1–2

The Pew Center on Global Climate Change / The National Commission on Energy Policy
The 10–50 Solution: Technologies and Policies for a Low-Carbon Future
Dinner keynote, Washington DC, 25 March 2004
Good News about Profitable Climate Solutions
Amory B. Lovins
Chief Executive Officer
Rocky Mountain Institute
www.rmi.org
Chairman of the Board
Hypercar, Inc.
www.hypercar.com
ablovins@rmi.org
Copyright © 2004 Rocky Mountain Institute. All rights reserved. Reproduction for sponsors’ and attendees’ noncommercial use is licensed for sponsors.
Hypercar® and Fiberforge™ are trademarks of Hypercar, Inc.
Glad tidings from a
parallel analytic universe
1. End-use efficiency need not be modest, costly,
incremental, or subject to diminishing returns
2. Dramatic improvements are available in vehicle
physics (mass and drag), not just in propulsion, and
can make H2 vehicles happen far earlier and cheaper
3. Distributed power brings gamechanging (~10×)
economic benefits, not just familiar minor ones
4. Such supposedly big problems as vehicular H2 storage
and bulk electricity storage are artifactual and need
not actually be solved (with good vehicle physics and
diverse renewables)
5. Nuclear power not only isn’t needed or economic, but
would worsen climate change compared to best buys
By 2050, an affluent world could
meet or beat a 2000 CO2 ÷ (3–4) goal
Cenergy=
×2
× 3–4
÷ 2–4
×1.5
× 4–6
× 1–2
population × affluence per capita × carbon intensity
conversion eff. × end - use eff. × hedonic eff.
(2.8–3.6%/y; US primary energy/GDP fell 3.4%/y
during 1979–86 and 3.1%/y during 1996–2001)
or ~1.5–12× lower CO2 emissions despite the
assumed 6–8× grosser World Product.* Great
flexibility is thus available. The future is not
fate but choice.
Encouragingly, during 1990–2002 U.S. CO2
emissions grew 3× slower than U.S. GDP.
*A 1993 UN study found 1.35× and 8×, respectively, 1985–2050. Johansson, Kelly, Reddy, Williams, & Burnham, Renewable Energy,
1177 pp., Island Press, Washington DC. That analysis, though mostly excellent on the supply side, assumed relatively weak end-use efficiency opportunities.
U.S. energy/GDP already cut 42%,
to very nearly the 1976 “soft path”
250
primary energy
consumption
(quadrillion BTU/year)
200
150
"hard path"
projected by
industry
and
government
government ~1975
USEIA Annual Energy
Outlook 2004 forecast,
Reference Case
actual total
consumption
actual
total energy
reported by
consumption
USEIA
"soft path"
proposed by
Lovins in 1976
100
coal
gas
oil and gas
50
oil and gas
nuclear
0
1975
soft technologies
(which do not include
big hydro or nuclear)
nuclear
renewables
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
but that just scratches the surface, esp. for oil & electricity…
As nationwide, a clear break from old
trends has happened in California…
Per-Capita Electricity Consumption, 1960–2000
16
14
12
MWh Per Person-Year
Rest of U.S.
California
10
8
Then, in 1–2Q01,
Californians undid the
previous 5–10 years’
demand growth
6
4
2
(DOE and CEC data, compiled 1960–89 by Worldwatch Institute, 1990–2000 by Rocky Mountain Institute;
2000 data are preliminary; 1991–2000 population data not yet renormalized to 2000 Census findings)
0
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
…and similarly in New England
A vast unbought efficiency potential
remains largely unnoticed
◊ US could save ≥3/4 of its electricity use (~1/4 lights,
1/4 motors, ≥1/4 others), with same or better services, by fully retrofitting best tech @ <1¢/kWh av. cost
◊ Huge 25-year literature documents a comparable el.eff. potential throughout the industrial world, e.g.:
{
{
{
{
Sweden (State Power Board, 1989): save 1/2 of el. @ $0.016/kWh
Denmark (Nat’l. Tech. U.): save 3/4 of bldg el. @ $0.016/kWh
FRG (Institut Wohnen u. Umwelt): save 4/5 of home el., 40% ROI
Even bigger and cheaper potential in developing countries
◊ Tech. details in ~2.5-m bookshelf: www.esource.com
◊ US power plants discard more energy than Japan uses
◊ Think systems efficiency, not device efficiency
{
{
Power-plant fuel to incandescent light: ~3%
Gasoline to moving the car’s driver: <1%
◊ Fundamental advances still happen
(www.paxscientific.com)
When rewarded, not penalized,
efficiency can work quickly (new
mktg. methods are even better)
◊ In 1983–85, 10 million people served by So. Cal. Edison Co.
