Ethnicity, Religion and Culture based Discrimination: A Study of

Transcription

Ethnicity, Religion and Culture based Discrimination:
A Study of Malaysia
S.N. Malakar
Chittaranjan Senapati
Working Paper Series
Indian Institute of Dalit Studies
New Delhi
2010
Foreword
Indian Institute of Dalit Studies (IIDS) has been amongst the first
research organisations in India to focus exclusively on development
concerns of the marginalised groups and socially excluded
communities. Over the last six year, IIDS has carried-out several
studies on different aspects of social exclusion and discrimination
of the historically marginalised social groups, such as the Scheduled
Caste, Scheduled Tribes and Religious Minorities in India and other
parts of sub-continent. The Working Paper Series disseminates
empirical findings of the ongoing research and conceptual
development on issues pertaining to the forms and nature of social
exclusion and discrimination. Some of our papers also critically
examine inclusive policies for the marginalised social groups.
The working paper “Ethnicity, Religion and Culture based
Discrimination: A Study of Malaysia” has been taken out from our
report on Caste Based Discrimination in South Asia. Drawn from
the country report of Malaysia; the study emphasises on the colonial
policy which had encouraged mass Asian immigration into Malaya
and the influx of Chinese immigrants that have largely contributed
in the emergence of multi-ethnic country such as Malaysia. The
political economy of Malaysia shaped by colonial capitalism had
created certain patterns of uneven development, economic
disparities and social divisions. The paper broadly explores the
nature and extent of ethnic, religious and cultural diversity within
the communities and the degree of stratification and inequality
that has become prevalent over the years. Also ethnicity, religion
and culture have become convenient political resources in an
unconstructive sense causing insecurity and disadvantages.
Indian Institute of Dalit Studies gratefully acknowledges Action
Aid for funding this study. We hope our working papers will be
helpful to academics, students, activists, civil society organisations
and policymaking bodies.
Surinder S. Jodhka
Director, IIDS
Contents
1.
Introduction
1 . 1 Malaysia: An Overview
1.2 Emergence and Ethnic Composition
1
3
5
2.
Exclusion, Division and Discrimination
2.1 Ethnic Division in the Economic System
2.2 Rural-Urban Divide
2.3 Exclusion and Discrimination in the Labour Market
10
12
12
13
3.
History of Exclusion Practice
3.1 Origin of the Plural Society
3.2 Perpetuation of Differences and Inequality
3.3 Growing Sense of Alienation and Resentment
3.4 Cultural Impact
18
20
22
22
24
4.
Nature of Deprivation: Access to Resources
and Opportunities
24
4.1 New Economic Policy and Beyond (1971 - 2010)
4.2 Vision 2020
4.3 National Vision Policy (2001-2010)
25
27
27
5.
Altered Ethnic Structures and Inequalities
5 . 1 Social Sector Policies
5.2 Governance: Public–Private Sector Divide
5.3 Governance and Public–Private Sector Overlap
5.4 Ethicised Civil Service
29
30
42
44
44
6.
Economic, Social, Political and Cultural
Fallouts of Exclusion
46
6.1 Ethnic Policy in Malaysia
6.2 Representation and Domination
6.3 Ethnic Representation: Parliament and State
Legislative Assemblies
46
49
52
7.
Conclusion
63
8.
Recommendation and Suggestions
65
Ethnicity, Religion and Culture based
Discrimination: A Study of Malaysia
*S.N. Malakar
**Chittaranjan Senapati
1. Introduction
In multi-ethnic state, ethnic identity plays an additional variable in socioeconomic development over and above those usually present in more
‘homogeneous’ societies. The role of ethnicity in development can be
negative or positive, in other words a potential challenge. In multi-ethnic,
multi-religious and multi-cultural societies, more often ethnic exclusion
and discrimination come to the notice rather than peace, inclusion and
equality. The scholarly efforts to study ethnic, religious and cultural
exclusion and discrimination have resulted in the development of a
substantial knowledge on the subject. Much of the pioneering work related
to the subject has been done in developing countries, from the societies
with a general standard of living and also characterised by functional
differentiation and cross-cutting interest affiliations.
Identities bearing markers of ethnicity, religion and culture are often the
sources of conflicts, exclusion and discrimination. The consequences of
adhering to such an assumption could be that the identification and
*
S. N. Malakar is a Professor at Centre for African Studies, JNU, New Delhi.
snmalakar@mail.jnu.ac.in
** C. R. Senapati is an Associate Professor at Sardar Patel Institute of Economic and Social
Research, Ahmedabad. crsenapati@gmail.com
Volume IV, Number 04
elaboration of the distinguishing characteristics between different ethnic,
religious and cultural groups assume more importance. The differences in
religious beliefs, languages, cultural heritage, national or geographical
origin of each ethnic group are distended. As such the implications at policy
level are that the solution to ethnic exclusion lies at the ethnic relation
level. This results in proliferation of community goodwill, racial relations
and so on; whereas the problems of economic and political inequality among
ethnic communities are marginalised.
Scholars, who believe in social and cultural incompatibility in a multiethnic society, suggest that ethnic, religious and cultural exclusion and
discrimination are inevitable. This reinstates that ethnicity, religion and
culture, are more often the symptoms rather than causes of the difficulty.
In an exploitative economic structure, for example, exploitation would
continue irrespective of its ethnic, religious and cultural identities and
without delving into the economic structures, the replacement of
immigrants by natives would in no way contribute to the resolution of the
problems.
In case the feelings of insecurity, uncertainty and fear arising from adverse
circumstances do not exist; social groups tend to be less inclined to
ethnicity, religious and cultural identities. On the contrary, when such
feelings creep in, ethnic, religious and cultural identities become a shield,
a rallying point or a protective mechanism for members of the social groups.
This is true about immigrant communities all over the world and is wide
spread among existing communities which face competition from the
immigrant groups. Ethnic identification and consciousness are stronger
among disadvantaged ethnic minority groups who largely endure
unemployment, upward social and political mobility, incase of Indians
and Chinese in Malaysia. In this context, ethnicity has assumed an
important role for articulation and in an effort for social and economic
justice and equality. Ethnicity, religion and culture are also convenient
political resources that can be readily exploited to serve the purpose of an
individual politician, a political party or the system. It becomes easy to
mobilise support and gain prominence for political success. The ethnic
minority or majority groups have become scapegoats for the vested political
interests and Malaysia is prominent evidence undergoing such difficulties
since 1969.
2
Ethnicity, Religion and Culture based Discrimination: A Study of Malaysia
S.N. Malakar and Chittaranjan Senapati
The second category of conventional wisdom that stratification on the
basis of class or ideology is healthy and that ethnic consciousness is to be
abhorred has percolated as the blind faith. Undoubtedly, when a society is
vertically stratified along ethnic lines; the potential to exploit ethnic issues
is far greater than stratification on the basis of class or ideology. This,
however, does not in any way imply that the latter form of stratification is
less capricious. Unfortunately, the process of emergence of more
sophisticated social and economic infrastructures which could reduce the
relevance of ethnic issues in the political arena is time consuming. In the
interim, such politicians are left with no positive frame of reference to
develop constructive policy or programme measures in order to resolve
ethnic issues. So far, the issue of ethnicity and outcome of an approach to
it has been down beating. Ethnicity not being inherently unyielding
phenomenon can become a powerful resource for national development.
Indeed in a multi-ethnic society, each ethnic community has its particular
characteristics. For those involved in guiding societal development, the
challenge is to mobilise the strength of various ethnic groups as the
resource-input in search for the realisation of the goals of development.
Such an approach to ethnicity is likely to be beneficial for political
endeavours that identify the societal interests with those of political
prominence and fulfillment of the personal vested interests of few.
Although a constructive approach to the issue of ethnicity is rare, it exists
in a profound form in Malaysia which is today one of the flourishing society.
Before moving on to examine the Malaysian experience, it is important to
explore the background of the country to arrive at the understanding of its
ethnic situation.
1.1 Malaysia: An Overview
Malaysia is a part of archipelagic South-East Asia, the Peninsular Malaysia
connected to mainland South-East Asia via the long narrow isthmus of
southern Thailand. The Malay Peninsula, now usually called Peninsular
Malaysia is contiguous to the land mass of Thailand to the north and linked
by a causeway to the Island-State of Singapore to the south. In comparison
to its closest neighbours, it is a medium-size country, both area and
population wise, (See Table 1).
3
Table 1: Geographical Area and Population
of South-East Asian Countries
Sl.No
Country
Area (000
Population (0000)
1.
Indonesia
1,904
222,611
2.
Vietnam
325
82,481
3.
Philippines
300
81,408
63,763
4.
Thailand
513
5.
Myanmar
677
50,101
6.
MALAYSIA
330
25,493
7.
Cambodia
181
14,482
8.
Lao PDR
231
5,787
9.
Singapore
1
4,261
10.
Brunei Darussalam
5
366
Source : ESCAP, 2004.
Malaysia is an independent nation and a Parliamentary Constitutional
Monarchy with Federal government structure. The country is one of the
ten nations (plus Timor-Leste) in South-East Asia comprising thirteen states
spread across two major regions separated by the South China Sea
(Peninsular Malaysia and East Malaysia on the island of Borneo), and three
Federal Territories––Kuala Lumpur, established in 1974; Labuan,
established in 1984 and Putrajaya, established in 2001. The other principal
region of Malaysia is the northern portion of the Island of Borneo—the
rest of Borneo being the small state of Brunei and Kalimantan, which is a
part of Indonesia. This latter region was once called East Malaysia but the
name has been dropped from official use. The Federation of Malaysia has
a total of 13 states. In Peninsular Malaysia there are 11 states, which
constituted the Federation of Malaya up to 1963 and the remaining two
states are Sabah and Sarawak, physically located on the island of Borneo.
These two states constitute about 60 per cent of Malaysia’s total
geographical land area but only 18 per cent of its population. The issues of
isolated population, not totally absent in Peninsular Malaysia are more
pressing in these states and strengthening of the transportation network
and access of small communities to basic amenities has been major
preoccupations in the developmental activities. However, Malaysia has
abundant of natural resources like rubber, tin, timber, oil palm, and
petroleum and natural gas, which have been providing the basis for its key
wealth and industrialisation.
4
1.2 Emergence and Ethnic Composition
Singapore as part of British Malaya remained a British colony when Malaya
was formed in 1948, and attained its independence in 1957. In 1963, the
Federation of Malaya merged with Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore to form
the Federation of Malaysia. However, Singapore seceded from Malaysia in
1965 as a result of irreconcilable differences between the Federal
government of Malaysia and the State government of Singapore.
Due to changes in the political structure of Malaysia i.e. pre-colonial Malay
states, British Malaya, independent Malaya, Malaysia between 1963 and
1965, and post-1965 Malaysia, makes it difficult to present a full series of
consistently comparable demographic data in a simple format. The rapid
population growth in Malaya and Singapore from 1911 to 1957, mainly due
to mass immigration from China and India saw the population of Malaya
almost tripling and that of Singapore increasing four-fold in this period
(See Table 2).
Table 2: Population of Malaya, Singapore and British Malaya
(1911–1957), Malaysia Including Singapore (1963)
and Malaysia Excluding Singapore (1970)
Year
Malaya
Singapore
British
Malaya
1911
2,338,951
303,321
2,642,272
1921
2,906,691
418,358
3,325,049
1931
3,787,758
557,745
4,345,503
1947
4,908,086
938,144
5,846,230
1957
6,278,758
1,445,929
7,724,687
1963
1970
Malaysia
(1963)
9,007,414
Malaysia (1970)
a
10,319,324
Since no census data was available for 1963, the 1963 total population figure is an
estimate combining 1957 figures for Malaya and Singapore and 1960 figures for
Sabah and Sarawak.
Sources: Census Reports of Malaya 1911–1957, Sabah 1960, Sarawak 1960,
Singapore 1957, and Malaysia 1970.
In 1957, the population of Malaya was 6,278,758. The merger of Malaya
with Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore created a total Malaysian population
of 9,007,414 in 1963. After Singapore secession in 1965, the Malaysian
population subsequently grew to 10,319,324 in 1970. Peninsular Malaysia
had approximately 84 per cent of the total population in 1970, but its
5
share of the population declined to about 81 per cent by 2000, mainly
because of an influx of Filipino immigrants to Sabah and Indonesian
immigrants from Kalimantan to Sarawak ( See Table 3).
Table 3: Population of Malaysia, 1970 –2000
Peninsular Malaysia
Year
Number
1970
8,809,557
1980
11,426,613
Sabah
Per
cent
Sarawak
Total
Number
Per
cent
Number
Per
cent
84.4
653,604
6.3
976,269
9.4
10,439,430 100.1
83.1
1,011,046
7.4
1,307,582
9.5
13,745,241
1991
14,475,400 82.4
1,398,900
8.0
1,700,000 9.7
17,574,300
100.1
2000
18,523,632
2,230,000 9.8
2,071,506
22,825,138
100.1
81.2
9.1
Number
Per
cent
100.0
Note: Due to rounding, not all percentage rows add up to 100.
Sources: Census Reports of Malaysia 1970, 1980, 1991 and 2000.
Even the growth rate of population in three geographical regions of
Malaysia varies; in fact, the magnitude of population growth depends on
the level of development (See Table 4).
Table.4: Average Annual Growth of Population in Per cent
Year
Peninsular Malaysia
Sabah
Sarawak
Malaysia (Total)
1970-80
2.6
4.4
2.9
2.8
1980-91
2.6
3.6
2.9
2.7
1991-2000
2.0
3.5
1.5
2.1
Sources: Various issues of Census Report of Malaysia
For the purposes of this study, it is informative to note that the influx of
Chinese and Indian immigrants helped to increase the population of British
Malaya from about 550,000 in 1850 to about 2.4 million in 1911, the first
year for which census data is available, and then to 4.9 million in 1947.
Colonial policy was not intended to turn British Malaya into a “white settler”
colony on the model of Australia, Canada, New Zealand or South Africa.
Indeed, the last pre–Second World War census of 1931 showed that there
were only 17,768 Europeans, or 0.4 per cent of the total population.
Instead, colonial policy, except for or reversed during economic recession,
actively encouraged mass Asian immigration to Malaya, similar to the
practice in other British colonies such as Burma, East Africa and Fiji. By
1931, the combination of 1.7 million Chinese and 0.6 million Indians had
already exceeded the Malay population of just under 2.0 million (or 44
6
per cent of a total population of almost 4.4 million). Thus, the Malaysian
society emerged with multi-ethnic character (See Table 5).
Table 5: Multi-Ethnic Composition in Peninsular Malaysia
1911
Ethnic
group
1921
1931
1947
1957
1970
1980
1991
2000
Malays
1,367,245 1,568,588 1,863,872 2,427,853 3,125,474 4,685,838 6,315,000 8,433,800 11,485,341
Chinese
693,228
855,863
Indians
239,169
439,172
570,986
535,092
735,038
932,629
1,171,000
1,380,000
1,774,002
Others
85,358
43,377
68,254
60,408
184,732
69,183
75,000
537,500
121,641
Total
1,284,888 1,884,647 2,333,756 3,122,350 3,865,000 4,251,000
5,142,649
2,385,000 2,907,000 3,788,000 4,908,000 6,379,000 8,810,000 11,426,000 14,602,300 18,523,632
Proportion of total population (per cent)
Malays
57.3
54.0
49.2
49.5
49.0
53.2
55.3
57.8
62.0
Chinese
29.1
29.4
33.9
38.4
36.6
35.4
33.8
29.1
27.8
Indians
10.0
15.1
15.1
10.9
11.5
10.6
10.2
9.5
9.6
Others
3.6
1.5
1.8
1.2
2.9
0.8
0.7
3.7
0.7
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Note: Due to rounding, not all percentage columns add up to 100.
Sources: Census Reports of Malaysia 1911–2000.
But the growth of Bhumiputra is higher than other ethnic groups and the
lowest is among Chinese (See Table 6).
Table 6: Growth Rates in Percentage by Ethnic Group,
Malaysia, 1970–2000
Year
1970-80
Bhumuputra
Chinese
Indian
Total Malaysia
3.2
2.1
2.2
2.8
1980-91
3.1
1.3
1.9
2.7
1991-2000
2.7
1.4
1.7
2.1
Sources of data: Malaysia, Department of Statistics, 1983a, 1991a, and 2000e.
The typical representation of the multi-ethnic society of Malaysia
comprising of three main ethnic groups—Malays, Chinese and Indians—
understates the ethnic diversity prevalent within these communities and
equally complex are the ethnic diversities in Sabah and Sarawak. In ethnic
terms, the present Malaysian population consists of different communities,
several of which lend themselves to further sub-divisions. Based on their
differences in regional origin, for example, the Malay would include
immigrants from parts of Indonesia to the Malay states or British Malaya.
The Chinese make up groups of various dialects, for example, Cantonese,
Hakka, Hockchew and Hokkien; while as the category of Indians not only
includes Malyalis, Punjabis and Tamils, but include Ceylonese and
Pakistanis. The major ethnic categories that are officially recognised and
7
commonly accepted by the relevant communities themselves are used with
no further reference to sub-ethnic categories. The post-1970 fundamental
official classification divides the population between “bumiputera
(“pribumi” in the Indonesian language carries an equivalent reference to
indigeneity.)” or indigenous people, and non-bumiputera as non-indigenous
people (SeeTable 7).
