Scienza della logica

Hegel
TEORIA
XXXIII/2013/1
Hegel Scienza della logica
Scritti di: Claudio Cesa, Walter Jaeschke, Klaus Düsing, Jean-Louis
Vieillard-Baron, Giuseppe Cantillo, Félix Duque, Riccardo Dottori,
Franco Chiereghin, Michela Bordignon, Marcello Monaldi, Bernard
Mabille, Pasqualino Masciarelli, Rainer Schäfer, Massimo
Adinolfi, Elena Ficara.
ISSN 1122-1259
I
l primo tomo della Wissenschaft der Logik fu pubblicato alla fine di aprile del 1812. Il secondo uscì dalla tipografia nel
dicembre dello stesso anno, recando però come data il 1813.
Entrambi erano dedicati alla “Logica oggettiva”. Il terzo volume
sulla “Logica soggettiva”, che Hegel sperava di far seguire immediatamente, uscì invece alla fine del 1816.
Siamo quindi a circa duecento anni dalla pubblicazione di
quest’opera. Per tale occasione il presente volume di «Teoria»,
nelle sue varie parti, intende offrire una lettura approfondita di
alcuni aspetti del testo hegeliano. Ciò viene compiuto, com’è ormai stile della rivista, avvalendosi dei maggiori esperti a livello
internazionale e coinvolgendo nel progetto studiosi affermati di
diverse generazioni.
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TEORIA
Rivista di filosofia
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TEORIA
Rivista di filosofia
fondata da Vittorio Sainati
Ultimi fascicoli apparsi della Terza serie di «Teoria»:
XXXI/2012/2 (Terza serie VII/2)
«Spinoza nel XXI secolo»
XXXI/2012/1 (Terza serie VII/1)
«Conformity and Dissent - Conformità e dissenso»
XXXI/2011/2 (Terza serie VI/2)
«La formazione e la conoscenza ai tempi del web»
XXXI/2011/1 (Terza serie VI/1)
«Critica della ragione medica»
XXX/2010/2 (Terza serie V/2)
«La figura e il pensiero di Armando Carlini»
XXX/2010/1 (Terza serie V/1)
«Filosofie dell’immagine»
XXIX/2009/2 (Terza serie IV/2)
«Metamorphoses of Love - Metamorfosi dell’amore»
XXIX/2009/1 (Terza serie IV/1)
«Etica della comunicazione tra due continenti»
XXVIII/2008/2 (Terza serie III/2)
«Eurosofia. La filosofia e l’Europa»
XXVIII/2008/1 (Terza serie III/1)
«Il futuro del “nuovo pensiero”. In dialogo con Franz Rosenzweig»
XXVII/2007/2 (Terza serie II/2)
«Ethicbots - Etica e robotica»
XXVII/2007/1 (Terza serie II/1)
«Democrazie, appartenenza, valori - Democracies, belonging, values»
XXVI/2006/2 (Terza serie I/2)
«Levinas in Italia»
XXVI/2006/1 (Terza serie I/1)
«L’identità in questione»
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TEORIA
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Rivista di filosofia
fondata da Vittorio Sainati
XXXIII/2013/1 (Terza serie VIII/1)
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#LAUDIO#ESA!DRIANO&ABRIS
Premessa, p. 5
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7ALTER*AESCHKE
Die Prinzipien des Denkens und des Seins.
Hegels System der reinenuVernunft,
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*EAN,OUIS6IEILLARD"ARON
Le devenir logique: négativité et contradiction, p. 49zione
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Il doppio rispecchiamento:
ragione e vita nella logica hegeliana, p. 69
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Problemi della misura, p. 87
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Pensiero e linguaggio nella Scienza della logica di Hegel, p. 155
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INDICE
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Dialectic and
Natural
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Theories
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Vagueness,
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-ARCELLO-ONALDI
La ragione nella storia. Appunti per una rilettura
del rapporto tra logica e storia in Hegel, p. 199
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En quel sens Hegel est-il philosophe de l’identité ?, p. 213
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Hegel abbandonò
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2AINER3CHËFER
Die syllogistische Genese des Widerspruchs
in der absoluten Idee in Hegels Logik, p. 265
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%LENA&ICARA
Hegel Within Contemporary Logic, p. 297
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Pagina 297
Hegel Scienza della logica
Hegel Within Contemporary Logic
Elena Ficara
It is usual to think of Hegel’s logic as incompatible with contemporary formal logic1. There are indeed some major resistances to the attempt of considering Hegel’s logic from a formal point of view, or even as belonging to the
canon of the philosophy of logic. They are further aggravated by Hegel’s famous observations, according to which considering thought using figures and
signs is «useless»2, and formal logic «neither grasps truth nor can be considered as a path towards truth»3. So it is not surprising that in most handbooks
of the history and philosophy of logic the Hegelian, and more generally the
German classical reflections about logic are not considered4. The only excep1
On the fact that despite our study and knowledge of Hegel have impressively grown, we
are still far from a true understanding of what his logic, in particular the dialectical method, is,
see H.F. Fulda, Unzulängliche Bemerkungen zur Dialektik, in R.P. Horstmann (ed.), Seminar:
Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 1978, pp. 33-69 and H.F. Fulda,
Hegels Dialektik als Begriffsbewegung und Darstellungsweise, in R.P. Horstmann (ed.), Seminar:
Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels, cit., pp. 124-74. See also W. Flach, Hegels dialektische
Methode, in Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 1, Heidelberger Hegel-Tage 1962, Bouvier, Bonn, pp. 55-64.