(then the #3 US investor-owned utility) were cutting its 10y-ahead peak load by 81/2% per year, at ~1% of long-run
marginal supply cost
◊ In 1990, NEES got 90% of a small-business retrofit pilot
program’s market signed up in two months
◊ PG&E got 25% of its 1990 new-commercial-construction
market in 3 months, raised its 1991 target, and got it all
during 1–9 January; new mktg. methods are even better
◊ In 1977–85, U.S. GDP grew 27%, oil use fell 17%, oil
imports fell 50%, and Persian Gulf oil imports fell 87%
◊ Many big, fast savings are independent of or contrary to
price signals; costly energy isn’t necessary or sufficient for
very efficient energy use; econometrics is a rear-view mirror
End-use efficiency’s potential is
getting bigger and cheaper…faster
◊ Technologies: mass production (often offshore),
cheaper electronics, competition, better tech
(thanks to Jim Rogers PE for most of these examples, all in
nominal dollars)
{
Compact fluorescent lamps: >$20 in 1983, $2–5 in 2003 (~1b/y)
{
Electronic T8 ballasts: >$80 in 1990, <$10 in 2003
{
Direct/indirect luminaires: gone from premium to cheapest option
{
Industrial variable-speed drives: ~60–70% cheaper since 1990
{
Window a/c: 54% cheaper than 1993, 13% more efficient, digital
{
Low-E window coatings: ~75% cheaper than five years ago
◊ Delivery: scaleup, streamlining, integration
{
E.g., a NE lighting retrofit firm halves the normal contractor price
◊ Design integration: huge, least exploited resource
Integrative design can make negawatts
far cheaper than anyone thought
“People who seem to
have had a new idea
have often just stopped
having an old idea”
—— inven
invento
torr Edwin
Edwin Land
Land
Making big savings cost less than small or
no savings: some recent building examples
◊ New
{
Big office buildings: 80–90% less energy, build ~3–5% cheaper
and 6 months faster, superior comfort and market performance
{
Houses: comfortable without heating system down to –44˚C, 99%
water-heating saving, 90% el. saving, 10-month payback in 1984
{
Houses: comfortable with no a/c up to +46˚C, same or lower cost
{
Houses: 90% a/c saving in Bangkok, better comfort, same cost
◊ Retrofit
{
Sweden’s Systembolaget AB, with IT help, cut its building fleet’s
energy cost by ~75%, ~1985–2000
{
75% energy savings retrofittable in big Chicago office tower,
better comfort, same cost as the routine 20-year renovation
{
97% a/c saving design for retrofitting a California office, with
better comfort and good economics
◊ All but the Swedish example illustrate how integrative design can “tunnel through the cost barrier”
Old design mentality:
always diminishing returns...
New design mentality: expanding returns,
“tunneling through the cost barrier”
Industrial efficiency from integrative
design, just using old technologies
◊ Save half of motor-system electricity (3/8 of all industrial
electricity), retrofit aftertax ROI 100–200%/y
◊ Better still, start downstream (less flow & friction): 92%
saving in new industrial pumping loop just by using fat,
short, straight pipes; lower capex, better performance
Could have saved more like 98%, even cheaper, with fuller optimization
{ Reducing pipe flow or friction saves ~10× more fuel & CO2 at power plant
{
◊
◊
◊
◊
◊
◊
Similar returns saving >50% of old chip fabs’ HVAC power
Retrofit refinery, save 42%, 3-y simple payback
Larger savings retrofitting big platinum mine, LNG plant,…
Redesign new data center, save 89%, costs less, up more
Redesign new supermarket, save 70–90%, costs less
Redesign new chemical plant, save ~3/4 of el., cut construction time & cost by ≥10% (+ process innovations)
◊ Huge, neg.-capex savings in new chip fab, LNG & GTL,…
So why hasn’t all that cheap
efficiency been bought already?
