In view of the impossibility of conducting a thorough
cadastre at the time the Housing Reconstruction Plan
was launched, MINVU decided to conduct a “demand
side” census (pull cadastre), calling upon the affected
population to register in a new special registry in order
to apply for Reconstruction Plan Subsidies.
Bank of Pre-designed
Projects on own site
A bank of pre-designed projects
was created to accelerate the
reconstruction process on
own site; those projects are
pre-certified by the Technical
Division of the Ministry.
Today 122 projects
are approved and
72 are in process
of approval.
The Ministry decided to use demanded subsidies and existing housing programs to focus and allocate
resources, making the processes more flexible and simplifying regulatory requirements and timing.
Diagram of the Subsidy Program Stages
STAGE 1
Register of
Disaster
Victims
STAGE 2
STAGE 3
Application
Process
Allocation
of Subsidy
STAGE 4
Construction
or Repair
17
HOUSES TO REPAIR AND RECONSTRUCT
Damaged houses in Dichato
1. DIAGNOSIS: DEFINITION OF THE TYPES OF PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS
The extent of the area affected by the catastrophe required
the preparation of a Housing Reconstruction Plan with
various solutions and a flexible system of resource allocation,
to allow adaptation to different problem situations.
In order to provide a definitive housing
solution for families affected by the
earthquake, the Plan was structured
on the basis of grouping problems into
seven categories:
1) Families living in housing provided by
SERVIU (Housing and Urban Development
Service) that was destroyed or seriously
damaged.
2) Vulnerable or high social risk families
that were left homeless by the earthquake
or tsunami and lived in housing belonging to
relatives, lived in destroyed homes without
ownership title, or lived in high risk areas.
3) Families owning their first homes in
coastal cities or towns that were devastated
by the tsunami.
18
4) Families owning housing, primarly made
of adobe, in rural or urban sectors that were
destroyed or seriously damaged.
5) Families owning houses in traditional
areas or of heritage interest that were
severely damaged.
6) Families registered as homeless who do not
benefit from earthquake insurance and whose
housing was destroyed or seriously damaged.
7) Low income families that suffered
damage to their homes.
The decision was made to use demanded
subsidies based on existing housing
programs to focus and allocate resources,
making the processes more flexible and
simplifying regulatory requirements and
timing.
2. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PLAN
- Legality and Formality of the Solutions:
Construction Permits and Municipal
Construction Acceptance Certificates
must be issued for all subsidized
constructions, as stipulated by the LGUC
(Urbanism and Construction Law). There
will be no self-construction subsidies,
although contractors are encouraged
to employ manpower from families
participating in the project (assisted selfconstruction). Housing can only be built
on sites provided by the beneficiaries if
the title deeds to the property have been
regularized.
- Construction on Owned Site:
The reconstruction of housing on the
same sites where the housing was
damaged or destroyed by the earthquake
was encouraged. Priority was given
to the use of land inside urban limits
for housing to maintain neighborhood
social networks, consolidate existing
settlements, and avoid migration from
rural areas.
- Competition for Demand:
Allocation mechanisms were developed
to generate competition to the benefit of
the disaster victims.
- Territorial Scale:
It is understood that many interventions
(social
condominiums,
fishing
villages, heritage areas, etc.) require
a
comprehensive
approach
and
broader reconstruction plans, which
are to be handled and coordinated
by the instruments described in the
Neighborhood and City Programs.
- Citizen Participation and the
Possibility to Choose:
Beneficiaries choose the housing that
best meets their characteristics and
needs, in the understanding that housing
is a family’s greatest investment and
that a housing subsidy is the largest
Government subsidy that they receive in
their lifetimes.
- Innovation:
Innovation will be encouraged in industry.
The use of new constructive technologies,
process industrialization and operating
efficiencies in construction are promoted
so that the logistical costs of building
housing in geographically dispersed sites
does not negatively impact the quality of
housing solutions.
be certify this by means of a lease or
utility bills in their name bearing the
stricken address. Families that lived in
the house of another family or “families
doubled up” certified this condition by
means of the Social Protection Data
Sheet (FPS) prior to February 27th.
Among other exclusions, they were not
considered in this condition if the number
of inhabitants in the damaged home was
under 7 (including the owner’s family).
- Dynamic Structure:
In view of the information available at the
time that the Housing Reconstruction
Plan was designed, the different types
of subsidies were assessed and the
resources redistributed in terms of
demand behavior.
- Targeting of Resources:
Free subsidies are open to abuse by
unscrupulous individuals who may not be
disaster victims but could attempt to gain
access to the reconstruction benefits.
The necessary mechanisms to avoid
inappropriate access to reconstruction
subsidies include: that each family should
hold a Damage Certificate issued by the
Municipal Works Office (DOM) and be
registered in the Register of Disaster
Victims. Families that are tenants should
Prefabricated houses
19
3. PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF
DEMAND AND COSTS
4. REGISTER OF DISASTER
VICTIMS
One of the major problems in the
design of the Reconstruction Plan and
its cost structure was the reliability of
the information available at the time
of the emergency. Initial calculations
put the number of damaged housing
at 1.5 million, 0.5 million of which were
completely uninhabitable. On March
10th, ONEMI (National Emergency
Office – Ministry of the Interior)
submitted a list indicating 81,149
destroyed houses, 100,247 homes with
major damage, and 192,388 homes with
minor damage, with a total of 373,784
homes affected by the disaster.
In view of the impossibility of conducting
a detailed cadastre at the time the
Housing Reconstruction Plan was
launched, MINVU decided to conduct a
“demand census” (pull cadastre), calling
upon the affected population to enroll
in a new registry in order to apply for
Reconstruction Plan Subsidies.
ONEMI’s numbers were based on
information provided by mayors and
military emergency authorities, which in
some cases were unreliable. Therefore
the Ministry of Housing and Urban
Development began a study of data to
estimate the number of damaged homes
and damage levels in terms of specific
groups: Coast; Urban Adobe; Rural
Adobe; SERVIU Social Housing; Private
Housing.
The Housing Reconstruction Plan
ensured a focus on vulnerability, in the
understanding that the socioeconomic
situation of affected families was
negatively correlated with the damage
to their homes and, in many cases, the
effects on the sources of employment
and social networks. The National
Social Characterization Survey (CASEN)
survey provided the information to
determinate the level of vulnerability,
and therefore, the eligible percentages
for each group.