Table 7: Population of Malaysia by Bumiputra and
Non-Bumiputra Divisions, 1970-2000
Population
division
1970
Number
1980
Percent
1991
2000
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Number
Percent
Bumiputera
5,738,250
55.6
8,059,537
58.6
10,656,500
60.6
14,621,468
64.1
NonBumiputera
4,581,074
44.4
5,685,704
41.4
6,917,800
39.4
8,203,670
35.9
Total
10,319,324
100.0
13,745,241
100.0
17,574,300
100.0
22,825,138
100.0
Sources: Census Reports of Malaysia 1970, 1980, 1991 and 2000.
As per this classification, the bumiputera of Peninsular Malaysia consists
almost entirely of the Malays and the Orang Asli (Aboriginal Communities),
while as the bumiputera of Sabah and Sarawak refer to the indigenous
people of diverse ethnic communities. On the whole, the non-bumiputera
category chiefly refers to Chinese and Indians whose demographic presence
became significant with the waves of immigration from China and India,
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and subsequently the
mass settlement of the immigrants and their descendants. In censuses and
bureaucratic tabulations, a category of “other” (likewise non-bumiputera)
communities is usually reserved for Burmese, Eurasian, Portuguese, Thai
and other ethnic origins.
The ethnic composition of the population of Sabah and Sarawak, and the
composition of bumiputera communities in particular, is more varied than
that of Peninsular Malaysia. In case of Sabah, the categorisation of the
different ethnic groups was a major problem when the first census of Sabah
was conducted in 1960. For 1970 census, 38 ethnic groups, which were
formerly enumerated separately, were re-categorised into 8 groups: Bajau,
Chinese, Indonesian, Kadazan, Malay, Murut, other indigenous and others.
According to the 1970 census, Kadazandusuns was the single largest ethnic
group, forming just over 28 per cent of the Sabah population, followed by
the Chinese comprising 21 per cent of the population. Since then, there has
been an official tendency in categorising the Sabah population in
accordance with the basic tripartite classification: (i) non-Muslim
bumiputera (Kadazandusun and Murut); (ii) Muslim bumiputera (Bajau,
8
Malay and other smaller groups); and (iii) non-bumiputera (Chinese and
other non-indigenous groups) (See Table 8).
Table 8: Ethnic Composition of the
Population, Sabah, 1960-2000.
1960
Bumiputera
1970
1980*
1990**
2000***
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent
Kadazan
145,229
32.0
183,574
28.2
321,834
24.6
479,944
Murut
22,138
4.9
30,908
4.7
NA
NA
50,255
3.8
84,679
24.1
4.3
Bajau
59,710
13.1
77,755
11.9
,,
,,
203,457
15.5
343,178
17.3
Malay
1,645
0.4
18,244
2.8
,,
,,
106,740
8.2
303,497
15.3
Other
indigenous
79,421
17.5
126,274
19.4
,,
,,
255,555
19.6
390,058
19.6
308,143
67.8
436,755
67.0
792,043
82.9
937,841
71.6
1,601,356
80.5
13.2
Subtotal
Non-bumiputera
Chinese
104,542
23.0
138,512
23.0
155,304
16.2
200,056
15.3
262,115
Others
41,736
9.2
76,037
11.7
8,365
0.9
171,613
13.1
125,190
6.3
146,278
32.2
214,549
33.0
163,669
17.1
371,669
28.4
387,305
19.5
454,421
100.0
651,304
100.0
955,712
100.0
1,309,510
100.0
1,988,661
100.0
Subtotal
All categories
Total
*In the 1980 census, all bumiputera categories were collapsed into one pribumi
category. ** Does not include 425,175 non-citizens. *** Does not include 614,824 noncitizens.
A similar attempt at a more manageable re-categorisation has been adopted
for Sarawak. The Ibans (“Sea Dayaks”), comprising about 31 per cent of
the population in 1970 remains single largest ethnic community in Sarawak
(See Table 9).
Table 9: Ethnic Composition of the
Population, Sarawak, 1960-2000
1960
Bumiputera
1970
1980
1991*
2000**
Iban
237,741
31.9
273,889
30.9
396,280
30.3
506,528
29.8
603,735
30.0
Malays
129,300
17.4
178,188
20.1
257,804
19.7
360,415
21.1
462,270
23.0
Bidayuh
57,619
7.7
83,313
9.4
107,549
8.2
140,662
8.3
166,756
8.3
Melanau
44,661
6.0
52,293
5.9
75,126
5.7
97,122
5.7
112,984
5.6
Others
37,931
5.1
50,528
5.7
69,065
5.3
104,391
6.1
117,690
5.9
507,252
68.1
638,21
71.9
905,824
69.2
1,209,118
71.7
1,463,435
72.9
26.7
Subtotal
Non-bumiputera
Chinese
229,154
30.8
239,569
27.0
385,161
29.5
475,752
28.0
537,230
Others
8,123
1.1
9,512
1.1
16,597
1.3
15,149
0.9
8,103
0.4
237,277
31.9
249,081
28.1
401,758
30.8
490,901
28.9
545,333
27.1
100.00
887,292
100.0
1,307,582
100.0
1,700,019
100.0
2,008,768
100.0
Subtotal
All categories
Total
744,529
*
Does not include 18,361 non-citizens. **Does not include 62,738 non-citizens.
9
The other major indigenous communities include Bidayuh (“Land
Dayaks”), Malays and Melanau. The remaining smaller communities such
as Bisaya, Kayan, Kedayan, Kelabit, Kenyah and Penan collectively
constitute less than 5 per cent of the total population. Among the nonbumiputera, the Chinese, who have had a long history of settlement in this
state (although their numbers only grew substantially in nineteenth and
twentieth centuries) account for about 30 per cent of the population.
In recent years there has also been an official inclination to differentiate
the population along religious lines, the most important dividing line being
between Muslims and non-Muslims. Pragmatically, without exception, the
Malays, including the ethnic Malays of Sabah and Sarawak, are Muslims.
There is a substantial number of indigenous non-Malay Muslims in Sabah
and Sarawak, Indian and Thai Muslims in Peninsula Malaysia and a small
number of Muslim converts of other ethnic backgrounds. As a rough guide,
all other Malaysians are classified as or regard themselves as non-Muslims.
The Constitution provides for Islam as the official religion of the country
but Malaysia as a secular state maintains freedom of worship with one
critical provison: non-Islamic proselytisation among Muslims is forbidden,
as is any organised attempt to convert Malays and Muslims to other
religions. The basic ethnic and religious differentiation does not exhaust
the cultural diversity and complexity of Malaysian society. However, it
offers a convenient glimpse of the reality of a “plural society”, a conceptual
characterisation of Malaysian society originally theorised by Furnivall
(1948), that is compelling for most observers.
Malaysian social and political life seems overwhelmingly organised around
its ethnic divisions and their attendant, if fluctuating, trends of inter-ethnic
competition, compromise and conflict. Political parties are openly ethnic
in their membership, espoused interests and modes of mobilisation.
Coalitions of political parties represent attempts at inter-ethnic compromise
or co-operation. National economic, educational and cultural policies, to
take prominent examples, either explicitly or indirectly discriminate on
the basis of ethnic and religious differentiation. Nevertheless, many
mundane and trivial issues are “ethnicised” or “communalised” very easily.
2. Exclusion, Division and Discrimination
Although not all forms of social exclusion derive from discrimination, yet
all forms of discrimination lead to exclusionary behaviour. Exclusion and
10
discrimination exacerbate poverty, unemployment, conflicts and
instability. This approach has been defined as a “way of analysing how and
why individuals and groups fail to have access to a benefit from the
possibilities offered by societies and economies”. It identifies excluded
population groups’ need, assistance and allows for more targeted policies
to ensure their participation and integration in the development process.
Societal and economic forces create and intensify various forms of
exclusion. In the extreme, individuals move from vulnerability to
dependency to marginality. The patterns of development in which benefits
of economic growth are shared by only certain identifiable groups further
intensify exclusion.
The issue of livelihood (or its absence) can also be viewed through the
prism of exclusion. In this context, exclusion takes various forms, such as
exclusion from land, productive assets, and markets both in urban areas as
well as labour markets. Scholars have suggested that severe ethnic and
racial antagonisms can often be traced to the point at which groups meet
head-on contending in the labour markets. This theory argues that all forms
of discrimination by ethnic, religious and cultural groups originate through
this dynamics, wherein groups mobilise political and economical resources
to amplify their material interests. The goal of such actions is the exclusion
of competing groups from the market economy. Governments combat
discrimination based on ethnic or religion and culture by
(a) promoting equality of opportunity by outlawing discrimination;
and
(b) seeking equality of results by granting preferences to members of
disadvantaged groups.
The second approach has been labeled variously, including benign quotas,
reverse discrimination, reservation policy, employment equity, positive
discrimination, positive action and affirmative action. In contrast with
equal opportunity, which focuses on procedures and individuals, this
approach is result as well as group oriented. However, the two approaches
are not mutually exclusive.
Exclusion is the process through which individuals or groups are wholly or
partially excluded from maximum participation in the society they live in.
It has multidimensional characteristics involving exclusion in civil,
11
cultural, economic, social and political spheres. In fact, exclusion and
discrimination are the processes and cause of deprivation. The Malaysian
society has a high degree of stratification and inequality associated with
various kinds of group identities such as ethnic, religious, cultural, social
and regional origin. Ethnicity indeed becomes a powerful tool for social,
cultural and economic segregation and unfavorable inclusion, particularly
with unequal treatment of some ethnic groups that have made way into the
social system of Malaysia so far.
2.1 Ethnic Division in the Economic System
The indigenous communities suffer exclusion and marginalisation in access
to property and economy. The idea of equality remains alien to its basic
governing principles and ethics. There is indeed recognition of inequalities
and exclusion as well as severe deprivation of indigenous communities by
government although anti-discriminatory policies have been developed
since the New Economic Policy. These have brought about some positive
changes in the economic and social conditions of the indigenous
communities but continue to increase economic deprivation and disparities
between them and the dominant ethnic groups.
2.2 Rural-Urban Divide
On the eve of independence in 1957, the political economy of Malaysia
shaped by colonial capitalism had created certain patterns of uneven
development, economic disparities and social divisions. Spatially,
Malaysian west coast had a developed urban sector that stretched northsouth from Penang to Singapore. This region has well developed
infrastructure that integrated the domestic economy with the world
economy. A broad spectrum of middle and working classes increased with
economic diversification and bureaucratic expansion under colonialism.
However, nearly 60 per cent of the economically active population
continued to work in the rural sector, mostly rice cultivators (either on
their own land or rented land), small-holders growing rubber and other
cash crops, wage labourers working in plantations and squatters, and also
illegally raising cash crops on the state land. This rough rural-urban division
in the distribution of population and economic activity has had its ethnic
dimensions as well.
The dynamics of exclusion and deprivation can be seen from the rural and
urban composition of Malaysian population, so to say, the rural and urban
12
economy of Malaysia is divided ethnically . Between 1921 and 1970, the
Chinese consistently made up about 60 per cent of the urban population
(See Table 10).
Table 10: Proportional Distribution of Urban Population by
Major Ethnic Groups, Peninsular Malaysia 1921-1970
Malays
Year
Per cent Per cent of
Total
total
population
urban
population
Chinese
Indians
Per cent
Per cent
Per cent
Per
Per cent
Per cent
Per
of the
Total
urban
cent
Total
urban
cent
a
Malays
population population urban population population
urban
urban
population
1921
54.0
18.4
6.7
29.4
60.2
40.5
15.1
17.8
23.1
1931
49.2
19.2
8.6
33.9
59.6
38.8
15.1
17.8
25.9
1947
49.5
22.6
11.3
38.4
62.3
43.1
10.8
10.7
33.8
1967
49.8
22.6
19.3
37.2
63.9
73.0
11.3
10.7
41.1
1970
53.1
27.6
21.8
35.4
60.0
71.1
10.5
11.3
44.8
Sources: Census of Malaysia of different years
In contrast, the Malays who formed approximately half of the total
population during that period accounted for not more than a quarter of the
urban population. Even in 1957, only 19.3 per cent of the entire Malay
population lived in urban centres compared to 73 per cent of the Chinese
and 41.1 per cent of the Indian population.
2.3 Exclusion and Discrimination in the Labour Market
The economic disparities and social divisions were complicated by an ethnic
division of labour similar to the organisation of labour in other former
British colonies; Burma, Fiji, Guyana, Kenya and Uganda. The Colonial
design in order to preserve the basic structure and fabric of traditional
Malay society1 as well as the peasantry’s “refusal to supply plantation
labour”2 left the Malay peasantry mostly engaged in food production,
principally rice cultivation and fishing. Early Chinese migrant labourers
mainly worked in the mines; whereas later migrants were engaged in
commerce, industry and services, so that by 1930s “the occupations of the
Malayan Chinese had varied a great deal, ranging from business activity in
Singapore to coolie work in the tin mines” and “the great majority of them
were small traders, shopkeepers, artisans and, to a lesser extent,
agriculturalists and fishermen.” (Li 1982:116). During the colonial period,
migrant Indian labour was engaged in public works projects and the vast
majority of Indian labour was deployed at rubber estates. In 1931 and
13
1938, respectively, Indian workers formed 73.5 per cent and 80.4 per
cent of the estate labour force of the Federated Malay States. 3 In 1931,
when the total Indian population in Malaya was 624,009, Indian workers
accounted for more than 300,000 of Malaya’s total estate population of
423,000 4. A smaller number of educated middle class and professional
Indians and Ceylonese also worked in the British colonial offices and public
sectors.5 Table 11 provides a summary picture of independent Malaya’s
basic division of labour that, by geographical separation was later officially
described as “the identification of race with economic function”6, kept the
majority of the major ethnic communities more or less separate except
when they met “in the market-place”.
Table 11: Distribution of the Labour Force by Selected
Occupations and Ethnicity, Peninsular Malaysia, 1957
Occupation
Total
Number
Malays
(Percent)
Chinese
(Percent)
Indian
(Percent)
Others
(Percent)
Rice Cultivation
398,000
95.8
2.4
0.0
1.2
Rubber Cultivation
614,000
42.4
32.6
24.5
0.5
Mining and quarrying
58,000
17.7
68.3
11.6
2.4
0.7
Manufacturing
135,000
19.7
72.2
7.4
Commerce
195,000
16.4
65.1
16.8
1.7
Government services
34,000
52.4
15.4
26.3
5.9
Police, home guard and
prisons
52,000
83.2
9.6
4.4
2.8
Armed forces
11,000
76.8
8.8
8.4
6.0
Sources: Government of Malaysia 1971-75
The four major ethnic groups in Malaya correspond approximately to four
economic castes as that in India. The British were political rulers and
controlled large businesses. The Chinese were essentially middle-class
businessmen engaged in small trades. The Indians formed the bulk of labour
population, though a large number of them engaged in plantation operation
and commercial enterprises. The occupations of the Malays have always
been rice cultivation, fishing, and hunting (Li 1982, 170). The consequence
of this ethnic division of labour increasingly bore political tensions just
before and after the end of colonial rule. Historically, Malay peasantry
evaded the harsh conditions of early colonial capitalism that took a heavy
toll on migrant labour, but the rural Malay peasant community was locked
in a subsistence sector. This “most unfortunate circumstance of the past
14
half-century the non-participation of the Malays in their own country’s
economic activities” (Li 1982, 170) bred the so-called “relative economic
backwardness” of the Malays7, compared to Chinese and Indian migrants
who mobilised expanding urban sector to gain foothold in commerce and
upward mobility through education and other professions.
In sociological terms, poverty and inequality were not to be explained by
ethnicity but the difficulty arose from observing and interpreting poverty
embedded in the ethnic division of labour. In ordinary terms, inter-ethnic
comparisons invariably led to inter-ethnic inequalities so that there
appeared to be no immediate comprehensible conclusion than that the
Malay being relatively poorer than the non-Malay. Table 12 shows that
upto 1970, Malay households formed high majority group within the two
lowest monthly income ranges. Given the Malay proportion of total
population, it might have been generally expected but Malay poverty
relatively accounted for 42 per cent out of the 58.4 per cent of all
households having a monthly income of less than RM200.
Table 12: Proportional Distribution of Households by
Income* and Ethnicity, Peninsular Malaysia, 1970
Income range
Malay
(per cent)
Chinese
(per cent
Indian
(per cent)
Other
(per cent)
Total
(per cent)
1-99
22.9
2.6
1.3
0.2
27.0
100-199
19.1
7.8
4.4
0.1
31.4
200-399
10.4
11.9
3.5
0.1
25.9
400-699
3.0
5.3
1.1
0.1
9.6
700-1499
1.1
2.9
0.6
0.1
4.7
1500-2999
0.2
0.7
0.1
0.1
1.1
3000 & above
0.0**
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.3
Per cent of Total Population
56.7
31.3
11.2
0.8
100.0
(RM per month)
*
**
Income includes cash income, imputed income for earnings in kind plus transfer
receipts.
Proportion is negligible in relation to the total. Source: Government of Malaysia
1973:3
Table 13 reveals a more pronounced picture of poor Malay households,
vis-à-vis non-Malay households, that was politically more controversial.
15
Here, lower the income range, higher is the Malay representation in 1970
with Malay community forming nearly 85 per cent of all households having
the lowest monthly income. In contrast, Chinese representation increased
with income range until the highest level, when it fell sharply. At the highest
income range, moreover, there was a statistical absence of Malay
households while other ethnic groups seemed to be equally represented.