2
G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in 20 Bänden. Auf der Grundlage der Werke von 1832-1845 neu
edierte Ausgabe, hg. von E. Moldenhauer und K. M. Michel, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1971
(=Hegel, Werke 1-20). Hegel, Werke 6, p. 295.
3
Hegel, Werke 5, p. 36.
4
Or, if they are, they are not free from the suspect of giving a psychologistic account of
logic. However, this critique has to be dismissed in advance, as neither Kant nor Hegel intended
thought as the psychological activity or process. On the Hegelian meaning of “objective thought”
see V. Verra, Introduzione a Hegel, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 19999, pp. 69-74; V. Verra, Su Hegel, Il
Mulino, Bologna 2007, pp. 349-370; A. Nuzzo, La logica, in C. Cesa (ed.), Hegel, Laterza, Roma-Bari 1997, pp. 39-82, pp. 43-44; E. Ficara, Ursprünge des Ausdrucks “das Logische” beim
frühen Hegel, in: «Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte» 52 (2010), 113-125. On Hegel’s and Frege’s
conception of objective thought see F. D’Agostini, Pensare con la propria testa. Problemi di
filosofia del pensiero in Hegel e Frege, in N. Vassallo (ed.), La filosofia di Gottlob Frege, Franco
Angeli, Milano 2003, pp. 59-94. On the objective meaning of thought in Kant see E. Ficara, Die
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tions are the reflections linked to the first attempts of formalising dialectical
logic started in the 60ties, attempts which, for many reasons, have been either
abandoned, or marginalised 5. However, the success that non-classical logics
are experiencing in recent years surely is an important aspect, which could
possibly help such an endeavour 6.
The paper has four parts. In the first part I briefly consider a basic meaning
of «logic», as presented by some recent handbooks. In the second I examine
Kant’s and Hegel’s views on logic, in particular their approach to the question:
what does it mean that in logic (since Aristotle) if some things are supposed,
others «follow with necessity»? In the third part, I present Hegel’s theses
about the relation between logic and metaphysics, a central topic in order to
understand the specific Hegelian idea of logical necessity. In the last part, I
conclude hinting at the utility of considering Hegel’s reflections about logic in
the perspective of contemporary philosophy of logic, and considering contemporary debates from a Hegelian point of view.
1. What is Logic?
In contemporary handbooks, logic is defined as the discipline that inquires
into inference, examining «what follows from what»7. In Logical Pluralism JC
Beall and Greg Restall write:
Logic is about consequence. Logical Consequence is a relation among claims expressed in a language. An account of Logical Consequence is an account about what
follows from what8.
And Graham Priest in Logic. A Very Short Introduction quotes Tweedledum
und Tweedledee in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass:
Ontologie in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft , Königshausen und Neumann, Würzburg 2006, pp.
163-67 and pp. 187-188.
5
See the critical survey on these attempts developed by D. Marconi, La formalizzazione
della dialettica. Hegel, Marx e la logica contemporanea, Rosenberg & Sellier, Torino 1979, pp.
9-84.
6
Among the works that try to re-open the question of the link between the classical German reflection (from Kant to Hegel) and contemporary logic E. Tugendhat, Logisch-semantische
Propädeutik, Reclam, Stuttgart 1993; E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen über die sprachanalytische
Philosophie, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1976; F. D’Agostini, From a Continental Point of View.
The Role of Logic in the Analytic-Continental Divide in: «International Journal of Philosophical
Studies», 9 (2001) n. 3, pp. 349-367; F. D’Agostini, Logica del nichilismo, Laterza, Roma-Bari
2000; F. Berto, Che Cos’è la Dialettica Hegeliana? Un’Interpretazione Analitica del Metodo, Il
Poligrafo, Padova 2005 are worth noting.
7
S. Read, Thinking About Logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, p. 1.
8
JC Beall-G. Restall, Logical Pluralism, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006, p. 3.
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Hegel Within Contemporary Logic
299
«I know what you are thinking about», said Tweedledum: «but it isn’t so, nohow».
«Contrariwise» continued Tweedledee, «if it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it
would be: but as it isn’t, it ain’t. That’s logic».
Priest comments:
What Tweedledee is doing is reasoning, and that is what logic is about. We all reason. We try to figure out what is so, reasoning on the basis of what we already know9.
All these definitions are in substantial continuity with Aristotle’s conception in the Prior Analytics, according to which:
A deduction is speech (logos) in which, certain things having been supposed, something different from those supposed results of necessity because of their being so10.
Logic is thus the inquiry into what necessarily follows from what. According
to Beall and Restall:
Necessity is one feature which classically determines logical consequence: the
truth of the premises of a valid argument necessitates the truth of the conclusion of the
argument. […] Necessity is borne by the transition from the premises to the conclusion. What is necessary, in an argument from A to B, is […] the connection between A
and B. The conditional if A then B is true of necessity11.
All this stated, some fundamental questions arise: why having supposed
certain things, something different necessarily follows from them? And what
does it mean that the truth of the premises necessitates the truth of the conclusion?
The two notions of validity defined by contemporary logic12 are of a certain
relevance in relation to Hegel’s perspective. According to the concept of syntactic validity, a reasoning is valid if it follows the logical rules of the language
in which it is formulated. In this sense, necessity is basically linguistic necessity. The normativity of logic is based on the logical constraints produced
by logical languages, or systems. In traditional logic, logical constraints
(rules) come from thought (are rules of thought). This basically holds also for
Kant, and for Hegel (though in a slightly different way).
According to the notion of semantic validity, validity is based on truth. In
the semantic definition, an inference is valid if given the truth of the premises, also the conclusion is true. This is the so called requisite of truth preserv9
10
11
12
22-28.