A total of 195,950 subsidies was the first
estimate for the total number of homes
qualifying for a subsidy. This estimate,
however, did not necessarily correspond
to the real demand, which could only
be determined by actual subsidy
applications, a process that began with
the Register of Disaster Victims.
20
To register in the Register of Disaster
Victims, the families had to be visited
by technical staff from the Municipal
Works Office to certify the damage to
their homes. This measure also served
as a filter as it prevented people who had
not been affected by the earthquake from
having access to the benefits.
The Register of Disaster Victims was
closed on July 30th, 2010 to boroughs
with over 10,000 inhabitants, but it
remained open until August 27th 2010 for
boroughs with under 10,000 inhabitants.
At the close of registration, over 286,000
families had been registered.
The numbers in the Register must not be
understood as representing the number
of qualified applicants and subsidy
beneficiaries since the Register was
merely a filter based on the status of
victim. An important number of families
in the registry did not have access to the
reconstruction subsidy because they may
have already owned a second home, they
were one-family applicants, who were
unable to reliably confirm their status
as “doubled up” tenants at the time of
the earthquake, or there were other
circumstances that prevented them from
perfecting their application to regulatory
requirements.
As a consequence, and according to
the cross-checking of the different
variables, it was possible to estimate
that the number of qualified applications
for reconstruction subsidies amounted
approximately to 105,000 units for
reconstruction and 115,000 units for
repair subsidies. This modified the
construction/repair ratio that was initially
estimated, with a slight increase in the
total number of subsidies.
Original Distribution Table for Reconstruction Program Subsidies
subsidy type
n° subsidies
us $ /subsidies
us $ / total
Repair Subsidies
61,956
US$ 2,786
US$ 172,596,932
Purchase Subsidy
15,000
US$ 8,125
US$ 121,878,357
Construction Subsidy
118,994
US$ 21,636
US$ 2,572,863,992
TOTAL
195,950
US$ 14,672
US$ 2,867,339,281
Subsidy Redistribution Table according to the Program´s Progress.
subsidy type
n° subsidies
us $ /subsidies
us $ / total
Repair Subsidies
115,000
US$ 3,761
US$ 432,494,054
Purchase Subsidy
20,000
US$ 19,083
US$ 382,247,670
Construction Subsidy
85,000
US$ 24,144
US$ 2,052,597,557
220,000
US$ 13,047
US$ 2,867,339,281
TOTAL
* Numbers approximated using current US Dollar - Chilean Peso exchange rate (April 27th, 2011).
5. NEW TOOLS FOR THE
HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION
PLAN
Role of the Ministry in the case of the bank of pre designed projects in owned site: link
between offer (projects) and demand (families)
Construction of Pre-Designed Projects
on Owned Site
The subsidy mechanisms in place are
for the regular construction of definitive
new housing or for construction on new
sites, a system with which the housing
deficit in the country has been addressed
in recent years. The challenge posed by
the earthquake, however, implies the
construction of a large number of homes
in geographically disperse locations due
to the families’ need to rebuild on their
own land.
PRE-DESIGNED
PROJECTS
AFFECTED
FAMILIES
MINVU
SERVIU
OFFER
TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE
DEMAND
The invitation to apply for a subsidy for
Construction of a Pre-Designed Project
on a Beneficiary-Owned Site was made
in this context, with a dual aim:
Fast track for the regularization of property title deeds
- It invited disaster victims owning land
to apply directly to SERVIU (Housing and
Urban Development Service) and choose
one of the pre-certified homes in the predesigned project portfolio.
- It invited builders to bid on the
construction of housing solutions on
disperse sites for a fixed amount of
money (possible because of the volume
of housing units to be built under this
arrangement, estimated to total at least
60,000 units).
An important percentage of property titles in rural areas and in the historic city centers
have not been regularized, which precludes applying for a subsidy. The regularization
of the material possession of real estate is a procedure that normally lasts between
18 months to two years. An agreement was reached with the Ministry of the National
Endorsement to reduce processing times in order to address this issue and reduce the
time in which subsidies were and are allocated to families in this situation.
6. PROJECTIONS AND GOALS
The first goal in the frame of the reconstruction housing program was to allocate 100
thousand subsidies by the end of 2010; the second goal is to have allocated a total of
220 thousand reconstruction subsidies by December 2011.
This system also provides the following
benefits:
- The model benefits applicant families
by creating competition since the
implementation of a “showcase” of
solutions leads solution bidders to seek
differentiating factors, such as the offer
of additional floor space, better finishes,
more rooms and/or extra equipment.
- The families’ real option of being able
to “choose” their home empowers them
as owners and makes them relevant
stakeholders in the reconstruction
process.
Pre-designed projects
21
B. EMERGENCY CAMPS
SOCIAL CONDOMINIUMS
THE CHALLENGE
REPARATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
OF SOCIAL CONDOMINIUMS
106 EMERGENCY CAMPS IN THE
AFFECTED AREA
Of the 80,000 families affected by the
earthquake who received emergency
housing, there were 4,350 families
without a place to build their shelters,
so it was required to implement 106
emergency camps, equipped with
basic services.
The Program for Emergency Camps Assistance and
Social Condominiums addresses the need to repair
a total of 7,707 apartments with an estimated total
investment of more than US$ 81,716,536, and to
replace 6,415 apartments with an estimated total
investment of more than US$191,401,532.
DECONGESTION OF SOCIAL CONDOMINUIMS
The repair of social housing units, and the reconstruction process in general, provide an opportunity to improve
the previous conditions of these communities, adopting public policies with a sustainable development
approach. The decongestion proposal involves reducing one third of the apartments, for which families will
be relocated in new projects.
[
[
Before: 3 units
After: 2 units
Increasing square meters per unit
DIAGNOSIS FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL CONDOMINIUMS
3 studies were developed to assess the possible repair or reconstruction of each project.
1.
22
Technical Studies
Made by external and
prestigious companies.
Purely technical
assessment of damage.
2.
Economic Studies
Made by SERVIU’s technical
teams and / or external
expert company.
Economic evaluation
of a possible repair vs.
reconstruction with 2010
standards.
3.
Social Studies
Usually performed by the
municipality.
Social Assessment of
pre- and post- conditions
27F of the condominium
resident families.
