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Journal of Aviation Management 2010
Published by Singapore Aviation Academy
A Division of the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
1 Aviation Drive
Singapore 499867
Tel: (65) 6540 6209/6543 0433
Fax: (65) 6542 9890/6543 2778
Email: saa@caas.gov.sg
Website: www.saa.com.sg
Copyright © 2010 Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore. All rights reserved.
No part of this Journal may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any
means without prior approval of the publisher, except for quotations in book reviews.
Views expressed in this Journal are the authors’ personal observations and not
necessarily the views of the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore. While every
reasonable care has been taken in the preparation of the Journal, the publisher
is not responsible for any inaccuracies in the papers.
FOREWORD
Ten years ago, the Singapore Aviation Academy (SAA) published its inaugural issue of the Journal
of Aviation Management. With the theme “Challenges in the New Millennium”, the issue went on
to bag an award at the Year 2000 Excellence in Communications Contest organised by the Airports
Council International – Pacific. Since then, we have had the privilege of working with over 100 authors
from the aviation community to provide our readers with an annual publication that we hope is both
informative and useful.
This edition is a collection of papers covering both topical and evergreen issues. A hot topic that made
headlines in April this year was the volcanic eruption of Mount Eyjafjallajökull, which severely disrupted
global air travel to and from Europe. The paper on this outlines the key lessons learned from the crisis and
the importance of establishing business continuity plans. The papers on aviation and the environment, an
issue on the rise, focus on the ASPIRE partnership committed to reducing aviation’s carbon footprint in the
Asia Pacific region and ICAO’s leadership in addressing international aviation’s impact on climate change.
The section on aviation safety covers Singapore’s experience in aviation safety data collection and
analysis, and the CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy team, which is charged with developing common
taxonomies and definitions for aviation accident and incident reporting systems to improve the quality
of information and communication within the industry. The paper on the area of airport emergency
and rescue provides recommendations and guidelines on the development of water rescue plans for
airports, while the paper on aviation security muses on whether the industry is simply playing catch-up
to security threats or proactively seeking for a catalyst for change to deal with the emerging threats.
Salient issues relating to the provision of air navigation services, such as managing airspace for civil and
military aviation and understanding a State’s responsibilities for air navigation facilities and standards as
prescribed in Article 28 of the Chicago Convention are also featured.
The variety of topics discussed captures the dynamism of the aviation industry, and serves to remind
us of the complex interplay among technology, people and nature. To all the authors and the Editorial
Advisory Board, I would like to express our sincerest appreciation for their valuable contributions, support
and expert advice.
I would specially like to thank Professor Henry Fan, who is stepping down from the Editorial Advisory
Board, for his dedication and significant contribution to the publication since its inception ten years ago.
To all our readers, I hope you find this tenth edition of the Journal an insightful and engaging read.
Yap Ong Heng
Director-General
Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
i
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD
Ms Jeri Alles
Director, Asia Pacific Office
Federal Aviation Administration, US
Mr Ken McLean
Director, Safety Operations and Infrastructure (Asia Pacific)
International Air Transport Association
Prof Henry Fan
Professor, Centre for Infrastructure Systems
School of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Mr Cletus M J Packiam
Chief, Airport Emergency Service
Changi Airport Group, Singapore
Mr Chiang Hai Eng
Director, Asia Pacific Affairs
Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation
Dr Jarnail Singh
Chairman
Civil Aviation Medical Board, Singapore
Mr Pok Cheng Chong
Director, Singapore Aviation Academy
EDITORIAL TEAM
Ms Chan Pin Pin
Ms Jasmin Ismail
Ms Addrienne Kang
Ms Zheng Wanting
ii
CONTENTS
Airport Emergency Services
1
Designing a Water Rescue Plan for Airports
Mr Edwin Lim
1
Air Traffic Management
2
Managing Airspace in Civil and Military Aviation Dr Ruwantissa Abeyratne
International Civil Aviation Organization
3
State Responsibilities for Air Navigation Facilities and Standards
– Understanding its Scope, Nature and Extent Dr Francis Schubert
Skyguide, Swiss Air Navigation Services Ltd
11
21
Aviation Management
4
Key Lessons for Airports and Airlines from the Volcanic Eruption of
Mount Eyjafjallajökull
Mr Bernard Lim
Ministry of Transport, Singapore
33
Environment
5
ASPIRE – Reducing Emissions by Promoting Best Practices in the
Asia Pacific Region
Mr Kevin Chamness
Ms Melissa Ohsfeldt and Ms Emily Berkeley
CSSI Inc, US
41
iii
6
ICAO’s Increasing Emphasis on Climate Change
Ms Jane Hupe
49
Safety
7
Aviation Safety Data Collection and Processing – Singapore’s Experience
Mr Michael Pang
8
CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team – An International Safety Partnership
Mr Corey Stephens
55
65
Security
iv
9
Aviation Security: Proactive or Playing Catch-up
Mr Chris Bala
CJ Security Consulting Group
10
Title to be advised
Mr Alvin Tuala
General Manager, Pacific Asia Safety Office
71
0
Designing a Water Rescue Plan
for Airports
Abstract
An airport water rescue plan is an integral and essential component
in an emergency plan for airports located in close proximity to water
bodies. Unlike tactical plans that attend to an aircraft accident on terra
firma within the aerodrome, an aircraft mishap at sea often involves a
greater degree of complexity and brings with it unique challenges and
difficulties.
This paper aims to draw reference from existing international standards,
recommendations and guidelines in developing a set of principal
considerations in the development of a water rescue plan for airports.
These considerations are deliberately developed to provide airport
operators with the flexibility to adjust and tweak their plans to better
suit their operating environment.
for Airports
About the Author
Mr Edwin Lim is Head of Planning in the Airport
Emergency Service (AES) division of Changi
Airport Group, Singapore. He oversees the AES
functions in operations, manpower and logistics
planning, standards assurance, special projects as
well as the planning, control and review of AES’
annual budget. Since January 2010, Mr Lim was
appointed Singapore’s representative in ICAO’s
Rescue and Fire-fighting Working Group which
was responsible for the review and development
of Standards and Recommended Practices. He
holds a Bachelor of Science (Hons) in Fire Safety
and Management and a Master of Science in Air
Safety Management under the CAAS Overseas
(Operations) Scholarship in 2005.
01
for Airports
Mr Edwin Lim
INTRODUCTION
All pictures speak a thousand words. However, not many can boast of being able to
tell a story on their own. Just like the ‘Tank Man’ who was photographed stopping the
advance of a column of tanks during the 1989 Tiananmen Incident, and the soldiers
planting the American flag on the Japanese island of Iwo Jima during World War II
on 1945, the image below is certainly an enduring one which will be firmly imprinted
on the minds of many for years to come. Hailed as the ‘Miracle on Hudson’ by major
news broadcasters, emergency agencies, pilots and even politicians alike, all 155 persons
onboard the US Airways Airbus A320 were pulled to safety as the plane ditched in the
frigid Hudson river on 15 January 2009.
Figure 1: Passengers waiting for rescue on the wings of US Airways Flight 1549
Source: Reuters
02
THE HUDSON MIRACLE
It is not difficult to understand why the accident was considered a miracle, and no surprise when the pilot
of the aircraft, Captain Chesley Sullenberger, received universal tributes after successfully manoeuvring
his crowded jetliner over New York City and into the Hudson river with an impact that was described as
‘not a whole lot more than a rear-end collision’.1
History has proven that aircraft accidents at sea rarely end with such fortunate outcomes. The Hudson
crash took place almost exactly 27 years after an Air Florida plane crashed into the Potomac River and
sank shortly after taking off from Washington National Airport, US. Seventy-four out of a total of 79
passengers onboard perished together with four fatalities on the ground.
In the past few years, several unfortunate accidents bore testament to the low survivability rates of
aircrashes into water bodies. On 25 January 2010, an Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 plane crashed
into the Mediterranean Sea in stormy weather, two miles west of Lebanon. None of the 90 persons
onboard survived. On 30 June 2009, a Yemenia Airway Airbus A310 crashed into the Indian Ocean,
10 miles off the coast of the Comoros island while attempting a second approach to land. Out of the
153 persons onboard, only a 14-year-old girl survived. Just four weeks earlier on 1 June 2009, an Air
France Airbus A330 jetliner went down over the Atlantic Ocean en route to Charles de Gaulle. All 228
persons onboard perished.
Figure 2: Salvage operations of Air France Flight 447
Source: Associated Press
The accidents listed above all occurred in very different circumstances which had no doubt affected the
outcomes to varying degrees. Therefore, it would also not be fair to assume that the tragic endings of these
accidents were caused by an absence of certain factors which contributed to the ‘Miracle on Hudson’.
1
Personal account from a passenger on board US Airways Flight 1549
What factors could the ‘Miracle on Hudson’ be attributed to? Was it the heroic actions of Captain
Sullenberger? Was it divine intervention, or was it sheer luck? One thing we can be sure of is that the
outcome would have been drastically different if an effective water rescue plan had not been put in place.
INTERNATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES
Annex 14 (Aerodromes) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation states that:
“[t]he (aerodrome emergency) plan shall include the ready availability of and coordination with
appropriate specialist rescue services to be able to respond to emergencies where an aerodrome
is located close to water and/or swampy areas and where a significant portion of approach or
departure operations takes place over these areas.”
Similarly, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), US, mandates that:
“[e]ach (aerodrome) certificate holder shall develop and maintain an airport emergency plan
designed to minimise the possibility and extent of personal injury and property damage on the
airport in an emergency.”
The FAA Code of Federal Regulations Part 139.325 also states that the aerodrome emergency plan must
include procedures and guidance for prompt response to “water rescue situations.”
Both ICAO and FAA have published comprehensive guidance materials to aid aerodrome operators in
the promulgation of water rescue plans. These can be found in the ICAO Airport Services Manual Part 1
(Rescue and Fire-fighting) and Part 7 (Airport Emergency Planning), as well as the FAA Advisory Circular
(AC) No: 150/5210-13B.
Airports differ and will naturally operate under vastly dissimilar environments and conditions.
The objective is to create conditions in which survival is possible in the event of an accident, and from
which the mission can succeed. It is therefore crucial for crisis managers to adapt these guidelines into
a feasible, relevant and effective plan not just for the aerodrome operator, but for other mutual aid
agencies who have a part to play in the successful mitigation of any air disaster.
PRINCIPAL CONSIDERATION 1 – UNIQUE CONDITIONS DURING AN AIRCRASH INTO WATER
Any water rescue plan must take into account the unique and harsh circumstances survivors are
subjected to during an aircraft accident in water. The success of the rescue mission will therefore be
greatly influenced by the plan’s ability to address these concerns. Some of the key considerations in the
rescue mission are as follows:
Water Temperature
Survivors of an aircrash into water will not only be unprepared for the sudden exposure to low water
temperatures, they will also experience increased body-cooling rates due to the evaporating fuel that
could be seeping out from the aircraft wreckage. Survivors are also vulnerable to hypothermia which may
set in when the core body temperature drops below the temperature required for normal metabolism
and bodily functions at 35°C.
03
04
The water rescue plan must also take into consideration the temperature of the waters surrounding
the aerodrome. During the Hudson river crash, most passengers had to wade in knee-high waters after
evacuating from the aircraft, with some reports of passengers shivering in chest-high waters of 2°C.
In the waters surrounding Singapore and neighbouring countries, water temperatures are typically
more forgiving at 27°C to 29°C. Even so, survivors will be susceptible to hypothermia setting in after
prolonged exposure.
Duration of Exposure
When a person suddenly comes into contact with extremely cold water, they experience a cold shock
response. This phenomenon is similar to jumping into a freezing swimming pool on a hot summer
day. Immediately, the person will hyperventilate and take uncontrollable, deep and fast breaths for
the next one to three minutes. If a person goes underwater in this state, he/she could swallow water
and drown. However, once the cold shock response subsides, the person should be out of the danger
zone temporarily.
An average person will be able to survive in 5°C waters for a period of 10 to 20 minutes before the
muscles become weak from the effort of staying afloat. The person will then lose coordination and
strength as blood moves away from the extremities towards the core of the body to protect the heart.
The need to reduce the risk of hypothermia in survivors translates that the water rescue plan must
place great emphasis on the quick response time to the scene of the accident. Of equal significance is
to prevent survivors from experiencing hypothermia while in transit to medical facilities. Thus, rescue
vessels must also be equipped with blankets, as well as other forms of body warmers.
Other Water Conditions
Survivors may encounter hazards which will diminish their chances of survival. Depending on the
characteristics of the water, aircrashes into water bodies are mostly high-impact events which will result
in the break-up of the fuselage. Spilt fuel could possibly be ignited, leading to a post-impact fire. Even
if ignition sources were suppressed by the waters, the inhalation and ingestion of fuel vapours would
definitely pose severe health risks to the survivors.
On the other hand, sharp-edged debris from the wreckage may inflict severe injuries to passengers,
further hampering their survivability rates. Flotation devices may also be rendered ineffective by the
jagged debris.
In open waters, rough currents and waves may overpower survivors without life vests; the risk of
drowning is likely to occur. On the other hand, life vests would not be useful in swampy areas as survivors
may succumb to the ‘quicksand effect’ of the treacherous terrain. The dangers posed by various marine
life in such environments are also a genuine concern to both survivors and rescue personnel.
PRINCIPAL CONSIDERATION 2 – CLEAR LINES OF RESPONSIBILITIES
ICAO Airport Services Manual Part 1, Chapter 13 states that:
“[i]n producing its detailed plan, the airport authority should have regard to the services and facilities
already provided by the search and rescue organisation in accordance with ICAO Annex 12 (Search
and Rescue), to ensure that the separate responsibilities for an aircraft accident in the vicinity of the
airport are clearly delineated.”
FAA AC No: 150/5210-13B also states that:
“[b]ecause of jurisdictional or logistical reasons, an airport operator may need to develop a water
rescue plan that consists of a written mutual aid agreement identifying an entity other than the
airport to act as the primary response agency.”
Clear lines of responsibilities and good operational leadership are vital for a successful rescue mission of
an aircraft accident at sea. Unlike on land where the operational area is smaller and easily contained, an
aircrash at sea could stretch the operational area many hundred nautical miles, with various resources
spread thinly beyond the on-scene commander’s line of sight.
The Air France Flight 447 crash on 1 June 2009 illustrated the enormity and complexity of search and
rescue operations for an aircrash at sea. The first two bodies were only recovered on 6 June, five days
after the crash. After three weeks of search operations, 51 bodies out of the 228 persons onboard were
recovered. On 6 May 2010, the location of the flight’s black box was pinpointed to within a three to
five square kilometres radius on the ocean floor. To-date, both the cockpit voice recorder and flight data
recorder have not been recovered.
In Singapore, the Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) is the incident manager responsible for the
command, control and communications for any aircraft accident at sea beyond the turn-out area of the
Airport Emergency Service (AES). Within AES’ turn-out area, the airport operator, Changi Airport Group,
will assume the role of incident manager, with the RCC playing a vital role as well. In either scenario, the
incident manager would be well supported by mutual aid agencies such as the Republic of Singapore
Navy, Republic of Singapore Air Force, Police Coast Guard and the Maritime Port Authority of Singapore
out at sea.
Figure 3: Turn-out area of Airport Emergency Service, Changi Airport Group
05
06
PRINCIPAL CONSIDERATION 3 – PERSONNEL AND TRAINING
At airports that are planning to or already providing water rescue services, the rescue personnel are
generally selected from amongst trained aircraft rescue and fire-fighting officers. This is the case for
many international airports such as Singapore’s Changi Airport, Denmark’s Copenhagen Airport,
Boston’s Logan International Airport and Hong Kong’s Chek Lap Kok Airport.
Personnel deployed at specialised sea rescue units must possess fundamental skills such as fire-fighting,
first aid, safety awareness, victim and hazard recognition and the proper use of personal protective
equipment. In addition, they must also be equipped with a whole new array of competencies and
knowledge, to ensure effective performance at their job and to safeguard their own well-being in an
actual operation. The diverse repertoire of skills include vessels handling, water rescue techniques, victim
handling procedures, deep-sea diving and navigation rules.
Airport operators or providers of sea rescue services decide on the scope and depth of training to be
undertaken by sea rescue personnel. In an ideal situation, it would be best to have personnel who are
trained in all aspects of sea rescue operations. However, as airports around the world seek to increase
their productivity and drive cost efficiency, it becomes increasingly untenable for sea rescue services to
enforce “wholesale training”.
How then can sea rescue services ensure cost effectiveness of training without compromising operational
effectiveness and excellence?
Once the water rescue plan has clear lines of responsibilities in place for the various agencies, it is then
not difficult to review, analyse and streamline training requirements for an airport’s sea rescue services.
For example, if a country’s Navy or Coast Guard has the necessary deep-sea diving capabilities, it may
then not be essential for the airport’s sea rescue services to replicate this skill. Instead, more resources
can be invested into rescue swimming and surface rescue training components.
However, decisions such as this must also be based on “time and space” considerations. If the response
time of a particular agency is assessed to be faster than the sea rescue unit, it may be necessary for that
agency to further improve on its surface rescue and rescue swimming capabilities as these skills are vital
for saving lives in the immediate aftermath of an aircrash at sea.
Besides individual competencies, emphasis must also be placed on developing the group of individuals
into an effective and operationally-ready team. Therefore, the training plan must take into account
programmes which enforce and inculcate the values of teamwork and team coordination. It is also vital
for the team to be led by chosen leaders who have the authority, decisiveness and operational awareness
to make independent and often difficult decisions under unbearable conditions and stress.
PRINCIPAL CONSIDERATION 4 – KEY ASSETS AND EQUIPMENT
Sizing up the vehicular assets of a land fire station is straightforward as international standards set
by ICAO and FAA have determined the type, size, number and capabilities of fire trucks required to
provide runway fire protection at airports. Terrain within or around the airport vicinity does not pose
insurmountable challenges as it is generally flat, obstacle-free and easy to manoeuvre about.
Conversely, international standards by ICAO and FAA for the provision of vessels in sea rescue operations
are performance-based rather than prescriptive. The type of rescue vessels and equipment available in
the market that could contribute to mission success during an aircraft crash in water bodies has been
well documented by ICAO and FAA.
Vehicles and vessels used for the conduct of water rescue operations must also be suitable for the
water condition and environment. Collectively, these equipments should have enough capacity to
accommodate the maximum number of passengers carried by the largest aircraft serving the airport.
The appropriate selection of these assets will require planners to consider weather variations and tide
conditions in the local environment.
Again, FAA AC No: 150/5210-13B provides guidance and recommendations on the specific applications
of various sea vessels in different operating environments. For instance, fast boats are recommended for
airports in close proximity to oceans or large lakes whilst inflatable or air cushion vessels and shallow
draft boats or amphibious vehicles are recommended for inland waters and swampy areas respectively.
Figure 4: One of the two hovercrafts under AES’ inventory
07
08
Figure 5: Catamaran fire command boat of the Hong Kong Fire Services Department (HKFSD)
Source: HKFSD website
It is important to note that the capacity requirement to “accommodate the maximum number of
passengers carried by the largest aircraft serving the airport”2 does not imply that the airport operator
or sea rescue service provider must single-handedly accommodate all passengers. What it mandates is
for the airport operator, who is the party responsible for promulgating the water rescue plan, to ensure
that the collective efforts and assets of all mutual aid agencies have adequate capacity to comply with
the requirement.
It is common for sea rescue units to augment the capacity of their vessels with inflatable life rafts which
can be deployed to pick up survivors during an aircrash at sea. Rescue units should bear in mind that it
is not merely a “ferry service”. A certain standard of fire-fighting capability would also be useful in the
event of a post-crash fire. Other basic provisions that must be carried onboard the rescue vessels are
blankets to delay or reverse the onset of hypothermia as well as medical equipment for initial triaging
and stabilising of casualties. Of equal importance is the coordination of the sea rescue plan with air assets such as helicopters for
winching operations and expeditious evacuation of casualties with grave injuries to medical facilities.
Helicopters are particularly beneficial to rescue operations as it can be used to drop flotation devices such
as life rafts, or provide illumination from an elevated vantage point.
PRINCIPAL CONSIDERATION 5 – TESTING OF PLAN
Like every operational plan, a sea rescue plan requires each and every party involved to have an intimate
understanding of their own roles and responsibilities, as well as that of their supporting partners. Close
2
Extracted from FAA AC No: 150/5210-13B
coordination amongst all parties is also a pre-requisite to the mission’s success. The only way to glean
the effectiveness and identify the gaps of any plan is to put it into practice in a controlled exercise
environment.
ICAO mandates the conduct of a full-scale aircraft crash exercise at least once every two years while
FAA’s requirement is at least once every three years. During a full-scale exercise, it is important to involve
all parties to derive maximum benefits.
During the Hudson river crash, the first two vessels that arrived at the ditching four minutes later were
private ferries which played a key role in rescuing the passengers from the waters before the arrival of
trained personnel from the New York City Fire and Police Departments and the US Coast Guard. It may
be worthwhile for airport operators to involve private ferry operators in their full-scale exercises even
though these operators are not typically in the loop of the “crisis management channels”.
Full-scale exercises also provide useful platforms for the incident manager to assess the synergies
amongst all parties, and to evaluate the harmonisation of resources at his disposal. Any changes in the
principal considerations previously discussed above can also be validated during these exercises before
actual implementation.