Table 13: Proportional Distribution of Households (Per cent)
by Income* and Ethnicity, Peninsular Malaysia, 1970
Income range
(RM per month)
Proportion (Percent) of Households in Income Group
Malay (per
cent)
Chinese
(per cent
Indian (per
cent)
Other (per
cent)
1-99
84.8
9.6
4.8
0.7
100-199
60.8
24.8
14.0
0.3
200-399
40.2
45.9
13.5
0.4
400-699
31.3
55.32
12.5
1.0
700-1499
23..4
61.7
12.8
2.1
1500-2999
18.2
61.6
9.1
9.1
3000 & above
0.0**
33.3
33.3
33.3
Percent of Total Population
56.7
31.3
11.2
0.8
*
Income includes cash income, imputed income for earnings in kind plus transfer
receipts. Source: Government of Malaysia 1973:4, Table.2.
Even after independence, the focus of advanced economic activity lay in
the foreign-owned plantations, mines and agency houses that produced
and exported primary commodities, viz, rubber and tin being the most
important, to the rest of the world. It was another very important socioeconomic disparity that was widely perceived in inter-ethnic terms. The
pioneering study of Puthucheary, James, “Ownership and Control in the
Malayan Economy” in the 1950s found that European-owned companies
controlled 84 per cent of large rubber estates (of over 500 acres each), 60
per cent of tin output, 65 per cent to 75 per cent of exports and 60 per cent
of imports8. On the whole, “foreign, especially British, interests dominated
nearly every facet of the colonial economy, including plantations, mining,
banking, manufacturing, shipping and public utilities”9. Domicile Chinese
capital maintained a sufficiently strong presence in economic activities
like banking, small-scale manufacturing, retailing and services, so that the
“ubiquitous activity of the Chinese middleman” lent weight to the “popular
16
misconception that commerce is controlled by the Chinese” (Puthucheary
1960: xv). Political control and administration of the state apparatus had
been mostly turned over to Malay aristocrats, who had been trained for
civil service by the colonial state. Thus, the social origins of the business
and political elites were those of the expatriate representatives of foreign
capital, indigenous Malay aristocrats and domicile Chinese capitalists and
traders.
Finally, political decolonisation in Malaya was not accompanied by
significant economic nationalisation. Consequently, post-colonial patterns
of “asset ownership” continued to show significant inter-ethnic differentials.
Until 1970, their proportions of share capital in limited companies, foreign
interests dominated the corporate sector of the economy. Non-Malay and
mostly Chinese ownership of share capital was substantial but the
proportion of Malay ownership was very low (See Table 14).
Table 14: Ownership of Share Capital (at par value)
of Limited Companies, 1970
Sector
Non-Malay**
Foreign
Per cent
of total
value
Value
(RM
million)
Per cent
of total
value
Value
(RM
million)
Per cent
of total
value
Agriculture
14
1.0
339
23.7
1080
75.3
Mining
4
0.7
146
26.8
394
72.5
Manufacturing
34
2.5
510
37.9
804
59.6
Construction
1
2.2
37
63.7
20
34.1
Transport
11
13.3
61
74.7
10
12.0
Commerce
5
0.8
216
35.7
386
63.5
21
3.3
283
44.4
333
52.3
103
1.9
1979
37.4
3207
60.7
Banking
Insurance
Total
*
Malay*
Value
(RM
million)
&
Includes Malay interests. **Includes Chinese, Indian other Malaysian residents,
nominee and locally controlled companies, although the ethnic ownership of
nominee and locally controlled companies is not known.
Source: Government of Malaysia 1973:86–87
The preceding discussion of earlier ethnic patterns of residential
segregation, labour force participation, income distribution and corporate
ownership does not consider the complexities of inequalities within each
major ethnic group. A fuller approach to Malaysian political economy will
17
reveal that its divisions were not historically, and are not exclusively,
determined by its multi-ethnic and multi-religious features as is claimed
by politicians or mainstream analysts who view it only from an “ethnic
perspective”. A deeper analysis would not overlook the Janus-like quality
of post-colonial Malaysian society, which has class cleavages that are no
less significant than its ethnic distinctions.
Indeed, the difficulties of managing the fissures of Malaysian society and
political economy have always stemmed, to a large extent, from the
intersections of ethnic differentiation with class divisions. These produced
colonial patterns of socio-economic disparities that grew into postindependent structures of inter-ethnic inequalities. In that sense, an
enduring ethnic division of labour accentuated the Malay community sense
of suffering a condition of “relative backwardness”. The Malay appeared
at once to be excluded from the modern sector; confined to rural areas
with minimum facilities, amenities and opportunities; mired in poverty
and finally to benefit less from the wealth of the country.
3. History of Exclusion Practice
Socio-economic exclusion and disparities existed in Malaysia since colonial
period or more pertinent even before the arrival of the European colonial
powers (Portuguese in 1511, the Dutch in 1640 and the English in 1795). In
a pre-modern or traditional Malaysia, the population was relatively
homogeneous but the social and economic disparities were existent;
nevertheless, it was not an issue of social conflict. As the country was
gradually exposed to modernisation and immigrants from other countries,
which altered the demographic features and population composition along
with economic disparity among social groups, especially inter-ethnic, to
begin with resentment and discontent. Simultaneously the society was
increasingly politicised either as a result of a nationalist movement against
colonialism or as a by-product of electoral activity. Eventually resentment
and discontent aggravated sense of unfairness and injustice, which lead to
occasional uproar and finally major racial riots in May 1969.
The riots of 1969 have been interpreted and analysed from distinct view
points. As part of ‘gangsterism’, and ‘communist agents’, government reports
referred it as the “political and psychological factors contributing to the
conflict”. But a government White Paper issued in 1971 entitled, “Toward
18
National Harmony” stressed on the view “economic factor” for causing
the riot which was later amplified in public comments by the government.
The failure of economic policies to address the relative deprivation of
Malays in comparison to non-Malays was root cause of the crisis. The
Official reports confirmed 196 dead and 439 injured. An adverse
international publicity, which the country went through as a consequence
of the riots conveyed a loud and clear message to the government need for
the affirmative action in order to create more equitable society.
The history of social and economic disparities among the main ethnic or
racial groups in Malaysia is inseparable from the growth of its multi-ethnic
society. During the colonial period, Malaysia was called Malaya and was
described as “an example of a multi-racial society par excellence10.The
Malaysian (Malayan) society is divided along numerous lines viz racial,
religious, regional, linguistic, economic and social. Among each of the main
groups there are sub-groups, for example, in the single linguistic group a
further division can be discerned on the basis of dialects. In every religious
group there are several sects or schools of thought with sharp differences
which contain potential conflicts. In each ethnic or racial group, differences
can be discerned along economic, social and regional dimensions. The
more salient and significant demographic feature of Malaysia, especially
in the early years of independence till today, is the association of ethnic
identification, economic activities and geographical areas.
Malays were mainly rice growers in the rural areas, while the Chinese
dominated the commercial sector based in urban areas, and most of the
Indians, largely Tamils were rubber plantation labourers. The nature of
their profession and different localities of their residence minimised the
chance of one ethnic group interacting with another. All this was largely
responsible for the emergence of a “plural society” as defined by Furnivall
“comprising two or more elements of social orders which live side by side,
yet without mingling into one political unit.”11
The process of modernisation and population growth with their attendant
ramifications made it almost impossible for these ethnic groups to continue
their “compartmentalised co-existence” characterised by lack of intermingling. Social and economic interactions were bound to increase and at
the same time bound to be more problematic due to differences and
contradictory demands of the groups. The ethnic differences nearly implied
linguistic, religious, educational, social and economic differences, which
19
in turn, contributed to the differences in perceptual and worldly
orientations and ideal expectations. All these provided potential for ethnic
conflicts of various dimensions with alarming consequences.
3.1 Origin of the Plural Society
The roots of “plural society” can be traced back to British colonial era
when wave after wave of immigrants from China and India flooded the
Malay Peninsula, the original geographical component of the present day
Malaysia. The British engaged and encouraged such immigration to provide
cheap labour for the tin mines and rubber plantation. The rapid increase of
the Chinese population in Malaysia within a short span of few decades was
phenomenal. In one of the tin mining area in Perak, the Larut Valley, there
were only three Chinese before 1850. About more than a decade later
there were between 20,000 to 25,000 Chinese newcomers, and by the end
of 1871 their number increased to 40,000. By 1901, the Chinese constituted
46 per cent of the population of Perak. Toward the end of 19th century
mass immigration of the Chinese to Malaysia coincided with rapid growth
of country economy, especially due to tin mining which was attributed
exclusively to the Chinese role. Indeed, the growth of tin mining industry
shaped the economic dominance of the Chinese. The increasing number of
non-Malay coupled with their increasing control of the economy has been
a constant source of fear and insecurity to the Malay whose indigenous
claim dates back to thousands of years. Beside resentment against British
colonialism, this fear gave birth to Malay nationalism between the two
World Wars and the resentment against Chinese became another factor in
organising the Malays politically.
The Indians also migrated in substantial number to the Malay Peninsula,
almost concurrent with the advent of British colonialism. The earliest Indian
contact with South East Asia, presumably with the Malay Peninsula dates
back to sixth century B.C. However, there is no evidence of large-scale
migration of people from the Indian subcontinent to the Malay Peninsula
until the end of the 19th century. The British colonial administration stepped
further in promoting it by establishing an Indian Immigration Fund in
190712. Labourers from Southern India were given accommodation and
free passage to their place of employment in Malaya and special agencies
were formed to facilitate them. The Chinese immigrant labourers
concentrated mainly on the tin mining industry, and the Indian migrants
20
were employed as rubber estate and railway workers. They lived as isolated
communities socially and geographically, away from the Chinese tin mine
labourers and the Malay paddy planters. Similar to the Chinese pattern of
migration at an early stage, the Indian labourers stayed in the Malay
Peninsula for shorter periods before they went back to India either on
“home vacation” or on permanent retirement. Over a period of time they
settled permanently in the Malay Peninsula and within a span of 40 years,
from 1891 to 1931, the Indian population increased almost twenty fold,
from 20,000 in 1891 to 380,000 in four main Sultanates of the Malay
Peninsula, (namely Selangor, Perak, Pahang and Negeri Sembilan;
otherwise known as Federated Malay States FMS).
The preceding account on the influx of immigrants from China and India
to the Malay Peninsula brings forth three inter-related points:
•
The British colonial administration not only introduced and
imposed an open-door immigration policy (at least up to 1931) on
the Malay States but actively participated in bringing a great
number of immigrant labourers from China and India especially
towards the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the
20th century.
•
In the four Sultanates that made up FMS, there had been an
extraordinarily rapid growth of population in a relatively short
period of less than 40 years, from 418,500 in 1891 to 1,713,100 in
1931 i.e., more than 400 per cent.
•
The phenomenal growth had an additional significance in the sense
that it drastically altered the population structure in terms of its
ethnic composition especially pertaining to the indigenous Malays
vis-à-vis the immigrant groups.
At the beginning of the 19th century, the Malays comprised 90 per cent of
the whole population of the Malay Peninsula, including the small Island of
Singapore. The proportion was reduced to 54 per cent in 1911, and declined
further to 49 per cent in 1921 and further lower to 45 per cent in 1931.Thus,
there emerged a “plural society”, as defined by Furnivall, that effectively
served the economic and political interests of British colonialism in Malaya.
The British colonial interests turned successful through skillful colonial
manipulation of various ethnic groups’ economic exploitation of Malaya.
However, different concerns cropped up since the interests of various
ethnic groups that made up the plural society came into question.
21
3.2 Perpetuation of Differences and Inequality
In Furnivall’s definition of plural society, it is implicit that several social
orders (different ethnic groups) not only lived separately in different
geographical locations and engaged in different economic activities, but
also grew and developed separately through different educational
programmes, different ideological orientations and a different rate of
economic progress. These differences were further perpetuated by a series
of practices initiated by the colonial administration, either by instituting
formal policies or by taking a laissez-faire attitude on selected matters or
by sheer neglect, leading certain groups into backwardness. In addition,
there were infrastructural developments that took place in an irregular
manner, benefiting certain groups and neglecting others.
While there was a rapid economic growth but the distribution of benefits
was not equitable. The disparity and inequality in sharing the growing
economic pie took place in several dimensions:
•
Between Europeans (British) and the Asians (indigenous or
immigrants);
•
Between the immigrant and the indigenous population;
•
Between the Chinese immigrants and the Indian immigrants; and
•
Between the Malay aristocrats and the Malay peasants.
This followed in line, not only with “divide and rule policy” of the British
which politically and economically served their interests but also saddled
the plural society with differences, resentment, suspicions and even
animosity.
3.3 Growing Sense of Alienation and Resentment
As the British colonial rule was approaching to its termination in Malaya,
the uneven development that featured Malaysian plural society became
more evident. The immigrant ethnic groups earlier known as “transients”
became permanent residents. Their much improved economic well-being,
consciously or unconsciously had become a source of anxiety to the
indigenous Malays. In the same vein, the Malay were increasingly resentful,
and also fearful, of the rapid growth of the immigrant population. The
following quotation from a leading Malay intellectual provides a summary
22
of how the Malay community perceived their plight and expressed their
sense of alienation first with the emergence, and then with the “maturity”,
of plural society:
“The immigrant population was introduced on a very large scale,
giving a new life to the peninsular economic activity, for the benefit
of the colonials, but obviously at a great disadvantage to the
indigenous people. New centers of plantation and mining activities,
displacing the traditional centers of Malay economic activities grew
along the coasts and river banks. The new cities were populated
exclusively by the immigrants, and the indigenous people were in
one way deurbanized, or were ruralised, and were largely deprived
of the new modernizing agents, especially the secondary and tertiary
education. The net result of this, until late 1960s, [was that] some
85-90 percent of the new intelligentsia, the new intellectuals and
professionals, were made up from the immigrant communities, less
than 15 percent from the indigenous people, even though they
formed the majority of the population. Coupled with the economic
dominance of the immigrant communities, more than 85 percent
of the economic middle class were from the immigrants. This set
the basis for the balancing games of contemporary Malaysian
politics, a game of communal reaction and counter-reaction in
search of a more equal society”.
This quotation from Ismail Hussein’s writing intend the following:
•
The sense of bitterness Malays suffered as a result of British
colonialism with its open-door immigration policy drastically and
substantially reduced the percentage of the Malay population. This
led to their “ruralisation” or “marginalisation”, away from the
mainstream of economic growth and social development;
•
To provide some indications about how the Malay were “left out”
in the process of modernisation which gained momentum with the
advent of British colonialism
•
To set an example of a fairly representative opinion or perception
of a major component of the plural society; perhaps diametrically
opposed to that of another component, i.e., Chinese. If Malay were
fearful and resentful of the fact that as “indigenous people” they
23
have been swamped by the “immigrants”, the Chinese were
concerned about their disadvantageous position and political
under-representation.
3.4 Cultural Impact
Culturally, the effect of this intellectual and economic dominance of the
immigrant communities in Malaysia could easily be predicted. There has
been an attempt to reject the history and tradition of the indigenous people
or attempt to displace or neutralise the indigenous culture. The use of
English as an exclusive medium for the education of the new intelligentsia
during and immediately following the colonial period had greatly helped in
this. For obvious reasons, the colonial government attempted to subjugate
the indigenous culture, or at least tried to neutralise it and the Malaysian
English education exactly appropriated that. The cultural capital could
not reckon to the pride of the people. Malay intellectual and cultural
concern, for example, had been branded as communal or racial prejudice
equated with the cultural chauvinism of the immigrant communities. The
Malaysian English press avoided reportage or analysis of this indigenous
cultural gamut, despite its importance in shaping the cultural politics of
Malaysia.
4. Nature of Deprivation: Access to Resources and
Opportunities
The relatively advantageous situation of Malaysia in terms of per capita
income and physical and administrative infrastructure at the beginning of
analysis need be balanced against the challenges of substantial ethnic and
geographical inequalities in, for instance, income and access to basic
resources, economic opportunities and social services such as health and
education. Ethnic riots in 1969 signalled potent threat to the stability of
Malaysia and its economic progress. The riots were precipitated by tensions
following the unexpected general election results in May 1969. Indeed,
more basic precipitating causes were discouraging economic trends,
growing urban unemployment and controversies surrounding language
and education. The most basic underlying cause, however, was probably
the imbalance between Malaysian ethnic groups in terms of poverty and
participation in the modern sectors of the economy.
Thus in 1970, Malaysian future stability and economic growth were by no
means assured, and its development strategy was intensively reviewed,
with the intention of ensuring and achievement of growth with equity,
24
particularly between the ethnic groups. Politicians, planners, and the people
at large had been obliged by circumstances to recognise that development
as a process cannot be achieved by economic and technocratic means alone
but has strong social elements demonstrably involving different ethnic,
religious, and social groups, providing all of them a stake in its outcomes
and building bridges of understanding in between.
4.1 New Economic Policy and Beyond (1971 - 2010)
Out of this situation New Economic Policy (NEP) came into formulation.
This policy and successor policies played a key role in social and economic
planning over the last three decades of the 20th century, and demonstrated
the strong political will and consistent commitment of the government
towards improving the living standards of the poor and decrease inequalities
in the society. Before reviewing these policies, it is significant to describe
the economic planning in Malaysia.
Malaysia follows a systematic planning process whereby five-year plans
are set within longer-term Outline Perspective Plans (OPPs), and systematic
reviews are conducted at the midpoint of these five-year plans. Annual
plans are the vehicle of fine tuning and adjusting the five-year plans to
changing circumstances. The sequencing of NEP and its successors, as
well as fitting in of the five-year plans into this sequence is tabulated in
Table 15.
