BuilDing flexiBle cApABility for A fAst-chAnging worlD

Transcription

Aerospace in the SDSR 2015:
Building flexible capability
for a fast-changing world
A Briefing Paper by the
Royal Aeronautical Society
www.aerosociety.com
Royal Aeronautical Society – Aerospace In The SDSR Review 2015: Building Flexible Capability For A Fast-Changing World
Aerospace in the SDSR
REVIEW 2015: Building
flexible capability for a
fast-changing world
About the Royal Aeronautical Society (RAeS)
The RAeS is the world’s only professional body dedicated to the
entire aerospace community. Established in 1866 to further
the art, science and engineering of aeronautics, the Society has
been at the forefront of developments in aerospace ever since.
We seek to i) promote the highest possible standards in
aerospace disciplines; ii) provide specialist information and act
as a central forum for the exchange of ideas; and iii) play a leading
role in influencing opinion on aerospace matters. The RAeS is
also working with the Government and industry leaders within
the Aerospace Growth Partnership (AGP).
About this Paper
The aim of this Paper is to stimulate debate, highlighting air power
priorities and actions we believe are required to achieve essential
national security and economic objectives, in the most cost
effective way possible, in a persistently changing and challenging
world. It should be noted that owing to the nature of our Society,
this Paper does not comment on the UK’s specific land and sea
force capability, except where a role for air is required, nor has it
focused on our domestic security challenges unless they overlap
with the international environment, such as the global terrorist
threat, or where capability has defence and law enforcement
benefits. This Paper has been compiled employing expertise from
within the RAeS’ membership, in particular Specialist Groups.
The Paper is issued to a wide range of stakeholders, including
politicians, civil servants and industry leaders, as well as the
press and media.
Without an up-to-date National Security Strategy the RAeS
is unable to provide a definitive assessment of capability
requirements that should be included in the SDSR to meet the
Government’s national security objectives. This Paper is therefore
based on a series of assumptions of the likely contents of the
forthcoming NSS drawn from relevant and recent Government
publications and announcements up to the Summer Budget
20151, and from the Conservative Party [General Election]
Manifesto 20152, as well as our own expert analysis.
The RAeS will provide a response to any consultations on the
NSS and SDSR 2015 when published by the Government.
July 2015
For further information or comments on this paper,
please contact:
Simon Whalley
Head of Policy and Public Affairs
ROYAL AERONAUTICAL SOCIETY
No.4 Hamilton Place
London W1J 7BQ
United Kingdom
simon.whalley@aerosociety.com
1 HM Treasury (2015) Summer Budget.
2 Conservative Party (2015) Conservative Party Manifesto 2015: Strong Leadership; A Clear Economic
Plan; A Brighter, More Secure Future.
Front cover:
The BAE Systems
Taranis, an
Unmanned Combat
Air Vehicle (UCAV).
T +44 (0)20 7670 4300
E raes@aerosociety.com
www.aerosociety.com
(BAES)
2www.aerosociety.com
Aerospace In The SDSR Review 2015: Building Flexible Capability For A Fast-Changing World – Royal Aeronautical Society
FOREWORD
The UK’s defence capability to provide essential home
and international security is an issue that should be, but is
rarely today, high on the national agenda. Despite continuing
economic pressures, the Government is still required to
provide security for defence of the realm and to challenge
emerging threats around the world before they reach the
UK’s shores. An increasingly unpredictable international
environment and changing global threats are currently
placing significant pressure on the Government to deliver
the same, if not more, within a tightly-constrained resource
envelope. The question is: how can this objective be achieved
– if at all – and what will the consequences be to our national
security, prosperity and wellbeing if compromises are made
to our capability in favour of financial stringency?
Defence was given little prominence during the recent
General Election; political party manifestos contained few
details of how they would promote national security – other
than commit or oppose a successor programme to Trident.
While part of the reason is that there are few votes earned
from foreign policy and defence, the other is that a Strategic
Defence & Security Review (SDSR) was expected soon after
the election of a new Government.
The 2015 National Security Strategy and SDSR should
provide an opportunity to have an honest debate about what
position and the degree of influence the UK should have in
the world, within the confines of limited budgets, and to agree
upon the form of military capability required to meet the UK’s
defined national security objectives.
This Paper is the Royal Aeronautical Society’s (RAeS)
contribution to that important debate. It argues that to deal with
new, changing international developments in a cost-effective
way, a genuinely strategic approach to defence provision
is required by the UK Government. The Society assesses
the current international landscape and sets out the broad
capabilities, and the more detailed aerospace capabilities,
required to deal more effectively and efficiently with these new
threats. The Paper: makes the case for a force construct that
meets a series of generic requirements, that in turn will improve
the flexibility of the UK to adapt to the evolution of global
security challenges; argues for further reform of procurement
processes to improve the efficiency and affordability of
defence acquisition; makes the case for continuing long-term
Government-industry partnerships to capture and exploit the
full suite of economic, security and social gains; and sets out
the benefits of maintaining regional and global alliances.
Under its Royal Charter, the RAeS – the world’s only professional
body dedicated to the entire aerospace community – has a
duty to provide independent, expert advice and specialist
information on aeronautical and aerospace issues to politicians,
industry and society generally.
The Society now invites Government, opposition parties and
the aerospace industry to join us in discussing how best we
can jointly take forward the recommendations in this paper.
