Wertediskurs

Wertediskurs
Vor dem Respekt kommt die Angst
Manuel Schilcher
XING.asia 03
Wertediskurs
02
Rukunegara
03
I respect your articles of faith - will you respect mine?
06
Row over Malaysian family laws
07
The art of no-seduction: Muslim boy-band
music in Southeast Asia and the fear of the female voice
11
Malaysia ‚apartheid‘ row deepens
13
Malaysia‘s trouble with migrants
15
Politics and Islamization in Malaysia
21
Malaysia’s Asian Values Debate
25
Zum „peripheren Islam“ in Südostasien
Rukunegara
Malaysia’s national ideology, the Rukunegara was formulated with the
purpose to serve as a guideline in the country’s nation-building efforts. The
Rukunegara was proclaimed on August 31, 1970 by the Yang di-Pertuan
Agong IV.
The pledge of the Rukunegara is as follows:
“Our Nation, Malaysia is dedicated to: Achieving a greater
unity for all her people; maintaining a democratic way of
life; creating a just society in which the wealth of the nation
shall be equitably distributed; ensuring a liberal approach
to her rich and diverse cultural tradition, and building a
progressive society which shall be oriented to modern science
and technology.
We, the people of Malaysia, pledge our united efforts to attain
these ends, guided by these principles:
• Belief in God
• Loyalty to King and Country
• Upholding the Constitution
• Sovereignty of the Law, and
• Good Behaviour and Morality”
2
I respect your articles of faith
- will you respect mine?
Timothy Garton Ash
In Malaysia, Islam seems to coexist as an official religion with a tolerant, multicultural
society. But all is not as it seems
In the space of a few dusty hours and clamorous city blocks I have contributed my quart
to the gallons of milk being ceremonially poured over a statue of the Hindu Lord Ganesh
(thus removing all obstacles to prosperity, peace and success), been enlightened under a
bodhi tree by a Buddhist businessman of Sri Lankan origin, inhaled the incense offered to
selected gods by the Chinese marking the end of their new year in the See Yeoh temple,
listened to a Malay choir practising English hymns in the Anglican church of St Mary and
discussed the finer points of Islamic banking with a Malaysian sheltering from torrential
rain at the beautiful Jamek mosque. This is not just multiculturalism but multi-cultism in
one city. All human faith is here. Yet Malaysia is a majority Muslim country, where Islam
is the official religion.
At first glance I would seem to have found the holy grail of the post-9/11 world,
proof positive that Islam in power can allow and even encourage a peaceful, tolerant,
multicultural society. That is certainly what the country’s political leaders, who join us in
the aptly named Hotel Shangri-La for a conference on relations between Islam and the
3
Inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict is avoided not by the systematic balancing
mechanisms of a liberal democracy, with fully representative politics, free media and
independent courts, but by a semi-democratic, semiauthoritarian balancing act, with a
distinct tilt towards the Malay Muslim side.
west, wish us to understand. And measured by the standards of the Middle East, indeed
of most majority Muslim states, Malaysia is an exemplar of interfaith coexistence.
As the maritime trading crossroads of south-east Asia, it has for centuries been a
place where all of what Europeans have called “the east” has met - Indians, Chinese and
Japanese, as well as the native peoples. Its population became even more diverse under the
aegis, at once repressive and transforming, of Portuguese, Dutch and British colonialists.
(From the window of the National History Museum, which is housed in a building where
John Major once worked as a banker, you still peer down on a somewhat melancholy
cricket pitch.) This place was globalised well before anyone talked of globalisation.
Look a little closer, however; talk to Malaysians from the minority faiths as well as
critical observers within the Muslim community, and the picture becomes more muddy
- as befits a city whose name means “muddy confluence”. For a start, the communities
coexist rather than co-mingle. I’m told there is relatively little intermarriage. This is no
melting-pot. “We live and let live,” says the Buddhist businessman of Sri Lankan origin.
Apart from anything else, the different groups’ religious prescriptions often prevent them
eating each other’s food.
Of course there’s nothing wrong with such peaceful coexistence. The same was true
of another often-lauded exemplar of multiculturalism, Sarajevo, before the second
world war, and it is probably true of parts of London and New York today. Only
advancing secularism (as in Sarajevo under the communist regime led by Marshal Tito)
or farreaching assimilation (as has been traditional in France and America) produces
the deeper mixing. But retaining separate communities does mean that politics remain
group-based and there is always the potential for violent conflict to erupt, as happened
here in 1969, if one group feels strongly disadvantaged.
In Malaysia, all communities are equal but some are more equal than others. Although
the National Front coalition, which has been in power since 1957, includes Chinese and
Indian parties, the Muslim Malay majority is dominant. While the Chinese still have
a predominant position in the business community, there is affirmative action for the
Muslim Malays, and other “indigenous” groups, in access to higher education, jobs in the
civil service, government contracts and housing. Inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflict
is avoided not by the systematic balancing mechanisms of a liberal democracy, with fully
representative politics, free media and independent courts, but by a semi-democratic,
semiauthoritarian balancing act, with a distinct tilt towards the Malay Muslim side.
The day I arrived, the government announced the indefinite suspension of the Sarawak
Tribune newspaper, which published one of the Danish cartoons. It also made it an
offence for anyone to publish, import, produce or even possess copies of the caricatures.
4
A government spokesman explained
that since Malaysia currently chairs the
Organisation of the Islamic Conference,
which is dedicated to promoting Islamic
solidarity between its 57 member states
and peoples, “it would be awkward
if Malaysia slams the west for [its]
insensitivity when in our own backyard
we don’t have control”. The law used
to ban the Sarawak Tribune dates from
1984 and gives the government draconian
powers to limit free media, while other
laws (at least one of them, the Internal
Security Act, traceable back to the Britishled repression of communist insurgents in
the so-called Emergency) enable it to curb
other forms of dissent.
So the Malaysian way is to keep the lid on
a simmering cauldron. But as anyone who
cooks pasta or noodles knows, if you keep
the lid on and the heat underneath is too
high, the pot will eventually boil over.
Whereas the country’s secular courts
still use a version of English common
law, there is a separate, parallel structure
of Islamic courts. There is, quite literally,
one law for Muslims and another for
everyone else. All Muslims must go
through these courts for most aspects of
family law and a few of criminal law.
Here, sharia law is applied with variable
rigour of interpretation, depending on
which of the country’s federal states you
are being charged in. Offences may range
from eating in public during Ramadan
or drinking alcohol to apostasy - the
deviation from or renunciation of Islam,
punishable by a fine or imprisonment.
One young Malay made it clear to me
that it is extraordinarily difficult and
risky for a young man - let alone for a
woman - from a Muslim family publicly
Lee Bruce Lee, the King of Chinks: Reorienting Queer Asian Diaspora Studies
Yue, Audrey [University of Melbourne]
Lee Bruce Lee is a disco-dancing, kung
fu prancing Melbourne-based Malaysian
Chinese drag king. Just like the real thing,
s/he begins her act by ripping off her
Bonds singlet, revealing a bound chest, but
unlike the real thing or even the movies,
nothing much else is hard-boiled or hardbodied. The cock is synthetic, homemade.
Made in China. Lee Bruce Lee performs
best to a Barry White croon. S/he gyrates
the Travolta swagger with the balletic
grace of the real thing. S/he chopsticks a
fly in slo-mo tai chi precision. S/he even
tops it off with the trademark squeal. The
chicks at the Star Hotel love their chinky
boi. This paper examines the “kinging”
tactics of Lee Bruce Lee. These tactics-the displacement of postcolonial Chinese
masculinity by diasporic Asian female
masculinity, the parodic replacement of
martial arts aesthetics by drag and the
commodity consumption of kung fu
by a lesbian subculture--engage action,
queer and subcultural theories to inscribe
the local culture of the diasporic Asian
lesbian in Australia This paper engenders
the diasporic Asian lesbian with a new
body politic that decentres the fraught
uses of hybridity and identity in queer
“n” Asian studies and Asian-Australian
studies. It re-orients diaspora through the
situatedness of Australia by staging the
new body politic as a text and a model
for new forms of cross-disciplinarity and
regionality. It argues that the modernising
force of diasporic Asian lesbian “kinging”
in Australia reconstitutes Australia as a
new regional South of Asia.
5
to renounce Islam, and above all, to
renounce it in favour of secularism.
What people believe in the depth of
their hearts they alone know (“I go my
own way,” one told me, cryptically) but
public conformity is enforced by family,
community and state sanctions.
So, yes, compared with most of the
Muslim world, Malaysia is a positive
example of live-and-let-live multi-cult
co-existence, but Shangri-La it isn’t.
You may say: what right have I, as a
westerner, a guest and a descendant
of British colonialists to boot, to point
these things out? Indeed, the religion
with which I grew up teaches that one
should start by criticising one’s own
faults rather than those of others. That
seems to me a good principle. So my first
responsibility is to look at the way my
own communities - Oxford, Britain, the
EU, the west - treat their own minorities,
not least their Muslim minorities. We
have plenty of discrimination and
double standards of our own.
Does that disqualify me from
commenting on other countries’
shortcomings? I think not, especially
when what I’m doing is reporting
criticisms made to me by Malaysians,
people who do not feel they can speak
entirely freely in their own country and
who would not be published if they did.
In fact, I believe that as a writer with
access to free media I have a duty to
speak up for those who cannot speak
freely for themselves. That’s my strongly
held belief, and I trust that political
leaders of other faiths, including Islam,
will respect my beliefs. Then we can
have a productive interfaith dialogue. «
Row over Malaysian
family laws
Jonathan Kent
The law would make it easier for Muslims to
take more than one wife
Malaysia’s government has quelled a rebellion
among lawmakers who wanted to stop new
legislation they said could undermine
women’s rights. An Islamic family law,
making it easier for men to have polygamous
marriages and take more of wives’ property,
is expected to be passed in the Senate. Women
senators from the governing coalition, who
hoped to oppose the bill, have been ordered
to support it. The law has angered women’s
rights campaigners on several counts. It
makes it easier for a man to take multiple
wives and to divorce. It allows a husband to
claim a share of an existing wife’s property if
he takes further wives. And it curtails a wife’s
rights to maintenance and to dispose of her
own property.