◊ Most analysts don’t acknowledge that it exists
◊ No engineering school yet teaches how to cost-tunnel
◊ 60–80 market failures; each can be turned into a
business opportunity (“Climate: Making Sense and
Making Money,” www.rmi.org/sitepages/pid173.php)
◊ Firms are starting to do so, but still face big obstacles
◊ Clients that wanted 2-y paybacks now seek <6 months
even though the cost of capital is close to zero!
◊ NB: Efficiency is also faster than supply; when bought,
it captures the revenue first, causing supply overshoot
(mid-1980s) and bankrupting suppliers
{
We don’t need to see this very bad movie again: beware irrational
exuberance (CCGT, LNG, el. tx.,…)
Let efficient use compete fairly
◊ All technologies should be allowed to compete
fairly, at honest prices, regardless of whether they
save or produce energy, what kind they are, how
big they are, or who owns them
◊ In every market and every administrative process,
therefore, negawatts should be able to compete on
a level playing-field with megawatts
◊ Big technologies or favorite technologies should
receive no special advantage (as they now do)
◊ CO2 emissions should not be grandfathered
◊ Key: reward distribution companies for cutting
customers’ bills, not for selling them more energy!
Renewables are entering rapidly too
◊ Europe plans 22%-renewable electricity by 2010
◊ World wind cap. production ×5 ’97–’03, PV production ×6
{
{
Global wind capacity has lately added 7–8 GW/y, vs. 3.1 GW/y av.
nuclear additions through the 1990s; India & Mongolia emerging
Wind, 1/5 of Denmark’s power today, provides 3× el. util. ind.’s jobs
◊ Price and potential are equally fast-moving targets
o
o
o
o
Best US ’03 wind price 1.8¢/kWh, soon <1.5 (cf. Hoffert’s 3.3–3.5¢
“today”—a 1996 source), + 1.8¢ subsidy, – ~1¢ const.-price value
Practical wind potential ~1.5–4× global electricity use; similar for US
Land-use is not excessive—comparable to coal or nuclear fuel cycles
Renewable el. from diverse sites and sources does not present an
intermittence problem as is still widely and erroneously supposed
◊ PV prod’n grew 32–43%/y ’99–’03, 0.74 GW/y in ’03;
can compete in many US bldgs., esp. if integrated; big
arrays now sell for $2.5/Wp; offered by some major
merchant homebuilders; 0.7-eV InN bandgap (LBNL
’02) could add 20 % points of efficiency; organic?
Bundling PVs with end-use
efficiency: a recent example
◊
◊
◊
◊
◊
◊
◊
◊
◊
◊
Santa Rita Jail, Alameda
County, California
PowerLight 1.18 MWp project,
1.46 GWh/y, 1.25 ha of PVs
Integrated with Cool Roof and
ESCO efficiency retrofit (lighting, HVAC, controls, 1 GWh/y)
Energy management optimizes
use of PV output, raising profit
— leverages demand response
Dramatic (~0.7 MWp) load cut
Gross project cost $9 million
State incentives $5 million
Gross savings $15 million/25 y
IRR >10%/y (Cty. hurdle rate)
Works for PVs, so should work
better for anything cheaper
Similarly overlooked opportunities
to integrate renewables with
natural gas
◊ Old (but good) method: solar-thermal-electric with
gas backup
◊ New method: “firm” wind energy (make it dispatchable) with a DSM or hydro contract, then trade it to
free up ~$3.5/106BTU gas from peakers to sell into
a ~$5–6/106BTU gas market: biggest but ignored
windpower value today is shifting the gas market
{
DSM too: cutting 2000 US el. loads by 5% saves 9.5% of gas
◊ Potential future method: use wind to make kWh
onpeak and H2 (to beat gasoline) offpeak; or even
design to make only H2, eliminating power electronics, gearbox, uptower mass, system cost,…; could
pipe H2 and use O2 to gasify coal w/C sequestration
Electricity supply (and more):
what’s the right size for the job?