G. Priest, Logic. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000, p. 1.
Aristotle, Prior Analytics, I. 2, 24b18-20.
J.C. Beall and G. Restall, op. cit., 14-15.
See S. Haack, Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1978, pp.
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Elena Ficara
ing, which the definitions of logical necessity considered above refer to. Here
the logical constraints come from the world, or from the facts that make true
the premises and/or the conclusion. But notably, the formula «if the premises
are true also the conclusion is true» does not say anything about the real effective truth, truth with reference to the world in which we live. The expression «given the truth of the premises» means «in any possible world in which
the premises are true». The truth presupposed is possible or hypothetical.
The two notions are not rival. They simply come from looking at validity
from different perspectives. Though, it should be noted that the first notion of
validity is established by the axioms or rules of language, so – as it seems – is
ontologically neutral; while the second is ontologically committed, with reference to some world. But notably, the world at stake is a possible world (rather:
a set of possible worlds). So we can say that in both cases validity is a formal
phenomenon, and the enterprise of logic is still to establish validity «in virtue
of form», like Sider writes13.
Interestingly, also for Kant and for Hegel the connection between form (language) and being (truth) is the fundamental problem of logic, in different
ways.
2. Logic and Necessity
When Hegel speaks about the idea of logic, and logical consequence (in
the Introduction to the Encyclopaedia and in the Vorbegriff to the Logic of the
Encyclopaedia) he always uses the formulation: «universality and necessity»,
a typically Kantian formulation. Kant famously defines «universal and necessary» the field of a priori structures that constitutes the main theme of logic.
The formulation «general or formal logic» goes also back to Kant. In the
Jäsche Logic we read:
Everything in nature [...] takes place according to rules, although we do not always
know these rules. Water falls according to laws of gravity [...] the fish in the water, the
bird in the air, moves according to rules. All nature, indeed, is nothing but a combination of phenomena which follow rules ; and nowhere is there any irregularity14.
13
See T. Sider, Philosophical Logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York 2010, p. 2.
«Alles in der Natur [...] geschieht nach Regeln, ob wir gleich diese Regeln nicht immer
kennen. Das Wasser fällt nach Gesetzen der Schwere [...] der Fisch im Wasser, der Vogel in der
Luft bewegt sich nach Regeln. Die ganze Natur überhaupt ist eigentlich nichts anderes als ein
Zusammenhang von Erscheinungen nach Regeln; und es gibt überall keine Regellosigkeit». I.
Kant, Werke in zwölf Bänden, Herausgegeben von Wilhelm Weischedel, Band 2: Schriften zur
Metaphysik und Logik, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a. M. 1996, p. 432.
14
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Hegel Within Contemporary Logic
301
Kant underlines then that thought (or: the understanding) as the faculty of
discovering and fixing rules, moves according to certain rules. Then he asks:
according to which rules does thought itself move? This is the specific question that, according to Kant, gives rise to the logical inquiry. Logic is not the
study of particular regularities (those of the fish’s swimming, the bird’s flying
or of water’s falling: die Regeln des besonderen Erkenntnisgebrauchs/the
rules of thought’s particular use), but the inquiry into the general and universal rules of thought (die Regeln des allgemeinen Erkenntnisgebrauchs/ the
rules of thought’s universal use). The latter are common to all thoughts: whatever object we think about, we have to use them; the former concern a limited
use of thought, and a limited field of objects. This means that the regularities
of thought’s general use are necessary, while particular rules are contingent:
If, however, we set aside all knowledge that we can only borrow from objects, and
reflect simply on the exercise of thought in general, then we discover those rules
which are absolutely necessary, independently of any particular objects of thought,
because without them we cannot think at all.15.
Similarly, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant connects the universality of
the logical field to its formality, underlying that:
General logic abstracts from every content of knowledge and from the differences
between objects and only has to do with the mere form of thought16.
According to Greg Restall, this Kantian view is fundamental in order to understand what logic (in general and today) is and why it is indispensable for
us. He comments:
When we do logic we don’t care about what it is that the statements are about, we
don’t care that my statements might be about tables and chairs or might be about numbers or about platonic ideas. Logic abstracts away from the identity of the objects, the
differences of the objects and only has to do with the structure of thought.
In one sense, logic is a very timid enterprise, because it only considers a very re15 «Wenn wir nun aber alle Erkenntnis, die wir bloß von den Gegenständen entlehnen
müssen, bei Seite setzen und lediglich auf den Verstandesgebrauch reflektieren: so entdecken
wir diejenigen Regeln desselben, die in aller Absicht und unangesehen aller besonderen Objekte des Denkens schlechthin notwendig sind, weil wir ohne sie gar nicht denken würden. Diese
Regeln können daher auch a priori, d. i. unabhängig von aller Erfahrung eingesehen werden
weil sie, ohne Unterschied der Gegenstände, bloß die Bedingungen des Verstandesgebrauchs
überhaupt, er mag rein oder empirisch sein, enthalten» (I. Kant, op. cit., p. 433).
16 «Die allgemeine Logik abstrahiert von allem Inhalt der Erkenntnis und von dem Unterschied der Gegenstände und hat mit nichts anderem zu tun als mit der bloßen Form des
Denkens». The Critique of Pure Reason is quoted following the Academy-edition (second edition): I. Kant, Gesammelte Werke, hrsg. von der (Königlichen) Preußischen (später Deutschen)
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. I ff., Berlin 1900 ff. (=B). B 26.
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stricted domain. But in a sense it is very ambitious, because it considers the structure of
absolutely everything that can be thought. So logic is about nothing, in a very important
sense, but because it is about nothing it is about anything that can be thought17.