Table 15: Overview of Malaysian Development
Planning Framework
1960-70
1971-90
1991-2000
2001-10
Pre-NEP
New Economic Policy
(NEP) OPP1
National
Development
National Vision
Policy
Policy (NDP) OPP2
(NVP) OPP3
Eighth Malaysia Plan
(2001–5)
First Malaysia
Plan
Second Malaysia Plan
(1971–5)
Sixth Malaysia Plan
(1991–5)
(1966–70)
Third Malaysia Plan
(1976–80)
Seventh Malaysia Plan
(1996–2000)
Fourth Malaysia Plan
(1981–5)
Fifth Malaysia Plan
(1986–90)
The largest group of Malaysian development plans viz, from second to the
fifth plans continued within the period covered by NEP.
25
New Economic Policy: 1971-1990
Poverty, unemployment and economic disparities among ethnic groups
continued to be problems in early 1970s. In 1970, almost half of Malaysian
population was living in poverty. Consequently, NEP was formulated with
the following objectives:
•
To reduce and eventually eradicate poverty by raising income
levels and increasing employment opportunities among all
Malaysians; irrespective of race.
•
To restructure Malaysian society to improve economic imbalances
so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race
with economic function.
Based upon the philosophy of achieving growth with equity, the success of
NEP was predicated upon rapid economic growth, so that poverty
reduction and restructuring of society strategies did not take place by
means of the reallocation of existing wealth, rather from new and expanded
sources of wealth.
These objectives were to be pursued through a number of means.
Enhancement of productivity of those in low-productivity occupations
was pursued through the adoption of modern agricultural techniques, such
as double-cropping, off-season and inter-cropping, drainage and irrigation,
alongwith improved marketing and credit, and financial and technical
assistance. Opportunities for movement from lower to higher productivity
sectors were to be provided through land development schemes, and
assistance in entering commerce, industry, and modern services. Special
attention was paid to the development of a Bumiputera Commercial and
Industrial Community (BCIC).
National Development Policy: 1991-2000
National Development Policy (NDP) maintained the basic strategies of
NEP, that is, growth with equity or equitable distribution in addition to
several adjustments to policy:
26
•
The focus of anti-poverty strategy was shifted to the eradication
of hard-core poverty.
•
An active BCIC was developed to increase the participation of
Bumiputera in modern sectors of the economy.
•
There was greater reliance on the private sector to generate
economic growth and income.
•
Emphasis was placed on human resource development as a primary
instrument for achieving the objectives of growth and distribution.
NDP programmes included loan schemes for small-scale agricultural and
commercial developments modeled on the Grameen Bank, land
consolidation and rehabilitation programmes, commercialisation of farms,
agricultural productivity enhancement projects, provision and
improvement of services for the urban poor, and efforts to promote
employment opportunities in manufacturing, construction, and other
urban-based industries.
4.2 Vision 2020
Shortly after the Sixth Malaysia Plan was launched, the then Prime Minister,
Dr Mahathir Mohamad, in a speech to the Malaysian Business Council
outlined a vision of Malaysia as the developed country by 2020; in terms
of all dimensions of national life. This included national unity and social
cohesion, economy, social justice, political stability, system of governance,
quality of life, social and spiritual values, and national pride and confidence.
While moving towards these goals, he stressed the importance of human
resource development, export-led growth and industrial diversification,
low inflation, and private/public sector partnerships. The importance of
this document is that it put in visionary terms the national objectives
pursued in Malaysian development planning to emphasise holistic nature
of the developmental endeavour.
4.3 National Vision Policy (2001-2010)
National Vision Policy (NVP) builds upon and maintains the efforts of
NEP and NDP, and incorporates Vision 2020 objective of transforming
Malaysia into the developed nation by 2020. It emphasises the need to
build a resilient and competitive nation, as well as an equitable society to
ensure unity and political stability. The private sector will spearhead
economic growth, while the public sector will provide supportive
environment and ensure achieving socio-economic objectives. To achieve
these goals, the key strategies include developing a knowledge-based
economy, emphasising human resource development, and accelerating
the shift of the key economic sectors toward more efficient production
27
processes and high value-added activities. At the same time, further
progress towards poverty eradication is expected to result from rapid
economic growth, assisted by specific poverty alleviation programmes,
consolidated under the Skim Pembangunan Kesejahteraan Rakyat (SPKR),
targeted towards eradicating poverty in areas and among groups where its
incidence is high, such as the Orang Asli and other Bumiputera in Sabah
and Sarawak.
Both NEP and NDP have shaped up the socio-economic development of
the country, guided by broad outline perspective plans that are embodied
in the series of five-year development plans. The story of Malaysian
development since 1970 must be rated a real success story if the criterion
is achieving improved level of broad-based welfare as defined by the
variables included in MDGs. The variables that were later to be
incorporated by the international community in MDGs was already
prioritised in Malaysia and great strides were made in achieving them. A
common thread running through these plans is the priority given to poverty
eradication and equity. This consistency in defining and prioritising
developmental problems has not only helped to focus economic governance
to eradicate poverty but also contributed in large measure to the success
of those efforts.
It has already been noted that although Malaysia entered the 1970s with
stronger endowment of wealth and infrastructure than many of its
neighbours, it also faced the challenges of a multi-ethnic society with
marked imbalances between ethnic groups. In one sense, however, this
challenge strengthened to focus attention on poverty alleviation.
Moreover, since the Bumiputera, who held political power but
disadvantaged economically were concentrated in rural areas; therefore
rural development was a strong and persistent focus in development
programmes. There was thus persuasive political motivation for pursuing
the kind of policies that were most likely to meet MDGs.
The success of these policies could largely be attributed to political stability,
strong foreign direct investment, and visionary leadership. A physical
evidence of success of these strategies is to be seen in the functional and
physical urban infrastructure of air and land transportation facilities, the
Cyberjaya Multimedia Super Corridor (MSC), the Putrajaya government
office enclave and other elements of the built environment.
28
5. Altered Ethnic Structures and Inequalities
The three main ethnic communities in Malaysia are Bumiputera (Malays
and other indigenous groups), Chinese and Indians. Historically these were
separated both geographically and by employment reflecting the differing
settlement patterns. In 1970, while (27 per cent) Malaysian (10.4 million
persons) were living in urban areas, the Bumiputera (55 per cent)
population was predominantly rural. They were engaged mainly in rice
cultivation, fishing, and rubber tapping, distinct from the growing urban
economy. The Chinese (36 per cent) population was urban, dominating
trade and commerce as well as tin mining and commercial agriculture;
whereas Indians (approximately 10 per cent) population settled in towns
were mainly concentrated in the rubber estates and plantations. By 1970
poverty was markedly higher among Bumiputera than other ethnic
communities. About two-third of Bumiputera households were living below
the poverty line ; poverty rates among Chinese and Indian households
were 26.0 per cent and 39.2 per cent; respectively. As a result of policies
adopted by Malaysia, there has been tremendous decline in the poverty
rate for each ethnic group, such that by 2002 it was 7.3 per cent, 1.5 per
cent, and 1.9 per cent for Bumiputera, Chinese, and Indians; respectively.
Ethnic income differentials generally narrowed over the period 1970–
2002. The ratio of mean household income of Chinese and Indians to the
mean household income of Bumiputera decreased over this period, most
notably in 20 years up to 1990. However, over the last decade of the last
century, relative incomes have been broadly constant and absolute
differentials in income have widened. Moreover, Chinese mean household
income remains about two times higher than that of Bumiputera. The spatial
distribution of poverty is closely related to the pattern of development,
which in turn is closely linked to ethnic settlement patterns and industrial
structures. Historically, the Bumiputera community lived in settlements
along the coasts and riverbanks. Chinese and Indian migrants settled along
the western coastal plains around the tin mines, agricultural estates, and
urban centres. Relatively fewer communities settled in the east coast states,
especially in Kelantan and Terengganu, which were sparsely populated in
1970. The big states of East Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak were also sparsely
populated and under developed. Selangor, Perak, and Johor were the most
populated states with more than one million persons. In 1970, there were
wide disparities in poverty levels between states; the lowest in west coast
29
states of Melaka, Selangor, and Johor and the highest in Sabah, Kelantan,
and Terengganu. There have been significant reductions in poverty rates
for all 13 Malaysian states and Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur over
three decades since 1970. However, there are still sharp state differentials
and geographical and historical factors that continue to influence. The
west coast states of Peninsular Malaysia are more developed and have
tended to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The rail and road system
in these states became accessible to seaports, facing the Straits of Malacca,
a key maritime highway for international trade in South-East Asia. On the
contrary, Kelantan and Terengganu, until the discovery of offshore oil in
the east coast, were less accessible and attracted lesser FDI.
Currently, the poor in Malaysia are mainly concentrated in the states of
Kelantan, Terengganu, Kedah, Perlis, and Sabah, particularly in the rural
areas. In 2002, while the national poverty rate was 5.1 per cent, the poverty
rates for the poorest states were as follows: Sabah, 16.0 per cent; Kelantan,
12.4 per cent; Kedah, 10.7 per cent; Terengganu, 10.7 per cent; and Perlis,
10.1 per cent. Overall, the levels of poverty in these states are two to three
times higher than the national level except Terengganu. Also, these states
have per capita GDP levels significantly below the national average and
the population is predominantly Bumiputera.
5.1 Social Sector Policies
Social and economic development is an inter-related phenomenon. Social
change is an integral component of economic development and not just its
by-product. While economic growth leads to improvements in the quality
of life, a better quality of life enables the population to participate more in
economic development. The commitment to socio-economic development
can be seen in the strategic thrusts of all three national development policies
where poverty eradication has been a constant and integral component of
all policies. This commitment is also reflected in the steadily and
substantially rising share of the social sector in total public development
expenditure viz. from 11 per cent in 1970 to 45 per cent in 2003 (See Table
16). In addition, expenditure on economic services include the provision
of public utilities (such as electricity, piped water and sewerage services),
and infrastructure and transportation to both rural and urban areas,
enhancing the quality of life.
30
Table 16: Federal Government Development Expenditure by
Sector, Malaysia, 1970–2003 (Percentage of Total
Development Expenditure)
Sector
1970
1980
1990
2000
2003
Security
23.7
16.4
9.9
8.3
15.3
Social services
11.2
15.9
24.5
39.6
45.0
Education
6.1
7.5
15.3
25.4
25.9
Health
2.8
1.1
4.3
4.6
6.8
Housing
–
4.0
0.4
4.3
4.9
Others
–
–
4.5
5.4
7.4
Economic services
62.2
64.8
62.7
41.7
35.0
Agriculture and rural development
27.3
15.2
12.1
4.2
4.1
Public utilities
2.8
8.9
7.5
5.4
2.3
Trade and industry
13.8
20.8
25.5
13.1
8.8
Transport
11.0
13.8
17.3
17.4
18.7
Communication
7.3
5.7
0.0
0.8
1.0
–
–
0.3
0.6
1.1
2.9
3.0
2.9
10.4
4.7
Others
General administration
Education and health sectors are mainly responsible for distinct rise in the
social services’ share of development budgets. Education receives the
major share of Federal government development expenditure on social
services. Towards the second half of 1990s, enrolments expanded rapidly
both at the bottom and the top rung of education ladder–in pre-school and
tertiary education; respectively. Both these levels of education make an
important contribution in building the quality of human resources of the
nation.
The public sector took on a multiplicity of roles generated and justified by
NEP.
•
The public sector emerged providing opportunities for the Malays.
It enlarged the existing service of Malay entrepreneurs, graduates
and professionals and gave to the aspiring Malay entrepreneurs
financial assistance, credit facilities, contracts, preferential share
allocations, subsidies and training. Also, it established new public
universities and all-Malay residential schools and colleges at home,
and sent tens of thousands of Malay young students and mid-career
31
officers to the universities abroad. The result of this social
engineering was a wide range of Malay entrepreneurs and
capitalists13, a sizeable Malay middle-class14 and a considerable
“bumiputera participation rate” in the professions15.
32
•
The public sector functioned as a stringent regulator of businesses,
both local and foreign that enforced compliance with restructuring
requirements of NEP by using legislative means, i.e., Industrial
Coordination Act (ICA) in 1975 and bureaucratic procedures,
which were set by the Foreign Investment Committee. The
restructuring requirements of NEP set a quota at least 30 per cent
bumiputera equity participation and employment in companies
covered by ICA. In “expanding government power over firms”,
ICA gave the minister of trade and industry wide discretionary
power over licensing, ownership structure, ethnic employment
targets, product distribution quotas, local content and product
pricing. Even at the state and local level government, (non-Malay)
businesses came under strict bureaucratic regulation. In a nonmanufacturing area such as real estate development, for example,
many state authorities including land offices, town and country
planning departments, municipal councils and state economic
development corporations imposed an array of “NEP
requirements” on such seemingly technical matters as land-use
conversion or planning guidelines.
•
The public sector became a major investor. In order to raise the
Malay ownership of corporate equity, it used state resources to
expand its ownership of assets via “restructuring” exercises that
included setting up companies by public sector and buying into or
buying up existing as well as new local and foreign businesses.
These entries into the corporate sector eventually allowed the
public sector to control the “commanding heights” of the Malaysian
economy i.e., plantations, mining, banking and finance, and
property and real estate16
•
Finally, the public sector functioned as the trustee of Malay
economic interests. The state-owned agencies, banks and funds
sought, bought and otherwise held equity “in trust” for the
bumiputera. Some of the best known of these “trustee” agencies
were Bank Bumiputera, Urban Development Authority,
Perbadanan National (Pernas, or National Corporation),
Permodalan National Berhad (PNB, or National Equity
Corporation), Amanah Saham National (ASN, or National Unit
Trust Scheme) and the state economic development corporations17.
To perform these new extensive and intensive roles, the public sector
rapidly grew in size and resources, as can be inferred from the indicators
Table 17. The structure of the public sector was altered as a whole slate of
public enterprises emerged. These public enterprises proliferated in
number from 22 in 1960 to 109 in 1970, 656 in 1980, and 1,014 in 1985.
Table 17. By 1992, the number had risen to 1,14918. However, under NEP,
the public sector concerns were vast development, the direction of which
was increasingly ethinicised.
Table 17: Growth in the Number of Public
Enterprises, 1960–1992
Sector/industry
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1992
Agriculture
4
5
10
38
83
127
146
Building and construction
2
9
9
33
65
121
121
Extractive industries
0
1
3
6
25
30
32
Finance
3
9
17
50
78
116
137
Manufacturing
5
11
40
132
212
289
315
Services
3
6
13
76
148
258
321
Transport
5
13
17
27
45
63
68
Others
0
0
0
0
0
6
9
Total
22
54
109
362
656
1,010
1,149
The expansion of public sector served two priorities under restructuring
objectives of NEP. One was to provide employment for Malays, which was
generally satisfied by absorbing Malay personnel into the civil services at
all levels, notably via a massive civil service recruitment drive. Between
1982 and 1987, a period for which analysis has been conducted, the
bumiputera proportions of civil service staff for all categories of personnel
rose steadily and always exceeded 60 per cent of all civil service personnel.19
The magnitude of growth is drawn below (See Table 18).
33
Table 18: Public Service Personnel* by Service
Category and Ethnicity, October 1999
Ethnic
Group
Service Category
Managerial/
Professional
Number
Total
Per
cent
Number
Per
cent
Number
Percent
Number
Per cent
Bumiputera
78,422
67.9
517,488
78.4
595,910
76.9
Chinese
27,198
23.6
98,253
14.9
125,451
16.2
Indian
7,044
6.1
35,239
5.3
42,283
5.5
Others
2,814
2.4
8,815
1.4
11,629
1.4
115,478
100.0
659,795
100.0
775,273
100.0
Total
*
Support
Includes personnel in state public services, federal statutory bodies, state statutory
bodies and local authorities but excludes military and police personnel.
Source: Government of Malaysia 2000:198
Although civil service lists after 1987 do not reveal the distribution of
officers by their ethnicity; such data having become politically “sensitive”
by then, Table 18 confirms Malay domination of the public sector, in both
“managerial and professional” category and among lower-level “support”
staff, persisting into the 1990s. At the higher echelons of the civil service,
especially the elite Perkhidmatan Tadbir dan Diplomatik (PTD, or
Administrative and Diplomatic Service), Malay “over-representation”,
already sanctioned before NEP, was such that Malay officers averaged 85
per cent of the PTD’s total number of appointments.20 Thus, the state trained
a whole generation of Malay administrators, technocrats and professionals
at public expense and equipped them with the resources to take charge of
economic development under NEP.
In the process, the state management of education, especially tertiary
education was also ethnicised in Malaysia. Under NEP, student enrolment
in public institutions of tertiary education, the award of state scholarships,
the determination of fields of study, the recruitment of academic staff,
inter alias, were subject to quota and target based “affirmative action”. As
early as 1975, the effects of ethnic discrimination of NEP in tertiary
education, which favoured bumiputera in general and Malays in particular,
were already discernible for all levels of tertiary education in local public
institutions (See Table 19.)