ASSISTANCE AND
PROGRAM
The
reconstruction
of
Social
Condominiums
units
that
were
severely damaged is the Ministry´s
responsibility. This organization not only
rebuilds damaged homes but also gives a
solution to the previous situation of high
social vulnerability that affected these
families.
EMERGENCY CAMPS
Among the challenges of the reconstruction
program, there is an integrated intervention
in the relocation process, in parallel with the
development of the final housing projects for
each of the emergency camps.
6,415
7,707
homes were selected
for reconstruction.
homes were selected
for repair.
Under the concept of integrated
intervention, we considered
the need to provide permanent
housing solutions accompanied
by a full and appropriate
psychosocial
reconstruction
process.
Improvement of community- based
organizations and leadership
encouragement
Build empowered and trained
leadership teams.
EMERGENCY CAMPS
The
Emergency Camps
Psychosocial
Recovery
program aims, with the
collaboration of residents
and leaders of each camp,
to give efficient, concrete,
and appropriate attention.
LEADER
COMMUNITY
Diagnose internal problems and
opportunities of the community.
Develop a coordination strategy among
members of the camps and public and
private agencies that work with them.
Submit specific projects to benefit the
whole community.
23
EMERGENCY CAMPS ASSISTANCE
Among the regions affected by the earthquake of February 27th, a large group of families
lived in social housing built by SERVIU (Housing and Urban Development Service) and its
predecessor institutions. High levels of vulnerability, exclusion, and social conflict, coupled
with severe urban decay in many of these buildings and neighborhoods, made the condition
of these affected families particularly complex and difficult to address through the special
instruments included in the Reconstruction Plan.
While most of these apartments
resisted the earthquake, its crumbling
infrastructure
highlighted
the
precariousness of their standards,
especially of those buildings constructed
between 1980 and 2000. The typical
damages are on the stairways, roofs,
and interior panels, with some of them
collapsing completely with fatal cost.
About 13,000 SERVIU apartments
(Social Condominiums) were detected
in these conditions, of which over
7,000 are being repaired and around
6,000 demolished and rebuilt. In some
cases, the demolition includes all of the
condominium buildings and in other
cases just a few.
Moreover, of the 80,000 families
affected by the earthquake who received
an emergency house, there were 4,350
families without a place to build an
emergency shelter, so it was required to
implement 106 camps, equipped with
basic services, to receive them (originally
107 camps, but then 2 were merged).
We
identified,
in
the
general
Reconstruction Plan scenario, three
types of demand at neighborhood
level that require special attention by
the Housing and Urban Development
Ministry as a result of the combination
of the historical conditions and the
earthquake consequences:
24
DEMAND TYPES AT THE NEIGHBORHOOD SCALE
1. Demand for repair
2. Demand for reconstruction
3. Demand for relocation
1. REPAIR OF SOCIAL CONDOMINIUMS
Beneficiaries
To integrate the list of beneficiaries from social condominiums, it was necessary to
apply the adecuate criteria in order to avoid the access constraints included in the
National Reconstruction Plan:
• exclusion and social conflict
• successive experiences of repair
• lack of mediators, Social Real State Coordinator Entity, prepared to address them.
• complex projects (demolition, reconstruction, extension, overall improvement,
decongestion)
• nature of emergency
Apartments to repair
condominium
district
metropolitan region: 4,295 apartments
Ñuñoa
Estación Central
Cerro Navia
Cerro Navia
n° of units
Villa Olímpica
Villa Portales
Laurita Allende
Javiera Carrera
2452
1637
76
130
o´higgins region: 274 apartments
Mostazal
Graneros
Bernardo Retamal
Los Regidores
146
128
Constitución
Talca
Talca
Manuel Francisco Mesa Seco
Astaburuaga
Manuel Larraín
1318
60
160
Mártires del Carbón
Centinela I
146
128
maule region: 1,538 apartments
biobío region: 1,600 apartments
Coronel
Talcahuano
total:
7707
SOCIAL CONDOMINIUMS PROGRAM
Strategy
Through its Social Condominiums Unit,
the Department for Neighborhood
Development is addressing the need to
repair and replace 7,707 apartments,
with a total investment of more than US
40 million and allowing personal and
expeditious attention.
Objectives
a. Allocate subsides for the repair of the
units and the improvement of common
property.
b. Strengthen community capacity
for management and conservation of
properties through the formalization of
the joint ownership.
While the first objective depends on
the beginning stages of the project,
the second allows for these works to
endure over time and are retained by
the investors in the full exercise of their
rights and duties.
Decongestion of Social Condominuims
The repair of social condominiums
units, and the reconstruction process
in general, provide an opportunity to
improve the previous conditions of these
communities by adopting public policies
with a sustainable approach.
The Ministry of Housing and Urban
Development is facing one of the
greatest challenges in addressing the
repair of the housing stock built in high
density buildings with a reduced footage
of the units. For example, in the repair
projects of social condominiums in
Talcahuano and Coronel, particularly
the cases of “Centinela I” and “Mártires
de Carbón,” we have the opportunity to
apply the decongestion policies for the
new apartment blocks in the context of
post-earthquake repairs.
The decongestion proposal involves reducing one third of the apartments, for which
families are being relocated in new projects. In that way, the remaining apartments are
being redesigned and repaired, increasing their square footage in agreement with the
standards of the new housing policy.
2. RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL CONDOMINIUMS
Beneficiaries
Among the social condominiums affected by the earthquake and tsunami of February
27th, there was a group of buildings with very serious damage. After an economic,
technical, and social analysis, it was decided to demolish these units completely and
reconstruct with better standards.
Apartments to repair
district
n° of units
condominium
valparaiso region: 296 apartments
San Antonio
Villa del Mar
Rancagua
Rancagua
Santa Cruz
Rengo
Los Parques
Cordillera
Paniahue
Villa San Francisco
n° of units for
demolition
296
296
184
1956
339
312
184
1956
339
312
Cauquenes
Constitución
Constitución
Constitución
Talca
Los Acacios
60
Cerro O`higgins
93
El Aromo
80
Manuel Francisco Mesa Seco IV Etapa
Astaburuaga
60
48
93
80
72
60
Chiguayante
Coronel
Coronel
Coronel
Los Angeles
Los Angeles
Penco
Talcahuano
Arauco
Tome
Tome
Villa Futuro
Camilo OLavarría
Cristo Redentor
Gabriela Mistral
Galvarino
Judas Tadeo
V. Esperanza y V. Baquedano
Centinela II
Los Arrayanes
Miramar
El Sauce
region: 2.791 apartments
o´higgins
maule region: 365 apartments
biobío region: 3020 apartments
total:
1320
60
90
198
110
42
70
600
300
100
130
8227
1320
60
90
59
110
42
70
600
300
100
130
6415
Strategy
To accomplish this complex task and to comply with FSV regulations (FSV- Solidarity
Housing Fund - is the program through which the most vulnerable families access
housing in Chile), SERVIU requested authorization from the Ministry to act as a
real estate development mediator or EGIS. Thus, multidisciplinary teams based on
SERVIU’s professional service experience took charge of each of these projects and are
responsible for their success.
