Introducing and managing process safety Key

Transcription

Introducing and managing process safety Key
Introducing and Managing Process Safety Key
Performance Indicators (KPIs)
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Neil Jackson, Process Safety Manager
National Grid - Gas Distribution
An international gas and
electricity company
 Based in the UK and northeastern US we
play a vital role in delivering gas and
electricity to millions of people safely, reliably
and efficiently
 One of the world’s largest investor-owned
utilities
 Approximately 19 million industrial,
commercial and domestic customers
 In the UK we operate the National
Transmission System and distribute gas
to 11 million customers
 In the US we provide gas to 3.5 million
customers and distribute electricity to 3.4
million customers
 Almost 28,000 employees 63% work in the
US; 37% work in the UK
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What is Process Safety?
‘Process Safety’ is a collective name for the measures, systems, procedures
or policies which prevent incidents and/or protect people/ environment from
effects of Major Accidents
What do we mean by Major Accidents ?
• Multiple Fatalities
• Significant effect on the Environment
• Major news items
• High consequence – low frequency events
(compared with occupational injuries, which are low
consequence, high frequency events)
• Examples – Texas City, Ghislenghien, Deep Water
Horizon
Process safety management focuses on building
layers of control measures to ensure the likelihood
of such an incident is low.
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Background – BP Texas City
accident
 Accident at the BP Texas City
refinery on March 23 2005.
 15 deaths, more than 170
injuries and significant economic
losses.
 Independent Safety Review
Panel – chaired by James
Baker.
 Investigated the effectiveness of
BP’s corporate oversight of
safety management systems
and its corporate safety culture.
 Investigation focused on
Process Safety.
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National Grid Process Safety
Related Assets
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Process Safety Risks
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Controlling Process Safety
What do we have in place to
prevent major accidents and
protect people ?
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Some quotes from HSG 254
Too many organisations rely heavily on failure data to monitor performance. The consequence of this
approach is that improvements or changes are only determined after something has gone wrong.
Often the difference between whether a system failure results in a minor or a catastrophic outcome is purely
down to chance. Effective management of major hazards requires a proactive approach to risk
management, so information to confirm critical systems are operating as intended is essential.
The main reason for measuring process safety performance is to
provide ongoing assurance that risks are being adequately controlled.
Directors and senior managers need to monitor the effectiveness
of internal controls against business risks. For major hazard
installations and chemical manufacturers process safety risks will be a
significant aspect of business risk, asset integrity and reputation.
Early warning of dangerous deterioration within critical systems
provides an opportunity to avoid major incidents. Knowing that process
risks are effectively controlled has a clear link with business efficiency, as
several indicators can be used to show plant availability and optimised
operating conditions.
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Measuring performance – early
warning before catastrophic failure
 Leading indicators
 Active monitoring provides feedback on performance before an
accident or incident;
whereas
 Lagging indicators
 Reactive monitoring involves identifying and measuring
numbers of minor incidents, damages or near misses to check
the controls in place are adequate and to identify weaknesses
or gaps in control systems.
 Dual assurance – leading and lagging indicators for each risk
control system
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Measuring Performance
 Leading Indicators
 Lagging Indicators
•
Safety critical maintenance completion
•
Asset damage
•
Permit inspections
•
Protective device faults
•
Inspections of pressure systems
•
Loss of gas incidents
•
Competency assessments
•
Pipeline repairs
•
Compliance with modification procedures
•
3rd party damage events
 KPIs can be either qualitative or quantitative – although
quantitative is best
 If the quality of the performance can not be measured by a KPI,
then it should be subject to inspection and audit
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Process Safety High Level KPI
Elements
KPIs
• The effectiveness of the control
measures to be monitored through a
set of performance indicators using a
traffic light system.
• Development and agreement of 12
high level KPIs to monitor process
safety across the relevant National
business units.
• Each business unit provides a KPI
report on a quarterly basis.
• These are reviewed by the Company
Executive at their regular meetings.
PS.1
Process Safety leadership
G
PS.2
Plant design and modifications
A
PS.3
Operational procedures
G
PS.4
Workforce competence
G
PS.5
Human factors
Y
PS.6
Emergency arrangements
Y
PS.7
Protective devices,
instrumentation and
alarms
Y
PS.8
Inspection and maintenance
A
PS.9
Permit to work
Y
PS.10
Asset records and data quality
A
PS.11
Third party activities
Y
PS.12
Audit, review and close out
Y11
KPI measures under high level
elements
KPIs
PS.1
Process Safety leadership
G
PS.2
Plant design and modifications
A
PS.3
Operational procedures
G
PS.4
Workforce competence
G
PS.5
Human factors
Y
PS.6
Emergency arrangements
Y
PS.7
Protective devices, instrumentation and
alarms
Y
PS.8
Inspection and maintenance
A
PS.9
Permit to work
Y
PS.10
Asset records and data quality
A
PS.11
Third party activities
Y
PS.12
Audit, review and close out
Y
•Number of 'Operations' employees whose competency
record has not been reviewed within last 12 months or
within 4 weeks of starting new role.
•% of those on SCO register with out of date
competency records
•% Control Room Shift staff with out of date
competency records
•Number of individuals on Competency register who
have not had update training.