Lawmakers in Malaysia’s male-dominated
lower chamber passed the bill after two
days’ debate that centred on men’s rights
to polygamy rather than scrutiny of the bill
itself. But it has prompted a rebellion in the
senate, where Malaysia’s parliament minister,
Nazri Aziz, said the cabinet instructed the
rebels, most of whom are women, to toe the
line. They are free to debate and speak their
mind, but when it comes to a vote they have
to follow, he said.
Islam is very strict about the circumstances
under which a man can take more than one
wife. He must, for instance, be able to treat
all his wives justly. However the new rules
would mean a Malaysian Muslim man would
no longer have to prove he could behave fairly
to all his spouses before marrying. «
February 16, 2006 The Guardian
BBC News, Kuala Lumpur
6
The art of no-seduction:
Muslim boy-band music in Southeast Asia
and the fear of the female voice
Bart Barendregt
Religion, more often than not, equates the arts of seduction – whether in traditional
performances or popular music – with immoral behaviour. The status of music and
dance in the Islamic world, especially the fear of its sensuous powers, has been heatedly
discussed in religious treatises; with its clean-cut performers and moral messages, nasyid,
the Islamic boy-band music of Southeast Asia, seems to epitomise the art of no-seduction.
Reality, however, is more complex, as Muslim pop music struggles to combine two
competing powers – the eroticism of pop music and the persuasive power of religion.
And especially when the female voice comes into play.…
One of the most significant developments in present day Southeast Asia is the rise of an
Indonesian-Malay Muslim middle class. With its own social aspirations, this group fuels
what might be termed Islamic chic – a cosmopolitan lifestyle characterised by new media
and consumerism, Muslim fashion labels, popular ‘tele-evangelists’ such as AA Gym, and
a range of lifestyle magazines that affirm that it is hip and modern to be a Muslim.
Nasyid is the musical component of this emergent civil Islam (see also Barendregt
2006). The term nasyid comes from the Arabic word annasyid , which means ‘(singer of a)
religious song’. In Southeast Asia today it stands for an a-cappella song genre that mainly
uses vocal harmonies and is predominantly performed by male vocalists. Not surprisingly,
performers of nasyid trace the genre to the Middle East, especially to the verse thola’al
7
badru ‘alaina (finally the moon has arisen amidst us), which many Muslims think was
sung when the Prophet Muhammad first arrived in Medina.
Malaysian students studying in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan were probably the
first to bring home nasyid cassettes, and by the late 1980s the genre had become popular
in Malaysia. From there it spread to neighbouring countries with Muslim populations:
Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, and especially Indonesia. Practitioners of nasyid are found
in religious schools ( pesantren ) and mosques, secondary schools and universities, where
it is used to propagate ‘Campus Islam’, an often radical mix of student activism, youth
culture and religion. Many trace nasyid’s popularity to its accessibility: sung in Malay
rather than Arabic, nasyid touches on not just religious issues, but social ones as well.
Between the persuasive power of religion and the eroticism of pop
Inspired by the international boy-band craze of the late 1990s, nasyid is a perfect showcase
for the issues that confront today’s younger Muslim generation. Groups like Indonesia’s
S’nada or Malaysia’s Raihan and Rabbani have gained superstar status, performing
regularly on radio, television and MTV. Today nasyid is one of the best-selling genres of
the local recording industry and one of the few that could potentially go international –
some groups already having performed for Muslim audiences in the West and the Middle
East. Nasyid ‘s very success, however, might prove to be one of its main challenges, due to
tension between innovation and nasyid ‘s status as a vehicle for moral teaching.
Some nasyid artists have recently begun to experiment with crossovers such as hip-hop,
R&B and break beat, and to collaborate with renowned rock artists. Others like Izzatul
Islam refuse to experiment with newer forms of nasyid and insist that the religious
message must be primary; they therefore do not use musical instruments other than the
hand-held frame-drum or Malay kompang . As Muslim musicians and music lovers
grapple with two competing powers – the eroticism of pop music and the persuasive
power of religion – the crucial question remains: At what point does religion end and the
eroticism of pop take over? Artists and fans recognise the religious restrictions on the uses
of the performing arts by Muslims, and among them there is lively discussion about the
form that nasyid should ideally take.
Indeed, there is a long-standing discourse in Islamic law about the permissibility of
music and singing, which has recently been summarised by Van Nieuwkerk (1998).
Islamic law classifies music into three categories: the commendable recitation of the Koran;
the singing of work or wedding songs, which is neither discouraged nor encouraged
(makroh); and ‘sensuous music that is performed in association with condemned
8
activities, or that is thought to incite such prohibited practices as consumption of drugs
and alcohol, lust, prostitution etc.’ (Al-Faruqi 1985: 1-13 as quoted by Van Nieuwkerk).
This discourse includes many, varied positions and has been more or less stringent in
different times and places; discussion on what ‘pure’ or authentic Islamic music should
sound like continues unabated.
Meanwhile, a new style of Islamic popular culture is developing which in many
respects follows western manifestations of popular culture. Many regard nasyid’s success
as inspired by western boy-bands like Boys II Men and the Back Street Boys – their style,
singing techniques, and even lyrics. One of the most controversial aspects of this new
style of Islamic popular culture is the greater focus on visuals, nowhere better captured
than in the recent critique of the Festival Nasyid Indonesia, a song contest modelled on
the programme American Idol , which first took place in 2004. The festival, shown on
national television during Ramadan, led to fierce debate among nasyid enthusiasts, many
of whom condemned the show’s blatant commercialism. Like their western equivalents,
young nasyid singers are often worshiped by largely female audiences.
Fear of the female voice?
What about Muslim equivalents to female pop singers in the West? Siti Nurhaliza seems
to many Malaysians to embody the perfect blend of western fashion and distinctive
Malaysian flavour. Siti is often seen as an icon of the New Malay, one who can uphold
cultural and religious traditions and still be progressive. But while Siti is Muslim, she
is not a Muslim artist. She is able to cleverly switch between the two personas, which
allows her to get away with it. A similar strategy is used by one of Malaysia’s latest nasyid
sensations, the 25-year-old Waheeda, whose mini-album Wassini sold 20,000 copies in
2003; a full album followed in 2005 . Some attribute Waheeda’s success to her odd mix of
pseudo-Arab songs, her wearing a veil and her cute but sexy on-stage persona. Waheeda
herself (like Siti) denies singing nasyid songs, defining what she does as world music (
muzik dunia ) with Asian and Middle Eastern influences.
Malaysia is home to some well-known female nasyid groups such as HAWA (Eve),
Huda and Solehah, who also perform earlier variants of Islamic pop like qasidah moderen
. Female groups, however, are the exception. Similarly, Indonesia has only a few female
nasyid groups ( munsyid akhwat ) , the Jakarta ensemble Bestari and Bandung-based
Dawai Hati being the most prominent. During nasyid competitions there are separate
contests for male and female performers and, with the exception of children’s nasyid
choirs, mixed ensembles are clearly taboo.
9
Why? Because controlling women’s behaviour – especially the fear of westernised
women – has long been a central tenet of Islamic society. The sociologist Göle (2002)
explains that tensions arise from the need of public Islam ‘to redefine and recreate the
borders of the interior, intimate, and illicit gendered space ( mahrem ).’ Public visibility
is an issue that has long remained unaddressed in Muslim thinking; new ideas here
easily break with tradition. To outsiders, moreover, such dialogues result in ironic
contradictions, like those of recent discussions on the fashionability of headscarves or ‘
jilbab sexy’ in Indonesia.
Many aspects of nasyid music present us with a similar mix of contemporary gender
reinterpretations, highlighting both changing ideas about gender relations in Southeast
Asia and the tensions this brings to an otherwise modern musical genre. Thus, when the
female nasyid group Bestari’s first album was released in 1996, it met with considerable
resistance. Islamic magazines refused to advertise it and even women were reported to
boycott their cassettes. Since then, the situation appears to have become more relaxed, but
munsyid akhwat remain hotly debated. Conservatives continue to emphasise the taboo
on women singing in public, claiming that the female voice is part of the aurat , the parts
of the body that must be concealed.
Why are the powers of the female voice so feared? A summary of the discourse can
be found in Van Nieuwkerk’s work (1998), which explains why female performances
are so controversial. Women are often seen as the weaker sex in need of protection from
male desire; this power balance could be reversed were women to seduce men – thus
they must be restrained. As Hirschkind (2004) has recently argued, Muslim scholars have
been relatively uninterested in elaborating a theory of vocal persuasion and agency; any
positive or negative effect is largely attributed to the listener. As the 9th century mystic
al-Darani said: ‘Music does not provoke in the heart that which is not there.’ That is, the
female voice itself does not have the persuasive power to incite a person to commit evil
deeds; this can only happen if the evil already reigns in the listener’s heart. Besides, if the
origin of female nasyid , as its proponents claim, truly is the shalawat badr sung by those
who hailed Muhammed’s arrival in Medina, and if claims that it was women who did the
singing are true, a woman’s singing voice might one day resound more as a blessing than
as a bane. For now, the debate continues. «
References
Barendregt, B. 2006. ‘ Cyber-Nasyid: Transnational Soundscapes in Muslim Southeast Asia’. Holden, T. and T. Scrase, eds. Medi@asia:
Communication, Culture, Context . London: Routledge
Göle, N. 2002. ‘Islam in Public: New Visibilities and New Imaginaries’. Public Culture 14-1.
Hirschkind, C. 2004. ‘Hearing Modernity: Egypt, Islam and the Pious Ear’. Erlman, V., ed. Hearing Cultures: Essays on Sound, Listening, and
Modernity . Oxford: Berg.