CONCLUSION
An effective water rescue plan is a critical element of the aerodrome emergency plan. Recognising the
principal considerations would ensure that the plan is operationally effective and relevant to the airport’s
operating environment. It is every emergency practitioner’s wish that the enduring image from the
Hudson river crash will trigger the impetus to continually review, adjust and improve on our contingency
plans. Indeed, as Confucius once said, “A man who does not think and plan long ahead will find trouble
at his door.”
09
k
Managing Airspace in Civil
and Military Aviation
Abstract
Functionally, civil and military aviation are different, although they may
operate in the same airspace. This brings to bear the risk of air routes
used by civil aircraft being endangered by military aviation including
missile testing by States. This paper examines the military activities that
could endanger civil aviation, the instances of use of civil and military
aircraft and the distinction between the two as well as initiatives by
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The paper also contains
some suggestions and recommendations that could promote greater
cooperation between the two activities.
Managing Airspace in
In Civil
And Military
and
Military Aviation
Aviation
About the Author
Dr Ruwantissa Abeyratne is a Coordinator for
Regional Affairs at ICAO. He has worked in the
field of aviation law and management for over
twenty five years. He also teaches Aero Politics,
Law and Policy at the John Molson School of
Business, Concordia University, Montreal in the
Global Aviation MBA Programme.
He has published 14 books and over 300 leading
journal articles on international law and air
law, in addition to many papers presented to
conferences. Among his latest books are Aviation
in Crisis, Air Law and Policy, Aeropolitics, Aviation
and the Environment, Airport Business Law and
Aviation Security Law. Dr Abeyratne is a Fellow
of both the Royal Aeronautical Society and the
Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport.
He is also a member of the International Law
Association, in which he serves as member of
both the Association’s International Trade Law
Committee and Space Law Committee. He is a
founder member of the Montreal Branch of the
Royal Aeronautical Society.
11
Managing Airspace in Civil
and Military Aviation
Dr Ruwantissa Abeyratne
INTRODUCTION
Military aviation and civil aviation are intrinsically different from each other in their
nature and functions. However, both operate in the same air traffic management (ATM)
environment and therefore use common airspace which needs to be stringently managed
for safety and efficiency. While military aviation is essential for national security and
defence and is therefore a legitimate and indispensable activity, civil air transport is not only
necessary for global interaction between nations but it also makes a significant contribution
to the global economy1. These two equally important activities call for uncompromising
cooperation in the shared use of airspace and an enduring understanding of each other’s
needs. Military aviation not only includes the operation of conventional aircraft for military
purposes but also involves the use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)2 and missile testing,
all of which call for a close look at the use of airspace in the modern context.
MISSILES LAUNCH BY DPRK
A grave concern confronting the civil aviation community is that, with the proliferation
of military activity will inevitably come the issue of endangerment of air routes. The
consequences of the nuclear missile firings of 5 July 2006 by the Democratic Peoples’
Republic of Korea (DPRK)3 brought to bear the hazards and grave dangers such activities
pose to civil aviation. In this instance, missiles launched by DPRK crossed several
international air routes over the high seas. It was revealed that, when extrapolating the
projected paths of some of the missiles, it appeared that they could have interfered with
many more air routes, both over Japan and the air space of the North Pacific Ocean.
A similar incident took place on 31 August 1998 in the same vicinity in which the North
Korean missiles were fired in July 2006. An object propelled by rockets was launched by North
Korea and a part of the object hit the sea in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of Sanriku in northeastern Japan. The impact area was in the vicinity of the international airway A590 which is
known as composing North Pacific Composite Route System, a trunk route connecting Asia
and North America where some 180 flights of various countries fly every day.
1
Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Air Law and Policy, PublishAmerica: Baltimore, 2007 at 25-47.
2
The potential explosion of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (commonly called UASs) in airspace also brings to bear
the need to have a closer look at the civil-military aviation airspace demarcation. UASs are commonly associated
with military operations in many parts of the world. The question that would arise in this context is how would a
State feel about sharing airspace over contiguous States with a swarm of UASs operated by a mix of military/law
enforcement and commercial enterprises? For more information see Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Regulating Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles – Issues and Challenges, European Transport Law, Vol. XLIV, No. 5 – 2009, 503-520.
3
http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t261698.htm See infra text pertaining to notes 49 and 50.
12
Managing Airspace in Civil and Military Aviation
ANNEX 11 TO THE CHICAGO CONVENTION
From an aeronautical perspective, Annex 11 (Air Traffic Services) to the Chicago Convention4, lays
down requirements for coordination of activities that are potentially hazardous to civil aircraft. The
International Standards and Recommended Practices in the Annex, Chapter 2, contain provisions for
coordination between military authorities and ATS and coordination of activities potentially hazardous to
civil aircraft. These provisions specify that ATS authorities shall establish and maintain close cooperation
with military authorities responsible for activities that may affect flights of civil aircraft.
The provisions also prescribe that the arrangements for activities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft
shall be coordinated with the appropriate ATS authorities and that the objective of this coordination shall
be to achieve the best arrangements which will avoid hazards to civil aircraft and minimise interference
with the normal operations of such aircraft.
Standard 2.17.1 stipulates that arrangements for activities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft,
whether over the territory of a State or over the high seas, shall be coordinated with the appropriate
ATS authorities, and for such coordination to be effected early enough to permit timely promulgation
of information regarding the activities in accordance with the provisions of Annex 15 (Aeronautical
Information Services) to the Chicago Convention.
Standard 2.17.2 of Annex 11 explains that the objective of the coordination referred to in the earlier
provision shall be to achieve the best arrangements that are calculated to avoid hazards to civil aircraft
and minimise interference with the normal operations of aircraft. One must of course hasten to add
that Article 89 (War and Emergency Condition) of the Convention stipulates that in case of war, the
provisions of the Convention (and, by implication its Annexes) shall not affect the freedom of action
of any of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)’s member States affected, whether as
belligerents or as neutrals5. The same principle would apply in the case of any member State which
declares a state of national emergency and notifies the fact to the ICAO Council.
The above considerations of safety notwithstanding, it is incontrovertible that cooperation in the
activities of military and civil aviation is not only about sharing airspace. It is also about the efficient
allocation of airspace to both categories of activity in separating such flights, particularly in the context
of military flights which operate in special use airspace and those proceeding to special use airspace
across civilian air routes. This brings to bear the inevitable conclusion that there must essentially be
coordination between military authorities and air navigation service authorities.
4
Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944. ICAO Doc 7300 9 th ed: 2006.
5
In October 1949, on the occasion of the adherence of Israel to the Chicago Convention, the Government of Egypt advised ICAO that,
in view of considerations of fact and law which at that time affected Egypt’s special position with regard to Israel and in pursuance of
Article 89, Israeli aircraft may not claim the privilege of flying over Egyptian territory. See letter dated 16 October 1949 reproduced
in Annex A to Doc 6922-C/803 at p. 125. It was Egypt’s claim, as was later clarified by Egypt upon a query of the Secretary General
of ICAO, that a state of war existed between the two countries. The Government of Iraq also advised ICAO along similar lines, that a
state of emergency had been declared on 14 May 1848 and therefore Article 89 was applicable and all Israeli aircraft were denied the
privilege of flying over the territory of Iraq. On 28 November 1962 the Government of India informed ICAO that as a result of external
aggression into Indian Territory by the People’s Republic of China a state of grave emergency existed and the Government of India
may not find it possible to comply with any or all of the provisions of the Chicago Convention. On 6 September 1965 the Government
of Pakistan notified ICAO of the state of emergency under Article 89. In all instances, ICAO relayed the communications received to
all its member States.
GLOBAL AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT FORUM ON CIVIL AND MILITARY COOPERATION
At the Global Air Traffic Management Forum on Civil and Military Cooperation6, convened by ICAO7
on 19 October 2009, the International Air Transport Association (IATA)8 noted that, given the equal
importance of civil and military aviation, it was imperative that airspace be managed as a whole, as a
continuum and one common source and not a collection of segregated areas. This called for minimal
restrictions on the use of airspace by both users, which in turn called for a structured and systematic
management of the scope and duration of the use of airspace.
At the Forum, the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation (CANSO)9 underscored the fact that
increasing growth in civil air transport and traffic was putting pressure on limited airspace resources and
that civil-military cooperation was becoming imperative. CANSO, while calling for a global platform of
cooperation, emphasised that the key to successful cooperation is the establishment of trust, respect,
transparency and flexibility on all key players and that States could play a lead role in developing a
framework of cooperation. It also stated that a regional approach (as opposed to a national approach)
was essential, citing the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL)10 as
a true civil-military agency which involved both civil and military offices at the policy-making level. In
summing up, CANSO called for a fully integrated civil-military ATM, leading to the complete union of
civil-military partners at the national, regional and global level11.
SESAR AND NEXTGEN
A good example of the management system called for by IATA, and balanced cooperation as referred
to by CANSO, is the establishment of a Single European Sky (SES) legislation. This legislation aims to
ensure a harmonised regulatory framework for ATM and which uniformly and harmoniously applies
in all 27 member States of the European Union (EU) and 28 other associated States surrounding the
Union. This legislation is accompanied by a technology programme called Single European Sky Air
Traffic Management Research (SESAR) which modernises and helps run the European air traffic control
infrastructure modernisation programme, making SES and SESAR the essential components of the full
air transport policy of Europe.
The outcome of this merger between policy and infrastructure technology has resulted in a robust civilmilitary aviation cooperation enabling all EU member States to be represented by a civilian and a military
6
The theme of the Forum was “Time to take it global: Meeting each other’s needs without compromising the Mission”. The event was
held as a follow-up to recommendations of the Eleventh Air Navigation Conference (Doc 9828, Rec. 1/2) concerning coordination
with military authorities with a view to achieving enhanced airspace organisation and management as an integral supporting
mechanism of the successful series of civil/military air traffic management summits instituted by the Air Traffic Control Association
(ATCA). It was also a follow up to ICAO Assembly Resolution A36-13, Appendix O, Coordination of civil and military air traffic wherein
States are asked to take appropriate action to coordinate with military authorities to implement a flexible and cooperative approach
to airspace organisation and management.
7
The International Civil Aviation Organization, a specialized agency of the United Nations, was established by Article 44 of the
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944 (supra, note 5). The main
objectives of ICAO are to develop the principles and techniques of international air navigation and to foster the planning and
development of air transport. ICAO has 190 Contracting States.
8
The International Air Transport Association, an association of air carriers, was formed in 1919 as the International Air Traffic
Association.
9
CANSO is the global voice of the air traffic management profession. Its members comprise over 50 air navigation service providers
who control more than 85% of global air traffic movements.
10
EUROCONTROL, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, is an intergovernmental organisation made up of 38
Member States and the European Community.
11
See Civil-Military Cooperation – The CANSO Perspective, October 2009.
13
14
officer in the EU Single Sky Committee (which develops legislation) and military officers to be included
in other bodies working on SES and SESAR.
The counterpart of SESAR in the US is the Next Generation Air Transport System (NextGen). NextGen,
which is scheduled to be effective from 2012 to 2025, calls for a shift in airspace management to a
trajectory-based system. It will have the following five attributes:
• Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast which will use the Global Positioning System
satellite signals to provide air traffic controllers and pilots with much more accurate information that
will help to keep aircraft safely separated both in the air and on runways;
• System-wide Information Management System which will provide a single infrastructure and
information management system to deliver high quality, timely data to many users and applications;
• Next Generation Data Communications which will provide an additional means of two-way
communication for air traffic control clearances, instructions, advisories, flight crew requests and
reports;
• Next Generation Network Enabled Weather which will reduce weather-related delays at least by
half; and
• National Airspace System Voice Switch which will replace existing voice systems with a single airto-ground and ground-to-ground voice communications system.
Both SESAR and NextGen, targeted for post-2020, would improve the performance of the ATM system
by combining increased automation with new procedures that improve and achieve benefits related to
safety, economic efficiency, capacity and environmental protection.
LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES
Distinction Between Civil and Military Aviation
A simplistic but apt definition of civil aviation is “aviation activities carried out by civil aircraft”. A civil
aircraft has been defined as any aircraft, excluding government and military aircraft, used for the carriage
of passengers, baggage, cargo and mail12. However, civil aviation comprises in general all aviation activities
other than government and military air services which can be divided into three main categories:
• Commercial air transport provided to the public by scheduled or non scheduled carriers;
• Private flying for business or pleasure;
• A wide range of specialised services commonly called aerial work, such as agriculture, construction,
photography, surveying, observation and patrol, search and rescue, aerial advertisement et al13.
By the same token, military aviation must be aviation activities carried out by military aircraft. Military
aircraft have been defined as aircraft that are designed or modified for highly specialised use by the
armed services of a nation14.
Adrianus D. Groenewege, Compendium of International Civil Aviation, Second Edition, International Aviation Development
Corporation: Canada 1999, at 437. It must also be noted that an aircraft has been defined in Annexes 6, 7 and 8 to the Chicago
Convention as any machine which can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of air other than the reactions of air on
the Earth’s surface.
12
Ibid.
13
http://www.answers.com/topic/military-aircraft
14
Military aviation therefore can be identified as the use of aircraft and other flying machines for the
purposes of conducting or enabling warfare, which could include the carriage of military personnel and
cargo used in military activities such as the logistical supply to forces stationed along a front. Usually
these aircraft include bombers, fighters, fighter bombers and reconnaissance as well as unmanned
attack aircraft such as drones15. These varied types of aircraft allow for the completion of a wide variety
of objectives.
Assembly Resolution A10-19
Arguably, the most fundamental difference between the operation of civil and military aircraft lies in the
fact that, although they are expected to share the same skies, the procedures by which they do this vary
greatly. Civil aircraft depend entirely on predetermined flight paths and code of commercial conduct
which varies depending on aircraft type and types of traffic carried, whereas military aircraft operate
in line with the exigency of a situation and are not necessarily always guided by predetermined flight
paths. This dichotomy led to the adoption, at the 10th Session of the ICAO Assembly (Caracas, 19 June
to 16 July 1956) of Resolution A10-19 which, while recognising that the skies (airspace) as well as many
other facilities and services were commonly shared between civil and military aviation, focused on ICAO’s
mandate to promote the safety of flight16.
The preponderance of weight in prioritising civil and military aviation seems therefore to be in favour of
civil aviation, particularly when taking into consideration this Resolution and the earlier discussion on
Annex 11 to the Chicago Convention, thus attenuating the principle that military aviation should, out
of necessity, consider the compelling need to protect civil aviation from the spontaneous risks that the
former may carry with it.
At the Global Air Traffic Management Forum on Civil and Military Cooperation17, ICAO subsumed its
position by stating that airspace is a natural resource with finite capacity for which demand from all users
is constantly expanding and that there has been an increased requirement on airspace use to meet a
fast-growing aviation demand.
States were elected to be parties to the Chicago Convention so that international civil aviation may be
developed in a safe and orderly manner and international air transport services may be established on the
basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically. To achieve these objectives and
to take due account of current and future needs in aviation, ICAO developed its vision of a seamless ATM
system. ICAO further advised that, although the Chicago Convention governs international civil aviation
and is not applicable to State aircraft (i.e. aircraft used in military, customs and police services), State
aircraft as well as military CNS/ATM systems and services are an integral part of the aviation community. A
much closer cooperation between civil and military organisations will contribute to the vision encapsulated
in the preamble to the Chicago Convention, leading to the optimum use of the airspace and balancing
State requirements for both civil and military aviation.
In a report released on 21 December 2009, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is reported to have announced that, on Sunday, 20
December, military drones had penetrated Venezuelan airspace along the North-western border with Colombia. He had warned
that Venezuela was prepared to defend itself if any State were to violate its sovereignty. See http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/
news/5022. On 4 January 2010, it was reported that a US drone had fired two missiles in Pakistan, flattening an extremist hideout
in Pakistan’s lawless tribal belt on Sunday, 3 January 2010, killing five militants in a recent spike in drone attacks. See http://www.
channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/1028351/1/.html
15
As per Article 44 of the Chicago Convention.
16
17
Supra, note 7.
15
16
Assembly Resolution A36-13
ICAO drew the attention of the Forum to Assembly Resolution A36-1318 adopted at the 36th ICAO
Assembly (Montreal, 18-28 September 2007), Appendix O, which recognises that the airspace as well
as many facilities and services should be used in common by civil aviation and military aviation. The
ICAO Global Operational Concept19 also states that all airspace should be a usable resource and that
any restriction on the use of any particular volume of airspace should be considered transitory, and all
airspace should be managed flexibly. It was noted by the Forum that, through A36-13, the Assembly
resolved that the common use by civil and military aviation of airspace and of certain facilities and
services shall be arranged so as to ensure safety, regularity and efficiency of international civil air traffic.
The regulations established by ICAO member States to govern the operation of their State aircraft over
the high seas shall ensure that these operations did not compromise the safety, regularity and efficiency
of international civil air traffic and to the extent possible such operations conformed to the Rules of the
Air contained in Annex 2 to the Chicago Convention. The resolution also requested the Council of ICAO
to provide guidance and advice to States that wished to establish civil-military agreements.
Need for Cohesive Civil-Military Cooperation
Against this backdrop, ICAO advised the Forum of the need for a strengthened civil-military cooperation
and coordination which called upon ICAO member States to initiate as necessary or improve the
coordination between their civil and military ATS. It was important that States, in view of the increasing
need to cooperate with multiple airspace users, develop an integrated and cohesive civil-military
coordination strategy with a roadmap indicating short, mid and long-term objectives. ICAO further
advised that the benefits of enhancing civil-military cooperation should be considered at the global
level with a view to identifying best practices through dialogue and exchange of information. Effective
civil-military cooperation and coordination is required not only to meet future civil and military air traffic
requirements for increased safety, security, capacity, efficiency and environmental sustainability, but
also to achieve interoperability, seamlessness and harmonisation through sound policy, a structured
framework, effective liaisons and management at the working level20.
ICAO INITIATIVES
One of the recent initiatives is the ICAO Global ATM Operational Concept21 which visualises an
integrated, harmonised and global interoperable ATM22 system. The broad vision of this concept is
to achieve an interoperable global ATM system for every user during all phases of flight that meets
agreed levels of safety, provides for optimum economic operations, is environmentally sustainable and
meets national security requirements23. The ATM system is based on the provision of services, through
Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and associated practices related specifically to air navigation, Assembly
Resolutions in Force (as of 28 September 2007), Doc 9902, II-2.
18
19
Infra, note 22.
In its briefing, ICAO emphasised that cooperation between civil and military authorities should be aimed at achieving optimal use of
the airspace resulting in increased airspace capacity, operational flexibility, and savings in flying time, fuel and CO2 emissions. The
Forum noted that safety, economical impact, efficiency and interoperability are objectives shared by both civil and military aviation
communities.
20
21
An operational concept is a statement of what is envisioned.
Air traffic management is the dynamic, integrated management of air traffic and airspace – safely, economically and efficiently –
through the provision of facilities in collaboration with all parties. See ICAO Doc 9854, supra note 19 at 1-1.
22
Ibid.
23
a framework which involves airspace, aerodromes, aircraft and persons which are part of the ATM
system. The benefits accruing to all members of the ATM community are greater equity in airspace
activity; greater access to timely and meaningful information for decision support and more autonomy
in decision-making including conflict management, and the opportunity to better deliver business and
individual outcomes within an appropriate safety framework.
ICAO has also issued guidelines on the coordination between military authorities and ATS authorities
which recognise in limine that coordination between the responsible military authorities and appropriate
ATS authorities is essential to the safety of civil aircraft operations whenever activities potentially
hazardous to such operations are planned and conducted by any military units24. These guidelines go on
to state that in the event that a sudden outbreak of armed hostilities or any other factors preclude this
normal coordination process, appropriate State and ATS authorities, civil aircraft operators and pilots-incommand of aircraft must assess the situation based on the information available and plan their actions
so as not to jeopardise safety25.
The Guidelines recommend that, in the event that a military unit observes that a civil aircraft is entering
or is about to enter a designated prohibited, restricted or danger area, or any other area of activity
which constitutes potential hazards, a warning to the aircraft should be issued through the responsible
ATS unit. The warning should include advice on the change of heading required to leave or circumvent
the area26. If the military unit is unable to contact the responsible ATS unit immediately and the situation
is deemed to be a genuine emergency, an appropriate warning to the aircraft may be transmitted on
the VHF emergency channel 121.5 MHz. If the identity of the aircraft is not known, it is important that
the warning include the secondary surveillance rader (SSR) code, if observed, and describe the position
of the aircraft in a form meaningful to the pilot, for example by reference to an ATS route and/or the
direction and distance from an airport or an aeronautical radio navigation aid, an established waypoint
or reporting point27.
In the case where an unauthorised aircraft is observed visually to be flying in, or about to enter a
prohibited, restricted or danger area, the following visual signal is prescribed by the International
Standards in Annex 2 (Rules of the Air) to the Chicago Convention Appendix 1 to indicate that the aircraft
is to take such remedial action as is necessary28. The Guidelines highlight the importance of coordinating
with the responsible ATS unit(s), whenever possible. The issuance of any warnings and advice to civil
aircraft regarding changes of flight path should be emphasised in any briefing or instruction given by
military authorities to their units since uncoordinated warnings and associated navigational advice, when
followed, may result in a potential risk of collision with other aircraft in the area29.
Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, ICAO Doc 9554AN/932 First Edition, 1990, paragraph 3.1.
24
Id.Paragraph 3.1.1. Examples of military activities which may pose a threat to civil aircraft and which should be coordinated with ATS
authorities include practice firings or testing of any weapons air-to-air, air-to-surface or surface-to-air in an area or in a manner that
could affect civil air traffic; certain military aircraft operations such as air displays, training exercises and the intentional dropping of
objects and paratroopers; launch and recovery of space vehicles; and operations in areas of conflict, when such operations include a
potential threat to civil air traffic. See Paragraph 3.2. of Doc 9554.