34
Table 19: Student Enrolment in Tertiary Education by
Course, Institution and Ethnicity-1975
Institutions*
Bumiputera
Chinese
Indian
Other
Total
UM
3,991
3,554
589
160
8,294
USM
1,218
1,479
195
21
2,913
UKM
2,396
134
35
5
2,570
UPM
539
132
24
3
698
UTM
456
74
3
0
533
8,600
5,373
846
189
15,008
57.3
35.8
5.6
1.3
100.0
Degree
Subtotal
Per cent of subtotal
Diploma
Ungku Omar Polytechnic
80
45
7
0
132
7,203
0
0
0
7,203
Kolej TAR
0
902
38
1
941
UM
41
7
3
2
53
1,694
143
27
2
1,866
MARA IT
UPM
UTM
1,487
126
11
16
1,640
10,505
1,223
86
21
11,835
88.8
10.3
0.7
0.2
100.0
723
210
29
5
967
Kolej TAR
0
79
0
0
79
MARA IT
175
0
0
0
175
Subtotal
Certificate
Ungku Omar Polytechnic
Subtotal
898
289
29
5
1,221
73.5
23.7
2.4
0.4
100.0
20,003
6,885
961
215
28,064
71.3
24.5
3.4
0.8
100.0
All levels
Total
Per cent of Total
UM: Universiti Malaya; USM: Universiti Sains Malaysia; UKM: Universiti
Kebangsaan Malaysia; UPM: Universiti Pertanian Malaysia; UTM: Universiti
Teknologi Malaysia; MARA IT: MARA Institute of Technology; Kolej TAR: Kolej
Tunku Abdul Rahman.
Source: Government of Malaysia 1979:204–205.
*
By 1985, the major ethnic shares of student enrolment in domestic
polytechnics, colleges and universities had been substantially reversed
from that in 1970, when Malay students formed about 40 per cent of the
total student enrolment (See Table 20).
35
Table 20: Student Enrolment in Tertiary Education by
Institution and Ethnicity,1970-1985
Institution
Bumiputera
1970
Local enrolment by institution
Chinese
Indian
1985
1970
1985
1970
1985
a
UM
2,843
5,041
3,622
3,374
525
841
USM
67
3,996
126
2,509
33
657
UKM
174
6,454
4
1,914
1
468
UPM
—
3,652
—
603
—
253
UTM
—
2,284
—
567
—
154
UIA
—
363
—
14
—
14
UUM
—
488
—
161
—
44
MARA IT
—
1,560
—
0
—
0
Kolej TAR
—
3
—
2,099
—
42
Subtotal for local
enrolment (per cent)
3,084
(40.2)
23,841
(63.0)
3,752
(48.9)
11,241
(29.7)
559
(7.3)
2,473
(6.5)
Overseas enrolment
(per cent)
N.A.
6,034
(26.8)
N.A.
13,406
(59.5)
N.A.
3,108
(13.8)
Per cent of Total
enrolment
N.A.
49.4
N.A.
40.7
N.A.
9.2
UM: Universiti Malaya; USM: Universiti Sains Malaysia; UKM: Universiti
Kebangsaan Malaysia; UPM: Universiti Pertanian Malaysia; UTM: Universiti
Teknologi Malaysia; UIA: Universiti Islam Antarabangsa; UUM: Universiti Utara
Malaysia; MARA IT: MARA Institute of Technology; Kolej TAR: Kolej Tunku Abdul
Rahman. N.A. = Not applicable
a
Indeed, were it not for the Kolej TAR which was MCA-managed, virtually
private and almost exclusively attended by Chinese students, the Malay
students would have constituted larger proportion of the local enrolment.
In fact, tertiary education in local public institutions was closely identified
with the restructuring of NEP and the educational quotas denied many
qualified non-Malay students admission to local public institutions. Within
NEP, the role of education, especially university education, became highly
politicised. To accelerate and actively facilitate the bumiputera demand
for access to higher education, Malaysian government implemented the
36
ethnic quota system where admission to public universities is based on the
ratio of 55:45 for bumiputera and non-bumiputera students. In order to
effectively coordinate the implementation of this policy, the Ministry of
Education established a Central Processing Unit for Universities, which
deals with all the selection of students for admission to public higher
education institutions21. This was a strong reason why many more nonMalay students were enrolled in overseas institutions than in local ones.
This situation of high bumiputera enrolment in public institutions of higher
learning persisted into the mid-1990s. As Table 21 shows that the
bumiputera proportion of student enrolment at public institutions of higher
learning was at least about two-third of total enrolment at the first degree
level.
Table 21: Enrolment and Graduation by Ethnicity at Degree,
Diploma and Certificate Levels in Public Institutions of
Higher Learning,1990-1995
1990
Bumiputera
Number
Degree
Diploma
1995
Non-bumiputera
Per
cent
Number
35,361
65.9
28,719
Bumiputera
Per
cent
Number
18,309
34.1
94.2
1,772
624
24.4
All levels
64,704
Degree
Non-bumiputera
Per
cent
Number
Per
cent
97,836
69.9
42,084
30.1
5.8
49,588
83.4
9,891
16.6
1,929
75.4
725
17.0
3,551
83.0
74.6
22,010
25.4
148,149
72.7
55,526
27.3
7,487
62.1
4,567
37.9
14,660
60.0
9,735
40.0
8,588
89.9
965
10.1
8,701
73.4
3,161
26.6
387
49.4
396
50.6
583
22.4
2,025
77.6
16,462
73.5
22,390
26.5
23,944
61.6
14,939
38.4
Enrolment
Certificate
Graduation
Diploma
Certificate
All levels
Source: Government of Malaysia 2000:198, table 2.61.
The bumiputera proportion of enrolment at the diploma level was higher;
94.2 per cent in 1990 and 83.4 per cent in 1995. A roughly consistent
picture of a concerted effort to train bumiputera in other areas can be
inferred from the almost exclusive participation of bumiputera in
37
entrepreneurial training programmes organised by several public agencies
(See Table 22).
Table 22: Participants in Entrepreneurial
Training Programmes,1981-1985
Sponsor/organizer
Bumiputera
No. of participants 1981
No. of participants
1985
Non-Bumiputera
Bumiputera
Non-bumiputera
4,940
15
2,901
11
Public works department
222
—
398
—
Bank Pembangunan Malaysia
134
—
343
—
—
—
1,109
—
MARA
14,614
—
15,000
—
Pernas
1,447
—
1,000
—
National productivity centre
Bank Bumiputera Malaysia
Source: Government of Malaysia 1986:116,Table 3.12.
The state intervention in various socio-economic sectors directly affected
the ethnic structures and patterns of inequalities during NEP period;
particularly the changes that “restructuring” directly imposed upon the
ethnic division of labour, ethnic distribution of corporate wealth and the
emergence of a significant broad professional and middle-class component
of BCIC. The considerable alteration of the ethnic division of labour can
be seen from the occupational structures of the major ethnic communities
in 1990 (See Table 23).
Table 23: Occupational Structures of Major
Ethnic Communities, 1990
Occupational category
Professional and technical
Bumiputera
Chinese
Indian
Total
(per cent)
(per cent)
(per cent)
(per cent)
9.2
8.2
8.0
8.8
Administrative and managerial
1.4
4.4
1.5
2.5
Clerical
9.3
10.9
9.0
9.8
Sales
7.2
19.7
8.8
11.5
Service
12.4
9.5
14.5
11.6
Agricultural
37.4
13.5
23.4
28.3
Production
23.2
33.8
34.8
27.6
100.0
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total
38
The distribution of occupations could not be identical for all major
communities, but there was not much difference in community
engagements in the “professional and technical”, “administrative and
managerial” and “clerical” categories. In addition, the pre-NEP
concentration of Malays in agriculture, for example, had diminished the
direct result of rural-urban out-migration, an end to the former exclusion
and discrimination of Malays from the “modern” sectors of the economy
and the induction of Malay youth into various educational and training
programmes.
The relative success of state intervention in attaining the objectives of
“restructuring” is also evident from Table 24 which shows changes in Malay
and bumiputera occupational structures during NEP period.
Table 24: Changes in Malay and Bumiputera
Occupational Structures, 1970–1990
Occupational
category
Per cent
in 1970
a
Targeted per
cent for
1990
b
Actual per
cent in
1990
b
Change in per
cent 1970–
1990
Professional and
technical
4.3
6.6
9.2
4.9
Administrative and
managerial
0.4
1.2
1.4
1.0
Clerical
3.3
6.1
9.3
c
6.0
Sales
5.2
5.6
7.2
2.0
Service
13.8
25.0
12.4
(0.8)
Agricultural
65.3
36.3
37.4
(27.9)
Production
7.8
19.1
23.2
15.4
100.0
100.0
100.0
Total
Malays only. b Bumiputera. c Teachers and nurses account for 3.9 per cent of this
category.
a
Source: Adapted from Torii (2003:227, table II; 237, table IV).
The reduction of Malay and bumiputera involvement in agriculture was
remarkable from 65.3 per cent in 1970 to 37.4 per cent in 1990. For other
occupational categories, the targets set in 1970 for 1990s were attained or
even exceeded, with the sole exception of the “service” category. Since
39
professional occupations are always a contentious category because of its
associations with limited entry, educational attainment, higher qualification
and lucrative remuneration; the steady increase in Malay representation
that occurred between 1970 and 1997 is evident from Table 25.
Table 25: Registered Professionals* by
Ethnic Group, 1970-1997
Year
Bumiputera
Chinese
Indian
Others
Total
1970**
225
4.9
2793
61.0
1066
23.3
492
10.8
4576
100.0
1975***
537
6.7
5131
64.1
1764
22.1
572
7.1
8004
100.0
1980
2534
14.9
10812
63.5
2963
17.4
708
4.2
17017
100.0
1985
6318
22.2
17407
61.2
3946
13.9
773
2.7
28444
100.0
1990
11753
29.0
22641
55.9
5363
13.2
750
1.9
40507
100.0
1995
19344
33.1
30636
52.4
7542
12.9
939
1.6
58461
100.0
1997
22866
32.0
37278
52.1
9389
13.1
1950
2.2
71843
100.0
Note: Due to rounding, not all percentage rows add up to 100.* Includes accountants,
architects, dentists, doctors, engineers, lawyers, surveyors and veterinary surgeons.
**
Excludes surveyors and lawyers. *** Excludes surveyors.
By 1995, Malay professionals had reached 30 per cent restructuring target
of NEP, an impressive gain, even if part of it might have been due to the
emigration of non-Malay; especially Chinese professionals, mostly out of
dissatisfaction with discrimination of NEP against non-Malays.
In short, the new occupational structures suggested a substantial
achievement of NEP goals of “abolishing the identification of ethnicity
with economic function”. The state-led social engineering had indeed
sponsored the rise of a Malay professional middle-class component of
BCIC. More than that, judgment of NEP by the criterion of ethnic distribution
of the ownership of share capital (corporate wealth), the other component
of BCIC, that is, a class of Malay capitalists had significant presence by the
end of NEP period, despite the difficultly in nurturing and sustenance.
Bumiputera ownership of share capital of public companies raised from
2.4 per cent in 1970 to 20.6 per cent in 1995 (See Table 26).
40
Table 26: Ownership of Share of Capital (at par of value)
of Limited Companies, 1970-95
1970
1980
1985
1990
1995
RM
million
Per
cent
of
total
RM
million
Per
cent
of
total
RM
million
Per
cent
of
total
RM
million
Per
cent
of
total
RM
million
Per
cent
of
total
1,952.1
36.6
18,493.4
57.0
57,666.6
74.0
80,851.9
74.6
129,999.5
72.3
Bumiputera
individuals
and trust
agencies
125.6
2.4
4,050.5
12.5
14,883.4
19.1
20,877.5
19.3
36,981.2
20.6
Bumiputera
individuals
84.4
1.6
1,880.1
5.8
9,103.4
11.7
15,322
14.2
33,353.2
18.6
Trust
agencies
41.2
0.8
2,170.4
6.7
5,780
7.4
5,555.5
5.1
3,628
2.0
Other
Malaysian
residents
1,826.5
34.3
14,442.9
44.6
42,783.2
54.9
50,754
55.3
78,026.9
51.7
Chinese
1,450.5
27.2
N.A.
N.A
26,033
33.4
49,296.5
45.5
73,552.7
40.9
Indians
55.9
1.1
N.A.
N.A
927.9
1.2
1,068
1.0
2,723.1
1.5
Others
N.A.
N.A
N.A.
N.A
987.2
1.3
389.5
0.3
1,751.1
1.0
Nominee
companies
320.1
6.0
N.A.
N.A
5,585
7.2
9,220.4
8.5
14,991.4
8.3
Locally
controlled
companies
N.A.
63.4
N.A.
N.A
9,249.7
11.8
N.A.
N.A
N.A
N.A
Foreign
residents
3,377.1
100.0
13,927
43.0
20,298
26.0
27,525.5
25.4
49,792.7
127.7
Total
5,329.2
32,420.4
100.0
77,964
100.0
108,377.4
100.0
179,792.2
100.0
Malaysian
residents
N.A. = Not applicable.
Sources: Jomo 1990:158–59, table 7.3; Phang 2000:116, table 4.9.
The latter figure, short of 30 per cent target of NEP, has often been
suspected of understating the extent of bumiputera ownership primarily
because the “nominee company” shares have been officially regarded as
belonging to “non-bumiputera” owners when, as has been widely argued22
the “nominees” typically held shares on behalf of bumiputera owners. On
the other hand, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, some originally
domestic non-Malay capital might have re-entered the economy as foreign
investment. Nevertheless, significant bumiputera ownership of share
capital, as a proxy measure of the size of the capitalist component of BCIC
had become a reality. The pressing issues of 1990s and beyond did not
merely concern that bumiputera share need be increased to reflect their
proportion of the national population. It also concerned the ability of the
state-nurtured bumiputera entrepreneurs to transform themselves into
“real capitalists”, capable of holding their own local and foreign capital
without extensive state assistance.
41
5.2 Governance: Public–Private Sector Divide
The changed structures and patterns of inequalities that emerged within
the broad public sector were direct result of an emphatically ethnic
interpretation and discriminatory implementation of objectives of NEP.
In administrative and regulatory terms, those adjustments were facilitated
by an ethinicised framework of governance in the public sector that
eventually created three different sets of difficulties for governance under
subsequent NEP regimes:
•
An inter-ethnic divide
•
The problems of bureaucratic self-regulation
•
The eventual subordination of the bureaucracy.
The preferences and discrimination favouring bumiputera were adopted
in principle. In practice, quotas and targets were set and continually
modified for many areas of social and economic life. It became the norm
for public sector to use price subsidies and discounts to offset what was
regarded as the lack of competitiveness of bumiputera. All such
preferences, quotas and subsidies formed parameters of an unambiguously
ethinicised framework of governance to facilitate the performance of public
sector and different roles under NEP and to determine (differential ethnic)
access to public services, the allocations of public resources and the detailed
regulation of businesses in the private sector. The twenty-year target of
NEP of a 30 per cent bumiputera share of corporate assets in 1990 was
virtually “institutionalised” as a minimum “30 per cent” “bumiputera
participation” in such areas:
42
•
Employment in private companies subjected to the purview of ICA
•
Issue or allocation of new shares in public listed companies
•
Sale or transfer of corporate or other assets in selected sectors
•
Award of government contracts and projects
•
Admission of students in tertiary education, selection of their fields
of study and awarding scholarships and financial assistance
•
Development and sale of urban housing and commercial space.
Since the inter-ethnic “imbalances” of the pre-NEP ethnic division of labour
could not be overturned within a short period without drastic measures,
“bumiputera quotas” frequently exceeded 30 per cent of whatever was
thought to fall within the ambit of restructuring and “redistribution”.
One outcome of this practice of “ethnicised governance” was widening and
stiffening public-private sector divide. This divide was beleaguered by
ethnically coloured dichotomies, so to speak, that were embedded in the
public imagination, but found in reality too. For example, it was common
for Malay politicians and bureaucrats to insist that the objective of public
sector that of “social enterprise” was a measure of balance against the
motive of “profitability” of private sector. However, for others that was
nearly the same thing as conceding “public sector ineptitude” in contrast
to “private sector efficiency”. Other constructs or ideological
representations of the features of the public-private sector divide included:
•
poverty versus wealth
•
redistribution versus growth
•
social objectives versus economic rapacity
•
nurture versus control
•
support versus penalty
•
expansion versus restriction
•
fostering national unity versus threatening national unity
•
constructive protection versus self-reliance.
Each of the above constructs carried public-private dichotomy that
implicitly overlapped with “Malay versus non-Malay” polarity. As can be
assumed, what the “Malay public sector” was inclined to proclaim as the
measures of NEP for “sharing” wealth; the “non-Malay private sector”, for
instance, tended to disclaim as acts of “aggrandisement”. Hence the public
services, public enterprises and statutory bodies became increasingly
Malay domains, but the powerful private sector was still popularly
perceived as a Chinese domain.23 The public sector came to be regarded
and justified as a bumiputera bulwark against non-bumiputera (and foreign)
private sector.
43
5.3 Governance and Public–Private Sector Overlap
The ethnically marked public- private sector divide only revealed part of
the difficulties of governance emerging under the conditions of altered
ethnic structures and inequalities. As far as BCIC was concerned, there
was crucially a public-private sector overlap because the borders between
“Malay social enterprise” and “Malay private business” were blurred when
the multi-dimensional state economic intervention of NEP took the form
of “state capitalism”.
