(Seminar) (April 2012)

IMPACT OF COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
ON COMMAND AND CONTROL
17-19 April 2012, Ankara, Turkey
www.c2coe.org
Review Document # 18
Seminar date: Apr 17 – 19, 2012
Table of Content
Introduction .............................................................................................
3
Executive Summary ...................................................................................
4
Seminar Facts ...........................................................................................
5
Day 1 ......................................................................................................
8
Prof. Dr. Tim GRANT - Command and Control in the Context of Comprehensive
Approach: A Scientific View ........................................................................
8
Maj. Cengiz Mesut BÜKEÇ (TUR AF) - Information Management in NATO Operational Environment ....................................................................................
9
LtCol Heiko HERKEL (DEU A) - The Role of CIMIC in a CA ................................
11
LtCol Siegfried Eisenreich (DEU A) - Impact of CA on C2:The Steadfast Series
Perspective-Current Status and Challenges ...................................................
14
Mr. Ali Nasuh MAHRUKİ - CA in Search and Rescue Operations ........................
17
Day 2 ......................................................................................................
20
CDR Marten MEIJER (NLD N) - Consequences of the NATO Comprehensive Approach for Command and Control ................................................................
20
Mrs. Suzana LIPOVAC - 10 Years of Civil-Military Cooperation with the
Bundeswehr in Afghanistan– An Insight View from a Civilian ...........................
22
Lieutenant General A.J.H.Van LOON - Keynote Speaker ..................................
24
Mrs. Christine MacNulty - The Human Elements of a Comprehensive Strategic
2
Approach to C2 .........................................................................................
26
Day 3 ......................................................................................................
29
Mr. Sylvain Vité- The Notion of Armed Conflict under IHL ................................
29
Mr. Peter KRUIT- Red Cross Casualty Information in WW2 ..............................
32
Seminar Closure ........................................................................................
34
Seminar Pictures .......................................................................................
35
ANNEX A Seminar Program .........................................................................
36
ANNEX B List of Used Abbreviations .............................................................
37
Introduction
D
ear Reader,
from 17 until 19 April 2012,
The Command and Control Centre of
Excellence (C2CoE), in close cooperation with the Defence Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence (CoEDAT) organized the first seminar of
2012 on The Impact of Comprehensive Approach (CA) on Command
and Control (C2) in the facilities of
CoE-DAT, Ankara, Turkey. This event
was executed in accordance with the
C2CoE Program of Work for 2012.
A
s a catalyst in the field of C2,
we aimed to present a catalyz-
ing platform about The Impact of CA
on C2.
I am very pleased with the
opportunity to organize this seminar
in a location within Turkey, as this
supported our ambition to reach out
to our Sponsoring Nations.
I
I
hope that the fruitful discussion
we have started during this semi-
nar will continue and will lead us to a
future event on this topic in the near
future.
am satisfied to conclude that we
reached our goal. There was an
international audience with a considerable number of attendees from
E
nding this short introduction, it
is my honour to offer you this
Seminar Review Document. I wish
Turkey. Speakers came from NATO
you a good reading and hope that we
entities, NATO members and other
can
non-military organizations and they
events organized by our centre.
welcome
you
at
upcoming
shared their knowledge and experience. The openness, quality, and in-
Yours sincerely,
tensity of the discussions contributed
to the success of the seminar. Therefore, I would like to express my
gratitude to all the speakers and participants.
A.P.P. Visser
Director C2CoE
Colonel NLD A
3
Y
ou are being presented with the Seminar Review Document, published by
the Command and Control Centre of Excellence after each seminar. These
Seminar Review Documents give the reader an overview of the event, highlighting the main topics and providing some of the lessons identified. This document will cover only the key themes of the seminar and is not an entire summary of all the briefings.
Executive Summary
T
he C2 seminar was held in the facilities of Defence Against Terror-
ism Centre of Excellence (CoE-DAT) in
ticipants are mostly interested in
the New NATO Command Structure.
Ankara, Turkey, from the 17th to 19th
For consideration there are other pos-
of April 2012. Since many different
sible topics such as: best practices of
aspects of CA and C2 were covered,
CA, lessons learned from past and
this C2 seminar was a great success.
current operations with regard to C2
T
and CA, C2 in mobile operations, aphe seminar covered many inter-
proaches
esting topics such as: Command
making/planning in a multiple contri-
and Control in the Context of Compre-
butions mission/operation and C2 in-
hensive Approach, Information Man-
teroperability.
agement in NATO Operational Environment, The Role of CIMIC in a CA,
The
Steadfast
Series
Perspective-
Current Status and Challenges, CA in
T
to
harmonizing
decision
he audience underlined that C2
seminars are a great environment
to learn about C2 and to open the
Search and Rescue Operations, Con-
eyes for different aspects of CA. The
sequences of the NATO Comprehen-
diverse
sive Approach for Command and Con-
provided interesting insights in real
trol, 10 Years of Civil-Military Coop-
world problems as well as the selec-
eration with the Bundeswehr in Af-
tion
ghanistan – An Insight View from a
over, seminars are great opportunities
Civilian, The Human Elements of a
for networking, the exchange of ideas,
Comprehensive Strategic Approach to
views and to enlarge the C2 commu-
C2, The Notion of Armed Conflict un-
nity.
der International Humanitarian Law,
Red Cross Casualty Information in the
Second World War and included a
small workshop.
4
F
or a follow-on seminar, the par-
of
background
of
participants
presentations/topics.
More-
Seminar facts
Background
Seminar Agenda
T
T
he complexity of operations has
increased as a significant pres-
ence of non-military participants has
he focused three days seminar
sought to achieve its aim through
a combination of presentations and
become more common than in the
discussions. The briefings mainly fo-
past. NATO seeks to achieve its ob-
cused on cooperation among national
jectives
Comprehensive
governmental departments and agen-
Approach that requires effective co-
cies, non-governmental organizations
operation among all actors. In all cir-
(NGOs),
cumstances, the commander and his
(IOs) and the private sector. More-
task forces find themselves part of an
over, the seminar included a work-
interrelated network that extends up-
shop on The Human Elements of a
ward to the strategic level, downward
Comprehensive Strategic Approach to
to the tactical level and laterally to a
C2.
through
a
range of military and civilian organizations.
P
M
international
organizations
rogram of the seminar is added in
Annex A.
Seminar’s Aim
T
he main aim was to offer a forum
for C2CoE Sponsoring Nations
oderator for this seminar was
LtCol Achim MÜLLER (DEU AF),
Deputy Director C2CoE.
(SNs), other Nations, NATO entities
and other organizations to discuss
topics related to CA and C2. The
seminar focused on both the military
and civilian aspects of the subject.
Our intention was to bring together
professionals
with
an
operational
background - both military and nonmilitary – who had an interest in CA
and C2.
T
he Seminar was also geared at
the possibility to extend or main-
tain social networks.
5
Seminar attendance
T
participating in the seminar.
he seminar's primary audience
consisted of both military (in the
level of OF-2 or higher) and nonmilitary (IOs, NGOs, GOs, etc.) per-
I
n total 54 persons from different
nations
and
organizations
(Netherlands Defence Academy, JWC,
AKUT,
Kinderberg
International,
sonnel who had an interest in one or
ICRC,
more aspects of the seminar topics.
CIMIC CoE, CoE-DAT, C2CoE) at-
C
onducting the seminar at a location within one of the Sponsoring
Nations (SN) of the C2CoE was a result of the enhanced activities of the
C2CoE to support its Sponsoring Nations.
TNO,
1
st
DEU/NLD
Corps,
tended the seminar. This contributed
to fruitful discussions not only during
the briefings and syndicate work but
also during networking breaks and
the social event.
Furthermore, it allowed the
host SN to have more individuals