25
26
27
Id. Paragraph 8.1.
Id. Paragraph 8.2.
Id. Paragraph 8.3.
28
Id. Paragraph 8.4.
29
17
18
The objective of the coordination between the military authorities planning activities potentially
hazardous to civil aircraft and the responsible ATS authorities is to reach an agreement on the best
arrangements which would avoid hazards to civil aircraft and minimise interference with the normal
operations of civil aircraft. Ideally, this means the selection of locations outside promulgated ATS routes
and controlled airspace for the conduct of the potentially hazardous activities. If the selection of such
locations is not possible due to the nature and scope of the planned activities, temporary restrictions
imposed on civil air traffic should be kept to a minimum through close coordination between the military
and ATS unit30.
The Guidelines are clear on the fact that although Article 89 of the Chicago Convention provides that
in the event of armed conflict or the potential for armed conflict, the Convention does not affect the
freedom of action of any Contracting State affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals. Nonetheless,
the need for close coordination between civil and military authorities and units is even more critical.
The responsibility for initiating the coordination process rests with the States whose military forces
are engaged in the conflict. The responsibility for instituting special measures to ensure the safety of
international civil aircraft operations remains with the States responsible for providing ATS in the airspace
affected by the conflict, even in cases where coordination is not initiated or completed31. Based on
information available, the State responsible for providing ATS should identify the geographical area
of the conflict, assess the hazards or potential hazards to international civil aircraft operations, and
determine whether such operations in or through the area of conflict should be avoided or may be
continued under specified conditions.
An international Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) containing the necessary information, advice and safety
measures to be taken should then be issued and subsequently updated in the light of developments.
All those concerned with initiating and issuing of NOTAM should be aware of the provisions governing
the duration of the published NOTAM. Annex 15, Standard 5.3.1.2 states that a NOTAM given Class
I distribution shall be superseded by a NOTAM given Class II distribution when the duration of the
circumstances notified is likely to exceed three months or the NOTAM has remained in force for three
months. A copy of the NOTAM should be forwarded to the appropriate regional office of ICAO32.
If the necessary information is not forthcoming from the States whose military authorities are engaged
in the armed conflict, the State responsible for providing air traffic services should ascertain the nature
and scope of the hazards or potential hazards from other sources, such as aircraft operators, IATA and
the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations, adjacent States or in some cases the relevant
ICAO regional office33.
Separate guidelines34 issued by ICAO provide that aircraft shall not be flown in a prohibited, or restricted
area, the particulars of which have been duly published, except in accordance with the conditions of
the restrictions or by permission of the State over whose territory the areas are established35. The same
30
Id. Paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2.
Doc 9554, Paragraph 10.2.
31
Id. Paragraph 10.3.
32
Id. Paragraph 10.4.
33
34
See Manual Concerning Interception of Civil Aircraft, ICAO Doc 9433-AN/926 Second Edition - 1990.
Id. Paragraph 3.2.4.1.
35
guidelines also provide that special procedures shall be established with a view to ensure air traffic units
are notified if a military unit observes that an aircraft which is, or might be a civil aircraft is approaching,
or has entered any area in which interception might be necessary. In such an event all possible efforts
should be made to confirm the identity of the aircraft and to provide it with the navigational guidance
necessary to avoid the need for interception36.
There is also a requirement to the effect that ATS authorities establish and maintain close cooperation
with military authorities responsible for activities that may affect flights of civil aircraft37. As soon as an
ATS unit becomes aware of an unidentified aircraft in its area, it is required to establish the identity of
the aircraft whenever this is necessary for the provision of ATS or required by the appropriate military
authorities in accordance with locally agreed procedures38.
CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion indicates, there is ample regulatory guidance from a civil aviation perspective
to ensure a seamless and interoperable sharing of airspace between civil and military aviation activities.
However, some weak spots remain, the first being the perceived inadequacy and lack of clarity of
Article 89 of the Chicago Convention which renders the legal structure in this context destitute of
certainty and effect39. Another contentious area is missile testing involving airspace and air routes used
by civil aircraft as was demonstrated by the DPRK issue of 200640. Many concerned parties voiced their
perturbation over the incident, including ICAO. A letter was sent by the President of the Council to the
DPRK authorities voicing the grave concern of the international aviation community that Standards 2.17
and 2.18 of Annex 11 to the Chicago Convention were not followed by the military authorities of DPRK.
Countries across the world joined in the protest, and the United Nations Security Council met for an
emergency meeting to discuss the missile tests.
The United Nations Security Council condemned the test firing by DPRK of missiles and adopted
Resolution 1695 which requested all member States to prevent the transfer of missile and missilerelated items, materials, goods and technology to the DPRK’s missile or weapons of mass destruction
programmes, as well as procurement of such items and technology from that country. It also addressed
the transfer of financial resources in relation to those programmes.
The resolution affirmed that such launches jeopardise peace, stability and security in the region and
beyond, particularly in light of the country’s claim that it has developed nuclear weapons. The Council
underlined that DPRK needed to show restraint and refrain from any action that might aggravate
tension, and continue to work on the resolution of non-proliferation concerns, through political and
diplomatic efforts.
In May 2009, DPRK test fired another short-range missile, apparently in clear violation of Resolution
1695 and, it is reported41 that it would take self-defence action if the United Nations Security Council
36
37
38
39
Supra, note 6.
An object propelled by rockets was launched by North Korea and a part of the object hit the sea in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of
Sanriku in north-eastern Japan. The impact area of the object was in the vicinity of the international airway A590 which is known as
composing NOPAC Composite Route System, a trunk route connecting Asia and North America where some 180 flights of various
countries fly every day.
40
41
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-05/30/content_7953420.htm
19
20
were to impose tougher sanctions. This missile, which was fired from the Masudan-ni site on DPRK’s east
coast, was the latest in the series of missiles the DPRK test fired since conducting a major nuclear test a
few days before the firing.
If the response of State authorities firing missiles into the air without paying heed to applicable
regulations and guidelines were to be that, since the State concerned has sovereignty over its airspace
(as recognised by Article 1 of the Chicago Convention) and that it does over its airspace is its concern,
it must be pointed out that air routes used by many airlines carrying passengers of various nationalities
and that there must be recognition that the concept of sovereignty, in its pristine purity and simplistic
interpretation, cannot be sustained in this instance. One commentator states very aptly:
The role of the State in the modern world is a complex one. According to legal theory, each State is
sovereign and equal. In reality, with the phenomenal growth in communications and consciousness,
and with the constant reminder of global rivalries, not even the most powerful of States can be
entirely sovereign. Interdependence and the close-knit character of contemporary international
commercial and political society ensures that virtually any action of a State could well have profound
repercussions upon the system as a whole and the decisions under consideration by other States42.
Therefore, in the ultimate analysis, cooperation between civil and military authorities, in accordance with
the existing regulations and guidelines is essential, with the underlying consideration that civil aviation,
with 15,000 aircraft airborne at any given time carrying 2.2 billion passengers annually, should not under
any circumstances be compromised.
The views and opinions expressed in this paper reflected those of the author and not necessarily those
of ICAO.
42
Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, Fifth Edition, Cambridge University Press:2003 at 120.
u
State Responsibilities for
Air Navigation Facilities and
Standards – Understanding its
Scope, Nature and Extent
Abstract
Article 28 of the Chicago Convention requires States to provide air
navigation facilities over their territory, which comply with ICAO’s
Standards and Recommended Practices, “so far as they may find it
practicable”. The objective of Article 28 is to secure a comprehensive,
seamless and continuous network of air navigation services around the
globe, to support the safety, regularity and efficiency of international
air transportation. Article 28 formalises a commitment by each
contracting State towards the other Parties to the Chicago Convention.
The responsibilities involved are essentially regulatory and supervisory
in nature. These responsibilities remain those of the contracting States,
even when they have mandated an autonomous or foreign entity to
perform service provision tasks. This paper discusses the exact scope,
nature and extent of the responsibilities involved under Article 28 and
explores the meaning and remits of “practicability” as used in the
Chicago Convention.
About the Author
Dr Francis Schubert is Head of Corporate
Development and Deputy CEO for Skyguide,
Swiss Air Navigation Services Ltd in Geneva,
Switzerland. He is also Adjunct Professor at the
Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University,
in Montreal, Canada and lecturer at the Faculty of
Law of the University of Lausanne, in Switzerland.
Dr Schubert started his career as an air traffic
controller, and moved to other positions after
several years of practical air traffic control
experience. At Skyguide, his current responsibilities
include international relations, corporate strategy
and legal affairs. Dr Schubert holds a Ph.D in
international aviation law from the University
of Geneva and has published numerous articles
dealing with legal aspects of air navigation services
and more particularly the legal liability of air traffic
controllers. He presently serves as Chairman of the
Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation Legal
and Policy Committee, and is past President of the
Swiss Air and Space Law Association.
21
Dr Francis Schubert
Skyguide, Swiss Air Navigation Services Ltd
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 7 December 1944 is,
among others, to lay down fundamental “principles and arrangements in order that
international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and orderly manner…”. The
development of an efficient global air transportation system requires a comprehensive,
consistent and seamless infrastructure to support air navigation operations around the
world. To that end, Article 28 of the Chicago Convention (Air Navigation Facilities and
Standard Systems) formalises the commitments undertaken by contracting States for the
purpose of establishing air navigation facilities and standard systems.
Article 28 to the Chicago Convention prescribes that:
“Each contracting State undertakes, so far as it may find practicable, to:
(a) Provide, in its territory, airports, radio services, meteorological services and other air
navigation facilities to facilitate international air navigation, in accordance with the
standards and practices recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to
this Convention;
(b) Adopt and put into operation the appropriate standard systems of communications
procedure, codes, markings, signals, lighting and other operational practices and
rules which may be recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this
Convention;
(c) Collaborate in international measures to secure the publication of aeronautical maps
and charts in accordance with standards which may be recommended or established
from time to time, pursuant to this Convention.”
Article 28 is to be understood from a systemic perspective. The air navigation facilities
covered by the title of this paper encompass both services offered to airspace users and the
technical infrastructure required for the provision of such services. These elements include
22
State Responsibilities for Air Navigation Facilities and Standards – Understanding its Scope, Nature and Extent
airports, radio services, meteorological services, air navigation services (ANS), markings, signals, lighting
and aeronautical maps and charts. Whereas the conclusions drawn in this paper will extend to all of the
above, the research done focuses specifically on the air navigation facilities mentioned in Article 28, lit.
a, and more specifically those supporting Air Traffic Management (ATM) functions1.
Until the late 1980s, most States had established ANS over their territory in the form of national
governmental agencies operating within the limits of their respective sovereign boundaries, although a
number of States have accepted responsibility to provide air traffic services2 (ATS) over parts of the high
seas, in accordance with the relevant provisions of ICAO Annex 11 (Air Traffic Services). The traditional
State-run national ANS provider (ANSP) model was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, it was perceived
as the most effective manner for States to comply with their international obligations under the Chicago
Convention. Secondly, ANSPs perform functions that are closely connected to the exercise of sovereign
powers. Governmental organisations were perceived as the best option for States to retain the level of
control required for the execution of sovereign tasks.
Article 28 did not raise any particular legal discussion during the first few decades following the entry in
force of the Chicago Convention, in times where ANS were operated by national governmental agencies.
The last two decades, however, were characterised by two main trends that have fundamentally
modified the ANS landscape worldwide. Firstly, many States have gradually entrusted their ANSPs
with some degree of institutional, financial and managerial autonomy, separating the service provision
activities from the regulatory function of the State. Autonomous ANS authorities3 have been established
in various legal forms, ranging from public companies to outright privatised corporations.
Secondly, the aviation community has realised that the proper performance of the ANS system at the
global level would require a departure from the historical tendency of States to confine the provision of
ANS to the airspace within the limits of their national borders. Recourse to cross-border service provision,
where a service provider performs ANS functions across the national boundary of the country where it
is located, into the airspace of another State, should be considered wherever such practices are likely to
improve the safety and flight efficiency of air navigation.
Whereas the right of States to delegate the functional responsibility to provide ANS to autonomous
or foreign entities has not been challenged, it is also accepted that even when States have entrusted
operational responsibilities to such organisations, “the relevant States continue to be responsible under
Article 28 of the Chicago Convention.”4 The various degrees of institutional and operational distance
added between the States and the organisations effectively in charge of operating air navigation
facilities have created a need to clarify the exact scope, nature and extent of the contracting States’
1
Defined as “[t]he dynamic, integrated management of air traffic and airspace including air traffic services, airspace management
and air traffic flow management – safely, economically and efficiently – through the provision of facilities and seamless services in
collaboration with all parties and involving airborne and ground-based functions” (ICAO, Procedures for Air Navigation Services – Air
Traffic Management, doc. 4444, 15th Edition, 2007).
2
Defined as “[a] generic term meaning variously, flight information service, alerting service, air traffic advisory service, air traffic control
service (area control service, approach control service or aerodrome control service)”, (ICAO, Air Traffic Services, Annex 11 to the
Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, 13th Edition, July 2001).
3
Defined as “[a]n independent entity established for the purpose of operating and managing one or more airports (or ANS), and
empowered to manage and use the revenues it generates to cover its costs. The word “authority” does not normally imply regulatory
authority when used in this context” (ICAO, Privatisation in the Provision of Airports and Air Navigation Services, Circular 284 AT/120,
March 2002).
4
ICAO, Report of the Secretariat Study Group on Legal Aspects of CNS/ATM Systems, 1st Meeting, Montreal, 7-8 April 1999, SSGCNS/I-Report (9 April 1999) §3.8.1.
responsibilities under Article 28, for the establishment of air navigation facilities. The ongoing work
undertaken under the auspices of ICAO, in respect of the development and implementation of global
communications, navigation and surveillance (CNS) systems such as the Global Navigation Satellite
System (GNSS) constitutes another development that has emphasised the need to clarify the remits of
States responsibilities under Article 28.
There are relatively few legal instruments that explicitly address the scope, nature and extent of the
States responsibilities under Article 28, and academic opinions on the subject remain scarce. However,
there is a significant amount of material, including ICAO regulations, resolutions and working papers, as
well as legal analysis focusing on the specific domain of ATS, one of the main components of ANS, the
implications of which can, for most of them, be extended by analogy to the generality of ANS.
STATES’ RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER ARTICLE 28
Scope
Aircraft engaged in international air transportation require reliable infrastructure and services that will
serve various specific purposes. These contribute to minimising the risk of safety occurrences (such as
collisions between aircraft) and avoiding delay, by expediting the flow of air traffic. They also help in
optimising the operational efficiency of flights, by ensuring that aircraft can fly pilot-preferred trajectories
to the farthest extent practicable. To be effective, these infrastructures and services must be dimensioned
to deliver the capacity needed to respond to traffic demand and must be operated without disruption,
in a timely manner and within its geographical location.
Air navigation facilities should be established in such a way that international air traffic can access the
territory of contracting States, for example through the availability of airports that can accommodate the
type of aircraft engaged in international operations and by designing airways that would enable these
aircraft to reach these airports. They should also support the overflight of their territory by aircraft in
transit serving the airports of other countries.
Finally, the performance of the global air navigation system requires that the applicable technical
requirements and operational procedures are thoroughly harmonised.
The purpose of Article 28 is to ensure the availability of facilities that meet these criteria worldwide.
It formalises a double State commitment. Firstly, it requires States to take measures in order to deploy
facilities to support international air navigation. Secondly, it requires States to ensure that these air
navigation facilities comply with the Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) defined by ICAO.
Air Navigation Facilities
ICAO offers no formal definition for the term “air navigation facility”, as used in Article 28, nor for
the most common generic concept of “air navigation services”. Article 28 however presents a list of
facilities, services and products that are to be covered by that provision. In addition, ICAO’s Policies on
Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services offers an enumeration of services covered by the words
“air navigation services”, in the specific context of ANS financing, that include “air traffic management,
communication, navigation and surveillance systems, meteorological services for air navigation, search
and rescue and aeronautical information services...”5
5
ICAO, ICAO’s Policies on Charges for Airports and Air Navigation Services, doc 9082/7, 7th Edition, 2004. Also see ICAO, International
Civil Aviation Vocabulary, Doc 9713, 2nd Edition, 2001.
23
24
Other definitions are also to be found in specific regional and national regulations. The various definitions
are not necessarily consistent with the meaning given in the aforementioned ICAO documents. For
instance, the definition of ANS under the European Single European Sky Regulations says that “‘air
navigation services’ means air traffic services; communication, navigation and surveillance services;
meteorological services for air navigation; and aeronautical information services”. Contrary to ICAO’s
listing, it includes neither ATM nor search and rescue6.
The requirements defined under Article 28 relate exclusively to the facilities established by States to
support international air navigation. Those put in place for the sole needs of domestic air traffic escape
the scope of the Chicago Convention. However, many States subject the facilities used by aircraft
engaged in national operations to the same criteria (in particular, compliance with ICAO’s SARPs) as
those governing the infrastructure made available to international air transportation. In fact, ANS
facilities are often shared by domestic and international air traffic.
Geographical Scope
States are required to undertake to establish air navigation facilities over their territory. The term territory
is to be understood as “the land areas and territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty,
suzerainty, protection or mandate of such State”, in accordance with the definition given under Article
2 (Territory) of the Chicago Convention.
However, ICAO has recognised the need to ensure a comprehensive and seamless network of ANS
facilities worldwide, in order to avoid a disruption in the availability, quality, reliability and continuity of
service given to international aviation. There are large stretches of the surface of the earth which extend
outside of the sovereign territory of States. In particular, the high seas constitute wide areas with a
high demand for the provision of ANS. For that reason, referring specifically to ATS, Annex 11, Section
2.1.2, foresees that “[t]hose portions of the airspace over the high seas or in airspace of undetermined
sovereignty where air traffic services will be provided shall be determined on the basis of regional air
navigation agreements.” Under such arrangements, States (normally those with a boundary with the
relevant sectors of airspace) are invited to accept the responsibility to establish ATS (and by analogy ANS)
in specific parts of the airspace over the high sea.
Compliance with ICAO’s SARPs
By undertaking to provide air navigation facilities over their territory “in accordance with the standards
and practices recommended or established from time to time, pursuant to this Convention”, States
commit to ensure that the services offered, as well as the technical infrastructure supporting these
services, comply with the SARPs produced by ICAO on the basis of Article 37 of the Chicago Convention
(Adoption of International Standards and Procedures).
NATURE OF STATES RESPONSIBILITIES
The Chicago Convention is an international instrument which formalises obligations under public
international law. By ratifying the Convention, the contracting States express commitments towards
other contracting States only. In itself, the Chicago Convention does not generate any prerogative, right
6
Regulation (EC) No 549/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 laying down the Framework for the
Creation of the Single European Sky, art. 2, Definitions.
or obligation for individual nationals of the contracting States, and such rights and prerogative cannot be
derived implicitly from the Convention. The public international law essence of the States responsibilities
under Article 28 is fundamental, in particular for the purpose of defining a breach of States’ obligations,
the remedies available in the event of such a breach and any obligation to repair damages arising as a
consequence of a failure of the air navigation facilities established by a contracting State.
EXTENT OF STATES RESPONSIBILITIES
The obligations on States under Article 28 are neither strictly nor narrowly defined, in the sense that
States retain considerable discretion and individual appreciation regarding:
• The means by which they intend to fulfil their commitment;
• The level of infrastructure and service they wish to make available to international aviation; and
• The degree of compliance of their air navigation facilities with relevant ICAO regulations.
Commitment to the Extent of Practicability
The obligations imposed on States under Article 28 are not absolute. Each contracting State is required
to establish air navigation facilities in accordance with ICAO SARPs, “so far as it may find practicable”.
This principle is not exclusive to Article 28; it is common to most of the obligations subscribed in Chapter
4 of the Chicago Convention. The delineation of the boundaries of the word “practicable” is central
to the definition of the States responsibilities under Article 28. The word “practicable” is not explicitly
defined in the Convention and the competence to appreciate the extent of practicability lies with each
individual State.
Level of Infrastructure and Services
The air navigation facilities established by contracting States must be adequate to serve the needs of
international aviation. States are responsible and competent to dimension the infrastructure and services
they intend to make available to aircraft engaged in international air navigation against the level they
perceive as practicable. To that end, they will take various factors into consideration to achieve the best
balance between traffic demand and the cost of implementing and operating the facilities. In order to
ensure the continuous provision of services, Annex 11 also requires States to “develop and promulgate
contingency plans for implementation in the event of disruption, or potential disruption, of air traffic
services and related supporting services in the airspace for which they are responsible for the provision
of such services.”
From a geographical perspective, States are not required to deploy ANS infrastructure throughout their
entire territory, but must ensure that adequate facilities are available over those parts of their territory
which are relevant for international air navigation purposes. Airspace sectors and airports with low traffic
density and operational complexity are typically less infrastructure-intensive than major airways and
international airports. Aircraft operating at these locations would need lower levels of services, at least
as far as air traffic control is concerned. According to Article 68 of the Chicago Convention (Designation
of Routes and Airports), each State retains the freedom to “… designate the route to be followed within
its territory by any international air service and the airports which any such service may use.”
25
26
Where States have accepted the responsibility to provide ANS over parts of the high seas, their
commitment extends in those airspace sectors to the same extent as over their sovereign territory. ICAO
is particularly cautious that the level of service is maintained in airspace sectors over the high seas, and
is not disturbed by domestic issues of the State in charge of managing them, such as industrial actions.
