BENEFIT-SHARING MECHANISMS FOR REDD: HOW TO EQUITABLY SHARE

BENEFIT-SHARING MECHANISMS FOR REDD: HOW TO EQUITABLY SHARE
BENEFITS AMONG FOREST MANAGERS?
Maria Fernanda Gebara1
ABSTRACT
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) in tropical countries
is now a critical piece of any international agreement that aims to reduce greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions. After the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) included the prevision of a REDD+ mechanism for the post-Kyoto
period, delegates and the broader international community turned the topic in one of
prime importance on the agenda of the Climate Change (CC) regime and are now
strongly encouraging the demonstration of REDD+ pilot projects. An important issue
refers to the equitable distribution of benefits or, in other words, equitable benefit
sharing mechanisms (BSM). This analysis seeks to address the gap between theory and
practice by considering the main issues of concern in equitable BSM for REDD+. By
doing so, it aims to contribute to the more effective design and implementation of
BSM and expand debate on the topic. This paper will explore how Local Participation
(LP) should be employed in the process of sharing benefits on the ground. It recognizes
that REDD+ adaptation and mitigation goals are more likely to be met where there are
democratic and interactive processes of LP while developing and implementing BSM,
because such processes allow more flexibility in the definition of benefits and
distributional mechanisms. The analysis concludes that: (i) the equity criteria should be
considered while defining benefits rather than at the time of their distribution and (ii)
given the complex and diverse relationships and issues that deforestation involves a
more multi-dimensional approach is necessary when identifying beneficiaries, benefits
and creating BSM.
Key words: REDD+, benefit-sharing, equity, local participation, Juma, Brazil
1
Author affiliations: Oxford Centre for Tropical Forests (OCTF) and Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)
Email: mfgebara@gmail.com
1
INTRODUCTION
At the risk of some generalization of the concept Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+) is the new United Nations Framework
Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) mechanism for compensating tropical
countries for the carbon benefits that their standing forests (“avoided emissions” +
“carbon stocks”) offer to the climate. Adopted under the Bali Action Plan (BAP)
(UNFCCC 2007) and ratified by the last UNFCCC decisions (UNFCCC 2009a; UNFCCC
2009b) REDD+ has been considered efficient in mitigating Climate Change (CC)
(Southgate 1952; Brown et al. 1996; Schneider 1998; Stern 2007; IPCC 2007; Eliash
2008) and strategic in fostering adaptation (“co-benefits”) activities in developing
countries (Dutschke & Wolf 2007). There are however dilemmas concerning what kind
of benefit-sharing mechanisms (BSM) should be implemented to promote mitigation
and adaptation actions. Is it really viable to share benefits on the ground that are fair
and at the same time produce additional and permanent outcomes?
Because benefits will inevitably interfere with the cultural and economic values of
forest managers (by encouraging them to change or maintain current behavior),
transforming funds into fair and efficient benefits is a challenging step for REDD+.
While the adoption of a REDD+ mechanism is an important and necessary milestone in
the process of implementing climate policy, this paper concurs that successful
outcomes on REDD+ will also depend on the construction and implementation of
equitable BSM. In reaching this goal, local participation (LP) is crucial in developing and
designing these mechanisms (Peskett et al. 2008; Griffiths 2008). The present analysis
will explore how LP should be employed in the process of sharing benefits on the
ground and demonstrate that a lack of participation of local forest managers in these
processes will have a negative effect on the outcomes of BSM and consequently in the
outcomes of REDD+ schemes in general.
In order to test this hypothesis I will look at the very embryonic Brazilian efforts to
share REDD+ benefits in the State of Amazonas. After looking at the conceptual
framework and challenges of BSM, the case of the Juma Sustainable Development
Reserve (JUMA) will be analyzed to explore the degree to which LP was considered
while sharing REDD+ benefits, to see what elements of the case study can be applied in
other projects and to draw some lessons for the way forward.
The analysis seeks to address the gap between theory and practice by considering the
main issues of concern in equitable benefit sharing for REDD+. By doing so, it aims to
contribute to the more effective design and implementation of BSM and expand
debate on the topic. This paper recognizes that REDD+ adaptation and mitigation goals
are more likely to be met where there are democratic and interactive processes of LP
while developing and implementing BSM, because such processes allow more
flexibility in the definition of benefits and distributional mechanisms. The analysis
concludes that: (i) the equity criteria should be considered while defining benefits
rather than at the time of their distribution and (ii) given the complex and diverse
relationships and issues that deforestation involves a more multi-dimensional
approach is necessary when identifying beneficiaries, benefits and creating BSM.