Simon C Luxmoore FRAeS
RAeS, Chief Executive
F-35B Lightning II. (MoD)
www.aerosociety.com 3
1. Executive Summary
The maintenance of a strong national defence capability must
remain a top priority in light of the increasingly unpredictable
nature of the international environment and growing global
threats, and the Government’s commitment to maintain
Britain’s global role and capacity to project British power
and influence. Notwithstanding pressures on Government
budgets, and acknowledging the commitment to spend a
minimum of 2% of GDP on defence, the RAeS cautions
against the Government taking a resource-driven approach
to the forthcoming National Security Strategy (NSS) and
Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR). In 2010, the
year of the last SDSR, the Coalition Government decided that
failure to reduce the national deficit was itself one of the most
significant threats to the prosperity and long-term security
of the UK. Public expenditure cuts were made to non-ringfenced departments, including the Ministry of Defence (MoD)
and measures were taken to deal with over-commitments
encouraged to have an honest debate about what position
and influence in the world it wants for the UK within the
confines of proposed budgets. The debate must cover both
our immediate capability needs and those the UK will require
in the longer term. In short, the SDSR 2015 must be a firm
foundation for the future.
Our assessment is that the UK’s capability gaps in relation to
the analysis of the level of international risk, and delivery of
UK air equipment needs within the expected budget, will be
very difficult, if not impossible.
Merely repeating the approach to, or a simple adjustment to,
the NSS and SDSR 2010 would therefore be inadequate.
The changes in risk and other international and national
factors, combined with the UK’s expected enduring world
role and economic interdependence, mean that a thorough,
transparent review is required – not simply be a bookbalancing exercise.
“ A clear strategic goal will help focus scarce resources more efficiently to match the
UK’s top defence and security priorities, and help to identify the options requiring
immediate funding and those which can be assigned to the longer term.
on equipment spending. Some programmes were cancelled,
such as the NIMROD MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft, and
there was an early withdrawal of the Invincible Class carriers
and the Harrier GR9, with seemingly little assessment of the
threats faced and capabilities still required.
In the meantime, the global context has altered dramatically: a
resurgent Russia, Islamic extremism, widening instability and
chaos in the Middle East, the threat of nuclear proliferation,
the USA’s strategic focus shift to the Pacific, growing
Chinese assertiveness and escalating risks in the Korean
peninsula – grave challenges that have drawn UK attention
and, in some cases, a military response. Such pressures
at a time when the Government is solidly committed to a
further round of austerity potentially place two major policy
objectives – constrained budgets and national defence and
security – in direct conflict. The Government is therefore
One area that should not be ignored is the potential strategic,
military capability and industrial impacts that a UK withdrawal
from the European Union (EU) would have. In advance of
the guaranteed referendum on UK membership, the NSS
and SDSR must factor in the potential risk and practical
outcomes of a negative vote, otherwise the review exercise
could become void.
It is acknowledged that a review that is totally strategy-driven
would inevitably result in a resource shortfall. In our opinion,
and learning from the experiences of the last SDSR, for the
UK to be able to respond to international developments, and
inevitable new threats, as well as reducing the public deficit,
a more balanced approach should be taken to NSS and
SDSR 2015: one that starts with a strategic approach, but
is assessed within the context of public funding constraints.
A clear strategic goal will help focus scarce resources more
efficiently to match the UK’s top defence and security
priorities, and help to identify the options requiring immediate
funding and those which can be assigned to the longer term.
To enable the UK to adapt flexibly and quickly to a fast changing
geo-strategic situation, force capability and structure should
be more reactive as the strategic environment evolves
between five-year reviews. A set of key characteristics should
apply to all the force elements in order to take military action
most effectively and efficiently.
River Joint. (RAF).
A continuing focus on delivering better value for money
from defence programmes is an important contribution to
improving industrial efficiency. International collaboration
with those that share similar values and face the same
strategic threats is also potentially a key driver of efficiency
through the provision of shared resource; however, our
involvement in and influence with multilateral organisations,
such as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), risks
being undermined by low UK commitment.
Government and industry, working closely together through
a strong, revamped Industrial Strategy, is a vital means
of delivering forward programmes, efficiently and costeffectively, that will guarantee UK national security and
economic well-being.
2. Strategic Context
National Security Strategy (NSS) and Strategic Defence &
Security Review (SDSR) 2010
In 2010 the Coalition Government decided that failure to
reduce a growing national deficit was the most significant
threat to the long-term security and prosperity of the UK.
Cuts to public expenditure were immediate and severe,
including to defence budgets. In order to justify reductions
to defence spending, the Government rapidly conducted an
SDSR, informed by an expedited NSS. The rapidity of both
exercises reduced time for consultation and deliberation
about the interaction between NSS and SDSR. The 2010
SDSR was therefore a resource-led rather than a “threatbased or capability based review of strategy”3.
The NSS and SDSR identified two main pillars of the
Government’s agreed approach to defence and security:
●to protect the UK and its strategic interests against all
forms of attack;
●to use all available means to shape the global environment
to enable better stability, including through better
cooperation and coordination amongst the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office (FCO), Department for International
Development (DfID), the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and
Home Office with regard to homeland security. This
approach was required to be delivered against a backdrop
of significant departmental budget cuts4.
SDSR 2010 set about creating a smaller force structure,
intended to be adaptable to a wider range of risks and
uncertainties, meeting the needs of the NSS and getting
MoD spending under control. In navigating towards the
new force structure – Future Force 2020 – some force level
reductions were transient, while others were permanent in
nature. There were significant reductions in manpower for all
three Services, and in the MoD Civil Service, combined with
a new employment model and whole-force approach, both of
which were designed to reduce personnel operating costs.
Lord Levene was commissioned by the Secretary of State for
Defence in July 2010 to chair the Defence Reform Group, set
up to guide head office reorganisation and advise on major
procurement reform.
In respect of equipment, SDSR 2010 reduced the number
of warships, Challenger main battle tanks and RAF fast-jet
squadrons. Support helicopters were rationalised, with the
www.aerosociety.com Apache in training at Lulworth-Bovington
transfer of Merlins from the RAF to provide ship-borne lift to
replace the ageing Royal Marine Sea King helicopter fleet.