25
Objectives
The reconstruction of SERVIU Social
Condominiums units that were severely
damaged is SERVIU’s responsibility. This
organization should not only rebuild
damaged homes but also give a solution
to the previous situation of high social
vulnerability that affected these families.
The specific objectives of this process are:
» Rebuild quickly but rebuild better
» Promote family involvement
» Competition for the demand
Diagnosis for the reconstruction of
social condominiums
It was necessary to develop 3 studies
that evaluate the possible repair or
reconstruction in each home.
1. Technical Studies
Made by external and prestigious
companies / Purely technical assessment
of damage
2. Economic Studies
Made by SERVIU technical team and / or
external expert company
Economic evaluation of a possible repair
vs. reconstruction with 2010 standards
3. Social Studies
Usually performed by the municipality
Social Assessment of pre and post
conditions 27F of the condo residents
families.
As a result, 6,415 homes were selected
for reconstruction.
Methodology and intervention process
Social characterization
›› Assessment of family characteristics
›› Constitution of working groups to to
provide information
›› Organization of families in committees
enabled to apply for housing benefits
Land transaction
›› SERVIU has to own the land in order to
be able to develop new projects to benefit
those families.
›› SERVIU also needs to provide subsidy
alternatives and solutions for those who
choose not to stay in the project.
26
Demolition
›› Issuance of demolition orders.
›› Management of bidding process and
adjudication contracts for demolition
processes.
Bidding and adjudication of construction
›› Fixed amount bids that promote
competition in a purely technical
perspective.
›› Adjudication according to families’
preferences.
Solutions for each project
Each of these projects provides a
complete solution to all affected
households. However, due to urban
decay and high density of previous
developments, some families opted for
another type of subsidy that allowed
them to purchase someplace else.
Of the 6,415 homes that are currently
programmed to be demolished, 4,277
will be rebuilt in the same place.
3. EMERGENCY CAMPS
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
Who lives in emergency camps?
Victims who have been displaced from
their places of residence either because
the tsunami swept away their dwellings
or because the earthquake destroyed the
buildings they inhabited.
How many villages are there in total?
Among the nearly 80,000 families who
received emergency housing, almost
95% of the units were built on their
own land. However, 4,350 families had
no place to build a house, so they were
relocated to the 106 camps.
Region / Emergency Camps
Valparaíso: 3 camps / 67 families
O’Higgins; 4 camps / 287 families
Maule: 16 camps / 430 families
Biobío: 83 camps / 3,566 families
Total: 106 camps / 4,350 families
EQUIPMENT FOR EMERGENCY CAMPS
Each of the emergency camps are equipped with:
Homes Equipment:
Electrical kit with security system
Thermal insulation
Waterproof covering
Starting kit: Cookware, mattresses, blankets, kitchenette.
Community facilities:
Bathrooms shared between 2 or 3 families.
Stabilized main streets
Perimeter fence
Lighting
Community center: for the camps with more than 16 families.
Permanent Accompaniment:
Each camp has a Ministry executive representative that coordinates the
relocation of families as well as a Ministry social team and NGOs that
coordinate community activities and provide support in the application for
housing subsidies.
Challenges in the reconstruction
process for emergency camps
One of the challenges of the reconstruction
program is the development of an
integrated psychosocial intervention
within the relocation process, in parallel
with the development of the final housing
projects for each of the camps.
Under the concept of integrated
intervention, we consider the need to
provide permanent housing solutions
accompanied by a full and appropriate
psychosocial reconstruction process,
which will be coordinated at a local,
intersectoral,
and
multisectoral
scales with high levels of community
participation. To achieve this, we have
needed to develop agreements with
other ministries and public services.
The psychosocial reconstruction program
is running in 106 camps in the country
with support from the international
cooperation program between Chile and
the European Union and FOSIS.
This program helps to generate
permanent structures accompanying
families to enhance their community
organization, to promote leadership,
and to empower camp inhabitants to be
responsible for resolving the problems
that exist in their communities.
For the implementation of this work,
technical and social workgroups have
been established to run urban and social
programs in each camp. Each team is led
by an executive who coordinates their
work with direct communication with
municipalities and community leaders.
These executives are responsible for the
relocation process, until the final closure
of each camp.
The project managers depend directly
on the Department of Neighborhood
Development which is currently
represented by the Regional Coordinator.
Currently, 100% of the teams have
started their work.
In order to ensure coordination and good
management of information, workgroups
were established at three levels: local,
regional, and national levels.
Psychosocial Scope
Based on the difficult situation of the
families that are staying in the emergency
camps, a psychosocial intervention
project was developed, coordinated
by the First Lady’s Office and with the
support of European Union and FOSIS.
The Emergency Camps Psychosocial
Recovery Program aims, with the
collaboration of residents and leaders
of each camp, to give efficient, concrete,
and appropriate attention. Its main
objective is to strengthen social and
organizational capacities of communities
directly affected by the earthquake and/
or the tsunami, so that its members can
revived existing social networks and
participate in the rebuilding of their lives
and their environment.
The program has 5 action lines:
a. Community Organization and
Leadership:
- Generate a team of empowered, trained,
and recognized leaders
- Diagnosis of problems and opportunities in
the community
- Develop a coordination strategy between
the members of the camps and the public
and private agencies that work with them
- Submit specific projects to benefit the
whole community
b. Social and Labour Inclusion:
- Enhance workforce in camps and promote
employability and employment generation.
- Create new instances of alternative work
in order to complement the family income,
until the employment situation becomes
stabilized.