2
RESEARCH METHODS
Lacking a clear definition of what BSM are and how they should be implemented, an
exploratory study was carried out to clarify some interpretations of the subject. To
complement the secondary data available on this topic, a questionnaire was sent by
email to some academics who are experts in “REDD+-like” schemes, including Payment
for Environmental Services - PES. The criteria for selecting interviewees were
representation and relevance to the conceptual framework and 8 respondents
participated in this part of the research. The questionnaire included questions about
their views on REDD+ equity, criteria for the distribution of REDD+ benefits, priority of
REDD+ investments, methods of LP and awareness of JUMA.
Field research permitted an in-depth investigation and examination of how BSM were
designed and implemented in JUMA and the role LP played in this process. 50 people
(mainly households, community2 representatives and students) were interviewed
using open (Grummitt 1980) and probing (Torrington 1991) questions in a combination
of semi-structured and unstructured interviews.
Five criteria were used in selecting interviewees:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Access to benefits - people receiving and not receiving benefits;
Market access – people living near to the roads and far from the roads;
Deforestation rates - areas with high and low deforestation rates;
Participation in the design and implemention of BSM – people who actively
participated and people who did not.
Questions focused on interviewees’ views with respect to how LP was approached in
the project both in terms of the design and implementation of BSM and the fairness of
the processes. Respondents were asked to assess the benefits of the project as fair,
significant, sufficient or insufficient. Other questions included how the benefits were
affecting forest cover change, forestry incomes and how the project developers
approach to BSM could be improved to achieve more effective results.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
It is widely recognized that the conservation of forests largely depends on
incentivating and supporting the countries that contain these forests and the people
who live and work in them (CBD 1992; UNFCCC 2007; Wollengerg & Springate-Baginski
2009). It is also recognized that incentive mechanisms such as REDD+ can quite
substantially increase benefit-flows to forest managers3 (Agrawal & Angelsen 2009).
2
This paper will adopt the definition of community as a rural group culturally differentiated which recognizes itself as such, with
its own forms of social organization and that uses natural resources for subsistence and for cultural, social, religious and economic
activities. This definition is recognized by Law in the State of Amazonas (LC 53/2007).
3
Forest managers are defined here as any group or individual that depends upon the forest to generate income or to subsist,
including private land-holders.
3
The main principle underlying REDD+ is the transfer of large financial incentives from
developed to developing countries in order to reduce deforestation and degradation.
The scale of the benefits is normally linked to the rates of reduction in deforestation
and degradation and in this regard REDD+ can provide substantial financial benefits to
developing tropical countries. The way in which these benefits are distributed has
become a major issue in REDD+. A particular concern is that the benefits may not be
equitably shared between different stakeholders and that some people could lose out
because they have less power in the benefit-sharing decision making processes.
It is argued by Peskett et al (2008) and Griffiths (2008) that equitable BSM is a
fundamental condition for allowing REDD+ to work effectively and this, in turn,
depends on the degree to which LP is considered in the process of developing and
implementing incentives and benefits. However, whilst concern has been raised in the
literature about the impact of BSM in the effectiveness of REDD+, as reflected in
overall reductions in deforestation (Luttrell et al 2007; Johns & Schlamadinger 2009;
Agrawal & Angelsen 2009), scholars have been unable to reach agreement on how
BSM could be made more equitable. Moreover, it is necessary to define what is meant
by BSM, what types of benefits they will deliver and by which process (see Diagram 1).
At present, the term 'benefit sharing' has many different meanings, which makes it
difficult to identify the key main issues and the best ways of approaching it. It is not
always clear what types of benefits need to be shared (e.g. financial benefits or in-kind
benefits such as access to services). It is unclear how 'legitimate' beneficiaries should
be identified, particularly in cases where deforestation is the result of illegal activities;
or how benefit sharing systems can be managed at different levels of government, i.e.
national, sub-national, local.
Defining Benefit-Sharing Mechanisms
According to the Bali Action Plan (BAP), BSM and related benefits will be created
through the policy approaches and measures for REDD+ (UNFCCC 2007), commonly
known as REDD+ Policies and Measures (PAMs) (Eliasch 2008; Peskett et al 2008,
Brown 2008). Two types of PAMs related to BSM have already been distinguished;
those that aim to generate compensations and those that generate incentives, where
compensations are benefits aiming to cover the foregone opportunity costs of
deforesting the land, and incentives are the benefits of incentivizing positive choices of
behaviour (Peskett et al 2008; Brown 2008). Both incentives and compensations can
be delivered up-front, to permit the commencement of REDD+, or dispensed over
time, to guarantee the continuance of REDD+.
In this paper, compensations are considered as a type of incentive as they serve to
encourage conservation behaviours. Other category of PAMs related to BSM are also
recognized here – those that aim to generate interventions. Interventions in this
context are actions designed to create legal, administrative and technical benefits and
include the regularization of land tenure, institutional arrangements, monitoring
systems and other actions that are necessary to permit and guarantee positive
outcomes for REDD+.