Thus – in both Kant’s definition in the Critique of Pure Reason and Restall’s interpretation – logic’s generality (as the characteristic of abstracting
away from all particular content) coincides with its formality (as the prerogative of considering the mere structure or form, and not the content, of
thought)18. In the Jäsche Logik Kant identifies logic’s generality or formality
with its necessity. And, in a similar way, Greg Restall underlines in Logic. An
Introduction, that: «The necessity of logic is a matter of its generality»19.
Kant’s idea implies that if we consider how we factually reason (that is: derive conclusions from premises), we recognise certain recurrent patterns. For
example, I know that if the train to Bochum is late, I won’t catch the connection to Berlin; and this means that if it is true that the train to Bochum is late,
it is true that I won’t catch the connecting train to Berlin. In the same way, I
know that if the pumpkins are sold out, we won’t have pumpkin soup for dinner; so if it is true that pumpkins are effectively sold out, I know that we most
certainly won’t have pumpkin soup for dinner. If I focus on the form of these
inferences, letting out their specific contents, I see that in both cases we have
a unique form: if p then q, p therefore q. I have thus isolated the contents of
the two inferences focussing on their identical form. This form is called modus
ponens and is – together with other forms – always active when we speak or
think. If we reflect in this way about what we do when we speak or think, we
discover that there are (relatively few) fundamental recurrent forms at the basis of our arguments or inferences.
At this point, the question is: what does it mean that logical forms are necessary? Kant points out that logic does not tell us how we think, but how we
should think20. So the logical forms do not only describe the structure of
thought, but, abstracting away from the peculiar contents or circumstances,
they also indicate how we ought to think, always and in all circumstances. Insofar as I recognise how I think, how thought works, I also know when it does
not work. Thus the valid form is not only the result of the consideration of how
17
G. Restall in interview with Adam Saunders at abc Radio/The Philosopher’s Zone.
In the history and philosophy of logic, the question of the connection between formality
and generality is controversial. On the difference between “generalisation“ and “formalisation”
see E. Tugendhat, Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanalytische Philosophie, cit., pp. 3951. On the several meanings in which logic is said to be formal see C. Dutilh Novaes, The Different Ways in which Logic is (said to be) Formal, in «History and Philosophy of Logic», 32(2011)
n. 4, pp. 303-332.
19 G. Restall, Logic. An Introduction, Routledge, London-New York 2006, p. 215.
20 I. Kant, Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik, cit., p. 437.
18
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we factually think (the description of how we validly think), but also the prescription of how we ought to think.
The Kantian meaning of logical necessity is thus so explained: that the
forms are necessary means that they oblige us to follow them. As soon as we
recognise them, we recognise their binding (normative) nature.
But what is the reason of logic’s coercitive force? Why are logical forms binding? In Aristotle’s conception, logos (what we say and think) is ultimately rooted
in on (being), and this implies that logical rules are binding insofar as they are
able to give an account of what really is. For instance, in the Categories Aristotle
writes that the truth of what we think or say is rooted in what is:
The fact of the being of a man carries with it the truth of the proposition that he is,
and the implication is reciprocal: for if a man is, the proposition wherein we allege
that he is, is true, and conversely, if the proposition wherein we allege that he is true,
then he is. The true proposition, however, is in no way the cause of the being of the
man, but the fact of the man’s being does seem somehow to be the cause of the truth of
the proposition, for the truth or falsity of the proposition depends on the fact of the
man’s being or not being21.
From an Aristotelian point of view, the necessity of logical inference is thus
grounded in the connection between logos and on: something necessarily follows from something because things are in a certain way, and our sentences
and arguments express how things are and behave.
However, the Aristotelian connection between logic (formal logic) and being
is not explicitly developed by Kant. In the Jäsche Logik, Kant rather suggests
that the notion of truth as «correspondence» is purely nominal, and cannot constitute a material criterion of truth22. The logical constraint, in Kant’s view,
comes from the structures of thought as they are instantiated by human language, and there is no specific normativity of being. Being, as it is logically relevant, is rather the being of objects already elaborated by thought (phenomena),
that is the being of conceptually grasped objects that figure in statements.
3. Logic and Metaphysics
Hegel’s reflections on logic and on the necessity of logical principles move
along Aristotelian lines23. Also for Hegel, the question of effective truth, in21 Aristotle, Categories, 12, 15-19 (transl. by J. Ackrill, Categories and De Interpretatione,
Oxford University Press, Oxford 1963).
22 See I. Kant, Schriften zur Metaphysik und Logik, cit., pp. 476-477.
23 On Hegel’s Aristotelism see V. Verra, Su Hegel, cit. pp. 349-369. On Hegel and Aristotle
see A. Ferrarin, Hegel and Aristotle, Cambridge University Press, New York 2001.
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tended as thought’s relation and correspondence to what is, is fundamental in
order to explain the meaning of logical validity and necessity. In particular,
Hegel’s reflections on logical necessity involve a consideration about the link
between logic and metaphysics.
In the Introduction to the Science of Logic Hegel considers the question of
the relation between logic and metaphysics in the context of a consideration of
the specific logical field, and of a critique of merely formal or subjective conceptions of thought. In this respect, ancient metaphysics had a «higher» conception of thought than modern philosophy. According to it, real is only what
is graspable through thought, and thought is the very ground on which we can
grasp something as existent. According to Anaxagoras, for instance, nous (i.e.
thought) is «the principle of the world, and the essence of the world is to be
defined as thought»24. According to Plato, «something has reality only in its
concept»25. Hegel also remarks that the objective, and not psychological or
subjective conception of thought is already present in our general and common idea of logic.