For that reason, the concerned States have defined specific measures in the form of contingency plans.
Responsibilities for Service Provision
The establishment of ANS requires action at the policy, regulatory and service provision levels. At the
policy level, States will define the level of infrastructure and services they plan to make available to
support international air navigation. The regulatory function, in its broader sense, is meant to formalise
the policy objectives in law by defining the rules governing the establishment and provision of ANS.
It also prescribes the processes applicable for the certification and supervision of ANS providers. The
regulatory framework has evolved from mainly safety regulation, to also include economic and airspace
regulation as well as the definition of performance criteria. Finally, the service provision function
consists of the effective execution of ANS operation and technical tasks, within the boundaries of the
regulatory framework.
Historically, States have often exercised the policy, regulatory and service provision functions within a
single integrated governmental organisation. However, this model was the result of domestic political
choices and not dictated by Article 28.
States responsibilities under Article 28 relate primarily to the policy and regulatory aspects of ANS.
They are limited to “setting and maintaining the standards of the services provided and for the quality
of services provided.”7 In essence, Article 28 defines an objective in terms of availability and quality
(measured against SARPs adopted by ICAO), but leaves the States free, as far as the means to implement
to achieve this objective are concerned.
In the same way as States are entitled to appreciate the level of infrastructure and service offered to
airspace users, they also retain the freedom to define the organisational set-up for service provision over
their territory. Nothing in the Chicago Convention nor in its Annexes prevents a State from designating
another entity, whether a national, foreign, public, or private organisation, to provide ANS over parts or
the whole of its territory. This general statement is supported by explicit provisions relating specifically to
the establishment of air traffic services. In that respect, ICAO Annex 11 states that:
“When it has been determined that air traffic services would be provided, the State concerned should
designate the authority responsible for providing such services [. . .]. The authority responsible for
establishing and providing the service may be a State or a suitable agency.” After having designated
an ATS provider, the State still has to “arrange for such services to be established and provided in
accordance with the provisions of this Annex.”
In conclusion, when a State has entrusted the functional responsibility for service provision to an
autonomous or foreign entity, it will fulfil its commitment under Article 28, by:
7
ICAO, Air Navigation Services Economic Panel, Report on Financial and Related Organisational and Managerial Aspects of GNSS
Provision and Operation, Montreal, May 1996, ICAO Doc. 9660, §2.6.1.
• Defining clear performance targets to be met by the service provider, reflecting the level of
practicability defined by the State;
• Establishing a clear regulatory framework within which the autonomous entity would be required
and free to operate, that complies with the SARPs adopted by ICAO, with the exception of differences
between ICAO’s SARPs and the States’ own regulations duly notified to the Council of ICAO in
accordance with Article 38 (Departures from International Standards and Procedures) of the Chicago
Convention;
• Applying an appropriate certification process, that would demonstrate the service provider’s capability
to deliver the required level of performance; and
• Exercising systematic surveillance over the operations of the designated service provider, to verify that
the latter effectively delivers the required level of performance and complies with all terms of the
regulatory framework.
Compliance with ICAO’s SARPs
Outlining the boundaries of practicability is particularly important when addressing States responsibilities
in relation to compliance with ICAO’s SARPs. Whereas practicability remains undefined, the scale to
measure the commitment of each individual State towards SARPs compliance is clearly outlined in the
Convention. The word “practicable” is to be read in the light of Articles 37 (Adoption of International
Standards and Procedures) and 38. The level of practicability expressed by each State is to be measured
against the differences between ICAO’s SARPs and that State’s domestic legislation that have been
notified to the Council of ICAO.
Article 37 constitutes the cornerstone of the ICAO regulatory system. It prescribes that:
“Each contracting State undertakes to collaborate in securing the highest practicable degree
of uniformity in regulations, standards, procedures, and organisation in relation to aircraft,
personnel, airways and auxiliary services in all matters in which such uniformity will facilitate and
improve air navigation.
To this end the International Civil Aviation Organization shall adopt and amend from time to time, as
may be necessary, international Standards and Recommended Practices and procedures…”
Whereas the domestic regulations of all contracting States should ideally comply in full with the regulatory
provisions adopted by ICAO, the Chicago Convention recognises that this objective may occasionally
be impracticable. Therefore Article 38 offers some discretion to contracting States, regarding the full
alignment of their national rules, on those adopted by ICAO. Article 38 states that:
“Any State which finds it impracticable to comply in all respects with any such international standard
or procedure, or to bring its own regulations or practices into full accord with any international
standard or procedure after amendment of the latter, or which deems it necessary to adopt
regulations or practices differing in any particular respect from those established by an international
27
28
standard, shall give immediate notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization of the
differences between its own practice and that established by the international standard.”
Consequently, any difference notified by a State, between its own regulations and those expressed by
ICAO, formalises the extent to which each individual State finds it practicable to fulfil its obligations
under Article 28 of the Chicago Convention.
The consistent use of the word “practical” in Articles 28, 37 and 38 in the English version of the Chicago
Convention is particularly helpful for the interpretation of that term. The text of the Convention in other
languages does not always establish such a systematic relation between these three Articles. For instance,
the keyword “réalisable” used in the French text of Article 28 (“Chaque État contractant s’engage, dans
la mesure où il le juge réalisable…”), also appears in Article 37 (“Chaque État contractant s’engage à
prêter son concours pour atteindre le plus haut degré réalisable d’uniformité dans les règlements, les
normes, les procédures et l’organisation relatifs aux aéronefs, au personnel, aux voies aériennes et aux
services auxiliaires…”), but not in Article 38, which governs deviations from ICAO rules.
The definition of the rules that govern the provision of ANS over the high seas, in particular as far as
compliance with ICAO regulations is concerned, raises interesting legal questions. Article 12 (Rules of
the Air) of the Chicago Convention prescribes that “[o]ver the high seas, the rules in force shall be those
established under this Convention.” According to this Article, the arrangements implemented by States
who have accepted to provide ANS over parts of the high seas would need to comply in full with ICAO’s
SARPs, without any possibility to notify differences between the rules applied by their designated ANSP
and the prescriptions of ICAO. The principle of full compliance of arrangements put in place by States
having accepted the responsibility for providing ATS is explicitly expressed in Section 2.1.2 of Annex 11
to the Convention, which stipulates that:
“A contracting State having accepted the responsibility to provide air traffic services in such portions
of airspace shall thereafter arrange for the services to be established and provided in accordance
with the provisions of this Annex.”
Interestingly, however, the foreword of Annex 11 also explains that:
“[t]he Standards and Recommended Practices in Annex 11 apply in those parts of the airspace under
the jurisdiction of a contracting State wherein air traffic services are provided and also wherever a
contracting State accepts the responsibility of providing air traffic services over the high seas or in
airspace of undetermined sovereignty. A contracting State accepting such responsibility may apply
the Standards and Recommended Practices in a manner consistent with that adopted for airspace
under its jurisdiction.”
A note in Annex 11 further specifies that:
“[t]he Council, when approving the Foreword to this Annex, indicated that a contracting State
accepting the responsibility for providing air traffic services over the high seas or in airspace of
undetermined sovereignty may apply the Standards and Recommended Practices in a manner
consistent with that adopted for airspace under its jurisdiction.”
The practical and legal implication of the above precisions to Annex 11 is that States who have notified
differences between their domestic regulations applicable to ATS and the SARPs adopted by ICAO,
are entitled to extend these differences to those parts of the high seas where they have accepted
the responsibility to provide ATS. While the practical wisdom of this principle is obvious, it remains
questionable whether an “indication” by the Council, a statement in the foreword of Annex 11 and a
note following an ICAO Standard, none of which carry any legal status, constitute a valid legal basis for
a rule which reserves an exception to a rule established by the Chicago Convention.
BREACH OF STATES OBLIGATIONS
The existence of a breach by a contracting State of its obligations under Article 28, is to be determined
against the contents and extent of the responsibilities described above. Fundamentally, a State may find
itself in breach of its commitment, if the air navigation facilities put in place by that State over its territory
(as well as airspace sectors over the high seas and under its responsibility) fail to respond to the needs
of international air navigation, offer insufficient capacity to accommodate traffic demand, are limited
by operational inefficiency or suffer from technical or operational disruption. A general complaint may
also be brought if the aviation regulations of a contracting State do not comply with the regulatory
framework adopted by ICAO.
Because the Chicago Convention formalises arrangements between contracting States, only other
contracting States, to the exclusion of their individual nationals, are entitled to allege a breach by
another State of its obligations. Such claims are subject to the sole remedies made available under the
terms of the Convention.
Complaints regarding an alleged breach by a contracting State of its obligations under Article 28 are to
be brought to the ICAO Council, in accordance with Article 84 (Settlement of Disputes) of the Chicago
Convention, which stipulates that:
“If any disagreement between two or more contracting States relating to the interpretation or
application of this Convention and its Annexes cannot be settled by negotiation, it shall, on the
application of any State concerned in the disagreement, be decided by the Council.”
Claims regarding the adequacy of air navigation facilities are explicitly addressed by Article 69
(Improvement of Air Navigation Facilities) of the Chicago Convention, which states that:
“If the Council is of the opinion that the airports or other air navigation facilities, including radio and
meteorological services, of a contracting State are not reasonably adequate for the safe, regular,
efficient, and economical operation of international air services, present or contemplated, the
Council shall consult with the State directly concerned, and other States affected, with a view to
finding means by which the situation may be remedied, and may make recommendations for that
purpose. No contracting State shall be guilty of an infraction of this Convention if it fails to carry out
these recommendations.”
29
30
In itself, the considerable discretion granted to States, regarding the appreciation of the practicable
level of infrastructure and services made available to international aviation, as well as of the degree of
compliance of such facilities with applicable ICAO provisions, render the prospect of a formal breach of
the obligations defined under Article 28 highly improbable. This conclusion stands even more so since
the Convention explicitly rules out a breach by a State of its obligations, even in those instances where
the Council expresses the opinion that the air navigation facilities established by that State fail to meet
the requirements of Article 28 and that State declines to take remedial action. As a result, “… the
obligations undertaken by the contracting States are subject to limitations and safeguards which make
it impossible for a State to be compelled to take action against its will.”8
LIABILITY ASPECTS
A common misconception is that civil litigation for compensation could be initiated against a State
by individual citizens, in the event of a damage caused by the negligence of that State’s ANSP, on the
basis of Article 28 alone. The assumption that, since the relevant States continue to be responsible
under Article 28 even when the functional responsibility to provide ANS has been entrusted to an entity
independent from the State, the latter must necessarily retain the ultimate liability towards third parties,
is equally incorrect. The States responsibilities subscribed under Article 28 and the compensation of
damages caused to third parties by a failure in the provision of ANS are distinct legal concepts.
An obligation imposed upon a State to repair the damages caused to passengers, aircraft operators or
third parties on the surface, as a consequence of the negligence of an ANSP only exists to the extent
such an obligation is explicitly foreseen by an international convention or by the applicable national
legislation of that State.
As explained above, the Chicago Convention formalises commitments subscribed under the rules of
public international law. It only defines obligations between contracting States, a breach of which is
subject to the exclusive remedies foreseen under the Convention. It creates no legal rights or prerogatives
for individuals in general; neither does it prescribe any duty for States to repair damages caused to
individuals relating to the provision of ANS in particular.
There is presently no global or regional international convention governing the liability of States in respect
of ANS, comparable to the Montreal/Warsaw system applicable to the liability of the air carrier. With the
exception of dedicated provisions in the Convention relating to the Cooperation for the Safety of Air
Navigation in Europe, which rules EUROCONTROL’s liability regarding the operation of the multinational
Upper Area Control Centre in Maastricht, the liability of States in respect of ANS is exclusively governed
by their national laws.
Although Article 28 itself does not generate any obligation for States to repair damages arising from
a failure in the provision of ANS, the domestic liability regimes put in place by individual States are
nevertheless often strongly inspired by their commitment under Article 28.
Most States derive an obligation at the national level to compensate for the damages caused by their
ANS, as a natural consequence of their obligations under international public law, regardless of whether
they provide these services themselves or whether they have delegated this functional responsibility to
8
Shawcross & Beaumont, “Air Law”, Butterworths, 2004, p. VI-3.
an autonomous entity. This obligation, which also reflects the sovereign qualification of ANS, has been
formally expressed under the domestic laws of the States concerned.
Various national liability regimes exist, which reflect different legal doctrines, but result ultimately in a
State liability. Under the “primary liability doctrine”, the State remains liable in the first place, even if the
service is provided by a third party (for example Germany and Austria). The State may, however, retain
a right of recourse against the effective provider. Under the “subsidiary liability regime”, the effective
service provider stands on the front line of liability, but the State retains an obligation to compensate
any damage which exceeds the insurance coverage or financial capability of the service provider (for
example Switzerland). In some countries, however, the State derives no obligation at the national level
to repair damages caused by the faulty operation of ANS facilities established under Article 28, when the
service provision responsibility is entrusted to a privatised entity. This is the case in the UK and Canada
for instance, where the privatised service provider stands fully and solely liable for all damages caused to
third parties, in the same manner as any ordinary private corporation.
CONCLUSION
Article 28 of the Chicago Convention requires States to provide air navigation facilities over their
territory, which comply with ICAO’s SARPs. The objective of Article 28 is to secure a comprehensive,
seamless and continuous network of ANS around the globe, to support the safety, regularity and
efficiency of international air transportation. Neither the right of States to establish autonomous ANSPs
or even to privatise their ATC system, nor the principle of cross-border service provision has been
challenged. However, it has been correctly asserted that even when the responsibility for service provision
has been entrusted to an entity other than the State itself, the relevant States continue to be responsible
under Article 28 of the Chicago Convention. The responsibilities involved are essentially regulatory and
supervisory in nature. Where the service provision responsibility has been provided to an autonomous or
foreign organisation, the contracting State will fulfil its obligations by setting clear performance targets
which would ensure that the facilities put in place would meet the needs of international air traffic.
The State would also need to define a regulatory framework which complies with the rules defined by
ICAO, as well as a certification process which would demonstrate the service provider’s ability to fulfil all
the performance criteria. Finally, the State would have to continuously monitor the performance of the
service provider and the level of compliance of air navigation operations with the established framework.
Considerable discretion is granted to individual States, regarding the extent of their commitment. Firstly,
Article 28 specifies that States are required to establish air navigation facilities “so far as they may
find it practicable”. States consequently retain the competence to determine the level of infrastructure
and service they deem practicable to support the safety, efficiency and regularity of international air
navigation. Secondly, Article 38 of the Chicago Convention reserves the possibility for States to notify
differences between their own national aviation rules, and those produced by ICAO. According to Article
69, States cannot be compelled to take action to improve their air navigation facilities, should the
Council issue the opinion that these facilities are insufficient to meet the needs of international air
navigation. In the light of the broad power of appreciation given to States, it is highly improbable that a
contracting State will be found in breach of its international obligations.
31
32
Article 28 alone generates no obligations for States to repair damages caused to individuals by a failure
of their ANS; it formalises commitments subscribed by contracting States towards other States and
creates neither explicit or implicit rights nor a prerogative for their individual nationals. An obligation
by States to repair damages caused to third parties only exists under the condition and to the extent
that it has been incorporated in their domestic legislation. The relevant national laws of many States are
strongly inspired by their commitment under Article 28 and do establish, in various possible forms, the
principle of the ultimate liability of the State for ANS-related damages.
ag
Key Lessons for Airports and
Airlines from the Volcanic Eruption
of Mount Eyjafjallajökull
Abstract
The volcanic eruption of Mount Eyjafjallajökull on 14 April 2010 led to
the immediate closure of large portions of Europe’s airspace. This in turn
led to the grounding of thousands of flights, resulting in an estimated
two million passengers being stranded worldwide. This incident reminds
us that it is essential for airlines and airports to establish relevant
contingency plans to deal with such massive disruptions at short notice,
especially since they can be expected to occur time and again. Several
lessons can be identified from the Mount Eyjafjallajökull episode. These
include the importance of all levels of management amongst airlines and
airports to be aware of the need to deal with such disruptions as part of
their usual order of business; the need for a Business Continuity Plan; the
usefulness of effective information management and the dissemination
and provision of creature comforts to alleviate the inconvenience and
difficulties faced by masses of stranded passengers at airports.
Aviation Management
About the Author
Mr Bernard Lim is Director for International
Relations and Security with the Ministry of
Transport, Singapore. His key responsibilities
include formulating and managing policy
matters concerning international relations,
transport security and transport emergency
preparedness in Singapore. He is currently the
Vice-Chairman of the International Civil Aviation
Organization Aviation Security Panel and also
the Vice-Chairman of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Co-operation Aviation Security Experts SubGroup. Mr Lim holds a Master’s Degree in Public
Administration from the University of Liverpool,
UK. He was trained in crisis management at the
Emergency Planning College in York, UK, and
in Leadership at the John F Kennedy School
of Government, Harvard University. He was
conferred the Airport Police Commander’s Award
in 2000, the Singapore Armed Forces National
Service Medal in 2001, the Ministry of Home
Affairs’ Emergency Preparedness Commendation
Award in 2002 and the Minister’s Innovation
Distinguished Award in 2007.
Aviation Management
33
Mr Bernard Lim
Ministry of Transport, Singapore
INTRODUCTION
On 14 April 2010, a massive volcanic erupted on Mount Eyjafjallajökull (pronounced ayyah-FYAH-lah-yer-kuhl) in Iceland. Volcanic ash was thrown up to a height of 30,000 feet,
spreading across a huge area in Europe, particularly over the UK, and as far down as Spain
and Northern Africa. The resulting ash cloud led to a closure of European air space for
some six days. This closure of airspace was attributed to fears over the safety of aircraft
flying through the ash cloud. Essentially, there was concern that the cold water from the
melting ice would chill the volcanic lava quickly, causing it to fragment into very small
pieces of glass which could pose as a hazard to aircraft. In 1982, a British Airways aircraft
that flew through volcanic ash billowing from Mount Galunggung, in Java, Indonesia,
encountered a shut-down on all four of its engines. Thankfully, the pilot was able to restart three of the four engines and landed the aircraft safely. During the recent Mount
Eyjafjallajökull eruption, on 15 April 2010, five F-18 Hornet aircraft from the Finnish Air
Force flew through the ash cloud in northern Finland. Volcanic dust was found on the
engines of three of the aircraft. There was also extensive damage caused by molten glass
deposits found inside the combustion chamber of one of the engines and the engines
had to be overhauled. These added to the growing level of safety concerns about airliners
flying through the ash cloud.
The closure of European airspace as a result of the eruption was regarded by some as the
largest airspace closure in the world since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in
the US. The resulting impact on air travel across Europe and in many parts of the world was
very significant. Over those few days, thousands of flights were cancelled and operations
at many airports were disrupted. Some analysts estimated that more than two million
passengers around the world were left stranded. In terms of economic damage, the
International Air Transport Association estimated that the airline industry suffered losses of
US$200 million a day as a result of these flight disruptions.
Around the world, chaotic scenes could be found in many airports as scores of passengers
were stranded. As the airspace remained closed, many airlines found it difficult to operate
any flights. From Europe to the Asia Pacific, airports and airlines had to contend with
thousands of frustrated passengers who found their journeys, work and leisure plans, as
34
Aviation Management
Key Lessons for Airports and Airlines from the Volcanic Eruption of Mount Eyjafjallajökull
well as their routines, suddenly disrupted. Airports were packed with passengers who were trying to
catch a flight out but ended up spending several days with little hope of flights resuming, and in great
despair as more flights were cancelled.
EFFECTS ON AIRPORTS AND AIRLINES
In the immediate aftermath of the volcanic eruption, some common scenes that were found in many
airports around the world included:
• Thousands of passengers at airport departure and transit lounges, trying to make the best of the situation,
camping out in any available space that they could find while waiting for news on the resumption of flights.
• Many of these stranded passengers were upset and argued with airline staff, airport ground handling and
passenger services staff, demanding to get onto flights and/or for updates on the latest situation.
• Many stranded passengers demanded that airlines and airport authorities provide them with alternative
means of transport to carry on with their journey. Many also asked the airlines and/or airport authorities for
hotel accommodation, as well as food and other creature comforts.
• Many stranded passengers demanded for compensation from the airlines for the inconvenience caused as
a result of the flight cancellations.
Passengers were distressed as they were running out of money to sustain themselves through this
period of flight cancellation. This was compounded by the fact that the duration of the airspace closure
remained uncertain. There were varying accounts by passengers of how some of the airlines and airports
were unable to or did not provide the affected passengers with accurate information on when their
flights would resume and when the stranded passengers could fly again. Other anecdotal accounts by
passengers included hotels raising prices to capitalise on the situation for quick and fast profits as these
stranded passengers had no choice but to pay the higher rates being charged.
There were also complaints that at some airports, airline representatives were nowhere in sight and
could not be contacted. Some airlines were also not manning their telephone lines or even the hotlines
set up to take calls from stranded passengers, while some airline offices in the airports stayed shut for
days – hence leaving their stranded passengers to turn to the airport operator for help. But there was
little that the airport authorities could do as they were not operating the flights. Some passengers also
complained of how they were sent from pillar to post by airline ticketing agents, who told passengers to
seek help from their travel agents for any changes to their air tickets should they wish to change their
flights. But the travel agents in return informed the passengers that all changes to air tickets required
the authorisation of the airlines. Then there were passengers who had purchased their air tickets via the
internet who could not turn to the airline or to a travel agent for help.