- Support the micro enterprise and
development of productive capacity in the
camps.
c. The Grant Application Process:
- Socialization mechanisms devised by the
Minvu reconstruction plan provide regular
allowances and housing supply in each
locality that are targeted to the homeless
- Coordination and support in the application
process
d. Psychological Counseling:
- Create open instances for the contention
between the residents of the cams and
specialized external agents, enabling them
to overcome the trauma of the earthquake
and tsunami, as well as develop resilience to
face life in camps
e. Working with focus in age and
vulnerable groups:
- To promote community development
through specific working groups previously
defined
- Group, recognize, and organize the
different age groups that exist in camps
and conduct activities that are of particular
interest to them
Physical Scope
The work within the camp is led by a
project executive who aims to develop
a concrete and final solution before the
winter of 2012. For that purpose, these
leaders have to manage the housing
requests and ensure a successful project
for each family.
Land search
Considering that construction in new
land is one of the most important subsidy
alternatives for affected families, a special
team was formed for the selection and
financing of land acquisition, in order to
embrace the most decisive factors in the
implementation of a project of this type,
such as the land itself, location, and the
available budget.
27
5. TERRITORIAL, URBAN,
RECONSTRUCTION PROG
THE CHALLENGE
DISASTER
OPPORTUNITY
The true challenges in urban reconstruction will be finding the right instance of intersectorial
coordination and relying on a decentralization without precedent in our history, where
regions and municipalities will play a key role in converting the disaster into an opportunity for the
development of their communities.
With the collaboration of a series
of public and private entities, the
Ministry developed 25 Master
Plans for the main urban centers
of the coastal edge in the area
affected by the tsunami.
URBAN IMAGE
The Master Plans developed for medium and
small towns recognize the value of existing
constructions and the particularities of
each locality, in order to orient and propose
reconstruction actions that enhance the urban
character and identity.
HERITAGE RECOVERY
The Ministry helped affected families in the
difficult challenge of the reconstruction or
repair of houses of historical interest, providing
an additional amount of US$ 9,325.
100 MASTER PLANS STUDIES WILL BE
FINISHED THIS YEAR
The objective of these plans has been to orient decisionmaking regarding the allocation of housing reconstruction/
repair subsidies, the prioritization of works and projects for
reconstruction of infrastructure, and the establishment of longterm investment criteria and planning for these cities.
Simultaneously, these plans encourage economic, social, and
environmental development, adding instances of community
participation and integrating those variables that will raise the
urban standard of our nation.
=
25 COASTAL CITIES MASTER PLANS
Risk Studies
Projects and Mitigation Works
Zoning and Tsunami Resilient
Subsidies
MITIGATION
WALL
28
MITIGATION
PARK
MITIGATION
PARK
AND HERITAGE
RAM
The action plan and criteria
for the reconstruction of
coastal cities respond to
the role of the government
Considering that the sites
owned by the families
should be compatible with
the uses defined by the
Master Plans, risk analysis,
and regular construction
norms, the Ministry started
the allocation of subsidies
in the areas affected by the
tsunami.
Evacuation routes
Prioritizing the protection of lives and the security of the people.
Promoting public policies to ensure the rational, efficient,
equilibrated, and sustainable use of the coastal area.
The earthquake and tsunami dramatically modified the
territory, especially in the lowest coastal areas. Whether and
how these high-risk areas should be redeveloped or inhabited
are significantly urgent questions. The Chilean Constitution
restrains the delivery of reconstruction subsidies in sites
that are known to present a risk to life; however, knowing
the attachment to the land and the longstanding cultural
tradition of coastal communities, the government is loathe
to hinder reconstruction in these areas.
This reality requires a proactive approach that
incorporates risk assessment, evaluation of risk
mitigation infrastructure investments, and definition
of land use conditions in these high-risk coastal areas.
The proposed criteria for the reconstruction of the affected
coastal cities establish conditions of use in direct relation with:
The Territorial Planning Instruments (IPT)
Escape routes were defined and
appropriately marked to ensure
prompt evacuation.
Construction technical norms
Allocation of housing subsidies
Priorization of public investment
TSUNAMI
TSUNAMI
RESILIENT HOUSE
RESILIENT
HOUSE
29
SCOPE AND COMPLEXITY OF THE CHALLENGE
The Territorial, Urban, and Heritage Reconstruction Program of the Chilean Ministry of
Housing and Urban Development has deployed an intense decentralized collaborative
platform with regional governments, municipalities, and in some cases, private institutions,
universities, and non-governmental organizations to integrally orient and coordinate the
different efforts and initiatives that emerged for the reconstruction process.
In order to understand the scope and
magnitude of the disaster, we are
talking about the most widespread
urban earthquake ever recorded. It was
experienced as a magnitude above 8
Richter by more than 12 million people in
the central and most populated area of
the country, a territory of more than 600
kilometers. The capital city of Santiago
and the second largest metropolitan areas
of Concepción and Valparaiso, along with
more than 900 towns and villages were
severely affected, leaving more than
370 thousand buildings damaged, 220
thousand corresponding to households
that will require governmental support
for reconstruction or repair.
Added to the magnitude of the challenge,
one of the main complexities of urban
reconstruction is the consideration of
tsunami risks. Chilean building codes
were known to be some of the oldest and
advanced in terms of structural resistance
to earthquakes, but the country lacked
any regulation for constructions in
tsunami risk areas, despite historical
evidence of tsunami risk and the fact that
near 25% of the fatalities were attributed
to the tsunami.
The greatest portion of the damage is
found in post-industrial towns, rural
communities and historical villages with
fragile economies that were undergoing
complex processes of economic and
social conversion or redefinition. That is
30
the case of the port-city of Talcahuano,
the fishermen towns in the Maule Region,
and the hundreds of small colonial
villages that were betting their future
on the development of special-interest
tourism based on their architectural
heritage. They are now mourning the loss
of their physical legacy and the prospects
for their future.
most of our territory, but rather planning
and designing our cities to become
more secure, resilient, integrated, and
competitive, while considering risk
reduction and prevention as key elements
of infrastructure and lifestyle.
All of these geographical and economic
variables compound the complexity
of integrating multisectorial projects
and investments, not only for urban
reconstruction but also for the
provision of the sound coordination of
infrastructure, transportation, and public
services regulation and implementation.
The greatest challenge of the urban
reconstruction process is finding the right
instances for intersectorial coordination
in an unprecedented context of
decentralization in Chilean history. Along
with their local communities, the six
regions and 239 municipalities affected
by the earthquake and tsunami will play a
key role in converting the disaster into an
opportunity for the future.