But on the other side, one can appeal to the conceptions of ordinary logic itself; for
it is assumed, for example, that the determinations contained in definitions do not belong only to the knower, but are determinations of the object, constituting its innermost essence and its very own nature. Or, if from given determinations others are inferred, it is assumed that what is inferred is not something external and alien to the
object, but rather that it belongs to the object itself, that to the thought there is a correspondent being26.
According to the ordinary conception of logic, logical rules are not arbitrary, or dependent on who thinks them, they are rather the very expression of
the structure of what really is. In other words, when I derive conclusions from
premises, saying for example: «all conservative politicians lye, Mitt Romney
is a conservative politician therefore Mitt Romney lies», I claim to adequately
grasp the object of what I say (in this case Mitt Romney and his truthfulness).
24 «Laut Anaxagoras ist der Nous das Prinzip der Welt und das Wesen der Welt soll als
Gedanke bestimmt werden» (Hegel, Werke 5, p. 44).
25 «Laut Platon hat etwas nur in seinem Begriff Wirklichkeit» (Hegel, Werke 5, p. 44).
26 «Man kann sich auf die eigenen Vorstellungen der gewöhnlichen Logik berufen; es wird
nämlich angenommen, daß z.B. Definitionen nicht Bestimmungen enthalten, die nur ins erkennende Subjekt fallen, sondern die Bestimmungen des Gegenstandes, welche seine wesentlichste
eigenste Natur ausmachen. Oder wenn von gegebenen Bestimmungen auf andere geschlossen
wird, wird angenommen, daß das Erschlossene nicht ein dem Gegenstande Äußerliches und
Fremdes sei, sondern daß es ihm vielmehr selbst zukomme, daß diesem Denken das Sein
entspreche. – Es liegt überhaupt bei dem Gebrauche der Formen des Begriffs, Urteils,
Schlusses, Definition, Division usf. zugrunde, daß sie nicht bloß Formen des selbstbewußten
Denkens sind, sondern auch des gegenständlichen Verstandes» (Hegel, Werke 5, 45).
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Consequently, in the Vorbegriff of the Encyclopaedia Logic Hegel calls the
logical forms which constitute the subject matter of logic «objective
thoughts».
With these explanations and qualifications, thoughts may be called objective
thoughts – among which are also to be included the forms which are more especially
discussed in the common logic, where they are usually treated as forms of conscious
thought only. Logic therefore coincides with Metaphysics, the science of things set and
held in thoughts – thoughts accredited able to express the essential reality of things27.
Logic thus coincides with metaphysics because the forms we use when we
think and reason express the very structures of what is. The forms analysed in
logic are both determinations of thought (and not of things), and determinations of reality (since thought, according to Hegel who basically follows Aristotle, has the ability to grasp things as they are) and metaphysics – as the science of the essence of things – is one and the same as logic – as the science of
the valid inference. Hegel observes that:
If thought tries to form a notion of things, this notion (as well as sentences and arguments) cannot be composed of parts and relations which are alien and irrelevant to
the things28.
All this suggests that Hegel follows the ancient, Aristotelian conception,
according to which the necessity of logos is not ontologically neutral. As a
matter of fact, we also read that
When logic is taken as the science of thinking in general, it is understood that this
thinking constitutes the mere form of a cognition that logic abstracts from all content
and that the so-called second constituent belonging to knowledge, namely its matter,
must come from somewhere else; and that since this matter is absolutely independent
of logic, this latter can provide only the formal conditions of genuine cognition and
cannot in its own self contain any real truth, not even be the pathway to real truth because just that which is essential in truth, its content, lies outside logic. But in the
first place, it is quite inept to say that logic abstracts from all content, that it teaches
only the rules of thinking without any reference to what is thought or without being
able to consider its nature. For as thinking and the rules of thinking are supposed to
27 «Die Gedanken können nach diesen Bestimmungen objektive Gedanken genannt werden, worunter auch die Formen, die zunächst in der gewöhnlichen Logik betrachtet und nur für
Formen des bewussten Denkens genommen zu werden pflegen, zu rechnen sind. Die Logik fällt
daher mit der Metaphysik zusammen, der Wissenschaft der Dinge in Gedanken gefasst, welche
dafür galten, die Wesenheiten der Dinge auszudrücken» (Hegel, Werke 8, 81).
28 «Indem der Gedanke sich von Dingen einen Begriff zu machen sucht, dieser Begriff [...]
nicht aus Bestimmungen und Verhältnissen bestehen kann, welche den Dingen fremd und
äußerlich sind» (Hegel, Werke 8, 81).
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be the subject matter of logic, these directly constitute its peculiar content; in them,
logic has that second constituent, a matter, about the nature of which it is concerned29.
Here Hegel observes that logic is indeed the science of thought in general
(separated from every particular content), the consideration of the mere form
of thought, and that this formal character of logic is at the very origin of the
common critique according to which logical forms are empty, and have nothing to do with truth30. But this view is wrong, as forms are themselves logic’s
specific content and subject matter. Thus logic is not a consideration of empty
forms, because the forms it considers are forms of something (thought), and
thought is both itself a specific content (the field of the logical theory) and
able to express what truly is.
Similarly, in the Lectures on Logic and Metaphysics of 1817 he maintains
that not only the forms of thought, but also their truth, constitute the research
field of logic. This also implies that logical forms are necessarily linked to nature, and natural language.
Logic is for us a natural metaphysics. Everyone who thinks has it. Natural logic
does not always follow the rules which are established in the logic as theory; these
rules often tread down natural logic31.