Airlines were unsure of when they would be able to resume their flights to and from the affected
airports. Even if they did, the airlines and airports would need to coordinate and arrange for the stranded
passengers to fly out in an orderly and organised manner. These would require prioritising, informing and
gathering the passengers to check-in and get to the boarding gate. But this was difficult as the stranded
passengers were either dispersed throughout the airport or had moved out to seek accommodation
in hotels in the city. Some passengers went on to find alternative means of transport such as trains,
taxis and ferries to try to circumvent the situation and get to their destination as quickly as possible
instead of waiting for the flights to resume. Airlines also had to work with the airports for take-off
and landing slots, and a number of airlines also mounted additional and/or chartered flights to clear
their passenger backlog as quickly as possible. There was also the need to ensure that adequate airport
ground support services, such as catering, refuelling, aircraft interior cleaning as well as engineering and
technical support services are available for these additional flights. Getting stranded passengers out of
the airports was certainly a top priority. The airlines also had to address, as much as they could, cargo
that had been stranded, especially perishables and other essential cargo.
At the airports, one could argue that many of the passenger service facilities were stressed and heavy
demands were placed on airport operators to try to meet the basic needs of the stranded passengers.
For instance, passengers needed food, drinking water, sanitation and, for those who did not have mobile
telephones, access to public telephones was needed to contact their families or business associates to
inform them of their situation. Many passengers also needed shower facilities and a change of fresh
clothes, especially those who had completed their business or leisure trips and were on their way home
but were left stranded for days at the airport. In some airports, one could argue that the situation was
near-chaotic and perhaps appalling with hundreds of helpless passengers at a loss as to what they
could do to alleviate the situation. Many airports also encountered situations where stranded passengers
were unable to leave the airport to seek temporary shelter in the city because of visa and immigration
restrictions. There were anecdotal accounts of passengers who were on transit stops when their flights
were disrupted. Although the airline wanted to put them up in a hotel outside of the airport until the
flights could resume, it was not possible to do so as they did not have a visa to enter that country. Others
who were returning home found themselves stuck in that country for several more days but their visas
had by then expired, hence flouting the local immigration laws.
By all accounts, the chaotic and frustrating situation arising from the eruption of Mount Eyjafjallajökull
and the subsequent closure of European airspace, is nothing new. Such disruptions to airport and airline
operations, and the impact on the scores of stranded passengers have occurred in the past and are,
arguably, a constant occurrence in the industry. In addition to volcanic eruptions, severe inclement
weather such as heavy snow storms, typhoons, fog, or even torrential rains have resulted in the
cancellation of hundreds of flights and left thousands of passengers stranded.
This raises several questions about contingency plans put in place by airports and airlines to deal with
such situations. The expectations of passengers and the possible means for them to help themselves
should also be considered.
SOME POSSIBLE KEY LESSONS
It should be of no surprise to airport operators that such major disruptions can occur anytime. Major
disruptions caused by bad weather, closure of airspace, sudden breakdown of air traffic control and
other critical airport systems, or even security threats to the airport and passenger operations, can halt
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hundreds of flights without warning. As such, all airports should have in place contingency plans and
Business Continuity Plans (BCP) to deal with such sudden and possibly prolonged disruptions.
From the disruptions and effects on airline and airport operations arising from the eruption of Mount
Eyjafjallajökull, several key lessons can be learned.
AWARENESS
All levels of management amongst all stakeholders – especially airports and airlines – must be conscious
of the fact that such disruptions can occur anytime. Hence, an awareness that these disruptions can
potentially occur, from top management down to the line managers, would be helpful right from the
start. Such awareness would help all managers who have to deal with such crises to appreciate the
immediate and subsequent challenges they would face. It would also enable them to anticipate the
necessary courses of actions to be taken to address the effects of the disruption and the needs of the
stranded passengers as effectively as possible. The support from top management of airlines, airports
and other stakeholders is critical during such crises to help line managers and front line staff deal with
the situation and render maximum assistance to affected passengers.
BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANS
It is essential that airports and airlines establish and maintain a set of BCPs to deal with such situations.
To have in place a current BCP with key anticipated and contingency actions listed out, as well as
demarcation of roles and responsibilities of relevant agencies and individuals, would certainly be helpful.
Should a major disruption occur, officers from the airports and airlines, including new personnel, can
make quick reference to the BCP for immediate guidance on actions that need to be undertaken. While
BCPs may not provide a hundred percent solution, they are nonetheless a useful guide for personnel
charged with the immediate and ensuing responsibility of managing the situation on the ground.
Airports and airlines should practise these BCPs, conduct periodic drills and exercises, and update the
BCPs as and when necessary. Airport and airline senior management personnel should also participate
in these drills and exercises to familiarise themselves with the standard operating procedures, so that
they can function effectively when activated. Through such BCPs, all stakeholders would also be clear on
the incident command and control structure, which would help all agencies manage the crisis situation
efficiently and minimise confusion.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
During such crises, up-to-date information on the situation, flight statuses, assistance available and
possible courses of action are critical. All stranded passengers would certainly want to be kept updated
on the situation and, given the likely state of frustration, demand airlines and airport authorities to
provide timely information and updates to them. Stranded passenger would also want to know the
flight situation – whether they would be able to take-off for their destination, the expected delay if
any, and whether there are alternative travel arrangements which the airlines could help them to make.
The quicker the airlines can provide information and updates to the stranded passengers, the more
successful the airline would be, hopefully, in obtaining the understanding and cooperation of these
stranded passengers. In all likelihood, effective information dissemination would enable the airlines and
stranded passengers to work together to undertake temporary arrangements, such as arrangements for
hotel accommodation or alternative means of transportation, until the crises abates and the situation
returns to normalcy. In such situations, airports and airlines could consider using the mass media to
help broadcast key messages and information alerts and updates to passengers. For instance, the mass
media could be engaged to inform passengers who have not left their homes or hotels for the airport to
refrain from doing so and to contact the airlines to obtain the latest information on their flight status. On
their part, the airlines, as a measure of good and responsible customer service, should ensure that their
telephone lines are manned to attend to these calls. This would help prevent even more overcrowding
of the airports and ease off the number of stranded passengers there.
One could also argue that effective information management can facilitate better understanding
amongst the affected passengers of the gravity of the prevailing situation. In most of these incidents
where disruptions are caused by natural calamities, it is beyond the control of the airlines and airports.
There is little that they can do to change the situation. It is necessary for passengers to understand the
predicament faced by the airlines and the airports; such disruptions would pile significant costs on them
which, in times when the air travel business is volatile, can result in massive financial losses to the air
carriers. In this regard, airports and airlines can use the media to educate the public by presenting the
facts, explaining the situation and building an understanding so as to set passenger expectations at
realistic levels. While we can expect that not all passengers would exercise rationality, if a majority of the
affected passengers are willing to accept the reality of the situation and cooperate with the airlines and
airports to try to alleviate their difficulties, that would help to ease the inconvenience on the ground.
CREATURE COMFORTS
Given the anticipated thousands of stranded passengers at the airport, it is critical that airports and
airlines work swiftly to ensure that the basic creature comforts are provided for these passengers, at least
to tide over the first few days of the crisis. These include:
• Food – Airport food and beverage outlets should be requested to open for longer hours or even 24
hours, if need be. There would also be passengers who would be low on money and may turn to the
airlines for assistance in providing them with meals in the interim period.
• Temporary accommodation – Airlines should establish plans and prior arrangements with hotels
that could assist them in such situations to provide temporary accommodation for the stranded
passengers. This would relieve the airport of the sheer number of stranded passengers and allow
the airport and airlines to concurrently carry out their other ongoing daily operations that may
not be affected by the ongoing crisis. For instance, airlines may have ongoing flights serving other
destinations not affected by the crisis and these flights, their passengers and operations need to
continue normally. During the eruption of Mount Eyjafjallajökull in April 2010, some airlines in
Singapore made arrangements for their stranded passengers to be ferried across to neighbouring
Malaysia for temporary accommodation at hotels there. This helped the airlines ease off their load of
stranded passengers at Singapore Changi Airport, and allowed the airlines to process the subsequent
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connecting flight for these passengers back to their home countries efficiently. But the availability
of hotel rooms during such crises is never a certainty. Therefore, it would help if airlines could tie up
with hotels for such assistance prior to the occurrence of such a crisis. This would ensure that there
would be some level of preparation and assistance available should the need arise.
• Ground transport – Related to the provision of temporary accommodation by airlines at hotels for
the stranded passengers, it is useful for airlines and airport authorities to ensure the availability
of ground transportation. Ground transportation is a critical element of the overall BCP as airlines
would need to ferry the passengers to hotels, especially in the city. A number of passengers would
also exercise their own initiative to find accommodation at locations outside of the airport; the
availability of ground transport would facilitate these movements. When the flights resume,
passengers would similarly need to make their way back to the airport quickly and en masse. In
this regard, the airport authority and the airlines could consider working out prior arrangements
with bus and taxi companies where they can be mobilised to assist in ferrying stranded passengers
to and from the airport when needed.
• Sanitation – It is imperative that airports pay close attention to the sanitation needs and ensure
that the airport toilets and shower facilities are kept clean and serviceable. During such crises when
thousands of passengers are stranded at the airport, the airport’s sanitation facilities would certainly
be heavily utilised and it would be of relief to these stranded passengers to know that they have
access to clean toilets and shower facilities during that time of need.
• Special needs – The number of air travellers who have special needs is steadily growing. These include
infants, elderly, and passengers who may be physically challenged. Nonetheless, they are still passengers
and their needs would have to be taken care of. Therefore, airports and airlines should anticipate and
cater for such needs. For instance, airport shops may be requested to assist in providing special needs
like milk powder for infants. Airport pharmacies and clinics should be able to provide insulin for diabetic
passengers who are stranded. In any case, such special needs should be factored into the BCP of
airports and airlines as we anticipate more of such passengers travelling in the future.
• Airport ground handling and ramp support – In such situations, we can expect many aircraft to
be grounded at airports. Aside from the airports needing to plan for contingency aircraft parking
space, it would be useful for the airports and airlines to work with the ground and ramp handling,
refuelling, catering and aircraft cleaning companies to be prepared to provide additional airport ramp
support for these aircraft. Though likely to be temporary, we can expect an increase in the number
of aircraft sitting on the tarmac, and the corresponding need for ramp services to get these aircraft
ready for take-off as soon as the situation improves. The sudden surge and demand for airport ramp
services can become a complicated situation, adding to delays. But with prior planning, these can be
managed more efficiently on ground.
• Immigration controls – Based on many past incidents, including the Mount Eyjafjallajökull incident, it
is necessary that the airlines and airport authorities engage the assistance of the State immigration
officials to assist during such crises. This is to enable bona fide passengers who may not have a
valid visa, but who are forced to stay on in the country longer than expected, or whose flights were
diverted from another country owing to the situation, to be able to stay on temporarily until they can
resume their journey.
CONCLUSION
Major disruptions to airline and airport operations resulting in stranded passengers en masse are not
new. Such disruptions are expected to occur again in the future as they can be caused by various natural
or man-made developments at any time. Therefore, airport operators and airlines should anticipate
such disruptions and, since we can expect such situations to occur repeatedly, it may be useful for
airports and airlines to build in the need to manage such situations into their business continuity and
crisis management plans early. The earlier the airport operators and airlines acknowledge and anticipate
the need for them to confront and manage such situations, the better equipped they would be in
dealing with these situations effectively, thereby minimising the inconvenience and disruption to their
operations, as well as that of their passengers.
39
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ASPIRE – Reducing Emissions by
Promoting Best Practices in the
Asia Pacific Region
Abstract
Significant emphasis has been placed on funding research to reduce
emissions and provide fuel savings. However, widespread industry and
government adoption of such practices has often lagged behind. Unlike
technology or procedure-specific Working Groups or initiatives, the ASia
and Pacific Initiative to Reduce Emissions (ASPIRE) is a comprehensive
approach to reducing aviation’s carbon footprint in the Asia Pacific
region. ASPIRE is a partnership of air navigation service providers
dedicated to reducing emissions and increasing efficiency, by identifying
under-utilised deployment-ready procedures and shepherding them into
industry-wide adoption.
With inputs from the industry and airline associates, ASPIRE established
14 initiatives to promote and record tangible progress in each of these
best practice areas by focusing efforts on 10 high priority best-practice
procedures and services.
Environment
Asia Pacific Region
About the Author
Author
About the Authors
Mr Kevin Chamness is the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) ASPIRE Coordinator and
Manager for Europe, Africa, the Middle East and
Global Forums in FAA’s Air Traffic Organisation.
He is responsible for coordination with European
partners such as Eurocontrol, the Single European
Sky Air Traffic Management Research Joint
Undertaking and air traffic service providers
throughout the region. After graduating from
the Georgia Institute of Technology, US in 1989,
Mr Chamness has worked in a variety of roles
in the FAA, including as an Air Traffic Controller
at Oakland Enroute Center, a Senior Air Traffic
Analyst FAA’s Oceanic Air Traffic Control group
for the Advanced Technologies and Oceanic
Procedures System, a Project Manager for Oceanic
Service Improvements, and as the FAA Lead for
NextGen International Projects in the Air Traffic
International Strategy and Performance Office.
Ms Melissa Ohsfeldt is a Senior Researcher
at CSSI, Inc, where she works on performance
metrics, operational analyses and transportation
policy. She received two Bachelor of Science
degrees in Economics and Planning from the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, US, a
Master of Science in Civil Engineering and a
Master of City Planning in Transportation from
University of California, Berkeley, US.
Ms Emily Berkeley is a researcher at CSSI,
Inc, supporting the FAA on the Atlantic
Interoperability Initiative to Reduce Emissions
(AIRE) and ASPIRE projects. After completing
her Master of Science in Civil Engineering and
MCP at University of California, Berkeley, US, Ms
Berkeley worked as a municipal development
advisor in Guatemala.
Environment
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Asia Pacific Region
Mr Kevin Chamness
Ms Melissa Ohsfeldt and Ms Emily Berkeley
CSSI Inc, US
INTRODUCTION
On 18 February 2008, the ASia and Pacific Initiative to Reduce Emissions (ASPIRE)
partnership was officially formed when three air navigation service providers (ANSPs) –
Airservices Australia, Airways New Zealand and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
US signed a Joint Statement of Purpose, committing themselves to becoming leaders in
green air navigation service provision. The initial partners were later joined by the Japan
Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) in October 2009 and the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore
(CAAS) in February 2010. While the ASPIRE partnership is exclusive to ANSPs, airlines and
industry associates have been invited to participate in ASPIRE demonstration programmes
at the meetings of regional Workgroups in the North and South Pacific. These associates
include United Airlines, Singapore Airlines, Qantas, Japan Airlines, Air New Zealand and
Boeing. In June 2008, the ASPIRE partners created the following six goals:
• Accelerate the development and implementation of operational procedures to reduce
aviation’s environmental footprint for all phases of flight on an operation-by-operation
basis from gate-to-gate;
• Facilitate worldwide interoperability of environmentally-friendly procedures and
standards;
• Capitalise on existing technology and best practices;
• Develop shared performance metrics to measure improvements in the environmental
performance of the air transportation system;
• Provide a systematic approach to ensure appropriate mitigation actions with short,
medium and long-term results;
• Communicate and publicise ASPIRE environmental initiatives, goals, progress and
performance to the global aviation community, the media and the general public.
In October 2008, ASPIRE partners created a strategic plan based on the above six goals.
This strategic plan discusses the 10 procedures/services that were identified by the partners
as best practices to help reduce emissions. An accompanying work programme outlines key
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ASPIRE – Reducing Emissions by Promoting Best Practices in the Asia Pacific Region
initiatives to support and track progress on ASPIRE’s goals. Organisationally, since ASPIRE is an initiative
rather than an independent organisation, responsibility for all contributing efforts are divided amongst
employees of the ASPIRE partners. Progress on each ASPIRE initiative is discussed in its Annual Meeting
and quarterly teleconferences, as well as in regional Work Group Meetings held throughout the year.
Each ANSP partner appoints an employee as their ASPIRE coordinator, with a one-year Chairmanship
rotating among the ANSPs. The ASPIRE Chairman is responsible for organising the Annual Meeting in
the second quarter of the calendar year, and overseeing the production of the ASPIRE annual report in
the third quarter.
ASPIRE’s flexible structure allows the initiative to open its doors to new members, as shown with the
incorporation of JCAB and CAAS. In fact, ASPIRE partners envision continued expansion across the
region, and to reach out to other ANSPs with one goal in mind. Potential ANSPs undergo a lengthy
process to ensure that they are capable of becoming a regional leader in emissions reductions. In
particular, the potential partner must show that their service provision is in line with ASPIRE goals by
demonstrating their commitment and ability to create performance metrics, implement ASPIRE best
practices procedures and services, and participate in and support ASPIRE work programmes.
In line with ASPIRE’s goal to encourage adoption of deployment-ready procedures and services, ASPIRE
partners work closely with research and development efforts such as Europe’s Single European Sky
ATM Research (SESAR) programme, Japan’s Collaborative Actions for Renovation of Air Traffic Systems
programme, and the US’s Next Generation (NextGen) Air Transportation Systems programme to ensure
that new technology and services are incorporated into ASPIRE’s portfolio of best practices and initiatives
as soon as they are thoroughly vetted.
In 2009, ASPIRE was internationally-recognised for its green initiatives when it received Jane’s ATC Global
Award in Service Provision and the Air Traffic Control Association’s Earl F Ward Award.
BEST PRACTICE PROCEDURES
Serving as the foundation for ASPIRE activities in the region, ASPIRE partners have identified 10
procedures and services that had proven effective in the reduction of fuel and emissions in each phase
of flight, or were key target areas for technology and procedural development for the future. These best
practices include:
• User Preferred Routes (UPRs)
• Dynamic Airborne Reroute Procedures (DARP)
• Oceanic Separation Reductions
• Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM)
• Flexible Track Systems
• Surface Movement and Runway Monitoring
• Departure Management
• Arrivals Management
• Continuous Descent Approaches
• Performance Based Navigation (PBN) Implementation
As air transport procedures and technologies are being continually enhanced to provide additional benefits,
the ASPIRE partners intend to add on or modify the recommended best practices to promote the most efficient
aviation environment possible in the region.
INITIATIVES
This section will discuss the progress on the 14 initiatives from ASPIRE’s strategic plan. The first five
initiatives were designed as performance measurement and demonstration tools, while the remaining
nine dealt directly with the implementation of best practice procedures and services. With the inclusion
of JCAB and CAAS in late 2009 and early 2010, these initiatives were updated to reflect the expansion
of ASPIRE from the South Pacific to the entire Pacific region.
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT INITIATIVES
Modelling Efficiency Gains
For the first initiative, ASPIRE partners developed a model showing efficiency gains in the South Pacific
over the past decade. The aim was to identify how much individual procedural changes over this period
have incrementally contributed to emissions reductions. Focusing on flights between Australasia and
the US West Coast, the existing air traffic control environment provides an average of 2.6 percent of
fuel savings for flights in the oceanic en route airspace. Key technology changes were the successful
implementation of RVSM and UPR. Additional savings from ASPIRE efforts will build on the base of
savings demonstrated in the model of efficiency gains.
Developing an “Ideal Flight” Benchmark Metric
The second initiative was designed to calculate the greatest feasible emissions reductions given the
current fleet in the market, making use of all available fuel-saving procedures and services. Once
completed, this metric will be used to create reasonable future emission-reduction targets for each
phase of flight. Ideally, this metric will be based on data provided by the associate airlines’ partners and
then aggregated by origin destination aircraft. As the next best alternative, the “ideal flight” benchmark
would be developed via modelling techniques using data from ASPIRE service providers. This activity is
expected to commence in mid 2010.
Developing the “Baseline” Flight Metric
The third initiative will determine the average emissions for current Australasia-North America flights.
This metric will be used as the baseline to measure the effects of future implementation efforts. For
the initial data development, the baseline will be modelled using verified data provided by the ANSPs
and participating associate airlines. The long term aspect of this development aims to employ airline
partners’ supplied fuel data for the most accurate calculation of fuel usage and emissions in the Pacific.
Publication of the first set of data is scheduled to coincide with the ASPIRE 2010 Annual Report.
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ASPIRE Flight Demonstration Programme
This programme consists of performing, analysing, and publicising gate-to-gate demonstration flights
with airline partners, encouraging them to make use and maximise all ASPIRE’s best practice procedures/
services. To-date, the programme has completed five gate-to-gate demonstration flights. All flights had
realised substantial fuel and emissions reductions by utilising DARP, UPRs, limiting the use of the auxiliary
power unit, using just-in-time fuelling and other “green” procedures. Simply by taking advantage of
readily available techniques and procedures, these flights saved between 3,500 and 8,900 kilogrammes
(kg) of fuel. The ASPIRE initiatives, press releases, results, and additional information about these
demonstration flights can be found in the ASPIRE Annual Report 2009, on ASPIRE’s website, as well as
on the various ANSPs’ websites. The Airways New Zealand website provides a thorough description of
the first demonstration flight, Aspire 1.
ASPIRE-Daily Flight Programme
As a natural offshoot of the ASPIRE flight demonstration programme, the ASPIRE partners recognised
that best practices can and should be utilised on a daily basis to achieve maximum reduction in
emissions. They are also developing a novel concept for “green” ASPIRE star-rated city-pair designations,
to showcase the availability of best practices on individual routes. Higher star ratings would be given to
city-pairs that have the most best practices procedures/services available, with one star given for each
best practice in operation. A route with RVSM and 30/30 nautical mile (nm) separation would be given
two stars, whereas a route with RVSM, 30/30 nm separation, DARP, and UPR available would be an
ASPIRE four-star route. Airlines will be encouraged to document and publicise their use of the ASPIRE
star routes, thus providing further motivation to ANSPs in increasing the availability of ASPIRE star routes,
and push for continued expansion of best practice procedures and services throughout the region.