Nieuwkerk, K. Van. 1998. ‘An Hour for God and an Hour for the Heart. Islam, Gender and Female Entertainment in Egypt’. Music and
Anthropology
Bart Barendregt lectures in the Anthropology Department of Leiden University, and is a postdoctoral fellow at the Department of Southeast Asian
Studies at the same university. Barendregt was the former chair of the Bake Society for Ethnomusicology.
10
Malaysia ‚apartheid‘ row deepens
Jonathan Kent
Ms Mahathir says new laws make daily life worse for Muslim women. There has been
an angry reaction in Malaysia to remarks by the daughter of the former PM comparing
Muslim women to black South Africans under apartheid. Conservative Muslim women’s
groups say Marina Mahathir brought shame on the country by saying new Islamic laws
have made local women second class citizens. Her remarks were published with cuts in
her regular newspaper column on Friday after being held back for several days. Marina
Mahathir is a prominent campaigner for women’s rights.
Strong criticism
At the centre of this row is a newly introduced Islamic family law act. Her (Ms
Mahathir’s) prejudiced views... smack of ignorance of the objectives and methodology
of the Sharia Muslim Professionals Forum. It was intended to help standardise the rules
affecting Muslims across all of Malaysia’s 13 states. Opponents say it did so by dropping
standards to the lowest common denominator, allowing men to divorce or take up to four
wives more easily while giving husbands greater control over their wives’ property.
Conservative groups disagree
“Her prejudiced views and assumptions smack of ignorance of the objectives and
methodology of the Sharia, and a slavish capitulation to western feminism’s notions of
women’s rights, gender equality and sexuality,” the Muslim Professionals Forum (MPF)
said in a statement to the BBC. The MPF argues that men wanting to enter polygamous
marriages will now be scrutinised more closely. Conservative groups also say that wives
can now take out orders preventing their husbands disposing of property if they re-marry,
just as the men can.
11
‘Women regressing’
But it is Marina Mahathir’s choice of language that has caused most anger. “In our
country, there is an insidious growing form of apartheid among Malaysian women, that
between Muslim and non-Muslim women,” she said. She has argued vociferously that
the changes to the law represent a step backwards for women’s rights in Malaysia. “As
non-Muslim women catch up with women in the rest of the world, Muslim women here
are only going backwards,” Ms Mahathir said. “We should also note that only in Malaysia
are Muslim women regressing; in every other Muslim country in the world, women have
been gaining rights, not losing them.”
‘Insulting’ remark
Many here however argue that women play a far more active role in all aspects of life
in Malaysia than in most other Muslim or east Asian countries. Dr Harlina Halizah
Siraj, women’s chief of the reform group Jamaah Islah Malaysia told the BBC that Ms
Mahathir’s opinion was wrong about the reality of life in the country. “Women in Malaysia
are given unlimited opportunities to obtain high education level, we are free to choose our
profession and career besides enjoying high standard of living with our families,” she said.
Civil rights groups say the apartheid remark was insulting because Ms Marina’s father,
the former premier Mahathir Mohamad, bolstered Malaysia’s race laws. Those denied
certain ethnic groups the same educational, financial and career opportunities given to the
majority, predominantly Muslim ethnic Malays. But what there seems to be a measure of
agreement on is that Malaysia’s Islamic courts are inefficient, under-funded, and suffer
from a lack of women on the bench.
‘Bound and gagged’
Few comparisons could be more hurtful. Malaysia led by Mahathir Mohamad was in the
forefront of the international campaign to end white minority rule in South Africa. But
his daughter Marina has described Muslim women in Malaysia as subject to a form of
apartheid - second-class citizens held back by discriminatory rules that do not apply to
non-Muslim women. Her outburst appears to have been prompted by recent changes to
Malaysia’s Islamic family law that makes it easier for Muslim men to take multiple wives,
to divorce them and to take a share of their property. The women’s ministry encouraged
female lawmakers to vote for the measures, saying they could be amended later. That
prompted widespread criticism and has led Miss Marina to suggest the ministry be split
in two - one to help non-Muslim women fight discrimination, the other to keep Muslim
women, in her words, bound and gagged.
However, compared to many other countries both in South East Asia and the wider
Muslim world, Malaysian women - Muslims included - play a prominent role both in
business and public life. «
BBC News, Kuala Lumpur
12
Malaysia‘s trouble with migrants
Jonathan Kent
Malaysia has an uneasy relationship with its immigrants
Malaysians have a curiously contradictory relationship with the huge number of foreigners
living and working in their country. Estimates vary, but it is generally reckoned that there
are between two and a half and three million migrant workers in Malaysia. Only one and
a half million of them are here legally - in a nation which has an entire population of just
24 million. So on the surface, it is hardly surprising that Malaysia has threatened to deport
its illegal immigrants. But the vast number of foreigners are as vital to the economy as
they have ever been. The foreign workers do the three D jobs that Malaysians don’t
want - dirty, dangerous and difficult.
When Malaysia was under British rule, millions of Chinese came to the country to
start businesses and work in tin mines. Tamils were brought over to work in the rubber
plantations, and Punjabis and Sikhs acted as police officers and worked on the railways.
Their descendants make up a good 45% of those who call themselves Malaysians.
Vital workforce
Now it is Indonesians and Filipinos who fill the factories, building sites and plantations.
“Around 11% of the workforce are foreigners,” said Shamsuddin Bardin, director of
the Malaysian Employers Federation. Their labour has helped Malaysia to build up
the region’s most successful economy after Singapore. Some argue that foreign workers
are taking jobs away from Malaysians. But unemployment is low and falling - and is
currently just 3.5%. “The foreign workers do the three D jobs that Malaysians don’t want
- dirty, dangerous and difficult - especially working on plantations and in construction,”
said Mr Shamsuddin. Even young male Malay graduates, a group amongst which there
is a shockingly high rate of unemployment, will not take the jobs the illegal workers do.
For 30 years or more, Malaysia has given economic privileges to the Malay community to
help it win a more proportionate share of the economy. But even former Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad, the great champion of Malay rights, ended his 22 years as premier
13
frustrated that, rather than develop a work ethic, many Malays had simply developed a
sense of entitlement. Middle-class Westerners might be happy to slum it for a few years
before settling into a career, but their Malaysian counterparts are far less willing to get
their fingers dirty. “That is not our culture yet,” said Mr Shamsuddin. “Malaysians
who’ve been through tertiary education want to go straight into middle management.
Even those with no degree don’t want to take up low-paid jobs.”
Blamed for crime
So the move against illegal workers is not because they take jobs from locals. Indeed the
government is offering to help them come back legally, so long as they leave during the
amnesty. Many Acehnese [immigrants] complain that they have money taken from
them by the police. Instead, the campaign has far more to do with a fear of rising crime.
The nation’s newspapers are full of such sentiments, and so too are comments sent by
Malaysians to the BBC News website. “Malaysian people... are sick of the increasing
number of Indonesians, Bangladeshis, Filipinos and Indians on our streets. The crimes,
gang fights and other social diseases are getting unbearable,” said one respondent.
“Malaysia is not safe any more. We are sliding down to become the haven of illegal
immigrants,” said another. But many human rights activists say the situation is made
worse by illegal workers and refugees being preyed on by police, immigration officials
and locals. “Many Acehnese [immigrants] complain that they have money taken from
them by the police,” said Syed Osman al-Noordien, a leading member of the Acehnese
community in Malaysia. “Almost all of the police ask for money - 200 ringgit ($50), 500
ringgit ($130). They also take people’s phones,” he said. Quite often the sums of money
are far higher, up to $500, which represents two or more months’ wages. Abdul Ghani
bin Abdul Rahman, a Burmese Muslim refugee, was robbed by gangs of locals posing
as police. “I told them: ‘You take blood from me, I don’t have money’,” he said. Stories
such as this are heard time and time again among the immigrant community. But most
Malaysians never hear them, because they are not widely reported.
Self-service Malaysia?
Nor will many Malaysians be pleased to know that their government has again
announced an extension to the amnesty allowing foreign workers to leave unpunished
- instead of sending in half a million volunteers to round them up. Home Minister Azmi
Khalid acknowledged that the move would “not [be] popular among the Malaysian
public”. But it might be welcomed by some small businessmen, such as the owner of my
local restaurant. “I had to wipe the tables myself this morning,” he told me the other day.
Kuala Lumpur’s cheap eateries rely heavily on foreign labour, particularly from India and
Bangladesh. The government may be encouraging construction and plantation workers
to leave and return as legal immigrants, but not restaurant staff. Instead it is suggesting
that eateries become self-service. That will almost certainly be many locals’ first direct
experience of life without foreign workers. I wonder whether government ministers will
be queuing up with the rest of us to serve themselves? «
Jonathan Kent, BBC News, Kuala Lumpur
14
Politics and Islamization
in Malaysia
Claudia Derichs
The ruling party in Malaysia, the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), has
set up a website showing the party’s various jihad efforts. The mere act of setting up
such a website - regardless of its contents - reveals much about the competition in “being
more Islamic than thou” in the country these days. Since it is primarily political parties
who are the protagonists in this competition, one can guess that Islamization in Malaysia
has become a highly political issue rather than a straight outcome of Islamic social
movements.
It cannot be denied though that there is an underlying societal demand for stronger
Islamic commitments from Malay politicians. The term “Malay” should be stressed in
this context, because it is primarily the ethnic Malays (55% of the Malaysian population)
who are considered the Muslims in the country. Among the other ethnic groups – Chinese
(30%), Indians (7%) and other indigenous peoples - Muslims form a minority. A Malay
is defined by the Malaysian Constitution as a follower of the religion of Islam, and
since political power is in the hands of the Malays, Islam has been declared Malaysia’s
official religion. The ethnic constellation and the fact that the government prefers a soft
authoritarian type of rule to a liberal democracy, has led to an interesting formation of
coalitions and competing groups. The semantics of Islam have transcended the aura of
Malaysia’s mosques, suraus, and private Muslim spaces and entered the realm of the
15
political public as a whole. The reader may judge whether Malaysia is undergoing the
politicization of Islam or the Islamization of politics.