The upgrade of the Puma helicopter fleet was confirmed and
the increased total fleet size of Chinook heavy lift helicopters
was also endorsed.
However, the Invincible-class aircraft carriers were
decommissioned, the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft
(MPA) was cancelled just before entering service, the Sentinel
airborne battlefield and ground surveillance aircraft was
due to be withdrawn from service after the involvement in
Afghanistan was concluded, and the Harrier was withdrawn
from service. However, the replacement of the Nimrod R1
electronic reconnaissance aircraft, withdrawn from Service in
2011, with three US Rivet Joint aircraft in project Airseeker
was initiated, with the first aircraft being delivered in late
2013.
These changes left a temporary but prolonged gap in carrier
strike, designed to be rectified with the introduction of the
Queen Elizabeth (QE)-class aircraft carriers and the F-35
aircraft. This is now planned to have an initial operating
capability from land bases and start sea trials in 2018, and
have full operating capability from the carrier in 2023. There
is a persistent gap in maritime patrol, anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) and long-range search and rescue (SAR). No remedy
for these deficiencies is currently planned, with the MoD
currently partially filling these crucial capability gaps by other
means, both national and allied.
SDSR 2010 has largely been implemented, but some
combat air (Tornado GR4) and intelligence, surveillance
and reconnaissance (ISR) (Sentinel) reductions have been
postponed due to continuing military need. There is also work
still to do to improving procurement efficiency in Defence
Equipment & Support (DE&S). As part of the head-office
reform, designed to concentrate on the strategic functions of
defence, there has been increased delegation of authority to
the three Services for equipment, and Joint Forces Command
has been created to manage the joint enablers, most notably
defence intelligence and ISR assets, and the running of the
permanent joint HQ.
3 Gedney, Brig. Felix G. (2014) Reviewing UK defence: Lessons from 2010 for 2015: Royal College of
Defence Studies ‘Seaford House Paper’. Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.
4 DfID was designated a protected department from budget cuts until July 2015.
5
and Afghanistan. Supporting on-going efforts to counter the
global terrorist threat, and the establishment and training of
an Afghan National Army,ww was one of the top priorities of
the new Coalition Government.
BAESystems Taranis
Despite an embarrassing double reversal of carrier launch
and recovery capability, and associated F-35 type, the
aircraft carrier programme and F-35 are now on track and
decisions have been announced on carrier Airborne Early
Warning (AEW) protection with Crowsnest/Merlin helicopters
and on the intention to bring both QE carriers into service.
It has also been announced that there will not be further
Service manpower reductions in SDSR 2015.
All of these decisions, and those taken on Typhoon and its
radar and weapons, and plans for the successor nuclear
deterrent, reduce the financial room for manoeuvre in SDSR
2015. This matters because changes in the international and
national security environment have dramatically increased
the level and types of risk from five years ago.
Changes Since 2010
At the time of the last SDSR, the UK had been largely
focused for almost a decade on overseas operations in Iraq
Since then, the geo-strategic environment has been altered
dramatically by a series of international events and factors.
The approach set out in the 2010 NSS and SDSR is
no longer fully fit for purpose and a more strategic,
threat-based approach to determining military capability,
which can respond and adapt to global instability, should
be taken by the Government this year if it wishes to maintain
vital national security and influence on international
issues.
Russia
Despite, or because of, its economic weakness, Russia has
sought to reassert its military and political presence in East
and Central Europe. The invasion of Crimea in March 2014,
continued involvement and/or proxy involvement in Ukraine,
posturing in relation to Eastern Europe more broadly, longrange probing of NATO airspace by way of provocative
military exercises and increased submarine activity have all
raised tensions and increased the potential threat to the UK
and NATO countries.
Middle East
The so-called Arab Spring, civil unrest starting in Tunisia
with initial hopes of a spread of democracy to a number of
North African and Middle Eastern totalitarian states – aided
by NATO and the West, has degenerated into an increase
in ungoverned space and even more illiberal regimes, and
has created the perfect environment for extremism, and its
bedfellow terrorism, to grow and thrive.
General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper. (UASF/Staff Sgt Brian Ferguson)
Islamic State
The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (or Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria) is a radical Islamist group that, using
brutal and repressive actions, has seized large swathes
in eastern Syria and across northern and western Iraq. IS
has supplanted Al Qaeda as the principal threat to stability
across the Islamic world and beyond. Islamic extremism
more generally presents an increased threat to Western
democracies’ liberal tolerance as well as to life. This is
indeed a conflict (of values and literally) that is likely to last
a generation.
the local population and it is also probable that the Greek
government will not be able to repay its debts despite further
austerity measures. Notwithstanding this recent progress,
the risk of a Greek exit from the Eurozone remains.
Secondly, the UK’s relationship with fellow EU members
remains difficult and will not be resolved until the referendum
planned for 2017 (but possibly as early as 2016). Thirdly,
as alluded to above, indebted European nations are
unlikely to spend more on defence, some even struggling to
maintain current allocations. All of these factors complicate
European coherence and cohesiveness on security issues;
more strategic, threat-based approach to determining military capability, which can
“ Arespond
and adapt to global instability, should be taken by the Government this year if it
wishes to maintain vital national security and influence on international issues..
Iran
While an agreement with Iran on uranium enrichment has
been reached, at the time of writing the UN Security Council
is still to vote on – or veto – a resolution endorsing the deal.
Critics argue that the agreement could fuel a nuclear arms
race rather than solve one and suspicions in the Middle East
will take time to abate even if the UN resolution is passed. It
is our view therefore that a conventionally-armed provocation
or misjudgement could still occur and that the possibility of a
nuclear arms race in the Middle East remains.
this is currently apparent in the response to the immigrant
crisis in the Mediterranean (caused by some of the factors
above, plus the relative strength of the northern European
economy).