Audience Breakdown - Nations
6
Belgium
3
Norway
1
Bosnia and Herzegoniva
1
Romania
1
Czech Republic
1
Slovakia
2
France
4
Turkey
16
Germany
13
United Kingdom
1
The Netherlands
9
USA
2
Total
54
Audience Breakdown - Affiliation
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
Evaluation of the Seminar
T
he seminar was evaluated by the
topics/speakers excellently met their
participants by filling out a short
expectations and another 63% of the
survey at the end of the seminar. Out
of 54 seminar participants, 24 filled
out the questionnaire with their assessment of the quality of the seminar.
O
respondents rated this as good.
S
ome negative comments were
made on the time limitation as “a
lot of subjects were requiring discussion, but time was limited.”
n the question about the overall
quality of the seminar, 33% of
the respondents rated this quality as
excellent. Another 58% rated this
M
ost of the respondents reported
that
they
would
recommend
this seminar to a colleague.
quality as good.
O
n the question if the topics/
speakers of the seminar met the
expectations of the participants, 21%
of the respondents stated that the
7
Presentation by Professor Doctor Tim Grant, Operational ICT, Faculty of Military
Sciences, Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA)
C2 in the Context of Comprehensive Approach: A Scientific View
the partners‟ C2 systems must be
linked together, forming a system of
systems of systems. The central issue
is how to make their C2 systems
interoperable,
enriching
facilitating
information
between
the
and
sharing
partners,
while
respecting their cultural differences.
This
requires
achieving
more
technical
than
just
interoperability,
because information sharing must be
The science of Command &
Control
(C2)
multi-
and pragmatic levels. The key is to
combining
physical,
find and build on the common ground
informational,
cognitive,
disciplinary,
technical,
is
inherently
between the partners.
and socio-organizational aspects. In
The purpose of his presentation
his presentation Professor Tim Grant
was to identify the implications of the
focused on the socio-organizational
CA on the design and implementation
aspects. Traditionally, C2 is a top-
of
down, formal communication process
multidisciplinary
nature
that takes place in a hierarchical
systems.
Next,
the
organization.
However,
reviewed
the
Comprehensive
Approach
requires
a
organizations
wide
to
the
systems.
outlined
of
the
C2
presentation
range
of
possible
of
enforcing a change in form from a
together
hierarchy to a coalition. Then the
towards shared goals despite highly
presentation
disparate
differences
national,
It
organizational forms, with the CA
diversity
work
C2
(CA)
organizational,
showed
how
constrain
cultural
the
and professional cultures. Since the
interoperability between systems. It
partner organizations retain their own
argued for a focus on the common
sovereignty, the collective takes the
ground between partners as a way of
organizational form of a coalition.
maximizing
Communication
the
between
partners
may be both formal and informal.
In
his
presentation,
interoperability.
presentation
drew
Finally,
conclusions
and recommended areas for future
he
regarded an organization‟s C2 system
as a set of networks (a “system of
systems”). In the context of the CA,
8
compatible at the syntactic, semantic,
research, concept development, and
experimentation.
Presentation by Maj. Cengiz Mesut BÜKEÇ (TUR AF), Turkish General Staff
Information Management in NATO Operational Environment
economic, financial, social, and commercial aspects as well as military.
Having been evolved for a new way
of conflict resolution since November
2006, NATO military power elements
need precise and timely information
while they interact with variety of
national and NATO entities. These
interactions require organizations to
adapt to a very complex security environment where information manHe
presented
a
systematic
method for Information Management
(IM) in the NATO Operational Environment where a joint operational
task is achieved with a multi-national
military power. The aim of his study
is to define an IM-based advisory
promise in NATO‟s complex security
environment in order to endorse
comprehensive approach.
Knowledge became a strategic
resource for organizational systems
to survive. For modern organizations,
managing this strategic resource requires utilization of new and complicated technologies as well as a set of
complex techniques. Knowledge is
gathered from variety of sources,
processed for due tasks of the organizations and valued en route for
the aims of the organizations.
Today‟s
security
environment
drives the alliance to change its way
of thinking in the operational environment where its multidimensional
characterization
requires
political,
agement among a range of partners
is utmost important. The alliance is
aware of the fact that information
technology
and
a
well-considered
concept to accomplish management
of it, are compulsory since the environment is ever more dynamic, uncertain and challenging. However,
experiences on the ground clearly
show that the alliance has a lot to
do.
Aiming to build a bridge between the
theory and facts, the systematic approach herein may clarify how to
achieve a new type of operations
better
while
utilizing
Communications
and
the
NATO‟s
Information
Technology (ICT) tools. IM does not
merely refer to implementations of
technology but it cuts across the organization and the environment surrounding it. Managing such a bigscale IT structure will require due
understanding of organizational behaviour,
leadership
and
strategic
management.
9
Joint and international elements of the Alliance, equipped with high technology systems and products, utilize a variety of IT artefacts in order to communicate, report position and/or mission to others and the commanders who
have the operational command authority within the complex operational environment of NATO.
In his presentation he explained the systematic way of IM for accurate information exchange among civil and military authorities in this complex environment. He proposed a KM Model for NATO Tasks which he named after a
myth in Greek Mythology. He says the more we gather and assess the experiences in recent and ongoing NATO operations within systematic context, the
better we guide future operations.
Conclusion:
In order to increase mission effectiveness, the Alliance is evolving towards
a networked force with enhanced capability of efficient information sharing.
Both as arranged within the organization and as interacted with the global actors surrounding in collaboration with any necessary agency of the new security
environment aiming to synchronize with all civil and military authorities.
10
Presentation by LTC Heiko Herkel (DEU F), Civil-Military Co-operation CoE
The role of CIMIC in a Comprehensive Approach
As NATO did not define CA by purpose, to
avoid claiming ownership, the following description
was offered for consideration:
“Comprehensive
Approach is the synergy amongst all actors and
actions of the International Community through
the coordination and de-confliction of its political,
development and security capabilities to face today‟s challenges including complex emergencies”.
As the interaction among relevant military and civil
stakeholders is fundamental for a CA, the following
description of Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) was
also offered: “CMI is the appropriate engagement,
governed by political decisions, between military
and non-military actors. CMI is therefore a permanent strand in order to optimize NATO‟s contribution to a coherent response by the International Community. CMI takes place throughout the entire crisis management process, prior to
and during its operations and missions, and it requires adequate capabilities,
functions and procedures.”.
The levels of interaction can
range
from
awareness to integration
(see figure) as not all IOs
and NGOs have the same
will to cooperate with the
military based on security
and safety reasons and
on
internal
principles
institutional
(impartiality,
independence, neutrality,
etc). Another significant
aspect to be taken into
consideration is the need
for
some
humanitarian
organizations to give visibility to their contributors
on the independent (and not in support of others) humanitarian assistance they
provide, to maintain current funding and ensure future donations.
11
How much NATO‟s understanding of military command and control
(authority, orders, control, accountability,…) is in line with the CA principles
(common aim, no ownership, self-commitment, respect of individual principles,
…) was questioned. Initial conclusions seem to suggest that there is no possible
C2 in a CA but a strong requirement to harmonize efforts through consultation
and dialogue.
The following CIMIC Core functions are to be addressed to analyze how
CIMIC could facilitate the cooperation and coordination between a NATO Commander and relevant civil actors including the indigenous authorities and population:

Civil-military liaison, as a way to establish direct contact with relevant
civil actors to facilitate harmonized planning and the conduction of
operations, and as a way to share information with the civil environment.

Support to civil actors and their environment, which could comprise a
wide variety of activities and resources (preferably enabling support,
but also direct support, like specialized advice, equipment, transportation, road / harbour engineering, information, communications facilities…)

Support to the forces, including among others the assessment of the
civil environment especially in terms of cross-effects and interdependencies of military and non-military entities‟ actions and incorporating it into the planning process, and promoting civil-military interaction and force acceptance.
The CIMIC operational design to contribute to the CA is based on linking
military operations with civil actors in a comprehensive context, facilitating the
full spectrum of civil-military interactions, incorporating civil environment into
the planning and conduct of operations, all of which enhance the military‟s ability to reach the desired end state.
The challenges and opportunities for CIMIC/CMI are the following:

CIMIC
is
a
well-known
military
“brand”,
but
has
been
„misused‟ (limiting it to a tool for force acceptance only) and wrongly
focused (projects) during several missions.

The level of interaction with civil organizations is strongly influenced
by individuals and organizational cultures. Thus personal contacts are
keys to success, while the high frequency of rotation on the military
side causes problems.
12

Many civil organizations would accept the interaction with the military
at the lowest structural level, but not officially and openly. Consequently we often have no Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with
these organizations, but good relationships on TF level, where we exchange situational information and military guarantees for an extraction in the worst case.