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KPI measures under high level
elements
KPIs
PS.1
Process Safety leadership
G
PS.2
Plant design and modifications
A
PS.3
Operational procedures
G
PS.4
Workforce competence
G
PS.5
Human factors
Y
PS.6
Emergency arrangements
Y
PS.7
Protective devices, instrumentation and
alarms
Y
PS.8
Inspection and maintenance
A
PS.9
Permit to work
Y
PS.10
Asset records and data quality
A
PS.11
Third party activities
Y
PS.12
Audit, review and close out
Y
•
Have network gas supply emergency plans
been tested in line with the plan
•
Have the site emergency plans been tested in
line with the plan
•
Have the standards of service for responding
to gas escapes been met
•
Have there been any significant events
reported
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KPI measures under high level
elements
•
% pipeline routine aerial and vantage point surveys
undertaken to schedule
KPIs
•
Number of significant aerial surveillance sightings
(A1 and B1) as recorded in the UKOPA
Infringement database.
PS.1
Process Safety leadership
G
PS.2
Plant design and modifications
A
•
Number of aerial surveillance sightings of activities
that National Grid were not previously aware of.
PS.3
Operational procedures
G
•
PS.4
Workforce competence
G
Number of landowner liaison letters dispatched on
time with no response and not followed up within
12 months
•
PS.5
Human factors
Average response time (working days) responding
to plant protection queries.
Number of plant protection queries responded to
outside prescribed timescales (7 working days) not currently available
Y
•
PS.6
Emergency arrangements
Y
PS.7
Protective devices, instrumentation and
alarms
Y
•
Number of break-ins to HP storage/PRS/AGI & LP
storage sites
PS.8
Inspection and maintenance
A
•
Number of 3rd party interference damages to
below 7 bar g plant.
PS.9
Permit to work
Y
•
Number of reported to 3rd party damages
PS.10
Asset records and data quality
A
•
PS.11
Third party activities
Y
Number of third party interference events
(incidents and near misses) to pipelines requiring a
medium or high level investigation (INV/1).
PS.12
Audit, review and close out
Y
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Traffic Light Scoring
G
Compliance on Target, no serious issues
Y
There is some level of non compliance but this is limited
and not representative of the overall level of compliance
A
There are significant compliance failures and/or failings
in the control process, but there is an action plan in
place and the issues are known about by senior
management
R
High level of non compliance and there is not control
framework in place or a significant incident has occurred
or a significant audit finding
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Development of KPIs
Industry good
Practice (HSG 254)
Develop
Process
Safety
Steering
Group
Data Collection
Processes
Embed
Reporting
to Exec
Challenge and
Review Workshop
Improve
Benchmark
With external
organisations
and consistency
within the company
Wider business
awareness
Drive
Performance
Action Plans
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Action Plans
KPI Name
Significant aerial surveillance sightings
KPI Type
Lagging
Item Code
PS011.002.g.UK
KPI Champion Ian Aldridge
Data Provider
Paul Warman
Data Source SMF report
Definition
Number of significant aerial surveillance sightings (A1 and B1) as recorded in the UKOPA
Infringement database.
Objective
The objective of this KPI is to record third party activities that have been identified through aerial
surveillance as causing or having the potential to cause damage to above 7 bar buried pipelines.
Category A1 are incidents that caused damage or leaks, B1 are activities within 15 m of the pipeline
that were assessed as having serious potential for damage.
Current Status
yellow
Trigger Level
Current
Score
11
<= 10 Green <= 40 Amber
Action Plan
What
By Whom By When
The landowner database is currently being updated to ensure that National Roy Titely 01/12/2010
Grid have contact details for landowners along the length of the pipeline.
(for first
tranche)
The new external Eagles system should result in an improvement in the
IFI project 01/06/2011
number of individuals that contact National Grid before carrying out work
next to high pressure pipelines.
GL to be asked to review historical data and set appropriate tolerance limits Neil
01/08/2011
for yellow, amber and red.
Jackson
GL to be asked to produce a quarterly report that summarises the
significant aerial surveillance sightings.
Neil
Jackson
GL to be commissioned to undertake an audit of helicopter surveillance
process.- note something is being done by UKT in this area, needs to be
joined up.
Shape files being made available to Local Authroities for LUP related
activities
Neil
Jackson
Local Authority briefings/visits being undertaken to a planned programme
Net
Integrity
Action Plan Status
On Target
When it will go green ?
01/08/2011
on hold
C
Complete
Thompson
Ongoing
01/06/2011
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Process Safety Generally –
summary of progress to date
 KPI reporting process
established for all relevant
lines of business
 Steering Group to drive
consistent approach across
business
 Process safety culture survey in
2008 and repeat survey in 2010
 Process safety training for all
senior managers and relevant
staff
 Communications plan to raise
awareness inc using learning
from incidents
 Formal assessment procedures
(HAZOPs, HAZIDs etc),
developed and rolled out
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Leadership
 Crucial issue
 Company Commitment Statement
 Guidance booklets produced
 Training for senior managers so they
can:
 Give a clear vision of what is
expected
 Demonstrate its importance through
their actions
 Review process safety during safety
visits
 Leadership days organised around
process safety
 Process Safety a highlighted as a priority
through ‘line of sight’
 Process Safety highlighted as an
important area at key internal
management conferences.
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Priorities going forward
 Using the KPIs to drive process safety improvements
 Improving the communication and learning from
incidents
 Ongoing work to develop a consistent framework
across the Group
 Making process safety a part of the day job, i.e. not just
something that is done by technical specialists
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Conclusions
 Major drive to refocus efforts on improving the management of
process safety
 Putting a consistent KPI reporting process in place across all
relevant National Grid Businesses has been at the heart of this
initiative
 The KPI process has taken some time to develop and embed
within the business but it is now being used to drive process safety
improvements
 Commitment from the top has been key to ensuring its successful
implementation and ongoing application
 It’s not about the KPIs it’s about the action plans
 Any KPI process needs to be supported by wider Process Safety
initiatives
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The End
 Any Questions?
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