Significantly, Hegel distinguishes between logic as theory and logic as natural logic (or natural metaphysics). In this sense, Hegel seems to develop the
Kantian notion of logical necessity in two senses32. First he underlines the
role of concrete experience (natural logic and natural metaphysics) for the
discovery and fixation of logical rules (the logical theory); second, he understands experience in an enlarged way, as already structured in terms of lan29 «Wenn die Logik als die Wissenschaft des Denkens im allgemeinen angenommen wird,
so wird dabei verstanden, daß dies Denken die bloße Form einer Erkenntnis ausmache, daß die
Logik von allem Inhalt abstrahiere und das sogenannte zweite Bestandstück, das zu einer Erkenntnis gehöre, die Materie, anderswoher gegeben werden müsse, daß somit die Logik, als von
welcher diese Materie ganz und gar unabhängig sei, nur die formalen Bedingungen wahrhafter
Erkenntnis angeben, nicht aber reale Wahrheit selbst enthalten, noch auch nur der Weg zu realer Wahrheit sein könne, weil gerade das Wesentliche der Wahrheit, der Inhalt, außer ihr liege»
(Hegel, Werke 5, 36).
30 See for instance Kant’s conception of formal logic as the negative condition of, and not
the path towards truth (B 84-85).
31 «Die Logik ist für uns eine natürliche Metaphysik. Jeder, der denkt, hat sie. Die natürliche Logik folgt nicht immer den Regeln, die in der Theorie für die Logik aufgestellt werden;
diese Regeln zertreten häufig die natürliche Logik» (G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über Logik und
Metaphysik, Heidelberg 1817, herausgegeben von K. Gloy, Meiner, Hamburg 1992, p. 8. Cursives are mine).
32 On the concept of natural logic see A. Nuzzo, La logica, cit., pp. 47-50. Nuzzo explains
here (pp. 47-48) that both expressions „natural logic“ and „science of logic“ were originally
used by Kant.
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guage and thought (natural logic and natural metaphysics). This conception is
perfectly coherent with Hegel’s Aristotelism, as Hegel repeatedly underlines
that Aristotle’s empiricism was speculative33.
Similarly, in the Preface to the second edition of the Science of Logic, we
read that logical rules are sunk in human language and human nature, and
that the general task of logic as theory is to become aware of this, making the
rules that are implicit in our effective speaking and thinking the thematic
field of our inquiry. In other words, when we speak or reason, we use specific
patterns, for instance disjunctive syllogism (the door is open or closed, it is
not closed, therefore it’s open), without knowing it. In this sense Hegel speaks
about natural logic or logic as natural metaphysics (the logical rules are there,
but unconsciously). The logical theory («logic» in the common meaning of the
word, as referring to the discipline) consists in recognising these patterns,
making them the object of inquiry.
However, sometimes the logical theory «treads down» logic as natural
metaphysics because it fixes rules, taking them as valid for every linguistic
context, rules that are nevertheless refuted by the natural logic of language, or
the natural metaphysics. For instance, logic finds within the natural logic of
language the form of disjunctive syllogism «p or q, not p therefore q» and forgets that it does not lead per se to valid and sound arguments, but that it
should be anchored in the analysis of predicates, and in the relation between
words and what really is. If the argument34 «the door is open or closed, it is
not open, therefore it’s closed» is sound, the argument, which is equally
grounded on disjunctive syllogism, «you are either for the Palestinians or for
the Israelis, you are not for the Israelis therefore you are for the Palestinians»
is not sound, though presenting the form of disjunctive syllogism. The second
argument is not sound because the predicates «being for the Palestinians»
and «being for the Israelis» behave differently from the predicates «being
open» and «being closed», and because it is not true that one is either for the
Israelis or for the Palestinians, and that there is not a third possibility. A logic
that dogmatically claims that the rules it fixes are the norm of truth, treads
down the natural logic and metaphysics because it does not take into any account the meaning words and arguments have in concrete contexts, and their
adequacy or inadequacy to express what truly is.
33
V. Verra, Su Hegel, cit., p. 364.
There are many examples of the failures of classical logical rules in Hegel’s texts. See for
instance Hegel, Werke 2, 575-581, Hegel, Werke 18, 526-538 as well as E. Ficara, Dialectic and
Dialetheism, 34 (2013) n. 1, pp. 35-52. This example, which is taken from F. D’Agostini, Verità
avvelenata, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 2010, p. 31, shows quite plainly the limits of logical validity. Other clarifying examples can be found in G. Priest, Logic. A Very Short Introduction, cit.,
pp. 1-2; G. Restall, Logic, cit., pp. 212-213; S. Read, Thinking About Logic, cit., pp. 36-41.
34
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Significantly, doubts about disjunctive syllogism, and conditionals, and
other devices of classical logic, have led to non-classical logics, where they
are interpreted hegelianly, as symptoms of the controversial normativity of logic when referred to natural metaphysic35.
In the context of the discussion of Atomism, Hegel observes that one cannot escape metaphysics – which he defines here as merely consisting in tracing nature back to thoughts – by throwing oneself into Atomism’s arms. The
atom is in itself a thought and the conception of matter as consisting of atoms
is in itself a metaphysical conception.
Pure physicians are, as a matter of fact, only the animals, because they do not
think, whereby human beings are born metaphysicians. And the question is only if the
metaphysics one uses is of the right kind, if we keep with univocal and fixed intellectual determinations as the basis of our theoretical and practical activity, instead of
keeping with concrete, logical ideas36.
Similarly, in the Naturphilosophie of the Encyclopaedia we read:
What distinguishes the philosophy of nature from physics is the kind of metaphysics it adopts. As a matter of fact, metaphysics is nothing else than the range of
thought determinations, the network in which we bring every matter and through
which we make it understandable. Every educated mind has its metaphysics, the instinctual thought, the absolute power in us over which we become master when we
make it the object of our thought37.