East Asia
North Korea has become increasingly unpredictable and
dangerous and China has become increasingly assertive in
the Asia-Pacific, not least in territorial actions in the South
China Sea.
Meanwhile other international changes have occurred:
An RAF Mark 6 Chinook helicopter at RAF Odiham
United States of America (USA)
Today
The USA has ‘pivoted’ to the Asia-Pacific region and has
become increasingly publically irritated by the failure of
European NATO allies to bear a proportionate part of the
defence and security burden in Europe and at Europe’s
boundaries, with no likelihood that this will change
significantly for most European nations. The NATO Summit
in Wales in 2014 set a 2% of GDP minimum target, which
the UK committed to meeting up until 2020 in the Summer
Budget 2015, perhaps with the help of some creative
accounting with aid and intelligence budgets – albeit with
some justification for the portion genuinely coordinated by
MoD, across FCO and DfID, for conflict prevention.
The UK Government is committed to: maintaining “Britain’s
strong global role and… [the] capacity to project British
power and values around the world”; retaining “the Trident
continuous at sea nuclear deterrent to provide the ultimate
guarantee of our [sic] safety”; maintaining the UK’s global
presence through a strengthened NATO – supporting its new
multi-national rapid response force; and continuing to have a
global presence, strengthening defence partnerships in the
Gulf and Asia5.
Europe
Firstly, the Eurozone crisis continues. Despite Eurozone
nations agreeing to a third Greek bailout in the middle of July,
it comes with conditions that could prove unpopular with
www.aerosociety.com The legacy of protracted campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan
continues to be reflected in a reluctance to have Army ‘boots
on the ground’ in regular combat roles, potentially placing
a premium on maritime and air capabilities, whilst also
increasing the importance of special forces, and of training
and advisory capacity for UK land forces.
5 Conservative Party (2015) Conservative Party Manifesto 2015: Strong Leadership; A Clear Economic
Plan; A Brighter, More Secure Future.
7
Nevertheless many aspects of the UK’s position in the world
endure. The UK is a P5 member of the United Nations (UN)
Security Council and is a nuclear power. The UK is a leading
member of NATO and the EU (noting the point above on
uncertainty) and of the Commonwealth, and the Government
is committed to remaining so6. As an island nation, we are
dependent on a world-wide network of trade and finance
for our economic success. The UK aerospace and defence
industries are world-leading and make an enormously valuable
contribution to the UK balance of payments.
Next Steps
In view of these significant changes in the country’s geostrategic environment, a simple adjustment to SDSR 2010
would be inadequate. Although the future is, by definition,
uncertain, the increase in risk, and other international and
national factors, combined with the UK’s expected enduring
world role and economic interdependency, mean that a proper
review of the NSS and a fresh, strategy-led SDSR is required.
Whilst the level of the UK’s ambition and aspiration will be
a key part of the strategic thinking, the NSS cannot ignore
the reality of a very different geo-political context to five
years ago. SDSR 2015 therefore must not simply be the
book-balancing exercise of 2010; it needs instead properly
to balance policy with capacity and capability. A genuinely
strategic assessment should enable an open and transparent
debate over the best allocation of scarce financial resources
to support our priority national security and international
objectives.
Reaper MQ9A RPAS (MOD)
3.Capability
For the UK to maintain a strong global role with the ability
to project power around the world, continuing investment in
sufficient and appropriate military (human and equipment)
capability will be required. Five years after the 2010 review,
the UK economic outlook is broadly more promising, albeit
with on-going Eurozone uncertainty. This more positive
outlook should support further investment in new essential
equipment.
In light of the highly changeable global landscape, and types
of threats to national and international security, as well as
6 Ibid.
in the context of budget limits, the Government should fill
crucial gaps in current capability and consider the creation,
over the medium term, of a force with flexible capability to
adapt to the evolution of new global challenges.
The resulting force structure should be capable of evolving as
the factors above and international events develop; it should not
be a fixed ‘target’ that is only examined at five-yearly intervals.
But what capabilities, generically, and in detail concentrating
on the air and space environment, are now needed?
Government should ... consider the
“...the
creation, over the medium term, of a
force with flexible capability to adapt to
the evolution of new global challenges.
In such an unpredictable world and constantly changing
strategic context, there are a number of key characteristics
that should apply to nearly all the force elements required to
take military action.
Generic Capability Requirements
The UK’s first requirement should be provision of high
readiness forces to respond rapidly in times of crisis. The
maintenance of such readiness requires a high level of
training. Reserve forces are useful for specialist roles, but
are less useful for providing instant action. The Reserves
strategy therefore requires a re-think away from simply using
reserves to make up for lack of mass; the Government’s focus
on arbitrary reserve forces numbers targets – that the MoD
struggles to meet – is not an efficient way of contributing to
the high force readiness that is required.
High-readiness forces need to be capable of being rapidly
deployed globally, placing a premium on sufficient air
lift capacity that is capable of operating into a hostile
environment. Once deployed, protected rapid mobility is a
key requirement for manoeuvring within the enemy’s decision
cycle, and for avoiding conventional and unconventional
threats. Rotary lift capacity lessons from recent conflicts
remain highly relevant.
High technology is part of the UK’s all-important asymmetric
advantage against the majority of our actual and potential
enemies. The temptation to increase platform (or indeed
personnel) numbers at the expense of high-end capability
should be resisted, especially in the air environment,
where ‘first day’ capability against well-equipped enemies
is inevitably expensive. Second best equipment in this
environment means losing the fight and possibly the war, and
we will not be a valuable international partner unless we can
turn up on the day with maximum effectiveness.