Development of the ASPIRE-Daily concept is a top priority within the ASPIRE 2010 Work Programme.
IMPLEMENTATION INITIATIVES
Enhancements of DARP
The first of nine implementation initiatives is the DARP Enhancements initiative. It works to identify and
remove institutional, procedural, and technological barriers to implementation and adoption of DARP in
the Asia Pacific region. Although DARP was originally demonstrated in 1999, a survey from the Informal
South Pacific Air Traffic Services Coordinating Group (ISPACG) planning team in 2008 showed a mere 5
percent of flights between North America and Australasia took advantage of DARP. The airlines’ hesitation
to use DARP was perhaps attributed to the increased workload of the flight dispatcher. On the other hand,
DARP was a great potential for fuel savings as Air New Zealand reported in Information Paper 16 of the
ISPACG meeting in 2008 (ISPACG22/IP16). In this paper, Air New Zealand estimated that DARP initiative
could save fuel on 58 percent of its flights from Auckland to North America, with an average savings of 453
kg of fuel per flight. Given this vast potential, ASPIRE partners are making a business case for using DARP.
In 2009, DARP was available in the Auckland Flight Information Region and in all FAA South Pacific airspace
for Future Air Navigation System (FANS)-equipped aircraft. Currently, Airservices Australia is automating
DARP processing, while the FAA is researching methods of automation.
Expansion of User-Preferred Routes
Following the same process used for DARP Enhancements, the ASPIRE partners are working towards
removing constraints to UPR expansion in their FIRs and across the Pacific region. UPRs are available
in the oceanic portions of flights between North America and Australasia for FANS-equipped aircraft.
Aircraft without FANS can request a UPR for selected city-pairs. Airservices Australia plans to have UPR
available throughout Australia by mid-2011. Next year, the ASPIRE partners will examine how UPR can
be made available for flights between Japan and Singapore, as well as other destinations in the Pacific.
Development of Oceanic and Remote In-Trail Procedures
The third ASPIRE implementation initiative involves Oceanic and Remote In-Trail Procedures (ITP). The
ASPIRE partners will initially foster the deployment of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
(ADS-B) ITP in the South Pacific. In 2008 and 2009, the business and safety cases and a programme
plan were developed for ITP implementation. Certified aircraft and approved airspace will commence
operational trials starting in end 2010 and concluding in 2011. ASPIRE partners are in contact with
various airlines who may be interested to participate in the trials. A final report will be released by the
ASPIRE partners in 2011.
Oceanic ADS-C Climb-Descent Procedures
As many aircraft have been equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Contract (ADS-C), the
three initial ASPIRE partners have developed the business and safety cases for an ADS-C Climb and
Descent Procedure. This safety case is currently under review with a June 2010 target date for approval of
operational trials. ICAO has been notified through a briefing package. Trials are scheduled to commence
in the South Pacific in November 2010.
Analysis of Oceanic Separation Minima Reductions
ASPIRE partners will determine if it is worthwhile to pursue oceanic separation reductions below the
current minimum separation of 30 nm longitudinal and 30 nm lateral. In particular, they will weigh the
benefits from additional capacity on optimal routes with costs of providing further reduced separation
standards. In 2010, the FAA, on behalf of the other partners, will begin the feasibility analysis based on
modelling and simulation of the expected air traffic and behaviours.
Arrivals Optimisation
Making arrivals optimisation part of standard operating procedures is a key initiative of ASPIRE. Currently,
a number of large airports in the ASPIRE partners’ jurisdictions – including Osaka’s Kansai Airport,
Melbourne’s Tullamarine Airport, and San Francisco International Airport (SFO) – allow for optimised
profile descents on a trial basis with approved airline partners. Using a tailored arrival into SFO, one
flight saves an estimated 617 kg of fuel, which clearly shows the benefits of using this procedure. At
SFO, Air New Zealand is taking the lead by using tailored arrivals on nearly 50 percent of its flights into
SFO between December 2007 and December 2009. At Auckland Airport, arrival optimisation is currently
permitted on an ad-hoc basis, but the procedures and underlying technologies will only be in place to
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standardise optimised profile descents in 2011. CAAS has recently completed the second optimised
profile descent operational trial with Singapore Airlines and is reviewing the results in preparation for
the next phase of the operational trial to include other operators at Changi Airport. Airservices Australia
has begun a nationwide programme to allow for Required Navigation Performance (RNP)-based arrivals
optimisation, with trials currently ongoing at 17 airports. The remaining ASPIRE partners continue to
explore ways in expanding arrivals optimisation to additional airports.
Departure Optimisation
The ASPIRE initiative to optimise departures will encompass all aspects of departure, including minimising
on-ground delays and optimising the climb to cruise level. Some efforts on this initiative include an
“auto-release procedure” in Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane. Using this procedure, tower controllers
are able to clear aircraft for take-off without having to rely on time-consuming voice communications
with the terminal area controllers. In New Zealand, trajectories are optimised for individual flights,
allowing for uninterrupted climb when possible. The FAA is currently progressing on a tool to improve
efficiency of the climb, while JCAB is in the process of developing a departure optimisation programme.
Implementation of Reduced Horizontal Separation
In the Asia Pacific region, accommodating traffic growth while minimising emissions is more important
than ever. According to the International Air Transport Association (IATA), this region is now the largest
aviation market in the world. In a press release on 1 February 2010, IATA announced that in 2009, the
passenger numbers of intra-Asia Pacific surpassed that of North America for the very first time. The
ASPIRE partners plan to help encourage emissions reductions while allowing for continued growth by
promoting reduced horizontal separation, through implementation of RNP10 and RNP4 performancebased separation standards in the South China Sea and the Bay of Bengal. CAAS, ASPIRE’s newest
partner, has been the leading effort in the region, establishing an Enroute Monitoring Agency known as
the South East Asia Safety Monitoring Agency and implementing 50 nm longitudinal separation in the
South China Sea in 2008, with plans to roll out 30/30 nm separation in 2011.
Implementation of ADS-B with VHF Communications
ASPIRE partners are working alongside Vietnam and Indonesia to encourage implementation of ADS-B
in the South China Sea. ADS-B has been identified as the leading tool to achieve emissions reductions
through more efficient routing while increasing safety at the same time. This technology is of global
significance, as evidenced by NAV Canada’s receipt of the Environment Award at the 2010 ATC Global
Conference for its implementation of the ADS-B in the Hudson Bay area.
CONCLUSION
The ASPIRE partners plan to continue incorporating new technologies and procedures into their
initiatives and updating the strategic plan as needed to reflect the best practices at any given moment.
In the short-term, when development of the baseline metrics is complete, partners would be able to
measure the post-implementation benefits of these new technologies as they come into place. ASPIRE
partners also look forward to developing ASPIRE-Daily city-pairs, with plans to foster a network of green
routes throughout the Asia Pacific region. In the mid-term, ASPIRE will be joined by other ANSP partners,
airlines and industry associates committed to leading the region in environmental stewardship.
The ASPIRE programme is a unique partnership of ANSPs committed to developing, implementing and
encouraging use of emissions-reducing procedures and services. It has made progress in several of its
initiatives with its baseline work currently underway and the foundation for implementation having
been set. With the planned research and demonstrations, ASPIRE partners will be able to further refine
and implement best practices. These are designed to increase capacity and reduce fuel usage, therefore
reducing the carbon footprint. ASPIRE partners will also continue to perfect the initiatives as participating
partners and research grow. As the traffic growth increases in the Asia Pacific, partners are wellpositioned through identification, demonstration, facilitation, and promotion of emissions reductions
best practices to reduce the carbon footprint of aviation in the Asia Pacific region.
For more information, please visit the ASPIRE website at: www.aspire-green.com.
References
(ASPIRE Annual Report, 2009, p. 1)
www.airways.co.nz/ASPIRE/
47
aw
ICAO’s Increasing Emphasis
on Climate Change
Abstract
The 37th Session of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
Assembly concluded with a Resolution that embodied significant decisions
and commitments, reaffirming ICAO’s leadership in international aviation
and climate change. This paper summarises the outcome of the Assembly
with regard to climate change activity, including the shift within ICAO
from a policy-making mode to one that focuses on implementation.
The paper also outlines the ambitious work programme that ICAO is
expected to undertake in this field in the next three years in its pursuit of
aviation’s sustainable future.
Environment
on Climate Change
About the Author
Ms Jane Hupe is Chief of ICAO’s Environment
Branch and the Secretary of the Committee
on Aviation Environmental Protection (CAEP).
Her responsibilities include the management
of CAEP and the coordination of all activities in
the field of aviation and the environment with
other international organisations. Ms Hupe has
been at the forefront of ICAO’s efforts to define
and promote policies and standards for an
environmentally sustainable aviation and advises
the ICAO Council on all aviation environmental
matters. She represents ICAO in other international
fora in this field.
Jane was a lead author for the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Reports on
aviation-related measures, including the 2007
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report and the 2006
IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories. For her work, Ms Hupe received a
certificate acknowledging her contribution to the
award of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize to the IPCC.
Environment
49
on Climate Change
Ms Jane Hupe
INTRODUCTION
A few years from now, we will look back at this first decade of the 21st century as the
time when aviation shifted gear towards a more sustainable future. Environment, and in
particular climate change, has never been so high up on the world’s agenda. Everywhere,
environmentally-friendly technologies and practices are being introduced and there is
increasing support for new and renewable sources of energy.
ICAO is the United Nations’ specialised agency for international civil aviation and takes
its responsibility to address aviation’s impact on the global climate seriously. Although
the contribution of aviation operations to total global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions
is relatively small, forecasted traffic growth raises questions on the future contribution
of aviation activity to climate change and the most effective ways of addressing CO2
emissions from the sector.
ICAO’s member States, together with the aviation industry, diligently pursue technical,
operational and other means of ensuring that civil aviation is not only efficient and
economical, but also sustainable. Thanks to technological improvements, today’s jet
aircraft are some 70 percent more fuel-efficient and 75 percent quieter than those of
the 1970s. Operational improvements include the development of shorter, more energyefficient air routes.
While ICAO has always been a major player in the response of the aviation sector to the
challenge of climate change, it has become increasingly active in the last three years. With
the global agreement reached at the 37th Session of the ICAO Assembly in October 2010,
international aviation is the first sector with a shared global commitment to environmental
goals of increasing fuel efficiency and stabilising its global CO2 emissions in the medium
term. States, together with the industry, have agreed on an ambitious work programme to
continue on the path towards sustainability.
This paper focuses on these recent achievements, paying particular attention to the
outcome of the 37th ICAO Assembly.
50
Environment
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Since its creation in 1944, ICAO has fostered cooperation among its member States, currently numbering
190. It has been involved in environmental protection for more than 40 years. The strategic objective
of ICAO’s environment programme is to “minimise the adverse effect of global civil aviation on the
environment”. The three specific environmental goals are to:
• Limit or reduce the number of people affected by significant aircraft noise;
• Limit or reduce the impact of aviation emissions on local air quality; and
• Limit or reduce the impact of aviation greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on the global climate.
The initial phase of ICAO’s environment-related activities dealt mainly with the first two areas. During
the last few decades, ICAO has developed an increasing interest in the third area, reflected in, and
further accelerated by, the decisions of the 36th Session of the ICAO Assembly in September 2007. The
Assembly recognised the urgent and critical need to address GHG emissions from international aviation
and established a process leading to the development of an ICAO Programme of Action on International
Aviation and Climate Change. The process included:
• Establishing the Group on International Aviation and Climate Change (GIACC) to develop ICAO’s
Programme of Action on International Aviation and Climate Change;
• A High-level Meeting on International Aviation and Climate Change in October 2009 to review
ICAO’s Programme of Action;
• A Conference on Aviation and Alternative Fuels in November 2009, when ICAO established a Global
Framework for Aviation Alternative Fuels; and
• Continued technical support provided by the Committee on Aviation Environmental Protection
(CAEP).
The last three years were therefore truly momentous in terms of ICAO’s work with regard to international
civil aviation and climate change. They witnessed a series of steps that laid the foundation for the
successful outcome of the 37th Session of the ICAO Assembly.
OUTCOME OF THE 37TH ICAO ASSEMBLY
The 37th ICAO Assembly took place from 28 September to 8 October 2010 and adopted Resolution
A37-19: Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies and practices related to environmental
protection – Climate change.
Building upon ICAO’s achievements since the 36th ICAO Assembly, including the Declaration and
Recommendations approved by the High-level Meeting, the Resolution took one step further by
incorporating important key elements, such as:
• Further endorsement of the global aspirational goal of 2 percent annual fuel efficiency improvement
up to year 2050;
• A medium-term global aspirational goal from 2020 that would ensure that, while the international
aviation sector continues to grow, its global CO2 emissions would be stabilised at 2020 levels;
• Further work to explore the feasibility of a long-term global aspirational goal for international
aviation;
• Development of a framework for market-based measures, including further elaboration of the
guiding principles adopted by the Assembly, and exploration of a global scheme for international
aviation;
• Concrete steps to assist States to contribute to the global efforts;
• De minimis provisions to ensure that States with small contributions to the global air traffic are not
burdened disproportionately; and
• States’ action plans, covering information on CO2 emissions reduction activities and assistance needs.
The Assembly also decided that the Council should undertake further work in order to continue progress
on a number of issues contained in Resolution A37-19, where States expressed concerns, such as the
implementation of the medium-term global aspirational goal and market-based measures including the
de minimis provision. Some States filed reservations on these aspects.
The Resolution constitutes a comprehensive and substantive global policy on how to address GHG
emissions from international aviation, making international aviation the first sector with a shared global
commitment to environmental goals of increasing fuel efficiency and stabilising its global CO2 emissions
in the medium term. It reflects the collective determination of ICAO’s 190 member States to contribute
to the global efforts on climate change, and provides an ambitious work programme over the next
triennium and beyond.
OVERCOMING DIFFERENCES
There was intense media interest in the climate change discussion in the months, weeks and days before
the start of the 37th Assembly, as there was during the meeting. One reason was the different views
among States on several aspects of the climate change discussion.
Following substantial debate during the Assembly session, delegates were able to achieve the positive
outcome outlined above. The Resolution has earned widespread recognition and approval, earning the
applause of the international community. The US Department of State called the Resolution on climate
change “an unprecedented global commitment to collective action among the countries of the world,
both developed and developing, toward aviation CO2 reduction”. Mr Siim Kallas, European Union Vice
President and Commissioner for Transport, hailed this agreement and said, “this deal is very significant
because at a global level, Governments and the aviation industry have for the first time agreed to cap
greenhouse emissions from 2020. It is the first time any transport sector has been able to reach this kind
of deal”. Mr Giovanni Bisignani, IATA’s Director General and CEO, lauded the Resolution as “historic”
and “a good first step that prepares the way for future achievements”, as did several other national and
multilateral entities.
51
Environment
REASONS FOR SUCCESS
There are various reasons why ICAO was able to overcome challenges and reach agreement on climate
change. One of the main roles of ICAO is a “global facilitator”. It has always provided a forum where
States, working with the industry, can deliberate on challenges facing the international air transport
sector. While the challenges change over time, ICAO’s capacity to cooperate in finding global solutions
to those challenges has endured.
Another factor is the sound technical work and information that provide a basis for informed discussion
and decision-making in ICAO. For example, during the discussions leading to the Resolution, States
requested information on the historic and current levels of international aviation activity. The data
presented were based on the total revenue tonne kilometre (RTK) – a function of the number of
passengers/amount of cargo and distance travelled, and they demonstrated that the States with the
largest activity levels historically are, in general, the same ones with the largest activity levels currently. In
addition, international air travel during the last 20 years was four times greater than during the previous
20 years (see Figure 1).
Total International RTK
6,000,000
4,996,847
5,000,000
International RTK (million)
52
4,000,000
4x more than
previous 20 years
3,000,000
2,000,000
1,252,163
1,000,000
0
1970-1989
1990-2009
Figure 1 : Total international aviation traffic (RTK from 1970 to 2009)
An obvious success factor is the strong and ongoing supportive role of the air transport industry. The
collaboration between ICAO member States and the industry is made easier by the recognition of both
that ICAO is best placed to take a leading role to develop global solutions for addressing all aspects
relating to international aviation, including international aviation and climate change.
Despite these advantages, the negotiating and decision-making process during the 37th ICAO Assembly
was difficult and agreement was only reached at the end of the session. As substantive discussions were
undertaken in a spirit of cooperation, States were able to make progress towards a convergence of the
differing views and the achievement of a successful outcome.
NEXT STEPS
The agreement reached by the 37th Assembly paved the way for ICAO and its member States, in
collaboration with the air transport industry, to continue identifying and pursuing a global solution to
address GHG emissions from international aviation. These efforts will be focused on the three areas
decided by the Assembly.
Firstly, the Council will undertake work to review the medium-term global aspirational goal, taking into
account the progress towards achieving the goal, the new studies regarding its feasibility and also the
relevant information to be contained in States’ action plans. It will also explore the feasibility of a longterm global aspirational goal.
Another area of future work is related to market-based measures. The Assembly adopted the guiding
principles that it urges States to respect when designing new and implementing existing market-based
measures for international aviation. Moreover, it urges States to engage in constructive bilateral and/
or multilateral consultations and negotiations with other States, with a view to reaching an agreement.
The Assembly requested the ICAO Council to undertake further work to elaborate on these guiding
principles. The Assembly also resolved on a de minimis threshold of international aviation activity of 1
percent of total RTK for the application of market-based measures. During the Assembly, concerns were
expressed regarding possible market distortions arising from this de minimis threshold and further work
by the Council was requested on this matter.
ICAO will also assist States in two important ways. Firstly, it is developing guidance and templates, and
will conduct regional training workshops in 2011 to help States prepare their own action plans and
submit them to ICAO by the end of June 2012. Secondly, it will facilitate the provision of technical and
financial assistance to States.
At the technical level, CAEP will continue to play a vital role in providing its technical support for the
work of the Council. For example, CAEP is expected to develop a global CO2 Standard for aircraft,
targeted for completion in 2013. Work is underway in CAEP to update Circular 303 (Operational
Opportunities to Minimise Fuel Use and Reduce Emissions), as the information contained in that
Circular would provide an important basis for States in the preparation of their action plans. The
next triennium will also witness continuing efforts to facilitate the development and deployment of
sustainable alternative fuels for aviation.
ICAO will continue to cooperate with other international organisations involved in policy-making on
climate change, notably the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
The outcome of the recently concluded Assembly was presented to the UNFCCC Climate Change
53
54
Environment
Conference in December 2010 in Cancun, Mexico. ICAO will subsequently keep the UNFCCC and other
UN bodies informed of any further progress on international aviation and climate change.
FROM POLICY SETTING TO IMPLEMENTATION
The work programme agreed on by the 37th Assembly reflects a shift by ICAO in the field of international
aviation and climate change from “Standard policy setting” to an “implementation” mode. This shift
provides an interesting parallel with ICAO’s work in aviation safety and security. In these two other fields,
ICAO has identified specific areas for improvement through its audit programmes and has supported
States’ efforts in effectively addressing deficiencies. In the case of climate change, it would be the
voluntary action plans that will allow States to identify their basket of measures and assistance needs.
This would allow ICAO to monitor the progress towards the global aspirational goals and to address
specific needs of States towards facilitating technical and financial assistance.
CONCLUSION
ICAO has overcome great challenges and recorded significant progress in the area of international
aviation and climate change, including Resolution A37-19 adopted by the 37th Assembly.
However, much remains to be done. Differing views still exist between developed and developing
countries. Aspirational goals have to be reviewed and a framework for market-based measures has to
be elaborated. The application of the de minimis provision to market-based measures requires further
clarification.
In the pursuit of these remaining tasks and challenges, we can be encouraged by the fact that the
spirit of cooperation at ICAO still prevails and makes it possible to overcome the most challenging
obstacles. The outcome of the 37th Assembly clearly demonstrates the strong will of ICAO’s member
States, together with the industry, to take concrete steps towards a global solution. It represents a big
challenge, but provides an array of opportunities as ICAO moves forward in demonstrating to the world
how it intends to achieve the ultimate objective of environmentally sustainable international aviation. In
the words of UN Secretary-General Mr Ban Ki-moon, “Air travel has brought many benefits to modern
life. Let us ensure that, from now on, it benefits both people and the planet”.
bc
Aviation Safety Data Collection
and Processing – Singapore’s
Experience
Abstract
Aviation safety data collection, analysis and exchange are at the heart
of the State Safety Programme and Safety Management System. Safety
management relies on the measurement and monitoring of safety
indicators to identify areas of concern, and this in turn relies on effective
collection of safety data.
This paper shares how Singapore, under its Safety Data Collection
and Processing System, uses the Singapore Aviation Accident/
Incident Reporting System to perform safety data collection, analysis,
measurement, monitoring and exchange.
Safety
Experience
About the Author
Mr Michael Pang is a Senior Manager
(Continuing Airworthiness) in the Airworthiness/
Flight Operations Division of the Civil Aviation
Authority of Singapore (CAAS). He is responsible
for performing safety oversight of airlines and
maintenance organisations. He was the Principle
Maintenance Inspector (PMI) for Singapore
Airlines for three years and is now the PMI for
Singapore Airlines Cargo. He also sits on the A380
Maintenance Review Board and International
Maintenance Review Board Policy Board.