Humanitarian organizations require visibility of their independent efforts in international media to find donors. Hence they prefer
„invisible‟ enabling support by the military or any other governmental
organization. This sometimes is in contrast with our political aim to
show our efforts for relief and reconstruction.
Regarding the technical dimension of C2 in CA, there is a need to increase
the information sharing with relevant civil partners, the requirement for the
military to extend the use of data available in social media and collaboration
tools, which are extensively used in the civil environment, and the significance
of new initiatives such as the Relief Web (UN) and the Civil-Military Fusion Centre and Civil Military Overview (CFC/CMO – NATO/ACO).
Finally it is relevant to emphasize the importance for the military to understand and respect the perception, boundaries and principles of GOs, IOs and
NGOs as well as the expectations of the indigenous authorities and population,
as some civil actors have expressed their concerns about the way NATO is implementing the comprehensive approach.
13
Presentation by LTC Siegfried Eisenreich (DEU A), JWC, Chief ESB
Impact of CA on C2: The Steadfast Series Perspective – Current
Status and Challenges
The development of a “contribution to a
Comprehensive Approach” has been influenced by
the operational experience gained in the fields after the fall of the “IRON CURTAIN”. “Train as you
fight – fight as you train” this well known maxim is
a driver of the exercises facilitated by JWC. NATO
contribution to a CA is a major design criterion for
the two types of exercises to which JWC is contributing. While the ISAF Training Events truly replicate the current C2 architecture in theatre and the
content relevant in theatre, the STEADFAST Series
Exercises are built on the concepts, policies and
doctrine agreed as well as operational experience.
The exercise and training objectives reflect also the lessons identified and the
current prudent thinking “how to approach the challenges”.
The NRF and its mission spectrum have been determining the SF series
exercises. For the past years the focus has been laid on Crisis Response Operations (scenario “CERASIA”), but with the Lisbon Summit NATO re-focused on
collective defense and SKOLKAN is the new setting allowing full spectrum exercising.
Within SF series exercises the main means to facilitate a CA are:
 The
scenario
modules
through phases 1-3 of the
exercise
 The MEL/MIL in phase 3 of
the exercise
 The role players provided in
phase 3b and limited in phase
2.
14
The phase 1 “situational awareness and knowledge development” provides a lot of input pertaining to the non-military operational environment; in
phase 2 the OLRT (Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team) adds to these
processes
supported
by
some
Grey
Cell
interaction.
Event
1
called
“STAKEHOLDERS” is completely built to facilitate the activities of the TA COMs
and HQs with the HN, the international community to include UN, other IOs,
and NGOs as well as other countries relevant in theatre; usually two other
events also provide input to these processes. We have seen that the contribution to a CA is an important part of the ISAF Training Events and the SF series
exercises.
Knowledge Centre (KC), Effects Management, Joint Plans, Joint Assessment and Theatre Engagement Centre (TEC) are the most relevant elements to
implement the contribution to a CA. This organization was built to support the
idea of CA. An organizationally important fact is that the strategic level elements are not yet built. This organizational approach is a past approach since
NATO is developing a new DHQs concept with JFC LB in lead. Currently JFC LB
is going to execute the final preparations for the execution phase of the conceptual exercise – SFJT 12. This concept provides more and earlier in-theatre capabilities especially to liaise, understand, and prepare KLE if needed and appropriate.
The next issues - Role of a NATO SCR and Civil-military planning are organizationally relevant, also at the military strategic level and at the political
level. Ambassador Sedwill emphasized the role of a NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) and the necessity to define this role alongside the NATO Military Commander. The SF Series exercises only played with this role limited to a
“Double-headed JFC Commander”. Therefore the exercise experience is very
limited. A JFC Commander, double-hatted as NATO SCR doesn‟t own the civilian
analysis and planning capabilities to support this role. Secondly the relations of
the JFC Commander, SACEUR, and NATO HQ tend to be uncertain. The appointment of a real NATO SCR and the clear delineation of the Command Arrangement would be a better support to the CA.
Civil-Military Planning is an issue also touched by the Lisbon Summit
documents and related documents as the “Political Guidance on Ways to Improve NATO‟s Involvement in Stabilization and Reconstruction”. Overall the exercise observations show that there is a growing understanding for the need to
develop a more comprehensive analysis and planning. The C2 process is covered inter alia through the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive
(COPD), the system of Boards and the designated Battle Rhythm. Capability to
share information is defined through the rules that are applied to the process
and the physical ability to share information. Right now this capability is very
limited and hampers the design and execution of exercises as it does hamper
real world operations. NATO Security Office is developing rules that allow better
15
Info-Sharing with NN entities. The physical ability to share information is very
restricted (mission secret networks) – at the least it does not support the necessities of a CA.
Reviewing the current status within the SF Series Exercises, there are
challenges which will further impact C2:
a.

In the organizational domain:
The development of Command Arrangements for the role of a
NATO SCR alongside the military commander; being in place and
assuming the SCR was not subordinated to the military commander, an additional element to coordinate with was introduced in
the system.

The provision of a mature KD organization throughout ACO and a
coherent training regime. Activities are based on mutual trust and
need therefore a high level of engagement – not only at working
level but especially on Command level (KLE).
b. In the domain of C2 means:

The introduction of Info Sharing rules and the provision of an infrastructure that supports the contribution to a CA. Info Sharing has
been identified as an especially difficult issue. The supportive policy, rules, and systems for the physical exchange of information
are needed.
c. In the domain of C2 processes:

As with the NATO SCR the design of NATO-internal Civil-MilitaryPlanning will impact on C2 and the exercise design creating additional complexity.