4
Another important consideration is the process by which BSM implement benefits:
directly or indirectly (Peskett et al 2008). Direct benefit-sharing includes direct benefits
to forest managers (e.g. PES, technical materials) and indirect benefit-sharing includes
benefits that aim to foster broader development and adaptation actions that enhance
co-benefits (e.g. social benefits).
BSM would then deliver these benefits at national and local levels. The choice of PAMs
used to establish BSM will affect the whole structure of a REDD+ scheme by
determining who is to be incentivized to do what and what kind of interventions are
needed to facilitate the successful implementation of the process.
BSM
(created by PAMs)
Process:
Timeframe:
Direct X Indirect
Upfront X Overtime
Benefits
Incentives
E.g.: Social Benefits,
PES
Interventions
E.g.: Definition of Land
Rights
Diagram 1: Summary of BSM characteristics
Defining Beneficiaries
In this paper I will consider three categories of beneficiaries: national, sub-national and
local. National and sub-national beneficiaries, such as federal and state government
agencies, receive resources to implement interventions through PAMs. Local
beneficiaries, such as forest managers, receive a variety of incentives, including direct
payments and subsidies. All these actors benefit from REDD+ investments and should
be considered as BSM beneficiaries They include: governments, agencies, private
entities, municipalities, traditional communities, indigenous communities, settlers,
private land-holders, associations, institutes, non-governmental organizations, among
others.
CHALLENGES OF BSM: LOCAL PARTICIPATION AND EQUITY
Local Participation
It has been argued by some academics that active and continued LP is necessary to
identify beneficiaries, appropriate benefits, the timeframe for implementation and the
5
ways in which benefits will be received while developing and implementing BSM for
REDD+ schemes (Santilli et al. 2005; Nepstad et al. 2007; Peskett et al. 2008; Griffiths
2008). However, evidence shows that processes of LP are being poorly implemented or
even not implemented at all in REDD+ pilot-schemes (see for example Dooley et al.
2008 review of nine Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PINs) submitted to the World Bank’s
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF)4).
For the purposes of this paper it is important to define LP. Local maybe defined as any
group that depends upon the forest to generate income or to subsist, including private
land-holders. These people, who will be referred to in this paper as “forest managers”
derive significant benefits from the forest and therefore are more inclined to manage
and take care of it. If there are any changes in the forest cover, quality of the forest
and its services, they will be the first to feel the impact.
Participation, on the other hand, can have different meanings, depending on the
context. Whatever the definition, participation is “highly context-specific and its
effects range from coercion to full local control” (Hobley 1996). First, there are two
distinct perspectives for participatory approaches: participation as a mean and
participation as an end (Cleaver 1999; Diamond 2002). The first refers to participation
as a mean to improve effectiveness of certain interventions and the second as a
necessary tool for equity and empowerment of suppressed groups. Second, according
to Pimbert & Pretty (1994), there are different levels of participation, from simple
sharing of information to transfer of power, as described in Table 1, below.
Table 1 – Typologies of Participation
Typology of participation
Manipulative
Passive
Participation by consultation
Participation for material incentives
Functional participation
Characteristics
People’s representative is unelected
and has no power.
People are simply being told what has
been decided; unilateral
announcement by administrators.
People are consulted; analysis and
decisions are made by external agents.
People contribute resources (e.g., field
and labor), and receive cash, food, and
other material incentives. People have
no stake in prolonging participation
incentives when the incentives end.
People’s participation is an answer to
predetermined objectives formulated
by external agents. They may be
involved in decision-making, but tend
to appear only after major decisions
have been made. They may simply be
co-opted.
4
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, one of the 4 World Bank’s funds for forest and REDD+ issues.
6
Interactive participation
People participate in joint analysis,
development of action plans, and
formation or strengthening of local
institutions. Participation is a right, not
an obligation to achieve a goal. A group
has control over local decisions and
resources. They have a stake in
maintaining structures or practices.
Self-mobilization
Independent initiative by the people.
Contact with external institution is
based on their need. They retain
control over decisions and resources
used. Facilitation from outside
technical assistance. Structure and
distribution of wealth and power may
or may not be challenged from within.
Source: Pimbert & Pretty 1994 in IIED 1994
Since the 1970s many different participatory approaches to research, policy making
and planning have been suggested. However only since the 1990s participatory
methods have entered the development mainstream. Participation became a
buzzword in studies related to the poor and on development projects. In this regard
the best known participatory approaches are: Beneficiary Assessment, Social Analysis
and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA). The table below summarizes the main
characteristics of these approaches.