Metaphysics is thus the structure of thoughts we use in order to grasp what
is. If we want it or not, we – as thinking and acting human beings – always
think and act according to some orienting general view (the natural, i.e. unconscious metaphysics). What is more, Hegel observes that these general orienting views can be problematic, because they oblige us to think in certain
ways and to do certain things. When Hegel points our that the main problem
35 See G. Priest, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logics, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 20082.
36 «Reine, pure Physiker sind in der Tat nur die Tiere, da diese nicht denken, wohingegen
der Mensch, als ein denkender Wesen, ein geborener Metaphysiker ist. Dabei kommt es dann
nur darauf an, ob die Metaphysik, welche man zur Anwendung bringt, von der rechten Art ist,
und namentlich, ob es nicht, anstatt der konkreten, logischen Idee, einseitige, vom Verstand fixierte Gedankenbestimmungen sind, an welche man sich hält und welche die Grundlage unseres
theoretischen sowohl als unseres praktischen Tuns bilden» (Hegel, Werke 8, 207).
37 «Das, wodurch sich die Naturphilosophie von der Physik unterscheidet, ist näher die
Weise der Metaphysik, deren sich beide bedienen; denn Metaphysik heißt nichts anderes als
der Umfang der allgemeinen Denkbestimmungen, gleichsam das diamantene Netz, in das wir
allen Stoff bringen und dadurch erst verständlich machen. Jedes gebildete Bewußtsein hat seine
Metaphysik, das instinktartige Denken, die absolute Macht in uns, über die wir nur Meister werden, wenn wir sie selbst zum Gegenstande unserer Erkenntnis machen» (Hegel, Werke 8, 20).
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is therefore not if we have a metaphysics (or logic) or not, but if our metaphysics (i.e.: logic) is wide and flexible enough, he also refers to the risks of
holding to a too rigid logic or metaphysics. Therefore he says that there is only
one right metaphysics, and this is the «concrete, logical idea». By «concrete
logical idea» he means dialectical logic, typically defined by Hegel as the logic of «concreteness», that is: «connection». In this sense, dialectical logic appears to be both: – the individuation of the most general patterns of thought
(in Kant’s, but also the contemporary meaning of «formal logic»), obtained abstracting away from all content of thought, focussing on the mere form; and: –
the critical reflection on these forms, a reflection which brings us to ask about
their truth, i.e. their effective ability to grasp what is. For instance, if we assume atomism as our metaphysics, then we have the difficulty of giving an account of phaenomena such as the space-time continuum, which aren’t adequately graspable assuming that matter is constituted by atoms. Thus our logic
and metaphysics has to be wide in order to grasp what experience presents us
in every case, it must also be flexible, i.e. be ready to discuss its own structures, when they reveal to be inadequate.
4. Conclusion
In the context of a consideration of Aristotle’s syllogistic in the Lectures on
the History of Philosophy, Hegel writes:
The form of an inference, as also its content, may be absolutely correct, and yet the
conclusion arrived at may be untrue, because this form as such has no truth of its own;
but from this point of view these forms have never been considered38.
This Hegelian statement is a typically non-classical insight, shared by most
contemporary philosophers of logic. As a matter of fact, researches in the philosophy of logic39 recognise that, sometimes, classical logical inference patterns are not able to convey truth as they, in principle, should. Read defends
for this reason the importance of a critical reflection on basic logical notions.
He observes:
There are few books on the philosophy of logic. One reason is a widespread but re38
«Die Form eines Schlusses, so wie sein Inhalt, kann ganz richtig sein und doch sein
Schlusssatz ohne Wahrheit, weil diese Form als solche für sich keine Wahrheit hat. Von dieser
Seite aber sind diese Formen nie betrachtet worden» (Hegel, Werke 19, p. 240).
39 S. Haack, op. cit.; S. Read, op. cit. and see also, more recently, J.C. Beall and G. Restall,
op. cit., and, in Italy, F. D’Agostini, I mondi comunque possibili. Logica per la filosofia e il ragionamento comune, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 2012 and F. Berto, Teorie dell’assurdo, Carocci,
Milano 2006.
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grettable attitude towards logic, one of deference and uncritical veneration. It is based
on a mistaken belief that since logic deals with necessities, with how things must be,
with what must follow come what may, that in consequence there can be no questioning of its basic principles, no possibility of discussion and philosophical examination
of the notions of consequence, logical truth, and correct inference40.
While Restall observes that:
Logic is not a completed science, and teaching it as it is one gives the mistaken
impression that all the important issues have been decided and all of the important
questions have been given definitive answers. This is a misrepresentation of the state
of the art41.
For Read and Restall, as well as for Hegel, logic is not a rigid canon, which
has to be accepted as it is once and for all. According to Hegel, logic as theory
has to be continuously re-thought in consideration of the natural logic of language, and of our implicit metaphysics.
Similarly, according to Haack, thinking about logical necessity involves
considerations about implicit epistemological and metaphysical assumptions:
The very rigour that is the chief virtue of formal logic is apt, also, to give it an air of
authority, as if it were above philosophical scrutiny. And that is a reason, also, why I
emphasise the plurality of logical systems; for in deciding between alternatives one is
often obliged to acknowledge metaphysical or epistemological preconceptions that
might otherwise have remained implicit42.