The establishment of a well designed KD process which allows the
timely production and provision of actionable knowledge from collection over analysis to dissemination and finally using it for planning purposes.
16
Presentation by Mr. Ali Nasuh MAHRUKİ, SAR Association, TURKEY
Comprehensive Approach in Search and Rescue Operations
Mr. Nasuh MAHRUKİ is the co-founder and
the president of AKUT (Arama Kurtarma DerneğiSearch and Rescue Association).
The number of people doing outdoor sports
in Turkey has increased considerably during the
90‟s resulting in an increase in accidents in the
outdoors. Nasuh Mahruki together with a group of
mountaineers started thinking on how search and
rescue activities should be made more efficient
and so he founded AKUT in 1996.
AKUT is a volunteer search and rescue team.
At the beginning, the main goal was to organize
search and rescue activities on mountain and in
other nature environments. After completing earthquake and flood training
1997, AKUT became capable of helping official institutions during natural disasters. Today AKUT has more than 30 teams and 1500 volunteers.
On August 17, 1999 AKUT was faced with the Marmara earthquake and
reacted to the disaster immediately. Working with 150 permanent members at
that time, they rescued 200 people from the debris. Before the Marmara Earthquake, the only volunteer association focused on search and rescue was AKUT.
After the disaster, hundreds of search and rescue groups came into life
in different regions of the
country. Associations got
founded in different provinces and districts in order
to react locally to disasters. In addition to the restructuring of the army
and
government
institu-
tions, a lot of big factories
and
firms
developed
teams supported by materials, logistics, and training within themselves. This
movement has turned into a national mission and extremely positive steps have
been taken. As a result, AKUT has changed the search and rescue standpoint of
many governmental and private sector institutions. It has been a leader of new
leaps.
17
civil initiative task, including the very
difficult disaster relief operations,
3. Volunteering is a very economic &
effective tool and has many side
benefits for the society,
4. NGOs are a great sector with an
amazing potential between the public
and private sectors and can set good
and effective examples to motivate
both,
5. With the right mind set, positive
attitude, strong commitment, proper
education
&
training
and
enough
equipment anybody can make a difference,
6. Instead of expecting everything
from the State as the old vision,
every citizen should behave, act and
The Athens Earthquake that
choose in harmony with the needs
came after the Marmara Earthquake
and necessities of the society. This is
and the work that AKUT did there,
the key element of living and improv-
has been a symbol of peace and
ing
brotherhood regardless of the process
healthy, strong and promising com-
unresolved for tens of years. It has
munity,
showed that at hard times, people
7. Leadership and teamwork are key
can work side by side, despite differ-
elements and if well used can make a
ences in language, religion, race, and
great difference.
nationality.
Mr. Nasuh MAHRUKI listed his
organization‟s principles as: voluntary
effort, honesty, reliability, helpfulness
and respect for and giving value to
human life.
AKUT has 7 perspectives leading them in their effort:
1. If you get well organized, preplanned, prepared, cooperate, and
coordinate, you can even manage to
deal with the greatest disasters,
2. Volunteering became a very important tool for achieving any kind of
18
life
together
and
building
a
He elaborated on the Disaster
Management
Cycle
and
tional response and relief efforts to a
paradigm
more comprehensive risk reduction
shift in disaster management. Until
culture. It must involve every part of
recently, the approach to Disaster
the society, every part of the govern-
Management has been reactive and
ment and every part of the profes-
relief centric. A paradigm shift has
sional and private sector; it must
now taken place from the relief cen-
involve all of us.
tric approach to holistic and integrated approach with emphasis on
prevention, mitigation and preparedness. These efforts are aimed at conserving developmental gains and also
at minimizing loss of lives, livelihood,
and property.
Comprehensive Disaster Management (CDM) is actually a globally
sustainable development issue. He
says that we need a paradigm shift in
Disaster Management from conven-
19
Presentation by Commander Marten MEIJER, (NLD N), C2CoE
Human Aspects of the NATO Comprehensive Approach
Journal. However, in the internet version of this journal, this definition was
not available. Other authors in this
field have stated that there is no definition for Comprehensive Approach.
Some others even state that NATO
cannot define the Comprehensive Approach, as NATO does not own the
processes involved in this approach.
All this confusion might originate from
the fear for loss of control, which is
Commander Meijer of the Com-
hard to stand for males and for mili-
mand and Control Centre of Excel-
tary males even more. Anyhow, the
lence provided the definition of the
Comprehensive Approach urges the
NATO
or
military to cooperate with non-military
Whole Nation Approach: the integra-
actors. This presents the question:
tion of military security efforts in di-
What are the consequences of the im-
plomacy and development.
plementation of the Comprehensive
Comprehensive
Approach
Approach for command
and
control
in
NATO
and
exer-
Through
inter-
operations
cises?
views,
and
observations,
questionnaires,
various aspects of military
command
and
control were assessed
in two NATO operations
in
Afghanistan
and
Libya and two major
NATO exercises. From
these
assessments
it
appeared that key fea-
20
This definition was given by Ad-
tures of traditional military command
miral Stavridis, Commander Supreme
and control are deeply challenged by
Allied Headquarters Europe in Mons,
the necessity to cooperate with civilian
Belgium in the 60th NATO Anniversary
actors, who organize and perform in a
edition of the SHAPE Community Life
different cultural context.
Non-military actors write letters use
violence against opposing forces and
non-secured phones and operate on
the protection of non-military actors
social media, which are not connected
are still needed. However, the tradi-
to the secured NATO information and
tional military culture is not open
communication networks. These tech-
enough to optimize cooperation with
nology gaps prevent cooperation be-
non-military
tween military and non-military ac-
mended to bridge cultural differences
tors. Social media can fill these gaps.
between military and non-military or-
Lack of trust between military and non
ganizations, which have to cooperate
-military actors also prevents this co-
in the same field of operations, includ-
operation (see figure).
ing the use of social media and effec-
It is concluded that traditional
actors.
It
is
recom-
tive gender policy.
military roles like the use of massive
21
Presentation by Mrs. Suzana Lipovac, Head and Founder of
KinderBerg International e.V.
Ten years of Civil-Military Cooperation with the Bundeswehr in
Afghanistan: An Insight View from a Civilian
“Why they don’t listen to me and I don’t understand them!”
To illustrate the long way KBI
and the military had to go to understand each other, Mrs. Lipovac took an
example right from the beginning of
the activities in Afghanistan when she
requested support from the German
troops to organize a treatment session
near Kabul. Because KBI and the military communicated in their own languages, but not with each other in a
common language, the support was
KinderBerg
International
e.V.
(KBI) has been present in Afghanistan
since February 2002. The main features of the projects there are to provide ambulant primary medical care in