The 27F disaster, along with the 2008
Chaitén volcano eruption and regular
natural disasters have proved that Chile
must learn to live with its privileged
nature while considering its risks.
This does not mean turning our backs
to the historic coastal living traditions or
abandoning high-risk areas that comprise
The 27F disaster taught Chile a hard
lesson in terms of territorial and urban
planning, the lesson that we must learn
to plan our cities knowing and managing
the natural risks to which the particular
geography of the country exposes us
permanently. The Zoning Plans and
Ordinances for all coastal municipalities
and localities are now being updated,
based on the risk analysis and the
changes in the territory produced by the
earthquake and tsunami, as indicated in
article 27 of the National Catastrophe
Law.
Of the 239 municipalities affected by
the earthquake and tsunami, 173 do not
require any change or update to their
zoning plans and ordinances derived
from natural risks, 69 will require a
change or adjustment to the instruments,
29 of which correspond to coastal
municipalities and the remaining to
inland municipalities exposed to specific
limited risks related to landslides or
streams.
1. UPDATE OF RISK-BASED PLANNING
TOOLS
instruments, 29 of which correspond to
coastal municipalities and the remaining
to inland municipalities exposed to
specific limited risks related to landslides
or streams.
Criteria for reconstruction in risk areas:
The
earthquake
and
tsunami
dramatically modified the territory,
especially in the lowest coastal areas
such as fishing coves, river deltas,
estuaries, wetlands, and ponds as well
as slopes and ravines. These places were
in some cases inhabited by formal and
informal settlements dated before risk
assessment studies were available, and
many of them are now gone.
Whether and how these zones should
be redeveloped or inhabited are
significantly urgent questions, since
the Chilean Constitution restrains the
delivery of reconstruction subsidies in
sites that are known to present a risk
to the life of individuals. Nonetheless,
the
government
cannot
hinder
reconstruction, knowing the attachment
to the land and the longstanding cultural
tradition of coastal communities. This
reality requires a proactive approach that
incorporates risk assessment of coastal
areas, evaluation of risk mitigation
infrastructure investments and land
use conditions on those localities more
exposed to future natural disasters.
Risk assessment reports and studies
have progressed significantly and will
lead to the following measures:
a. Clearing and immediate release of
areas free of geological or tsunami risk in
order to begin reconstruction.
b. Determination and delimitation of the
areas of moderate risk where an eventual
recurrence requires development of
infrastructure, land use, or mitigation
measures, accompanied by early warning
and evacuation protocols.
c. Delimitation and oversight of areas
of exceptionally high risk that may not
be apt for permanent residential use or
activities due to geographical changes
or geological conditions. These latter
are expected to be as few as possible in
order to minimize the resettlement and
displacement of communities whose
economy depend precisely on coastal
activities.
2. RESTORATION OF URBAN
ROADWORKS
Reconstruction and restoration of urban
roads and rainwater systems damaged
by the earthquake is under way through
a special plan in regions V, VI, VII,
VIII, IX and the Metropolitan Region.
Each Regional SERVIU is in charge of
implementation.
The objective of this plan is to return the
functionality of the roads and rainwater
collection and drainage systems as soon
as possible in the cities damaged by
the earthquake. The majority of urban
repairs were completed by December 31,
2010, and the remaining repairs will be
finished by December 31, 2011.
3. ACTION PLAN AND CRITERIA FOR
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE
COASTAL AREAS
The action plan and criteria defined
for the reconstruction of urban
settlements located in the coastline
affected by the tsunami considers the
early reconstruction of homes and
infrastructure and promotes the safe
development and quality of life in the
localities beyond the emergency. These
considerations depend on the necessary
technical criteria to orient land uses and
allow the allocation and execution of
housing subsidies in safe areas, as well as
the execution of public investment work
for reposition or the construction of new
mitigation infrastructure in areas subject
of risk.
For the definition of the coastline
reconstruction criteria, a series of
technical studies were developed,
providing planning teams with the
information for each locality affected
by the tsunami. In parallel with those
studies, the Ministry developed specific
simulations and scenarios of tsunami
risk and mitigation infrastructure
in the localities of Constitución,
Dichato, Talcahuano, Llico, Tubul, that
are complementary to the studies
developed by National Service of
Geology and Mining (SERNAGEOMIN)
and Hydrographic and Oceanographic
Service of Chilean Navy (SHOA).
The proposed criteria for the
reconstruction of the affected coastal
towns established land use conditions
in direct relation with the Territorial
Planning Instruments (IPT), construction
codes and technical norms, allocation
of housing subsidies, and priorization of
public investment.
The action plan and criteria for the
reconstruction of coastal cities respond
to the constitutional mandate of
prioritizing the safety of the citizens,
as well as promoting public policies to
ensure the rational, efficient, equilibrated,
and sustainable use of the coastal area,
compatible with the economic and social
interests of the public and the private
sector.
31
Premises
- The protection of life is the primary
role of the state, making it an obligation
to understand, inform and give timely
warning to the inhabitants of areas
subject to tsunami risk and the conditions
of risk to which their property is exposed.
- The coastline is a natural font of
resources and labor of our country,
so that the Government recognizes
the priority to recognize and support
communities whose livelihoods depend
on economic, cultural, social and touristic
activities developed in the coastline.
- The use of the coastline should consider
all types of activities, but should be
regulated according to the risk through
the Territorial Planning Tools (IPT)
and the conditions of construction and
urbanization in accordance with current
regulations and complementary criteria
for reconstruction.
- There should be proper evacuation
routes, education programs, and
adequate training to carry out emergency
plans at all sites at risk.
- Avoid exposing the destruction or
damage of public and private property,
especially equipment deemed critical by
regulating the uses in areas of high risk
and minimizing future losses.
- Invest in mitigation measures and
infrastructure in existing developments
in advance to future disasters if the
economic and social benefits justify the
costs.
Action plan
To respond in a timely maner to the
demands of reconstruction of the
affected population, the plan is to work
in 3 parallel lines of action, which will be
assumed, as the competence established
by law and regulations, by the different
levels of government:
1. Support local government in updating
the IPT and establishment of a tsunami
protocol
2.
Implementation
of
mitigation
infrastructure.