For greatest efficiency, and partially to compensate for lack of
combat mass, exceptional ISR will be required. This will ensure
that forces are best employed – the right numbers in the right
place at the right time – and, critically, not out-faced.
For ISR, command and control, and the conduct of operations,
secure communications of high and ever-increasing
bandwidth is required. Satellite communications access
can now be sourced commercially for considerably less than
dedicated military programmes, but contracting needs great
care to ensure guaranteed availability and security.
Flexibility in all its aspects is essential. This places an
emphasis, first, on varied and testing training, often
synthetic, in order to give all the complexity that will be
needed to replicate operations fully and realistically. The MoD
aspiration to have 50% of training in synthetic environments
by 2020 will therefore need to be properly resourced.
Equipment should, where possible, be (a) multi-role, to avoid
having expensive equipment that would not be useful in many
potential scenarios, and (b) defined in close dialogue with the
UK’s defence export industry so that synergy with potential
export markets can enhance its affordability.
Finally, and very importantly, air equipment and systems
must be designed with resilience to the growing number of
incidents and increased severity of cyber attacks, which
threaten, and have the potential to undermine, our entire
defence and security capability.
AgustaWestland Wildcat.
types, Typhoon and F-35, need the full suite of ground-attack
capabilities to be fully effective in future combat.
The number of squadrons of fast-jet aircraft is currently at
an all-time low – from 33 at the time of the first Gulf War in
1990 to seven today. Imaginative use of synthetic training
could potentially increase capability and combat readiness
of the deployable force, but the number of combat aircraft
squadrons needs to be increased if it is to be in balance
with the rest of the UK’s forces – and provide the essential
“ Without control of the air, forces are vulnerable and severely compromised in freedom
of manoeuvre.
Air and Space Capabilities
Examining the consequences of the above generic
requirements for the main role categories of air power leads
to the following conclusions:
Combat Air
Combat air capability is essential for control of the air and
for air attack missions. The relative ease with which air
superiority, or even supremacy, has been gained by the
USA and allies in recent conflicts is not in any way a reliable
guide to future conflicts. Without control of the air, forces
are vulnerable and severely compromised in freedom of
manoeuvre. Similarly, the ability to hold at risk both mobile
and static targets, including hardened targets, such as
bunkers, is essential.
The ability to gain control of the air requires high-end fighter
aircraft equipped with the most advanced radar and missiles.
The development of Typhoon and its weapons and radar to
meet this standard must therefore be continued and not be
delayed any further. Equally, F-35’s stealth capability needs
to be matched with similarly high standards of air-to-air
weaponry to be fully effective. Any compromise in this area
devalues the whole investment.
The flexibility of both manned fast-jet types also to conduct
air-to-ground missions is crucial. The days of dedicated air
defence and ground attack aircraft are, rightly, over, so both
www.aerosociety.com cover that these require. In that increase, it is recognised
that difficult judgements will need to be made on the balance
between Typhoon and F-35 numbers, and it also will require
sophisticated analysis of the best balance between F-35
types in the longer term, with a recognition that the short
take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B carrier variant
is compromised in performance and price compared with the
F-35A (and, but less relevantly, C).
Air Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
Air ISR is required to provide air, ground and maritime forces
with vital situational awareness (and provide, as mentioned
above, vital electronic intelligence for all forces), and can
provide benefits to domestic security and law enforcement.
There is potential overlap between the capabilities required
in each environment, and achieving a balance between multirole and single capability is difficult. The optimisation of
these therefore requires thorough analysis as part of SDSR
2015, which should consider how these requirements can be
combined, and also how a common basic platform might offer
a long-term convergence, ultimately reducing the number of
types employed in ISR – and therefore the overall cost. The
next three paragraphs deal with each environment discretely,
but this point should be borne in mind.
The airborne early warning role (AEW) is crucial over land
and over sea. As noted above, the Merlin helicopter has been
selected to meet the Crowsnest requirement to provide
airborne surveillance over sea to protect the future aircraft
9
carriers. But the future of the UK’s E-3D Sentry AEW1 force
is unclear. The present platform suffers from obsolescence
and poor serviceability. The earlier it can be replaced the
better, with options including buy or lease as a stop gap.
Whichever solution is chosen, it should be part of a coherent
path to the long-term rationalisation described above.
Ground surveillance, through SAR, Ground Moving Target
Indicator (GMTI) and electro-optical means has been a
critical enabler of combat success in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This is an enduring requirement for all future conflicts
and the intention to remove the capability that Sentinel
airborne battlefield and ground surveillance provides is
therefore incoherent. At the risk of repetition, the manned
and unmanned ISR assets in this capability area need to
be rationalised, but this cannot mean removal or gapping
pending some undefined future replacement, or else any
future operation may be fatally undermined.
Local and Wide Area Maritime Surveillance (WAMS) against
both surface and sub-surface threats is essential for
freedom to operate the future aircraft carriers and a nuclear
deterrent. The current gap in WAMS is unsustainable
and should be filled as soon as possible. In any event, the
seedcorn crews cannot be left overseas indefinitely. A lowtechnology or low capability in this area would be nothing
more than a smokescreen, leaving carriers and deterrent
vulnerable; a high-end fixed (and the excellent Merlin rotary)
wing capability is therefore needed. The secondary role of
long-range SAR is also a major gap, leaving the UK vulnerable
to the charge that it is not fulfilling its International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) responsibilities (the loss
of Malaysian Airlines MH370 off the south west coast
of Australia, where the UK could not have provided the
necessary search capability, and the loss of yacht Cheeky
Rafiki, where the UK was unable to contribute meaningfully
to the search illustrate the deficiency).