Table 2: Participatory Approaches
Beneficiary Assessment
Social Analysis
BA is a method most
associated to Salmen
(1987, 1995), who has
defined it as: “an approach
to information gathering
which assesses the value
of an activity as it is
perceived by its principal
users… a systematic
enquiry into people´s
values and behavior in
relation to a planned or
ongoing intervention for
social and economic
change” (Salmen 1995: 1,
in Francis 2001:74).
Participatory Rural
Appraisal
Social analysis is associated According to Chambers
(1994: 953) “PRA is a
with the work of Michael
growing family of
Cernea (1991) and relates
to the “social dimension”, approaches and methods
a “structure of social
to enable local people to
relations” in which
share, enhance and
analyse their knowledge of
“people´s economic
activities are embedded”
life and conditions, and to
(Cernea 1991:9, in Francis plan, act, monitor and
evaluate”.
2001:74).
7
This sounds fine in theory. In practice, however, some recent applications of
participatory approaches in the development mainstream have fallen short of their
original intentions. Participation is sometimes used merely as a tool for achieving preset objectives and not as a process to empower groups and individuals to take
leadership, envision their futures, and improve their lives (Cornwall, 2000; Cleaver,
2001).
The crucial role of LP in the implementation of BSM is to develop approaches that are
flexible, suitably and able to secure the full and robust participation of forest
managers. Since interactive and self-mobilization participation, as described by
Pimbert and Pretty, involves control of local decisions and resources by forest
managers, they are more likely to enhance such approaches. There is a risk, however,
that BSM will end up reinforcing the status quo and that the control of the benefits will
remain in the hands of project developers or central governments to be distributed
according to their own criteria (Griffiths 2008), producing unfair outcomes.
Free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) should be considered while promoting LP
processes. This involves making sure that: (i) there is information about and
consultation on any proposed initiative and its likely impacts; (ii) there is meaningful
participation of forest managers; and, (iii) there are representative institutions (UN
2005). It has been argued that only through such participation is it possible to design
interventions and incentives that reflect the priorities of forest managers and are
relevant and feasible from their points of view (UN 2005). This type of participation, in
turn, helps them to maintain control and affects sustainability by building on their
knowledge, initiatives and motivation.
Additionally, participation enables forest managers to identify and adjust to emergent
problems, and to engage in advocacy and policy dialogue with local and national policy
makers. Effective participation, however, requires long implementation periods,
flexibility in the design of benefits, close monitoring and evaluation, and an effective
system for communication amongst stakeholders (UN 2005).
The earlier the forest managers are included in the process of developing and
implementing BSM, the greater the chances are of making it more feasible and
effective for them. Also, forest managers must be well organized and able to negotiate
if the outcomes of participation processes are to be maximized. In this regard, the
provision of legal assistance for forest managers is also recommended (Griffiths 2008).
From what has been stated above, it seems clear that guidelines for LP need to be
established in order to build a distributional mechanism in a REDD+ scheme and this
will vary from one REDD+ country to another. PAMs should include flexible approaches
for BSM, which can be adapted to the needs of forest managers and to the area in
which the REDD+ scheme is to be developed. It is essential, however, to guarantee that
the process of participation follows FPIC principles, is democratic and interactive and is
implemented before any other step is taken to share the benefits generated by the
REDD+ scheme. As the analysis of the case study will show, only forest managers are
capable of defining what fair benefits are and the best way of receiving them.
8
Equity
Equity is recognized as a key element when designing and implementing BSM for
schemes like REDD+ (Pagiola & Platais 2007; Peskett et al 2008; Grieg-Gran, in press).
There are different ways of defining equity and most definitions are based on ideas of
distributive justice (Rawls, 1971, Dobson, 1998; Okereke, 2008) which are as varied as
the cultures from which they eminate (Sachs and Santarius, 2007:136). Following this
the argument can be made that the definition of equity will always vary from one
REDD+ country to another.
We must also consider the way in which equity is analyzed: both in the outcomes of a
distributional scheme and in the process of coming to an agreement on such scheme
(Lind and Taylor, 1988). This distinction has already been described by Brown and
Corbera (2003) respectively as “equity in outcomes” and “equity in decision-making”,
where the first refers to the distribution of project outcomes among project
participants (Corbera et al, 2007:368) and the later concerns to procedural fairness
within the project framework, and considers the issues of recognition and inclusion in
strategic management decisions (Fraser, 1997; Paavola, 2003 in Corbera et al,
2007:368).
This paper recognizes that equity in decision making will directly interfere in equity in
outcomes, as already argued by Corbera et al (2007), and will employ this distinction to
analyze the way in which BSM were designed and implemented in JUMA. To analyze
equity in the decision making process I will use Pimbert and Pretty (1994) typologies of
participation to look at how local forest managers were engaged in the design and
implementation of BSM. To analyze equity in the outcomes, I will look at the fairness
of the benefits being distributed following Aristotle’s dictum of what is just is what is
proportional (Muller 2001).
Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis fair benefits will be those benefits capable
of meeting different needs proportionally, looking not just at incomes and costs (as the
literature on PES has been doing, e.g. Grieg-Gran, in press), but also at the main needs
of those in charge of keeping the forests standing. Including “meeting needs” in my
definition of fair benefits is justified by the fact that it figures prominently in the
sustainable development discourse (WCED 1987; Okereke & Dooley, in press).
One major concern when incorporating equity in REDD schemes is that in order to
meet the additionality criteria (as defined at the Clean Development Mechanism),
REDD+ needs to benefit large landowners who are likely to be responsible for the large
emissions from deforestation and degradation and this would be unfair to those who
have been conserving the forest for a long time, like indigenous communities
(Sunderlin et al 2008, in Griffiths 2008; Bond et al 2009). Consequently is necessary to
pre-determing through national and sub-national PAMs the eventual beneficiaries of
any REDD+ scheme and which types of incentives and interventions they will be
related to. In other words, who are to be encouraged to maintain behaviours (e.g.
9
indigenous communities), who will be compensated for the opportunity costs of
REDD+ (e.g. large landowners) and which interventions need to be made in each case.
In this sense, it is argued that as forest managers have different ways of managing and
obtaining benefits from the forest, they will have different demands for assuming (in
the case of large-landholders) or maintaining (in the case of indigenous communities)
conservation behaviour. To reach this goal, a contextualized assessment of forest
managers’ needs and which interventions are necessary in each case appear to be a
crucial step in determining equity parameters when defining the benefits and BSM of
REDD+ schemes at the local level. Additionally, as already shown by Corbera et al
(2007), a more contextually informed definition of the benefits is critical to ensuring
equitable BSM.
CASE STUDY
General Information
The Juma Sustainable Development Reserve project for reducing GHG emissions aims
to address deforestation in an area of the State of Amazonas (Brazil), which is under
pressure from land-grabbers and illegal loggers, due to two main highways that run
alongside the area (BR-319 and AM-174). The main activity of the area is small-scale
agriculture, for the production of tubercles, cereals and fruits. The project is financed
by government and private entities and has a complex institutional framework. The
area is a conservation unit (sustainable development reserve) created in 2006, which
belongs to the state and is protected by law. The overall project, however, is being
coordinated by a private entity called Amazonas Sustainable Foundation (Fundação
Amazonas Sustentável – FAS, in Portuguese).
All the carbon credits generated by the JUMA project belong to FAS, in consequence of
Law n° 3135 and the Decree n° 27.600 (Amazonas 2008) and will later be sold to
Marriott International, the main private funder of the project. The fact that the carbon
rights are owned by FAS can raise questions about the fairness of these PAMs taking
these rights away from the local forest managers, responsible for reducing emissions.
In fact, REDD+ like schemes, normally represent a virtual transfer of property rights
from service providers to resource users (Corbera et al, 2007), who often control the
nature of this transaction. Therefore, if forest managers are to be compensated and
incentivized in a fair way, there need to be transparent and accountable BSM.
BSM in JUMA
JUMA uses financial resources in both incentives and interventions, using different
types of BSM. Due to the complex nature of the research involved in analysing
interventions, this paper will limit its investigation to an analysis of incentives.
The BSM used by JUMA to implement incentives, was originally a state program to pay
for environmental services known as Bolsa Floresta Program (BFP). This program was
established by law in 2007 and is implemented in all the conservation units in the state
of Amazonas. In the case of JUMA, however, due to extra financial resources provided
10
by the REDD+ project there are more types of benefits being distributed as part of the
BFP than in other conservation units (R. Luna, 2009, personal communication), which
guarantees the financial additionality of the project.
Under the Decree n. 27.600 (Amazonas 2008), the coordination of the program is
delegated to FAS and the program now consists of four voluntary components: i) Bolsa
Floresta Family (BFF); ii) Bolsa Floresta Social (BFS); iii) Bolsa Floresta Association (BFA);
and iv) Bolsa Floresta Income (BFI). In 2007, Decree n. 26.581 created the State Fund
for Climate Change, which is where the resources for CC related activities, including
REDD+, are deposited. The amount of money designated for the benefits distributed
by the BFP is equivalent to the interest obtained from REDD+ investments in this Fund
(M. Cenamo, 2009, personal communication). The components of the program and
other relevant information are summarized on Table 2, below.