In addition to his technical responsibilities,
Michael established the Singapore Aviation
Accident/Incident Reporting System for the
Singapore aviation industry in 2009.
Mr Pang is a licensed aircraft engineer with
ratings on B747-400 (PW4000) and B777 series
(Trent 800/GE90). Prior to joining CAAS, he
had held various positions in SIA Engineering
Company’s Base Maintenance Division and
Singapore HAECO Pte Ltd.
Michael holds a Bachelor of Engineering Science
(Aerospace) from the University of Technology,
Sydney, Australia.
Safety
55
Experience
Mr Michael Pang
INTRODUCTION
In the early days, the conventional aviation safety approach was very much a “reactive” one
that responds to events that had already happened, such as incidents and accidents. State
safety agencies only acted when an incident or accident has occurred. The investigation
process and outcome only determined the root cause of the accident or incident without
constructing any process and action to prevent recurrences.
In the mid to late 20th century, resulting from overwhelming public concerns over safe
skies, major State safety agencies began to take a more “proactive” approach in its safety
management, aiming to reduce accident rates. The proactive approach actively looks for
the identification of safety risks through its analysis of the organisation’s activities. Measures
such as audits, inspections and reviews over controlled operating environment, processes
and procedures were introduced. These measures highlight areas of concern where
appropriate corrective actions and recommendations could minimise the possibilities of
these deficiencies escalating to undesirable incidents or accidents.
ICAO MANDATE
In early 2009, ICAO came up with a new requirement in Annex 13 (Aircraft Accident
and Incident Investigation) requiring States to establish and maintain an accident/incident
database to facilitate the effective analysis of safety data collected from its reporting
systems. Some of the main reporting systems include the mandatory reporting system,
voluntary reporting system and confidential reporting system.
Mandatory Reporting Systems: “Reporting of certain types of events or hazards. This
necessitates detailed regulations outlining who shall report and what shall be reported.
Since mandatory systems deal mainly with “hardware” matters, they tend to collect more
information on technical failures than on other aspects of operational activities. To help
overcome this bias, voluntary reporting systems aim at acquiring more information on those
other aspects.” (ICAO Doc 9859)
Voluntary Reporting Systems: “Without any legal or administrative requirement
to do so, reporter submits voluntary event or hazard information. In these systems,
56
Safety
safety agencies and/or organisations may offer an incentive to report. For example, enforcement
action may be waived for events that are reported underlining errors or unintentional violations.
The reported information should not be used against the reporters, i.e. such systems must be nonpunitive and afford protection to the sources of the information to encourage the reporting of such
information.” (ICAO Doc 9859)
Confidential Reporting Systems: “Protect the identity of the reporter. This is one way of ensuring
that voluntary reporting systems are non-punitive. Confidentiality is usually achieved by deidentification, and any identifying information about the reporter is known only to “gatekeepers” in
order to allow for follow-up or “fill in voids” in the reported event(s). Confidential incident reporting
systems facilitate the disclosure of hazards leading to human error, without fear of retribution or
embarrassment, and enable broader acquisition of information on hazards.” (ICAO Doc 9859)
CAAS’ PREDICTIVE APPROACH – SAIRS
In mid-2009, under the State Safety Programme (SSP) and Safety Management System (SMS) initiatives,
the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) revamped its mandatory reporting system to collect,
store and analyse safety data. This system is known as the Singapore Aviation Accident/Incident Reporting
System (SAIRS). The scope of safety data collection is not limited only to accidents and incidents but
also hazards and threats. This predictive approach captures real-time system performance as it happens
during normal operations so that potential future problems can be identified and predicted. With these
safety data, safety performance indicators (SPI), together with its acceptable level of safety (ALoS), can
be determined objectively. With SAIRS, SPIs are being measured, assessed and trended continuously to
ensure that the risk level of each indicator is kept within acceptable levels (see Figure 1). Once there are
areas identified and predicted to be entering potential high risk levels, appropriate mitigating actions will
be performed to bring the level of risk down to as low as possible.
Figure 1: Safety cycle/workflow
SAFETY DATA COLLECTION
In most States, the main safety data source comes from the mandatory reporting system where “actual/
real time” occurrences that happened in the normal controlled operating environment were reported.
This is followed by the voluntary and confidential reporting systems.
Under SAIRS, the mandatory reporting is guided by a revised list of reportable occurrences with new
reporting timelines. In order to facilitate specific trending, the classification of occurrences was realigned
with close reference to Annex 13’s classifications. In addition, CAAS also encourages the reporting of
potential safety deficiencies that could affect flight safety and this is made possible in the CAAS SAIRS
form which has the provision to report hazards and threats.
Apart from SAIRS, CAAS also started another safety management project known as the Safety Oversight
Management System (SOMS) in late 2009. This system was partially launched in July 2010 and targeted
for full operation in late 2010. SOMS aims to capture and manage safety data collected through
routine audits, inspections and reviews conducted on airlines, design organisations and maintenance
organisations holding Singapore approvals.
Once SOMS is fully operational, CAAS will integrate SAIRS with SOMS. With this integration, CAAS
would be able to further expand its scope of safety data collection so as to facilitate more comprehensive
data analysis (see Figure 2).
CAAS INTEGRATED DATABASE
Predictive
Proactive
Reactive
SAIRS
SOMS
Safety Data
Application
SAIRS
Mandatory,
Confidential,
Voluntary,
Hazard
and Threat
Reports
Audits
Inspections,
Reviews etc
SOMS
Safety Data
Collection
Figure 2: CAAS’ safety data collection process
57
58
Safety
SAFETY DATA STORAGE AND ANALYSIS
ICAO Annex 13 states that the safety database systems should use standardised formats to facilitate
data exchange.
Currently, the European Coordination Centre for Accident and Incident Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS)1
software is the only software that operates on the ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting taxonomy.
As such, it was adapted as CAAS SAIRS’ main operating system. With ECCAIRS, all safety data stored
in SAIRS database are in a standardised format. Apart from providing a standardised format, ECCAIRS
software also applies the commonly used ‘SHELL model’ in its analytical tool.
ECCAIRS’ analytical tool allows users to perform three levels of analysis by using the query builder. For
every occurrence (event), the user is able to analyse level 1 (occurrence categories), level 2 (symptoms)
and level 3 (casual factor) (see Figure 3). To perform these, the user first needs to determine which level
of analysis is required before building the query.
Who, Where, When ?
Occurrence
Statistics
What ?
Event/phase
of flight
Event/phase
of flight
Analyses on occurrence
categories (CFIT, RI, etc.)
How ?
Why ?
Descriptive
factor
Explanatory
factor
Descriptive
factor
Explanatory
factor
Analyses on
symptoms
Analyses on
causes (HF)
Figure 3: Three levels of data analysis
1
ECCAIRS is a cooperative network of European Transport Authorities and Accident Investigation Bodies which started in 1995. It is
managed by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission and is used by all European Union member States and is also
widely used by non-EU safety agencies. Currently, both ICAO and the Airline Pilots Association are also ECCAIRS users.
Taking an example of an engine in-flight shutdown occurrence, the following could be the query builder
for all three levels of analysis (see Figure 4):
Occurrence / Event
Analyses on Categories
Analyses on Symptoms
Analyses
on Causes
Figure 4: A typical query builder
Once the query is built, the user will name the query and store it in the system for future use – in this
case, the query is named “In-flight shutdown (IFSD) occurrences”. When the database has collected
sufficient safety data and is ready for analysis, the user will select and run the “IFSD” query. The system
will then search through the database and filter all in-flight shutdown occurrences with fields (e.g. event
type, event phase, descriptive factor etc) that fulfil the above criteria.
In most cases, the occurrence event type is commonly used as one of the criteria. Figure 5 is a typical
event type page example:
Figure 5: A typical event page of each occurrence
59
60
Safety
After filtering, the data can be used to plot graphs and charts for trending and analysis. The user may
choose to further enhance the query by adding more criteria to specifically look at a particular airline,
engine type, aircraft type, specific period/time frame and so on.
In the event the analysis indicates an uptrend of a particular event type (see Figure 6), the next
consideration would be whether this trend has exceeded the acceptable safety limit.
7
Up Trend
6
5
4
Trent 800
3
IAE V 2500
Trent 700
2
1
0
2006
2007
2008
2009
Figure 6: Example of a graphical representation of IFSD occurrences
SAFETY PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND MONITORING
‘Safety measurement’ is not a continuous process; it is a spot check and is conducted following a prespecified period. ‘Safety performance measurement’, on the other hand, is a continuous process and it
monitors and measures selected operational activities.
The following are the definitions of key elements which will be discussed in this section:
• Level of safety: The degree of safety of a system – it is an emerging property of the system, which
represents the quality of the system from the safety perspective, and is expressed through safety
indicators;
• Safety indicators: The parameters that characterise and/or typify the level of safety of a system;
• Safety targets: The concrete objectives of the level of safety;
• Acceptable level of safety (ALoS): The minimum degree of safety that must be assured by a system
in actual practice;
• Safety indicator value: The quantification of a safety indicator; and
• Safety target value: The quantification of a safety target.
The selection of appropriate SPIs is important as it is an essential foundation for performance
measurement and is key to the development of ALoS.
ICAO Doc 9859 states that “If the level of safety is to be represented in broad, generic terms, the selection
of safety performance indicators representing high-level/high-consequence system outcomes
(quantitative) and/or high-level system functions (qualitative) is appropriate.”
Some examples of SPI representing high-level/high-consequence system “outcomes” are accident rates
and serious incident rates. Examples of high-level system “functions” include absence/poor legislation
and regulations as well as regulatory non-compliance.
ICAO Doc 9859 also specifies that “If the level of safety of the system is to be represented in specific,
narrow terms, then the selection of indicators representing low-level/low-consequence system
outcomes and low- level system functions is required.”
Examples of SPI representing low-level/low-consequence system “outcomes” are the number of rejected
take-off events per number of flight hours or flight cycle, the number of bird-strike events per number of
departures, the number of foreign object debris events per number of departure and so on. Some lowlevel system “functions” examples are absence/poor procedures and instructions as well as ineffective
quality assurance system such as audits, inspections, checks and reviews.
The above examples of SPI can be adopted from the ECCAIRS classification types, for example accident,
incident and category type such as in-flight shutdown, bird-strike, Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT),
traffic alert and collision avoidance system and so on. Since SAIRS’ safety data are stored in ECCAIRS
format, CAAS has decided to adopt some of the ECCAIRS classification types for its high-level/highconsequence SPIs and the ECCAIRS category types for its low-level/low-consequence SPIs. In both cases,
meaningful SPIs must be representative of the outcomes, processes and functions that characterise
system safety.
Once the SPIs have been established, the ALoS will be set for each of these SPIs. The setting up of an
ALoS may seem simple, but a good and meaningful ALoS could take years to develop. A well established
database with comprehensive safety data could expedite this process.
The last element for safety performance measurement and monitoring would be to set up the safety
targets. Some typical examples of safety targets are reduction in accidents, serious incidents, reject takeoff events, bird-strike events and CFIT.
61
62
Safety
Number of Non-fatal Runway Excursions
Figure 7: Runway excursion
Figure 7 shows a sample of how SPI, ALoS and safety target are being applied. From the analysis charts
and graphs, State safety agencies could interpret the trend or even predict a certain trend pattern of a
particular indicator. With this information, State safety agencies can device safety intervention and/or
mitigating strategies to address or break those undesirable trends.
SAFETY PRECAUTION AND RECOMMENDATION
Following the identification of areas of safety concern, safety precautions and recommendations are
required to address these actual or potential deficiencies.
Safety precautions and recommendations should be practical and achievable. In cases where the areas of
concern are very technical or specialised (e.g. aircraft systems-related or human factor-related), a subject
matter expert who has the relevant knowledge would be able to establish good and effective mitigating
actions. Safety recommendations could also be derived from investigations and safety studies.
With the application of proactive and predictive approaches, State safety agencies should establish
a process/system to implement safety precautions and recommendations effectively. Apart from just
implementing these safety measures, the process should also monitor the state of implementation and
effectiveness.
The key safety management activities are shown in Figure 8. In order to effectively implement such
safety measures, the cooperation and partnership between industry and the State safety agencies are
very important. Regular safety meetings with the industry and organising regular safety seminars for the
industry are key safety management activities.
Collect
Data
Re-evaluate
Situation
Collect
Additional Data
Analyse
Data
Implement
Strategies
Safety
Management
Process
Prioritise
Unsafe Conditions
Assign
Responsibilities
Approve
Strategies
Develop
Strategies
Figure 8: Key safety management activities
SAFETY DATA EXCHANGE
Most States are not comfortable with exchanging safety data for various reasons, one of which is the
sensitivity of the information. As the possibility of safety data misuse is high, there should be some
form of disclaimer clauses or mutual agreements in the safety data exchange programme to protect the
information, sender and any person or organisation from any legal liabilities.
Nonetheless, ECCAIRS’ software has the provision to de-identify safety data so that sensitive information
can be removed and only relevant information is shared with ICAO, other States and the relevant safety
organisations. This flexibility would encourage States who use ECCAIRS to share or exchange safety data
with others.
With ECCAIRS, airlines and other aviation-related organisations can also be confident that their State safety
agencies are not exchanging information that will compromise their safety standing or corporate image.
Therefore, if a State identifies any safety matters that are considered to be of interest to other States, it
should be forwarded to them as soon as possible.
In addition, safety information that is relevant to local/foreign organisations such as original equipment
manufacturers, approved maintenance organisations and vendors, should also be forwarded to them.
Under the SSP, States should also promote the establishment of safety information free exchange/
sharing networks among local/foreign organisations through the SMS.
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Safety
CONCLUSION
Under the Singapore Safety Data Collection and Processing System, SAIRS was established in early 2010
to fulfill the SSP and SMS initiatives for aviation safety data collection, analysis and exchange. This was
made possible with the help of the ECCAIRS software and the revamping of the entire reporting system
framework.
In addition to SAIRS, SOMS was also developed in 2009. Together, it will be a comprehensive one-stop
operational system streamlining audits, inspections and approval functions by capturing, storing and
managing safety-related information. It is a secure system that enables real time audit data capture,
automated tracker on action items and comprehensive generation of management report.
With the future integration of SAIRS and SOMS, CAAS will be able to perform the collection, analysis
and exchange of safety data at an aggregated State level. CAAS intends to share these web-based
systems as a leading, robust and portable solution that can be easily implemented to any interested
State’s safety.
CAAS is certain that, with the help of technology, these safety management functions and initiatives can
be performed and freely shared at a higher level of integration globally.
References
ICAO Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation
Safety Management Manual, ICAO Doc 9859-AN/474, Second Edition-2009
bm
CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy
Team – An International Safety
Partnership
Abstract
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Commercial
Aviation Safety Team (CAST), which includes Government officials and
aviation industry leaders, have jointly chartered the CAST/ICAO Common
Taxonomy Team (CICTT). CICTT includes experts from several air carriers,
aircraft manufacturers, engine manufacturers, pilot associations,
regulatory authorities, transportation safety boards and ICAO, as well as
members from Canada, the European Union, France, Italy, Netherlands,
UK, and US. The CICTT is co-chaired by representatives from ICAO
and CAST. The Team is charged with developing common taxonomies
and definitions for aviation accident and incident reporting systems to
establish a standard industry language, thereby improving the quality
of information and communication. With this common language, the
aviation community’s capacity to focus on common safety issues is
greatly enhanced.
Safety
Partnership
About the Author
Mr Corey Stephens is co-chair of the CAST/
ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT) and a
Senior Aviation Safety Researcher with the US
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)’s Office of
Accident Investigation and Prevention. Prior to
joining the FAA, Mr Stephens was a senior staff
engineer with the Air Line Pilots Association’s
Engineering and Air Safety Department. He has
assisted the International Federation of Air Line
Pilots Associations with technical expertise on
international accidents. He also serves as an FAA
representative to the CAST – Joint Implementation
Monitoring Data Analysis Team. Corey also works
on the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and
Sharing programmes.
Safety
65
Partnership
Mr Corey Stephens
INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Commercial Aviation
Safety Team (CAST) jointly chartered the CAST/ICAO Common Taxonomy Team (CICTT).
The CICTT includes experts from air carriers, manufacturers, pilot associations, regulators,
and investigative authorities. ICAO, Canada, the European Union, Singapore, France, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, UK, and the US are represented. CICTT is co-chaired by representatives
from ICAO and CAST – a government industry cooperative effort within the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA)’s Safer Skies programme. The goal of CAST was to reduce
the risk of fatal accidents by 80 percent by 2007 and then maintain a continuous reduction
in fatality risk in the US and international commercial aviation beyond 2007.
BENEFITS OF COMMON TAXONOMIES
Before the formation of the CICTT, there was no universal standard for safety data.
A focus on worldwide safety at that time resulted in the start-up of many disparate efforts.
This in turn made the development of a common worldwide safety agenda extremely
difficult. It was decided that an international industry and government standard, made
up of common and “non-proprietary” standards, must be developed. Non-proprietary
standards were needed since proprietary or patented taxonomies had contributed to
“stove piping” of data. The Team is charged with developing common taxonomies and
definitions for aviation accident and incident reporting systems. Common taxonomies
establish a standard industry language, thereby improving the quality of information and
communication amongst all parties.
Using common taxonomies also allows groups such as CAST to develop a more accurate
event count and facilitates the metrics to determine the success of a safety programme.
The CICTT taxonomy may be used in place of, or in addition to, the database owner’s
current taxonomy. It is not expected that owners of existing databases would replace their
current structures or change data, but there may be scope for such owners to adopt the
target taxonomies in addition to their own to facilitate information sharing. The CICTT
has developed clear and unambiguous definitions that describe individual components of
the taxonomy to help organisations make the transition. This common taxonomy can be
implemented when reporting systems are designed or updated.
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One benefit of developing and using common taxonomies would occur as information is shared across
different reporting systems and organisations. In particular, where ICAO has a role in collecting data
from States, it will streamline the data entry process if information received from each State is supplied
using common definitions. In addition to ICAO, the European Coordination Centre for Aviation Incident
Reporting Systems (ECCAIRS), has adopted the definitions. ECCAIRS was set up to integrate data
from the occurrence reporting systems of a number of European Union (EU) countries. Aviation safety
database managers and users are urged to visit the CICTT website to review and consider adopting the
current definitions.
HOW CICTT WORKS
The original taxonomies established by the CICTT activity were:
• Occurrence Categories;
• Phase of Flight;
• Aircraft Make/Model/Series; and
• Engine Make/Model.
The Occurrence Categories and Phase of Flight definitions were completed in 2002. The Aircraft Make/
Model/Series values were established in 2004, and the Engine Make/Model values activity started in
2006. In 2009, the Positive Taxonomy, Engine Occurrence Sub-Category and Concepts working groups
finished their work. Both the Aircraft and Engine taxonomies are updated quarterly. The establishment
of these original taxonomies lays the foundation for:
• Worldwide sharing of common accident/incident data;
• Focused, data-driven, coordinated safety agendas;
• Common investigation, reporting and post-accident analysis; and
• Shifting from reactive to proactive safety assessments.
OCCURRENCE CATEGORIES
The occurrence categories are used to classify accidents and incidents at a high level to permit analysis
of the data in support of safety initiatives. Categories, such as Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) and
“loss of control” have been developed specifically for this purpose. An organisation may develop subcategories of occurrences to suit their own needs. An example would be a manufacturer using the CICTT
category of CFIT and using sub-categories to record whether an aircraft was put into service before
or after a particular ground proximity warning system/enhanced ground proximity warning systems
software load.
AIRCRAFT MAKE/MODEL/SERIES
The purpose of an aircraft master model list is to create a grouping of similar aircraft models for analytical
purposes and to identify models that share airworthiness properties. By combining the original aircraft
make (e.g. DOUGLAS) and aircraft model (e.g. DC-3), a master model (e.g. DOUGLAS DC-3) is created.
Current users of the aircraft make/model/series data identified a need to group related aircraft models.
Users have described situations in which two or more aircraft are related, but this would not be evident
to someone without comprehensive knowledge of those aircraft. Military forces may have aircraft that
are based on a civilian model. Persons who analyse aircraft safety data may wish to review reports
of military and non-military operations of the aircraft model. In addition, over time, former military
aircraft may enter civilian registries and accident/incident databases. For example, the Master Model
DOUGLAS-DC3 applies to the civilian DOUGLAS-DC3 as well as the military versions: DOUGLAS-C47
and DOUGLAS-R4D.
PHASE OF FLIGHT
Many aviation occurrence reporting systems capture the phase of operation or the phase of flight in
which an event occurred, but not all systems use the same criteria for these categories. The list of flight
phases developed by the CICTT provides guidance for this classification. The list provides unambiguous
definitions of what constitutes each phase of flight. This not only allows individual organisations to
record events in their databases, but also facilitates the exchange and comparison of events. By using a
common phase of flight taxonomy, organisations can be assured that similar events are being grouped
together when looking at trend information.
POSITIVE TAXONOMY
The CICTT developed a positive taxonomy that better identifies the “safety nets” found in events and
assesses their effectiveness, with emphasis on successful human interventions. Human factors have
generally been considered in relation to accident causes or as performance limitations. The Team:
• Considered human factor as a safety factor;
• Recorded successful human interventions in databases; and
• Capitalised on positive taxonomy to increase the resilience of the aeronautical system.