Transport/AAR - Fixed Wing
In contrast to the two main roles above, the current state
of air transport/air-to-air refuelling (AAR) is reasonably
sound. The important thing is not to repeat the mistakes of
the UK’s history and reduce investment or to under-invest
in maintaining this capability. It has been suggested by
uninformed commentators that contracting out to the civil
sector would suffice for much of the capability, but this
ignores the whole point of dedicated military lift, which is to
be able to operate in areas where civil charter is not able to
without unacceptable risk.
For example, airlift into Iraq and Afghanistan needed infrared
missile (IR) jamming equipment to be fitted. Therefore antimissile self-protection remains essential for the whole
military fixed wing, and rotary wing, transport fleet.
Case Study: Cheeky Rafiki Yacht
When the Cheeky Rafiki yacht, with its British crew,
capsized in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, the United
States coastguard honoured its responsibilities under the
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue
to look for the sailors within waters overseen by the US.
The UK flew a Hercules aircraft to assist; however, the
Hercules was inadequate to carry out a search and rescue
function, as it has inadequate sensors (only visual search,
albeit with a limited radar cueing the lookout).
Until the 2010 cancellation, the UK would have deployed
an aircraft designed for such a purpose – the Nimrod
MRA4. Fitted with top-class radar technology and the
capability to search over 20,000 square miles of ocean.
The UK therefore lacks an effective operational maritime
surveillance and long-range search and rescue capability
in order to honour our international commitments and to
save lives in the event of an incident at sea.
Rotary Wing
Skynet. (MoD)
Joint Helicopter Command is now well-equipped with
rotary lift in the form of Chinook, Merlin and Puma, but any
temptation to reduce assets should be resisted, since the
clear lesson of recent campaigns is that rapid in-theatre air
movement of forces, including from ship to shore, is key for
operational success, providing essential improved security
and agility, operating within the enemy’s decision cycle and
to some extent compensating for lack of mass. Land Force
Combat Air (Apache) and multi-role light support (Wildcat)
Boeing C-17 Globemaster III
are vital assets. The latter is entering service but a decision
by MOD on Apache replacement is overdue, since an inservice date before 2020 currently looks unlikely, leading to
a potential capability gap. The maritime position with Wildcat
entering service is sound.
There are two further areas of aerospace that require
additional analysis:
Manned/Unmanned aircraft mix
The increasing ubiquity of unmanned air vehicles (UAV) or
remotely piloted air systems (RPAS) – more commonly called
drones – has been a major change in warfare in the last two
decades. UAVs can remain in the air for longer periods, can be
cheaper and create less danger to flight crew than manned
aircraft. The UK inventory includes Reaper, Watchkeeper,
attack must not be taken for granted, as they have so far
principally been used in uncontested airspace; an ability to
operate in contested airspace will become more important.
It may be that the best use of unmanned aircraft will remain
threefold: first, for lengthy (unconstrained by human
limitations) and ‘dull’ missions, gathering data (imagery
and signals intelligence), for real-time or subsequent
exploitation; secondly for prosecution of targets revealed
by such surveillance; and thirdly, for short-range tactical
once-only use in, for example, urban warfare, to gain a quick
advantage over an opponent.
Space Segment
Our forces and equipment depend on first-class, reliable
satellite navigation; however, these essential systems
are prone to signal jamming. A growing reliance on these
defence acquisition remains essential to national security. Cost overrun,
“ Improving
delay and other problems undermine not only UK defence preparedness but threaten
to deprive the UK defence industrial base of future resources.
Scan Eagle, Desert Hawk and some smaller models, whilst
the research and development effort continues with a UKFrance (BAE Systems and Dassault) feasibility study on
medium altitude long endurance UAV. In addition the recently
completed Taranis Technology Demonstrator, a semiautonomous unmanned stealth warplane capable of carrying
a variety of weapons to attack both aerial and ground targets,
has demonstrated much of the technology for partially filling
the requirement for a future combat air system.
Decisions are required on how much, of what types, the
future mix of manned and unmanned aircraft should
comprise. A proper study of this topic is required for SDSR,
but it should be noted that high-end unmanned aircraft may
not necessarily lower cost than manned aircraft, and may
possibly be less flexible, despite the attractions of avoiding
human risk for the operator. Furthermore, invulnerability to
www.aerosociety.com navigation systems risks creating a potential vulnerability to
accidental or even deliberate interference, so more emphasis
needs to be given to protecting these space-based systems.
The most recent generation of satellites for military
communications, Skynet 5, is nearing end of life, so there
needs to be an evaluation of the future solutions. As
stated above, commercial developments could meet the
communications need. Notwithstanding the possibilities
of small satellites for rapid reaction for specific missions,
such as maritime surveillance, our relationship with the
USA should continue to provide the specialised large-scale
space-based intelligence assets that only a country with its
resources can provide. There is a need to ensure that this
relationship is two-way and it may be that UK exploitation
capability, or other intelligence means, need to be reinforced
to guarantee continued access to US capabilities.
11
4.Efficiency and Effectiveness
Investment in new capability and technology is vital to
maintaining our national security and power projection
capability. But just as important will be further reform of the
way that human and financial resource is allocated, in order to
achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency – and thereby
value for money for the taxpayer.
The RAeS highlighted procurement reform as a priority issue
for Government five years ago7. Improving defence acquisition
remains essential to national security. Cost overrun, delay and
other problems undermine not only UK defence preparedness
but threaten to deprive the UK defence industrial base of
future resources.
The 2010-2015 Government rightly focused on improving
the organisational structures of the Ministry of Defence,
and especially on reforming procurement processes, to
create more streamlined and efficient defence management
systems.