Table 2: Bolsa Floresta Program
BFP
Characteristics
Beneficiaries
Traditional Communities, Local Associations, Women,
Households and Children
Coordination FAS
State Climate Complementary
Decree
Decree
PAMs created Change Law
Law 53/2007 –
26.581/2
27.600/2008
(Law
Regulated the
007–
– Defined the
coordination
3135/2007) – State Climate
Created
Established
Change Law
the
of the
the Program
State
Program
Fund for
Climate
Change
Funds
Interests from the State Climate Change Fund, administrated by
FAS with funds donated by the state and private investors.
BFI
BFF
BFS
BFA
An average
Direct
An average
Payment to
value of BRL
payment of a value of BRL
the
monthly grant 4,000 (+- USD
association of 4,000 (+- USD
2,000) per
people living 2,000) per
of BRL 50 (+community
in the
USD 25) per
community
per year. This
Components
family, to the per year,
reserve. It
of BFP
households of destined to
corresponds portion is
social
to 10% of all destined for
these
supporting
families.
improvements the BFF
sustainable
.
granted. Its
purpose is to production.
strengthen
the
organisation
and social
control of the
11
program.
1. Be a resident of the reserve for at least 2 years.
Eligibility
2. If there are children have them at school.
3. Actively participate in the Association and in the
development of management plans and complying with
their rules.
4. Sign a commitment agreement for keeping crop and
pasture areas no larger than those of the year when the
Program was instituted.
Rules
Families who deforest an area a little larger than their crops (up
to 50%), are given a “yellow card” and after explaining their
reasons to the Association are allowed to continue in the
Program for another year. If they continue deforesting, the
families are given a “red card”, and their benefits are suspended
for undetermined time. Whoever deforests an area much larger
than their crop are (in excess of 50%) is given a “red card” in the
first year. Families given either two consecutive yellow cards or
three in alternate years are excluded from the Program.
Source: Adapted from the Amazonas State secretariat for sustainable development
website (www.sds.am.gov.br).
This paper will use the definition of a traditional community as given by
Complementary Law 53/2007, which regulates the Climate Change State Law; a rural
group culturally differentiated which recognizes itself as such, with its own forms of
social organization and that uses natural resources for subsistence and for cultural,
social, religious and economic activities. These communities maybe indigenous, but in
the case of JUMA there are no indigenous communities, just river bank ones.
FINDINGS
Local Participation in BFP
The BFP program is voluntary and beneficiaries of the program include: the Association
in the reserve, traditional communities, households, women and children. The
association benefits from the BFA, while traditional communities, households, women
and children benefit from all the other components: BFI, BFF and BFS.
According to Project Design Document (PDD, 2008) “the project was designed through
a transparent process involving participatory workshops and political consultations in
order to guarantee the involvement and commitment of all the local stakeholders”
(p.7). Also, “the use of participatory methods in all of these meetings, workshops and
public hearings throughout the reserve creation process was very important for
increasing understanding at the community organization level and for communicating
the modus operandi to the local communities” (p.54). These workshops were
meetings with local communities where climate change, the program and REDD+ were
explained.
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When asked to describe their participation in these meetings, the majority of
households interviewed classified them as informative/passive rather than as
empowering. In fact, as the whole program had already been developed (with the
participation of just key stakeholders5) when these workshops occurred they served
more to inform than to help in constructing the project and its BSM. It was during
these meetings, also, that people were invited to sign a non-deforestation
commitment (M.Cristo, 2009, personal communication).
With the exception of the BFS case, the traditional communities and households in the
reserve were not included during the early stages of the development of the
components of BFP and were not given the opportunity of choosing the benefits they
would receive and how they would receive them.
Because the LP process was passive almost all the households interviewed considered
that direct payments under the BFF, for example, made no difference to their wellbeing and in fact meant “nothing” to them. Some of the households (15%) considered
that it was “better than nothing”, but was not sufficient to help encourage better
behaviour in view of the fact that the benefits they could obtain from the forest were
greater6. Another complaint was that to receive the money the households had to
travel to the nearest town and this involved spending almost an equivalent amount on
fuel to get there – this decreased the efficiency of the payments.
Despite having the last word on how resources should be applied in any one year,
some communities were not able to participate in the BFI decision making process,
due to a lack of information with respect to the days on which BFI decisions would be
taken. Thus, the BFI choices benefited only the communities in one part of the reserve
and this prevented fair and effective outcomes.
In order to monitor the impacts of the project in the communities, a socio-economic
evaluation of these communities was carried out during the initial stages of the
implementation of the project. Through a questionnaire answered by the head of the
household, the social conditions of communities were evaluated and their social needs
were identified (PDD 2008:93). This evaluation was also used to determine social
benefits, and the best way to distribute them in the BFS (R.Luna, 2009, personal
communication).
The fact that the families in the reserve did not have easy access to services such as
education, health, water and energy, made social benefits in the BFS very important in
that they provided permanent, self-sustainable benefits, without creating dependency.