So, why is UMNO carrying out a jihad? The first time the term caught my eye (when
used by the ruling party) was in August 2000. While doing field research in Malaysia, a
headline in the (government-friendly) mainstream newspaper The Star struck me. The
headline blamed the Islamic Party (PAS) for committing a disservice to Muslims with its
jihad.[1] In the accompanying column, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad was quoted as
complaining that what PAS members were carrying out was not a holy war but activities
which would split the (Malay) community. On the other hand, UMNO’s struggle could
be considered a real jihad since it was “more structured and long term in nature, and
aimed at developing both the country and empowering the community with the latest
knowledge and skills to ensure that Muslims were respected by others.” (The Star, 12
August 2000) The confrontation, one can assume by now, takes place between the two
parties UMNO and PAS, and the reason for hoisting the battle flag is the fear of disunity
among the Malay community. A disunited Malay community poses a potential threat
to political stability and hence to the balance of ethnic power relations. The question
arises as to why many members of the Malay Muslim community, who used to vote
overwhelmingly for UMNO, have suddenly switched to supporting the Islamic Party.
The change of tide is due to recent domestic developments which have affected the
Muslim as well as the non-Muslim public. The sacking of and verdict pronounced on
former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim provoked a huge cry of indignation.
When Anwar was co-opted into UMNO in 1982, he was regarded in the country as an
extraordinarily charismatic leader of the Islamic Youth Movement ABIM. The Prime
Minister (Mahathir Mohamad) could not involve himself too much into Islamic affairs,
for he had to mediate between a commitment to the plural society as prescribed in the
constitution, and the commitment to Malay-Islamic interests as expected by the Malay
voters. It was thus logical and beneficial to co-opt somebody whose Islamic credentials
stood beyond question. Since Anwar had been educated and influenced by the respected
Islamic scholar Syed Naguib al-Attas, his bias towards the internationally initiated
project called the Islamisation of Knowledge had become strong. Al-Attas had founded
the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), one of several
research institutes established with Mahathir’s consent to promote modern Islam in
Malaysia.
Accompanying this new Islamic awareness was an appreciation of Islam as a way of
life, as a comprehensive system and model of behavior, not merely as a religion, let alone an
old-fashioned orthodox religion. A whole generation of Malay entrepreneurs, privileged
by the Malaysian version of an affirmative action policy in favor of the Malay community,
associated entrepreneurial skill and economic success with the behavior of true and good
16
Muslims (Sloane 1999). Within such a political and social mood and atmosphere, Muslim
youth leader Anwar could be integrated perfectly into the program of modernization
and Islamization the Malaysian government sought to carry out. Until Anwar’s sacking
in 1998, Mahathir and Anwar seemed to be performing a mutually beneficial political
duet. By the time of the mid-1990s then, Malaysia had become considerably Islamized
without getting caught in the trap of Islamist extremism. Compared to many Arab and
African Muslim states, Malaysia’s Islamization policy appeared to be reform-minded
and progressive. It is not difficult to guess that Anwar’s religious and moral convictions
included some really popular reformist ideas. In view of the multi-ethnic society in
Malaysia, Anwar introduced a model of a civil society which was fully devoted to
the acceptance of the diversity of religious traditions. The Malay term chosen for the
translation of “civil society” is masyarakat madani, an Arabic term emphasizing that a
multi-ethnic nation-state like Malaysia needs civil and societal integration, and at the
same time emphasizing Anwar‘s personal affiliation to Islam which has played a pivotal
role for his political career.
The core arguments of Anwar‘s vision of the masyarakat madani are embedded in a
secularist and democratic framework that will provide for a responsible and accountable
civil society – a civil society that is also responsive to the state’s agenda. When Anwar
joined UMNO, the dominant point of reference in the state’s agenda was a combination
of “Malay” and “Islamic” with a developmentalist orientation. It was urbane, progressive,
modernist and democratic in character, and at the same time bound to an Islamic and
ethical framework. So the ouster of Anwar from the government and from UMNO is
regarded by many until today as a dismissal of all these reformist Islamic and democratic
principles. And even worse: Muslim morale has been severely hit by the accusation of
Anwar’s sodomy. Malays cried “Shame!” on Prime Minister Mahathir for this accusation
– regardless of whether it has any merit - and non-Malays joined in because Anwar had
been the most integrative figure of the ethnically heterogeneous society.
The rest is not history, but rather a snowball effect of the events in 1998, when Anwar
was ousted from his government post and party membership for not fully comprehensible
reasons. As long as UMNO could count on Anwar Ibrahim, he served as the party’s
“Islamic conscience”. Putting him into jail for 15 years was seen as the burial of political
change embedded in Islamic moral principles. Doing field work in Malaysia two years
after this watershed incident makes obvious that change has taken place, but in quite
another direction than it was intended in the late 1990s. Observing the scene at public
universities, the drastically increased number of female students wearing the tudung
(headscarf) and male students wearing the kopiah (skull cap) immediately strikes the eye.
Teachers admit that the trend of demonstrating one’s Muslim identity has become popular
and that it has become even exceptional for female Malay teachers not to wear the tudung.
17
Pluralism in Islam and Pluralism in
Discourse
Derich, Claudia [University of Duisburg]
This paper concentrates on discourse
in Malaysia, where the Muslim society
is characterised by a huge diversity
and pluralism of attitudes towards the
West and the “Muslim world”. This
pluralism is neither unusual nor special,
but reflects a modern society”s reality. In
the general perception, however, many
people tend to speak of “the” Islamic
discourse in Malaysia. This discourse
does not exist as a monolithic, clearly
bounded phenomenon. Islam in Malaysia
has as many faces as the Muslims in the
country, and so has the Islamic discourse.
Searching for anti-West sentiments that
are reflected in the public discussion,
there is evidence of another discursive
connection: The critique against the
West cannot be separated from a critical
perspective on the “Muslim world”.
The simple equation “progressive means
pro-Western” or vice versa, “traditional
means anti-Western” does not match the
real situation. Rather than such blackand-white dichotomies, what we find
are various constellations of attitudes,
including the official position of the
Malaysian government which proclaims
Malaysia an Islamic state, calls for the
internalising of true Islamic values and
at the same time enjoys a new respect
by the United States of America after
9/11 because of such policies. The paper
strongly suggests that the plurality of
attitudes within Muslim societies should
not be overlooked when discourse
analysis is conducted.
18
Campus occasions like annual convocations
are accompanied by loud nasyid music,
i.e., the Malay version of Islamic pop
music, whereas proposals to celebrate the
Chinese lantern festival on the campus
are turned down by university authorities.
The “new juvenile theocracy” at the public
universities, as political scientist Farish
Noor has dubbed them, mirror the general
atmosphere of a rapidly growing Islamic
assertiveness and assertion among the
Malay populace. In a do-it-yourself manner
– instead of letting others like Anwar do
it for them – radical Muslims seem to be
determined to counterbalance the indecent
liberties that are expected to come along
with uncensored use of IT and the internet.
In a predominantly Malay primary school,
new rules on non-halal food have been
declared which remind the non-Muslims
not to bring in such food during break
time. It went to the extent that reminder
notes were stuck to the canteen pillars.
Conversely, nothing is mentioned when
Muslim pupils happily munch their beef
sandwiches while sitting next to a classmate of Hindu-Indian origin.
More such examples of spreading orthodox
mood and assertion could be cited, and they
all reflect the same phenomenon: the lack
of a spiritual rhetoric of politics in order
to respond to non-material demands of
a society which has become increasingly
aware of the arbitrariness of state power in
times of crises. When young urban Malays
are asked why they are fond of the Islamic
party, the reply is that PAS leaders are able
to attract the people spiritually - a capability
the Prime Minister and his party obviously
do not possess in abundance. The physical
and material side of development is just
one area of people’s demands, hopes and
wishes. The other and at least equally
important area is spirit and belief.
Spiritual inspiration can translate beliefs
into action, and for many Malays this is
exactly what is required to lead the nation
out of its crisis.
The attractiveness of an Islamic
political rhetoric would by no means
be exceptional for the Malaysian case,
if it were only Muslims who followed
the path. Far more interesting for the
external observer is the fact that some
non-Muslims appreciate the rhetoric of
PAS too, despite some highly provocative
remarks of party leader Nik Aziz Nik
Mat. Nik Aziz almost regularly draws
the attention of the nation and the media
towards himself with remarks such
as pretty women should not apply for
good jobs because they can be married to
rich men who are able to care for them,
or that women who expose their belly
buttons in public must not be surprised
when they are raped by men. He does
not have to wait long for voices of protest,
but still his party enjoys an increasing
number of followers and huge audiences
wherever PAS leaders talk to the people.
The saying goes that UMNO leaders pay
the audience for attending a convention,
whereas in the case of PAS the audience
pays for attending.
But besides the spiritual attractiveness
there must be something else that makes
even non-Muslims turn to listen to PAS.
PAS never talks politics, PAS only talks
religion, according to one Malaysian.
Like reading between the lines, the
political content is transmitted through
this rhetoric, and people understand it
well. Drastically speaking, about the
only places where a fruitful, pluralist
political debate can take place are the
Empowering or Enslaving? : What
Adat and Agama Mean for Gender
Relations and Domestic Food
Production in Malay Households in
Urban Malaysia
Devasahayam, Theresa [National University of
Singapore]
The corpus of literature on gender
work and domestic food production has
generally stressed women”s oppression.
The basic argument put forth is that in
the arenas of housework and cooking,
women are “producers,” while men
are “consumers” of women”s services.
Focusing on the Malay example, this paper
seeks to understand whether women see
the mother and wife roles as laid down in
the Quran to be liberating, and perceive
their adat-endorsed food provider role to
be oppressive. Since domestic foodmaking
is imbued with immense cultural value
in the Malay context, contrary to popular
assumption, food preparation and
distribution are seen as empowering
activities for women in the context of adat.