◊ ~1880–1980: power stations costlier & less reliable
than the grid, so must be shared via the grid
◊ ~1980– : power stations cheaper & more reliable
than the grid, so really cheap and reliable supply
must be at/near customers, i.e., “distributed”
◊ Central thermal power plants stopped getting more
efficient in the 1960s, bigger in the 1970s, cheaper
in the 1980s, and bought in the 1990s
◊ Distributed cap. >25% of total in several countries
◊ Wind 39 GW (XII.03), ind. expects 150 GW by 2012
◊ Photovoltaics now the cheapest option for ≥2 billion
people (w/eff., often positive cashflow from day 1)
Distributed generation
can compete strongly now
◊ Industrial gas-turbine cogen/trigen delivers a
few MWe/site at ~0.5–2¢/kWh net (η ~ 0.90)
◊ A recent microturbine retrofit design would give a 1-y
payback against 5.5¢/kWh utility power (η ~ 0.92) in
a 150,000-m2 office/laboratory complex
◊ But commodity ¢/kWh omits key “distributed benefits”
o
Small Is Profitable: The Hidden Economic Benefits of Making Electrical Resources the Right Size (www.smallisprofitable.org, 2002), an
Economist Book of the Year
o
207 distributed benefits boost typical economic value by ~10×; the
biggest benefits come from financial economics, then el. engineering
o
“Cleaner Energy, Greener Profits” (www.rmi.org, 2001) shows fuel
cells can often be profitably applied even at $2,000–3,000/kW
o
Distributed benefits are starting to be recognized and captured, but
authors here only hinted at them, as if they were small, not decisive
The Future of Nuclear Power
(MIT, 29 July 2003)
◊ Good cost analysis of new nuclear power: 6.7¢/kWh
busbar [2002 $]), implying 9.3+¢/kWh delivered — so
it’s stagnating because economically uncompetitive
◊ Found only a major expansion would justify the high
costs of addressing its many challenges
{
3× world nucl. cap. to cut CO2 increase 25% by 2050
◊ But the media missed the report’s big logical flaw
{
{
{
The report compared nuclear power only with two obsolete competitors — central coal and combined-cycle gas — and found it might
beat them if it had huge cost cuts and heavy carbon taxes
But no analysis of its three fatal competitors today: end-use
efficiency (~3–30× cheaper), wind (2×), and distributed gas
cogen or trigen (5–10×, net of heat credit); carbon taxes would
advantage the first two as much as they would nuclear power; this
comparison does not count the competitors’ distributed benefits
So no analytic basis for authors’ personal opinion—that all options
are needed, so nuclear power merits increased subsidies…thereby
retarding their competitors (a major cost not mentioned)
Why nuclear power can’t save
climate: opportunity cost
◊ If saving a kWh costs as much as 3¢ (well above average), and delivering a new nuclear kWh costs as little
as 6¢ (extremely optimistic), then each 6¢ spent on a
nuclear kWh could have bought two efficiency kWh
{
Buying the costlier nuclear kWh thus perpetuated one kWh of fossilfueled generation that’s otherwise avoided
◊ Unless nuclear power is the cheapest way to meet
energy-service needs, buying more of it will make
climate change worse than “best buys first”
◊ Same for e.g. PVs—and even more so if they’re in
orbit …which would deliver costlier, riskier kWh than
putting them on rooftops
{
Peter Glaser’s solar power satellites and Bucky’s world grid are unattractive, due to basic economics, stability, and vulnerability issues
Oil intensity has halved despite 22 years of
flat or worsening light-vehicle mpg; so just
imagine if that resumed its 5%/y increase!