The extension of state capitalist interests are not confined to the new
“public enterprises” which claim to represent “Malay interests” but the
state support for private capital accumulation by Malays can be seen in the
similar light. Joint ventures involving Malay and non-Malay partners (socalled “Ali Baba” arrangements), appointments of Malays to company
directorships and securing government contracts by politically wellconnected businessmen are all manifestations of expanding Malay private
capital. Private companies, for example, recognise the advantages to be
gained from having well-connected directors. (Jomo 1988:266)
The restructuring of NEP envisioned the state-sponsored creation of Malay
capital. Beside adequate financial and economic resources, the success of
the ambitious project of social engineering was dependent upon three
critical requirements:
(i) Political power needed to push NEP agenda
(ii) Administrative capacity to implement NEP
(iii) Individual successes to vindicate NEP itself.
5.4 Ethicised Civil Service
Over the years, through the operation of Malay “special rights” in
recruitment and promotion preferences, the whole structure of government
services has become a bastion of Malay power and the major avenue for
Malay professional and economic advancement. This pattern is particularly
pronounced at higher administrative and policy making levels where Malay
dominance comes closer to reality.24
The emergence of a clearly Malay-dominated public sector has raised
concerns over bureaucratic “responsiveness and legitimacy” and
44
“effectiveness and efficiency”, “governance and accountability”25, and a
sense of marginalisation and insecurity among non-Malay personnel. These
are serious issues by any standard of public administration, and “politically
sensitive” issues much to the dismay as and when put in ethnic garb. As a
result, the public service in Malaysia has deteriorated in the quality and
performance of its personnel because of ethnically influenced decisions
on recruitment and promotions, which favoured Malays over competent
non-Malay counterparts. Yet, arguably, Malay “over-representation” in
the civil service that antedated NEP and the changes to public sector
governance, are linked to the rise of the sector in the first decade of NEP.
Malayanised bureaucracy had practically to remain a preserve of the
Malays. Thus, the Malay to non-Malay recruitment ratio of 4:1 for the
elite Malayan civil service (MCS) was instituted, which ensured that “at
least 80 per cent of the service will be filled by Malays, far above their
proportion in the total population”. The post-independent civil service
saw rapid Malay domination (See Table 27).
Table 27: Ethnic Composition of the Federal and State
Services (DI, II and III), 1969
Ethnic
group
Federal services
(Division I)
States services
(Division II)
Federal and state
services(Division III)
Number
Per cent
Number
Per cent
Number
Per cent
Malays
36,618
60.7
12,328
79.1
48,946
64.5
Chinese
12,181
20.2
1,744
11.2
13,925
18.4
Indians
10,499
17.4
1,394
8.9
11,893
15.7
Others
986
1.6
125
0.8
1,111
1.5
Total
60,284
100.0
15,591
100.0
75,875
100.0
Source: Puthucheary 1978:57.
Table 28: Ethnic Composition of the Malayan
Civil Service, 1950–1970
Ethnic group
1950
1957
1963
1970
Malays
31
124
250
603
Non-Malays
—
13
31
93
British
114
221
9
—
Total
145
358
290
696
Malays as per cent of Total
21.4
34.6
86.2
86.6
Source: Puthucheary 1978
45
As disagreeable as this “pre-NEP quota” system might be to non-Malay or
even rational Weberian sensibility, there were few feasible alternatives in
one critical respect. So long as the pre-NEP ethnic division of labour was
stiffening in non-expanding laissez-faire capitalism managed by the
Alliance; the civil service was bound to be a site for zero-sum inter-ethnic
competition.
However, the whole socio-economic and employment sector of Malaysia
has become ethnic since NEP and has visibly divided the society. The
social problems prior to 1970s are re-emerging and the sectoral and biased
policies in favour of Malay communities have fractured the social fabric.
It has virtually marginalised Indian and Chinese communities.
6. Economic, Social, Political and Cultural Fallouts of Exclusion
Malaysia is a multi-ethnic society and ethnic consciousness and identity
are quite strong in day to day conditions. Indeed, the historical and present
importance of ethnicity in social, economic, political and cultural relations
becomes significant. Ethnicity has been an on-going debate and controversy
in Malaysia. To a large extent, ethnicity is socially constructed but its
physical attributes and deep cultural differences between the groups cannot
be denied. The differences in language, ancestry or customs surface no
matter how finely the lines are drawn. It becomes important to note that
public policy has much to do with group formation. These three ethnic
groups of Malaysia (Malay, Chinese, and Indian) would be considered an
ethnic group (“coloured”) under Apartheid Law in South Africa under which
the Malays, Chinese, and Indians who migrated to South Africa would feel
closer to each other in terms of their cultural background than they would
in Malaysia. Thus, any discussion of ethnic differences would be futile
without contextualising the issues in society, economy, polity and culture.
6.1 Ethnic Policy in Malaysia
Groups are often referred to as “majority” or “minority”; whether the group
is majority or minority depends on the numerical size of the group, its
political power relative to other groups and in this sense, the majority
group in Malaysia is the Malay, consisting over 60 per cent of the total
population. The Chinese and Indians are minority groups forming 30 and
10 per cent of the total population; respectively.
46
In political or popular discourse in Malaysia, “ethnicity” is often used
interchangeably with “race”; whereas social scientists use “race” to refer
to the physical or biological attributes and “ethnicity” refers to the cultural
attributes. “Race” is primarily a description of skin color or visible physical
attributes. The skin color is continuous than categorical, particularly
among descendants of mixed marriages. Thus, the term “race” lends little
to sociological or anthropological understanding of people. On the
contrary, “ethnicity” or “ethnic group” is used primarily in contexts of
cultural difference, which can be traced back to shared ancestry and
common language, religion or place of origin. Therefore, the term
“ethnicity” has greater claim to sociological analysis than “race”.26 In
Malaysia, the differences in visible physical attributes among Malays,
Chinese and Indians are relatively less, for it is the difference in cultures,
particularly language and religion that form the basis for conflict.
Malaysian independence marked a political victory for Malays. Soon after
independence, in 1961, the Education Act was enacted and National
Education Policy (NEP) was introduced. NEP stated two goals:
•
To establish a national system of education
•
To make Malay the national language as well as the medium of
instruction in all government schools, colleges, and universities.
Under the policy, Malay language became the sole official language in the
country and was termed “Bahasa Malaysia” - the Malaysian language.27
The ethnicity-based public policies in Malaysia was fundamentally
economic but masqueraded as cultural. Malaysian public policies have
been formulated with an assumption that Malay majority needs economic
security from the non-Malay immigrants. Prime Minister Mahathir-BinMohamad engineered Malaysian preferential policies since he took over
the office in 1981. He was lucid about the differences in “character” of the
two groups. Although he used the term “hereditary” in his writing in 1970,
but it laid emphasis that such differences in group “characters” were a
consequence of environment and economic conditions that shaped the life
of Malay and Chinese communities. A new category “bumiputera” was
created to refer to the beneficiaries of NEP and the formulated policy of
bumiputera ethnicity served two purposes.
47
•
It gave legitimacy to the group receiving preferential treatment
under the policy. In Malay language, bumiputera means “son of
the soil” which implied that the group is entitled to favorable
treatment for being original inhabitants of the land.
•
Using the new term instead of “Malay” category created a broader
political base as bumiputera refers not only to the Muslim Malays
on the Peninsula, but it also incorporates the indigenous peoples
of East Malaysia of Sabah. These indigenous peoples do not share
the same language and religion of Malays on the Peninsula.28 This
broader base helped in fostering smooth incorporation of Sabah
into Malaysia and created a clear numerical majority ethnic group
in the country.
The goal of NEP was to increase the economic share held by bumiputeras
from 2.4 per cent to 30 per cent. This was done by moving bumiputeras
into business by giving them special consideration for government
contracts and licenses. Initially, many bumiputeras sought the opportunity
to get contracts and licenses but promptly sold them to their so-called “Ali
Baba” joint venture partners or to non-bumiputeras.29 This clearly indicated
to the politically conscious policy makers that economic change would not
occur without cultural change. A cultural reformation, involving new skills,
new approaches and values was thought essential, if bumiputeras were
made to emerge as confident, commercially sophisticated community,
capable of competing with the non-bumiputeras business community.
Education and training, therefore, built up the strongest element in the
initiatives of NEP30 under which university education became the terrain
of ethnic contestation. Prior to NEP, few bumiputeras were admitted into
the university and were grossly under-represented in lucrative fields of
science and engineering. The institution of NEP quota system ensured
Malay pre-dominance amongst the university students, faculty and staff.
Almost four out of every five university scholarships were awarded to
Malay students31 who only needed to possess the minimum requirements
for admission.
To increase the access of bumiputeras to higher education, an “Off-campus
Universities Programme” was set up after the implementation of NEP.32
This programme brought into Malaysia American professors from 20
48
American universities of the Mid-West Universities Consortium for
International Activities (MUCIA), to prepare bumiputera students for
degrees in Arts, Science, and Engineering. The programme supported
bumiputera students overseas in Britain, Australia and Canada. In addition
to “Off-Campus Universities Programme,” public funds were directed to
establish several institutions, such as MARA junior colleges, which admitted
exclusively bumiputera students for post-secondary vocational training.
6.2 Representation and Domination
In the fundamental ways, BN which built upon the traditions of its
predecessor, the Alliance, is the institutional emblem of a system that
combines “open ethnic politics” with inter-ethnic co-operation as
advocated by those in power and well developed in actual practice. This is
so partly because BN is not only the historical product of a political system
in which party programmes, political mobilisation and voting behaviour
are dominated by ethnic considerations and appeals. Partly, it is because
BN being the most successful competitor in the electoral process has used
its uninterrupted rule at all levels of government with significant but rare
exceptions among state and local governments to shape the political system
and the electoral process according to the ruling coalition ideas and
requirements.
Since its formal beginnings in 1974, BN has not been monolithic or static.
Both obvious and subtle alterations have been made to works of the ruling
coalition. As a definitive example, the elite compromise of Alliance
supposedly based upon equitable inter-party consultations—notably
between UMNO and MCA has been superseded by more centralised
decision making of BN, grounded in implicit dominance of UMNO in the
coalition. This important change was a distinct movement, though not a
sharp break, away from “consociationalism” of the Alliance toward a
“democracy without consensus”. 33 But BN has invented a discernible
tradition and institutionalised different mechanisms to which endurance
of coalition can be attributed. The most important of these formulas and
mechanisms include a tested framework for managing inter-ethnic politics
within and outside the coalition, relatively stable allocations of
opportunities for electoral representation and contestation; and functioning
arrangements for power sharing at different levels of government.
49
The control of BN over the electoral process has been derived from many
factors and sources. Since the political system is not a one-party state, yet
an unbroken tenure in the federal government has allowed BN virtually to
conflate state and ruling coalition, not least in the exercise of vast powers
of incumbency of the coalition. At its disposal, BN has an imposing array
of state resources including the command of administrative apparatus,
control over economic resources and an ownership and regulation of the
mass media. Moreover, the principal parties of BN have their own “fleets”
of corporations34 as well as those of their major business allies from which
to draw financial and other forms of assistance. Simultaneously BN
governments at all levels routinely deny the opposition access to the same
resources. The administrative machinery is regularly used to obstruct or
repress the opposition and its supporters, and not just when elections are
scheduled. The “deployment-denial” by BN of state and non-state resources
constitutes a massive structural advantage by any standard. In a typical
first-past-the-post electoral contest, this advantage tactically confers upon
the candidates of BN a leading, if not, winning edge. Between elections, the
same strategy usually taking the form of state-financed “public services”,
helps to entrench an incumbent BN representative—but pointedly not one
from any opposition party—in the constituency35.
Hence, across the electoral terrain, the advantages of BN in a general or
state election were historically overcome only at moments of political
crises; 1969 and 1984 in Sabah, 1990 and 1999; that generated sweeping
waves of anti-regime recalcitrance. Even then, the heightened dissent
tended to raise the share of popular vote for the opposition without securing
for opposition a commensurate proportion of parliamentary or state
assembly seats. The results of the elections of 1986, 1990, 1999 and 2004
attest to this systemic inequality (See Table 29).
50
Table 29: Proportion of Popular Vote Compared
with Number and Share of Parliamentary
Seats in General Elections, 1959–2004
Election
year
All opposition parties
Total no.
of seats
contested
No.
of
seats
Per
cent
of
seats*
Per cent
of
popular
vote
No.
of
seats
Per
cent
of
seats*
51.7
74
71
48.3
30
29
104
1964
58.5
89
86
41.5
15
14
104
1969
49.3
92
64
50.7
51
36
143
1974
60.7
135
88
39.3
19
12
154
1978
57.2
130
84
42.8
24
16
154
1982
60.5
132
86
39.5
22
14
154
1986
55.8
148
84
41.5
29
16
177
1990
53.4
127
71
46.6
53
29
180
1995
65.2
162
84
34.8
30
16
192
1999
56.5
148
77
43.5
45
23
193
2004
63.8
198
90
36.2
21
10
219
1959
*
Alliance/BN
Per cent
of
popular
vote
Rounded to the nearest 1 per cent. Source: Adapted from Funston (2000:49,
Table 1).
The structural advantage of BN is allied to other features of the electoral
system, such as gerrymandered constituencies and a carefully calibrated
distribution of constituencies. Consequently, BN has consistently gained
two-third majorities in Parliament that did not reflect the shares of the
popular vote for BN. It received 60 per cent or more of the popular vote
only four times; in 1974 when most of the opposition parties successful in
1969 were freshly co-opted; in 1982 when the first Mahathir administration
was greeted with popular expectations and in 1995 and 2004, following
few years of very high economic growth. However, BN won less than 80
per cent of the parliamentary seats twice; in 1990 following the split of
UMNO in 1987–198836 and in 1999 when the persecution of Anwar Ibrahim
in 1998–1999 swung the Malay vote against UMNO.37 In the pre-BN
elections, 49.3 per cent share of the popular vote of the Alliance in 1969
was the lowest ever in Alliance/BN history; still, the Alliance took 64 per
cent of the parliamentary seats and retained its two-third majority in the
Parliament in December 1970 when the Sarawak United People’s Party
(SUPP) which had five seats joined the Alliance.
51
It is, arguably, the ability of BN to dominate electoral process
overwhelmingly by securing more than two-third majority in Parliament
and controlling almost all state governments that validates and sustains
the claims of BN to being committed to inter-ethnic cooperation,
collaboration between component parties and consensus building. The
fact that BN having to parcel out seats for contestation among 14 members,
perhaps having more than two-third majority in politics is akin to
dependence of NEP on high economic growth. This could facilitate
redistribution without provoking a sense of deprivation, exclusion and
discrimination. None of these “articles of faith” is untrue of the modus
operandi of BN so long they are collectively located within BN framework,
which
•
determines ethnic representation in the electoral process by
allocating seats to component parties before elections.
•
maintains inter-ethnic power-sharing by distributing positions in
the federal government and in state governments under BN control
to component parties.
•
entrenches the position of UMNO as dominant party in the political
system.
6.3 Ethnic Representation: Parliament and State Legislative
Assemblies
Over 30 years, BN has grown into a standing coalition of 14 “component
parties” all of which could lay some claim to representing BN in any general
election. Thus, the allocation of seats for electoral contest, always a critical
issue for BN, is a complex process. For the entire country, the process is
based largely on the overall ethnic composition of the electorate, the ethnic
profiles of constituencies and the relative strengths of component parties
within BN. Thus, in Peninsular Malaysia, where the largest groups of voters
are Malay and Chinese, most constituencies show a majority of Malay or
Chinese voters, and UMNO and MCA are the largest parties and obtain the
two highest allocations of seats (See Table 30).
On the other hand, allocation of seats for BN parties in Sabah and Sarawak
reflect more diverse ethnic composition of the electorates as well as the
influence of the non-Malay bumiputera parties. In fact, UMNO only began
to feature directly in Sabah in the 1995 general election, for which UMNO
was established to replace previously “Muslim or Malay” parties, notably
USNO. In addition, given the first-past-the-post electoral contests, the
most important criterion for allocating a specific constituency to a
52
component party is the ethnic composition of the electorate of that
constituency. In principle, a “Malay majority constituency” in Peninsular
Malaysia will be allocated to UMNO, while a “Chinese majority
constituency” will go to either MCA or Gerakan, these being “Chinesebased” parties of BN. This basic formula is modified to accommodate MIC
which receives certain number of seats although no constituency has a
majority of Indian voters. The Constituency demarcation has been steadily
skewed to create much larger number of Malay-majority constituencies;
allocation of BN which disproportionately favours UMNO over all other
BN parties (Sothi Rachagan 1980). Despite this fundamental inequality
and the component parties’ periodic disagreements over seat allocations,
the mechanism of BN to provide for ethnic representation in electoral
contests has been flexible enough to meet changes in the coalition
memberships over many elections (See Table 30).
Table 30: Allocation of Parliamentary Seats among
Alliance or BN Parties, 1959–2004
1959 1964
Peninsular Malaysia
UMNO
70
68
MCA
31
33
MIC
3
3
Gerakan
PPP
PAS
HAMIM
Berjasa
Sabah
UMNO
USNO
SCA
Berjaya
PBS
UPKO
PBRS
SAPP
LDP
Sarawak
PBB
SUPP
SNAP
PBDS
SPDP
Total
104
104
1969
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1995
1999
2004
67
33
3
61
23
4
8
4
14
74
27
4
6
1
73
28
4
7
84
32
6
9
86
32
6
9
92
35
7
10
93
35
7
10
104
40
9
12
1
12
11
13
4
1
2
1
4
1
3
1
4
4
1
2
1
2
2
13
3
16
8
103
154
6
5
10
11
8
7
9
152
8
7
9
154
6
6
14
14
8
7
5
4
10
8
3
6
10
7
4
6
10
7
4
6
177
180
191
192
11
7
6
4
219
Note: In any election year, a blank for a party indicates one of the following: the
party did not exist at the time; had been dissolved; had not yet joined the BN; had
left the BN; or its significance had diminished and it was not allocated any seat.