remote
rural
areas
of
Kunduz,
Badakhshan, Baghlan, Taloquan and
Logar with a focus on mother and
child health care. The project is implemented in collaboration with three
partners: the Afghan Ministry of Public
Health, local representatives of traditional informal structures and the German Federal Foreign Office. In addition, the project is logistically supported by the German Armed Forces
(Bundeswehr).
The
current
project
phase is scheduled to run until 31 December 2012. Until then, an estimated
3.5 million patients will have been
treated within the scope of the project.
22
there in the end, but there was too
much of it, and it was badly prepared.
This was not the only event
man government was deeply divided
which nearly failed because of a lack
in this issue. KBI‟s main concern was
of understanding, but it shows that a
that cooperation with the military will
successful
compromise the neutrality of all hu-
cooperation
depends
mainly on local acceptance, a com-
manitarian aid.
mon civil-military language, mutual
The strategy on if and how to
understanding and respect and a
proceed when the German armed
clear demarcation between civilian
forces are withdrawn from Afghani-
and military actors.
stan
is
not
yet
clear,
but
Mrs.
For this civil-military approach,
Lipovac left no doubt that KinderBerg
which is defined by clear guidelines,
will certainly continue its work in Af-
KBI has been strongly criticized by
ghanistan in some way.
members of the German humanitarian aid community and even the Ger-
The presentation ended with a quote from Seneca on a strong plea for
deliberate action in the direction of a clear goal: “If a person does not know
to which port he is steering, no wind is favourable to him.”
23
Presentation by Lieutenant General A.J.H. Van LOON, Com 1st German
Netherlands Corps
Keynote Speaker
Developing and Sustaining Interagency Competency
multiply the security domains, which
results in multiple networks.
In addition to that complexity,
the majority of information is classified, which restricts the accessibility of
this information. The default network
classification is mission secret, even
for invitations to lunch together.
A third complicating factor is
that some functional applications are
often only available on one network.
Lieutenant General Van Loon,
The emphasis is placed on the security
commanding officer of the First Ger-
of information, and not on sharing in-
man Netherlands Corps in Münster,
formation. However, the Comprehen-
Germany served on two deployments
sive Approach requires the connection
in the International Security Assis-
of networks and exchange of informa-
tance Force in Afghanistan. He was
tion with open and accessible sys-
the first Dutch commanding officer of
tems. This requirement conflicts with
the Regional Command South in Af-
current military security policies and
ghanistan.
presents a need for accredited inter-
He has concluded that the cur-
that
share
information
with
rent military Communication and In-
trusted partners using minimal secu-
formation Technology is not yet fit for
rity over the World Wide Web.
the Comprehensive Approach, both
from his experiences in Afghanistan
and from his observations in exercises
with the German Netherlands Corps
Headquarters.
Shortcomings
originate
from
the fact that most of the time there is
only one isolated highly protected network for one community or security
domain. During longer deployments,
troop contributing nations tend to
24
faces
The general shift of focus in military information and communication systems can be described as follows (see table)
Traditional Military
Communication
Information
and
Comprehensive Approach Information
and Communication Technology
Situational Awareness for Military Eyes
Only
Situational Awareness for all entities
who act in the area of operations
Joint Cooperation between the Armed
Services
Shorten time lags between sensor to
shooter
Interagency
Cooperation
between
Armed Services and all other entities
and agencies
Lengthen time between sensor to
shooter, by considering all effects of kinetics use
Preventing damage to allied military
members
Avoiding civilian casualties
Using secret systems for military use
only
Sharing sensitive information in common systems
Command and control and the supporting communication and information systems remain crucial capabilities, but must adapt to new environments
and missions. The transformation of the architecture for command and control
urges to accept the consultative nature of today‟s command and control, with a
multinational approach from the start. It also increases the need for the transformation of “network” thinking to make it more comprehensive in nature. In
that respect the inclusiveness of information is more important than the speed
of the actions, which are based on this information. Seamless intelligence sharing has to be based on the desire to share and has to be designed to build
knowledge. All in all the Comprehensive Approach adds to satisfying the need
for a smarter defense, which is on the agenda of the NATO summit in Chicago,
USA in May 2012.
25
Presentation by Mrs. Christine MacNulty, FRSA, CEO Applied Futures
The Human Elements of a Comprehensive Strategic Approach to
Command and Control
Warfare
has
become
much
more complicated than it used to be
for many reasons, but one of the main
reasons is that technology has enabled
it to be conducted with much greater
precision over much larger areas of
the globe. This expansion in space and
time has resulted in the need for a
comprehensive approach that takes
into account the elements of the space
(cultural, economic, political, as well
as military and technological) and time (from short-term and tactical to longerterm and strategic). Today we rarely operate alone, and our complicated relationships with allies, host nations, other government agencies and NGOs require us to understand cultures more than ever before – and this applies to C2
as well as more general communications.
C2 is often considered from a technological perspective.
There is validity in
that, but C2 is so much more… especially
when considered from a comprehensive
perspective. C2 is about leadership, management and how the entire C2 structure
supports military operations and strategies. This means that C2 itself needs to be
thought about strategically.
Characteristics of the New C2 Culture
require more strategic thinking - problems
and issues are more complex, involving more
organizations and more people with different
perspectives. Collaboration and cooperation
becomes a key to enable people and organizations to share and utilize their knowledge
and expertise and build a team of subject
matter experts to have on call.
26
MacNulty examined the changing contexts in which C2 is required and a
particular perspective on C2 developed by Pigeau and McCann, including the
nature of Command Capability (Competency, Authority and Responsibility) and
challenges encountered. They suggest that Command is an art – the expression
of human will; while Control is a science – the systems and processes to enable
Command and manage risk. She also looked briefly at leadership, strategy and
the characteristics that are required.
Effective communication is a key to effective C2. Different cultures use
different words and phrases and non-verbal communications may be different.
Her briefing illustrated problems of perception, including some key cultural differences.
After the presentation, Mrs. MacNulty organized a short workshop where
the participants were divided in four small groups to discuss what their group
found as the most challenging strategic and communication issues that their
organizations have had with respect to command and control. The results of
the groups‟ findings were interesting and varied in many aspects.
* Strategic issues/problems that organizations have had with respect to C2:

NGOs‟ resistance to share information with the military and how or why
the organizations are blamed for having close contacts with military organizations,

Difference in C2 of military and civilian structures when dealing with
natural disasters,

Lack of unity of command,

Lack of coordination,
27
*

Legal limitations (could not start planning),

Slow political decision making process,

Lack of “learn” mindset and creativity reacting in a timely manner,
Communication
issues/problems
that organizations have had with respect to C2:

Frequent
change
of
com-
mand,

Lack of cultural awareness,

Delegation of authority and
responsibility
–
who
does
what,

Underestimating professionalism of the CIMIC and NGOs,
* Potential solutions

Liaisons between organizations,

Governmental representatives should be part of planning/coordinating
process,
28

Learn to “fly as you go” – be creative,

Act and plan in parallel,

Leaders take risks,

Education/training of subordinates,

Supervision,

Control of personal media devices,

Respect for the expertise regardless of rank and/or positions,
Presentation by Mr. Sylvain Vité, Former Legal Adviser ICRC, FRA
The Notion of Armed Conflict under International Humanitarian Law
Mr. Sylvain Vité, former legal adviser at the International Committee of
the Red Cross (He did not speak on behalf of the ICRC), explained how the understanding of the notion of armed conflict under international humanitarian
law has evolved over the past decades.
This evolution followed changes in the
character of modern warfare, from traditional wars between States to armed
conflicts involving other actors, such as
multinational forces or non-State armed groups.
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide extensive protections for
victims of armed conflicts, including civilians. All States have ratified them.
However, a challenge is to have a clear understanding of what is an armed conflict for the purpose of international humanitarian law, as this notion defines the
scope of application of this legal framework.
First, each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide that :
"In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime,
the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them" (Art. 2(1)
common to the four Geneva Conventions).
This provision defines what is an "international armed conflict”, i.e.
armed conflict arising between States. It shows that international humanitarian
law governing such conflicts applies not only when States have formally declared a war, but also when States resort to armed force against each other
without any formal recognition of the situation.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has proposed a general definition of international armed conflict, stating that such conflict "exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States". Other
international bodies have adopted this definition since then. The armed conflict
between Sudan and South-Sudan is an example of an international armed conflict, of two opposing States.
29
Apart from regular, inter-state
national dimension. Whatever the
armed conflicts, Additional Protocol I
nature of the conflict, once a person
of 1977 extends the notion of inter-
is in the hand of a party; he or she
national armed conflict to include
must be respected and protected
"armed conflicts in which peoples are
against all forms of violence, includ-
fighting against colonial domination
ing murder, torture and other forms
and alien occupation and against rac-
of ill-treatment.
ist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self-determination, as en-
Additional Protocol II of 1977
shrined in the Charter of the United
applies to armed conflicts "which
Nations and the Declaration on Prin-
take place in the territory of a High
ciples of International Law concern-
Contracting Party between its armed
ing
Co-
forces and dissident armed forces or
operation among States in accor-
other organized armed groups which,
dance with the Charter of the United
under responsible command, exer-
Nations" (Art. 1(4)).
cise such control over a part of its
Friendly
Relations
and
territory as to enable them to carry
Article 3 common to the Ge-
out sustained and concerted military
neva Conventions of 1949 applies to
operations and to implement this
"armed conflicts not of an interna-
Protocol" (Art. 1(1)).
tional character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Additional Protocol II therefore
Parties". Those are armed conflicts of
applies to a limited number of non-
opposing States forces
and non-
international armed conflicts. First, it
opposing
applies only to conflicts of opposing
State
armed
groups
or
such groups against each other.
State armed forces and organized
non-State armed groups. It does not
The International Criminal Tri-
to
conflict
between
such
bunal for the former Yugoslavia went
groups only. Second, it requires that
on to determine the existence of a
parties involved must exercise terri-
non-international
conflict
torial control. In a number of non-
"whenever there is […] protracted
international armed conflicts, non-
armed violence between governmen-
State armed groups do not meet this
tal authorities and organized armed
condition.
groups
or
armed
between
such
groups
within a State". An example is the
initial stages of the crisis in Libya,
when a certain level of intensity in
the violence between government
forces
and
dissident
forces
was
reached. With the intervention of
NATO units, the conflict got an inter-
30
apply
In practice, assessing and classifying situations may be complicated, as
different armed conflicts may occur in the same territory. Depending on the opposing sides, such conflicts may be either of an international or noninternational nature (see figure).
Most recently, cyber warfare has presented a plethora of new questions,
which have to be answered for determining the applicable rules. A cyber attack
against a State does not necessarily entail the application of international humanitarian law.
31
Presentation by Mr. Peter KRUIT, TNO, NLD
Red Cross Casualty Information in the Second World War
societies are guided by the Geneva
Conventions but are independent in
nature. That is strength, but also a
weakness of the Red Cross movement: the implementation of the Geneva Conventions is local and takes
the character of the people of the
home-nation. So how the people
treat the casualties of a conquered
army is very dependent on how the
International Humanitarian Law is
implemented
if
they
are
imple-
mented at all. The difference in how
Nazi Germany treated Western POWs
Nowadays we know the ICRC
(Prisoner of War) and Soviet POWs is
and the IFRC mainly for their hu-
a shocking example of the influence
manitarian work and as the guardi-
of local circumstances and policies.
Secondly
ans of the International Humanitar-
explained
how
ian Law. But when the ICRC was
and why the Netherlands Red Cross,
founded in 1863 it was a pure mili-
during WW2 had become responsible
tary occasion. The reasons for that
for the supply of information about
lay in the nature of 19th century
the
warfare. European warfare in the
missing and how they had prepared
middle of the 19th century had, com-
for that task. The Netherlands Red
pared to Napoleonic and 20th cen-
Cross was more or less part of the
tury warfare, a limited character. The
military and functioned as a part of
ICRC was founded in that era of lim-
the Military Medical Services. Nowa-
ited warfare. Wars between Euro-
days the Red Cross is very appre-
pean nations were mostly fought on
hensive in showing their commitment
the battlefield between soldiers, so
to one party or another. During the
the rules of war at the beginning of
Second World War it was widely ac-