U.S. energy intensity since 1975
1.2
1.2
Oil intensity –5.2%/y
Oil intensity –2.1%/y
1.0
1.0
el./GDP down only 9% — average-cost
rates, subsidies, perverse incentives,…
0.8
0.6
0.6
New-light-vehicle L/100 km stagnated; hit a 22-year high in MY2002
0.4
electricity (L axis)
primary energy (L axis)
oil (L axis)
new light vehicles (R axis)
42% intensity drop
1975–2002: 2/3 bigger
than total oil use, 3× oil
imports, 5× oil output,
12× Gulf imports
50% oil
intensity
drop broke
OPEC’s
pricing
power for a
decade
0.2
0.2
Data source: U.S. Energy Information Administration,
www eia doe gov/emeu/aer/contents html
Annual Energy Review
,
Light-vehicle data from
id . and TEDB 22 (ORNL-6967), 2002, www-cta.ornl.gov/cta/data/index.html
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
Year
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
0.0
1975
0.0
0.4
Intensity vs. 1975
light-vehicle fleet
0.8
Midsize 5-seat-SUV virtual design (2000)
Ultralight but ultrasafe
Uncompromised
0–100 km/h in 8.3 s
Competitive cost
2.05 L/100 km-equivalent = 115 mpg
(EPA combined city/hwy., w/H2 fuel cell)
“We’ll take two.” — Automobile magazine
A Saudi Arabia under
Detroit, a nega-OPEC
…and when parked, a
35-kW power plant
on wheels…if everyone did it, ~6–12× US
electric gen. capacity
Challenging a basic Detroit and
Washington assumption
◊ Both assume that making cars far more efficient
must entail tradeoffs against other desired
attributes — price, size, performance, safety,…
◊ Hence policy intervention needed to induce customers to buy the compromised vehicles; but
Congress has gridlocked on that for >20 years
◊ But what if superefficiency were a byproduct of
breakthrough engineering, so people would buy
the cars because they’re better —like buying digital media instead of vinyl phonograph records?
◊ An engineering end-run around tax/CAFE gridlock
◊ Robust business model based solely on value to
customer and competitive advantage to maker
Henry Ford on lightweighting
“Fat men cannot run as fast as thin men, but we build
most of our vehicles as though dead-weight fat
increased speed….I cannot imagine where the
delusion that weight means strength came from….”
◊ Many (even NHTSA) confuse mass, size, and safety
◊ Size protects; weight is hostile; light can be strong
{
Advanced-composite (carbon/thermoplastic) crush structures can
absorb 5–10× the energy/kg of steel—and do so more smoothly
◊ By decoupling size from mass, ultralight but ultrastrong autobodies can protect their occupants and
those they hit, saving both lives and oil without the
widely claimed conflict or contradiction
◊ The Fiberforge™ process for cheap advanced-composite autobodies (85% of hand-layup performance at
15% of its cost) is being nicely validated in 1–2Q04
857-kg curb mass (÷2), low drag, load ÷3,
so 89 km/h on same power as normal a/c,
so ready now for direct hydrogen fuel cells
35-kW
load-leveling
batteries
137-liter 345-bar H2 storage
(small enough to package) 35-kW fuel cell (small
enough to afford early)
Hydrogen-ready cars + integration with
buildings = fast, profitable H2 transition
(A.B. Lovins & B.D. Williams, NHA, 1999, www.rmi.org)
◊ No technological breakthroughs required (new storage tech or
onboard reformers); as soon as durable and cheaper fuel cells
arrive, fuel-cell cars can be marketed profitably, many years
earlier than would be possible with inefficient vehicles
◊ Staged deployment based on building & gas-station reformers
◊ Meanwhile, engine or engine-hybrid Hypercar® vehicles can
save most of the oil & CO2 (~3.0–3.5 L/100 km midsize SUV)
◊ It doesn’t matter whether stacks first become durable
(favoring buildings) or cheap (favoring cars); whichever
happens first will accelerate both markets
◊ No need for new liquid-fuel infrastructure (methanol, ultrapure
gasoline,…), liquid H2, or costly central H2 production/distrib’n.