Sources: Suruhanjaya Pilihanraya (Election Commission), various years; New Strait
Times 2004:64.
53
BN has successfully extended its method of seat allocation to contest at
the level of the State Legislative Assembly in each of the 13 states. Finer
adjustments can be made at this level to suit local demographic features
and also because larger number of state seats are available as compared to
smaller number of parliamentary seats, illustrated by the seat allocation
for state contests in 2004 (See Table 31).
Table 31: Allocation of State Legislative Assembly Seats among BN
Parties, Peninsular Malaysia-2004 General Election
State
UMNO
MCA
MIC
Gerakan
PPP
Total
Perlis
13
2
0
0
0
15
Kedah
28
4
2
2
0
36
Kelantan
44
1
0
0
0
45
Terengganu
31
1
0
0
0
32
Penang
15
10
2
13
0
40
Perak
34
16
4
4
1
59
Pahang
31
8
1
2
0
42
Selangor
35
14
3
4
0
56
Negeri Sembilan
22
10
2
2
0
36
Malacca
18
8
1
1
0
28
Johor
34
15
4
3
0
56
Total
305
89
19
31
1
445
Source: New Straits Times 2004:64.
Perlis, a small Malay-majority state has only three parliamentary
constituencies. Here, Chinese voters make up 14 per cent of the electorate,
none of the Chinese-based parties get a parliamentary seat but MCA contests
at the state level. Similarly, the non-Malay parties, MCA, Gerakan and
MIC contest a limited number of state seats in the heavily Malay-majority
states of Kelantan and Terengganu. In some cases, the allocation of state
seats serves to compensate “lesser” component party that has not been
given a parliamentary seat to contest. For instance, Gerakan, regarded as
the smallest of the two Chinese-based parties of BN did not contest at the
parliamentary level in Johor, Kedah and Selangor in 1999, but Gerakan
contested at the state level in each of the three states.
In an electoral process where voting behaviour is heavily influenced by
ethnic concerns and the acceptability of a candidate is closely correlated
with the candidate’s ethnicity, the successful deployment by BN of seat
54
allocation as a mechanism of political representation lends credibility to
their claim of practicing “multi-ethnic politics”; despite its component
parties’ unabashedly ethnic character. Component parties have disputed
seat allocations before and only the threat of severe penalties including
expulsion from BN has prevented disgruntled component parties from
sabotaging electoral campaigns in constituencies not allocated to them. In
practice, however, the reward of a disciplined adherence to the seat
allocations to BN is the component parties’ ability to enjoy vital “mutuality
of access” to each others “natural”, ethnically defined constituencies.
On the contrary, individual parties which appeal to “single” communities
even if ideologically they renounce ethnic politics, such as PAS and DAP,
are unable to penetrate predominantly Chinese and Malay areas;
respectively, let alone campaign profitably there. BN parties for example,
UMNO and MCA face no such limitations, albeit the actual extent of cooperation has to be negotiated at the local level, and sometimes local
squabbles among them lead to non-cooperation or sabotage. At the
electorate level, “mutuality of access” works for a partisan supporter of
BN component party. The supporter need not agree with all other BN
component parties but has the choice to vote, for either BN or the
opposition. Thus, the status of BN as a standing coalition, with all its
candidates contesting on a “unified” ticket, demonstrates a practical
strength that must be a prerequisite of any viable coalition, that is, the
ability to be inclusive in obvious and subtle, practical and ideological ways,
and as it were, to be all things to all people, hence “multi-ethnic” to otherwise
“ethnic” voters.
Power sharing: Federal Cabinet and State Executive
Committees
Initially, the power sharing between Alliances reflected an inter-ethnic
compact reached before independence. After 1969, BN was established to
co-opt as many opposition parties as could be attracted to an enlarged
ruling coalition. Even so, BN continued to uphold inter-ethnic power
sharing in real as well as symbolic ways. The ways in which coalition
institutionalise inter-ethnic power sharing is to translate ethnic
representation in elections into ethnic representation in BN cabinets. In
2004, Table 32, the ethnic composition of the Cabinet approximated ethnic
composition of the electorate. Since ethnic composition of population
55
and the electorate continually vary for different reasons, it would be
unrealistic to accept anything but an approximation of ethnic composition
of the Cabinet as compared to the ethnic composition of the electorate at
any given time.
Table 32: Ethnic Composition of the Electorate Compared
with the Ethnic Composition of the Cabinet, 2004
Ethnic
group
Per cent of
electorate
Minister
Posts
*
Deputy
minister
Parliamentary
secretary
Total
Per Posts Per Posts Per cent Posts
a
cent of
cent of
of total
a
**
total
total
Per
cent
of
total
*
Malay
59.1
22
67
18
47
11
50
51
55
Chinese
28.5
6
18
11
29
7
32
24
26
Indian
3.6
1
3
4
11
3
14
8
9
Non-Malay
bumiputera
8.8
4
1.2
5
13
1
4
10
10
1999 figures. **Rounded to the nearest 1 per cent.
Sources: Syed and Pereira 2004; Wong et al. 2004; www.pmo.gov.my/website/
webdb.nsf/vf_Front_Gov? OpenForm&Seq=2#_RefreshKW_f3_SubPM, accessed
on 15 July 2005.
This basic ethnic composition of BN Cabinets should not be taken as
evidence of an ethnically proportionate influence over policy formulation
or decision making. It is a tacit but crucial feature of the rule by BN that
prime minister and the deputies would be Malays. And while Chinese
ministers held the strategic portfolios of finance and trade during the
Alliance period, since mid-1970s, only Malays have headed the key
ministries of finance, home affairs, defence, international trade, and
education. Nonetheless, leaving aside the wider implications of resource
control and powers of patronage, the fact of ethnic representation in BN
Cabinets helps to uphold and legitimise the framework of coalition of interethnic cooperation and power sharing.
There is a different dynamics by which this method of inter-ethnic power
sharing works in post-1969 politics. Beside the original Alliance member
parties—UMNO, MCA and MIC other parties that joined BN would have
had their own reasons indeed. While the tense political milieu after “May
56
13” made it critical, even desirable for many parties to attempt at reestablishing a post-Alliance framework of inter-ethnic cooperation, not all
parties that joined BN did it out of “ethnic interests”. The parties that have
controlled different state governments at various times, such as PAS in
Gerakan and Kelantan in Penang in 1969 and Parti Bersatu Sabah (PBS) in
Sabah in 1984, took into account the enormous difficulties of administering
an opposition-led state government in the face of hostility from BN Federal
Government.
Yet, membership in BN essentially held out the hope that a party would
trade its opposition for some influence in government insofar as the party
delivers the votes of “its” community. It is a hope that has been realised by
most BN parties inasmuch as they have found ministerial appointments in
the Cabinet at various times (See Table 33).
Table 33: Distribution of Ministerial Posts by Component
Party, Selected Years-1973–2004
Component
party
1973
1974
1976
1981
1999
2003
2004
UMNO
13
14
13
15
16
19
22
MCA
4
3
4
4
4
4
4
MIC
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
Gerakan
*
1
1
1
1
PAS
1
1
1
PBB
2
1
1
1
2
1
2
SUPP
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
PBDS
USNO
1
2
1
PBS
1
LDP
UPKO
Total
24
23
23
24
27
1
1
30
33
* In a particular year, a blank for a party indicates one of the following: the party
did not exist then, had been dissolved, had not yet joined the BN, had left the BN
or its significance had diminished.
Sources: Abdul Aziz Bari 2002; Syed and Pereira 2004; www.pmo.gov.my/website/
webdb.nsf/vf_Front_Gov?OpenForm&Seq=2#_ RefreshKW_f3_SubPM, accessed
15 May 2008.
57
From power sharing perspective of BN, a component party claiming to
represent the interests of “its” community gains, through a Cabinet
presence, a voice, a place and an opportunity to bargain formally; unequally
within the decision-making and policy-formulating councils of BN. While
the performances of specific component parties vary over elections, it is
clear that the most powerful party in the Cabinet has always been UMNO.
Table 34. Even so, the disadvantage of inequitable power sharing might
perhaps be less important, symbolically and otherwise to smaller parties
than the mere fact of their inclusion in the Cabinet, if need be at lower
ranks of deputy minister and parliamentary secretary (See Table 34).
Table 34: Distribution of Posts of Minister, Deputy Minister
and Parliamentary Secretary by Component Party, 2004
Component
party
Minister
Deputy
minister
Parliamentary
secretary
Total
UMNO
22
18
11
51
MCA
4
8
4
16
MIC
1
3
3
7
Gerakan
1
3
2
6
PPP
0
1
0
1
PBB
2
1
1
4
SUPP
1
1
1
3
PBDS
0
2
0
2
PBS
1
0
0
1
UPKO
1
0
0
1
SPDP
0
1
0
1
Total
33
38
22
93
Sources: Syed and Pereira 2004; Wong et al. 2004;
www.pmo.gov.my/website/webdb.nsf/vf_Front_Gov?OpenForm&Seq=
2#_RefreshKW_f3_SubPM, accessed 15 July 2005.
Just as the method of BN of determining ethnic representation in elections
covers both the parliamentary and state levels, its power sharing in
government is extended to the level of the state governments that are
controlled by BN. The State Executive Council is the state equivalent of
the Cabinet. The current distribution of State Executive Council positions
in the 11 states, which BN heads in Peninsular Malaysia is indicated in
Table 35. There is a broad accommodation of the main BN component
parties even though UMNO leads the state governments in all these states,
except for Penang, which has been led by Gerakan since 1969.
58
Table 35: Distribution of Executive Council
Positions by BN Parties in BN-Led State
Governments, Peninsular Malaysia-2003
State
UMNO
MCA
MIC
Gerakan
Perlis
9
1
0
0
Total
10
Kedah
7
1
1
1
10
Penang
3
2
1
4
10
Perak
6
2
1
1
10
Pahang
7
2
0
1
10
Selangor
6
2
1
1
10
Negeri Sembilan
6
2
1
1
10
Malacca
7
2
1
0
10
Johor
7
2
1
0
10
Total
58
16
7
9
90
Sources: Web sites of the respective Malaysian state governments.
Roughly similar principles of ethnic and party representations are applied
to lesser prominent levels of government, namely, the Senate, “upper
house” in Parliament and the Municipal Councils or “local government” in
each state. The senators have always been appointed, while municipal
councilors have been appointed since early 1970s when local elections
were effectively abolished. In practice, the Federal Government controls
appointments to the Senate, and State Government controls their Municipal
Councils. BN uses appointments to both Senate and Municipal Councils
for a variety of reasons, chiefly to reward its own politicians who are unable
to secure nominations for parliamentary or state elections. In the process,
however, some pattern of ethnic representation is once again maintained
(See Table 36).
Table 36: Distribution of Councilors by BN Parties,
Petaling Jaya Municipal Council
Name of Parties
UMNO
MCA
MIC
Gerakan
Total
Number of councilors
13
7
3
1
24
Per cent of total
54
29
13
4
100
Majoritarian and Dominant: UMNO’s Position
Even so, there is no overlooking of the domination of UMNO within the
framework of collaboration with BN. If ever UMNO was truly only the
first among equals during the Alliance period, UMNO has clearly been the
59
dominant party of BN. Qualitatively, this “fact of BN life” and, associated
with it, the reality of “Malay [political] supremacy” can be seen from various
perspectives. The simplest is the exit of component parties from BN.
Despite the dissatisfaction of MCA in partnership with Gerakan during
early days of BN; submitted to the reality of UMNO dominated “enlarged
Alliance”, while Gerakan, claiming to be the conscience of BN during late
1980s, simply genuflected before the dictates of UMNO in policy areas
and political conduct. However, PAS was virtually ejected from BN in
1976–1977 and PBS was defected in 1990. Further, UMNO could claim to
be the source of hegemonic stability within BN for long, since 1974
elections. The domination of UMNO was established to the extent that
Mahathir repeatedly reminded the component parties of BN that UMNO
could rule the country on its own if UMNO was not committed to power
sharing. Mahathir’s assertion of the supremacy of UMNO in the electoral
system in late 1980’s rested upon a conception of electoral politics in
exclusively ethnic terms and conveniently left aside any consideration of
the complex, if not destabilising consequences, of any UMNO attempt to
rule by itself. In any case, the assertion candidly expressed an underlying
majoritarian view of democracy that at the very least appeared to have
arithmetic on its side (See Table 37).
Table 37: Distribution of Parliamentary Seats by UMNO,
Other Alliance/BN Parties and all Opposition Parties in
General Elections, 1959–2004
Election year
1959
1964
1969**
1969–1970***
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1995
1999
2004
UMNO
Total no.
of seats
Seats
Per
cent*
104
104
104
144
154
154
154
177
180
192
193
219
52
59
51
51
61
69
70
83
70
90
72
107
50
57
49
35
40
45
45
47
39
47
37
49
Other Alliance or
BN parties
Seats
Per cent*
22
30
15
41
74
62
62
65
57
72
76
91
21
29
14
28
48
40
40
37
32
37
39
41
All opposition
parties
Seats
Per
cent*
30
15
37
51
19
24
22
29
53
30
45
21
29
14
36
35
12
16
14
16
29
16
23
10
Rounded to the nearest 1 per cent.** Figures for Peninsular Malaysia only. Only 103
seats were contested because of the death of a candidate in a constituency in
*
60
Malacca.*** Figures for the whole of Malaysia after elections were resumed in Sabah
and Sarawak in July 1970. The actual number of seats contested was 143.
Sources: von Vorys 1975:160, table 6.3; Means 1991:34, table 2.1; 68, table 3.3;
186, table 6.4; Funston 2000:49, table 1; New Straits Times 2004:64.
UMNO had a majority in Parliament in the first two elections of 1959 and
1964. In subsequent elections, UMNO held a large plurality of seats, its
apparent decline being attributable mainly to the co-optation of parties
such as PAS and Gerakan into an enlarged coalition of BN. More than any
hypothetical argument, the National Operation Council post-May 13 Rule,
showed that UMNO would exercise its governing plurality in any
emergency. The number of Malay-majority constituencies far exceeded
all others. Thus, it was conceivable that UMNO by an overwhelming victory
in these constituencies could form a government on its own. Notably, after
1986 elections, when UMNO won 83 seats out of a total of 177 seats, only
an improbable and unwieldy coalition of all the remaining parties could
have contested UMNO claim to form UMNO government; incase UMNO
desired. UMNO could have contested and probably won even more seats,
were it not expedient for it to concede some of its safe seats to non-Malay
coalition partners, namely, MCA and MIC. From 1960s to 1980s, UMNO
made some such concessions to MCA when the very strong opposition
sentiment in the large urban Chinese-majority constituencies left BN with
no other means to buttress unconvincing claim of MCA to being “the party
of the Chinese”. The concession to MIC had a different motive; there was
no alternative to giving up a few seats by UMNO to secure some degree of
Indian representation in Parliament. Of course, it might be argued, UMNO
concessions wouldn’t be necessary if the composition and distribution of
constituencies were not gerrymandered according to ethnic considerations.
In fact, prominent candidates of one ethnic background won earlier in
constituencies largely composed of voters of different ethnic background.
But that argument would take discussion into the realm of principles, maybe
of systemic reform, rather than prevailing conditions of electoral
competition.
For a long time, therefore, singular performance of UMNO vis-à-vis all
other parties underwrote the integrity of BN as a ruling coalition. In 1969,
1986 and 1990 elections, when the non-Malay opposition parties did well,
the formidable performance of UMNO offset its non-Malay partners’
losses. Twice, the number of parliamentary seats of UMNO was less than
61
the combined seats of all other BN parties. Table 38. In 1974,
parliamentary representation of UMNO was less than half of the total of
BN because of the co-optation of PAS, Gerakan and SUPP that had had
good results in the 1969 election.
Table 38: Distribution of Parliamentary Seats by UMNO and
Other Alliance/BN Parties in General Elections, 1959–2004*
Election year
Total No. of
Alliance or
BN seats
Seats
Per cent**
Seats
Per cent**
1959
74
52
70
22
30
1964
89
59
66
30
34
1969
66
51
77
15
23
1969–1970
92
51
55
41
46
1974
135
61
45
74
55
1978
131
69
53
62
47
1982
132
70
53
62
47
1986
148
83
56
65
44
1990
127
70
55
57
45
1995
162
90
56
72
44
1999
148
72
49
76
51
2004
198
107
54
91
46
UMNO
Other alliance or
BN parties
* Retabulated from table 36, above **Rounded to the nearest 1 per cent
It was in 1999 election that caused UMNO so many defeats and it’s
Parliamentary Representation (of 72 seats) went down to less than the
combined number of seats (76) held by its coalition partners. BN displayed
its depth as a “permanent” coalition; while compensating the setbacks of
UMNO in 1999, MCA and Gerakan performed strongly which prevented
DAP from advancing as a leading member of ad-hoc coalition of Barisan
Alternatif (Alternative Front). The “mutuality of access” that UMNO and
its non-Malay coalition partners enjoyed came to the rescue of UMNO in
the ethnically mixed constituencies in reversal of past trends when it was
non-Malay component parties that needed assistance. Ironically, that
result merely restored unquestioned domination of UMNO of the BN
framework.