Ethnographic interviews with forty, mostly
working middle- and upper-income,
Malay women residing in the Klang
Valley reveal that they derive personal
gains from food production. Cooking
and presenting food to the family is a role
that completes women in their capacity
as wives and mothers, and “feeding” is
viewed as a significant cultural tool for
building kinship bonds. Hence, women
carry out the food provider role not solely
in keeping with Islam, although they may
reinforce Islamic requirements of them,
but rather in accordance with adat, since it
is in adat that Malay women find strength
and meaning in everyday life.
19
mosques, suraus, and PAS conventions. For those who want to discuss and want to
be informed but do not have access to non-mainstream media, let alone the internet,
the mosque is the place to go. Censorship is hardly extendable into the mosques, and
if it were to be so, a mass substitution of Imams would have to take place to replace
the current ones with exclusively “unpolitical” ones. The humiliating fate of Anwar
Ibrahim and the consequent formation of a large opposition movement has given birth
to a coalition of forces opposed to the government; and PAS is an important part of it.
They call themselves the “Alternative Front” (Barisan Alternatif) and are composed of,
among others, the Chinese-dominated Democratic Action Party (DAP), the multi-ethnic
People’s Party (Parti Rakyat Malaysia, PRM) which is preferred by many intellectuals, the
National Justice Party (Keadilan) which is led by Anwar’s wife Wan Azizah Wan Ismail,
and of course PAS. The glue that holds the coalition together is the opposition towards
the ruling coalition (of which UMNO is the de facto ruling party), and the struggle for
an accountable, transparent, pluralist political system, allowing the participation of civil
society in the political process.
The possibility of articulationg interests in an Islamic rhetoric and the aggregation of
these interests through parties, organizations, and networks offers a political opportunity
structure which the existing political system does not provide. Functioning as a valve
to let out feelings that have been bottled up, non-Muslims can use this opportunity
structure as well. In a process of “Islamic lingualization” (R. Schulze’s original German
term for it is “islamische Versprachlichung”), a political discourse that lacked public
recognition is now brought before a mass audience. By way of a coalition, a symbiosis
of reform movement and Islamic movement has evolved. Whether this symbiosis heads
for an “exclusive” or an “inclusive” direction, remains to be seen. An exclusive direction
would mean that the Muslims and non-Muslims in Malaysia keep staying widely apart
from each other once the goal of toppling the current government is met. This would no
doubt add fuel to the fire of those who sternly believe that politics in Malaysia is already
excessively polarized along ethnic lines – and they are many. An inclusive direction would
mean that the opposition forces will be able to form a viable multi-ethnic coalition. As
for the time being, the nation is witness to a competition of the two big Malay parties
UMNO and PAS in winning the award of the “more Islamic party”. Sadly enough, the
ethnically and culturally integrative and progressive idea of a civil society embedded in
an Islamic ethical framework is increasingly marginalized in politically instrumentalized
jihads while radical ideologues are increasingly taking advantage of the attractivness of
Islamic rhetoric.
References:
Schulze, Reinhard (1996), Die islamische Moderne. In: Ch. Burgmer, ed., Der Islam in der Diskussion (Islam in
Discussion). Mainz: Donatha Kinzelbach.
Sloane, Patricia (1999), Islam, Modernity and Entrepreneurship among the Malays. New York, etc: St. Martin’s
Press.
Dr Claudia Derichs is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg, Germany. She
conducts research on Japan and Malaysia and is co-editor of a series on Discourses on Political Reform and
Democratization in East and Southeast Asia.
20
Whatever Could/Should A ‘Cultural Politics’ Be?
Malaysia’s Asian Values Debate
Joel S. Kahn
The first project I will discuss is some ongoing research on Malaysia, and particularly
some current research of mine that involves a critical assessment of the Asian values
debate in contemporary Malaysia. In fact this is to oversimplify a more complex set of
cultural and/or civilisational projects which attempt to represent - but more than that,
direct - Malaysia’s trajectory of modernisation in “culturally appropriate” directions
- whether that appropriateness is characterised on ethnic (Malay), religious (Islamic) or
racial (Asian) grounds. The debate, moreover, takes place in a variety of contexts - within
Malaysia, with others in the Asia-Pacific region; within the world Islamic community;
and in global arenas.
While of course there are many aspects of cultural politics in Malaysia that are unique
to Malaysia, nonetheless significant parallels exist between the current quest for a uniquely
Malaysian cultural identity and Beilharz’s own notion of an “Antipodean” identity
location within a global culture in a “periphery” that is in some senses more modern than
modernity’s metropolitan “core”. And that is not altogether surprising, since while some
may view the synchronicity of processes of globalisation and localisation as paradoxical,
they are also clearly intertwined and, hence, inseparable.
Equally, the project of constituting a Malaysian modernity might be instructive in
the light of a number of issues raised in Barns’ paper, not least of which his call for an
alternative to liberalism’s classical separation of public and private. For many of those
21
Specifically for many Malaysians the goal is not a complete re-enchantment
of the world, but instead a partial one in which certain spheres of social
existence.
Malaysians calling for an alternative modernity, including influential members of the
governing elite, it is precisely the western separation of public and private that is being
called into question. Perhaps the most clear-cut illustration of this is the project of
Islamising the State apparatus, a goal not just of Malaysia’s Islamic opposition, but also of
key powerbrokers in the ruling coalition.
This is not the place for a detailed discussion of cultural, economic and political
developments in contemporary Malaysia. Suffice it to make three observations.
First, it would, I think, be a mistake to view the project of constituting a uniquely
Malaysian modernity as a purely instrumental attempt on the part of a political elite to
legitimise an otherwise illegitimate authoritarianism or to deflect an otherwise justified
critique of Malaysia’s failings in the area of environmental policy and human rights. To
do so would be to fail to acknowledge the very significant extent to which this project
resonates so strongly throughout the population, particularly among middle class
Malaysians, intellectuals and, indeed, those among them who in the past have been
extremely vocal critics of the ruling regime. Far from bringing an inevitable universalism,
commitment to human rights, individualism and democracy among Malaysia’s middle
classes, the structural transformations in Malaysian society associated with a prolonged
period of rapid economic growth have at the same time generated an increasingly
powerful commitment to what some might call religious and cultural particularism and
an associated demonisation of western individualism.
Second, it would be equally misleading to attempt to capture this cultural project
by means of a concept like ‘fundamentalism’. As many observers have pointed out,
fundamentalism is too crude a label with which to analyse religious developments
throughout the Islamic world. Specifically for many Malaysians the goal is not a complete
re-enchantment of the world, but instead a partial one in which certain spheres of social
existence - those associated with science, technology and the market - are to be regarded
as “global” and hence culturally neutral - whereas other spheres - notably family life,
but also the State, need to be re-sacralised. Not only that, but by strengthening the latter,
Malaysians will, it is assumed, also be inoculated against the worst excesses of western
modernism - individualism, greed, drug culture, sexual licence and crime. What is
envisaged here, therefore, is a rather unique re-orientation of the private and the public,
the secular and the spiritual, the economic and the moral, one that appears to embrace
some aspects of western modernity and reject others.
Third, Malaysia’s project also has a global dimension. Like the radical multiculturalists
of whom Barns writes, the Malaysian leadership seeks to challenge the political “rules of
the game”, arguing that the supposed universals of international law according to which
nation states are compelled to act, the global public space within which modern nations
must operate, are not culturally-neutral but in fact themselves particularistic, in this case
22
There will inevitably be conflicting, non-negotiable and universalising
principles in most reference frames that cannot be resolved through
dialogue...
the products of “western culture/ civilisation”. Combating these international ground
rules is seen by many of Malaysia’s leaders to be a continuation of earlier anti-imperial
struggles.
Culture, Multiculture, Postculture
This leads to a consideration of a second project of mine which involves an attempt at a
deconstruction of what has come to be called cultural politics, and a simultaneous search
for alternative approaches to the problem posed for democracies by human diversity
[1]. Once again it has to be said that this is not the place for a detailed exposition of that
project. However because it seems to me that the understandings of culture embedded
in much of what passes for cultural politics in the contemporary world serve as much to
confuse current debates over democracy, power and resistance, that some clarification can
only be a good thing. Let me broach the issue by characterising in a rather crude manner
what at first sight appears to be a very persuasive radical stance, one that finds its parallels
in both internal and external politics being pursued by the current Malaysian regime.
The argument here is that no matter how much a political regime operating according to
the principles of western liberal democracy attempts to accommodate cultural diversity
- recognising cultural pluralism by accommodating “multiculturalism” in one way
or another - always and inevitably that regime will suppress difference by requiring
all cultural groups to negotiate within a public space which is shaped by a particular
culture. In other words a liberal multiculturalism that accommodates cultural diversity
by recognising, in addition to the rights and freedoms of individuals, the rights of cultural
communities, will nonetheless at best still confine the sphere of operation of these group
rights to the private sphere, insisting that potential conflicts among groups be negotiated
in a, supposedly culturally-neutral, public sphere. But given that rules governing the
public sphere remain those that arise from the discourse of liberalism, then liberal
multiculturalism is little more than a sham, apparently removing cultural hegemony in
the private sphere, but reimposing the hegemony of western culture in the public.
While persuasive, this form of radical multiculturalism leaves us with a conundrum,
namely how to constitute an intercultural space that is not itself culture-bound, hence
doubtless the appeals of discourses of cultural and political autonomy. It is a problem
that I do not see as being solved merely by appealing to the need for democratic dialogue
between and among different “reference frames.” There will inevitably be conflicting,
non-negotiable and universalising principles in most reference frames that cannot be
resolved through dialogue (as manifest for example in the conflict between “right to
lifers” and “women’s right to choose” advocates in the abortion debate in the ‘West’) [2].
I would not claim to be able to resolve the conundrum. However given that most
parties to the debate - cultural conservatives, liberals and radicals - all seem to share in a
23
realist language of cultures and multiculturalism that is in my view seriously flawed, it
may at least be possible to suggest that it is falsely posed. By this I mean that all parties
to the debate appear to share a problematically essentialised or reified notion of culture.