3. Allocation of housing subsidies.
Referential scheme for the occupation of the coastal edge
USES
RISK AREA
Residential
Housing
Lodging
Equipment
Scientific
Comerce
Cult &
Culture
Sports
Education
Recreation
Health
Security
ALLOWED
TYPES
RISK FREE AREA
ZR1 RESTRICTED
USE AREA
ZR2 CONDITIONED AREA
Mitigation and evacuation
routes
Scientific
Sports
Recreation
Comerce
Housing
Lodging
Housing
Lodging
Scientific
Comerce
Cult y Culture
Sports
Recreation
Social
Scientific
Comerce
Cult y Culture
Sports
Recreation
Education
Health
Security
Services
Social
Green areas and
public spaces
Transport Infraestructure
Port Infraestructure
Green areas and public spaces
Productive Activities
Infraestructure
Transport Infraestructure
Port Infraestructure
Infraestructure
Maximum risk simulation level / threat potential
Critical equipment
is excluded:
Education
RESTRICTED ZONE 1
CONDITIONED ZONE 2
Potentially flooded areas / Aplication of Art. 2.1.17 OGUC
32
RISK FREE ZONE
4. RECONSTRUCTION MASTER PLANS
The Ministry and several public and
private entities have developed more
than 100 studies of Master Plans for
the main towns along the seaboard and
others located inland that were affected
by the disaster.
The objective of these plans has been
to orient decision-making regarding the
allocation of housing reconstruction/
repair subsidies, the prioritization of
works and projects for reconstruction
of infrastructure, and the establishment
of long-term investment criteria and
planning for these cities.
Simultaneously, these plans encourage
economic, social, and environmental
development, adding instances of
community participation and integrating
those variables that will raise the urban
standard of our nation.
Coastal Cities Master Plan
During the year 2010 the Ministry and
several public and private entities have
developed 25 studies of Master Plans for
the main towns along the seaboard that
were affected by the tsunami.
In the case of coastal cities, the Master
Plans involve technical studies and
preliminary proposals for mitigative
works, urban design, infrastructure,
housing, and instances of community
participation for coastal localities that
require integration and coordination
of interministerial projects (mitigative
works, fishing coves, river and coastal
edges, rain water, sanitation, road works,
parks, infrastructure, etc).
The
Public-Private
Association
Agreement is the mechanism used to
coordinate and finance the Master Plans
during the emergency phase. It was
made among municipalities, regional
governments, businesses, and social
organizations. MINVU acted as guarantor
to ensure that the outcome generated
valid inputs in updating master plans
and scheduling investment plans after
technical, economic, and social validation
by the corresponding agencies.
To summarize, each coastal town has
3 concrete PRODUCTS leading to the
reconstruction and the Regulatory Plan
Update of the town:
that recognizes the identity and
particularities of the localities, and
supporting the tourist potential of the
area in the short and long term.
1. Risk studies
Risk studies elaborated by SERNAGEOMIN
and Universidad Catolica and Universidad
del Biobío.
5. HERITAGE RECOVERY
2. Master plans and mitigation projects
Master plans for each location include a
plan of urban infrastructure and mitigation
projects.
3. Zoning and polygons for special
subsidies
Definition of zones of exclusion and areas
where it will be possible to construct tsunami
resilient houses with special subsidies.
Urban Generation Master Plan
More than 100 Urban Regeneration
Master Plans were developed by the
Ministery for the reconstruction of
intermediate and small localities. They
are currently being developed by the
Urban Development Division of the
MINVU.
The Regeneration Master Plans help
to guide the harmonic reconstruction
of localities, neighborhoods, and cities
whose urban character and identity are
threatened by the dynamics inherent to
reconstruction and that are worthy of
tools that recognize and protect their
value as a whole.
The main objective of these master
plans is to preserve the specific urban
image of the locality by orienting
decision-making regarding the allocation
of
reconstruction/repair
subsidies,
prioritizing works and reconstruction
projects, and establishing long-term
investment criteria and planning for
these cities.
All the plans developed by the Ministry
have been presented as non-binding
exercises that orient decision-making and
facilitate a consensus regarding a vision
of long-term development for the future
of these cities. Assuring a reconstruction
Activities have been undertaken to
recover real estate and zones of historic
importance, such as a preparing a
cadastre, and protecting and prioritizing
works. The government has also set up
an interministerial task force, and has
designed training plans and special
heritage recovery plans with the support
of foundations, businesses, NGOs, and
international organizations.
From the cadastre elaborated by the
Ministry of Housing and Urbanism, it is
possible to observe that, from the total
of damaged houses, the houses built
in adobe (earth blocks) are the largest
percentage (27%). Also, from the total
of adobe houses with damage, 91% are
located in the regions O´Higgins, Maule
and Biobío.
The data gathered and systematized
include records on the condition of
the properties of Zones of Historic
Conservation and Typical Zones. In
localities where the property or zone has
not yet been declared for Conservation or
a Typical Zone, the Master Plans and local
authorities defined special polygons
for areas with patrimonial value. The
polygons demarcate the areas of priority
intervention and orient the allocation
of special heritage subsidies (additional
amount of ). In parallel with the cadastre
work and allocation of special subsidies,
the Ministry has promoted training in
restoration and earthquake-resistant
construction. These trainig programs
have been designed with universities,
foundations, and NGOs to train
manpower skilled in heritage recovery
and safe reconstruction using adobe. In
terms of the institutional framework,
one of the greatest innovations has been
the creation of the Regional Office of
Heritage Reconstruction of the Region
of O’Higgins; this agency has progressed
in an integrated fashion, focused on
rescuing the cultural legacy of the region,
both material and intangible.
33
25 COASTAL MASTER PLANS
01. COBQUECURA
02. PERALES
03. DICHATO
04. LOS MORROS
05. CALETA DEl
MEDIO
poner denuevo!!!!
06. VEGAS DE
COLIUMO
07. COCHOLGÜE
08. PENCO
09. TUMBES
10. TALCAHUANO
11. CALETA LO
ROJAS
12. ISLA SANTA
MARÍA
13. TUBUL
14. LLICO
15. LEBU
16. ISLA MOCHA
17. QUIDICO
18. TIRÚA
19. CONSTITUCIÓN
20. DUAO
21. ILOCA
22. LA PESCA
23. PELLUHUE
24. CURANIPE
25. JUAN
CONSTITUCIÓN
CONSTITUCIÓN
FERNÁNDEZ
PELLUHUE
JUAN FERNÁNDEZ
34
DICHATO
A CHALLENGE OF NATIONAL UNITY
AND DECENTRALIZATION
Heritage Reconstruction Project in Curepto
The sense of unity proposed in the “United Reconstructing a Better Chile“
axiom suggests that we should all be involved in the reconstruction. It
would be a mistake to pretend that the goverment could, centrally, define
the reconstruction of more than one thousand cities and towns. Thus, the
plan involves an exercise in decentralization and collaboration between
the central government, local government, and civil society that has no
precedent in our history.