The Defence Reform Act (2014) was passed to alter the
way the Ministry of Defence procures and supports defence
equipment by reforming the Defence Equipment and Support
(DE&S) organisation. But further work is still required to
improve DE&S’s relationship with the front-line commands,
in line with the increased delegation of authority to the three
Services and Joint Forces Command for equipment.
It is current UK defence policy to unite all personnel needed
to deliver defence outputs, including non-operational roles,
regular and reserve service personnel, civil servants, as well
as industry contractors, into a coherent whole. The private
sector provides an important role in defence equipment
maintenance and support and provides vital support to military
operations. In effect, industry has become an additional
arm of the traditional military role. Fully implemented, this
Whole Force should create greater efficiency through the
full integration of military and civilian personnel – public and
private.
The MoD has been slow to implement the approach due
to the complex nature of the idea and the broad range of
stakeholders involved. In our view, the MoD should place
emphasis on full implementation and management, involving
industry in this process, to achieve the maximum flexibility,
cost-effectiveness and efficiency from its equipment and
personnel. Methods include:
●
closer Government-industry relationship during and on
operations;
●
close dialogue between the UK aerospace and defence
industries and the MoD when defining equipment
requirements, procurement approach, R&D and timescales,
ultimately to improve affordability through higher levels of
export;
Total or Whole Force
Further reform is also needed to the arrangement of defence
personnel: one that delivers the required capability at reduced
costs.
●clearer understanding between Government and industry
of the capability gaps, which will help target investment in
essential areas;
BAESystems Typhoon. (Copyright © 2014 BAE Systems. All rights reserved)
7 RAeS (2010) Aerospace in the Strategic Defence Review; A Discussion Paper by the Royal Aeronautical Society.
●
more
engagement with small- and medium-sized
enterprises to understand how current and developing
technologies, capabilities and skills can be leveraged; and
●greater involvement of industry experts with commercial
and technical skills, such as risk management, portfolio
and project management, and technology development, to
complement defence-specific skills.
Capability Management and Integration
As part of its efforts to improve financial efficiency, and
meet current and future operational requirements, our
national defence capabilities must continue to be integrated
and interoperable across all Defence Lines of Development
(DLOD) . Government and industry need to work more closely
together to achieve more across all DLODs8. The level of
interoperability achieved – technological and organisational –
should be a critical measure of successful implementation of
the SDSR 2015 and future programmes.
The Government should use this 2015 SDSR to assess the
capability of the defence aerospace industrial base to meet
current and future operational requirements within agreed
budgets, and take action to support further reform of industry
performance and to identify additional opportunities for
collaboration. Specifically, the Government should prioritise:
●investment and collaboration with industry on exploitable,
goal-based research and development (R&D);
●
addressing skills gaps through the development of
vocational routes to Science, Technology, Engineering and
Mathematics (STEM) careers to sit alongside accepted
academic routes;
●continuing to work with the defence aerospace industry to
create quality apprenticeships that will boost the capability
and capacity of the supply chain and exploit opportunities
abroad; and
maintenance of commitment and investment in our strategic international allianc“ The
es is a vital way of efficiently and effectively dealing with shared strategic threats and
reducing unnecessary duplication of military equipment, training and logistics.
5.Industry
The maintenance of operational sovereignty in specific areas
was a keystone of recent defence strategies, and should
remain so, but broadened in scope in the forthcoming review.
Indigenous capability provides strategic resilience in the
ability to recognise and anticipate emerging threats and to
respond in an appropriate timescale.
Specifically, sovereignty is essential for military assessments
of combat risk, affording priority access to industrial
capability, better value-for-money over equipment life-cycles
and operational control over certain, classified aspects of
science and technology.
However, retaining indigenous capability is dependent on
the UK having a strong defence aerospace industrial base.
Recent defence strategies, including the SDSR 2010, have
affirmed that the Government has a responsibility for the
health and success of the UK defence industry, in part due to
the significant economic and social gains a strong industrial
base provides.
The 2010-2015 Government committed to working with the
aerospace and defence industries to support their competitive
advantage and supply chain capability through the Aerospace
and Defence Growth Partnerships (AGP and DGP). These
Partnerships were developed with a degree of coherence and
long-term thinking to help provide the certainty required by
companies to develop individual strategies. The partnerships
are also supporting the development of technology, skills and
tools. To take full advantage of the investments made by the
previous administration, it is vital that the positive momentum
is not allowed to dissipate.
●closer dialogue with the aerospace and defence industries
to improve the affordability of new equipment through
higher export levels.
While off-the-shelf equipment purchased from foreign firms
would in some cases likely offer a better initial financial
deal, the full implications of buying ‘off-the-shelf’ could be
significant, as it means missing out on the national economic
benefits of buying from British defence suppliers. We need
to achieve a better balance of safeguarding operational
sovereignty while also delivering value for money, and a
process must be identified to balance the defence and
national imperatives.
6.International Collaboration
The UK rarely acts alone. The maintenance of commitment
and investment in our strategic international alliances is a
vital way of efficiently and effectively dealing with shared
strategic threats and reducing unnecessary duplication of
military equipment, training and logistics.
Global and Regional Alliances
The threat of greater Russian assertiveness in Eastern
Europe following the annexation of parts of the Ukraine is
emerging as one of the most significant security challenges
facing the UK and the world, and requires a collaborative
response. The UK has confirmed that it will contribute
1,000 troops to a NATO rapid-reaction force – a Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) – in order to strengthen
the security of NATO’s eastern flank. Meanwhile, the Royal
Air Force (RAF) has been flying Typhoon patrols over Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania. New developments in Russia are likely
9 The DLODs provide a mechanism for co-ordinating the parallel development of different aspects of capability that need to be brought together to create a real military capability: Training, Equipment, Personnel, Information, Doctrine &Concepts, Organisation, Infrastructure, Logistics – also known by the acronym TEPIDOIL
www.aerosociety.com 13
Simulation of a F-35 landing on The Queen Elizabeth II aircraft carrier. (MoD).
to place further demands on the UK to reinforce and intensify
these alliance efforts.