CONCEPTS
One major challenge faced by aviation safety analysts is the extensive use of free text to capture important
information related to accidents and incidents. Simple facts, such as date, time, operator, altitude and
location, are easily collected using structured data fields. Acquiring a thorough understanding of what
happened, how and why, requires a subject matter expert to interpret the narrative component of the
report if there are no structured data fields. Accident narratives can be lengthy and complex. Depending
on the nature of an analysis, subject matter experts may be required to read thousands of reports. As a
result, a safety analysis can be a very time-consuming and expensive undertaking.
One approach to addressing the free-text issue is to develop text-mining concepts. This concept, simply
stated, is a collection of words that have been related to a subject.
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Safety
Concepts can be combined to form complex concepts that include word strings and use text-mining
techniques, such as stemming and word proximity rules, to assess the strengths of relationships among
words. In a recent study using the concepts for automation and confusion, analysts were able to quickly
search through 5.4 million records to identify 800 reports for further analysis.
The objective of the CICTT Text-mining Concepts Taxonomy is to develop a shareable collection of
concepts (i.e. concept banks) and structure them within a taxonomy that would facilitate easy retrieval by
the aviation community. The development of concept banks greatly helps exploit the current databases
that do not operate a common safety language yet. The next step could be merging the concept banks
within new structured fields for improved trend analyses.
ENGINE OCCURRENCE SUB-CATEGORY
The engine occurrence sub-category was developed to aid in standardising events that fall under System/
Component Failure or Malfunction – Powerplant (SCF-PP). This taxonomy defines specific failures and
issues and gives guidance on their identification through usage notes. The “uncontained” category is
listed below as an example:
SCF-PP-Uncontained
The uncontained release of debris from a rotating component malfunction (blade, disk, spacer, impeller,
drum/spool).
Usage notes:
• In order to be categorised as uncontained, the debris must pass completely through the nacelle
envelope. Parts that puncture the nacelle skin but do not escape or pass completely through are
considered contained.
• Fragments that pass out of the inlet or exhaust opening without passing through any structure are
not categorised as uncontained.
• Starter and gearbox uncontainments are excluded and documented under “Gearbox/starter
uncontainment”.
CURRENT WORKING GROUPS
Currently there are seven working groups either developing new or additions to existing taxonomies.
These groups are:
• Flight Data Event – There are several government and industry efforts to use digital flight data in
prognostic safety programmes. However, current flight data monitoring and analysis programmes
may use different criteria and parameters to identify or characterise an event. These differences
limit the analysis and sharing of flight data safety information. The goal of the Flight Data Event
working group is to deliver a list of events to the CICTT that can help to provide governments and
industry means to identify, record, analyse, and communicate/share issues that can be found in
digital flight data.
• Unmanned Aerial Vehicle/Unmanned Aircraft System (UAV/UAS) – Developing new event
categories and modifying existing ones to capture UAV/UAS related events.
• Helicopter – Developing new event categories and modifying existing ones to identify helicopter
related events and phase of flight differences. The occurrence taxonomies currently used in
safety databases were, on historical grounds, initially merely developed around fixed wing aircraft
occurrences. As a result, helicopter specific events are in general less addressed compared to fixed
wing aircraft occurrences.
• Aerodrome – Developing standards for aerodrome identification beacons and events.
• Human Factors – The goal of a human factors common taxonomy is to overcome the challenges
facing data analysis and exchange. A common taxonomy will improve an organisation’s internal ability
to assess and analyse human factors issues, facilitate communication among users and promote the
synthesis of human factors data among the industry.
• Hazard Taxonomy – The working group is examining ways they can help in hazard identification
and determining what the scope of that work should be.
CONTINUING FORWARD
Every year, more industry and governmental authorities (both regulatory and investigative) continue to
adopt the CICTT taxonomies. This common language allows us to compare trends and develop shared
safety strategies, thus improving aviation safety worldwide. While these improvements are important,
more work must be done. In order to ensure the continued success of the current CICTT taxonomies
and those that will be developed in the future, we must have participation from all facets of aviation.
Organisations that are interested in participating in this initiative are encouraged to visit the CICTT
website (www.intlaviationstandards.org) and select the “Contact Us” link at the bottom of the page or
contact me directly at corey.stephens@faa.gov
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Aviation Security: Proactive or
Playing Catch-up
Abstract
No one can deny that the fortification of aviation security processes,
policies, as well as planning and execution has reached an all time
crescendo following the September 11 incident. The level of cooperation
fostered between intelligence, law enforcement agencies and private
enterprises such as airlines as well as technology providers is indeed
commendable.
This paper explores the age-old question of which came first – the chicken
or the egg? Are we playing catch-up to the threats posed by terrorist
groups and the like or are we taking the lead? Exploring the reaction
of people to incidents and the ensuing measures that have been put in
place, we find out if aviation security is indeed reactive or proactive in
the industry. This paper addresses the possible causes for our behaviour,
including evidence of post-incidents and measures behaviour, reasons of
such behaviour, possible consequences and the need for change as well
as positive examples in the market. This paper also aims to identify the
catalyst for change within the aviation industry, and examines how this
catalyst works.
Security
Playing Catch-up
About the Author
Mr Chris Bala is Head of CJ Security Consulting
Group, and an adjunct lecturer for the Security
Management Diploma at Edith Cowan University,
Australia. He was the first Asian to receive the
Certified Security Trainer qualification from the
Academy of Security Educators and Trainers,
US. Mr Bala holds a Bachelor in Business
Administration from RMIT University, Australia
and a Master in Occupational Psychology from
the University of Leicester, UK. He is also a
certified ICAO National Inspector.
Security
71
Playing Catch-up
Mr Chris Bala
CJ Security Consulting Group
INTRODUCTION
Threats facing the aviation industry between the 1970s and 1980s were dramatic midair bombings, airport attacks and hijackings. To counteract these threats, the security
measures in place at that time were mainly targeted at protecting aircraft and its passengers
from mid-air bombings and unlawful hijackers. Cabin crew were trained to comply with
hijackers in the interest of passengers’ safety.
Little did they know that this would prove to be a lethal combination of customer service
and compliance, when the September 11 hijackers plotted to use the aircraft as weapons
of mass destruction. The incident is still painful to remember, and overnight the industry
learned that flight crew should never allow any unauthorised personnel into the flight deck.
IMPACT AND EFFECTS POST-SEPTEMBER 11 – CATALYST NUMERO UNO
How has the September 11 incident affected aviation security and the travelling public?
The tide has turned. For now, security takes precedence over customer service and ontime departures. Governmental control and increased security measures has undoubtedly
become the mainstay. Nine years after the events of September 11, passengers have been
schooled on checking in early, expecting long security queues and being patient; in many
cases thankful that these cumbersome measures are granting them safe air travel.
An unimaginably devastating, albeit well planned attack involved not one, but multiple
aircraft. For some, it was an intelligence failure or worse – a failure to take intelligence
seriously. For others, it was an active failure on security manpower as X-ray screeners failed
to detect the threat items terrorists brought onboard the plane. Many blamed the lack of
security awareness on the aircraft when terrorists gained access to the cockpit with relative
ease. What does aviation security have to say?
There was much significant catching up to do, as many security measures were implemented
for added protection and defence purposes. These measures include the establishment of
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), fortified cockpit doors, placement of air
marshals onboard flights, extensive training for X-ray screeners and the restriction of items
brought onboard that may become potentially dangerous in-flight.
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Security
The phenomenon on September 11 covered the entire world in a black shroud. It gripped everyone
hard, be it emotionally, spiritually or physically. Who can forget the terrible sinking feeling in our hearts
when we first heard the news, saw images of the aircraft hitting the twin towers, or when both towers
collapsed like a deck of crumbling cards? The key question was – is this the final straw for the aviation
industry to look at security seriously? And are we there yet?
After the September 11 incident, there seemed to be a frantic scrambling across the globe for aviation
security fortification. New technologies were being developed, security officers were sent for extensive
training, audits were conducted more frequently than usual and new laws were set in place. Airlines that
once protested against such cumbersome security initiatives in fear of inconveniencing their passengers
were now toeing the line, nary a complaint in sight. Passengers too, reported earlier for flights and
refrained from carrying items found in the restricted list, which ranged from nail clippers to lighters.
Three months after September 11 came the infamous shoe bomber, Richard Reid, with plastic explosives
in his hollowed-out shoes. This resulted in additional security measures, atop many others to detect
other potential shoe bombers. Passengers were requested to remove their shoes for the scanning of
explosive items.
In 2006, the UK law enforcement agencies foiled a plot to simultaneously detonate homemade bombs on
at least 10 American airliners while en route from London to the US. The weapon of choice this time was a
small amount of homemade liquid explosives to be brought onboard disguised as sports drinks. In addition,
the plot was to bring in small bomb components disguised as everyday items in the carry-on luggage of
several different conspirators. This resulted in the liquids, aerosols and gels (LAGs) restrictions that are
mostly still in place today. Duty free retail shops reeled at its implications to their business and strategised
on how to work within the rules without sacrificing profits. In the past 12 months, many countries have
eased up on the LAGs restrictions, from “zero tolerance” to minimal amounts (see Table 1).
Incidents
Resultant Security Measures
September 2001
Fortified cockpit doors
Air marshals
Cabin restrictions on items such as sharp objects
Increased and intensified security screening
December 2001 (Richard Reid)
Screening includes shoes
August 2006 (UK foils multi-aircraft
LAGs restrictions put in place
liquid explosive threat)
Security for improvised explosive device components increase
Table 1: Summary of trends
PRESSURES FACING THE AVIATION INDUSTRY TODAY
Like any other segment of the transportation industry, the aviation industry is made up of enterprises,
organisations and conglomerates motivated by profit. With a world scarred from the dot-com bubble,
currency crisis, economic downturns and ash clouds, many airlines are fighting to stay in the game and
keep their heads above water. Airlines have now begun charging for services/products that have once
been part of the air travel experience such as check-in luggage, seat selection, meals and beverage and
possibly even use of the in-flight lavatory. Customer service is all about catering to customers’ requests
and needs; what better way to do this than to provide them with better service, clean safety records
and assurance of their security? Many are left guessing of the actual impact of the current measures, as
regular reports of slip-through, new plots and poor training keeps the travelling public both compliant
and on their feet.
With the backdrop of slashed budgets paired with dwindling profitability, what is the forecast for aviation
security? Are we ahead of the game with our technological advances, greater focus and governmental
support, or are we in the proverbial chicken and egg situation?
My guess is that we are indeed following the lead of the terrorists. While they device ingenious ways of
planting attacks, we counteract by finding new ways to defend ourselves and our interests.
To better understand the relationships between the different agencies and organisations, we need to
examine the different viewpoints of stakeholders in this industry (see Figure 1).
ICAO
Part of the UN, looks after the international civil
aviation interest of member States including matters
relating to aviation security. Members must comply with
ICAO regulations (audits conducted regularly to check
for compliance and identify gaps).
Infrastructure
National/Country Bodies/Agencies
Member States/countries will have their own
country based agency/ies creating the national laws.
Eg. US – Transportation Security Administration or
Singapore – Ministry of Transport
ft rs
ra re
rc tu
Ai fac
u
an
M
Airports
Employees
IATA
Security
Manpower
Airlines
Travel
agents
Employees
Passengers
Figure 1: Viewpoints of stakeholders
Shops
Technology
Providers
Ancillary
Agencies
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Security
The United Nations-based ICAO sees its role as the gatekeeper and lawmaker acting on behalf of its
190 contracting States. Once ICAO sets a regulation, all member States are to adhere to it, ensuring
international compliance. ICAO also provides training, Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs)
and audits to ensure that their member States comply with these regulations. The publication of audit
results creates a significant deterrence on member States to straighten up their act and make good
on the agreed regulations. Non-compliance of ICAO-set regulations may also have a detrimental
effect of discouraging airlines from flying to their countries, and may result in additional security
requirements imposed on these airlines. Taking a consultative approach, ICAO coaxes rather than
deals punishments, much like an understanding parent trying to bring a child back in line. ICAO
regulations also tend not to be prescriptive as to how the member States should achieve them; rather,
it states the standards and allows member States to dictate how they would comply.
The significance of ICAO cannot be undermined. Without it, individual countries would impose their
respective regulations without any globally agreed standards.
Country Level Agencies
Country level or national agencies are usually responsible for the national security of the aviation sector
within their countries’ border. However, they too usually place demands on airlines operating into their
countries to follow certain regulations governing national interest and airspace. Whilst most of them
would be within the realm of what has already been set out by ICAO, there is nothing to stop member
States from imposing their own additional regulations. These add-ons may serve to counter threat
dealing with regional or national security issue, or geo-political/historical reasons.
Countries often do this with or through their own assigned security agency. In the US, it is the TSA,
whereas in Singapore, the Ministry of Transport works closely with the Civil Aviation Authority of
Singapore, Airport Police Division and the auxiliary police forces. The Air Navigation Act in Singapore
governs the standard operating procedures (SOPs) for airlines, cargo agencies and all other interested
parties operating within the restricted areas of the airport.
Country level agencies keep fellow operators in check, focusing on operational issues and balancing
between operational efficiency and security needs. They usually cooperate well with other country/
regional/global agencies, as well as Interpol. For example, critical evidence on the plot to plant an attack
at a Mass Rapid Transit station in Singapore was uncovered when recognisance tapes were found by the
US coalition forces from the rubble of an al-Qaeda based operative based in Kabul, Afghanistan.
In some cases, countries from a particular region come together to collectively review and agree on
standardised regulations for their region and citizens i.e. the European Union regulations.
Airlines
Airlines are the prominent faces of the aviation industry. With varying history, operations and aircraft
fleets, they brand themselves in accordance to their business models and perspectives (for example
full-fledged, budget, customer service oriented, efficient and so on). Branding aside, all airlines have
to comply with the State and ICAO requirements. Airlines themselves can also impose additional
measures to protect their own interests, like arranging for cabin crew to undergo training such as tactical
communication techniques, and dealing with physical threats onboard the aircraft.
The airline security team follows all measures and procedures from start to end. They focus on all
aspects of operations when the aircraft is on ground, inflight and even when undergoing maintenance.
In addition, the team also takes care of all items carried onboard such as meals, beverages, cargo,
passenger baggage and of course, the passengers and crew themselves.
Aircraft Manufacturers
Boeing and Airbus are the major players in the aircraft manufacturing industry. Based on the orders
placed by many leading airlines, both aircraft manufacturers build a range of aircraft to satisfy the
transportation needs of different airlines. These aircraft are also manufactured with the necessary safety
and security measures that are welcomed by airlines alike. Examples of such measures include fortified
cockpit doors and the even more recent anti-missile technology. Whilst in the past safety measures
were placed foremost in the priority list of aircraft manufacturers, there are now increasingly more
requirements for security measures to be put in place.
Security Manpower
The security manpower provides enforcement services for airlines, airports and other agencies/operators
working within restricted areas, and also for all facilities within the airport itself. This security role is
executed by a combination of private security agencies, government agencies and law enforcement
units. Countries may have varying regulations that govern the authority given to private security
agencies. For example, the private security agencies, also known as the auxiliary police force on duty
at Singapore’s Changi Airport, have similar authority to that of the State police, while working within
a restricted area without the power of prosecution. The security manpower work closely with security
technology companies to provide the best security solutions for their customers – the airports.
But is this good enough?
Let us not forget that terrorists are “extremes” at what they do. They also happen to be extremely
focused in executing their plan and achieving their goal. Most post-attack reports cite months, if not,
years of preparation, training for multiple scenarios, reconnaissance trips and detailed dry runs with
alternative plans in place.
Does our security manpower have a passion to match up to the terrorists?
This is a question for discussion. The August 2009 Gallup Employee Engagement Index reported
that only 33 percent of workers expressed interest in their jobs, while 49 percent felt disengaged.
The remaining 18 percent of workers are actively disengaged. The very thought of having disengaged
aviation security officers is disconcerting. There is definitely more to be done in the industry in the up-
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Security
skilling and increasing the attractiveness and profile of aviation security personnel, elevating it from a
minimum wage job opportunity to becoming a career of choice.
Technology Providers
A variety of technology players exists within the aviation industry. These players range from the
aforesaid anti-missile technology on commercial aircraft to closed-circuit television and other detection
technology, with the X-ray technology sector being the most common. X-ray is utilised to see through
the many layers of baggage and cargo to ensure no threat items make their way onto an aircraft. From
the one-dimensional black and white images of yesteryear to the more sophisticated body scanners of
today, X-ray images has definitely been enhanced with technological advancements, greatly benefitting
the industry. Also, technology manufacturers and providers are in a constant race to provide the latest
detection technology to assist security personnel.
International Aviation Organisations
With 230 airline members accounting for 93 percent of all scheduled commercial flights in the world,
the International Air Transport Association is a 60-year-old association that looks after the interest
of its members by providing the much needed industry-based support and highlighting the needs of
its members, including their concerns over imposed security measures. This in turn improves work
efficiency or passenger convenience factors such as ticketing systems. Also seated with IATA on the
ICAO security panel is the Airports Council International – the first association to represent airports
worldwide.
HOLISTIC APPROACH TO AVIATION SECURITY
With the aforementioned agencies working together in joint defence, we embark on an integrated
and holistic approach, more so now than before. Private enterprises like airlines work closely with
government agencies, while government agencies have dealings with technology providers. Intelligence
agencies work effortlessly across the nation borders whereas civilians and law enforcement officers work
in cooperation. Today, there are many great examples of this integrated and holistic approach, and it is
one positive aspect that emerged after the September 11 incident. The phrase “Don’t let a good crisis go
to waste” rang true when the aviation security industry picked itself up post September 11.
Protecting lives, facilities and assets is the first priority for all agencies. With everyone focused on the
same end result, it enables us to work with the economies of scale. Whilst we may not have a perfect
system, the current process allows us to play on each agency’s strength and compensate for overall
weaknesses or gaps by layering the security processes, physical security measures and technological and
human interface.
Today, the costs involved for providing security are getting quite considerable. It takes time and effort
to put new security measures in place, for laws and policies to be drawn up and deliberated, to create
SOPs and scrutinise privacy laws, to develop and implement technologies and to send staff for relevant
training. All these measures would need to be financed as well. When large scale security measures are
introduced, for example the LAGs restriction, it may take years before every ICAO member State can fully
and correctly implement these measures.
With the increasing interest in aviation security, it would not be difficult to start simulating or envisaging
different threat scenarios and make our preparations. On the other hand, this would only open the flood
gates of possibilities, resulting in finding fault with anything and everything. This perpetual paranoia may
lead to unfocused development without sequential or strategic insights in the aviation security industry
– a poor defensive strategy against our well prepared and committed enemies.
The reactive approach may be questionable at first glance, but it provides a clear roadmap on “What to
do first” and “Why?”. With better intelligence input, this roadmap gains the credibility of the public, as
well as the administrators. The fact that we have not had any significant aviation incidents (except for
foiled attacks since September 11) lends credibility that the current process is indeed working. The caveat
of course, is that it has to be implemented, well executed, monitored and tweaked where needed.
CONCLUSION
We operate in a unique industry where each flaw is carefully examined and then immediately rectified.
It is unique because both profit-making and governmental organisations readily share lessons learned
from mistakes, errors and lapses so that others might benefit from it. The camaraderie with which we
approach aviation security is definitely commendable.
Could more be done?
The answer is always “Yes”. Like any other industry, ours is constantly changing and evolving as we
speak, to cater to its ever increasing demands and challenges. If we have learned anything at all, it is that
security is an ongoing business and would always be a “work in progress”.
Take car bombings as an example. The fatalities involved in car bombings are more than victims of
aviation terrorism. However, the car manufacturer does not do much to prevent their vehicles from being
used as weapons of mass destruction. Besides the external security controls, we have to live with the fact
that vehicles will and can be used in methods to achieve the bombers’ means. This acceptance does not
apply to the aviation security industry. All involved are expected to do what they can to prevent incidents
and spot flaws and gaps in threat management.
Threats will always exist. It is critical that we keep our feet firmly on the ground and continue to share
intelligence, provide quality training and invest in the research and technology sector. With security at
the forefront, airport facilities are now developed and built with scrutinising security features at the
design stage, rather than an afterthought once the building begins operation.
Time and again, the aviation security industry has shown that it is still responding efficaciously to the
challenges thrown at it. Despite having flaws, it has also shown numerous times that the security industry
is able to prove itself worthy of developing and implementing effective measures.
77
78
Security
The aviation security industry might play catch-up from time to time, but it always provides an immediate
response to threats. Reacting effectively in a well-planned manner on a global scale is a feat in itself,
given the financial challenges and constraints that we face. Reactive or proactive, all the current measures
implemented do serve to deflect existing threats and expand the sphere of security to yet another layer.
These concentric circles signifying protection, prevention and intelligence is both proactive and reactive
all at once. What matters most is that the aviation security industry has responded effectively to threats,
and has done its best with the limited resources available.
References
2010. ACI (www)
http://www.airports.org/cda/aci_common/display/main/aci_content07_banners.jsp?zn=aci&cp=1_725_2___
2002. CNN (www)
http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/southeast/01/12/ret.singapore.attack/?related
Elias, B (2004). Aviation Security-Related Findings and Recommendations of the September 11 Commission. USA.
Congressional Research Service
Fox, A (2010). HR Magazine. (www)
http://shrm.org/Publications/hrmagazine/EditorialContent/2010/0510/Pages/0510fox.aspx
2010. IATA (www)
http://www.iata.org/about/Pages/index.aspx
2010. ICAO (www). Tape shows Singapore attack plans.
http://www.icao.int/cgi/goto_m.pl?/cgi/statesDB4.pl?en
JOURNAL OF AVIATION MANAGEMENT 2011
CONTRIBUTOR GUIDELINES
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JOURNAL OF AVIATION MANAGEMENT 2010
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