Instead I would argue that cultures do not really exist in any absolute sense. Instead
culture, and multiculture, are a modern/western mode of framing the diversity of the
city/nation/globe, and hence neither of these phenomena has an independent existence
outside of modernist discourse.
I say this for two reasons. First, contrary to its usage in classical anthropology, a
culture (as in Balinese culture, Samoan culture etc.) is quite clearly a construction- it
does not pre-exist its appropriation in discourse, a point made long ago by Weber and
the hermeneuticists, and recently rediscovered by the “Writing Culture” school of
anthropology. Second, it is impossible, particularly after at least a century of cultural
globalisation (precisely the period when we “discovered” the existence of “other cultures”)
to locate the kinds of discrete, unchanging, pure cultures out there in the world of
which most culturalist discourse speaks. And what holds for cultures, also holds for the
distinction between public and private in western democracies.
Recognising this fact does not dispose of the problem of envisaging a radical democracy
in a culturally diverse world, but does suggest that since neither cultures nor public
spaces are given for all time, their contours and boundaries are subject to continual
shift and change. One would be hard put to argue, for example, that all intercultural
communication, accommodation, negotiation and/or conflict takes place according to
the abstract principles envisaged by eighteenth century liberalism; instead, the current
constitution of public space has been constructed - sociologically and politically - out of
two centuries of conflict. And while it may be that politically-dominant groups have done
more than others to shape the current contours of “the public”, it remains that resistance
by dominated groups has not left these spaces untouched. Moreover given that particular
“cultures” are themselves precipitates of these historical and sociological processes,
we must not assume that apparently irresolvable cultural differences are somehow
primordial, but that they too are subject to negotiation and resistance. While it does
little to provide universal theoretical solutions to the problems of cultural conflict, this
reframing of the problem does allow for historically-specific analyses and strategies that
appear hopeless so long as we continue to treat cultures as pregiven, primordial entities
lying outside the space and time of modernity. «
(1) For a discussion of these issues see Joel S. Kahn, Culture, Multiculture, Postculture London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 1995.
(2) It is interesting in this regard to note the claims of prominent Malaysian Islamists that given the failings of liberalism to constitute a genuinely
culture-free public space, and given the unsatisfactory nature (from the point of view of non-westerners) of a public space dominated by “western”
principles of intercultural interaction, Islam provides a superior means of structuring a public space even in a multicultural society like Malaysia.
Joel Kahn is a Professor in the School of Sociology, Politics and Anthropology, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria 3083.
24
Zum „peripheren Islam“
in Südostasien
Bernhard J. Trautner
Von weltweit etwa 1,2 Mrd. Muslimen lebt ungefähr ein Fünftel in der südostasiatischen
Peripherie der islamischen Welt. In drei Staaten stellen Muslime gegenwärtig die nominelle Mehrheit der Bevölkerung. Deutlich ausgeprägt ist diese Mehrheit gleichwohl nur
in Indonesien, während Muslime in Malaysia und im Zwergstaat Brunei nur je eine
leichte Mehrheit bilden; in einigen peripheren Landesteilen Malaysias sind sie sogar in der
Minderheit. Islamische Minderheiten leben auch auf den Philippinen, in Singapur und
in Thailand; sie stellen aber dort, beispielsweise auf den Süd-Philippinen, lokal durchaus
auch die Mehrheit. Zusammengenommen leben mehr Muslime in Südostasien als in der
gesamten arabischen Welt.
Anders als dem Kernraum der islamischen Welt, also den arabischen Staaten, der
Türkei und dem Iran, widmete der Westen der südostasiatischen Peripherie des Islam
lange Zeit nur geringe Aufmerksamkeit. Das ist rückblickend umso erstaunlicher, als
im Malaysia von Premierminister Mahathir Mohammed ein Nation-building unter den
vergleichsweise schwierigen Ausgangsbedingungen von Multiethnizität und Multikonfessionalität zu gelingen schien - zumindest bis zur schweren innenpolitischen Krise im Gefolge der Asienkrise 1997. Und Indonesien, das nach seiner Bevölkerungsstärke immerhin
größte muslimische Land der Welt, hatte als verlässlicher Partner westlicher Außen- und
Entwicklungspolitik gegolten - bis zum Sturz von Präsident Suharto im Jahr 1998. Diese
Diskontinuitäten, die Asienkrise und der Sturz Suhartos sollten dann die Aufmerksamkeit des Westens wieder auf diese Region lenken - stärker jedenfalls als die zuvor geführte
Debatte um die so genannten “asiatischen Werte”. Diese hätten, so wurde argumentiert,
mittels eines alternativen, nichtwestlichen Entwicklungsweges den wirtschaftlichen Erfolg
von Staaten wie Malaysia oder Singapur ermöglicht.
25
Das lange geltende Image vom flexiblen, per se toleranteren, ja sogar unpolitischen peripheren Islam in Südostasien wurde in der jüngsten Vergangenheit von zwei gegenläufigen
Tendenzen ins Wanken gebracht:
- Immer deutlicher trat einerseits die potentiell desintegrierende Kraft des Islam zutage,
etwa als separatistisches Leitmotiv für die Errichtung eines islamischen Staates auf den
Süd-Philippinen und im indonesischen Aceh.
- Mit der Ablösung Suhartos durch den muslimischen Philosophenkönig Abdurahman
Wahid stellte der Islam aber auch sein integratives Potential unter Beweis: Der befürchtete
Zerfall des indonesischen Inselreiches ist bislang ebenso ausgeblieben wie die landesweite
Einführung des islamischen Rechts, der Scharî’a, über die Provinz Aceh hinaus.
Immerhin konnte nun nicht länger angenommen werden, der Islam habe im Zuge der
leidlich erfolgreichen Modernisierung an normativem Einfluss verloren, islamisch motivierte Bewegungen und Gruppen besäßen bestenfalls marginale Bedeutung und lösten
sich als Beiprodukt der Moderne und als vorübergehende fundamentalistische Reaktion
auf diese gleichsam von selbst auf.
Vor diesem Hintergrund kann es daher kaum verwundern, dass das gemeinhin als
“strikt” angesehene Regelgebäude des Islam stärker als im islamischen Kernraum durch
Fremdeinflüsse verformt wurde. Dies bezieht sich zunächst weniger auf Glaubensinhalte
und das Rechtssystem der islamischen Scharî’a als vielmehr auf die kollektiv begangenen
lokalen Riten und individuellen Verhaltens- und Benimmregeln, die in den sog. “ c Adat”
(“Gewohnheits-Islam”) Eingang finden. Hiergegen haben sich stets die Befürworter eines
am “arabischen Islam” orientierten Schriftislam gewandt und tun das noch immer. Tatsächlich hat nach der fl ächendeckenden Islamisierung des Malaiischen Archipels von den
Häfen und von den Küstenregionen aus der Austausch mit Indien nachgelassen. Es kam
zu einer geistigen Umorientierung auf die arabische Welt: Während im 7. Jahrhundert
nicht wenige indonesische Theologie-Studenten beispielsweise an der nordindischen Nalanda-Universität studierten, lösten im 16. Jahrhundert Mekka und Medina die indischen
Lehrstätten als bevorzugte Ausbildungsorte für die malaiische Bildungselite ab.
Nicht nur in der Auseinandersetzung des Islam mit den lokalen Traditionen und Religionen vollzogen sich Wandlungsprozesse auf beiden Seiten. Auch innerhalb des islamischen
theologischen Diskurses selbst und als Reaktion auf die zunehmende Akkulturation des
Islam auf dem Malaiischen Archipel setzte hier im 18. Jahrhundert eine Umorientierung von der bis dahin vorherrschenden mystisch/sufistischen Ausrichtung auf die eher
orthodox/skripturalistische Interpretation ein. Die legalistische Ausrichtung nahm teilweise die Form heftiger Polemiken gegen den Sufismus an. Vor allem im 18. Jahrhundert sind
aber auch immer wieder Versuche unternommen worden, die mystische Religionspraxis
mit der Scharî’a zu versöhnen. Finden sich beispielsweise in den bis 1600 entstandenen
Korankommentaren noch keine Spuren der mystischen Interpretation (tasawwuf), drangen diese im Laufe des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts in die Schriften der Mehrzahl malaiischer
Theologen ein.
26
Malaysia: Nation-building im Zeichen
von Malaiisierung, Islamisierung und
ökonomischer Modernisierung
Malaysias Bevölkerung von knapp
23 Mio. Einwohnern ist nicht nur in
konfessioneller Hinsicht, sondern auch
ethnisch heterogen. Diese Heterogenität
wird dadurch erhöht, dass die konfessionellen Trennlinien entlang der ethnischen
Differenzierung verlaufen. Die Muslime
malaiischer Abstammung bilden gegenüber den Nichtmuslimen chinesischer
und indischer Herkunft nur eine leichte
Mehrheit. Der malaiische Anspruch auf
die Rolle des Staatsvolks wurde durch die
Einbeziehung indigener Völker gestärkt,
welche die lokale Bevölkerungsmehrheit
in den erst 1963, also sechs Jahre nach der
Unabhängigkeit Malaysias von Großbritannien, zum malaysischen Staatsverband
akzedierten Teilstaaten Sabah und Sarawak auf Borneo stellen. Die Einbeziehung
dieser Bevölkerungen, die weder Angehörige der chinesischen bzw. hinduistischen
Hochkulturen noch Muslime waren, veranlasste die damalige politische Führung
zur Preisgabe des Malaientums als des alleinigen ethnischen Bestimmungsfaktors
für das Staatsvolk zugunsten eines Konzepts der bumiputera (Söhne des Landes),
das in der Folge immer stärker islamisch
interpretiert wurde.
Eine ähnlich knappe Mehrheit von Muslimen im Staat findet sich im arabischen
Kernraum der islamischen Welt nur noch
im Libanon. Dieser Staat war in seiner
heutigen Form erst nach dem Ende des
Ersten Weltkrieges mittels “politischer
Chirurgie” von der französischen Mandatsmacht als ein Gebilde mit ursprünglich leichter christlicher Bevölkerungsmehrheit aus Groß-Syrien herausgetrennt
Framing Melayu: Negotiating Malay
Identity through Cinematic Treatments
of Peril and Exclusivity, 1947-1965.