The Hegelian way to deal with the failures of logical necessity seems to imply
two kinds of reactions. On the one side, the awareness that logical validity and
necessity might fail implies – exactly as in contemporary views – the idea that a
critical reflexion about these forms, that is: what today is called «philosophy of
logic», as critical enterprise, which is concerned with the limits and resources of
(classical) logic, is needed. What is more, what Hegel calls «logic» is both the
fixation of the rules of valid inference and the critical reflection upon them. On
the other side, referring to Aristotle’s logic, Hegel also claims that:
There are a number of kinds of judgment and inferences, each of which is held to be
per se valid, and is supposed to have truth so as it is, per se. Thus they are simply content, indifferent, detached content: the famous laws of contradiction, identity etc., the
forms of syllogisms etc. […] Thus they are only the material of [the] truth [of thought],
the formless content; their deficiency is hence not that they are only forms but rather
that form is lacking to them, and that they are in too great a degree content 43.
40
412
42
43
S. Read, op. cit., p. 2.
G. Restall, op. cit., 4.
S. Haack, op. cit., 10.
«Es sind eine Menge Arten des Urteilens und des Schließens, deren jede so für sich gilt
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and:
The scorn of logic rests simply on the false assumption that there is a lack of content. On the contrary, the error [of logical forms] is that they are in too great a degree
content44.
These observations imply that, according to Hegel, the problem with logic is
not its lack of content (since Kant it is evident that logic has forms as its specific content or subject matter) but its lack of form. In this perspective, Hegel
claims that formal logic, as the fixation of forms of valid inferences as it is traditionally conceived and practiced, has not yet a form. Dialectics can thus be
plausibly interpreted as the logic that, critically reflecting on classical logical
forms (of what we do when we fix forms such as the Law of Non Contradiction,
the Law of the Excluded Middle, but also the basic logical operations such as
negation, identity, etc.) gives classical logic the form it is lacking. As a matter
of fact, the Science of Logic is precisely the critical reflection about logical necessity and logical forms elevated to a form and methodically developed.
As far as I know, this insight has not been considered yet in contemporary
options. Contemporary philosophers of logic neither explicitly admit that their
reflection follows unitary patterns, neither consider their own reflection on
classical logic and its possible failures as what gives logic rigour and the status of a science45. In this sense, the Hegelian view on logic not only appears
to be perfectly compatible with contemporary philosophy of logic, but it also
might constitute a contribute to its self-awareness.
In conclusion, what is characteristic for the Hegelian account is the consideration of dialectic as the specific form of the critical reflection upon
forms. Thus to the question: «What kind of logic is Hegel’s logic?» is possible
to answer: philosophy of logic elevated to a form and methodically developed.
In particular, in Hegel as well as in contemporary logic, emerges that the critical reflection upon logic goes hand in hand with the recognition of the failures
of validity and necessity of the forms of traditional logic, because sometimes
und an und für sich, als solche Wahrheit haben soll. So sind sie eben Inhalt, gleichgültiges, unterschiedenes Sein: die berühmten Gesetze des Widerspruchs usf., die Schlüsse usf. [...] Sie sind
nur das Material der Wahrheit, der formlose Inhalt; ihr Fehler ist nicht, daß sie nur Form sind,
sondern Form fehlt» (Hegel, Werke 19, p. 239).
44 «Die Verachtung der Logik selbst beruht auf dem falschen Gesichtspunkt des Mangels
des Inhalts. Sie [die Formen] haben den Fehler, zu sehr Inhalt zu sein» (Hegel, Werke 19,
p. 240).
45 This would require more detailed considerations about the link between dialectics and
the concept of scientificity, and the differences between classical and dialectical demonstrations. On the scientific nature of the dialectical proof see H.-G. Gadamer, Hegels Dialektik. Fünf
hermeneutische Studien (translated by C. Smith, Yale University Press, New Haven-London,
1976, pp. 6-7 and 30-32).
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Elena Ficara
an inference is formally (classically) valid, and the premises are also true in
any possible world, but the conclusion is not true. In addition, Hegel sees in
dialectics the unitary form of this reflection about classical logic and its possible failures, contributing to establish dialectics as the form of our thinking
about forms, and about truth.
Abstract
In this paper I consider Hegel’s idea of logic in different passages of his work
(in the Introduction to the Science of Logic, in the Vorbegriff of the Encyclopaedia Logic, in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy), and I compare it with
some contemporary conceptions of logic. In my view, such a comparison is relevant in at least two senses. First, it makes possible to address the controversial
question: «what kind of logic is Hegel’s logic?». Second, it allows to locate
Hegel’s view within contemporary debates, assessing its actuality. In this perspective, Hegel’s reflections reveal to be crucial in order to deal with some questions at the very core of contemporary debates in the philosophy of logic.
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Hegel Scienza della logica
I
l primo tomo della Wissenschaft der Logik fu pubblicato alla fine di aprile del 1812. Il secondo uscì dalla tipografia nel
dicembre dello stesso anno, recando però come data il 1813.
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azion alla “Logica oggettiva”. Il terzotavolume
Entrambi erano
one
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sullaco“Logica
soggettiva”, che Hegel sperava di
far
peseguire immepia
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diatamente, uscì invece alla fine del 1816. c
Siamo quindi a circa duecento anni dalla pubblicazione di
quest’opera. Per tale occasione il presente volume di «Teoria»,
nelle sue varie parti, intende offrire una lettura approfondita di
e
alcuni
del testo hegeliano. Ciò viene compiuto, com’è orionaspetti
lutazstile della rivista, avvalendosi dei maggiori esperti a livello
a
v
mai
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pe
copia
internazionale e coinvolgendo nel progetto studiosi affermati di
diverse generazioni.
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€ 18,00
zione
ISBN 978-884673663-5
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