Also, according to the majority of households interviewed, such benefits were more
effective in modifying behaviour than direct payments. With their children at school,
for example, families felt much more confident about meeting their commitments with
respect to conservation (M. Adu, 2009, personal communication).
5
These included: NGOs, state representatives and forest managers representatives in Manaus, the capital of the State of
Amazonas.
6
For the question about how much is their forestry income in cash per month answers varied from a minimum of BRL500 (around
USD 200) to BRL5000 (around USD 2000).
13
In the case of BFA, when it came to the application of the resources households did
not have the power to decide. In the first year, for example, although households
participated by giving opinions on resources in some workshops realized by FAS, final
decisions of the BFA were made by the foundation. Also, the equipment that FAS
bought for the Association belongs to the foundation. Indeed, the households are
starting to call the BFA the “Bolsa Floresta Foundation” (D. Correa, 2009, personal
communication)! Participation in this case can only be considered consultative and this
could reduce the autonomy of the Association and limit the chances of it reaching its
goals.
Equity in BFP
In this section I will look at how the decision-making process affected the outcomes of
the BSM in JUMA by analyzing equity in decision-making and in outcomes.
With regard to direct payments made by BFF there was no attempt to determining
households´ needs, how they would access the money and transaction costs that
participants would incur. Furthermore, households could not renegotiate the deal and
this placed them in a very passive position, which had negative implications for equity.
In the case of BFS, however, the fact that the communities’ social needs were
considered before implementing social benefits meant that there was “equity in the
decision-making” and “in the outcomes”. The families in the reserve did not have easy
access to services such as education, health, water and energy and so these became
additional benefits, which were permanent in nature.
Strategies to decrease dependence on forests such as more educational and social
services can be effective ways of reducing emissions and generating co-benefits (Byron
& Arold 1999) on REDD+ schemes. The most concrete benefit of JUMA up to now is,
undoubtedly, the provision of education through the establishment of the main school
of the project. Indeed, the majority of the academics interviewed believed that from
an equity stand point local adaptation and capacity building must be the main focus
when sharing benefits in a REDD+ project7.
The aim of the Association is to strengthen the participation and the organisational
character of the local communities and should be seen as a very important step to
enhancing equity and attempting to follow FPIC principles. Nevertheless, as not all
people are able to actively participate in the decision-making process and receive
benefits from the association, these goals are not being reached. On the contrary,
conflicts have arisen among communities and the association representatives and this
has made the process of meeting different needs more difficult. In this sense, there is a
need to improve equity both in decision-making and in outcomes in BFA.
In the case of BFI, the resources were all invested in the production of Brazilian nuts
and this activity was not capable of serving the interests of all communities.
Households complained that there was a need to invest the resources in diversified
7
Information obtained through the analysis of questionnaires that were distributed among the experts.
14
activities, to benefit more people in the reserve. Households also reported that the
investment was inefficient, because they receive the income from Brazilian nuts just
once a year, rather than all year around.
DISCUSSION
This paper aimed to explore how to fairly distribute REDD+ benefits based on a
framework of LP and equity. This section examines the prevalent issues and suggests
ways forward. It also identifies elements of this study that can be applied in other
REDD schemes. Two specific issues arise within this framework (1) how to define
benefits and (2) how to develop and implement a BSM.
How to define benefits
The JUMA experience has demonstrated that benefits may be fairer and more efficient
if defined before deciding how to share them. The advantages of defining the benefits
before defining their distributional mechanism are:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
the ability to identify what will work more effectively for forest
managers and which benefits are more efficient in changing behaviour;
a greater possibility of guaranteeing additionality and the permanence
of the scheme;
the ability to meet different needs;
the ability to deal with multi-stakeholders’ issues more effectively.
It is also clear that defining fair benefits depends upon a transparent, interactive,
inclusionary and well-implemented process of LP. However, it has already been argued
that LP processes are difficult to implement because they require communication
among forest managers, information, logistics systems and close monitoring and
evaluation (UN 2005). Moreover, local power relationships are very often
underestimated or not even taken into account, leading to a distorted version of the
local reality (Cleaver 1999, Kanji and Greenwood 2001, in Maniggel 2005:60). As
Agarwal (2001:1625) states:
“There are limits to what participation alone (even if
interactive) can achieve in terms of equity and efficiency, given
pre-existing socio-economic inequalities and relations of
power.”
Therefore, the evaluation of forest managers’ needs and what may be considered fair
and effective benefits could lead to a more equitable benefit sharing process. There
are some core needs for financial investments in REDD+ schemes, but it is crucial to
analyze the particular needs of the area where the scheme will be implemented in
order to try to obtain fairness, additionality and permanence.
•
What can be replicated in other REDD+ schemes?