Mckay, Benjamin [Northern Territory
University]
The release in Singapore between
1947-1965 of a substantial number of
Malay films coincided with a period of
considerable social, political, economic
and religious change in the region.
Contemporaneous political commentary
was often muted, but many filmmakers
addressed these changes as a subtext to
their narratives. (Re-) presentation of
Malay identity was an important feature
of many Malay films during this period.
The multicultural reality of Singapore
and Malaya was largely ignored as
filmmakers constructed new visions of
tanah melayu. On screen filmmakers
often negotiated Malay cultural identity
through a series of recurring narrative
juxtapositions that pitted secure and
homogeneous communities against the
threat, real or imagined, of the ‘alien’
(from within or without). Given the
social and political climate at that time,
where different visions of the state, its
makeup and its very citizenry were
being contested, it is not surprising that
filmmakers were concerned with matters
of identity. The threat from both outside
and from within to an ‘idyllic’ Malay
heartland reveals a concern about those
who may oppose the political and moral
order - the shadow of the communist
insurrection of the Malayan Emergency
permeates a number of these films.
Filmmakers fashioned a unique quasi’national’ film culture between 1947
and 1965; a film culture often based on
exclusivity under seige.
27
worden. Dort überwiegt auch heute noch in Form des sog. Konfessionalismus der religiöse
Aspekt der Heterogenität, verstehen sich doch schiitische und sunnitische Muslime ebenso wie die Christen bzw. Maroniten in der Regel als Araber. Die ethnisch-konfessionelle
Heterogenität Malaysias dagegen nötigt die politisch und kulturell zwar dominierende,
unter modernisierungstheoretischen und wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten jedoch marginalisierte muslimische Bevölkerungsmehrheit, sich aus einer weltanschaulichen Sicht
grundsätzlich mit einem ethnisch und konfessionell pluralen gesellschaftlichen Umfeld
auseinander zu setzen. Dies gilt, obwohl der Islam hier, im Gegensatz zu Indonesien, die
offizielle Religion des Bundesstaates ist - bei Ausübungsfreiheit für andere Religionen.
Die Dominanz des Islam als eines Faktors, der die Herausbildung eines ausgeprägten
überkonfessionell-säkularen, also staatsbürgerlichen Nationalbewusstseins verhinderte,
wird unter anderem hergeleitet aus der Tatsache, dass in Malaysia - im Gegensatz zum
Nachbarland Indonesien - unterhalb der nationalen Ebene die gewachsenen Strukturen eines dynastischen Islam fl ächendeckend erhalten geblieben sind. Die Kolonialpolitik hatte
die Stellung der traditionellen Oberhäupter, der Rajas bzw. Negris, und deren islamische
Staats- und Gesellschaftsordnungen unangetastet gelassen.
Der föderale Aufbau des malaysischen Bundesstaates perpetuierte diese Strukturen
bis ins 20. Jahrhundert. Die neun Negris auf der Malaiischen Halbinsel übten zumindest
bis in die Gegenwart in ihrem Herrschaftsbereich jeweils formal die Rechtshoheit und
den für die Muslime zeremoniell maßgeblichen Einfluss aus. Heute beschränken sich die
legislativen Rechte der Sultanate/Bundesstaaten im Wesentlichen auf das Gebiet des Familienrechts und auf die Verwaltung religiöser Angelegenheiten. Aus ihrer Mitte bestimmen
die Negris turnusmäßig das formelle Staatsoberhaupt, den König von Malaysia Yang diPeruan Agung (“den zum Herrn gemachten Großen”), der - nach dem Vorbild der konstitutionellen Monarchie des Vereinigten Königreichs von Großbritannien und Nordirland
- seinerseits den Ministerpräsidenten ernennt.
Seit der Unabhängigkeit Malaysias von Großbritannien 1957 geht es um die Frage nach
der weltanschaulichen Identität des Staates - ähnlich wie im Libanon. Im Gegensatz zu
diesem aber wird die islamische Identität des malaysischen Staates nicht von einer weiteren
großen Religion in Frage gestellt, wie dies im Libanon durch die Christen der Fall war
und ist. Muslime haben im Libanon demnach einen besonderen Anlass, die islamische
Identität des Staates umso mehr zu betonen, als keine ethnische Unterscheidung zwischen
Muslimen und (christlichen) Maroniten möglich ist. Insofern erlaubt in Malaysia gerade
die Vielfalt der mit dem Islam konkurrierenden asiatischen Weltanschauungen und Glaubenssysteme und deren Einbeziehung in die interethnischen Verhandlungen aus Sicht der
muslimischen Mehrheit einen gelasseneren Umgang mit dieser Verschiedenheit.
Sollte im Libanon der ungeschriebene “nationale Pakt” den drei Hauptkonfessionen
(Maroniten, Sunniten und Schiiten) einen fairen Anteil an der politischen Macht sichern,
so galt während der fünfziger und sechziger Jahre zwischen Malaien einerseits und Chinesen (und Indern) andererseits, dass Letztere ihre politischen Aspirationen zugunsten
28
der Malaien zurückstellten und sich mit ihrer Dominanz in der Wirtschaft zufrieden
gaben. Diese als “historischer Kompromiss” bezeichnete Konstruktion sorgte für eine nur
funktionale Aufteilung, nicht aber für eine echte politische Teilung der Macht. Bezogen
auf das Gesamtgefüge blieb die Rolle des Islam zunächst eher untergeordnet. Um aber
der islamischen Opposition zuvorzukommen, strebte die Regierung eine weitreichende
Islamisierung des öffentlichen Lebens an - allerdings nur bezogen auf den muslimischen
Bevölkerungsteil; so galt z.B. die Anerkennung der traditionellen religiösen Gerichtsbarkeit explizit nur für die Muslime.
Bereits 1951 spaltete sich die islamistische PAS (Parti Islam Se-Malaysia = Pan-islamische
Partei Malaysias) von der Regierungspartei UMNO (United Malay National Organisation) ab; 1959 gewann sie die Wahlen in den Bundesstaaten Kelantan und Terengganu und
zog schließlich 1969 ins nationale Parlament ein. In dieser Zeit nahmen die Spannungen
zwischen den Ethnien stetig zu, sie entluden sich in den Rassenunruhen des Jahres 1969.
Vor dem Hintergrund dieses gesamtnationalen Traumas war die folgende Phase vom Bemühen der relevanten politischen und gesellschaftlichen Akteure geprägt, den prekären
Status quo, d.h. die politische Suprematie der Bumiputera, nicht anzutasten.
Der Amtsantritt des gegenwärtigen Premierministers Mahathir Mohammad im Jahr
1981 ist ein entscheidendes Datum in der Geschichte des politischen Islam in Malaysia.
Zunehmend war das Konzept des Staatsvolks von Seiten zweier unterschiedlicher Kräfte
islamisiert worden.
Einerseits zielte die bis dahin eher säkular orientierte Staatspartei UMNO als Partei der
Malaien mit der Stärkung des Islam in einer zeitgemäßen Form und als Instrument der
Modernisierung der Gesellschaft und des Staatswesens eher auf ihre malaiische Wählerklientel. Diese hatte begonnen, sich unter soziostrukturellen Gesichtspunkten zu enttraditionalisieren und war mit dem stets partikularistischen Bumiputerismus nicht mehr zu
gewinnen, hatte dieses Konzept doch stets auf die bäuerlich-ländliche Herkunft und auf
Überholtes rückverwiesen. Dagegen ließ sich über das neue Konzept des Islam eine moderne, über den politischen Bezug auf den Kernbereich der islamischen Welt sogar eine
internationale Identitätsdimension besetzen.
Andererseits geriet das Konzept der Bumiputera in die Kritik von Seiten der PAS,
der (anfangs) PAS-nahen Malaysischen Islamischen Jugendbewegung Angkatan Belia
Islam Malaysia (ABIM) und vor allem der islamischen Renaissance-Bewegung Dakwah.
Gerade wegen der universalistischen und tendenziell kosmopolitischen Perspektive eines
überlokalen Islam wurde die chauvinistische Verknüpfung von Ethnie und Religion im
Bumiputera-Konzept der Regierungspartei scharfer Kritik unterzogen.
Zweifelsohne verstärkten die gesellschaftlichen Kräfte einander auf ideologischer wie
personeller Ebene. Der Impetus der Islamisierung gewann dadurch eine erhebliche Eigendynamik. Die Debatte über die Islamisierung ist infolgedessen heute überaus stark
fragmentiert - weniger allerdings durch Polarisierung entlang eines Spektrums von “konservativ” auf der einen und “modernistisch” auf der anderen Seite als durch die politische
29
Konkurrenz zwischen den Machtpolen Regierung und islamische Opposition.
Im Gegensatz zu den meisten Gesellschaften des islamischen Kernraums beruhte die
Islamisierung Malaysias insgesamt auf einem breiten gesellschaftlichen Konsens. Sie war
weder auf den Sturz korrupter, unfähiger und zur Veränderung unwilliger postkolonialer
Eliten noch primär gegen Nicht-Muslime gerichtet, sondern in erster Line auf die Förderung der eigenen Entwicklung und Modernisierung - allerdings nicht nach westlichem
Vorbild. Die erfolgreiche ökonomische Modernisierung im Sinne einer (Leicht-)Industrialisierung und eines Vorstoßens der Produktion in weltmarkttaugliche Hochtechnologiebereiche schuf eine wichtige Voraussetzung dafür, dass sich die politische Dynamik
der Islamisierung in einem günstigen wirtschaftlichen Umfeld entfaltete: Auf der Basis
exorbitanter ökonomischer Wachstumsraten gewann also nicht, wie in den rentenökonomischen Systemen der arabischen Welt, eine Gruppe nur auf Kosten der anderen (“Nullsummenspiel”). Die nichtmuslimischen Minderheiten mussten die ebenfalls zunehmend
erfolgreiche staatliche Förderung der Bumiputera vor dem Hintergrund eines insgesamt
wachsenden “Kuchens” (“Positiv-Summenspiel”) nicht primär als Bedrohung ihrer eigenen Existenz wahrnehmen.