It is not only about collaboration with local
communities and institutions that have contributed
resources and management capacity during the
days following the emergency. It is also about a
commitment to delegating a considerable part of the
management and decision-making to municipalities,
regional agencies and local government as they
know their needs and those of their communities
better. The deployment of this plan will put many
communities and local leaders to test and the
government will be ready to help and aid anyone
who is challenged by the complexity of the task.
In these difficult months, we have proudly seen how
communities in small and large localities have moved
quickly to plan the reconstruction and recovery of
their heritage with the aid of civic organizations,
businesses, and regional agencies.
Spontaneous alliances and initiatives have sprung
up all over, and the Ministry has set up a work
structure by which all these initiatives can be
channeled and formalized as agreements and plans
that can be implemented and are viable in the future.
Experiences like these are multiplying throughout the
disaster zone. The Ministry’s role has been to ensure
that these exercises comply with the technical and
civic validation required and thus become relevant
inputs in the reconstruction investment plans.
Progressing quickly while procuring a long-term
vision, integrating everyone by trusting in local
capacities, recovering our heritage, and projecting
ourselves in the future are the challenges and
opportunities that we are willing to assume so that
united, we will rebuild a better Chile.
35
3. 2011 SUMMARY – FIRST
The Reconstruction
From March 11th, 2010 to March 11th, 2014
This stage of the Plan is currently being fully implemented and developed in parallel with the regular
government program. The objective is that, by March 11, 2014, the buildings and infrastructure
destroyed by the earthquake will be reconstructed. This goal has been made feasible by a large
allocation of public resources and a healthy fiscal policy. The following summary describes the main
and pending issues in the reconstruction, by sector:
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
PROGRESS
On February 27th, 2011, over 132,000 reconstruction
subsidies have been allocated (60% of the total
committed)
4,350 families located in 106 emergency camps,
distributed over the affected area. 100% of the families in
emergency camps have received technical assistance
Over 76,000 reconstruction and repair works are ongoing
or delivered to the families
80% of the families in emergency camps with allocated
reconstruction housing subsidies
From the 100 Reconstruction Master Plans: 53 Master
Plans in tender stage, 21 in execution stage, and 26 with
finished design
83% of repair works in execution for apartments in social
condominiums
80 thousand emergency houses installed, doubling the
initial goal of 40 thousand
50 thousand families benefited with the program “Manos
a la Obra” (Hands to work) that helped families learn how
to repair their own house
100% of subsidies for families living in social condominiums
to reconstruct already allocated
100% of demolition works initiated or finished for social
condominiums
100% of the Reconstruction Master Plan studies finished
285.500 registered in the Registry of Victims of Ministry
of Housing and Urban Development. The registry was
open until August 27th, 2010
TO BE DONE
Progress 27F and goals
During 2011, the total amount of 220
thousand reconstructing subsidies
will be allocated
By February 2013, over 90% of the
reconstruction and repair works will
be in execution or finished.
Finish and implement all
Reconstruction Master Plans
the
Eradication of all the emergency
camps
36
YEAR OF RECONSTRUCTION
EDUCATION
PROGRESS
TO DO
100% of children attending classes 45 days after the
earthquake
21,000 maintenance subsidies to students
Reconstruction and repair of 70% of the educational
institutions affected by the earthquake through the following
programs:
Plan for major repairs (first trimester 2011, institutions
with damages greater than over US$367 thousand)
Program Earthquake 1 and Earthquake 2 (594 institutions)
Minor repair plan 1 (over US$ 173 million, 601 institutions,
ends in February 2011)
Minor repair plan 2 (over US$ 129 million, 333 institutions,
ends in April 2011)
Repair plan of 12 traditional schools
HEALTH
PROGRESS
100% of hospital beds recovered with temporary or
permanent solutions
9 hospitals in accelerated construction
90% of the medical equipment and industrial equipments
are operative
84% of destroyed operating rooms are recovered and in use
19 campaign hospitals for the emergency stage (14 are
already dismantled)
From the 17 hospitals with severe damage, 94% are
operating and 7 are in process of major repair
TO BE DONE
Open to the public 9 hospitals in accelerated construction
during the first semester of 2011
Finish the repair works of 7 hospitals (second semester
2012)
Implement the definitive hospitals recovery plan for the
following: Talca, Curicó, Cauquenes, Parral, Constitución,
Chillán, among others
Plan for total reposition (first trimester 2011, institutions
with major damage, greater than 50%)
Plan for emblematic institutions (21 institutions, over
US$75 million)
Over US$18 million available for the reconstruction or
repair of the universities’ infrastructure
The Ministry of Education also proposed to reduce to half
the 70 thousand students that are currently sharing the
infrastructure as of March 2011
PUBLIC WORKS
PROGRESS
99.1% of the public infrastructure is recovered partially
or totally
100% of the 1.554 kilometers of damaged roads
recovered
100% of ports infrastructure recovered
100% of the rural potable water systems recovered
100% of the aerodromes and airports recovered
98.9% of the hydraulic works recovered (canals,
reservoirs, rain water collectors)
98.6% of the damaged bridges recovered
TO BE DONE
Finish the emergency projects (over US$354 million,
80% finished) and reconstruction projects (over
US$413 million), which includes 15 executed projects, 9
adjudicated, 14 in tender, and 47 for tender
During 2010, 428,000 jobs were created, the economy grew over 5%, exports and investment were
significantly increased, crime rates were diminished, security was increased, and major reforms were
launched in the goverment´s program, most notably the Education Reform approved in January 2011.
* Numbers approximated using current US Dollar - Chilean Peso exchange rate (April 27th, 2011).
37
WWW.MINVU.CL
MINVU
RECONSTRUCTION PLAN
GOVERNMENT OF CHILE
MINISTRY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
UNITED RECONSTRUCTING A BETTER CHILE HOUSING, NEIGHBORHOOD, CITY

minvuministry of housing and urban development government of chile

Transcription

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