{
See “Twenty Hydrogen Myths,” 2003, www.rmi.org, Intl J Hydr En forthc.
◊ Integrating mobile and stationary deployment makes the
transition profitable at each step (>10%/y real return)
Six hydrogen surprises (see “20
Hydrogen Myths,” www.rmi.org)
◊ >2/3 of fossil-fuel atoms burned today are H2 —
we only need to get rid of the last 1/3 (the carbon)
◊ A hydrogen transition based on natural gas won’t
use more natural gas, and may well use less
◊ It’ll also need less capital than gasoline does
◊ It would reduce drivers’ fuel cost per km
◊ It would be more profitable for oil, gas, and
(ultimately) probably coal companies
◊ Just Dakotas windpower could make enough H2 (50
MT/y, = today’s world H2 production) to fuel all US
highway vehicles if feasibly and profitably efficient;
US refineries’ 7 MT/y could displace 1/4 of gasoline
Platform physics is more important than
powertrain—and is vital to its economics
◊ Cars can run clean IC engines on gasoline or NG (≡1η)
◊ Better ones using hydrogen in IC engines (≤1.5 η)
◊ Still better ones using H2 in IC-engine hybrids (~2.5η)
{
Ford “Model U” concept car…but tanks >4× bigger (niche market)
◊ Better still: ultralight autobodies, low drag, Otto (3η)
◊ Power those platforms with IC-engine hybrids (4η)
{
Hypercar 5-seat carbon Revolution has the same mc & CD as 2-seat
aluminum Honda Insight…Insight-engine hybrid version ~66 mpg
◊ Best: put fuel cells in such superefficient bodies (5–
6η)
◊ The aim isn’t just saving fuel and pollution
{
Also strategic goals in automaking, plug-in power-plants-on-wheels,
off-oil, primary fuel flexibility, accelerated transition to renewables,…
◊ H2 needs 5η vehicles far more than vice versa
◊ 5η vehicles make robust the business case for
providing the H2 that their fuel cells would need
Layer upon endless layer of
efficiency in various forms…
◊ Beyond Hypercars® (4–6×): transport demand mgt;
mode-switching (Curitiba/Bogatá/Lima bus, Cybertran™, hybrid bikes…); vehicle-sharing (Stattauto,
ZIPcar,…); mobility-/access-based business models
(mobility.ch…); don’t mandate/subsidize sprawl…: 10×
◊ Beyond efficient aircraft (2–3×): big operational gains
at airport & system levels; point-to-point in smaller
aircraft (hubless w/gate & slot competition); air taxis;
mobility-/access-based models; virtual mobility…: 10×
◊ Class 8 trucks: 2× savings @ $0.11/L, + logistics,…
◊ Industry: materials productivity, emerging eff’y.