WW2 were designed for the military.
cepted that the national Red Cross
military
dead,
wounded
and
In his presentation Mr. Peter
societies were involved in revitalising
KRUIT first introduced the ICRC as
the Armies on both sides of the
an organization and it‟s relation to
front.
the national societies. The national
32
he
Thirdly he described how this
judgment, this source was an impor-
hugely complicated stream of infor-
tant tool to help explain how severe
mation had been organized and how
the fighting was and what was the
it functioned in the Netherlands dur-
decisive weapon in a specific front.
ing the May 1940 battles. The war
The
that came to the Netherlands in May
ceived image of the severity of the
1940 was not the war the Nether-
battle and the real effectiveness of
lands
weaponry proved to be very surpris-
Armed
Forces
expected
to
fight. The unexpected developments
difference
between
the
per-
ing.
during those 5 days of war made the
task to inform the families and the
Army
about
whereabouts
the
of
well-being
the
wounded
and
or
killed soldier very complicated, if not
almost impossible.
Finally he elaborated how he
had used the military medical information to clarify the tactical battle
circumstances.
The
information
about the wounded and killed soldiers proved to be a valuable source
for research and to separate fact
from perception. Because the medical information is objective and independent from political or emotional
33
Closing remarks by LtCol Achim MÜLLER, Colonel Altan ÖZTAŞ and
Colonel Toine Visser
M
oderator, LtCol Achim MÜLLER,
briefly summarized the previous
presentations and thanked all for their
Visser, thanked the host CoE-DAT
for their hospitality, their support, and
participation in the seminar, the very
the use of their facilities for the semi-
pro-active work, the good contribu-
nar.
tions and the fruitful discussions.
H
e expressed his hope that everybody found the seminar interest-
C
olonel Visser closed the seminar,
expressing the hope that the par-
ticipants had an interesting seminar
ing, had established new contacts to
and thanked all involved in organizing
widen their social network and will in
this seminar. He wished all partici-
the future always stay in touch with
pants a safe trip and invited all to the
the Command & Control Centre of Ex-
upcoming C2CoE activity, most likely
cellence.
in the autumn 2012 in the Kromhout
T
Barracks, Utrecht, The Netherlands.
he CoE-DAT director, Colonel Altan ÖZTAŞ, expressed that it was
an honour to host the seminar in the
facilities of CoE-DAT and wished all
participants a safe trip back.
34
T
he C2CoE director, Colonel Toine
Seminar Pictures
35
ANNEX A Seminar Program
Tuesday 17 April 2012
ADMINISTRATION and INTRODUCTION
0800-0900
Arrival and in-processing (pay fee for seminar and if applicable Non Hosted Dinner)
0900-0915
Opening of Seminar
Colonel A.P.P. VISSER, Director C2CoE
0915-0930
Welcome Speech by Director of CoE-DAT
Colonel Altan ÖZTAŞ, Director DATCoE
0930-0945
Introduction to the Seminar
Maj. Serkan ERDİNÇ (TUR AF), C2CoE
Moderator, LtCol Achim MUELLER, Dep. Dir.
C2CoE
0945-1000
Participant Introduction
All
1000-1030
Icebreaker
1030-1115
Command and Control in the Context of Comprehensive
Approach: A Scientific View
1115-1130
Coffee-Break
1130-1215
Information Management in NATO Operational Environment Maj. Cengiz Mesut BÜKEÇ (TUR AF), Turkish TGS
1215-1400
Lunch (Merkez Officers' Club)
1400-1445
The Role of CIMIC in a CA
1445-1500
Coffee-Break
1500-1545
Impact of CA on C2:The Steadfast Series PerspectiveCurrent Status and Challenges
1545-1600
Coffee-Break
1600-1645
CA in Search and Rescue Operations
Mr. Ali Nasuh MAHRUKI, SAR Association, TUR
1645-1700
Wrap up, End of Day One
Moderator, LtCol Achim MUELLER, Dep. Dir.
C2CoE
Prof. Dr. Tim GRANT, Netherlands Defence Academy
LtCol Heiko HERKEL (DEU A), CIMIC CoE
LtCol Siegfried Eisenreich (DEU A), JWC
Wednesday 18 April 2012
0900-0945
Consequences of the NATO Comprehensive Approach for
Command and Control
0945-1000
Coffee-Break
1000-1045
10 Years of Civil-Military Cooperation with the Bundeswehr in
Mrs. Suzana LIPOVAC, Kinderberg International
Afghanistan– An Insight View from a Civilian
1045-1100
Coffee-Break
1100-1200
Keynote Speaker
1200-1400
Group Photo and Lunch (Merkez Officers' Club)
1400-1500
The Human Elements of a Comprehensive Strategic Approach to C2
1500-1515
Coffee-Break
1515-1715
Workshop
Mrs. Christine MacNulty, Applied Futures
1715-1730
Wrap up, End of Day Two
Moderator, LtCol Achim MUELLER, Dep. Dir.
C2CoE
2030-2230
Social event: Non Hosted Dinner "Restaurant Behzat" (30 Euro to be paid inprocessing morning)
0900-0945
The Notion of Armed Conflict under International HumanitarSylvain Vité, Former Legal Adviser ICRC, FRA
ian Law.
0945-1000
Coffee-Break
1000-1045
Red Cross Casualty Information in the Second World War
1045-1115
Coffee-Break
1115-1130
Closing of the seminar
CDR Marten MEIJER (NLD N), C2CoE
Lieutenant General A.J.H.Van LOON, Com 1st
German Netherlands Corps
Mrs. Christine MacNulty, Applied Futures
Thursday 19 April 2012
36
Peter KRUIT, TNO, NLD
Moderator, LtCol Achim MUELLER, Dep. Dir.
C2CoE
ANNEX B List of Used Abbreviations
ACO
Allied Command Operations
ACT
Allied Command Transformation
AKUT
(Arama Kurtarma Derneği - Search and Rescue Association)
AMN
Afghan Mission Network
CA
Comprehensive Approach
C2
Command and Control
C2CoE
Command and Control Centre of Excellence
C3
Consultation, Command and Control
CDM
Comprehensive Disaster Management
CFC
Civil-Military Fusion Centre
CIMIC
Civil-Military Cooperation
CIS
Communication and Information Systems
CMI
Civil-Military Interaction
CMO
Civil Military Overview
COPD
Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive
DAT-CoE
Defence Against Terrorism Centre of Excellence
DEU
Germany
DOTMLPFI
Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities,
Interoperability
FRA
France
GOs
Governmental Organizations
HQ
Headquarters
ICRC
International Committee of the Red Cross
ICT
Information and Communications Technology
IHL
International Humanitarian Law
IJC
ISAF Joint Command
IM
Information Management
IOs
International Organizations
ISAF
International Security Assistance Forces
IT
Information Technology
JFC
Joint Force Command
JHQ
Joint Headquarters
JWC
Joint Warfare Centre
KC
Knowledge Centre
KBI
KinderBerg International
LL
Lessons Learned
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NC3A
NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency
NEC
Network Enabled Capabilities
37
ANNEX B List of Used Abbreviations
38
NGOs
Non-Governmental Organizations
NLD
The Netherlands
NLDA
Netherlands Defence Academy
NML
NEC maturity level
NNE
Non-NATO Entities
NNEC
NATO Network Enabled Capabilities
NOR
Norway
NRF
NATO Response Force
OF3
Major
OF4
Lieutenant Colonel
OF5
Colonel, Captain Navy
OLRT
Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team
OUP
Operation Unified Protector
POW
Prisoner of War
SAR
Search and Rescue
SACEUR
Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SCR
Senior Civilian Representative
SHAPE
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
SN
Sponsoring Nations
TA
Training Audience
TEC
Theatre Engagement Centre
TNO
The Netherlands Organization (Dutch Organization for Applied Scientific Research)
TOPFAS
Tool For Operational Planning, Force Activation and Simulation
TRIF
Task Related Information Flow
UN
United Nations
UK
United Kingdom
USA
United States of America
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39
Catalysing the art of C2
Command and Control Centre of Excellence
Kromhout Kazerne, Utrecht
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The Netherlands
The Netherlands
Building K01, Floor 4
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