15
Benefits as social improvements, like education, and the idea of generating income
through the promotion of sustainable businesses were, in the JUMA experience, fairer,
more additional and more permanent benefits than direct payments. Consequently, it
appears that REDD+ schemes are more sustainable if based on benefits like these
rather than on direct monetary compensations. It was also clear that these benefits
were successful in improving the welfare of forest managers and in generating cobenefits while, at the same time, reducing emissions.
Developing and Implementing a BSM
The case study shows that where local forest managers do not fully engaged in
participation processes as in the cases of BFF, BFI and BFA, there can be a negative
effect on the outcomes of equitable BSM. On the other hand, a more contextually
informed and interactive participation of forest managers in the design and
implementation of BSM, as in the case of BFS, can increase positive outcomes in terms
of equity.
Because benefits must be distributed across multiple stakeholders and at different
levels, there must be different options for sharing them. They must also be developed
according to local capabilities and be reviewed and monitored from time to time to
guarantee equity, permanence and additionality. In the absence of reviewing
processes, as in the case of BFP, there is a risk of forest managers being locked into
inappropriate long-term commitments, receiving benefits that are insufficient to cover
the costs of reducing deforestation.
Finally, but no less important, strong local organisation and negotiation capacity
appeared to be vital for guaranteeing that benefits were distributed following a
bottom-up approach, rather than a top-down approach based on discretionary criteria.
Mechanisms for resolving social conflicts were also considered crucial by the majority
of households interviewed, highlighting the need for implementing accessible and
transparent grievance mechanisms in JUMA. This lack of monitoring could make the
difference between being in favour of or against the program.
•
What can be replicated in other REDD+ schemes?
Although it is a flexible mechanism, BFP has shown that BSM will only produce
equitable outcomes with interactive local participation in all the stages of benefitsharing, from the design and definition of benefits to the implementation of the
mechanisms that will distribute them. The main approaches adopted in JUMA for the
inclusion of forest managers in the process of sharing benefits were more consultative
and informative, which lead to conflicts between forest managers’ needs, the benefits
that were being implemented, and the ways in which they were receiving them. The
JUMA project has also shown that monitoring and accountable systems to
administrate BSM are important tools for equitable outcomes, especially where forest
managers do not retain carbon rights.
16
Nevertheless, the four components of BFP contribute to the development of other
BSM because it is extremely important to have different benefits that meet the social,
organisational and financial (mainly income generation) requirements of forest
managers.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper aims, trough the study of the JUMA project, to address the extent to which
LP was considered while sharing REDD+ benefits in the project and what the
implications of these were for equity parameters. It appears, from the analyses of
JUMA, that it is more important to consider the equity criteria while identifying
benefits than when sharing them. Moreover, because of the complex and diverse
relationships and issues that deforestation involves a more multi-dimensional
approach in identifying beneficiaries, benefits and creating BSM is indispensable.
A multi-dimensional approach would reflect the relative costs and needs of different
stakeholders. As schemes like REDD+ must also target areas that are at greatest risk in
terms of effectively reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (Hall 2008;
Wunder 2007), benefits for these areas will need to consider the conservation efforts
and the costs of forest managers in the given areas. A multi-dimensional approach
should also include benefits for those who already have conservation behaviour (such
as indigenous communities), because such benefits are essential for dealing with
equity dilemmas and avoiding “perverse incentives” that could increase deforestation
(Richards & Jenkins 2007).
In considering these factors and multi-task processes, project developers must keep in
mind that there is no “one size fits all” for REDD+ projects and BSM implementation
will need to vary from one project to another. Also, further research is needed for the
development of guidelines for implementing inclusionary, interactive and democratic
processes of LP. Finally, when we think about how to equitably share REDD benefits
among forest managers and whether it is really possible to share benefits that are fair,
additional and permanent at the same time we need the ask the question: how far are
REDD+ benefits consistent with the needs and conservation efforts of forest
managers? That one more question has been raised is perhaps not surprising for a
subject matter that is relatively new. What can be said is that for that to be fair,
additional and permanent benefits BSM will need to be developed and implemented
with inclusive approaches and a flexible dynamic to benefit different types of forest
managers. If not, REDD+ will only aggravate social relations in the forest and obstruct
the process of reducing emissions.
17
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was realized with the support of the James Martin 21st Century School
Tropical Forests Initiative visitor programme, while at the Oxford Centre for Tropical
Forests (OCTF) at the Environmental Change Institute, University of Oxford. I am
extremely thankful to Connie McDermott, Tim Forsyth and Tony Hall for all the help
and attention they gave me for the production of this work. Special thanks to Mauricio
Adu and João Tezza for the realization of the field research. This paper is dedicated to
all communities in JUMA, specially my interviewees, to whom I own the outcomes of
this work.
18
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