It is arguably the novel experience of 1999 elections that truly proved
strong peculiarity of the framework of representation of BN power sharing
and domination within its system of open ethnic politics. By 2004 general
elections, with the opposition in disarray, its domination was re-established
62
to greater effects (See Table 37). Additional evidence comes from the
mimicry to which the opposition parties have had to resort. In past elections,
the best opposition performances were made possible when the opposition,
among other things, adopted some variant of the Alliance or formulas of
coalition of BN; by negotiating an electoral pact in 1969 or forming a
“second coalition” in 1990 and 1999.
7. Conclusion
The accommodation of differences is the essence of true equality38, and
group specific rights are needed to accommodate differences. In a family,
society and state individual rights and differences already allow
accommodation and on the basis of this proposition equal right of each
individual; irrespective of the identity, requires for the cohesion of the
society and state. But in the broader framework some minority rights
eliminate those rather than creating.
In the contemporary scenario, ethnic exclusion and discrimination have
received far greater attention than peace, inclusion and equality in multiethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural societies. But at the policy level,
the implication is that the solution to ethnic exclusion lies at the ethnic
relation level. Some scholars opine that social, economic and cultural
incompatibility in a multi-ethnic society is inevitable. Such kind of notion
breeds practices of exclusion and discrimination in the multi-ethnic society.
In an exploitative economic structure, exploitation, exclusion and
discrimination are identical issues on the basis of ethnic, religious and
cultural identities. Ethnic identification and consciousness are particularly
strong among disadvantaged ethnic minority groups who undergo
victimisation, as in case of Indians and Chinese in Malaysia. Ethnicity,
religion and culture are also convenient political resources in an
unconstructive sense.
As for human philosophy, culture, organisation and technical know how,
in a multi-ethnic society each ethnic community has strengths and
weaknesses. The typical representation of multi-ethnic society of Malaysia
comprising three main ethnic groups; Malays, Chinese and Indians
understates the ethnic diversity that is found within these communities in
itself. In ethnic terms, the present Malaysian population consists of different
communities, several of which lend themselves to other subdivisions. The
bumiputera of Peninsular Malaysia consists almost entirely of Malays and
63
Orang Asli (aboriginal communities), while the bumiputera of Sabah and
Sarawak refer to the indigenous people of diverse ethnic communities.
The ethnic composition of the population of Sabah and Sarawak and the
composition of bumiputera communities in particular, is much more varied
than that of Peninsular Malaysia. In the census of 1970, 38 ethnic groups
were formerly enumerated separately and re-categorised into eight groups:
Bajau, Chinese, Indonesian, Kadazan, Malay, Murut, other indigenous
groups. According to 1970 census, the Kadazandusuns was the largest
ethnic group forming just over 28 per cent of the Sabah population, followed
by Chinese who comprised 21 per cent of the population. There are sizeable
number of indigenous non-Malay Muslims in Sabah and Sarawak, Indian
and Thai Muslims in Peninsular Malaysia and a small number of Muslim
converts of other ethnic backgrounds.
On the eve of independence in 1957, the political economy of Malaysia
shaped by colonial capitalism had created certain patterns of uneven
development, economic disparities and social divisions. This rough ruralurban division in the distribution of population and economic activity also
had its ethnic dimensions. The economic disparities and social divisions
were complicated by an ethnic division of labour. Consequently, postcolonial patterns of “asset ownership” continued to show significant interethnic differentials. The non-Malay, mostly the Chinese ownership of share
capital was substantial, but the proportion of Malay ownership was very
low. The social and economic disparities are the breeding ground of interethnic resentment and discontent.
The immigrant ethnic groups who used to be “transients” are permanent
residents. Their much improved economic well-being, consciously or
unconsciously, became a source of insecurity to the indigenous Malays. In
1970, poverty was markedly higher among the Bumiputera than other
ethnic communities. Approximately two-third of Bumiputera households
was living below the poverty line and the poverty rates among Chinese and
Indian households were 26.0 per cent and 39.2 per cent; respectively.
Since NEP, the ethnic income differentials narrowed over the period 1970–
2002. The public sector took on a multiplicity of roles as justified by NEP.
The public sector emerged as the provider of opportunities for Malays as
it enlarged the existing group of Malay entrepreneurs, graduates and
professionals. The re-structuring of requirement of NEP set a quota for at
least 30 per cent bumiputera equity participation and employment in
64
companies covered by ICA. Even at state and local level government, (nonMalay) businesses came under strict bureaucratic regulation. The public
sector emerged as a major investor seeking to raise the Malay ownership
of corporate equity. It employed state resources to expand the ownership
of assets via “restructuring” exercises that included setting up companies
by public sector and buying into or buying up existing as well as new local
and foreign businesses. Finally, the public sector functioned as the trustee
of Malay economic interests. Some of the best known “trustee” agencies
were Bank Bumiputera, Urban Development Authority, Perbadanan
National (Pernas, or National Corporation), Permodalan National Berhad
(PNB, or National Equity Corporation), Amanah Saham National (ASN, or
National Unit Trust Scheme) and the state economic development
corporations.
Within NEP, the role of education especially university education, was
strongly politicised. In order to accelerate and actively facilitate bumiputera
demand for access to higher education, the Malaysian government
implemented ethnic quota system where admission to public universities
is based on the ratio of 55:45 for bumiputera and non-bumiputera students.
This situation of high bumiputera enrolment in public institutions of higher
learning persisted into mid-1990s.
8. Recommendation and Suggestions
Ethnic identification and consciousness are particularly strong among
disadvantaged ethnic minority groups like the Indians and Chinese in
Malaysia. In this case, ethnicity has assumed an important role for the
purpose of articulation and in the struggle for social and economic justice
and equality. Ethnicity, religion and culture have become potential political
resources in the Malaysian society and since 1969, emerged as tools in the
political process. All forms of exclusion in Malaysia are ethnicity based
discrimination. However, the major findings are:
•
In this study, four kinds of exclusion and discrimination have been
elucidated; between Europeans (British) and the Asians (indigenous
or immigrants); between the immigrant and the indigenous
population; between the Chinese immigrants and the Indian
immigrants; and between the Malay aristocrats and the Malay
peasants.
65
66
•
Again, as per the process of economic development and planning
of the government in this study, it has also observed that the
exclusion and discrimination are broadly in two forms. Before the
implementation of the New Economic Policy, the indigenous Malay
ethnic groups were discriminated from the main stream economy
and the development process. The indigenous communities
suffered the most and were excluded and marginalised from access
to property and economy. Since the introduction of NEP, the
Malaysian government put entire thrust on the upliftment of the
indigenous groups.
•
Culturally there has been an attempt to reject the history and
tradition of the indigenous people, or attempt to displace or
neutralise the indigenous culture. The use of English, Chinese and
Tamil as the medium for education were attempts to subjugate the
indigenous culture, or at least to neutralize it. Malay intellectual
and cultural thinkers were branded as communal or racial, placed
at the same level with cultural chauvinism of the immigrant
communities which finally shaped the cultural politics in Malaysia.
•
Since the New Economic Policy, the mechanism of the government
functioned in the form of affirmative action. The public sector
emerged as the provider of opportunities for the Malays. It enlarged
the existing corps of Malay entrepreneurs, graduates and
professionals and also provided aspiring Malay entrepreneur
financial assistance, credit facilities, contracts, preferential share
allocations, subsidies and training. It established new public
universities and all-Malay residential schools and colleges at home,
and sent tens of thousands of Malays, young students and midcareer officers to universities abroad. The result of this social
engineering was wider which produced a vast pool of Malay
entrepreneurs, a sizeable Malay middle-class and a considerable
“bumiputera participation” in the professions.
•
The public sector functioned as a stringent regulator of businesses,
both local and foreign, that enforced compliance with restructuring
requirements of NEP by using legislative means i.e. the Industrial
Co-ordination Act (ICA) in 1975 and bureaucratic procedures,
which were set by the Foreign Investment Committee. The
restructuring requirements of NEP set a quota of at least 30 per
cent bumiputera equity participation and employment in
companies covered by ICA. In “expanding government power over
firms”, ICA gave the minister of trade and industry wide
discretionary power over licensing, ownership structure, ethnic
employment targets, product distribution quotas, local content and
product pricing. Simultaneously, the public sector became a major
investor and raised the Malay ownership of corporate equity. It
also used state resources to expand its ownership of assets via
“restructuring” exercises that included setting up companies by
Public sector and buying into or buying up existing as well as new
local and foreign businesses.
•
At the same time the public sector functioned as the trustee of
Malay economic interests. State-owned agencies, banks and funds
held equity “in trust” for the bumiputera. Some of the best known
of these “trustee” agencies were Bank Bumiputera, Urban
Development Authority, Perbadanan National (Pernas, or National
Corporation), Permodalan National Berhad (PNB, or National
Equity Corporation), Amanah Saham National (ASN, or National
Unit Trust Scheme) and the state economic development
corporations. These intensive and extensive roles led the public
sector grow rapidly in size and number. These public enterprises
proliferated in numbers from 22 in 1960 to 109 in 1970, 656 in
1980, and 1,014 in 1985. Table 17. By 1992, the number had risen
to 1,149. However, under NEP, the public sector concerns were
developmentalist, but the direction of those concerns was
increasingly ethicised.
•
Over the years, through the operation of Malay “special rights” in
recruitment and promotion preferences, the whole structure of
government services has become a bastion of Malay power and the
major avenue for Malay professional and economic advancement.
This pattern is particularly pronounced at the higher administrative
and policy-making levels where Malay dominance comes closer to
reality. Malayanised bureaucracy had practically to remain a
preserve of the Malays. Thus, the Malay to non-Malay recruitment
ratio of 4:1 for the elite Malayan civil service (MCS) was instituted,
which ensured that “at least 80 per cent of the service will be filled
by Malays, far above their proportion in the total population”. The
emergence of a clearly Malay-dominated public sector has raised
concerns over bureaucratic “responsiveness and legitimacy” and
“effectiveness and efficiency”, “governance and accountability”,
67
and a sense of marginalisation and insecurity among non-Malay
personnel. These are serious issues by any standard of public
administration, and are “politically sensitive” when they appear in
ethnic garb, as in Malaysia. As a result, the public service has
deteriorated in the quality and performance of its personnel
because of ethnically influenced decisions over recruitment and
promotions, which favours lesser competent Malays over their
non-Malay counterparts.
68
•
The mechanism of the affirmative action should be people friendly
without distortion of the values and norms of the plural society. In
the era of globalisation, the economy should be competitive with
due consideration of the interest of the indigenous people.
•
In the social development sector, especially education should be
impartial. Malaysia is situated socially and economically in a very
competitive zone and trade blocs viz. ASEAN and APEC. This
region requires more of human development engineering process
rather than social engineering.
•
The public sector became a major investor and raised the Malay
ownership of corporate equity. It used state resources to expand
ownership of assets via “restructuring” exercises that included
setting up public sector own companies and buying into or buying
up existing as well as new local and foreign businesses. The overall
economy of Malaysia has not only been reshaped by the indigenous
Malay; although Chinese and Indians and other immigrant
communities have equally participated and it is strongly
recommended that irrespective of the ethnic groups, there must
be equal equity in the economic opportunities.
•
The public sector should function as the trustee not only for the
Malay economic interests but for all. Presently, there are about
1,149 public sector firms in Malaysia, the indigenous communities
have dominance and the non-Malayan are marginalised which has
diluted the vertical and horizontal growth of public sector firms.
To benefit from globalisation, there is a need of equal participation
of non-Malay communities.
•
The “special rights” of the Malay in recruitment and promotion
preferences made the whole structure of government services a
bastion of Malay power. This pattern is particularly pronounced
at the higher administrative and policy-making levels. The
emergence of Malay-dominated public sector has raised concerns
over bureaucratic “responsiveness and legitimacy” and
“effectiveness and efficiency”, “governance and accountability”,
and a sense of marginalisation and insecurity among non-Malay
personnel. These are serious issues by any standard of public
administration, and “politically sensitive” when they appear in
ethnic garb. As a result, the public service has become monolithic
with in-competent features. There is a need of equal participation
as per the proportion of different ethnic groups.
69
Endnotes
1
I Dun Jen. 1982. British Malaya: An Economic Analysis. Second revised
edition. Insan, Kuala Lumpur, p- 170
2
Latas, Syed Hussein. 1977. The Myth of the Lazy Native. Frank Cass,
London. p-80
3
Elvakumaran Ramachandran. 1994. Indian Plantation Labor in
Malaysia. Insan, Kuala Lumpur, p-50
4
Ibid, p-55
5
Ratsaratnam, Sinnapah. 1979. Indians in Malaysia and Singapore.
Revised edition. Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, p-34
6
His was the official formulation of the “racial imbalances” in the
economy, which was adopted beginning with the Second Malaysia Plan
1971–1975 (Government of Malaysia 1971).
7
Mahathir Mohamad. 1970. The Malay Dilemma. Donald Moore,
Singapore., p-70
8
Puthucheary, James. 1960. Ownership and Control in the Malayan
Economy. Eastern Universities Press, Singapore. pp-26–86
9
Searle, Peter. 1999. The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-Seekers
or Real Capitalists? Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, New South Wales,
p-28
1 0 R L Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society – A Study of a Non-communal
Political Party in West Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University
Press, 1971, p 3
1 1 Furnivall, J.S. 1948. Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study
of Burma, Netherlands and India. New York University Press, New
York, p-34
1 2 Andaya, Barbara Watson and Leonard Y. Andaya. 2001. A History of
Malaysia. Second edition. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmills, p-67
1 3 Searle, Peter. 1999. The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism: Rent-Seekers
or Real Capitalists? Allen and Unwin, St. Leonards, New South Wales,
p-156
1 4 Abdul Rahman Embong. 1995, State-Led Modernization and the New
Middle Class in Malaysia.
Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmills, p-77
1 5 (Jomo, K.S. 1990, Growth and Structural Change in the Malaysian
Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. 1990:82–83
70
1 6 Heng Pek Koon and Sieh Lee Mei Ling. 2000 “The Chinese business
community in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957–1999”, in Lee Kam Hing
and Tan Chee Beng (eds.), The Chinese in Malaysia. Oxford University
Press, Kuala Lumpur. P-136
1 7 Gomez, Terence Edmund and K.S. Jomo. 1997. Malaysia’s Political
Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, p-165
1 8 Ibid
1 9 Lucas, Robert E.B. and Donald Verry. 1999. Restructuring the
Malaysian Economy: Development and Human Resources. St Martin’s
Press, New York, p-125
2 0 Crouch, Harold. 1996. Government and Society in Malaysia. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, NY, pp-131-132
2 1 Lee, Molly N.N. 2004, Restructuring Higher Education in Malaysia.
School of Educational Studies, Monograph Series No. 4/2004.
University Sains Malaysia, Penang, p-44
2 2 Parti Gerakan. 1984, The National Economic Policy: 1990 and Beyond.
Rakyat Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, p33)
2 3 Jomo, K.S. 1990. Growth and Structural Change in the Malaysian
Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, London, p-229). ( Jomo, K.S. 1990.
Growth and Structural Change in the Malaysian Economy. Palgrave
Macmillan, London, p-229
2 4 Means, Gordon P. 1991. Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation.
Oxford University Press, Singapore. 297–298
2 5 Ho, Khai Leong. 1999. “Bureaucratic accountability in Malaysia:
Control mechanisms and critical concerns.” In Hoi-kwok Wong and
Hon S. Chan (eds.), Handbook of Comparative PublicAdministration in
the Asia-Pacific Basin. Marcel Dekker, New York. 26–29
2 6 Fenton, S. 1999, Ethnicity: Racism, Class and Culture. New York:
Macmillan Press, p-189
2 7 Pong, S. 1995, Access to education in Peninsular Malaysia: Ethnicity,
social class, and gender.”Compare, No. 25, Vol.3, ,pp- 239-52..
2 8 Khan, J.S. & Loh, K.W. 1992, Fragmented Vision: Culture and Politics in
Contemporary Malaysia. Sydney, Allen & Unwin, p-87
2 9 Mahathir, B. M.1998, The way forward. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
pp-43-67
71
3 0 Ibid, p-12
3 1 Mehmet, O. Yip, Y. H. 1986,. Human capital formation in Malaysian
universities. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Department of Publications,
University of Malaya, p-177
3 2 Ling, L. S., et al. (1988). The future of Malaysian Chinese. Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia: Malaysian Chinese Association, p-189
3 3 Von Vorys, Karl. 1975, Democracy Without Consensus: Communalism
and Political Stability in Malaysia, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
p-167
3 4 Gomez, Terence Edmund and K.S. Jomo. 1997, Malaysia’s Political
Economy: Politics, Patronage and Profits, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, pp-231-247
3 5 Loh Kok Wah, Francis. 2001, “Where has (ethnic) politics gone? The case
of the BN non-Malay politicians and political parties.” In Robert Hefner
(ed.), The Politics of Multiculturalism: Pluralism and Citizenship in
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. University of Hawaii Press,
Honolulu, P-189
3 6 Khoo Boo Teik. 1995. Paradoxes of Mahathirism: An Intellectual
Biography of Mahathir Mohamad. Oxford University Press, Kuala
Lumpur.
3 7 Khoo Boo Teik. 2003. Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and Its
Discontents. Zed Books, London, P-44
38 W. Kymlicka (1995), Multicultural Citizenship: A Liral Theory of
Minority Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford
72
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Ethnicity, Religion and Culture based Discrimination: A Study of

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