In the Middle East, the persistent threat by ISIS to the stability
of the region and its cultivation of international terrorism for
export to the UK and other western societies is also a major
challenge to UK national security. The RAF continues to carry
out bombing raids on terrorist positions in northern Iraq with
Tornado GR4s and unmanned Reaper UAV. Depending on
the success of US-led operations, additional demands by our
partners to contribute further resource should be expected.
Maintenance of sufficient, flexible, interoperable capability
(personnel and equipment) will be required for the UK to
continue to play a leading role in alliance operations.
Industrial Collaboration
Effective military industrial co-operation is still not very
prevalent. Despite the shared values and defence objectives,
confidence among European nations is limited, as they
The downsides of increased collaboration are derived from a
loss of independence and sovereign capability; however with
continued budget pressures, trade-offs will be inevitable and
will need to be accepted if we are to increase efficiency while
retaining sufficient defence capability. Therefore, focused
investment on areas of industrial collaborative advantage
would be wise, but must be undertaken in the full expectation
of improvements to the management and delivery of
international programmes.
European Uncertainty
The European Commission has been assisting member states
achieve financial savings through the removal of inefficiencies
in the European defence market and the creation of more
competition; however, it could do more to ensure the full and
even implementation of the Single Market by Member States
to promote genuinely competitive procurement programmes.
However, uncertainty over the UK’s future within the EU
until a referendum vote is held no later than 2017 is likely
“ The Government should resolve the UK’s position within the EU as soon as possible,
to enable further cooperation at state level and to provide certainty to industry, so as
not to weaken any joint industrial efforts, which have the potential to deliver efficiency
savings and large scale benefits.
seek to protect domestic employment within their armed
forces and industrial base. European countries did agree
to some initiatives since the economic downturn, but the
efficiency saving was only around 200 to 300 million Euros
– approximately one hundred times less than collective
budget cuts9.
to undermine further cooperation in this area, at least in the
short term.
The Government should resolve the UK’s position within the
EU as soon as possible, to enable further cooperation at state
level and to provide certainty to industry, so as not to weaken
9 O’Donnell, C.M (2013) The trials and tribulations of European defence co-operation. Centre for European Reform.
any joint industrial efforts, which have the potential to deliver
efficiency savings and large scale benefits.
If the UK does remain in the EU, more effort must be made
by the Government to improve the effective functioning
and performance of the European Defence Agency (EDA),
by refocusing its primary aim onto ensuring commonality
of standards in Euro-defence, therefore aiding exports of
European-made equipment.
7.Summary of Recommendations
Main Recommendations:
– Fill the gap in maritime surveillance against surface and
sub-surface threats (and SAR).
– Increasing commonality of ISR platforms.
●Transport (Fixed and Rotary Wing):
– Sustained investment in air transport/air-to-air refuelling and rotary lift.
– Maintenance of dedicated military lift with anti-missile
self-protection.
●Rotary Wing:
(Rapid decision on) Replacement of Apache.
●A strategy-led NSS and SDSR 2015 assessed within
the context of – but not wholly dictated by – public funding constraints.
●Manned/Unmanned Aircraft Mix:
– Decisions required now on how much, of what types, the
future mix should comprise.
●Creation of a force (and equipment) with flexible capability to evolve more quickly to changing global challenges.
●Further reform of defence acquisition and defence
personnel management processes to delivery necessary
capability at lower cost.
– Development of stand-alone unmanned capability,
including new concept of operations for UAV, taking
advantage of new technologies.
●Space:
●Use the SDSR to assess the capability of the defence industrial base and take action to further improve industry
performance, to enhance R&D and to identify additional
opportunities for national and international collaboration.
Specific Recommendations:
Capability (General Requirements)
●Concentration on provision of high-readiness forces.
●Rapid force global deployment capability.
●High Technology to enable asymmetric advantage.
●Exceptional Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).
●Secure communications.
●Flexibility in all aspects of force and equipment provision.
●Prioritisation of varied and testing training, particularly
synthetic.
●Equipment to be multi-role and on common platforms as
far as practicable.
Evaluation of next generation satellite solutions (including
commercial) for military communications and surveillance.
Efficiency and Effectiveness
●Further work on Defence Equipment &Support (DE&S) to
concentrate on the strategic functions of defence.
●Full implementation of Whole Force to generate greater
efficiency from all personnel.
●Government and industry to work more closely to achieve
further integration and interoperability across all Defence
Lines of Development (DLOD).
Industry
●Investment and collaboration with industry on research
and development (R&D), export requirements and procurement.
●Address skills gaps through the development of vocational routes to Science, Technology, Engineering and
Mathematics (STEM) to sit alongside accepted academic
routes.
●Combat air for control of the air and air attack missions:
●Continue to work with the defence aerospace industry to
create quality apprenticeships that will boost capability
and capacity of the supply chain and exploit opportunities
abroad.
● Typhoon with advanced radar and missiles.
International Collaboration
Capability (Air and Space)
– F-35 with high-standards of air-to-air weaponry.
– Both Typhoon and F-35 need a full suite of groundattack capabilities.
●Air and space ISR to provide air, ground and maritime
cover:
www.aerosociety.com ●Continued investment in the UK’s strategic alliances
to deal efficiently and effectively with shared strategic
threats.
●Resolve the UK’s position within the EU as soon as possible to reduce industry uncertainty and support long-term
joint industrial effort – and competition.
15
www.aerosociety.com

BuilDing flexiBle cApABility for A fAst-chAnging worlD

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