technologies (Price & Worrell), biomimicry, nanotechnology: probably ≥10×, maybe ultimately more
Evolving as fast as technologies,
the new policy slate
◊ Not just fiscal instruments (tax, price, subsidy) and
regulation or liberalization, though they work
◊ Also ~20 new transideological instruments, e.g.:
{
Don’t just deploy efficient new technologies — also bounty-hunt
and scrap inefficient old ones (“negative tech transfer”)
{
Accelerate turnover of all vehicle stocks (scrappage/feebates)
{
Promote competition at all scales including micropower, capture
distributed benefits, and reward lower bills, not higher sales
{
Sell end-use efficiency not for its reduced energy costs but for its
~10–100×-more-valuable side-benefits
› 6–16% higher labor productivity in efficient buildings
› 40% higher retail sales & 20–26% faster learning w/daylight
› Huge gains in industrial output and quality
{
Reform design pedagogy and practice (RMI’s 10XE project, 2005)
{
Most important: emphasize ~60–80 kinds of “barrier-busting”
Winning the Oil Endgame:
Profitable Energy Security
by Mobilizing American Innovation
◊ RMI synthesis of a full, rapid, attractive, and
profitable U.S. off-oil roadmap for business and
military leaders to be published July 2004
◊ This exercise, co-funded by DoD, will:
{
update, w/2 variants, RMI’s 1987–88 Shell supply curve for oil
end-use efficiency & saved natural gas; these could have saved
80% of 1986 oil use @ $2.5/bbl — now more & cheaper
{
add an aggressive supply-side transition (biofuels, hydrogen)
{
analyze how much of the unbought overhang of oil savings can
be elicited by traditional plus ~15–20 new policy options, plus—
in our tripolar society—innovative business models
◊ Expected to be more profitable for the country and
probably also for hydrocarbon companies
◊ Similar potential w/el., coal, cement…hence for CO2
The oil endgame is starting
◊ Many oil majors wonder whether to say so; the chairs of
four already did (plus those of three big automakers)
◊ The China-led hydrogen/Hypercar leapfrog in Shell’s
10/01 “Spirit of the Coming Age” scenario is clearly now
underway, with strong support from the highest levels
◊ Oil will probably become uncompetitive even at low
prices before it becomes unavailable even at high prices
◊ Don Huberts, Geoffrey Ballard, Sheikh Yamani: “The
Stone Age did not end because the world ran out of
stones, and the Oil Age will not end because the world
runs out of oil”
◊ Like uranium already and coal increasingly, oil will
become not worth extracting—good mainly for holding
up the ground—because other ways to do the same
tasks are better and cheaper
Leapfrog development
◊ Free up enormous financial capital to fund
other development needs
{
Compact-fluorescent-lamp and superwindow factories need
~1/1000th as much capital as expanding electric supply, and
pay back ~10 times faster; the power sector, now devouring ~1/4 of global development capital, could even export
net capital to fund other development needs
◊ Advanced resource productivity is the cornerstone of development
Otherwise the cost of supplying more resources devours
most or all of the development capital
{ Many other development goals served too—e.g., CFLs make
PVs affordable, so girls can learn to read at night, advancing
the role of women; PVs then also support irrigation pumps,
vaccine refrigerators, cellphones, and many other key tools
with powerful synergies
{
How do political leaders choose?
◊ Most of the action is at state and municipal level, but
federal policy sets the context and can help or hurt
◊ Current federal policy is at best seriously incomplete,
and if current US Energy Bill passed (??), it’d do little
◊ National Energy Policy Initiative, www.nepinitiative.org
{
Fast, low-budget proof-of-concept (a few months, a few hundred k$)
{
Start with principles and objectives, focus on existing consensus
{
Organized by two nonpartisan nonprofits (RMI & CBI), 2001–02
{
Funded at arm’s-length by seven foundations
{
Interviewed 75 diverse constituency leaders
{
Convened 22 bipartisan US energy policy experts
{
Reached broad consensus on vision, goals, and strategies; suggested
innovative, win-win policy options in a highly integrative framework
◊ Encouraging for a fractured polity…and for NCEP
Policy wildcatters drill through thick
strata of partisan polarization…and
strike a gusher of consensus
◊ Endorsed by 32 bipartisan energy leaders
{
Half are or were senior energy-industry executives
{
Others’ backgrounds include:
› Two Presidential advisors, two Dep. Secs. of Energy
› Five Subcabinet members (State, Com., En., DoD, EPA)
› A CIA Director, a House energy leader & his deputy
› Two senior economists of President’s CEA
› Chairs/members of 2 Fed. & 3 State en. reg. commns.
◊ Meeting energy, economic, environmental, and
securi-ty needs simultaneously and without
compromise…by building on the hidden consensus
that already exists… and that NCEP should seek to
articulate
The CO2 problem is one we needn’t
have, and it’s cheaper not to
“You can always count on Americans to do the right
thing—after they’ve tried everything else.”
— Churchill
“Sometimes one must do what is necessary.”
— Churchill
“We are the people we have been waiting for.”
www.rmi.org