Seminarthemen SS 2014 - Ruhr
Transcription
Seminarthemen SS 2014 - Ruhr
Nina Ismael, Annika Sauer, Jörg Schimmelpfennig Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft Ruhr-Universität Bochum SS 14 Seminar Intermediate Microeconomics A: Spieltheorie und Anwendungen nicht-zitierfähige Grundlagenliteratur: Dixit, Avinash K. and Susan Skeath (1999), Games of Strategy, W.W. Norton & Company, New York. Motta, Massimo (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, New York. A1) Das Tausendfüßlerspiel - Kritik an der Rückwärtsinduktion Rosenthal, Robert W. (1981), Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 92-100. A2) Das Chainstore-Paradox Selten, Reinhard (1978), The Chain-Store Paradox, Theory and Decision, vol. 9, no. 2, pp.127-159. A3) Predatory Pricing - ein sinnvolles Konzept? Ordover, Janusz A. und Robert D. Willig (1981), An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation, Yale Law Journal, vol. 91, no. 1, pp. 8-53. A4) Zur (Un-)glaubwürdigkeit der Limit Pricing - Strategie Bain, Joe S. (1971), Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing Industries, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. Sylos-Labini, Paolo (1962), Oligopoly and Technical Progress, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. A5) Tit for Tat Rapoport, Aanatol und Albert M. Chammah (1970), Prisoner`s Dilemma – A Study of Conflict and Cooperation, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. Axelrod, Robert M. (1987), Die Evolution der Kooperation, Oldenbourg, München. B: Industrieökonomik und Anwendungen nicht-zitierfähige Grundlagenliteratur: Motta, Massimo (2004), Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, Cambridge University Press, New York. Carlton, Dennis W. und Jeffrey M. Perloff (2005), Modern Industrial Organization, Pearson AddisonWesley, Boston. B1) Theorie der bestreitbaren Märkte – Sinn oder Unsinn? Baumol, William J. (1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industry Structure, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York. B2) Asymmetrische Informationen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt: Die Effizienzlohntheorie Yellen, James L. (1984), Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment, American Economic Review, vol. 74, no. 2, pp. 200-205. Stiglitz, Joseph E. (1987), The Causes and Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 25, no.1, pp. 1-48. B3) Asymmetrische Informationen und Qualitätsunsicherheit: Das „Lemon“ - Problem Akerlof, George A. (1970), The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of of Economics, vol. 84, no. 3, pp. 488-500. B4) Monopole dauerhafter Güter: Würdigung und Kritik Coase, Ronald H. (1972), Durable Goods Monopolist, Journal of Law and Economics, vol.15, no.1, pp. 143- 150. B5) Entstehung und Stabilität von Kartellen Stigler, George J. (1964), A Theory of Oligopoly, The Journal of Political Economy, vol. 72, no. 1, pp. 4461. Levenstein, Margaret C. und Valerie Y. Suslow (2006), What Determines Cartel Success?, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 43-95.