Als sich Ende der neunziger Jahre im Zuge der Asienkrise die ökonomischen Parameter
in Richtung eines “Nullsummenspiels” zu verändern begannen, verschärften sich zwar die
Konflikte innerhalb des islamischen Lagers, besonders um die mögliche Nachfolge Mahathirs, nicht aber diejenigen zwischen den Konfessionen - jedenfalls nicht in dem Maße, wie
es zu erwarten gewesen wäre. Im Gegenteil: Das bis heute hochgradig konfessionalisierte,
infolge ausbleibender interreligiöser bzw. interethnischer Vermischung kaum homogenisierte gesellschaftliche und politische System Malaysias konnte unter den Bedingungen
der drastisch und nachhaltig zurückgehenden wirtschaftlichen Gesamtleistung dennoch
vor dem Zusammenbruch bewahrt werden. Das ist auch der Flexibilität des malaysischen
Gesellschaftsvertrags geschuldet: Neben der Verfassung schaffen informelle, schriftlich
nicht niedergelegte Vereinbarungen zwischen den ethnischen Gruppen über ihre jeweilige
Rolle in Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Politik eine langfristige Erwartungssicherheit - auch
unter sich verändernden Gegebenheiten - und verstärken den grundsätzlichen Willen aller
beteiligten Gruppen zur Zusammenarbeit.
Das reibungslose Funktionieren dieser Aushandlungsprozesse im Sinne sowohl der
Vermittlung zwischen den Gruppen als auch innerhalb der malaiischen Elite verdankt
sich zu einem guten Teil dem Charisma des noch weithin populären Mahathir. Aber die
Rahmenbedingungen des Gesellschaftsvertrags zeigt noch stets die Regierung auf, so
etwa mit der Verhängung des Ausnahmezustandes im Anschluss an die Rassenunruhen
von 1969 für zwei Jahre, mit der unter fadenscheinigen Gründen erfolgten Inhaftierung
Anwar Ibrahims, des schärfsten potenziellen Konkurrenten um die Nachfolge Mahathirs,
und jüngst mit der Einführung eines rechtstaatlich bedenklichen Internal Security Act.
In dasselbe Bild fügen sich dann aber auch Bemühungen der Regierung in jüngerer
Zeit, die zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen aller Glaubensgemeinschaften in einer
zwischen dem Staat und den Gemeinschaften vermittelnden Institution in Form interreligiöser Räte zusammenzufassen und politisch einzubinden. Als Reaktion auf die Islami30
sierung hatte nämlich auch bei den nichtmuslimischen Gruppen eine kulturelle Bewusstwerdung und eine politische Institutionalisierung eingesetzt. Die Institutionalisierung
interreligiöser Räte scheiterte bislang vor allem am Widerstand von muslimischer Seite. So
verfügen allein die Muslime derzeit in der Person des Negri über eine zwischen ihnen und
der Bundesregierung zumindest symbolisch vermittelnde Institution.
Vor dem Hintergrund einer ökonomischen und politischen Erfolgsgeschichte des Gesamtstaates erscheint immerhin der Streit zwischen Bundesregierung und PAS-Regierung,
die seit Jahren versucht, in der Provinz Kelantan weitere Bestimmungen der Syaria, des
islamischen Rechts (arab.: Scharî’a), zu implementieren, in einem milderen Licht als die
Auseinandersetzungen um die Einführung der Scharî’a im entwicklungsökonomisch
renitenten wie politisch desolaten arabischen Zentrum der islamischen Welt.
Ähnlich wie dies im Ägypten Nassers oder im postrevolutionären Iran angestrebt
wurde bzw. wird, stand Malaysias Entwicklung im Zeichen kultureller Eigenständigkeit
gemäß der Parole “westliche Technologie, islamischer Geist”. Malaysia hat sich bis heute
allerdings keineswegs ausschließlich auf ein “authentisch islamisches”, d.h. auf autochthonen Wurzeln beruhendes Modell festgelegt. So wenig das malaysische Entwicklungsmodell sich inhaltlich abgrenzen lässt, so ist doch ein Leitmotiv der Islamisierung wie auch
der Debatte um die “asiatischen Werte” erkennbar, das sowohl von staatlicher als auch von
(zivil)gesellschaftlicher Seite getragen wird: materielles Wohlergehen der Gesellschaft mit
ihrem spirituellem Gefüge in Einklang zu bringen.
Für Letzteres stehen die islamischen - ersatzweise auch: “asiatischen” - Werte ein, wie
sie traditionellerweise interpretiert und gelebt werden. Fern von Festlegungen etwa auf
bestimmte islamische Rechtstraditionen oder -schulen schloss Mahathir sogar auf dem
Höhepunkt der Debatte um die “asiatischen Werte” nicht aus, die Asiaten könnten vom
Westen lernen, denn viele der so genannten “asiatischen Werte” seien einmal “westliche
Werte” gewesen, der Westen habe sie aber erfolgreich abgelegt oder verloren. Genauso
würden heutige asiatische Werte im Verlauf der Entwicklung herausgefordert und abgelegt werden. Islamisierung von oben - also seitens der Regierung - bedeutet in diesem
Zusammenhang also gerade nicht die Bewahrung oder gar die Wiederherstellung traditioneller Werte, um welche Regierung und islamische Opposition in der arabischen Welt
allzu häufig zum Schaden der längst enttraditionalisierten, modernisierungswilligen
Bevölkerungsteile wetteifern.
Dem Wegbrechen der universalen Werte der traditionalen Gesellschaften soll vielmehr
ein umfassender symbolischer Rahmen Einhalt gebieten, der diese Werte als Gegengewicht zur antizipierten und wohl als letztlich unausweichlich erkannten, individualistischen und materialistischen Orientierung bewahrt und ggf. modifiziert. Gleichzeitig
umgreift dieser Rahmen den wirtschaftlichen und technologischen Fortschritt und schafft
eine Grundlage für die semantische Besetzung dieses Feldes als genuin “islamisch”. Dieser
symbolische Rahmen versucht somit, die beiden Felder “Tradition” und “Moderne” aufs
Engste zu verknüpfen. Die zwischen diesen beiden Polen bestehende Spannung überträgt
sich auf den Rahmen selber. Seine Grundlage, die islamische Symbolik, ist daher nicht sta31
So stellt Malaysia den wohl einzigen Staat in der islamischen Welt mit einem
erfolgreichen makroökonomischen Profil dar...
tisch (“fundamentalistisch”), sondern - je nach Interpretation - in hohem Maße dynamisch
bzw. recht beliebiger Interpretation ausgesetzt.
Zu dieser Islamisierung à la Malaysienne gehört also einerseits die Implementierung der
klassischen Attribute eines islamischen Gemeinwesens und deren gleichzeitige Anpassung
an den modernen Staat: Die religiösen Institutionen wurden ausgeweitet und zentralisiert;
die Zakat (Almosengabe) wurde als öffentliche Abgabe eingeführt, die religiöse Rechtsprechung und andere zentrale Bereiche des religiösen Lebens wurden reorganisiert, wie
der Bau von Moscheen, die Einrichtung traditional und modernistisch orientierter religiöser Schulen etc.
Andererseits versucht die Regierung, die Förderung des materiellen Wohlstands und
eine forcierte Industrialisierungspolitik als islamisch geboten zu legitimieren, und zwar
sowohl als Antwort auf die säkulare Attitüde im eigenen Land (“Der Islam hat zur industriellen Technologie nichts zu sagen”) als auch in Abgrenzung gegenüber den meisten
arabischen Staaten, die eine solche Industrialisierung aus traditionellen Gründen zumeist
ablehnen.
Ähnlich wie im postkolonialen Tunesien überwog auch in Malaysia stets der Aspekt der
Modernisierung. Die in beiden Fällen willkürliche modernistische Interpretation des Islam durch Regierung und Regierungspartei dient Mahathir allerdings nicht, wie seinerzeit
Bourguiba, als Camouflage einer letztlich kemalistischen Agenda zum säkularisierenden
Aufbrechen der traditional islamischen Gesellschaft und zur Entmachtung entwicklungsresistenter religiöser Gelehrter (Ulama). Wie Bourguiba usurpierten zwar auch UNMO
und Mahathir den Islam im Sinne der Schaffung einer Staatsreligion, doch eben nicht
mit dem Ziel, den Islam aus dem politischen Leben nach dem Vorbild der französischen
laïcité herauszudrängen, sondern um mittels Inklusion und Stärkung bestehender religiöser Institutionen, gleich ob traditionalen oder zivilgesellschaftlichen Typs, den islamischen
Charakter des Staates gerade zu verstärken.
Das Schreckensbild eines “islamischen Staates Malaysia”, Saudi-Arabien oder Iran
vergleichbar, ist gleichwohl fern der Realität. Denn die drei für das postkoloniale Malaysia
bestimmenden Leitperspektiven Malaiisierung, Modernisierung und Islamisierung sind
unauflösbar miteinander verbunden. So stellt Malaysia den wohl einzigen Staat in der islamischen Welt mit einem erfolgreichen makroökonomischen Profil dar, der auf dieser Basis
auch die kulturelle Modernisierung leidlich bewältigt, und zwar nicht nur trotz, sondern
augenscheinlich auch aufgrund der höchst heterogenen konfessionellen und ethnischen
Gesellschaftsstruktur. Kyai (religiösen Lehrer) und ihrer Anhänger. Die NU stellt heute
mit 30 Mio. Mitgliedern die größte nationale Muslimorganisation nicht nur Indonesiens,
sondern der gesamten islamischen Welt dar. «
Dr. rer. pol., geb. 1964; 2001 - 2003 Senior Research Fellow am Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung der
Universität Bonn, zuletzt Vertretungsprofessur für Politikwissenschaft und Politikmanagement an der
Hochschule Bremen.
32